



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

**THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: 2004 - 2020**

ZEYNEP TEMEL
PROF. DR. SERHAT GÜVENÇ

MASTER'S DEGREE

ISTANBUL, APRIL, 2021



Zeynep Temel

Master's Degree Thesis

2021

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SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
WITH THE AIM TO MEET THE PARTIAL REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED TO
RECEIVE A MASTER'S DEGREE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
AND HUMANITIES

ISTANBUL, APRIL, 2021

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THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY: 2004 – 2020

ABSTRACT

The Annan Plan and the accession of Cyprus to the European Union are important developments that demonstrate what kind of stance the Turkish political elite initially took regarding the issue in Cyprus. The natural gas drilling activities that came around the end of the 2010s have added an additional dimension to the issue, and have contributed to the shaping of the Turkish Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus over the last sixteen years. Specifically, Turkey's Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus has changed and become de-securitized and later securitized particularly after certain events; namely the Annan Plan and then conversely the discovery of hydrocarbons as well as domestic challenges Turkey's political elite was faced with that are in line with certain external "threats". This thesis aims to explore this issue further and find out why this might be the case. Critical discourse analysis is used to analyze the process of securitization which itself is an important concept of the Copenhagen School. Discourses of Turkish political elite are analyzed in light of domestic and international developments. As the thesis demonstrates, Turkey's Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus has come to be mostly about solidifying its sovereignty and securitization of the region as a whole and is linked to the "construction" of a security issue as well as its urgency by Turkey as a matter of survival.

Keywords: Copenhagen School, securitization, Cyprus, Turkey, foreign policy, Annan Plan, hydrocarbon reserves, discourse analysis, existential threat, sovereignty

TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASINDA KIBRIS SORUNUNUN DEĞİŞEN KARAKTERİ:
2004 – 2020

ÖZET

Annan Planı ve Kıbrıs'ın Avrupa Birliği'ne katılımı, Kıbrıs konusunda Türk siyasi elitinin başlangıçta nasıl bir duruş sergilediğini gösteren önemli gelişmelerdendir. 2010'lu yılların sonlarına doğru gerçekleşen doğalgaz sondaj çalışmaları konuya ek bir boyut katmış ve son on altı yıldır Kıbrıs'a ilişkin Türk Dış Politikasının şekillenmesine katkı sağlamıştır. Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'a ilişkin Dış Politikası, özellikle Annan Planı ve daha sonra görülen hidrokarbon keşifleri ile Türkiye'nin siyasi elitinin bazı dış "tehditler" doğrultusunda karşılaştığı iç zorluklar gibi bazı olaylar neticesinde önce güvenlik dışlaştırılmış, daha sonra güvenleştirilmiştir. Bu tez, bu durumu daha detaylı araştırmayı ve ardında yatabilecek sebepleri belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez kapsamında Kopenhag Okulu'nun önemli bir kavramı olan güvenleştirme süreci, eleştirel söylem analizi yoluyla analiz edilmiştir. Bu yöntem, Türk siyasi elitinin söylemlerinin iç ve dış gelişmeler ışığında incelenmesine dayandırılmıştır. Bu tezin de gösterdiği gibi, Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'a ilişkin dış politikası daha çok bölgedeki egemenliğini sağlamlaştırmak ve bir bütün olarak güvenleştirilmesi ile ilintilidir. İlgili dış politika aynı zamanda bir güvenlik sorununun Türkiye tarafından "inşası" ve aciliyetinin bir hayatta kalma meselesi olarak görülmesi ile bağlantılıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kopenhag Okulu, güvenleştirme, Kıbrıs, Türkiye, dış politika, Annan Planı, hidrokarbon rezervleri, söylem analizi, varoluşsal tehdit, egemenlik

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis becomes a reality with the kind support and help of many amazing individuals. I would like to extend my most genuine thanks to all of them. Without the support of even one amazing individual mentioned below, I would not be able to be the person I am today.

First and foremost, I would like to express my special gratitude and thanks to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Serhat GÜVENÇ, for imparting his knowledge and expertise in this study as well as for his understanding and mentorship in me. I am also highly indebted to Asst. Prof. Cihan DİZDAROĞLU and Assoc. Prof. Özgür ÖZDAMAR for honoring my thesis defense jury and their valuable guidance.

I am equally eternally grateful for the support and expertise my professors at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research; Dr. Nino KEMOKLIDZE, Dr. Daniel RAJMIL BONET, Dr. Jon-Hans COETZER and Dr. Zlatko NIKOLOSKI provided me. I would equally like to thank all of my esteemed professors at Galatasaray University International Relations Department for giving me such a solid basis that fundamentally enabled me to write this thesis.

I would also like to thank the precious friends and family who have always shown their interest and support in this thesis and in me, for constantly and patiently encouraging me; even when I sometimes felt like I was about to give up. Thank you very much dear classmates Bahadır and Aybüke who embarked in this journey with me; your continuous support and encouragements have helped me more than you can ever imagine. Speaking of encouragement, it is impossible for me not to mention the never-ending support these beautiful ladies provided me: My aunt Prof. Ezgi YALÇIN, my grandmother Fahrünnisa TEMEL and my grandmother Ayten GÖNLÜM. I also wish to thank my colleagues and managers, and all of the Advocacy and Scientific Research Divisions at my workplace for their understanding and support.

Finally, words would not be enough for me to express how grateful I am for having such a wonderful family that I love so very much. This thesis is dedicated to my lovely mother Evren TEMEL, father Prof. Dr. Ahmet TEMEL and brother Yiğit TEMEL. Even though I may have seemed so close to giving up for one too many times, I would not be able to do anything I have achieved so far without you; including this thesis.



To My Dearest Family...

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LIST of ABBREVIATIONS

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EMGF	East Mediterranean Gas Forum
EU	European Union
GCNG	Greek Cypriot National Guard
JRCC	Joint Rescue Coordination Center
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

1. INTRODUCTION

Cyprus is an island located at the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean with an exceptionally rich history; after the Roman domination on Cyprus starting at 58 A.C., it was ruled chronologically by the Byzantine Empire and the Frankish Empire before it got under the rule of Ottoman Empire in 1571. The Ottoman Empire conquered the island and ruled it until June 4, 1878 when the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit secretly signed the Anglo-Turkish Convention with Great Britain in order to achieve its support against the Russians. With this convention, the administration of Cyprus was transferred to Great Britain and although this was only a transfer of administration and not possession, one can argue that the de facto Ottoman rule of over 300 years had ended. Cyprus was under British rule on 1878-1960; the period until 1914 being solely based on administration rights of the British. When the World War I started and Ottomans joined the war as part of the Central Powers, Great Britain annexed Cyprus and ruled it until 1960 when the Island gained its independence. However, during all those years, dissatisfaction was always prominent between the two communities. As such, on January 1950, an unofficial referendum¹ for *enosis* (union) with Greece was held in Cyprus, and while the voting only took place among the Greek Cypriots it was approved by 95,71% of the votes.² Finally on August 16, 1960 following the trend of de-colonization, Cyprus became an independent sovereign state with the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of

¹ The referendum took place after Archbishop Makarios II called for a referendum that the Great Britain rule declined. The Church Council and Enosis Organization still organized the referendum; demonstrating in a way the view of the Church about the potential future of Cyprus.

² Sevinç, D . (2017). Türk-Yunan İlişkileri Çerçevesinde Kıbrıs Sorununda Yeni Bir Aşama (1954-1960) . Atatürk Yolu Dergisi , 15 (60) , . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/pub/ankuayd/issue/42665/514156>, p.176

Cyprus; which was followed by numerous intercommunal violence leading to the division of the country at 1974, as well as to the formation of the Cyprus as we know it today.³

The location of Cyprus is also extremely critical from a geo-strategical point of view. Considering all the other actors present in the Eastern Mediterranean and the year 2009 when the first major discovery of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean lead to the region being an essential one in terms of energy relations; its location as well as its ethnic composition has made it very susceptible to conflicts. Indeed, in fact it has been hosting a dispute that is almost six decades old now, and that has divided the country in two at 1974. Today, Cyprus is still divided in two, and although there are no active conflicts, the dispute is still far from being resolved.

The particularity of this dispute equally is that even though it had essentially started out as a dispute between Greece and Turkey it had gradually changed nature over the coming years. Initially, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots both had different wants on the Island in terms of administrative rights that were closely linked with the wants of Greece and Turkey; therefore, it can be argued that it used to affect Greek-Turkish-British relations only⁴. Later on, it had changed nature and become an international one due to the changing dynamics and involvement on the part of different international actors. These different involvements have become more apparent on the year of 2004 when the Annan Plan had been voted in a referendum, and shortly after the rejection of the Plan the accession of Cyprus to the European Union (EU). The year 2003 is also particular in the sense that Cyprus ratified the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)⁵ law which in turn had implications on the natural gas drillings in the Mediterranean Sea; which is especially important to mention as the discovery of hydrocarbons have added an additional dimension to the dispute. Furthermore, it can be argued that these discoveries have rendered the resolving of the Cyprus issue even more difficult.⁶

³ [Preface]. (2010). In F. Mirbagheri (Author), Historical dictionary of Cyprus (p. Xiii). Lanham (Md.): The Scarecrow press.

⁴ Since Great Britain is one of the three guarantor states on the Island; the other two being Greece and Turkey.

⁵ CYPRUS. (n.d.). Retrieved February 20, 2021, from <https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CYP.htm>

⁶ Çalık Orhun, F. (020). Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikası ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ile İlişkileri. In M. Çelik & A. Duran (Eds.), Türkiye'nin bölgesel sorunları "Osmanlı'dan günümüze" Doğu Akdeniz (pp. 9-28). İstanbul: Hiperyayın, p.17; Doğu Akdeniz - times: Türkiye'nin doğalgaz Yataklarına Uzmanması, Kıbrıs sorunu'nu yeniden Alevlendirebilir - BBC News Türkçe. (2019, June 27). Retrieved February 28, 2021,

This thesis aims to analyze how the character of Cyprus problem has changed in Turkish Foreign Policy between the years of 2004 - 2020, in other words “The Changing Character of the Cyprus Problem in Turkish Foreign Policy: 2004 - 2020”. Furthermore, the year 2004 is chosen as it has enabled a turning point in the discourses of Turkish political elite in terms of the Cyprus issue and security.

The reason why this thesis aims to analyze the central research question above in the framework of Turkish Foreign Policy is that the narrative used by the key actors after 2004 had undergone a critical change. To be more specific; while the Cyprus narrative used by the founder and first President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) Rauf Denktaş had always been a nationalistic one, the Turkish discourse regarding Cyprus had started to differ from that of the previous years. The major driver behind this change is then analyzed in this thesis; which can partly be explained by the election of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AKP), and with Turkey’s position regarding the EU accession process of Cyprus and the varying internal political dynamics and power struggle among Turkey’s political elite, too.

Overall, the central research question of this thesis is relevant because Turkey’s position in its foreign policy, as well as its priorities have changed a lot regarding Cyprus over the course of the last sixteen years. It is noteworthy to understand the driving force(s) of these changes and correlations as well as causalities whenever applicable, in order to grasp a better understanding of the Island’s past along with its potential future.

The thesis aims at demonstrating these correlations and causalities, concerning the changing character of Cyprus in Turkish Foreign Policy by using the securitization framework. Accordingly, it aims at understanding how the problem had been “securitized”; meaning how a security discourse had been “constructed” regarding Cyprus in Turkish Foreign Policy over time.

The research method used in this thesis is discourse analysis, which is qualitative in nature. Among different kinds of discourse analysis, "critical discourse analysis" is selected. Although the reasons why it is a suitable method is elaborated under the

from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-48783067>; Faustmann, H., Gürel, A.,; Reichberg, G. M. (2012). Kıbrıs Deniz Hidrokarbonları: Bölgesel Siyaset ve Servet Dağılımı. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from <https://cyprus.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=1162>, p.5

“Theoretical and Methodological Framework” section, a brief explanation as to why discourses of government officials that are influential in foreign policy are used, is as follows: The thesis aims to understand how Turkey’s Foreign Policy narrative vis-a-vis the ever-changing situation regarding Cyprus have securitized or de-securitized, therefore the statements of government officials that are influential on the decision-making processes in Turkish Foreign Policy are analyzed in the light of critical discourse analysis.



2. METHODOLOGY: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

As mentioned above, this thesis uses discourse analysis in order to analyze and understand the linkage between the Turkish discourse on the developments of Cyprus and securitization theory. To be more specific, the thesis uses discourse analysis to explain the Turkish narrative on the developments on Cyprus dispute, and how this narrative is securitized. In order to better understand the context in which securitization and/or de-securitization occurs, the events that take place in the International Relations scene over the last sixty years are described first, and then how said developments may have affected the making of Turkish Foreign Policy regarding the dispute in Cyprus are explained.

Among various types of discourse analyses, the thesis uses critical discourse analysis method (CDA). In order to be able to understand what a critical discourse analysis is, one must first understand what exactly discourse analysis is and how it can be used to analyze political events, and in this particular case, how it was used to create a sense of urgency and security in the Turkish context.

Discourse could easily be thought to simply signify speech, but in fact it covers all forms of communication; and it can also cover pictures and texts as they all communicate some sort of commonly accepted knowledge, too. People who study discourse argue that communication shapes the world in which we live, and that it is a form of social practice. When one communicates s/he uses generally accepted knowledge as well as assumptions in order to generate statements that make sense to the recipient/audience. Also by doing so, s/he also reinforces or challenges those assumptions. Either way s/he contributes to the flow of commonly accepted knowledge through time, which makes up the process known as “discourse”. A discourse is “a set of statements which construct an object”.⁷

One of the main goals of discourse analysis is to identify dominant discourses of the time and through those discourses to show how reality is socially constructed. Analyzing discourse involves interrogation of the data, designing a questioning framework to find out what kind of purpose the discourse serves, what kind of people involved in the data are, what impact the discourse has on the audience, what the most powerful discourse is and why. What is important in order to be able to conduct a discourse analysis properly

⁷ Parker, I. (1992). *Discourse dynamics: Critical analysis for social and individual psychology*. Taylor & Frances/Routledge, p.5

is that one should clearly understand the differences between description, analysis and interpretation. A description is when one describes an event, perhaps a historical event without drawing any sorts of assumption; an analysis is when one works on the description or data by implementing a systematic analysis, and an interpretation is when one puts the results or the key findings in the context of analysis.⁸

One of the pioneers of the field; van Dijk defines critical discourse analysis; as an interdisciplinary “approach” to discourse analysis that aims at analyzing the way social power abuse, inequality and dominance are played out and further reproduced by written and verbal communication in both the social and political context.⁹ Another pioneer, Ruth Wodak explains that populist leaders use multiple constructs to include or exclude specific social groups to their electorate.¹⁰ Van Dijk also argues that critical discourse analysis is not a specialization or school to the whole field, but that it rather offers a new, “alternative” or critical mode of applying discourse analysis with the primary focus being to understand social inequalities and hierarchy, as well as social constructs. Furthermore, the concepts found in critical discourse analysis such as power and ideology were first introduced by the critical theorists of Frankfurt School before the Second World War.¹¹ Critical discourse analysts believe that social and linguistic practices are interrelated, and even more so that they constitute one another; which means that discourse constitutes society and culture, and vice-versa. According to the pioneers of the “approach” Fairclough and Wodak, it also means, “power relations are discursive”.¹² Wodak further explains that discursive practices may “produce and reproduce unequal power relations” between social classes¹³. The aim then is to analyze and interpret the societal power relations and hierarchy that are reinforced or challenged by the use of communication¹⁴,

⁸ Starks, H., & Brown Trinidad, S. (2007). Choose Your Method: A Comparison of Phenomenology, Discourse Analysis, and Grounded Theory. *Qualitative Health Research*, 17(10), 1372–1380. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732307307031>, p. 1372-1380, p.1374-1377

⁹ van Dijk, T.A. (2008). Critical Discourse Analysis. In *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (eds D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H.E. Hamilton). doi:10.1002/9780470753460.ch19, p.1

¹⁰ Weiss, G., & Wodak, R. (2003). *Critical discourse analysis: Theory and interdisciplinarity*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.. p.10-11

¹¹ van Dijk, T.A., *op.cit.*, p.1

¹² *Ibid.*, p.2.

¹³ Piazza, R. & Wodak, R. (2020). *DCA - Critical Discourse Analysis.*, p.303

¹⁴ Li, E. (2019). A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Power Relationships in Institutional Talks. 10.2991/assehr.k.191217.124, p.377

and in the case of this work; language (official written material of government officials, and written medias from news agencies).

Critical discourse analysis is then used in the thesis in order to get a better understanding of the correlations between the developments regarding Cyprus problem and the Turkish Foreign Policy's discourse regarding the issue through the discourses of key foreign policy-making actors such as the President¹⁵ ¹⁶, Vice-Presidents, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council declarations and Head of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces¹⁷, and others.

Desk-based research using both primary and secondary sources is conducted in order to explain the developments and describe the geopolitical situation of Cyprus as well as to give an overall background information, and then conduct the analysis building upon the background information that has a solid basis. The primary sources that are used include official statements of government officials, UN Security Council Resolutions, official reports and statements by oil and gas companies that are active in the area, and NavTex declarations. Secondary sources include analyzing the existing literature on this subject. The discourses of government officials are retrieved from either the official websites of government bodies or news agencies. This way, the research is not constraint with time nor budget limitations; and it is as unbiased as possible. As for any ethical considerations, the author translates the official statements that are retrieved from these official websites, whenever they are not available in English; and the usage of words that may be related to security and securitization are demonstrated.

¹⁵ A constitutional referendum was held in Turkey on April 16, 2017. The referendum was on whether to approve 18 proposed amendments to the Turkish Constitution; if approved, these amendments would signify the abolishment of the office of the Prime Minister as well as the existing parliamentary system of government, and their replacement with an executive presidency and a presidential system. The referendum, which was held under a state of emergency after the attempted failed coup d'état in July 2016, resulted in 51,41% of votes in favor of the adoption of said amendments and 48,59% of votes against. The thesis therefore elaborates on the statements of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister as well as the President until the year 2018; and then President and Vice President as presidential system was adopted in 2018.

¹⁶ Source: Ete, H . (2018). 24 Haziran Seçimleri: Yeni Sistemin Siyaseti ve Sosyoloji. Muhafazakar Düşünce Dergisi , 15 (54) , 293-321 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/pub/muhafazakar/issue/47588/599402>

¹⁷ The military has had some periods in Turkish political history in which it was more influential than before; during the times this thesis deals with, it was more influential in the years leading up to the 2000s than it was during the 2000s. The reason behind this change can be argued to be related to the general shift of agenda in foreign policy-related matters of the Justice and Development Party Government.

Furthermore, since according to critical discourse analysis, political realities are constructed through the means of language, the thesis also dwells into the Copenhagen School of Security framework and how it lays the theoretical foundation of the securitization of Cyprus issue, taking into account the developments in the regional and international levels such as Cyprus' EU membership process and hydrocarbons. How these developments affected Turkey's position in regards to the Island is certainly deterministic to Turkey's view on the Island (whether Turkey sees Cyprus as its own security issue in the region or not). The thesis then works on studying those, using critical discourse analysis of the main foreign policy decision-making actors of the ruling political party of Turkey during all those years; which is the Justice and Development Party.



3. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL AND THE SECURITIZATION FRAMEWORK

Security is a field of political action that has always been central to International Relations. This chapter deals with the concept of security, how it has evolved as well as the emergence of different schools of thoughts around it, and the Copenhagen Security School along with the securitization framework.

When talking about security, the term "essentially contested concept" often comes into play. This term was developed by Walter Bryce Gallie, in his article "Essentially Contested Concepts" and it was first applied to the notion of security by Barry Buzan in his book "People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era". Steve Smith further popularized it in his book "The Contested Concept of Security". When used to describe security, the term "essentially contested concept" then started to be used to signify both a state and a feeling of security.¹⁸

Historically and traditionally in International Relations, the concept of security has meant the protection of a state, and therefore of its population against a threat that is oftentimes military. At a time when debates around security and whether the state is the main actor of the international system or not were being explored; scholars started exploring various different possible sources of threat or insecurity, hence making the traditionalist view of security undergo changes. While security has traditionally been associated mostly with emergency, military issues, as well as rigidity and radical responses; it has undergone changes especially over the past century, which made scholars think of "security" differently than that of traditionalists.

The traditionalist approach to security refers to a certain commonly accepted belief existing in the field of Security Studies and more generally, in the realist and later the neorealist circles of International Relations. Traditionalists usually argue that security has some politico-military, state-centered and materialist meaning.¹⁹ This approach was

¹⁸ Jhandad, Junaid. (2016). Is security an essentially contested concept, p.2

¹⁹ Buzan, B., & Hansen, L. (2015). The evolution of international security studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p.2-3

especially concerned with keeping the state secure from external military threats; notably nuclear threats, during the Cold War. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War has led for the nature of security threats to change; therefore causing a shift in security studies. It is also noteworthy that when Emma Rothschild in her 1995 article suggested that security as a concept not be limited to military only, and that it in fact needed to be extended to environmental, economic, political and societal spheres as well, it showed how there was now some criticisms to the traditional understanding of security which is rigidly state-centered.²⁰

The Copenhagen Security School and therefore the securitization framework emerged in such discussion in the field of International Relations. There exists three main approaches of this School: securitization, sectors and regional security complexes. Securitization is the concept that is elaborated in the relevant paragraphs under this chapter.

“Sectors” or sectoral analysis often deals with security from a sectoral framework; according to this approach, there exists five sectors of security and they are military, economic, environmental, societal and political.²¹ “Regional security complexes” on the other hand, deals with security within the regional dynamics of the issue. According to this approach, all states are interrelated from a security point of view and which makes the threats that they are faced with related to each other, too. Therefore, geographical proximity is important when analyzing their security perceptions and interrelations.²²

Talking about security in the securitization framework involves taking the emerging trend of globalization and the new order of post-Cold War era into consideration. The referent object, which signifies the object that needs to be secured, formerly was thought to solely be the state. However, ever since the end of the Cold War, concepts such as society, individual, and vulnerable groups has also come to be thought of when dealing with the referent object. On the other hand, the actor that has the duty to provide security be formerly and historically also thought to be the state; but the post-Cold War era showed a significance increase in the role of international institutions in providing international

²⁰ Rothschild, E. (1995). What is security?. *Daedalus* 124(3): 53-98.

²¹ Akgül-açıkmeşe, S . (2011). Algı mı, Söylem mi? Kopenhag Okulu ve Yeni Klasik Gerçekçilikte Güvenlik Tehditleri . *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* , 8 (30) , 43-73 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/uidergisi/issue/39278/462550>. P.43-73

²² Baysal, B , Lüleci, Ç . (2015). Kopenhag Okulu ve Güvenlikleştirme Teorisi . *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi* , 11 (22) , 61-96 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/guvenlikstrjtj/issue/7544/99268>, p. 61-96

security. Finally, with the rise of globalization the boundaries of where the threat or perceived threat is coming from has undergone change, too. It is now harder to make a clear distinction as to whether the issue is an internal, external or international security issue.²³

Constructivist theory provides an interesting alternative in this regard. By integrating certain ideational and identity-based factors into its analysis, it puts forward the idea according to which security is a construction of the agents and the structure of the international system.²⁴ Consequently, by accepting that security can take different forms according to the actor involved, constructivism recognizes a certain subjectivity in itself.²⁵ Since this normative set is socially constructed, it can theoretically evolve over time, which is in line with the words of Wendt about international system: "anarchy is what states make of it".²⁶

The relations between states according to Constructivism can be seen very clearly in the "securitization" concept of Copenhagen School of International Relations in which Barry Buzan and Ole Waever are prominent scholars. Constructivism explains international phenomena through securitization theory by saying that when one starts to approach a certain reality or a certain policy field through the prism of security, that certain reality or policy field transforms and becomes a security issue in the eyes of the audience. This way, it also loses its initial feature of being, for instance financial or environmental in nature, and becomes a concept that is about the state's survival; making it easier for measures that could otherwise seem illegitimate now seem legitimate and then to be taken. The prominent scholars of Copenhagen Security School then combined the state-centeredness of security and constructivism, making securitization theory emerge.

