



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
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**AID EFFECTIVENESS AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN A  
FRAGILE STATE: THE CASE OF SOMALIA**

Abdulkadir Sheikh Mohamed SHUKRI

MASTER'S THESIS

ISTANBUL, AUGUST, 2020

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MASTER'S THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial  
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International Relations

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# AID EFFECTIVENESS AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS IN A FRAGILE STATE: THE CASE OF SOMALIA

## ABSTRACT

This study concerns the relation between foreign aid and fragile state institutions by asking how foreign aid effects fragile state institutions. And to elaborate furthermore, the study applies the case of Somalia as a fragile state which is pointed out as heavily dependent on foreign aid. It notices that the good governance approach which is the dominant approach for assessing state institutions cannot be appropriate for fragile states, so as an alternative for that approach, the thesis provides that good enough governance can be a proper application for fragile states, which concerns the institutions itself, not its outcomes as a result. In the case of Somalia, the thesis concerns only the current government implementation and progress (2017-2019), and to understand whether the Somalia fragility comes, the third chapter concerns the roots of fragility in Somalia, which, as a result, related to the warlord, factional leaders, and other authorities who rejected or refused any sort of agreements and conciliations to implement in the country. Moreover, this thesis applies the Country Indicator for foreign policy index (CIFP)'s concept of institution assessment mechanisms; state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy (ACL). In Somalia, these mechanisms are not shown increases, for example, the current state authorities in Somalia reveals an increase in the balance of the president and prime minister disputes, but the attention of conflict prevention is very low and that not great for the stabilization between the federal government and federal member states. Also, the rule of law in Somalia is getting worse when the federal constitutions take a decade to fulfill it, where, on the other side, it shows developments in state capacities. Finally, the study argues state authorities and state legitimacy in fragile states must be concerned as key for the development not only aid flow.

**Keywords:** fragile state, institutions, foreign aid, effectiveness, Somalia, quality, state authority, state capacity, state legitimacy, political stability.

## ÖZET

Bu çalışma, dış yardımın kırılğan devletlerin kurumlarını nasıl etkilediğini sorarak, dış yardım ile kırılğan devlet kurumları arasındaki ilişkiyi ele almaktadır. Daha da detaylandırmak gerekirse, çalışma, dış yardıma yoğun olarak bağımlı olduğu belirtilen ve bir kırılğan devlet olarak ele alınan Somali örneğine odaklanmaktadır. Devlet kurumlarını değerlendirmede baskın yaklaşım olan iyi yönetim yaklaşımının kırılğan devletler için uygun olamayacağına dikkat çeken çalışma, bu yaklaşımın alternatifini olan ve sonuçlar yerine kurumların kendilerine odaklanan yeterince iyi yönetişimin kırılğan devletler için uygun bir yaklaşım olabileceğini belirtmektedir. Somali örneğinde, tez yalnızca mevcut hükümet uygulaması ve ilerlemesiyle (2017-2019) ilgilenmektedir. Somali'deki kırılğan yapıyı anlamak için, üçüncü bölüm, Somali'deki kırılğanlığın kökenlerine odaklanmaktadır. Bunlar savaş ağaları, hizipler ve her türlü anlaşma ve uzlaşmayı reddeden diğer aktörler ile ilgilidir. Ayrıca, bu tez, Dış Politika Ülke Göstergeleri Endeksi (CIFP)'nin kurum değerlendirme mekanizmalarından yararlanmaktadır: devlet otoritesi, devlet kapasitesi ve devlet meşruiyeti (ACL). Somali'de bu mekanizmaların işleyişi ile ilgili bir düzelme gözükmemektedir, örneğin, Somali'deki mevcut devlet yetkilileri, cumhurbaşkanı ve başbakan arasındaki anlaşmazlıkların çözülmesinde bir iyileşme vardır, ancak bu istikrarın sağlanması açısından yeterli değildir. Ayrıca, Somali'de hukukun üstünlüğü konusunda sorunlar giderek artmaktadır. Diğer yandan devlet kapasitesinde bir gelişme gözükmemektedir. Son olarak çalışma, kırılğan devletlerde devlet otoritesinin ve devlet meşruiyetinin yalnızca dış yardımlar bağlamında değil, kalkınmayı teşvik etmede de kilit bir faktör olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır.

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
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To my parents

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## **List of Abbreviations**

ACL	: State authority, State Capacity, State Legitimacy
ARPCT	: Alliance of Restoring Peace and Counter-terrorism
CIFP	: Country Indicator for Foreign Policy
DCD	: Development Co-operation Directorate
FGS	: Federal Government State
NDP	: National Development Plan
OCHA FTS	: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Services
ODA	: Official Development Assistances
OECD	: The Organizational Economic Co-operation and Development
SDRF	: Somali Development and Reconstruction Facilities
SNM	: Somali National Movement
SNRC	: Somali National Reconciliation Conferences
SPM	: Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF	: Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	: Transitional Federal Government
TNG	: Transitional National Government
UIC	: United Islamic Court
UK DFID	: UK Department for International Development
UN MPTF	: UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund
UNSOM	: United Union Mission in Somalia
USC	: United Somali Congress
WB MPF	: World Bank Multi-Partner Fund

## 1.0. Introduction

Since 2012 Somalia has gotten attention internationally that attention was mainly concerned in two ways. Firstly, at that time Somalia was recovering consecutive civil wars and it is going to open up the country for a democratic way and make signs of progress on the economic, human development and other sectors, however, all these sectors were not involved any institutional or governmental authority whether hospitals and schools are not public and economic are not regulated any official sectors, so in 2012, Somalia was ready to make its institutional systems. Secondly, the Somalia state system, after a decade, transited from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Federal Government State (FGS). This transition contributed to developing the relations of the government and foreign aid to become the later not only limited to humanitarian assistance but also concerns the development and treasure assistance. This thesis questions the effectiveness of that aid to Somalia's state institutions.

Hence, Somalia since the Federal Government State in 2012 has two different governments. In the first government (2012-2017), the president was Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the Mohamud's government tackled to stabilize the institutions whether in four years there were three prime ministers, and the institutional corruptions reach the highest in decades. The second government (2017- until now) is ruled by Mohamed Abdullahi known as Farmajo. Farmajo somehow reduces the institutional corruption and stabilizes the president and prime minister disputes. So this study assesses Farmajo's era that brings formations of state institutional stabilization and also who prioritizes and underlines his government focuses on stability more than anyone.

Every year many countries receive aid in different issues. International assistance might help countries to support their developmental bases like roads or social

development like hospitals and others receive aid to support it is state revenue and economic development. Since the end of World War II, foreign aid becomes popular among countries for various objectives (see for example Holbik 1968, Valenta 1981, Trap 2000). But later the idea of international aid becomes to harmonies low-income states and equality among states known these days as 'no one left behind'. Then, the questions of state institutions come up and state classifications bases on institutional challenges arise, for example, fragile state and not fragile state.

Since the end of the cold war, foreign aid has started a new path for approaching the implementations of foreign aid. The question of institutional effectiveness begins at the end of the cold war because foreign aid before that was a mechanism that has been used to approach as an interest or for such strategically (Trap, 2000). After the cold war, many questions have been asked for the effectiveness of foreign aid and the state institutions, so the Good Governance approach was used to apply the institutions that have been receiving aid. However, fragile states become one of the institutions that needed an exceptional dynamic for supporting them, and that it is one of the arguments that this thesis tries to engaged by asking is there any different approach that fragile state allows us to understanding of their state institutions?

In the second chapter, the study tries to engage the approach and theories that have been utilized to analyze foreign aid since WWII, and all these approaches are only concerned the foreign aid and institutional relation. Firstly, after WWII and the end of the cold war, many countries were using foreign aid for either purpose of allies or for the aim of keeping ties with aid receivers. The two blocks that were existed at the time, namely, USSR and United States were using foreign aid spread their allies in the world in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Also, in many countries such as the UK and France

after giving independency to many countries, foreign aid became another way to keep the relation with them by initiating 'Francophone' foundations for example and that is known conditionality foreign aid.

Furthermore, good governance is an approach that has been applied to characterize the institutional strength in receiving countries. Institutional strength is a sign of institutional effectiveness, for example, good governance puts forward such instruments that strengthening states such as reducing corruption and allowing accountability for the social, and other methods those are core elements for institutional effectiveness. But for the fragile states which either already faces dictatorships, regimes or enduring civil war and the causes of that have low-incomes are not easily applicable to the good governance. So this study suggests the applicable approach which determines the effectiveness of institutions in the fragile state is the willingness of state authority or good enough governance (see for example Grindle 2004 and 2005).

To put this approach in a case, the study uses Somalia as a case study to apply good enough governance approach to it. Somalia is one of the fragile states which have endured civil war after collapsing its central state, this civil war which had taken more than a decade and a half has caused damages on civil societies, hospitals, and the state institutions, and today it is recovering all that damages and developing its state. The thesis overviews three decades of instability in Somalia to understand the root causes of that long term instabilities. Also, the chapter concludes a table that shows the reconciliations attempts that half of them did not work because of the factional leaders who have not seen their interest in it.

The fourth chapter of the thesis contextualizes the effectiveness of aid in Somalia institutional by utilizing the ACL state mechanisms. At first, the thesis assesses

the effectiveness of aid by looking at how it is allocated in the Somalia institutions and instruments that have been used for that by arguing that the effectiveness of aid is the responsibilities of institutions, not aid is reasons for that. Add to that, the assessment of institutions separately is inevitable to understand the institution's effectiveness. And to do so, the thesis implements the CIFP approach of institutions assessment and that is (ACL) mechanism; state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy. These mechanisms underline the weakness of the institutions and requiring balancing these mechanisms. So the study agrees that the balance of these mechanisms is inevitable, but state authority has the priority of these mechanisms and without stabilizing it other will not be stabilized as well.

### **1.1. Central Research Question**

- ❖ How does Foreign aid effect on Somalia's government institutions in the second federalization period (2017-2019)?

In many countries, foreign aid plays a major role in government incomes, especially, African countries. Some countries are classified as weak or fragility states, and that is when such a state recovering a long time of civil wars such as South Sudan, Congo, and Somalia in Africa and Yemen in Asia. Somalia is one of the countries that rebuild its institutions after two decades of civil wars, and it is recovering from statelessness and terror war. Therefore, those countries are one of the most needed support by international donors to maintain recovering and prevent further conflicts and crisis.

This thesis focuses on (2017-2019) time period for several issues. Firstly, this period is the period that Somalia's federalization took its second phase. 2012 was the period that Somalia moved from Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to the federal government, so the first government was suffering to settle down issues on state

systems like border lineation between federal states, rebuilding federal state, and constructing its institutions. Secondly, the issue that my research scope starting from 2017 and that is because 2017 was the shift between two cabinets in the Somalia Federal state. This cabinet is supported internally and externally, also, it is claimed that it is applying a good governance approach in the federal institutions. Thirdly, this government promised to establish a fair system on financial revenue, unlike the previous government which was pointing it out as weak governance and corruption. Hence, within all considerable issues my research sticks on that period.

As I mentioned above the central question of this research “*How does Foreign aid influence on Somalia’s government institutions in the federalization period*” contributes to the case of Somalia's foreign aid. As the study discusses below that there is a distinct gap in the analysis of the effectiveness of Somalia's foreign aid. So, The analysis will rely on the exists approach on foreign aid which in that point the good enough governance approach will be applied and asking In what sense that foreign aid contributes to the performance of governance?

## **1.2. Methodology of the study**

Methodologically, this research is qualitative research which uses the case Somalia to add discussion on the literature on fragile state and institutional qualities. The case of Somalia institutions is well fits the description of fragile state economically, socially, and institutionally. But this research focuses how this institution handles all that surrounded weakness. Also, the thesis studies carefully and analyzing foreign aid in Somalia institutional performance and reports that reported by the Minister of planning

and development of Somalia Federal government which is accessible on its official website in English language<sup>1</sup>.

This research gets inspiration from many conducted types of research that assessed the effectiveness of aid inflows in different research. For example, Cerment et al, (2008) assess the aid effectiveness on ACL mechanism; state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy. The same mechanisms were used by Grävingsholt et al., 2012 to give more understanding on the fragile typologies. This research conducts the concept of those mechanisms which is originally proposed it by the Country Indicator for Foreign Policy (CIFP)

### **1.3. Study Background**

Somalia is a country located in East of the horn of Africa, and it has got its independency in 1960 when former British colony (Northern part of the country) and former Italian colony (southern of the country) joined to become Somalia country. As Mehmet (1971) conducted in the first nine-year of independency that the average Somalia population was estimated at 3 million and it was one of the largest recipient foreign aid, and at that time 85 percent the government expenditure was supported mostly by the two former colonies. In 1969, Somalia had endured a military coup that entirely changed the previous government's ideology from capitalist to socialist, even though the recipient of foreign aid was a standing point of the state.

