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THE EFFECT OF SELF-DISTANCING ON EMOTION REGULATION AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL REMEMBERING

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APPROVAL

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To My Family...

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THE EFFECT OF SELF-DISTANCING ON EMOTION REGULATION AND
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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of the study is to investigate the effect of different distancing strategies (visual, linguistic), perspectives (immersed, distanced), and emotions (sadness, shame) on emotion regulation and memory characteristics. Self-distancing is an effective strategy for regulating emotions by taking a step back from the distressing stimulus using various methods. Namely, visual and linguistic strategies were useful for attenuating the negative affect of several emotions. However, the effect of these strategies on basic and self-conscious emotions remains unclear. In particular, visual distancing was not effective in controlling emotions such as shame and guilt, in contrast to linguistic strategy, which was beneficial across diverse emotions. Moreover, similar to the regulatory function of distancing, shifting from a field to an observer perspective decreased the experiential memory characteristics such as reliving or vividness, as shown by studies on memory perspectives. Accordingly, we expect a difference between distancing strategies depending on the type of emotion in the current study. More specifically, we predict that shifting from a field to an observer perspective will reduce ratings for sadness but not shame memories in visual strategy, whereas the shift will be effective for both emotions in the linguistic condition. Participants (N = 147) were instructed to rate memory characteristics before and after using the assigned strategies. The change between the initial and subsequent memory ratings was calculated and analyzed using a MANCOVA, including memory age and resolution as covariates. Contrary to our hypothesis, the findings revealed no effect of field-to-observer shift on memory phenomenology. Unexpectedly, we found that observer-to-field shift increased reliving and vividness ratings in the visual strategy and decreased them in the linguistic strategy. We discussed the results in light of potential factors that could moderate the effectiveness of strategies and proposed future directions.

Keywords: Self-distancing, Autobiographical memory, Emotion regulation, Visual perspective, Basic emotions, Self-conscious emotions

KENDİNE MESAFELİ BAKIŞ AÇISININ DUYGU DÜZENLEME VE OTOBİYOGRAFİK HATIRLAMA ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİNİN İNCELENMESİ

ÖZET

Çalışmanın temel amacı, farklı stratejilerin (görsel, dilsel), bakış açılarının (kendine odaklı, kendine mesafeli) ve duyguların (üzgün, utanmış) duygu düzenleme ve anı özellikleri üzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Kendini uzaklaştırma, çeşitli yöntemlerle kişilerin rahatsız edici uyaranlardan geri adım atarak uyguladığı, duyguları düzenlemede kullanılan etkili bir stratejidir. Şöyle ki, görsel ve dilsel stratejinin farklı duyguların olumsuz etkilerini azaltmada yararlı olduğu bulunmuştur. Ancak bu stratejilerin temel ve bilinçli duygular üzerindeki etkisi belirsizliğini korumaktadır. Özellikle görsel stratejinin, çeşitli duyguları kontrol etmede faydalı olan dilsel stratejinin aksine, utanç ve suçluluk gibi duygularda etkili olmadığı görülmüştür. Buna ek olarak, kendini uzaklaştırmanın duygu düzenleme işlevine benzer şekilde, bellek perspektifleri üzerine yapılan çalışmalar, kendi bakış açısından gözlemci bir bakış açısına geçiş yapmanın yeniden yaşama veya canlılık gibi deneyimsel anı özelliklerini azalttığını göstermiştir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada stratejilerin etkisinin duygu türüne göre değişmesini bekliyoruz. Daha spesifik olarak, kendi bakış açısından gözlemci bir bakış açısına geçiş yapmanın, görsel stratejide üzüntüye yönelik anı özelliklerini azaltacağını fakat utanç verici anılar için etkili olmayacağını, dilsel stratejide ise her iki duygu için de etkili olacağını tahmin ediyoruz. Katılımcılara (N = 147), atandıkları stratejileri kullanmadan önce ve kullandıktan sonra hafıza özelliklerini puanlamaları talimatı verildi. İlk ve sonraki anı özellikleri arasındaki değişiklik hesapladıktan sonra, sonuçlar anının yaşı ve çözülme durumunun ortak değişken olarak alındığı bir MANCOVA ile analiz edildi. Hipotezimizin aksine, bulgular kendi bakış açısından gözlemci bir bakış açısına geçmenin bellek fenomenolojisi üzerinde etkisi olmadığını ortaya koydu. Beklenmedik bir şekilde, gözlemci bakış açısından kendi bakış açısına geçişin görsel stratejide yeniden yaşama ve canlılık derecelerini artırdığını, dilsel strateji ise azalttığını bulduk. Sonuçları, stratejileri etkileyebilecek olası faktörler ışığında tartıştık ve gelecek çalışmalar için bazı önerilerde bulunduk.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Kendini uzaklaştırma, Otobiyografik bellek, Duygu düzenleme, Görsel bakış açısı, Temel duygular, Bilinçli duygular

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LIST OF SYMBOLS

α Type I error

β Standardized regression coefficient

B Unstandardized regression coefficient

F F-ratio

η_p^2 Partial eta-squared

N   Sample size

p Probability value

R^2 The coefficient of determination

t Test statistics for Student's t-test

LIST OF ACRONMYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMQ   Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire

ANOVA   Analysis of Variance

ER   Emotion Regulation

ERQ   Emotion Regulation Questionnaire

fMRI   Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging

ID   Identification

M   Mean

MANCOVA Multivariate Analysis of Covariance

MANOVA Multivariate Analysis of Variance

MSE   Mean Squared Error

RRS   Ruminative Responses Scale

SD   Standard Deviation

SE   Standard Error

1. INTRODUCTION

Self-distancing has been conceptualized as a strategy that allows the adaptive processing of experiences by creating a psychological distance between the self and the stimulus through changing perspectives (Kross et al., 2005). The process of effectively analyzing events can help individuals to regulate their emotions and behaviors, which are closely related to the cognitive, social, and psychological well-being of people (Gross, 2014).

Even though there are several methods to alter psychological distance, two distancing methods have gotten more attention in the field of distancing. One way to create this distance was by using mental imagery to manipulate the point of view of an event, which is called visual self-distancing. Another procedure was to implement distanced self-talk, a more recent approach to distancing that takes advantage of narrative perspective through shifts in personal pronouns. The research revealed that both distancing methods were useful strategies for adaptive self-reflection, thus regulating negative affect. Namely, distancing helped people regulate emotional reactivity to their anger and sadness-related memories and their anxiety after being provoked by a public speaking task (Kross et al., 2005; Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross et al., 2014). The findings are further supported by the studies showing the behavioral and physiological benefits of distancing (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Mischowski et al.,2012; Streamer et al., 2017).

However, while both distancing approaches efficiently regulated negative emotions, there were also studies with conflicting results showing differential effects for diverse emotions. The research indicated that the usefulness of visual distancing might differ depending on the type of emotion that is analyzed. For example, it was found that adopting distanced perspective did not regulate (Katzir & Eyal, 2013) and even increased (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012) self-conscious emotions like shame and guilt as opposed to basic emotions like sadness. Unlike visual distancing, narrative shifting was beneficial for reducing emotional reactivity across diverse emotions, including self-

conscious and basic emotions (Orvell et al., 2021). Accordingly, one of the main purposes of the study was to compare visual and linguistic distancing in regulating emotions from distinct categories. Moreover, vulnerable individuals, such as people with high anxiety levels and ruminative tendencies, benefited more from distancing than healthy individuals. Hence, the study also investigated individual differences, including rumination and habitual use of emotion regulation strategies of participants, in order to examine the possible influence of these variables (Kross & Ayduk, 2009; Kross et al., 2017).

The self-distancing paradigm was closely related to the literature on field and observer perspective in cognitive psychology. As in distancing, imagery visualization of events from own eyes and the observer's eyes holds fundamental importance for these studies. The greatest discrepancy lies in the objectives of the studies. While self-distancing focuses on analyzing and regulating emotions from a distanced perspective, memory studies primarily concentrate on alterations in memory characteristics with the change of perspective. However, regardless of the research aims, the obtained results were compatible among these studies. Similar to the regulatory function of distanced perspective, it was demonstrated that shifting from a field to an observer perspective led to fewer sensory details for the memories, such as reliving (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993).

Despite the similarities, no study to our knowledge has investigated the effect of perspective shift on memory phenomenology using self-distancing strategies. Moreover, the impact of distancing on memory components was also not completely explored. Therefore, examining changes in the memory characteristic with perspective shift can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the influence of self-distancing on memory and emotion regulation. That is why another goal of the study was to compare changes in memory qualities with the shift in perspective.

Altogether, the present research aims to investigate whether two types of self-distancing (visual, linguistic), the shift between perspectives (immersed, distanced), and different categories of emotions (basic, self-conscious) have an influence on characteristics of

memories and regulation of emotions. This chapter will start with a brief introduction and background to the topic, followed by the research's aim, rationale, and hypotheses.