Some examples of which areas can be securitized are energy, climate, trade, or finance. Another simple and classic example of securitization is the use of the word "war" and when it is used in the context of "war on drugs" or "war on terror". In these cases, there is no real war, but a perception of urgency is created by these words. As such; a policy of

²³ Macleod, A., Masson, I. & Morin, D. (2004). Identité nationale, sécurité et la théorie des relations internationales. *Études internationales*, 35 (1), 7–24. <https://doi.org/10.7202/008445ar>, p.10-11

²⁴ Buzan, B., & Hansen, L., *op.cit.*, p.187-190

²⁵ Charrett, C. (2009). A Critical Application of Securitization Theory: Overcoming the Normative Dilemma of Writing Security. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. 10.2139/ssrn.1884149., p.15

²⁶ Wendt, A. (1992). « Anarchy is what states make of it : The social construction of power politics», *International Organization*, vol. 46, no 2, 1992, pp.391-425, p.395

securitization is made, and it is shown that issues such as drugs or terror are viewed and worked on through a prism of security, that it is viewed as a threat to states' security; their control, and vulnerability. In turn, states' behaviors and relations transform, and the said-policy areas turn into security areas. To demonstrate this change and transformation with a simple example, one could take trade. Before attributing the prism of security to trade relations between states, the main goal of each state that does not see trade through the prism of security, would be to extract the maximum benefit from that trade relation for themselves. However, after attributing that, states' major driver becomes different; it becomes about keeping control, and reducing their vulnerability by reducing their dependency. Furthermore, as soon as states start acting for the sake of security and not extracting profit, they also start engaging in such relations. These relations are generally less beneficial for both sides, although this does not mean that states are not ready to engage in less beneficial relations for the sake of "securitizing" the issue on hand; meaning for the sake of attaining invulnerability and control.²⁷ A different kind of reality and relations are constructed when the issues are securitized. In material aspects it may still be the same kinds of relations but the perception of reality has changed, changing almost all of states' behavior and in turn relations, policies and also evidently government officials' narratives and discourses on the issue. In this regard, words or discourse of primary actors in official grounds, as this research attempts at analyzing, matter. The choice and use of certain words make for the securitization of certain issues, and in this case, it is of Cyprus dispute.

3.2.HOW DOES SECURITIZATION OCCUR?

Securitization theory, as explained above, is one of the most important components of Copenhagen Security School which came up with this alternative way of seeing security and which differentiates itself from the classical realist view of "security" by focusing on the perception of threat. While according to classical realism, threats would be one of the most significant components that would determine the fate of much of state relations; according to securitization theory, threat perceptions rather than "military threats" are the

²⁷ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. . (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub. p.82

deterministic components of International Relations. Therefore, the focus shifts from military threats to concepts such as urgency, state of exception and threats that undermine state sovereignty.

In essence, securitization is identified with the presence of a particular narrative structure where four fundamental elements come together: a **securitizing actor** who designates an existential threat to a **referent object** in the eyes of the **relevant audience** and who invokes the need for emergency measures to overcome the threat in question.²⁸ In order for a successful securitization to occur, the word "security" does not necessarily need to be mentioned, but its resonance must at least be implicit.²⁹ The securitizing actor can also be the referent itself (for instance a Head of State speaking on behalf of that state) or the securitizing actor may be speaking on behalf of a referent object, in which case, a certain legitimacy needs to be claimed.³⁰ Overall, for securitization to be considered effective, the Copenhagen Security School explains that the securitizing actor must convince a relevant audience of the danger of a threat and the relevance of any exceptional measures, which do not necessarily need to be adopted. At the very least though, a sense of urgency must be recognizable.³¹

An issue, before becoming securitized or de-securitized using language has to go through a process. This process starts with what is called a "speech act" carried out by the securitizing actor. According to Balzacq, this speech act is strategically planned out by the securitizing actor before being carried out, with the aim of reducing vulnerability and influencing audiences.³² Then, using language in pragmatic and strategic ways, what has started out as a single speech act turns into a series of "discourses". After this step, comes trying to make the audience perceive the issue to be of exceptional importance by socially constructing the perception that the issue is about state survival.³³ However, it is important to note that the issue on hand does not have to constitute a real threat, but only be perceived as one by the relevant audience. At this point, which is called the "stage of identification" the audience identifies the issue as being political, and they believe it may

²⁸ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J., *op.cit.*, p.23-25

²⁹ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J., *op.cit.*, p.176-178

³⁰ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J., *op.cit.*, p.40-42

³¹ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J., *op.cit.*, p.23-25

³² Balzacq, T. (2005). The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations*, 11(2), 171–201. doi: 10.1177/1354066105052960, p.172.

³³ *Ibid.* p.190

be resolved using political means. Finally, as the discourses are constantly being employed, comes the “stage of mobilization” when the audience is convinced that the issue is an issue of security, therefore legitimizing the securitizing actor to resort to a state of exception.³⁴

In the example of Cyprus and Turkish Foreign Policy though, the speech acts are not always decisive; and in cases where the securitizing actor carries out some moves, but when they do not implicitly evoke emergency measures but just a certain existential threat, the Paris School of Security comes into play. One of the most prominent scholars of Paris School, Didier Bigo describes the securitizing actor by the following words: “Security is often marked by the handing over of entire security fields to ‘professionals of unease’ who are tasked with managing existing persistent threats and identifying new ones”.³⁵ Bigo also adds that some securitization moves that are carried out by bureaucracies or the media are embedded in routines, and that because they are embedded in routines they are rarely if ever questioned; and that they are seen as the continuation of the existing routines.³⁶ Consequently, the Paris School of Security argues that securitization can be observed rooted in the “empirical referents” of policy.³⁷

The Paris School of Security therefore provides an alternative way of understanding how securitization takes place, and that it argues that securitization does not solely manifest itself in speech acts but that it also manifests itself in structural actions.³⁸

Lastly, it is important to note that securitization or de-securitization takes place after a certain awareness of a particular issue is established among the audience. Then, the new conditions are revised and it is decided if the issue is going to be further securitized or not. If it is to be securitized, then the “urgency” of the issue is often emphasized by stating that the survival of the state is at stake. Under such circumstances, administrative and executive bodies of the state start to employ extraordinary policies they otherwise would

³⁴ Roe, P. (2008). Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq. *Security Dialogue*, 39(6), 615–635. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010608098212>, p.620

³⁵ Bigo D. Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives*. 2002;27(1_suppl):63-92. doi:10.1177/03043754020270S105, p.65

³⁶ Williams, P., & Ebooks Corporation. (2013). *Security studies : An introduction* (2nd ed.). London ; New York: Routledge, p.128

³⁷ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis & Esra Dilek (2018): Securitizing Migration in the European Union: Greece and the Evros Fence, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2018.1506280, p.3

³⁸ Bigo, D., & Tsoukala, A. (2008). Understanding (In)Security. In D. Bigo, & A. Tsoukala (Eds.), *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty. Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11* (pp. 1 - 9). Routledge., p.5

not be able to employ; which is called a “state of exception”. Under the state of exception, the relevant bodies of the state now have the legitimacy to use exceptional means. After some time though, the issue on hand may cease to be an issue of security in which case the state of exception is stopped. Finally this way, the process of de-securitization starts.³⁹ De-securitization is the logical opposite of securitization. It is the process by which securitization is reversed and by which the issues are moved out of security sphere back to the political sphere. De-securitization can take the form of re-politicization or, conversely, of exclusion from public discussion and the political sphere, too. Several researchers have nevertheless underlined an asymmetry between securitization and de-securitization by stating that the same issue can be simultaneously presented as a political question and a security question; meaning that the security framing of an issue does not necessarily imply it is not part of the political debate. In addition, if this conceptualization is discussed in terms of sectors, an issue could be securitized in the economic sector, but politicized in the identity sector and non-politicized in the military etc.⁴⁰

To conclude, there is no consensus on the definition of the concept of de-securitization. For scholars of the Copenhagen School though, de-securitization signifies the process of taking a security problem to the sphere of political routines.⁴¹ Furthermore, there are different opinions on the possibilities of how the return to politics would take place.

One of the said-opinions is of Lene Hansen; Hansen elaborates on four forms of de-securitization in her article titled “Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it”; the categorization Hansen makes is an elaborate one which takes into consideration various case studies in which de-securitization happens, in different contexts. These four forms are as follows: change through stabilization, replacement, rearticulation and silencing. The definitions of these four forms of de-securitization can be found in her article, in her own words:

“**Change through stabilisation** is when an issue is cast in terms other than security, but where the larger conflict still looms; **replacement** is when an issue is removed from the securitised, while another securitisation takes its place; **rearticulation** is when an issue is moved from the securitised to the politicized due to a resolution of the threats and

³⁹ Buzan, Waever, *op.cit.*, p.82

⁴⁰ Swarts, Jonathan & Karakatsanis, Neovi. (2013). Challenges to Desecuritizing Migration in Greece. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*. 15. 97-120. 10.1080/19448953.2012.736238., p.102

⁴¹ Skidmore, D. (1999). *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. By Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998. 239p. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4), 1010-1011. doi:10.2307/2586187, p.74

dangers, that underpinned the original securitisation; and **silencing** is when desecuritisation takes the form of a depoliticisation, which marginalises potentially insecure subjects.”⁴²

This thesis uses the “change through stabilization” form of de-securitization laid out by Lene Hansen. “Change through stabilization” is the form that best explains the de-securitization process of Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue as in this form the issue quits the security sphere in a rather slow way, enabling a more political environment to take place. However, the conflict is still present and can be re-securitized in the future. This form takes its roots from the Détente period of the Cold War, but as Hansen also argues in her article; it reaches the post-Cold War period, too.⁴³



⁴² Hansen, L. (2012). Reconstructing desecuritisation: The normative-political in the Copenhagen School and directions for how to apply it. *Review of International Studies*, 38(3), 525-546.
doi:10.1017/S0260210511000581, p.529

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.539

4. THE CONTEXT OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

4.1. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE IN CYPRUS

Cyprus gained its independence from the Great Britain and became an independent sovereign state with the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Cyprus on August 16, 1960. This signified that it was to be led by a Greek Cypriot president who is also the religious leader of the community^{44 45}, Archbishop Makarios and by a Turkish Cypriot vice-president, Fazıl Küçük. Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey became guarantors of the sovereignty and integrity of the new state by signing the Treaty of Guarantee.⁴⁶ The agreements also provided for complex power sharing arrangements between the two communities and granted veto powers to the Turkish Cypriot community, which proves to be important to understand the 1963 December incident. The three guarantor powers were given rights to interfere in Cypriot affairs if needed; however, these needs were defined in terms of administrative rights prohibiting any activity that is aimed at promoting either union of Cyprus with any other state or partition of the Island. Furthermore, the United Kingdom was given the right to keep its “sovereign base areas” that make up 2,7% of the territory of Cyprus along with substantial intelligence gathering facilities. Greece and Turkey on the other hand, were allowed to station small military contingents (the numbers of their troops accounting for 950 and 650, respectively) on the Island.⁴⁷ Also in September 1960, Cyprus became a member state of the UN (United Nations).⁴⁸

This information above are worth noting in order to understand the ethnic conflict that took place in Cyprus. *Enosis* and *taksim* are two important concepts to note here. First, as Costas M. Constantinou argues in his article “Cypriot In-dependence and the Problem of

⁴⁴ The Church was an influential political actor that was in favor of *enosis* even before Cyprus gained its independence; for example on January 1950 Archbishop Makarios II and Enosis Organization organized a referendum among the Greek Cypriots to vote on *enosis* with Greece.

⁴⁵ Source: Akgün, S. (2019). The Construction of Turkish and Greek Identity in Cyprus: The Enosis Referendum of 15th January 1950. *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 28, 75 - 89.

⁴⁶ Mirbagheri, F. (2010). *Historical dictionary of Cyprus*. Lanham (Md.): The Scarecrow press., p.42

⁴⁷ Miltiadou, M., & Coufoudakis, V. (2011). *The Cyprus question: A brief introduction*. Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus., p.46

⁴⁸ Mirbagheri, F. (2010). Chronology [Introduction]. In F. Mirbagheri (Author), *Historical dictionary of Cyprus* (p. Xxxi). Lanham (Md.): The Scarecrow press.

Sovereignty”, even if the Island was given all of the debated independence at the time, it would not be what the local communities had demanded it in the first place. He argues that the island would simply not exist as an independent state today if what the locals had demanded took place. Prior to Cyprus becoming an independent state, most Greek Cypriots’ opinions were in favor of union with Greece (*enosis*), while most Turkish Cypriots asked for partition (*taksim*). Other Cypriots from smaller minorities of the Island on the other hand, were in favor of keeping the status-quo and the colonial rule. So much so that the situation in Cyprus was described by some as a “realpolitik compromise”, and Cyprus a “self-determination substitute”, a “reluctant republic”, and even an “unwanted child”.⁴⁹ The current perspectives of both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots can be seen in the words of scholar Tözün Bahçeli. According to Bahçeli, a federated state is seen as the “second best solution” in Cyprus, and that while the Greek Cypriots would prefer to have a unitary state, they would agree to a federated state with a strong central government; whereas the Turkish Cypriot side would prefer to keep a separate Turkish Cypriot state.⁵⁰

The ethnic clashes took the three guarantor states on table. By the year 1959 Greece, Turkey, and Britain came to an agreement for the settlement of the Cyprus problem. As previously mentioned, Cyprus was not going to be united with Greece nor ethnically partitioned. The solution that was found foresaw that Cyprus would be established as an independent and bi-communal republic and that its sovereignty along with its territorial integrity was to be guaranteed by the guarantor states that are Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey.⁵¹ Makarios of Cyprus accepted the proposed settlement unwillingly, thinking that reaching *enosis* could be postponed until a moment that would be more feasible. However, Colonel Grivas who was the military leader of EOKA^{52 53}, clearly rejected the

⁴⁹ Constantinou, C. (2010). Cypriot independence and the problem of sovereignty. *Cyprus Review*. 22. 17-33., p.17

⁵⁰ Bahçeli, T. (2000). Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States. *Publius*, 30(1), 203-216. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331129>, p.203

⁵¹ Anastasiou, H. (2008). The broken olive branch. nationalism, ethnic conflict, and the quest for peace in Cyprus. Volume One, The Impasse of Ethnonationalism. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press., p.94

⁵² *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston* (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), is a Greek Cypriot guerilla organization fighting for self-determination of Cyprus, the end of British colonial rule and *enosis* with Greece.

⁵³ Source: Şahin, İ . (2020). Düşünceden Eyleme EOKA . *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları* , (37) , 21-49 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iuydta/issue/55247/758157>

proposed solution as it made the option of enosis constitutionally impossible. Eventually though, EOKA and Grivas accepted the solution in exchange for political amnesty for all the EOKA-associated political prisoners that had filled the prisons and detention camps of the British colonial administration.⁵⁴

The intercommunal violence that showed the need for a UN intervention erupted around Christmas 1963 when in December of the same year; the Greek Cypriots demanded constitutional amendments in order to legitimize and open the way for the option of enosis, which Turkey rejected. Following the start of the 1963–64 intercommunal violence, the Turkish Cypriots split with the government. It resulted in the paramilitary organization of Turkish Cypriots called “Turkish Resistance Organization”⁵⁵ ⁵⁶taking control of strategic villages and city sectors and proceeding to settle their people into the Turkish enclaves while at the same time reasserting the old claim for the ethnic partitioning of Cyprus.⁵⁷

The United Nations then agreed to send a peacekeeping force to the Island through the adoption of Resolution 186 dated March 4, 1964 by the UN Security Council. Considering both Turkey and Greece were NATO members and that the escalation of tension between them could endanger stability in the region, the creation of a peacekeeping force in Cyprus was of essential importance. Hence, the UN Security Council Resolution authorized the deployment of its military force named the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). A mediator by the Secretary-General, who previously served as the former President of Ecuador; Galo Plaza was appointed as part of the Resolution.⁵⁸ ⁵⁹ However, even before the UN intervention, there had been efforts on Great Britain’s side to stop the

⁵⁴ Anastasiou, H., *op.cit.*, p.94

⁵⁵ Turkish Resistance Organization (“Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı”), is a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organization formed in November 15, 1957. The goal of the organization was to gather all local defense forces under one umbrella.

⁵⁶ Source: Yiğit Yüksel, D. (2018). Kıbrıs’ta Yaşananlar ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (1957-1964) . Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi , 34 (98) , 311-376 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/aamd/issue/40613/489683>, p.325

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, .p. 95-96

⁵⁸ UNSCR search engine for the United Nations Security Council resolutions. (n.d.). Retrieved February 20, 2021, from <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/186>

⁵⁹ Mirbagheri, F. (2010). The United Nations and the Cyprus problem. 22. 149-158., p. 150

conflict; such that the *Green Line*^{60 61} was established.⁶² The Resolution 186 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council and became the basic document to guide the peacekeeping force in Cyprus ever since. To summarize, this resolution:

“Established the UN Secretary-General’s *mission of good offices* aiming at a peaceful solution on the basis of an agreed settlement in accordance with the UN Charter, created UNFICYP which is the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus, reaffirmed the sovereignty and continuing existence of the Republic of Cyprus and, reaffirmed the continuity of the government of the Republic of Cyprus.”⁶³

On April 21, 1967; a military regime seized power in Greece, which led to disagreements between pro-military junta Colonel Grivas and Makarios. The National Guard of Cyprus, which is the joint arms military effort of Cyprus, attacked two Turkish enclaves in Southern Cyprus, killing 1 soldier and 26 Turkish Cypriots while leaving others wounded.⁶⁴ This led to the USA –not wanting any conflicts between two NATO-ally countries- to send former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to conduct *shuttle diplomacy* between Greece and Turkey in order to make a ceasefire agreement possible.⁶⁵ At the end, peace was restored and Athens recalled Grivas, as well as the 10.000 Greek soldiers that were located in Cyprus back to Greece; it is important to note that initially there were 11.000 Greek soldiers on the Island.⁶⁶

The first talks between the two sides on the Island started in 1968. These negotiations, in which the Turkish thesis was presented in the form of local autonomy, continued until the end of 1971. Negotiations were continued during the years 1972-1974 with the participation of experts from Greece and Turkey. These negotiations ended with the

⁶⁰ Also called the “Buffer Zone”, the “Green Line” was drawn on the city map by a British commander using a green pen during the first inter-communal violence in December 1963; it is also started being called Ceasefire Line or Attila Line after 1974 and it is still dividing the capital city of Cyprus, Nicosia to this day.

⁶¹ Source: Calame, J., & Charlesworth, E. R. (2012). *Divided cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, p.133

⁶² Mirbagheri, *op.cit.*, p.152

⁶³ Miltiadou, Coufoudakis, *op.cit.*, p. 47

⁶⁴ Richmond, O. P., & Ker-Lindsay, J. (2001). *The work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting peace and development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave., p.81

⁶⁵ Özdamar, Ö., Erciyas, O. (2020), Turkey and Cyprus: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Decisions during the Crises of 1964, 1967, and 1974, *Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 16, Issue 3, Pages 457–477*, p.466

⁶⁶ Richmond, O. P., & Ker-Lindsay, J., *op.cit.*, p.81

Greek coup d'état of July 15, 1974; which resulted in a set of incidents to erupt, which consequently lead to Turkey choosing to intervene militarily in Cyprus.⁶⁷

On July 15, 1974, when the second Greek military junta and its Greek Cypriot collaborators carried out a coup d'état against the president of Cyprus,⁶⁸ the British intelligence pointed to the fact that most of the leaders of the new Greek coup had a much closer attachment to Cyprus than the previous Junta.⁶⁹ This coup d'état made Turkey use Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee that states "...each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."⁷⁰ to launch a military intervention.

The Turkish military launched this first involvement on Cyprus in July 20, 1974;⁷¹ following the turmoil the Island was facing but also following the UN Secretary General's call to both parties to work for ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. Turkey's own response to the coup d'état on the other hand, was demanding from the UN to restore the "balance of forces" in Cyprus. As the situation did not improve, in a communication dated July 16-17, a Turkish representative stated that it was the UN who had the responsibility to take precautions to enable the restoration of the military balance of forces and to enable demilitarization. The representative added later with regards to the UN Security Council resolutions that recognition of a Greek-backed government in Cyprus was impossible, implying that the only legal administration on the Island at that moment was the Turkish Cypriot one, under the Vice-President. The representative further declared that Turkey retained the option to make use of the rights it had, granted by the 1960 treaties.⁷² Correspondingly, on July 20, the Turkish ambassador located in Nicosia informed the commander of UNFICYP that Turkish troops were planning to

⁶⁷ Cyprus (Historical Overview). (n.d.). Retrieved February 28, 2021, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-historical-overview_en.mfa

⁶⁸ Temel, B . (2013). Divided We Stand: A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Semi-Centennial Cyprus Dispute . *Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Dergisi* , 17 (40) , 1-14 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/cyprusstudies/issue/54295/736732> , p.3

⁶⁹ Asmussen, J. (2008). *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and conflict during the 1974 crisis*. Place of publication not identified: Bloomsbury Academic, p.17

⁷⁰ From Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Retrieved January 10, 2021, from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/page1-the-facts.en.mfa>

⁷¹ Savrun, E . (2018). Kıbrıs'ta Yunan Cunta Darbesine Karşı Türk Barış Harekâtının Belgelerle Kısa Tarihi . *Uluslararası Beşeri Bilimler ve Eğitim Dergisi* , 4 (9) , 258-273 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijhe/issue/39344/476084> , p.266

⁷² Richmond, O. P. (1998). *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot communities and the United Nations*. London: Frank Cass, p.115

intervene in order to counteract the moves of Athens and to put an end to the dispute for the Turkish Cypriots.⁷³ These developments demonstrate that the struggle for legitimacy and sovereignty in Cyprus now held a special significance, and that the help of the Turkish troops sent to the area enabled the Turkish Cypriot side to control a larger proportion of the Island than before. This military intervention by Turkey is also important as it implies the Greek Cypriot side no longer represented the Turkish Cypriot side.⁷⁴ This first intervention by Turkey lasted for two days and in the end, finalized with the UN call for a cease-fire. At this point, the majority of the international community were in favor of Turkey's actions as the Treaty of Guarantee clearly outlawed forming a union with another country, in other words; enosis.

As the situation would not calm, the UN Security Council started passing certain resolutions; in fact, it passed eight resolutions^{75 76} between July 20 and August 30. As the balance of power was now shifted to strongly being in favor of the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek Cypriot side demanded measures of empowerment from the UN Security Council in order to assure the resolutions it wanted adopted to be enforced. Turkey agreed to a ceasefire on July 22; however, it was not a formal ceasefire but a de facto one.⁷⁷ This marks the end of the first of the two military interventions of Turkey on Cyprus.

At the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the next day, the Deputy Prime Minister argued that the area seized so far was not sufficient for Turkey to protect the Turkish

⁷³ The Situation in Cyprus. (n.d.). Retrieved February 28, 2021, from https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/72-74/Chapter%208/72-74_08-6-The%20situation%20in%20Cyprus.pdf, p.151

⁷⁴ Richmond, O. P. (1998)., *op.cit.*, p.115-116

⁷⁵ These resolutions are S/RES/353 (1974), S/RES/354 /1974, S/RES/355 (1974), S/RES/357 (1974), S/RES/358 (1974), S/RES/359 (1974), S/RES/360 (1974) and S/RES/361 (1974), respectively.

⁷⁶ Source: Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1974. (n.d.). Retrieved February 28, 2021, from <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1974>

⁷⁷ Kejanlioğlu, D., & Carpentier, N. (fall 2019). The Discursive Construction of War and Peace in the Books of Three Turkish Commanders on the "1974 Cyprus Peace Operation". *Journal of Cyprus Studies*, 20(44), 19-46, p.33

Cypriots. It was added that Turkey was not able to trust the UN to assure the safety of the Turkish Cypriots.^{78 79}

On July 25 and August 8, 1974, the first and second Geneva Conferences gathered based on the UN Security Council Resolution 353 - Article 5 that foresee talks to be held among guarantor states to reinstitute the constitutional order. However, these talks also ended up not finding a solution to the problem.⁸⁰ The failure of these talks lead the Turkish Cypriot side to declare the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” unanimously, in February 1975. According to the interviews conducted by scholars Birol A. Yeşilada and Ahmet Sözen, the reason behind this development was that the Turkish Cypriot side wanted to get the Greek Cypriot administration to start another round of talks that would potentially enable a federal system for the Island in the future.⁸¹

Under such circumstances on August 14, 1974, Turkey launched another military operation, which this time resulted in the creation of the Green Line as we know it today. According to Richmond and Key-Lindsay; this newly-created line has “changed UNFICYP’s *modus operandi*”. They explain this change in their book *The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development*. It is argued in the book that instead of trying to keep the peace throughout the enclaved communities of Cyprus like it used to, UNFICYP now had the aim of maintaining peace and stability by protecting the integrity of the Green Line.⁸² The creation of the Green Line also signifies an ethnic division in Cyprus; following the ceasefire, 160.000 Greek Cypriots; in other words, a quarter of the Greek Cypriot population had become refugees. Similarly, 51.000 Turkish

⁷⁸ This distrust in essence was related to the Nicosia Airport incident, too; when it was declared by the UN Security Council in its meeting that took place on July 22-24 that Nicosia International Airport became an UN-controlled area. This declaration and the new situation of the airport was not welcomed by the Turkish government, as the Turkish government argued that taking control of the airport was not among the responsibilities of the UNFICYP. In the end though, the Nicosia International Airport was left under UN control. Politicians such as the Turkish Cypriot politician Mehmet Barut argues that the operation on the airport may have been launched on purpose by the UNFICYP as it was well aware Turkey would not risk a conflict with UNFICYP itself and that “if Turkey did take the airport the Greek Cypriot National Guard would have been crushed”.

