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THIRD CINEMA MOVEMENT AS A VIRTUALITY

FAİK ONUR ACAR

DANIŞMAN: PROF. DR. BÜLENT DİKEN

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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ABSTRACT

FAİK ONUR ACAR, *THIRD CINEMA MOVEMENT AS A VIRTUALITY*, MASTER'S THESIS, Istanbul, 2019.

The struggle against capitalism was gaining power in the 1960s, both in Europe and in Latin America, and cinema was considered as one of the fields of conflict by the activists. In this context, Fernando Ezequel Solanas and Octavio Getino created the Third Cinema Movement as a strategy to revolutionize the cinema as a form that attracted the masses to the struggle. They declared in their manifesto (*Towards a Third Cinema*, 1968) that one of the most important objectives of the Third Cinema Movement was to produce revolutionary subjectivities. In this thesis, I argue that the Third Cinema Movement's understanding of cinema and their suggestions are still effectual. In this regard, first the theory (manifest) of the movement is read on the basis of the studies of Maurizio Lazzarato Gilles Deleuze. Then, the mechanism of capitalism today, namely, that of the Post-Fordist era, is analyzed to re-establish the material basis of the arguments of the Third Cinema Movement. Meanwhile, the increasing importance of the production of subjectivities in the Post-Fordist era is mentioned. Finally, on this basis, after summarizing the Deleuzian understanding of cinema, the movies that contain the main characteristics of the Third Cinema Movement are analyzed respectively: *The Man with a Movie Camera* (Dziga Vertov, 1928), *The Battle of Chile* (Patricio Guzman, 1975) and *The Hour of the Furnaces* (Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, 1968). These analyses are made mainly with the guidance of Deleuzian concepts such as "movement-image", "time-image" and "affect". In this context, it is demonstrated that the Third Cinema Movement has evaluated cinema and the audiences as well as history, even the universe, both as actuality and virtuality and that therefore, the production of subjectivities was carried out on this basis.

Keywords: Third Cinema Movement, Post-Fordist Era, Movement-Image, Time-Image, Deleuze, Subjectivity.

ÖZET

FAİK ONUR ACAR. *VİRTÜELLİK OLARAK ÜÇÜNCÜ SİNEMA HAREKETİ*, YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İstanbul, 2019.

1960'lı yıllarda Avrupa'da olduğu kadar Latin Amerika'da da kapitalist sisteme karşı mücadele güç kazanıyordu. Aktivistler tarafından sinema mücadele alanlarından biri olarak kabul ediliyordu. Bu bağlamda, Fernando Ezequiel Solanas ve Octavio Gettino, sinemayı devrimci hale getirmenin, sinema aracılığıyla kitleleri mücadeleye çekmenin bir biçimi olarak Üçüncü Sinema Hareketi'ni ortaya çıkardılar. Solanas ve Getino, yayımladıkları manifestoda (*Towards a Third Cinema*, 1968) Üçüncü Sinema Hareketi'nin en önemli hedeflerinden birinin devrimci öznellikler yaratmak olduğunu belirttiler. Ben bu tezde, Üçüncü Sinema Hareketi'nin sinema anlayışının ve iddialarının bugünde etkisini koruduğunu iddia ediyorum. Bu bağlamda, öncelikle hareketin teorisi (manifestosu), Maurizio Lazzarato'nun ve Gilles Deleuze'ün çalışmalarından yararlanılarak yorumlanmıştır. Ardından, hareketin maddi zemini yeniden tesis edilmesi için günümüzde yani Post-Fordist dönemde kapitalizmin işleyişi analiz edilmiştir. Bu analizde, Post-Fordist dönemde öznellik üretiminin her geçen gün artan önemine dikkat çekilmiştir. Son olarak, bu temelde, Deleuzcü sinema anlayışı özetlendikten sonra Üçüncü Sinema Hareketi'nin temel özelliklerini barındıran üç film sırasıyla incelenmiştir; *The Man with a Movie Camera* (Dziga Vertov, 1928), *The Battle of Chile* (Patricio Guzman, 1975) ve *The Hour of the Furnaces* (Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, 1968). Bu incelemeler ağırlıklı olarak "hareket-imge", "zaman-imge" ve "duygulanım" gibi Deleuzcü kavramların yol göstericiliğinde yapılmıştır. Üçüncü Sinema Hareketi'nin sinemayı ve alıcılarını olduğu kadar tarihi ve hatta evrenin kendisini de hem aktüellik hem de virtüellik olarak da ele aldığı dolayısıyla öznellik üretiminin de bu temelde gerçekleştirildiği gösterilmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Üçüncü Sinema Hareketi, Post-Fordist Dönem, Hareket-İmge, Zaman-İmge, Deleuze, Öznellik.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION¹

The *Third Cinema* movement emerged in 1968 with the movie called *The Hour of the Furnaces* (1968) and one year later with the manifesto entitled *Towards the Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for the Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the Third World* (Getino and Solanas, 1994, p. 33-57). The manifesto is based on the experiences of Solanas and Getino that they gain during the making of *The Hour of the Furnaces*. (Erus, 2015, 131) Therefore, it should be considered as a different kind of theoretical study which is based mainly on practice. This situation is coherent with the fact that their theory has close relations with the political situation in Latin America and more precisely in Argentina.

In this period, socialist movements all around Europe and Latin America were gaining power. The Allende Government in Chile and the Cuban Revolution are some of the most remarkable achievements of these movements. The oppositional forces were struggling against capitalism in every field possible, and cinema was among these fields. The activists in cinema were trying to produce new cinematic tendencies to influence people and to make them act against capitalism.

In this context, the *Third Cinema* movement presents itself as a part of this struggle. (Buchsbaum, 2001, p. 164) The initiators of this movement, Fernando Ezequiel Solanas and Octavio Getino tried to posit cinema as a tool that would function in the ideological field. (1997, p.37) Their judgements about cinema have close relations with their political attitude concerning the social situation in Argentina. (Erus, 2015, p.34) Therefore, it will be necessary to mention the political situation in Argentina during that era. “Between the years 1946 and 1955 two Peron governments took power and both of them were suspended from power with military-civilian groups.” (Erus, 2015, p.35) Apart from the Peronists in general, the Revolutionary Peronists, which consisted of students, journalists and union leaders emerged as an important movement of resistance in this political

¹ Part of this thesis had been published as “Üçüncü Sinema Hareketi’nde Öznellik Üretimi” in “SineFilozofi Dergisi”, Özel Sayı:1, 2019, pp.352-273

atmosphere (Erus, 2015, p.35) and the creators of the *Third Cinema* movement considered themselves as a part of them. In this context, they considered their actions in cinema as a contribution to the struggle, especially in Argentina and of course to the social struggle all around the world. As a part of this struggle, the *Third Cinema* movement directors showed that they tended to use cinema to produce new subjectivities in the audiences, or more clearly, they tried to find new ways to produce a new revolutionary subject in history. As expected, in their manifest, Solanas and Getino were influenced by the studies of Franz Fanon along with Karl Marx and Mao Zedung (*Getino and Solanas, 1994, pp. 33-57*). Solanas's and Getino's relation with Fanon is notable because just like Fanon, they also aimed to signify the difference between the people in the colonial world and those in the Western world. In this context, the creators of the *Third Cinema* underlined the fact that people in the colonial world should not be considered as free objects yet. More clearly, they needed to gain the fight for their rights. According to them, only after that could they be defined as subjects. It is important to note that this first theory from the colonial world arose from these assumptions.

In their understanding, capitalism produces subjects who will act compatibly with the current system. Solanas and Getino wanted people to appraise themselves not as parts of the system or a cog of the given assemblages but as potentialities or virtualities in the Deleuzian sense that can change the system and history. In other words, the *Third Cinema* movement directors tried to produce "affects" in their movies to actualize audiences' virtuality and consequently virtuality in general. This argument leads to the question "what is virtuality?". Drawing from a study by François Zourabichvili, (2012, pp.214-215) which examines the main concepts of Deleuzian philosophy, I would like to answer this question as follows.

The actual is given, and it should be considered as a form of possibility. The other possibilities which are also given can be actual in different understandings, universes or in the mind, for instance. In other words, actuality has close references to transcendency. On the other hand, virtuality cannot be thought with the terms of possibility because it postulates the fact that everything is not given. Virtuality cannot be experienced as the actuality or it does not have a psychological existence, but it has a reality just as the actuality has. In fact, in this understanding, reality becomes a fluidity between the actual and the virtual. Therefore, the actual becomes

a flow from virtuality. In this context, actuality comes to light not only as a given subject or a limit of virtuality but as a door to virtuality which leads to new ways to understanding and considering the given. In this sense, virtuality refers to the immanence way of thinking. It is the hidden process between the given or between the unities. In short, I argue that virtuality should be considered both as a hidden process, a hidden fundamental side of the actuality, but also a call to think about the given assumptions of the given world. In this sense, it is a reminder that the given cannot be reduced to history, science of any other disciplines that function at the basis of the unities. I would also like to mention that I consider the approach of the current studies to the *Third Cinema* movement on this basis. They all consider the *Third Cinema* movement as a given subject and try to analyze it on this basis. On the other hand, I would like to focus on the tendency of this movement to signify the virtuality.

I argue that the current studies that examine the *Third Cinema* movement can be classified into three different categories. Firstly, scholars evaluate the *Third Cinema* movement in the context of the production of national cinema in the 1960s. This existing literature on the *Third Cinema* movement examines its political and historical origins as expected, and focuses on similar conditions and achievements in other Latin American countries in the same period. In this regard, the *Third Cinema* movement is evaluated as part of an attempt to establish an independent national or peoples' cinema which aims to produce production, distribution and screening systems independently altogether.

Scholars such as Robert Stam and Michael T. Martin indigenize this approach and consider the *Third Cinema* movement as one of the movements that occurred in different Latin America countries, such as *New Cinema* in Brazil, the *Ukamau Group* in Bolivia, the *Santa Fe Documentary School* in Argentina or the *New Documentary Movement* in Colombia. Because of the similar cultural histories and ideological tendencies of these movies and writings, such as *The Aesthetic of Hunger* (Glauber Rocha), *Problems of Form and Content in Revolutionary Cinema* (Jorge Sanjines), *Cinema and Underdevelopment* (Fernando Birri), they tend to classify all these cinemas under the name of "New Latin American Cinema" (ed. Martin, 1997). Then, under this general historical category, some of the scholars such as Robert Stam designate the difference of the *Third Cinema* movement from

the other movements as “a Fanon-inflected version of Brechtian aesthetics along with a dash of national culture” (Stam, 2004, p. 31).

Secondly, scholars such as Teshome H. Gabriel evaluate the *Third Cinema* movement by drawing from its formal differences used in the movies such as lighting, camera angle, placement, and movement, etc. (Gabriel, 1994, pp. 30-53). He simply gives priority to the formal structures of the *Third Cinema* movies and as expected, draws from the postulate that cinema is a formal art although this is closely related to its aims. But as Mike Wayne mentions, it would be a mistake to evaluate the *Third Cinema* movement or the main example of it, “*The Hour of the Furnaces* by measuring it against a set of avant-garde formal strategies” (Wayne, 2001, p.128).

On the other hand, Gabriel also examines the *Third Cinema* movement under themes such as class, culture, religion and ideology in his book called *Third Cinema in the Third World: The Aesthetics of Liberation* (Gabriel, 1979). After establishing the connection between the Third Cinema movement and these major concepts, he argues that this movement should be “recognized as a cinema of subversion” (Gabriel, 1979, p.95). He continues as follows, “it is a progressive cinema founded on folk culture whose role is to intervene on behalf of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America who must fight equally for political as well as cultural liberation” (Gabriel, 1979, p. 95). As a result, he seems to be approaching the *Third Cinema* movement through the conditions of its creation or, we can say, through the given assumptions or facts at the molar level in the Deleuzian sense.

