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PARTY TYPES AFTER THE 1980 COUP IN TURKEY:
A COMPARISON OF COMPETING TYPOLOGIES

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MASTER'S DEGREE THESIS

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Advisor: Prof. Dr. Himmet Murat Güvenç

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ABSTRACT

Many political parties have taken place in Turkish political life before and throughout the history of the Republic. In the literature, political party typologies have been tried to be created, there are various studies, but there is no theory of parties, so these studies did not lead us to a theory. Turkey has a unique political history within its geography. This study aims to analyse the political party formations in Turkey after the 1980 coup. The party models generated in the literature are criticaly analyse and three following comhrehensive model generated by Gunther&Diamond, Krouwel and Rahat are selected as tools to analyse party formations after the 1980 coup in Turkey. Wish to aim to restructer totaly the political landscape of Turkey by adopting, the law on political parties adopted by the leadership of the coup stipulated rather strict rules for political participation cut off the links of political parties with the civil society imposed a ten percent electoral threshold and arbitrary controls for party membership. In so during generated a distinction between parties that have rather strong links with civil society but not allowed the participated in elections and the parties that work allowed the participated did not have strong linkages and legitimacy in the civil society. The thesis aims to analyse the structures of different parties using the criteria formulated in the social political science literature and tries to monitor the evolution of political party structures in an empirical context. So as to facilitate the discussion the distinctive features associated with each party model is used to classify party formations after the 1980 coup. This comparative historical analysis suggest that inspite of partial concurrencies, it is not so easy to fit a party in any category as viable. Although there are some similarities, the parties are not in harmony with the ideal types. The formations can not be needly classified under the party models existing party literature.

Keywords: Justice and Development Party, Republican People's Party, Political Parties, Party Typologies, Election, Motherland Party, Party Organization, Party Types, Personalized Politics, Personalization

TÜRKİYE'DE 1980 DARBESİ SONRASI PARTİ TİPLERİ: REKABET EDEN TİPOLOJİLERİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI

ÖZET

Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca ve öncesinde birçok siyasi parti Türk siyasi hayatında yer almıştır. Literatürde siyasi parti tipolojileri oluşturulmaya çalışılmış, çeşitli çalışmalar mevcuttur ancak partiler teorisi olmadığı için bu çalışmalar bizi bir teoriye götürmemektedir. Türkiye, coğrafyası içinde benzersiz bir siyasi tarihe sahiptir. Bu çalışma, 1980 darbesi sonrası Türkiye'deki siyasi parti oluşumlarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Literatürde üretilen parti modelleri eleştirel bir analizdir ve Gunther&Diamond, Krouwel ve Rahat tarafından oluşturulan üç kapsamlı model, Türkiye'de 1980 darbesinden sonra parti oluşumlarını analiz etmek için araç olarak seçilmiştir. Darbe önderliği tarafından kabul edilen siyasi partiler kanunu, siyasi katılım için oldukça katı kurallar öngörerek, siyasi partilerin sivil toplumla olan bağlarını keserek, yüzde 10'luk bir seçim barajı ve parti üyeliği için keyfi kontroller dayatarak, Türkiye'nin siyasi manzarasını bütünüyle yeniden yapılandırmayı amaçladı. Sivil toplumla bağları oldukça güçlü olan ancak seçimlere katılmasına izin verilmeyen partiler ile katılımına izin verilen partilerin sivil toplum içinde güçlü bağları ve meşruiyeti yoktu. Tez, siyaset bilimi literatüründe formüle edilen kriterleri kullanarak farklı partilerin yapılarını analiz etmeyi amaçlar ve siyasi parti yapılarının evrimini ampirik bir bağlamda izlemeye çalışır. Tartışmayı kolaylaştırmak için, 1980 darbesinden sonraki parti oluşumlarını sınıflandırmak için her bir parti modeliyle ilişkili ayırt edici özellikler kullanılmıştır. Bu karşılaştırmalı tarihsel analiz, kısmi uyumlara rağmen, bir partiyi herhangi bir kategoriye uygun olarak yerleştirmenin o kadar kolay olmadığını gösterir. Bazı benzerlikler olsa da taraflar ideal tiplerle uyum içinde değildir. Oluşumlar, mevcut parti literatüründe parti modelleri altında zaruri olarak sınıflandırılamaz.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Siyasal Partiler, Parti Tipleri, Seçim, Anavatan Partisi, Parti Organizasyonu, Parti Türleri, Kişiselleştirişmiş Siyaset, Kişiselleştirme

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ABBREVATIONS

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

ANAP: Anavatan Partisi

BTP: Great Turkey Party

CMP: Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi

DP: Democrat Party

DISK: Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu

DEHAP: Demokratik Halk Partisi

DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)

EU: European Union

FP: Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)

HADEP: Halkın Demokrasi Partisi

HEP: People's Labor Party

HP: People's Party

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IDP: Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi

JP: Justice Party

MKP: Maoist Komünist Partisi

MBK: Milli Birlik Komitesi

MÇP: Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi

MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

MSzP: Hungarian Socialist Party

MDP: Nationalist Democracy Party

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSC: National Security Council (MGK)

NPC: Northern People's Party

ODS: Civic Democratic Party

RPP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)

RP: Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)

SODEP: Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi

SHP: Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti

SHDP: Social Democratic People's Party

TOBB: Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği

US: United States

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In this section, political party models and their characteristics are analysed based on the typologies generated by Gunther, Dimond and Krouwel as typical classifying in the literature. Although there are many political party typologies in the literature, these classifications have been insufficient to capture the diversity in party types worldwide in last decades. One of the reasons is that many typologies are based on west European parties in late nineteenth and mid-twentieth. There are studies showing how to fit commonly used party concepts into the coherent framework and how existing party models fall short of explaining contemporary party models literature. For almost a century, political scientists have developed genres and typologies of political parties with intent to find out the primary features of the partisan organizations which were the targets of their studies. Nowadays, the literature is fertile with several schematization of political parties that have obtained the status of classics also they have been used by scientist long since such as Duverger,1954 and Kirchheimer, 1966. Scholarly interest in classification of political party models results in substantial number of parties. Existing party models are insufficient to comprehend the diversity of party types but have created a literature with extensive definitional criteria. This variety and different interpretations make it impossible to construct a conductive and cumulative party theory. Political party typologies have not accumulated in a general theory. There is no single line that shows the types of parties, the transformation they undergo over time. Most of them are limited conceptualization models based on Western Europe and the USA (Sartori, 2005). There is no one ecumenically comprehensive scheme so a treasury of typologies is requisite. The main reason for creating a political party typology with Weberian ideal types is the abstractive and descriptive value that this typology provides (Katz and Mair, 1995). We can define typology as a theoretical primitive tool used to explain the complexity of the world. Therefore, ideal types allow the reader to capture complex and multidimensional concepts. Thanks to typologies, the researcher can develop his/her work using the common research language before starting each new study from scratch. Ideal types also play a crucial role in the diachronic analysis of political party progress (Krouwel, 2003). Summarizing features common among political parties in various countries, scholars also use ideal types to diagnose problems of contemporary party democracy and to develop various methodological tools. The limitation of this tool is that real-world political parties do not in conformity with the all criteria that define the party model, or some may contain more than one ideal type

element. Proposed classifications include ideal types that can serve as benchmarks for mapping parties at a particular point in mapping the evolution of parties. It does not describe as nominal categories. Most of the cases in the real world are expected to be among these ideal types.

1.1 Different Approaches to the Clustering Political Parties

In this section, the questions of how researchers approach the issue of party typologies and how to develop a de facto party model proposal are discussed. By re-evaluating the previous political party typologies, some aspects of the party models are clarified and new party types are defined. These classifications can be made in many ways; Gunther and Diomond distinguish party models according to temporal and demographical context.

As it is known, party typologies are theories prepared about the classification of political parties. These theories are based on the structure, ideology and organization of parties. It helps in examining aspects. The most important of these is the typology of "cadre" and "mass" parties introduced by M. Duverger in 1954. Then, "representation parties and integration parties" belonging to Sigmund Neumann and "catch-all parties" put forward by Otto Kircheimer come (Türköne, 2003: 260-262). Likewise, Panebianco's typology of "professional parties", Katz and Mair's typology of "cartel parties" and Ruud Koole's typology of "modern cadre parties" are other typologies used in political science.

The first studies on political parties, which progressed in parallel with the birth of modern political science, were produced by Ostrogorski (1964), Michels (1962) and Weber (1968). These works, which are considered classical; The work of Duverger (1954), Ranney (1954), Neumann (1956), Eldersveld (1964), Sorauf (1964) and Kirchheimer followed. However, Duverger is considered among the classics because he developed a valid approach that would affect others after Michels. These studies (Epstein, Lipset and Rokkan, Sartori), which are a sub-section of modern political science, have increased since 1945. In these studies, the issue of party and party systems in Western Europe gained importance. Studies on political parties have also been tried to be divided according to their subjects. The main topics covered are; party type, party systems, party membership, elites, organizations, decision-making process, programs and policies, election campaigns, and the electorate associated with parties. In addition,

studies on party and party transformation are also included. In the 1970s, with the specialization in social sciences, there was a rise in election, voting and party identity issues. As a result of specialization in political science, the formation of different traditions about party performances and party systems has been witnessed.

Studies on political parties have brought different approaches and classification attempts. Accordingly, some of the classifications correspond to competitive dynamics, cultural factors, institutions or electoral system. In other classifications, other aspects of the parties related to the party organization and structure are taken into account, such as the age of the party, the possibility of using patronage, the character of the society or economy. Finding the political party classification confusing, Wolinetz tried to classify the parties from a different point of view. He divided them into three groups: 'policy-seeking parties', 'vote-seeking parties' and 'office-seeking parties '. In his classification, Wolinetz tried to reflect the appearances, grouping behaviors and preferences of the parties. He also examined whether these factors were sufficient to understand the nature of the parties. According to this classification, policy-seeking parties focus on political goals. These parties are trying to spread their political ideas. Vote-seeking parties aim to win the elections by getting high votes. Among the aims of these parties are to ensure that the party leaders take part in the state administration and to maintain the patronage relationship. Although a party is not entirely a policy-office or vote-seeking party, this scheme is seen as a classification that will allow it to relate to the social, economic, geographical and institutional characteristics of the parties (Wolinetz, 2002).

Ware, on the other hand, has gathered the studies and approaches on political parties and party systems in three categories. According to this classification, the parties are classified as 'social factors' (Lipset, Rokkan and Almond); There are approaches that analyze 'institutional factors' (Panebianco, Michels, Beyme, Katz and Duverger) and 'competition factors' (Sartori, Duverger, Epstein, Budge and Downs). In 'social factors', political institutions are seen as insignificant intermediaries, as social conflicts in countries are taken into account. In the case of 'institutional factors', on the contrary to the social approach, the political survival of institutions is important. Accordingly, changes in political rules will also affect the nature of other institutions. For example, the existence of legal restrictions on political patronage broadly affects the nature of political parties within the system. 'Competition factors' are also seen as a variant of the institutionalist approach. However, this approach only deals with the element of

competition. Accordingly, political parties are in competition with other political parties (Ware, 1996).

1.2 Classical Approaches in the Political Party Literature

These authors, who produced the first basic works on political parties, also influenced the authors and studies that came after them. Ostrogorski and Michels, who are among the classical writers, focused on the political party organization and drew attention to the oligarchic tendencies and bureaucratization within the party. Known for his studies on bureaucracy, Weber not only looked at the role of parties in social classes, but also examined party types in his later studies. Duverger, who has continued his influence after Michels with his political party studies, has examined both political party types, political party systems and the structure of political parties. M. I. Ostrogorski's book "Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties" was the first study to focus on party organization. Ostrogorski, in his analysis, tried to determine the real-life functioning of political parties through observation, by leaving the historical and legal description method. In his study, Ostrogorski tried to determine the real-life functioning of political parties through observation, rather than the historical and legal description method. Ostrogorski, who argues that party organizations will become bureaucratized and organizational goals will take priority over ideological goals, states that the party organization demands full loyalty and discipline from its members and elected representatives. Thus, the representatives of the parties in the parliament will come under the domination of extra-parliamentary party organizations. Since winning elections has become the main objective of the parties, the ideological differences between the parties decrease and the parties become more and more alike. Ostrogorski, as a remedy for this situation, which he finds contrary to the understanding of democracy, suggested the abolition of permanent party organizations and the establishment of temporary organizations that will take certain stances on the important problems of that day for each election. However, this thesis of Ostrogorski has been criticized for having deficiencies. According to Lipset, Ostrogorski failed to see that organized parties, party machines, and even party oligarchies contribute to the functioning of democracy at all levels of state administration (Özbudun, 1976).

Weber, who is shown among the classical organization writers, dealt with the issue of bureaucracy, as it is known. However, while defining the bureaucracy and the state

apparatus, Weber also examined the role of political parties in them. Within the scope of political sociology; Examining the phenomena such as 'the relationship between the state and violence', 'the relationship between domination and legitimacy', 'the resolution of political parties' and 'bureaucracy', Weber considers bureaucracy as the driving force, actor or organic structure underlying these elements. In this context, according to him, political parties turn into organized bureaucratic machines in order to gain and maintain mass support.

While categorizing societies, Weber dealt with classes, status groups and political parties separately. Pointing out that the main purpose of these three groups is to consolidate their dominance, Weber states that their classes are within the relations of production and property; within the consumption forms represented by the status groups, private life styles; political parties were handled within the building of 'power and government'. According to Weber, the actions of parties are aimed at gaining social power. As a rule, parties can exist within a social club or within the state. In certain cases, parties represent interests determined by the institution of class and status. However, this does not require the parties to be purely class parties or status parties. According to Weber, parties are partly class and partly status parties. But they can be neither of these. According to him, parties are shaped according to the dominance structure of the society they are in. Because the main task of the party leaders is the conquest of the community. On the other hand, Weber does not assume that parties are merely the product of contemporary forms of domination. Weber defines medieval parties as parties, although they have fundamental differences from the structures of contemporary sovereign parties. According to Weber, parties together with classes and status groups are the existence of a comprehensive socialization and political framework.

Weber also focused his studies on political parties on party types. Before the First World War, he systematically studied the functions and characteristics of different types of parties. In this context, he particularly emphasized the patronage parties, class and interest parties, congress parties and elite or elite parties. While all these party types correspond to the "liberal" or "representative parties" of the 19th century, they correspond to the party types Duverger calls "cadre" parties. Weber also analyzed the better organized, more mobilized "mass" parties, a new and different type of political party that was emerging after 1890. One of the most important studies on political

parties was Robert Michels' work titled "Political Parties: A Sociological Analysis of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy", which includes his research on the German Social Democratic Party and became known as the "Iron Law of Oligarchy". Like Michels de Ostrogorski, who influenced many writers who came after him, he made a generalization that was not limited to a particular party or country by comparing party organizations.

According to Michels, all large and complex organizations inevitably keep oligarchic tendencies in their nature. In those organizations, a small ruling minority tends to perpetuate its power. Because it is impossible for this group to be controlled by the majority of the governed. Based on his observations on intra-party oligarchy, Michels argued that it was inevitable for democratic regimes to turn into oligarchy over time. Despite the impact, Michels' views have also drawn criticism. Duverger, who was influenced by Michels, found the author's views correct, but criticized them at some points. Duverger acknowledges that people who have authority will try to maintain this authority and place people who are always loyal to them around them. According to Duverger, those responsible in all organizations have a tendency to confront their members, to form a rather closed circle and to continue themselves in autocratic ways within this inner circle. There is an oligarchic tendency in most of the organizations, even the democratic ones. However, Duverger, who says that the oligarchy tendency is much stronger in non-democratic structures, argues that Michels makes you forget this in his thesis. According to Duverger, in non-democratic organizations, official rules regarding the appointment and supervision of administrators have a strengthening effect on the oligarchy tendency. Another point to be considered is related to the goals of organizations. Duverger, who divides organizations into two in terms of realizing the goals, notes that in the first type of organizations, leaders, managers and all members adopt the same basic goals. In such organizations, which include parties, unions, churches and pressure groups, even if the interests of the managers of the organization are not exactly the same with the members, the managers adopt the goals of the organization in order to gain power in the organization and try to establish an identity between the common goals. This constitutes an obstacle to oligarchic tendencies. In the second type of organizations, where he refers to economic organizations (companies, etc.), there is a profound difference between the goals of managers and members. According to Duverger, this anomaly has the same effect as the "iron law" of the oligarchy described by Michels. Despite his criticisms, Duverger's work, which was

influenced by Michels, has an important place in the literature of political parties, although it has caused various discussions (Duverger, 1974: 16).

Duverger argues that the single-celled creature of past ages has been replaced by twentieth century parties with their complex and differentiated structure. The first type is the bourgeois parties of the 19th century. They continue to exist today as Conservative and Liberal parties. The party's organization outside the parliament is underdeveloped and they operate only from election to election. Party leadership is usually in the hands of the party's representatives in parliament. An example of the second type is the socialist parties of Europe. The party has a large organization and a permanent bureaucracy. Doctrine plays a much more important role. Moreover, the party does not stay only in the political field, but also affects areas such as society, economy and family. The emergence of totalitarian parties in the twentieth century has revealed the third party type. Extreme centralism, harsh discipline and assignment of leadership etc. recourse to autocratic methods. According to Duverger, the biggest factor determining party systems is electoral systems. However, the author did not deal with other independent variables such as party doctrine, social and economic structure that affect the party. According to Özbudun, although the author mentions these variables from time to time, neither the socio-economic structure of the society nor the value system has been systematically evaluated as independent variables. According to Lavau, one of the writers who criticize Duverger, Duverger's most important methodological mistake is that he tries to explain parties with parties and electoral systems. Stating that political parties cannot be evaluated independently of the society they are in, Lavau argues that the parties are shaped under the geographical, historical, economic, social and ideological conditions of the country they are in (Özbudun, Siyasal Partiler, 11.).

1.3 The Shape of Modern Political Parties

Research on political parties, party types and political systems increased towards the middle of the 20th century. In the studies, party types are tried to be defined as well as the changes and transformations in political parties. More attention has been paid to party systems and types than to party organization. Although the complexity of the party structure has an important role, the parties have been considered as stand-alone

actors. Researchers such as Katz, Mair and Isaac argue that parties experience a transformation, not a crisis.

If we look at the studies that emerged in this period in general, some authors such as Sigmund Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer and their works come to the fore. Discussing mass parties, Neumann examined the emergence of "mass-integrated parties" and their transformation into "catch-all parties". Kirchheimer, in addition to assuming "catch-all" parties as a means of representation; defines it as a vote-seeking, leader-centered, and affiliated party. According to Kirchheimer, not every party has to undergo such a transformation; some may remain as mass parties. At this point, what is important is that the party defends the interests of a particular group or class.

Maurice Duverger and Seymour Martin Lipset systematically examined the socio-structural and institutional characteristics of political parties in the 1950s and 1960s. Lipset and Stein Rokkan analyzed the interaction, social and political divisions between vote congruences and the party system. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, on the other hand, were concerned with the behavioral segmentation of democratic politics and certain aspects of civic culture. Giovanni Sartori also produced comparative formal and analytical typologies by dividing the party systems into seven types according to the number and interaction of the parties. By adding historical dimensions to these typologies, Klaus and Beyme strengthened these typologies. At this point, Puhle emphasizes that he was influenced by the trends in research on political parties and the changes in the theory of democracy. Emil Lederer, on the other hand, emphasized the economic elements of the party form and performance. The fact that these studies complement each other has made significant contributions to the literature of political parties (Puhle, 2002).

