



KADİR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
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**SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION BY RADICAL
RIGHT IN EUROPE: THE CASES OF ALTERNATIVE
FOR GERMANY AND DANISH PEOPLE'S PARTY**

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SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. SİNEM AKGÜL AÇIKMEŞE

MASTER'S THESIS

İSTANBUL, AUGUST, 2019

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MASTER'S THESIS

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fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in the Program of
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I, İLGI DOĞA ALBASAR;

Hereby declare that this Master Thesis is my own original work and due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources

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ABSTRACT

International migration has been one of the most important agenda topics in Europe since the second half of the twentieth century. Especially with the developments of globalization, deterritorialized global markets and, the establishment of the Schengen area, the old assumptions of Westphalian understanding of sovereignty have challenged. With the changing global context, there has been an increasing tendency to look at the issue of international migration from the security lens. Consequently, international migration started to be seen as a security threat to European societies. This perception is gradually constructed by the involvement of multiple actors. Among those actors, radical right parties have become one of the most influential as well as the most benefiting political securitizing agents of the securitization process. Study at hand intends to analyze how radical right parties securitized migration. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany and the Danish People's Party (DF) in Denmark are selected as case studies. This analysis is conducted by following the main premises of Copenhagen School's securitization theory and its methodology of speech act. The study shows that both AfD and DF presented immigration as an existential threat to the collective identity, culture, and society of each relevant country. Furthermore, each party called for emergency measures that are necessary to be taken. In this context, the analyses show that DF has managed to securitize issues successfully between 2015-2019 whereas AfD's securitization attempt stayed at the level of securitization move.

Keywords: international migration, security studies, securitization, Copenhagen school, security speech act, radical right parties

ÖZET

Uluslararası göç, yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından bu yana Avrupa'nın en önemli gündem konularından biri olmuştur. Özellikle küreselleşme, sınırları aşan küresel pazar ve Schengen Bölgesinin kurulması gibi gelişmelerin ortaya çıkmasıyla Vestfalya tipi egemenlik anlayışının eski varsayımlarına meydan okundu. Bu değişen küresel bağlamda, uluslararası göç konusuna güvenlik merceğinden bakma eğilimi giderek artmakta. Bunun sonucunda, uluslararası göç Avrupa toplumları için bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak algılanmaya başlandı. Bu algının inşası, kademeli olarak birden fazla aktörün katılımıyla gerçekleşmektedir. Bu aktörler arasında popülist radikal sağ partiler göçü güvenlikleştirme sürecinin en etkili ve en çok yarar sağlayan politik güvenlikleştirme aktörlerinden biri haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, radikal sağ partilerin göçü nasıl güvenlikleştirdiğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Almanya'dan Almanya için Alternatif (AfD) ve Danimarka'dan Danimarka Halk Partisi (DF) bu çalışmada örnek olay incelemesi olarak seçilmiştir. Bu analiz, Kopenhag Okulu'nun güvenlikleştirme teorisinin ve söz edimi metodolojisinin ana öncüllerini takip ederek gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışmada hem AfD'nin hem de DF'nin göçü kendi ortak kimliklerine, kültürlerine ve toplumlarına karşı bir tehdit olarak ileri sürdükleri görülmüştür. Buna ek olarak, her iki partinin de alınması gereken acil eylemler üzerine çağrılarda bulunduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ancak bu eylemler ancak ilgili kitlenin bu iddiaları kabul etmesi halinde hayata geçirilebilir. Bu doğrultuda yapılan analizde DF'nin 2015-2019 yılları arasında göç konusunu başarılı bir şekilde güvenlikleştirmeyi başardığı sonucuna ulaşırken AfD örneğinde göçün güvenlikleştirilmesine güvenlik adımı seviyesinde kalmıştır.

Anahtar sözcükler: uluslararası göçler, güvenlik çalışmaları, güvenlikleştirme, Kopenhag okulu, güvenlik söz edimi, radikal sağ partiler

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INTRODUCTION

Migration movements constitute a significant part of human history. In the social sciences, the migration phenomenon is, in its most basic form, defined as "crossing the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period" (Castles, 2000, p. 269). In this context, the concept of migration has two meanings: firstly, it is the movement that occurs from one area to another within the country; and secondly, it is associated with crossed boundary which involves the borders of different states (OECD, 2006, p. 16).

International migration is a complex process that has great importance for present-day societies due to the effects and consequences it has created in the social, political and economic life for not only receiving countries but also sending countries as well. In general sense, international migration is not a new occurrence. In fact, it is a phenomenon that humankind has encountered throughout the ages. However, in the last, three or four decades, the effects of international migration have become more and more visible and interest in issues connected with international migration has skyrocketed among political, social and, academic life as well as in media thanks to increased immigrant inflows the Western part of the world have experienced with the recent developments of globalization and ever-increasing transnational economic activities in the last couple decades.

In this sense, migration has become one of the hottest issues of political debate ever since the 1980s, especially in Europe. The reason that Europe comes forward as an important point of interest regarding the immigration issue is related to how the position of migration is changed in the political and social agenda. To put it differently, Europe is not unfamiliar with the transnational movements in its long history. In fact, the immigration flow was already a thing before any of the recent developments come into view with globalization. However, the way that the migration phenomenon is perceived has gradually transformed.

It is useful to remember that European countries have undergone a serious social and economic transformation aftermath of World War II. In this context, international migration emerged as one of the most significant issues related to the social and economic

transformation that Europe has been experiencing since the 1950s. In this context, it has become apparent that European countries come forward as the countries of destination for the immigrants especially after the cold war period came to an end. For this reason, European countries have realized that they need to take this trend into account more seriously regarding their immigration policies as well as future strategies. This need, however, not only limited to one policy area but also various areas ranging from social policies such as accommodation of multiethnic society to economic policies such as reconstructing the welfare state system. Thus, how to approach and perceive international migration and incoming immigrants into the national agenda has become one of the leading questions for the host countries in Europe since the 1970s (Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Castles *et al.*, 2014).

This question, however, does not have one definite answer in the field. For instance, international migration is pointed out as a positive development for the receiving societies considering the low-birth rates on top of the aging population of the Western European countries. Thus, migration is highlighted as a positive development in demographic terms. In an economic perspective, the presence of the immigrant population is also underlined as an extra labor force for Western European countries. In humanitarian terms, incoming migrants are seen as the people who flee from the devastating war-like conditions and are in need of help. However, it has also been seen as a social problem that endangers the cultural, economic, political cohesion of the host countries.

After the World War II came to an end, a great number of Western European countries have welcomed immigrants with open arms from various places as a useful labor force to rebuild their devastated economic infrastructure. In this context immigrants were primarily seen as the temporary settlers who provide the cheap and extra workforce in 1950s and 1960. Thus, the economic aspect of the migration was the main point of discussion in these periods (Huysmans, 2000, p. 753). However, more and more people started to immigrate to the European countries and this trend further accompanied by the permission to immigrate based on the family reunion. In other words, the immigrant population not only grew larger by day but also the guest workers who thought to be temporary became the permanent settlers. Even though the immigration population in

Europe has steadily increased through these periods, the migration issue was not perceived as a significant security issue by the European Communities.

At the beginning of the 1970s, the immigration issue started to become a public concern in Europe. Due to the 1973 Oil Crisis, the increasing unemployment rates and the economic instability they have experienced, many European governments shifted their attention to more strict migration policies as the uneasiness among the public became more apparent (Karyotis, 2007, p. 3). In other words, since the mid-1970s onwards, the migration issue has become one of the hottest political debates, particularly in Western Europe. However, the shift to the restrictive regime and control during this period did not change the perception of immigrants fundamentally. Majority of the incoming immigrants are still thought as the temporary guest workers who eventually will leave and stricter migration policy changes were made in the areas of economy and labor market in order to safeguard the social and political rights of domestic workers in the face of increasing immigration (Huysmans, 2000, p. 754).

In the following years after the mid-1970s, the migration topic has gradually been associated with the security questions. In this regard, the majority of the scholars who work on the migration and security nexus argue that presentation of migration as a security issue is not a present-day phenomenon and this perception is observable since the 1980s (Faist, 2006; Karyotis, 2007). Additionally, the concept of security underwent a series of transformation thanks to the new context that arose after Cold War period in which multiple actors ranging from governments to political politicians and bureaucrats and academic literature to national media organs have associated migration with security issues. To be more clear, migration is not only associated with security concerns but it is also designated directly as the security threat to the host countries. More on this point, Huysmans and Squire (2009, p. 169) underline that migration turned into a security issue thanks to the end of the Cold War, globalization and the consequent changes in the socio-political understanding.

Similarly, Thomas Faist (2006, p. 106) argues that while politics has linked international migration to security issues even before the 1980s, the end of Cold War era is the crucial point that stimulated and intensified the security concerns regarding immigration. In a

similar account, Castles and Miller (2014) assert that migration is not a new occurrence; instead the politicization and securitization of migration in Europe was rather new.

The increasing link between international migration and security concerns in the 1980s is not accidental. In the last couple decades of the 20th century, the old assumptions that derived from the Westphalian state sovereignty and identity have been challenged by the developments of globalization, transnational movements, construction of the European Union and the establishment of the Schengen area as well as deterritorialized global markets and dissolution of the major states like Soviet Union (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 21). In the Westphalian system, it is assumed that nation-states enjoyed the ultimate sovereignty which took its power from the societies that share the same beliefs, identity, and destiny in a given territory marked by the psychological borders. In this vein, Heisler and Layton Henry (1993, p. 158) put forward the argument that majority of the European states was in complete belief that they are homogenous nation states that their people share the same history, culture, beliefs and ethnic identity.

In this sense, migration has considered as a threat to the collective identities, homogeneity and moral values of western societies along with problematic economic consequences. Thus, it is presented as a security threat to immigrant-receiving countries and displayed as a negative phenomenon for European societies. Sharing the similar idea, Margit Fauser (2006, p. 1) argues that after the end of the Cold War period, societies have confronted with various threats connected with terrorism, criminality, human and drug trafficking which all are related with the transnational movements; thus, migration increasingly seen as the source of these diffused threats.

In this sense, migration has increasingly been presented by the political elite and reified as a threat to domestic order, collective identity, market stability and the well-being of the societies of European countries (Huysmans, 2000, p. 752). As a result, the existential anxieties and fears of Western European societies regarding their identity, security and well-being connected to the migration through its transnational character, thus; migration seen as a significant danger to the long-term patterns of social order and stability (Huysmans, 1995, 2000; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Buonfino, 2004; Ibrahim, 2005; Squire, 2015; Tsoukala, 2018).

The negative perception of immigration is further deepened by important historical events in the following years. In this sense, the impact of September 11 attacks on US is also highlighted as a critical turning point in the securitization of the migration process in the European context (Faist, 2006; Fauser, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Karyotis, 2007; Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015). Thomas Faist (2006) notes that even before the events of 9/11, the anti-immigrant discourses were present. However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks seem to have escalated the linkage between immigration and security. Sharing a similar idea, Karyotis (2007) underlines that the 9/11 terrorist attacks accelerated the establishment of migration as a security threat. Consequently, the securitization of migration in the Western world has been deepened after the the 9/11 terrorist attacks and through the security discourses and practices.

The idea that the migration issue has been securitized in the Europe in terms of both domestic and transnational level has also become the wide-spread in the academic literature in the past couple decades specifically within Critical Security understanding (Huysmans, 1995, p.54; Huysmans and Squire, 2009, p. 170) While migration was part of research area belong to the fields such as anthropology, sociology and economics, it quickly finds a pivotal place in world politics (Huysmans and Squire, 2009, p. 170)

The traditional security studies, which is a subdiscipline of International Relations influenced by Western world, underwent a series of crisis after the demise of Cold War period since the traditional security studies strictly focused on military relationships between the states under the Cold War conditions (Bigo, 1995; Buzan *et al.*, 1998). With the communism threat is gone, new insecurities other than military-focused state security under the bipolar world system are introduced into the security studies by the critical approaches (Fauser, 2006, p. 1). Proponents of broader security agenda argued that the concept of security should be both expanded beyond the military threats to include other threats such as, economic, societal, political and environmental problems and deepened to add additional units besides the state that also threatened by the security threats such as individuals, communities and ecological system (Huysmans, 1998, p. 227). In this regard, the transnational movement of people was one of the central issues that moved to the field of analysis in security studies.

Even though there is substantial debate on how to approach and explain the quest of migration to become a security issue, several prominent theoretical models put forward their arguments. For Copenhagen School, securitization of migration come out of the speech acts which legitimize the extra-ordinary policies (Wæver, 1995; Buzan *et al.*, 1998). For the followers of Paris school, the process is done through the routinized and mundane practices of security professionals and bureaucratic decisions (Huysmans, 1997; Bigo, 2002, 2008). The Aberystwyth School, on the other hand, focuses individuals over states as the referent object in the securitization process. Regarding the migration issue, the school adopts an individual security approach and prioritize individual migrating and concerns with the consequences that immigrants face after the act of migration.

Among these theoretical approaches, securitization theory which has been developed by the Copenhagen School emerged as a significant framework. The vast majority of academic literature has drawn upon Copenhagen School's securitization approach regarding the securitization of migration in Europe and its social construction as a security issue. In this sense, to understand the social construction of migration as a security threat in the European context, there is a clear need to underline the process of securitization.

Copenhagen School argues that something becomes a security issue when it is presented as an existential threat to a valued referent object by the relevant political actors who demands exclusive right to employ every means possible to stop it. (Wæver, 1995, p. 54; Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p.21). The success of this attempt depends on whether the relative audience accepts such claims or not. Copenhagen School suggests that migration is an issue that should be read in the societal security context. In this line, immigration is presented as a security threat to the identity of the host society which is believed as a homogenous unit. Thus, the referent object is the collective identity and its survival as opposed to survival of the state as traditional security studies suggest. This perspective gives a clear-cut understanding of how an issue which is previously not considered as a security threat turn into a security object. For this reason, the securitizing actor who performs the speech act event has a particularly important place in the Copenhagen School's securitization framework.

Alessandro Buonfino (2004, p.24) argues that the production of migration as a security threat is the result of the dynamic interplay between political actors, domestic and global

media and public opinion. In the European context, the majority of the studies concentrated on the securitization of migration at the European level. Some studies explored the role of media in the process whereas other studies investigated the role of political parties as well as public opinion. There are also several studies that focused on the radical right parties as the agents in the construction of migration as a security threat.

Among various actors involved in the construction of migration as a security threat process, populist radical right parties have come forward as significant securitizing actors in the securitization of the migration process recently. Spierings *et al.* (2015, p. 3) argue that radical right parties as political actors are not temporary actors like they used to in the past; instead, they are now not only significant actors but also permanent ones in the today's European politics. Furthermore, Mehmet Gökay Özerim (2013, p. 2197) indicates that in regard to migration, radical right parties are leading the way in the securitizing process.

Cas Mudde (2012, p. 9) notes that the uptrend of the radical right parties in Europe is often associated with the increasing immigration. The vast majority of the academic literature on the Western European radical right argued that the uptrend of third-wave radical right-wing parties is in response to the perceived threat of mass migration. For example, Klaus von Beyme (1988) explains the emergence of third wave of the radical right in Europe as a reaction to multi-ethnic and cultural societies resulted by the ever increasing migration. Moreover, due to their strong arguments, discourses and party manifestos over the migration issue, radical right parties in Europe are even labeled as anti-immigration parties. In this vein, Mudde (2012, p. 9) argues that since radical right parties in Europe have dedicated a significant portion of their focus on the immigration issue, several scholars did not hesitate to refer them as “by and large single-issue parties”. In other words, radical right parties of European countries have presented migration as a threat to national and cultural identity along with economic, national and internal security. Thus, the anti-immigrant stance of radical right parties in Europe date as far back as the 1980s. In other words, the emergence and the rise of the third wave radical right parties coincide with the recent developments in the last couple of decades of the 20th century which intensified the immigration inflow.

11 September 2011 attacks in the US and following terrorist attacks in Europe such as 2004 Madrid, 2005 London attacks as well as 2015 Charlie Hebdo, Paris and 2016 Nice attacks and 2015 European migrant crisis have created a fruitful atmosphere for radical right parties to connect international migration and security threats. As a result, this connection has been strengthened in Europe which further increased the public fear and anxieties towards immigrants. In this process, radical right parties, through using anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic rhetoric, intensified the negative perception of incoming immigrants to the host countries in the public and political space. The anti-immigrant position of radical right parties is manifested in their negative rhetoric towards multiculturalism which resulted in the exclusion attempts of immigrants and more specifically Muslim immigrant population in the social and political spheres of the host countries.

In this context, the increasing electoral performance of radical right parties in the last decade or so in the wide-range of European countries cropped out as a particularly interesting topic and aroused considerable scholarly attention. In the last few years, Europe has experienced the emergence and the rise of radical right parties across Europe. In Austria Freedom, "Party of Austria (FPÖ)", in Belgium, "Flemish Interest (VB)", in Denmark, "Danish People's Party (DF)", in Germany, "Alternative for Germany", in Hungary, "Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz)", in Finland, "Finns Party (PS)", in Italy, "Northern League (LN)", in France, "National Front (FN)", in Norway, "Norwegian Progress Party (FrP)", in Sweden, "Sweden Democrats", in Switzerland, "Swiss People's Party (SVP)", in Poland, "Law and Justice Party (PiS) has become increasingly influential political actors due to the electoral success that they achieved in the last decade.

One of the main reasons for this is due to the anti-immigrant, anti-establishment and Eurosceptic views of radical right parties. Radical right parties, through their nativist ideology, firmly believe that the social groups that have different cultural and religious backgrounds can never be co-existed together peacefully (Mudde, 2007, p. 22). Thus, the recent electoral success of these parties is considered a problem for the European Union integration project which advocates European values like democracy, human rights and free movement of people. In other words, the anti-immigrant stance of radical right parties is thought to be risking the social cohesion between multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and

multi-religious groups within the European societies (Buonfino, 2004). In this sense, it is important to remember the United Kingdom's decision to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum known as Brexit. Some of the radical right parties in Europe have already started to advocate the following of British example since the EU violating the sovereignty of their country. Hence, the populist, nativist and anti-establishment discourses of radical right parties are signaling further challenges that the EU might face in the future.

As a result of these challenges posed by radical right parties along with their increased role in the securitization of the migration process, it is believed that it is crucial to analyze how radical right parties construct their discourses regarding the immigration issue at the national level and their role in securitizing migration in their relevant communities. Thus, the general aim of this study is to analyze how radical right parties securitized migration through unfolding how successful are their securitization attempts. In short, this study underlines the importance of analyzing the discourses of radical right parties regarding the immigration issue by employing the Copenhagen School's securitization framework.

However, it should not be forgotten that the majority of the radical right parties in Europe were not always anti-immigrant parties. In fact, most of them, at their establishment period, founded on different political ideas. Yet, they have changed their party policies and visions as migration issues becoming a significant point of debate in political life. For this reason, treating every radical right party in Europe as the same political agent that shares the exact similar visions should be avoided.

Therefore, in this context, different countries have treated immigration issue differently due to the differences in their historical backgrounds. In other words, each European country has experienced different migration flows in their particular history, thus, the way that migration is perceived and treated in social and political life differs in each country. Moreover, each European country also has different historical backgrounds and experiences regarding radical right movements in their political history in relation to the migration issue. As a result, each country and each radical right party in their relevant countries must be treated separately. In this regard, there is a need to explore the securitization migration by radical right parties at the national level as opposed to European level in order to investigate the existing situation in each European country.

One of the better ways to analyze how migration is securitized by the radical right parties in Europe is comparing two different parties from two different countries in order to stay at the national level and get a comparative edge. For this reason, Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Denmark's Danish People's Party (DF) are selected as case studies.

First of all, Germany is an old immigration country having one of the biggest immigrant populations and Muslim immigrant populations in Europe. In other words, for decades, Germany has been a destination country for migrants as the numbers of non-national residents is higher in Germany in comparison to all other member states (Lehr, 2015, p. 113). During the 2015 European migration crisis, the country has remained the main target country for immigrants. According to the Eurostat data (2017), Germany has received the highest number of asylum applications and first-time applicants among the European countries. In fact, in 2016 it is announced that over a million people have crossed the borders of Germany for the purpose of searching for asylum (Thomas, 2016). In this sense, Germany, which is the country receiving the highest immigration flow in Europe, is the country where the transformations in the social and political spheres created by the migration can be observed clearly in Europe. The issue of Immigration once was regarded as a necessary and positive phenomenon for the economic reconstruction after World War II, has become one of the most prevalent topics in German political debates in the last few years and has mostly been debated as a security issue rather than a societal one.

Secondly, one of the reasons that make Germany a worthy case study is related to its historical background regarding the radical right parties and radical right movements. There is an undeniable existence of Nazism in Germany's radical right history which has affected the whole world and Germany's political life deeply. Despite this background, AfD has managed to gain 12,6% of the total votes in the federal elections in 2017 which made them the first radical right party that overcome the 5% electoral threshold and became the main opposition party in Bundestag in German political history since the war period (The Federal Returning Officer, 2017).

AfD is quite a new party that founded in 2013 on the basis of neoliberalism and Euroscepticism. Initially, they advocated for leaving the Euro-zone and returning back to

the national currency. With the 2015 European Migration Crisis and immigration numbers reaching over a million, the party quickly adopted more conservative views and included immigration issues broadly in their political agenda.

In other words, due to the role and influence Germany has in the European politics, it's fruitful history regarding the immigration and radical right parties and the recent rise of radical right makes Germany and AfD a rather fruitful case selection.

The second case study that is going to be analyzed is Denmark's Danish People's Party (DF). Unlike others, we find Denmark as an interesting case to examine radical right parties in relation to the securitization migration process. Lazaridis and Tsagkroni (2015, p. 208) argue that success of radical right parties in Denmark is particularly interesting due to the Danish political life which was dominated by the social democratic understanding with a strong emphasis on stability.

Unlike Germany, Denmark has not been among the highest immigrant-receiving countries after the 2015 European migration crisis. In fact, the other Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway have faced a higher number of incoming immigrants in comparison to Denmark. However, with the rise of DF and ever-increasing numbers of strict immigration policies, Denmark comes forward as a fruitful case in the topic of securitized migration. After becoming the second biggest party in the parliament and receiving more than 20% of total votes in the 2015 national elections, DF has become one of the most influential agents in the Danish political life. The foundations of DF has established in 1995 and the party initially adopted the ideology of its predecessor, Progress Party (FrP), on the matter of welfare. However, after a while, DF gradually abandoned neoliberal approaches inherited by the FrP and instead focused on issues like immigration and its connection to welfare.

In this sense, Denmark and Germany have different historical backgrounds regarding the migration issue and radical right movements. While AfD is rather a new party in German political life, DF has been around for more than 20 years and their adoption of anti-immigrant views is much older than AfD. With that being said, the different historical context regarding the two parties is not the only criterion for these case selections.

In order to achieve a successful securitization case, the authority and power of the securitizing actors are underlined as an important variable by Copenhagen School. In other words, the school argues that the more securitizing actors have authority on the particular issue the more likely for the issue to be securitized (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 32). In this sense, the governments, more often than not, come out as the most common securitizing actor in the securitization studies due to the authority they have. However, this study finds it as a significant opportunity to focus on political actors that are not in the governmental position. After the 2017 federal elections, AfD became the opposition party whereas, during the years between 2015-2019, DF provided parliamentary support to the minority right coalition. While both parties did not win the elections, they also did not achieve similar positions in their respective parliaments. In this regard, DF had a more influential role in their relevant parliament comparing to the AfD. Thus, if the authority and the power of the securitizing actors are matters as the securitization theory suggests, the strength of securitization should be different in each case.

Another reason for these case selections is related to data collection. After its creation in 1995, DF has published several party programs and working programs with the latest being published in 2009. In addition, their official website still maintains the party program that established in 2002 as the effective program of the party. AfD, however, published its party manifesto more recently in 2017. If something becomes a security issue with speech act event as securitization theory suggests, and if the migration issue belongs to the societal sector as the referent object is the national identity rather than the state, then regardless of the publication dates, party manifestos of both parties should follow the similar paths. Thus, one of the hypotheses of this study is that radical right parties present migration as a threat to the cultural identity of their relevant countries.

In order to conduct an empirical analysis, this study will employ securitization theory which embodies a contemporary approach that we can analyze how migration is securitized as a theoretical framework. Through the following the main premises of securitization theory, this study aims to analyze how something becomes a security issue.

This study is not interested in if migration is truly a security issue in objective terms. Instead, the main focus is on how migration phenomenon is perceived and presented as a security threat by AfD and DF. For this reason, the securitization approach is believed to

be a good fit for this study due to its constructivist nature. Thus, securitization theory and its methodology of speech act will be investigated in detail in the first chapter of this study.

In the second chapter, a comprehensive literature review will be conducted. This chapter will provide the necessary background on how the migration issue is associated with security in the European context. Here, not only the studies that focus on radical right parties in the securitization migration process but also studies that focus on different actors will be highlighted. In addition to the studies that employ the securitization framework, other studies that employ different frameworks will be included. All in all, it is aimed to provide a comprehensive background on migration-security nexus ever since migration has become part of the security studies.

