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  • A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies 

    Authors:Kıbrıs, Özgür; Tapki, İpek Gürsel
    Publisher and Date:(Springer, 2014)
    To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility) and fairness. We show that only a uniform mechanism satisfies all three. We also show that all efficient and strategy proof mechanisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their optimal bundle. In choosing ...

  • Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules 

    Authors:Kıbrıs, Özgür; Tapkı, İpek Gürsel
    Publisher and Date:(Elsevier Science Bv, 2011)
    We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. In particular, decomposable rules (which are extensions of rules from the Nash domain) constitute a nowhere dense subset of all possible rules. For them, we analyze the process through which "good" properties ...