The military coup brings the idea of 'revolution' and country was encouraged to be self-reliance on agricultural and other natural products although it was receiving foreign aid. In the first phase of that period (1969-1978), Somalia was trying to do its best to reach self-reliance on agricultural, manufacturing and military capability, besides

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<sup>1</sup> See more <http://mop.gov.so/index.php/data-reports/reports/>

those activates, Somalia had changed its political policies from west to east. This made it adopt the socialism approach to ally with the Soviet Union. So, the Soviet Union supported Somalia enormously until 1978 when Somalia decided to cut ally with the Soviet Union for disagreement on the Ogadenia war<sup>2</sup>. The next phase was in between 1978-1991 when Somalia returned its relation with western countries particularly UK and USA. As Warsame (2011, p.51) pointed that Somalia, at that period, was receiving annual foreign support from the USA that was estimated \$100 million which makes it the third country (after Egypt and Israel) that USA gives foreign aid until the central government collapsed in 1991 by warlords and militates.

Since then Somalia had faced an unsettlement crisis; humanitarian crisis, political crisis, and the collapse of the central government. 1991 was when the central government collapsed and a massive crisis happened. Many countries had tried to stabilize those crises, for example, the USA and UN had adopted together the United Union Somalia Mission (UNSOM) that was mandated to settle these crises in between (1991-1994), but it was failed to do so Haggmann, 2016).

At the end of 1999, a broad conference was held in Djibouti which was gathered different sides of the society to settle institutions and government, so, in the conference, parliaments were elected and Abdi-Qasim Salad Hassan became president. Abdi-Qasim's institution was not allowed to serve properly when it faced huge challenges from warlords, even though some of them were appointed as ministers to participate in the settlements of situations. Moreover, generally speaking, institutional system after a decade needs a mechanism to run the state, for example, Somalia's national military and

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<sup>2</sup> Ogadenia war happened between Somalia (mainly allied to Soviet Union) and Ethiopia (mainly allied to the western countries) on a disputed border, the war took place between (1977-1978). It ended when Cuba and soviet militaries intervened in the war against Somalia. And that was when Somalia cut ties with the Soviet Union.

tax systems were not existent or ineffective, and foreign aid had its role in establishing the institutions and runs it. In this period, what was highly underlined and realized was only localizing is not enough to produce the agreed state system.

After four years another meeting was held in Nairobi for more reconciliation and wider state system attempts. When Abdi kasim's government did not serve well and it did not at least stabilize the capital city. In 2004 Mbagathia conference was held to discuss two points. First, it was designed to gather warlords to discuss the future of the country and reduction of the massive violence in which society is major victims. Secondly, a more collaborative state system in all different sides, in the view of the external actors, was inevitable to agree (see Hagmann, 2016; Menkhaus, 2018). This was when the federalization system was agreed, as a result, parliament was selected and Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed was elected as president of the next four years as the Transitional federal government (TFG).

When violence and crime still plagued Somalia and warlords are the main actors, the United Islamic Court (UIC) raised and tackled with warlords. Although the 2000s the crimes were not as much as 1991-1995 and that because there were blocks in the southern cities which was maintained to plunder the society to across each other. So, in 2006, UIC declared war against a warlord in the Mogadishu city, and a few days later some warlords fled to other cities and others surrendered and then joined to the UIC. Moreover, UIC regulates Islamic court as essential regulations in the Mogadishu and neighboring cities that UIC controls them. Additionally, UIC brought public orders in a large area in a short time and diminished the idea that Somalia is ungovernable (see Menkhaus, 2010). Therefore, UIC has made massive work in the southern cities of Somalia and established its cabinet, on the other hand, the Mbagathia cabinet still stands

and ready to rule out the country. Once again, the clash between them happened and southern cities went back to war again. Then UIC became an extremist terror group to the country until now, after three years of war another mediating conference was held in Djibouti 2009.

In the formulation of the federalization system, the Mbagathia in 2004 and Djibouti 2009 were a point as the transitional federal government (TFG). The first job of TFG was to establish the institutional systems that federal government will work on it, for example, constitutions that government will work on it, lineation of the federal state. Unlike Mbagathai 2004 election the Djibouti election in 2009 government worked on such produce a draft on the federal constitutions and lineation of such federal state. Finally, in 2012, the transitional government has finished it is the deadline and Somalia transited to the federal government.

In the first four years of the Somalia, the federalization period was described that this kind of state formulation requires government strategy and stabilized institutions. I discussed above that federalization was taken for the reason that Somalia cannot be stabilized unless the government power gets distributed. For example, when you look at Somalia's civil war from 1991-2000, we can argue that getting a territory was what the warlords were fighting for. Therefore, in the first four years of Somalia federalization, the most problematic issue was border lineation between federal states.

In this chronological period, Somalia has endured such fragility dynamics. in the collapse of the state system, as we know when government institutions collapse such basic systems will collapse as well, for example, educational and health services will no longer be available. Moreover, the revenue of the government system would be collapsed. So, in the re-building of the state system, there will be a high demand for

state funding. Somalia receives until now huge foreign flows that allow the Somali authorities to build up the country.

### **1.3.1.Somalia Institutions and Foreign Aid**

Foreign aid arrives in Somalia in two ways; one is the most dominant one is multilateral aid and the second one bilateral aid. United Nation and its agencies are the lead and response to the donors at the main needs in Somalia, also, they have been in Somalia since the collapse of the government and they stand alongside Somalia. Another way that Somalia receives donations is bilateral relation through NGOs not the federal government, but some countries like Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia donate aid to Somalia which they mostly hand it over the federal government to distribute it.

In the case of Somalia, we should distinguish the kind of foreign aid that flows to Somalia. For example some researches discuss the humanitarian foreign aid and puts forward such inevitability of a strategy which provides of humanitarian aid to Somalia Medinilla, Shiferaw, and Veron (2019), whether Grünewald (2012), highlights that humanitarians aid becomes effective if the foreign agencies empower local NGOs and funding them to reach those suffers in such humanitarian tragedies.

The effectiveness of foreign aid inflow to government is rarely researched when it comes to the case of Somalia. Until now we have found that only three researches were conducted in the case of the effectiveness of Somalia foreign aid, one of that researches were timed in 1960-1969 Mehmet (1971). The two-second research was conducted recently. (sheikh Ali, Dalmar, & Ali, 2018) compared between foreign aid and foreign debt in the case of Somalia, they conclude their research that foreign debt does not affect foreign aid. However, the research adds that foreign aid becomes effective when it used to the purpose of economic growth, this research denies that in

government institutions foreign aid can be effective, because of corruption and fear of not used effectively.

The second research on the effectiveness of foreign aid is done by (Warsame 2011). Warsame argues that international aid and trade policy has an effective role to support the newborn of Somalia federalization. Warsame's Research analysis that the upcoming federalization government of Somalia will heavily depend on international aid, therefore, the only way Somalia should get the advantage of that International aid is to implement good governance policy and prevent corruption issues to deserve more international aid. Warsames questioned that if the international aids go directly to the TFG at that time or not. He ends up the conclusion that the more foreign aids go directly to the institutions the more it becomes useful.

## **2.0. Perspectives on the effectiveness of foreign aid in the quality of government institutions**

In today's world more than half of the countries in the world receive aid in different ways. In a long time, many countries have been dependent on foreign aid, so historically, foreign aid has been the most dominant issue since WW II, since then foreign aid combines historical components many ups and downs scenario until today. Foreign aid as a broad study requires separate studies on each sector such as human developments, economic growth. However, in this chapter, we will investigate root approach of foreign aid that has an effect on government's institution.

Foreign aid had got a frame in the cold war era. In this era, the aid that donors provide to the recipients knew as conditional aid. Conditional aid is aid that was related to an exchanged interest, so it was grounded through political interest. Starting at that point, in the first section, we will provide the main observable points in the cold war era.

The second perspective for foreign aid is the selectivity perspective; aid that is based on characteristics. After more than four decades, the effectiveness of foreign aid has been asked variously, and then selectivity becomes a reasonable way of providing aid. In the second section, we engage selectivity or good governance approach and its dimension and how scholars have discussed it.

The third perspective for aid is an aid for fragile states. A fragile state is a state which institutionally has endured massive tendencies in state systems or economic or institutional collapsing in such time. In these sections, we will highlight frames of state fragility and its aid effectiveness, and then we will conclude by underlined ways that aid can be improved in fragile states.

## **2.1. Post-cold war and aid conditionality**

In this section, we will look at some paradigms of foreign aid and how foreign aid shifted for the narrative purpose to wild aim. Foreign aid is the most dilemma tool to use for different purposes, in the twentieth century and particularly after World War II, foreign aid had faced major disputes on its purpose and interests diplomatically and ideologically. The main presumption of foreign aid in the twentieth century until the last decade was only to contribute to economic growth besides the other diplomatic and ideology purpose. So, foreign aid before the end of the cold war had driven many issues that we will address in below lines, also, this discussion will be useful to understand foreign aid's points until this time.

Although foreign aid or country provides help to the outside of its sovereignty was estimated to start in the nineteenth century but the major discussion on it merely starts after World War II. After the massive impacts of WWII on the European countries particularly the western countries those were damaged in WWII. Marshall Plan was a project program that was supported by European countries by the United States (US). This program was estimated to spent approximately \$13billion between 1948-1952 on the construction sector as once addressed it (Wood, 1989, p. 29). Wood (1989) sees that this program was the beginning of European crisis and that exemplifies the presumption that the United States of America has power from now on, however, others such as Tarp (2000) points this program as a unique successfully of foreign aid.

However, both agreed this program was handled very well in terms of timing and its objectives. Tarp (2000) viewed that the Marshall plan had achieved its goals of development in terms of constructions and infrastructures without discussing any other circumstances. On the other hand, what Wood (1989) emphasizes is that the Marshall

Plan witness the weakness of European countries destroyed their power all over the world and economically and politically. On the record, France and Britain in that were the most two countries those colonies many parts in the world such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Wood 1989, p. 32). Three reasons can be explained deep crisis that Marshall plan occurred in European countries as: 1) it threatened the kind relation that European countries had with third world, because many of the third world countries were under the administration of European countries, namely, United Kingdom and French and the main reason was economical supports, so Marshall Plan viewed the other side of colonial states (Wood 1989, p. 32). 2) The major declines tendency of trade terms and slowing the foreign investment (Wood 1989, p. 32). 3) Marshall plan had revealed that European countries become dependency on US aid (Wood 1989, p. 33). Marshall Plan had changed the assumption of aid in the twentieth century.

Marshall Plan was an aid that was designated for constructions project at a certain time, but after it, foreign aid was changing according to objectivity. Marshall Plan whatsoever was pointed out that it achieved its purpose in rebuilding the massive damages that WWII has left behind, and Britain and France were among the countries that the WWII damaged. Besides that, many countries were taken independence mostly from Britain and France and later wanted to strength relation ties to them, so the easy way was to provide aids which designed to alleviate poverty and improve the economy. To do so, Britain, for example, had come up with a new alignment renaming it 'commonwealth developmental cooperation after it was called Colonial developmental cooperation in the 1960s (Hjertholm & White, 2000, p. 2). Similarly, France comes up with another frame called 'Francophone' countries; apparently, these countries are

mostly African countries that had been colonies by France (Martin 1995, p. 5). Both blocs are one of the three themes of foreign aid since the cold war era.

The last and most important theme of foreign aid after WWII was the aid driven by ideology, namely, the two big blocs at that time the USA and USSR. Another sophisticated issue in the mid-1950s until the collapse of the Soviet Union was the kind of contest between the USA and the USSR which was mostly based on military and economy. Holbik (1968, p. 17) once pointed out that US and USSR were behaving similarly to be selectively targeting such a countries political and economic crisis. Also, both of them were making alignments to the less developed countries in Africa and Asia by promising economic growth and military strength. For example, Somalia as one of the less developed countries has once turned to the “umbrella” of USSR for exchange advantages, particularly; the later has wanted massively to get an entrance to the horn of Africa whether Somalia was needed to build up its economic and military (Valenta, 1981 p. 5). So, foreign aid with the presumption of economic growth had opened up a new approach to both sides; donor (USSR and USA) and recipients, namely, less developed countries. However, after the collapse of the USSR USA and other multilateral and bilateral donors turned up to dictate the offering of foreign aid by putting on the governments to such conditions.

We have seen that foreign aid in the previous century had three main features besides that the logic of aid was quite clear. To begin with, the kind of morality that foreign aid has was to tackle issues of poverty for exercising economic forms, the three features we have discussed are not only the kind of foreign aid we have endured in the previous century. For example, foreign aid has struggled a vary famine that had hit many places in the world particularly Africa and Latin America and that was the

beginning of import food as an aid, the second foreign aid was relying of debt relief in most Africa and Latin America to help them to achieve development Hjertholm & White (2000, pp. 1–3), so, foreign aid has different occasions, but we discussed only three features those related to states level. Therefore, in last decades foreign aid shifted from objective-driven such as ideology to concerning of government and its implementation.

## **2.2. Foreign Aid and Quality of Government**

After four decades the world begins to question foreign aid's effectiveness in the social and government. As we pointed in the previous section foreign aid become driven by other objectives in almost four decades, also, those aid flow, although it was meant to upgrade some countries' economies, it was objectivities to work on some purpose, namely, ideological purpose and so on. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the world started to ask questions about the efficiency of foreign aid, so here we will discuss issues related to the concept quality of government and aid effectiveness.