⁷⁹ Richmond, O. P. (1998), *op.cit.*, p.116-117

⁸⁰ Tripartite Conference & Geneva Declaration. (2015, November 20). Retrieved January 10, 2021, from <https://unficy.unmissions.org/tripartite-conference-geneva-declaration>

⁸¹ Yeşilada, Birol & Sozen, Ahmet. (2002). Negotiating a Resolution to the Cyprus Problem: Is Potential European Union Membership a Blessing or a Curse?. *International Negotiation*. 7. 261-285. 10.1163/138234002761384990, p.265

⁸² Richmond, O. P., & Ker-Lindsay, J., *op.cit.*, p. 83

Cypriots left their homes in the southern part of the island, either seeking sanctuary in the British Bases or making their way north.⁸³

Intercommunal talks resumed following the declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975; which are elaborated in the next chapter. However, on May 13, 1983, when A/RES/37/253 was adopted at the UN General Assembly, the Turkish Cypriot side found it necessary to declare the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”; in order to resume the talks that were in a deadlock.⁸⁴ The particularity of this decision is that it demonstrates how the second Turkish military operation in Cyprus is viewed; and that the international community as well as the UN itself view it as an illegitimate attempt of “occupation”.⁸⁵ The decision called for the “withdrawal of all occupation forces” in Cyprus and emphasized the Cypriot people’s rights of settlement and property.⁸⁶ Under such circumstances on November 15, 1983 the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus Assembly declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” unanimously.⁸⁷

4.2.ROAD TO ANNAN PLAN AND EU ACCESSION OF CYPRUS

After the major rupture that took place in 1974 and that cut the Island in half, UN continued with its efforts to find a solution. However, these initiatives failed to produce any results; and former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim launched a mission of good offices in April 1975. Several talks were held for 10 months as part of this attempt, and while humanitarian issues were effectively discussed between the two communities, territorial issues remained unresolved. However, UN managed to get the two sides to sign an agreement in February 1977, which is called the 1977 High Level Agreement. This was of crucial importance because it ended up with both sides agreeing on the future of

⁸³ Faustmann, H., & Varnava, A. (2009). *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan plan and beyond*. London: I.B. Tauris., p.16

⁸⁴ Bostancı, M . (2015). Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti’nin ilânı ve buna yönelik tepkilerin Türk kamuoyundaki yankıları . *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* , 34 (57) , 317-356 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/tariharastirmalari/issue/47745/603066>, p.317

⁸⁵ Uras, U. (2012, June 8). Kıbrıs sorunu ve Türkiyeli göçmenler. Retrieved February 07, 2021, from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber-analiz/kibris-sorunu-ve-turkiyeli-gocmenler>

⁸⁶ A/RES/37/253. (1983, March 13). Retrieved December 22, 2020, from <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/cyprus-37-253.php>

⁸⁷ İsmail, S. (1998). 150 soruda Kıbrıs sorunu. Çağaloğlu, İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınevi, p.176-179

Cyprus as a federation made up of two states (bi-zonal) and two communities (bi-communal) and signing the four-point agreement on this issue.⁸⁸

Another attempt of UNFICYP was the Twelve Point Proposal that was drafted by Canada, United States and Great Britain and was presented by the Secretary General to both of the two sides. This proposal also, in accordance with the 1977 High Level Agreement, envisaged a federation of two states. According to this, the establishment of a “bicameral parliament” was foreseen. The establishment of this bicameral parliament would mean that there would be an upper and lower chamber, and that the old system of a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president would be kept. Another change in relation to the number of troops on the Island is that the number of Greek and Turkish troops were to be reduced to 1960 levels – 950 and 650 respectively. While this agreement was in line with the 1977 Agreement, the Greek Cypriot side rejected it claiming it did not guarantee their three basic freedoms, which are the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the freedom/right to own property.⁸⁹

In summer 1979, UN Secretary-General Waldheim came up with the proposal of an “Interim Agreement”. The Agreement foresaw contributions to the peace process by tackling important issues; such as the lifting of economic embargoes imposed on the TRNC side. Furthermore, it led the way for new negotiations to open under Secretary-General’s Special Representative; Hugo Gobbi. These talks collapsed because the Turkish Cypriot side had reservations over the term “bi-zonality” as they interpreted it as a confederation. The Turkish Cypriot side wanted the two parties to have their own sovereignty, while the Greek Cypriot side was in favor of having a central sovereign state. While these talks collapsed soon after the discussions over bi-zonality and sovereignty, they touched upon important issues; which are about “improving levels of goodwill between the two sides, return and resettlement of displaced Greek Cypriots in Varosha, constitutional matters and territorial issues”.⁹⁰

Right after the major change in 1983; in other words right after the unilateral declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, attempts of the UN to find a solution in Cyprus were resumed. In March 1984, the fifth Secretary-General of the UN; Javier Perez

⁸⁸ Ker-Lindsay, J. (2005). *EU accession and UN peacemaking in Cyprus*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.15

⁸⁹ Faustmann, H., & Varnava, A, *op.cit.*, p.16-17

⁹⁰ Ker-Lindsay, J., *op.cit.*, p.16

de Cuellar came up with a five-point suggestion for confidence building measures and presented it to the leaders of the two communities in a new round of talks that followed. A blueprint was reached after three rounds of discussions; according to the blueprint Cyprus would become a “bi-zonal, bi-communal and non-aligned” federation. Additionally, it was decided that Turkish Cypriots would keep 29% of their federal state while all foreign troops would have to leave Cyprus. In January 1985, the two leaders met for their first face-to-face talks in six years. The general belief was that the meeting was aimed at reaching a final settlement, whereas for the President of the Republic of Cyprus; Kyprianou it could be a chance for further negotiations to decide on other sovereignty issues, too. As a result, this UN attempt ended with the talks collapsing. Furthermore, while Kyprianou was heavily criticized both by the public opinion and abroad; Denktaş won a “public relations victory”.⁹¹

Despite the collapse of the talks, de Cuellar continued with his efforts to find a solution for the dispute in 1986 by proposing both sides a “Draft Framework Agreement” in March 1986. This plan was similar to the previous one in the sense that it envisaged the creation of an “independent, non-aligned, bi-communal and bi-zonal state of Cyprus”. However, the Greek Cypriot side was not satisfied with the proposal as their argument was that the plan did not deal with the increasing number of Turkish settlers nor did it deal with the Turkish military forces present. In the end, both sides rejected the proposal.⁹²

Negotiations resumed on 1988, and on June 1989, the UN Secretary-General came up with a “set of ideas” which was quickly rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side as the essence of the document was against Turkish Cypriot claims. Cyprus formally applied for accession in the European Community in 1990, and in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the UN Secretary-General. He then proceeded to work on said “set of ideas”; however, the Turkish Cypriot side again rejected the creation of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. Denktaş was especially reluctant to accept these attempts, as he believed such attempts were out of UN Secretary-General’s authority.⁹³

So far, there had been no full agreement reached since neither side wanted to have their “red lines” crossed; Greek Cypriots agreed only on a federal government and not a

⁹¹ Ker-Lindsay, J. (2005), *op.cit.*, p.17-18

⁹² *Ibid.*, p.18

⁹³ Faustmann, H., & Varnava, A, *op.cit.*, p.18-19

confederal one while Turkish Cypriots wanted the texts to imply some sort of confederal government features. In the meantime, Greece-United States relations were tense since Greece had withdrawn from the military command structure of NATO between the years 1974-1980. Therefore, because of a shift of focus of the Western Bloc to the dissolution of USSR and to the Iraqi problem, there was not much of a solution attempt in Cyprus during that time. Another development that is important to mention is 1979 Iranian Revolution; as USA lost an ally because of this Islamic revolution, Turkey became even more important to the Western Bloc since as mentioned before, the last thing the Western Bloc had on the agenda was to have Soviet influence/bases on Cyprus. Therefore, one can easily argue that until the emergence of European Union agenda on the Island and Annan's Plan, there was no substantial efforts to find a concrete solution on the island, as the United States did not want to upset its ally, Turkey by placing too much pressure. Of course, in the absence of the political settlement to the Cyprus problem explained above, UNFICYP has stayed on the island and undertook the duties of supervision of ceasefire lines, maintaining of the Green Line, undertaking humanitarian activities while supporting the good offices mission of the Secretary-General to this day.⁹⁴

The second half of 1990's prove to be a complete new turn for Greco-Turkish relations; in other words, the 1999 Helsinki Decision of the EU with regards to accepting Turkey as a candidate state coupled with the so-called "earthquake diplomacy" enabled an atmosphere of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. This rapprochement manifested itself in the domain of Cyprus as well; there were multiple attempts with the aim of enhancing peace that showed promise. These are in a way considered the "catalytic framework of the European Union" for some scholars, particularly through the accession process of Cyprus that started in 1990 with Cyprus officially submitting its application for full membership to the EU and later in 1995 EU's agreement to open accession talks with Cyprus. The United Nations and newly emerging civil society in Cyprus were trying to use EU accession as a catalyst on the Island; they were trying to make the whole island part of EU ideally when the accession finally takes place. As argued by Harry Anastasiou,

⁹⁴ UNFICYP Fact Sheet. (n.d.). Retrieved November 03, 2020, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unficyyp>

the former nationalistic mentality towards the division of the island was slowly being replaced by the idea of Europeanisation and “citizenship”.⁹⁵

In such a political and social atmosphere came the “Basis for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”, known commonly as Annan Plan. On November 11, 2002, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced his plan for the reunification of Cyprus, which is said to be one of the most “elaborate and sophisticated” proposals prepared for the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus. For some scholars such as Anastasiou, the negotiations for the Plan, which had started in late 1999, were extremely elaborate and detailed. He argues that taking into consideration the complex background of the conflict, the grievances, and sufferings along with the fears, concerns and interests of each community, the general structure of the Annan Plan may be argued to be a “masterpiece in conflict-resolution diplomacy”.⁹⁶ Equally, before the Plan was taken to the referendum, it was seen as the ultimate basis of a potential settlement of the Cyprus problem.⁹⁷ The proposal presented an elaborate plan of more than 150 pages covering the basic concepts of the Cyprus dispute that can be listed as “governance, territory, refugees, property and security”, and left room for further negotiations and closure details. The Annan Plan previewed the creation of a “loose bi-zonal Swiss-modeled federation” building primarily on the original treaties that established the independent Cyprus; which are the Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance.⁹⁸

The Plan which was later taken to referendum was eventually rejected by the 75,8% Greek Cypriot vote that was against the plan (while 64,9% of the Turkish Cypriot voters ended up approving of the Plan)⁹⁹; however the emergence of a Cypriot civil society as well as the reasons behind the failure of the Annan Plan are worth noting. Furthermore, the The Hague Talks that Annan had organized with the two leaders of the two communities in order to advance with the diplomatic process for the Annan Plan had also ended up collapsing. However, it should be highlighted that from the declaration of the Plan onwards in Cyprus, a strong Turkish Cypriot civil society had emerged and started to do

⁹⁵ Anastasiou, H. (2008). The broken olive branch nationalism, ethnic conflict and the quest for peace in Cyprus. Volume Two, Nationalism versus Europeanization. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, p.3

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.52

⁹⁷ Özersay, K. (2004). Annan Planı ve Federal Yasaları Çerçevesinde Doğu Akdeniz Yetki Alanları . Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi , 59 (03) . . DOI: 10.1501/SBFder_0000001561, p.203

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.53

⁹⁹ Theodoulou, M. (2016, December 29). The peace processes: 2004 annan plan. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from <https://cyprus-mail.com/2016/12/29/peace-plans-2004-annan-plan/>

numerous peace rallies. It is argued that those were in a way against the “long-time virtually undisputed” leader of TRNC, Rauf Denktaş as the majority of Turkish Cypriots worried they would end up being left out of the EU. Indeed, if both communities voted in favor of the Annan Plan, the Treaty of Accession to the EU would be signed on April 16, 2003 and that the full-complete integration would take place on May 1, 2004 as a unified Cyprus.¹⁰⁰ Because of the refusal of the Plan following the Referendum, Cyprus became a member-state of EU on May 1, 2004 with the whole Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus people along with the TRNC people that were born there before the 1974 interventions, holding a Cypriot passport. However, Denktaş and the Turkish Armed Forces in Turkey had worries about the territorial integrity of the Island in case of the acceptance of the Plan as according to the Plan, Varosha (Maraş or Kapalı Maraş) and Morphou (Güzelyurt) were going to be under the jurisdiction of the Greek Administration of Northern Cyprus, along with 42 villages. A particular concern the former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök had was regarding the order of territorial waters designed as part of the Annan Plan. He declared:

“According to international maritime customs, warships can pass through territorial waters without any military purpose, just like merchant ships. This rule is applied in this way in the Aegean. However, such an article has been added to this law, which is contrary to custom. This is far from being acceptable not only for us but for all countries. As this prevents the ships' freedom of movement more or less to some extent.”¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Anastasiou, H. (2007). Nationalism as a Deterrent to Peace and Interethnic Democracy: The Failure of Nationalist Leadership from the Hague Talks to the Cyprus Referendum. *International Studies Perspectives*, 8(2), 190–205, p.195

¹⁰¹ Kıbrıs'ta oy verme işlemi başladı. (n.d.). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2004/04/printable/040424_cyprus_referandum.shtml




Figure 1: Map showing how the territorial division would be like if the Annan Plan were accepted ¹⁰²

¹⁰² <https://defactostates.ut.ee/media-gallery/lightbox/26058/42927?lang=et>. (n.d.). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://defactostates.ut.ee/media-gallery/lightbox/26058/42927?lang=et>



Figure 2: Map of Cyprus showing current north-south divide¹⁰³

It is also argued that one of the main reasons behind the failure of the The Hague Talks and then that of Annan Plan is the ethno-centric nationalism that both Rauf Denktaş and Greek Cypriot leader Tasos Papadopoulos are known to favor. As such, even Kofi Annan designated Denktaş as one of the elements behind the failure of the talks leading up to the Referandum, as part of his 2003 Cyprus Report presented to the Security Council.¹⁰⁴ However, the Turkish Cypriots were known to overwhelmingly support the Plan. Therefore, arguably the opposition of Turkish Cypriots and the disapproval of the Justice and Development Party government that is elaborated further in the discourse analysis section, led to the electoral defeat of Denktaş in December 2003.

Lastly, according to Anastasiou, it was evident that the main reason for the failure of talks was the lack of sufficient political will by the leaders of the two sides to formally commit to a referendum on the Annan Plan. This, however, was not the only reason for the failure of the Cyprus talks. Upon announcing the collapse of the talks, Annan stated that the search for a Cyprus settlement had been “overshadowed by the atmosphere of crisis and

¹⁰³ Oktay, D. (2007). Analysis and Review of the Divided City of Nicosia, Cyprus, and New Perspectives. Geography (Sheffield, England). 92. 10.1080/00167487.2007.12094203, p.231

¹⁰⁴ Duran, H . (2015). BM VE AB ÇERÇEVESİNDE KIBRIS KONUSUNA GENEL BİR BAKIŞ . Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi , (21) , . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/dpusbe/issue/4763/65442>, p.134-135

great anxiety that is affecting the whole world, the question of Iraq and its disarmament". This demonstrates that especially Great Britain and the United States were unable to fully support the talks before they had collapsed in 2003 and that these international factors have affected the future of the Plan tremendously.¹⁰⁵

In the end, the referendum did take place on April 24, 2004 which is just one week prior to the full accession of Cyprus to the EU; the Greek Cypriot voters rejected Annan Plan V which is the fifth modified/revised version of the plan by voting 24,2% for and 75,8% against the Plan. However 64,9% of the Turkish Cypriot voters ended up approving of the Annan Plan.¹⁰⁶ Cyprus then became a member-state of the EU on May 1, 2004; but not as a reunified country. Furthermore, at the Helsinki Summit on 1999, Turkey had lifted its reservation that made settlement in Cyprus conflict a condition of Cyprus' accession to EU in exchange for Turkey's EU candidacy;¹⁰⁷ meaning while Cyprus conflict happened to be an internal conflict of the EU with its full accession, there legally was no barrier in its accession as a divided country.

Turkey's position regarding the Cyprus agenda in its foreign policy changed dramatically with the beginning of 2000s; it has become one that prioritizes the EU agenda, which is discussed in the chapter 6.3 of the thesis. Although this change is discussed in an elaborate way in the relevant chapter and sub-chapter of the thesis, it is still important to get a basic understanding of the post-Annan period and what the developments of this period meant for Turkey's EU agenda.

The Post-Annan developments are characterized by a few breaking points of this newly transformed foreign policy; the Loizidou legal case^{108 109} being a prominent example. Although the case is dated December 18, 1996,¹¹⁰ it still is an important one to

¹⁰⁵ Anastasiou, *op.cit.*, p.67

¹⁰⁶ Miltiadou, Coufoudakis, *op.cit.*, p.21

¹⁰⁷ Çelenk, A.A. (2007) The Restructuring of Turkey's Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party's Struggle for Power, *Turkish Studies*, 8:3, 349-363, DOI: 10.1080/14683840701489092, p.354

¹⁰⁸ A legal case dealing with the rights of refugees in Cyprus who demand returning to their former homes and properties. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Ms. Loizidou and all other refugees wishing to return to their former homes, do have a right to do so. The Court also ruled that Turkey was violating Loizidou's human rights and therefore made Turkey pay a compensation of 1.2 million Euro.

¹⁰⁹ Source: 2005-12-23 de Standaard. (2007, July 4). Retrieved February 28, 2021, from <https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=37467>

¹¹⁰ Necatigil, Z. M. (n.d.). SAM PAPERS NO. 8/99- THE LOIZIDOU CASE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION BY ZAIM M.NECATIGIL - Ankara, November 1999. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from

demonstrate how the European Court of Human Rights had decided to rule a decision that is in favor of the plaintiff (Ms. Tatiana Loizidou) and consequently how the EU agenda of Turkey was faced with various challenges, all related to Cyprus. Another two of these breaking points are the December 17, 2004 Decisions taken at the Brussels Summit and the October 3, 2005 Negotiating Framework. The first document made the resolution of the Cyprus problem a prerequisite for Turkey's EU accession (Although it was not part of the list of prerequisites of the Copenhagen Criteria)¹¹¹. The second document made the support of Turkey to finding a solution in Cyprus one of the indicators for Turkey's advancement in terms of its EU accession negotiations.¹¹² As can be seen by these breaking points, during these years Turkey found itself faced with Cyprus as a real and solid challenge when it came to the EU accession talks.¹¹³ The hydrocarbon discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean and disputes over the maritime delimitation zones also added another dimension to the conflict; therefore changing the foreign policy discourse of Turkey during the following years accordingly.

[http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-loizidou-case_-a-critical-examination-by-zaim-m_necatigil_-november-1999.en.mfa#:~:text=This%20article%20is%20a%20critical,\(Girne\)%20in%20North%20Cyprus](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-loizidou-case_-a-critical-examination-by-zaim-m_necatigil_-november-1999.en.mfa#:~:text=This%20article%20is%20a%20critical,(Girne)%20in%20North%20Cyprus).

¹¹¹ TMMOB. (2005, June 1). 17 Aralık 2004 Brüksel Zirvesi Kararlarına Yönelik Bazı Saptamalar. Retrieved February 28, 2021, from <https://www.imo.org.tr/resimler/ekutuphane/pdf/9763.pdf>

¹¹² TÜRKİYE İÇİN MÜZAKERE ÇERÇEVE BELGESİ ve İlgili Diğer Belgeler. (2005, October). Retrieved February 28, 2021, from

https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/AdaylikSureci/MuzakereCercevesi/Muzakere_Cercevesi_2005.pdf, p.4

¹¹³ Bulunç, A. Z. (winter 2007). Kıbrıs Politikasının Annan Belgesi ile Başlayan Kırılma Noktaları. Akademik Barış, 1, 73-112., p.73

5. ADDED DIMENSION OF THE CONFLICT: NATURAL GAS

5.1. WHAT IS EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE? SOME DEFINITIONS

This chapter aims to explain some of the key definitions regarding the delimitation of marine zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is this very question on the delimitation of marine zones such as how the energy reserves are to be extracted and distributed that cause further tension in surrounding states' relations. Furthermore, these definitions and in later chapters the drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean are important to study as they all affect the Turkish Foreign Policy and its eventual securitization regarding Cyprus that is studied with the help of discourse analysis. Without having a basic understanding of the concepts discussed in this chapter, it would be hard to understand the developments as well as the Turkish discourse regarding Cyprus particularly after 2009 fully, when the questions on the discovery of hydrocarbons became a lot more prominent.

Regarding the hydrocarbons, the first big discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the area took place in 2009, at a time when the world's energy needs were increasing steadily. That discovery was made on the offshores of Israel; 90 km west of the port city of Haifa, called Tamar Field.¹¹⁴ After this discovery, which is said to supply 60% of Israel's power generation¹¹⁵, the focus of oil and gas companies have quickly shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean. Several other discoveries were also made including that of the 2010 Leviathan Gas Field discovery, the 2011 Cyprus Block 12 discovery, the 2015 Zohr Field discovery, and 2018 Calypso Field discovery.¹¹⁶ However, while these developments signified that an energy supply as big as 122 trillion cubic feet were found,¹¹⁷ it also meant that the region, which already constitutes an unresolved dispute between Greece and Turkey, has now become even more conflict-prone.

¹¹⁴ Tamar Gas Field. (n.d.). Retrieved May 8, 2020, from <https://www.delekdrilling.com/natural-gas/gas-fields/tamar>

¹¹⁵ Tamar Natural Gas Field: IIF - Israel Infrastructure Fund. (n.d.). Retrieved May 8, 2020, from <https://www.iif.co.il/assets/tamar-natural-gas-field/>

¹¹⁶ Boustros, E. (2018). Natural Gas in East-Mediterranean Basin – Changing the Energy Landscape., p.5

¹¹⁷ Schenk, C.J., Kirschbaum, M.A., Charpentier, R.R., Klett, T.R., Brownfield, M.E., Pitman, J.K., Cook, T.A., and Tennyson, M.E., 2010, Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean: U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2010-3014, p.1.

In order to understand how the delimitations are regulated, one must first understand the basic concepts of international maritime law, which are exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. Although both territorial sea and exclusive economic zone are concepts that authorize coastal states certain rights to regulate and exploit the water within their jurisdictions, they are much different in the sense that the EEZ grants states rights both on living and non-living resources which is a nuance that is also elaborated in the following paragraphs.

First, it is important to understand the brief historical developments in the law of the sea. The law of the sea, in a very broad sense, is defined as the whole of the rules regulating the legal regime of the sea areas, their various uses and the navigation of ships at the sea. The law of the sea, for centuries leading up to the mid-XIX century, used to be dealt with common law. However, with the Industrial Revolution and countries needing more raw materials, countries started to consider using their marine areas in addition to their land areas; which had led to a need of coming up with written regulations dealing with states' rights in their territorial waters as well as international waters. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in 1958, for this very need. Four conventions were adapted and opened for signature at this conference; which are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf.¹¹⁸ The importance of this conference and the conventions lay in the fact that they are the first international body of text dealing with issues related to the use of waters.¹¹⁹

The **exclusive economic zone (EEZ)** is defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as an area in which a sovereign state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, whether they be living or non-living. It starts where the territorial sea ends and stretches out to 200 nautical miles. In simpler terms, it signifies an area of 200 miles starting from the end of territorial waters where the coastal state is authorized to carry out economic activities above and below the

¹¹⁸ Anlar Güneş, Ş., 2007. Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi Ve Deniz Çevresinin Korunması. Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 56(2), p.5

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3

sea. This, however does not signify that the state has absolute sovereignty but that it can exercise exclusive rights over the natural resources.¹²⁰

The main difference between continental shelf and exclusive economic zone is that the continental shelf is determined by the geographical structure of the coastal state, and that while the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone give the coastal state the same sovereign rights such as oil maritime exploration and extraction, the exclusive economic zone is more inclusive. The scope of the rights granted by the exclusive economic zone also includes living resources such as fishing activities in the body of water.