1.1 Visual Self-distancing

Visual self-distancing has been characterized as a self-regulation strategy that allows adaptive emotional processing of negative events by altering the point of view of individuals (i.e., McIsaac & Eich, 2004). It is suggested that adopting a distanced perspective to the event increases psychological distance, which enables people to regulate their emotions (Kross et al., 2005; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). There are two processes essential to distancing studies. Participants were asked to visualize a negative experience from a specific perspective and analyze feelings surrounding that experience while maintaining the given perspective. The perspectives people reflect on include self-immersed and self-distanced. In the immersed perspective, participants are instructed to replay the situation from their own eyes; in other words, they are asked to relive the same experience from the original point of view since the majority of experiences are retrieved from an immersed perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Thus, the intention is to minimize the psychological distance between the event and the self. On the contrary, in distanced perspective, participants are instructed to move away from the experience to watch the experience from a distance while imagining that it is happening to a distant self, thereby increasing the psychological distance. Following the instruction for perspectives, participants were told to reflect on the underlying causes of their emotions.

A number of studies investigating self-distancing have shown various benefits of analyzing an experience from a distanced perspective, including regulating physiological reactivity, behaviors, and emotions. For example, participants' blood pressure activity was attenuated significantly when they analyzed an anger-related experience from a distance (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Ayduk & Kross, 2010). Accordingly, they also displayed less aggressive reactions compared to immersed conditions, supporting the role of distancing in controlling behaviors (Mischowski et al., 2012).

In addition to physiological and behavioral implications, self-distancing was an effective tool in regulating different emotions. Specifically, participants in the distanced perspective reported lower levels of negative emotional reactivity for their sadness/depression (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross et al., 2012) and anger/conflict-related memories (Kross et al., 2005; Ayduk & Kross, 2008) in contrast to immersed perspective, which has given opposite results by increasing emotional intensity. Likewise, higher spontaneous distancing was related to decreased negative affect, revealed by spontaneously measured distancing studies (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Grossmann & Kross, 2010; Park et al., 2016). Furthermore, it should be noted that regulatory benefits of distancing were observed in a variety of populations, such as children (Kross et al., 2011), adolescents (White et al., 2015), and adults (Kross et al., 2005).

Even though the regulatory function of reflecting on emotions is shown, some contradictory evidence states that analyzing negative feelings might not always be beneficial. Past research suggested that it can also result in rumination, increase negative affect (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), and lead to more depressive symptoms over time (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Rumination, which is one of the key characteristics of depression, means repeatedly and passively focusing on negative emotions, which creates vicious cycles that further feed and heighten depressive feelings (Teasdale, 1988). For example, Wimelaweera and Moulds (2008) found that reflecting on emotions by thinking reasons behind their emotions increased intrusions regardless of perspective, which also did not attenuate negative affect; in other words, analyzing the emotions caused ruminative thinking.

While the determinant factors for favorable or harmful self-reflection were considered, Ayduk and Kross (2010) emphasized the importance of psychological distance. They suggested that analyzing negative feelings can be beneficial or backfire and lead to rumination depending on the psychological distance. Since immersed perspective is lacking in this distance, it can lead to rumination, a maladaptive self-reflection, whereas distanced perspective creates a psychological distance, which is negatively associated with emotional intensity (Van Boven et al., 2010), thus can provide adaptive emotional

processing. Previous studies have yielded results supporting this claim. When thinking over an event, asking "Why did the event occur in this way?" from a distance has been shown to protect against rumination and future negative affect and reduce blood pressure levels (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross et al., 2005; Kross et al., 2012; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). In other words, distanced perspective allows self-reflection without being overwhelmed by emotional and physiological responses thanks to reduced reactivity, and in turn, buffers against negative outcomes associated with rumination over time.

Accordingly, there were also changes in the thought content of participants. More specifically, participants in the distanced condition showed less recounting and more reconstruing about the event, which means that they focused more on understanding the reasons behind the event and less on emotionally arousing characteristics and details about the event, which caused a decrease in emotional reactivity. In other words, the change in the thought content mediated the relationship between distancing and emotional reactivity. That is, distancing led to more reconstruing and less recounting of memory, which in turn led to decreased negative affect. Contrarily, in the immersed perspective, people tend to focus on a specific chain of events that led to the event along with the emotions experienced, which leads to reliving the experience without adaptively processing the event (Kross et al., 2005; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). Moreover, the change in thought content and emotional reactivity was observed regardless of the depression level, and the benefits of self-distancing increased as depressive symptoms increased, indicating that more depressed participants benefited more from distancing (Kross & Ayduk, 2009). Likewise, spontaneous self-distancing was negatively correlated to trait rumination, pointing out that the participants with higher self-distancing had lower rumination levels (Ayduk & Kross, 2010). Therefore, self-distancing might be more adaptive and functional for emotionally vulnerable individuals, especially for people who have a tendency for negative affect and rumination, which offers a clinical value to self-distancing.

The following studies on distancing training yielded results that served as evidence supporting this value. In one study, the participants were trained to self-distance for

stressful situations in everyday life. The findings revealed that training reduced negative affect and rumination during the ten-day diary task for people with high baseline vulnerability levels. The effect of distancing was observed even after six months, protecting participants against depressive symptoms, which suggests a long-term benefit of training (Orvell et al., 2023). Further, Ranney et al. (2016) examined the effect of online training for reappraisal techniques, including distancing and positive reappraisal using daily stressors. They found that after two weeks of training, participants in the self-distancing condition demonstrated lower levels of negative affect and higher general well-being than no training condition. Similarly, reflecting daily adverse experiences from a distance perspective increased positive emotionality levels, showing its benefit for everyday life (Dorfman et al., 2021).

As a result, previous studies provided robust evidence showing that self-distancing is an effective strategy for regulating emotions, and distanced perspective provided an adaptive way to analyze experiences, which can be especially important for vulnerable individuals. Since distancing studies emphasize the importance of self-reflection from a distanced perspective, to better understand the cognitive mechanisms underlying distancing, we believe it is also important to understand the role of visual perspective on memory, and examining memory characteristics can reveal more about this strategy.

1.2 Visual Perspective

Not only did perspective influence the regulation of negative affect, but it also affected memory characteristics. In doing so, it can give a better understanding of the vantage point. That is why, for the next part, we will focus on the relationship between vantage points and memory characteristics.

1.2.1 Characteristics of field and observer memories

Previous research on visual perspective focuses on how imagery perspective influences and is influenced by characteristics of autobiographical memories. It has been well documented that the visual perspective adopted when recalling memories has a

significant impact on memory phenomenology and the emotional aspects of the events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Williams & Moulds, 2008). Memories can be retrieved from two visual perspectives called field and observer perspectives, also known as first and third-person perspectives, respectively.

In an earlier study, Nigro and Neisser (1983) conceptualized the field perspective as looking at a situation through one's own eyes without seeing themselves. In contrast, they argued that the observer perspective involves a state of looking at the situation from an observer's eye as if you are watching yourself from the outside. In their research, they found that the majority of the memories were recalled from a field perspective, whereas only about one-third of memories were recalled from an observer perspective. Moreover, older events had a higher chance of being accompanied by an observer perspective, whereas recently encoded memories were more likely to have a field perspective. Also, focusing on emotions felt during the event produced more field memories than observer memories. Therefore, memory age and level of emotionality are some of the determinants of the vantage perspective.

While some characteristics of memories may determine visual perspective, research showed that visual perspective also might influence memory characteristics and emotional intensity. Previous studies indicated that visual perspective affects the recalled information (McIsaac & Eich, 2002) and the intensity of emotional response to the event (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). More specifically, the findings revealed that memories retrieved from a field perspective produced more information about subjective states on emotional, psychological, and physical sensations and were rated higher on vividness, reliving, and emotional intensity compared to the observer perspective. In contrast, memories from an observer perspective were associated with fewer sensory details and lower levels of reliving. Thus, the field perspective produced greater nervousness and emotional response, whereas the observer perspective was associated with less distress (Terry & Horton, 2007).

As a result, the prior literature proposed that the relationship between vantage point and memory characteristics is reciprocal. That is, some of the memory characteristics

influence the vantage perspective, and more importantly, the memory perspective influences how the information related to memory is retrieved, pointing out the role of visual perspective for memory characteristics and regulating emotions. So, it is possible to change memory phenomenology by changing the visual perspective. Another important point of the research on vantage points was this change between perspectives.

1.2.2 Shift between perspectives

One of the significant concepts that the research on vantage points concentrated on was the shift between perspectives and their influence on memory characteristics. Although memories are usually formed from a field perspective, in time, they transform naturally to an observer perspective after the visual information from the event is lost. Then, the forgotten or changed information is reconstructed with general knowledge, leading to a shift from a field perspective to an observer perspective (Rice & Rubin, 2009). Accordingly, repeatedly retrieving memories from a first-person perspective resulted in ratings for better visual imagery, sense of recollection, and higher belief in accuracy for the memory than the third-person perspective, which had the opposite influence on memory characteristics. Thus, it was concluded that while repeated retrieval from the first-person perspective maintained visual information and slowed the shift, repeated retrieval from the third-person perspective caused the forgetting of visual information and facilitated the shift (Butler et al., 2016). Hence, the findings supported the idea that the loss of visual information plays a crucial role in the transformation of field memories into observer memories.