1.4 Current Debates About Political Parties

The developments related to political parties and the discussions in this field continued over party types. Two main debates about political parties have come to the fore: One of them is whether mass parties of any kind will turn into catch-all parties. The second is the decline of catch-all parties since the 1970s, when they had their golden age, and whether there is a crisis of political parties from this point of view. Kirchheimer was the

first to argue that mass parties would turn into catch-all parties. Puhle, on the other hand, opposed this thesis. Because, according to Puhle, there are more than one factor affecting the parties. Therefore, in order to make this assumption, it is necessary to examine the dimensions of the parties, the electoral system, the institutional structure of democracy, and each disintegration related to the society. On the other hand, Puhle argues that the political party crisis has manifested itself since the 1980s. According to Puhle, the lack of alternative parties in the 1980s brought up the question, "Are parties important?" In this period, political parties started to show a united attitude against oligarchic tendencies and tried to develop a bottom-up control mechanism with democratic decision-making processes. Puhle expects the parties to fulfill the following criteria in order to prevent the crisis of political parties: Parties must provide leadership. They should not be government-financed or dependent on funding interest groups. Parties should not be represented by professional politicians; also inexperienced elites or amateurs should take part in the parties (Puhle, 2002).

Mair, on the other hand, draws attention to the fact that the discussions about political parties are stuck with the mass parties and that the changes in the mass party (catch-all party, cartel party, professional party for elections, etc.) are perceived as a sign of the weakening and collapse of political parties. Mair finds the findings about the crisis of political parties and the emergence of new social movements problematic. One reason for this is the difficulty of collecting data. Another reason is that these determinations are not based on empirical evidence. The third problem is that party organization is still evaluated through the party-civil society relationship (Katz and Mair, 1995).

Another important development regarding political parties is the increase in party opportunities and party revenues in almost every party. For example, in the last ten years, there has been an increase of 300 percent in Germany, 200 percent in Austria, and more than 100 percent in Ireland. Drawing attention to the development in the party-state relationship (the civil society-party relationship has always been emphasized before) in the last two decades, Mair notes that political parties establish close ties with the state. According to Mair, Kirscheimer's "catch-all" party model and the bottom-up party organization model emphasized in Panabianco's "election-oriented professional party" and thought to erode the party-civil society relationship can be regulated with more emphasis on the party-state relationship.

The state is very important for the survival of political parties. Although the parties adhere to certain criteria to make propaganda or give a message to their voters, they use state television much more than before. In the last two decades, the number of personnel of the parties has significantly increased. Because this group is paid much more than the state budget. On the other hand, assimilation and adaptation come to the fore for the survival of the parties. From this point of view, Mair concludes that the parties do not disperse, but change, the balance on the different sides of the parties shifts and these sides become more and more independent from each other. Therefore the parliamentary wing of the party is increasingly state-oriented and away from civil society. Mair also interprets the fact that the parties are so dependent on the state as the fact that the parties themselves are dependent. Because after all, parties are the state itself, or at least the enforcers of the rules set by the state (Mair, Party Organizations, 1-23.).

Recently, it has focused more on candidate elections. At this point, Mair likens the European parties to the candidate-oriented American model parties, which are completely far from a centralist understanding. He argues that although there is a decrease in the understanding of "partisanship" in the European society, there is no decrease in the understanding of "partisanship" of the state, and that the state intervenes in the decision-making process of the people through parties. European parties differ from American parties in this respect. Therefore, Mair talks about the change and adaptation of the parties rather than the concept of the disintegration of the parties. On the other hand, Mair points out that the distrust of parties creates an anti-party understanding among the masses. The failure of alternative attempts has brought social movements that want to change the party system to the agenda. Another reflection is that it led to the rise of far-right parties.

Electoral campaigns have become more personalized over time. Increasing importance of leaders/candidates' personalities to the detriment of parties and platforms for the voters' choice; but empirical evidence of this impact is controversial (Campbell, 2016). It fluctuates substantially among countries: for some of them, politics has always been highly personalized since their democratization. Besides, more personalism does not guarantee more attention by voters. Decline of the importance of partisanship for elections, but whether party attachment still important as voters' follow party cues is still unclear. Beyond these features already defining the new linkage between parties, voters and the state, some trends of current politics suggest that the transformation is not

over. Rather the contrary, as the fast evolution of new technologies are redefining the conditions where political parties compete and represent their voters (Gerboudo, 2019).

1.5 A Classification of Parties and Party Systems: Fifteen Ideal-type 'Species' of Parties

Undoubtedly, every idea in the society must be represented in the political arena for the long-lasting functioning of democracy. In democratic systems, the way to do this is through political parties. However, there are many different qualities that distinguish political parties from each other, from their establishment to their functions, from their institutional structures to their activities. Due to the existence of these qualities, political parties; the theories of the emergence of parties are classified in terms of party typologies and institutionalization criteria of parties. Parties cannot be considered independent of the social and technological environment they are in. On the other hand, it is wrong to try to explain late twentieth century parties with classical party typologies that emerged a century ago. While there was no television when classical party typologies were formulated, television has become an important medium of communication between voters and candidates in modern democracies (Gunther and Mughan, 2000). This medium privileges the personalities of party leaders and provides an opportunity to convey their ideology in their presentations. Television also diminishes the importance of mass membership in electoral mobilization. In the late twentieth century, focus groups and public opinion polling techniques have considerably increased. At the same time, the fundamentals of mass culture and social structure have changed profoundly. While the political salience of economic inequality decreased, 'post materialist values' became influential in partisan politics.

According to Gunther, in the absence of extended party typology, the party model including common typologies has led to an extreme concept stretching. Although the qualities of the new parties that emerged were different from the original definitions of the party models, it was tried to define the parties with inappropriate labels. Gunther describes this effort as getting square pegs into round holes. Theory building can be undermined by unwarranted assumptions and improper labels applied to parties that differ organizationally and ideologically. The catch all party type is a category exposed to such abuses, as it appears to be flexible and adaptable to contemporary conditions (Puhle, 2002). While acknowledging the contribution of empirical studies based on

Western European models, we are also witnessing an effort to understand new campaign models in other regions of the world in recent decades.

With this initiative, party models will be re-evaluated and they will have the opportunity to enhance (Pasquino, 2001). The other trouble is that existing typologies rely on various criteria and no effort has been made to make these typologies more consistent with one another. As a result of these inconsistencies, a cumulative theory-building could not be created in the field because party types definitions lack of precision. Some typologies are based on functionalist criteria, differing on the basis of their organizational reason for existence or the goals they pursue.

Neumann (1956), divides parties into 'parties of individual representation' and 'social integration'. In his typology, total integration parties have ambitious goals of seizing power and demanding the full commitment of their members. Individual representation parties have been put forward very similar to Duverger's distinction between cadre parties. The social integration party, on the other hand, corresponds to the mass party. However, Türköne states that Neumann based on the functions of the parties and Duverger based on the organization of the parties (Türköne, 2003: 261). Based on their functions, Neumann introduced the distinction of "totalitarian integration parties" as a sub-title for social integration parties. Accordingly, parties that prioritize ideology, have a strong hierarchy, are far from democracy, and engage in activities that even regulate the lifestyles of their members, in accordance with the mass party type, are in the category of totalitarian integration parties.

Herbert Kitschelt (1994) proposes a four-part classification between 'centralist clubs', 'decentralized clubs', 'decentralized mass parties' and 'Leninist cadre parties'. Angelo Panebianco (1988), in the detailed articulation of typology contrast 'electoral-professional' with 'mass bureaucratic' parties. Diamond and Gunther do not dispute the idea that some criteria can be used to distinguish one party type from another. They use three main criteria as the basis of their integrative scheme. They said that: 'We do believe that systematic hypothesis-testing and cumulative theory-building have been hindered by the tendency of proponents of the various typologies to 'talk past' one another without systematically assessing the overlap or distinctiveness, not to mention the relative merits, of the various classification schema'. The lack of terminological consistency contrasts sharply with concepts such as fragmentation and volatility that exist in some subfields of political science whose meanings have been agreed upon. In

addition, some of these typologies were created by choosing a single criterion such as organizational structure or social basis of representation as the basis of a typology. This narrows the focus of analysis, making it difficult to systematically analyse variations in party types.

While the approach may seem lucrative in terms of parsimony, it loses in capturing theoretical differences between real-world parties. In addition, most studies are deductive and initially acknowledge the importance of a particular criterion rather than maintain this claim by carefully considering the relevant evidence. Such studies, fall victim to reductionist argumentation, in which it is assumed that various structural features are due to a single privileged variable. According to Gunther, it is premature to attempt to construct elaborate theories on the basis of inadequate typologies. Eventually fruitful line of empirical analysis must begin with a set of party models that are comprehensive and undubitable and more accurately reflect the discrepancy between real-world parties. Countries outside especially Western Europe should also be included in the comparative analysis. Therefore, Gunther and Diamond build their theory of party typologies on models and terminology previously developed by other scholars, by ordering existing criteria. They also avoided the attempt to create a new type of party based on the assumption that cases cannot be explained using existing typologies. Their typology of parties is affiliated to three fundamental criteria.

The first of these criteria is the nature of the formal organization of the political party. Some parties are organizationally weak, while others advanced extensive mass-membership bases in different but connected areas of social life. Some are based on particularistic networks, while others are universalistic in terms of membership. Again, some rely on modern mass communication techniques, while others keep face-to-face channels of communication in the background. The second basic criterion contains the nature of the party's programmatic commitments. Accordingly, some parties consist of well-articulated ideologies or nationalist sentiments rooted in political philosophy, while others either lack well-defined ideological commitments or are pragmatic. The third and final criterion includes the norms of behavior and strategy, such as whether the party is pluralistic or proto-hegemonic. Some parties completely adhere to the rules of democracy, are pluralistic in their views of society and respectful of their opponents, while others are semi-loyal to democratic norms or anti-systemic, preferring a uniform regime that committed to the acquisition of their programmatic goals.

Gunther and Diomond's detailed discussion of the party focuses on the characteristic of party models and two dimensions within existing party literature. The first is the sociological dimension, i.e. the nature of the clients with which the party claims to defend and advance its interests. The second dimension, which the authors deal with, includes the internal dynamics of the decision-making processes of parties, ranging from charismatic figures to forms of collective party leadership. Their hypothesis is that party types are related to particular social clienteles patterns, but this relationship is not in a deterministic manner. Their second assumption is that sociological and leadership dimensions are not to the extent that they are included in the definition of party type. Both scholars point out that the political party models they describe are ideal types in the Weberian sense. For them, their work is beneficial because they offer easy-to-understand effects that help the reader comprehend complex or multidimensional concepts more easily. However, as with all ideal types, real-world parties should not be expected to fully comply with all the criteria that define party models. In the meantime some parties may contain more than one ideal type element. Most importantly, individual parties can develop over time, they may approach the party type in a previous period, but then they may transform to a different party type.

1.6 Types of Political Parties

Figure 4.1 Extent of organisation

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YEAR   THIN   THICK

1850

Elite-based

Tradit.
Local
Notable
                                                                    Mass-based ——— *Socialism*

        Clientelistic
                                                                        Class-mass

                                                                Nationalism

                                                    Religion   Pluralist-
                                        Ethnicity-based   Nationalist
                                                        Denominational   Leninist
                                            Congress
                                                                        Ultranationalist

                                    Ethnic
                        Electoralist
                                    Catch-all
                                            Programmatic
        Personalistic
                                                                    Fundamentalist
                    Movement/Parties
        Left-Libertarian
                            Post-industrial
   Extreme-Right
2000

Figure 1. Extent of organization

On the basis of five main type (Figure 4.1), they define fifteen different species that acquisition the main essence of parties in various historical periods. While they are aware of the negative trade-off in this approach, they argue that the lack of parsimony can confuse the reader or even make it difficult to perceive the important differences between the various parties. Therefore, they privilege party organization in one of the three dimensions of classification. Both authors define the type of party organization as a genus that encompasses various types of political parties, by adapting an analogy from biology. These types are respectively; elite-based, mass-based, ethnicity-based, elestoralist and movement parties. In their diagrams, they showed the party types as 'organizationally thin' and 'organizationally thick' parties in a two-dimensional array. Towards the top of the diagram are historical periods, and towards the bottom are the more recent entrants. The relationship between the organizational thickness and thinness of the party and its dimension is not accidental. A political party emerges in a particular technological context that may evolve over time, and this context can leave a lasting imprint on the fundamental nature of the party organization. For them, parties are

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channels of mediation between the political elite and the electorate, and their organizational ability to mobilize voters is highly dependent on their context.

As they argue, in some of the Western European countries in the 19th century and in most Latin American countries until the 20th century, politically unmobilized peasants, many of whom were illiterate and isolated from society, made up the large segment of the electorate. Within these segments of society, local notables had considerable influence.In this way, organizationally thin, elite based parties come in sight. After a while, different kinds of parties were risen as a result of developments such as urbanization, political mobilization of the working class and the spread of suffrage. The electoral mobilization of the newly entitled voters was carried out by parties with this large mass-membership and large organizational structure.

Since the 1960s, television has been a means of communication between the political elite and the electorate in this manner, massive party organizations have become a less effective tool in electoral mobilization. With the decrease in trade-union memberships and secularization, the secondary associations of the classical mass-based party shrank as well. In summary, according to the authors, the social and technological context of the party function has a direct impact on the effectiveness of partisan organizations, and these characteristics will systematically progress over time (Mair and van Biezen, 2001).

1.6.1 Elite Based Parties

According to the Figure 1, this genre is divided into two types which consists of traditional local notable and clientelistic party. Elite parties are parties whose basic organizational structures are minimal and based on established elites in a particular geographical area. This type of party is not ideological, the basic electoral commitments are to distribute spesific benefits to clients at the bottom of the patron-client hierarchy. Historically the earliest examples of this party type are traditional local notable parties. In the semi-democratic regimes in the 1850s, voters with limited suffrage ensure the continuity of the party. Election campaigns did not require special effort, as few enfranchised voters were sufficient for the elite to be elected to office. Elite parties do not have central party bureaucracies, national-level party organization consists of loose alliances that bind elected deputies together on the basis of common interests. The clientelistic parties are confederations of traditional or liberal professional notables.

Examples of elite party variants include the parliamentary factions that dominated the British House of Commons in the nineteenth century, the French conservative parties in the first half of the twentieth century, and a few conservative parties in Brazil today. Typically poorly organized elite parties lack of program or ideological emphasis. The function of the organization is to control the loose and indirect individual campaign efforts of the notabes in order to secure power. The campaign activities of the elite party depend on hierarchical chains where loyalty patterns are at the forefront in interpersonal relations. In almost all clientelistic parties, localized voters living in rural areas with low literacy levels and poor communication and transportation networks are common. That kind of clientelism, provided mutual benefits in terms of both the clients living in isolation from the dominant center and the patron in the relationship between the patron and the client (Gunther et al., 1986: 84–5). With the modernization process, the rural population has become increasingly literate and has taken political action by being exposed to mass media. With these developments, the patron's benefits to the clients decline, and clients increasingly resist the patron's attempts to influence voting decisions. With these conditions, patron-client relations became more challenging and oppressive because they threatened to cut economic interests from the client unless political support was committed to the client.

1.6.2 Mass-Based Parties

In Figure 1, mass based genus divided into three sub-genre which are religion, nationalism and socialism based. Religion based type also divided into two genus as denominational and fundamentalist. Nationalism species divided into two category which are plularist-nationalist and ultranationalist. The last type of mass-based party which based on socialism also divided into two category as Leninist and class-mass party. The mass parties as the second genus of party types has deep roots in the literature throughout nineteenth and early twentieth century in Europe. This party type emerged as the manifestation of the political mobilization of the working class. The party has large dues-paying members and these members play an active role in party affairs also the party is characterized by this membership base. The party organization aims to penetrate many areas of social life in order to spread its ideology and create an active membership base. Trade unions and other organizations are not only political allies of the party, but also mediums that serve to reflect the pragmatic objectives of the party in the social arena. Establishes nationwide networks of local party branches by establishing comprehensive and supportive organizations that include newspapers and

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recreational clubs. These organizational networks serve not only for mobilization at election time, but also for recreation opportunities for party members (Barnes, 1967).

The primary way for parties based on pluralistic masses to achieve their programmatic goals is to win elections. The party's vote mobilization strategies are based on the development and activation of a mass membership base. Party militants perform a variety of tasks, such as distributing printed propaganda and escorting voters to the polls. The party's allied secondary organizations, unions or religious groups, invite their members to support the party and do this through partisan messages in newspapers, radio and television broadcasts.

Proto hegemonic mass based party species, in contrast to the pluralist mass-based, places much more emphasis on discipline, continuous active commitment, and loyalty to the conduct of political conflict. For this reason, recruitment is highly selective and demands acceptance of the ideology and short-term party line from their members.

Class-mass parties, on the other hand establish bases within their class constituencies through groups organized both locally "branch" and functionally as 'trade unions'. The demand for ideological conformity on candidate members is minimal. Social integration through the activities of the party and its union allies is one of its major goals, but the party is primarily concerned with winning elections and taking part in the formation of governments. These parties are pretty open about recruiting, and given the party's primary concern with securing a majority of the electorate. The social democratic parties of Germany, Sweden and Chile are prominent examples of this party type.

Leninist parties, as defined by Gunther and Diomond based on class ideology, aim to overthrow the existing political system and implement revolutionary alteration in society. The party adopts a closed structure based on a semi-secret cell rather than the open branch that characterizes pluralist class-mass parties. These parties are highly selective in membership and demand absolute loyalty and obedience from their members. Leninist parties describe themselves as the "vanguard" of the proletariat, and although these parties seem to represent the working class, they clearly play a leading and top-down role in leading the class they represent. The main purpose of these parties is to seize power by using force if necessary. If the party succeeds in coming to power, it manifests itself as an "organized expression of the will of society" and changes its behavior towards other political groups. In Schurman's words: in the former Soviet

Union, it is the expression of 'the interests of the whole nation'; For the Chinese, it represents the "interest of the people" (Schurmann, 1966: 100). Based on its reputation, it can establish hegemonic control over the political and economic system, abolish or take over established secondary organizations. It uses almost all organized social groups in society as arenas for the social integration of individuals into the new society it hopes to re-create. The party will take on the task of presiding over the recruitment of the ruling elite, directing the activities of the state.

Pluralist nationalist parties, emerged in various forms, such as the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party, until the late 1990s. In many of these parties, cooperation with secondary groups, including massive membership bases, cultural organizations and trade unions, is essential. The voters of these parties will form individuals who subjectively identify themselves as belonging to a separate national group also the boundaries of the clientele will be rather malleable. The main functions of nationalist parties are to persuade citizens to vote for the party, as well as to use the party's election campaign and affiliated secondary organizations to intensify their identification with the national group. Those aspirations may include a demand for self-government, ranging from autonomy within a multinational state to full independence or even the redrawing of international borders. Although these parties seem moderate in their policy choices on religious issues, left-right continuum and some other issues, they can take an anti-system stance on regional governance issues. In addition, tensions are inevitable within the party between those who demand a more militant stance to defend their nationalist demands and those who emphasize cooperation with other parties in forming a coalition and even oppression for some laws to be implemented.