The main disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean are caused by disputes regarding the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the surrounding states. In order for the coastal states to be able to enjoy exclusive economic zone rights, they need to first declare their EEZ and publish a map clearly demonstrating the EEZ or a list of the coordinates of the EEZ, and later hand this document in to the UN Secretariat (which is not the case for continental shelf). In cases when there appears to be a dispute between two or more states, the International Court of Justice foresees the states that are part of the dispute to sign a treaty. However, it is important to note that there is no such rule or regulation in the international law stating that an EEZ cannot be declared unilaterally.¹²¹

5.2.NATURAL GAS DRILLING ACTIONS

The year 2009 is a turning point for Cyprus as the first big discovery of hydrocarbon reserves were made in Israeli waters 90 km west of the port city of Haifa, at Tamar field. The company that undertook this operation is US-based Noble Energy - along with Israeli partners -, which thanks to this discovery not only discovered the largest hydrocarbon reserve in the area, but also has managed to make the largest contribution to Israeli power supplies (by supplying 60% of Israeli energy needs from the hydrocarbon extracted from this field).¹²² This big discovery understandably shifted the focus of Eastern

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.43-44

¹²¹ Kıta Sahanlığı Ve Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge Nedir? | BAU | Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi. (2020). Retrieved 17 August 2020, from https://bau.edu.tr/haber/15945-kita-sahanligi-ve-munhasir-ekonomik-bolge-nedir#_ftnref3

¹²² Parshall, J. (2020). Noble Leviathan Project Offshore Israel Gives ‘Opportunity To Change a Region’. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://pubs.spe.org/en/jpt/jpt-article-detail/?art=3834>

Mediterranean countries to the area. Only one year after the discovery in Tamar field, in December 2010 hydrocarbons were discovered in Leviathan field too, which is located in Israeli waters 29 km south-west of Tamar¹²³ which was followed by several others containing important amounts of natural gas; such as the 2011 Cyprus Block 12 discovery, the 2015 Zohr Field discovery, and 2018 Calypso Field discovery.¹²⁴

It is essential to highlight that even before these important discoveries in the area, that the Eastern Mediterranean dispute regarding rights over waters were still relevant. The main reason behind this is that the countries of the region have always had a constant need for energy supplies. Turkey for instance is a country that has a history of being a highly energy-dependent country. The data suggests that in 2020, 75% of primary energy consumption of Turkey is provided by external resources, and that its dependency on natural gas is larger than its dependence on petroleum.¹²⁵ Similarly, Cyprus had signed an Exclusive Economic Zone agreement with Egypt in 2003, showing that the disputes in the area were still relevant long before the major gas discoveries took place.¹²⁶ Additionally, Cyprus has signed an EEZ Agreement with Lebanon in 2007 and with Israel in 2010. Another example to demonstrate the relevance of the issue at the beginning of the century would be the 2002 efforts of the Norwegian Northern Access ship to conduct seismic researches, which would later be prevented by the Turkish Naval Forces.¹²⁷

The discoveries of Tamar and Leviathan fields has led Cyprus to announce thirteen research parcels in the area in 2007¹²⁸ ¹²⁹, and to start its research drillings, which in turn made Turkey sign an Exclusive Economic Zone agreement with TRNC's Economy and

¹²³ Leviathan – History in the Making. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://www.nblenergy.com/operations/leviathan-progress-update>

¹²⁴ Boustros, E., *op.cit.*, p.5

¹²⁵ Enerji Sektörel Bakış (2020). Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/tr/pdf/2020/03/sektorel-bakis-2020-enerji.pdf>

¹²⁶ Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/EGY-CYP2003EZ.pdf>

¹²⁷ Yağcı, C. (2019). Türkiye-Libya Arasında İmzalanan Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge Andlaşmasının Sonuç ve Etkileri. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://kriterdergi.com/dosya/turkiye-ve-libya-arasindaki-anlasmanin-sonuc-ve-etkileri>

¹²⁸ Alhas, A. (2020). Energy resources in Eastern Mediterranean: an overview. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/energy-resources-in-eastern-mediterranean-an-overview/1504786>

¹²⁹ Doğu Akdeniz: KIBRIS AÇIKLARINDA Doğalgaz Arama krizi nasıl başladı, hangi ülke ne istiyor? (2019, May 10). Retrieved February 07, 2021, from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-48225246>

Energy Ministry in November 2011, designating its continental shelf and EEZ. Following the exclusive economic zone agreement, the TRNC Cabinet has granted Turkish Petroleum Corporation the license to search for hydrocarbons in TRNC's jurisdiction.¹³⁰ After dividing the area in thirteen parcels, Cyprus also got in licensing agreements with international operators. To be more specific, there is Italy's Eni, South Korea's Kogas, France's Total, Israel's Delek Drilling, USA's Noble Energy and ExxonMobil, UK's BG, and Qatar's Qatar Petroleum all active in the parcels.¹³¹




Figure 3: Map showing the thirteen parcels in Cyprus' claimed waters.¹³²

The clashes of interest regarding the continental shelves between Turkey and Cyprus take place at parcels number 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7; and the clashes of interest between TRNC and Cyprus take place at parcels number 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 13. This signifies that the only

¹³⁰ Türkiye Petrolleri A.O. | TPAO. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <http://www.tpa.gov.tr/en/turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus>

¹³¹ Granted Licences | Hydrocarbons Service. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/hydrocarbon.nsf/page16_en/page16_en?OpenDocument

¹³² Yanarocak, D. (2018). Turkey at the Eastern Mediterranean Crossroads - THE JERUSALEM INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (JISS). Retrieved 30 August 2020, from <http://tekmormonitor.blogspot.com/2018/12/turkey-at-eastern-mediterranean.html>

parcels where TRNC's or Turkey's and Cyprus' claims of right do not collide are parcels number 10 and 11.¹³³




Figure 4: Map showing the overlap between Cyprus' and TRNC's parcels¹³⁴

¹³³ Tiryakioğlu, M. (2019). Doğu Akdeniz'de enerji denklemi. Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/dogu-akdenizde-enerji-denklemi-1/1474137>

¹³⁴ Aphrodite's gift: Can Cypriot gas power a New dialogue? (2016, August 22). Retrieved February 07, 2021, from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/cyprus/aphrodite-s-gift-can-cypriot-gas-power-new-dialogue>, p.23




Figure 5: Map demonstrating the Eastern Mediterranean gas fields.¹³⁵

Israeli involvements and its rapprochement with Cyprus has also been a marking point for the states in the region and their drilling efforts. Especially for Turkey, who had recently started to actively conduct research drillings as well, the Israeli involvements signified a lot, and made Turkey take securitizing actions in the area. Hence, it is important to know the events that led up to the Israeli-Cyprus rapprochement in the domain of hydrocarbons in the area.

The Gaza flotilla raid incident that took place in May 2010 demonstrated perhaps the peak point of the sovereignty issues of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has also showed

¹³⁵ Solutions, E. (2018). Egypt holds keys to East Mediterranean gas. Retrieved 30 August 2020, from <https://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1466463730/egypt-holds-keys-to-east-mediterranean-gas/2018-02-23>

how Turkey-Israeli relationships, which were already tense due to Israel's Gaza Operation that took place at the end of 2008, got even tenser. Regarding Israel's Gaza Operation the strain it put on Turkey-Israel relations; Turkey's then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's reaction at the World Economic Forum -also known as Davos Summit- showing his dissatisfaction of this Israeli operation to Israeli President Shimon Peres has been an additional factor.¹³⁶ The Gaza flotilla raid was about a flotilla of six ships carrying aid to Israeli and Egyptian-blockaded Gaza, and which was in international waters about 80 miles (130 km) from the Israeli coast when the incident had happened. Commandos using ropes descending from helicopters landed on the Turkish-owned Mavi Marmara ship, the largest of the flotilla, causing clashes to break out. Although whether the Israeli commandos opened fire immediately after landing on the ship or after being attacked is still disputed, in the end 9 activists of Turkish citizenship and 1 American of Turkish origin died.¹³⁷

Under such circumstances and crises between the two countries, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Athens in August 2010, also becoming the first incumbent Israeli prime minister to visit Greece.¹³⁸ This diplomatic sign of rapprochement caused Turkey to face an Israeli-Cypriot camp in the Eastern Mediterranean, as for some scholars the Gaza flotilla raid incident and Cyprus' help to Israel greatly ensured this Israeli-Cypriot rapprochement to take place.¹³⁹

An exclusive economic zone agreement between Israel and Cyprus was also signed in 2010; enabling Israel to conduct its drillings in Tamar and then in Leviathan fields.¹⁴⁰ Another important visit took place right after the discoveries of hydrocarbons, when Israeli President Peres visited Nicosia in November 2011, and when Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Danny Ayalon joined him.¹⁴¹ During this visit, Peres declared that the rights over the natural gas reserves found in Israeli and Cypriot EEZs belonged to the two

¹³⁶ Recep Erdogan storms out of Davos after clash with Israeli president over Gaza. (2009). Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/30/turkish-prime-minister-gaza-davos>

¹³⁷ Mavi Marmara: Why did Israel stop the Gaza flotilla?. (2016). Retrieved 17 August 2020, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/10203726>

¹³⁸ Tziampiris, A. (2015). *The emergence of Israeli-Greek cooperation*. New York: Springer, p.86

¹³⁹ Tziampiris, A. (2014). The Beginning of Energy Cooperation Between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. *The Emergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation*, 135–162. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-12604-3_7 , p.146

¹⁴⁰ UNTC. (n.d.). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002802d12b7>

¹⁴¹ Melakopides, C. (2016). *Russia-Cyprus relations: A pragmatic idealist perspective*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan., p. 138

states.¹⁴² In about 3 months, another historical visit by Prime Minister Netanyahu took place when he officially visited Cyprus with the Israeli Minister of Energy and Water, where they discussed potential collaborations in energy.¹⁴³ Furthermore, this visit enabled a military cooperation deal between Cyprus and Israel to be signed and ratified. This deal would mean that Israeli military ships and planes would be authorized to use Cypriot military bases, in order to protect the drillings happening in Cypriot and Israeli EEZs,¹⁴⁴ demonstrating an important step towards the militarization of the issue.

All of these developments, and the fact that in January 2020 Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Jordan and Palestinian Authority all signed the East Med Gas Forum's (EMGF) foundation charter in Cairo meant that the transportation of Eastern Mediterranean gas would probably use a different route than Turkey. The Forum would act as a platform for natural gas cooperation in the region that would transform the region into an international energy hub. However, Turkey and the TRNC were excluded from the Forum.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline -also known simply as EastMed; which is a natural gas pipeline planned to transport the natural gas directly from the Eastern Mediterranean to mainland Greece via Cyprus and Crete¹⁴⁶- also demonstrates how Turkey would be left out when it comes to the transportation of the gas. The gas transported to Crete through EastMed would then be transported through Poseidon and IGB pipelines to Italy and other European regions.¹⁴⁷ According to the plans, the pipeline would take about 7 years to build¹⁴⁸, however in January 2020 the EastMed Pipeline

¹⁴² İsrail'den Türkiye'ye "hodri meydan". (2011). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/israilden-turkiyeye-hodri-meydan-19160158>

¹⁴³ Netanyahu eyes energy cooperation in Cyprus visit. (2012, February 16). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-netanyahu-cyprus-idUSL5E8DG04420120216>

¹⁴⁴ Tanchum, M. (2015) A New Equilibrium: The Republic of Cyprus, Israel and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean Strategic Architecture, Occasional Paper Series. Cyprus: PRIO Cyprus Centre and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

¹⁴⁵ Geropoulos, K. (2020, January 17). East Med Gas Forum makes Cairo HQ. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.neweurope.eu/article/east-med-gas-forum-makes-cairo-hq/>

¹⁴⁶ Harper, J. (2019). Israel-Hamas undersea gas spat in full swing: DW: 12.07.2019. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.dw.com/en/israel-hamas-undersea-gas-spat-in-full-swing/a-49442656>

¹⁴⁷ Eastmed. (n.d.). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed>

¹⁴⁸ Greece, Israel, Cyprus sign gas pipeline deal, angering Turkey. (2020, January 02). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/greece-israel-cyprus-sign-gas-pipeline-deal-angering-turkey-200102142853126.html>

accord was signed in Athens between Israel, Cyprus and Greece;¹⁴⁹ materializing the collaboration between the three countries now more than ever.



Figure 6: Map showing the predicted route of Eastern Mediterranean natural gas pipeline¹⁵⁰

Additionally, as the natural gas and its transportation became even more important for surrounding countries and as competition grew, Turkey has gone on to increase its seismic activities in the region; resulting in several NavTex¹⁵¹ declarations to be issued by both Turkey's Directorate General of Coastal Safety and Republic of Cyprus' Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) Larnaca. Mostly, Turkey's ships called "Oruç Reis", "Ataman" and "Cengizhan" and their seismic drilling activities have been declared along with the activities' coordinates through these NavTex declarations; as well as declarations

¹⁴⁹ Deveci, M. (2020, July 19). Israel approves deal on EastMed gas pipeline project. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-approves-deal-on-eastmed-gas-pipeline-project/1915650>

¹⁵⁰ Karakurt, N. (2017). CYPRUS ENERGY CORRIDOR | Energy Policy Turkey. Retrieved 30 August 2020, from <http://www.energypolicyturkey.com/cyprus-energy-corridor/>

¹⁵¹ Navigational Telex (NavTex) can be defined as a system that allows for transmitting urgent marine safety information to ships worldwide. Navigational and meteorological as well as urgent marine safety information can be transmitted through this system to ships worldwide by coastal safety institutions of states.

in response to Cyprus' JRCC Larnaca regarding Cyprus' sovereignty. These declarations are elaborated more in detail in the discourse analysis part of the thesis.

These developments all work to demonstrate how important the natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean is for the surrounding countries; and how its drillings has come to become one of the most defining factors for Turkey's Foreign Policy decisions regarding Cyprus over the last decade.



6. EVOLUTION OF DISCOURSE REGARDING CYPRUS IN TURKEY

The political context of Turkey's ruling elite from the beginning of the conflict to date is important to study in order to understand the foreign policy decisions that were made regarding the developments on the international scene. Understanding this would eventually shed light on the foreign policy decisions of Ankara regarding the developments on Cyprus, as well as how these developments in Turkish Foreign Policy have eventually lead to the securitization of the issue. In this chapter, the general political developments of Turkey both on domestic and international domains are discussed in four time periods first; which are 1960-1983, 1983-2002, 2002-2011 and 2011-2020. Sub-chapters dedicated to discourse analysis under all four of these chapters are introduced, as they work for the demonstration of securitization and de-securitization processes of Turkish Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus.

Several sources were used in these sub-chapters. The official website of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs offers a vast archive consisting of official ministry statements. Additionally, the official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey also offers both official statements coming directly from the President of Turkey, and official statements of relevant meetings of the National Security Council which is the official government body of Turkey that advises the President about national security, military and foreign policy issues. The archives offered by these websites are the primary sources used in these sub-chapters. Secondary sources that are used are news agencies' articles. The author translates some statements retrieved from these sources that are not available in English, and some statements that are available in English marked at the source as "unofficial translation" are left unchanged.

6.1. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1960-1983

A number of substantial changes in foreign policy as well as security areas, which eventually also had effects on Cyprus issue and its securitization, marks the period between 1960 and 1983 in Turkey. In this sub-chapter then, the general look of Turkish

Foreign Policy regarding the main issues on its agenda are summarized, as well as how the Cyprus issue came to be on the agenda of Turkish Foreign Policy.

However, in order to understand the latter and the developments in Cyprus that led to the securitization of Cyprus in Turkish Foreign Policy, how the issue was being dealt with earlier in Turkish Foreign Policy are elaborated.

Cyprus, or the issue of Cyprus was not at the forefront of Turkish Foreign Policy during the beginning of 1950s. As such, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time, Necmettin Sadak, declared in a speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly dated January 23, 1950, “There is no such issue called Cyprus issue” and that “Britain had no intentions to give the Island to another state”.¹⁵² These sorts of view regarding Cyprus in Turkish Foreign Policy were later consolidated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the newly elected Democrat Party Government of the time Dr. Fuad Köprülü, by his following statement:

“For now, an issue as the Cyprus issue is not in our focus. Because the Greek Government is not officially preoccupied with Cyprus. Consequently, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not officially aware of the existence of such an issue.”¹⁵³

However, the situation shifted when in mid-1950s EOKA started its attacks in order to reach enosis, and when the 6-7 September 1955 Incidents^{154 155} took place in Turkey. These developments lead for the primary Turkish Foreign Policy actors of the time to transform their focus on gaining some control over Cyprus during the declaration of the independent Republic of Cyprus, and hence Turkey joined the Zurich and London Conferences that led the Republic of Cyprus to be declared as an independent state on 1960.

The declaration of an independent Republic of Cyprus did not end the constitutional and administrative disputes between the two communities, nor did it put an end to the claims

¹⁵² Albayrak, M . (2000). Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikaları (1950-1960) . Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi , 16 (46) , 249-275 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/aamd/issue/54908/752536>, p.250

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.250

¹⁵⁴ The 6-7 September Incidents or the Istanbul Pogrom is the organized mass attack on the Greek minority living in Istanbul on 6-7 September 1955. The Incidents took place following a fake news that circulated the day before, which claimed that Greeks had bombed Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki.

¹⁵⁵ Kolektif. (2005). 6-7 Eylül Olayları Fotoğraflar-Belgeler: Fahri Çoker Arşivi. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.

of enosis. The intercommunal violence that reached a peak point in 1963 and the 1967 crises -which are all elaborated in the previous chapters- lead for the emergence of a strong public opinion in Turkey. There was a strong public opinion and protests especially regarding these developments in Cyprus, so much so that when Special Representative of US President Cyrus Vance was sent to Ankara to manage USA's shuttle diplomacy, his plane was not allowed to land on Ankara Esenboğa Airport by the protestors. The plane then had to land on the military airport.¹⁵⁶

Another important point regarding Cyprus and the Turkish Foreign Policy atmosphere around it during this time period is that following the intercommunal violence¹⁵⁷ that broke out in 1963, a military intervention did not happen just yet, however the Turkish military was still concerned about the Turkish Cypriots' security and safety. In fact, Turkey did send Turkish jets to Cyprus in 1964, in order to ensure peace, stability and a ceasefire on the Island.¹⁵⁸

Under such circumstances, the Johnson letter to Turkey demonstrates the perceived need of a new approach in Turkish Foreign Policy. The Johnson Letter is a letter written by the US President Lyndon B. Johnson towards Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on June 5, 1964; and which can be summarized as the US stating it may not be able to defend Turkey in case of a clash with USSR¹⁵⁹ in Cyprus. In other words, this period along with other developments on the international scene such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the following decision of the US to withdraw its Jupiter Missiles from Turkey show that Turkey should not rely on US alone on its national security.¹⁶⁰ One of the most significant reflection of this shift can be seen in the 1965 Government Program of the Justice Party: "Being committed to an alliance and an ideology does not prevent the development of relations with neutral countries that belong to other alliances and ideologies, or that

¹⁵⁷ Details about the intercommunal violence and the reasons behind it are elaborated under chapter 4.1 titled "Brief Background of the Dispute in Cyprus"

¹⁵⁸ "5 Rum Şilebi ile Bir Hücumbot Batırdık Bir Jetimiz Düştü Pilot Kurtuldu", *Hürriyet*, 09.08.1964

¹⁵⁹ Akman, H . (2012). Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti İlanından Johnson Mektubuna, *Kıbrıs Sorunu (1960-1964). Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* , (22) , 65-98 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iugaad/issue/34334/381914>, p.88

¹⁶⁰ İzmir, B . (2017). İki Müttefik, Bir Kriz: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Jüpiter Füzeleri Krizi . *HUMANITAS - Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* , 5 (10) , 177-192 . DOI: 10.20304/humanitas.320533, p.188

constitute the majority today.”¹⁶¹ This phrase from the government program itself demonstrates that Turkey was to implement a multifaceted foreign policy during this period. It can also be argued that it implies Turkey was going to share closer relations with the Soviet Bloc while still being a part of the Western Bloc. Another important emphasis of the same phrase is on the Non-Aligned Countries and the importance Turkish Foreign Policy places on its relations with them at the peak of the Cold War. Indeed on March 25, 1967 Turkey signed an Economical and Technical Cooperation Agreement with USSR, demonstrating in a way the placement of economic development at the heart of Turkish Foreign Policy.¹⁶²

On the other hand, the prominence of the military was very evident during this period. The aftermath of the 1960 coup d'état got the military a seat on the foreign policy-making table. Some scholars say the features of this period can be defined as a “tutelary democracy”.¹⁶³ In fact, while the 1961 General Elections enabled a civilian government to be on power; the military was still present in policy-making processes in various forms. An example of these forms is that the establishment of the National Security Council (which can be defined as the body that declares the opinions of military to the Council of Ministers on security-related issues) also took place via the 1961 Constitution.¹⁶⁴ Another military-based institution that was founded with the 1961 Constitution was the Senate of the Republic, which would be in effect until the 1980 coup d'état.¹⁶⁵

The year 1971 is of significant importance while studying the Turkish political context of 1960-1983; the multifaceted foreign policy Turkey adopted in 1960s was interrupted with the 1971 military memorandum, but continued shortly after with the 1973 General Elections. The Republican People's Party won these elections and came to power, its leader being Bülent Ecevit. The security approach Ecevit chose to adopt was based on

¹⁶¹ Neziroğlu, İ, & Yılmaz, T. (2013). Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümetler-Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri Cilt 4 (27 Ekim 1964-26 Mart 1971). TBMM Basımevi, p.2204-2205

¹⁶² Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Genel Kurul Tutanağı 21. Dönem 1. Yasama Yılı 42. Birleşim. (1999, July 30). Retrieved December 23, 2020, from https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic_yazici?P4=1298&P5=B&page1=35&page2=35

¹⁶³ Kaya, M , , . (2013). VESAYET DEMOKRASİSİ VE TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ . Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi , 15 (2) , 491-538 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/akuibfd/issue/1618/20274>, p.491-492

¹⁶⁴ Gürpınar, B., “Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Dış Politika”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 10, Sayı 39 (Güz 2013), s. 73-104, p.79

¹⁶⁵ Özgişi, T. (2012). Önsöz [Preface]. In Türk Parlamento Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Senatosu. Ankara: TBMM Basımevi.

“good relations with neighbors and regional countries” as well as “mutual trust”. He believed having mutual confidence with other states was more important than armament.¹⁶⁶

This period starting from 1973 was characterized by a rapprochement with the Middle Eastern countries amidst the 1973 oil crisis and the arms embargo USA imposed on Turkey following the 1974 Cyprus intervention. Under such circumstances, Turkey tried sharing close ties with countries it has “historical and traditional ties with”. Nevertheless, while Turkey was diversifying its potential allies on the foreign policy front, it did not cut off ties with NATO and the Western Bloc, either.¹⁶⁷

On the other hand, Turkey’s 1974 Cyprus intervention and the arms embargo imposed by USA, coupled with the oil crisis made Turkey look for alternative sources economically; the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline was opened on 1977 following an energy cooperation agreement with Iraq, enabling Turkey to be less energy-dependent on one source only.¹⁶⁸

6.1.1. Discourse regarding Cyprus

Cyprus in particular, because of its geostrategic location have always been prone to having more significance than it may seem; especially when it comes to national security issues of the surrounding states. Coupled with the fact that it has a history of conflict, the narrative of key Turkish Foreign Policy actors have changed and been in a securitization and de-securitization loop over the past decades.