Coherent with this suggestion by Gabriel, Mike Wayne’s study (Wayne, 2001) also shows the ways in which the *Third Cinema* movement functions as an ideological tool. He firstly argues that “in order properly to appreciate Solanas and Getino’s seminal essay ‘Towards a Third Cinema’, we have to situate it within the national context of Argentina and in particular the history of the film industry within that country” (Wayne, 2001, p.118). In this sense, it is fair to argue that he tries to expand the manifesto and the claims of this movement just like Gabriel. But different from him, he focuses on the national context, not the cultural one. In any case, Wayne also evaluates the *Third Cinema* movement as a tool to produce the subjectivity in the Third World. He underlines the fact that the Third Cinema

movement cannot be considered as a movement of Argentina, and that, on the contrary, it is a movement of the colonial world. Consequently, Wayne reveals the relation between the *Third Cinema* movement and the studies of Marx, Fanon and the post-colonial theorist Bhabha, in which the problem of constructing a revolutionary subject or any subject is considered (Fanon, 2004, 2017, Bhabha, 1987, Marx, 1973, 2007).

This existing literature on the *Third Cinema* movement which is mentioned briefly above either uses the categories which the *Third Cinema* filmmakers reject in their manifesto (national cinema or forms which are considered to be excluded from the movement's aim or the cultural economic basis, for instance) or consider the *Third Cinema* movement in the ways that its creators do. Solanas and Getino accept the importance of the cultural and ideological era, but they mainly put emphasis on creating a non-national, Revolutionary cinema. They analyze the capitalist world namely the system not on national basis. According to them, the struggle against the system should also be on an international scale. For example, producing a network of guerilla cinema which will function not only on a national scale, but all over Latin America is one of their main goals. Coherent with that, as will be seen below, they categorize cinema with concepts which do not signify any nation, history or geographical place, and instead, they create these concepts through the "affect" of the movies, in other words through the experience. They undoubtedly theorize their political tendencies concerning the conditions of the people in the colonial world; nonetheless, I argue that limiting the analysis of the Third Cinema movement to the creators' assumptions will result in failing to notice the distinctness and the importance of this movement for the period that we are living in.

Briefly, I argue that the first two approaches would fail to comprehend the authenticity of the *Third Cinema* movement because these have the tendency to evaluate this movement based on its historical and cultural similarities with other movements. On the other hand, the third approach, which is represented mainly by Wayne and Gabriel, indigenizes political, cultural and theoretical aspects of the *Third Cinema* movement's creators and consequently, its inferences are limited to them. They focus mainly on the studies of Bhabha and Fanon and examine the *Third Cinema* movement through the cultural and political imperialism model. On this

basis, they try to put forward the achievements of the *Third Cinema* against the cultural, economic and ideological hegemony.

On the other hand, I would like to show that the *Third Cinema* movement cannot and should not be reduced to national cinemas, to the production of new forms or new aesthetics in cinema history, or to the intentions of the creators of this movement. I have chosen not to limit myself to the understanding of the creators of the *Third Cinema*, either. Therefore, in this thesis, I do not focus on finding the cultural, historical or political sources or basis of the *Third Cinema* movement, nor do I analyze the aesthetic forms of the movement. This would be limiting the analyses of the *Third Cinema* to its actuality, in other words to its given appearances or results. On the contrary, I have chosen to focus on its potential to reach the virtuality, both at the time the movement came to light and at the present time. To advocate this argument, I intend to think the *Third Cinema* movement with the philosophy of Deleuze. I argue that the Deleuzian understanding of cinema and the world provides the necessary tools to evaluate this movement in a new way and will show that the *Third Cinema* movie makers have achieved more and different things than what they intended to achieve.

On this basis, drawing from the studies of Lazzarato and Deleuze, firstly, I would like to interpret the main writing of the *Third Cinema* movement directly, which is the manifesto entitled *Towards a Third Cinema: Notes and Experiences for the Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the Third World*, with concepts such as “multitude”, “virtuality”, “repetition”, “time”, “event” and “difference”.

Before starting my analyses, I would like to define these concepts briefly with their connections to each other. Firstly, I evaluate multitude as a device to consider subjectivity in a fluid way. Different from people or subject, multitude refers to a fluid structure. It implies the fact that evaluating the subject as a solid being would be wrong and not useful for understanding its function both in the ontological and political field. Drawing from the studies of Paolo Virno, Deleuze and Mauricio Lazzarato, I establish the relation between the multitude and the molar and molecular levels in the Deleuzian sense. I argue that multitude gives the opportunity to show that subjects should not be regarded solely as identities, which refers to the level of the molar. In Deleuzian understanding, the molar level is the level of unities

such as object, subject or any other concept which can represent absolutely anything. On the contrary, the molecular level signifies a level before any unity. It is a level where the relation between the object and the subject does not occur. Only the flows, patterns or direct “affects” occur. This level can be considered as a level of chaos. At this level, change and movement are constant and it gives the opportunity, the tools to re-evaluate the molar level because it can also be understood as the basis of the molar level. This understanding of subjectivity also has an effect on time. Time is evaluated as a linear process in which every moment has an independent unity in general. This conceptualization of time is useful at the molar level but not at the molecular level. At the molecular level, time occurs as an operation that shapes not only the moment but also the past and the future. Therefore, it corresponds to virtuality as a force that can change every given being. Coherent with that, subjectivities become multitudes which are open to their virtuality as well as their actuality. Actuality is at the level of unities such as identity and linear understanding of time and virtuality is at the non-linear understanding of time; time that shapes the future and the past in each and every moment, that differentiates itself from itself in the form of a repetition. At this point, the difference should not be understood as a difference from something. This assumption would fit only at the molar level. On this basis, the difference holds another meaning; it becomes hidden, new connections, new assemblages, a force that leads us to consider the universe and history in a new perspective. More clearly, difference does not refer to the difference of the given or any differences between subjects and objects. It should be understood as becoming a difference, as a force; a force that produces new subjectivities. This leads to another concept that I mentioned above; repetition. Time that shapes the past, the present and the future does not cancel the given assumptions of the previous moment. It mainly re-shapes and provides the necessary tool to evaluate the postulates of the molar level. In that sense it is not an independent creation; it is a repetition in a difference. That is why every real repetition contains a difference in itself and vice versa. At this point the question between the difference and subjectivity arises. I argue that if the difference occurs it should also change the way or the method of conceptualizing the given, consequently history or nature, just like an event. It would be fair to define the difference as an event under these conditions because in this process, history as well as the subjectivities are recreated. At this point, it should be clear why I describe

the difference as becoming a difference. It is an act, as an ongoing process in which literally everything changes. This is the absolute condition of an event. It should be an operation which cannot be reduced to an event in history or a process between the subject and object. Therefore, an event can also be considered as a call for the subjectivities to realize their hidden connection with the universe in general; a call for revolution. Consequently, an event which shapes both the universe and the subjectivities can be evaluated as a bond between the actual and virtual and between the subject and the object (François Zourabichvili, 2012, pp.148-150, 171-182, 188-201, 205-207 and Deleuze, 1994, pp. 11-17).

I argue that these concepts will provide the necessary tools to reconsider the explicit discoveries of the *Third Cinema* movement by showing how these filmmakers think (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp. 163-201) and act in the Deleuzian sense. Consequently, instead of using the concepts which were rejected by the *Third Cinema* movement directors, I would like to interpret the concepts and categories they invented in their manifesto. In this sense, I can say that I will try to repeat the manifesto of the *Third Cinema* movement in the Deleuzian sense. Hopefully, this repetition will result in something different. This analysis will lead us to an interpretation of the current status of capitalism. Therefore, in the next section, I would like to explain why the *Third Cinema* movement and its arguments are still valid in the period we are still living in.

In this context, I would like to analyze the Post-Fordist era. I should mention that I define Post-Fordism with its relation to Fordism. In the Fordist era, the production of mass consumer commodities was planned in detail with the usage of assembly line techniques and once it was standardized and initiated, it would be nearly impossible to change or re-plan it. Simply, it was the production that took place in big factories and shaped the economy. Therefore, the consumers or the subjectivities were tried to be shaped based on this process. People were accepted and needed to be solid subjectivities that should not change as the production process forced them. Therefore, the ideology in an Orthodox Marxist sense became a valuable tool to understand the politics. On the other hand, it is important to note that this process was functioning in each country differently under the protection of national laws. Therefore, it was tied in with the politics of that country. Different from the Fordist era, in the Post-Fordist era, the production process is not planned

or centralized. With the development of communication and logistic technologies, production can be spread all around the world. The plans concerning production can be and need to be changed according to the needs and interests of the consumer. This leads to flexible working arrangements. People cannot be workers at the office and mothers at home, for instance, they need to be there both at the same time. They need to be fluid. That is why I chose the concept of multitude to analyze this period. In short, production became more consumer-oriented in general. Mutually, the production of the subjectivities gained another meaning. The service industry started to grow; shaping the subjectivities became an important part of production. More clearly, it became hard to draw a line between production and the production of subjectivities. People were shaped during the consuming process and vice versa (Marazzi, 2017, pp. 15-33 and Lazzarato, 2014 pp.7-17).

While analyzing this period, I would like to make use of the studies of Christian Marazzi, Franco “Bifo” Berardi and mostly Paolo Virno on the basis that their findings for the Post-Fordist era are coherent with the suggestions of Deleuzian philosophy. To support this hidden assumption, I would like to analyze the synthesis of time in the Deleuzian sense because the synthesis of time sheds light on the structure of the social: the relation between the molar and molecular levels as well as the main concepts of Cinema in the Deleuzian sense such as movement-image and time-image. I argue that the analysis of the synthesis of time is essential because it will hopefully provide the basis for the establishment of the connection between the interpretation of the current capitalist era and the philosophy of Deleuze, or more clearly, the Deleuzian ontology.

With this framework, in the third section, which is called “Cinema as Production of Images”, firstly, I would like to give a short summary of the Deleuzian understanding of cinema which will be predicated both on my interpretation of the *Third Cinema*, Deleuzian philosophy, and the Post-Fordist era.

Then I would like to interpret some scenes from the examples of the *Third Cinema* movement such as *Man with a Movie Camera* (Dziga Vertov, 1928), *The Battle of Chile* (Patricio Guzman, 1975) and *The Hour of the Furnaces* (Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino, 1968) with the concepts of “time-image” and “movement-image” (Deleuze, 1997, 2001).

Hopefully, in the last section, I will establish the relationship between the “affects” of these movies with the production of new subjectivities and the description of the *Third Cinema* movement as a virtuality whose claims are still valid.



CHAPTER 2

THE THIRD CINEMA MOVEMENT

One of the most important scholars that studied the *Third Cinema* movement, Jonathan Buchsbaum, mentions that “no other manifesto was so inextricably linked to a particular film” (Buchsbaum, 2001, p. 155). Here, Buchsbaum was writing about Solanas’s and Getino’s movie called *The Hour of Furnaces*. Consequently, the filmmaker/theoreticians usually “discussed the ideas in their manifesto, conjoining theory and practice around the dual text of film and manifesto” (Buchsbaum, 2001, p. 155). Different from them, I have chosen to analyze them separately because of my need to point out the similarities of the theoretical suggestions of Deleuze, Lazzarato and the creators of the *Third Cinema*. After that, on this theoretical basis, I would like to analyze some scenes from the movie.

According to Solanas and Getino, the cinema can be divided into three general sections; (1) Commercial Cinema (First Cinema), (2) Art Cinema (Second Cinema) and (3) Revolutionary Cinema (Third Cinema). They interpret Commercial Cinema as a form of the dominant ideology of capitalism. They argue that this ideology posits human beings “as a passive and consuming object; rather than having his ability to make history” (Solanas and Getino, 1994, p. 42). Therefore, the movies in this section permit human beings only “to read history, contemplate it, listen to it and undergo it...The world, experience, and the historical process are enclosed within...the movie screen” (Solanas and Getino, 1994, p. 42). Human beings are presented in the movies solely as a part of the capitalist system drawing from their actual position.