In the third chapter, first, the conceptualization and historical development of contemporary radical right parties in Europe will be briefly examined. Since this study uses this label to group these parties, it is necessary to explain and understand why it is thought to be appropriate. Then, the main arguments of this will be analyzed through case studies. In this sense, this study compares two radical right parties in Europe that have attained high electoral success recently: Alternative for Germany (AfD) from Germany and Danish People's Party (DF) from Denmark. This study will be based on qualitative design and securitization theory and its methodology of speech act will be employed in the case studies. As data collection, party Manifestos and speeches of leaders and members of each political party will be used to carry out this study.

In brief, this study interests in radical right parties in Europe as securitizing actors of migration. Through investigating the similarities and differences in both cases, this study aims to systemically analyze how migration is securitized by both AfD and DF in their respective countries and find out whether migration is successfully securitized by the parties in question.

1. SECURITIZATION: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

This Chapter argues that securitization theory which was developed by the Copenhagen School provides an appropriate framework to explain how something becomes a security issue. Thus, whole chapter will be dedicated to the main theoretical and methodological framework of this study. In order to analyze how radical right parties in Europe present migration as a security threat, the chapter will initially investigate the emergence, development and intellectual roots of securitization theory in order to get a good grasp on the theory. Then, it's main premises will be broken down elaborately to show the theoretical and methodological path that this study will follow. In the final parts of the chapter, the selected case studies and the necessary data collection will be explained.

1.1. EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITIZATION THEORY

Throughout the last few decades, the field of International Security Studies has become increasingly contentious and debated areas in the realm of IR as it has provided a working ground for critical perspectives to challenge advocates of traditional understanding - such as realists and neo-realists- who had held firm grip on the field of ISS since its emergence after the World War II (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 1; Huysmans, 1998b; Williams, 2003; Collective, 2006; Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

During the 1980s and 1990s, dominant traditionalist understanding was challenged by emerging critical approaches. The concept of security started to be re-shaped in the post-Cold War terrain. The primary discussion revolved around the what is now known as wide versus narrow security concepts. (Wæver, 2003, p. 8). stemmed from dissatisfaction of the robust narrowing of the security studies field which was imposed by traditionalist/realist understanding that strictly focuses on military relationships between the states under the Cold War conditions (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 2). Proponents of broader security agenda argued that the concept of security is needed to be both broadened beyond the military threats to include other threats ranging from economic, societal, political and environmental areas and deepened to add additional units besides the state that also threatened by the security threats such as individuals, communities and the ecological system (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 227).

However, critical approaches did not share the same vision on the concept of security. Thus, the debate over a broad versus narrow security agenda was not only a point of discussion for wideners and traditionalists but also it was a debate among the wideners. While advocates of critical approaches agreed on widening and broadening the security agenda, to what extent should the security agenda be expanded was a point of contention among wideners camp (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 188).

The Copenhagen School established one of these approaches which supported the idea of the widening and deepening of the concept of security through the assumptions of its own-developed Securitization Theory. Among its prominent scholars, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009, p. 212) underline that despite being originated within the European studies, concepts of the Copenhagen School also employed in other studies with non-Western subjects. Similarly, Wæver (2003, p. 21) also notes that the amount of empirical studies that apply securitization theory as a framework is surprisingly high. Williams (2003, p. 511) refers to the Copenhagen School and securitization theory as one of the most influential as well as important of newer approaches. For Huysmans (1998a, p. 480), the Copenhagen School distinguishes itself by being more consistent and continuous in the security studies. Lene Hansen (2000, p. 288) echoes Huysmans and argues that despite the countless number of scholars participating into the widening debate, the Copenhagen School and the securitization theory successfully takes a step forward by managing the concept to widen enough to include other issues without making its expansion limitless.

The Copenhagen School emerged at the end of the 1980s in this context of “wide” versus “narrow” debate (Wæver, 2003, p. 8). The foundation of the Copenhagen School was laid down in 1985 at the “Centre for Peace and Conflict Research” which was established in Copenhagen. Before adopting the name ‘Copenhagen School’, the members of the school were referred as the “European Security” research group as the group was established within the Copenhagen Project along with several other research groups. Since its initiation in 1985, Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan became the most prominent figures of the Copenhagen School since these two scholars laid the foundation of core ideas and theoretical framework which now defines the Copenhagen School. Those ideas are; (1) securitization, (2) security sectors, (3) regional security complex theory.

These core ideas are not the products of collective works. While securitization approach was initially developed by Ole Wæver, the other two approaches - security sectors and regional security complexes – were developed by Barry Buzan. These individually developed concepts were included later in collective works. Buzan's concepts of security sectors and regional security complexes were included first in collective work "*The European Security Order Recast* (1990)" and securitization approach developed by Wæver was used as a theoretical framework first time in a collective work "*Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (1998)". Thus, despite being developed individually, the main reference point for those core ideas is attributed to the later collective works (Wæver, 2003, p. 8). Nevertheless, despite the contributions of several other scholars in collective works, Buzan and Wæver were distinguished as the prominent representatives of the Copenhagen School. For this reason, Huysmans argues that the Copenhagen project managed to be successful due to consistency and continuity among its limited members which lead to coherence within the developed theories of the school (Huysmans, 1998a, p. 479).

In line with the widening the security agenda, "sectors" refer to the distinction between "political, economic, environmental, military and societal security" while the concept of "regional security complexes" underlines the significance of regionality in the security analysis, thus; offers an analytical framework to approach how regional formations linked to each other with the security concerns (Wæver, 2003, p. 8).

The three core ideas – "security sectors", "regional security complexes", and "securitization" – are not only the integral part of understanding Copenhagen School's position but also have a synergy between them which help us understand each theory better (Wæver, 2003, p. 8). However, the securitization approach, as Wæver (2003, p. 8) puts, is the approach that defines the school most in theoretical sense, guides it in future developments. In other words, while securitization is the meta-theory, the other two concepts mostly function as varied applications of securitization (Akgül Açıkmeşe, 2008, pp. 162–163).

From the very beginning, the Copenhagen School concerned itself with the question that how to move security studies beyond the narrow scope that zooms on only the state as the security actor and the military issues as the security threats while at the same time not

including everything that creates a security concern to mankind. Creating an original theoretical contribution to the debate was also one key drive of the Copenhagen School (Huysmans, 1998a, p. 482) In this sense, Copenhagen School paid attention to criticisms of traditionalists that claim coherence of the field is at risk due to the widening of the concept (Walt, 1991, p. 213). However, members of the school also disagreed with the notion that the coherence is maintained by only having military at the center of the security studies (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 4).

Instead of asking the question “what is a security issue?” They tackled with the question that "how an issue becomes a security one?" For the securitization theory, through the discursive process, issues turn into a security threat when they are presented by the authorized actors as existential threats to a referent object to call for urgent and extraordinary measurements in order to get rid of the threat which justifies the actions that outside of the normal boundaries of the political process (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 23–24; Buzan and Waver, 2003, p. 491) Through this question, the field opens up to the other areas other than military issues. However, this does not necessarily signal that everything indeed becomes a security problem when they presented as such. Securitization, inherently, is an intersubjective process that is not only decided by the securitizing actor but also with the involvement of the audience that accepts the claims of the actor who is securitizing the issue. In other words, it is a negotiation that includes both securitizing actor and the relative audience. Therefore, as Copenhagen School puts, "successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 31).

In this sense, the School claims that, through the speech act, anything can become a security topic. Consequently, the Copenhagen School, through its securitization approach, offers a third way besides the state-dominated narrow understanding which is solely limited to military issues and the wider approach which includes everything by creating a security risk to humanity.

Therefore, in this debate, the Copenhagen School neither position itself within the traditional approach nor the proponents of wideners that believe everyone and everything could be the tackled within the security agenda. Combining the perspectives of

philosophy of linguistics, political theory and elements of social constructivism, the securitization approach brought a new analytic framework to the security studies.

1.2. INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF SECURITIZATION THEORY: THE SPEECH ACT

The speech act approach is also the source of inspiration for the securitization theory, which has been brought up by John L. Austin (1962) in the book named "How to do Things with Words" and further developed by his student John R. Searle. Both in Wæver's earlier individual works and later collaborative works with other members of Copenhagen School, Austin and speech act theory are addressed and mentioned as an inspiration during the construction of the securitization approach. In fact, Wæver points out Austin as one of the four theoreticians who influenced the thoughts of the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 2004, p. 13; Taureck, 2006, p. 18).

Austin divides the sentences into two categories as "constatives" and "performatives". The former has a function of reporting or describing states of an affair which are subject to truth and falsity test. The latter concept, however, has an additional function as it signals the performing of an action, in the most straightforward words, they 'do' things (Balzacq, 2005, p. 175). In this regard, performative utterances lie at the heart of the speech act theory. For Austin, reality is not described by the performative utterances; instead, they have ability to form a new reality independent from true/false dichotomy (Stritzel, 2007, p. 376).

In one of the famous examples, Austin (1962, pp. 5–6) illustrates the performativity of utterances like this: "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth". Here the intention is not to report that this ship is called Queen Elizabeth. The intention is making a factual point that this ship is from now on will be called Queen Elizabeth. As pointed above, performative utterances are not utterances that describe something true or false. Therefore, for Austin performative utterances has "felicity conditions" rather than "truth conditions". In this sense, if the felicity conditions are fulfilled, regardless of being true or false, the speech act may still fulfill its conditions and be felicitous (Stritzel, 2007, p. 361).

In this context, sentences may bear three different types of acts - (1) "locutionary", (2) "illocutionary" and (3) "perlocutionary" - as these three come together and the speech act constituted by the merger of these acts (Balzacq, 2005, p. 175). The locutionary act is the utterance that consists of the employment of expression such as sentences that has a given meaning. The illocutionary act is the utterance where explicit performativity can be observed. The perlocutionary act is where the effect of the illocutionary act can be observed on the hearer as speakers aim to evoke certain feelings, thoughts or beliefs of the target audience.

In this sense, the speech act theory focuses on the performativity of the utterances. Therefore, unlike regular communication, there is a speaker who tries to persuade the target audience in the speech act. However, a total speech act situation also contains the reaction of the audience to the claims of the speaker. This is the point that Copenhagen built upon the idea that securitization is an intersubjective process. Successful securitization can only occur if the audience is persuaded and accepted the speaker's claim. Thus, the discourse only constitutes one part of the securitization process. For example, securitizing actors might claim that migration is a threat to the cultural identity of the host country. However, for a successful securitization, the audience must be included in the process as without their acceptance an issue cannot be securitized successfully (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25). Therefore, the responsibility of persuading the audience falls on the securitizing actor.

While Austin had a significant contribution to the field of philosophy of language, he also could not avoid his fair share of criticisms. One of the significant criticisms came from French linguist Jacques Derrida, who also had a significant impact on securitization theory. Similar to Austin, he is also mentioned as one of the four figures that influenced the development of securitization theory (Wæver, 2004, p. 13; Taureck, 2006, p. 18). Derrida criticizes Austin for prioritizing speech over text by arguing that in the speech event, the sender and the receiver must be present at the same time whereas in texts this condition is not obligatory as text can reach its interlocutor any given time (Akgül Açıkmeşe, 2008, p. 173). Thus, prioritizing the importance of the text, Derrida developed a famous approach that claims "there is nothing outside the text". In other words, the meaning and the performative force of the text is not related to its context. Similar to

Austin's concept of performativity, Derrida believes that utterances have the ability to create a new context, independent from the prior contexts. Thus, the meaning of the text can only be understood within the utterances and not beyond. This understanding can also be observed in Wæver's own words. He argues that context is a rather doubtful concept since it is implied that the meaning of something can only be understood in the specific context whereas the speech act event creates its own meaning which points out the pivotal position of Derrida's understanding (Wæver, 2004, p. 11).

Thus, this statement can be acknowledged as the acceptance of Derrida's belief of "there is nothing outside the text". This philosophy also has another meaning which points out that the meaning of the text can only be understood within the very context that the text created since the meaning is independent of the prior context. In other words, Derrida claims that the meaning of the speech act and its performativity isn't related to the outside context. This is another criticism towards Austin who argued that a speech act can only happen felicitously if the felicitous conditions are met. The felicitous conditions here points out the existence of an outside context. For Derrida, there is no need for such conditions since the outside context can never be seen as a constant variable and the meaning can never be fixed (Stritzel, 2007, p. 361).

Derrida's postmodern/poststructuralist understanding has also further extended by Judith Butler. For Butler, speech acts has the ability to create and forge social relations in a brand new fashion (Stritzel, 2007, pp. 361–362). Thus, it is emphasized that the speech act event alone has the ability to bring out a change instead of relying on pre-existing context and has the capability to create a new authority where the prior context does not empower actors. Stritzel (2007) argues that Wæver acknowledges this statement by stating that speech act breaks the ordinary meaning as it established a new one that have not been in the context yet. Thus, it creates the context through performativity (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 46; Wæver, 2000, p. 286).

In the end, it can be said that Copenhagen School developed a unique version of speech act through securitization theory by combining both Austin's and Derrida's arguments. In this sense, the school sometimes highlights the emphasis of Austin and Derrida at other times in this combination that adapted into the concept of security. Additionally, Copenhagen School combines the elements of political theory and the perspective of

social constructivism and set forth a new analytical framework to the field of security studies. Thus, while heavily inspired by the linguist theory, political theory, and social constructivism, Copenhagen School created its own unique theoretical framework that can be seen as a security speech act model.

1.3. THE SECURITIZATION THEORY

While contesting the traditional narrow approach and broadening the security agenda is one of the primary motives of the school from the start, they were very much concerned with the limits of the wider agenda; thus actively tried to avoid emptying the concept of security and making it all-inclusive.

Critically approaching both sides, Wæver (2003, p. 9) argues that the concept of security cannot be understood if one is concerned with how it should be used through setting up ideal definitions. Strategic Studies only include military-political issues whereas proponents of a wider approach claim that all individual matters should be the concern of security. This conceptualization sets up the ideal definitions of security. To solve this problem, the Copenhagen School argues that the concept of security cannot be understood by arguing over which issues belong to the concept. The securitization perspective, here, offers an alternative framework. Embracing the assumption used by traditionalist that "security is essentially about survival"; securitization approach focuses on the functionality of the concept security through linguistic practices instead of idealizing the concept (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 21; Wæver, 2003, p. 9; Williams, 2003, p. 516).

What makes something a part of security agenda is, therefore, must be related to survival. Something becomes a security issue "when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 21). The term "referent object" is here defined as something that "one can point and say it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to..." (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 36). The existence of the designated threat concerning the referent object "justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 21). Therefore, the word "security" is associated with priority of the matter which legitimizes the use of force and extra-ordinary measurements as well as other tools that increases the power of the executive agent (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 208). Thus, something becomes a security issue when elites says so (Wæver, 1995, p. 54)

Securitization, therefore, can be simply defined as transformation of something into a security issue through presentation of it as a threat to existence.

In the traditional perspective, security and insecurity are conceived as opposite conditions. More security is better or else lack of security would create the condition of insecurity is the very idea that Copenhagen School contests in the first place. Thus, the securitization approach perceives these concepts differently. In this perspective, security points out to a situation where there is a threat and there is a defense against it. Insecurity, refers to a situation that there are a threat and no defensive measurements against it (Wæver, 2003, pp. 12–13). Therefore, the idea that “the more security is better” becomes problematic. Since security is a move that framing something as a special type of politics, it opens the way to take it beyond the underlying rules of the politics; thus, securitization can be speak of when the issue goes extreme and beyond the realm of politicization. (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 23). In logical sense, any issue can be placed on a scale that varying between non-politicized, politicized and securitized. If an issue is placed outside of the political end of the spectrum, neither state deals with it nor the issue becomes a matter of public debate. When an issue is politicized, it becomes the part of public debate that requires government involvement through decisions and resource allocations. The issue is securitized if it is perceived as an existential threat which opens the way for adopting extreme measures and justifies breaking boundaries of the political procedure (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 23–24). Therefore, the securitization approach is interested in how the concept is used instead of what people think the meaning of the concept is. The answer given to the question of what the concept of security encompasses is insufficient to understand the concept of security. The scope of security can be defined by the use of the concept in discourse because security is the speech act. Therefore, securitization is a process of social construction that is based on rhetorical structure. The word “security” here is no used to define the objective reality; instead it means constructing a new reality from scratch.

Textual analysis constitutes the foundation of the securitization approach. Through textual analysis, it can be understood that something is marked as a security issue since its urgency requires the utmost priority over other issues. For this reason, one issue can only become a security issue if it is presented as an existential threat. If the actors can

manage to break the established rules through this discourse, it becomes a case of securitization. In this sense, Buzan et al (1998, p. 24) asserts that actors imply that if we don't handle this issue, everything will be ruined by it because we will not be in position to revert it. Thus, they demand extraordinary rights and means in order to handle the issue. As a result, "security" comes forward as a self-referential practice since the issue becomes a security one not because it is an real and actual threat but it is designated and presented as such.

However, the designation of some particular issue as the existential threat isn't sufficient for the securitization by itself. This is called "securitizing move" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25). The specific issue can only be considered as securitized when the target audience accepts such claims, therefore, it gives consent for the use of extreme measurements. This is why the best definition of the securitization is forged by the "intersubjective establishment of an existential threat". While the designation of an issue as an existential threat is a subjective construction by the securitizing actor, it can become a a security issue with the acceptance of such a claim by the audience. For this reason, securitization is neither objective nor subjective but an intersubjective process.

The correct path to analyze securitization is looking at the discourses in order to understand when and how the specific rhetorical structure attains enough impact to make the audience tolerate breaking the established rules which are supposed to be obeyed (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25). With this perspective, it is possible to extend the security agenda beyond the narrow traditional agenda without making everything the subject of security studies.

1.4. SECURITIZATION THEORY AND ITS METHODOLOGY OF SPEECH ACT

There are three components that constitute the successful securitization cases which are (1) designation of the existential threats, (2) extraordinary measures, and (3) acceptance of emergency actions by the audience. The trademark of securitization is the emphasis of rhetorical structure. Since security means that taking something from the non-politicized sphere to the realm of the emergency process through discursive actions, the process of

securitization, with drawing inspiration from the language theory, defined as a speech act. On this subject, Wæver (1995, p. 55) asserts:

"With the help of language theory, we can regard "security" as a *speech act*. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it." (Emphasis in original)

Therefore, if something can only become a security issue with the existence and combination of the three components of securitization through a speech act, then this analysis can also be applied to various issues other than military-political ones, thus makes it possible to expand the agenda of the security studies.

In this regard, it is asserted that the main of the securitization studies is to understand who is the securitizing actor and what is the issue he securitizes, why he securitizes, whom he is trying to secure it for and what are the results of this process under certain conditions (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 32).

1.4.1. Facilitating conditions

While the practice of securitization opens the way to include other sectors to the agenda, Buzan *et al.* (1998, p. 27) implicitly assert that uttering the word security is not enough to create successful securitization case. It is indeed that there are no objective measures or recipes to achieve successful securitization which indicates that by following the securitization practice everything can be included in the security agenda. However, there are some structured features that increase the success rate of the securitization attempt. Drawing inspirations from the speech act's felicity conditions through language theory, these structured features called "facilitating conditions" of security speech act. These conditions divided into two different categories: (1) "the internal (linguistic and grammatical)" and (2) "the external (contextual and social) conditions" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 32). The internal aspects of the speech act include the grammar of security based on the rhetoric that required by the related sector and construction of an enunciation that

involves existential threat, implication of there is no return back and a way to find opening since the audience is more likely to be persuaded in the presence of such statements. There are two main conditions among the external aspects of the speech act. The first one is the social capacity of the securitizer. While being in a position of official authority is not a must-be condition, the agent should have a sort of authority in order to persuade the audience. Moreover, the securitizing agent should possess the authority to take emergency measurements given that the audience is persuaded. The second external condition is related to the threat. The likelihood of something to be perceived as a threat is greater if the particular object is historically associated with threats, may it be tanks or hostile sentiments. If the audience associates the presented threat with those themes that are collectively held as a threatening, securitization attempt is easier to be justified (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 32–33).

Wæver (2003, p. 15) points out that the facilitating conditions in relation to perceived threat should be read as a convention. In this sense, war planes have a higher threat perception than brochures due to the historical context. In another example, the high number of incoming immigrants may be associated with invasion by the host country. Thus, the greater the number of incoming immigrants, the greater the chance that the host society perceives it as a threat since they might be overrun by influxes of migrant people (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 121).

Moreover, facilitating conditions, Wæver (2003, p. 14) argues, are not fixed entities. These conditions themselves are not enough to make necessary securitization. Unlike Austin's "felicity conditions", facilitating conditions do not imply that all conditions must be met in order to achieve successful securitization. Therefore, on the contrary to felicity conditions of Austin's speech act theory, Copenhagen School (1998, p. 32) state that facilitating conditions come forward as conditions where speech act works under, in comparison to examples where the act is failed.

While it can be argued that the existence of these structured conditions detracts securitization perspective from social constructive approach and moves it closer to the objectivist territory, it should be noted that the existence of these conditions is not necessary, they just facilitate the securitization process to achieve success. In other words, facilitating conditions can be seen as secondary or derivative conditions. The necessary

steps for securitization to happen in the first place are the designation of the existential threat and emergency measurements by the actors through either textual or discursive utterances and the admission of such claims by the target audience. It is, therefore, becomes clear that the quality, position, and power of the securitizing agent should be explored in order to understand who can speak security successfully.

1.4.2. Securitizing actor and referent object

Copenhagen School defines security as a "self-referential practice" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 24). Regardless of the objective reality, an issue becomes a security one if presented as such. Thus, the securitization process begins with the subjective assessment of the securitizing agent. The important question should be asked here is whose security are we talking about? Throughout the history of international security studies, the object that should be secured identified in a wide spectrum ranging from global to the individual level. Therefore, there is no universally accepted answer about "whose security" should be dealt with in the security agenda.

Following the securitization perspective, Copenhagen School divides security units into three different types as (1) securitizing actors, (2) referent objects and (3) functional actors. Securitizing actors are the individuals or collectivities that claim a referent object is under the threat thus move the issue to security agenda. In other words, they are the agents who perform the security speech act (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 40). Traditionally, the state is the primary actor in security studies. According to the realist security studies, "security is and should be about the state and the state is and should be about security" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 37). While Copenhagen School accepts the privileged position of the state, they contest the idea that the state is the only actor who can securitize the issue. In this regard, Buzan *et al.* (1998, p. 37) asserts that they acknowledge the fact that the field is state-centric but not state-dominated.

Thus, it is highlighted that while the state is the privileged one among the competing actors, it does not mean that the state is the only actor that is able to securitize issues. However, due to their favorable positions, political elites and leaders, bureaucratic apparatuses, national governments, lobby and pressure groups come forward as a common agents in the field of security (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 40). However, these actors

very rarely construct themselves as referent objects since it would not appeal to the audience. In this sense, security action is taken in the name of collectivities in order to reach out to larger audiences. This is why it is emphasized that it is difficult to distinguish referent objects and actors, and one should be careful to point out in the cases that the state is not a referent object or securitizing agent. For instance, sovereignty is the referent object for the state whereas identity is assumed for the nation. Therefore, in theory, securitizing actors can point out anything as a referent object. However, this assumption is not limitless due to facilitating conditions. In this regard, Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 36–37) claim that success of the establishment of the referent object is often depends on the size or scale of the referent object. For instance, in the micro-level, individuals and small groups can rarely establish a successful securitization process since the legitimacy of the claims will not be accepted by the large numbers. At the macro level, it is equally hard to establish a security legitimacy that concerns the whole system. For this reason, middle scale collectivities like states, nations or civilizations constitute the most successful referent object in the security field.

The reason behind this success is that limited collectivities rival each other thereby reinforces and empower their "we" feeling. When this feeling invoked, it is easier to legitimize security action, therefore, middle-level collectivities gain an edge over micro and macro levels since it is harder to execute the invocation of "we" feeling at those levels. This observation, however, is not binary. Not every middle-level collectivities can be established as a successful referent object nor every individual and system-level destined to failure. Thus, while, the Copenhagen School argues against the realist understanding and the monopoly of the state in the security studies, they also accept that the state has a privileged position as both referential objects and the securitizer actor. However, any actor might hope to construct an issue as a referent object. The success of this attempt, however, depends on the appeal of the referent object. In other words, the construction of some types of recent objects is more likely to be successful due to the existence of facilitating conditions. In that sense, Buzan et. al. (1998, p. 39) assert that referent object should have legitimate claim on why it needs to survive. Thus, securitizing actors such as bureaucracies, political regimes and firms rarely hold the sense of everlasting survival. As a result, the securitizing actors do not construct themselves as the referent object that is being threatened. This is why securitizing actors other the state often

claim that they are speaking and acting on behalf of the groups, collectivities or nations in order to get a greater appeal to the audiences.

1.4.3. Existential threat and sectoral approach

The designation of existential threat is an important segment of the securitization process. In the traditional sense, military threats have dominated the security field. However, with the extension of security agenda different kinds of threats have been included ranging from environmental degradation to political instability, migration to economic problems. Furthermore, some critical approaches argued that even the more simple things that can be threatening to individuals should be counted in.