Alternatively, observer perspective can also be achieved intentionally through experimental manipulation of vantage points. Controlling the shift between perspectives during memory retrieval has shown similar effects on memory characteristics like naturally occurring shifts. Namely, shifting from a natural field perspective to an observer perspective reduced vividness, sense of reliving, and emotional intensity of memories as in information lost in the natural transformation (Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Besides, several studies with different types of memories replicated these results, such as high-intensity memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), negative intrusive

memories (Williams & Moulds, 2008), and positive memories (Vella & Moulds, 2014). Moreover, the reductions in emotional intensity persisted even after four weeks, indicating a long-term effect of the field to observer shift on memory (Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014). Although changing from field to observer perspective decreased the reliving components of memories, the observer-to-field shift did not display a significant effect on memory characteristics and emotional intensity, which demonstrated an asymmetry between different types of shifts. It was explained that memories from a natural observer perspective might have lower levels of accessibility to visual and emotional information about the event, which makes it difficult to increase accessibility by shifting to a field perspective. On the contrary, memories from the natural field perspective have existing visual and emotional records of the event, and shifting to an observer perspective occurs by inhibiting this information (Robinson & Swanson, 1993).

Overall, the findings suggested that perspective holds a great influence on memory characteristics. That is, the observer perspective attenuates reliving components of memories, including emotional intensity. In the previous chapter, we explained that self-distancing studies built on reflecting on memories from different perspectives and that a distanced analysis of emotions decreased the emotional reactivity of negative memories. Accordingly, one can argue that these two research fields have provided mutually supportive results. Despite the perspective being the main part of distancing studies, the changes in the memory phenomenology with perspective shift were not the major focus, except for some qualities like vividness. That is why we suggest that additional research is needed to understand how self-distancing influences memory characteristics, which can also provide information on how and through which channels self-distancing works.

Taken together, the prior research indicated that analyzing emotions from a distanced perspective was an influential way to regulate negative affect, and the observer perspective had an attenuating effect on reliving components of memories. However, this is not always the case since perspective has a differential effect on distinct

emotions. In line, in the next section, we will emphasize the importance of the type of emotion.

1.3 Basic and Self-conscious Emotions

The regulatory benefits of a distanced perspective can vary depending on the emotion studied (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012; Katzir & Eyal, 2013). The two most commonly studied emotion categories were self-conscious and basic emotions. Self-conscious emotions are described as social and complex emotions considering that they necessitate interaction with other people, whether real or imaginary, together with the awareness of how others will evaluate them (Baldwin & Baccus, 2004). It was proposed that the evaluations that give rise to self-conscious emotions not only stem from others but also take the form of self-evaluation (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Given that shame is one of the foremost common examples of self-conscious emotions, after experiencing a situation that triggers shame, one can feel ashamed because of the idea that others will evaluate them negatively, and at the individual level because their behavior does not match with their self-representation, hence include a self-evaluative process. On the other hand, basic emotions are primarily about individuals' needs and goals, which are induced by the evaluation of to which extent these demands are satisfied (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Also, basic emotions may or may not contain self-awareness and self-evaluation because these are not requirements for basic emotions like anger or happiness.

Although the distanced perspective creates a psychological distance that regulates negative affect, it was suggested that its effect might differ for self-conscious emotions. Specifically, it was found that distanced perspective increased attention to self (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and evaluations by other people (Leary, 2007), which gave rise to self-evaluation (Tangney, 2003). In addition, the observer perspective was closely associated with events with high self-awareness, as well as self-conscious emotions (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). For example, Robinson and Swanson (1993) discovered that highly self-conscious individuals are more likely to have observer memories. These findings may reveal an avoidance response against intense

negative experiences; in other words, individuals might have more observer memories in order to escape from negative emotions. Accordingly, if the observer perspective effectively regulates self-conscious emotions, self-consciousness could have been decreased due to reduced emotional intensity and reliving components of memories. Conversely, observer memories also might have increased self-conscious emotions because of the increased self-evaluation and self-focus and caused a further increase in this trait. Therefore, distanced perspective may not hold a beneficial role in controlling self-conscious emotions.

Correspondingly, Katzir and Eyal (2013) showed that distancing reduced basic emotions of anger and sadness but not self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt after reflecting on memories from a distanced perspective. Similarly, Hung and Mukhopadhyay (2012) discovered that adopting an observer perspective for imaginary scenarios and past experiences increased a variety of self-conscious emotions, including pride, guilt, and embarrassment. Opposingly, the field perspective caused a rise in ratings for the intensity of hedonic (basic) emotions. The impact of visual perspectives was explained by distinctions in the participants' appraisals. In line with the previous studies, an appraisal from the observer perspective was found to be related to how others might evaluate the participant, which, in turn, heightened self-conscious emotions. In contrast, field perspective was associated with appraisals about features of the situational environment, thus stimulating hedonic (basic) emotions. More recently, Cândea and Szentágotai-Tătar (2017) investigated the efficacy of self-distancing in regulating experimentally induced shame. The results revealed that the distancing did not reduce state shame, supporting the idea that distanced perspective may not be an effective strategy for regulating self-conscious emotions.

Furthermore, Grol et al. (2017) provided neurological evidence by conducting an fMRI study to investigate neurobiological differences between field and observer memories. They stated that memories retrieved from the observer perspective were associated with greater activity in the right precuneus, a region associated with producing vivid mental imagery for autobiographical memories, along with self-referential processing (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Thus, a higher activity level in the precuneus might

indicate greater self-evaluative and visuospatial processing. Moreover, the decline in precuneus activity for field memories further advocated the self-evaluative nature of the observer perspective compared to the field. If the observer perspective involves greater self-evaluation, as suggested, a distanced perspective might not be beneficial for regulating self-conscious emotions triggered by self-evaluative processes.

Together, the previous literature suggested that a distanced perspective might not be the best strategy for regulating self-conscious emotions like shame and guilt; in fact, it might even increase self-conscious emotions. However, it is also noteworthy to consider methodological differences in these studies. While distancing studies generally instruct participants to reflect on past experiences from a given perspective, memory studies focus solely on the effect of the perspective. There is also variation in the type of stimuli; some studies ask participants to retrieve a memory, while others prefer to use imaginary scenarios. Therefore, more research is needed to comprehend the relationship between distanced perspectives and self-conscious emotions.

While visual distancing has been considered a form of emotion regulation strategy that serves to attenuate negative affect, it is also important to note that there is also conflicting evidence showing that visual distancing failed to regulate self-conscious emotions. Another method of distancing, known as linguistic distancing, demonstrated similar regulatory functions to a great extent but with evident differences. In the next chapter, evidence on the effect of linguistic strategy across different contexts and emotions will be discussed through comparisons with visual distancing.

1.4 Linguistic Self-distancing

Visual self-distancing proved to be a useful strategy for reflecting and regulating emotions by adopting an observer perspective to create a sense of distance. Along with mental imagery, a sense of distance can also be accomplished through verbal strategies by changing the way of referring to self, which is called linguistic self-distancing. In daily life, non-first-person pronouns are generally used to refer to others, and people tend to think more reasonably when they assess others' experiences rather than their

own experiences (Grossmann & Kross, 2014). Accordingly, it was assumed that using a non-first-person language would increase psychological distance by leading people to think about themselves similarly to how they think about others, in other words, more objectively, which in turn helps people regulate their emotions. That is why linguistic self-distancing uses words to create the distance between the self and the stimuli. In distanced and immersed conditions, participants were asked to reflect on their feelings and thoughts using different pronouns. Distanced self-talk is achieved by using non-first-person pronouns when referring to self (e.g., "he/she" or "you" or "person's name"), like treating yourself as another person. For instance, instead of saying "I can do this" during a task, participants are instructed to use " You can do this" in the distanced condition. Contrarily, immersed self-talk requires using first-person pronouns like "I" and "my" while performing the task to keep the distance at a minimum.

Unlike other emotion regulation strategies requiring mental effort, linguistic self-distancing was a cognitively effortless way of self-regulation. For example, Moser et al. (2017) investigated participants' brain activity using electroencephalogram (EEG) and fMRI while reflecting on emotions induced by aversive stimuli and negative past experiences. The research showed that participants in the distanced self-talk condition had lower activation levels on markers of self-referential processing without indication of cognitive control. Since the observer perspective increased the activity in the area of self-referential processing, it can be concluded that self-distanced talk was a cognitively less effortful way to regulate emotions compared to visual strategy. Additionally, linguistic distancing provides a more concrete strategy instead of depending solely on mental imagery, which can provide an easier strategy to understand, implement and study with diverse populations.