In this context, I argue that Getino and Solanas approach Commercial Cinema as a form of “social subjection” (Lazzarato, 2014, p.25). Lazzarato argues that “social subjection produces and distributes places and roles within and for the social division of labor” (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 25). According to Lazzarato, through language and in this case through the form of Commercial Cinema, the dominant ideology “creates a signifying and representational web from which no one escapes” (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 24). In this regard, I interpret Getino’s and Solanas’s argument, as the movies in this section present subjects as an actual identity who have no virtuality. These movies aim to restrict subjects to their actual function in

the capitalist system. They give the message to the audience that they do not have any choice to change either themselves or the world they live in.

Commercial Cinema mainly depends on the understanding of linear time. Events and acts seemingly effect solely the actuality with reference to the cause and effect of the relationship. The general structure of this kind of movie tends to convince the audience that actuality is the absolute limit for any political change.

Hence in these commercial movies the image of time, which can be accepted as a force for any change, is given to the audiences through movements on the actual basis. This understanding of the universe does not provide any “events” that can give the characters the chance to explore and produce themselves in a new way. The only option for the characters, and consequently for the audiences, is to explore his or her hidden but permeant identity. Therefore, so many Hollywood movies end when the main character finds its identity. Movies close in themselves (end) when the characters do, too.

In this regard, it is fair to argue that these kinds of movies tend to restrict people to socially justified identities in general, in other words, they are part of the ideological hegemony. But it is important to remember that this understanding of an ideology does not function only at the superstructure in a classic Marxist sense; rather, it should be understood as a surface which involves the production of subjectivities as well as production in general. More clearly, subjectivities which are produced and supported by these movies are a part of a cog of the representational web which is undergirded. All the other connections established with the audiences through the images are hidden. Like any other movie, in Commercial cinema too, every image constitutes a bond, a machine with the audiences. But these bonds function for the benefit of the identification process. I have chosen not to analyze this underlining production in Commercial cinema, because this form starts to change with the Art Cinema. By rejecting the linear understanding of time, Art Cinema seems to focus on and show the ways to produce these alternative bonds, and this surface will be discussed below.

Getino and Solanas interpret Art Cinema as a progressive act against Commercial Cinema and its concomitants. According to Solanas and Getino, Art Cinema, namely Second Cinema, produces new, alternative forms for reproducing people’s

feelings and acts. They argue that “this alternative signified a step forward inasmuch as it demanded that the filmmaker be free to express himself in non-standard language” (Solanas and Getino, 1997, p. 42). It should be remembered that the “standard language” which focuses on the identification process and applies the linear understanding of time is generated by the Commercial cinema. In this context, it seems as if the Art Cinema posits itself in a struggle against the dominant ideology and its apparatus. Consequently, it should be considered as an act against cultural colonization (Solanas and Getino, 1997, p. 42) in Europe and Latin America against the United States. For this very reason, Getino and Solanas evaluate Art Cinema as an ally with Revolutionary Cinema, namely, the *Third Cinema* movement, and underline the fact that the border between Art Cinema and the *Third Cinema* movement is transitional.

A famous example of Art Cinema comes from Alain Resnais with the movie called *Hiroshima My Love* (1959), which is characterized by the usage of non-linear time. According to Martin-Jones (Martin-Jones, 2011b, pp. 51-67), usage of a non-linear understanding of time, in other words actualizing time not with movement but with duration, corresponds both for the characters and for the audiences, who are not able to respond to the forces which they are exposed to, to be witnesses of the time in itself; becoming someone or something; becoming duration in Bergson’s sense (Deleuze, 1994, pp. 70-94). This movie can be considered as a promoter of this view.

In this movie, images are presented in themselves; they connect and relate with the audiences and the main characters at the same time, or more clearly, in the same process. Resnais cut the subjective moments (*Elle*’s hand touching *Lui*’s shoulder) with the objective moments (objects at the museum). The distinctions between the objective moments-shots and subjective moments-shots are canceled just with the beginning of the movie. Because of the style of the shot of the corridors and the rooms of the hospital, we perceive them as objective, but the narrator (*Elle*’s voice) forces us to see them as memories, as subjective shots. Canceling this distinction is essential to make new connections because the identification process basically depends on this distinction; in this understanding, objective shots are used to give information to construct the basis for the process, to let the audience get familiar with the world he or she will hopefully get into. On the other hand, subjective shots

are used to complete this process, to make the audiences accept the characters' view and consequently their understanding. In the traditional understanding of documentary, for instance, the voice-over (voice of God) functions as the main means of the same process.

Along with the usage of images, Resnais also uses the voice-over for another purpose in the movie. *Elle's* voice (the narrator of the movie) and what she says seems to be just images among other images rather than an informer or determiner. It seems as if the formation of both the audience and the main character is tried to be accomplished through the experience of the movie, or more clearly, through the connection with the images.

In the words of Deleuze, we are now experiencing not an agent's but a seer's cinema., (Martin-Jones, 2011b, pp. 141-145). We are now in front of characters who are living and experiencing beyond the actuality with the rejection of the cause and effect relationship. With the new connections established through the images, new times, a new understanding of time came to light. Different from Commercial cinema, activity behind the actuality become known or even produced.

The characters, *Elle* for instance, are now able to produce new futures which are not limited or destined in a linear understanding, but rather, are limited only by the images themselves. This situation is also echoed in the audience. The same thing is even valid for the past, too, as seen in *Hiroshima My Love*. The characters now have the power to produce new histories by producing new living presents. As Deleuze suggests, it seems as if "subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual" (Deleuze, 2011, pp. 82-83). In other words, subjectivity has become a concept which is closely tied in with the virtual through time. It is not something about an identity anymore; on the contrary, it is something that is defined by the time, by the change and the process. Consequently, time has become a being that forces us to re-evaluate the subjectivity. At this point, from the perspective of producing new subjectivities and new assemblages, this movie seems to be a revolutionary movie.

However, according to Solanas and Getino, this understanding of cinema, although it is a step forward, is not enough to produce a Revolutionary cinema. They

repaginate Art Cinema on three different but related bases; (1) form, (2) identity and (3) event.

I will try to explain these together. Solanas and Getino argue that Art Cinema still functions based on individuals, who have been subjugated by a different mechanism of capitalism. It functions only to redefine the identities in new forms. It tries to interpret peoples' feelings on the understanding of an identity, which seems to be constructed in itself. They argue that as long as people are regarded only as identities, the capitalist system can redefine them or take advantage of them.

The capitalist system can reformulate them because identities refer predominantly to peoples' actual position and their actual position constitutes a function in the capitalist system. If it does not do that, if these movies focus on the virtuality and on new connections with the audiences, then the capitalist system will still have the opportunity to benefit from this cinema because different approaches to peoples' actual position can provide the system with new ways to make people function inside the system, and the system can change for the benefit of the same system.

According to Solanas and Getino, producing new forms in cinema, which seems to be revolutionary in itself, has the inevitable result of vanishing, of becoming a meaningless empty form. This is what Solanas and Getino mean by saying that this kind of movie "would be distributed by the System according to its own norms" (Solanas and Getino, 1997, p. 42).

In this regard, in Art cinema, the director's understanding of the world as a dimension of his or her identity is basic, a permeant reference as well as the form of the art movies to evaluate them. Solely the hegemony of auteur theory shows that. It is customary to mention the creator's or author's biography or world view while evaluating Art Cinema. Consequently, the problem of identity seems not to be rejected but divided with the Art Cinema; divided between the characters and forms of the movies and the creators of the same movies.

On this basis, this seems a valid question: why is producing new forms, or establishing new connections, or thinking about cinema in the Deleuzian sense not enough to produce a Revolutionary cinema? Solanas's and Getino's answer is very

simple. Cinema should be a part of a bigger social struggle. It should be connected with an “event”; even more, it should *be* an “event”.

That is why Solanas and Getino mention that the limit between the Art Cinema and Revolutionary Cinema is not abiding. They stress that the qualification of the movie does not only depend on its form but also on the social structure of the place where the movie is shown and on the time when it is shown.

According to their understanding, one movie can be revolutionary in France, for instance, but not in Chile. As Paul Willemen mentions, “in Europe, most Third Cinema products have definitely been consumed in a Second Cinema way, bracketing the politics in favor of an appreciation of the authorial artistry” (Willemen, 1987, p. 15). The relation between the audiences and the movie is the only basis to evaluate the movie or more clearly, the “affects” produced with the movie. So, the categories they created in their manifesto should be understood not as concepts which correspond to objects or movies. They should be understood and used as toolboxes in a Deleuzian sense; as devices which can help us to think with the images in an event. This leads us to the *Third Cinema*.

According to Solanas and Getino, the *Third Cinema* movement is “at the same time one of destruction and construction.” (Solanas and Getino, 1997, p. 49) To begin with, it is a deconstruction of the image that capitalism created of itself. This image constitutes a history, a story with the other images which explains and justifies the actual condition of the world. This justification materializes in two different ways. Firstly, as mentioned above while analyzing the Commercial cinema, it functions as a hegemonic ideological tool, and capitalism and its image subjugate individuals as identities drawing basically the linear understanding of time.

Secondly, it gives the impression to the people that neither history nor the people have virtuality. Everything is functioning and will be functioning as it is and even if it changes it will change for the sake of the system just as the Art Cinema does.

The *Third Cinema* is an attempt to destroy this image. In this context, it seems as if the *Third Cinema* is an attempt to constitute a crack in the given system (Foucault, 2010, p. 68). Solanas and Getino continue, stating that the *Third Cinema* is “construction of a living reality, which recaptures truth in any of its expressions”

(2010, p. 68). It is construction because it tries to reach the virtuality of people from this crack, but different from the Art Cinema it tries to connect this crack with an “event”. So, in a way, it tries to reveal peoples’ potentiality to construct a socialist system. They evaluate the *Third Cinema* movement as part of the socialist struggle, namely, as part of a bigger “event”.

I argue that Getinos’ and Solanas’ thesis that “the restitution of things to their real place and meaning is an eminently subversive fact” (Solanas and Getino, 1997, p. 46) should be evaluated in this regard: deconstruction and construction; i.e. deconstruction of the actuality and construction of a new reality through the virtuality but also with reference to an event. I argue that the “real” points both to the actuality and to the virtuality of things.

The *Third Cinema* movement filmmakers are trying to change the reality by influencing people, by reaching peoples’ virtuality. They tend to use both the “movement-images” and “time-images” in their movies to achieve their final purpose which is to produce new subjectivities. But this alone is not enough to differentiate the *Third Cinema* movement either from the Commercial Cinema or from the Art Cinema.

However, different from the Commercial Cinema, they do not hide the fact that they are producing a new connection with the images and they do not search for renewal or change in the form for the sake of the form or for the sake of a new understanding of the identity, as the Art Cinema does. Rather, they are aiming at new subjectivities within an event.

They want people to see themselves as subjectivities through their own virtuality and event but also with reference to their actual position and function in the capitalist system. I argue that the “crack” in the reality which the creators of the *Third Cinema* movements mention, corresponds to this understanding of politics and cinema.

Compatible with this understanding, the *Third Cinema* movement filmmakers also tend to provide proper spaces for the audiences to reach their virtuality through their actuality, or more clearly, their actual position functions in the system. They prefer showing their movies in places where people live or work: in factories, in cafes, in

classes rather than in movie theaters. They neither want to separate people from their actual position in the system, nor do they reject that. On the contrary, they try to change the actual position by reaching peoples' virtuality. They encourage people to discuss the movies after the screening. They do not want the audiences to become passive art consumers. They aim for subjectivities which can form inside an event, a movie screening in this case. In other words, they want to give people an opportunity to change that identity by producing "affects" both in their movies and in the places in which the screening occurs. In the long run, they expect these "affects" to help people produce a new system.