Copenhagen School, however, rejects this idea. In this sense, it is argued that if everything that creates a security concern to mankind included in the boundaries of security, it would mean that the use of emergency measurements justified for everything from the individual to a global scale which would empty the meaning of the concept security. Because of this, the Copenhagen School adopts the sectoral approach which offers a framework of analysis that separates the security issues into different sectors such as military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). In another article, Lautsen and Wæver (2000) introduced religion as a separate sector that was previously included in the societal sector. The reason behind these divisions is the idea that both source of threat and way of survival are remarkably different in each sectors. These sectors are not fixed and there can be multiple sectors concerning with the referent object. In this sense, Buzan et al (1998, p. 27) assert that security gains its meaning when the existential threat challenges the survival, however, the existential threat is not fixed and shows variety throughout different sectors. For example, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 7) explain each of the offered sectors in detail how some of these sectors have varied referent objects as well as incoming threats. With regard to the *military sector*, the hostile armies and possession of weapons may be constructed by securitizing actors as a threat to the state, its boundaries or territory or even to its military. In the *political sector*, the perceived referent object against the threat is sovereignty, political stability and order as well as regime type. In the *economic sector*, markets, finance, and resources come forward as common referent objects. In the *societal sector*, the existential threat is directed towards

the collective identity, language and culture. And lastly, certain environmental issues such as pollution and global warming might be constructed as existential threats to the biosphere, animal species, human life as a whole and natural environment. For the *religion sector*, Lautsen and Wæver (2000, p. 719) argue that faith is considered as the ultimate referent object that is threatened.

However, existential threats can only be presented successfully by the actors who are competent enough to know the dynamics of each particular sector. In this sense, Thierry Balzacq (2005, p. 187) argues securitizing actors stimulate the audience to give their consent to specific issue in the process of securitization. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 31) assert that security is a pre-structured terrain where some agents are located in a position of power since it is generally assumed that they are the providers of security. Thus, some actors are more advantageous to establish successful security cases than others by the virtue of authority they have in their particular domains. For example, public officials are more likely to securitize an issue comparing to the others primarily because the influential positions they have in the security field (Balzacq, 2005, p. 191).

One essential condition for existential threat is related to its invocation. In this sense, it is argued that when a threat is not securitized or in other words presented as such, it is not possible to talk about that particular threat since it is assumed that the presence of threat is subjectively constructed rather than being understood in objective terms. Therefore, in order to talk about the existence of a threat, it must be uttered by the securitizing agent (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 39–40).

1.4.4. Emergency measures and the audience

As explained above, the designation of existential threat is not itself create the securitization. It is only a "securitizing move" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25). For a successful securitization, the audience must accept such claims and give permission to use of emergency actions. In this sense, what makes something a successful securitization case is the audience rather than the securitizing agent (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 31). Thus, although the designation of the threat and proposed emergency actions are subjectively decided, the success of the securitizing act falls upon the audience's willingness to be persuaded by such claims.

In theory, the audience does not necessarily mean that "the public" or "the people", rather it is the relevant group that needs to be persuaded (Wæver, 2003, p. 26). Even if the audience accepts the claims of securitizing actors, it does not mean that it occurs in a civilized fashion. It can be through coercion or consent. Moreover, some security practices can be taken in secrecy without the knowledge of the audience at all. Nevertheless, it is argued that especially in democracies, the situation will be argued in the public sphere in regard to why the situation constituted in the security frame in the first place (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 25–28).

The successful securitization process requires some sort of emergency measures to be adopted. However, Copenhagen School argued that for the successful securitization, the demand is not so high that emergency measures have to be adopted. Instead, the threshold is at the level where the existential threat has to gain enough attention to be discussed upon in which in which legitimizing the adaptation of emergency measures is possible thanks to the discourse that explicitly points out the existence of the existential threat (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25). Therefore, the criterion is whether the discourses were enough to create this situation that otherwise would not be possible.

1.4.5. The security speech act and discourse analysis

As it is argued earlier, discourse analysis is the main analytical tool for the analyst. Wæver (2002) argues that discourse analysis works on public texts. Thus, the emphasis on the importance of public text by the scholars who employ the securitization framework implies that the securitization analyst should stay at the level of discourse and work on accessible sources that open to everyone and uses them as they are instead of trying to get the hidden motivations or thought processes in the minds of securitizing actors. In their unique security speech act concept, Copenhagen School adopts Derrida's notion that "there is nothing outside of the text" understanding. In this sense, the Copenhagen School utilizes the discourse analysis methodology in order to understand the extent of the concept of security. In this sense, the methodology of Copenhagen School, as Derrida suggests is based on discourse. In this sense, Copenhagen School highlight that textual analysis in the security cases propounds that an issue should take full priority because it is more vital than other since it is portrayed as a security issue (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 24). It does not matter whether the discourse is uttered or written. This emphasis on textual

analysis suggests that the analyst should stick with the text and only text. In this sense, Wæver and Hansen (2002, pp. 25–26) further highlights that in discourse analysis which employs the public texts, it's not analyst intention to find out the secret thoughts or motives of the agent, thus; neither the beliefs of agent nor the audience is relevant to the analyst. What is important is the codes that are used in the interaction of the two parties.

For this reason, in this study, the discourse analyses will be conducted upon the public texts. The main research question of this study is how radical right parties in Europe securitize the migration issue and Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD), as well as Denmark's Danish Peoples Party (DF), will be the selected case studies of this study. Both AfD and DF also share some core ideological features and security themes regarding the immigration issue. While every political party has its unique policy preferences and ideologies, it is believed that due to these core features such as nativism and populism, these parties can be included in the same family of the political parties. For this reason, these parties are marked as 'radical right party' in this study. More discussion on this conceptualization will be made in Chapter 3 where the case studies through the party manifestos and speeches of prominent members of AfD and DF will be analyzed.

1.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter laid down the securitization framework developed by the Copenhagen School which constitutes the main theoretical and methodological framework of this study. It is argued that there are three components of the securitization process. First, a problem must be presented as a threat to the existence of a referent object with the use of security-laden words. Secondly, the presented threat must call for urgency and necessitates breaking the routinized boundaries of normal politics to adopt emergency measurements. And lastly, the approval of emergency actions by the audience.

These three steps constitute the securitization theory and its methodology of speech act. Following these footsteps, this study aims to systemically analyze how migration issue is securitized by radical right parties in Europe through two case studies, Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Danish People's Party (DF), as they have become one of the most

influential political actors in the securitization process. Before conducting the analysis, however, it is important to investigate how an issue like migration has become part of the security agenda through conducting a comprehensive review of migration-security nexus in the academic literature.



2. SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

This chapter argues that international migration has become one of the key security issues in European political agenda since the second half of the 20th century onwards as it is shown in the academic literature. Through following the literature conducted upon the increasing connection between migration and security, the following chapter will specifically lay down the arguments on how migration is presented and perceived as a security issue through the securitization theory and speech act. In order to do that, this chapter first will break down the discursive construction of migration as a security threat, then, will investigate the relevant securitizing and functional actors that underlined in the literature. And finally, how developments in the past 40 years have penetrated and influenced the EU's understanding of migration as a security problem going to be highlighted.

2.1. SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION THROUGH SPEECH-ACT

Huysmans and Squire (2009) stress that international migration has been perceived as a security threat in Western societies in a swift manner. As a consequence, this perception became more and more visible in the developments of migration policies in both domestic and EU levels. The visible linkage between migration and security is referred as the “migration-security nexus” by some scholars (Faist, 2006; Karyotis, 2007; Huysmans and Squire, 2009). Even though there is a substantial debate on how to approach and explain the quest of migration to become security issue, several prominent theoretical models put forward the argument that securitization of migration emerges from the speech acts which legitimizes the extra-ordinary policies (Wæver, 1995; Buzan *et al.*, 1998), the routinized and mundane practices of security professionals and bureaucratic decisions (Bigo, 1995, 2002, 2008) or the incorporation of the both discourses and practices (Huysmans, 2006; Balzacq, 2010; Bourbeau, 2011). However, it is apparent that the vast majority of the studies conducted upon the premises of Copenhagen School's securitization logic since it posits the idea that securitization foremost is a socially constructed process through discursive methods. In other words, securitization logic focuses on the process that how something becomes a security issue through security speech acts rather than whether or not if it is really a security threat in objective terms. Thus,, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 30)

argue that it is not an easy task to determine if the threat is real or not since there is no way to measure it and no security theory has managed to provide a tool that can measure it.

Following the main premises of securitization theory, this study hypothesizes that if migration is to be both presented and perceived as a security threat through discourses, then it is possible to talk about the securitization of migration. Here, it is necessary to clarify the main referent object which is being threatened by the migration issue. In traditional sense, the referent object referred to is the state. In this sense, migration is not perceived as a direct threat, rather it is thought as a side issue that might threaten the stability of the political order or signal that other states might see as a hostile act (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 168). In other words, migration as an issue has traditionally been seen as one of the many extensions of state security. However, this old assumption is challenged with the launch of the concept of societal security that introduced a new referent object. In this regard, it is shown that how issues like migration can be perceived as an existential threat by putting an emphasis on identity.

The concept of societal security first introduced in the book named "*Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*" (Wæver *et al.*, 1993) in order to extend the scope of security literature that focused on mainly environmental and economic sectors (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.213). Here, the concept of societal security offers a different referent object than state sovereignty. It is noted that the main referent object for the "military, political, economic and environmental security is the state" while cultural identity identified as "the referent object" for societal security (Wæver *et al.*, 1993, p. 26). While sovereignty is a must-have condition for a state to survive and continue its existence, preservation of the cultural identity is the survival condition for the society (Wæver, 1995, p. 67). Wæver *et al.* (1993, pp. 25–26) argues that identity is the survival of an society simply because it is how an society comprehends the existence of existential threat as it is assumed that they will no longer live as they are. In this sense, this conceptualization distinguishes between the security of state and security of society and set forth the idea that security of the state and security of the society does not always align on the same axis, for instance, minorities might be threatened by their own state (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 213). Thus, the realist idea that state and society is synonymous

terms refuted by the introduction of the societal security which was launched in the light of the developments of ethnic separatism in Yugoslavia and Soviet Union as well as the visible reluctance against the expansion of European Union and its integration policies which reveals that security concerns and interest of the society and state do not coexist in all contexts (Bilgin, 2003, p. 211). Therefore, societal security is defined as a society's persistence to maintain its essence against the change and current or future threats (Wæver *et al.*, 1993, p. 23).

In the securitization logic, the securitizing actor often claims that they are speaking on behalf of the nation. However, the word “nation” is an ambiguous concept since the meaning of the term shows a variance from place to place. Buzan *et al.* (1998, p. 120) argue that there are different examples where the nation is self-defined in terms of people living in the territory of the state or in other cases it is defined in terms of ethnicity meaning that the share of the common culture, bloodline and, language. Therefore, the word nation can be understood differently in different contexts. Societies, on the other hand, refer to the groups within the state. While it is mainly used synonymously with the nation, it can be referred to as the various religious or racial groups as well. The idea here is that these collectivities, groups and such are self-constructed identity-based communities, in other words, “imagined communities” (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 120). Therefore, any threats to identity also result from the construction of something which threatens the proclaimed “we”. In this setting, migration becomes one of the common issues that can be perceived as a threat to societal security.

It is further argued that the issue of migration can also be approached from an economic and political standpoint. However, it is often dramatized through cultural end since the cultural aspect is at the heart of the security drama which explains why the majority of discourses constructed upon the notion of identity thereby creating the understanding of “self and other” dichotomy (Huysmans, 1995, p. 61).

Drawing upon the concepts of securitization and societal security, Jef Huysmans (1995) stresses that there is a growing feeling of insecurity in societies that leads the xenophobic and racist stance against migrants and refugees since they are conceived as the source of insecurity. It is not only the individual security but also the whole collective identity of the nation threatened by the foreigners which creates the dichotomy of self and others.

Huysmans talks about how easy to turn migration into a security issue if it is placed in security logic that perceives migrations as a threat to collective identity. In order to deal with such threats, small groups within the society unite and set aside their differences which make it clear who to trust and who to fear. It is argued that a nation becomes a nation in order to face other nations. In this sense, identifying the other (migrants) identifies the self (society). Adopting the Hobbesian understanding, Huysmans argues that when there is a feeling of fear which is cannot be grasped as an object; it becomes an abstract feel such as death. The solution to avoid such an ending is finding a way to destroy it. In this analogy, migrants pair up with the threat which is death. Migrants, therefore, becomes an issue that must be dealt with immediately. In line with Huysmans' argument, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 32). sees the feeling of fear as a facilitating condition in the securitization process. It is argued that the likelihood of something to be perceived as a threat such as migration to is greater if the particular object is historically associated with threats, thus; the securitization attempt would be more likely to be justified (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 32–33). In this sense, the presence of the foreign and the alien historically connected with the threat.

Buzan et al (1998, p. 122) stress that there are two different ways that societies can response to such threats with either taking actions through the themselves or moving the issue to the political sphere by placing it to the state agenda which can result in stricter policies and border controls. While it is relatively easier to point out new developments regarding the migration policies and border controls both in the domestic and EU level, it is harder to identify the actions that are carried out by the communities. In this context, some scholars highlighted how these fears and anxieties related with the migration manifested in xenophobic and racist behaviors and the important role of such behaviors on the securitization of migration process (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Ibrahim, 2005; Toğral, 2016; Chebel d'Appollonia, 2017; Tsoukala, 2018).

It is argued that one of the notable treats of the Western European societies after the Cold-War period is the production of a discourse that marked by the fear of instability and disruption. The source of these fears linked to the alien may it be the Muslim, Hispanic, or immigrant in general. (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 22). As Huysmans (1995, p. 54) points out, linking migration with the insecurity of the collective identity is also evident

in Western academic literature and debates. The infamous concept “Clash of Civilizations?” which is coined by Samuel Huntington (1993) had a significant impact on this subject. Huntington divides the world into multiple civilizations and argues that cultural and ethnic identities of each civilization will constitute the foundation of future conflicts in the new era. Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 29) critically approach this conceptualization by arguing that through such perceptions migrants presented as non-adaptable entities. Furthermore, the fears which emanate from the idea that migrants are reluctant to integrate with the host society by having fixed and unchangeable cultural characteristics and motives to maintain their own cultures creates a presumption that integration process becomes a cultural problem through presentation of "migrants as the cultural other" which creates a conflictual relationship between the migrants and host society (Ibid).

In a similar line, Maggie Ibrahim (2005) investigates how cultural difference is associated with the threat and shows how the use of the cultural difference in the discourses should be read as a racist discourse. Adopting the concept "new racism" that coined by the Martin Barker (1981, p. 24) which refers to the idea that no ethnic or national community is superior or inferior to one another yet they are different, Ibrahim (2005, p. 163) calls the securitization of migration as "the most modern form of racism". This racist understanding does not lie with the idea of biological superiority; rather it is manifested in the idea of cultural superiority. It is argued that the discourse is built upon the idea that cultural difference destabilizes the order and creates social breakdown. One prominent feature of this new racist thought is based on the idea that cultural pluralism will eventually lead to ethnic conflicts that endangers the coherence and stability of both state and society (2005, p. 165) This discourse has been constructed in order to legitimize the methods that limit the entrance of immigrants and asylum seekers. Thus, it is stressed that through looking from this lens it might be possible to realize how migrant-as-a threat rhetoric re-actualizes the racist discourse by using cultural difference narrative as a criterion to justify exclusionary and discriminatory actions.

Burcu Togrul (2016, p. 220) stress that this new form of racism is "much more hidden" and "respectable" through configurations that it has built on, such as identity and value preservation against other cultures and effects that drives from them and disrupts the

stability. However, it is noted that this innocent establishment of new racist rhetoric does not necessarily mean dropping the older forms of racist practices; it provides the same exclusionary and discriminatory discourses through the narrative of cultural differences instead of biological differences. In this sense, while we do not see the any mention regard the race in the traditional and biological sense, it contributes to preservation of hierarchies based on racial differences which are the sources of oppression (Toğral, 2016, p. 222)

Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia (2017) is another scholar that explores the link between migration, security, and xenophobia. Through observing the increasing convergence of migration and counterterrorism policies, it is shown that how the perception of symbolic threats against the morals, values, and identity of the community reproduced the new forms of xenophobia towards migrants and refugees. Thus, security-driven racism has become a widespread phenomenon in Western societies. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia (2017, p. 261) stresses that public discourse on migration in the EU is constructed on the differentiation of the migrants as "Other" based on religious and ethnic backgrounds as well as the physical appearances. Thus, migrants are not only differentiated in terms of their legal status but also by their ethnic and religious identities. In consequence, these perceptions have been analyzed through the securitization of racial identities in both Europe and the USA.

International migration is not only seen as a threat to the culture and collective identity of the host societies but also the source of the multiple problems in different spheres. In the connection between migration and security, two additional axes also emphasized besides the political and societal axis where the migrations presented as a threat: economic criminological axes (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Buonfino, 2004; Karyotis, 2007).

Huysmans (2000, pp. 761–762) further argued that migration has seen as a "meta-issue" meaning that it is shown as the cause of multiple problems. Same idea shared by Thomas Faist (2006) who argued that immigrants have increasingly been seen as the source of multiple problems ranging from unemployment to increased violence which is described as the meta-politics. In this sense, meta-politics refer to the connection between social problems and security concerns with fears stems from the migration (Faist, 2006, p. 106).

In the economic axis, immigrants have usually been portrayed as an economic danger to the citizens of the host countries (Karyotis, 2007, p. 10). It is argued that the arrival of the migrants into the host country creates a competition among the citizens and migrants regarding the job, education and housing opportunities (Buonfino, 2004, p. 33). The anti-immigrant discourse derives from the idea that immigrants might cause wage levels to fall down as well as raising the expenses on housing as well as additional goods in the market. In this context, the fears arise from the assumption that low-paid migrants taking the jobs of the native population through informal laboring (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, pp. 23–24). Another dimension of the security discourses in this axis is related to the "welfare provisions". In this sense, migrants have been presented as an additional burden to the welfare system of the host countries. Huysmans (2000, p. 767) asserts that when the countries experiencing an economic recession as they experienced in the 1970s, the distribution of social goods and services becomes more competitive and creates a rivalry between the migrants and national citizens. The assumption that migrants put extra weight on the welfare system creates the obvious display of "welfare chauvinism". However, welfare chauvinists do not consider migrants as equal competition partners but free rider who exploit social services. Moreover, it is noted that the existence of the welfare provisions attracts more migrants into the Western European countries which further puts the extra burden on the welfare system (Huysmans, 2000, p. 767).

Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 29) pointed out that through the securitization of migration the distinction between the asylum seeker and migrant progressively weakened. The increasing suspicion towards asylum seekers created a division between the "genuine" and the "false" asylum seekers. It is argued that the national authorities tended to classify most of the asylum seekers as "the false" ones who are migrating just for economic reasons (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 29). Huysmans (2000, p. 755) shares a similar view by stating that since the 1980s immigration has been "politicized through the confusion of asylum and immigration" as asylum seeking are believed to be just an alternative way performing economic migration which shows how easy to connect asylum seekers to illegal migration. The International Organization of Migration (IOM) (2015) explains that migrants are not necessarily asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers are not economic migrants. Asylum-seekers can only achieve refugee status if it is granted legally by the states or the UNHCR (The International Organization of Migration, 2015).

However, as these studies shown, securitizing actors intentionally ignore these distinctions and label everyone as immigrants who are immigrating based on economic benefits. Through this conscious confusion, they are able to include asylum-seekers and refugees to their economic security threat narrative despite the fact that in definition both asylum-seekers and refugees are people who flee from their own country to seek protection. In other words, when securitizing actors use the word 'immigrant' they often include refugees as well as asylum seekers.

In a similar vein, Magdalena Kmak (2015) uses the Foucaultian concept of "homo economicus" and shows how the discourses embedded in European migration law differentiates the EU citizens and immigrants by creating two different example. It is argued that the migration people who are EU citizens is both moral behavior and rational act whereas bogus asylum seekers presented as not only irrational but also immoral (Kmak, 2015, pp. 401–404).

The negative impacts of the incoming migrants are also shown in the "criminal migrant thesis" (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 25). Migrants have often been connected with criminal activities ranging from organized crime to drug and human trafficking to radicalization and terrorization (Karyotis, 2007, p. 9). In the social construction of the migrants as a threat, Tsoukala (2018, p. 171) focuses on how the particular connection between immigration and criminal tendencies is made public even though this connection has never been proved. In fact, many studies come to the conclusion that migrants hardly involved in the activities of organized crime. It is further argued that the reason that some scientific or pseudo-scientific analyses confirm the criminal migrant thesis results from the fact that migrants and citizens of the host societies are treated unequally in the trials (Tsoukala, 2018, p. 173).

2.2. ACTORS IN SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION PROCESS

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25) argue that "security is a self-referential practice" which means that threat is – whether it really exists or not- designated subjectively by the political elites. However, the presentation of migration as a security threat is not enough for the

securitization by itself. The relative audience must accept such claims for a successful securitization which explains why securitization is an essentially intersubjective process. Looking through this lens, it is possible to understand how the presentation of migration as a threat is a political choice.

The subjective construction of migration as a security threat is also emphasized in the literature. For instance, Tsoukala (2018, p. 64) argues that

"social problem is not a verifiable entity but a construction serving ideological interests and that, consequently, its explanation should be integrated into a social construction process, we notice that the immigration issue has been, above all, a major political issue".

In the same vein, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 29) state that "It is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization". Similarly, Huysmans (Huysmans, 2000, p. 762) argues that social and political agencies use the migration as a security threat rhetoric to connect various political issues in their competition over "power, resources, and knowledge". Similarly, Ceyhan & Tsoukala (2002, p. 29) adds that nearly all political actors position themselves from the point of securitizing migration as it may be utilized as a strategic tool to obtain political support for electoral purposes.

In line with the understanding of securitization as a political tool, Huysmans (1998c) emphasizes on Hobbesian state of nature and Schmittian friend/enemy distinction regarding how migration securitized as a technique of government. The article argues that following the Schmittian political realism, securitization turns into government technique which revives the fear of "violent death" through fabricating the existential threat and with this way it artificially creates an abrupt disruption in daily lives which creates a shock and unites the essentially fragmented society.

In Schmittian political realism, the perceived threat is more than a problem, instead, it is the essence of politics. Thus, the political authority legitimizes its rule on society in the face of the enemy. The sovereignty of the state lies on the supposition which is based on the idea that political authority is the ultimate decider which means it is in the hand of the political authority to whether to step in and employ the emergency measurements against the existential threat (Williams, 2003, pp. 515–516). Huysmans (1998c, p. 587) further argued that the fabrication of the enemy is the first step to securitization; however, it has

more function than that. The emergency actions also define normal politics, thus, securitization emerges as a powerful technique for grounding and legitimating the political regime.

The significant place of discourses in the construction of a threat is also highlighted by Alessandro Buonfino (2004). In her article, she investigates how the migration is politicized at the national level and how the conceptualization of migration has become a hegemonic discourse among the member states of the European Union over the other competing discourses such as economization and human rights. The triumph of the securitization as a dominant government discourse is the result of the invocation of the risk and fear felt by the societies in the face of mass migration since securitization is the best possible option for the national governments in the quest of maintaining existing distribution of power in the socio-political terrain.

The dynamic interplay between the political actors and public opinion is investigated by Gattinara & Morales (2017) through conducting an empirical analysis of the dynamics in public opinion and party politicization of the immigration in seven EU member states between 1993 and 2013. The comprehensive empirical data shows how political parties address immigration and create political strategies through public attitudes about immigration. It is noted that despite the fact that there is a variation between countries regarding how migration is perceived and linked to the security in the political sphere, these links pair up with the public attitudes on insecurity in nearly all cases. Thus, the likelihood of political parties to emphasize multifaceted security aspects of migration increases in the situations that the public perceives migration as a security issue.

The usual suspects of securitization of the migration process are often thought of as the right-wing and nationalist parties. Since radical right parties are selected as the securitizing actors in this study, more discussion on their history, the role that play, what kind of securitizing actors they are and how they securitize the migration issue in the securitizing process will be discussed in the next chapter in detail through utilizing the case studies.

However, it is important to note here that there are only a handful of studies that analyzes the securitization of migration in depth from the perspective of the radical right parties.

Thus this is the reason why this study argues that more attention should be given to these parties as a securitizing actor. Lazaridis and Skleparis (2015) examine the Greek case while Lazaridis and Tsagkroni (2015) focus on the right-wing parties from Scandinavia. Both studies show that throughout their existence, right-wing parties have changed their attitudes and securitized migration in order to strengthen their electoral support. However, the success or the failure of these parties very much lies governments' efficacy to adjust the policies on migration since those parties present themselves as the alternative option to comfort the fears of the societies.

While it is assumed that anti-immigrant discourses serve as a support for electoral games for right-wing parties, Huysmans (2000, p. 758) argues that one should not be tempted to such reductionist perspective since multiple actors involved into the process such as national governments, police networks, EU institutions, grass-roots and the domestic and global media. Similar idea shared by Buonfino (2004, p. 24) who asserts that production of migration as a security threat is the result of the dynamic interplay between national governments, mass media, and public opinion. Karyotis (2007, p. 11) notes that radical right parties have internalized the nativist and racist discourses which help them to gain electoral support noticeably especially after the 9/11 events all across Europe. In consequence, a lot of liberal parties who shied away from the migration issue felt the electoral pressure and adopted the opinions that more aligned with the securitization logic.