Ultra-nationalist parties have an ideology that favors the nation or race over the individual, hates minorities, and encourages the use of force by a strong, semi-military party, compose of uniformed party militias (Orlow 1969). In some respects, they may resemble the Leninist parties in organizational and behavioral characteristics, such as the highly selective recruitment process, intense indoctrination of members, strict internal discipline, the goal of seizing power by force when necessary, and being anti-system. When they come to power, as in the Leninist parties, they will seek hegemonic domination and suppress existing secondary organizations in an effort to resocialize all people. They differ from Leninist parties not only in the content of their ideologies, but also in the extent to which they express these ideologies less precisely and are subject to

interpretation by the charismatic leader. In such parties the national leader is the ultimate source of power and authority; such as Hitler's Nazi party and Mussolini's fascists, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) under Franjo Tudjman and Aleksandr Barkashov's Russian National Unity party. There are social conditions in such a party that give rise to ultranationalist and fascist parties dominated by a charismatic leader, and these conditions create an obedient devotion to an all-powerful leader.

A third programmatic origin for mass-based parties is 'religion'. The origins of the 'denominational mass-based party' can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, and the Christian Democratic party can be cited as an example also Christian Democracy in Poland is included in this party type more recently. These parties embody many of the organizational characteristics of the mass party, including the presence of a large base of dues-paying members, hierarchically structured party organizations, newspapers and broadcasting organizations, and religious allied secondary organizations. That kind of mass-based parties differ in an important way from parties based on ideologies because the basis of party programs is a set of religious beliefs determined by clerics or a religious institution. Intra-party tensions can arise when party leaders choose to modify the party's electoral appeals or programmatic commitments to conflict with religious values such as abortion and divorce. For example, the Italian Christian Democratic Party witnessed serious internal tensions over the legalization of divorce, which the Catholic church hierarchy was strongly opposed. As long as religious beliefs can be subject to different interpretations, it has been possible to observe such conflicts periodically in denominational mass parties in different periods.

According to the authors' scheme, the final mass-based party is the 'proto-hegemonic religious party' or the other title 'religious fundamentalist party'. While the fundamentalist party seeks to reorganize the state and society around a rigid reading of religious doctrinal principles, denominational-mass parties are more pluralistic. Fundamentalist parties do not have contradictory interpretations of religious norms that serve as the basis for the laws the party program seeks to impose on society. Religious leaders can interpret these texts and have absolute authority to translate them into politically and socially relevant terms.

In this theocratic party model, there is no separation between religion and the state, and religious norms are imposed on all citizens regardless of their religious beliefs. We can say that the organizational development activities of these parties, which can come to

the brink of totalitarianism and have wide-ranging goals, are quite extensive. In these parties, where member involvement and identification is essential and intense for the party, authority relations within the party are hierarchical, undemocratic and even absolutist, and members are highly disciplined. Religious fundamentalist parties not only invoke religious doctrines, but often perform a wide variety of social welfare functions that promote gain and consolidate the loyalty of their members. These parties get significant support from the poor, oppressed and marginalized middle class, for whom accusations of injustice and corruption have a special resonance. Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front and Turkey's Welfare Party contain elements of such an organization.

1.6.3 Ethnicity-Based Parties

This party species divided into two sub-genre as ethnic and congress party type. Ethnic parties are typically not organized as comprehensively and elaborately as mass-based parties. The main thing that distinguishes these parties from mass parties is their political and electoral logic. Unlike most mass-based parties, they lack transformative programs for society as a whole. These parties, which support the interests of a particular ethnic group, have narrower goals and strategies. And unlike nationalist parties, their programmatic goals typically do not include secession or a high level of decision-making and administrative autonomy from the state apparatus. Instead, they are content to use existing government structures to channel benefits to specifically define electoral clientele.

The ethnic party type only seeks to mobilize the votes of its own ethnic group. Party's classic historical samples are the Northern People's Congress, the Action Group of Nigeria's First Republic, more recently South Africa's Inkatha Freedom Party, the Turkish minority party (DPS, Movement of Rights and Freedoms) in Bulgaria. Although it may nominate candidates in other geographic areas and bring forwars as a national issues, these are actions that reluctantly mask the party's true regional purpose. As Kitschelt (2001) argues, ethnic parties limit their appeal to a particular regional constituency and draw boundaries between ethnic 'friends' and 'foes'. Ethnic parties do not have any universal purpose, they try to provide political and cultural benefits to the ethnic group in competition with other groups. For this reason, the programmatic and ideological commitments of ethnic parties are quite low.

They also typically do not have a well-developed organizational structure and formal membership base. Ethnic parties, lacking of any ideological agenda, tend to mobilize pre-existing clientelistic connection, so these parties are resemble to the clientelistic party in terms of structure and internal authority relations. That kind of parties can mobilize strong emotional symbolic issues of identity and even cultural survival, so they tend to be dominated and organized around a single charismatic leader. Unlike almost all other political parties, including nationalist parties, the party's electoral campaign is not intended to appeal other segments of society (Horowitz, 1985: 294–7). Thus, even more so than the fundamentalist party, the party's potential electorate base is ethnically constrained. Since by definition these parties cannot expand significantly beyond their ethnic electoral base, they cannot maintain hegemony unless they reach a demographic majority or undermine democracy. Historically, Nigeria's NPC tried to achieve territorial dominance by spoofing elections and cheating the census during the First Republic. This type of domination by an ethnic party can lead to violent conflict and has indeed been a contributing factor to the Nigerian civil war.

The congress party which is the first genus of ethnicity based parties, appears as a coalition or federation of ethnic parties, although it can take the form of a single party structure. Thus, it may share some organizational features and programmatic commitments with the ethnic party at the local level, but behave dramatically different within the national political system. Electoral appeal emphasizes national unity and integration rather than division, and encourages ethnic sharing and coexistence rather than threat. Where a compromise system within a post-election coalition government seeks to share power and resources among each group, a congress party pre-builds coalition guarantees within the broad tent of its party organization. If the party's tent is large enough, it can become a dominant party, like the Congress Party, which was the archetype of this model in the first two decades of India's independence.

The congress party allocates party duties and distributes patronage and other benefits in accordance with proportional formulas. Its social base is broad and heterogeneous, and the aim of the party is to make it as inclusive as possible.

1.6.4 Electoralist Parties

Gunther and Diamond divided electoralis party type into three different ideal party types as catch-all, personalistic and programmatic in which other issues such as personal

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attractiveness of party candidates, length of service in the party or official organizational position within the party are important criteria for candidacy. According to the authors classification, the first type is the 'catch-all' party. The most important goal of catch-all parties is to maximize the party's votes and win the elections. For the sake of this purpose, they try to aggregate as many diverse social interests as possible.

In societies where the distribution of public opinion is centrist on the left-right continuum, catch all parties will try to maximize their votes by positioning themselves at the center of the spectrum by appearing moderate in their policy choices and behaviors. The party strives to extend its electoral appeal to a wide variety of groups, and its eclectic policy orientations change according to the mood of the people. These parties, without a clear ideology, tend to emphasize the attractive personal qualities of their candidates, and nominations are determined by the candidates' electoral sources rather than organizational criteria such as years of experience or length of service in the party. The Democratic Party of the United States, the Labor Party under Tony Blair, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and the Socialist Party of Spain (PSOE) are a few examples of this party type.

Gunther and Diomond's conceptualization of the catch-all party differs in some important respects from the classical party type described by Kirchheimer (1966). First, Kirchheimer did not define a stable ideal type; his catch-all party is a concept that diverges from an earlier type of party and is therefore defined by what the party is rather than what it is. Specifically, Kirchheimer's definition denotes of the various ways in which the catch-all party diverged from the previously dominant party model of mass integration and is therefore still within the long-term evolutionary trajectory of such parties. Basing his analysis explicitly on the experience of central Western European socialist parties, Kirchheimer argued that as the importance of party militants diminished, control over the party and its candidacy would increasingly fall into the hands of the dominant parties. As is seen, the experience of the American catch-all parties clearly shows that this is not a fundamental component of the model. The rise in television-dominated personality-driven campaigns and the shifting of party alliances with serving social groups have gone hand in hand with the proportional decline of party bosses.

The programmatic party type, like the catch-all party, the programmatic party is a modern, pluralistic, thinly organized political party whose main function is to conduct

of election campaigns (Wolinetz, 1991). The party often tries to benefit from the personal appeal of its candidates. However, the programmatic party is closer to the classic mass-based party model. It has a much coherent programmatic agenda than the ideal-type catch-all party, and the party obviously incorporates these ideological appeals into its electoral campaigns. Although its organization and social base is similar to that of the catch-all party, the programmatic party has a more clearly defined social base and is likely more closely linked to some organizations which has similar ideologies or expectations in civil society. Therefore, the party's electoral strategy is to mobilize the core electorate rather than expand through the gathering of interests. The Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher, Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Vaclav Klaus, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) the Democratic Union in Poland, and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) are some examples of programmatic party.

In the second place, the only rationale for the 'personalistic party type' is to provide a facility for the leader to win elections and exercise power. An organization built by an incumbent or aspiring national leader solely to further their national political ambitions. Electoral appeal is not based on any program or ideology, but on the personal charisma of the leader, who is shown as indispensable for solving the country's crises. While the party can widely distribute special benefits to its supporters through clientelist networks, it is weak and opportunistic in terms of organization. In fact, this party type can be so temporary that it can change its name and structure with each election, even in the ministration of an incumbent president like Alberto Fujimori in Peru. A recent classic example is Thai Rak Thai Party of Thai businessman Thaksin Shinawatra, whose personality and vast personal wealth gave his party an unprecedented parliamentary majority, although it was founded just a few months before the November 2000 elections. Most of these parties were pluralistic and tolerant in their behavior, but this is not always true, as the proto-hegemonic behavior of Peru's Fujimori and Venezuela's Chavez clearly demonstrates.

1.6.5 Movement Parties

The most outstanding examples of movement parties in Western Europe consist of two genus: 'post-industrial extreme-right parties' and 'left-libertarian parties'. Herbert Kitschelt presents a comprehensive analysis of the "left libertarian" variety of the movement party. According to him, in Western Europe, "left libertarian" parties are essentially "post-materialist" in respect to their attitudes and behaviors. They reject the

superior status of economic issues and are characterized by a "negative consensus that the dominance of markets and bureaucracies should be reversed in favor of relations of social solidarity and participatory institutions" (Kitschelt, 1989: 64). Indeed, since there is no consensus to support a single overarching ideology or set of programmatic preferences, it functions as the lowest common denominator shared by a heterogeneous clientele. The party's agenda is a multiplicity of issues that are not limited to a single arena. There are no barriers to membership in the group, which is open to anyone who wishes to join and further diversifies the social base and attitude orientation of the activists. There are no barriers to membership in the party, which is open to anyone who wishes to join and further diversifies the social base and attitude orientation of the activists. Organizationally, the movement party relies on "loose networks of grassroots support with little-formal structure, hierarchy, and centralized control" (Kitschelt, 1989: 66). The left-libertarian movement party emphasizes 'constituency representation' rather than the logic of electoral competition, sometimes making it a unpragmatic coalition partner.

Piero Ignazi (1996), provides a concise overview of the post-industrial extreme-right party, which he sees as a different type of reaction against the conditions of post-industrial society. Where left libertarians place the greatest emphasis on informality and libertarianism in their response to modern society and state institutions, supporters of the extreme right have been driven to seek more order by atomization and alienation, while attacking the state for its intervention in the economy and social welfare policies (Ignazi, 1996: 557). Party members adopt the "leadership principle" and do not question the directives of the party's supreme leader. Xenophobia, racial animosity towards immigrants is a very distinct line of conflict. Besides, where fascists favoured the strong state-building, neoconservative anti-state rhetoric and attacks on the social welfare state penetrates the speeches of party leaders.

The typology developed by Gunhter and Diamond is certainly less parsimonious than the two- or three-category frameworks that have so far dominated the comparative literature on political parties. According to them, scientists who prefer deduction-based theorizing styles from the simpler one-dimensioal set of criteria may not welcome their contribution on the grounds that multidimensionality may hinder theorizing. They regardfully disagree to that mindset. As they noted earlier, many of the previously dominant typologies were found to be incomplete to the extent that they were based on

the historical experience of Western Europe from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. These typologies do not adequately reflect the diverse reality of political parties in other parts of the world. As they suggest, the deep ethnic divisions that divide many societies in Africa and Asia have a much more ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous context. As a consequence, for a party typology to be useful for cross-regional comparative analysis, different types must be allowed to emerge in disparate social contexts such as ethnic, congress, and religious-fundamentalist parties. Similarly, typologies based on the characteristics of Western European parties in the early twentieth century cannot be assumed to be valid for all time, even within a single region. As the socio-economic context and communication technologies develop, significant transformations are observed in the structure, resources, objectives of political parties. A dichotomy between cadre-mass parties or 'individual representation parties' and 'social integration parties' may have accurately reflected the reality of Western Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. By the second half of the century, these classical models proved incapable of capturing the diversity of party types present within democracies. Political parties have not emerged in a unilinear manner and have not converged to a single party model. In place of this, they believe that typologies are the products of changes in the organizational forms, electoral strategies, programmatic goals, and ideological orientations of political parties. According to them, it would be a mistake to rely on an excessively restricted number of party types. This will prompt scientists to try to cram new parties into unsuitable models or attempt to fail the theory-building process by concluding in frustration that existing theories and models do not fit established party types. Gunther and Diamond believe that the typology they present will facilitate testing of multiple hypotheses about the origins and functions of political parties that are less parsimonious but more fully reflect the real diversity in party types around the world.

1.7 Krouwel's Clustering and Linking of Party Models

Three types of classification methods have been used in the literature. The first is to simply list the party types and enumerate characteristics, such as elite, mass, catch-all, and cartel parties. In the second method, the genres of the party types are determined and charted. An example of this method is Duverger's scheme, with eight types dividing the parties' origins into two genera, external and internal. On the other hand, Gunther and Diamond (2003) also developed five genera based on fifteen party species. They classify each of the 15 'species' of party into its proper 'genus' based on three criteria: (1)

the nature of the party's organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic orientation of the party (ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and (3) tolerant and pluralistic versus proto-hegemonic.

The third method classifying which is generated by Krouwel based on abstract dimensions. According to Krouwel, the genera method is extreme deterministic also developing indisputable genera is nearly unfeasible. There is no broadly accepted categorization to cluster the different party models. Likewise, the deductive method that used for abstract dimensions is also controversial. In consequence, Krouwel decides on a parsimonious and straightforward method describing the differentiating features of party types. The model he proposes is based on reformulating already existing models and revealing the overlapping aspects of the party models. On the basis of their resemblances, he has classified the several party types into five main species which are loosely structured elite-centred cadre parties, all models of mass parties, electoralist catch-all party types, cartel parties and business firm parties. Unlike Gunther and Diamond's typology, Krouwel does not generated a detailed classification of ethnicity-based and movement parties.

According to him, party models don't have to extensive reductionist by stressing one-dimensional feature of political parties. It is necessary to analyze the party models extensively to capture the existing variations. This analysis which based on genetic origin, consists of three dimensions: electoral, ideological and organizational. At first, Krouwel classified the political parties according to their 'genetic dimension' in other words origin. Considering his scheme, 'elite-cadre parties' have parliamentary origins, limited electorate of upper social strata through personal affairs, self-recruitment private initiative in social basis, traditional status of individual candidates in terms of ideological basis and quite limited extent of party competition on the basis of personal status. Mass party as a second type of party have extra-parliamentary origin, appeal to particular social group based on social cleavages from the point of electoral dimension, class or religious based internal recruitment in social basis, intense ideological foundations, polarized and ideological competition for extent of party. The catch-all party type as a third type of genre originates from mass parties and merging interest groups in terms of genetic origin. Besides, it appeals to extensive middle class beyond core group of support in electoral dimension also the party has external recruitment from various interest groups for social basis. The ideological dimension of the cartel

party type based upon the quality of management of the public sector. In point of the extent of party competition, diffusion of political division namely conflicts become symbolic.

Figure 4.2 Ideological dimension

In reference to his classification (Figure 4.2), cartel party type has a fusion of the state apparatus in genetic dimension, regular clientele in favourable policies in that electoral dimension, recruitment basically from within the state structures in social basis, maintenance of accured power by sharing executive office in ideological dimension. Lastly, the business-firm party type originates from the private-initiative of political entrepreneurs, in electoral dimension it comprises of electoral market with a high level of volatility, in terms of social basis it depends on private initiative. Last but not least, extent of party's competition is formed by permanent struggle for media attention and ideological dimension of party based on issues and personalities.

Figure 4.3 Organizational dimension

Krouwel's second categorization of political parties is associated with the organizational dimension axis (Figure 4.3). Evaluating according to importance of 'membership organization', he argues that elite parties have non-existent or minimal membership base, mass parties have voluntary membership organization is the essential of the party, catch-all type emphasize on marginalization of their members, cartel parties regards members as a pool for recruitment of political personnel and business firm parties have minimal also irrelevant membership base.

The second evaluation criteria of organizational dimension; position of the party in public office. When we consider that in elite parties public office creates core of the party organization, in mass parties; public office subject to extra-parliamentary leadership, in catch all parties; public office concentration of resources at the parliamentary party group, in cartel parties; public office concentration of power at the party leadership and government and in business firm type; office has a high level of autonomy for political entrepreneurs. Taking into consideration that resource structure, elite parties supply their resources from personal wealth, mass parties provide resource from membership contribution and party press, catch all parties' resource structure consist of interest groups and state subsidies also cartel parties benefit from state subsidies, lastly business-firm parties ensure their resources from using of marketing techniques and non-permanent use of experts 'contracting out'.

He determines two axes which are related to electoral appeal and recruitment patterns. According to his analysis while mass, electoralist and entrepreneurial parties have open

and inclusive elite recruitment pattern; elitist and cartel parties have closed and exclusive pattern. On the other hand, considering his second dimension on the axes, while mass and elitist parties have narrow electoral appeal with intense party link, electoralist, cartel and entrepreneurial parties have broad electoral appeal with weak party link. For instance, electoralist catch all parties have a broad tenacious appeal of the former mass parties that compose of several interest groups. Otherwise cartel parties seek to pursue their control of public office so display rather closed type of elite recruitment as incumbent. In reference to Krouwel, electoralist catch all and cartel parties have capital-intensive organizational structure.

Considering to second axes, Krouwel assumes that cartel, business-firm and elite parties have hierarchical and centralized control of the party leadership as common. On the contrary, electoralist catch all and mass parties have horizontal and democratic decision making. According to him, cartel and business-firm parties have capital-intensive with professional organizational structure, on the other hand, elite and mass parties have non-professional party organization. In conclusion, political parties are multi-faced creatures also their transformations can't be linear. Krouwel attempt to gather all these elements to design comprehensive model to finding that question: What is still crucial at organizations in modern democracies?

1.8 Proposed New Classification: Personalization and Personalized Political Party Types

Under this heading, the new party classification created by Rahat in accordance with personalized politics is included. The author comparatively examines the typologies that exist within the framework of the concepts of power and collective action, which he sees as the basic principles of politics, in terms of parsimony, simplicity, time resistance and usefulness. Democracies as well as political parties have undergone a remarkable transformation in terms of political personalization during the recent years. Existing party typologies are insufficient to explain the changes in today's democratic politics, so the balance of power between politicians and collegial entity subject to transform.