A shift of Cyprus’ positioning in Turkish Foreign Policy as well as how it came to be on its main agenda is discussed in the previous sub-chapter, and it can be said the shift can be observed clearly in the mid-1950s. Expressions such as “national cause” started to be used to signify Cyprus by key Turkish political actors. Furthermore, before Cyprus became an independent state, Turkish Prime Minister of the time Adnan Menderes is

¹⁶⁶ Ecevit, B. (1978). Turkey's security policies. *Survival*, 20(5), 203-208.
doi:10.1080/00396337808441766, p.205

¹⁶⁷ Laçiner, S. (2010). Turkish Foreign Policy (1971-1980): Ideologies vs. Realities. *Uluslararası Hukuk Ve Politika*, 6(21), 61-100., p.62-65

¹⁶⁸ Kandemir, E , Tuncer, C . (2020). IRAK- TÜRKİYE ENERJİ İLİŞKİLERİNİN BÖLGENİN EKONOMİK GÜVENLİĞİNE ETKİLERİ . *Uluslararası Ekonomi Siyaset İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Dergisi* , 3 (1) , 75-89 . Retrieved from <http://www.dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijephss/issue/51653/659664>, p.83

known to have said in 1955: “Cyprus is Turkish”¹⁶⁹; implying that Cyprus belongs to the Turks. Additionally, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time; Fatin Rüştü Zorlu described the ideal order for Turkish Cypriots regarding Cyprus as a “cooperation beyond federation”.¹⁷⁰

Following the independence of Cyprus as an aftermath of decolonization, and the intercommunal violence that broke out soon after, the key Turkish actors used the rights granted to Turkey as a guarantor state by the founding treaties of the Island, and considered military intervention for the safety of the Turkish Cypriots, too. In fact, İnönü stated on June 2, 1964 that a military intervention to Cyprus is being planned.¹⁷¹ Although a military intervention on a full-scale never took place until the year 1974, President of the USA Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to İsmet İnönü. Many interpret that letter as using a harsh tone and warning Turkey not to send its troops to Cyprus, and that if Turkey did that and faced an attack by the USSR, then the NATO would not be there to back Turkey. Johnson added in his letter that such a military intervention would mean a clash between two NATO-allies, and that Turkey could only use the arms provided by the USA as a means of defense.¹⁷² İnönü’s response to the Johnson Letter on the other hand, demonstrates that Turkey wanted to make use of its rights as a guarantor state according to international law, and that partition was not what was being sought after. In his letter, İnönü reminded President Johnson of the article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, added that Turkey will not act in opposition to international law and stated:

“The expressions in your message that imply Turkey's intentions of intervening in the Island are based on purposes of partition, I met with great astonishment and deep sorrow.”¹⁷³

İnönü also said in another instance, when Rauf Denктаş opposed to publishing a joint declaration with the Greek Cypriot side in order to stop the bloodshed:

¹⁶⁹ “Kıbrıs Türktür”, Milliyet, 25.08.1955

¹⁷⁰ Fırat, M. M. (1997). 1960-71 arası Türk dış politikası ve Kıbrıs sorunu. Cebeci, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, p.64-65

¹⁷¹ Atun, A. (2018, February 19). 1964 Johnson Mektubu'nun Perde Arkası. Retrieved December 26, 2020, from https://tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/50196/1964_johnson_mektubunun_perde_arkasi

¹⁷² Gülen, A. (2012). İnönü Hükümetleri'nin Kıbrıs Politikası (1961-1965). Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi, 50, 389-428., p.410

¹⁷³ Armanoğlu, F. (1991). Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, p.273

“People are dying and you are still dealing with words, the main thing is that forces to stop the attacks reach Cyprus immediately.”¹⁷⁴

Several other attempts of negotiation were carried out by both sides during the following years; one of the most well known ones being the Acheson Plan facilitated by USA. Representative of USA, Dean Acheson tried to come up with two plans for a solution. The plans were about partitioning Cyprus between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus but they failed.¹⁷⁵

The 1967 Crisis that happened when a military regime seized power in Greece and when claims of enosis resurrected on the Island, made Turkey bring the importance given to stability arising from the Founding Treaties of Cyprus as well as the rights of the Turkish Cypriots to the forefront once again. Regarding this, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared:

“The Cyprus issue has not been able to be solved until this day primarily because Greece has not considered any other option but the annexation of the Island. Turkey will never consent to the annexation of the Island.”¹⁷⁶

Similarly, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Zeki Kuneralp stated about the 1967 Crisis and the talks that were carried out between Turkish and Greek leaders: “Turkey is in favor of a solution that would protect the rights and interests of all sides”.¹⁷⁷

The talks that were carried out between Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers on September 9-10, 1967 collapsed, as Turkey did not accept proposals for enosis in exchange for a Turkish base on Cyprus.¹⁷⁸

Finally, on 1974, Turkey decided to send its troops to Cyprus. The first intervention and the second one both used a similar narrative regarding these activities. The narrative emphasized that the interventions had the aim of bringing peace to Island; and not just to the Turkish Cypriot side, either. Ecevit said on July 21, 1974: “Turkish planes are not

¹⁷⁴ Batur, N. (2007). *Yeniden yaşasaydım: Rauf Denktaş*. Şişli, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, p.238

¹⁷⁵ Brands, H. (1987). America enters the Cyprus tangle, 1964. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 23(3), 348-362. doi:10.1080/00263208708700711, p.356

¹⁷⁶ Kıbrıs'ın dünü-bugünü-yarını. (1995). İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı., p. 29

¹⁷⁷ Kırıl, Ş. (2018). 1967-1974 Döneminde Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Türkiye ile Yunanistan’ın Kıbrıs Politikaları. *Journal of History Culture and Art Research*, 7(2), 444-460. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.7596/taksad.v7i2.1437, p.449

¹⁷⁸ Şener, B. (2020). 1967 Kıbrıs Krizi’nde Siyasi, Askerî ve Hukuki Boyutlarıyla Türkiye’nin Zorlayıcı Diplomasi Uygulaması. *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 16(31), spring, 271-304., p.281-282

throwing bombs, but goodwill messages.”¹⁷⁹ Similarly, he said regarding the military interventions:

“We are actually going to the Island not for war, but for peace, and to bring peace not only to the Turks, but also to the Greeks.”¹⁸⁰

At the Turkish Grand National Assembly Ecevit also portrayed the intervention as follows:

“The operation that the Turkish Armed Forces embarked on; in order to bring peace, tranquility and freedom to Cyprus, in order to counter the attack on the independence and constitutional order of the Turks on the island, in order to secure the rights and safety of our beloved kinsmen have started early this morning.”¹⁸¹

Similarly, Head of General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces General Semih Sancar said in his message:

“Great Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish Nation! At this very moment that my message is published, the heroic Turkish Armed Forces; being at the disposal of our nation and with the power received from the supreme presence, and based on the rights granted by the treaties, is carrying out a joint operation in order to ensure peace in Cyprus and in the region, and to ensure the safety of brothers and sisters in foster land.”¹⁸²

Additionally, former Ambassador Ecmel Barutçu who served as Head of Cyprus-Greece Department at the time of 1974 intervention to Cyprus portrayed the 1974 intervention by Turkey in his book as follows:

“Turkey was faced with a big opportunity. The coup d’État against Makarios would enable the sympathy of international community towards Makarios to be directed to Turkey. Never before during the Cyprus dispute there has been such opportune times for Turkey. If this opportunity is missed, history will never forgive those who miss it. What happens in Cyprus is Latent Enosis. Turkey must intervene fast.”¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Ecevit: “Türk Uçakları Bomba Değil İyi Niyet Mesajları Atıyor”, Hürriyet, 21.07.1974

¹⁸⁰ Arslan, M. (2020, July 20). Kıbrıs Barış Harekatı'nın 46'ncı yıl dönümü. Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/kibris-baris-harekatinin-46nci-yil-donumu/1916076>

¹⁸¹ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Gizli Oturum). (1974, July 20). Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/GZC/d13/c013/gcz13013003.pdf>, p.19

¹⁸² Tarakçı, M. (2010). Kıbrıs barış harekâtı. İstanbul: Hiperlink, p.90

¹⁸³ Barutçu, E. (1999). Hariciye koridoru: Hatıralar. Sıhhiye, Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, p.48

These speeches above are important in order to demonstrate how the steps of securitization through speech acts are taking place; as an existential threat is mentioned for the Turkish Cypriots on the Island. The speeches above are also worth noting because they demonstrate how an emergency measure is applied, by launching a military operation. In other words, they demonstrate how an existential threat in the form of “an attack on the independence and constitutional order” of the Turkish Cypriots is emphasized as well as how an emergency measure that would not be able to be taken if there were no existential threat mentioned, is effectively being taken.

The emphasis on peace is also of essential importance when studying the discourses of this time, as it may be interpreted as having been internalized by the Turkish Cypriots equally; so much so that July 20 which is the day Turkey started sending its troops to the Island is celebrated as Peace and Freedom Day in TRNC.

However, start of the following decade showed a shift in Turkey’s attitude towards Cyprus. The coup d’état in Turkey was not like the one carried out in 1960, the hierarchy and structure of it was different; leading to a new constitution to be written in Turkey and the National Security Council to be restructured, too. This period is marked by a prominence of the military in Turkey following neo-liberal economic policies of Özal. This means while the military side was rather conservative concerning the Cyprus issue, Turgut Özal rather viewed Cyprus as an obstacle for economic development of Turkey. Özal’s attitude towards Cyprus at the time was revolving around the idea that it was not a good idea to “keep it as a ‘national cause’ as it was an obstacle for foreign capital to reach Turkish markets.”¹⁸⁴

On the other hand, the National Security Council, which became a dominant actor of Turkish Foreign Policy, also issued certain press releases regarding the main foreign policy problems of Turkey. What is particular about the language National Security Council chose to use during this time is that, it chose to use words that enable the securitization of certain threats, especially external threats. Initially, the Council was focusing on “national defense” and defending the state as a whole; but then on 1980s, it started using the expression “national security” more in its press releases. The external threats that were mentioned mainly dealt with the issues with Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria

¹⁸⁴ Özal, T., & Barlas, M. (1996). Turgut Özal'ın anıları. İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, p.131

and NATO. The discourse that was used was revolving around state of emergency and martial rule. However, as the years passed by the declarations made by the Council simultaneously diversified. They were still emphasizing “national security” but this time, they had more of an aim of becoming an active party of decision-making processes regarding foreign policy issues and were relatively less focused on internal threats.¹⁸⁵

This shift concerning the National Security Council is observed in the case of Cyprus in a clear way. During the 1980’s, Özal wanted to make certain compromises regarding Cyprus; however, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces was cautious and simply waited and observed the talks through the National Security Council, and checked if there were any compromises made.¹⁸⁶ However in 1990s, there was a shift in Turkish military’s involvement in decision-making processes as explained above, and the end of the Cold War enabled Turkey to start giving importance to its strategic presence on Cyprus; rather than Turkish Cypriots’ safety and rights or livelihoods. Another wave of securitization took place during these years. In fact, while former Turkish President of the military regime Kenan Evren said “Turkey seized more territory than initially planned as it thought those territories would be given back later by diplomatic means”, Ecevit criticized these words of him. Ecevit highlighted the historical rights Turkish Cypriots had on the Island and added that seizing more territory than needed would endanger the peace in Cyprus.¹⁸⁷ This example demonstrates once more the highlight on peace and Turkish Cypriots’ rights during the 1970s and the shift that took place in narratives of Cyprus during the following years.

6.2. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1983-2002

The 1980 coup d’état in Turkey marks the root cause of the political shift in Turkey, compared with 1960s and 1970s. This period was characterized by a surge of the neo-liberal policies on the international scene; this wave of neo-liberalism evidently equally influenced Turkey. The importance given to economy and finances during the past 20

¹⁸⁵ Gürpınar, B. (2013) “Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve Dış Politika”, *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt 10, Sayı 39, 73-104, p.96-98

¹⁸⁶ Uslu, N. (2004). *Turkish foreign policy in the post-cold war period*. New York: Nova Science, p.414

¹⁸⁷ Ecevit: Kıbrıs'ın tamamını alabilirdik. (2002, November 21). Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/ecevit-kibris-in-tamamini-alabilirdik-5197440>

years still existed; but now it was more than a means of enabling national security and being able to afford arms. It was now the very essence of most of the policies adopted. This priority given to economy along with the Turkish capital opening up to foreign markets eventually revived the US emphasis on almost all levels of decision-making processes and enabled a rather pro-American public opinion that associated ideas and concepts such as innovation and technology with USA.¹⁸⁸

On the security side, PKK terror attacks along with ASALA attacks reached their peak around mid-1980s. The most prominent security concerns of the time then revolved around these two threats. This eventually strained Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, causing a shift from the political situation of the previous two decades.¹⁸⁹

These developments caused Turkey to bend towards economic neo-liberalism when it comes to Turkish capitals and foreign markets; and at the same time a rather conservative foreign policy shaped by the security threats the country was facing.

The resurgence of the military was also prominent during this time. While mostly the civilian government dealt by the neo-liberalism side of the coin, the national security issues was handled by the military; and to be more specific, by the impact of the National Security Council. It was until the 1983 General Elections in Turkey that the National Security Council was even more prominent in decision-making processes. Most of the functions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Senate was allocated to the National Security Council during the military prominence of the time; furthermore, the functions and capacities of the President was given to the President of the National Security Council, who was Kenan Evren. Additionally, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces was given responsibility to declare opinion on the security aspects of international agreements; however, the National Security Council really may be interpreted as one of the core elements of policy-making of the time.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Karahanoğulları, Y . (2019). Türkiye'de Neoliberalizmin Kuruluş Süreci: 1980-1994 . Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi , 74 (2) , 429-464 . DOI: 10.33630/ausbf.545324

¹⁸⁹ Dursun, S . (2008). Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Algılamasındaki Değişim: 12 Eylül 1980 Askeri Müdahalesi Sonrası Dönem . Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi , 7 (16) , 421-433 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ctad/issue/25239/266858>, p.429

¹⁹⁰ Duran, B., Inat, K., & Ulutaş, U. (2012). Türk dış politikası yıllığı. Ankara: SETA, p.56

This period until the 1990s can be summarized as Turgut Özal being a key decision-maker in the civilian economical neo-liberal issues, and the military with National Security Council being the key decision-making actor in terms of security issues.

Furthermore, Turgut Özal became President of Turkey with the 1989 Presidential Elections, which is the same year as when the USSR collapsed. He served as the President until he passed away on 1993 and followed a policy that rather emphasized shared religious views, historical ties and the common legacy of Ottoman Empire with other countries and interpreted it as being the leader of the Muslim world; meaning he started placing the emphasis on identity rather than only economic concerns. However, Özal did not reject the Western world completely with this approach; rather he believed Turkey, becoming the leader of the Muslim countries, would have a key role among the Western countries, too.¹⁹¹

Regarding the developments in Cyprus, Özal attempted at a partial disarmament of the Island in order to reach a settlement. The reasons behind these attempts were Özal's perception of Cyprus issue as being an obstacle to Turkey's accession to European Economic Community (later to be named EU) as well as an obstacle to Turkey's integration in the US-led neo-liberal world. Therefore, he believed that the "national cause" approach to the issue was ineffective and that it needed to be abandoned.¹⁹²

Another importance of Cyprus along with the Aegean Crises Turkey had with Greece was about the Turkish candidature to European Economic Community; the Community did not accept the full accession of Turkey on 1989 because of the problems Turkey had with Greece and because the collapse of USSR shifted the agenda focus of the Community substantially. Even though the full accession of Turkey was rejected, the efforts for an economic integration was still present on both sides. The Community which was about to transform to EU with a more prominent political role among member-states declared that the relations with Turkey would be based on the Ankara Agreement dated 1963, meaning that it would be based on economic integration.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Daban, C . (2017). Turgut Özal Dönemi Türkiye Dış Politikası. Sosyal Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi , 17 (33) , 77-96 . DOI: 10.30976/susead.327659, p.86

¹⁹² Ataman, M . (2003). Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış . Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi , (2) , 49-64 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/bilgisosyal/issue/29113/311468>, p.56-57

¹⁹³ Türkiye-AB İlişkilerinin Tarihçesi. (2020, February 12). Retrieved December 22, 2020, from <https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=111>

The security perception of the 1990s changed from that of the previous years; the series of articles retired Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ published on Milliyet Newspaper titled “Two and a Half War Strategy” demonstrates the shift in this security perception. In his article, Elekdağ states that Turkey is surrounded by security threats from all around and within. He essentially states that Turkey is threatened by PKK terrorist organization as an internal threat and threatened by Greece and Syria as external threats.¹⁹⁴ This sort of approach to security is called “Sevres Syndrome”, and it enabled a rupture in the foreign policy approach of Özal; making way for Kemalist approaches to be more prominent.¹⁹⁵ On the other hand, secularism was also emphasized because of the domestic political turmoil; the 1990s proved to be a period in Turkish political history when coalitions were formed and when the prominence of the Army was seen in decision-making processes. The mechanisms that were used by the military to be influential in decision-making processes were the National Security Council and the “National Security Policy Document” which is a document prepared mostly by General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces. The importance given to secularism reflected itself in the approach taken to Welfare Party, and political Islamist approaches were mostly stopped while rapprochement with Western countries were observed. An example of these rapprochements is the Turkish-Israeli one.¹⁹⁶

All in all, secularism and national security were effectively highlighted during the 1990s. Regarding Cyprus and EU; while Cyprus issue was brought to table by Greece during the accession talks of Turkey, EU focused on improvements in the human rights domain as one of the prerequisites of Turkey’s accession. Cyprus again proves to be an important example in order to demonstrate the political atmosphere of the time; the security crises began when Greece and Cyprus signed a “Common Defense Doctrine” in 1993. It reached a peak when Imia/Kardak Crisis took place on December 1995.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴ “İkibuçuk Savaş Stratejisi”, Milliyet, 02.12.1994

¹⁹⁵ Baskın Oran, “Türk Dış Politikasının Kuramsal Çerçevesi”, Baskın Oran (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1, 13. Baskı, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008, p.235-236

¹⁹⁶ Balcı, A . "Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası ve İsrail: 1990'lar ve 2000'lere İlişkin Bir Karşılaştırma". Ortadoğu Etütleri 2 (2016): 117-136, p.120

¹⁹⁷ Yılmaz, B . (2019). Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Yeni Güvenlik Algıları Çerçevesinde Zorlayıcı Diplomasi: S-300 Füzeleri Krizi. Barış Araştırmaları ve Çatışma Çözümleri Dergisi , 6 (1) , 1-32 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/yalovabaccd/issue/51168/666796>, p.20

Nevertheless, perhaps the incident that caused the Greco-Turkish relations to strain to full extent was the events that led to the capture of PKK terrorist organization leader Abdullah Öcalan. On January 29 and February 1, 1999; Öcalan demanded refuge in Greece. Greece then proceeded to send Öcalan to its Kenya Embassy and Öcalan was captured there carrying a Greek passport. Although this resulted in a partial purge among Greek bureaucrats that had radical views towards Turkey, and that this caused another period of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey following the consequent earthquakes in both countries, it was still a peak moment in the relations of two countries.¹⁹⁸

Finally, the year 1999 proves to be important in the recent history of Turkey because both the August 17, 1999 earthquake and the Helsinki Summit took place during this year. Turkey lifted its reservation that made settlement in Cyprus conflict a condition of Cyprus' accession in exchange for Turkey's EU candidacy at this very summit. As a result, Turkey's foreign policy and security agenda changed, and turned into being about Europeanization and economic cooperation. In fact, Vice Prime Minister of the time Mesut Yılmaz stated that national security should not be an obstacle to progress; demonstrating the downwards trend of national security-based approach in policy-making, once again.¹⁹⁹

Regarding the 1999 earthquake; Turkey suffered an earthquake on August 17 and only about twenty days later, on September 7 Greece suffered one. The two countries sent aid to each other, which enabled this phenomenon to be called "earthquake diplomacy", and the relations between the two countries got closer once again. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time, İsmail Cem was equally influential in this shift that took place following the capture of Öcalan which led to this security threat coming from Syria to lose its effectiveness. The EU candidature of Turkey, which led to concepts such as human rights, peace, democracy, rule of law to be the dominant concepts, had an impact on the shift, too. Another important point regarding the EU agenda of Turkish Foreign Policy in the meantime was the emergence of a strong public opinion in favor of the EU accession of Turkey. Such that multiple NGOs as well as the public formed a movement called "Europe Movement 2002"; the aim of the movement was to conduct advocacy

¹⁹⁸ Berberakis, S. (2020, November 1). Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında deprem diplomasisi tekrarlanacak mı? Retrieved December 22, 2020, from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-54768581>

¹⁹⁹ Tabuları yıkarız. (2001, August 04). Retrieved December 22, 2020, from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/tabulari-yikariz-5279041>

activities in favor of the EU candidature among Turkish policy-makers during the 2002 Copenhagen Summit.²⁰⁰

6.2.1. Discourse regarding Cyprus

The 1990s in Turkey were marked by the increase of PKK and ASALA terrorist organizations' attacks. Furthermore, on 1999 Abdullah Öcalan who is the leader of PKK terrorist organization was caught in Greece's Kenya Embassy demonstrating a peak point of the rise of tension between Greece and Turkey that started in the beginning of the decade. Additionally, the end of the Cold War meant that the international community's agenda was preoccupied with different topics than the frozen conflict in Cyprus.

The securitization of the issue accelerated when Greece and Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus signed a "Common Defense Doctrine" in November 1993, which in turn lead to the proposed installation of two Russian-made air defense S-300 missiles in the southern side of Cyprus, in 1997-1998.²⁰¹ This perhaps marks the peak of securitization, hence the discourse used by Turkish key Foreign Policy actors show strong signs of securitization. An example of this securitizing speech is that of former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz regarding the S-300 missiles as the S-300 missiles had a range of 250 km, meaning their deployment would not only change the balance of military power on the Island between the two communities but also risk being a security threat to Turkey²⁰²:

"S-300 missiles on Cyprus issue for us now ceased to be a matter of security of Greek Cypriots, it has turned into a matter of security of Turkey. There is nothing we would not do, even for our own safety."²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Aslanoğlu, E. (2020, September 23). Avrupa Hareketi 2002. Retrieved December 22, 2020, from <http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/177433.asp>

²⁰¹ Öztürk, O . (1999). Kıbrıs'ın Türkiye Bakımından Stratejik Önemi ve Füze Krizi . Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi , 1 (1) , 138-152 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/gaziuibfd/issue/28360/301552>, p.141

²⁰² Güranlı, Z. (1997, August 28). S-300 baskını. Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/s-300-baskini-39261690>

²⁰³ Sarıkaya, M. (1997, September 12). Mesut yılmaz: "S-300'ler Türkiye'yi Tehdit ediyor". Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/mesut-yilmaz-s-300ler-turkiyeyi-tehdit-ediyor-39264000>

Additionally, former Prime Minister (Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) Tansu Çiller and Minister of National Defense of the time Turhan Tayan said the missiles will be shot if needed.²⁰⁴

Turkey's strategic interests equally started being mentioning during these years. Former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mümtaz Soysal who served on July 27, 1994 – November 28, 1994 under Tansu Çiller Government for instance stated in a panel regarding Turkey's foreign policy, highlighting the strategic importance given by Turkey to Cyprus:

“Cyprus is not an ordinary piece of land; it has symbolic significance.” and added: “If Cyprus is lost, we, as a society, will suffer a great depression. We will suddenly lose the confidence we gained thanks to the victory we achieved in 1974. The demoralization is worse than anything else is. An army whose morale is broken cannot fight. The country will not be able to develop; it will start seeking help from others. Internal confusion will arise. This should be avoided.”²⁰⁵

The former approach which can be summarized as “not having a solution/deadlock is the solution”, and which is often attributed to Denktaş is replaced with National Security Council's emphasis on national interest and security in Cyprus. National Security Council on 2003 declared in a press release:

“Along with Cyprus and Iraq, all foreign policy developments regarding Turkey's full membership to the European Union has been extensively evaluated for Turkey's national interests.”²⁰⁶

Similarly on 1990's, Cyprus started being called once again as the “national cause” of Turkey. Former President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel highlighted the use of that expression along with “foster land”; they being used since the 1940-1950's. Although some Turkish Cypriot politicians have been against the use of expressions such as “foster land” when defining Cyprus as it may be thought to imply that it needs Turkey as a

²⁰⁴Gürsoy Mahdy, Z , Aksu, F . (2020). Türkiye ve Yunanistan Arasındaki Dış Politika Krizlerinde Karar Birimlerinin Siyasi Evren Algıları . Journal of International Eastern European Studies , 2 (2) , 505-549 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/jiees/issue/58859/832527>, p.525

²⁰⁵ Mümtaz Soysal: Kıbrıs'ın sembolik bir anlamı var. (2004, January 28). Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/mumtaz-soysal-kibrisin-sembolik-bir-anlami-var-5123041>

²⁰⁶ MGK 2003 Yılı Kasım Ayı Toplantısı. (2003, November 21). Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/2003-yili-kasim-ayi-toplantisi>

motherland to survive, Demirel always emphasized the rights of Turkish Cypriots along with Turkey's strategic interests. He criticized the stance taken by Turkey during Annan Plan and EU accession processes of Cyprus by stating:

“There is no point in gaining anything by sacrificing our own sister/brother. It feels like we gave up on Cyprus for the sake of Europe.”²⁰⁷

This sort of discourse demonstrates how Turkey views Cyprus as its own cause, and in terms of its own strategic interests; rather than a completely different and separate country. This can be interpreted as the stage of identification; meaning the audience is likely to view the issue as an issue belonging in the political sphere. Additionally, as words and expressions highlighting Turkey's national interests and security were used, the issue gradually started getting in the stage of mobilization; meaning the use of measures of a state of exception and other means would be more legitimate in the eyes of the audience as the issue started being perceived as a security issue.