Religious actors have been shown as a significant non-political actor in the securitization of migration. Karyotis & Patrikios (2010) explores the role and respective powers of both political and religious elites as securitizing actors in the securitization of the migration process in Greece. The findings of the quantitative analysis show that religiosity is one of the primary factors in the construction of the anti-immigrant stance in Greece. In fact, it is shown that the strength of religious messages that revives the nationalistic attitudes coming from the Orthodox Church even overweight the political messages which explain the persistence of anti-immigrant behaviors in Greece despite the fact that political elites started to shift towards alternative discourses.

Another significant element in the securitizing process is considered as the role that the media plays. The recent studies on this topic put forward the idea that the media apparatus plays an important role in the process not as the securitizing actors but instead as a

functional actor (Caviedes, 2015, 2017). Buonfino (2004, p. 34) argues the main reason media just like right parties adopts the anti-immigrant rhetoric is derives from the assumption that the most effective way to get masses behind is arousing their fears on their well-being. In this light, several case studies conducted upon the role of media in securitizing migration.

Fred Vultee (2010) conducts a survey on the effects of articles that presents migration as a security problem in the media. The empirical results show that when the issue is securitized, it is more likely to produce trust in governments since the people who are already inclined to trust the governments are quicker to acknowledge what is framed as a threat, thus ready to grant exceptional powers to government to face with the threat. In this regard, when migrants are associated with terrorism, the audience receives the signal that resources should be directed towards this issue.

Boswell (2012) looks at how immigration policy in the UK is affected by the information supply. It is argued that the amount information supply determines the political attention towards the issue since once the problem gain mass media attention the likelihood of political attention given to the issue significantly increases because otherwise, the political elites that fail to give enough attention to the presented issue will hold accountable by the media, opposition parties, and interest groups. In order to avoid such consequences, political elites more likely to put attention on issues that surfaced through the media which explains why immigration policies attracted considerable attention from the political elites in the UK. As a result, the media come forward as an important functional actor.

Another analysis is conducted by Alexander Caviedes (2017) who investigates the role of media agents in the securitization of the migration process looking through cases of the UK, Germany, and Spain. With adopting multiple perspectives, it is shown that media articles that published on migration issue differ from each other in terms of narrative. For instance, the problematique of the border is surpassing all other narratives in the media of both the UK and Spain whereas the same thing can be said on the connection between migration and criminality in Germany.

The media as a functional actor and its influence on securitization process is also highlighted by Buzan et al. (1998). It is claimed that, media is telling who is "us" and who is "them".

2.3. SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN THE EU

After the World War II came to an end, the Western European countries were economically devastated and had to face significant political and economic consequences. In this context, the migrants are welcomed as a necessary labor force to rebuild up the economic infrastructure (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 22). In fact, migration in the 1950s and 1960s was primarily seen as the cheap and extra workforce for the Western European countries; thus migration controls were rather permissive due to the fact that the illegal workforce provides even more flexibility and exploitability (Huysmans, 2000, pp. 753–754). This perspective, however, has increasingly shifted towards more restrictive policies in the 1970s as migration started to be a public concern with the developments of family reunion and the realization that temporary workers becoming permanent guests. Georgios Karyotis (2007, p. 3) notes that due to the 1973 Oil Crisis and the increasing unemployment rates, governments of European countries started to pay more attention to migration control policies as the national fears regarding the immigration has become more visible in the European Communities. Huysmans (2000, p. 754) stresses that, however, despite the stricter migration policies, the perception of migration did not change entirely since free movement of people disregarded in the development of continental domestic market system. Thus, the movement of citizens from non-Western countries perceived as a marginal issue.

Since the 1980s, however, the linkage between migration and security has become visible in the EU's agenda which inherited the national fears and anxieties of the Member States. One of the most important decisions regarding this connection is taken in Council Regulation 1612/68. According to this decision, free movement of people are divide into citizens of Member States and third world countries which laid down the idea "fortress Europe" (Ugur, 1995, pp. 966–967). The Paris Summit of 1973 further cemented the idea that nationals of Member States should be granted additional special rights while at the

same time it is asserted that legislation for foreigners was needed (Huysmans, 2000, p. 754).

In this period, migration became a significant issue within the intergovernmental relations. Thus, intergovernmental cooperation on security issues corresponds with the establishments of TREVI (stands for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence Internationally) as well as with the Ad hoc Group on Immigration group. The primary goal of the TREVI Group was to strengthen the collectivity in fighting terrorism and strengthening internal security between the Member States. In the 1980s, this cooperation progressively extended to include not only terrorism and internal security but also illegal migration and organized crime and further cemented with the Ad hoc Group on Immigration (Karyotis, 2007, p. 4). The experiences of TREVI and Ad hoc Group on Immigration encouraged the establishment of the European Police Office (Europol) which initially developed to fight against drug trafficking but gradually extended into other areas related to immigration (Karyotis, 2007, p. 5). Thus, this gradual intergovernmental cooperation regarding migration policy made its way to the constitutional structure of the EU.

The Schengen Treaties, which was initially signed by France, Germany, and Benelux countries in 1985, is also seen as one of the most significant marks in the development of cooperation internal security. With the Schengen Treaties, it is agreed upon the establishment of free movement between the signatory states which abolished the internal border controls. The agreement further supplemented by the Schengen Convention in the 1990s in which a common visa policy is offered along with the idea to get rid of internal border controls. Both the Schengen Agreement and Convention then were enacted and became effective in 1995.

Karyotis (2007, p. 4) also argues that the important development for framing migration as a security issue was the decision of Single European Act (SEA) in 1992 with the purpose of executing internal market system in order to actualize movement of resources and human capital throughout continent without bothering with internal borders. In quest of SEA, the scope of policies rapidly shifted from the internal borders to strengthen the external borders. Thus, "the Europeanization of migration policy" connected to the security discourses. Huysmans (2000, p. 760) argues that the project of the internal market

spread to the security project. Market not only improves the free movement citizens and goods but also facilitates ill-activities performed by terrorists, criminals and illegal migrants. Thus, migration connected with the problems marked by the transnational movement. Huysmans argues that this is apparent in the convention that implemented the Schengen Agreement of 1985 made the bridge between the issues of immigration with criminal activities like terrorism and connected it with the border control (Huysmans, 2000, p. 760).

Following the impetus developed in SEA and the Schengen group, The Maastricht Treaty introduced the Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs in 1992. In consequence, the migration issue has become the part of intergovernmental arrangement in EU. However, after a while, the dissatisfactions emerged from the Third Pillar and its intergovernmental nature. Thus moving the issues related to migration to First Pillar became the top issue in the agenda (Huysmans, 2000, pp. 755–756). With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the change is made in policy development hereby moving its responsibility to First Pillar from the Third. Thus issues relating to migration communitarized and as Karyotis (2007, p. 6) puts it open the floodgates for Europeanization of migration policy.

The impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the securitization of migration is also highlighted as a critical juncture in the development of common migration policies in the EU (Faist, 2006; Fauser, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Karyotis, 2007; Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015).

Thomas Faist (2006) is one of the scholars that put emphasis on the 9/11 events and its implications on security-migration nexus. It is noted that even before the events of 9/11, the anti-immigrant discourses were present. The 9/11 events seem to have escalated the flow of securitization of migration. While migration perceived as a threat to the cultural identity prior to the 9/11 events, it has become a direct physical threat to life. One of the main arguments of the article is on the unintended consequences of securitizing migration. Despite the previous attempts to strengthen border controls against the mass migration threat, the number of immigrants failed to decrease. With the 9/11 events, states put more emphasis on strict border controls and surveillance. As a result, especially Muslim migrants all over the West have encountered with the increased antagonism and hostility. Nevertheless, Faist concludes that there is an observable trend of public and

political dialogue between the Western states and Muslim organizations within those countries which might result in enhanced inclusion of these organizations in political life in the future.

Margit Fauser (2006) investigates how attacks of September 11 affected migration policies in Germany, Spain and the UK. While the framing migration as a security issue has been undergoing for a while, the 9/11 attacks reemphasized the security-migration nexus which is visible in the migration policies of the European States. The article shows that immediate restrictive measures taken by Germany and the United Kingdom quickly after the 9/11 events though it was a slower process for Spain. The main argument of the article suggests that the restrictive migration policies of these countries paradoxically overrule the human rights aspect which is one of the principal values that liberal democracies built their legitimacy upon.

In his article Karyotis (2007) focuses on European migration policy especially after the 9/11 events. The underlying argument of the article is that while securitization of migration policies in the EU has its roots in dating back to as early as the 1970s, the 9/11 terrorist attacks accelerated the establishment of an internal security regime in the EU. Even though dominant anti-immigrant discourses challenged by the more liberal migration policies signaled after the Amsterdam Treaty and inclusion of the Commission, the 9/11 terrorist attacks disrupted the development of such policies and justified the even more repressive policies and control mechanisms for immigration. In this sense, migration appeared continually in the economy of the anti-terrorist campaigns thus in the light of these discourses counter measurements are quickly taken by the EU institutions which brought back the exclusionary policies instead of inclusionary ones.

The impacts of 9/11 events on Muslim migrants and minorities further investigated in the literature (Kaya, 2009; Fox and Akbaba, 2015). It is implied that securitization and stigmatization of migration have become an especially fundamental issue after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the US and the following bombings in Madrid and London. Thus, in the light of these events, Islamophobic attitudes further intensified which in the end empowered the societal unrest and anxieties deriving from the immigration (Kaya, 2009, p. 201)

Fox and Akbaba (2015) analyze the discrimination level between Muslim immigrants and minorities and other religious groups in Western states. Using the comprehensive dataset, it is shown that results back up the securitization logic and indicates that especially after the 9/11 attacks and following events, Muslim immigrants have to struggle with much higher levels of discrimination in contrast to other religious groups.

However, some scholars challenged the idea predominant idea that 9/11 events encouraged the more restrictive controls to be taken that led intensification of framing migration as a security issue. For instance, Christiana Boswell (2007) argues that 9/11 events and terrorism threat have not considerably affected the political discourse and practice in EU, thus it is suggested that presence securitization of migration in the light of link between migration controls and terrorism remains non-existent on contrary to claims of critical security literature.

This argument, however, questioned by Vicki Squire (2015) who argues that connecting migration various problems is strongly engraved in European context which soundly created the migration as a threat. In this sense, the perception of migration as a security risk "effectively becomes self-fulfilling in practice" means there is no need for migration to be explicitly linked with terrorism since the concerns and insecurities that derives from the migration blocks the alternative paths from escaping the process of securitization (Squire, 2015, pp. 32–33)

In the light of this contested ideas, Baele and Sterck (2015) explore whether migration has been securitized at EU level or not through a quantitative analysis. This question derives from the fact that there is no consensus on this question and there are even fewer studies that empirically answer this question. The article analyzes the use of security words in EU texts regarding regular issues, migration issues, and hard-case security issues. The results show that the uses of security words are more frequent in the texts regarding migration than regular issues. However, in comparison to hard-case security texts, migration is not as closed as being framed as a security issue. The frequency of security words is more visible throughout the example of illegal migration in contrast to other forms of migration such as legal, asylum, borders thus, it is highlighted that there is a visible change between the wide range of policy fields. Nevertheless, it is shown that

immigration is securitized more than the regular issues which accredit the idea that migration has indeed securitized in the European context.

In this line, Baele and Sterck (2015, p. 1122) argue that there are no quantitative studies regarding the securitization of migration at the EU level. Thus, securitization theory is mostly used in qualitative designs while there only a few attempts in quantitative designs. Based on the literature review of securitization migration, there are only four articles, - which three of them reviewed in earlier parts - Karyotis and Patrikios (2010) regarding role of religious agents in securitization of migration process in Greece. Fred Vultee (2010) regarding the role of media in the securitization of migration process and, Phillippe Bourbeau (2011) securitization of migration in both France and Canada along with the study of Baele and Sterck (2015) have produced empirical securitization of migration cases where there is some sort of quantitative method usage is visible.

2.4. SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION THROUGH OTHER PRACTICES

The main theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis follows the securitization theory and explains the discursive construction of migration as a security problem. While the securitization approach which brings the speech act theory into the Security Studies has been the most influential approach regarding the migration-security nexus, "the governmentality of unease" model that drew inspiration by Michel Foucault's and Pierre Bourdieu's body of thoughts has its fair share in the securitization of migration literature through the works of Didier Bigo (1995, 2002, 2008). Thus, when it comes to the migration-security literature it is important to acknowledge the criticisms towards securitization theory and mention that there are alternative frameworks that approach securitization phenomenon rather differently despite the fact that this study does not implement their premises.

In this regard, Bigo, in contrast to securitization theory, claims that security is neither about survival nor emergency to use urgent measurements. Instead, it is security is related to the routinized bureaucratic decisions and practices of everyday politics that consequently creates the feelings of insecurity, fear, danger, and unease (Bourbeau, 2011,

p. 38). Thus, the securitization process foremost begins with the routinized practices of security professionals such as bureaucrats and police. Bigo (2002, p. 64) argued that securitization of migration is related to the securitizing actors' own interest and to the transformation of tools, in this case technologies, that they use. In other words, security professionals may benefit from the securitization since it allows them to allocate additional resources and eventually more power (Huysmans, 2006, p. 123). Therefore, migration can be securitized without the discursive methods through the routinized everyday practices of security professionals which produce and reproduce the securitization of migration through non-discursive methods. Thus, the result of the securitization process does not create the politics of exception rather it creates governmentality of unease.

In this line, there are some studies that focus on the securitization of the migration process from this perspective (see also Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Huysmans, 2006; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Balzacq, 2008). Some scholars further adopted this logic and criticized the securitization theory by claiming that securitization theory is insufficient to explain the dynamic and complicated nature of the process. For instance, Sarah Leonard (2010) investigates the effect of FRONTEX on the securitization of migration process. It is pointed out in the article that sociological approach that gives privileges the securitizing practices is a much better way to understand the securitization process over securitizing speech acts. The findings of the article suggest that the general activities that are took place in FRONTEX is classified as securitizing practices, thus; it contributes to the continuation of migration to be securitized.

In the same topic, Andrew Neal (2009) explores the case of FRONTEX. It is argued that securitization theory fails to grasp the multifaceted relations of different institutions since the dynamic nature and complexities of this issue far exceed the borders of the securitization logic. The article instead suggests that EU immigration policies and practices of FRONTEX should be approached from a risk analysis perspective. This perspective aims to "manage and regulate the activities of security apparatuses in Member States" (Neal, 2009, p. 353). A similar perspective regarding risk management is also adopted by Rens Van Munster (2009) who advocated the idea that migration issues should be analyzed from risk perspective rather than the perspective of exception.

In another case study, Huysmans and Buonfino (2008) analyze in what extend political elites in the UK have securitized the migration since the 9/11 terrorist attacks through looking at parliamentary debates that link immigration and terrorism. The results show that there is a noticeable reluctance among the political elites to keep connecting migration and terrorism heavily in the political debates. The analysis of parliamentary debates also suggests that the politics of unease model is needed to understand how migration is securitized since the logic of the politics of exception, a perspective that focus on explaining how the issue is framed cannot be used to explain the situation exclusively.

There are also several studies that employ the discursive as well as non-discursive methods in analyzing the securitization of migration in the European context. Bourbeau (2011) analyzes the securitization process of the migration in both France and Canada from the mid-1980s to 2005 by looking at both political actors through the security speech acts and the editorials in the media. The study uses both logic of exception and logic of unease as both logics are proven to be useful in explaining both cases in regard to the securitization of migration. One of the main arguments of the article revolves around the idea that structural and contextual factors have a huge place in the process. For instance, it is shown that the 9/11 attacks had a strong impact on how media and political elites framed the migration in both countries. Additionally, it is debated that while securitization of migration as a process visible in both France and Canada, there is a remarkable disparity in the level of securitization in both countries. In this sense, due to the dynamic interplay between political elites, media, public opinion and pre-existing contexts, the securitization level in France appears to be strong whereas securitization level in Canada appears to be weak. Therefore, Bouerbeau suggests that process ought not be understood as a binary-process instead it should be seen as a continuum where it can be either be strongly or weakly securitized.

Georgios Karyotis (2012) argues that securitization emerges through both discursive and non-discursive methods as it is shown in the Greek migration policies during the 1990s. Using the elite interviews and in-depth contextual analysis, the article shows that migration has securitized in Greece by the political elites in order to pursue the controversial goals while using national interest as a smoke screen.

2.5. CONCLUSION

This chapter investigated the existing literature on migration and security. The literature review of the securitization of migration highlights that international migration has been one of the most salient topics in Europe beginning from the second half of the twentieth century. Especially with the developments of globalization, transnational movements, deterritorialized global markets and, the establishment of the Schengen area, the old assumptions of Westphalian understanding of sovereignty have challenged. With the changing global context, there has been an increasing tendency to look at the issue of international migration from the security lens. As a result, international migration replaced the communist threat of the Cold War period and started to be seen as a security threat to the collective identity of the European societies ever since the 1980s onwards. Furthermore, several studies argued that migration issues not only seen as a security threat to the collective identity and the collective culture of the European societies but also presented as meta-problem. In the literature, there is also a consensus that this perception is gradually constructed by the involvement of multiple actors. Among those actors, - radical right parties have emerged as one of the most influential as well as the most benefiting agents of the securitization process. Thus, in the next part, the concept of radical right will be explored.

3. THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION BY RADICAL RIGHT: THE CASES OF ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY (AFD) AND DANISH PEOPLE'S PARTY (DF)

Myriad of academic pieces have been conducted on the securitization of migration. While some studies focused on EU institutions, others focused on different actors ranging from national governments to media. This rich literature regarding the security/migration nexus helps us understand the fact that securitization of migration is a multi-actor based process cannot be reduced to a single actor. Following the 2015 European migration crisis, radical right parties have achieved remarkable results all over Europe. In this regard, Spierings et al. (2015, p. 3) argue that radical right parties as political actors are becoming a permanent actors in European political life. Through this recent electoral success and with their increased political power, radical right parties in Europe came forward as significant political actors in the securitization of the migration process. In this account Mehmet Gökay Özerim (2013, p. 2197) indicates that in regard to migration, radical right parties are leading the way in the securitizing process.

It should be noted that this study is not interested in how and why radical right parties in Europe have managed to increase their votes in elections following the 2015 European migration crisis. This study puts forward the argument that radical right parties in Europe are not merely adopted the anti-immigrant approach, instead, these parties both perceive and present immigration as a security threat, meaning that it should be the top priority of their specific countries and must be handled in a special way with urgency. The main reason for this argument is that adopting an anti-immigrant position does not necessarily indicate that the actor actively securitizes the migration. Securitization is a specific process that involves multiple steps as securitization theory suggests. Moreover, radical right parties do not possess monopoly over the anti-immigrant rhetoric in Europe alone. Even parties with liberal and social democrat heritage have opted to follow anti-immigrant policies and rhetorics. However, the difference is it's the radical right parties in Europe who claim migration is a security problem that threatens the very existence of their countries. In other words, this study argues that radical right parties in Europe actively and consciously securitize the migration issue. This is why radical right parties

comparing to the other political groups come forward as the important securitizing actors regarding the migration issue.

The identification of radical right parties as securitizing actors in the securitization of the immigration process is, however, not a novelty concerning the field of Security Studies. While the usual suspects of securitization of the migration process have often highlighted as the right-wing and nationalist parties, there is a serious gap and lack of empirical studies in the literature with a clear methodology. This study ultimately aims to fill the gap in the literature by systemically analyzing and providing empirical results on how radical right parties as the political securitizing actors securitize migration through the methodology of security speech act by two specific case studies. In this context, Alternative for Germany (AfD) from Germany and the Danish People's Party (DF) from Denmark have selected as the case studies.

This analysis will not only shed a light on how radical right parties in the European context securitize migration but if they securitize it at all. In the case of securitization, success depends on the persuasion of the target audience as well as putting the emergency measure into action. Thus, the results will show that even if the migration issue is presented as a security threat, the success of the securitization attempt depends on the success of the further steps.

The case studies will be analyzed through the party programs and/or manifestos as well as the public speeches of prominent members of each party. This analysis will be done through the main premises of securitization theory and its methodology of speech act. Before jumping into the case studies, however, it is necessary to clarify some conceptual ambiguity regarding the term "radical right parties" since multiple labels have been used in the literature to classify this new political family in Europe. After the conceptual debate, the historical background of the contemporary radical right parties, will be briefly discussed. Then the reason behind the selection of AfD and DF as the main case studies as well as the resources and data collection will be explained. In the final part of this study, the case studies will be analyzed and the results of these analyses will be laid down.

3.1. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: ANTI-IMMIGRANT, EXTREME OR RADICAL RIGHT?

Klaus von Beyme (1988, p. 14) asserted that "there is virtually no comparative literature on the topic", more and more studies have been conducted on radical right parties in the literature. Starting from the early 1980s onwards, the so called "third wave" of postwar radical right parties have started to achieve gradual success. While Europe has been facing this new phenomenon of radicalization, it is proven to be a hard task to define when this phenomenon first occurred (Lazaridis and Tsagkroni, 2015, p. 207). Even though a significant number of current radical right parties was founded in the 1980s, a proportion of these parties have institutional foundations that go way more back in time even though not necessarily as the radical right parties (Mudde, 2012, p. 4).

Thenceforward initial emergence of contemporary radical right parties in the political scene, various labels are employed to classify and describe this emerging political family. In this sense, there is still no consensus on the label radical right party that is used in this study. For example labels like "extreme right" (Ignazi, 1997; Hainsworth, 2000; Carter, 2005); "right-wing populism" (Decker, 2004), "ethnonationalism" (Rydgren, 2005), "anti-immigrant" (Fennema, 1997; van Spanje, 2010), "radical right" (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Minkenberg, 1998), "populist extremist" (Goodwin, 2011) and "far-right" (Marcus, 2000) have also used in the literature. Additionally, Mudde (2012, p. 3) also notes that the academics have also used terms like "xenophobes", "nativists", "racists", "radical right-wing populists", "neo-fascists" and "neo-Nazis". Thus, there is no consensus in the literature.

In this conceptual debate, Mudde (2007) argues that there is a underlying distinction among the terms radical and extreme. He defines extremism as anti-democratic since the main components of democracy such as majority rule is rejected by the extremists. On the other side of the coin, radicalism acknowledges the fundamental principles of democracy while challenging some important features of liberal democracy such as minority protections.

It is also argued that the majority of the literature on radical right in Europe regards the emergence and intensification of radicalization to be a "response to the threat of mass

migration" (Mudde, 2012, p. 9). In this line, several scholars (Fennema, 1997; Gibson, 2002; Van Der Brug *et al.*, 2005; van Spanje, 2010) argued that radical right parties can be considered as a single-issue parties, therefore; can be referred as the anti-immigrant parties.

Fennema (1997) argues that the core factor that the radical right parties in Western Europe have in common is strong opposition against immigration. Thus, it is proposed that these parties can be called "anti-immigrant parties". However, in later studies, Fennema and Van der Brug (2009) have acknowledged that this proposition only works in Western European radical right parties since the label fails to include the parties from Central or Eastern Europe as immigration is rather limited in those parts and these parties have mobilized against minority ethnic groups and anti-EU sentiments. Van der Brug and Fennema advocate that while the term "anti-immigrant" is appropriate to use for the parties of Western Europe, they prefer to employ the term "radical right" to include a greater and more inclusive European context.

Mudde (2012, p. 10) opposes this argument by stating that while immigration is an important issue for the third wave of the radical right, these parties maintains a deeper ideology and have wider range of issues in their agenda and consequently their constituents' votes for them not only for the issue of immigration but also different reasons. Thus, Mudde asserts that the core features radical parties that are connected to the significant political issues of immigration, crime and corruption. As a result, it would be wrong to call radical right parties as a single-issue parties (Mudde, 2012, p. 9).

Moreover, it is pointed out that while radical right parties in Western Europe shows strong dissent against immigration, that not all anti-immigrant parties are the offsprings of neofascist tradition and it would be wrong to include them into the family of radical right parties (Van der Brug and Fennema, 2009).

Opposing the anti-immigrant party conceptualization, Cas Mudde (2007) coins the infamous term "populist radical right". The study conceptualizes the core ideological features of parties that can be included in this political family. The study argues that there are three core ideologic features of populist radical right parties which are defined as "nativism", "authoritarianism", and "populism" (Mudde, 2007, pp. 22–23)

The first feature, nativism is also underlined as a key ideological feature that contains features like nationalism, xenophobia, and welfare-chauvinism in its dimension. Mudde defines nativism as an ideology that suggests native groups should solely inhabit the state as non-native elements threatens the homogeneous nature of the nation-state (Mudde, 2007, p. 22).

The second element, authoritarianism, can be simply explained as the strict belief in order. (Mudde, 2007, p. 23). Müller (2016) argues that populist who see themselves as the one legitimate representative of the good people, thus they tend to blame the opponents as being illegitimate which tilts them toward authoritarianist tendencies.