To begin with, good governance was an issue that has arisen since the late 1980s for many reasons by World Bank and other non-governmental organizations. At the time that the USSR collapsed many eastern European countries needed foreign aid from western countries, so, the latter one had broadly and immediately considered eroding the previous authorities by considering government replacement. It was important to reform the former authorities at that time to ensure the transformation of democracy (see Bridger & Pine, 1998). Moreover, at that time was there was the third wave era of democratization which designated for changing regimes by-election victory (see Norris, 2012, p. 80). Also, the questioning of government and market for economic development become a central issue when was lunched the liberalization of economic

form which was experienced and influenced by New Institutional Economics (NIE) (R. pomerantz 2013, p. 163). Those are brief enlighten of reasons those contributed to the risen of a good governance issue.

Multilateral and bilateral donors disputed on the prioritizing of good governance among the recipients. R. pomerantz, (2013, p. 165) pointed out that in the beginning 1990s governance was a central discussion among donors, many bilateral donors were pursuing 'conditionality', similarly, the World Bank was denying for ruling conditionality issue. For example, as R. pomerantz, (2013, p. 165) underlined that the World Bank's agreements articulated to limited its role on only the empowering local economic developments and local agencies without taking governance in a considerable matter. In 1992 the World Bank started to enlighten the importance of governance, so it launched annually publication to discuss governance and development. It defines governance as "synonymous with sound development management" (World Bank, 1992, p. 1). On the other hand, bilateral donors started to demanding more actions on part of finance that they provide to host-specific issues like 'free and fair election' R. pomerantz, (2013, p. 165), so, mediating between donors become inevitably for achieving aid's goal.

Conditionality aid that has been utilized by US and USSR in the cold war era becomes a problematic for the other countries those contribute the donations of aid to low income countries for many reasons. For example, when multilateral and bilateral donors both provide aid in the same country this problematic was variously discussed among donors and recipients as R. pomerantz (2013, p. 165) pointed out, so, conditionality aids become threaten to recipients to consume aid as it usually. Also, conditionality was set only to satisfy the donor's ideologically and politically object

which putting a country for economic and development risks. Therefore, the selectivity method of aid becomes an alternative for approach and harmonizes between multilateral and bilateral in one side and recipients on the other side.

Selectivity way for providing aid become a common and agreed way after World Bank assessed the effect on aid. As I mentioned above, the World Bank prohibited its agreements articles to demand political action to provide aid, but bilateral donors were always defined which sectors that aid the amount should go or invest. Selectivity way underlines the importance of investing political sectors and institutions to imply useful and productive policies that put a country forward, so, quality of government or good governance was the selective way that many donors choose to invest in it.

Additionally, the World Bank annual publication report in 1998 had widely criticized and pointed aid as a tragedy on its tendency since 1991. Assessing aid was a report that has been reported in the WB to provide an assessment for aid effectiveness. The report reveals issues related to the ineffectiveness of aid such as policy issues in economic and development failure in Africa and Latin America. For example, the report once discussed aid flows to Zambia saying “If all the aid to Zambia had gone to production, it would be a rich country” (World Bank, 1998, p. 10). The report enforced the implementation of the selectivity method in the level of multilateral and bilateral aid providers and good policies for recipients (see World Bank, 1998). Since then the good governance approach has become a major measurement in world institutions.

There are many measurements of political and institutional policy that relates to the quality of government. For example, the ‘Freedom House- liberal democracy’<sup>3</sup> is

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<sup>3</sup> See information related to this index on its official website <https://freedomhouse.org/>

one best-known measurement for the democracy issue index and is widely used among scholars. Freedom house measures and focuses on the political systems, election process, civil rights, and rule of law in each country. Also, other measurements stick on party dimensions of good governance such as the Corruption Perception index (CPI)<sup>4</sup> which annually published corruption issues. Hence, among those varsities index good governance has not gotten yet any index gathers all governance varieties together until Kaufmann-Kraay and his colleagues generated the world Governance Index (WGI)<sup>5</sup>, and it is “the most ambitious attempt to measure all the dimensions of ‘good governance’” (Norris, 2013, p. 188). As WGI publishes in the front page of its official website (WGI, 2019), it measures six dimensions of government: 1) voice and accountability 2) political stability and Absence of violence 3) government effectiveness 4) regulatory quality 5) rule of law 6) control of corruption, so, this program indices these six dimensions to over 200 countries since 1996. Those dimensions are criteria for the selectivity approach and quality of government.

In the discussion of good governance, many scholars have pointed out that the concept has less meaning than it appears. Good governance is designed to handled properly and enforce institutions to adopt a proper change of institutions behaving or fulfill its purpose. After a decade of good governance waving around the world and presenting it as the perfect fit for governmental models and enhancing it better development and growth, Grindle (2004, 2007) question what is true about that. Grindle (2004) has debated a lot on meaningless of the concept of the good governance, and that is because in this world good governance concept assumes to prioritize that institutions

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<sup>4</sup> Check this index on <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi#>

<sup>5</sup> See <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>

should fulfill all the dimensions that pointed above, and that cannot be priority for every country, so he provided 'good enough governance'.

Good enough government is not an opponent to good governance, but it recognizes the limits of the dimensions of good governance. In each country, the institutional demands are different, and a way for development and growth with alleviating poverty can be slightly different. Above all, Grindle (2004, p.525) underlines that the government willingness about state development and reduction of poverty are the utopia for fragile countries. Therefore, such scholars pointed out that good governance is not enough to be a model for development, but good governance underlines that important point for institutional quality.

However, scholars have shown a variety of conclusions and result in the effectiveness of aid for institutions. Such scholars have demonstrated that there is a positive impact of aid in institutions. Boone (1996) insisted that aid benefits only to the government, not poverty and development, but Burnside & Dollar (2000) pointed that aid have positive on aid by providing appropriate environmental policies, also, Collier (2001) and Dollar (1999) similarly, concludes that reforming good policies and targeting poverty reductions are way to reflect to the institutional effectiveness. On the other hand, other scholars have neglected the positivity that aid has in recipient countries, Easterly (2003) insisted that foreign aid does not affect at all to the growth of and development in a country, similarly Moyo (2009) noticed similar conclusion that aid is a 'dead' in Africa. With all these discussion aid needs more binding policies and authority insists on making more productivity.

### **2.3. Aid allocation in a fragile state and its implication**

After a long discussion on foreign aid and its dynamics in conditionality and selectivity methods, one more method can be considered in here. Foreign aid effectiveness is a major question and discussion in both donors and receipt. When we look at the selectivity approach for aid providing it demands an application of good governance that we discussed above, but there is another dynamics of government institutions that clarified as 'fragile' state. Fragile states are a state which has been endured such institutional troubles such as civil war or an extended institutional deteriorate. In this section, we extend our discussion of foreign aid effectiveness beyond good governance and selectivity approach. We will discuss here the fragile state concept and related issues, and then provide such important points for increasing aid effectiveness in fragility state.

The prominences of state fragility have become a discussion issue since the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and Somalia 1991 had given a considerable debate on the state collapse and fragility. The terms 'weak' and 'strong' states have been questioned theoretically and practically, what makes a state weak or strong? The most obvious factor is that the state is the one that provides political services or goods to its citizens. For example, a state provides firstly security and safety to itself and citizens such as sovereign security, then individual security, human security, rights of political exercise, and other services like passport, infrastructure, hospitals, and schools ... etc. So that is the basic differentiation of a strong and a weak state; if a state does not provide those services it might count as a weak or fragile state (Rotberg, 2004, pp. 2–4). Also, the terms 'state collapse' and 'state fragility' bring, obviously, differences in the terms. A state can be weak or fragile but collapse is

another level, which means that a state can stay on the fragility without being collapsed for regimes or institutional or economic issues Rotberg (2004, pp. 5–10). Therefore, a fragile state requires internationally more consideration to preventing it from any possibility for failure.

The fragile state issue has been taking place in security interests and aid agenda. As Call (2008, pp. 2–6) once pointed out that in the case of Somalia and the USSR where both of them has been not ceased in one day. In the case of Somalia generated a threat of greed and terror aspiration to the neighborhood countries which, indeed, has become a problematic issue in the horn of Africa, also, the case USSR collapse has generated a noise among world security. For example in 1994 the CIA funded a multidisciplinary project called “State Failure Task Force” to understanding extensively the state fragility in security interest (Call, 2008, p. 3). Add to that, the concept has been heavily used after the 9/11 event, when many countries mainly the USA and EU has realized the possibility extension threats of fragile states in security interest (Grimm, 2014, p. 2).

Also, fragile state issue has got a massive aid flow among aid donors. The Organizational Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD) had contributed its commitment to the specialized annual report on the fragile of states issue since 2005. The report provides the wide issues related to the fragile states, for example, the report has targeted to empower seven sectors of state fragility such as promising more aid and investment, empowering state capacity, prevent possible security threats, and so on (OECD, 2018). In the 2018 annual report of the state fragile, it indicated that the aid flows to fragile increases since the financial crisis. In 2009 until 2016 the Official Development assistances ODA has spent

65% of funding to 58 contexts in OECD fragile framework, since then, it increases 26% at that period (OECD, 2018, pp. 11–14). The report adds to the aid agenda goal is to help the fragile state to target sustainable development goals by 2030. Hence, fragile states mainly framed in security interests and aid agenda manners.

There are three ways that many scholars have been used to map on state fragility. Like the good governance approach measurement components, fragile states have three ways to frame it. Gisselquist (2015) gives us a broad overview of the fragile state dimension in the literature of the fragile state. To begin with, the variety typology of the fragile state comes in contextualization aid allocations and the effectiveness of aid. Besides the necessity of understanding to country's root fragility whether it is civil wars based on clan or religion type or others could help agencies and aid providers to consider what and who to provide aid, however, scholars provide typologies to help us and aid providers where to allocate in a country the desperately needs aid. Understand aid allocations help us to assess the effect that aid provides to that country.

One of the typologies of the fragile state is to consider the historical roots of conflict since the conflict is the major cause of fragility of state. 'In, Out, Trapped, and exited' specifies the countries known as 'conflict-affected state', so Carment and Samy (2019) frame the countries that consume aid as a fragile state to understand its effectiveness, these kinds of classification of countries counterparties that, for example, authorities are crucial key for 'trapped' countries like Afghanistan. So, the kind of state fragility relies on the understanding of the historical bindings to the historical context of the state. This approach applies the historical context and the duration of fragility as the key to aid allocations Gisselquist (2015, p. 7), and each of these duration might demand such external conditions for rebuilding and empowering it. So history and duration of

fragility is the key to fragile dimension. Therefore, Carment et al. (2019) argues that aid is misallocated in sectors of fragile state and that brings to underline since aid is not allocated very well the effectiveness of aid will not be productive.

The main major way to frame fragile state is to look at the 'component dimensions', namely, State Authority, State Capacity and State Legitimacy (ACL) as (Grävingholt et al., 2012) named in their typology of a fragile state. With remarked verities of these dimension's concept, we can namely call them institutional dimensions, and no doubt that the institution's role is a key critique on state fragility and state-building. My point overview in this thesis is that institutions are crucially binding state fragility because of conflict and instability begins in the institutions undermining and that is what will discuss in the body of this thesis. In other word, state fragility is an outcome of weakness that existed in that state. For example, institutions are binding to perform and put policies in order to benefit the major population live in that state, so when that state could not deliver that policies and perform weak and ineffective policies, that is when the possibility of civil war breaks comes in the consideration.

Carment and Samy (2008) again have researched on aid allocations among authority, legitimacy, and capacity ALC mechanisms; they provide conclusions that aid the mostly targeting on authorities and capacity with denying the role of legitimacy (Carment et al., 2008). As they elaborated further, authority refers the ability of a state to set up binding legislation, and later refers to binding legislation provides safe and stable environment, and lastly, capacity refers the power of state to empower public services into developmental way or 'productivity use' (Carment et al., 2008, p. 2). Furthermore, the allocation of aid only in authorities and capacity undermines the balanced way that ALC needs to get same leveled of the state; the authors reveal that the

legislation which in one way gives the regime public loyalties and stability environmental in another way. In the institutional mechanisms in a fragile state, aids need to allocate a more balanced way.

Some scholars framed state fragility in the context of their 'institutional degree' of fragility or failure, as Lambach, Johais, & Bayer (2015) conceptualize state to collapsed or not collapse by taking account into 17 cases: (Angola 1992, Chad 1979, Congo-Kinshasa 1969 and 1996, Guinea-Bissau 1998, Liberia 1990, Sierra Leone 1998, Somalia 1991 and Uganda 1985) in Sub-Saharan Africa, and other in rest of the world (Afghanistan 1979 and 2001, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992, Georgia 1991, Iraq 2003, Laos 1960, Lebanon 1975 and Tajikistan 1992) (Lambach et al., 2015, p. 13). In their case of fragile conceptualization, Lambach and his colleagues consider only the result of the state whether it is collapsed or not without compromising institution factors in depth. In those three types analyzing of the fragile state; historical context, institutional context, and the outcome of the fragility bring to consider the discussion of good policies if it is a way for aid effectiveness.

Besides the discussion of aid allocation and effectiveness in the previous sector, the fragile state receives aid, so how effective is it? As we discussed above many scholars argued that aid is good for good environmental policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2000), and that concentrates that aid is more productive in selectivity way economically and institutionally. However, the fragile state consumes aid flows especially for poor performance whether it is a conflict-affected or post-conflict state. Therefore, scholars like Burnside and other pro-aid might neglect the aid flows to the fragile state because of the assumption that aid is worthwhile for those performing good policies. On the other hand, scholars such as Easterly, Moyos, and others would indeed deny any

effectiveness of aid in a fragile state, because of their strong and divisive argument against aid.