New classification of party models which includes five different types of political party; two personalized-centralized types, two personalized-decentralized types and a collegial type. While the old party types resist the new habits in the age of personalized politics,

the trouble of redefining the problem which is presented between power and collective action as one of the most essential mottos of politics appears (Rahat and Kenig, 2018).

Collection of typologies is essential because it is not a universally valid scheme, but the usefulness of the scheme is directly proportional to what we want to know (Wolinetz, 2002). A typology that is useful for one purpose may be invalid or incomplete for a different purpose. In the diagram he created, includes comprehensive descriptive value of party typologies also he tries to demonstrate how the recommended new categorization addresses their inherent restraints. Existing classifications are not sensitive enough to capture of parties in the age of personalized politics.

Rahat agrees with Gunther and Diomond's Weberian ideal types classifying and asserts that Weberian ideal types enable us find labels that make sense of complex or multidimensional concepts more easily and grasp the real-world reflections of parties (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 172). These typologies contribute to the building of a common standard research language and helping researchers not to start from point zero with each new study. This limitation stems from the fact that political parties cannot satisfy the all criteria for a genus or some parties may contain features belonging to more than one ideal type.

On the other hand, in reference to Rahat, Krouwel does not deny the importance of personalization in the development of party types, but he actually doesn't estimate how magnitude it is. It is clear that with the emerging of several institutional advancement and under favour of mass media politicians and voter behavior has also evolved (Rahat and Kenig 2018). Political parties exist in that politic leaders promote their personal aims from the point of vote and office and take advantage of them. Nowadays, with the support of the political comunication politicians make contact with their voters via social media. In this framework, as a result of the weakening of collegial elements, it is essential to include personalized elements in new types of classification.

1.9 The Classification: Personalization and Beyond

Introducing a new typology is required for parties predominantly emerged in the late twentieth century then in progress of time they cannot be captured to classic typologies' characteristics that developed a century earlier. These typologies are no longer gives us

sufficient consideration to the influence of personalization on modern political parties in the age of personalization (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, 168).

Figure 4.4 Party types

Table 1 Party Types: Core Unit(S)					
	Personalized-centralized		Collegial	Personalized-decentralized	
Type	Personal	Leader	Collegial	Network	Movement
Core unit(s)	A specific politician	Party leader	Party institutions	Politicians	Activists

Rahat, mainly suggests three organizational patterns as personalized-centralized, personalized decentralized and collegial parties for his political party classification (Figure 4.4). He also proposed these party types on a continuum with five labels on the second row for the sake of simplicity. Personalized centralized parties, which are the first type in the classification, are ruled by leaders. This type of party is divided into two types as the 'ultra personalized personal party' and a 'less personalized party'. Decisions made in the personal party type depend on only one person. The only logic is to ensure that the leader wins the election and seizes the tools of power. In Weberian sense, the party is purely predicated on the charismatic authority. The leader has a say in candidate selection, policy decisions, whether to join the coalition and within the party roles in a word he dominates everything.

In leader party type, the person holds the dominant status of the party to seize the party leadership. Although the leader's parties are personalized, the source of the leader's authority in the Weberian sense is legal-rational. The leadership position enables the individual a wide range of authority and power. If the individual leaves the leadership position, someone takes the place of leadership and seizes the authority and power of the leader.

Collegial party as another type of party is governed by intra-party institutions and the main source of their authority is legal national in Weberian terms. These institutes can be small institutions such as bureaus or more inclusive institutions such as parliaments. By contrast with the leader party, collegial parties belong to the impersonal collective. Traditional mass parties can be seen as the real-world manifestation of this party type (Calise 2015).

In personalized-decentralized parties case, personalization of politics is a process that includes politicians as well as leaders. Personalization does not just affect the top leadership, it permeates the party. As social media has become a daily part of politics, opportunities for this type of party have increased. This party type consists of two subcategories that differ at the organizational level as the 'network party' and the 'movement party'. Both types of parties are defined based on networks of interaction between individuals, not on a defined hierarchical organization also their grassroots support is negligible (Kitschelt 1989, 66). The biggest difference between the two parties is that while the core unit is the politician in the network party, the movement party is any individual active within the party.

The network parties were created based on the motto we are all politicians. This party type is based on connections between individual politicians. On the other hand, it based on charismatic authority in the Weberian sense. Every politician has a personal organization and her own clientelist network. These networks are a confederation of personalized organizations operating under the same banner. As is known, political parties were formed when representatives of local identities came together in parliament and realized the value of forming permanent coalitions. It is no coincidence that the 19th century elite party is a network party. It is defined as the party responsible for its own electoral destiny, designed around their ambitions by rallying politicians around it (Aldrich's 2011, 306). Therefore, it appears as a party that is sensitive to the concerns of its individual voters.

The movement parties, which are in the second category of decentralized party classification, set out with the motto we are all individuals. The party is a post-materialist entity that is so much about individualism that it fits none of Weber's sources of authority. Individuals are not party leaders, but the main source of authority. The core unit of the party is similar to the 'pluralist democracy' model, in which individuals form and politics is carried out on the basis of temporary agreements (Kölln 2015). The German Green Party has been close to this model since its establishment.

Rahat's classification provides indicators for identifying real-world political party types and proposed operationalization on three criteria: leadership selection, candidate selection, and policy formation (Gauja 2017). Besides he examines on the roles, authority, and powers of the leader in his table that composed characteristics of the five ideal types.

In terms of candidate selection, while the leader is the only selector in the personal party, the leader play an active role in the selection of candidates by screening or vetoing the candidates in the leader party. In collegial parties, part institutions play the cenral role in candidate selections. In terms of leadership selection process, the leader selects himself in personal parties in other words self-selection is implemented. While party members are preferred in leader parties, party delegates are elected from within the parliament in collegial party types. On the other hand, in the network party, we have no particular leader. In the movement party, the grassroots are expected to influence the leadership choice. In terms of policy formation, it is not possible to talk about the policy making process in the personal party. In the leader party, the leader has an significant role of policy formation in the eyes of his party. In a network party, politicians have the same ideology as their party, so every politician is a policy maker. Lasty, in the movement party type, policy makers depend on the former base while generating the formation.

Rahat also focused on the advantages and limitations of his classification. In terms of simplicity and parsimony, the classification of Rahat is quite simple. From his point; Gunther and Diomond produce fifteen species based on three criteria, while Volinetz creates three party types by considering a single criterion. Whereas in his scheme five party types are proposed using a single criterion that is power balance between the collegial and two types of personal party. Rahat criticizing social scientists before him, accusing them of being victims of reductionist argumentation. Rahat argues that although his work is simple and parsimonius, he offers a creation that not only fits certain categories, but is inclusive and not too demanding for all parties. It is also rather resistant classification in terms of time resistance because power considered as a core rationale in his study. According to Rahat, another feature that should contain in typologies is usefulness. As it is known, we cannot assert a unique universally valid schema. The benefits of existing typologies depend on how we use them. Classification useful for one purpose may not be useful for another. Last but not least, the other important evaluation criteria that is founded in Rahat's shema is limitation. Although there are various limitations of creating a schema based on a single criterion, it has been possible to find real-word examples of the political parties. Finally, it can said that the proposed typology should be viable, valid and reliable in this context for pursuing recent debates.

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS IN TURKISH POLITICS

In social sciences, society is defined as the whole of relationships that people maintain among themselves. Therefore, as the value judgments, ideologies, behavior patterns and perceptions of the people who make up the society change, the society also changes. Every society has an internal order, but this structure is not static, it is in fluctuation. Since societies have a dynamic structure, it is inevitable that the changing balances will be replaced by new ones. Both the whole of society and the institutions that make up the social structure are constantly transforming depending on the conditions of the period (Kalaycıoğlu, 2017:5).

Political alteration can be defined as the transition of a society from the political situation it is in to another political situation or entering a process towards it with the imposition to the world conjuncture. This political situation differentiation can be in the form of progress or deterioration. Changes in Turkey can be given as a concrete example of this. Turkey's transition to a multi-party system in 1945 and its political life without a party on September 12, 1980 are also political changes (Sarıbay, 1996: 174-178).

In such an environment, the administration was seized with a military coup in 1980 in order to prevent terrorist incidents and put an end to the negativities experienced. With the restrictions and measures taken, the chaos was prevented. With the entry into force of the new Constitution, a new era has begun in Turkish politics. In the post-1980 period, the social and political restructuring process continued. In this context, internal and external developments affecting the social and political change experienced are discussed and their effects on Turkish politics are emphasized. In addition, the transformative power of Law No. 2820 on political parties within the framework of the 1982 Constitution is examined in this part of the thesis.

2.1 Turbolant Years: 1973-1980

If we considered the period that lasted until the 1980 military coup in Turkish political life, the 1970s are seen as the years when the country was ruled by minority governments and inconsistent coalitions that lack of discipline. Proportion election has been applied as it should have been. As a result of this phenomenon, minor parties

participating in the struggle to seize political power also had the opportunity to be represented in the parliament. The splinter parties could not have disciplined and coherent coalitions because social and political realities played a role behind the party splits. This phenomenon brought along the ideological polarization between the parties and caused the coalitions formed to be undisciplined and inconsistent. For this reason, in the post-1980 period, the importance of stability was emphasized and a political life without minorities and coalitions was designed.

Civil-military relations constitute one of the common problems of almost all societies whose democracy culture is not developed. In these societies, a consensus could not be reached both in the society and in public institutions on how the administration should be. Therefore, the state administration displays an unstable appearance in such countries. Turkey has a rough trot in civil-military relations after the transition to democracy. Since 1960, a military coup has occurred almost every decennial. When the soldiers returned to their barracks after the coup, they tried to keep control of the administration. The constitutions and institutions created by the military after the coup were planned to ensure the control and tutelage of the military.

Despite all the arrangements in the period after the 12 March Memorandum, it was not possible to solve the problems. Due to the inability to institutionalize democracy, the system collapsed in a short time. On the one hand, while the government and the opposition could not come together and talk about the problems, on the other hand, politics was divided into two as right and left. The inability of politics to find solutions to the demands that emerged as a result of the rapidly increasing migration from the village to the city also deepened the crisis in this period. The inability of the President to be elected by the parliament was added to all these crises. There was no result from the election rounds held every day, the Assembly could not do anything else. This situation disturbed the society. In fact, some sections of the society were clearly expecting a coup. (Dursun, 2000: 191).

Since the mid-1970s, an upward trend has been observed in the struggle of the working class and leftist movements. In this process, violence and pressure in social life increased. The Taksim Square massacre on May 1, 1977, the events of Kahramanmaraş, Çorum, Malatya, Sivas, Bingöl and the assassinations of symbolic figures from the left and right were effective in the increase in social tension. Some groups of the left began to use violence as a method, and again in this process, a radical nationalist segment

became a part of this spiral of violence with the rhetoric of protecting the homeland. Young people who were dissatisfied with the system started an uprising against the state and caused anarchy and terror events that continued for years in the country. These violent incidents, which started in the 1970s, combined with the economic crisis, paved the way for a chaos that the government could not prevent (Akça, 2013: 184).

In the period up to the coup in 1980, 1606 people passed away due to terrorism (Dursun, 2000: 201). The effectiveness of the state was reduced due to the terrorist incidents that occurred. Although security became the most important agenda topic for people, the political power and the opposition did not come together to find a solution (Dursun, 2005b: 192).

The only way out of this chaos environment was an early election. Although all parties supported the early election proposal given by the National Salvation Party (MSP), Ecevit opposed the proposal because he thought it would be useful for Demirel and thus his last chance to get out of the crisis through democratic ways was lost. The people were fed up with terrorism and instability, so they reacted the coup positively. The opinion of the rest ot the world also supported the coup in Turkey (Dursun, 2000: 218-232).

2.1.1 Changing International Conjuncture

One of the reasons that triggered the September 12 coup d'état was the change in the international conjuncture. With the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, the Islamic Revolution, and the USSR's occupation of Afghanistan, Turkey's security has increased in the West. It was not possible for the elected governments to respond to the West's demands from Turkey. Therefore, as a result of the military coup, it would have been more possible to ensure cooperation towards expectations. Examples of this have also occurred in previous periods. The USA believed that a significant part of the drugs sold in its own country was supplied from Turkey. The USA demanded a ban on hash cultivation from Turkey; but the government refused this request. The government of Nihat Erim, established after the 12 March Memorandum, banned the cultivation of hash. In 1974, the Ecevit government again lifted this ban. In the following periods, the USA had other demands from Turkey. But the government refused this request. There are serious allegations that foreign actors prepared the environment for the coup to happen. After the coup, the USA and the West, meanwhile the IMF and the World Bank

did not take a negative attitude towards the junta, and their relations intensified. On the one hand, the green light was given for Greece's return to NATO, on the other hand, policies supported by the West were put into practice. In this period, it can be said that Turkey got closer to the West rather than moving away from it (Dursun, 2005a: 60-73).

In this process, it is understood that the soldiers regard themselves as a problem solver as soon as the situation matures. As a matter of fact, military intervention in the Armed Forces was discussed loudly. The military believed that their demands were not met by the government. In this environment of insecurity, an intervention could be considered. In this process, a letter signed by the force commanders was presented to the President on 27 December 1979. In this letter, it was stated that all institutions should work in cooperation in order to solve the problems the country is in, especially terrorism, and all constitutional institutions, especially the parliament, were invited to duty. In fact, the Turkish Armed Forces was aware that no result could be achieved with this letter, but it was laying the groundwork to legitimize its intervention. Political parties, on the other hand, accused each other with vicious polemics and stated that the addressee of this letter of the army was not themselves but other parties. On January 9, 1980, the commanders and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel came together to evaluate the process and expressed the measures and legal regulations that the government should take. Although these demands were accepted, the request of the JP and the RPP to form a joint government was rejected. The military demanded this request in previous periods as well. In the political environment of that period, it was not possible for such a government to be formed and for the minority government to carry out legal arrangements that significantly limited freedoms in a short time. In fact, the soldiers were aware of this situation, but they were trying to accelerate the process.

2.2 Political and Economic Restructuring of CHP and Rise of Social Democracy in Turkey

The domestic developments that led to radical alterations in the social and political arena in Turkey after 1980 were the 24 January decisions, the 12 September regime and the 1982 Constitution. In particular, the military coup of 12 September and the 1982 Constitution became a turning point in Turkey's economic, social and political life. In order to comprehend the difficulties in determining which type of party Turkish political parties belong to, it is necessary to concentrate the constitutional and legal regulations after 1980.

2.2.1. January 24 Decisions

In the Turkish economy, crisis symptoms have started to appear since 1974. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, there was a very high increase in oil prices and the prices of other imported goods started to increase (Şahin, 2016:167-169). These price increases also affected the Turkish economy, which is foreign-dependent energy. In the autumn of 1979, the economic depression increased, shortages and queues began to form in basic consumption goods. Inflation exceeded 70%, terrorism and political instability aggravated the chaos in the country (Şahin, 2016:180). The underlying reason for this is that the international competitiveness of the industry with an import substitution structure has not risen to the expected level and import dependency has increased rather than decreased. In such an environment, the coalition government decided to resign, and as a result of the by-elections, Süleyman Demirel formed the minority government together with the supporters of the minority government. The New Government announced the 24 January Decisions to recover the economy from the depression. The January 24 Decisions was deeply influenced the statist economic policies that had been implemented up to that time and started the liberal economy period (Uluç, 2014:114). From that date forward, an export-oriented economic policy was initiated and the economy was substantially liberalized. The aim was to turn into the private sector the driving force of the economy and enable it to compete in international markets. Wages were kept low, government subsidies on basic goods were removed, and import restrictions were lifted to reduce domestic demand and redirect production to exports (Heper, 2011:139-208). The decisions taken under the administration of Turgut Özal meant an emergency regime in the economy. Because the measures included decisions such as devaluation by 33%, limiting subsidies, which could not be easily conducted in a democracy. The basis of the January 24 program was the reduction of the share of the working class, peasants and laboring people from the national income (Turan, 2007:113-114). For these reasons, that is, in order for the people not to object to these decisions, the existence of an undemocratic environment was necessary. This situation was one of the factors that paved the way for the coup. With the 1980 coup, the January 24 Decisions were put into practice under the management of Turgut Özal.

2.2.2 1980 Coup Détat Regime and 1982 Constitution Act

While the Demirel government accepted the January 24 Decisions, although the economy was improved to some extent by removing the products from stocks, they

could not end terrorism. In addition, after the expiration of President Fahri Korutürk's term, a new president could not be elected as the voting rounds for the election of a new president in the Grand National Assembly were prolonged. In addition to the social unrest caused by the economic package, the political crisis was also increasing day by day. While all this was going on, the Turkish Armed Forces seized power on 12 September. Immediately after the coup, Özal explained that the Turkish economy would suffer greatly if the economic program he had prepared was not implemented, and asked for permission to implement these decisions.

Thereupon, Özal was assigned as the person fully responsible for the economy. In the following months, Özal was given a free hand to solve the country's economic problems. This meant lowering inflation by releasing prices, preventing consumption by keeping wages low, and increasing exports (Ahmad, 2016:217). In short, the January 24 Decisions work like a charm under his directorship (Turan, 2007:114). There was no reaction from the social segments against the coup (Öcal, 2009: 5). On the contrary, citizens supported the coup because of the increasing terror, and employer organizations because union activities were banned and strikes ended. Likewise, universities, TOBB etc. institutions also expressed their support for the coup in their statements. One of the factors that influenced the acceptance of this coup was that the coup was not directed against any segment of the society (Dursun, 2005a: 96-97).

As a result of the coup, the Second Republic, which was established with the 1961 Constitution and restored with the 1971 memorandum, was destroyed and the Third Republic was established with the 1982 Constitution (Dursun, 2005a: 7). In the first part of the 1982 Constitution, the coup implemented by the Turkish Armed Forces was tried to be legitimated. With the 1982 Constitution, some institutions and rules created for the purpose of control and balancing over the executive were modified. The Senate was abolished, the Constitutional Court's principle of supervising only the form in constitutional amendments were introduced, the judiciary was subordinated to the Ministry of Finance both financially and administratively, and the autonomy of some institutions was either abolished or restricted. The areas of activity of parties and associations were also restricted. It has been made impossible for the effective control to be carried out by the sections other than the majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The decentralisation of the President's authority has led to the formation of dual executive (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007: 335-336).

In addition, according to the 1982 Constitution, candidates can be nominated for the Presidency from outside the parliament (article 101.) (Dursun, 2006: 238). With this regulation, it may have been intended to pave the way for the election of military-origin people to the Presidency as in previous periods. In order to keep the society under surveillance and control, the military authority ensured that soldiers were included in the autonomous committees. Going further, judge advocate were given place in the Constitutional Court. In this way, the way for the military to be effective in the Constitutional Court has been paved (Erdem, 2005: 759).

Measures were also taken to make it difficult to take back the actions taken during the coup period. According to the provisional article 4 of the 1961 Constitution and the provisional article 15 of the 1982 Constitution, the constitutionality of the laws made by the military after the coup cannot be audited by the Constitutional Court, even after the transition to democratic governance (Özbudun, 2007: 105-106).