Mudde (2004, p. 543, 2007, p. 23) highlights that populism is best understood as a thin-centered ideology. Mudde's argument is also shared by several scholars (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2007; Stanley, 2008; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Martinelli, 2016; Müller, 2016). In this sense, Mudde asserts that populist ideology simply sees society as two separate entity one being homogenous, the pure and the other being antagonistic and the corrupt as the politics should be used as a the way to good people's expression (Mudde, 2004, p. 543).

In accordance with this definition, Mudde underlies two core understandings of populism in the politics of the public. The first understanding suggests that populist discourses conducted based on being simplistic and highly emotional which target the 'gut feeling' of the people. The second understanding emphasizes the idea that swiftly pleasing constituents with and opportunistic policies. Mudde further argues that the general will of the people is the most important thing in the populist democracies even above the rights that are given to every human being which are also protected by the constitution. (Mudde, 2007, p. 23).

Along with Mudde, several other scholars have also underlined the significance of populism regarding the radical right parties. Matthew Goodwin (2011) uses the term "populist extremist" whereas Frank Decker (2004) adopts "populist right". While populism is often thought of as a core feature for radical right parties, the term "populism" has its own fair share of criticisms and concerns in the literature.

In this context, there are different opinions on how to define populism. For example, Kurt Weyland (2001) simply puts that it is a "particularly confusing concept". Ionescu and Gellner (1969) admit that not a single person clear on the subject that populism is whether a doctrine or a movement. Echoing similar opinion, Kirk Hawkins (2010) underlies that neither academic world nor the public is sure about the exact meaning of the word populism. Moffitt and Tormey (2014, p. 381) argue that there is no consensus on the proper conceptualization of populism.

It should be noted here that the concept of the "populist party" has no universal meaning. This is simply because the term populism shows diversity depending on the context that it is used. For example, this term is both used in the Latin American context where the particular populist parties are associated with the left side of the political sphere and in Europe where the particular populist parties are associated with the right side in comparison.

In light of discussion and conceptual background above, the term "radical right" is believed as the most appropriate term to use in this study. First of all, while this study focuses on the immigration phenomenon, it is believed that the term "anti-immigrant parties" came up short for the correct conceptualization since radical right parties the immigration is not the only issue in the agenda of radical parties. Moreover, radical right parties do not have absolute monopoly as other parties use anti-immigrant rhetoric in their party programs time to time. Secondly, it is preferred that "radical right" is a more appropriate term comparing to "extreme right" by following Mudde's explanation. Lastly, while it is believed that populism is a core concept of the "third wave of the radical right" in Europe, the term is "populist party" is a rather ambiguous term that has different correspondence depending on the context it is manifested in. Thus, this study opted to go with the term "radical right" alone in order to provide a all-encompassing conceptualization. In the next section, the emergence and the development of the contemporary radical right parties in Europe will be discussed.

3.1.1. Contemporary radical right parties in Europe

Contemporary radical right parties in Europe, also known as the third wave of radical right parties, regained its place in the literature once again after gradually achieving

electoral support from electorates since the early 1980s (Mudde, 2012, p. 4). Throughout this time, their position is shifted from being the marginal actors of politics to permanent and regular actors of political life. In this transformation, however, the role of radical right parties' anti-immigrant party policies has started to gain attention from scholars. In general, it is safe to say that radical right parties of contemporary Europe, especially in the last 20 years, have often identified with anti-immigrant views (Fennema, 1997; Van Der Brug *et al.*, 2005; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2009). This association is not only made through current party policies but also the ideological and historical heritages that these parties have been carrying. While the anti-immigrant standpoint isn't the single policy that radical right parties in Europe have at hand, it has become one of the most common tools that are used in their electoral campaigns.

The important point that should not be overlooked that the European radical right does not represent a homogenous unity as a whole. Therefore, when the term "radical right in Europe" is used, it does not necessarily refer to a completely cohesive unit. A bigger difference is visible between the Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Europe. In this account, Mudde (2012, pp. 6–7) argues that radical right parties outside of Western Europe have different characteristics as the parties and party systems are not as institutionalized as the Western counterparts and have a stronger non-party radical right in comparison. Thus, in this study, in accordance with the selected case studies of AfD in Germany and DF in Denmark, the focus is given to the Western and Northern European countries and radical right originating in the Western part of Europe.

According to Mudde (2012, p. 4) French National Front (FN) founded in early 1970s, can be considered as "*pater familias*" of the third wave radical right parties in Europe as the majority of the new radical right parties have adopted FN's party policies and propagandas. Even though most of the third-wave radical right parties in Europe have founded after the 1980s, some of them have been carrying longer institutional legacies such as the the Swiss People's Party (SVP) and Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) (Mudde, 2012, p. 4).

Among the third wave of radical right parties in Europe, there are salient examples of parties that have made big jumps in electoral results in the late 1990s. For example, FN in France has increased its vote numbers to 14.9 percent in 1997 up from only 0.2 in 1981.

In another example, FPÖ in Austria has increased its vote share more than 5 times from 5 percent in 1983 to almost 27 percent in 1999. Another remarkable case is observed in Switzerland where SVP doubled its vote numbers from 11.1 percent in 1983 to 22.5 in 1999.

However, despite the electoral successes of these parties, it would be hard to say that the 1990s were the golden ages of radical right parties since the electoral performance of radical right parties has shown high variance across Western Europe. Mudde (2012, p. 4) notes that in the beginning, only a handful amount of radical right parties achieved the 15 percent threshold in the parliamentary elections while only one-third of the countries have achieved votes that in the range of 5 and 15 percent. Moreover, the majority of the radical right parties in Europe could not break through the 5 percent threshold. In most of the countries, radical right parties could not bail out themselves from being the marginal actors of political life. In this account, Goodwin (2011, p. 3) notes radical right parties in some notable countries such as Germany, Spain, Portugal along with Ireland haven't be able to overcome electoral difficulties.

Furthermore, the very parties that have achieved significant electoral success have started to stagnate after the end of the 1990s. For instance, just in ten year period, FN in France has dropped from 14.9 percent to only 4.3 percent whereas FPÖ in Austria has only achieved 10 percent of the total votes in 2002 after achieving party record 26.9 percent in the previous election.

Nevertheless, the success of some of these parties cannot be ignored. Despite being small in number, some of these parties have found their ways to the coalition governments, which is something that can not even be imagined before the 1990s (Williams, 2006). For example, FPÖ after the 1999 national elections in Austria, Lega Nord (LN) after the 2001 national elections in Italy and Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) after the 2002 national elections in the Netherlands have become part of the coalition governments.

Entering the 21st century, radical right parties in Europe have revitalize their appeal through prioritizing the immigration issue in their party policies. September 11 attacks in the US, in particular, is considered as a key event in this process (Faist, 2006; Fauser, 2006; Huysmans, 2006; Karyotis, 2007; Lazaridis and Wadia, 2015). Karyotis (2007, p.

7) underlines that the significant amount of radical right parties has shifted their party policies towards immigration issues through adopting the racist discourses.

Radical right parties in Europe have started to establish an electorate base and has come forward as an alternative choice for the solution of concurrent problems in European political life. In consequence, even liberal parties who shied away from the migration issue felt the electoral pressure and adopted more restrictive policies in order to prevent radical right's rise. One particularly interesting study on this subject is conducted by Joost van Spanje (2010). In his article, the electoral pressures created by anti-immigration parties on other main-stream parties are investigated. The results show that anti-immigration parties not only put pressure on main-stream parties but on entire party systems. Van Spanje also underlines that radical right parties in Western and North Europe have managed to affect policy output without entering the government. Thus, radical right parties have turned themselves into influential actors in the politics without entering the government.

In recent years, Europe has experienced the rise of radical right parties across Europe. In Austria "Freedom, Party of Austria (FPÖ)", in Belgium, "Flemish Interest (VB)", in Denmark, "Danish People's Party (DF)", in Finland, "Finns Party (PS)", in Germany, "Alternative for Germany", in Italy, "Northern League (LN)", in France, "National Front (FN)", in Norway, "Norwegian Progress Party (FrP)", in Sweden, "Sweden Democrats", in Switzerland, "Swiss People's Party" (SVP) has become increasingly influential political actors in Europe thanks to the success that they achieved in elections in the last decade.

In this account, similar to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 2015 European migrant crisis comes forward as a critical juncture in the European political context. This event is characterized by high numbers of migrants entering into Europe from the Middle East and Africa through the Mediterranean Sea and South and East Europe. With millions of immigrants entering Europe, the immigration issue has quickly turn into one of the key political issues in the political agenda of Europe. In this context, Table 3.1. shows how radical right parties, Western Europe in particular, have performed in general elections before as well as after the 2015 European migration crisis.

Table 3. 1: Electoral Performances of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe before and after 2015

Country	Party Names	Latest Vote% before 2015	The most recent Vote% during or after 2015
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	20,5 (2013)	26,0 (2018)
Belgium	Vlaams Belang (VB)	3,7 (2014)	12,0 (2018)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	12,3 (2011)	21,1 (2015)
Finland	Finns Party (PS)	19,1 (2011)	17,65 (2015)
France	National Rally (RN)	13,6 (2012)	13,2 (2017)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	4,7 (2013)	12,6 (2017)
Greece	Golden Dawn (XA)	6,9 (2012)	7,0 (2015)
Italy	Lega Nord (LN)	4,1 (2013)	17,4 (2018)
Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV)	10,1 (2012)	13,1 (2017)
Norway	Progress Party (FrP)	16,3 (2013)	15,3 (2017)
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	12,9 (2011)	17,5 (2015)
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	26,6 (2011)	29,4 (2015)

Source: The Table conducted by Mudde (2012, p. 6) updated for the needs of this study.

While the increase rate in vote percentage is not identical for every single party due to historical, political and sociological differences of each country, it is crystal clear that majority of the radical right parties have been able to up their public support in a significant manner. Thus, just like the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the 2015 European migration crisis has served as a critical juncture, where migration issue has been used as a significant strategy to reach out to the public.

3.2. THE CASE SELECTIONS

In order to analyze how radical right parties securitize immigration, the analysis must be done at the national level. This is because each country has a different historical context regarding their migration history and radical right movements. To be able to analyze the process, Alternative for Germany (AfD) from Germany and the Danish People's Party (DF) from Denmark are two radical right parties that are going to be analyzed in this study.

The selection of AfD and DF offers two ideal cases where the main question of this study can be analyzed but also the comparison of these two cases provides a comparative edge. In this sense, the selection of AfD and DF is not solely based on similarities and differences between two parties but rather a combination of both.

First of all, the significant leap that both parties have displayed in their national elections after 2015 distinguishes them from the other radical right parties in the continent. This leap is particularly interesting because both AfD and DF have managed to do this in the context where the electoral expectations from radical right parties are rather weak. In Germany, because of the Nazi experience, many radical right parties were forced to shut down in the past, and until the success of AfD in 2017, no radical right party had been able to get over the election threshold and take their place in Bundestag. In other words, AfD by increasing its vote from 4.7 percent to 12.6 percent in 2017 elections, has performed well above expectations considering the past performances of the radical right parties.


Similarly, Denmark's historical context regarding the radical-right movements is considered as a weak one considering Denmark is often thought of as a prototype country of the Scandinavian model where characteristics of the welfare state, multiculturalism, and cultural tolerance highly touted. However, in the 2015 general elections, DF has gathered 21.1 percent of the total votes and has become the 2nd biggest party in the Danish parliament. In this context, the electoral success of AfD and DF in recent years becomes quite intriguing in the light of the historical background and the weak radical-right cult in both countries.

Concerning the migration history, both of the countries are not unfamiliar with the migration phenomenon in their past. Germany was home to high numbers of immigrants following the years after the end of World War II. In this context, Germany emerged as one of the largest immigration countries in Europe. Moreover, Germany also emerged as the main destination country for immigrants after the 2015 migration crisis in Europe. According to the statements made in early 2016, more than 1 million refugees entered the country (Thomas, 2016) (Figure 4.1.). In this context, 14.8% of the German population today consists of immigrants (UN Migrant Stock, 2017). More than 85% of these immigrants are people who are not European citizens (Eurostat, 2017).

Figure 4. 1: Number of migrants who registered to seek in Germany, 2015

Asylum Surge

Number of migrants who registered to seek asylum in Germany, by country of origin, which totaled nearly 1.1 million in 2015



Source: Germany's Federal Ministry of the Interior


THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Source: Thomas, A. (2016) 'Record Number of Asylum Seekers Flood Germany', The Wall Street Journal, (6 January)

Denmark, on the other side of the coin, has also been hosting immigrants with the expansion of the manufacturing sector in the 1960s. According to the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior (2018), while immigrants with the non-Western origin constituted about 1 percent of the population in Denmark in the 1980s, today, more than 8 percent of the population has a non-western background, corresponding to

approximately half a million people. (Figure 4.2.). Thus, the statistics show that In the past 40 years, the number of native Danish population remained almost identical at the range of 5 million. However, a little less than 6 million people live in Denmark today, thus the increase of nearly one million people in Denmark's population is constituted by the immigrants, especially immigrants with the non-Western background. Among the 1 million immigrants residing in Denmark, just a little less than 75 percent of the immigrants are non-national, meaning that they do not have citizenship from any EU member states (Eurostat, 2017).

Figure 4. 2: Danish population divided by origin from 1980 to 2018




Anm.: Befolkningen 1. januar.
 Kilde: Danmarks Statistik og egne beregninger.

Source: Indenrigsministeriet, Ø. (2018) 'Parallelsamfund i Danmark', (30)

According to the Statista dataset (2019) (Figure 4.3.), The total number of immigrants in Denmark reached its highest point in 2015 and peaked just under 99 thousand. After immigration become a part of the political agenda, the yearly immigration numbers experienced a slight decrease down to 87 thousand range in 2018.

Figure 4. 3: Number of immigrants in Denmark from 2008 to 2018



Source: STATISTA (2019) Number of immigrants in Denmark from 2008 to 2018.

While the recent statistical data regarding immigration in Germany and Denmark is useful to understand of each countries' immigration issue in recent years, it does not reveal much. Despite Germany have been accommodating a greater number and ratio of immigrants compared to Denmark, DF has gathered 21,1 percent of the total votes whereas AfD has only achieved 12,6 percent of the total votes in their respective national elections following the 2015 European migration crisis. Thus, the greater the number of immigrants in one country doesn't necessarily mean that the vote percentage of the radical right party will also be greater.

In this line, a wide range of studies has been conducted on the relationship regarding the increased number of immigrants along with the electoral success of radical parties in European context. However, Mudde (2012, p. 12) indicates that "the results are strikingly contradictory". For instance, in his study, Matt Golder (2003) detected a positive correlation regarding the number of non-native people and the electoral gains of the radical right parties in particular countries. On the other hand, the studies of Messina (2007), Wendt (2003) and Kitschelt and McGann (1995) indicate conflicting results. Swank and Betz (2003), Lubbers (2001), Knigge (1998) and Wendt (2003) also have

found that there is a positive correlation regarding the quantity of incoming new immigrants whereas Dülmer and Klein (2005), Jesuit and Mahler (2004), Kitschelt and McGann (1995) have found no correlation whatsoever.

In this sense, this study neither claims that the success of radical right parties has resulted from their anti-immigrant position nor claims that there is a positive correlation within the immigration numbers and the success of these specific parties. Instead, AfD and DF are primarily selected because of the different political power levels that each party possesses in their respective countries.

While both AfD and DF have increased their electoral votes around 8 percent in the most recent national elections during and/or after 2015, both parties have ultimately achieved different political powers at the end. In this account, AfD has managed to achieve 12,6 percent of the total votes in 2017 whereas DF has increased its vote to 21,1 percent in 2015. Since securitization theory strongly underlines the significance of the authority and the power of the securitizing actor in successful securitization cases, these two parties come forward as proper examples in comparison.

Another important reason for the selection of AfD and DF as the case studies is related to the materials that are going to be used in this study. While developing the securitization approach, the Copenhagen School adopted Derrida's notion that "there is nothing outside of the text" understanding. In this sense, regardless of the outside context, the speech act event has its own unique power of creating a new reality and the speech act event can only be understood within the scope of the text itself. The first materials that are going to be used in the analysis will be the party manifestos and/or party programs of each party. While the party manifesto of AfD is conducted in 2017, DF has not published a new party manifesto since 2009 and still using its document from 2002 as the main source of the party program on its official website. Thus, through following the securitization theory and the adopted understanding of "there is nothing outside of the text", it is expected that both published materials will be free of outside context since what important is not the outside context but the context that texts establish in itself. In other words, since this study argues that both AfD and DF as radical right parties are securitizing actors that actively securitize the migration issue, it is expected that documents of both parties will follow

the similar steps of securitization process since the securitization theory gives an archetype on how an issue is constructed as a security issue.

The second set of materials that are going to be used in the analyses will be the speeches of the prominent members of each party. However, the speeches, due to excessive numbers, are selected from the dates between 2015 and 2019. Therefore, in the second part of the analysis of each case, there will be no time difference between the materials. In this way, it is expected that similar to the explanation above, the speeches will not show different results since the security speech act follows similar rhetoric that securitization theory suggests. As a result, the notion of “there is nothing outside of the text” understanding will be tested through in the materials that are published at a different timeline as well as a similar timeline. More detail regarding the selection of relevant materials will be given below.

3.2.1. Resources and data collection

The materials that are going to be used in the analyses will be the party manifestos of AfD and DF and the public speeches of the party members of each party. Materials used in this study were obtained by a certain filtration process. In order to reach the discourses of the parties about migration, only the relevant parts that migration issue is mentioned in the party manifestos were included in the analysis. In the leader speeches, the data was filtered through some words in order to reach the relevant discourses. In this direction, words such as immigration, immigrant, Muslim, and refugee were used in filtering. The exact wording will be laid down in the parts of each individual case.

AfD’s party manifesto was published in 2017 and is accessible through the party’s official websites. A 94-page manifesto presents the party's views and positions on many issues, including migration.

The party program of the Danish People’s Party also known as Principprogram is accessible through the party’s official website in Danish as well as English. This party program was established in 2002 and the main premises of the program are still maintained to this day. The Latest Party Manifesto of DF was published in 2009 as a 158 pages long document. The party program, which was published in 2002 with a printed

version of 6 pages and later published on the party's official website, still appears to be DF's current party program. Therefore, the main text to be examined will be the program published in 2002, but in the program published in 2009, issues related to migration will also be included in the analysis.

Leader discourses will be included in the analysis in addition to the party manifestos of the two parties. In this context, the discourses that are thought to be related to migration after filtering will be discussed. Accessing these speeches directly from the official websites of the two parties considered important in order to prevent selection bias from secondary resources. These materials will be systematically analyzed using the theory of securitization and its methodology of speech act. In this analysis, threat construction and referent objects, facilitating conditions, extraordinary measures, and attitudes of the audience will be underlined.

Copenhagen School suggest that an issue such as migration should be read in the societal sector. For the concept of the societal sector, migration is socially constructed as a threat to national identity, culture, and society. Following this premise, this study hypothesizes that AfD and DF were presented migration as a threat to the survival of the collective identity, culture, and society. In the literature review on migration-security nexus and the securitization process, it is emphasized that migration has historically been associated with the collapse of the welfare system and the increasing criminal activities as well as terrorism. In this context, it is argued that the collapse of the welfare system and the criminal activities are some issues that have served as facilitating conditions for both AfD and DF. In this analysis, these hypotheses will be tested in addition to the question of how AfD and DF construct migration as a security problem.

3.3. CASE STUDY: ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY (AfD)

3.3.1. Radical right in Germany

This part of the study is going to zoom in into the historical background of radical right parties in Germany which will provide valuable information on how radical right movements and parties come into existence concerning the internal dynamics of German political life. Additionally, this part will expose the main similarities and differences

between the AfD and past radical right parties which will shed light upon the unprecedented success of AfD.

While the main timeline in this part will be in the post-war period, it is useful to look at a wider conjuncture which includes the pre-war context. The National Socialist German Worker's Party (NSDAP) was established in 1920 in Munich by Adolph Hitler who then rises to the position of chancellor of Germany in 1933. NSDAP or more commonly referred to as the Nazi Party were able to achieve significant electoral support in the inter-war conditions that marked by the Great Depression. This unstable political and economic conditions provide a critical opportunity for Hitler and his party as they ruled the country until the end of great war. One of the most defining features of the Nazi Party marked by the racist and anti-Semitic ideology.

After the fall of Hitler and the Nazi Party, the whole country traumatized. Related with this trauma, the notion of the radicalism has turned a sensitive issue in both political and societal spheres in Germany. Thus, this traumatic process that started with the foundation of the Nazi Party and ended with their fall has created a subconsciousness that stimulates a reluctant view against anti-democratic, radical or even extreme thoughts when they come into existence. The sensitivity against the radical thoughts further intensified when especially with the division of Germany into two. The victorious states of World War II, actively involved internal affairs of the country as they strictly prohibited the revival of any racist and anti-Semitic discourse.

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany entered into the force in 1949 under these circumstances. This constitution is established to maintain the democratic system of the country and individual rights. Braunthal (2009, p. 170) notes that the Federal Constitutional Court possessed the right to banish parties which are shown anti-democratic treats a well as extremist organizations under the premises of this constitution.

The German Conservative Party-German Rightist Party (DKP-DRP) was founded in 1946 and quickly found support from the former Nazis. In the 1949 elections, DKP-DRP was able to win five seats in the Bundestag. Following the election, former Nazis outcasted by the nationalists at the party. The expelled Nazi supporters formed a new party named the Socialist Reich Party (SRP). In 1952, The Federal Constitutional Court exercised its

power as Socialist Reich Party banned. After its dissolution, former members of SRP established a new party named German Reich Party (DRP) in the 1950s. However, after achieving marginal success this party was also banned in the following years.

Another radical right party is founded under the name of The National Democratic Party (NPD) in 1963 by the former supporters of the Nazi party. NPD put their emphasis on guest workers and the dangers of labor immigration as well as reunification of Germany (see: Ramet, 1999). The economic stagnation at the end of the 1960s provided a space for NPD to achieve electoral support. However, despite overcoming the necessary voting threshold in local elections, they were not able to overcome the five percent threshold for Bundestag during this period and their success diminished gradually.

The emergence and the rise of the populist radical right parties in Europe concur with the post-1980 period. The same thing can be said for the German context. During this period, The Republicans (REP) was founded. Mudde (2007, p. 42) underlines that despite its relatively poor performance in elections, REP have become one of the most famous radical right parties in Europe. Similar to the NPD, REP also supported the German unification. One of the defining positions of this party was their nativist ideology and anti-immigrant stance. Despite the multiple ideological struggles and contention for the party leadership, the party stay in course in terms of core ideologies of radical right. (Mudde, 2007, p. 42). However, REP has never been able to overcome the threshold in the elections with 1989 European elections being the sole exception.

Another populist right party that can be identified in this period is The German People's Union (DVU). It is formed in 1987 and has become a significant representatives of the radical right. Populism, authoritarianism, and nativism were key characteristics of the party until their dissolution in 2012. Despite adopting a very strong anti-immigrant discourse, the party was not able to overcome the five percent electoral threshold in its existence.

Thus, up until the latest success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the radical right parties in Germany have failed to overcome the electoral threshold in the majority of the elections they participated in. In other words, the success of these parties was rather marginal, and they were never able to make breakthroughs. In light of this context, AfD

is formed in 2013 as a euro-skeptic party. In their first Federal Parliament elections, AfD could only receive 4.7 percent of the votes and failed to send a deputy to the Bundestag. In the following years, the migration issue is included in the party agenda, and AfD adopted a more conservative position (Salzborn, 2016). In its second elections, AfD made its breakthrough and managed to achieve 12.6 percent of the total votes and won out 94 seats in the Bundestag. The success of the party was remarkable. AfD not only becomes the third-largest party in the Bundestag but also becomes the first radical right party to achieve such success after a half-century-long period. Due to their unprecedented success, it is important to look at how AfD used anti-immigrant rhetoric to attract electoral support from the German people.

3.3.2. Party manifesto of AfD

In this part of the study, AfD's party manifesto, as well as speeches of its prominent members will be analyzed through following the securitization theory and its methodology of speech act. In this context, three components of the securitization process will be investigated. First, a problem must be presented as a direct threat to a valued referent object. Wæver (1995, p. 49) further argues "something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so". Secondly, the presented threat must call for urgency and necessitates breaking the routinized boundaries of normal politics to adopt extraordinary measures. "The designation of the threat as existential justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle it" (Wæver, 2003, p. 9). As a result, the speaking of security justifies the use of force and other emergency tools such as secrecy and conscription in order to deal with the threat. And lastly, the acceptance of emergency actions by the audience. In other words, the relevant audience should be persuaded regarding the claim that the designated referent object is indeed being threatened and should approve the emergency measures that are going to be taken. By following these footsteps, this study aims to systemically analyze how migration issue is securitized by AfD. In this regard, the first material that is going to be analyzed is the party manifesto of AfD.