In this understanding, the actuality and the virtuality are not separated from each other. On the contrary, they construct reality together inside an event. Movies are not accepted as solid, completed art objects; movies become solely a detonator or a pretext (Solanas and Getino, 1997, p. 54). Solanas and Getino even call for other movie directors, even for the people who are screening their movies, to re-cut and add some scenes to the movies they have directed. They consider movies as open creations or more clearly, objects which should be formed again and again in compliance with the event (Biryıldız and Erus, 2007, p.29), the place or the history of the screening. Only through and in an event can subjectivities escape from becoming a new ground for the reproduction of capitalism. An event is "cut off from any preconceived, anterior scenario" (del Rio, 2008, p.4). In this context, cinema can be an important part of this struggle, namely, an important tool to reach virtuality.

After analyzing and interpreting the *Third Cinema* manifesto, I would like to check if my interpretation of the arguments about the *Third Cinema* are still valid. To do that, firstly, I need to analyze the materialist basis of these arguments, namely, the capitalist period we still live in. Therefore, in the next section, I will analyze the Post-Fordist era.

CHAPTER 3

THE POST-FORDIST ERA AND PRODUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITIES

In the Post-Fordist era in which we are still living, “the central project of capitalist politics consists in the articulation of economic, technological, and social flows with the production of subjectivity in such a way that political economy is identical with the subjective economy” (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 8). In other words, in this era “it is impossible to separate economic, political, and social processes from the processes of subjectification occurring within them” (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 8). Now more than ever, the economic process is tied in with politics, ethics, and consequently with art. All these disciplines can be evaluated as tools but also as part of the production of subjectivities. In short, in the Post-Fordist period of capitalism, the production of subjectivities has become one of the most important parts of the existing order.

All kinds of subjectivities which are produced by the system seem to be the necessities for the re-production, namely, survival of the same system. In this context, it is fair to argue that the crisis in capitalism indicates the crisis of the production of subjectivities which consists of new potentials for the struggle against capitalism. I argue that the *Third Cinema* movement can be interpreted as a part of this struggle.

In the Post-Fordist era, firstly, the traditional subjectivity forms and social structures were wiped out by the system. As Marx put it, the process in which “all that is solid melts into air” accelerated constantly (Marx, 2007, p.12). In the Post-Fordist era, production is not planned from year to year, it is shaped based on the daily responses. Hence, the importance of communication and language in production increases constantly and furthermore, it becomes a value in its own right. As Marazzi mentions, in the Fordist era of capitalism, communication was considered as a factor that could interrupt production (Marazzi, 2008, p. 23). However, in the Post-Fordist era, the production process communicates in itself and with consumers constantly. With the constant usage of communication, Post-Fordism focuses on the production of subjectivities rather than on production in general. The increasing importance of the service sector in economics can be

considered as a sign of this shift in capitalism. A flexible production system corresponds to the constant and flexible production of subjectivities.

On this basis, it is fair to argue that in this period, the system itself also wipes out the difference between production in general and production of subjectivities. Now, the production of subjectivities is not just a necessity for production, it is a production in itself. At this point, it is crucial to remember that the *Third Cinema* movement offers to produce revolutionary subjectivities to contribute to the struggle against capitalism.

According to Deleuze, Guattari, and Lazzarato, at the molar level, the unities in general are actualized unity in time, unity in identity, etc. On the other hand, at the molecular level, as a difference from the molar level, individuals, namely, identities are considered just as “a gear, a cog, a component part in the ‘business’ and ‘financial system’ assemblages, in the media assemblage, and the ‘welfare state’ assemblage and its collective institutions (schools, hospitals, museums, theaters, television, internet, etc.)” (Berardi, 2009, p. 21).

Consequently, the factories as stationary places or the classes do not characterize society anymore, “the imposition of conducts and the subjection of bodies are not explicable by monetary constraints and economic imperatives alone. Regimes of signs, machines of expression and collective assemblages of enunciation (law, knowledge, languages, public opinion, etc.) act like the cogs of the assemblages, in the same way as machinic assemblages (factories, prisons, schools)” (Lazzarato, 2006a, pp.172-173).

In this context, it is important to remember that identities or classes are not canceled, but they are now “nothing but the capture, integration, and differentiation of multiplicity” (Lazzarato, 2006b, p. 171). In this era of capitalism, the subject is always in the process of becoming like the system. Capitalism is no longer characterized by “panoptic, place-bounded discipline forcing people to overtake given subject positions” (Diken and Albertsen, 2006, p. 246). Positions and spaces lose their significance. Individuals become workers outside the factories, students outside schools, etc., “hence social space tends to lose its delimitation” (Diken and Albertsen, 2006, p. 246), and without its given limitations, mutually, identities also lose their references to spaces and consequently their unity. This conclusion is

coherent with the Post-Fordist period of capitalism. As Deleuze suggests, it is now time to talk about control societies rather than disciplinary societies (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 169-182). Nowadays, “factories are replaced by businesses, schools by continuous education, exams by continuous assessments” (Diken and Albertsen, 2006, p. 246). Identities are shaped not only by the system and for the system but also by the subjectivities as the subjectivities.

Capitalism always needs the entrepreneur character, an identity which is ready to transform to survive, but different from before, in this era, it needs individuals to become a business themselves. This blurring between production in general and production of subjectivities is also defined with the “the progressive commodification of social life or even of social rights – receiving a proper education is no more part of the welfare state duties and policies but a facility one can buy, for instance” (Giardini, 2018, p. 36). It would be a good time to remember what Marx wrote about “general intellect” in *Grundrisse* to establish the connection between the individual and the production:

Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are products of the human industry: natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand: the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real-life process (Marx, 1973, pp. 625-626).

More clearly, under these conditions, the means of production cannot be reduced to machines anymore. Language, communication, and consequently “thought becomes the primary source of the production of wealth” (Virno, 2004, p. 64). I argue that Marx implies the unity of production of subjectivities and production in general with the concept, “general intellect”.

According to Paolo Virno, “general intellect” occurs when “all the workers enter into production in as much as they are speaking-thinking” and he continues as “to speak/to think are generic habits of the human animal, the opposite of any sort of specialization” (Virno, 2004, pp. 40-41). These conditions are in relation with two

actualities; firstly, segmentation and hierarchy in the division of labor are now more reversible and changeable than ever. Secondly, they foster personal dependence. This reality gives another reason to analyze the production of subjectivities in the period we are living in.

As a result, it is fair to argue that “general intellect” functions in the ground of multitude, and multitude signifies singularities. Singularities in which differences occur, more clearly, individuals, have a potential, virtuality to differentiate themselves both from themselves and from others. In this regard, singularity should be considered “as a point of arrival, not as a starting point” (Virno, 2004, pp. 40-41). Now, on reaching that point, I would like to analyze how these singularities are subjected.

According to Lazzarato, capitalism has two different but related tools for producing new subjectivities: (1) social subjection and (2) machinic enslavement. Social subjection functions at the molar level in the Deleuzian sense in which identities like student, mother, woman, worker gain their meanings. In this context, every identity tries to justify itself based on either a transcendent ground or an “outside”. According to Deleuze, this outside constitutes the other identities but also the molecular level because of the relation and flow between these levels’ identities are doomed to preserve themselves constantly.

At this level, the individual “works or communicates with another individuated subject by way of an object-machine, which functions as the ‘means’ or mediation of his actions or use. The ‘subject-object’ logic according to which social subjection functions is a ‘human, all too human’ logic” (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 26). Other individuals, as well as all objects, are external to each individual. But this logic is not enough either for capitalism to function or to explain the system. It has another dimension: machinic enslavement. But before going any further, I should discuss Lazzarato’s example, which is closely related to our subject, the television.

According to Lazzarato, television succeeds in “presenting statements that conform to the dominant reality of capitalism as though they were the statements of individuals, by constructing a machine that interprets their words and their expression; it also puts in place a machine of subjectification that operates by creating a double of the subject. It encourages you to speak as the subject of

enunciation (sujet d'énonciation), as though you were the cause and the origin of statements" (Lazzarato, 2006a, p. 2). In other words, while we are watching TV, both the people on the television and the people who are watching it are accepted and consequently function as subjects because of the same reason; as identities they exist at the molar level which is predominately shaped by the system in general and by the television in this example.

This function of television has close bonds with Commercial cinema and Art cinema. Just like television, Commercial cinema also primarily focuses on the statements and tries to shape identities with its mediation, but with a big difference. Commercial cinema uses statements to constitute an identification between the audiences and main characters and tries to shape audiences' understanding under this process. In a way, it tries to wipe out the differences between them for a short period of time. Art cinema, on the other hand, evaluates audiences as separate independent subjectivities and itself as an independent art object. In this cinema, the creator (author) seems to be stating his view independently from its object (movie) to another subjectivity. In this sense, it is fair to argue that the similarities between television and cinema are increasing.

In short, according to Lazzarato, this process constitutes one of the characteristics of television; by functioning as a transmitter as an object, it produces subjectivities. But Lazzarato indicates that it has another function, and he continues, "It (television) does not operate solely on the basis of a few ready-made statements, but also through the selection of a certain lexicon, a certain intonation, a certain speed of delivery, a certain type of behavior. It uses a certain rhythm, certain gestures, a certain mode of dress, a certain color scheme, a certain setting for your interview, a certain framing of the image, etc." (Lazzarato, 2006a, p. 2). In this context, ready-made statements correspond literally to the subjectivities. They are in a way the "call" from one subjectivity to another to become "real". But this call functions only with a relation with the patterns and rhythms of the element which do not have any reference to any subjects, more clearly, any identities, namely, subjectless subjectivities (Kennedy, 2002, p.46).

In this process, humans are not users or subjects of the television, they become one single body, a machine with the television which is open to becoming other machines to constitute other connections. This process, which is machinic

enslavement, functions at the molecular level. At this level, we are not separated as a subject, and actually, there is no “we” as people anymore; just connections or assemblages exist.

This characteristic form of existence forces us to think with the concept of multiplicity. In this context, not binary oppositions as subject and object, form and content, but fluidity becomes principal; patterns gain more power. This pre-individual, pre-social dimension does not constitute a totality, it is the power which is actualized through the connections. Therefore, “it has power: the power to set the creative process in motion” (Lazzarato, 2006a, p. 3). But Lazzarato continues, “it is machinic enslavement which endows capitalism with a sort of omnipotence since it permeates the roles, functions, and meanings by which individuals both recognize each other and are alienated from each other” (Lazzarato, 2006a, p. 4). Hence, it has two sides. It is an opportunity to struggle against capitalism but also constitutes the basis of and for capitalism.

In this understanding of subjectivity, the bonds with a subject are loosened. It is fair to argue that the struggle against capitalism in the Fordist period generally functions at the molar level where the identities, consequently the subjects of history, seem to be emerge as the class for instance. But drawing from the new progress in capitalism which we mentioned above, it seems as if this need to change, this struggle at both levels, needs to be produced with the understanding of the multitude.

To produce this struggle at both levels, it is necessary to find the relation between the molar and the molecular levels, between the actuality and the virtuality. Drawing from the studies of Lazzarato, I have tried to describe how these two levels, molar and molecular, virtuality and actuality, exist together through the function of television in practice.

Now I would like to establish the same connection between the molar and molecular level in a more ontological way, through the synthesis of time in the Deleuzian and Bergsonian sense, because in Deleuze’s view, the time or the duration has close bonds with cinema. Establishing this ontological basis will lead us to Deleuze’s understanding of cinema; cinema and the universe both function on the same basis: the image. Unsurprisingly, the synthesis of time gives the image its authentic

meaning. Therefore, the synthesis of time would constitute the main concepts of Deleuze concerning cinema, namely, movement-image and time-image.