The fragility states require more attention in different ways. A fragile state is a situation that comes with a group of factors about the state, and it comes in two ways; when a state devastating institutional and economic crisis, and in the process of state-building. Both ways are demanding more external aware of their situations, for example, both ways are more vulnerable to get institutions collapse which will become a tragedy for them and others. In the Somalia case vulnerability of state, as I will discuss later in the next chapters, brings even to lose the basic manners of state. So, aid for fragility is not the only amount of money that is thrown away, but it is an aid for in terms of security, economic, hospitality, and so on.

However, aid to fragile states is needed to be improved through policies and willingness. Feeny & McGillivray (2009; 2008) discussed those good policies are very important to recipients, particularly to fragile states. They observed through among fragile states there are fragile states that receive more aid than before, also, some countries receive less aid than before and that is the institutional performance of countries. Moreover, the UK department for international development DFID has provided classification to the fragile states by focusing on 'willing and capacity' as 1) weak but willing 2) strong but unwilling 3) weak and weak (see Olowu & Chanie, 2016; Warrenner, 2005). So, this UK DFID classification in fragile states considers how the willingness and seriousness of the authorities might government into another level of development and quality of government. Therefore, the fragile state is likely to increase institutional performance by focusing on the points that we highlighted here.

## 2.4. Conclusion

In here, we discussed the three major perspectives on foreign aid. Firstly, in the last century, as we highlighted above, the conditionality aid was the dominant approach for providing aid, then many scholars were debated the way that this aid could be more productive. In the mid-twentieth century, most aid drivers, namely, the USA and USSR are prioritizing ideological or other political most inert rather than anything at that time and this did not work well. The second approach of foreign aid was aid that grounded by the selectivity approach which means that donors are demanding more institutional performance to be qualified to get more aid, and this is the most prestigious approach through World Bank and many countries. Finally, many countries cannot be institutionally selective, and those are 'fragile states'. Fragile states are institutionally weak, so those countries can perform institutional quality by good policies and seriousness on productivity.

In this chapter, the study pointed three analytical themes for foreign aid, but also there are other analytical frames that can be utilized the frame of foreign aid, also, the chapter does not cope historical changes of foreign aid. However, this chapter puts foreign aid on the scope of the relations between foreign aid and government institutions that receives support looking for an approach for fragile states that have endured institutional weakness. To put this frame in a case, the paper investigates the roots of Somalia's state fragility in the next chapter and then moves to overview and assesses the effectiveness of aid in the Somalia institutions.

### **3.0. Roots of Somalia institutional fragility**

In this chapter, the thesis will try to overview the headlines of Somalia's state-building changes. Somali historians say every ten years there is a new face in Somalia politics. State weakness in Somalia case comes into two ways; weakness before the state collapse was laying on the legitimacy and authority narrative and weakness after the collapse of state added capacity. In this chapter, we will elaborate on the Somalia institutional building trauma to understanding the chaotic situation that Somalia goes under it, so the paper devises this chapter into two sections.

In the first section, the paper considers the roots of state failure then collapsing it also the external efforts that try to end the warfare in the country. The paper highlights that in the Somalia context state failed to provide strong institutional and economical development, controversially, the state put effort into weaponizing clans to fight each other. Over decades of that situation, the central state collapsed then a massive civil war break out. Also, there was a military intervention to reduce the humanitarian crisis and build a new state, but nothing has been accrued. Generally, the first section views the challenges of reconciliation in building state formation.

After a decade in that situation, a state was formulated in Djibouti called Transitional national government (TNG). The second section points key challenges in Somalia's institutional barriers to accomplish and build strong institutions. A nearly decade of the transitional government in the context of institutional building the paper underlines that state-building was undermined by fictional leaders and later Islamist movements. And that would be clear in the last table which shows the conference that

was held to enhance governance in the country, on the other way, this point the kind fragility that Somalia is into it.

### **3.1. The state collapse and re-building attempts**

Before the failure of the central state in 1991, we need to highlight the root causes of that failure. Like many countries, Somalia took independence in 1960 after ten years of state-building. As soon as Somalia gets independence and state systems are completed, huge mismanagement and high corruption had disappointed the people's will of equality and prosperity (Mehmet, 1971). In nine years two presidents and three primary ministers had interchanged in the state offices and yet nothing has been solved institutionally and economically. At that time, Somalia has been hit by massive drought with an economical crisis. With all these deep pain in Somalia institutions, Sharmarke, the president of Somalia at that time had been killed after ruling the country two years. After six days of Sharmarke's death, a military coup led by Barre declared himself as the new president and hero for the country promising a new development agenda for the country institutionally and economically. At that time Somalia changed from electoral democratic system to a dictatorship rule which means waves of institutional weakness have taken another level.

The new military government had shown an impressive strength institution which in its first decade had begun tremendous tendency. Barre had led the country two decades (1969-1991), in this period Somalia had reach socially and institutionally its highest and lowest level. Firstly, the military had declined a wave of anti-corruption attempts which was welcomed and liked by Somali people. Secondly, the president promised an economic development focuses on natural resources such as agriculture, fishing, and livestock and those sectors were contributed to the social prosperity of that

time. Another factor was that Barre changed the country from ideological neutrality to adopting one (Mehmet, 1971). At that time there were two ideological blocs, namely, socialism and capitalism, so Somalia before the Barre era was playing neutrality role, but Barre had clearly announced that the country allies with USSR. This ally, in the first decade of Barre's era was one of factors for the institutional and military successes. At the end of the first decade, Somalia has started to face way around the successes by a series of crises which led the end of the central state (see more Adam, 1992).

In the second decade of Barre's era, Somalia had started to shrink because of the ideological and institutional crisis. USSR was the main aid donor to Somalia, it has built productive companies which empowered social economics and well equipped and strength Somalia national army along with similar policies in the region and Africa. With all these entrusted cohesion, suddenly Somalia had made its decision to cut all ties with USSR after the Ogaden war disputes. In 1977, Somali went war against Ethiopia which allies with the USA- over Ogadenia territory, so USSR intervened the war siding with Ethiopia against Somalia, and that resulted diplomatic dispute in between USSR and Somalia, and then Somalia has lost a major aid donor, and the state's ideology changed from socialism to nationalism.

Ideological crisis and losing a major aid donor have led the disruption in the state institutions (Adam, 1992). After the Ogadenian war, Barre had lost control of the state and many of his loyal commands started to militate against him and each of them needed disparately to overthrow and replace him. So, in general, what unifies them is to overthrow Barre, but no one discussed what could come after, and that resulted in three decades of unsettlement. As usual to every dictatorship, Barre answered the overthrown attempts to kill thousands of civilians by targeting their origin cities and clans. Besides

that, the rate of corruption had been weakening government institutions since then. Barre and his remaining loyalties, finally, fall apart and left the country when clan-based militias come to the capital city from every corner, so the civil wars have broken out and the political instability becomes worse add to that millions of civilians have fled and others have been killed.

Possibilities of state collapse prevent occurred in the last decade of Barre's period. The stagnation of development that had occurred in the Somalia societies economically and politically brought up the question of clan dispute. As Adam (1992) underlined the clanship question was brought by Barre as a weapon to secure his government through providing weapons and poisoning to each other Adam (1992, p. 17), and this is the same instrument that militias have used to gather weapons and people. However, when the number of militias increased and the battle become between government and militias many scholars and Somalia elders signed a manifesto to prevent the worsening situation in Somalia (Abdullahi Baadiyow, 2018; Ingiriis, 2012). Among that elders was the first elected president Adan Abdulle Osman and Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed former speaker of parliament and other traditional elders and former ministers, also, their manifesto was pointing out that no one can ignore the worsening situation of the country, and demanding a quick solution steps (Abdullahi Baadiyow, 2018, p. 24). This manifesto was the earlier months in 1990, and the Barre regime's response was to arrest, kill, and exile many of them. Abdullahi Baadiyow (2018) and (Ingiriis) 2012 both believe that if the regime would accept that, at least, three decades of civil war could be preventable.

War broke out and militias won in the battle when the regime finally left the presidential house (villa Somalia) and militias occupied the main places in the country

such as the airport, seaport, and villa Somalia, but unfortunately, each militia was needed desperately to be the winner. As the paper mentioned above, there was not an alliance between militias and each of them was not based on any clear ideology. In 1978-1989 the number of militias was main four militias, namely, Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1978, Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1988, and the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1989, so the main actors of each of them were coming to a certain region in Somalia which points a certain clan, so each of them was focusing their region rather than other. For example, SNM was targeting the former British Somalia colony knowing as Somaliland in the north of Somalia, SSDF, as well, was focusing certain regions and both of them were stopped in the villages of their clans (Abdullahi Baadiyow, 2017, pp. 169–170). Unlikely the USC and SPM came to the same region which forced the UN military intervention.

As soon as the regime left the villa Somalia and ever militia targeted to their clan territory or region, unfortunately the USC and SPM become in the same region which is mainly the capital city of Somalia Mogadishu. SNM and SSDF soon they arrived in Northern cities they started to stabilize the situation, unlike USC and SPM, the remain parties were somehow intend to secede, for example, SNM clearly declared itself as a state, also, SSDF announce the autonomous state willing to federalize the country, but in the end, both SNM and SSDF stabilized the cities which brought hope of the populations over there. Therefore, all the eyes were on the southern cities and mainly USC and SPM. However, USC was much populated in the middle and southern cities and it has captured a lot, so their leader Mohamed Aidid was seen himself as the most desirable leader to rule the country than other leaders, also, Aidid was not only

targeting the villa Somalia and to lead the country, but he pushed away many clans. USC was the one who mitigates any ceasefires.

With push-pull fighting among the militias, Somalia recorded it's the highest humanitarian crisis which demands a quick military intervention as UN pointed. In 1992 and 1993 Somalia was hit by a devastating famine with a combination of destroyed and plundered social services such as hospitals and schools. As Human Rights Watch (1993) reported Somalia's conflict turned the country particularly the south of Somalia into a warfare state, and that is causing the increasing numbers of death and refugees. Moreover, the social services and hospitals were destroyed by militates, the report points out that Somalia runs by the lack of medical services. The report underlines the major role of UN military intervention was stabilize in Somalia's current situation. Indeed, military intervention was needed at first but it seemed that cannot stabilize the country and mediate the militias.

Another hope had found to Somalia by the UN with the coalition to the US. 'Restore Hope' was the name of the operation that the UN decided to bring stability back to the country (Baumann et al., 2003). The military operation comes after the Aidid and Ali Mahdi signed a ceasefire in the UN headquarter New York, the agreement announce that Ali Mahdi will become the leader of the country during the restoring hope, but the agreement did not work after Aidid neglected and started to maneuver to Mahdi's territory (see Abdullahi Baadiyow, 2018 pp.35). The United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNISOM) had worked into two frames to decrease the humanitarian crisis and famine that hit the country and to build institutions that could work for the country that should be done in four years as the mandate spelled. UNISOM's mandate finished and nothing has reached that because the Aidid's party

USC neglected to participate in any restoring hope for the country. On the other hand, the UNISOM mission was successful to tackle the humanitarian crisis and decrease the effect of famine (Klarevas, 2000, pp. 524–525). Some scholars see the loss of UNISOM operation was a ‘great loss’ to hope and it delays the restoration of the institutions back (Abdullahi Baadiyow, 2018, pp. 36–37), so the reason for that is the neglected political mediation among militias.

The country’s situation, generally, was worsening day after day, especially, in 1994 when the UN had left the country. Besides, the worsening humanitarian situation and massacring a lot of people in the northern cities clans and sub-clans begin to fight among each other. Instead of four to five warlords, for example, the country gets forty warlords and each one demands such conditions. reconciliations and conference was inevitable for Somalia situation since the military intervention was not have an impact on it, so reconciliation attempts had taken place in Ethiopia and Egypt to call out the warlords to mediate them, however, declarations have been announced, papers have been signed but nothing has accrued, also, day by day the warfare was taking a step forward to switch from clans to sub-clans until Aidid was killed by one of his loyal colonels.

### **3.2. Transitional to federalization government and institutional building**

In the collapse of Somalia government in 1991 and the segments of the state civil war with the failed mediations attempts appeared nothing was left in the Somalia crisis. Soon the Somalia central state collapsed and a massive famine and other humanitarian crisis hit the country. So, the UN intervention was, indeed, to prevent any further civil wars and alleviation of humanitarian crisis. In this section, the paper discusses the three transitional government institutions and the main disrupts of institutional building.

On September 1999 Djibouti president Gelle delivered in the UN headquarter New York that Djibouti held conferences to solve Somalia's political problem in different manner (Abdullahi Baadiyow, 2018 pp. 157). Following the UNISOM policy of mediation pointed as “Being neglected” to solve the Somalia crisis, the ‘Restore Hope’ mission to Somalia was handed over the Intergovernmental Authority on Development: Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and such Arabic league countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Yemen the major method that all these countries approach the mediations was to open a conference that gathers militia factions, also, this approach brought up nothing conclusion and that is because in every conference there was an agreement of ceasefires and state rebuilding but it becomes nothing when they come back to Somalia. So Gelle’s approach was to prioritized the intellectuals, social activists and traditional elders rather than warlords.

