Now showing items 1-10 of 10

  • Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions 

    Authors:Karagozoglu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Ozcan-Tok, Elif
    Publisher and Date:(Springer, 2019)
    We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: the first parameter can be interpreted as the effectiveness (or salience) of the reference point in determining the anchor whereas the second parameter can be interpreted as its effectiveness in shaping agents' aspirations. Utilizing these parameters we provide a unifying ...

  • Converse Tournaments 

    Authors:Keskin, Kerim
    Publisher and Date:(Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences, 2019)
    This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.

  • Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests 

    Authors:Keskin, Kerim
    Publisher and Date:(Elsevier Science, 2018)
    We investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels we present results on the existence of equilibrium and total rent dissipation. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  • A Dynamic Game Theory Model For Tourism Supply Chains 

    Authors:Keskin, Kerim; Ucal, Meltem
    Publisher and Date:(SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC, 2020)
    This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigate the strategic dynamics (i.e., collaboration and competition) embedded in a market with two different tourism supply chains, and then we extend our model to an infinite-horizon repeated game arguing that agents would face the same decision problem in ...

  • Endogenous reference points in bargaining 

    Authors:Karagozoglu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim
    Publisher and Date:(Springer Heidelberg, 2018)
    We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points taking into consideration that with a certain probability they will not be able to reach an agreement and will receive their disagreement point outcomes whereas with the remaining probability an arbitrator will distribute the resource by using (an extended) Gupta-Livne bargaining solution (Gupta ...

  • Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model 

    Authors:Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, Cagri
    Publisher and Date:(Walter De Gruyter Gmbh, 2019)
    Although most contest games are modeled in such a way that the outcome depends only on the efforts exerted by the contestants what is arguably more important is the contestants' effective efforts which may be influenced also by their ability human capital strength etc. In this paper we investigate an extensive model including such an effectiveness parameter and analyze the optimal investment behavior in a dynamic conflict framework. At each period two contestants compete for a common prize by ...

  • Multi-player race 

    We present a model of race with multiple players and study players' effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that in equilibrium once any two players win one battle each the remaining players do not exert any effort anymore. This turns the continuation game into a two-player race. This is different than the results in previous two-player models of race which report that all states of the game are reached with positive probabilities. We also provide a set of comparative static ...

  • On (mis-)perception of probabilities in first-price sealed-bid auctions 

    Authors:Kantur, Zeynep; Keskin, Kerim
    Publisher and Date:(Economics Bulletin, 2019)
    We study a two-stage probability weighting model [see Tversky and Fox 1995] in a first-price sealed-bid auction. We present the unique symmetric equilibrium and provide some experimental support for our model.

  • Sabotage in team contests 

    Authors:Dogan, Serhat; Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, Cagri
    Publisher and Date:(Springer, 2019)
    In the contest literature sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent's likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that anticipating a possible sabotage contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team's aggregate effort which in turn determines the contest's outcome. For the ...

  • Time-varying fairness concerns delay and disagreement in bargaining 

    Authors:Karagozoglu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim
    Publisher and Date:(Elsevier Science, 2018)
    We study an alternating-offers bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair Moreover we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e. their sensitivity to violations of their fairness judgments) decrease over time as the deadline approaches. Our results offer a new explanation to delays and disagreements in dynamic negotiations. We show that even mutually compatible fairness judgments do not guarantee an immediate agreement. ...