The linguistic strategy was investigated in many different aspects. Representing regulatory functions, distanced self-talk was a useful method for decreasing physiological reactivity (Streamer et al., 2017) and regulating behaviors by providing self-control and improving the performance for cognitively demanding tasks in children (Grenell et al., 2018; White & Carlson, 2015) and adults (Dolcos & Albarracin, 2014). Moreover, participants with the highest anxiety levels benefited the most from

distanced self-talk, pointing out the potential clinical value of distancing (Kross et al., 2017). Therefore, like visual distancing, vulnerable individuals might gain more from linguistic self-distancing.

Most importantly, distanced self-talk was a powerful tool for controlling emotions. For example, Kross et al. (2014) demonstrated the usefulness of linguistic shifts in anxiety-provoking situations, such as making a good impression and giving a public speech. After reflecting on their feelings about approaching interaction, participants in the distanced self-talk group displayed better performance and reported lower anxiety levels compared to the immersed group. When the researchers examined linguistic strategy in a more daily life context, they found that writing worries about Ebola using non-first-person pronouns reduced participants' worries by increasing fact-based reasoning and rational thinking (Kross et al., 2017). Similarly, diaries written with third-person pronouns had more objective content than those written with first-person pronouns, characterized by emotional content (Jin, 2010). Thus, one can argue that distanced self-talk indeed caused people to think about themselves in the similar way they think about others and helped people to manage their anxiety.

More recently, the efficacy of self-distanced talk was investigated across a range of emotions using autobiographical memories and imagined future events (Orvell et al., 2021). It was discovered that self-distanced talk decreased emotional reactivity for different types of emotions with varying emotional intensities, including embarrassed, rejected, abandoned, angry, and others. Further, the results persisted across a wide range of negative experiences, such as health, financial and interpersonal issues. Additionally, in another study, participants in the distanced self-talk condition reported lower levels of shame than the immersed condition after giving a public speech (Kross et al., 2014). Hence, the evidence showed that distanced self-talk regulated both basic and self-conscious emotions.

Taken together, the findings illustrated the functionality of changes in the language for regulating different types of emotions, as well as how we think and behave about given situations. Unlike visual distancing, linguistic self-distancing was effective at regulating

self-conscious emotions. Thus, we suggest more research is needed comparing these two strategies for regulating basic and self-conscious emotions to comprehend their influence on emotions.

1.5 The Present Study

There are substantial similarities in research between visual and linguistic distancing strategies. Both distancing methods were found to be effective in regulating emotions (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross et al., 2014). However, the findings revealed that visual distancing might not be effective for self-conscious emotions as opposed to linguistic distancing (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012; Katzir & Eyal, 2013; Orvell et al., 2021). Here, it is argued that these strategies are two different techniques for managing emotions.

Some past research examined the association between visual perspective and linguistic strategy. For example, Kross et al. (2014) investigated the link between narrative language and spontaneous self-distancing of participants. They discovered that participants in the distanced self-talk group displayed greater visual self-distancing than the immersed group, indicating that the two strategies are certainly related. Nonetheless, the authors also pointed out that two distancing strategies should not be treated as equivalents since the narrative perspective explained only 8% of the variance in the visual perspective on average, and a higher percentage of variance is needed to claim equivalency. It was also shown that linguistic distancing is a cognitively effortless strategy compared to other ER strategies, which further evidences their disparity (Moser et al., 2017). Similarly, Gu and Tse (2016) showed the influence of narrative language on visual perspective. More specifically, participants who used third-person pronouns to write their memories rated higher on observer perspective, whereas those who used first-person pronouns had more field perspective.

Together, the findings showed that the two distancing strategies are connected, but at the same time, they diverge in regulating different emotions. Hence, it might be beneficial to know which strategy is best for which emotions or is more helpful in

general. For example, in a case in which linguistic distancing proves to be more useful than visual distancing, it can be attached more importance to developing as a strategy. However, there is no study to our knowledge focusing on different types of distancing strategies using discrete emotions. So, one of the main purposes of the study was to investigate visual and linguistic self-distancing strategies in terms of their effectiveness in regulating basic versus self-conscious emotions. For this purpose, participants were randomly assigned to sadness or shame groups and visual and linguistic strategies.

Another important point was that some individual traits might boost the positive impact of self-distancing. Namely, self-distancing was more beneficial for vulnerable individuals like people with high anxiety, rumination, and depression than people who are less vulnerable (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Kross et al., 2012; Penner et al., 2016). Hence, self-distancing strategies can be used for clinical purposes with people who have difficulty controlling their emotions. That is why another goal of the study was to investigate individual differences that contribute to the effect of self-distancing. Therefore, participants' emotion regulation strategies and ruminative tendencies were taken as self-report.

Although self-distancing studies emphasized the changes in some memory characteristics, such as imagery vividness, they did not comprehensively explore how distancing affects memory characteristics as opposed to the research on cognitive psychology, which gave more weight to this issue. The findings showed that shifting from a field to an observer perspective decreased the reliving components of memories (Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Williams & Moulds, 2008). Hence, perspective influences how we feel about our memories, and studying the shift with memory characteristics can provide a better understanding of the mechanism behind the distancing. Therefore, exploring the effect of the shift between immersed and distanced perspectives on memory phenomenology was another objective of the study. For this reason, participants were given the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) after shifting perspectives using the same memory.

As a whole, the present study merged two different lines of studies to investigate the effect of strategy (visual, linguistic), perspective shift (immersed, distanced), and different types of emotions (sadness, shame) on emotion regulation and phenomenological qualities of memories. Accordingly, my hypotheses are as follows:

1.   It is expected that the ratings of the memory characteristics for shame and sadness memories will differ depending on the distancing strategy. More specifically, for participants who recalled sadness memories using visual strategy, the distanced perspective will have lower memory ratings compared to immersed perspective. In contrast, the distanced perspective will not have lower ratings for shameful memories. Also, we predict linguistic distancing will have lower memory ratings for both sadness and shame emotions in distanced condition than immersed condition.

2.   Accordingly, we expect the effect of the shift from immersed to a distanced perspective will differ depending on the distancing strategy and emotion. We hypothesize that in the visual self-distancing, the shift from self-immersed to a self-distanced perspective will reduce ratings only for the basic emotion of sadness but not the self-conscious emotion of shame. For linguistic self-distancing, we expect the shift will reduce ratings for both sadness and shame.

3.   Based on previous research, we do not expect a reverse shift from distanced to immersed perspective to cause an increase in memory ratings.

For exploratory hypotheses:

1.   We predict that memories recalled from an original observer perspective will be older and more resolved compared to memories recalled from an original field perspective.

2.   Also, we hypothesize that participants with higher levels of ruminative tendencies will be associated with lower levels of psychological distance and rate higher on original memory characteristics. Opposingly, those who have higher reappraisal

abilities will rate higher on psychological distance and lower on sensory memory characteristics.

2. METHOD

2.1 Participants

A priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power (v. 3.1; Faul et al., 2007). The sample size was determined with a moderate effect size of $f = 0.25$ with 90% power at an α level of .05, based on previous studies (Ayduk & Kross, 2009, 2010). We used ANOVA fixed effects for the calculation. According to power analysis, 171 participants were needed to achieve power, with approximately 21 participants in each of the eight groups. Considering inappropriate survey completion and data loss, we collected data 10% more of the sample in each condition.

A total of 239 participants were undergraduate students at the Kadir Has University who participated in exchange for course credit. The participants who answered the filler item incorrectly (14.5%), as well as the missing entries, were excluded ($N = 92$) from the data, leaving 147 participants with an age range of 19 to 34 ($M = 21.52$, $SD = 2.16$). The majority of participants were female (105 females, 39 males, and 3 missings). The data was collected through Qualtrics, an online survey platform that is an effective and widely used platform for collecting data. The study was approved by Kadir Has University Ethics Committee and Human Research Ethics Committee, and all of the participants provided informed consent to participate in the study.

Field memories (60.5%) were more prevalent than observer memories (39.5%). Accordingly, more participants were assigned to distanced perspective condition (60.5%) than immersed condition (39.5%).

2.2 Materials

2.2.1 Demographics

We asked participants to report some of their personal information, including date of birth, gender, and e-mail address, to contact them in case of a problem (See Appendix C).

2.2.2 Information on memory perspectives

After the informed consent (See Appendix A), participants were provided with an explanation of vantage perspectives modified from Williams and Moulds (2008). It described how memories could be recalled from two different points of view: from the own eyes or the observer's eyes using visual images. The information we used can be seen in Appendix B.

2.2.3 Memory recall task

Participants were instructed to recall an overwhelming sadness or shameful experience from the last five years. As memories get older, they might lose emotional information about the event (Rice & Rubin, 2009). That is why we chose to limit the time of the event for the study purpose (See Appendix D).