We can start analyzing the synthesis of time from the outcomes of the interpretation of the Commercial cinema. As Commercial cinema forces us to do, we accept the traditional linear understanding of time which arises from two different but related assumptions: (1) every moment is equal with each other, and (2), the identity is a unity which does not change during the operation, or changes only with reference to the cause and effect relation, which is valid solely at the molar level. In other words, the basis for the linear understanding of time draws from the unity of identity and unity of time. These assumptions also lead us to other results such as the fact that we evaluate the past as the memory, and the image more clearly as the representation of the living present.

Drawing from the studies of Bergson, Deleuze and Lazaratto, I argue that these assumptions are missing, or I should say they are only valid at the molar level. According to Bergson and Deleuze, every further moment has other dimensions just like the identity has. These dimensions are reflections of the relation between the molar and molecular levels.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze analyzes time through three syntheses. Each of these syntheses is in relation to one another. In the first synthesis, the past and the future are the dimensions of the present. In other words, the present, more clearly the living present, determines the past and the future (Deleuze, 1994, pp. 72-94).

In this understanding of the living present, every moment defines and differentiates itself from the past and the future as their actuality. The difference of every moment gives itself the potential to create in general at the molar level which corresponds to production in general, which includes the production of the cinema, too. But this process flows over another one. It is possible at actuality because of its relationship with virtuality, in this context with the past and the future. Therefore, if we did not consider the singularity, the difference of each moment and its relationship with virtuality, we would lose the opportunity to evaluate each moment in a proper way. Here, the understanding of a singularity leads us to think about the multitude. In

this context, the singularity, and consequently the multitude, refers not only to solid human beings but predominately all and any differences that come to light.

The loss of opportunity to evaluate each moment is what is forced on us by the hegemonic ideology; dominating discourse tries to hide the virtuality and its connections with actuality, consequently the true meaning of the difference. As we saw while we were analyzing the Commercial Cinema, its primary tactic is to limit people and the system with unities such as identity. This tactic also manifests itself as reducing the differences to actuality or representations of the difference. In this context, the differences become just representations; a thing which is open solely to reactive forces, not active ones.

According to Deleuze and Bergson, in each moment, which seems to be equal at the molar level, two different things are happening mutually. Firstly, another level of the past is added to the pure difference by the living present and secondly, the multiplicity of pure differences, namely, the past is actualized. Hence, in this understanding, the past is not something that passed, or it is not the representation of the present, it is the difference from the living present as virtuality.

To understand the second synthesis of time, we should take the past as a starting point. From this perspective, the past seems to be a force that makes the living present possible; a force which is active because as a level of pure differences, the past sets the limit for the living present. Hence, it makes the present an actuality, a difference that is different from before. In other words, it is simply the force that differentiates the moments from the others that are now the past.

I tried to describe this reality about the past in our discussion about *Hiroshima My Love*. As the movie shows, the past is not limited to the representation. The living present constitutes the past in each moment. In this movie, we are not watching the subjective or the objective representation of the past, rather, we are called to be a part of the becoming of the living present and consequently of the past. In this context, both the living present and the past become part of the becoming process: a difference.

This inference about the relationship between the living present and the past, which sheds light on the connection of the molar and molecular levels, leads to the third and the last synthesis of time. In this last synthesis of time, I would like to give

priority to the future as a repetition in the Deleuzian sense; a repetition in which differences, namely, singularities are actualized. Different from the past, the future is the virtuality of repetition in an event. The event (Diken, 2013, p. 41) has the function of connecting the singularities, the differences. Here I am not talking about the repetition of the same as a representation in the molar level. I am talking about the difference in repetition, in actuality as well as virtuality. Consequently, it is the cut, the break that makes new assemblages that differentiate themselves from the living present at the molecular level just like the past. In this regard, the difference between the past and the future is canceled in the difference because in the difference, at that moment, both the past and the future are re-shaped or more clearly re-produced (Angelucci, 2014, p. 338).

I should mention that this is only one way to look at the synthesis of time in the Deleuzian sense. But I argue that this interpretation of the synthesis of time, firstly, will shed light on the relation between production and production of subjectivities and secondly, will lead us to a Deleuzian understanding of Cinema.

If we give priority to production, or the difference which is created at the molar level, we see the production of subjectivities (at both molar and molecular levels) just as a complement, as a necessity for production. The same flow can be seen in the process between the living present, the past and the future.

In this framework, the living present is the level of identity because it is at the molar level, while on the other hand, both the past and the future refer to the molecular level which is before the level of identity, where the assemblages of machines which are shaped with reference to the molar level occur. At both levels, production of subjectivities is actualized as seen above with the example of television. Therefore, it is important to remember that every actualization of the living present will create a new level of the pure past, and therefore, another source for the repetition, namely, the future, just as the production of subjectivities is shaped with reference to production in general. The first synthesis of time leads to the second and third syntheses just as the identities at the molar level lead to the production of difference, consequently production at the molecular level.

However, as we have seen before, the molecular level should be regarded as the level that differentiates the living present from itself. From this perspective, the pure

past sets the limit for the living present and the future represents the difference in repetition as production, the difference in general. Repetition in the future “can be seen as necessary within the first two syntheses as that which is distinctive and singular in each living present and in the passing of a present into the pure past” (Williams, 2011, p. 14). In other words, in the first two syntheses, we approach the present and the future as singularities, as differences which cannot be defined by identities or their negations because each defines itself with repetition which functions at the basis of an event, an event that is also at the level of virtuality. According to Deleuze, difference, namely, the source of every difference, every creation, always manifests itself in repetition. In this understanding, the living present becomes dependent on the future, namely, virtuality and consequently, the production of subjectivities which carries production in general.

As a conclusion, I argue that production in general and its assumptions, such as identity, class and linear time, are only valid because of their relationship with the molecular level. This relationship can be seen through the synthesis of time. So, in a way, production in the general sense also depends on the molecular level and the activity at this level, a molecular level which is a part of the production of subjectivities. Consequently, the concept of production needs to be extended to the molecular level to understand the Post-Fordist Era in which the difference between production in general and production of subjectivities seems to be disappearing.

This leads us to the question of how we can be sure that the struggle against capitalism will not result in the re-establishment process of capitalism. I argue that the production of the struggle, the production of the new revolutionary subjectivities should be tied in with the future constantly, in other words, it should be actualized in an “event”. Hence, at every moment, it will be a new “event” in relation to the production of subjectivities.

I consider the “event” as a happening that opens the social’s actuality to its virtuality. But it is important to remember that it is the subjectivities bond that differentiates the “event” from other happenings in the capitalist system. Hence the “event” is the difference because it also functions just like capitalism at both levels. The event and subjectivities produce themselves and the other mutually. Hence with the actualization of an event, the production of alternative history, the social and

consequently the subjectivities become possible and constant, because in every moment at the molar level the event as the difference differentiates itself from itself.

As an example, in the same period as the *Third Cinema* movement, the Cuban revolution can be evaluated as the result of an event: an attack on the Moncada Barracks. On 26 July 1953, Castro and his organization tried to take over the Moncada Barracks but did not succeed. This failed attempt gave the organization its name: the 26th of July Movement, and years later, the same movement took over the government. As an “event”, this failed attempt did not change much in the actuality, but people’s commitment and bond with it created the possibility of new values, new categories to reference while evaluating the acceptances at the molar level. In other words, the “event” makes it possible to reject the given totalities, the given judgments at the molar level for the subjectivities, because it constitutes another place and time for the subjectivities to be actualized in a different way. It is a way to produce new machines at the molecular level with reference firstly to itself, its own virtuality. Therefore, the commitment’s first duty is to resist reducing an event to solely an actuality, to a happening in history.

This reduction corresponds to being under the influence of reactive forces in actuality, in other words, its only reference is to the given judgments. This attitude corresponds to the view from the outside of the event. On the contrary, acting and actually being inside the event, which means evaluating its virtuality in connection with it, is the necessary condition to preserve an event as an event. In this context, Paola Virno’s judgment about the singularity gains another meaning; it should be considered “as a point of arrival, not as a starting point” (Virno, 2004, p. 76). In any event, the differences between the subjectivities and the event seem to be transforming only to a singularity, a difference. But if we try to evaluate the event as a happening outside the subjectivities it becomes solely an actuality. In other words, a revolution is actually an event in history, for sure. On the other hand, it is an opportunity to re-evaluate the categories of history itself. Therefore, it cannot be limited to a representation. It cannot be a part of history. The commitment to an event means a commitment to its difference, to its singularity. This means that it cannot be reduced to the problems of the given history, but rather, it creates new problems, potentials and categories.

Although the relationship between the event and the subjectivities seems to be a dialectic one, this evaluation is totally mistaken because this relation cannot end with totality, with a synthesis, with a concept that would correspond to the process. Rather, it implies endless connections at the molecular level which result in machines in the Deleuzian sense. Reducing an event to a totality means evaluating an event only at the molar level where the totalities, representations, and identities are actualized.

Therefore, the subjectivities within the event do not fit the concept of people which is used to express what governments represent. The concept of people came to light with the production of states at the molar level in history and it dialectically constitutes the consubstantiality for the state.

In this context, “The people are the collective; the multitude is concealed by the presumed impotence, as well as by the immoderate uneasiness, of single individuals” (Virno, 2004, p.24). This duality between the people and the multitude is valid only at the molecular level. I argue that production at the molecular level wipes out this duality and implies the multitude as a valid concept for the discussion of the production of subjectivities. In other words, the Post-Fordist era, which is dominated by machinic enslavement and activity at the molecular level as the production of subjectivities, offers multitude as a valid concept to discuss both capitalism and the struggle against it, because also in the actual basis, as Paolo Virno stated, multitude is “hybrid, fluid, mutant ... just like immaterial workers of the postmodern world, and yet, in mysterious ways, it is supposed to encompass the world poor which replaced the working-class at the bottom of the ladder” (Virno, 2004, p. 14).

Now, in the next section, I would like to explain the meaning of concepts such as difference and multitude in the Deleuzian understanding of the universe, namely, the ontology of Deleuzian philosophy. I will try to answer this question while describing the Deleuzian understanding of Cinema because, as it will be observed, they are closely related to each other.

CHAPTER 4

CINEMA AS PRODUCTION OF IMAGES

In his studies about Cinema, Deleuze did not aim to constitute a theory of cinema; rather, his main aim was to classify and label the images that are produced with the Cinema. Of course, Deleuze labeled the images with the concepts which he created by drawing from his previous studies such as *Difference and Repetition* (1994) and *Bergsonism* (1990). Nonetheless, these concepts should not be evaluated as elements of a complete theory in which concepts correspond to specific kinds of images. In this kind of understanding, concepts would be just the representations of the images and without a doubt, this is what Deleuze rejects strongly in his philosophy.

Deleuze's studies, in general, should be regarded as a toolbox that will help people think, think with, that is to say, to create. In his monographs which analyze philosophers such as Spinoza, Nietzsche and Hume, Deleuze thinks with these philosophers and their concepts and this journey ends up with new concepts such as transcendental empiricism, repetition, etc. Deleuze argues the same thing, namely, that thinking is actualized with paintings, cinema and literature, too. In this framework, he tries to do the same thing in his studies about cinema (Martin-Jones, D. 2011a, p.10).

At this point, we should remember that in Deleuze's philosophy, image indicates everything: every creation, every tool and every part of the ontological basis. In other words, in this universe, which Deleuze shaped through his studies of Bergson, if we are talking, speculating or creating, we are inescapably always either creating images or making new connections with the images, which results also in images; a chair is an image as well as the brain or a concept, for instance.

This ontological basis of Deleuze's philosophy places cinema in a relatively different position; cinema, as an activity which "takes a number of images and connects them to form a sequence, and it cuts and connects sequences using the inhuman eye of the camera, which can, therefore, create a number of competing viewpoints or angles" (Colebrook, 2002, p. 31), arises not as a name of an art but in a way as a name of the world, in other words, a name of the universe (Ranciere, 2016, p. 109). Ranciere summarizes Deleuze's understanding of cinema as follows,

The image needs not to be constituted at all. It exists in itself. It is not a mental representation, but matter-light in movement. Consequently, the face looking at images and brain conceiving them are dark screens that interrupt the movement in every direction of the images. The matter is the eye, the image is the light, light is consciousness (Ranciere, 2016, p. 109).