Securitization of Cyprus conflict may have gone on well into the 2000's, however the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and Turkey's EU journey changed the situation almost completely.

The Turkish economic crisis of 2001, along with its EU candidature status granted in 1999; changed the approach adopted by key Turkish Foreign Policy actors towards Cyprus, too. With the Justice and Development Party coming to power with the 2002 Turkish General Elections, they supported the negotiations for the Annan Plan and declared in multiple instances:

“Not having a solution/deadlock is not the solution. We will not be the side fleeing from the table. Turkey will get rid of the shackles on its feet. We are following a win-win policy.”²⁰⁸

Erdoğan also showed his support for the Annan Plan during an interview in 2004:

“I am not a fan of the formation or development of a ‘give and take’ logic here. There is a different logic lying under this. Therefore, I will neither buy nor give. It also goes for

²⁰⁷ Demirel: Avrupa uğruna Kıbrıs'ı yedik gibi geliyor. (2004, April 09). Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/demirel-avrupa-ugruna-kibrisi-yedik-gibi-geliyor-5102178>

²⁰⁸ Erdoğan: Kıbrıs'ta çözüm AB'nin zıddı değil. (2003, November 18). Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-kibrista-cozum-abnin-ziddi-degil-184352>

the other party. Because then it gets harder to get results. I said, ‘Let's put it forward with a win-win approach, I will win, you will win in a fair way.’²⁰⁹

These sorts of speeches are very prominent regarding Cyprus during this time; there is a logic of “positive-sum game” according to game theory. It means it is different from the zero-sum game, which implies that a rational actor will seek to maximize its interests and will act accordingly at the expense of the other party; but that the rational actor may act in a way that enables it to maximize its interests, but also that of the other party, too. It means the former “not having a solution/deadlock is the solution” approach lost its influence and that it is replaced in a way with a “peaceful deadlock”; which is a term introduced by Professor of International Relations Süha Bölükbaşı in his book with the same name. In his book, he explains that in its recent history, Cyprus was faced with three crises or “depressions”, and that they were the 1964, 1967 and 1974 ones. He then proceeds to analyze and compare the Turkish Foreign Policy adopted for each of these three crises. He says, “Power is not always influence”; according to him, the 1964 crisis and the divergence of US and Turkish policies got Turkey alone on the international arena. He adds however, that in 1974 crisis Turkey acted more determinant as the military was better equipped for such an intervention capacity-wise and that the Watergate Scandal in USA side had an influence that favored Turkey’s military intervention, too. The author also says in some conflicts, it may have better results to leave the deadlock be in a peaceful way and to enable cooperation between both parties in non-political domains (such as technical, social, economic), and that this method may stop the deadlock to escalate to a definite deadlock. He also argues that what the UN follows in Cyprus is this very method, and that the right approach to finding a solution in Cyprus should be “peaceful deadlock” itself.²¹⁰

The approach that enabled de-securitization of the issue and that favored a “peaceful deadlock” and cooperation in non-political areas was supported by the media and business world, too; the National Security Council’s role in decision-making processes regarding foreign policy matters were almost replaced by organizations like TÜSİAD (Turkish

²⁰⁹ Erdoğan: Kıbrıs'ta başarmayı düşünüyoruz. (2004, February 17). Retrieved December 26, 2020, from <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogan-kibrista-basarmayi-dusunuyoruz-203233>

²¹⁰ Bölükbaşı, S. (2001). Barışçı çözümsüzlük: Ankara'nın ABD ve BM ile Kıbrıs macerası. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.

Industry and Business Association). One of the press declarations of TÜSİAD following the launch of talks for the Annan Plan, highlighted the importance given to EU agenda:

“It is a pleasant news that negotiations around Annan Plan have started as a result of the agreement reached on February 13, 2004 in New York, at the United Nations. If successful, these negotiations that would make a unified Cyprus become a member- state of the EU before May 1, 2004; would enable us to make use of the historical opportunity we are faced with today.”²¹¹

6.3. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 2002-2009

The year 2002 is when Justice and Development Party came to power for the first time and when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected in the November 3, 2002 General Elections as Prime Minister. While after becoming Prime Minister, Erdoğan was not part of the Parliament, he was still active in the shaping of Turkish Foreign Policy. However, the period between 2002-2009 in Turkish Foreign Policy is mostly shaped with Ahmet Davutoğlu’s foreign policy approach; which is explained in detail in his book titled “Stratejik Derinlik” (Strategic Depth) and published in 2001. During this timeframe, Davutoğlu served as Advisor of Justice and Development Party Government; according to him who later would become Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey’s Foreign Policy needed to adopt an Islamist approach as a valid ideological legacy of the Ottoman Empire. However, he did not mean Turkey needed to adopt a neo-Ottomanist approach as Davutoğlu criticized that approach for being “theoretically insufficient, superficial, and journalistic”.²¹²

Davutoğlu’s book suggested that the Kemalist foreign policy was problematic and that rights and responsibilities arising from the Ottoman Empire needed to be restored as during its founding, Turkey rejected any responsibilities and claims that arose from its Ottoman history.²¹³ According to this approach, this caused Turkey to end up in a pacified and defensive position on the international arena and that the solution was the

²¹¹ "Annan Planı temelinde Kıbrıs'ta müzakerelerin başlaması kararı memnuniyet vericidir". (2004, February 16). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.tusiad.org/tr/basin-bultenleri/item/1061-tusiad--annan-planı-temelinde-kıbrıs-ta-muzakerelerin-başlaması-kararı-memnuniyet-vericidir>

²¹² Ozkan, B. (2014). *Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism. Survival, 56(4), 119–140.* doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.941570, p.128

²¹³ Miranto, E. (2017). Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East: A Critical Constructivist Analysis. *Jurnal Politik Profetik, 5(2), 219-246.*, p.233

reconstruction of Turkey's own identity and political culture. In other words, Davutoğlu believed the solution was to reconstruct elements of religious and historical continuity through economic and cultural means between societies rather than through long bureaucratic processes.²¹⁴

The most prominent result of the adaptation of such an approach in Turkish Foreign Policy is the birth of an important principle that characterized the Turkish Foreign Policy of the time: zero problems with neighbors. This simply means abandoning the defensive perception that Turkey is surrounded with external threats as its neighbors, and following a “zero problem policy” with neighboring countries in the hopes that such an approach would strengthen Turkey's position as a global and regional energy, trade and human mobility hub.²¹⁵

Another important implication of this newly-adapted zero problem policy is the rejection of the security perception that was earlier constructed based on “Turkey's strong army”, and which places the emphasis on the role of military in politics and foreign policy in general. The new security perception was based on Turkey's “soft power” in the sense that social and economic partnerships became a lot more prominent. Vulnerabilities existed between Turkey and neighboring countries as both were dependent on each other in trade relations. The core pillars of this policy was based on the strengthening of cultural and historical ties between the countries of the region, the emerging liberal market and democratic institutions.²¹⁶

Strengthening of economic trade relations were needed at that time not only because of the shift in security perception; but also because on the global-scale there had been an important trend in the increase in neo-liberal policies since 1980s. However, all of these developments as a whole also signify important changes on the domain of military structure in the sense that the military became a lot less prominent in the shaping of foreign policy; an important example of this is the reconstruction of Turkey's National Security Council. Beginning from 2001, legal changes were made regarding the power of National Security Council such as the 2003 change that made the Council hold meetings

²¹⁴ Balcı, A. (2015). Dış politikada hesaplaşmak Ak Parti, Ordu ve Kemalizm. İstanbul: Etkileşim., p.65-66

²¹⁵ Tuğtan, M. (2016). Kültürel Değişkenlerin Dış Politikadaki Yeri: İsmail Cem ve Ahmet Davutoğlu. Uluslararası İlişkiler, 13(49), 3-24., p.19

²¹⁶ Benhaïm, Y., & Öktem, K. (2015). The rise and fall of Turkey's soft power discourse. European Journal of Turkish Studies, (21). doi:10.4000/ejts.5275, p.14

every two months instead of every month and the Secretary General being a civilian.²¹⁷ Furthermore, in 2004 a legislation that authorized the National Security Council autonomy in the sense that it gave the Council executive powers, was abolished.²¹⁸ Another important point to note regarding the military is that at the beginning of 2000s the military had different, almost opposing opinions with the Government regarding the situation in Cyprus. However, the military lost its influence that turned almost into a different block than the civilian government following the 2007 Ergenekon Trials which led to hundreds of military personnel being arrested, and which led to the Turkish Armed Forces losing most of its power and influence in the shaping of foreign policy decisions.²¹⁹ Simultaneously, the focus was shifted on the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Justice and Development Party, after coming to power in 2002, appointed important figures to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Abdullah Gül, presiding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 2003-2007 was elected in 2007 as President of Turkey. It should be noted that he was the first President to be elected in Turkey. When he became President of Turkey, he mostly took foreign policy decisions that were in line with the Government's decisions.²²⁰

The most defining reason behind all of these steep changes is the EU accession process of Turkey that gained momentum at the end of 1990s and beginning of 2000s. The Turkish Foreign Policy agenda of these years and the element of EU were mostly also linked with Helsinki Summit Decisions of 1999 where Turkey lifted its reservation that made settlement in Cyprus conflict a condition of Cyprus' EU accession in exchange for Turkey's candidacy.²²¹ Following this decision, even though no settlement was reached in Cyprus, it still became a member state in 2004; becoming an internal conflict of the EU itself, by nature.

The foreign policy position that Turkey took regarding the Annan Plan was shaped in such an environment; President of TRNC at the time Rauf Denktaş had reservations regarding the state model the Plan designed; and he was in fact so against the model

²¹⁷ Secretariat-General of the NSC. (n.d.). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us>

²¹⁸ T.C. Resmi Gazete. (2004, January 8). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2004/01/20040108.htm>

²¹⁹ Bardakçi, M. (2013) Coup Plots and the Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey under AKP Rule, *Turkish Studies*, 14:3, 411-428, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2013.831256, p.2

²²⁰ Çelenk, A.A., *op.cit.*, p.351

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p.354

designed by the Plan that he even called for a memorandum against the Government from the Army. In Yeniçağ Newspaper which is a newspaper with nationalist tones in Turkey founded in 2002, Rauf Denктаş wrote an article in the form of an open letter addressed to retired ambassador and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey İlter Türkmen. Denктаş stated in the letter that he had read the article written by Türkmen regarding a claim that an intervention was planned to be carried out in Cyprus in 2004. Denктаş also states in this open letter that in Türkmen’s article he was portrayed as an actor who was behind-the-scenes of this alleged plan himself. Denктаş adds he would need to be aware of such a plan were the allegations against him were true. He adds “Our expectation -at least during the days you mentioned- was a declaration made by the General Staff, explaining that our people who are going for the referendum and Turkey are not in favor of Annan Plan; and that the support only came from the ruling party, which itself was convinced by the United States.” and that before the Annan Plan “The Turkish Cypriots, with the support of the Motherland and for the “joint national cause”, made every sacrifice to prevent the island from getting seized by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots”.²²² The emphasis on Cyprus being Turkey’s “national cause” is underlined in several other platforms, too; one of which is the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ official Ministry Statements. An example of this is the Ministry Statement dated January 5, 2005; and which says “Our ministry is following the rights and interests of Turkey and TRNC people regarding Cyprus, which is a national cause.”²²³

On Turkey’s side, the Turkish Armed Forces was against the Annan Plan, too. The reservations they had was two sided; they believed the Annan Plan would endanger Turkey’s interests in the area, and they also believed it would confine Turks in the Anatolia.

On the other hand, it was not just the Turkish Armed Forces that was against the Annan Plan; such that the Atatürkist Thought Association, an important secularist association founded in 1989 following Kemalist principles, became very active in the field before the Referendum; they organized “national consciousness” events along with high-level

²²² Denктаş, R. (2008, July 19). Sayın İlter Türkmen’e mektup - Rauf DENKTAŞ. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/sayin-ilter-turkmene-mektup-4533yy.htm>

²²³ No:1 -;5 Ocak 2004, Kıbrıs Sorunu hk. (2004, January 5). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_1--_5-ocak-2004_-kibris-sorunu-hk_.tr.mfa

commanders from the Army.²²⁴ It is argued that those who identified themselves as following the Kemalist principles was also against the Plan as they believed the Plan to be endangering Turkey's position and interests. They were mostly concerned about the territorial regulations that the Plan foresaw; according to the Plan, Varosha and Morphou were going to be under the jurisdiction of the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, along with 42 villages.²²⁵ One point to emphasize here is that the issue of Cyprus and securitization of Turkish Foreign Policy once again proves to be of essential importance based on the current developments regarding Varosha; which almost has a symbolic meaning now because of Varosha's historical significance. Varosha was abandoned by its population consisting of Greek Cypriots during the 1974 Cyprus Operation, and remained under military control ever since with a large part of it being closed to settlement.

December 2003 proves to be an important moment regarding Turkish Foreign Policy, TRNC and Annan Plan, too. General elections were held in December 14, 2003; in TRNC. Mehmet Ali Talat was elected as President of the TRNC in these elections, replacing the first President and Founder of TRNC; Rauf Denktaş. This was a significant moment that changed the dynamics surrounding the Annan Plan as well as the Turkish Foreign Policy as unlike Denktaş, Talat was a supporter of Annan Plan. Simultaneously in Turkey, important actors of the business world that was influential such as TÜSİAD²²⁶ and the media were also predominantly pro-Annan Plan since they did not want Cyprus dispute to be an obstacle for Turkey's EU accession. The army still showed opposition towards the Plan though, to the point of retired Turkish general and Commander of the First Army of Turkey; Ahmet Hurşit Tolon accusing the ones that are in favor of Annan of being traitors.²²⁷

Furthermore, in January 24, 2004, Erdoğan and Annan met to discuss the future of Annan Plan. They decided during that meeting that if the leaders of the two sides did not manage

²²⁴ "Ulusal Bilinç Saf Tuttu", Cumhuriyet, 04.03.2004

²²⁵ Yorucu, V. & Gazioğlu, T. (2018) Cost of relocation and compensation using a mass valuation model for the disputed properties in Cyprus, Turkish Studies, 19:4, 629-646, DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2018.1464916, p.639

²²⁶ "Annan Planı temelinde Kıbrıs'ta müzakerelerin başlaması kararı memnuniyet vericidir". (2004, February 16). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.tusiad.org/tr/basin-bultenleri/item/1061-tusiad--annan-planı-temelinde-kibrista-muzakerelerin-baslamasi-karari-memnuniyet-vericidir>

²²⁷ Anadolu Agency. (2004, January 17). 'Kıbrıs'ı ver kurtul diyenler hain'. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <http://arsiv.ntv.com.tr/news/253102.asp>

to reach a solution regarding the dispute, that Kofi Annan would proceed to fill in the loopholes and then hold a referendum. In the end, it was exactly what took place, too; as the two sides did indeed fail to reach a settlement and that Annan completed the final version of the Plan that was to be voted on in the referendum.²²⁸

These developments hold important significance for the roadmap of Turkish Foreign Policy over the next few years. The Turkish Armed Forces lost some of its influence when the Annan Plan was rejected with only a 24% of vote that is in favor of the reunification of Cyprus from the side of Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus.²²⁹ Equally importantly, this also resulted in the strengthening of Justice and Development Party's position both on the international scene and in its foreign policy. Since the failure of Annan Plan resulted from the Greek vote, Turkey managed to position its foreign policy as "pro-settlement" between the EU and the West in general, alleviating some of the pressure coming from the EU that was explained in previous paragraphs. Consequently, the Justice and Development Party Government managed to de-securitize the issue of Cyprus effectively in its foreign policy while at the same time undermining some of the influence of the army and those who identify themselves as followers of Kemalist principles had in both domestic and foreign policy affairs. However, this process did not last long as the important discoveries of hydrocarbons in the area effectively added a brand new dimension to the whole issue; once again preparing the ground for the securitization of Turkish Foreign Policy.

6.3.1. Discourse regarding Cyprus

This sub-chapter deals with the main shift in Turkish Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus, which occurred because of the Justice and Development Party coming to power and influencing the foreign policy agenda around Cyprus; making it about Europeanization and the EU agenda as well as being pro-Annan Plan. These were important developments as the ruling party chose to display such attitude among the international community, too;

²²⁸ Secretary-General's press encounter following meeting with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey Secretary-General. (2004, January 24). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2004-01-24/secretary-generals-press-encounter-following-meeting-prime>

²²⁹ Joannin, P. (n.d.). The European Elections Monitor. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/0291-failure-of-the-referendum-on-the-reunification-of-the-island>

hence making most of the discourses of the political elite of the time about this situation. The influence of the Army was seen to be declining during this time period, as well; because of some reconstructing legislative frameworks regarding the National Security Council; which are elaborated throughout the chapter, and because of the outcome of the Annan Plan, as well as the effects of the Ergenekon Trials, too.

The Turkish Foreign Policy narrative and the Turkish political atmosphere regarding the Annan Plan is elaborated as a background information in the previous chapter. Key Turkish Foreign Policy actors such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had different views than that of Rauf Denktaş. They were almost in different camps regarding the issue and Annan Plan, as both were active in the field before the Referendum. Erdoğan was especially active in the sense that he requested TRNC President Rauf Denktaş to join the four-sided talks on Cyprus issue in Switzerland whereas Denktaş declared he was not going to participate in the talks a week before. Instead of Denktaş, Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat were going to join the talks from the TRNC side; and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Erdoğan were going to be present at the talks.²³⁰ While responding to an Anadolu Agency correspondent, Erdoğan acknowledged the different views Turkish Armed Forces had about the issue by saying:

“There might be some different statements and views regarding the method. Not everyone can think of similar views. A result is reached generally. Everyone acts under the constitutional frame and according to her/his mission.”²³¹

Similarly, Erdoğan responded to the questions regarding the Cyprus issue from the media on a plane traveling to Japan only thirteen days before the Referendum, and said that it saddens him to see the TRNC President coming to Turkey and holding meetings with “marginal groups”. Erdoğan also responded to a question about the opposition party criticizing the Annan Plan about how lengthy it is (about 9 thousand pages) and how it has not been explained well and clearly; by detailing how those 9 thousand pages are written and adding that United Cyprus Republic with two constituent states comes out of

²³⁰ Sayarı, S. (2004, March 18). Denktaş görüşmelere gitmiyor: DW: 18.03.2004. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.dw.com/tr/denkta%C5%9F-g%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9Fmelere-gitmiyor/a-2526878>

²³¹ Erdoğan'dan Denktaş'a İsviçre'ye 'git' ricası. (2004, March 23). Retrieved January 10, 2021, from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogandan-denktasa-isvicreye-git-ricasi-5107471>

those lengthy pages. He also added how Turkey both views the issue as a “national cause” and at the same time supports the rights of TRNC people arising from the 1959-1960 Founding Treaties of Cyprus by saying:

“We, as the Government of the Republic of Turkey, currently view the issue as a national issue. But while viewing it as a national issue, we wanted our TRNC sisters and brothers to have the opportunity to become a state.”²³²

After the Referendum was held and the results showed that the model proposed by the Plan was rejected by the Greek side of the Island; Erdoğan commented on the possible future of TRNC people. He said:

“I believe that the isolation policies towards the Turkish Cypriots in the international community have come to an end as of today. This is what I want to underline and from now on, I believe in the international community that Turkish Cypriots can no longer be subjected to a policy of isolation.”²³³

With this, he highlights that the TRNC people showed their good will towards finding a lasting settlement in Cyprus; and that they should no longer be subjected to the embargoes imposed on them.

The Turkish Foreign Policy actors, especially one of the most prominent ones, which is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, issued a press release on May 1, 2004 in order to demonstrate the Turkish stance regarding the EU accession of Cyprus. The press release is titled “Press Release Regarding the EU Enlargement”; and it both summarizes the recent developments and explains how and why a simultaneous separate referendum was held in both sides of Cyprus, and details that with the Greek Cypriot “no” vote for the Annan Plan, that an international conflict is now being imported to the EU. This document is also particular in the sense that it is one of the documents that clearly demonstrates the Turkish position. It shows that the “Turkey’s recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will remain unchanged.” and that “The accession of Southern Cyprus cannot prejudice in whatsoever manner the rights and obligations of Turkey regarding Cyprus under the 1960 Treaties.” These sorts of statements along with the following

²³² Erdoğan'dan Denktaş'a: Ne anlatacaksan Kıbrıs'ta anlat... (n.d.). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/erdogandan-denktasa-ne-anlatacaksan-kibrista-anlat-5101931>

²³³ Anadolu Agency. (2004, April 24). 2004-04-25 Kıbrıs'ta Referandumlar - Derleme. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=35141>

article from the same press release demonstrate how Turkey emphasizes and is likely to keep emphasizing the rights and sovereignty of TRNC; as well as its recognition of TRNC, over the next years. The press release reads:

“The Greek Cypriots, who will join the EU on 1 May 2004, have no authority to represent the whole of Cyprus or the Turkish Cypriots. They cannot claim authority, jurisdiction or sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriots, who have equal status, or over the entire Island of Cyprus. They cannot impose the “Republic of Cyprus” on the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the Greek Cypriots who organized themselves under their own constitutional order and within their boundaries cannot be the legitimate government representing the whole of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots.”²³⁴

The Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Namık Tan made a similar statement in 2005, reminding the EU of its responsibilities and undertakings about the Cyprus issue and calling for the lifting of all embargoes towards TRNC; two of the expressions of the same statement having similar emphasis are:

“To honor the promises given to the Turkish Cypriots and to remove all embargoes and restrictions, in line with the commitment of the EU on 26 April 2004. In this regard, the regulations prepared by the Commission on Financial Assistance and Direct Trade should be implemented in full and without further delay.” And,

“In conformity with the appeals of the EU Council as well as the UN Secretary General, to support the package of proposals made by Turkey on 30 May 2005 regarding the simultaneous lifting of all restrictions on Cyprus by all relevant parties.”²³⁵

These statements and speeches demonstrate how the Cyprus issue is becoming de-securitized during those years; the main arguments of the military side regarding the making of Turkish Foreign Policy used to be shaped around Cyprus dispute.

One example of the political rights of TRNC people and how Turkey issued a statement when it was taken away is the cancellation of a football match between Çetinkaya Football Club of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Luton Town Football Club

²³⁴ No:73 - Press Release Regarding the EU Enlargement, 1 May 2004. (2004, May 1). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_73---press-release-regarding-the-eu-enlargement_-1-may-2004.en.mfa

²³⁵ September 22nd, 2005, Statement of Mr. Namık Tan, the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the EU Counter Declaration (Unofficial Translation). (2005, September 22). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/september-22nd_-2005_-statement-of-mr_-namik-tan_-the-spokesman-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-eu-counter-declaration-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa

of the United Kingdom in July 2007. The cancellation of this match is of particular importance, as the match would signify that TRNC is recognized as a sovereign state by the UK. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its press release titled “Press Release Regarding the Cancellation of the Football Match Between Çetinkaya Football Club of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Luton Town Football Club of the United Kingdom” states this cancellation was “due to the obstructionist efforts of the Greek Cypriot Administration” and that it “constitutes another example of inhuman restrictions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots over years”.