2.2.4 Strategy manipulations

After the rating for memory perspective, participants were assigned to different strategy-perspective duals depending on the original perspective of the memory. The participants who recalled their memory from a field perspective were randomly assigned visual or linguistic distanced conditions. In contrast, those who recalled from an observer's view were assigned to one of the immersed conditions. We used instructions from Kross et al. (2012) for visual strategy and Kross et al. (2014) for linguistic strategy. The instructions were directly translated into Turkish, as found in Appendix E. In the visual strategy, participants were instructed to recall their experience and move away from the situation to watch from a distance or see the

situation with their own eyes. While in linguistic strategy, participants were asked to analyze their experience using first-person pronouns ("I" and "My") or non-first-person pronouns ("You" and "Your name"). After the strategies, participants wrote down their thoughts and feelings regarding their memory.

2.2.5 Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire

Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) developed by Rubin et al. (2003) was used to assess the phenomenological qualities of memories. The questionnaire was first adapted to Turkish by Gülgöz and Rubin (2001). There are 19 items on the questionnaire that aim to measure several properties of memories. In this study, participants rated only eight statements from the Turkish version of AMQ regarding sensory and emotional components of their memories using a 5-point Likert ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The items used for the study were baseline affect, valence, emotional intensity, reliving, vividness, importance, rehearsal, and self-definition. The items were selected based on their relevancy to our study, considering the prior literature with memory perspectives (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Williams & Moulds, 2008). At the end of the AMQ ratings, participants indicated a dominant memory perspective of their memories by choosing either field or observer.

Additionally, we asked for perceived time, also known as psychological distance, memory age, and memory resolution. Some of the items were treated as covariates following previous research with a similar procedure (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross et al., 2014), considering memories with higher resolution and distant in time may be less emotionally intense (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). The memory items used in the study are presented in Appendix F.

2.2.6 Emotion Regulation Questionnaire

The ERQ was initially developed by Gross and John (2003) in order to assess individual differences in ER strategies. The questionnaire consists of 10 items with two dimensions. The six items comprise cognitive reappraisal, which means reinterpreting a

situation to change its meaning and emotional impact. The other four items concern suppression, which can be defined as the inhibition of outward signs of emotions. The initial Turkish adaptation and reliability-validity studies of the scale were carried out by Yurtsever (2004). Participants completed the questionnaire using a 5-point scale, one indicating strongly disagree and five strongly agree (See Appendix G).

2.2.7 Ruminative Responses Scale (Short Form)

The original form of the scale was developed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1991), which aims to measure ruminative tendencies using 22 self-report items. Later, the short version of RRS was created by Treynor et al. (2003), which consists of 10 items and two subscales: reflection and brooding. The six items form the reflection subscale, and the other four create the brooding subscale. Reflection is a cognitive problem-solving effort to control depressive symptoms by turning one's inner thoughts and feelings, whereas brooding is described as passively thinking about unachieved goals (Treynor et al., 2003, p. 256). The Turkish adaptation of the RRS-short was formed by Erdur-Baker and Bugay (2010). In the present study, participants completed 10-item brooding and reflection subscales using a 4-point scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). The increase in the total scores indicates a higher ruminative tendency. The Turkish version of the scale is presented in Appendix H.

2.2.8 Manipulation checks

We used several manipulation checks to assess whether the manipulations acted as expected. Following McIsaac and Eich (2004), participants were instructed to rate how easy they found it to maintain the manipulated perspective on a 1 to 5 scale, ranging from very easy (1) to very hard (5). Also, participants in the visual-distancing strategies indicated; how strongly they were able to maintain the manipulated perspective (immersed/field vs. distanced/observer) on a 1 to 5 scale ranging from not at all maintained (1) to strongly maintained (5). While for linguistic distancing, participants rated how strongly they were able to maintain the given strategy (me/my vs. you/your name) on a 1 to 5 scale ranging from not at all maintained (1) to strongly maintained (5). Additionally, both visual and linguistic distancing groups were instructed to report

their level of engagement to the study on a 1 to 5 scale, ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = not at all engaged to 5 = very engaged) following Kross & Ayduk (2008). We also administered a filler item as an instrumental manipulation check to eliminate those who had been inattentive. Participants were given the statement, "How real did it feel to recall this memory?" and instructed to choose "3" on a 1 to 5 scale, irrespective of their real answer (See Appendix I). Furthermore, we analyzed the written content participants provided as another manipulation check to see to what extent participants implemented the given strategies. For this purpose, we calculated the total pronoun use for "I" and "you" using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker et al., 2007).

2.3 Procedure

Participants were Kadir Has University students who participated in exchange for course credit. First, participants were given a brief explanation of the field and observer perspectives. Then, they filled in some demographic information, including date of birth, gender, as well as their contact information and e-mail address. Afterward, participants were randomly assigned one of the emotion conditions and prompted to recall an autobiographical memory in which they felt overwhelming shame or sadness for 30 seconds.

Following initial memory recall, participants rated several memory characteristics regarding recalled events such as intensity, reliving, and importance using AMQ along with the covariates like memory age and memory resolution. In the last part of this section, participants stated their original perspectives and were assigned to one of the strategies from opposite perspective based on their answers. For example, people who recalled their memory from the observer perspective were randomly assigned to one of the immersed conditions, visual or linguistic, and asked to recall their initial memory using a given strategy (See Figure 2.1).

During the subsequent recall, participants analyzed their deepest thoughts and feelings about their memory and reflected on their experience from the assigned strategy for 60 seconds. Then, they wrote down their memories, emotions, and thoughts surrounding that memory for 4 minutes. We requested participants to rate some of the memory

characteristics and covariates again to see the differences between initial and subsequent memory recall. As a part of these memory questions, we implemented a filler item to eliminate those who were inattentive to the task. After completing the memory task, participants filled in ERQ and RRS for individual differences. Lastly, several manipulation checks were presented. At the end of the study, participants selected the course they would like to take credit for and their school ID number.

Figure 2.1 Experimental Design

3. RESULTS

3.1 Analysis Plan

There were several stages in the current analysis. First, we checked whether or not our manipulation worked as intended using the manipulation check items. We eliminated the participants who answered the filler item incorrectly as well as the missing values, leaving 147 participants for the analysis. Then, we analyzed descriptive statistics for attention, maintenance, and easiness. Due to the potential effect of covariates on memory characteristics, we conducted separate MANCOVA analyses with each manipulation check item as a covariate using subsequent memory characteristics as dependent variable and strategy (visual, linguistic), perspective (immersed, distanced), and emotion (sadness, shame) as independent variables. Additionally, we analyzed written content by participants to check how much they implemented the given strategy. We calculated the total usage of pronouns "I" and "you" using a word-counting program and performed between-subject ANOVAs using pronoun usage as the dependent variables and type of distancing, emotion, and condition as independent variables.

Secondly, we investigated phenomenological differences between initial memory ratings. For this purpose, we performed a two-way MANOVA analysis, using the type of emotion (sadness, shame) and perspective (immersed, distanced) as independent variables and memory ratings such as reliving, vividness, and emotional intensity as dependent variables. At this stage, participants were not assigned to different distancing conditions (visual, linguistic), which is why we did not include the type of strategy in the analysis.

Thirdly, we examined the differences between manipulated (subsequent) memory ratings. After the initial memory rating, participants were instructed to rate memory characteristics a second time using the assigned strategy. We conducted a MANCOVA

analysis using the second-time memory ratings as the dependent variable and type of emotion (sadness, shame), perspective (immersed, distanced), and strategy (visual, linguistic) as independent variables. We included memory age and memory resolution as covariates. Independent sample t-tests were used as a post hoc test for significant interaction effects.

Fourthly, we investigated the effect of perspective shift through the changes between the ratings of initial and subsequent memories. We first calculated the difference between memory ratings by subtracting time 1 ratings from time 2. Then, we divided the obtained ratings into time 1 ratings to calculate the percentage of change between the two ratings. After that, we conducted a MANCOVA analysis using the percentage change for each memory characteristic as the dependent variable and type of emotion (sadness, shame), perspective (immersed, distanced), and strategy (visual, linguistic) as independent variables, controlling for memory age and memory resolution. The significant interaction effects between variables were investigated through independent sample t-test analyses.

Lastly, we explored the relationship between ruminative tendencies and reappraisal abilities using initial memory ratings. Following our exploratory hypothesis, we performed hierarchical regression analyses with each memory characteristic, such as retrieval, importance, and intensity, to predict the memory ratings. First, we dummy-coded emotion and perspective types due to their categorical nature. Shame and observer perspective was coded as "1", and other categories were coded as "0". In the first block, we entered rumination and reappraisal scores into the model. In the second block, memory perspective and type of emotion were entered, followed by the third block, which included the interaction between two dummy variables.