Arta conference was determined to establish Somalia's state regardless of the barriers. Nearly a decade, Somalia has not had a central government to reestablishing it in a democratic and civil state was not appreciated by militia faction leaders. With no doubt all the militia and faction leader would not go to an election and to democratize the country, indeed, all of them were needed to conquer and vanquish the other one to be found his establishment government and then dictate on it that is why militia fiction leader neglect to participate the hope restoration of the Somalia state. As Menkhus, Sheikh, Joqombe, Johnson (2009) stressed that the Arta peace and state rebuilding conference was invited to SNM the Somalia secessionist part in northeastern of Somalia, and Puntland; a territory that SSDF captured, unlike others these parties, generally, succeeded to stabilize and to return the sense of state and government to the north part of the country, however, both parties did not accept the invitation alongside

with rest parties of Somalia, moreover all of them declined to not accepting whatever was agreed on that conference.

Nevertheless, that Arta conference was held and parliament and a president was elected, but it had consequences and circumstances. In the Arta conference, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was elected as the president to rule out a Transitional National Government (TNG). Abdiqasim as clan he comes from the Hawiye clan; those mostly neglected the stabilization of the capital city, but he did not come up with a solution and a real deep consensus of state formulation (Doornbos, 2002). Abdiqasim has not got to establish a governmental institution and that has something to do with him and the general situation in the capital city. The warlords in the capital city and those who settled in the villa Somalia refused any moving forward to settle in the capital which forced him to turn his own home as presidential and governmental offices, so that was the common situation that every president would have faced in a chaos capital city.

However, Abdiqasim could not settle the national institutions. Instead of putting an effort into what matters to the country and the nation Abdiqasim returning a classic fight that inherited him, three presidents, after him until this government. The Somalia state system is a mixed president and prime ministry based on a power-sharing system, and the president is the one who appoints prime ministers. The way of power-sharing is well defined in the Somalia constitutions, but always one side minds the other one. Thus, beside his limited period (2000-2004) and barely limited working space of representing Somalia in international conferences had pointed three prime ministers alternately in the prime minister office. So this becomes a major reason and continuity of the weakening Somalia institution roughly for a decade and a half.

Besides the state settlement struggles institutionally and states physically, the TNG had inherited a situation that all fictional leaders are untruthfulness of state and its factions. At the time that the central state collapsed and militia based on clans replaced it, the most clan conflicts happened in the south of Somalia, because the majority of clans are concentrated on it. For that reason, the TNG had spent the time to attract the warlords by appointing them to high state offices, for example, Qanyare Afrah one of the warlords in southern Somalia was appointed as minister of reconstruction and then as security ministers, Bare Hirale, also, one of the southern warlords was appointed as defense ministers and so on. Obviously, they did not have any attention to participate this government, but the strategy was to make them part of the states and the vulnerability of TNG forces that as well. There is a famous statement that Yalahow who was one of the warlords in the capital city and now he is a member of the upper house had ironically asked him “what is the state? If it is weak it will not get away from us if it is not we will sit with them” Bbc News (2002), this shows us the task that TNG had to satisfy all warlords and be opening up with state offices.

After the collapse of Somalia's central state and the country turned to warfare and clan struggling space, the Somalia Transitional National State was given a mandate and a task to fulfill. At the time Somalia was struggling ‘Blocks’ such as Somaliland, Puntland, and the rest of Somalia Southern. As Table (1) demonstrates the block approach was conducted and formulated to reduce the clan-based clashes, which did not work in the Central and southern regions. This approached was well welcomed by IGAD and UN it defines the clan-based approaches, in the mean time, the TNG was seen this approach as inappropriate in Somalia

This approach has neither a milestone political stabilization nor quick settlement for Somalia (Bryden, 1999, p. 139), but (Hansen, 2003, p. 68) argues that it only fails when warlord would be involved. Thus, TNG organized a high profile conference from 2002 to 2004 to agree on the federalization of Somalia and this conference was the Mbagathi conference.

**Table 1: Mapping Somali Building Blocks (1991-2009)**

Name of Blocks	Empirical statehood	State formulating process
Somaliland	It is the former Somali-British territory, in 1991, it declared itself as independent state called Somaliland	Establishment of institution that combines the clan political order and modern. It focuses on certain clans.
Puntland	Self-declared as a regional state but as secessionist	It was occupied by SSDF militias and later declared the willingness of Somali federations.
Central and southern Somalia	Internationally recognized, struggling clan fights , and the central of TNG	The state was formulated as 4.5 state formulas prioritizing the major clans.

Source: Failures of the state failure debate: evidence from the Somali territories (2009)

Mbagathi finally becomes a new hope for Somalia reconciliation. After a series of Somalia National Reconciliation Conferences (SNRC) held in Ethiopia and Kenya, Mbagathi becomes the last one that interpreted all sides of Somalia political. Gathering the different sides of Somalia political was difficulties, because of distrust among warlords and believing the mediator's sides to one side rather than been neutral, however, the SNRC was initiated by TNG and was one of its tasks, so getting all fictional leaders particularly warlords in one table show sense of willingness of state reconstitution. Moreover, this conference comes after Somalia intellectual and social

activists proved that Somalia can build state and salvage the tragedy of statelessness, also, the existence of block approaches helped the reduce of clan violence, and here is where started the assumption of state federalization, and federalization could be the way out.

Hence, the assumption of state federalization soon gets wide acceptance among warlords, since it defines itself as block approach nothing more or else. The autonomous region which Puntland, for example, declared itself even before the federation attempts was built the assumption the clans (Harti) which mostly in the area of North West of Somalia should unite and stick together, even though part of that territory was disputed between Puntland and Somaliland. As African Union chairperson reports (2004) the warlords underlined that the new government will take the name of Transitional Federal Government TFG instead of TNG. This conference made a progressive of agreeing on state formations, for example, the number of parliament will be 275seats %12 of them will be women, also, the next president's duration will be five years (Union, 2004, p. 4). After agreeing on these issues, the next movement was to elect parliaments and president, and this happened in days with African Union's (AU) facilitation, so Abdullahi Yusuf a former colonel and leader of SSDF faction become the president Somalia transition federal government.

After that, Abdullahi Yusuf hit forward to build up appoint a new prime minister and to accelerate the new tasks for his government. Yusuf who was well-knowing his massive support of Somalia federalism settled to Baidoa 90 kilometers away from the capital city of Somalia Mogadishu, and this was 2006, when the first time the president, prime minister, and parliaments come together after two years of disagreements on the issue of state-building (Samuels, 2008, p. 598), and the root of such conflict among the

state leaders was based on the regressions on the Mbagathia agreements and the MPs. It obvious in the history of Somalia mediations that any agreements that were signed in the disputed sides did not work when each of them returned to the country, for example, Aidid and Mahdi in the New York agreement which turned to a civil war knowing as four month war take place in the capital city Mogadishu and thousands on death were recorded. Therefore, the TFG settled in Baidoa due to the massive damages in the capital and too many parties on it, only Mogadishu faced too many blocks that were based on sub-sub-clan disputes, however, the unintended Islamic Court Union (ICU) movements emerged in the southern city to take their role on Somalia peace.

With no central authorities and lack of justices among Somalia societies, particularly, the central and Sothern regions, the clans and the major societies preferred to rule themselves according to the Islamic law. Somalia is a country which it's the majority of its population is a Muslim-Sunni, with that embedded believe of Islam the southern population, especially Mogadishu, come up with its justices, and those justices were based on clan which applies the Islamic rule, so those Islamic courts handle the society cases such as rape, bugler, and other related society matters (see Barnes & Hassan, 2007; Mwangi, 2010). The concerns of Islamic movements as Islamic courts and or in the Somalia political sphere started with TNG as Menkhaus points out when the Abdiqasim was appointed as the new president of TNG, also, Menkhaus underlined that the Islamist movements could be a challenge in the current Somalia situation or might even be worst if they intervene the Somalia politics through TNG (Ken Menkhaus, 2000, p. 19). The only reason that Menkhaus puts his concern on Islamist movements that way is because, since the collapse of Somalia state, Islamist movements

answered the society's need such as schools, hospitals, even universities, so, they gained a lot of supports in the societies besides the claiming of Islamic rule.

Eventually, the signs of progress of Islamist movements among the society and the spread of ideology concerned the U.S and Somalia factional warlords. In a long time, the Somalia general politics was manipulated by factional leaders, so in ever movements that ICU make toward social orders increases the tension between those leaders and ICU. Therefore, to ride them, the factional leaders make a new alliance in Mogadishu called: Alliance of Restoring Peace and Counter-terrorism ARPCT. Additionally, the state and elected president still figuring out the movements that can make toward institutional construction and capacity building such as military, and TFG is mostly backed Ethiopia which is viewed as a historical enemy to Somalia. With all these, in 2006 a war broke out and in a few days, the ICU eliminated the factional leaders and accomplished a milestone achievement for southern stability. ICU has got the opportunity to stabilize the country and reopens the seaport and airport after decades of closing, (Menkhaus, 2010) underlined that ICU has changed the global assumption and believe that Somalia is ungovernable country.

Besides the victory of ICU in southern cities, Yusuf the elected president decided a military action against ICU. ICU's period in the Somalia Southern cities was estimated at nearly six months, those six months were pointed as 'Golden Age' period of Southern stabilization and economic increase (Barnes & Hassan, 2007). At that time, Arab League, UN, and Kenya have tried to mediate the sides of the dispute; TFG which has authorities on approximately in one city and ICU authorities in the majority of southern cities, whatever, represents of both side met in Khartoum, Sudan three times and nothing was implemented on the ground as usually in the Somalia politicians. Thus,

with failing mediations, a war broke out between TFG backs Ethiopia against ICU. Thus, the damages that Somalia faced were similar to the civil war in the 1990s. Because, unlikely Ethiopia military, the either sides ICU and TFG have not had any Somalia trained militaries, so both sides had used clan-based militias to defeat each other (see more Human Rights Watch, 2007, pp. 27–29). As a consequence, the ICU leaders left the country to formulate a new Alliance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), on the other side, Yusuf had to resign from the office after a sequence dispute on the Somalia prime ministers and external pressure, because he was massively opposed the negotiation with former ICU now ARS.

The capturing of Mogadishu and Sothern cities by Islamic Courte Union has seen as a game-changer. The victory of the ICU of Mogadishu and stabilizing it in months show their legitimacy and capacity because the society in Mogadishu was struggling with the clan and interest-based blocks those warlords maintained since the state collapse. The southern cities in Somalia were one of the most bloodshed cities than north cities, and as the paper mentioned the north cities such as Puntland and Somaliland were established conditional institutions dispute the southern cities. Therefore, as soon as the ICU captured these cities included Mogadishu many warlords fled to either TFG or joined the ICU. Since Then Somalia moved forward about the issues of warlords and factional leaders those was dominated them since the fled of Barre, and the later elections in Djibouti, warlords were barely isolated to include on the next state construction.

Thus, after the resignation of Somalia president Abdullahi Yusuf and after the UN-led Djibouti agreement become done for both sides, namely, TFG and ARS, so they have seen the necessity of a new election. During the peace process in Djibouti and

Yusuf's resignation, the country was in the middle of peace and institutional chaos. The part of the Djibouti deal was to deploy the Ethiopian soldiers from the whole country and to replace them for other soldiers excluded neighborhoods; Ethiopia and Kenya. Add to that, Yusuf has not accrued any resistant institutions in Somalia state, in Somalia's election the MPs are normally elect the president and in days the president appoints a prime minister who holds the second power of the government. So that, Yusuf, in his four years appointed three prime ministers, and that is, besides the constitutional-unclear power-sharing between the president and prime minister is the questioning of Ethiopian's intervention and massive damage in Mogadishu, and the issues of negotiation with ARS (Shay, 2014, p. 79), and that has something to do with his resignation before a year of his period. In the end, both sides agreed to hold a new TFG presidential election in Djibouti.

Following the agreement a new Somalia president elected on 30<sup>th</sup> January 2009. In such a difficult time, Ahmed, who is the Islamist and former leader of the ICU and ARS were elected, due to his roots of Islamism and ability to reconciliation with Islamic militias (Clarke, 2009). At that time, Ahmed was facing the Al-Shabab part of Al Qaida and Hizbul-Islam both fighting in Somalia against the government in southern cities and Mogadishu. Besides the necessitation of peace and stabilization, Ahmed's TFG task was to deliver the Somalia federal constitution and enhance Somalia's institutions in two years. Ahmed appointed Omar Sharmarke the son of the overthrown president by Barre in 1969, and a few days Omar, also, appointed his cabinet. Moreover, after the election, Ahmed has to move the state to the capital city, Mogadishu, and it almost dominated by opponent Islamist militias, for example, the government at that time was controlling a

few street blocks such as villa Somalia, airport, and seaport and so as in the southern cities.

Nevertheless, Ahmed did not enjoy wider legitimacy than as a leader ICU. Ahmed, who is widely known in his Islamist ideology and become the leader of the Islamic Court Union which strongly opposed the TFG and Yusuf, now replaced that position and fighting against Islamist that is how many people viewed in his election as president. Also, Apuuli (2011, p. 51) points out that Ahmed lacks legitimacy inside the country, undermined his ability to reconciliation with Islamist militias. For that reason, (Apuuli, 2011) argues that Ahmed's election does not guaranteed institutional stabilization.