The only goal of the junta that stage a coup was not to put these decisions into effect. Another goal of the Armed Forces was to ensure political stability by pacifying and depoliticizing the over-politicized society. It has achieved these goals by using various methods of pressure, especially the use of armed force (Tarhan, 2012:17). After the coup, all political parties were closed; The activities of DİSK and MİSK were suspended. Martial law was declared all over the country and travel out of the country was prohibited. Arrests were commenced soon after. After all; conflicts and terrorist acts that have been going on since the 1960s were suppressed by a military coup. The new Constitution aimed to amplified state against individuals and other social classes in state-society relations. In this sense, the state has been a tool to pacify and depoliticize the over-politicized society. The coup administration intervened in the social and political field to restructure the political system. By narrowing down the working areas of associations, parties, associations and parties, regulations were introduced to reduce all forms of political participation. The authority of the President have been expanded, and the power of the executive has been increased (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016:373).

Politicians active before September 12, 1980 were banned from politics for ten years. Party membership to students, teachers, and civil servants was banned. The unionization of the new parties was prevented, making it impossible for them to take root in the society (Zürcher, 2016:406). Therefore, fundamental rights and freedoms were limited with the new Constitution. The main reason for making a constitution for the first time

was the strengthening of authority and the state, not freedom and democracy. This difference permeates every point from the propaganda speeches during the constitution making process to the spirit and length of the text (Sevinç, 2017:138).

The 1982 Constitution also paved the way for the development of conservative thought. It is possible to say that the principles of strong government, social authoritarianism, disciplined society, hierarchy and nationalism, which are the basic elements of neo-conservative thought, prevailed on September 12 and later. Briefly; the new Constitution, unlike the 1961 Constitution, is a constitution that limits fundamental rights and freedoms. These limitations were aimed at preventing youth movements that increased before the coup, creating an apolitical youth, and creating a more disciplined society. For this purpose, the new government aimed to develop a conservative discourse that will dominate Turkish politics in the future and to gather young people under the roof of Islam.

2.3 Law on Political Parties No: 2820

Under this title, the law on political parties, which is the main factor determining the party-state relationship in Turkey, will be discussed comparatively. It would be helpful to consider the law in terms of organization, finance and ideology. The law on political parties involves the provisions regarding the establishment, organization, activities, duties, powers and responsibilities, acquisitions of property, income and expenses, examination of accounts, closing and dissolution of political parties. According to article 5 of the law, political parties can be established without constraint within the framework of the Constitution and laws without prior permission. The Turkish party system has traditionally been shaped by elites and leaders rather than social divisions. In the Turkish party system, the functioning of the parties has been shaped within a network of patronage, which is also reflected in the state's relations with the public. Party organizations work on the basis of the distribution of patronage, and especially the party leader plays a dominant role in every stage of the organization's work. As a result of the military interventions in the multi-party period, the parties could not find the opportunity to form a permanent base, so the corporate culture could not be transferred. A repressive mindset of politics, which aims to regulate social life down to the smallest detail, is dominant in Turkey. Laws regulating political life are full of prohibitions. The law on political parties provided a uniform organization of parties and contributed to the

consolidation of similar structures. However, parties are represent to social differentiation.

Currently, the criticisms leveled against the law on political parties are based on arguments that it hinders intra-party democracy, restricts the participation of minor parties in politics, and limits parties ideologically. After the 1980 military intervention, all political parties closured also a political ban was imposed on the leading cadres and a new beginning was aimed for the party system. As a matter of fact, the liquidation of the cadres, which was formed as a result of a thirty-year process, has led to the opposite of what was intended instead of providing a stable environment to the party system. Many studies define the "Political Parties Law", which came into force in 1983 after the 1980 military coup, as one of the main obstacles to the establishment of democracy in the country (Carkoglu et.al., 2000).

The compatibility of the law with democratic operability is questioned, especially because of its support for major parties and its decisiveness in closing parties. It is also claimed that the law prevents the establishment of intra-party democracy (Genckaya, 1998). A wide range of party laws may restrict the emergence or activities of political parties, while an insufficient number of parties may lead to a chaotic political system (Janda, 2005). For this reason, the party law should be evaluated within the specific conditions of the countries and its function should be discussed in comparison.

2.3.1 Analysis of the Law on Political Parties in Party Organization

The second part of the law is devoted to the organization of political parties. When we consider it in terms of organization, we see that it is forbidden for parties to establish organizations low the district level. The main problem here is that the functioning of the party organization is completely centrally regulated by the state, and it has a structure that encourages the formation and continuation of major parties at many points and prevents especially minor parties and regional organizations. Likewise, the law restricting organizations smaller than the district does not allow parties to follow their own unique way of organizing. In addition, the fact that the nomination processes for the party organization and the functioning of the organization are completely dependent on the central structure and that they are supervised by central structures such as the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Supreme Election Committee prevent the

parties not only from following their own methods but also from designing new methods in the functioning of the parties. The law prohibits civil servants and university professors from being party members.

2.3.2 Law on Political Parties in Ideologically

The fourth part of the party law is devoted to prohibitions on political parties. In this section, the ideological framework in which parties can operate under many different titles has been determined. It can also be said that the law has a function of restricting the parties ideologically, since many laws cannot even be proposed to be changed and are subject to wide-ranging obstacles such as "cannot pursue aims contrary to public morals". In addition, the prohibition of parties from claiming that there are minorities in Turkey in the same section and the fact that they are not allowed to use a language other than Turkish in their activities indicate another restrictive feature of the law. In countries such as Turkey, where political divisions have been ethnic and religious for many years, the definition of system opposition through these divisions has led to the exclusion of a significant part of the society from politics. Those most affected by the law were the Kurdish political movement and the Islamist movement, whose many parties were closed. While the ideological restrictions in a law designed by the military are in line with the expectations, the fact that the civilian governments after the military regime did not show enough will to reduce these restrictions shows the inherent characteristic of the problem in the political culture. Therefore, while legal and institutional regulations create an effect that can limit the ideological-programmatic freedom of parties, the continuation of these prohibitions by political actors should be associated with political culture.

The 1982 Constitution includes political parties in its Articles 68 and 69, and primarily limits the statutes of the parties. Accordingly, the relevant article states that "...The statutes, programs and actions of political parties cannot be contrary to the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and the rule of law, national sovereignty, democratic and secular Republic principles; may not seek to defend or establish class or estate dictatorships or dictatorships of any kind; cannot incite the commission of a crime…" (1982 Anayasası, md.68). With the article listing the principles to be followed by political parties, the Constitution prohibits commercial activities for political parties and

underlines the prohibition in Article 68 regarding the party's bylaws and program. (1982 Anayasası, md.69) The constitution states that if it becomes the focus of these actions, punishments of permanent dissolution or deprivation of State aid will be imposed and the party that has been permanently dissolved cannot be established under another name. In addition, it prohibits the executive staff of permanently closed parties from their administrative duties in another party for a period of five years and financial aid from foreign states, international organizations and real and legal persons who are not Turkish nationals.

This Law No. 2820 regulates party bans substantially similar to Law No. 648. The related Law has titled the prohibitions as "Prohibitions Related to Purposes and Activities, Protection of the National State Characteristics, Protection of Atatürk's Principles and Reforms and Secular State Characteristics and Various Prohibitions" (2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, md. 78-98). Accordingly, the first part of the prohibitions section includes "prohibitions related to the protection of the democratic state order". In the second part, it is ruled that "protection of independence, protection of the principle of the unity of the state, prevention of the creation of minorities, prohibition of regionalism and racism, protection of the principle of equality" (2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, md. 79- 83). The third part of the law imposes bans on parties on "protection of Atatürk's principles and reforms, respect for Atatürk, protection of the principle of secularism, the prohibition of exploiting religion and things considered sacred by religion, the protection of the place of the Presidency of Religious Affairs" (2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, md. 84-89). It is clear that this title does not differ from the Law No. 648. Apart from these, the prohibitions included in the Law are stated as restrictions on the bylaws and programs and party activities, the prohibition of political relations and cooperation with associations, unions, foundations, cooperatives and professional organizations, and the prohibition of statements and attitudes against the 1980 coup détat. "The status of closed political parties and their members" and "party names and signs that cannot be used" are also included in the title of various provisions in the Law (2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu, md. 90-97). When the Constitution and Laws are taken into account, although the provisions do not differ greatly, it is striking that they were expanded especially after 1980. Limitation of parties with these provisions has brought about party closure cases. To date, thirty parties have been closed by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of these prohibitions.

When we are taking into account the reasons for the closure of political parties, it is seen that the article that comes to the forefront for the period 1960-80 and after 1980 is the article on "creating a minority". After 1980, in addition to the articles of the Constitution containing prohibitions on political parties, "democratic state order", "protection of the principle of the unity of the state", "prevention of the creation of minorities", "in cases of unconstitutionality" and "prohibition of the party listed in the law" in the Political Parties Law No. 2820. Articles regarding "being the focus of actions" come to the fore in closure cases. (Özbudun, 2007: 264). While this situation can be considered as a defense mechanism of a state whose democratic process has been interrupted, it can also be considered as a reflection of the "prohibition-oriented" attitude of the Constitutional Court towards political parties.

2.3.3 Law on Political Parties in Party Finance and External Audit

Party financing regulates the incomes, expenses, financial transactions and financial audits of the parties under the title of financial provisions, which is the third part. The greatest fund of party financing is state aid, which amounts to %80 in mainstream parties. With the amendments in 2014, political parties that received more than %3 of the total valid votes in the elections can receive state aid at the rate of the support they receive. However, in the pre-2014 period, the granting of aid only to parties that reached %7 of the votes had an effect that weakened the groups that supported the major parties and had limited support in terms of financing. Financing, which constitutes the most detailed and comprehensive part of the political party laws in advanced democracies, is much less regulated and supervised in Turkey. This actually distinguishes Turkish practice from party laws in democratic regimes whose primary function is to regulate party financing. Gençkaya (2018) associates the weak party financing and monitoring mechanisms with the lack of transparency and accountability. On the other hand, Ayan-Musil and Vasenda (2020, 99-101) argues that the insufficient detailing of the law on political parties on party financing and control, the use of state aids for personal interests, the unequal distribution of these aids among the party organizations, the more support of central organizations and the unchecked resources for parties cause to the possibility of patronage.

Regarding party closures, Turkey is shown as an exemplary case in a negative sense. Party closure has been an inherent practice in the political system since the transition to

the multi-party system, even before. Apart from many parties that were closed after the military coups, both the political parties established by the Kurdish movement and political Islamist parties were closed in the 1990s within the scope of the ideological constraints of the law. This is due to the fact that the law on political parties is broad in scope and unclear in terms of ideological framework restrictions on party closures. This situation shows a function that will facilitate party closures when deemed necessary. The closure of political parties should be transformed from a common practice into an exceptional practice, as suggested by the Commission.

While the Political Parties Law is detailed and restrictive in terms of party organization and ideological-programmatic aspects, it remains weak in terms of party financing. Considering the post-1980 period, in addition to the articles of the Constitution containing the prohibitions on political parties, the "democratic state order", "protection of the principle of the unity of the state", "prevention of the creation of minorities", "in cases of unconstitutionality" and "in cases of unconstitutionality" in the Political Parties Law No. 2820. It has been seen that the articles on the cases of "being the focus of the prohibited acts" stand out in the reasons for the closure. As a result, the functioning and existence of political parties is of great importance for democratic processes. This importance also brings along great risks for non-democratic parties. Turkish political parties have been tested with coups that interrupt democratic processes, and on the other hand, with bans, which are measures taken against parties that disrupt or are likely to disrupt the democratic order. It is possible to evaluate this situation as a factor that shows the fragility of democracy for Turkish political parties.

2.3.4 1983 General Election

With the September 12, 1980 coup in Turkey, the National Security Council (MGK) seized the country's administration and a military government was established under the Prime Ministry of Bülend Ulusu. Turgut Özal, who was named as the architect of the January 24 decisions, took office as Deputy Prime Minister in the Ulusu government (Yaşar, 1990: 112-13). With the law enacted on October 16, 1981, all political parties were closed. The military, who seized the administration of the country, took action to make a constitution, and a Constituent Assembly consisting of the NSC and the Consultative Assembly was formed. The constitution, which was put to the public vote on November 9, 1982, was accepted with a high rate of 91.3% (Gözler, 2012: 190-192). With the adoption of the Constitution, Kenan Evren was elected President; on

September 11, political bans for five and ten years were imposed on politicians in the Parliament. The military blamed the politicians of the period for the political and economic situation in the country before September 12, and did not include former politicians in the new political order after September 12. With the adoption of the constitution, leaders such as Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş, who were among the important names before September 12, became politically banned. With the release of political party activities on April 24, 1983, the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), known as the military-supported party, was established under the leadership of Turgut Sunalp on May 16, 1983. On May 20, the Motherland Party (ANAP), the Great Turkey Party (BTP), and the People's Party (HP) were founded. The most important condition that the established political parties had to fulfill in order to participate the general elections of 6 November 1983 was the approval of the 30 founding members of a party by the National Security Council. The NSC aimed a single party to come to power with the 1983 general elections. The NSC held the coalition governments responsible for the unprevailing economic situation, anarchy and terrorism before September 12. Therefore, the three parties MDP, HP and ANAP were allowed to enter the general elections of 6 November 1983. Other political parties could not meet a condition of 30 founding members by vetoes and could not participate the elections. General elections were held on 6 November 1983 with three parties also it was the first elections held after the September 12. The People's Party, the Nationalist Democracy Party, and the Motherland Party ranked among in the 1983 general elections and Motherland Party came to power alone under the leadership of Turgut Özal.

When we consider the MDP, its founders are Justice Party (AP) members who oppose Süleyman Demirel, members of the Consultative Council, lawyers and academics. HP was established on May 20, 1983 under the chairmanship of Necdet Calp. The HP leader focused mainly on the economy at the public meeting and explained what they would do when they came to power (Seçkin, 2019: 101- 103).

The 1983 general elections are evaluated as the turning point of the election campaigns

in Turkey. In the 1983 general elections, ANAP collaborated with Man Agency. The agency undertook of even the smallest detail in the election campaign. ANAP allocated 240 million liras for the election campaign. The tools in the election campaign implemented by ANAP are considered a milestone. ANAP is the first party to use tools

such as newspaper advertisements and video cassettes in its election campaign (Özkan, 2007: 66-71).

During the election campaign period, ANAP mainly focused on issues such as the maintenance of the atmosphere of trust, inflation, unemployment, the middle class, the housing problem and bureaucracy. An election campaign was followed in line with the demands of the people. ANAP is claimed that combining four tendencies before the election. From the four tendencies, the four parties before September 12 (AP-CHP-MSP, MHP) were referred and ANAP tried to get votes from the base of these parties and used a conciliatory style (Sakallıoğlu, 1996: 1251). Particularly, the volunteer group, which includes women, listened to the problems of female voters with the home visits they organized, and ANAP's solutions for female voters were explained. In order to introduce the ANAP deputies to the voters and to get votes from the undecided voters, ANAP included neighborhood tours. Turgut Özal both listened to the demands of the voters and had the opportunity to explain the party's policies and what he would do when they came to power, during his conversations with market tours, shopkeepers and people he saw on the road. Thus, face-to-face communicate with the voters (Kalçık, 2013: 135-140).

In the 1983 general elections, in which the turnout was 92.3%, ANAP was the first party with 45.1% of the vote, HP was the second party with 30.5%, and MDP was the third party with 23.3%. It can be said that keeping an understanding of politics based on service rather than ideology, adopting a conciliatory understanding of politics unlike the political parties before September 12, and combining conservative values with liberal values were effective in ANAP's success in the 1983 elections (Kalaycıoğlu ve Sarıbay, 2008: 509-514). In addition, ANAP's emphasis on civilian administration may have led some voters who were not satisfied with the military administration to ANAP. ANAP prioritized economic policies, used a moderate style, and formed policies and promises by taking into account the expectations of the society. While MDP and HP do not have economic policies and solutions; ANAP, on the other hand, had both policies and solution proposals regarding the economy, which is the main problem of a significant part of the people. These solution proposals were also adopted by the voters. It can also be supposed that the Turkish people hold the military-supported MDP responsible for the bad economic situation after the September 12 coup (Özkazanç, 1995: 1221). It is observed that ANAP prioritizes policies related to the economy, which is the main

problem of a significant part of the people, and putting forward solutions in line with the demands of the society is an important factor in its success in the 1983 elections.

The fact that the True Path Party, which was founded instead of the Great Turkey Party, could not participate the 1983 elections, led a significant part of the centre-right voters to ANAP. In addition, the fact that parties founded other than MDP, HP and ANAP could not participate the elections was in favor of ANAP. The absence of a political party against ANAP is also effective in ANAP's success. The election threshold implemented in the provinces is also an important factor in the success of ANAP in the elections. The founders of ANAP were composed of ordinary people, to show that ANAP had no connection with any political organization before September 12 and Turgut Özal aimed to include new and young names in the party. Since the founders of ANAP were mainly business people, the organization and campaign activities of the party were completed quickly. The coming to power of ANAP can be perceived the success of the civilian administration and the defeat of the military. Thus, ANAP became the first party to come to power in the first general election after its establishment.

ANAP conducted discourse on the claim of being non-ideological (Parla, 2005: 155). This situation has become compatible with the depoliticization process that occurred after September 12. Thus, ANAP came into existence as an aggregating political party that did not seem to come forward with a rigid or pure ideology. One of the important features of catch-all parties is to attract more voters without splitting. In that way, the maximum possible voter support is targeted. All four tendencies, which are attached to the party program and tried to be expressed at every opportunity, are about the fact of not being divided. Özal developed a discourse that postpones the concepts of right-left by analyzing the structure of the masses that started to move away from politics with the great disappointments of social democracy before the 80s (Zaralı, 1986: 82). After the return to political life, unlike the MDP and HP, only ANAP advocated a rapid return to liberal civilian life, which is not statist and non-bureaucratic (Ahmad, 1993: 189-190). Catch-all parties need strong and charismatic leaders. The leader both gives direction to the party and the importance of party members other than the leader decreases.

In the success of the Motherland Party, Turgut Özal's being ahead of other leaders with his personal characteristics, following a face-to-face election strategy, pursuing an election campaign in line with the demands of the people, using different campaign

mediums such as newspaper advertisements, neighborhood tours, private meetings, video tapes, and reconciliation. Factors such as using of a political style, keeping economic policies, service-based policy understanding at the forefront and offering economic solution proposals to the public, and the inability of parties other than the Nationalist Democracy Party, Populist Party, and Motherland Party to participate in the 1983 elections were effective. ANAP, one of the political parties established in the apolitical environment of the post-September 12, has been one of the important actors influencing Turkish politics for many years. ANAP is a political party that should be emphasized when it is considered from the aspects such as its establishment with the claim of bringing together different segments of society, its coming into power a few months after its establishment, the continuation of this power throughout the 1980s, and the neoliberal transformation it created in the Turkish economy. With a charismatic and strong leader, who is not based on a rigid ideological unity, aims to provide as much vote support as possible, implements a policy of "catching everyone" by using inclusive discourses, engages in pragmatist discourses and actions, evaluates the political field with the logic of the free market, despite the limited effectiveness of its individual members. It is obvious that the typology of the catch-all party, which is considered as a structure that continues on its way, is in accordance with the ANAP in the 80s. Considering the criteria such as ideological softness, pragmatism-oriented flexible discourses, the prevailing free market logic, efforts to appeal to large segments of society, and being charismatic leader-oriented, it can be assumed that ANAP is the catch-all party.