3.2 Manipulation Checks

We used various items to check the effectiveness of our manipulation. At the end of the study, participants rated how easy it is to implement a given strategy and to what extent they were able to maintain the assigned strategy along with the filler item and attention check. The participants in the visual (94.6%) and linguistic (94.3%) distancing groups

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reported that they were concentrated on the task. Also, the majority of participants in the visual (58.7%) and linguistic distancing (61.9%) reported that they were able to maintain the assigned strategy during the given time. However, a significant number of participants reported that it was hard to change assigned perspectives in visual (33.3%) and linguistic (38%) strategies. Accordingly, we used manipulation check items for easiness, maintenance, and attention ratings as a covariate by conducting MANCOVA analyses with subsequent memory characteristics. The results revealed that none of the manipulation check items had a significant effect on the memory ratings, p > .05.

We conducted an additional analysis to assess whether or not our manipulation worked as intended. We used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker et al., 2007), a word-counting software program that calculates the percentage of words in written material, to calculate the total word count for pronouns for "I" and "you," representing immersed and distanced conditions, respectively. Then, we performed 2 (Type of Distancing: Visual, Linguistic) X 2 (Type of Emotion: Sadness, Shame) 2 X (Perspective: Immersed, Distanced) between-subjects ANOVAs with total "I" and "you" scores as dependent variables.

The results revealed that there was a significant main effect of condition on "total I" usage, $F(1, 138) = 12.35$, $MSE = 587.22$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .082$. Participants in immersed condition ($M = 11.01$, $SD = 8.53$) used higher levels of the "I" pronoun compared to participants in distanced condition ($M = 7.09$, $SD = 5.85$). Also, there was an interaction effect between the type of distancing and perspective, $F(1, 138) = 8.94$, $MSE = 425.20$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .061$. Further independent sample t-test revealed that immersed ($M = 8.62$, $SD = 7.08$) and distanced ($M = 8.00$, $SD = 6.21$) conditions did not significantly differ in the visual strategy, $t(73) = 0.40$, $p > .05$. While we found a significant difference between immersed ($M = 13.57$, $SD = 9.31$) and distanced ($M = 6.13$, $SD = 5.35$) conditions in terms of usage of "I" pronoun in the linguistic strategy, $t(69) = 4.27$, $p < .001$. We found no main or interaction effect for the total usage of the pronoun "you" between different types of emotion, strategies, and perspectives, $Fs < 1.99$.

3.3 Initial Memory Differences: Pre-manipulation Ratings

We hypothesized that memories recalled from an original observer perspective would be older and rated as more resolved than memories recalled from an original field perspective. A 2 (Type of Emotion: Sadness, Shame) X 2 (Original Perspective: Field, Observer) MANOVA analysis was conducted to analyze the effect of emotion and perspective on initial memory ratings. The results revealed that the emotion groups did not differ significantly on most of the memory qualities, with the two exceptions (See Figure 3.1). The main effect of emotion was significant on importance $F(1, 97) = 15.31$, $MSE = 15.02$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .136$ and valence $F(1, 97) = 14.13$, $MSE = 7.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .127$. Sadness memories ($M = 4.33$, $SD = 0.86$) were rated as more important relative to shame memories ($M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.11$). Sadness memories were also rated as more negatively valenced ($M = 1.65$ $SD = 0.72$) than shame memories ($M = 2.20$, $SD = 0.73$). There was a main effect of perspective on memory resolution $F(1, 97) = 6.15$, $MSE = 6.84$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .060$ and psychological distance, $F(1, 97) = 4.12$, $MSE = 21.84$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .041$, as shown in Figure 3.2. Observer memories ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 0.85$) were rated as more resolved than field memories ($M = 3.03$, $SD = 1.17$). Moreover, observer memories ($M = 6.49$, $SD = 2.25$) had higher psychological distance scores relative to field memories ($M = 5.55$, $SD = 2.30$). There was not a significant interaction effect between emotion and perspective, $Fs < 2.47$. Table 3.1 presents means and standard deviations for memory characteristics across groups.

Table 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations for Initial Memory Ratings

		Field Perspective		Observer Perspective	
		Visual	Linguistic	Visual	Linguistic
Baseline Affect	Sadness	4.17 *(1.50)*	5.10 *(2.33)*	4.69 *(1.93)*	5.00 *(1.70)*
	Shame	4.46 *(2.03)*	4.82 *(1.63)*	4.40 *(1.51)*	4.90 *(2.28)*
Valence	Sadness	1.50 *(0.51)*	1.50 *(0.53)*	1.85 *(0.90)*	1.80 *(0.92)*
	Shame	2.15 *(0.90)*	2.18 *(0.53)*	2.40 *(0.97)*	2.10 *(0.57)*
Perceived Time	Sadness	5.50 *(2.41)*	5.80 *(1.93)*	6.92 *(1.93)*	5.70 *(2.16)*
	Shame	6.38 *(2.69)*	4.82 *(2.01)*	6.40 *(2.55)*	6.80 *(2.53)*
Reliving	Sadness	3.39 *(0.92)*	3.40 *(1.43)*	3.15 *(1.07)*	3.10 *(1.20)*
	Shame	3.77 *(1.09)*	3.18 *(1.07)*	3.00 *(1.25)*	3.20 *(0.79)*
Emotional Intensity	Sadness	3.17 *(1.04)*	2.70 *(1.34)*	2.38 *(1.12)*	2.40 *(0.84)*
	Shame	3.00 *(0.71)*	2.59 *(1.06)*	2.60 *(0.84)*	2.60 *(1.07)*
Memory Resolution	Sadness	3.06 *(1.06)*	3.20 *(1.14)*	3.54 *(1.13)*	3.40 *(0.84)*
	Shame	3.23 *(1.17)*	2.76 *(1.35)*	3.50 *(0.71)*	3.80 *(0.63)*
Memory Age	Sadness	26.89 *(17.20)*	28.50 *(16.14)*	30.38 *(22.43)*	36.90 *(20.05)*
	Shame	40.31 *(14.71)*	27.00 *(16.16)*	27.60 *(15.15)*	32.90 *(21.16)*
Importance	Sadness	4.28 *(0.96)*	4.70 *(0.48)*	4.38 *(0.77)*	4.00 *(1.05)*
	Shame	3.46 *(1.39)*	3.24 *(1.20)*	4.00 *(0.67)*	3.50 *(0.85)*
Vividness	Sadness	4.06 *(0.73)*	4.80 *(0.42)*	4.00 *(0.82)*	4.30 *(0.82)*
	Shame	4.31 *(0.63)*	4.12 *(0.70)*	3.60 *(1.07)*	4.50 *(0.53)*

Figure 3.1 Initial Memory Ratings: The Main Effect of Emotion

Note. There was a significant main effect of emotion on importance and valence ratings.

Figure 3.2 Initial Memory Ratings: The Main Effect of Perspective

Note. There was a significant main effect of perspective on memory resolution and psychological distance.

3.4 Subsequent Memory Characteristics: Post-manipulation Ratings

We hypothesized that ratings of the memory characteristics would differ depending on the type of emotion and distancing strategy. In the visual strategy, the distanced perspective would lead to lower ratings for memory qualities only for sadness memories, whereas distancing would attenuate ratings for both sadness and shame emotions in the linguistic strategy. We conducted a 2 (Type of Distancing: Visual, Linguistic) X 2 (Type of Emotion: Sadness, Shame) X 2 (Condition: Immersed, Distanced) MANCOVA analysis using the subsequent (second time) memory ratings as the dependent variable, including memory age and memory resolution as covariates.

After controlling for memory resolution and memory age, the emotion type did not have an effect on memory characteristics, Fs < 3.63. Similarly, condition, in other words perspective, did not have a significant main effect on memory qualities, Fs < 1.41, as well as the type of distancing, Fs < 3.09.

There was a not significant interaction effect between condition and type of distancing, Fs < 3.78, as well as between emotion and condition, Fs < 1.66. However, there was a significant interaction effect between emotion and distancing on emotional intensity [$F(1, 85) = 6.53$, $MSE = 7.18$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .071$] and reliving [$F(1, 85) = 5.23$, $MSE = 4.69$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .058$]. An independent sample t-test was conducted to reveal the pattern of interaction. The results showed that there was not a significant difference between shame memories ($M = 2.97$, $SD = 1.12$) and sadness memories ($M = 2.95$, $SD = 1.18$) in terms of emotional intensity in the visual distancing, $t(73) = -0.08$, $p > .05$. Similarly, reliving ratings did not differ between shame ($M = 3.66$, $SD = 0.94$) and sadness memories ($M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.15$), $t(73) = -0.64$, $p > .05$. Likewise, in linguistic distancing, there was not a significant difference between shame memories ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.21$) and sadness memories ($M = 2.93$, $SD = 1.17$) for ratings of emotional intensity, $t(70) = 1.02$, $p > .05$. The reliving ratings also were not significantly different between shame ($M = 3.36$, $SD = 0.96$) and sadness memories ($M = 3.47$, $SD = 1.04$), $t(70) = 0.46$, $p > .05$ (See Table 3.2).