In other words, images that actualize the differences are not representations but matter-lights in movement and the interruption, namely, dark screens enables the production of new images, namely, assemblages and therefore, subjectivities. According to both Deleuze and Bergson, the existence of dark screens results in the acceleration of the reaction time between the images, and this delayed process signifies the level of the development of the living being, the organism, and therefore, subjectivity.

Nonetheless, these images do not have to be and usually cannot be a result of a subjective viewpoint in cinema. It would be a mistake to presume a mutuality between the subjectivity produced through the cinema, the subjective shots in cinema and the cinema as a subjectivity. Rather, we should evaluate this process of the becoming subjectivities as a flow between images, whether inside the movies or outside them. On this basis, defining cinema as the name of the universe gains its actual meaning and leads us to the production of subjectivities.

Hence, “what makes cinema cinematic is this liberation of the sequencing of images from any single observer, so the ‘affect’ of cinema is the presentation of an ‘any point whatever’ ” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 31). In other words, cinema has the power to function at the molecular level but always with the usage of subjective shots, and therefore, with reference to the molar level. From another perspective, we can argue that cinema associates the flow of the images with wholeness, which consists of the virtual as well as the actual. It is unquestionable that cinema generally uses everyday images, but it distracts us from the everyday meanings of them and reveals their connections with their virtuality. Briefly, it has the power to create a difference in repetition in the Deleuzian sense. These images create new subjectivities both in themselves, namely, in every different movie and also with the connection to the audiences.

Deleuze creates two different concepts to differentiate and think with the images: “movement-images” and “time-images”. Therefore, these images require an examination of their creation. As mentioned before, Deleuze suggests that cinema

is thinking with images which corresponds to creating movement and time images in this context.

4.1 Movement-Image and Time-Image

According to Deleuze, movement-image is the mediated image of time. It is “a tendency which imperceptibly came to be acted out [passait à l’acte] by the mobilization of the camera in space, or by montage in time of mobile or simply fixed shots” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 25). In other words, in this image, time is mediated because these images transmit time solely through the movements; movements of the objects and the subjects (Colman, 2009, p. 166); objects which are actualized and function in the linear understanding of time and subjects who behave on this basis but also inside the universe of causality. At this point, montage plays an important part in understanding the movement image. In other words, in these images, we as audiences witness, experience and understand time through the movements in general which correspond to the first synthesis of time in Bergson’s philosophy.

In this first synthesis of time, consequently in the movement-image, the cause and effect relationship is never discussed or in other words, it is accepted as a postulate. It is the only way things (objects and subjects) in general relate to each other. The characters in these movies, for instance, act and feel only if they are exposed to an object or an act of another character. Their reaction, not their action in the sense of creation, not their attendance, constitutes the basis of the characters. Mutually, audiences are also accepted as receivers, as interpreters who are forced to be identified with these solid identities, as we have seen while analyzing Commercial cinema. For this very reason, in this kind of image it would be hard to talk about events in the Deleuzian sense.

Yet it is important to remember that in Deleuzian understanding, time, in general, should be regarded as “the power of difference or becoming whereby we move from the virtual to the actual, from all the possible creations and tendencies to actualized events” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 33). In other words, as we have seen in the previous sections, the first synthesis of time leads to the second and third syntheses of time (Bergson, 1991, p. 161-163), just as the movement-image leads to the time-image.

Firstly, I would like to mention that “the time-image has nothing to do with a flashback, or even with a recollection” (Deleuze, 2001, p. XII). In other words, it does not only change the order or the happenings in a linear understanding of time. In general, it is the immediate image of time. Deleuze suggests that time-image “changes the unchanging form in which the change is produced” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 17). Different from the movement-images, in the usage of time-images there are no constant cause and effect relationships or identities that establish and maintain unity and the unchanging form with itself anymore. On the contrary, it should be understood as an attempt to change, or more clearly, to cancel that form. Consequently, a time-image that is put on public display establishes the connection between the current, the present with its virtuality, namely, with the pure past and future. In this establishment it also re-creates the form at the molar level. Every image establishes new stories, new history and a new future with itself, as seen above with the example of *Hiroshima My Love*. Image as time differentiates itself from itself as well as from the other. As Deleuze suggests “it constitutes a whole cinema of time, with a new conception and new forms of montage (Welles, Resnais)” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 22).

From another perspective, as Bergson stated, time in this understanding “is the form taken by the succession of our inner states of consciousness when our self lets itself live when it abstains from establishing a separation between the present state and anterior states” (Bergson, 2001, p. 100). This fact leads us to the position of the characters in these images. The characters in these kinds of images are not captured like an identity; on the contrary, the characters became open both to their virtuality and to the whole. On this basis, the whole implies the “event” in which new assemblages can occur. Therefore, the relation between the movement-image and time-image re-establishes itself. Now, it would be hard to differentiate the subject from the object. In Deleuze’s words, at this level, “the world has become a memory, brain, superimposition of ages or lobes, but the brain itself has become consciousness, continuation of ages, creation or growth of ever new lobes, re-creation of matter as with styrene” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 125).

As Deleuze mentions, “movement has two facets, as inseparable as the inside and the outside, as the two sides of a coin: it is the relationship between parts and it is the state [affection] of the whole” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 19). I argue that here,

movement characterizes the main function of time. On the one hand, it is linear and on the other, as mentioned above, it is a force that forms the whole. Moreover, Deleuze continues, “the shot is movement considered from this dual point of view: the translation of the parts of a set which spreads out in space, the change of a whole which is transformed in duration” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 20). This argument sheds light on the relation between the main element of the movie, the shot, and movement-image and time-image. The shot is a movement-image in itself, it is part of the set, the space, it functions at the molar level as a moment of linear time but it also has the function to determine the whole as a moment that re-forms the past and the future. On this basis, it should be considered as time-image.

According to Deleuze, time-image came to light at the end of the Second World War (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 4-7) because directors felt the need to reach the virtuality of events in history. After the pre-war period, directors could not establish the meaning based on linear time. They needed the connection between the actual and the virtual in order to redefine the characters and events, and they established this creation of “time-images”.

As Ranciere suggested, this inference gives the impression that Deleuze’s studies about cinema are an attempt to “harmonize art history and general history since, strictly speaking, for Deleuze there is no such thing as art history or general history: all history is ‘natural history’ ” (Ranciere, 2016, p. 108). In this regard, Ranciere defines Deleuze’s studies as an “attempt at the classification of signs” in the manner of natural history (Ranciere, 2016, p. 108). This fact leads us to two questions: (1) What is a sign? and (2) What is natural history?

Deleuze defines signs by referring to Bergson in *Cinema II* as follows: “signs themselves are the features of expression that compose and combine these images, and constantly re-create them, borne or carted along by matter in movement” (Ranciere, 2016, p. 108). On this basis, Deleuze suggests that he simply tries to classify the signs of cinema “in the manner of natural history” (Ranciere, 2016, p. 108). Therefore, it is fair to argue that natural history is absolutely ontological which is open to change in every moment.

In other words, Deleuze succeeds in two different and related things in his cinema books. Firstly, he treats cinematic images as events and assemblages. He tries to

produce bonds and think with these events. Along with this, he also tries to classify them as signs with some concepts. This attitude leads him to his second achievement: canceling the difference between the elements of a theory and natural history. He “presents his natural history of images in movement as the history of a certain number of individualized operations and combinations attributable to filmmakers, schools, epochs” (Ranciere, 2016, p. 110). Deleuze did not harmonize the movies or the images with events of history; on the contrary, by connecting his concepts, in this case the time-image, with a happening in history, World War II, he creates new assemblages, moreover an event, therefore a call to think on the ontological basis we summarized above. On this basis, he treats the same images of movies both as movement images and time images. In every treatment, another assemblage, therefore, another present, past and future are produced.

Similarly, The *Third Cinema* directors’ point to the fact that history can and does change in every moment. They suggest that changing the current situation is closely and inescapably connected with changing the past and the future. In this context, I argue that a Dziga Vertov movie from Soviet Cinema, *The Man with a Movie Camera*, is a precursor of the *Third Cinema* because of its similar structure and aims to those of the *Third Cinema* movie makers.

Unlike Solanas and Getino, Vertov made his movies with the support of the current government. Vertov’s aims in the movie and the politics of the government were relatively coherent with each other at that time. Consequently, it seems to be hard to define *The Man with a Movie Camera* as an example of the *Third Cinema* movement. Simply, he was not acting against the system in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the conditions have changed, and we are still experiencing this movie. Therefore, the meaning and the “affect” of this movie have also changed. Moreover, defining a movie with reference to the time and social environment in which it had been made would mean interpreting it solely with reference to its conditions and its actuality in the Deleuzian sense. On the contrary, with the acceptance of its virtual dimension, I would like to shed light on its effects today and to show what these “affects” mean in the perspective I have tried to create above. Concretely speaking, I would like to imply how *The Man with a Movie Camera* functions in the Post-Fordist period of capitalism in which production of subjectivities became one of the most important parts of this order.

4.2 The Man with a Movie Camera²

Just like the *Third Cinema* movie makers, the Soviet director Dziga Vertov also tried to produce new revolutionary subjectivities with the “affects” in his movies as a part of the struggle against capitalism. But this fact is not enough to define Vertov as a *Third Cinema* movie maker. All Soviet directors such as Pudovkin, Dovzhenko, and Eisenstein were in pursuit of the same goal. Along with their aim, their understating of cinema and their theoretical understanding also have some similarities.

According to Deleuze (1997, pp. 37-38), “If we can speak of a Soviet school of montage, it is not because its directors are similar but because within the dialectical conception which they share they, in fact, differ, each having an affinity with one or other of the laws which his inspiration recreates”. In other words, Deleuze argues that Soviet directors created different but related cinemas drawing from the same concept of dialectic. They are related because they assimilate the same concept of dialectic, and different because they adopt different laws of this dialectic to their cinema by the usage of montage. Consequently, both the difference and commonalities of their cinemas can clearly be seen in their usage of montage. Even so, it is possible to differentiate the understanding of Vertov from that of the other directors.

Except for Vertov, all Soviet directors’ adaptations of dialectic laws are based on the audience’s consciousness. They accepted audiences as consciousness, namely, as identities in the Deleuzian sense. Consequently, all three directors who we mentioned above used the montage as an exterior tool. According to them, this tool has this function because consciousness is also based on the rules of dialectic. The term Eisenstein uses for nature, “the nonindifferent” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 39) gives us a clue about this kind of understanding. But this understanding also limits them because it leads to the usage of movement images strictly; their constant reference to the consciousness means reference to perception on the level of rationality. For

² Part of this section had been published as “Dziga Vertov: Sovyet Ekölü, Diyalektik ve Sine-Göz in Rabarba Şenlik Aylık Sinema Dergisi, Temmuz-Ağustos 2019, Sayı 17, pp.12-15 and other analyzes of Dziga Vertov’s Cinema and its relation to the cinema of Sergey Eisenstein had been analyzed in the article called “Eisenstein Sineması’nda Kurgu ve Düşünce” in *Müdahil Dergi*, Kasım-Aralık 2015, Sayı:1, pp.54-60

this very reason, the *Third Cinema* movie makers suggest that Eisenstein makes examples of the First Cinema.

On the other hand, Vertov seems to give all his attention to the relation and interval between the dialectic of matter and consciousness. Distinct from Eisenstein and the other directors mentioned above, Vertov gives his attention to the interval between different movements (dialectic movements in the matter and in the mind), and to the transformation among them. He does not accept the dialectic movement as a whole, which contains both the matter and the mind. Instead, he establishes two different dialectic movements and analyzes the difference and relation between them. Vertov places the eye of the camera between these two systems of dialectics. The camera and then the montage fill the interval between these two different dialectic systems (Deleuze, 1997, pp. 39-40). Analyzing Vertov's most important movie, *The Man with the Movie Camera*, will give us the opportunity to clarify our claims about his cinema and his usage of montage.