While the parties express the differences in the society, it is observed that the party law no. 2820 does not express the existing differences. It is a regime that is shaped according to how the militarists predicted how the process should work. Concluding the second part, it can be asserted that the new political party law was to form all parties a uniform party structure. This constitution is unlike the 1961 constitution, emphasizing the duties and immunity of the state rather than the freedoms of the citizens so it encourages the state instead of the citizen. For political parties, the law focuses on reducing differences rather than representing them. It was aimed to design a strong state, a government loyal to the state and the opposition that does not conflict with that government. In terms of social classes, the law generates an environment in which civil servants, university professors and intellectuals cannot participate in politics. When we consider all these together, the situation that emerges is a democracy unlike any other

country. Parties cannot represent differences, there is a regime in which individuals cannot become members of parties and parties cannot express their real thoughts. The multi-party regime established after 1980 is a system in which almost the same organizational structure is imposed on all parties where the parties cannot express their differences, the parties cannot be organized in districts, streets and villages, but can be organized at the provincial level also their connections with civil society are disconnected. The military order forbids switching parties, they design politics, but after a year it is realized that this process does not continue. New political parties were established, suitable ways were found even though it was forbidden to transition from party to party. Thus, the constitution that came into force in 1980, the political parties they enacted depending on that constitution and the changes in the political party structures over time and the typologies that we can evaluate the recent established parties gain importance. Parties are established according to the same law their typologies are similar. Since the general president determined the candidates who could not be determined in the primary election, the candidate chosen in a way that the soldiers did not want has become a strong leader. While the 'two and a half' party system was considered for the main, the model they designed works completely in reverse, and the half party won the first place, while the party established by the soldiers came in second. Ultimately, the framework the soldiers set up has completely different outcomes. In terms of this system of rules, in the third part of the thesis, the Turkish political party typologies included in the party system will be analysed comparatively.

CHAPTER 3: TYPOLOGIES AND PARTY MODELS THAT TURKISH POLITICAL PARTIES' BELONG: 1984-2002

In this section, the elections held between the 1984 local elections and the 2002 general elections and the adventure of the political parties will be discussed. With the concern of not experiencing the difficulties experienced before September 12 again, the Constitution and the characteristics of the Pollical Party Law formed by the military were examined in the previous section. Even if European countries have laws on political parties, they do not have as high an election threshold as in Turkey, rigid state control, and determine how members will be elected. Political life in Turkey, which had a multi-party system between 1950 and 1980, was allowed to re-start under the conditions discussed in the previous section. The developments after the resumption of political life will be discussed in the third section. While the political parties established by complying with certain conditions were in political struggle with each other, they

actually developed in completely different directions from the framework determinate by the military and the Constitution. As can be seen, the politics endured, some parts of the constitution remained in force until the 2000s, but this design was not lived exactly as the military intended.

3.1 1984 Local Elections

One of the indicators and the reinforcement of ANAP's power is the local elections of 25 March 1984. The 1984 local elections have a special place in Turkish politics as they are the first local elections held after the 12 September regime. While he had great success in the general election, Özal wanted to hold elections quickly, and he wanted to set a surprise date, especially before the DYP could recover. Before the law on the participation of these parties in the elections was enacted, "Özal, who had PIAR conduct a research, realized that he would be the first with 37.5% of the votes in a possible election, and after he was relieved, he passed the law proposal that foresees the participation of SODEP, DYP and RP in the elections (Parla, 1995). Six political parties participated in the struggle for power in these elections: ANAP, SODEP, DYP, HP, MDP, RP. Özal, who did not take kindly to the participation of SODEP, DYP and RP in local elections, perceived this as a necessity in order not to damage his democratic image in domestic and international level. The new parties that participated the elections were governed by the 'consignation' method until the bans of their former presidents were lifted. Özal's Motherland Party, using the advantages of winning in the 1983 general elections, emerged as the first party with 41.5% of the votes. According to the election results, ANAP almost completely seized the local power (Belge, 1992:189). ANAP, wisely using the advantages of being a government, emerged victorious from this election. Thanks to this success, municipalities will try to root ANAP in politics with the resources and activities they have. After that election, political parties in tendency to suppose the character of the leader rather than remain parties of ideologies or policy programmes throughout 1980's. Therefore, Islamist parties called as Erbakan's parties, the RPP İnönü's party, the JP Demirel's party and the DP Menderes's party.

The right wing of the political spectrum continued the recovery process it entered with the 1983 elections with a large increase in votes in these elections as well. In the previous mayoral elections, right-wing parties lagging behind the left in terms of the

total votes they received throughout Turkey, increased their votes from 46% to 60%. The left wing, which received 48 percent of the vote in the last local election before the 1980s, lost one third of its political power in the local area after the coup. More strikingly, the left wing, which had won the previous election, received only half the votes of the right-wing parties after the coup (Kırçak,1994).

As a result, we can say that the coup undertook the function of bringing the right political culture to the fore. The undisputed winner of the election is Özal's ANAP. ANAP continued on its way in 1984 elections with the slogan of compounding the four tendencies (Ahmad,1993). For this reason, with its loose fit structure, it is identified with the catch all type among electoralist parties in the classification of Gunther and Diomond. At the same time, we can say that ANAP, has the characteristics of the personal party that Rahat takes in personalized-centralized parties in certain aspects. The personal party type belongs to a person, ANAP is also associated with Özal and is referred to as Özal's ANAP. In this party type, the party leader is a vehicle to win elections. It would not be wrong to say that Özal is a charisma in this type of party based on charismatic authority in the Weberian sense. A leader is a highly influential and authoritative person in election and policy decisions. The core unit of the leader party type is a specific politician, so Özal is in the center as the politician of his own party.

Such a slogan could only bring success in the post-political turmoil transition periods, and it did. In the following years, we will witness that the success of the transition period political parties that set out with such discourses will not be permanent when the political organizations are completed and the stones fall into place in democratic life.

When we considered as the basis of parties, SODEP has reached the position of the strongest party of the left wing with 23% of the votes. The populist party, which accuses its rival SODEP of extreme leftism and strives to become a classical social democratic party, came in fourth with 8% of the vote. On the other hand, right-wing DYP ranked third with 13%, MDP fifth with 9%, and RP, the heir of MSP, ranked sixth with 4%. All parties participating in the election have similar organizational characteristics and their boundaries are drawn by law, so it is difficult to say that they belong to any typology. However, if we interpret the first three parties that were successful in the elections, when we examine them in terms of party typologies, it is possible to say that SODEP

fits into the programmatic party type, which is the sub-species of electoralist parties. The party has a certain election program and although it has been active in Turkish political life for about two years, the closed mass party has embraced the mission of the CHP. Therefore, SODEP as the programmatic party resemble to the classic model of a mass-based party in many aspects. The DYP, which continues to exist on the right wing, has the classic mass party characteristics as it is a party organized in the people. The party was founded one year before this election, as a continuation of the AP, which was closed in the September 12 coup, so it appeals to the electorate of the AP. Although it claims to compound the four tendencies, one of the intersections of ANAP and the military administration is the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. During the ANAP rulership, associations and unions trying to make this synthesis the official view of the state are also encountered. In this period, indirect and direct relations established between state institutions and cadres and these structures. Those coming from such associations and unions started to find a place for themselves in the state staff through ANAP. It has been determined that there has been a noticeable increase in the sympathy and support of conservatives for the ANAP government (Cemal, 1990:17).

The change that ANAP, led by Turgut Özal, has advocated since the pre-election, continued its different politics and management approach after the election; It has been seen that he contributed to the change and development in Turkey after 1983 by making politics around a conservative, nationalist, social justice and free market identity. It has been observed that the Motherland Party also has the nationalist, conservative, democratic and liberal ideology that the centre-right parties have. It has been observed that the Motherland Party, which defended that its main goal was to solve economic problems at any cost when coming to power, followed an economic policy that was the continuation of the 24 January Decisions after coming to power, but could not approach the limits it targeted. The most important reason that made Özal a leader and kept him in power from 1983 to 1989; The fact is that he identified the formations, potentials, tendencies and aspirations of Turkish society extremely accurately in 1980s Turkey. In the surveys conducted during this period, it was determined that the image of the politician changed after September 12, and the approaches of "fixer" and "executiveism" came to the fore rather than "being a litigator".

3.2 1987 Genaral Election

The 1987 elections are the general elections in Turkish political history in which the public's interest and participation in the elections was the highest (Arslan, 2007). The Motherland Party, which was victorious in the elections, came to power again by increasing the number of deputies to 292, although the vote rate decreased by about 9 points compared to the 1983 elections, thanks to the new electoral system that came into effect. In the elections, a 10 percent threshold was determined and the party that could not pass this threshold could not get a deputy. In the process leading to the 1987 General Elections, it was decided to increase the number of deputies from 400 to 450 by increasing the representation rate in the parliament at a numerical level. Again in this period, it was decided to divide the provinces that have the ability to issue more than six deputies to more than one electoral district (Altan, 2005: 180).

After 1980, in accordance with the temporary Article 4 of the Constitution, the leading political actors of the period were banned for five and ten years (Sunay, 2010: 418). In this context, general lines have been set forth with a law article that states that they cannot be members of political parties, cannot be nominated in any way in local or general elections, and even voluntarily (T.C. Başbakanlık Mevzuatı Geliştirme ve Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1982: 1345-1346). However, when it comes to the 1987 General Elections, it became certain that the Provisional Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution was completely abolished with a rate of 50.2%, first by the parliament and then by the referendum. Thus, the elections became more contentious with the return of politically banned leaders such as Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan and Türkeş. The 1987 General Elections became a challenge on behalf of the party leaders, especially with the former politicians starting to take part in the political scene again. In the first general elections held after September 12, only three political parties were able to compete and all three of them found their place in the parliament. However, in the 1987 General Elections, the importance of these elections increased due to the fact that both former politicians entered the race with the lifting of their bans and that the parties that took part in the 1983 elections completed their existing organizations. Another feature of these elections is that Özal collaborations with public opinion research companies. KAMAR, KONDA, PİAR, and VERİ research companies are the most important organizations that conduct public opinion polls to determine the percentage of votes that the political parties that will participate in the elections before the 1987 early general elections (Altan, 2005: 180-181).

If we considered as the vote rates of the political parties that won the elections and were represented in the parliament, the winner of the general elections held in this period was the Motherland Party. However, ANAP decreased its vote rate by about nine points compared to the previous general elections and gained 292 seats with 36.3% of the votes. The second party of the elections was the Social Democratic Populist Party. SHP won 99 seats with 24.8% of the votes. The third party that entered the parliament was the True Path Party. DYP received 59 seats with 19.1% of the votes in these elections (T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, 2015). The left vote was now divided between the Ecevit's Democratic Left Party and SHP.

As a result of the early general elections held in 1987, there was a 9% decrease in the votes of ANAP, which was the absolute winner of the 1983 general elections. One of the main reasons for this is the increase in the number of parties competing in the right lane. Another reason is the deterioration of ANAP in power. In fact, from another point of view, the fact that ANAP lost votes despite having used its power blessings to the fullest before the elections, holding an early election in order to prevent the recovery of former politicians who returned to the political scene after the removal of political bans, and especially economic expansion with foreign support should be considered a major failure. However, the main thing that draws attention in these elections is the fragmentation of the right-wing votes. While there were two parties (ANAP and MDP) fighting in the right lane in the 1983 general elections, four parties (ANAP, DYP, RP and MÇP) fought in this lane in the 1987 general elections.

If we analyse it in terms of party typologies; SHP is the political party that was established in Turkey after the September 12 Coup to collect the votes of the closed Republican People's Party. It was established by the merger of the People's Party and the Social Democratic Populist Party, which were established in the same lane, on 3 November 1985. It has sought the votes of SODEP and HP, which is the priority, and therefore CHP. The SHP was the representative of the social democracy that started to emerge from the 1960s, and therefore the center-left. SHP favored mixed economy instead of strict statist understanding in economy. It supported the market economy, but this does not mean that the SHP completely rejected statism. The party has always been distant from privatization. Throughout its political life, SHP has been the delegate of the social democratic sector in Turkey. The party sympathized with the working citizens and protected their rights. However, the fact that it could not be in power alone

prevented him from fully implementing his program. SHP, which is more liberal and moderate on the Kurdish issue compared to other parties, has been criticized by some circles for this reason.

Considering the typology of Rahat, we can assert that SHP provides a collegial party feature in many ways. In this party type, which is based on legal national authority in the Weberian sense, there are inclusive institutions such as central committee and assembly. Unlike the leader parties, it has the impersonal collective. With its multiple institutions at various level such as local and national, the traditional mass party type fits into this classification. Even if parties choose to replace leaders for strategic reasons, leaders continue to serve the party. The leader is elected from the assembly, including the party delegates. Also in terms of the role of the leader, leadership positions in the collegial party are typically filled with different individuals. In terms of party membership, the individual has minimum obligations such as dues and a more definite membership status with limited rights such as electing delegates for party institutions. Considering all these, it would not be wrong to assume that SHP has some features of Rahat's collegial party type.

In Gunther and Diomond's classification, it is possible to associate this party with the class-mass party in the 'socialism' sub-genre in the mass based category. Class-mass party type of party have socialist ideological commitments, and SHP, as the representative of social democracy, has features of this type. Class mased parties aim at social integration through the activities of party and trade union allies. The priority of the party is to win the elections and take part in the formation of the government. Recruitment is pretty open, and the larger the party's mass base, the better. In a word, it has some features of the parties in the SHP socialism/ class mass species.

The True Path Party (DYP), which came third in the elections, is the former political party that is considered to be the political heir of the Democrat Party (DP) and the Justice Party (AP). Founded in 1983 as the continuation of the Justice Party, which was closed in the September 12 Coup, the legal existence of the DYP came to an end when its name was changed to the Democrat Party in 2007. In terms of being the heir of the Justice Party, we can list the features of the collegial party type that we associate with the SHP for the DYP. It has collegial party type characteristics in terms of membership affiliations, candidate selection, leadership position and party organization.

In fact, Özal, who developed all four trends as pragmatist discourse, stated that after the general elections of 29 November 1987, four trends are now a thing of the past, this was initially said to introduce themselves because they were a new party, and now there is a cohesive ANAP. Thus, it can be said that Özal's ANAP has the appearance of a catch-all party that aims to adapt quickly to changing conditions and develops discourse and policy in this direction. The catch-all party appears to be a preferable object in the free market rather than a political party on the political scene. Instead of a consistent ideology or a systematic discourse, there is a case of attracting voters to get the maximum number of votes (Parla, 2006: 159). As an integral part of the depoliticization process initiated in the society after September 12, deal with a technocrat team has been a model adopted by ANAP. Concepts such as "detente, tolerance, reconciliation" come to the fore in Turkey in the post-1980 period. Depending on this change in political discourse, system inquiries and opposition to the regime are increasingly being replaced by discussions and criticisms on the implementation. The detente in political discourse also corresponds to the seek for a "consensus" in society. In this sense, the post-1980 society can be characterized not as apolitical, but as a society in which a new understanding of politics is developing. As the individuals who make up the society acquire different views and freedoms of their own, they will break away from each other and will fight fiercely for the realization of their own social projects (Göle, 2016:560-561).

3.3 1989 Local Elections

Before examining the 1989 local elections, it would be useful to take a look at the legal regulations related to the local elections before the election. The Law No. 298 on the "Basic Provisions of Elections and Electoral Registers", which was implemented in the 1984 local elections, underwent six amendments, five times with the law and once with the 'Delegated Legislation' until the 1989 local elections. Two of these modifications are related to making paid propaganda on TRT, one is the amendment to reduce the voting age from 21 to 20, the other is the alteration to reduce the propaganda period from 21 days prior to the elections to 10 days, and the other is the change that regulates the election bureaucracy. Finally, it is the change that regulates the number of provinces and districts that political parties have to organize in order to participate the elections.

With these regulations, the ruling party ANAP, on the one hand, tried to utilize TRT for its own interests by making it difficult for the opposition to make propaganda, on the

other hand, tried to bind the party organization to difficult conditions in order to prevent the parties from participating in the elections all over the country.

In addition, ANAP did not hesitate to use the state's resources for its own interests in order to be successful in local government elections. The 1989 local elections showed that no matter how much an attempt is made to interfere with the will of the people, no matter how much the blessings of the government are used, if the people are not satisfied with the government, they will punish them at the ballot box. These elections have shown that the power of the government cannot always be reflected to the ballot box as desired.

ANAP, which received 36.3% of the nationwide votes in the 1987 general elections, decreased its votes to 21.8% in these local elections, if we evaluate the results of the provincial general elections. In the elections, ANAP, SHP, DYP, DSP, RP, MÇP, IDP struggled for power. When evaluated in terms of the number of mayorships won, the SHP is the winner of both the general provincial council elections and Turkey in general. Founded in November 1985 by the merger of the People's Party and SODEP, the SHP executed the left's second historic debut in local elections. Ecevit's CHP made the first appearance of the left in 1977 and opened an important page in Turkish political history with 41% of the votes it won across Turkey.

This outflow of the left was interrupted by the 1980 coup. In the 1989 provincial council elections, the SHP took the first place with 28% of the votes. DYP comes in second with 25% and ANAP comes in third with 21%. In terms of total votes, the left wing increased its power from 32% to 39% in the first post-coup local elections. These figures clearly show that the defeated party in the 1989 local elections was ANAP. ANAP's stance continued to decline and the 26 March 1989 local elections ended in disaster; Within five years, the party's vote had dropped from 45% to 22%. SHP gains the upper hand in metropolitans such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.

The votes of ANAP in the local elections decreased by about 15% compared to the 1987 general elections. In fact, ANAP was defeated in these elections. The 1989 local election results show that the general election results are not always reflected in the local elections. The fact that the candidates come to the fore in local elections and that the ruling party or parties are constantly criticized for the actions of the government and as a result they suffer blood loss cause different results in local elections. From this

point of view, when we considered the 1989 local elections, ANAP, which came first in the 1987 general elections and achieved a significant success, suffered a great defeat in the local elections. There are many reasons behind this. The first of these, as I mentioned above, is the usual weariness of power. The fact that ANAP has been in power since 1983 and a six-year period of power, which can be considered a long period for Turkey, caused ANAP to enter these elections as a worn-out and weakened party, which was an important factor in ANAP's failure in these elections.

In addition, the internal conflicts faced by ANAP, especially during the nomination, and the excess of speculation on the candidates were another factor that blowed the failure. The primary reason for the SHP's success in the 1989 local elections is its good left-wing rhetoric against right-wing parties and its success in producing alternative policies to right-wing policies. According to Gunther and Diamond's classification, ANAP belongs to the electoralist party type in this election, too. Catch-all parties of the electoralist type of party in their scheme use modern campaign techniques through television and mass media and rely heavily on professionals who can conduct such campaigns skillfully. As seen in the example of ANAP, at election time these parties definitely take action to perform their primary function, the pursue of the campaign.