The press release adds:

“The hindrance of a friendly match in such a manner does not only run counter to the prospective solution of the Cyprus problem and the rights of the Turkish Cypriots stemming from the 1960 Agreements, but also deprives, once again, the Turkish Cypriots of enjoying one of their fundamental rights.”

while recalling the European Council’s decisions of April 26, 2004; by noting European Council’s “Commitment to lift the restrictions imposed on the Turkish Cypriots following the Turkish Cypriots’ demonstration of their will for peace and unification in the referendum in 2004.” The call of the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots “by underlining its unjust and superfluous nature” was also recalled, and it was added, “The cancellation of the football match between Çetinkaya and Luton Town teams contradicts with these promises and declarations.”²³⁶ Additionally, the years 2004-2011 are marked mainly with the removal of Cyprus issue from the security agenda as during these years a state of exception was not constructed, and military measures that would otherwise seem illegitimate were not taken. There were not much perceived threats as Turkey’s political agenda was more focused on EU affairs and the guaranteeing of TRNC people’s economic and political rights. An example of this can be seen clearly in former Prime Minister Abdullah Gül’s (Deputy Prime Minister and

²³⁶ NO:105 - 14 July 2007, Press Release Regarding the Cancellation of the Football Match Between Çetinkaya Football Club of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Luton Town Football Club of the United Kingdom;(Unofficial Translation). (2007, July 14). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_no_105---14-july-2007_-press-release-regarding-the-cancellation-of-the-football-match-between-cetinkaya-football-club-of-the-turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus-and-luton-town-football-club-of-the-united-kingdom__unofficial-translation_-__p_.en.mfa

Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time) press announcement about the Action Plan designed by Turkey in January 24, 2006. In his announcement, Gül started by defining the current situation in Cyprus as follows, demonstrating the importance given to the EU agenda as well as the rights and interests of both parties:

“The developments of 2005 have once again shown to all of us that the absence of a settlement in Cyprus is, first of all, contrary to the interests of both peoples on the Island. It has become obvious that the current status quo works against the interests of all, including the EU and the parties to the problem themselves.”

He added the principal elements of the Action Plan in the same statement. The Action Plan had the main goal of attaining the following goals, all of which are primarily focused on rapprochement:

- “1. Opening of the sea ports of Turkey to Greek Cypriot vessels serving the trade of goods in accordance with the EC-Turkey Customs Union.
2. Allowing Greek Cypriot air carriers to use the Turkish air space for over-flights and to land at the Turkish airports in accordance with relevant international rules and procedures.
3. Opening of the ports in North Cyprus, including Gazimagosa, Girne, and Gemikonağı to international traffic of goods, persons and services under Turkish Cypriot management.
4. Opening of Ercan airport for direct flights under the Turkish Cypriot management.
5. Special arrangements for the practical inclusion of North Cyprus, as an economic entity, into the European Union’s customs union. Unhindered direct trade between both sides of the Island as well as with the outside world.
6. Participation of the Turkish Cypriot side in international sports, cultural and other social activities.”²³⁷

Furthermore, as in May 23, 2003 Turkey announced adopting a new, simplified visa regime for Greek Cypriot citizens²³⁸; Turkey then at the beginning of the 2000s was involved in efforts to ensure a less violent, less militaristic and more political approach towards the Cyprus problem. This period is also marked with the Greek-Turkish rapprochement, as it was during these years that a series of agreements were signed

²³⁷ INITIATIVE BY TURKEY ON CYPRUS, 24 JANUARY 2006. (2006, January 24). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/new-initiative-by-turkey-on-cyprus.en.mfa>

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

between Greece and Turkey. One of these agreements was signed on April 6, 2001, about the two countries prohibiting the sale and use of land mines. Additionally on April 12, 2005, Greece and Turkey reached a consensus in order to establish a direct communication line at the Air Forces Command level. The direct communication line was designed to be dealing with the long-time disputed airspace violations in the Aegean Sea. So much so that in May 2006 when two jets crashed in the Southern Aegean, the two countries –instead of being on the verge of a crisis- decided to take a series of confidence-building measures in order to ensure such an event would not occur in the future.²³⁹

The beginning of 2000s; while being marked with a period of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey which also manifested itself in the de-securitization (in the form of “change through stabilization”) of the Cyprus issue in Turkish Foreign Policy actors; the same cannot be said for all key actors. The Army side of Turkish Foreign Policy actors were not equally in favor of such an atmosphere. As an example, after being asked about whether Turkey had sent military ships to the Eastern Mediterranean following the EEZ Agreement of Cyprus with Egypt (in 2003) and with Lebanon (in 2007), former Chief of General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt said in February 2007:

“Thank you for asking this. They have been calling the General Staff about this issue since the morning. We already have ships on patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. We work in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We don't need to send new ships.”

This statement was interpreted in the media that the already existing military ships in the Eastern Mediterranean; deployed initially as part of “Operation Mediterranean Shield”²⁴⁰ would not allow any illegitimate attempts of gas exploration activities in the region.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Yılmaz, M . (2008). SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDE TÜRK-YUNAN İLİŞKİLERİ VE EGE SORUNU . Çağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi , 5 (2) , 27-44 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/cagsbd/issue/44602/554045>, p.33

²⁴⁰ Operation Mediterranean Shield is an operation launched on April 1, 2006 in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to ensure the security of the strategic oil transportation departing from Ceyhan terminal. It was launched to provide counter deterrence and to support NATO's maritime security efforts in the region.

²⁴¹ Akdeniz Kalkanı Harekatı. (n.d.). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <https://www.dzkk.tsk.tr/Harekat/icerik/akdeniz-kalkani-harekatı>

²⁴² Kıbrıs'a Göz Hapsi. (2007, February 02). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <https://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/kibrisa-goz-hapsi-187656>

Furthermore, former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök stated in April 20, 2005 while doing an annual evaluation, that the Turkish strategy has 4 pillars:

“One, the existence of a deterrent force against the symmetrical threats around us in order to protect the existing balances and national interests. Two, necessary measures that are taken against threats to the integrity of the country, national unity and continuity of the regime. Three, securing of our rights and interests in Cyprus that constitutes the fundamental point of our security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Protection of our rights and interests in Cyprus. Four, preventing the newly-emerging international risks and asymmetric threats -especially international terrorism- from harming our activities inside of the country and from harming our interests abroad.”²⁴³

As clearly seen above, Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus issues were seen as vital to Turkey’s strategic interests and sovereignty in the region (transforming the issue to an existential threat); meaning that the military side of the Turkish Foreign Policy elites were concerned with a different, more securitized agenda than that of the new Justice and Development Party Government.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs simultaneously issued several declarations regarding the unilateral gas searching activities carried out by the Greek Cypriot Administration; which are conducting oil and gas exploration by concluding EEZ agreements and issuing permits for these activities. These activities are known to have started in 2003; and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its “Press Release Regarding the efforts of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus to sign bilateral agreements concerning maritime jurisdiction areas with the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean” declares:

“The exclusive economic zone agreement between the Greek Cypriot Authorities and Egypt, which despite objections, was signed on 17 February 2003, was not recognized by Turkey.”²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral ÖZKÖK'ÜN Yıllık Değerlendirmesi. (2007, July 4). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=38650>

²⁴⁴ 30 January 2007, Press Release Regarding the efforts of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus to sign bilateral agreements concerning maritime jurisdiction areas with the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. (2007, January 30). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_30-january-2007_-press-release-regarding-the-efforts-of-the-greek-cypriot-administration-of-southern-cyprus-to-sign-bilateral-agreements-concerning-maritime-jurisdiction-areas-with-the-countries-in-the-eastern-mediterranean_br___p_en.mfa

Turkey adds about the negotiations to sign an EEZ agreement between Lebanon and the Greek Cypriot side that although demarches had been carried out with Beirut, the agreement were signed on January 17, 2017. Turkey then asked the agreement not to take any effect.

In the same statement, Turkey adds:

“The TRNC also has rights and authority over the maritime areas around the Island of Cyprus. Moreover, Greek Cypriots do not represent the Island as a whole. Consequently, neither the legislation adopted nor the bilateral agreements concluded by the Greek Cypriot Authorities have any effect. In addition, it must also be kept in mind that Turkey has legitimate and legal rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Parts of the maritime areas that are subject of bilateral agreements intended to be concluded by the Greek Cypriot Authorities also concern Turkey’s stated rights and interests. Turkey is determined to protect its rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and will not allow any attempt to undermine them.”

By clearly stating these, Turkey highlights once again how it is going to defend the economic rights and interests of TRNC, and how the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus does not represent the Island as a whole. This statement also demonstrates how an existential threat is mentioned (“Concern Turkey’s stated rights and interests”) and how an implicit mention of the use of emergency measures is made by declaring that Turkey will not allow any attempt to undermine its rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean; leading up to early attempts of securitization.

In the same statement, Turkey reminds the countries and companies that are given licenses by the Greek Cypriot authorities that their licenses are invalid and that the EEZ Agreements do not have any effect by concluding:

“In this context, we would like to remind those countries and companies that might consider conducting research for oil and gas exploration, based on invalid licenses Greek Cypriot Authorities may contemplate to issue for maritime areas around the Island of Cyprus, to take into account the sensitivity of the situation as well as the will of the Turkish Cypriots, the other constituent people of the Island, and expect them to refrain from any endeavor that might negatively affect the settlement process of the Cyprus issue and to act accordingly”²⁴⁵

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Turkey on the other hand declared its willingness to supporting the efforts of the “UN Secretary-General towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership state” by declaring in the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. In this document, it writes: “Turkey remains committed to finding a political settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated its resolve in this regard.” and that:

“Turkey will thus continue to regard the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly.”²⁴⁶

During those years the Greek Cypriot Authority of Southern Cyprus, on the other hand signed several defense agreements along with the EEZ agreements it concludes with other states. One of them is the Defense Cooperation Agreement it signed with France on March 1, 2007.²⁴⁷ After having been informed of the Agreement, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a “Press Release Regarding the Defense Cooperation Agreement; between France and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus” in which it clearly notes that its concerns are three fold; that

“Such an agreement would be against the 1960 Treaties; would constitute a threat to the stability in the Eastern Mediterranean; and would also adversely affect efforts for a comprehensive settlement under the UN.”

Turkey once again by stating these reminds the international community of its willingness to work for a lasting solution in Cyprus; but also highlights the importance given to the stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region as well as reminding French Authorities of the 1960 Treaties.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus, 29 July 2005. (2005, July 29). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/declaration-by-turkey-on-cyprus_-29-july-2005.en.mfa

²⁴⁷ 2007-03-01 kibris - Derleme. (2007, July 4). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <https://www.ab.gov.tr/p.php?e=40680>

²⁴⁸ NO:39 - 1 March 2007, Press Release Regarding the Defence Cooperation Agreement;between France and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (Unofficial Translation). (2007, March 1). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_no_39---1-march-2007_-press-release-regarding-the-defence-cooperation-agreement_between-france-and-the-greek-cypriot-administration-of-southern-cyprus-_unofficial-translation_-__p_.en.mfa

The military activities conducted by Cyprus, and that required the Turkish Foreign Policy actors to make diplomatic statements are not limited to the Defense Cooperation Treaty with France or the EEZ Agreements with Lebanon, Egypt and Israel. Cyprus also conducted a military exercise called the “Nikiforos Military Exercise” through the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG) was established in June 1964; according to Turkey the establishment of this armed force is against the Founding Treaties of Cyprus as according to Turkey “the Greek Cypriot militia and the EOKA terrorist organization came together under the umbrella of the GCNG and conducted violence against the Turkish Cypriots.” In this press statement regarding the military exercise Turkey underlines its importance as a guarantor state by concluding:

“The Greek Cypriot Administration’s insistence on this attitude, which increases tension on the island and jeopardizes stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, instead of responding to the constructive steps of the Turkish Cypriot side, once again reveals the importance of Turkey’s role as a guarantor state in maintaining peace on the island.”²⁴⁹

The above statement is worth noting as an existential threat is demonstrated by saying the Greek Cypriot Administration’s insistence on the attitude increases tension on the island and jeopardizes stability in the region. Turkey then emphasizes on its role as a guarantor state in order to show that emergency measures may be used, if necessary.

As clearly seen, the Turkish Foreign Policy narrative regarding Cyprus during these years, especially during the beginning of and mid-2000s, was mainly based on the Turkish will to protect the rights –be it economical or political- of TRNC people by calling other states to lift their embargoes and by reminding the authorities of the UN and EU undertakings; as well as on reasserting the claim that the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus does not represent the Island as a whole. These speeches are well worth noting as they are linked with the Greek Cypriot attempts at finding natural gas around Cyprus. Later, as more gas is found in the Eastern Mediterranean, more countries surrounding the region claim rights and conclude EEZ Agreements with each other. However, that adds a

²⁴⁹ NO:146 - 11 October 2007 , Press Statement Regarding the “Nikiforos” military exercise. (Unofficial Translation). (2007, October 11). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_146--_11-october-2007--_press-statement-regarding-the-_nikiforos_-military-exercise__-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa

new dimension to the securitization of the Cyprus conflict in Turkish Foreign Policy after having been de-securitized until the end of 2000s.

This sub-chapter dealing with the discourse regarding Cyprus between the years 2002-2009 is critical as after reaching an all-time peak in securitization between Greek-Turkish relations and consequently probably Cyprus, the Turkish Foreign Policy elite managed to effectively de-securitize the issue by having a period of rapprochement with Greece and by integrating the UN and EU involvements in the framework. The emphasis during these years was placed once again on the rights and livelihoods of the TRNC people, while the Treaty of Guarantee and Turkey's guarantor power was being reminded to the international community. This period is particular in the sense that it showed an important shift in foreign policy regarding Cyprus; and showed how de-securitization and in particular de-securitization by change through stabilization took place.

6.4. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 2009-2020

The year 2009 is viewed as the year when Turkey's Foreign Policy regarding North Africa, Middle East and Europe would start to shift. It is this year that Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs by Prime Minister of the time; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. When Justice and Development Party came to power again for the third time during the 2011 popular elections, (the first one was at 2002, and second was at 2007) Davutoğlu entered the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as deputy of the city of Konya, and continued to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs to the third cabinet until 2014.²⁵⁰

Davutoğlu has transformed Turkish Foreign Policy regarding the Middle East, North Africa and Europe while he was serving as Minister. He has adopted such different principles and views than that of his predecessors regarding foreign policy that he has led some scholars to call the period between 2009-2014 "Davutoğlu era Turkish Foreign Policy".²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Davutoğlu, A. (2013). Turkey's Mediation: Critical Reflections From the Field. *Middle East Policy*, 20(1), 83-90. doi:10.1111/mepo.12005

²⁵¹ Aras, B. (2014). Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 16(4), 404–418., p.405

The 2009 Davos Crisis that put a strain on Turkey-Israel relations, and the 2011 Arab Spring that eventually led to tensions between Syrian President Bashar Hafez al-Assad and Turkey regarding the Syrian Civil War all meant that the foreign policy principles of earlier times would be replaced with the new “central country” doctrine. This doctrine is different from the “zero problem” principles adopted by Turkish Foreign Policy and decision-makers in the first decade of 2000s; which may be explained with not having any problems with neighboring countries.²⁵² The central country doctrine on the other hand has an assumption that Turkey is the geographical and cultural center of the region, and soft power tools, placing the emphasis on civilization-based activities, would consolidate that assumption.²⁵³ An example to this would be granting scholarships called “Turkey scholarships” to international students so that they would be able to study in Turkey. This doctrine predicts a new international order in which Turkey would be the leading power that shapes the developments of the region. With the Arab Spring and the overthrowing of regimes in the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey also adopted a stance that would favor the pro-democracy opposition groups that were faced with authoritarian regimes.²⁵⁴

Another important topic for Turkey at this period was terrorist attacks conducted by PKK terrorist organization. The attacks were getting more and more brutal at the end of the first decade of the century, and this has led Turkey to take a more and more security-based approach in its foreign policy decisions.²⁵⁵

The year 2014 has also been a year to change the political narratives of Turkey regarding both internal and external “security threats”. In 2014 following the Turkish Presidential Election; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the Prime Minister before this election, was elected as President of Turkey. It was the first time that the President would be elected with direct elections. After becoming President, Erdoğan appointed Davutoğlu to become the 26th Prime Minister of Turkey and to assemble the cabinet. Davutoğlu then appointed

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p.407

²⁵³ Jabbour, J. (2015). An illusionary power of seduction?: An assessment of Turkey’s cultural power in the Arab world in light of its audio-visual presence in the region. *European journal of Turkish studies*. 10.4000/ejts.5234, p.16

²⁵⁴ Bürgin, A. (2018). Despite the growing alienation between Turkey and the EU: A continuation of the accession process remains the best option. *Orient - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik und Wirtschaft des Orients*. 59. 24-32., p. 26-27

²⁵⁵ Dinc, C. & Yetim, M. (2012). Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East : From Non-Involvement to a Leading Role. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, p.72

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁵⁶ He is still serving as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.

The period from 2014 to 2020 was marked by continuous crises for Turkey. One of the most prominent crises that Justice and Development Party was faced with was when Gülen Movement (also referred to as FETÖ or Fethullah Terrorist Organization) tried to overthrow the Undersecretary of Turkish National Intelligence Organization in 2012, with whom Erdoğan used to work with closely.²⁵⁷ Another crisis happened when Gezi Park Protests erupted in 2013 and at the end of 2013 when Gülen Movement started a “corruption” campaign targeting Erdoğan and Justice and Development Party.²⁵⁸

The foreign affairs side equally was faced with certain important crises. In 2013 the outcomes of the Arab Spring started to change direction, with the July 2013 Egyptian Coup being an important indicator of this shift as it has resulted in the arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including Morsi. Since Justice and Development Party has previously shaped a foreign policy based on the outcomes of the Arab Spring though, with this shift in Arab Spring movements, and as it was one of the biggest backers of Muslim Brotherhood²⁵⁹ it has become even more alienated from the West.²⁶⁰ Then in 2014, ISIS annexed Kobani through PYD (Democratic Union Party) which was established in 2003 in northern Syria with its headquarters in Kobani and which is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, causing more tensions between the West; especially the USA and Turkey.²⁶¹ On top of all of these developments, Turkey was also dealing with 3.6 million refugees fleeing the civil war in Syria²⁶², and in 2015 has shot a Russian plane on the Turkey-Syria border.²⁶³

²⁵⁶ Turkish PM Davutoglu presents new cabinet. (2014, August 29). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-pm-davutoglu-presents-new-cabinet/a-17888423>

²⁵⁷ Paksoy, M. (2020, June 21). FETÖ'nün hükümeti yıkmaya yönelik ilk kalkışması: 7 Şubat 2012 MİT kumpası. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/fetonun-hukumeti-yikmaya-yonelik-ilk-kalkismasi-7-subat-2012-mit-kumpasi/1884609>

²⁵⁸ Özey, B. (2013, December 26). Turkey rocked by corruption scandal. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-rocked-by-corruption-scandal/a-17324458>

²⁵⁹ Erdogan: Turkey's pugnacious president. (2020). Retrieved 30 August 2020, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13746679>

²⁶⁰ Yegin, M. (2016) Turkey's reaction to the coup in Egypt in comparison with the US and Israel, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 18:4, 407-421, DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2016.1196010, p.411

²⁶¹ Bajekal, N. (2014, October 20). Why Turkey Changed Course on Kobani. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://time.com/3524962/turkey-kobani-policy-change/>

²⁶² Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey. (n.d.). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey>

²⁶³ Karadeniz, T., & Kiselyova, M. (2015, November 25). Turkey downs Russian warplane near Syria border, Putin warns of 'serious consequences'. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from

All of these developments would mean that Turkey was going to adapt a new foreign policy narrative; one that would shift from the civilization-based Pan-Islamist central country doctrine, to “national will” discourse.²⁶⁴ This national will discourse meant that the national interest was above all, and that increasing security and military capacities were going to be the determining factors now.

6.4.1. Discourse regarding Cyprus

The first phase of Turkish Foreign Policy statements between 2002-2020 is shaped by the refusal of Annan Plan primarily by the Greek Cypriot vote, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, and then by the end of 2000s the acceleration of the natural gas exploration activities by Cyprus. The Turkish narrative therefore is mainly around these themes. The key Turkish Foreign Policy actors almost always remind the international community with their speeches by emphasizing and repeating that the Greek Administration is not the sole administration of Cyprus. They add in these speeches that the TRNC people’s rights and interests arising from the Founding Treaties need to be preserved; and that this need arise from the UN mission’s good offices in Cyprus as well as the EU’s undertakings.

Another important point about the narrative during this first phase is that emphasis is placed on the predominantly “yes” vote of TRNC at the Referendum for the Annan Plan. Key Turkish Foreign Policy actors keep reminding the international community that the Turkish Cypriots demonstrated that they are in favor of a lasting settlement in Cyprus whereas the Greek Cypriots showed they are not necessarily in favor of the Plan’s last and fifth version that was being voted on. This very emphasis is important as the third important theme; which is the acceleration of Cyprus’ natural gas exploration activities, is closely linked to it. Regarding the EEZ Agreements Cyprus signed with various surrounding countries, and regarding the licenses they issued for various companies; Turkey claim that these EEZ Agreements or licenses do not have effect and that they are not valid as the Greek Administration is not the sole administration on the Island. Turkey

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey/turkey-downs-russian-warplane-near-syria-border-putin-warns-of-serious-consequences-idUSKBN0TD0IR20151125>

²⁶⁴ "We recognize no earthly power above national will". (2018, July 13). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/94868/-we-recognize-no-earthly-power-above-national-will->

adds in these claims that the Greek Administration by signing these agreements demonstrate once again that they are not in favor of finding a lasting solution in Cyprus. Following the major hydrocarbon discovery made in 2009 in Tamar Field though, and following what perceived and real threats that the Turkish political elite was faced with during the end of 2000s and beginning of 2010s; the Turkish Foreign Policy narrative regarding Cyprus inevitably changed. At the beginning of the previous decade the issue was de-securitized both because of the loss of influence of the Army in Turkey on foreign policy affairs and because of how Justice and Development Party Government positioned itself as being in favor of Annan Plan and therefore a lasting solution in Cyprus. This enabled the Government to simultaneously positioning itself in a different manner on the international scene, gaining international community's support.

On the other hand, the Army lost some of its influence in Turkey also because of the arrests that were made within the scope of Ergenekon Trials; however, the beginning of the decline of its influence started during the Annan Plan talks. The Cyprus issue therefore was viewed mainly as being a part of the political sphere instead of the security sphere; as motives such as state survival and existential threats were not prominent. Therefore, the issue was mainly de-securitized during these years since it has reentered the political sphere while being removed from the security sphere using discourse.

The second phase from 2011 to 2020 though is marked by the securitization of the issue. It is marked by the natural gas exploration activities on the regional and international scene, and regarding the internal politics and foreign policy of Turkey; it was marked by several perceived and real security threats. This is why the Turkish political elite has decided to securitize the issue of Cyprus; in order to solidify and strengthen their sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean by signing EEZ Agreements themselves, too and by using discourse to remove the issue from the political sphere and to put it in the security sphere. This is inevitably done by constructing perceived threats and the idea in the public that the issue is about state survivability; legitimizing the use of tools of state of exception which otherwise would not seem legitimate. This sub-chapter then deals with the speeches that make up the discourse of Turkish Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus over the past decade, and how systematic securitization takes place.

The Gaza Flotilla Raid that took place in May 2010 and the incidents that preceded such as the World Economic Forum reaction of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan in January

2009 as a whole have proved to be an important indicator of which countries Israel would form closer relations with regarding the Eastern Mediterranean gas, too. An Israeli-Greek-Greek Cypriot rapprochement started to form following the Athens visit of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in August 2010. These circumstances also lead up to the eventual securitization of the issue in Turkish Foreign Policy, which would equally enable the country to strengthen its sovereignty when faced with the Israeli-Cypriot camp.

Regarding the Israeli-Greek-Greek Cypriot rapprochement and Turkey's concerns over the transportation of the natural gas, securitization started with speech acts that would politicize Israeli actions; meaning that would put Israeli actions on the headlines for the Turkish public, and making it as a political issue in the eyes of the Turkish public. Turkish political elite has managed to do that by mentioning Turkey's support to the people in Gaza, in several international platforms as well as in official statements. An example to this would be the 27 December 2008 "Press Release Regarding the Recent Developments in the Gaza Strip" where Turkey has stated:

"We are deeply concerned about the incidents in the Gaza Strip. We strongly condemn the high number of Palestinian deaths caused by the Israeli air strikes on Gaza."