The Man with the Movie Camera starts and ends with shots of a cinema theatre. In the beginning, we see the empty theatre and witness its preparation. Then we see how the movie that will be screened in this movie theatre is made. During this part, we witness how the movie is shot and montaged. Finally, at the end of the movie, we see the full theatre, the people who are waiting for the screening of the movie, the preparation of which we have just watched. So, in a way, this movie seems to have a self-consciousness mode. But I argue there is another purpose behind this structure of the movie. To justify this argument, I need to analyze the main part of the movie.

After the opening scene of this movie, we see still shots of a city that contains no movement; we see a city sleeping, empty streets, machines which are not working, etc. Then we see a car going along a street which stops in front a building. Then a man with a movie camera gets in the car. As the camera goes through the city, the city starts to wake up and so do the people. We see streets filling with people, birds flying, the wind blowing. These shots are followed by a shot of a woman waking up, getting out of bed and preparing for the day. Her preparation corresponds with the preparation of the streets (through a shot which shows the streets being cleaned with a cleaning machine). Finally, we see the preparation of the movie camera (changing the lens) which is followed by shots of a worker who is also waking up.

All the factories, the camera, and the people start to work. The function of these shots seems to be to bring “people into closer kinship with machines” (Vertov, 1984, p. 8) by showing how they act in relation to each other. We see both the poetry in the movements of machines and the mechanical mode in people’s acts. We see the machines, the matter and the people, we feel them, we experience our connection to them through the camera and montage, but always with the consciousness of the different movements of people and machines (matter in general) which correspond to different dialectic systems.

In a mine, we see how a man, a horse and the carriage function on the same rails in unity. In this usage of montage, Vertov seems to show that the new man has the “precise movements of machines.” (Vertov, 1984, p. 8) We once again see the camera recording the people walking in the streets, and the machines working in the factory. Then we see the rhythmic montage of machines and people in a way that demonstrates how the two correspond to each other. In the movie, in general, we see both the clues to their different dialectic systems (interval) and the establishment of the relationship between these systems. The montage itself has two functions. (Acar, 2015, pp. 59-60) First, it shows the distinct dialectics of matter and human beings separately. Secondly, it establishes the relationship between these two distinct dialectics. And I argue that the best way to do this is to reveal the position of the cameras and montages to the audiences just like Vertov did in the beginning and final scenes of the movie.

The purpose of the beginning and final scenes of this movie is not to show the audience the cinema apparatus but to show the position of cinema and montage. As Deleuze argues, in Vertov’s view “the dialectic should break with Nature which was still too organic and with a man still too readily pathetic. The result in his work (Vertov) was that the whole merges with the infinite set of matter, and the interval merges with an eye in the matter” (Deleuze, 1997, p. 40). Vertov rejects the understandings of the dialectic movement as a whole which contains the movement of consciousness and matter (reality). But he sees two distinct but related dialectics: the dialectic of consciousness and the dialectic of matter. On this basis, he tries to put these different movements together with the usage of camera and montage. This understanding gives us the opportunity to comprehend what he was trying to express by saying that “intervals (the transitions from one movement to another)

are the material, the element of the art of the movement (cinema), and by no means movements themselves” (Vertov, 1984, p. 8). The intervals are the areas of the montage (Lazzarato, 2017, p. 229).

On this basis, I argue that Vertov uses montage and cinema in general to create “events” in which both the consciousness, and therefore, the audience and nature which contains the past and the future can change. He accepts their different positions and by doing so he gives importance to the molar level which constitutes their difference in unity. Yet by posting his movie to the space between them, he also reaches the virtuality, the molecular level. As Stephen Crofts and Olivia Rose mention, this movie “perhaps more than any other film ever made, refuses any empiricist construction of the given phenomenal reality” (Crofts and Rose, 1977, p. 16). It does not limit itself to the phenomenal, given or actual reality; on the contrary, it just uses them to reach the virtuality. In this context, *The Man with a Movie Camera* becomes both subjectivity in itself and an event. In other words, he reveals the ontological basis which can be changed in a moment. That moment has an order, not with reference to linear time; on the contrary, the order of time is shaped “according to the coexistence of its own relations” (Deleuze, 2001, p. 207). This interpretation signifies the fact that Vertov was a pioneer and that he predicted the development of the Fordist period to the Post-Fordist one.

My next example of the *Third Cinema* movement was constituted during another socialist struggle in history: *The Battle of Chile*.

4.3 The Battle of Chile

The Battle of Chile (*La batalla de Chile*, Patricio Guzman, 1975-1979) which is composed of three different sections, was shot during the period of the Allende government and the 1973 Chilean coup d'état, then years later edited in Havana under the protection of the Cuban government.

According to the director of the movie, Patricio Guzman, their main aim at the beginning of making this movie was to document the current situation and reveal the course of the socialist movement in Chile. They suggested that as an important example of the socialist movement, the Allende government and the struggles

around it would provide an important experience for all the opposition in the world. As Guzman stated, “the same ideological battle ... going on in Chile could occur in France or Italy, for example, in a very similar way” (Burton, 1986, p. 60).

They were aware that “the existing situation could not sustain itself for long” and “the most important thing to do in Chile at that particular moment was to make a film about what was going on in the country day to day” (Burton, 1986, p. 60). They supposed that there were three different alternatives for Chile at that time: “a fascist coup d’état like the one that actually occurred, or a civil war that offered two alternatives- the victory or the defeat of the popular forces” (Burton, 1986, p. 60). Especially, the discussion of the socialist groups ironically implies two different things: the fact that history can go different ways and that for that very reason, history was actualized with the success of the coup. In other words, because of the lack of acts and endless discussions of social groups, the future was actualized in the way that we know, and consequently, the movie, too.

In this regard, I argue that the coup changed the structure of the movie and the film makers’ choice to explain the reason for the course of events in a mediated way. Both the existence of the narrator and what he says indicate this decision. The narrator’s function is to analyze and show the real meaning of the events due to the creators of the movie. Therefore, it predominantly depends on the cause and effect relationship; it limits images in the movie and outside it. In this sense, it would be fair to argue that it gives the audience the impression that they are limited to their actuality.

In a way, the moviemakers started the movie by accepting the period in which they are living as an event in the Deleuzian sense and they produced a bond with it. Yet the results lead them to a didactic attitude.

In each section, images that had been shot in the same period were used in different contexts to analyze different sides of the current situation. Voice-over always prevents the images from being extended to their virtuality; rather, it seems to be guaranteed that the images will be actualized due to the rationality of the historical story. In the first section (*The Insurrection of the Bourgeoisie*), Guzman analyzes the acts of the bourgeoisie against the Allende government. “The primary contradiction in the first film is thus between fascism/imperialism/bourgeoisie on

the one hand and the working masses on the other” (Burton, 1986, p. 50). The second section (*The Coup d'état*) simply discusses the strategies of different socialist movements and groups against this revolt. And finally, the last section can be evaluated as a tribute to the Allende government.

Images gain and transmit different “affects” due to the story that has been told. In this regard, time is only revealed through the historical stories that have been told. Yet knowing the fact that the origin of the images is from the same period leads the audience to realize the difference between the story (one possible actualization of the image) and the images themselves (the virtualities). One irrefutable usage of image arises from this crack.

In the last scene of the first section, we see soldiers shooting towards the camera and after that the image. The case at this point is the direct attack of the soldiers on the cameramen, on the movie makers, in other words on the movement-image in itself; we as audiences are forced to go beyond the causality of the story. In this manner, this attack implies the death of the voice-over, the narration which sets the limits. Consequently, this scene should be considered not as an act within the movie; rather, this act leads the understanding of an event. Both the movie and the people who were making the movie were shaped inside it; mutually, they were also producing it.

On the other hand, this virtuality becomes an actuality with the beginning of the second section. In this sequence, we watch the same scene from another perspective. This time, we as audiences are put in the location of the witness. Consequently, we can suggest that the event is confined once again. Now, we are in a position to analyze the event. Yet by experiencing the same happening from other perspectives, the gap between two different understandings arises. I argue that from that gap, a new assemblage is produced with the audiences irreversibly.

In short, this documentary, which has the aim of documenting the outgrowth of the Allende government at the beginning, results in explaining the coup. In other words, it begins by bonding with an event but later evolves into analyzing it. In this sense, it shows another way to actualize it through its own mediation. In other words, this shows how the same images function as “movement-images” as well as “time-images”.

If we evaluate the sections of the movie separately, it will be fair to conclude that this movie uses only “movement-images” and consequently has nothing to do with the virtuality of the people and capitalism. But when we evaluate them together, we see that the same images gain different meanings in different contexts, and therefore, the virtuality behind them. These images have other potentials that are and can be used in the future. So, it is fair to conclude that these images are also “time-images” and when we evaluate this movie as a whole, we see how they influence the virtualities of the people. This interpretation is coherent with the aims of the moviemakers that we can still learn from, and with this movie in the Deleuzian sense by repeating the events as it does again and again in different sections.

4.4 The Hour of Furnaces

The Hour of Furnaces (*La hora de los hornos*, Octavio Getino, Fernando E. Solanas, 1968) is considered as the first official example of the *Third Cinema* movement. This 260-minute-long movie aims to present three different but related stories: (1) it follows the colonial history of South America in general and Argentina distinctively, (2) tells the story of resistance against it and (3) tries to construct another one.

As mentioned before, this movie constitutes the basis of the *Third Cinema* movement, and the theory of Solanas and Getino is a direct result of their experiences that they gained during the shooting of *The Hour of Furnaces* (Erus, 2015, p.145). At first glance, this documentary seems to give some direct statements throughout the story that is told. In this context, Zeynep Çetin Erus mentions that this movie can be evaluated as a book-movie because “it contains elements as chapters, sub-chapters, information to think deeply and didactic forms” (Erus, 2015, p.151). Along with that, it is important to note that this form is not solid. This argument is coherent with the fact that Solanas and Getino use this form according to the political situation in Argentina in that era. They underline the fact that although the aim of producing revolutionary subjectivities stands still, the form of the movie can change due to the conditions of the screening of the movie. What I mean is, this thesis is limited to the first screening of the movie and there are several scenes in the movie to support Erus’s argument. The didactic approach of the movie

seems to shape the main structure of the movie. I would like to mention three scenes that characterize this argument.

There is the scene in which the image of workers is cut with the images of animals in the slaughterhouse. We come to the conclusion directly, as we do while watching Eisenstein's movie, *Strike* (1925): workers are like animals. If they are useful, they can live, if not, they can be killed. But for whom? Other images which were added to this scene provide the answer. Through the images of people from a commercial, the consumer, the user, exploiter and the exploited is declared.

In another scene, we see the bourgeoisie playing golf along with historical images of colonization; although they represent themselves in different forms, the continuity of the colonization based on the existence of the colonist is underlined. As a matter of fact, for both directors of the movie, Solanas and Getino, the oligarchy of the Argentina government's dream is to preserve the current situation in the country as it is. The directors indicate this fact with scenes in which the oligarchs' graveyards are shown. The oligarchy in history seems to be demanding to live eternally; the statues in the graveyards became a symbol of this will.

In this sense they become the main enemies of time and time-image. Coherent with this fact, these images should be considered as movement-images. They seem to be justifications of the statements about the situation in Argentina.

On the other hand, the moviemakers seem to be aware of the potentials of any image. They also use some images from other movies to support their arguments. The inclusion of scenes from *El cielo, la tierra de* (Joris Ivens, 1966) is to indicate the difference between the struggle in Vietnam against colonialism and the one in Argentina.