This pluralistic and tolerant ideal type is primarily distinguished by the party's shallow organization, superficial ideology and overwhelmingly electoral orientation, as seen in the ANAP cadre, as well as the prominent leadership and electoral roles of the party's top national-level candidates. One of the most important goals of catch-all parties is to maximize votes and win elections. To achieve this, the party organization seeks to bring together as many different social interests as possible. In societies where public opinion is positioned on the left-right continuum and is centrist, catch-all parties attempt to maximize votes by positioning themselves at the center of the spectrum by appearing moderate in their policy choices. The party organization endeavours to spread its electoral appeal to various groups, its policy orientations are eclectic and change according to the mood of the people.

The primary reason for the SHP's success in the 1989 local elections is its good left-wing rhetoric against right-wing parties and its success in producing alternative policies to right-wing policies. In the SHP program, the aims of the party regarding the individual were determined as freedom and equality and it was emphasized that labor was considered the highest value.

According to the program, SHP's goals for society were democratization, independence and productivity. It has the characteristics of collegial party type in terms of being based on legal rational authority and being based on impersonal collective. When we look at the examples in the world, we see that the Labor Party (Norway), Social Democratic Workers' Party (Sweden), which existed in the process until the 1990s, belong to Rahat's classification. By including concepts such as equality, freedom and labor rights in the party program, the SHP contained features that we can include in the collegial party type in these elections.

3.4 1991 General Election

The DYP won the early elections held in October 1991. SHP came in third after DYP and ANAP with 20.75 percent of the votes. The success achieved in the 1989 Local Elections was far away this time, it was most beneficial for the intra-party opposition. The SHP included the candidates of the People's Labor Party (HEP) who did not participate in the elections in the lists of the provinces of the Southeastern Anatolia Region. Thanks to this support, while the votes of the SHP exceeded 50 percent in the Southeast, there was a great loss of votes in the Black Sea, Thrace and Aegean regions. The decrease in the vote percentage in Turkey to 20.75 increased the criticism of the New Left group under Baykal within the party. After the elections, deputies of Kurdish origin tried to take the oath in Kurdish at the opening of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. As a result of the events that broke out on the 21 March 1992 Nowruz Festival, the HEP origins within the SHP resigned from the party. When a closure case was filed against HEP, DEP was established, but both were closed later. HEP and DEP members founded HADEP in 1994.

After Turgut Özal was elected president in 1989, Mesut Yılmaz emerged victorious from the leadership struggle that started in ANAP and became the second chairman of ANAP. The belief that Mesut Yılmaz was elected chairman by Özal after the General Presidency elections and that the party was actually under Özal's control was widely expressed in the public. Mesut Yılmaz also stated that he was not under Özal's guidance and that the initiative was entirely in his own hands. This was a very important turning point for ANAP. Yılmaz decided that an early general election would be appropriate in order to somehow prove that he had the initiative and that no one was appointed to this position with the approval of anyone, and in this direction, the general elections to be held in 1992 were delayed one year.

In the 1991 general elections, DYP became the first party in the country with 27% of the votes. Other parties that passed the electoral threshold and gained representation in the parliament were ANAP (24%), SHP (20.8%), RP (16.8%) and DSP (10.7%). As a result of these elections, since no party could reach the majority to form a government alone, the DYP-SHP coalition government was formed. The task of forming the government was given to DYP Chairman Süleyman Demirel. Demirel formed the DYP-SHP coalition government on 20 November 1991. SHP Chairman Erdal İnönü took the post of Deputy Prime Minister.

During the DYP-SHP coalition government, an mid-term local election was held, which could be an indicator for local elections and at the same time be considered important in terms of testing whether the coalition formed by two parties, one on the right and the other on the left, was accepted by the public. In the mid-term local elections held on June 7, 1992 for 341 mayors and in which 511 thousand voters cast their votes, DYP emerged as the first party, as was the case in the general elections. DYP received 35%, SHP 23%, ANAP 18.5%, RP 15%. Another important result in this mid-term local elections is that SHP surpassed ANAP as the second party. This result also meant the approval of the coalition government.

3.5 1994 Local Elections

Apart from the independents, thirteen political parties participated in these elections. The DYP could not maintain its success in the 1991 general elections. Having received 27% of the votes in the 1991 general elections, DYP was able to receive 21.4% of the votes in the 1994 local elections, according to the results of the provincial council. ANAP also reduced its vote in these elections from 24% to 21.1%. RP came in third with 19.1 votes. RP succeeded to be the second party after ANAP in the election of the city council and mayor.

When the 1994 mayoral election results are examined, we witness that blood loss has stopped in the right spectrum. Beyond that, right-wing parties have recovered very quickly throughout Turkey and increased their power. The total votes of the right parties, which were 59.48% in the 1989 elections, increased to 70.13% in the 1994 mayoral elections. Although DYP and ANAP were the pioneers in this rapid recovery of the right, the contribution of MHP and especially RP to this rise was undeniably great. The left wing, on the other hand, suffered a great loss of power in the face of this

rapid rise of the right. The vote loss of left-wing parties, approached 10% compared to the previous elections. The SHP played the most important role in this great regression of the left in local governments. While the SHP received 28.6% of the votes in the previous elections, it signed a historic defeat in these elections by getting only 13.5% of the votes according to the results of the provincial council elections. This failure can also be interpreted as an indication that SHP's understanding of local government is not accepted by the public.

While the SHP experienced the most dramatic result, the real winner of the election was Erbakan's Welfare Party. In the 1991 general elections, although it was an electoral alliance with the MÇP and the IDP, the RP received only 16.8% of the votes, but increased its vote rate to 19.1% in these elections (Bayramoğlu, 2007). The modern, secular and urban face of the MHP, which was displayed during the Alparslan Türkeş period, played an important role in the MHP's rise to the position of the fifth party in local governments. The adoption of this identity by Devlet Bahçeli, who was elected chairman after Türkeş's death, will bring greater success to the MHP in the 1999 general elections.

The process of partying that started in the Milli Gorus Movement with the establishment of the MNP under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan in 1970 continued with the MSP and yielded its first results by ensuring that Milli Gorus became a partner in power four times between 1974 and 1978. However, the National Vision Movement, which faced the resistance of the army and judicial bureaucracy from the beginning, was tried to be prevented and pushed out of politics. Despite this, the National Vision Movement continued on its way with the RP and achieved steady success in many local and general elections it participated in, bringing its popularity to the top and taking part in the government as a major power partner.

With its anti-Western and oriented foreign policy understanding, its ideology that constructs conservative nationalist discourse with Islamic concepts, and its unique arguments such as Muslim brotherhood, the RP achieved an advantageous position against other centrist parties. Although it is a political party founded by the Milli Gorus Movement, which is frequently accused of being an Islamist and Shari'aist, it has not avoided using religious motifs and messages as openly as possible. Trying to design a religious and local identity with propaganda, slogans and rhetoric, RP used a religiously-intense rhetoric to say, "The headscarf is our national dress," and a

propaganda aimed at reinforcing internal party organization with a religious motivation, such as "other parties have voters and we have believers." (Küçükyılmaz, 2010: 106).

This situation is better understood when we analyse the Party Programme. In the Party Program, in which the perspective that perceives religion as a tool for the development of capitalism with the developmentist-import substitution model is preserved, as in the predecessor Milli Gorus parties, the subject of religion and secularism under the title of "Basic Principles"; under the title of "National Education and Training", the subject of religious education was handled. The RP, which contains plenty of Islamic elements in its discourse, did not give much space to secularism, freedom of conscience and belief in the Party Program (Şen, 2004: 272).

RP sharing some characteristics with the 'proto-hegemonic religious party' or 'religious fundamentalist party', which is in the mass-based category in Gunther and Diamond's typology. The proto-hegemonic religious party type seeks to reorganize the state and society around a strict reading of religious doctrinal principles. At the same time, they differ from parties based on secular ideologies by a set of beliefs underlying their party programs. In this theocratic model, there is no difference between religion and state, and contradictory interpretations of religious norms are not included in the party program. Religious leaders have the authority to interpret this text and translate it into socially relevant terms. Religious norms are imposed on all citizens within the state. The far-reaching goals of these parties may come to the brink of totalitarianism. In this respect, the scope of the organizational development and activities of the parties is quite wide. Member involvement and identification is substantial and anciallry organizations have permeated the general public. Considering the religious fundamentalist nature and strict religious readings of these parties, we can say that the authority relations within the party are hierarchical and even absolutist. Religious fundamentalist parties do not receive support from policies that they derive by appealing solely to religious doctrine and identity. They perform a wide variety of social welfare functions, often helping to gain and consolidate members' loyalty. Web of organized activities is very valuable. Although not a class-based party, they received disproportionate support from the poor and oppressed and marginalized middle class, whose policies they produced had a special resonance with accusations of injustice and corruption.

In 1990s Turkey, where the struggle of political parties was based on conflicting socio-political identities and good living standards, poor and newly urbanized masses

preferred to be accepted and recognized as Muslims. They found this preference and their desire to distribute economic products and economic expansion equally in the RP's 'Fair Order' statement. Therefore, the Party has proposed an institutional framework for Turkey's quiet and repressed masses and social currents that seek to redefine and transform social, cultural and political interactions (Yavuz, 1997: 74-75).

The economic model displayed by the RP under the rhetoric of the Fair Order, which puts itself in an advantageous position over other parties, is indeed consistent with the Third Worldist, anti-imperialist language frequently used in the RP propaganda literature. At the same time, it differs markedly from the position of social democratic parties on the left, with more emphasis on democracy, human rights and social justice and less on private entrepreneurship (Öniş, 1997: 754). Emphasizing solidarity, harmony and justice, and the communal traditions of Turkish society, the Fair Order project advocates the use of modern technology to establish a better society, does not prevent the hope of modernity and progress, but presents it in a different context. It proposes a spiritual lifestyle based on Islamic principles. Morality; hard work, community service, fraternity and thus are claimed as the basis of social peace. RP women brought their parties to the head of local governments in many places in the local elections of March 27, 1994 (Yılmaz, 2012: 368).

The work of RP women in these elections, visiting from house to house in Istanbul, caused a great erosion in the party's view of women. Starting out with an Islamic discourse, RP has made great strides in the issue of "women's appear in the public sphere", which Islamic thinkers, whose ideas they embrace, are against. The interest that the RP aroused in women in politics played an important role in the transformation of women into "political individuals" from the traditional housewife role over time (Çaha, 2010: 257).

These elections demonstrated that the parties wear out considerably when they are in power. Especially in countries like Turkey that have not yet solved their fundamental problems, the people are constantly in search of power, which gives us the result that the voter bases of the parties are very slippery. The longer the parties stay in power, the more they wear out. The fact that two parties, one on the right and the other on the left, came together and formed a coalition government, caused both parties to lose votes at a significant rate. This shows us that the coalition culture has not yet been formed in Turkey.

3.6 1995 General Election

As mentioned above, the success of the RP in the 27 March 1994 local elections also paved the way for the RP to become the first party with 21% of the votes in the 24 December 1995 general elections. In other words, this success in the 1995 general elections was the reflection of the wind in the local administrations to the general politics, together with the success in the 1994 local elections. In the elections, the candidates of the BBP participated the elections from the ANAP lists, the Socialist İktidar Party and the Birleşik Socialist Party from the HADEP lists. RP was the first party with 21%, ANAP was the second party with 19.6%, and DYP was the third party with 19.2% (Akdoğan, 2005: 622).

The 24 December Elections, on which the "political class", big business and media circles rely on to be able to spend the next period with a "stable government", resulted in a picture that turned the government problem into a complete puzzle. These circles, who strongly hoped to enter 1996 with a centre-right government, thought that even if the Welfare Party emerged as the first party in the election, they could secure the majority in the Parliament with the total number of deputies of the centre-right parties, which had a difference of three to five points, preferably in favor of ANAP. However, the "Turkish voters" made an unexpected saintliness, neither giving the centre-right parties enough votes to form a majority together nor stating which one they saw as the "main party". During the attempts to form a government that started right after the elections, Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan first tried to form a coalition with ANAP but this did not happen, the ANAP-DYP coalition (ANAYOL) was formed two months after the elections. However, this coalition came to an end in a short time due to the incompatibility between the leaders of the two parties and the Constitutional Court's annulment of the vote of confidence. On 28 June 1996, under the presidency of Necmettin Erbakan, the Refahyol government was formed between the RP and the DYP and received a vote of confidence on 8 July. However, this government was forced to resign after the decisions of the National Security Council on February 28, 1997 (Tutar, 2007: 336-339).

In these periods, when parties with predominant religious colors increased their votes and power was an alternative, religion became a strategic marketing tool. On the other hand, it could be the subject of negative or positive promotion approaches. The most obvious example of this is the election activity carried out by Tansu Çiller and Mesut

Yılmaz in the 1995 General Elections, both leaders engaged in offensive-oriented campaign activities targeting the religious colors of the party against the Welfare Party, which the polls showed as an alternative to power.

In particular, it was tried to arouse fear by conveying messages to the voters that if they voted for the Welfare Party, the country would be plunged into darkness, secularism would disappear, people would not be able to live as they believed, modernization would stop and it would go back. In the Welfare Party's 24 December 1995 Election Declaration, which was published before the elections, it was stated that the main cause of the problems in the country was the wrong policies of parties with imitative mindsets, and that the solution to these problems was the Welfare Party.

In the elections held in this country until the 1980s, and even in the elections of the 1980s, when it was mentioned that the society had become "apolitical", either a certain party stood out with the obvious size and vitality of its mass support, and the power of its thesis or promises to set the agenda, or it was believed to have these characteristics. There would be fierce competition between two parties or blocs, but which side would favor the outcome could be predicted. The most distinctive aspect of the 1995 December elections was that it was almost outside of this pattern. Another feature of these elections was the high rate of "undecided voters".The party organisation is stated that they will fight unemployment with the Fair Order project and the production mobilization they will realize, National Vision will be implemented instead of IMF prescriptions in economic development, livelihood problems will be eliminated with their government and the welfare level of everyone will be increased (Refah Partisi, 1995: 3-10, 19-31). As can be understood from these promises expressed in the Election Declaration, the 24 December 1995 general elections, in which the RP, which has a very different discourse from the existing political parties, participated, constitutes a turning point in Turkish political life. The rise of the RP in elections that resulted in a restructuring of religion and politics in the public sphere meant broad popular support for the rhetoric of an Islamic-oriented party (Küçükcan, 2003: 494). However, despite this, the 24 December 1995 elections did not give any of the political parties the chance to come to power alone.

While the task of forming the government should have been given to the RP, which emerged as the first party in the elections, in accordance with the political custom and the principle of democratic administration, even this issue was made a subject of

political polemic and discussion (Akel, 1999: 41). In addition to the inability of political parties to capture the political power that can be in power on their own, the RP's emergence as the largest party in the elections (158 deputies) had a shocking effect on other political parties. With the establishment of the Anayol Government, it has been proven that being the first, second or third party is not so important after failing to capture the ruling power alone in Turkish political life (Akel, 1999: 47).

3.7 1999 Local Elections

Twenty parties participated in these elections. As in the previous elections, the 1999 mayoral election resulted in the undisputed superiority of the right wing. These elections also produced striking results in terms of parties. Right-wing parties won the first four places for the first time in all local elections held in the period of 1963-1999 in Turkish political history. The ranking has been concluded as ANAP, DYP, MHP, FP. In terms of the general provincial council election results of Turkey, DSP came first with 18%, MHP came second with 17% and FP came third with 16% (Güvenç, 2009).

When we considered as the first three parties that were successful in the elections, the third party typology was tried to be examined since the MHP did not analyse it in the previous elections. It was founded when the Republican Peasant Nation Party changed its name to the Nationalist Movement Party at the general congress held in Adana in 1969. The Nationalist Movement Party appealed to the nationalist conservative base. The MHP line, which was closed after the 12 September 1980 coup, was represented by the Conservative Party, which was founded by Mehmet Pamak in 1983, when new political parties were allowed to be established. This party changed its name to the Nationalist Work Party in 1985. The MÇP Congress, which convened on December 27, 1992 with its delegates in 1979, decided to dissolve the MÇP despite all the efforts of Sadi Somuncuoğlu, and to change the name of the party to MHP with the extraordinary congress held on January 24, 1993.

If we examine the third party, the MHP, in terms of the typology created by Gunther and Diomond, we can say that it has some similar characteristics with the pluralist nationalist parties in the mass based category. There will often be tensions within the plularist nationalist parties between those who demand a more militant stance to defend the group's nationalist demands and those who emphasize cooperation with other parties in forming government coalitions and press for increasingly beneficial legislation.

When MHP is examined in the context of typologies; It is possible to say that it does not belong to the typology of professional parties because there is no gathering for professionals in its ideology and cadres also it does not have a catch-all party due to its strict adherence to the ideology. Considering that the most striking feature of the MHP is the ideology it has defended in every period, it can be stated that it falls into the ideological party typology. On the other hand, the MHP is not a cartel party since it does not become dependent on the state due to its strong organizational structure and strong ties with its members. Even though the MHP was established as the leader party, it can be said that it has lost its leadership role because it has made the leadership change without any problems and increased the vote rate in the first election after the new leader came.

Considering the party typology of Rahat, we can say that it belongs to the collegial party type in terms of continuing the mass party tradition and organizing multiple institutions at various levels such as national, regional, and local.

It can be assumed that MHP takes part in mass parties according to the models of political party classification of Krouwel. Because, according to Krouvel's dimensional analyse, mass parties were based on polarized and ideological competition as the extent of party competition. On the other hand basis for party competition is ideology. In terms of resource structure, membership contributions and ancillary organization are also important. Position of party in central office is based on symbiosis between party and central office and party on the ground. Therefore, according to Krouwel's classification, we can say that MHP demonstrates features belonging to the mass party type.

3.8 1999 General Election

In these elections, DSP receives 22%, MHP 18% and FP 15%. In the 1999 General Elections, only five parties succeeded in overcoming the 10% national threshold. The CHP, which had a significant success in the previous elections, was excluded from the parliament as it failed to pass the threshold. The winner of these elections was undoubtedly the DSP. With the effect of Öcalan being brought to the country, the voters brought the Democratic Left Party to the parliament as the first party. At a time when corruption and political corruption increased, Ecevit's honest personality and DSP's non-corruption structure created excitement, hope and trust in the society. In the 18

April 1999 Elections, DSP increased its votes from %14.65 to %22.19 and became the first party.

However, the biggest surprise in the elections was the MHP, which failed to enter the parliament because it could not pass the threshold in the previous elections, as the second party in this election. The DSP had been the first party, but the Virtue Party had fallen to the third place, receiving one and a half million less votes than the RP in the 1995 elections. The centre-right had lost votes, but the DYP had its share as much as ANAP. The CHP could not pass the threshold, and the MHP, aside from passing the threshold, was placed in the second place.

In the 1995 and 1999 general elections, a large number of parties could not enter the parliament, and none of the parties that could enter the parliament could gain enough representation to be in power alone. However, since the regional threshold in the election law was abolished in these elections, the will of the people was more reflected in the parliament than in the 1983, 1987 and 1991 general elections.

There are some common political understandings of the parties that show the division of Turkey in terms of political preferences. DSP and MHP have a politics based on nationalism. At first glance, we can say that DSP, MHP, ANAP and DYP emphasize the supra-Turkish identity, FP emphasizes Islam, CHP emphasizes Alevism and HADEP emphasizes Kurdish identity. Considering the typology of Gunther and Diomond, we can say that it has some similar features with the programmatic party. First of all, the programmatic party is closer to the classic model of a mass-based, ideological party. It has a much more coherent ideological agenda than the catch-all party type. It incorporates programmatic appeals into election campaigns and government agendas. Second, programmatic parties try to take control of the government or a place within it. Third, although its organization and social base is similar to that of the catch-all party in a majoritarian system, the programmatic party has a more clearly defined social base and is likely to be more closely linked to similarly ideologies in some civil society. In this case, the electoral strategy of the programmatic parties is to mobilize the core electorate through the pooling of interests.