In the same press release, it was also stated that:

"Turkey will sustain her efforts towards the parties for bringing an end to the fighting and the restoration of calm, and at the same time, persistently continue its humanitarian assistance, particularly in the form of food and medical aid to Gaza."²⁶⁵

In another press release dated January 4, 2009 and titled "Press Release Regarding the Ground Operation by Israel to the Gaza Strip" Turkey has condemned Israel's air strikes on the Gaza Strip by stating that Turkey had expressed:

"deep concern about the Israeli air strikes on the Gaza Strip and called for their immediate halt, establishment of calm and facilitation of the transfer of emergency humanitarian aid to the people of the Gaza Strip."

²⁶⁵ Press Release Regarding the Recent Developments in the Gaza Strip. (2008, December 27). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_220---27-december-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-recent-developments-in-the-gaza-strip-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa

and also that it finds it unacceptable and “condemn Israel’s launching of a ground operation despite the warnings of the international community and the reactions in the international public union.”²⁶⁶ These speech acts eventually formed a discourse that politicized the Palestinian issue and particularly the air strikes happening at the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, rapprochement between Cyprus, Greece and Israel was demonstrating itself on the diplomatic scene. In response to this, Turkey has started to construct the issue to be perceived of exceptional importance by constructing perceptions of state survival. An example to this could be found in one of Erdoğan’s interviews with Al Jazeera television channel. When asked a question about the freedom of navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean, he responded by saying that:

“At present, Turkish military ships are primarily undoubtedly obliged to protect their ships. This is the first step. Moreover, we have humanitarian aid to bring there. And this humanitarian aid will no longer be attacked as it did in the Mavi Marmara.”²⁶⁷

In another interview he had with Al Jazeera television, he called the Gaza Flotilla Raid incident *casus belli*/cause of war by stating:

“This process, the Mavi Marmara incident on 31 May 2010, this attack in international waters, does not comply with any international law. Actually, this is a cause of war. But we are saying is let befitting the size of Turkey, we tolerate it with patience.”²⁶⁸

When he was responding the press’ questions after the Judicial Year Opening Ceremony of 2011, he has also responded to a question about the freedom of navigation in the area in a similar fashion; he has stated:

²⁶⁶ Press Release Regarding the Ground Operation by Israel to the Gaza Strip. (2009, January 4). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_3---4-january-2009_-press-release-regarding-the-ground-operation-by-israel-to-the-gaza-strip.en.mfa

²⁶⁷ Gemileri donanma koruyacak. (2011, September 8). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/gemileri-donanma-koruyacak/413680?utm_campaign=DonanimHaber

²⁶⁸ Bu bir savaş nedenidir. (2011, September 11). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/arsiv/bu-bir-savas-nedenidir/413272>

“The Eastern Mediterranean is not a foreign place to us. Aksaz and İskenderun are places that have the power, opportunity and right to supervise constantly. Of course, our ships will show themselves in those waters very often from now on, we shall see.”²⁶⁹

The “Press Release Regarding the Greek Cypriot Administration’s Gas Exploration Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean” issued in 5 August 2011 states that

“The Greek Cypriot Administration does not represent in law or in fact the Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus as a whole. As such, the Greek Cypriot Administration is not entitled to unilaterally negotiate and conclude international agreements as well as adopt laws and conduct activities regarding the exploitation of natural resources on behalf of the entire island. These unlawful acts create tension in the region, compromise and prejudice the Turkish Cypriots’ existing and inherent equal rights over the natural resources of the island and the sea areas of the Island of Cyprus as well as have a direct bearing on the ongoing settlement negotiations.”

In this section of the press release, and in particular with the last sentence, Turkey demonstrates an existential threat to the referent object, which is the Turkish Cypriots as well as the ongoing negotiations. However, as in the last paragraph the press release continues by stating that Turkey and TRNC will continue their diplomatic and political efforts to preserve the legitimate rights and interests of the region,²⁷⁰ there is no element of emergency measure. While this statement is an example of a speech act; as it is aimed to make the public perceive the issue as an economic threat, and that Turkey is actively trying to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot people; all actors in Turkey were careful with their speeches regarding the Eastern Mediterranean over the last decade. Turkish authorities preferred to actively keeping the issue on headlines for Turkish and TRNC public, emphasizing that Turkey is there to protect Turkish Cypriots’ rights and interests. Turkey has used these discourses to construct an economic threat in the eyes of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot publics. In the “21 September 2011, Press Statement On The Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Turkey And The TRNC” it

²⁶⁹ Politika. (2011, September 07). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.dha.com.tr/politika/erdogan-israil-icin-c-plani-da-var/haber-204695>

²⁷⁰ Press Release Regarding the Greek Cypriot Administration’s Gas Exploration Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. (2011, August 5). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-181_-5-august-2011_-press-release-regarding-the-greek-cypriot-administration_s-gas-exploration-activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean.en.mfa

is further stated that the Greek Cypriot side should stop their drilling activities, and put a political will for peace and reconciliation. It is also stated in the press release that:

"It will thus be possible to reach a lasting settlement which will also help the Eastern Mediterranean to become an area of peace, stability and cooperation, while ensuring that the natural resources of Cyprus be equitably shared by the two peoples who are co-owners of the Island."²⁷¹

This statement demonstrates how Turkish authorities have strategically constructed a discourse related to the Eastern Mediterranean, and how they have politicized the issue by using economic references. This statement then is a statement that puts the issue in the political sphere; meaning it is the very early stages of securitization (stage of identification). The use of emergency measures however were not very explicitly mentioned in speeches during these years. Therefore, the Paris School of Security comes into play; some of the statements regarding Cyprus of the time do not implicitly evoke emergency measures but just a certain existential threat, therefore the securitization is observed manifesting itself not only in speech acts but also in actions that are elaborated in future paragraphs.

The securitizing discourses or actions that are elaborated in the future paragraphs, as they were constantly employed, enabled the “stage of mobilization” legitimizing the resort to a state of exception.

As explained in the previous chapter, Turkey initially was constantly emphasizing that it protects the TRNC people’s economic needs and interests in the area. However, with the securitization taking place and placing the issue in a security sphere instead of the political sphere; Turkey has managed to legitimize the use of military tools such as its naval forces as tools of a state of exception; strengthening its presence in the area.

The last step of securitization, which is articulating an already politicized issue as an existential threat to state survivability and mentioning the use of emergency measures was being carried out by Turkish authorities simultaneously by involving military efforts (or emergency measures) to some extent. In September 20, 2011, Erdoğan said, “We have

²⁷¹ Press Statement on the Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement Signed Between Turkey and the TRNC. (2011, September 21). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-216_-21-september-2011_-press-statement-on-the-continental-shelf-delimitation-agreement-signed-between-turkey-and-the-trnc.en.mfa

different approaches to the region, which they declared as an exclusive economic zone,” and continued as follows:

“At the military point both with our frigates, assault boats and at this point, our air forces follow these zones in the region. This exclusive economic zone is controversial, as we have previously conveyed that it is not right for them to take such a step in this region.”²⁷²

making the audience reach the “stage of mobilization” and therefore legitimizing the use of a state of exception.

Simultaneously, the “Blue Homeland Doctrine” came to be talked about. Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz first coined the “Blue Homeland Doctrine” in 2006 who was later sentenced to prison within the scope of Ergenekon Trials and released in 2015, and in simple terms signifies the need for Turkey to protect its national rights and interests in its seas along with its land borders. It means Turkey needs to give importance to protecting its territorial waters, continental shelves and EEZs in both the Black, Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. Recently, and especially over this past year this doctrine came to be a rather popular element of the Turkish discourse regarding Cyprus. Such that Erdoğan stated for the Turkish Naval Forces Day:

“With the awareness of how important it is to defend our Blue Homeland, we continue to protect our rights and interests in our seas with a strong will and unshakable faith.”

and added

“Turkey will continue to strengthen its Naval Forces to protect the Blue Homeland, ensure safety, and deter those who have designs on the country’s rights.”²⁷³

Regarding Cyprus in the meantime, the May 2015-July 2017 period also showed another period of negotiations between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, when

²⁷² Rumlar Akdeniz’de sondajı başlattı ‘savaş gemisi ve TPAO’ resti çektik. (2011, September 20). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.dha.com.tr/ekonomi/rumlar-akdenizde-sondaji-baslatti-savas-gemisi-ve-tpao-resti-cektik/haber-210036>

²⁷³ Sert Karaaslan, Y. (2020, September 26). 'Turkey will protect its rights with unshakable faith'. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-will-protect-its-rights-with-unshakable-faith/1986366>

President of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades and President of TRNC Mustafa Akıncı met for the first time to start a series of peace talks.

Issues of settlers, governance and citizenship were discussed during the peace talks; first in November 2016, two rounds of negotiations were held regarding the issue of territory in Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland. On June 30, 2017; after the previous talks collapsed, the UN stated that an important step was taken towards settlement, and that a series of “highly constructive” talks were held in Crans-Montana, Switzerland. On July 7, 2017 though, these talks also collapsed. According to a message delivered by the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey on July 20, 2017, the negotiations were aimed at reaching a sustainable resolution in Cyprus by

“Establishing a new partnership state between the two sides on the Island on the basis of the two sides’ political equality within the framework of the UN Secretary General’s Goodwill Mission.”

The message adds that the reason behind the failure of the talks was the Greek Cypriot leadership side’s “uncompromising attitude” and that

“No one should any longer expect Turkey to be a mere spectator to Turkish Cypriot people eternally being a victim of the deadlock and being subjected to restrictions that lack any legal basis.

As it has been so far, Turkey will continue to always stand by the Turkish Cypriot people and to support the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and will be the guarantee of the environment of stability and freedoms both on the Island of Cyprus and in the East Mediterranean.”

This message is important in the sense that it clearly outlines the support by the Justice and Development Party Government to the peace talks. It also emphasizes an existential threat towards the referent object, which is the Turkish Cypriot side; as well as the emergency measures in an implicit way (by referring to the guarantor role of Turkey on the Island).

On the other hand, the Army was conducting certain operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, which are helpful to show how securitization has materialized in the Paris School of Security framework. The Office of Navigation, Hydrography and Oceanography of Turkish Naval Forces Command under the Turkish Armed Forces issued several NavTexes from the Antalya NavTex Station especially recently,

emphasizing that Turkey does not recognize the “Cyprus” mentioned in NavTexes issued by the Cyprus Joint Rescue Coordination Center Larnaca with NavTexes such as the following one issued on August 31, 2018:

“It is worthy to mention that the ‘Cyprus’ mentioned in Larnaca NavWarn Nr. 285/18 is not the original partnership state established in 1960. Therefore, Turkey declares that the term of ‘Cyprus’ neither amount to any form of recognition of the Greek Cypriot Administration nor prejudice Turkey’s rights and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.”²⁷⁴

It is essential to note here that Turkey not recognizing the term “Cyprus” used in this context by the Larnaca NavTex Station has implications for the de-securitization of the process. The “change through stabilization” form of de-securitization requires the parties of a conflict to recognize each other as legitimate, and in these sorts of NavTex declarations, the parties do not view each other as legitimate actors.

Turkey continued to issue NavTexes in 2020; mentioning the unauthorized NavTex issuings in Turkish NavTex service areas. In November 24, 2020 for instance Turkey issued the following NavTex through its Antalya NavTex Station, stating:

“Unauthorized station has broadcasted NavTez message numbered with MA41-455/20 in Turkish NavTex service area. Antalya NavTex Station has the authority to broadcast NavTex messages in the area.”²⁷⁵

Turkey added in the same NavTex that the unauthorized activity that was mentioned was carried out within Turkish continental shelf, and reminded the international community that the “Cyprus” mentioned in said-unauthorized NavTex does not represent the original partnership state established in 1960.

After having convinced the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot public opinions of the urgency of the situation, Turkey signed a Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement and an EEZ agreement with TRNC in September and November 2011 respectively, the latter granting

²⁷⁴ TURNHOS N/W : 0857/18. (2018, August 31). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.shodb.gov.tr/shodb_esas/index.php/en/safety-of-navigation/navigational-warnings/antalya-navtex-station/23-all-stations/antalya-navtex-station/1006-turnhos-n-w-0857-18

²⁷⁵ TURNHOS N/W : 1470/20. (2020, November 24). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from http://www.shodb.gov.tr/shodb_esas/index.php/en/safety-of-navigation/navigational-warnings/antalya-navtex-station/23-all-stations/antalya-navtex-station/7699-turnhos-n-w-1470-20

Turkish Petroleum Corporation the license to search for hydrocarbons in TRNC's jurisdiction. This way, Turkey has managed to expand its sovereignty in the area and started drilling activities both in Turkey's and TRNC's EEZs.

Additionally regarding the securitizing events in the area, in October 18, 2018, the Turkish Navy stopped a Greek frigate from "harassing" Turkish ship in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the incident, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared, "Turkey would continue to exercise its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its continental shelf" and added, "We recommend that Greece abstain from acts that would cause an escalation in the region".²⁷⁶ This event shows that Turkey both started to securitize the issue by military actions, and in cases where official statements are made, by speeches that contain elements of existential threat and more importantly, emergency measures.

Turkey's discourses regarding TRNC and the Eastern Mediterranean have changed over the coming years; possibly, because of the political context it had been in. At first, Turkey's discourses were mainly focused on the TRNC people's needs and interests, and that Turkey would try to protect them whenever possible. Over time, and as Turkey increased its presence and sovereignty in the Eastern Mediterranean the discourses started reforming Cyprus question as Turkey's "national cause." In a joint press conference Erdoğan had with TRNC President Mustafa Akıncı, Erdoğan said:

"We will never allow the Turkish Cypriots to become minorities in a Greek Cypriot state." and added "Cyprus is our national cause. Our goal is to find a just and lasting solution on Cyprus."²⁷⁷

The Libya-Turkey EEZ Agreement of November 2019,²⁷⁸ followed by the Greece-Egypt EEZ Agreement of August 2020 also happened in such circumstances, when the area had already been actively securitized for several years. Turkey's Foreign Affairs Minister

²⁷⁶ Turkish Navy stops Greek Frigate 'HARASSMENT' in Mediterranean. (2018, October 18). Retrieved February 22, 2021, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-greece-mediterranean/turkish-navy-stops-greek-frigate-harassment-in-mediterranean-anadolu-idUSKCN1MS2AP>

²⁷⁷ Chohan, K., & Kar Onum, N. (2018, July 11). Turkish President Erdogan: Cyprus is our national cause. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/international-relations/turkish-president-erdogan-cyprus-is-our-national-cause/20815>

²⁷⁸ Çaşın, M. (2019, December 13). ANALYSIS - Strategic, legal aspects of Turkey-Libya deal. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/analysis-strategic-legal-aspects-of-turkey-libya-deal/1673079>

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, right after the Greece-Egypt EEZ Agreement tweeted on his official Twitter account that:

“Greece-Egypt agreement is null and void. Will continue to resolutely defend rights of Turkey&Turkish Cypriots at the table&on the ground”; implying Turkey may decide to use other means than diplomatic ones.²⁷⁹

In a “statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hami Aksoy, in response to a question regarding the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece dated August 10, 2020 on the activities of Oruç Reis”, Aksoy has stated Greece has signed a “pirated agreement” with Egypt, and that:

“Turkish military presence in the area aims in no way toward an escalation, but merely functions as a guarantee of the exercise of our right to legitimate self-defense if need be. A military intervention on a civilian vessel of ours will naturally not be permitted.”²⁸⁰

demonstrating how militarized and securitized the area already is by such statements that can be classified as discourses of “stage of mobilization”. The statement contains elements of an existential threat on the referent object by the words “our right to legitimate self-defense if need be” and of emergency measures by the words “A military intervention on a civilian vessel of ours will naturally not be permitted” clearly showing that in case of an attack, Turkey would intervene militarily, too.

It is equally important to acknowledge the strong relations Erdoğan shares with former Prime Minister and current President of TRNC Ersin Tatar; a joint press conference between Erdoğan and Tatar was held on October 26, 2020 shortly after Tatar became the 5th TRNC President of TRNC. In that press conference, Erdoğan stated he is planning to visit TRNC on November 15, 2020 and added:

²⁷⁹ Kara Aydın, H. (2020, August 6). Turkey slams 'so-called' maritime deal by Greece, Egypt. Retrieved August 17, 2020, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-slams-so-called-maritime-deal-by-greece-egypt/1933938>

²⁸⁰ Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Press Release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece dated 10 August 2020 on the Activities of Oruç Reis. (2020, August 10). Retrieved August 17, 2020, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-74_--yunanistan-db-nin-oruc-reis-in-faaliyetlerine-dair-aciklamasi-hk-sc.en.mfa

“I believe that we will go further with Mr. Ersin Tatar, who was elected as the President. We had a comprehensive and productive meeting with Mr. Tatar. We discussed possible future steps regarding the Cyprus issue and reviewed the latest developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turkish side favors a fair, lasting and sustainable solution in Cyprus. To this end, it has taken the steps incumbent upon it in good faith and with a sense of responsibility. It is obvious that the Greek Cypriot side has no such intention as to accept a solution on the basis of the Turkish Cypriots’ equal partnership.”²⁸¹

The securitization that took place during this time is critical as unlike the other countries surrounding the Eastern Mediterranean Sea such as Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia who have declared EEZs in the area; Turkey had not concluded an EEZ Agreement apart from the one it had with TRNC back in 2011 until 2019 November when it concluded another one with Libya. This might mean that Turkey, along with its securitization of the issue, is likely to follow a foreign policy focusing much more on its sovereignty regarding Cyprus, and not necessarily focusing on the TRNC people’s rights and interests. While this probable future is interpreted as Turkey following an “irredentist” foreign policy by some foreign media resources such as the Arab News,²⁸² this thesis does not discuss that but rather discusses how securitization of the issue has taken place.

This period between 2009-2020 and the discourse employed on Cyprus by the Turkish Foreign Policy actors is important because of its potential future implications on the issue, but also because it shows first-handedly how the energy security aspect made the Turkish political elite go for securitizing the issue once again, and how. It is important, as during this period, the internal and external threats that the Turkish Foreign Policy actors were faced with were also influential; and it was not just the energy security aspect of Eastern Mediterranean that changed and securitized the Turkish stance. However, it is equally important to mention that it was not solely by discourse that Turkey securitized the issue; especially by the end of the decade. Turkey showed a more careful stance with the discourse used on Cyprus and at platforms such as Crans-Montana; but that enables an analysis through securitizing actions in the framework of Paris Security School to be made. In the end the securitizing actor, the referent object and the relevant audience are

²⁸¹ "The Turkish side favors a fair, lasting and sustainable solution in Cyprus". (2020, October 26). Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/122511/-the-turkish-side-favors-a-fair-lasting-and-sustainable-solution-in-cyprus->

²⁸² Romano, D. (2020, September 23). How Erodgan-led Turkey went from NATO ally to liability. Retrieved November 30, 2020, from <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1739061/middle-east>

seen in the speeches; as well as when and how the referent object is changed is demonstrated. Through these analyses, the replacement of the Cyprus issue from the political and public sphere to the security sphere is observed.



7. CONCLUSION

This thesis aims to understand the nexus between Turkish Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus on 2004-2020 and its securitization. First, the thesis introduces the summary of Cyprus issue and why it is relevant and important to study in terms of Turkish Foreign Policy narrative that is outlined. Then in second chapter, the methodology that is used which is discourse analysis and in particular critical discourse analysis is introduced. It is further explained why it is a suitable method to study the link between Turkey's Foreign Policy and securitization. In the third chapter focusing on the theoretical framework of the thesis, securitization theory is explained in greater depth; along with its ties with Constructivism. The stages of securitization is also elaborated in the same chapter. In the fourth chapter, a brief background of the Cyprus conflict is given in order to introduce some of the causalities behind the conflict and the Island's current situation as well as the Annan Plan and its significance. The next chapter is allocated to some of the important concepts regarding the delimitation of marine zones in the area. The concepts related to delimitation of marine zones are elaborated as most of the tensions and foreign policy decisions over the past decade in the area are based on these. They are also elaborated on as the natural gas drilling activities add a new dimension to the conflict and need to be understood in order to get the changes in Turkish Foreign Policy narrative. The last chapter before the conclusion elaborates the Turkish political context, which gives a detailed overview of the developments and situation regarding Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish political elite for that matter. It does so in order to outline some of the key events that have shaped the Turkish Foreign Policy in recent years as well as developments in the domestic arena. This chapter is divided in four chronological parts, and each of these parts have sub-chapters where Turkish Foreign Policy discourse regarding Cyprus are elaborated. The evolution of discourses in Turkey regarding Cyprus and the role of securitization hence are explained.

It has been argued that foreign policy and securitization are interrelated and need to be considered as one, as a whole. Foreign policy changes that lead to securitization of Cyprus cannot be understood solely by observing the EU's view on the issue nor by following up the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. As this thesis demonstrates, other developments regarding for instance, internal threats that the political elite is faced with,

also bare a significant influence. Discourse analysis is then used to better demonstrate how the securitization happened, along with why it happens, which is elaborated throughout the thesis.

In short, the thesis aims to understand how Turkey's Foreign Policy and narratives regarding Cyprus have been shaped by securitization, mainly because of the relevance of the issue. From the very beginning of the conflict, the discourse used by key Turkish Foreign Policy actors have changed and been through securitization and de-securitization, according to the political context and internal as well as external threats or perceived threats the country was facing. Especially from 2004 onwards Turkey -having EU accession in its main agenda and being a highly energy-dependent country- have been actively following the situation and developments about Cyprus and has been actively engaging in the drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the marine delimitation issues between the countries of the region lead to the tensions escalating between them, and in the context of Turkey, internal threats or perceived threats as well as foreign policy developments have been found to affect the narratives of Turkish political elite regarding Cyprus, too.

Discourse analysis, using primary sources such as official ministry declarations as well as secondary sources such as discourses found in news stories of news agencies' websites, is conducted in order to show how foreign policy and securitization are interrelated.

Another important point is how the Turkish political elite securitized and de-securitized the issue in a loop, the latter by calling the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus a "peace operation" and by highlighting the safety of Turkish Cypriots on various platforms. Then in 1980's, as the political life in Turkey was shaped mostly by the influence of the Army, the Cyprus issue simultaneously got securitized; meaning it gradually entered the security sphere. The securitization and de-securitization trends, which are processes in themselves, occurred in line with the loss or gain of influence of the army in domestic and foreign policy affairs. At the beginning of 2000's for instance, the Turkish political elite very effectively managed to remove the Cyprus dispute from the sphere of security and placed it in the political sphere. Later, based on the new circumstances, Turkey this time created a sense of "urgency" about the Cyprus dispute in order to solidify its stance in domestic politics and at the same time to strengthen Turkey's sovereignty in the region as a matter of survival.

Discourse analysis is used and shows how Turkish narrative transformed from being mainly about Turkish Cypriots' economic and political rights; to Turkey's own security and sovereignty in the region as a regional power. This eventually creates securitization as such discourses (or securitizing actions, when discourses do not explicitly mention emergency measures especially during the past decade) reinforcing perceived threats and security make the audience perceive measures that would otherwise seem illegitimate, legitimate. When securitization happens then, speeches are used and they are used in a way to reinforce that sense of urgency. One example demonstrating how securitization helped Turkey strengthen its sovereignty in the area is TRNC Cabinet granting Turkish Petroleum Corporation license to search for hydrocarbons in its own jurisdiction. Furthermore, recent developments such as Turkey-Libya EEZ Agreement and Egypt-Greece EEZ Agreement; followed by Turkey's escalation in the "stage of mobilization" domain also demonstrate the relevance and importance of the issue. The October 2020 TRNC Presidential Elections and the good relations that the Turkish political elite and the newly elected President and former Prime Minister of TRNC; Ersin Tatar share are also important developments that show first-handedly how relevant the issue is. The recent developments all could be understood through the lens of securitization, especially taking into consideration the whole process of securitization, clearly.

The theoretical framework of the thesis is selected carefully as securitization is about creating a sense of urgency. In the case of Turkey's Foreign Policy regarding Cyprus, that urgency is created in order to have more sovereignty and perhaps energy security in the area. Discourse analysis is a method that is qualitative in nature and that is suitable to study this using desk research mainly.

To conclude, domestic and regional changes are found to have greatly affected the Turkish political elite, and that in order to solidify both their stance in domestic politics and strengthen Turkey's sovereignty in the area as a regional power, a perception of "urgency" was created and securitization was utilized. Furthermore, energy security has added a new dimension to the Cyprus dispute, and that Turkey's Foreign Policy, through securitization, has effectively demonstrated that its presence in the region has become an issue of security and sovereignty.

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