The disappointment roots of Ahmed's authority were mishandling of president-prime minister scenario. As the paper mentioned above, constitutionally, the president is the highest authority in the country, prime minister as the head of executives and speaker parliament as head of legislators could not work along with each other. Ahmed's Transitional Federal Government was struggling to balance unconstitutional defined power, particularly, president and prime minister which in return has an impact on the institutional recovering. For example, in a year and half the first prime minister resigned in his position over continuity disputes with the president, in later days the president appointed Farmajo, today's president as prime minister and in six months the president and speaker of parliament enforced him to resigned when they agreed to add a year to presidential period. Beside unfinished work on the institutional building and the constitution, the head of the state and head of the executive did not settle their issues down. All these may reveal the kind of institutions that Somalia has endured it, same scenario happened again in the following government.

**Table 2: List of Somalia National Reconciliation Conferences (1991-2009)**

Conference	Date	Parties	Host country	Facilitator
Djibouti I,II	1991	SSDF, SPM, USC, SAMO, SNU, SDM	Djibouti	Djibouti
Addis Ababa conference	January-March 1993	15 factions	Ethiopia	UN-Ethiopia
National salvation council (Sodere)	November 1996- January 1997	26 factions	Ethiopia	Ethiopia
Cairo Conference	November 1997	Hussein Aidid's government and National Salvation Council (NSC)	Egypt	Egypt
Somalia National Peace Conference	2000		Djibouti-Arta	Djibouti
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference	2002-2004		Kenya-Nairobi-Mbagathia	IGAD\Kenya
Khartoum	2006	TFG and ICU	Sudan	Arab league
Djibouti	2008-2009	TFG and ARS-Djibouti	Djibouti	United Nations

Source: A history of Mediation Somalia since 1988 (2009)

### **3.3. Conclusion**

To conclude, in this section, the paper overviews the stereotypes of Somalia's institution since the collapse of the state. The above table (2) draws the conference that was held to mediate Somalia's disputed sides since 1991. So in 1991, for example, only six parties were the main disputes, the number goes up to 15 factions to 26 factions in five years, so the more factional leaders increase means the lack of seriousness and interests to stabilize, and this argued by (Elmi & Barise,2006).

This chapter elaborates and enlightens such roots for Somalia state fragile, and it is seen in the table (2) the cause of unsettled state stability can be viewed as in the frame of state authority. In the next chapter, the thesis goes to discuss the effectiveness of aid in Somalia institutions by viewing the aid allocations of Somalia and then discussing effectiveness of Somalia government institutions. Because aid is very main important to fragile states to manage a way out of fragility, but the responsibility of that relies on state institutions.

#### **4.0. Foreign aid effectiveness on Somalia Institutions: an assessment**

In the assessment of fragile state and foreign aid, there are two main crucial points that scholars tend to evaluate them. Fragile state or low-income states as World Bank named it describes itself as the most countries that desperately need international support. Somalia, for example, as one the listed lowest fragile states in the world and as a country that went civil wars over three decades and endured collapsing state as well as collapsing state systems and institutions, and lack of state revenue and capacities to rely on. So, for the fragile states particularly those have experienced a lack of Authority for the reason of state collapsing has had a long way to construct states. In the experience of Somalia, it had taken a long time to settle between fictional leaders and disputed militias as chapter three elaborates it, therefore, it was believed that Somalia is “ungovernable country” for the way that its leaders handled the country. It is obvious for a country surrounded challenges of fragility to rely on foreign aid, but it was a common understanding that a proper allocation of aid and strength institutions can lead the way out of state fragility.

Aid allocation is one of the bases of framing aid in a country. Aid allocations show donation amounts and how a country allocates that in a useful, absorptive, and productive way. For Somalia, the allocation aid that will demonstrate below shows generally the aid inflow that Somalia receives and how it allocated in Somalia, the minister of finance and planning and investment publishes reports on the allocation humanitarian developmental aid as well as aid on the treasure as below will be elaborated. So aid allocation contributes the state transparency and accountability and gives the population to not be ignorant of how their government allocates aid inflows, and that is part of aid effectiveness alongside institutional effectiveness.

Another point to assess aid effectiveness is tracking the institutional strength in a country. Institutions are an important key for the state's effectiveness whether a state will draw impact for its populations or not. The discussion of state fragility takes much consideration such draws it as developmental orientations like World Bank, other measures it by tracking the state conflicts, and other discussed by analyzing the institutional stability of a state (Carment et al., 2008, pp. 351–352). This research focuses on institutional stability, for reasons; first, as the paper discussed in chapter two, one of the deepest darkest problems for Somalia is institutional instability which was clear in chapter two, the second reason is that in Somalia since this government occupied on the villa Somalia the Somalia politics has shown changes of institutions, therefore this section tries to give understandable reasons for that.

#### **4.1. Somalia's aid allocation and institutional responsibilities**

In general, international support that flows to a country was designed to support the state's reconstructions and humanitarian assistance. The state fragility as Feeny & McGillivray (2009) pointed out that it is categorized into i) states that have been endured tremendous civil war and emerging from it ii) and those have been experienced military coups or corrupted regimes iii) and other those have been hit by devastating humanitarian crisis, so all these countries have two consequences in common; poor income in terms of growth and social and human development decrease (Feeny & McGillivray, 2009, p. 619). And poor institutional performance can be another factor that those states have in common, particularly, the first two categories, thus Somalia can be categorized as a state that emerging from three decades of civil wars and before that civil war it has endured a military coup which led, in the end, collapsing the state, so in this category of state fragility Somalia can be allocated in the first dimension which


defines the current situation of that country. For Somalia, international aid can be categorized as humanitarian aid and institutional aid.

Somalia which consumes aid heavily are persuaded internationally more on humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian aid assistance and remittances are the main resources of Somalia and it depends on them heavily as the minister of planning and investment reported in 2019 (MoPIED, 2019, p. 7). The nature of humanitarian assistance in the Somalia context is more concerned on the disasters that Somalia hit in the past years, for example, the below figures (1) which reveals ten years of humanitarian inflows in Somalia shows that the humanitarian inflows increased in 2011 and 2017 and the following years then slightly decreased the following years OCHA FTS (2019)<sup>6</sup> and that because both years was the time that the country was hit by devastating droughts and famine. Furthermore, in Somalia, the delivery of humanitarian aid demands good policies and security which extends the questions of its efficiency Adan (2018) and Grünewald (2012), so both authors underlined the importance of handling good policies and security in humanitarian supports.

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<sup>6</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking services OCHA FTS collects data on humanitarian response or pledge aid. Check the information relates to Somalia <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/831/summary>

Figure 1 Somalia Humanitarian aid trends 2010-2019




Source OCHA FTS

The other way that Somalia receives international supports is through development assistance. Developmental aid is the second major sector that donors aim to counterpart with fragile states and low-income countries. Also, developmental assistances are aimed to tackle the major problems of societies such as poverty, inequality, health issues, and so on. Moreover, fragile states have in common of weakness in terms of institutions and state factions like economics, security, and infrastructure. As OECD (2018, p. 112) pointed that in the fragile states the development assistance is more concerned with the basic social infrastructures and services, but the allocations of developmental aid in fragile states are another challenge for fragile states. Therefore, it is always crucial how a fragile state allocates the developmental aid that they always receive from bilateral or multilateral cooperation.

Somalia as one of the least fragile states according to the annual reports on The Fund for Peace (2019) highly depends on aid in its developments as mentioned above. Thus developmental aid trends are not as high as the humanitarian aid, and that is

because regardless of the conditionality of humanitarian aid in the Somalia context, developmental aid trends in the last ten years are not shown differences on the scales as figure (2) draws. The figure also shows smoothness that development slightly goes up. However, the crucial point is how a fragile state surrounded by institutional and social staginess over two decades will put on development aid in a way that reflects considerable output. Hence, the ODA trends on Somalia pictures that humanitarians are highly prioritized by donors, but that gives us the assumption that development aid is more required on strong state policy and Somalia could not reveal that although there have been some improvements on the development policies.

Figure 2 ODA aid Trends in Somalia 2009-2018



Source Official Development Assistance ODA

On the development aid allocations, Somalia has launched its development projects named Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facilities (SDRF) which was designed to enhance the long sustainability developments for the country. SDRF funds are financing mechanism that ties Somalia to the aid and cooperation units, as Shirdon the prime minister of Somalia at that time said: “The SDRF will enhance coordination

and alignment of external assistance transparently and will be increasingly used in-country systems over time” (UNSOM, 2013). Also, SDRF funds are a central platform to the Somalia government and international community which works in the frame of designing and implementing the Somalia National Development Plan (NDP). This financial mechanism brings together three multi-partner trust funds; UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF), World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (WB MPF), and African Development Bank under Somalia Infrastructure Fund (AFDB SIF) (see UNDP 2015).

This coordination between Somalia's government and multi-partner funds are mostly handed as “under the governance arrangements” to enhance the financial system in three folds. The first fold is that SDRF FUNDS is multi-partner coordination across different partners which are more than ten countries gathered in three partners to promote under one united activity and instruments. Also, these activities are always aligned with national prioritized such as economic growth, security, social and human developments, and so on. Finally, the SDRF FUNDS cooperation with multi partners is designed to reduce the “transaction cost for government” (see UNDP, 2015, p. 2). On the other hand, within these three folds, SDRF FUNDS was objectified to generate some sort of good governance approaches such as transparency, accountability, and others.

However, the SDRF funds have shown many decreases since it was launched in 2013. Many countries contribute the Somalia reconstruction and development funds outside of SDRF funds, for example, countries such as USA, Netherlands, UK, Italy, and Germany are delivered %85 of development and reconstruction funds outside SDRF funds whether over 15 countries and other partners channeled developmental aid through the SDRF funds which were estimated only %21 of development aid

(MoPIED, 2018, pp. 11–13). Nevertheless, MoPIED (2017, p. 12) reported that the SDRF funds decreased from 23% in 2015 to 16% in 2017 in three years and that because of reasons that were related to donors such as decreasing such country's currency value relative to the US dollars. However, the report of 2018 in the minister of planning of the federal government pointed that the decrease of estimated funds in the last two years was related to the lack of effectiveness and transparency of framing these funds on development and reconstruction projects (MoPIED, 2018, p. 15). Finally, the SDRF funds require policy and transparency to allocate it in useful projections.

As was mentioned above, the central framework for the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Funds platform is to improve and implement the National Development Plan (NDP). Since Somalia had ended long transitional governments and suffers weak institutions, low capacities alongside with devastating social and human developments, Hassan Sheikh the first president after a decade on a transitional government and his government has decided to arrange 'National Compact' with among Somalia stakeholders and aid donors to discuss developmental aid to the national development. The Somalia compacts come after a conference in Brussels in 2013 which was discussed more on Somalia's current situation and state construction difficulties, and then many projects were signed, mainly, the SDR and Somalia Compact which later become national development plan (BBC News, 2013).

Besides, state plans that were agreed and amounts that were pledged in this compact, it was not been as inclusive as the national development plan. The Hassan government was known one of the most disregarded government that Somalia has endured in many decades except the Barre's era for corruption and political instability and that because the Hassan who became president after a long time of difficulties in

Somalia he did not act as societies would hope in terms construction institutions and capacities, and that reason the SDRF funds showed less fund than in its first years. Nevertheless, the Somalia compact shows road maps to interesting ways of development politically and socially, also the compact underlines efficiencies and effectiveness in terms of economic, human developments and building state capacities (see more on the Federal Republic of Somalia, 2013). This compacted which was timed in three years (2013-2016) did not balance much on development and political reconciliations, (Manuel et al., 2017) pointed out on nine points that this compact did not deliver as it was agreed such as efficiencies, transparency, and specific action that prioritizing needs on development and balancing it. So these sum up the major problem that determined on the national compact.

The compact period (2013-2016) has ended and it was the time for a new deal with donors and Somalia state holders. Since the end of Somalia compact, the Somalia states have begun to articulate Somalia compact as National Development Plan NDP, so until now the state has launched two national development plans (2017-2019) as Eighth one since Somalia was established, and (2020-2024) and ninth NDP. Thus, both plans were looking closely on the current national prioritize such as peace and security, effective government institutions, economic growth, social and human developments, infrastructures, and capacity building and others. As the report shows the main sectors as mention above are distributed to federal states and Somaliland, also, in each sector, the development aid allocates in a sub-sector (MoPIED, 2019, p. 20). For example, in the sector of social and human development budget goes into the health sector, education sectors and other social services, also, the institution empowers budget goes

to local government, public administrations, and state Revenues. NDP is one of the sections that development aid is always allocated in it.

Besides the humanitarian and developmental aid that Somalia receives aid to support the state budgets and capacities known as 'aid on treasure'. Aid on treasures was pretty described as "aid disbursed into the government's main revenue funds and managed through the government's systems" (MoPIED, 2019, p. 30). As it seems from this definition the aid on a treasure is not always channeled through humanitarian or developmental aid, also like figure (2) shows that effective institutions as part of the NDP, so aid on treasures supports the main state revenues and budget. The minister of planning reported on 2019 that the delivered aid on treasure increased US\$ 114.2 million compared with 2017 US\$ 105.5 million, also, there other ways that the government gets support on the state budget such as pledge or granted supports that were managed outside the financial management systems notably from Saudi Arabia and contracts which was that singed for purpose of state-building and resilience such as contract signed with the EU to provide US\$ 117 million over two and half years supporting the state budget. So the aid on a treasure is the third aid that allocates on the Somalia states.