Considering the party program, the program includes many topics such as globalization, informal economy, labor-capital relationship, production, entrepreneurship, unemployment, culture, information society, space technology, public administration

and "local administration understanding", unionization and "university perspective". Therefore, DSP, which tries to protect its ideology by staying true to the party program, does not show the characteristics of catch all, ethnicity-based, or personalistic party types, and can be evaluated in the programmatic party category.

While ANAP and CHP, which supported February 28, lost votes, DYP and FP, which opposed it, did not gain votes, on the contrary, they also lost votes. The rate of votes lost by these parties is about %20. DSP and MHP won %18 of the votes. The change in preferences of the voters at this rate shows the erosion of the political parties, which are the main pillars of the political system, but the fact that the rate of participation in the elections tends to rise again and approaches the level of the 1980s, suggesting that the solution is still sought within the political system. Another unnoticed result of the elections is that for the first time in the last twenty years, a left-wing party came first. This argument can be criticized with the question of how left the DSP is, but in an environment where the definition of politics has changed, the DSP nevertheless represents a left stance and was perceived as such by the electorate and was preferred. Again, left-wing parties with socialist emphasis pushed a rate that was almost reached in the 1960s, which is a result that should not be ignored. The sum of the votes of DSP, CHP, HADEP, ÖDP and other left-wing parties exceeded 35 percent after a long hiatus, which represents an increase of nearly 10 percent compared to the previous elections.

The Virtue Party, which came in third in the elections, was founded on 17 December 1997, under the chairmanship of İsmail Alptekin, through the authorities, who saw the danger of the RP being closed after the MGK declaration of 28 February 1997 and the closure case against the RP on 21 May 1997 (Mert, 2008: 79). After the Constitutional Court decision to dissolve the RP on January 6, 1998, there was no problem in the transition of the RP deputies, who remained independent, to the FP, and all party members, except politically banned names, switched to FP (Karaalioğlu, 2001: 10-11). Thus, on 14 May 1998, Recai Kutan was appointed as the chairman of the FP, which had the opportunity to be represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In the general and local elections of 18 April 1999, FP's fate was similar to that of its predecessor RP, although it captured 15.4% of the vote in general, 18.4% in local municipalities, and 23.7% in metropolitan municipalities (Mert, 2008: 80). The Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Public Prosecutor's Office declared the Constitution on 7 May 1999 on the grounds that Articles 69 and 88 of the Constitution were violated

and that the FP was a continuation of the RP, and that the executives of the closed party could not be the directors or supervisors of another party and that the party was the focus of actions against secularism. A closure case was filed with the Court of Appeals and the FP was closed on 22 June 2001 by the decision of the Constitutional Court (Aykol, 2009: 258).

Considering the general aims of the FP, it asserts that "to believe in real democracy, human rights and freedoms in the broadest sense, and the supremacy of the will of the people; to enable the widest and fullest use of freedoms of thought and expression, religion and conscience and free enterprise; By removing injustice, double standards, corruption, oppression and oppression in the country, to establish an honest, clean, just, reliable and service to the nation, a state administration that prioritizes democracy and human rights and emphasizes liberal values (Fazilet Partisi, 1998: 3). FP draws a different party profile from its predecessor RP in terms of having some former ANAP executives in its senior management as well as its Program and adopting a liberal discourse by completely abandoning the Milli Gorus discourse. In other words, FP, representing the Milli Gorus Movement after the RP, tried to take on the appearance of a party that is pro-integration with the West, pro-liberal economy, and defender of the democratic state of law, unlike its predecessor and with the concern to guarantee its existence (Okutan, 2006: 317).

FP has shown a great departure from the collective economic understanding of its predecessor, RP. This is better understood when considering at the FP's Program. In the Party Program, the state should be kept out of commercial and industrial activities within the limits of possibilities and the necessity of having these works done by the private sector, the state's main functions such as security, justice, education, health and infrastructure, full public and semi-public goods and services, supervisory, regulatory and as a guide, it was stated that private enterprise should meet the requirements of a free market economy in order to develop, and that they wanted to achieve the main goal of transitioning to a production economy (Fazilet Partisi, 1998: 15-16).

FP embraced the discourse of democracy in the February 28 process, and turned to Turkey's main goal of integrating with the West and the democratic values required by this goal (Çaha, 2000: 171). It is better understood when we look at the April 1999 Election Declaration. In the Party Program, it was emphasized that "the country's relations with the West, especially with the EU and the USA, are important, the current

relations with these countries should be saved from the atmosphere of insecurity, and a policy based on mutual trust and understanding should be followed" (Fazilet Partisi, 1998: 35).

Emphasizing that non-governmental organizations should also be strengthened in order to strengthen democracy, FP said that in the Party Program, the state should not be in a dominant position, but a serving element; it states that the party is the guarantor of fundamental rights and freedoms within the understanding of the rule of law, which is based on the rule of law and justice. He also stated in the FP Election Declaration that he considers the protection of the rights of working women among the priority problems that await solutions and that he has concrete projects for this purpose, that women should have equal rights with men in education, political and economic life (Fazilet Partisi, 1999: 102, 137).

In short, the FP, which is seen to be different from its predecessor Milli Gorus parties in many aspects, especially in its understanding of economy and foreign policy, has had to pass countless legitimacy tests at every moment, although it apparently had to abandon its political and ideological legacy after the dissolution of the RP. The successor to the RP, FP, has had to deal with the tensions of inclusion operations and reidentify itself more directly in its quest for legitimacy. Political alliances and the balance of power have changed dramatically in the elections held under these suggestions. The successor of RP, FP, lost power in these elections. Tensions between Islamists and secularists during the RP's brief rule led many voters to turn to the DSP and MHP, both of which excluded religious issues from their election campaigns (Küçükcan, 2003: 498).

As mentioned above, although it won 111 deputies with 15.4% of the votes in the elections, FP could not escape its unfortunate fate. After the general elections, when Merve Safa Kavakçı came to the swearing-in ceremony wearing a headscarf, the turban discussions started to flare up in the country. Unlike the RP, in the Party Program, democracy and human rights are prioritized, liberal values are emphasized, and some former ANAP executives are included in the Party's senior management in order not to be perceived as a continuation of the RP, although FP retains its political and ideological legacy. Although he apparently had to leave, he had to pass numerous legitimacy tests and finally shared the same fate with RP (Dursun, 2004: 7).

It is possible to reconcile the Virtue party with the network party type of Rahat.

As is known, the network party is based on a network of connections between individual politicians. Every politician has their own power base and personal organization, campaign machine, client network, and support staff when it comes to incumbents. The party is a loose confederation of personalized organizations that work together under the same banner. After the intra-party nomination process is complete, politicians usually do not compete with each other for the same position and use the same party label. Beyond that, each is quite autonomous. It is no accident, therefore, that the "elite party" of the nineteenth century had the characteristics of a network party (Katz and Mair 1995, 18).

Its politicians rallied around it, and its basic units were local election machines. Aldrich's (2011, 306) definition of the contemporary American political party fits here: "A party effectively designed around the ambitions of autonomous politicians, responsible for its own electoral destiny, and therefore sensitive to the concerns of its individual voters." The Virtue Party, with its aforementioned policies and the women's networks it has created, has a few features of the network party. On the other hand, the party organization won the votes of the voters due to its sensitivity to the concerns of its individual voters.

3.9 2002 General Elections

On 3 November 2002, early general elections were held in Turkey. The voters made their choice of their own free will among the 18 political parties and other independent candidates participating in the election. 21 percent of registered voters did not vote. In this context, the most important question to be answered is: Is it possible to perceive and interpret this indifference of the electorate as a sign of alienation and distrust of the political system? When the ballot boxes were opened on the evening of November 3, there was an earthquake in Turkish politics. For the first time, all the parties (DSP, MHP, ANAP, DYP and SP) with representatives in the government and in the parliament were excluded from the Turkish Grand National Assembly by receiving votes below the 10 percent electoral threshold, while the AKP, which was established just a year ago under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan, received %34 of the vote. He was the clear winner of the elections and had a two-thirds majority in parliament (Çarkoğlu, 2002).

The CHP, led by Deniz Baykal, which had hit the threshold in the previous elections, was taking on the role of the country's new main opposition party, with 19 percent of the votes and a parliamentary group of 178 people, while preparing itself for power. In addition, there was another first in Turkish politics, and thus, nine independent candidates from different regions of the country were able to enter the parliament. Another successful party in the 2002 elections, even though it did not enter the parliament, was the Youth Party, which was founded just a few months before the elections and led by Cem Uzan, which attracted attention with its interesting media and campaign tactics. On the other hand, DEHAP, which is mostly known as a regional origin, has also seen that its claim to be a "Turkey party" has not been realized, although it has slightly increased its votes thanks to the electoral alliances it entered (Esmer, 2002).

On the losers side, the most dramatic loss of votes occurred in the DSP, which was the winner of the last election. For the first time, a loss of 21 points was experienced in the votes of a ruling party and the vote rate decreased from %22 to %1. Another ruling party that suffered a heavy defeat in the November 3 elections was the MHP. MHP, which entered the parliament as the second party in the previous elections, gave an image that moved away from the framework it had drawn regarding its own identity during the government partnership, failed to fulfill its promises to the public before the election, and displayed an image of dealing with itself rather than the problems of the citizens before the election so it lost a 10 point vote. ANAP, the smallest partner of the government, was excluded from the parliament due to similar reasons, but also due to the fact that the name of the party was associated with corruption. One of the most important results of the November 3 elections is undoubtedly the return of Turkish politics to the two-party system after fifty years, and the country's return to a single-party government fifteen years later (Bora, 2002).

If we evaluate the victorious AKP in terms of party typologies, it is possible to say that it is among the electoralist parties according to the scheme of Gunther and Diamond. In order to ensure institutional legitimacy, it is necessary to determine a political ideology for the party. In this process, the party's structure that cares about tradition and is open to innovation has been tried to be brought to the fore. In this case, the concept of "conservative democrat" began to be used to define the political ideology of the party (Erler, 2007).

The AKP is not a cadre party. On the contrary, we can interpret it as a typical catch-all party that gets votes from rural and urban areas, the rising conservative bourgeoisie and the poor in big cities. According to Kalaycıoğlu (2008); Instead of revealing their true position by using major ideologies such as Turkish nationalism, Islamism, liberalism and social democracy, the AKP confuses voters as the catch-all parties do. As with the catch-all parties, AKP voters support the party not because of ideological but pragmatic and even economic interests. In this party typology, there is an ideological softening of the mass integration parties and loosening in their organizational structure in order to increase their vote potential and get results quickly. This definition can be considered sufficient to explain the birth process of the AKP. They use communication techniques and mass media experts for this purpose (Sayarı, 2015).

There are historical developments that can be presented as evidence in the inclusion of the AKP in this party classification. The first of these is that Ertuğrul Günay, one of the important names of the left, joined the party and became the minister of culture. In addition, attempts were made to win the social classes that voted for leftist parties under the Alevi initiative. Another proof is that the leaders of other parties on the right joined the ranks of the AKP. The most important of them can be shown as Süleyman Soylu and Numan Kurtulmuş. Due to the large vote potential on the right, the AKP is trying to expand the voting cake by attracting the fragmented splinter parties and leaders in this lane. In this case, a central ideology cannot be expected to ossify in the party identity.

The AKP does not perceive the National Vision and Erbakan as its predecessor, both ideologically and institutionally. The leader and leading politicians of the party place themselves in line with the Democratic Party. But the party; especially with its policies in the field of education and the discourse of raising religious youth, it stands closer to the National Vision line. In addition, with its approach that prioritizes the free market economy, it is similar to the examples of New Conservatives in the world and continues the line of the Democratic Party and the Motherland Party. Considering the percentage of votes the AKP received and the social segments from which these ratios emerged, it can be said that it has an ideological appearance with many components that unites the social division lines of liberals, Islamists, conservatives and nationalists.

According to the leader of the party, Erdoğan (2004), AKP is a mass party based on conservatism. Erdogan used this expression in 2004. Exactly ten years later, Vice President Hüseyin Çelik; "The AKP is not an ideological party, it is a mass party. We

are making a policy that meets in principles and the common denominator is conservative democracy", he said. The AKP is not a mass party either because it does not educate or organize a mass based on a certain social group or class with a certain ideological doctrine. However, due to its centralist and disciplined structure, it can be said that AKP shows the characteristics of a mass party. In addition, it can be considered as a cadre party in the context of party establishment, since a politically elite group came together and formed the party.

In addition, since the parties that received 7% of the votes in the elections receive treasury grant, the parties exceeding this rate also comply with the cartel party typology (Katz and Mair, 1995). Özbudun (2003) lists the characteristics of cartel parties as follows; The main purpose of politics is "politics as a profession, party activities are capital-oriented, parties are dependent on state grants and accordingly, parties continue their existence by being integrated into the state apparatus". The institutionalization process of the AKP has a dynamic character. First of all, since it has been managed by a charismatic leader since the day it was founded, the leader's charisma surrounding his managerial qualifications preceded the party's corporate identity. When evaluated in terms of Rahat's classification, it can be said that AKP is close to the personal party type for many reasons. Personal parties attached significant role for the party leader also in terms of leader's role, it depends on absolute control of a single leader. For this reason, it is difficult to predict whether the institutionalization process of the party will continue after the founding leader.

Conclusion

Political parties did not emerge in a continuous, linear manner and did not converge to a single party model. Changes in the organizational forms, electoral strategies, programmatic goals and ideological orientations of parties are the products of various causal processes. If this is true, it would be a mistake to rely on an excessively limited number of political party types. This leads scientists to try to cram new parties into

unsuitable models or attempt to halt the theory-building process by concluding in frustration that existing theories and models do not fit established party types.

Accordingly, typologies should be constructed in a way that is less parsimonious but more fully reflects the real diversity in party types around the world, facilitating testing of multiple hypotheses about the origins and functions of political parties. Political, technological and cultural contexts must also be taken into account in the classification of parties. Political parties are indispensable elements of democratic political life as they contribute to the formation of political will in a country.

In a democratic system, different opinions in the society can be expressed, political tendencies should be organized as political parties and they should be candidates for power in a free and equal competition environment. Political parties prepare alternative political programs and present them to the public. Thus, they offer the citizens the opportunity to choose among various alternatives in the elections. In order to talk about real democracy, it should be possible for political parties to reflect the social division structure in the society and to transfer different ideologies to the political arena. By banning certain ideas, preventing their political representation and limiting parties to the extent that democracy does not allow, they are pushed out of the system and increasingly alienated. This hinders the healthy and stable functioning of democracy.

Democracy in Turkey has waxed and waned over the decades since the introduction of a multiparty system. It is accepted by modern states of law that political parties, which have become the indispensable rule of democratic political life, should be audited in terms of their establishment, purpose and activities in terms of their conformity with the Constitution. Constitutional arrangements are needed in order to protect political parties against arbitrary acts of the administration and to eliminate the negative effects of political parties on the democratic regime, rule of law and freedoms. In the new order created by both the Constitution and the Law on political parties after 1982, political parties have been caught in the grip of the Constitution and the Law in terms of their statutes, programs and activities.

The Constitution has almost become a common party program for all parties, and there is no other area left for the parties other than to implement the Constitution. Political parties that needed to produce alternative policies for the solution of the problems in

front of the Turkish society were faced with the sanction of closure even if they crossed this line of the Constitution and the Law in their thinking plan.

While freedom is the basis and restriction is the exception in Western democracies, the 1982 Constitution has almost made restriction the basis and freedom the exception. In fact, the amendments made in the Constitution and the Law No:2820 are far from bringing the freedom seen in Western democracies for political parties. In most of the Western democracies, even anti-system parties are allowed to participate in the elections, while in Turkish Law, political parties are confined to a narrow space that falls behind democratic standards.

For this reason, the provisions of the 1982 Constitution and the Political Parties Law regarding party bans and dissolution of parties should be rearranged and brought into the legal framework in real democracies. For this, party bans should be narrowed down and made more difficult to close. Therefore, within the scope of the Constitution and the Law on Political Parties to be regulated in accordance with democratic standards, it should not be possible to close political parties unless their statutes and programs are inconsistent with the Constitution and they do not resort to violence to carry out their programs and make propaganda for the use of violence.

Comprehensive changes made in the provisions regarding the closure of parties in 2002 and 2003, unfortunately, could not be realized in terms of the articles regulating the internal functioning of political parties. No effort has been made to approach the European political parties that are lagging behind in terms of organizational and membership structure, congresses, intra-party elections, party nominations, and discipline-related matters that will help establish intra-party democracy. Of course, both the constitutional and legal changes that made it difficult to close a party in 2002 and 2003 are quite appropriate and pleasing for our democracy.

The use of the same venue belonging to the closed party, by the new party founded by the party members, only by hanging the sign belonging to the new party with the same color and similar emblem, which has tragic-comic results and does not serve any purpose other than strengthening the closed parties and continuing their political lives. Thus, the party closures came to an end to some extent. However, for the democratization of politics, the state should not interfere with politics, but should be involved in anti-democratic practices. Today, Turkish political parties are both corrupt

in structure and significantly dysfunctional. Due to their adherence to the traditional party understanding and some legal regulations that reinforce it, political parties have turned into oligarchic organizations that are disconnected from the people and their ability to represent the electorate has been weakened.

Legal arrangements to be made in order to realize intra-party democracy should not aim to create a uniform party order, but to create a democratic party internal structure. The existence of legal regulations alone will not realize intra-party democracy. Intra-party democracy can be put into practice by adopting and owning all the institutions and rules of democracy by all segments of the society. The absence or lack of democracy within the party is a problem of political culture rather than a purely legal problem. The necessary socio-economic, cultural and legal ground has not yet been formed for the establishment of intra-party democracy in Turkey.

We witnessed both political depersonalization and personalization in established democracies in recent decades. Lately, democracies also political parties in particular altered political personalization. The personalized politics and them personalized parties turned into depersonalized polities with collegial party types in the nineteenth century from the Rahat's perspective. Recently, a reverse wave is observed in politics and personalized politics evolved with personalized parties contrary to the past. This awareness open fruitful paths of studies. In further studies, the links between party types and their ideologies will be examined by considering their effects on politicians. These studies also explain phenomena such as personalization and populism.

Changes in the electorate lead to change in government, and this in turn leads to changes in policy. There is adaptation rather than decline of political parties: voters keep following their closer parties, but their connection is less socially structured than in previous decades. Celebrity politics is gaining relevance among party leaders and candidates, coming from journalism, social activism, sports, sciences, and the private sector. Electoral effect is unclear, as much as it ability to maintain the policy linkage.

Decline of the importance of partisanship for elections, but this is unclear: party attachment still important as voters' follow party cues. This personalization has also extended to other areas of the political process which strengthening of prime ministers and party leaders. Additionally, more personalism does not guarantee more attention by

voters. Polarization might became the new normal in electoral politics as news actors need it to survive in a more volatile landscape.

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