The party manifesto of Alternative for Germany (AfD) is published on the 1st of May 2016 and still maintained as the latest party manifesto on the official website of the AfD. The published party manifesto is 94 pages long and it consists of 14 chapters where

multiple topics ranging from education to economy, environment to identity are discussed in detail. To stay within the scope of this study, some specific chapters of the manifesto will take priority in the analysis. However, through the entirety of the text, any references regarding the immigration issue in other chapters will be also be highlighted. In this regard, extra detail will be given to the chapters named "*Culture, Language and Identity*" along with "*Immigration, Integration and Asylum*" as these chapters signals for more fruitful content regarding the migrants, asylum seekers, Muslims, and minorities.

The contents in the chapter named "*Culture, Language, and Identity*" provides concrete examples of nativist ideology which refers to the idea that culture, language, and identity must be preserved for the native population. In the subchapter named "*Preserve German Culture, Language and Tradition*", AfD underlies the importance of preservation of the German cultural heritage for generations of future (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 46).

"It is one of the primary political goals of the AfD to preserve **the great cultural heritage** for future generations, and to develop and retain its unique characteristics in an age of globalisation and digitalisation." (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 46).

Here, it is clear that 'the great cultural heritage' is defined as something that unique and essential and carries great value. In accordance with the arguments of securitization theory and societal security, this 'great cultural heritage' of German people introduced as the referent object which must be preserved under any conditions. Thus, any threat that might have come due to globalization or digitalization or immigration is directed towards German culture. As a political securitizing actor, AfD uses culture as the main security theme. Culture, however, is an abstract concept. In this sense, in order to make it a concrete object so that it can be coded as a security theme, the great cultural heritage of Germany come into existence since it is implied that the cultural heritage of Germany is existed and accumulated for generations concerning its unique characteristics. Furthermore, it is underlined that this tradition must carry on for future generations. Thus, since the securitization of migration is constructed on the security of the collective culture, anything that might threaten its uniqueness and homogeneity presented as an existential threat that has to be dealt with immediately.

In another subchapter titled *‘German as a Predominant Culture instead of Multiculturalism’*, it is asserted that German culture is the predominant culture as it is derived from the "Christian religion, the humanistic heritage of Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment, and Roman Law". The combination of these three sources together constitutes the "foundation of the free and democratic society". In this sense, multiculturalism, which is the result of mass immigration, presented as a serious threat to the unity of the ‘great cultural heritage’ as well as not only to social peace but also to survival of the whole nation. Here, it is crystal clear that a security-laden word, ‘threat’ is explicitly used as multiculturalism is perceived as a serious threat. The German people who share this culture are referred to as ‘we’ whereas the members of the other cultural groups are labeled as the ‘others’. Thus, it is implied that this cultural heritage belongs to the native German people and it is their right to carry this culture and reproduce it for future generations. Moreover, the ‘great cultural heritage’ is used as a referent object that must be protected since it is argued that the survival of the nation depends on it. If it is not protected at all costs, the threat of immigration will destroy social peace and the German nation will not survive.

Throughout the texts, it is observable that AfD is concerned more with the immigrants with Muslim background particularly. In this sense, another subchapter named *‘Immigration from Other EU Countries’* gives an insight into AfD’s position on immigrants from other EU countries in comparison to immigrants from Muslim countries. Here, immigrants from members of EU countries are not defined as the ultimate threat to the German cultural heritage or national security of the country. There are also no mentions that these group of immigrants fundamentally poses a threat to the common values of Germany unlike the immigrants from third-world countries. Instead, these group of immigrants is portrayed as free-riders who come from the poorer EU countries only to benefit welfare provisions and social aids (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 60). Therefore, it can be said that while Muslim people are presented as a cultural, economic, political and national security problem, immigrants from other EU countries who shares the Christian background only perceived as an economic threat. In other words, while their existence is problematic, it is not framed as the top security issue. Furthermore, AfD argues that only the high-skilled immigrants who have the willingness to integrate should

be accepted into the country. Thus, as long as they are not exploiting the welfare system of Germany and contributes to economic life, they are more than welcomed.

In this context, it is necessary to look at how AfD frames Muslim immigrants. "*Islam and its Tense Relationship with our Value system*" is another interesting subchapter within the chapter of "*Culture, Language and Identity*". Here, the party firmly stands against the Islamic practices since they are not compatible with the foundation of the German culture.

"The AfD firmly opposes Islamic practice which is directed against our liberal-democratic constitutional order, our laws, and the Judeo-Christian and humanist foundations of our culture" (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 47).

This understanding further justified as AfD underlies that this tension made visible with the documentation of the "Cairo Declaration on Human Rights" dated back 1990. Here, it is not only emphasized that German culture is libertarian, democratic and progressive but also the outside group, Islamists portrayed as reactionary and anti-democratic. Thus, AfD not only argues that there is a one, homogenous German culture but also creates an antagonistic homogenous opposite culture based on differences in practices and value systems of both sides. Furthermore, in this subchapter, the divergence between the value systems of Islam and the German culture is constructed in a conflictual way, and it is asserted that this conflict can never be resolved. Therefore, due to these differences in practices and value systems, there will always be a conflict between Islam and the dominant German culture.

Similar rhetoric against Islam maintained in the subchapter titled "*Islam does not belong to Germany*". It is argued that due to its different nature, Islam cannot exist along with the German culture and its Christian values. In this part, Islam not only framed as 'other' but also framed as a national security issue since its religious radicalization is associated with violence and terrorism.

"Islam does not belong to Germany. Its expansion and the ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country are viewed by the AfD as a **danger** to our state, our society, and our values. Islam which neither respects nor refrains from being in conflict with our legal system, or that even lays claim to power as the only true religion, is incompatible with our legal system and our culture...However, the

AfD demands that an end is put to the formation and increased segregation by parallel Islamic societies relying on courts with shari'a laws. The AfD wishes to curb a trend towards religious radicalization amongst Muslims, and these turning into violent Salafists or terrorists." (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 48).

It is apparent that immigrants, especially ones with a Muslim background, in particular, are seen as the biggest obstacle against the preservation of homogenous German culture due to their incompatible nature. Thus, negative qualities attributed to Muslim people in order to justify their exclusion. Moreover, the ever-increasing number of Muslim immigrants is explicitly highlighted as a significant problem to German society and its values. Therefore, as emergency actions, AfD urges to prevent religious radicalization among Muslims.

More on the emergency actions, AfD focuses on the demand for the prohibition of foreign financing of mosques in Germany. In this part, it is asserted that the purpose of financing the mosques in Germany by Islamic countries is to disseminate Islam in Germany. In other words, the aim of these missionary activities is for consolidating the power and influence of the Muslim population in Germany. Thus, Islam is described here as in terms of conquering and expansionist understanding and as a result of this reading, all practices, and activities of this organizations are expressed as a security threat that imposes its value system thereby destroying the German culture by undermining the existing constitutional order and the liberal system. It is asserted that:

"These organizations are a tangible threat to internal security as well as an obstacle to the integration of Muslims. The AfD demands that anti-constitutional organizations should not be permitted to build and run mosques, as they are prone to spreading doctrines that violate the German Constitution and our legal system, and lead to **political and religious radicalization**." (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 48).

In addition to the prohibition of financing of mosques, it is also argued that Qur'an schools must be closed and lessons to the Muslim youth must be lectured in German language alone. The main argument revolves around in similar theme that places where Islamic practices are thought can led radicalization:

"As long as Islam has not been fundamentally reformed, we demand that Islamic Qur'an schools should be closed with immediate effect, as it is likely that uncontrolled radical and unconstitutional indoctrination takes place there" (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 54).

The last subchapter within the main chapter of "Culture, Language and Identity", AfD proposes "prohibition of full-body veiling in public spaces" as it is perceived as a political and religious representation of the submission of Muslim women to men. AfD argues that this practice has no place in Germany since German culture promotes equality between all individuals, men, and women. Thus, the full-body veiling and headscarf are underlined as a radical activity that degrades the women and creates an unequal relationship between sexes in society.

In this sense, in order to prevent Islamization and religious radicalization among Muslim immigrants, AfD proposes a set of security actions ranging from the prohibition of financing of mosques to prohibition of the burqa in public spaces.

The second main chapter named 'Immigration, Integration and Asylum' provides further concrete arguments of AfD on the immigration issue. Here, it is argued that "Germany is by no means a classic immigration country in view of its geographic location, its history, its people and its dense population" (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, 57).

However, AfD voices its concerns that Germany has turned into an immigration country due to the lack of legal frameworks and the failure of the German government. In order to prevent Germany's transformation to be an immigration country, AfD offers a complete closure of German borders as well as EU borders.

"Strict controls are to be established at German border checkpoints at which irregular immigration occurs, in order to prevent illegal border crossings. As long as there is worldwide migration into Germany, and as long as the external EU borders are not effectively controlled, we demand strict German **border control measures to prevent an uncontrolled influx of immigrants**. This includes measures to safeguard the "green border" (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 59).

In this sense, AfD once again claims that emergency measures must be taken in the face of immigration threat. While, AfD by itself incapable of taking such decisions, strict border controls suggested as must-be action in order to handle the problem. Thus, as securitization theory suggest, the speech act at hand not only designates the existential threat and referent object but also constructs emergency measures that must be taken urgently.

AfD also questions the concept of the refugee by arguing that all the people who enter Germany identify themselves as refugees thereby exploiting the concept in order to stay in the country forever. Thus, it is emphasized that there is a need for a clear distinction between the genuine refugees who are fleeing from the war-zone and irregular migrants who enter the country for other purposes. In this sense, AfD supports the idea that as long as there is a war in the country they came from, refugees should be granted shelter. Irregular migrants, on the other hand, have no business claiming protection; however, they present themselves as refugees and exploit the good faith of Germany. Moreover, in this chapter, it is underlined that once the conditions such as war or political persecution are no longer exists, refugees must leave Germany immediately since the domestic and foreign peace depends on their return to their homelands. (Manifesto for Germany, 2017, p.58). Here, it is highlighted that refugees and the immigrants who stay in Germany even though there is no obstacle for them to return their country of origin, would endanger the peace; thus, they are perceived as a threat to German society.

In the next part, AfD accuses immigrants of exploiting the German welfare system. It is argued that the welfare provisions gives incentive to immigrants to stay despite they have no right to demand protection. AfD emphasizes that the campaigns made by the immigration lobby and the media creates further excuses for immigrants to stay. The German government is blamed for not dealing with this issue. The main argument of AfD revolves around the suggestion that immigrants who are obliged to leave the Germany should not be given any incentives to stay and if it is necessary, they should be forced to leave the country immediately if they resist to stay.

In the following parts of the text, AfD once again returns to the topic of preservation of German identity and culture. The multi-cultural society not only defined as undesirable but also a failed concept. Since it is underlined that multi-cultural society threatens social

peace by creating counter societies as well as parallel societies in the country, the only way in which immigrants can live without undermining the peaceful dynamics of society depends on their successful integration to German culture. Here, assimilation is offered as the most effective way of achieving integration. Even though it is noted that assimilation cannot be enforced, it is still argued that immigrants have an obligation to integrate (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 62). In this sense, assimilation presented as the only viable option for immigrants if they want to gain permanent residency. If this option is refused, AfD argues that those people would lose their chance to stay in the country. For successful integration, AfD suggest that all immigrants must achieve proficiency in the German language and endorse the legal and social system. Thus, the nativist perspective is fully employed by the AfD as they oppose the existence of any other subculture and emphasizes the oneness of the German culture.

In this sense, it is clear that AfD constructs immigration, especially the Muslim immigrants as an existential threat to the preservation of great German culture and social peace. It is strongly emphasized that the protection of German culture and identity is perceived as the top priority for AfD. Since it is argued that immigrants with a Muslim background are not capable of integration and assimilation, they create parallel societies in a conflictual way with the native German society. As a result, the manifesto suggests that due to multiculturalism, social peace is at risk. In brief, in the first phase of the securitization process, AfD as a political securitizing actor designates immigration as an existential threat and the great German cultural heritage as the referent object that must be preserved at all costs.

Another topic AfD dwells on is the cost of immigration. It is argued that the ever-increasing number of immigrants brings an enormous burden to the economic system since immigrants not only fail to involve the labor market but also abuses the welfare system. The main arguments revolve around the belief that only the immigrants with low skillset cross the borders and enter to Germany. Therefore, they could not find a place within the economic system and the labor market and have to rely on the social aid funded by German society. In order to compensate for the free-riding immigrants, tax rates are increased which not only brings an additional burden to the German economy but also

intimidates the high-skilled incomers who prefer to go countries with relatively low rate of taxation in comparison (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 62).

Family reunions also another topic that AfD puts significant emphasis on. It is argued that asylum seekers alone create a gigantic burden for the German social system as they benefit from social aid as soon as they cross the border. Following their entrance, their joining members also added to the equation. Thus, the concept of family reunion opens new ways for the influx of additional immigrants into the social and economic systems of the country. As a result, AfD demands that family reunions including even approved asylum seekers must be stopped. In this line, using words such as influx, AfD presents immigrants as invaders that destroy the social and economic system of the country.

More on the topic, AfD complains about a lack of transparency on the cost of immigration. It is argued that the massive cost of immigration is a significant problem for Germany. In the manifesto it is asserted:

"The costs of mass immigration are not made transparent, estimates range up to several hundred billion Euros. It is not sufficient to simply multiply the number of welfare recipients with the standard rate. In addition, there are huge hidden costs for care and attendance of refugees on all levels of administration. Following mass immigration, a cartel-like migration industry has been established, arbitrarily setting the prices in many places" (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 62)

Thus, AfD claimed that the federal government hides the enormous expenditures on immigration. Here, it is possible to encounter the anti-elite rhetoric that the party adopts. AfD not only blames the government for not being transparent enough but also accuses them of not caring about the German people since the money that spent on immigration could have transferred to people who deserve it. Thus, AfD demands that necessary measures must be taken to make the cost of immigration transparent to society.

In addition to the economic problems that immigrants bring, manifesto mentions the connection between immigration and increasing crime rates.

"In the wake of uncontrolled mass immigration, there is a rise in crime figures. However, for reasons of political expediency, statistics on criminals and suspects and their asylum or immigration histories are either not compiled, distorted, or kept secret... Some of the problems caused by the influx of asylum seekers are being disguised or downplayed by government agencies and the media. The AfD demands that the protection of citizens against immigrant crime receives top priority" (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017, p. 63)

It is underlined that millions of people with different cultural backgrounds who do not have the necessary capacity to integrate are lured to the country under false promises. Because of this, many incomers sever their ties with their homelands. However, when they realize that their hopes of prosperity are unfulfilled, they drift into criminal activities. With this statement, the migration is directly connected with internal security and consubstantiate into criminality. Thus, immigrants are shown as uncivilized, backward, barbarian people who cannot adopt civilized Western culture and as a result, they are associated with all kinds of criminal activities. Through this definition, migration issues shown as a phenomenon that people should fear. The social anxieties and concerns over immigration are also intensified.

3.3.3. Public speeches of AfD party members

The second group of material that is going to be analyzed following the premises of securitization theory and its methodology of speech act is Party member's speeches. In this context, these materials are provided from AfD's archives on their official website. Before conducting the analysis, the broad archive in the AfD's official website filtered through some keywords. Since the website's broad archive maintains myriad of member speeches on various topics, it is necessary to use some keywords such as *Migranten* (migrants), Asylbewerber, (asylum seekers), Muslime (Muslim), Einwandern (immigrate), Einwanderung (immigration), Migrationswelle (migration wave), and Islam. in German to get access to relevant documents. After this filtration process, relevant speeches are included in this analysis.

In this regard, the first speech that is going to be analyzed belongs to Anton Friesen, AFD's representative in the Bundestag for southern Thuringia. On the immigration topic, he asserts that:

"When it comes to the narrative of the parties of the past, there is no Islamization in Europe and Germany. However, the latest study of the Pew Research Center shows that this is a lie. According to the study, even in the most optimistic scenario, the proportion of the Muslim population in Germany will rise from six to nearly nine percent in 2050. In extreme cases, this number can reach 20 percent. The irresponsible immigration policies of the past parties have contributed significantly to this development in the last decades. Another reason for this development is demographics. Muslim women bear significantly more children and the average age of Muslims is approximately 13 years younger than non-Muslims. This study should be a warning to all of us. Islamization threatens our identity as Germans and Europeans. We must, therefore, do our utmost effort to protect our borders, immediately deport immigrants who are obliged to leave the country and repeal family unification not only for those who are in need of subsidiary protection but also for refugees. Family support must become the guideline for all state policies. But that alone is not enough – we need to be proud of our culture, and carry out the tradition and values of the Occident, rather than destroying them" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchive, 2017d)

One of the main emphasis of this speech is that Muslim immigrants due to their wildly increasing population threaten the identity of not only Germans but for all Europeans. In this sense, it is apparent that immigration is designated as an existential threat to the identity of the Germans and Europeans which is the perceived referent object. Immigration is presented as a threat because according to the statistics that Friesen gives, the Muslim population in Germany will continue to rise. In this sense, the German population is under the threat of assimilation. The discourse dramatizes that 'we', meaning that native German people, should protect their culture in order to pass it to the future generation. It is further noted that not doing so would mean that German culture will be destroyed eventually. Moreover, as the emergency measures, Friesen advocates that the Germans have to protect their borders, deport the immigrants that have no right

to stay and end the family unification. Thus, in this securitization discourse we can see the designated existential threat – Islamization due to the immigration –, referent object – the identity of Germans and Europeans – and emergency measures – protection of borders. This connection is made through the constant use of security-laden words.

In another example, the co-leader of AfD, Alexander Gauland echoes similar arguments:

"Austria protects its people but we don't protect ours. Austria is late but sensible. First, they have recognized that the uncontrolled flow of migrants is a threat and not a blessing to society. Secondly, they have finally decided to take real countermeasures and prepare for a state of emergency in order to meet the upper limit that was set. These are sensible measures to protect your own population. What do Austrians have that we do not? A sense of reality coupled with a policy of reason and its goal-oriented implementation. We also urgently need a limit on our absorption capacity and safe borders to immediately reject anyone who has no chance of asylum. Everything else is damaging the society and puts the social peace on the line, as we, unfortunately, have seen very well in the New Year's Eve in Cologne" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2016b)

Here, once again it is possible to see that immigration is presented as a serious threat to German society. Thus, the protection of German society once again come forward as the referent object. Gauland strongly emphasizes that immigration should be framed as a threat rather than a positive phenomenon. Moreover, Gauland argues that Austria has taken the necessary emergency measures which are essential in the presence of immigration threats, and Germany has to follow the same footsteps. In this sense, it is suggested that border controls must be stricter in order to restrain the infiltration of unwanted immigrants. The urgent need for emergency measures is tied with the nature of the threat. If the necessary steps are not taken quickly, immigration will continue to damage the society and eventually the social peace will perish. In this statement, it can be seen that Gauland utilizing the 'point of no return' narrative as Copenhagen School and securitization theory suggests.

Alice Weidel, the leader of AfD in Bundestag, explicitly underlines that immigration is a serious threat to the German Society. Pointing out the terrorist attacks in Barcelona, she states:

"Now Barcelona too. We offer our condolences to the victims and families of the Islamist terrorist attack. This terrible attack that happened in the middle of vacation time in one of the most popular cities in Europe shows how acute terrorism is through Islamism in Europe. The terrorists are among us. Thanks to the borders that are still open, they can go in and out of Europe and Germany completely uncontrolled and perform their terrible, inhumane craft. The Barcelona attacks also have shown that we are dealing with a policy failure of open borders and loose immigration policy. This naïve welcoming culture endangers our security, kills our people and puts our peace at risk. We must close our borders and immediately eliminate all Islamist threats. Otherwise, what happened in Barcelona will repeat itself. Barcelona is everywhere" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2017b).

In this statement, Alice Weidel puts immigration as the reason for Islamist terrorist attacks since she argues that they can move freely in and out of Germany and other European countries. It is underlined that due to the insufficient immigration policies and naïve approach towards immigrants, German society and social peace is in danger. Thus, immigration, once again comes forward as an existential threat to the collective identity of Germany. In this sense, Weidel not only states why this threat is arising but also argues that instead of soft immigration policies and naïve intentions towards Immigration, the exact opposite approach must be taken.

Increased Islamization and radicalization due to the excessive immigration from Islamic countries is also another topic that emphasized by Alexander Gauland. After the two terrorist attacks in the UK, AfD lead candidate he declares:

"We have to give up our leniency towards Islam. What Theresa May said about British society is especially true for us: we are simply too tolerant of Islam. This tolerance has been exploited for years by Muslims to our detriment. The systematic Islamic immigration to Europe and Germany poses great dangers and

has already changed our society in a lasting way: danger of terrorism, crime, and social fraud have massively increased and have been changing our everyday lives...more strict border controls and immediate deportations are the only effective remedy against such offenders and illegal immigration into our social system... It is the final nail in the coffin of German society when in the face of social threat and threat of terror, the politicians of the old parties expect us to get used to all of this. It is an incomprehensible insolence to the victims of the terrorist attacks and to their families. No, we do not want to get used to the threat of terror! We must fight it for our freedom's sake. In addition, we must end our indulgence towards Islam and realize that this Stone Age religion poses a threat to our liberal society. Politicians who oppose this in order to conceal their inability and unwillingness to effectively protect our society from Islamic mass immigration must be voted out" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2017b)

Here, it is possible to see that security-laden words are used repetitively by Gauland. It is argued that systematic Islamic immigration poses a great threat to German society due to the activities that immigrants involve. Thus, once again immigration from Islamic countries is presented as an existential threat to the protection of German society.

More on the emergency measures that must be taken urgently, Gauland argues:

"Against the background of the many terrible terrorist attacks, the right to asylum for Muslims must be suspended immediately until all asylum seekers that is registered in Germany are checked and their applications are processed. Not all Muslims are terrorists, but religiously motivated terror always has a Muslim background. For security reasons, we can no longer afford to allow more unchecked Muslims to immigrate to Germany. Among the illegal immigrants, the numbers of Muslim terrorists are constantly increasing. Mrs. Merkel ignores the danger of terrorism and thus isolates herself further and further. Meanwhile, a phalanx of many European states and politicians has formed against Germany. Germany has become a security risk for the whole of Europe due to the negligent policies of Mrs. Merkel. If Mrs. Merkel does not close the borders, ensures that all Muslim immigrants are officially registered in Germany and massively

increases the police presence on our streets, she is jointly responsible for the future terrorist attacks, which sadly will happen certainly" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2016a).

In another instance, Alexander Gauland argues that immigrants not only poses a great danger to Germany but also make Germany a serious threat to other countries in Europe.

"Merkel makes Germany a security risk for Europe. Denmark is extending controls at the border with Germany because a large number of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers in Germany constitutes a real security threat to Denmark... The fact that Germany, with its catastrophic migration policy, is now even considered by its European neighbors to be a veritable security risk, should give our stubborn federal government food for thought. Germany was already safe heaven for the terrorist to prepare for their attacks before the 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks. By Merkel's asylum chaos, this situation has worsened dramatically. The Islamist attacks of recent years in Paris, Brussels, and not least in Berlin, also go to the account of German asylum and immigration policy. It is scandalous how Islamist immigrants can move in out of Germany undistributed. The German government not only destroys its own country but also becomes a danger for the whole of Europe. German border controls, which are more of passive observation of some border sections, are ineffective. We need real security measurements to all of our borders to end the illegal immigration to Germany. In addition, rejected asylum seekers must be quickly and consistently deported" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2017a)

Muslim immigrants are repetitively presented as security threats not only to German culture, identity, and society but also other non-German minorities in Germany. On this topic, Alexander Gauland asserts that religious radicalization among Muslim immigrants come forward as a significant danger for Jewish people in Germany.

"The real threat to Jewish people in Germany is the mass immigration of radical Muslims... Mrs. Merkel's CDU is decisively responsible for the strengthened anti-Semitism in Germany. It was she who allowed millions of Muslims to enter

Germany illegally up to this point. They not only brought their radical Islamism but also their hatred against Jews to Germany...The AfD has always sided with not only Israel but also Jews in Germany. The CDU/CSU union should be much more a role model for Israel in dealing with illegal Muslim immigration because the real threat to Jewish life in Germany is the mass immigration of radical Muslims" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2018).

Alice Weidel argues that due to the immigration influx, crime rates are increasing and Germany has to take necessary precautions to stop this trend.

"The continuing uncontrolled mass migration further worsens the security situation of German citizens...Indigenous citizens are rightly indignant that they are being demoted to second-class victims. Instead of swift prosecution of alleged criminals, confining and deporting them if they are proven guilty, suspects are all too often released and as a result, might commit further crimes as in the case of 'Frog Club' attackers in Frankfurt/Oder. This is a mockery for the law-abiding citizens...It is on the verge of state failure if citizens are left alone with the massively increased insecurity in public space" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2019)

In this sense, strengthen immigration as a security threat narrative, Weidel associates immigration with crime. This association is not surprising as the security-migration literature argues that migration is historically associated with increased crime rates ever since the 1980s. Thus, making reference to crime rates, immigration is tried to be established as a serious security threat. About the emergency measures, in another instance Alice Weidel suggests that border controls must be established in order to stop immigration:

"Uncontrolled immigration must be stopped immediately, border controls have to be introduced and non-asylum seekers must be deported. Otherwise, Germany will not have a future" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2016d)

Here, it is possible to read that this statement follows the grammar of security meaning that notion that "point of no return" is explicitly used in order to dramatize and securitize the immigration issue.