#### **4.2. Foreign aid effectiveness and Institutional dimensions on Somalia context**

It is assumed that weak institutions lead to fragility and international supports on the institutional dimensions can help to recover on fragility. Institutions are an important key for the state strength whether a state will draw an impact for its populations or not. The discussion of state fragility takes much consideration on three frames, first, as the developmental-oriented theme, this theme was generated the early works on the fragile state that was viewed as underdevelopment countries and named as 'low-income states' Neil Fantom Umar Serajuddin (2016), also, the issue of poverty and poor implementation of good policies in the market is seen as the ineffectiveness of development and lead state fragility World Bank (1992), so in general state developments on economic and trade was underlined an essential positive impact on state weakness particularly in Somalia (Warsame, 2011). The second theme of state fragility is to relate it to the conflict issues of a state. This theme was based on examining states on the frame of conflicts and preventing it and that frame generated the fragile state index collected by The Fund for Peace institution to assesses on conflict issues and provides considerable policies for preventing it (The Fund For Peace, 2017).

The third theme is to assess state fragility on the issues of political instability. Unlike both themes that were mentioned, this frame mixes the development and conflict issues of state fragility and puts them off the frame of political instability (CIFP, 2017). Political instability known as (ACL) mechanisms which are i) state authorities in the frame of government effectiveness, conflict intensity, and issue of related to state authorities ii) state capacity was related to the economic growths and human developments iii) state legitimacy concerns on the rule of law and accountability in a state.

Political stability is a major concern for the fragile states and it is always relating to the institutions because for the most fragile states, there are existed institutions and the challenge is to resist that institution. For example, in Somalia before two decades the question was if Somalia can get a state, then question become whether it is governable or not, today the question links state resilience and effectiveness and so as Afghanistan nowadays. Therefore, political stability which is the opposite of instability concerns state resilience on the power and conflict prevention in state authority, the value of the rule of law in state legitimacy, and the increase of state GDP per capita in state capacity.

The early studies on political stability show a strong and positive relation to political stability and the institutional dimensions ACL. For example, Hurwitz (1973) once concluded that the political stability approach was utilized conceptually to define i) the absence of domestic violence, ii) and the existence of state legitimacy and rule of law, iii) government durations and longevity, iv) continuity of state structures which avoids any aggregate changes of the state structure v) and necessity of multifaceted social attributes in government. So, political stability as Hurwitz views concerns on these different variables to the state, and all contribute to the stabilization of a state. Also, the lack of these approach on a state it might be weakening it, for example, the existence of domestic violence in a state might lead the collapse of that state as it happened on Somalia, as well as the absence of legitimacy and stable state structure.

Hence, the paper applies to the approach ACL to assess the political stabilization of Somalia. Somalia as a country which recovering from approximately three decades of collapse and failed states needs to put on assessments of its political stabilization, additionally, the paper utilizes the of state authority, state capacity, and state legitimate

to understand and evaluate the what has been done for Somalia since 2017 when this government came to the cabinet and announced major changes on the Somalia political, also, this assessment will contribute to point any future risks on Somalia politics because of political instability.

#### **4.2.1.State Authority on Somalia Context**

Perhaps, the most popular identifications of the terms authority and legitimacy come the Weber lecture on ‘politics as a vocation’. Weber sees authority as a special legitimate power that needs to be obeyed Weber (2004, p. 33), although there are interpretations and critics for Weber’s identification of authority with the power it enjoys a popularity among scholars such as (Uphoff, 1989). This identification of authority reflects and relays on the kind of legitimate that the authority needs to rule and to obey, this issue will be discussed more on legitimate sections, but it illustrates that kind of position that authority holds in a country. In other words, authority implicitly refers the extent domination that a state holds on its population to secure and protect them Grävningholt et al. (2012, p. 8), which enacts to binding legislation and offer public goods and provide a stabilized environment to the country (Carment & Samy, 2012, p. 4). The state authority, therefore, was seen as the first step of government effectiveness in fragile states.

Somalia witnessed the weaknesses of state authorities in the previous governments in terms of political stabilization among the state sectors. Clashes between state presidents and prime minister have been the most known political struggles since the transitional governments, and that relies on political cultures that Somalia draws on itself. This political culture was aimed to balance the political power in clans mainly the big four clans that dominates Somalia politics, for example, whenever the president

become one of the four clans the prime minister has to come from one of the other clans, and that is obvious observation in the Somalia political structure. So, in the last two governments and approximately eight years, the prime minister office had entered six prime ministers, as the Table (3) draws below, only Omar Sharmarke had served two times under two presidents. So, a question might be what causes this instability between the president and prime minister.

**Table 3 Somalia Prime Ministers (2009-2017)**

President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009-2012)	President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012-2017)
Omar Abdirashi Ali Sharmarke	Abdi Farah Shirdon
Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo	Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed
Abdiwali Mohamed Ali Gaas	Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke

Source the author

A quick reviewing of the root of disputes between presidents and prime ministers is different from each other, but all of them related to massive institutional corruption. For example, president Sharif who was elected in Djibouti after negotiations and reconciliations with the prime minister at that time, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, three prime ministers served under him. Sharmarke who was Sharif's first minister resigned after differences between them VOA News (2010), so, the kind of disputes are not clear until now. However, the next Prime Minister Mohamed Faramjo who serves as Somalia president at this moment resigned as well in six months after appointing him, and this time the resignation was forced to him by president and leader of Somalia Parliaments, and this comes after Kampala Accord which articulates the extension of the presidential period of one year for Sharif and appointing another

prime minister, so the resignation of Farmajo was a part of that deal Lunn & Thompson (2012, p. 7), then planning minister at that time Abdiwali Gas was appointed as the new prime minister. Similar resignation has been taking place in Hassan's presidential period, but for Hassan disputes with the two first prime ministers were related the 'choices of the cabinet' Campbella (2014), Hassan was dragging friends of him into the cabinet, namely, Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir and Abdikarim Da'ud. This prime minister change impacts the smoothing of the minister's work, so ever prime minister appoints a new whole minister of the cabinet.

Nevertheless, the current state has shown strong connections between the president and prime minister. Since Farmajo was appointed as president of Somalia in February 2017, he brought a new level of state strength. Farmajo and his Prime Minister Kheyr have shown strengths in the Somalia state authority and this is a new experience of Somalia state, also, the minister of the cabinet has not almost changed except three ministers. The duration and longevity of cabinets and prime minister contribute to the stabilization of politics (Hurwitz, 1973). Besides the state authority, Somalia parliament has shown responsibilities that have not seen on him in the previous states, so the Parliament questions the minister to exercises regular questions to the minister and all state branches, overall, the Parliament approved more than twenty legislation on state Economic, Oil and gas reforms, and the next election which is one of the greatest legislation that Parliament approved (HIPS, 2020, p. 2).

The second way to assess the state authority is to point out the conflict intensity of the state authority. The federal system in Somalia was designed to bring back the stability in the cities and to avoid any further dictator that might rule the country, so the federalization system and the Federal Members of State (FMS) was completed in

Mohamud's period to become five FMS and unsolved Somaliland which declared it is independent as a state since 1991. Since Farmajo come to power the relation between the federal government and federal members of a state have not gone well, and that is FMS were invoking constitutional articles by engaging diplomatic objectives, and Farmajo in return suspend the fiscal budgets that come from state treasure (HIPS, 2020, pp. 3–4). Consequently, the attention between the federal government and FMS went too far when the federal government tried to overthrow some leaders of some FMS to replace another one, and most of them were completed even though it caused deadly elections Abdi (2018), and even worse if that would not work at all, Jubaland, for example, which faced economical bans Garowe Online (2019). So these instability and unconstitutional validation shows that the intensity of this state to not prevent any further conflict among elites will not good for the political stability because if every authority would like to enforce and change the leaders of FMS to replace another leader that loyal to him will damage the country. Here it come the importance of rule of law and constitutions should be the one that leads all not the opposite.

State authority is one that draws the most work on state institutions at all, and it is the first line of institutions. The effectiveness of state authority shines from the work and the persistence that it applies to state institutions, also, it proves the willingness that many donors insist to donate, and that seems clear in the classification of the British Department for International Development (DFID) by looking at the willingness of the state authority then it comes capacity and legitimacy, the DFID put the fragile state on a) 'weak but willing': the states that are weak to provide goods and services to the population but have the willingness to tackle with that problems b) 'strong but unwilling': it is the states that have strong income but the authorities are not willing to

extant that to services to the populations c) ‘weak and weak’: weak on institutional dimensions (Olowu & Chanie, 2016, p. 4). For the strategy of strong state authority, it gives the ambition to come again and being strong beside the other state dimensions such as capacity and legitimacy. For Somalia, the stability of state authority in the puzzle of the president and the prime minister has been showing successful recently, but the intensity of conflict is not solving the complicated fragile problems in Somalia particularly.

#### **4.2.2.State Capacity on Somalia context**

State capacity in the fragile states is one of the complicated mechanisms that fragile states fail to provide to their population and it has to guide and approve policies that secure and brings the benefits back to the population. State capacities cope socio-economic developments and poverty reductions which represents the core elements of capacity as well as wellbeing, and human security which the fragile states are not providing them well. Unlike state authority and state legitimacy, the state capacity is the main core to assess state fragile which WB and OECD track fragile states by state income and human security.

Additionally, the linkage between state capacity and state development in economics and human security has been found in academic works. For example, Besley & Persson (2010) used the term ‘government investment’ to point out that the expansion of state revenue for development purpose is the key forward for the fragile state, also such early studies indicate that also political stability generates economic growth Gupta (1990), and it causes the failure of that state then collapse (Alesina et al., 1996). State capacity does not only the economic development but the human security developments are concerned state capacity such education and life expectance and so on (CIFP, 2017).

Hence, capacity is one of the major sectors that foreign aid is donated, humanitarian aid, for example, was generated to support those sectors, and it is more than other development aid. Also, that is clear on the two figures that have drawn on the above section whether humanitarian aid is always much more than developments, add to that, most of the humanitarian assistance that Somalia receives comes through UN organizations such as UNCHR and UNICEF and other non-governmental organizations NGOs.

Economic development is one of the most challenging in Somalia, and it has been crucial for every state that has been governed by Somalia. Droughts and famines that have been hit Somalia two times in that last ten years arose the question of states economic and while more than million people have evacuated for security reasons and others fled seeking to survive on themselves. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that Somalia can enhance its economy by increasing 3% in 2019, and it persists the hope for economic development (Holland, 2019). Economic development and foreign aid in Somalia was the question part of the development, for example, Ibrahim and Dahie (2016) have found that foreign aid has a positive relation with economic growth without questioning political matters, but seems that the professor Ali and his colleges (2018) have found similar relations with conditioning the political role in that matter, they argue that weak institutions with poor policies cannot enhance the state's economic and also the state's development. So, the questions on the state effectiveness also related to the level of transparency whether in the last ten years it has been on the top of the most corrupted country in the world.

Since this government led the country one major challenge that it focuses on was Somalia's debt relief. Somalia's debt started in 1985 that when Somalia faced major

obstacles on boosting economic and a massive famine and drought hit the country, since then debt was not even asking among elites and governments, and that because they were not seen it is the right time to discuss on it. Moreover, Somalia's debt relief was seen as it brings to 'the world economy' as Guardians published after three decades The Guardian (2020) because Somalia debt which was estimated five billion dollars was blocked to normalize relations with international committees and to get access to more financials and development supports. World Bank and IMF reported that Somalia's debt relief might take stages by testing its commitment to perform economic sustainability and development IMF (2020). Therefore, once again the decision of this debt relief mostly relies on the state's performance on transparency and commitment to reform it.

Recently, this government has focused on the boosting of human development by enhancing education. In the education sector, Somalia reached one of the lowest countries in the world, and that is because during the civil wars the all public educational centers were destroyed and some of them were occupied to use for other purposes (Dina et al., 2017, p. 20). The education enhance relies on the belief that educational prioritizing will impact on country's development and human capital World Bank Group (2019, p. 16), this is can be the most important achievement that this government can be proud of because this indicates an impact on the next generations. Yet many schools are private and many people can be affordable the amount of education, so this can critical for the government.