According to Getino and Solanas, different from the people in Argentina, the Vietnamese are fighting against an apparent enemy. As the narrator in the movie states, they can see their enemy when they raise their heads. The same consciousness of the enemy is much harder for the Argentinean. In Argentina, "the enemy is talking the same language, from the same race and color. It is hard to differentiate them" (*The Hour of Furnaces*, 1968). In this manner, we again witness a contradiction which is structured on the basis of consubstantiality; therefore, we

can say that we are still at the molar level. This implication exposes the whole purpose of the movie: to show the hidden enemy, the new colonialism.

Yet this fact changes with the beginning of the second movie; the text on the screen calls the audiences to argue about the declarations and images which are shown in the first movie. This act makes it impossible to define this movie as a story or as a representation anymore. On the contrary, it seems as if the movie itself is trying to become an “event” in itself.

By extending itself to the moment, both the movie and the audience become part of the story. So, the story becomes unfinished, open to the future and the past namely virtuality. Therefore, it would be hard to talk about an audience in a traditional sense anymore; they are not witnesses or traitors as declared by Solanas and Getino with reference to Franz Fanon, they have become the actors of the movie and of history at the same moment.

The audience who come to the screening with a solid identity as a worker or student is now forced to produce new subjectivities with the movie. To do that they need to reach their virtuality, the virtuality which is partly actualized as their story in the first part.

Audiences who are forced to meet and acknowledge their actuality are now forced to become something else. On this basis, the movement-images in the first part can be considered as time-images, too. The implication is simple and clear: transformation should begin and has already begun with this meeting.

The movie itself makes its suggestions about the current situation in the first part, not as an object but as a subject, but now it is the audience’s turn. The discussion will lead to new assemblages and subjectivities.

Thus, the movie cannot be accepted solely as a critic which functions at the molar level. The meeting with the movie becomes a meeting, an assemblage, a war machine in itself. People who have experienced different “affects” coincide with different peoples’ “affects”. Moreover, affects and images themselves coincide with each other and constitute a basis; people or identities are not the concern anymore. The movie itself has become an opportunity, catalyzer, virtuality in the Deleuzian

sense which opens to the future and re-evaluates the past. The conditions of liberation from the machinic enslavement are provided.

In a way, this movie becomes an idea in the Deleuzian sense. It becomes a problem that leads to other answers, in other words, to other creations. This movie is not, it will not, be complete on a regular basis. This fact sheds light on the moviemakers' suggestion; additional scenes should be shot, and the movie should be re-edited due to the location and time in which movie will be screened.

This suggestion should not be evaluated with the understanding of representation. The moviemakers do not encourage people to make another, different or more intense representation. On the contrary, they want them to become a part of the event which can only survive with their contribution, in other words, by becoming something else in every actualization. I argue that this outcome is coherent with the intentions of Solanas and Getino concerning the screening. As Buchsbaum mentions, "the film itself announces several breaks in the projection, allowing for discussion among the spectators. The 'act' of screening presupposed the presence of 'relators' prepared to stop the film" (Buchsbaum, 2001, p. 156). Solanas and Getino not only suggest but also force the audience to participate in a discussion, but as themselves not as spectators. On the one hand, this can be regarded as a result of the political oppression during that period in Argentina; it seems that they had no choice but to screen *The Hour of Furnaces* in relatively private places for 5 years (Erus, 2015, p. 147). On the other hand, this was also coherent with their suggestions that they mentioned in their manifesto (Getino and Solanas, 1994, p. 53-55). Perhaps they noticed the value and "affect" of this screening method through their forced experience. In any case, as a result, they suggest screening the movie in workplaces, cafes or houses, in short, in places where people experience as themselves, as identities that embrace their daily life. They do not want to disregard them; on the contrary, they want to change them and to achieve the idea that they firstly accept them as they exist. From another perspective, it would be fair to argue that audiences' identities at the molar level should be an inevitable point to start the change in the Deleuzian sense. Only after that would it be possible to reach the connections, moreover, to create new connections, new assemblages at the molecular level. In this case, Solanas and Getino choose to establish the connections essentially between the identities. Therefore, they evaluate their movie

as a pretext, but it is important to remember that this pretext never vanishes, only changes during the screening. In this sense, this movie should be considered both like the dark screens in which images present themselves (the screening) and like an image that has relations with other images.

It is open to the future in itself and secondly, by this never-ending structure it cancels all the final actualizations, and therefore, the past. The machine which is produced in the relation between the movie and the people becomes another machine which functions at the level of multitudes. It would be wrong to talk about people or movies anymore; singularities as images constitute the space now. In this regard, I argue that this movie indicates the ontological basis of Deleuze's universe and just like Deleuze's studies, it functions as a toolbox that functions as a call to re-create, to repeat in difference.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have tried to indicate the fact that the *Third Cinema* movement and the arguments that are shaped by the creators of this movement are still valid and will be valid as long as capitalism keeps on determining the world that we live in. To point out this fact, I have tried to apply a Deleuzian approach to the *Third Cinema* movement. More clearly, I have aimed to repeat the suggestions of Getino and Solanas in the Post-Fordist era. In this sense, this thesis is a search for a difference in repetition.

Following that, I have chosen not to analyze and discuss the concepts of the *Third Cinema* movement, such as ideology, neo-colonialism or the concepts of Deleuzian philosophy, such as time, event or difference separately. On the contrary, I have chosen to show that they are coherent with each other in practice, more clearly, within my arguments and suggestions concerning the Post-Fordist period of capitalism and cinema.

In the first section I interpret the manifesto of the *Third Cinema* movement, drawing mainly from the studies of Deleuze and Lazzarato. This interpretation provides us with the necessary perspective to rethink this movement and to understand the fact that although their arguments are shaped with direct references to Marx and Fanon, they can be expounded in a new way.

As seen above, the *Third Cinema* movement produced pieces both in theory and in practice; in writing and in movies. In this section, my focus is mainly on their theoretical studies because the aims and arguments of this movement are clear and concrete in this form. I have tried to reveal that the categories of cinema as (1) Commercial cinema, (2) Art cinema and (3) Revolutionary cinema are still valuable and valid to evaluate the political “affects” of contemporary movies. Movies can be function as a supporter or a creator of the hegemonic discourse (commercial cinema), can seemingly stretch or challenge these ideological assumptions as a part of identity politics (Art cinema) or can be an attempt to create alternative subjectivities (Revolutionary cinema). In any case, as a part of the current system they will be functioning in two different levels of the social: the molar and molecular.

This new way of understanding the *Third Cinema* movement, which was demonstrated in the first section, inevitably leads to interpreting the current situation of capitalism: The Post-Fordist era. Undoubtedly, Getino and Solanas evaluate capitalism as a system of domination and ideology, which is considered by them as a crucial part of this system.

These suggestions are still valid. Even so, I argue that this analysis does not reveal the current situation in the strictest sense anymore just as their categories of cinema. Concordantly, drawing from the studies of Mauricio Lazzarato, Paolo Virno, Franco “Bifo” Berardi and Christian Marazzi, I analyze the shift in the production process from the 1940s-1960s to contemporary times, namely from the Fordist period to the Post-Fordist period. This shift in the production process indicates the different functions of ideology in the Post-Fordist period. In this analysis I point out the fact that nowadays, a crucial part of the capitalism is effectuated by the production of the subjectivities. Ideology in a non-traditional sense shows its power implicitly in this process. It functions not as false consciousness but as an element of production which functions at the two levels of the social; the molar and molecular.

At the molar level, the identities of the subjects present themselves. These identities act as separate subjects both from the objects and from the other identities. They differentiate themselves from others, not from themselves. In this regard, they do not fit the definition of difference in the Deleuzian sense. They are seemingly independent because of their limits, which refer to their unity solely as a consciousness. Therefore, the main problem in the struggle against capitalism comes into view as changing or re-shaping the consciousness of the subjects. The *Third Cinema* movement seems to be trying to succeed in this process. On the other hand, as Deleuze revealed, there is another level of subjectivities: the molecular one.

At the molecular level, which should be characterized as a level before any unities, assemblages or connections present themselves as the main area of action. This activity opens the molar level to the molecular one. At this level, direct relations between the images arise as the essential area of production. Therefore, this area is straightforwardly connected with the ontological basis. This never-ending activity

derives from the characteristic of the ontology in Deleuzian understanding; now, it would be wrong to talk about a steady, unchanging basis; on the contrary, Deleuze suggests an unsteady, active, eternal resource of production.

We can approach the same problem from another point of view. As suggested above, one of the main characteristics of the molar level is the linear understanding of time in which one moment is followed by the next one as the consciousness accepts. On the other hand, this new understanding of ontology gives an opportunity to suggest another concept of time. In this understanding, moments are not considered as a part of time but as a time in itself which comprises the past, the future and the living present all together. Following that, in the last part of this section I interpret the synthesis of time. On the one hand, this part establishes the relation between the levels of the social and on the other hand, it implies the fact that the changes at every moment reverberate at the ontological level. These outcomes as the priority of the politics and the images as the main elements of the universe lead to the third section of the thesis which is called “cinema as production of images”.

Images as the source of any reality, either given (molar level) or mediated (molecular level), constitute also the basis of cinema. This condition differentiates cinema from the other arts. Cinema as an image, or relation between images, functions directly at both levels and gives audiences an opportunity to reach its virtuality. Because of the position of cinema, this virtuality becomes the virtuality in general; cinema gains a force which can change the world and the assumptions we use to understand it.

In the first part of this section I establish the relation between the cinema and the ontology of Deleuze. I underline the fact that they are both functioning and keep on determining the universe with the usage of images. In this regard, I consider cinema as a tool to extend the universe, but just like a moment in time, cinema extends it at the molar level. On the other hand, it determines it at the molecular level. Following that, I analyze the ways of usage of images in cinema: movement images and time images.

These concepts provide the necessary tools to analyze the examples of the *Third Cinema* movement. The rest of this section consists of interpretations of three

movies: *The Man with a Movie Camera*, *The Battle of Chile* and *The Hour of Furnaces*. Each of these examples shows another aspect of the *Third Cinema* movement. In *The Man with a Movie Camera*, Vertov emphasizes the relation between the individual with consciousness and nature, which contains history in itself. In respect to this, he posits his movie as an event between these seemingly separate areas at the molar level. On the other hand, *The Battle of Chile* represents an example of a movie which cannot fit into a structure of its own, which mainly relies on the molar level. Despite the filmmaker's intention, the didactic approach of each individual movie cancels itself in the relation with one another. The virtuality, the chance to change, moreover to understand the world in a new way, arises positively from this relation and gap between them. Finally, the creators of the *Third Cinema* movement, Solanas and Getino, analyze the condition of new colonialism in Argentina with the movie called *The Hour of Furnaces*. This movie also constitutes a linear understanding of time, but its function as a means to produce new connections between the audiences forces us to consider it in a new way. With the production of new machines, namely, new subjectivities, this movie also becomes an event in its own right, just like the other two. In short, I argue that all these movies should be considered as an attempt to create new subjectivities, both in themselves and with their connection to the audiences. With their usage of movement and time images, they force audiences to evaluate the world and the history in a new, revolutionary way. By doing so, they remain as an event which cannot be reduced to a solution or a guide. On the contrary, they should be characterized as ideas in the Deleuzian sense, which implies the actual as well as the virtual.

In conclusion, in this thesis I intend to show that the *Third Cinema* movement is still valid in theory, firstly by analyzing the theory of the *Third Cinema* movement drawing from the studies of Deleuze and Lazzarato, secondly by establishing the connection between this analysis and the interpretation of the current operation of capitalism, which keeps on determining the ontological basis of our world, and finally, supporting these arguments with the interpretation of some examples of the *Third Cinema* movement. In this regard, I argue that cinema as the name of this world will also keep on functioning on this basis, and, moreover, keeps on expanding and shaping it. The categories that are provided by the movement are not

limited to any historical era or to any geographical place. In this regard, the *Third Cinema* movement can still be regarded as a call to differentiate the world.



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