The collapse of the German welfare system is another topic associated with immigration. Jörg Meuthen who is serving as Federal Spokesman for AfD dwells on this topic by arguing:

"...In particular, systematic asylum fraud is worrying and is increasingly becoming a burden on Germany's budget. Meanwhile, in almost all states, cases are accumulating in which migrants get social benefits with multiple identities. This results in a loss in the millions for the German taxpayer: Criminal male migrants have an average of three to four identities and cause the taxpayer a loss of five to ten thousand euros per person. Another dramatic danger is the systematic introduction of unaccompanied minors to Germany for our social systems. Once the young people were recognized as refugees, their families may follow suit in most cases. This usually increases the social costs by five to eight percent. Apart from the threat of terrorism, this puts a permanent unbearable burden on our social system and is dangerous for a social explosion" (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2016c).

On the same topic, Alice Weidel similarly associates immigration with welfare abuse.

"Germany is considered as a promised land in the eyes of many economic refugees. Once you have arrived here, then you can very likely stay forever thanks to generous and lasting alimentation of the German welfare state. It is even enough to provide for the loved ones in their home countries through money transfers. Since 2007 remittances to developing countries have risen by more than 50 percent. According to the Bundesbank, more than four billion euros were transferred to migrant's home countries last year. These funds are often used by the still-at-home relatives to get on their way too. Since their relatives are already here, there is less need for integration efforts. Poverty migration brings even more poverty migration. Germany urgently needs a change of policy and paradigm here. The illegal immigration to Germany must be prevented by securing the borders.

Asylum seekers who have to leave the country must be deported consistently and social benefits - especially cash benefits – to migrants must be reduced drastically. If we can not stop mass immigration into our social system, the German welfare state will inevitably collapse” (Alternative Für Deutschland pressearchiv, 2017c).

Thus, the likelihood of securitizing the migration successfully is higher in the times where the German economy suffers. Associating economic problems with the immigration issue, therefore, can be seen as a facilitating condition since any problem in the welfare system will be paired up with the existence of immigration. As a result, constructing immigration as a threat will be easier if there are also economic problems in the country.

Through relying on these arguments, AfD has received 12,6 percent of the total votes in 2017 Federal elections increasing their votes up to 7.9 percent comparing the previous 2013 federal elections and received 94 seats in the Bundestag by finally overcoming the electoral threshold. AfD has also become the first radical right party to overcome the electoral threshold since the war period and not only has become the third biggest party but also the biggest opposition in Bundestag. However, despite the party have increased its relative power significantly, due to the limited number of seats in Bundestag, AfD’s influence on immigration policies stayed rather weak while Merkel’s government following their own immigration policies.

In short, in both party manifesto and leader speeches, it is possible to analyze the securitization theory and its methodology of speech act systematically. First, in all materials, immigration, especially Muslim immigrants are presented as a destructive threat to German culture, identity society and social peace which are perceived as the referent objects for AfD. The security-laden words such as threat, danger, survival, and protection are used explicitly in order to evoke the feelings of there is no return if this threat is not dealt with.

In the second phase of the securitization, the Copenhagen School suggests that the presented threat must call for urgency and necessitates breaking the routinized boundaries of normal politics to adopt extraordinary measures. Thus, both party manifesto and speeches of AfD members concerning the immigration issue will be analyzed in regard to offered emergency measures.

In the final phase, the target audience must accept that the issue at hand is indeed security threat and must tolerate the proposed emergency actions. While AfD has achieved historical success in the 2017 elections, the voting percentage of 12,6 was not enough to make them put emergency measures into action. In this sense, Copenhagen School (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25) underlines that "if no signs of such acceptance exist, we can talk only of a securitizing move, not of an object actually being securitized". For his reason, it can be said that the German case stayed at the level of the securitizing move.

Table 3. 2 Discourse Analysis of Alternative for Germany (AfD)

Material	Threat	Referent Object	Emergency Actions	Level of Securitization
Party Manifesto of AfD (2017)	Immigration	German cultural heritage	Strict border controls	Securitization move
		German Identity	Prohibition of financing of mosques	
	Multiethnic societies	German Society	Prohibition of full body-veiling in public space	
			Termination of family reunification	
			Cutting the cost of immigration	
Member Speeches	Immigration	German cultural heritage	Strict border controls	Securitization move
		German Identity	Termination of family reunification	
	Islamization	German Society	Cutting the cost of immigration	
			Deportation of rejected asylum seekers	
			Reduction of social benefits	

It should be noted here that while chancellor Merkel's coalition had to make some compromises from their open-door policy which has seen as coalition's shift to the further right under the pressure of immigration phenomenon the emergency measures that AfD wants to implement is still have not taken place in German political life (McAuley, 2018).

Findings in this analysis are tabulated through following the steps of the securitization process following the main premises of securitization theory and its methodology of speech act (Table 3.2.). This table unfolds how the immigration issue is constructed as a security issue through the designation of threat and referent object, sub-security themes which are thought as facilitating conditions, emergency actions and success of the securitization based on the participation of the audience in the process of securitization. These finding will be laid down in depth in the conclusion part of this chapter.

3.4. CASE STUDY: DANISH PEOPLE'S PARTY (DF)

3.4.1. Radical right in Denmark

The influx of radical right parties since the 1980s onwards is observed all over Europe including the Scandinavian countries such as Denmark. It is not a secret that Scandinavian countries attract particular interest among the scholars since it is one geographical area that marked by social democracy as it is established over more than fifty years. (Lazaridis and Tsagkroni, 2015). Thus, stability has been considered as one key characteristic of the political system in Scandinavian countries. For this reason, the emergence and the recent performance of the radical right parties pose itself as an interesting topic. Before the emergence of the radical right parties in the 1970s, Denmark had experienced a striking change in its political life. Before the establishment of a newly formed coalition government in 1968 with Conservative People's Party, the Radical Left Party and the Danish Social Liberal Party, the Social Democrats have enjoyed almost two-decade-long domination in the parliament. The rule of this coalition cut short as they could not overcome the overwhelming social democratic policies which resulted in the renewal of the social-democratic coalition in 1971.

Lazaridis and Tsagkroni (2015) note that the referenda that took place in Denmark in 1972 about the accession of Denmark to the European Economic Community (EEC)

created further polarization among the voters. The 1960s and 1970s are marked as the most expansive periods of welfare states portrayed with a significant increase in taxation. Under the circumstances marked by the political instability and burden of the increasing taxes, the ancestor of the current radical right parties, Progress Party (FrP), have founded in the early 1970s by Mogens Glistrup. FrP started its movement against the taxes. FrP started its way as a tax-protest party which also heavily opposes the state intervention and bureaucracy (Meret, 2010, p. 245). In the 1980s, Immigration was added to their agenda (Widfeldt, 2015).

In this context, the immigration issue dominated the policies in Danish political life starting from the 1980s and more and more political parties have included it into their political agendas. For instance, a revised law put into force by the government in 1983 in favor of the position of the refugees and immigrants. However, due to unease sourced from the increasing number of immigrants, the government had to adopt a more conservative stance against immigrants. As a result, the government consist of Conservative Party Progress and Social Democrats adopted a new law in 1986 in favor of tightening the immigration policy. With immigration issues occupying more and more space in the political arena, the majority of the Danish population come to the conclusion that immigration has become the country's one of the most important matters (Lazaridis and Tsagkroni, 2015, p. 225).

After its creation, FrP swiftly increased its popularity through the adaptation of liberal economic and political rhetoric and with the proposals of reductions in taxes and government costs. A year after its emergence, the FrP managed to receive 15.9 percent of the total votes and established itself as the second-biggest party in the parliament. Through the next two elections held in 1975 and 1977, the party was able to maintain its vote numbers by winning 13.6 percent and 14.6 percent of the total votes in each election. However, starting from the 1980s onwards, FrP experienced a significant decline in the elections which signaled that electoral success of the party as a neo-liberal and tax protest party was coming to an end. (Meret, 2010, p. 115). Thus, it was the 1980s that FrP turned their face to the anti-immigrant position. Before the mid-1980s, the immigration phenomenon didn't find a place in their party program.

After getting only 6.4 percent of the total votes in the 1994 elections, the prominent figures of the party left which further weakened the party and by the 2001 elections FrP could not even receive 1 percent of the total votes and decided to not participate in the following 2005 and 2007 elections.

Under the light of the bad electoral results in 1994, leading members broke away from the FrP to form a new party. In 1995, Pia Kjaersgaard co-founded the Danish People's Party (DF) together with Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Poul Nødegaard and Ole Donner (Ignazi, 2005). However, after its creation, the new party continue to adopt the ideology of its predecessor as Kjaersgaard built up the party on the matter of welfare. After a while, DF gradually abandoned neoliberal approaches inherited by the FrP and instead focused on issues like immigration and its connection to welfare.

The DF made its first appearance in 1998 parliamentary elections. The success of the party was imminent. DF managed to achieve 7.4 percent of the total votes and managed to get 13 seats in the parliament. Fractured FrP on the other hand only won 4 seats in the parliament with 2.4 percent of the votes. In the 2001 elections, DF managed to get 12 percent of the votes and nine additional seats in the parliament. After becoming the third biggest party, DF provided parliamentary support to the coalition government consist of the Conservative People's Party (KrF) and the Liberals (Venstre). In exchange for parliamentary support, DF pressured the coalition government in order to adopt more strict policies regarding the immigration (Pedersen and Ringsmose, 2004, p. 5). The electoral support of DF further increased in 2005 elections where the party were able to get 13.2 percent of the votes and two additional seats in the parliament and maintained its position as the third-biggest party.

Lazaridis and Tsagkroni (2015, p. 219) point out that DF's popularity among the opinion polls has increased significantly due to the enormous controversy on the publication of Mohammed cartoons by the in one of Danish newspapers. However, this increased popularity did not translate well into the election results as DF saw a very marginal increase in its votes by winning only 13.8 percent of the total votes and one additional seat in the parliament.

The 2011 results signaled the first decline of the party. The percent of the votes decreased to 12.3 and DF lost three parliamentary seats. As a result, Pia Kjaersgaard retired, and Kristian Thulesen Dahl took the leadership position. Under the leadership of Dahl, DF experienced a historic success, managed to up its votes to 21.1 percent and win the party-record 37 seats in the parliament. While the minority coalition government formed by the Liberal Party (Venstre), the DF currently provides parliamentary support to the government as it did in the previous years.

3.4.2. Party manifesto of DF

In this part of the study, DF's party manifesto and party program, as well as the party's leader and member speeches will be analyzed through following the securitization theory and its methodology of speech act. In this context, the party program of the DF is the first material that going to be analyzed.

The party program of the Danish People's Party (Principprogram) is accessible through the party's official website in Danish as well as English. This party program was established in 2002 and the main premises of the program is still maintained to this day. After its establishment, the first manifesto of the DF published in 1995 as a brief document. This manifesto, however, was not available to be retrieved. In 1997, DF published its first proper manifesto with the title of Principprogram. In the following years, two other working programs published in 2001 and 2009 under the name of Working manifestos (Arbejdsprogram). In this chapter, the primary analysis will be conducted on the party program of the DF despite its foundation laid down in 2002. However, the arguments are still maintained today as the DF's main premises. The additional focus will be given to the latest working manifesto of the DF's which is published in 2009.

In the preface part, Kristian Thulesen Dahl who is serving as the leader of the party since 2012, proudly presents the party program. The first thing that can be seen is a reference to the Danish cultural heritage. Dahl explains DF's foremost priority as the protection of Denmark, including Danish people as well as Danish cultural heritage:

"In the Danish People's Party, we are proud of Denmark; we love our country and we feel a historic obligation to protect our country, its people and the Danish cultural heritage. This sense of obligation implies the need for a strong national defense, and secure and safe national borders. Only in a free Denmark can the country develop according to the will of the people" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002).

Nativism, as Mudde argues, is one of the key elements of radical right parties. The nativist notions are visible throughout the entirety of the party program. Because of the protection of Danish culture and its people, DF implies that the country needs a strong defense and security system, especially in the borders. Here, another key attribute of the radical right actors appears as it is argued that Denmark can only flourish according to the general will of the people if it is free. In other words, DF presents itself as an agent that speaks on behalf of the people and puts the 'will of the people' above anything else.

Even in the just preface part, the cultural heritage of Danish People presented as the referent object which must be protected at all costs. This point further confirms the suggestion of securitization theory which argues that in the securitization process, an actor presents a referent object that is being attacked. The referent object here, however, is not defined as the survival of the state. As the societal security concept points out, the referent object is defined as the identity and the culture of Denmark. Thus, the protection of collective identity and culture takes absolute priority. This point excessively repeated throughout the text. It is argued that:

"We are bound by our Danish cultural heritage and our responsibility towards each other as people. For this reason, we wish to strengthen our country's internal and external security" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002).

In the next part, the importance of Christianity heavily underlined. The party program argues that the "Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church" is an integral part of Danish people. The importance of Christianity further intensified by the statement that "it is impossible to measure the significance Christianity has had and has on Danish life and the Danish way of life" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002).

In another instance, DF further underlines the importance of Danish identity. In this sense, it is argued that these components come together and creates the Danish culture and identity which defines Denmark's existence.

"Christianity draws a sharp distinction between the temporal world and the world of faith – a distinction of crucial importance for any country's evolution, for freedom, openness and democracy" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002).

Here, qualities like freedom, openness, and democracy are also attributed to Denmark which constituted by the Danes as the core qualities which all derived from Christianity. In other words, DF defines the Danish people as one single, homogenous group that share common values such as freedom, openness, and democracy. In another part, further characteristics of Danish People are underlined. It is argued that:

"The prosperity of Denmark is a result of enterprise, businesses and hard-working individuals working together. This prosperity stems from the fact that an extremely large proportion of both men and women are in work and, in particular, is a consequence of the high quality that is characteristic of the Danish workforce" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002).

In this sense, Danish people portrayed as hard-working people who also value equality between men and women. These qualities constitute the rich Danish cultural heritage. Any outside threat that disrupts the continuation and development of Danish culture, therefore, will endanger the existence of Denmark since the country is built upon these qualities. If these qualities are disrupted or destroyed, the country will lose its essential qualities which makes it Denmark in the first place.

In the following part, Danish culture is once again emphasized. DF asserts that "the country is founded on the Danish cultural heritage' and 'Danish culture must be preserved and strengthened" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002). This cultural heritage is constituted by the Danish people's common values and customs which are handed on from one generation to another. The preservation and development of these cultural elements are perceived as the most crucial issue in the country's survival.

"This culture consists of the sum of the Danish people's history, experience, beliefs, language, and customs. Preservation and further development of this culture is crucial to the country's survival as a free and enlightened society" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002).

This statement is one of the key parts that a reference to the survival of the country is directly visible. For DF, survival of Denmark and continuation as a free society depends on how well they can preserve the Danish culture. Any issue that threatens the existence of this cultural heritage is seen as an existential threat to the country's well-being. Copenhagen School adopts the realist assumption that security is about survival. Therefore, there is a clear intention in DF's argument that anything that threatens the survival of the Danish culture must be handled as a security issue in an urgent manner. Thus, it is safe to say that DF also sees security as a survival. In this sense, the protection of Danish cultural heritage takes priority above all else. As a result, the statements in the party program of DF confirms the arguments put forward by the securitization theory.

After highlighting the core features of Danish Identity, the very next part gives a clear clue about where the threat is coming. DF strongly opposes the idea that Denmark is neither an immigrant country nor a multi-ethnic society.

"Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multiethnic society. Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the lines of Danish culture. It ought to be possible to absorb foreigners into Danish society provided, however, that this does not put security and democratic government at risk" (Dansk Folkeparti Principprogram, 2002).

It is further argued that Denmark belongs only to the Danish people and not everyone who lives in the country. Thus, the obligation of any political actor is to provide a secure community to Danish people to live freely and securely. In this sense, Multiethnic society is presented as the biggest threat to the country since it would break the homogenous Danish culture. As explored in the earlier parts, this transformation would lead to the perishment of Denmark and its existence. Denmark is a free country only because it is built on the cultural heritage of Danish People. Thus, any transformation in this cultural

heritage will also affect Denmark's ability to exist as a free and sovereign country. In this regard, while the cultural heritage of Danish People is presented as the referent object that must survive, the multiethnic society which includes other non-ethnic Danes, presented as the existential threat to homogenous Danish society.

Within this context, multiethnic society seen as a result of mass immigration. Immigrants are perceived as the enemy who would destroy the Danish cultural heritage which is based on beliefs and values such as freedom, openness, democracy, as well as Christianity. It is argued that to this day, Danish culture is successfully preserved because it is claimed that Denmark has never been an immigrant country. Since the survival of the country depends on the preservation of this cultural heritage and the threat is coming from the multiethnic society that sources from the incoming migrants, it is asserted that migration is an existential threat to the unity of Denmark.

In the section named 'Tightening on Immigration Policy', more details are given about DF's stance against migration issues. This section starts with the criticism of the former Social-Democrat-led government. It is argued that since the 2015 parliamentary elections, the country's immigration policy has tightened thanks to the efforts of DF even though the former occupants of government eased it up to 45 times in the past. Here, another common feature of the populist parties that is anti-elitist ideology can be observed. DF argues that tightening on immigration policy is made because of the incompetence of the former ruling elite. It is also stated that the policy changes that are made thanks to the participation of DF and these changes are made on behalf of the collective will of Danish people instead of electoral concerns.

As emergency actions, DF advocates that asylum seekers must be rejected at the borders since they believe that one should not be able to move through five or six peaceful European countries and still claim to be in need of protection. Thus, DF approaches skeptically to the incoming immigrant's motives. Here, immigrants' motives are perceived as primarily economic - benefit from the welfare system of Denmark. This point further underlined as DF argues that since 2015, Europe and Denmark have experienced a huge wave of refugees and migrants. However, the ones that come are not the ones that are in need as they stuck in the refugee camps. Instead, the ones who

motivated by the economic reasons enter the country since they have more resources to move in comparison to people who need protection but could not escape the war-zone due to low economic capabilities.

As a result, DF supports the argument that Denmark should not accept more immigrants since Denmark has already received plenty of them over the years. Instead, it is argued that they must assist neighboring countries in order to provide a safe return for refugees to their homes as soon as possible. DF asserts that any help towards the immigrants who flee from the war zone must be done in regard to accountability. In other words, the parliament has a responsibility towards Danish people and accepting more and more immigrants cannot be justified through humanist notions. While helping people who are in need of protection is a moral duty, it is argued that no one in Denmark can benefit from receiving more immigrants than society can absorb. It is stated that:

‘No one can profit from the immigrants being allowed to go around freely – and no one can benefit from this misguided goodness in which we let values such as freedom, equality, and democracy to be undermined’ (Dansk Folkeparti Udlændingepolitik, 2019).

DF constructs their argument on the assumption that the more immigrants are accepted in the country, the more degradation will happen in the areas of freedom, equality, and democracy. Thus, immigrants are presented as agents that undermine the core values of Denmark which Danish cultural heritage is built upon for many years. Here it is visible that the exclusion of immigrants is justified by stating that excessive numbers of immigrants would undermine the core values of Danish culture; thus, it is necessary to stop the entrance to the country.

It is clear that throughout the entirety of the text, DF adopts the nativist approach, claiming that Denmark belongs to Danes and multiethnic society cannot be accepted since the immigrants degrade the core values of Danish culture and disrupt the Danish way of living. Throughout the text, it can be said that the threat sourcing from excessive immigration is articulated overtly and the possible results of such threats are intensified to the extent that the country’s survival is questioned. Since former Social-Democrat led

government eased the immigration policies severely and Denmark has absorbed more immigrants than they could have, the urgency of the matter is underlined repetitively.

While the official website of DF maintains the core visions and elements of the party program established in 2002, the latest working program (Arbejdsprogram, 2009) that published in 2009 refers to immigration in various contexts. For example, the concrete references to immigrants, or broader terms 'non-ethnic Danes', can be found in sections such as economy, health, education, labor market, housing, gender equality, and legal policy. Widfelt (2015, p. 144) notes that selected keywords associated with migration such as "immigrant", "asylum", "refugee" and "foreigner" appeared in 18 different sections. There is a whole subchapter in the economy section dedicated to the economy and immigrants in particular. In this part, DF claims that a large number of immigrants and their descendants who have come to the country over the last 30 years haven't adequately integrated to Danish society. In fact, some of these immigrants along with their descendants are took part in criminal activities and have a direct distaste for the values of Danish society and are attracted to the radical Islamist movements (Arbejdsprogram, 2009).

The association between immigrants and criminality can also be seen in different chapters. For example, in the chapter titled 'Legal Policy', DF claims that immigrants from third world countries and their descendants have a tendency to involve in criminal activities more than Danes and the persons originating from the Western countries (Arbejdsprogram, 2009). Thus, it is argued that tighter immigration policies must be implemented in order to prevent criminal activities. It is clear that DF links criminal activities to immigrants who come from third-world countries. Therefore, immigrants not only labeled as criminals but also their exclusion is justified in the name of decreasing crime rates.

Regarding the economy and fiscal policies, DF argues the welfare system that is Denmark built upon is under threat thanks to immigration influx. If citizens get the feeling that the wrong people are benefiting from the public services, their willingness to pay taxes is reduced. The reason is presented here as the immigrants who enters Denmark and get their shares in public services immediately, the public services that Danes have paid taxes

for their entire life time just to finance it (Arbejdsprogram, 2009). More on this point, DF asserted that:

"It is unacceptable that there is a large group of registered unemployed and cash benefiting recipients who are not available to the labor market. In this group, immigrants from third-world countries are highly over-represented and it is untenable that foreign labor is imported to support immigrants who do not want to contribute to the community" (Arbejdsprogram, 2009).

Here, DF argues that the immigrants from third-world countries not only exploit the welfare provisions which are paid by the Danes for years but also they don't even participate in the labor market. In order to cover the labor shortage, foreign labor is important but it is not a reliable solution. Thus, immigrants are underlined as free-riders and a heavy burden for the welfare system.

One of the reasons that immigrants' lack of commitment to the labor market is claimed as cultural constraints that women from third-world countries face. DF claims that the preservation of the Danish welfare state depends on the contribution of all groups in the Danish society. Thus, it is not possible to exempt, for example, immigrant women from the duty to work for religious or cultural reasons. However, there is a largely untapped labor resource among immigrants, especially immigrant women, that has not been activated yet because too much tolerance has been shown to their culture and traditions which implies women should, as a general rule, be at home. It is further argued that immigration in Denmark from especially Islamic countries has led to more feudal family patterns where gender equality between men and women does not exist. It is emphasized that this situation harmonizes poorly with the norms in Denmark. In fact, domestic violence and honor killings are becoming wide-spread as an increasing number of foreign women seek out the Danish women's crisis centers.

Another instance where the explicit reference to problems caused by immigration is visible in the section related to health. Under this section, DF emphasizes necessary measures to be taken against the spread of diseases from the citizens of the Third World countries via immigration. In order to prevent this, DF demands that all immigrants must be subject to an extensive medical examination and vaccination program. In this sense, it

is underlined that the spread of any diseases sourced from immigration would create an additional burden to the Danish health care system.

"Immigrants from third world countries have particular health problems due to malnutrition, lack of vaccination, multiple childbirths, marriages between closely related family members and lack of vitamins...Wearing a burka or scrap the whole day does not provide good health, as the skin and the body benefit from sunlight and fresh air. In order to counter an incalculable increase in health spending, these problems must be mitigated by effective preventive actions" (Arbejdsprogram, 2009).

Additionally to the health problems that are caused by the burka and scarf, DF claims that the Muslim scarf is a symbol of oppression against women and, therefore, must be banned in public institutions and schools. Throughout the whole text, the tension between Islam and gender equality is emphasized constantly. While the problematic side effects of immigration in the economy, education, health, housing, and labor market are underlined, the main focus points remain as the cultural aspect. It is argued that:

"Making Denmark multiethnic society involves a risk that the development of hostile reactionary cultures which will break down our hitherto stable, homogeneous society. We can influence a certain number of people from foreign cultures, but the size and composition of immigration that we have seen in the last decades of the 20th century and early 21st century cannot be integrated. Many immigrants want to continue their own culture, and this can have some consequences here as well as in the immigrants' home countries. In particular, it has proved challenging to integrate refugees and immigrants, with a Muslim background. It has nothing to do with tolerance to intolerance. There is no community in the world where a peaceful integration of Muslims into another culture has been possible, and it is irresponsible to inflict a collision to culture in Denmark which has risks of having very serious consequences" (Arbejdsprogram, 2009).