### **4.2.3.State Legitimacy on Somalia Context**

Perhaps the state legitimacy is the resource of the state institutions whether the authorities come through an election which part of the legitimate and later authority will bind such rules that will part of the state legitimacy. Again Weber is one who draws carefully the definition between authority and legitimacy when classifying authorities in three parties and one of them was legitimated authority who comes power through legitimacy Weber (2004). Also, legitimacy is important as much as the state authorities and state capacity, and even though it is not concerned in a fragile state as much as state capacity it remains core for institutional implementation at each level. Moreover, state legitimacy binds the state authorities and societies and the lack of it might causes the collapse of the state Bellina et al. (2009, p. 3), also, it is related to the state stabilizations where legitimacy defines the output of stabilization (Hurwitz, 1973, p. 455). For fragile states, state legitimacy was seen as underestimated in many countries (Carment et al., 2008). So state legitimacy needs different attention among authorities to contribute the recovery of a fragile state

In Somalia, the state legitimate challenge begins the election process. Elections are where the authorities assume their power and get population support for rules and this is the missing linkages in Somalia between state and society, Ahmed's part of failure in the stabilization of the country in between 2009-2012 was lack of legitimacy where he was elected outside of the country Kasaija (2010, p. 270), and Menkhaus argued the 2012 election which was the first election that held inside the country since state collapse brought such amount of legitimacy among societies Menkhaus (2018, p. 22), also, 2017 election where the current state was elected were most corrupted election. However, as this government promised and the parliament approved that the

next election will be one man one vote in 2021. So, all eyes on that elections and it can bring the society to their power to dismiss or approve to next authority.

The second challenge for Somalia state legitimate is the constitution. Constitutions play the main rule in the countries and since Somalia's constitution was approved partially in 2012 it has not been done yet. The Somalia constitution binds a major transition of the state system to the federal system, and the federal system requires the new shape of state power. Additionally, many problems arose in the constitutional process, because it has seen that the federalization system is generated by external actors in Nairobi not people's choice, also, the federalization was based on clan which draws border attentions among Somalia clans (Zoppi, 2018). These are the main challenges that the unfinished process of Somalia constitutions faces today, and its first draft was approved in 2012 since then and almost two governments there was not any attention to seek a solution for it.

#### **4.3. Conclusion**

To sum up this chapter, firstly, the paper points out the three main sectors or kind that Somalia receives foreign aid. In the first section, the papers figures out the dimension of receiving foreign aid in the Somalia context, and the paper observed that the Somalia humanitarian aid slightly increases in famine and drought times. Secondly, the development aid in Somalia is an aid that was designed to support the country in various sectors such as social and human development, economic growth, institutional effectiveness, and so on. Therefore, to plan all that Somalia launched the National Development Plan which gathers Somalia state holders and international donors and the aid of the later channel on Somalia Development and Reconstruction Funds SDRF. The last sectors that Somalia receives aid are on the treasure, the aid on treasures was

generated to support the state budget and enhanced it. So those are the three main sectors that International donors contribute to support on one of the least fragile states in the world.

Secondly, to assess the effectiveness of foreign aid it is important to assess the state's institutions believing that the state's willingness is a most important role to acquire aid effectiveness and in long term imposes the state resilient. To do so, the paper utilized the mechanism of state institutions such as state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy to assess the state's willingness to stabilize the fragile state. Somalia as the case of this paper shows strength in different sectors but it dismisses other parts that might cause damage to the country. To avoid any further damage to the country, the paper argues that Somalia needs to prevent any further conflicts among elites and to balance the three mechanisms of institutional dimensions.

## 5.0. Conclusion

This study extends the discussion of aid effectiveness and the quality of institutions in fragile states. It starts to provide the different perspectives that concern the relation of aid to institutions, it begins to overview the 'conditionality aid' that is always aimed to serves a specific purpose, and this is used in between WWII and the end of the cold war. The main highlight of the conditionality aid is that it was not development and economical improvement to states. Second perspective that this thesis provides and give close discussion is the 'good governance' approach which is used to apply on the state institutions, so this approach which it is consideration started in begin of the 1990s gets wild spread support from the NGOs and other main aid donors. This approach does not fit the fragile state that faces problems on state-building or goes under massive civil wars and endures stagnations under a regime.

Therefore, the thesis tries to find out an alternative perspective of the fragile state which can enhance its institution quality. The good enough governance which originally generated by Grindle (2004, 2007) was designed to think of the state authority and the willingness of state regime to develop that state. The same concept has applied this study, so this study finds out that good enough governance can be an alternative for fragile states, also, the concept of prioritizing state authority was used to classified fragile states by the British Department of International Development (DFID) and many states and international organizations, they all seen that the state authority is crucial of the institutions quality which in return underlines that fragility by other meaning is lack of state authority.

Also, the study tries to put the frame of good enough governance in the case of Somalia as a model of fragile states. To relate the case of Somalia to fragility and clarify

the weakness of Somali institution, the study chose to frame at first the root of the fragility in that case. So, it highlights that through three decades that Somalia has endured civil wars, warlord's dominations, and then extremist terror groups the problems were always related to the authorities who rejected or refused any sort of agreements and conciliations to implement on the ground. And the study puts forward a table that demonstrates the series conference that has been held for those leaders to settle disputes down and stabilize the country. Finally, it puts that roots of fragility in the case of Somalia can be revealed as the unwillingness of its leaders.

In the last chapter, the thesis puts forward some concerns on the relation of foreign aid and fragile state's institution in the Somali case. It highlights that the effectiveness of aid relates its allocation and it finds out that although there are systems that international donors channels aid supports through them those systems show poor implementations in Somalia context and that refers to the responsible institutions are enduring corruption. In the fragile states, state stabilization takes a huge part in the success of aid and institutions, so the study applies mechanisms that can be assessed institutions, and those are ACL mechanisms; state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy.

Thus, the ACL mechanisms of state assessment reveal that state institutions must be concerned about its stabilization if one these are dismissed. Somalia, the mechanisms are not shown increases, for example, the current state authorities in Somalia reveals the increase in the balance of the president and prime minister disputes, but the attention of conflict prevention is very low and that not great for the stabilization between the federal government and federal states. Also, the rule of law in Somalia is getting worse when the federal constitutions take a decade to fulfill it, where it shows

developments on state capacities. Finally, the study argues state authorities and state legitimacy in fragile states must be concerned as key for the development not only aid.

Above all, the state institutions are designed to engage and perform the most concerning issues in states, wherein every state in the world has economic, security, development institutions, or ministers that are only designed to fulfill those issues. This dissertation utilizes to frame the picture of state fragility in the concern of institutions, for the reason that institutions combine fundamental issues of a fragile state. The ACL mechanisms, for example, point out the three fundamental problematic issues in fragile states such as regimes, state legitimacy, and state capability, where authority represents the concern of state leaders and whom binding state law, and legitimacy represents the rule of law in the state and implements of the law that authority delegated, and finally, state capacity represents the concern of state development on the economic and human securities. So, the analysis of these significant mechanisms might address, on the other hand, poorly on issues such as security, democracy, and other related issues to fragile states.

In other words, these state mechanisms give an insightful understanding of state fragility for both aid donors and aid receivers. Aid inflows to a fragile state for the purpose of supporting state weaknesses in terms of economics, for example, or other needed developments, so these state mechanisms might provide a considerable assessment of the outcome of that received aid, which allows assessing how balanced that a state allocated receipt aid. besides these state assessments, the state mechanisms do not provide deep-dive understanding and evaluation of state fragility, it is true that states vary in fragility, in fact, many countries are in need of only certain support whether others might need more than that. So that these mechanisms firstly originated

by Country Indicator for foreign policy (CIFP) to give international donors an overview of fragile states. Therefore, in the below pages the thesis provides other points that affect fragile states regarding foreign aid.

In between indexes, Somalia case has sat in the category of the most fragile states institutionally, economically, socially, and the assessments of security, and that would not be extraneous for those who relevant to the case. For example, the World Bank under the 'Fragility, Conflict, and Violence' program which was established to help prioritize its strategic goals and prevent poverty has classified fragile states into four categories highly intensity conflict category which Somalia, Afghanistan, and others allocated in it, medium intensity conflict, high institutional and social fragility, and small states<sup>7</sup>. The second index is one the most famous index that measures economic, political, social pressures in fragile states, 'Fragile State Index' powered by 'The Fund for Peace' reports annually the latest measurements of states has allocated Somalia in the second most fragile states<sup>8</sup>. Finally, the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) index assess fragile states in the concept of ACL state mechanisms, and it allocated Somalia and South Sudan as the first most fragile states in the world<sup>9</sup>. So Somalia shows as one of most fragile states following Yemen and South Sudan.

Regardless of foreign aid effectiveness, other factors that fragile states face similarly are civil wars and some of them face terror groups, Somalia is one of the fragile states that both civil wars and terror groups are integrated one after one.

Hence, civil wars are one of the complicated issues that many countries have endured under different circumstances, but naturally, civil wars are attempted to break

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<sup>7</sup> For more information see <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence>

<sup>8</sup> Fragile state index 2020 gives more information on the classifications see it here <https://fragilestatesindex.org/data/>

<sup>9</sup> See more information on official website of CIFP here <https://carleton.ca/cifp/failed-fragile-states/country-ranking-table/>

out in countries that suffer a certain level of weakness which in a way or another affects the country such as colonial legacies, military coups, ethics, religion, poverty, and so on (Dunne & Tian, 2019, pp. 1–2). In many cases, civil wars destroy the state institutions and socio cohesions which lead the instability of that country and makes difficult of states to recover, Somalia as it was discussed in the third chapter can be an example of that, and the case of Sierra Leon can be a good example for that (M'cleod & Ganson, 2018). Aliyev (2017), on the other hand, argues that the non-state actor violent and civil wars are not caused of state failure or state collapse, but it occurs after state collapsed as an outcome of it, a similar conclusion has pointed by (Thies, 2010) underlying the importance of understanding the cause of civil wars and it affects on fragile states.

Another factor that many fragile states are facing and struggling with these days is the terror groups that determine the fragility of state to perform political, social, and economic progress (George, 2016). This leads us the assumption that terror groups are mostly generated and activated in states which suffer to empower socio weakness such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, and lack of educations as it was found in the cases of Pakistan Shahbaz (2013) Nigeria Isola et al. (2019) and Somalia and Mali (Mutanda, 2017). Terror organizations are active and in haven to states that cannot handle them properly, so they formulate threats to local societies and neighboring states.

So civil wars and terror groups are mostly allocated weak states and both of them are not associated with the occurrence of state fragility but both maintain the fight against the state stability and developments. The terror groups, Al-Shabab, for example, are always intended to threaten the societies in various ways such as attacking or bombing in crowded places, assuming taxes or otherwise putting business away, and so

on. All in all, civil wars and terror groups are not the grounded causes of state fragility but it is an outcome of certain level weakness that a state endures.

One of the major problems that many fragile states endure is the dilemma of state-building and the restoration of peace. The WB reported that in the last year 2019 it channeled through it under the state and peace funds projects more than 300 million dollars globally and only Africa assumes nearly 50% of that amount (World Bank, SPF, 2019). Humanitarian assistance, gender inclusivity, economic restoration, and more others are the essential agendas for international NGOs in peacebuilding programs. For example, one of the longest peacebuilding processes which have taken more than a decade has happened under African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (2007- until now), the agendas of AMISOM is not only fighting against Al-Shabab it also includes much societal enhancement.

Therefore, Somalia case shows more similarity on the factors that many fragile states endures equally, but what Somalia differentiates from other fragile states is the institutional total collapse which extended in a decades.

### **5.1. Limitations and Future Research**

This thesis overviews and assesses Somalia's current state institutions which starts from (2017-2019), although the state's timeline has not ended yet. To overcome that, the thesis engages in the state published reports and other studies that have been conducted on Somalia's foreign aid. The state's timeline has not seemed a problem because three years was enough to assess the state policies and to understand the end lines of state authority, state capacity, and state legitimacy mechanisms. The second limitation of this study is that the analytical approach that has been conducted in this study gives an

overview of that state, for example, in the discussion of the state capacity the approach allows us to give a hint on economic, education, human development. So the study faces two limitations the first one is the limitation of the time of conducting this study, the second limitation is the limitation of exclusiveness that this approach draws on it.

The study cases highlight an insight key for understanding them. Somalia's case gives us a unique way of understanding the complexity of state collapsing and peace restoration which this thesis launched it in chapter two. So this study finds out that the study of Somalia's case institutionally might bring another understanding of peace restorations which would target more on the state authorities and building state legitimacies, also an inclusive study on these areas will be inevitable for academic studies. The institutional studies on Somalia's case are not as popular as the study on terror groups, namely, Al-Shabab and security sectors in general, but the study of Somalia institutions necessitates attention in academic scholars.

Also, this thesis realizes that the application of Country Indicator for Foreign Policy (CIFP) concept of state mechanisms which is used broadly on the assessment of failed or fragile states all over the world designed to help international decision-makers to take certain decisions on a failed state and evaluating its institutional progress. But for me, it seems it can help to give a significant inside understanding of fragile states, for example, progress made by a fragile state's authority, legitimacy, and capacity in general views. So, since the CIFP concept gives the overview assessment of the fragile states it can be implemented all levels of whether its aid donors or aid receivers.

Many countries and NGOs have been involved the Somalia's aid supporting institutionally and developmentally, which in the mean time have not assessed in the literature of Somalia's foreign aid. I want to point out that the understanding of aid

donors agenda can contribute to the assessment of underlining involvement degrees of donors to the Somalia institutions. Countries such as USA and others were involved day-to-day state policies which they tweet on the social media by welcoming, critiquing, or in some cases by totally highlighting a situation as “unacceptable”. On the other hand there are other countries who are mainly known in humanitarian and development sectors such as Turkey and many NGOs, there are a third group of countries and NGOs which are not clear yet and mostly concentrate on Arab Gulf and Middle East states.



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