Also, there was a three-way interaction between distancing, emotion, and perspective for perceived time, in other words, psychological distance, $F(1,85) = 6.92$, $MSE = 35.57$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .075$ (See Figure 3.3). There was not a significant difference between visual ($M = 5.91$, $SD = 2.41$) and linguistic ($M = 5.87$, $SD = 1.77$) strategies in ratings of perceived time for sadness memories in the distanced condition, $t(36) = 0.06$, $p > .05$. Similarly, there was not a significant difference between visual ($M = 6.00$, $SD = 2.61$) and linguistic ($M = 5.54$, $SD = 3.07$) methods for sadness memories for immersed condition, $t(27) = 0.44$, $p > .05$. Contrarily, shame memories significantly differed between distancing groups, $t(44) = 2.20$, $p < .05$. Among the participants who were assigned to distanced condition, those in visual distancing ($M = 6.05$, $SD = 2.52$) rated higher psychological distance compared to linguistic distancing ($M = 4.46$, $SD = 2.35$). In contrast, the opposite pattern was observed when participants who recalled shame memories from an immersed condition, $t(25) = -2.12$, $p < .05$. There was a higher psychological distance for linguistic strategy ($M = 7.23$, $SD = 2.71$) than for visual strategy ($M = 5.07$, $SD = 2.59$).

Table 3.2 Means and Standard Deviations for Subsequent Memory Ratings

		Immersed		Distanced	
		Visual	Linguistic	Visual	Linguistic
Baseline Affect 2	Sadness	4.83 *(1.85)*	5.22 *(1.92)*	4.84 *(1.83)*	5.22 *(2.44)*
	Shame	4.00 *(1.89)*	6.11 *(2.03)*	5.15 *(2.34)*	4.64 *(1.28)*
Valence 2	Sadness	1.83 *(0.94)*	2.22 *(1.09)*	2.05 *(0.78)*	1.56 *(0.53)*
	Shame	2.10 *(0.88)*	2.44 *(0.88)*	2.31 *(1.11)*	2.21 *(0.43)*
Perceived Time 2	Sadness	6.17 *(2.48)*	5.44 *(2.24)*	6.00 *(2.54)*	6.00 *(2.12)*
	Shame	4.70 *(2.21)*	8.11 *(2.42)*	6.38 *(2.26)*	4.43 *(2.31)*
Emotional Intensity 2	Sadness	2.42 *(1.16)*	2.78 *(0.97)*	3.16 *(1.12)*	3.11 *(1.45)*
	Shame	3.20 *(1.23)*	2.22 *(1.09)*	3.23 *(1.09)*	2.57 *(1.16)*
Reliving 2	Sadness	3.33 *(1.23)*	3.00 *(0.71)*	3.53 *(1.07)*	3.89 *(1.17)*
	Shame	3.90 *(0.88)*	2.67 *(1.00)*	3.69 *(0.95)*	3.36 *(0.84)*
Vividness 2	Sadness	3.92 *(1.16)*	4.11 *(1.05)*	4.11 *(0.74)*	4.56 *(0.53)*
	Shame	4.20 *(0.63)*	4.33 *(0.71)*	4.31 *(0.63)*	4.00 *(0.68)*

Figure 3.3 Subsequent Memory Ratings: The Interaction Effect

Note. There was a three-way interaction between type of strategy, emotion, and perspective on psychological distance.

3.5 Original Perspective to Assigned Perspective: Change Between Pre-manipulation and Post-manipulation Ratings

We predicted that the effect of shifting from an immersed to a distanced condition would be different depending on the type of strategy and emotion. That is, the shift would reduce ratings only for sadness memories in the visual strategy. In contrast, it would be effective in attenuating both sadness and shame memories in the linguistic strategy. For each memory item, the change between ratings was calculated by subtracting the initial memory ratings from manipulated memory ratings. Then, to calculate the percentile of the change, we divided subtracted ratings into initial memory ratings. The obtained change ratings were used for the analysis. The percentage of change for memory characteristics was analyzed with a 2 (Type of Distancing: Visual, Linguistic) X 2 (Type of Emotion: Sadness, Shame) 2 X (Condition: Immersed, Distanced) MANCOVA analysis controlling for memory age and memory resolution following previous literature (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Ranney et al., 2016). The percentages of change in the ratings for memory phenomenology between initial memory ratings and manipulated memory ratings are given in Table 3.3

The results revealed that the main effect for type of emotion and condition was not significant, indicating the change in memory ratings did not differ on these variables (Fs < 2.76). Type of distancing had a main effect only on vividness [$F(1,84) = 4.11$, $MSE = 0.32$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .047$]. The overall pattern of change in vividness suggested an increase in ratings in the visual distancing group ($M = 0.07$, $SD = 0.33$), whereas a decrease in the linguistic distancing group ($M = -0.02$, $SD = 0.23$).

The type of distancing and type of emotion produced an interaction effect on emotional intensity [$F(1,84) = 4.20$, $MSE = 0.83$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .048$]. Further, an independent sample t-test was conducted to reveal the pattern of interaction. It was found that there was not a significant difference in ratings of emotional intensity for sadness ($M = 0.10$, $SD = 0.47$) and shame ($M = 0.11$, $SD = 0.42$) memories in visual distancing strategy, $t(73) = -0.10$, $p > .05$. While for linguistic strategy, we found a significant difference between the emotion groups, $t(70) = 2.15$, $p < .05$. That is, sadness memories ($M =$

0.22, *SD* = 0.52) had higher increase for emotional intensity compared to shame memories (*M* = 0.01, *SD* = 0.30).

There was a statistically significant interaction effect between the type of distancing and perspective on two memory characteristics: reliving [$F(1,84) = 5.25$, *MSE* = 1.64, *p* < .05, η_p^2 = .059] and valence [$F(1,84) = 4.13$, *MSE* = 1.00, *p* < .05, η_p^2 = .047]. Further, an independent sample t-test analysis was conducted to examine the pattern of the change ratings for reliving and valence. When participants shifted from immersed to distanced condition, there was not a significant difference between visual (*M* = 0.08, *SD* = 0.52) and linguistic (*M* = 0.23, *SD* = 0.45) distancing strategies at reliving ratings, $t(87) = -1.47$, *p* > .05. Opposingly, there was a significant difference between distancing strategies with the shift from distanced to immersed condition, $t(56) = 2.21$, *p* < .05. We found that reliving ratings increased in visual distancing (*M* = 0.28, *SD* = 0.57), whereas a decreasing pattern was present in linguistic condition (*M* = -0.03, *SD* = 0.47), as shown in Figure 3.4. As for valence, there was not a significant difference in change in the ratings for visual (*M* = 0.27, *SD* = 0.53) and linguistic (*M* = 0.09, *SD* = 0.32) strategies when participants shifted from immersed to distanced condition, $t(85) = 1.92$, *p* > .05. Likewise, visual (*M* = 0.10, *SD* = 0.66) and linguistic (*M* = 0.19, *SD* = 0.41) strategies did not significantly differ with the shift from distanced to immersed perspective, $t(55) = -0.60$, *p* > .05.

The interaction between type of emotion and perspective was not significant on change in memory ratings (*F*s < 1.39). There was a three-way interaction between type of distancing, type of emotion, and perspective on vividness [$F(1,84) = 4.19$, *MSE* = 0.33, *p* < .05, η_p^2 = .048]. There was not a significant difference between visual (*M* = -0.02, *SD* = 0.21) and linguistic (*M* = -0.02, *SD* = 0.11) strategies in ratings of vividness for sadness memories after shifting to the distanced condition, $t(36) = 0.00$, *p* > .05. Similarly, shame memories did not significantly differ for visual (*M* = -0.01, *SD* = 0.08) and linguistic (*M* = 0.00, *SD* = 0.24) groups with the immersed to distanced shift, $t(47) = -0.13$, *p* > .05. When participants who recalled shame memories shifted from distanced to immersed condition, there was a significant difference between distancing strategies on the rating of vividness, $t(25) = 2.07$, *p* < .05, that is ratings of vividness

increased in visual strategy ($M = 0.23$, $SD = 0.53$) and decreased in linguistic strategy ($M = -0.09$, $SD = 0.16$). Opposingly, there was not a significant difference between visual ($M = 0.01$, $SD = 0.27$) and linguistic ($M = -0.02$, $SD = 0.26$) methods for sadness memories after changing to immersed condition, $t(29) = 0.32$, $p > .05$ (See Figure 3.5).