Thus, DF argues that immigrants, especially the ones with a Muslim background, cannot be integrated into Danish culture in any way. Moreover, other cultures are seen as hostile

and reactionary cultures that would destroy the homogenous Danish society. Muslim culture in particular singled out with arguing that successful integration of Muslims into another culture has not been experienced in the history let alone Danish society. Multiethnic society is presented as a receipt for having conflictual relationships in society. It is further argued the countries that actually export their surplus population to Denmark are all characterized by the absence of democracy, the suppression of virtually all freedoms, the deprivation of the woman's right to choice of partner, sexuality, and identity and a general absence of financial freedom. The reason that immigrants lack these virtues is connected with the fact that if they share these values and qualities they would be living in a developed country in the first place, therefore, they would not need to immigrate to a developed country like Denmark. Thus, immigrants coming from third-world countries are seen as people that lack the core values of Denmark which is marked by freedom, democracy, and gender equality. Considering their inability to integrate and dangers of a multiethnic society, DF strongly opposes the inclusion of immigrants to the Danish society.

3.4.3. Public speeches of DF party members

The second group of material that is going to be analyzed following the premises of securitization theory and its methodology of speech act is member speeches of the party. In this context, these materials are provided from DF's official website. Before conducting the analysis, the broad archive in the DF's official website filtered through some keywords. Since the site's broad archive maintains myriad of member speeches on multiple topics, it is necessary to use some keywords such as *udlændn-* (foreigner), *indvand-* (immigr-), *flygtning* (refugee), and *asyl-* (asylum) in Danish to get access to relevant documents. After this filtration process, relevant speeches are included in this analysis.

In this context, the first leader speeches that are going to be analyzed belong to the Kristian Thulesen Dahl, who serves as the leader of DF since 2012. In one of his speeches, he asserts:

“The most important task of the Danish People's Party: Denmark must never be Islamized. 4 years ago - more specifically on February 14, 2015 - an Islamist

attacked the Krudttønden (a local cultural center) in Copenhagen. At that location, a discussion event was held on freedom of speech and censorship – and one of the participants was Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks. He was the target. He insulted Muslims by drawing Mohammed. Thus, in the terrorist's - Omar El-Husseini-mind, it was, therefore, enough to kill him. It was in the name of Islam that Omar El-Husseini killed innocent people. It was in the name of Islam that innocent people in Manchester, Madrid, London, Berlin, Brussels, Paris - yes, I could go on - were killed. It has happened so often that it becomes less and less shocking when an Islamist goes mad. Sad, but true...Denmark, for example, became the center of the Islamist anger in 2005, when the so-called Mohammed drawings were printed in the Jutland Post. And even today - so many years after - artists have to live under police protection because they drew a simple picture. There is also no doubt that the incident has led to self-censorship. Therefore, it has been a decisive goal for the Danish People's Party to restrict immigration from Muslim countries spread out in the Middle East and North Africa. Restriction attempts succeeded significantly in the periods when we have had influence. Conversely, the number from Muslim countries increased during the periods when we have not been influential as much. That is why we will continue to fight firmly for our most important brand case: limiting immigration. Denmark must never be Islamized” (Kristians Ugebrev, 2019).

Here, Kristian Thulesen Dahl associates terrorist activities with Immigrants with a Muslim background. He underlines that Islamic culture contradicts Danish culture thereby creates a conflictual tension. In order to prevent terrorist attacks that are sourced from Immigration from Muslim countries, he claims that specific actions must be taken and immigration must be restricted, otherwise Denmark is going to be Islamized and will lose its identity. In this text, it is possible to identify that migration is presented as a serious threat to Danish culture and countermeasures have taken only when DF had an influential power in the parliament.

In another speech, Kristian Thulesen Dahl criticizes Alternate Party leader Uffe Elbæk in regard to pro-immigration views. On this point, he argues:

“The Alternate Party leader Uffe Elbæk has declared that Denmark must be a ‘humanitarian superpower’. It is a term mostly associated with former Swedish Prime Minister Frederik Reinfeldt, who stood for open borders and mass immigration. A reality-free policy that has had lasting and deeply unfortunate consequences for our Swedish brothers and a line that more and more people in Sweden are now turning away from, though it may seem too late. This is the course that Uffe Elbæk wants Denmark to take. If it is up to Uffe Elbæk, Denmark should welcome more and more migrants. Denmark must be a "humanitarian superpower"! Of course, in the Danish People's Party, we want to follow a completely different path. Denmark cannot withstand another period when immigration from the Middle East and Africa increases massively, just as it did in the period between 2011-2015 when the Liberals had a decisive influence in the Social Democrat-led government. The problems are already massive today. They should not be made bigger - but smaller” (Kristians Ugebrev, 2018d).

As one can see in this statement, Kristian Thulesen Dahl perceives immigration as already a massive problem for Denmark. In this sense, he opposes the idea that Denmark should have open-door policies. It is stated that “Denmark cannot withstand another immigration period” meaning that if a similar immigration influx happens in the future, there will be no return from this problem.

More on the immigration topic, Kristian Thulesen Dahl opposes family reunification permits in order to prevent more immigrants to enter Denmark.

“When an immigrant is granted a residence permit in Denmark, it usually also means that his or her family will soon find their way to our country. This is a major problem, as the number of immigrants increases while the prospect of returning their countries diminishing through family reunification. The latest figures show that since 2015, a total of 25,782 family reunification permits have been granted. Just to put things in perspective: In these numbers, there are more people than in the whole municipality of Kerteminde! It is, therefore, no secret that we have a great challenge at hand. As a result of our austerity for the past two years, the amount of asylum applications has dropped to the lowest in 9 years. But

now we must also reduce the number of family reunions...Family reunification should take place in their home country instead” (Kristians Ugebrev, 2018c).

Immigration through the family reunification process presented as a great challenge. It is stated that thanks to the DF’s effort, the immigration numbers have decreased but immigrants still infiltrating to Denmark via family reunions. Thus, preventing this process is presented as an urgent action that must be resolved immediately.

Søren Espersen who is DF’s party member and its foreign affairs spokesperson, argues that it is not Denmark that has to integrate. Instead, immigrants must integrate themselves into Danish culture if they want to stay in the country.

“...[integration] is not a task that Denmark has to solve. No, it is the task that immigrants have to solve. Assimilation is a medical term which means "to do equal" or to "absorb" or to "adopt". In the medical language, it is about the absorption and transformation of nutrients to become part of the organism, which, after all, needs nutrients. But it is worth noting that it is the nutrients that need to be absorbed into the organism - not the other way around! Yes, this is the assimilation - we precisely, in the name of peace, security, and tolerance, must demand from foreigners...Assimilate yourselves - or disappear ...!” (Kristians Ugebrev, 2018b).

Espersen claims that assimilation is the best option for immigrants to integrate themselves into Danish society. Utilizing the medical meaning of assimilation, he presents it as a positive choice for immigrants for the sake of social peace, security, and tolerance. Thus, if immigrants do now willingly assimilate themselves, social peace and security will be at risk. In this sense, there is only two option for Espersen, assimilation or deportation from the country.

In the final leader speech, Kristian Thulesen Dahl once again dwells on the negative attribution of immigration.

“In Denmark, according to the Ministry of Finance's own figures, non-Western immigration costs at least \$ 33 billion DKK annually. It is an immensely high amount that could potentially be used more sensibly in other policy areas, for

example, in our elderly care, in our health care, and in our education. It is time that we have to settle for ourselves whether we want a Denmark that acts as a social office for immigrants from all over the world, or whether we want a Denmark that protects Danishness. We need refugees to return their home...” (Kristians Ugebrev, 2018a).

Here, it is argued that immigration is incredibly costly for Denmark. It is not only perceived as costly but also wastes resources. In this sense, resources should be canalized to other areas instead of immigration. One of the key narratives in this statement is the question that is asked to Danish people. Since Danish people gain nothing from the expenditure on immigration, Kristian Thulesen Dahl questions whether we should finance immigration or protect our Danishness. In this sense, money spent on immigration associated with the degradation of Danish Identity. Thus, since identity is presented as the referent object by DF in multiple instances, immigration, due to its cost, laid down as a serious threat to Danish identity.

By relying on these arguments, DF has received 21.1 percent votes in the 2015 parliamentary elections increasing their votes up to 7.8 percent comparing the previous 2011 parliamentary elections and received additional 15 parliamentary seats. Despite staying outside of the coalition, DF provided parliamentary support to the government and had significant power and influence in the parliament between the years of 2015 and 2019. After the 2015 elections, DF has become the second biggest party in the parliament. As a result of its increasing power, DF has managed to be a factor to tighten the immigration policy of the country as they proudly list all the policy changes regard to immigration in the section named ‘Tightening on Immigration Policy’. Here, DF continually updates the list after any changes made on immigration policy in the parliament which they participate. The list contains 146 policy changes ranging from the abolition of the green card scheme to prohibition of the burka in the public space.

It should be noted that this is the only section where the policy changes made in the parliament are listed one by one. Thus it further proves the importance of migration issues for DF. It is argued that thanks to these policy changes, the number of new immigrants entering Denmark have been decreased. Further justification is made in the statement that

the purpose of these changes is to safeguard the interest of the Danish people, fight against the criminal immigrants and to ensure that immigration is limited and better controlled (Dansk Folkeparti Udlændingepolitik, 2019).

In the last step of the process of securitization, the target audience must accept that the issue at hand is indeed a security threat and must tolerate the proposed emergency actions. In this regard, speeches of party leaders and members as well as the special page in DF's website named 'tightening on immigration policy' suggest that during the year between 2015-2019, DF directly or indirectly has managed to influence stricter immigration policies to be taken. As underlined multiple times, DF believes that this was only possible because of DF's influential position in the Danish parliament as a result of the votes that they achieved in general elections. In this sense, during this four-year period, DF has managed to persuade the relevant audience to acknowledge the claims about migration threat and permit urgent actions. For his reason, the Danish case can be highlighted as a successful securitization case.

Table 3. 3 Discourse Analysis of Dansk Folkeparti (DF)

Material	Threat	Referent Object	Emergency Actions	Level of Securitization
Party Program of DF (2002, 2009)	Immigration	Danish cultural heritage	Stricter border Controls	Successful securitization case
	Multiethnic societies	Danish Identity	Exclusion of immigrants from society	
		Danish Society	Prohibition of the burka in public space	
Member and Leader Speeches	Immigration	Danish cultural heritage	Stricter immigration policies	Successful securitization case
	Islamization	Danish Identity	Termination of family reunification	
		Danish Society	Cutting the cost of immigration	

Findings in this analysis are tabulated through following the steps of the securitization process following the main premises of securitization theory and its methodology of speech act (Table 3.3.). This table unfolds how the immigration issue is constructed as a security problem through the designation of threat and referent object, sub-security themes which are thought as facilitating conditions, emergency actions and success of the securitization depends on participation of the audience into securitization process. These findings will be laid down in depth in the conclusion part of this chapter.

3.5. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION OF THE CASE STUDIES

After collecting the relevant materials, the collected data analyzed through following the main premises of securitization theory and its methodology of speech act. In this context, how AfD and DF securitized migration is investigated. The analysis showed that both AfD and DF, constructed migration as a security threat to the collective identity, culture, and society in each relevant country. In the construction process, both AfD and DF underlined the urgency of the matter, presented the it as a matter of survival and emphasized that if the threat is not handled quickly, there will be no return. In this sense, in constructing immigration as a security threat step, both AfD and DF followed the rhetorical structure that is highlighted as an important feature in the security speech act by Copenhagen School. In this rhetorical structure, actors point out the urgency of the matter to survive against the existence of threat simply because if the threat is not handled, it will be too late to correct his failure (Wæver, 2003, p. 10).

These findings also support the first hypothesis of this study. Securitization theory suggests that along with state-military threats there are also other threats in different sectors. In this sense, the concept of societal security developed where the referent object at hand is not the survival of the state but the survival of the national identity, culture, and society. In this context, this analysis shows that both AfD and DF presented immigration as an existential threat to survival of collective identity, culture, and society instead of the survival of the state. Thus, the migration issues, as Copenhagen School suggests, come forward as an issue that should be read on the societal sector concept.

In the threat designation step, facilitating conditions are also analyzed. According to the securitization theory, there are some structural features that increase the likelihood of a successful securitization process that is called 'facilitating conditions'. In this context, the following grammar of security is presented as an internal condition. It can be seen in the threat designation with the notions of "point of no return" and "a possible way out". In this sense, both AfD and DF followed grammar of security, described immigration with security-laden words such as threat, danger, and risk while arguing that the immigration threat indeed exists and there is no return from this point if the emergency measures are not taken immediately.

For the securitization approach, there are two external conditions in facilitating conditions. The first of them is the social capacity of the securitizing actors. In this sense, the securitizing actor must have some sort of authority to speak about the particular topic at hand. In this logic, two of the important political actors in their particular countries, both AfD and DF can be seen as relevant actors who have enough social capacity to speak about the immigration issue in the political life. The second external condition is related to the threat. Securitization theory argues that the likelihood of something to be acknowledged as a security threat is greater if it is historically associated with certain objects that largely held to be threatening. One example would be that if environmental pollution is presented as a security threat, the likelihood of this attempt will be more successful if there are polluted waters around. In this context, this final facilitating condition analyzed particularly. According to the literature on security-migration nexus, immigration is associated with security issues ever since the 1980s. A great number of studies indicate that the immigration issue is presented as a sub-security theme in economic security, internal security, national security, and cultural security areas. In other words, migration is presented as a meta-problem. Thus, studies show that immigration comes forward as a problem in multiple security spheres. In this sense, since the immigration issue is historically associated with the collapse of welfare and increased rates of crime for the past four decades these sub-security themes can be seen as facilitating conditions. In this context, when immigration issue presented as a security problem, the chances that it is perceived as a security threat is greater since it is historically associated with the collapse of the welfare system and increased crime rates.

In the earlier parts of this study, it is argued that in order to dramatize the issue, actors use various security themes in their discourses. The analysis shows that both AfD and DF used these sub-security themes besides the main security theme of identity. These security themes are considered as facilitating conditions. In other words, the immigration issue is presented as a problem in economic, national and internal security areas however it is not framed as a threat to survival of referent objects. Rather, these problems are sub-themes that is used to make the audience accept immigration threat easier.

Securitization theory argues that the designation of an existential threat also legitimizes the use of emergency tools. In the second step, call for extra-ordinary measures analyzed. Findings at hand suggest that both parties have claimed that borders must be protected and permanently closed. Furthermore, in order to prevent Islamization and radicalization, parties have claimed Islamic practices must be prohibited. Additionally, they advocated the prohibition of the burqa in public space, closure of Quran courses and financing of mosques. In this sense, in both case studies, the particular emphasis on immigrants with Muslim backgrounds noticed. In this context, Muslim immigrants not only presented as prone to radicalization and terrorist activities but also defined as people who have completely different values, traditions and beliefs than European people. For this reason, they are seen as a threat that disrupts the identity and harmony of the native societies. Especially with the increasing immigration numbers, it is claimed that this transformation will be intensified and social peace will be at risk. Thus, this problem presented as a threat that needs utmost urgency.

In this context, the third step of the securitization process regarding the persuasion of the audience is analyzed. If the relative audience accepts the claims of securitization actor and tolerates the use of emergency measures, it is possible to talk about a successful securitization case. Otherwise, we can only talk about the securitization move. Who constitutes the audience is one of the most asked questions in the securitization studies. However, there is no definite answer to it. In this step, electorates are thought of as the relevant audience since securitizing is considered as a political choice and securitizing actors consciously decide to either securitize or not securitize the issue. If target audience accepts the claims of securitizer, recognize the presented threat and tolerate the emergency measures, this can be read on electoral results. At this point, it is necessary to

point out that political parties not receiving a vote for the only immigration issue. This study is aware that there can be multiple reasons for voting for any political party. However, it is visible that these political parties intentionally securitize the immigration issue in order to achieve electoral support. In this sense, securitization of migration is one of the strategical tools for political parties.

In this context, it is useful to look at the voting numbers of radical right parties after the 2015 migration crisis. In the 2017 elections, AfD has received 12,6 percent of the total votes and not only became the biggest opposition party in the parliament but also became the first radical right party since the Nazi period to enter Bundestag. DF, on the other hand, in 2015 general elections gathered 21,1% percent of the total votes which is the best result party ever had. In this sense, they accessed a very strategic position in the Danish parliament. At this point, what interests this study is not voting percentages but whether extra-ordinary measures regarding the presented immigration threat is adopted or not.

In the Danish case, it can be observed that many of the suggested emergency measures have been taken especially after DF's increased power in the Danish parliament after the 2015 general elections. In fact, DF has created a list on their official website in which they list every single policy tightening on immigration that DF has directly involved. Here, it is necessary to remind that the securitization theory does not demand that emergency measures have to be adopted. Instead, the threshold is at the level where the existential threat has to gain enough attention to be discussed upon in which in which legitimizing the adaptation of emergency measures is possible thanks to the discourse that explicitly points out the existence of the existential threat (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25).

In this context, when the tightening on immigration policies is remembered, it is possible to conclude that the immigration is successfully securitized by DF in the Danish context. The German case, however, points out a different result. Despite the fact that Germany has received more immigrants and become the destination country for many immigrants comparing to Denmark, the securitization process has not been as successful as in Danish example. First of all, AfD has relatively limited power in Bundestag due to the amount of vote they have achieved in the 2017 Federal elections. While the historic success of AfD has created pressure on other parties as well as coalition government and more stricter immigration rhetoric is adopted by these parties, the emergency actions that are

legitimized by AfD have not put into effect. In this context, Merkel's government does not perceive migration as a security issue comparing to the AfD. Thus, AfD directly or indirectly could not put proposed emergency measures into action due to its limited power in Bundestag. Nevertheless, after adopting the immigration policies, AfD has managed to achieve a respectable 12,6 percent of the total votes in elections. Thus, while AfD's securitization attempt can be seen as a failed securitized attempt in the securitization logic, in an alternative perspective developed by Philippe Bourbeau (2011), who argues that securitization processes can be read as either strongly securitized or weakly securitized, the securitization process in AfD's case can be said as weakly securitized.

4. CONCLUSION

International migration has been one of the most critical elements in Europe's economic and social transformation following the post-War period. In this changing political, social and economic structure, migration has increasingly seen as a security threat. The argument in this study is that this shift in the perception come into existence gradually with the help of different political and social actors. However, radical right parties in Europe, especially in the last few decade, have emerged as a significantly potent political securitizing actors in the process for securitization of international migration with their ever-increasing influence in the political sphere. Therefore, the subject of this study is about how radical right parties construct migration as a security issue.

To understand how migration is perceived as a security problem, the first part of the study introduces a theoretical and methodological scope. In this section, the Copenhagen School and securitization theory along with its methodology of speech act are discussed in detail.

For the Copenhagen School, if a topic is presented by the political elite as an existential threat to existence of a valued referent object, it is enough to be considered as a security issue. Presenting the issue at hand as a security issue justifies the use of emergency measures and moves the issue from the routinized political sphere to the politics of exception. If the relevant audience participates in the construction of this threat and

tolerates the extraordinary measures to be used, it is possible to say that the issue has been successfully securitized.

In this context, there are three steps to be followed in the methodology of securitization theory. The first is that something is required to be presented as an existential threat to existence of a referent object. There are some structural features that make it easier for the relative audience to acknowledge this threat designation. These structural features are called as facilitating conditions. According to these factors, first, the securitizing actor should follow a certain security grammar. In this security grammar, the threat should be constructed with words loaded with security, and it should be stated that there is no return but there is a way out. Secondly, the securitizing actor must have sufficient authority to talk about the issue. The third condition is the historical association of the threat. In this context, it will be easier to perceive something as a security problem if it is historically associated objects which generally held to be threatening.

The second step in the theory of securitization and its methodology of speech act is the legitimization of the emergency measures which should be taken after the threat construction by the securitizing actor. Since the issue is laid down as a security threat to the existence, the issue moves from everyday politics to security sphere. Thus, the issue at hand takes priority above all else. Emergency actions are measures that must be taken in order to eliminate this threat. Thus, these actions, which cannot be taken in normal times, can now be taken because it is presented as a matter of survival.

The third step is about the approval of the audience. The Copenhagen School suggests that the securitization process takes place intersubjectively. In this context, the securitizing actor needs the approval of the target audience to legitimize use of emergency measures. It can be said that the securitization process was successful if the audience accepted the alleged threat and tolerated the taking of extraordinary policies. If the audience does not accept this claim, this process will remain as a securitization move, not as a securitization case. Thanks to this theoretical framework, it is possible to study not only the state and military issues but also the such as environment and immigration from a security perspective in the security studies. Since the subject of this thesis is about the securitization of migration, this theoretical and methodological scope constitutes the main framework of this thesis.

In the second part of the study, a literature review is conducted on the securitization of migration. Through the comprehensive literature review, it has been shown how migration is historically presented as a security problem and how it is framed as a security problem both at the national and international levels. Additionally, it is emphasized that multiple actors took part in the process of securitization of migration, which was presented as a security problem since the 1980s. In addition to the claim that migration is presented as a threat to collective identity, migration has been described as a meta-problem. In this context, migration is securitized through both discursive methods and through practices.

In the third part of the study, two parties from the radical right movement in Europe, AfD from Germany and DF from Denmark have selected as case studies. A short literature review is conducted on radical right parties, which is considered as the political family where the main actors of this study, AfD, and DF is included. Then, these two parties are analyzed through following the steps that are laid down by the securitization theory and its methodology of the speech act in order to show how radical right parties of Europe securitize the migration phenomenon.

In this analysis, by analyzing party manifestos and leader discourses, the results showed that both AfD and DF followed the steps of the security speech act, the concept introduced by the Copenhagen School. Both parties presented immigration as a threat to existence, and the object to be protected was identified as a collective culture, identity, and the local community. In the phase where immediate measures justified to be taken, a number of measures were proposed ranging from permanently closing the borders to tightening the controls at the borders and to preventing the radicalization of Muslim immigrants. In addition, all immigrants who not entitled to stay argued that must be deported.

The Copenhagen School does not stipulate emergency measures to be taken. Instead, the Copenhagen School argues that

"the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the

form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity" (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 25).

In this context, the DF has achieved a historic voting rate of 21.1% in the 2015 elections and became a significant actor in the Danish parliament. Following the support that they receive from electorates, a list of immigration laws consists of 146 entry has been listed on a page titled 'tightening of immigration policies' which DF itself keeps up to date on its official websites. In this context, it can be concluded that the masses tolerated the adoption of urgent political actions by allocating just enough power to DF. Therefore, it can be said that DF has successfully built migration as a security problem between the years 2015-2019.

Alternative for Germany, however, presents a different example. Although Germany is considered as the destination country by immigrants, AfD, which set out with anti-immigrant rhetoric, has not been able to take immediate action to address the immigration threat. Although they have achieved a staggering 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 elections, they have failed to prevent the Merkel government's open-door policy and to ensure that urgent measures were taken. Nevertheless, the party, through adopting the anti-immigrant views, gathered 12.6% of the total votes and put pressure on other parties. In this sense, according to the theory of securitization, although the German case emerges as an unsuccessful example of securitization through the readings of securitization theory. In another perspective, Philippe Bourbeau (2011) argues that securitization cases should not necessarily be divided into two as successful or unsuccessful, but rather can be classified as weak or strong. In this sense, it can be said that the migration problem which is tried to be securitized by AfD is securitized weakly.

Due to these findings, It is our belief that study at hand contributes to existing securitization literature by providing empirical results with a consistent methodology. Ever since their appearance, Copenhagen School and their securitization theory have become one of the most intriguing developments in the International Relations and its sub-field, security studies. In this sense, the securitization framework not only became one of the most prevalent theories in security studies but also became one of the most criticized approaches replacing the traditional realist understanding. The majority of criticisms directed towards to lack of methodology in the studies that used securitization

theory as a framework. In this study, it is shown that the securitization framework and its methodology of speech act can be used as solid working ground in the analysis of anti-immigrant discourses of radical right parties in Germany as well as Denmark. In addition, the number of empirical studies on radical right-wing parties as political actors in the process of securitization is rather limited. Radical right parties emerge as important actors to be examined as the securitizing actors, especially considering their increased power in political life in the last decade. Therefore, it is believed that this study is a good addition towards securitization of migration studies, particularly regarding the migration and the radical right party literature.

As a result, this thesis analyzed how radical right parties construct migration as a security problem through the analyses of AfD in Germany and DF in Denmark in particular. This analysis is conducted based on Copenhagen School's securitization theory and its methodology of speech act. For the Copenhagen School, the issue of immigration should be read in the societal sector. The concept of the societal sector suggests that migration is constructed as a threat to national identity, culture, and society. Following this premise, this study hypothesized that AfD and DF were presented the migration issue as a threat to the existence of the collective identity, culture, and society. The literature review on migration-security nexus and the securitization of migration, it is emphasized that migration has historically been associated with the collapse of the welfare system and the increasing criminal activities as well as terrorism. In this context, it is shown that the collapse of the welfare system along with the increasing criminal elements are served as facilitating conditions for both AfD and DF in the securitization process.

However, the ultimate results show us the success of the securitization attempt depends on the persuasion of the relative audience. Since DF has managed to gather a bigger proportion of electoral support from Danish people, they were able to alter some of the policies regarding the immigration issue in the Danish Parliament. AfD, on the other side of the coin, despite becoming the first radical right party in the Bundestag since the Nazi period, has lacked the necessary electoral support from German people. Thus, AfD has a much more limited maneuvering area in the national parliament to force exceptional measures to be taken against the immigration issue.

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