Table 3.3 Means and Standard Deviations for the Change from Initial to Subsequent Memory Ratings

		Shift from Distanced to Immersed		Shift from Immersed to Distanced	
		Visual	Linguistic	Visual	Linguistic
Emotional Intensity	Sadness	0.17 *(0.69)*	0.31 *(0.70)*	-0.02 *(0.23)*	0.3 *(0.46)*
	Shame	0.26 *(0.47)*	-0.07 *(0.22)*	0.09 *(0.31)*	0.12 *(0.31)*
	Total	0.21 *(0.59)*	0.12 *(0.54)*	0.03 *(0.27)*	0.19 *(0.38)*
Reliving	Sadness	0.14 *(0.49)*	0.15 *(0.76)*	0.02 *(0.21)*	0.37 *(0.65)*
	Shame	0.49 *(0.66)*	-0.14 *(0.24)*	0.18 *(0.89)*	0.26 *(0.45)*
	Total	0.3 *(0.58)*	0 *(0.56)*	0.09 *(0.59)*	0.3 *(0.53)*
Vividness	Sadness	0.01 *(0.30)*	-0.02 *(0.27)*	0.01 *(0.18)*	-0.04 *(0.09)*
	Shame	0.32 *(0.61)*	-0.05 *(0.10)*	0 *(0.09)*	0.01 *(0.32)*
	Total	0.15 *(0.48)*	-0.04 *(0.20)*	0.01 *(0.15)*	-0.01 *(0.25)*
Baseline Affect	Sadness	0.17 *(0.51)*	0.25 *(0.82)*	0.27 *(0.64)*	-0.02 *(0.32)*
	Shame	0.06 *(0.66)*	0.4 *(0.73)*	0.46 *(1.22)*	-0.01 *(0.27)*
	Total	0.12 *(0.57)*	0.32 *(0.76)*	0.35 *(0.91)*	-0.01 *(0.28)*
Valence	Sadness	0.11 *(0.74)*	0.22 *(0.44)*	0.53 *(0.63)*	0 *(0)*
	Shame	-0.05 *(0.42)*	0.17 *(0.35)*	0.1 *(0.41)*	0.1 *(0.35)*
	Total	0.04 *(0.60)*	0.19 *(0.39)*	0.35 *(0.58)*	0.06 *(0.27)*
Perceived Time	Sadness	-0.12 *(0.27)*	-0.05 *(0.12)*	0.09 *(0.34)*	0.06 *(0.38)*
	Shame	-0.24 *(0.24)*	0.17 *(0.29)*	0.64 *(2.53)*	-0.03 *(0.37)*
	Total	-0.18 *(0.26)*	0.06 *(0.24)*	0.32 *(1.64)*	0.01 *(0.37)*

Figure 3.4 Change from Initial to Subsequent Memory Ratings: The Interaction Effect

Note. There was a significant interaction effect on change in ratings for reliving and vividness.

Figure 3.5 Change from Initial to Subsequent Memory Ratings: The Effect of Distanced to Immersed Shift

Note. Mean change in ratings of reliving and vividness after shifting from a distanced to an immersed perspective

3.6 Exploratory Analyses

We expected that higher levels of ruminative tendencies would predict lower levels of psychological distance and higher ratings for sensory memory characteristics. Conversely, higher reappraisal abilities were expected to predict greater psychological distance and lower sensory memory characteristics. Accordingly, hierarchical regression analyses were performed to predict ratings of initial memory characteristics. In the first block, total scores of rumination and reappraisal ratings were entered. In the second block, memory perspective and type of emotion were dummy coded as observer and shame and were included in the model. The third block consisted of the interaction between two dummy variables.

For the valence ratings, the first model was not statistically significant, $F(2, 138) = 2.09$, $p > .05$, and accounted for only 0.02 of the variance in valence. In the second block, emotion ($b = .37$, $t = 4.64$, $p < .01$) and perspective ($b = .02$, $t = .29$, $p > .05$) were entered in the model. Model accuracy significantly improved, $F(4, 136) = 6.58$, $p < .01$, explaining 14% of the variance. Although the third model was significant, $F(5, 135) = 5.24$, $p < .01$, the addition of an interaction variable ($b = -0.02$, $t = -0.18$, $p > .05$) decreased variance to 13%.

It was found that Model 1 [$F(2, 136) = 1.16$, $p > .05$], Model 2 [$F(4, 134) = 1.73$, $p > .05$], and Model 3 [$F(5, 133) = 1.81$, $p > .05$] was not significant in predicting psychological distance.

For emotional intensity ratings, the first model was significant, $F(2, 138) = 9.59$, $p < .01$, and explained 11% of the variation, showing that rumination ($b = .35$, $t = 4.35$, $p < .01$) predicted high levels of intensity while reappraisal did not predict intensity ($b = -.02$, $t = -.21$, $p > .05$). The second model was significant, $F(4, 136) = 6.33$, $p < .01$, explaining 13% of the variance, with the addition of emotion type ($b = -.03$, $t = -.41$, $p > .05$) and memory perspective ($b = -.19$, $t = -2.36$, $p < .05$) variables. The third model was also significant, $F(5, 135) = 5.22$, $p < .01$, but did not contribute to the model improvement and explained 13% of the variation ($b = .12$, $t = .91$, $p > .05$). The results of the analysis are given in Table 3.4.

It was revealed that neither Model 1 [$F_{(2, 138)} = 2.82$, $p > .05$] , Model 2 [$F_{(4, 136)} = 1.96$, $p > .05$], nor Model 3 [$F_{(5, 135)} = 1.56$, $p > .05$] was significant in predicting reliving. Similarly, Model 1 [$F_{(2, 137)} = 0.03$, $p > .05$] , Model 2 [$F_{(4, 135)} = 0.31$, $p > .05$] and Model 3 [$F_{(5, 134)} = 0.31$, $p > .05$] were not significant in predicting vividness.

For memory retrieval, the first model was significant, $F_{(2, 138)} = 14.81$, $p < .01$, and accounted for 16% of the variance in memory retrieval. It indicated that rumination ($b = .38$, $t = 4.92$, $p < .01$) predicted high levels of memory retrieval, while reappraisal did not predict retrieval ($b = -.15$, $t = -1.96$, $p > .05$). In the second block, emotion ($b = -.26$, $t = -3.48$, $p < .01$) and perspective ($b = -.03$, $t = -.43$, $p > .05$) were included in the model. Model accuracy improved significantly, $F_{(4, 136)} = 10.98$, $p < .01$, explaining 22% of the variance (See Table 3.5). The third model was also significant, $F_{(5, 135)} = 8.72$, $p < .01$, and explained 22% of variance, ($b = .00$, $t = -.01$, $p > .05$).

The hierarchical multiple regression demonstrated that the first model contributed significantly to the regression model, $F_{(2, 138)} = 6.50$, $p < .01$, and accounted for only 0.07 of the variation in memory resolution, showing that rumination ($b = -.26$, $t = -3.13$, $p < .01$) predicted low levels of memory resolution, while reappraisal did not predict resolution ($b = .13$, $t = 1.56$, $p > .05$). In the second block, emotion ($b = .10$, $t = 1.28$, $p > .05$) and perspective ($b = .15$, $t = 1.81$, $p > .05$) were entered in the model. Model accuracy slightly improved, $F_{(4, 136)} = 4.45$, $p < .01$, explaining 0.09 of the variance (See Table 3.6). The third model was also significant, $F_{(5, 135)} = 3.66$, $p < .01$, and explained 0.09 of variance, ($b = .10$, $t = 0.74$, $p > .05$).

The analysis revealed that the first model was not significant $F_{(2, 138)} = .78$, $p > .05$ and accounted for 0.00 of the variance in importance. It indicated that rumination ($b = .06$, $t = .66$, $p > .05$) and reappraisal ($b = -.09$, $t = -1.01$, $p > .05$) did not predict memory importance. In the second block, emotion ($b = -.44$, $t = -5.72$, $p < .01$) and perspective ($b = .10$, $t = 1.32$, $p > .05$) were included in the model. Model accuracy significantly improved, $F_{(4, 136)} = 9.49$, $p < .01$, explaining 20% of the variance. The third model

with interaction (b = .21, t = 1.71, p > .05) was also significant, $F(5, 135)$ = 8.28, p < .01, explaining 21% of the variance.

For self-definition, results showed that the first model was not significant, $F(2, 138)$ = 2.25, p > .05, and explained only 0.02 of the variance in self-definition. In the second block, emotion (b = -.20, t = -2.45, p < .05) and perspective (b = .03, t = .31, p > .05) were entered in the model. Model accuracy slightly improved, $F(4, 136)$ = 2.72, p < .05, explaining 0.05 of the variance. The third model was also significant, $F(5, 135)$ = 2.37, p < .05, with the interaction variable (b = .13, t = .97, p > .05) explaining 0.05% of the variance.

Table 3.4 Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Emotional Intensity

Predictor	B	SE	β	R^2
Step 1				0.11***
Rumination	0.07	0.02	0.35***	
Reappraisal	-0.03	0.13	-0.02	
Step 2				0.13***
Rumination	0.07	0.02	0.34***	
Reappraisal	0.01	0.13	0.01	
Perspective (1, observer; 0, field)	-0.4	0.17	-0.19*	
Emotion (1, shame; 0, sadness)	-0.07	0.17	-0.03	
Step 3				0.13***
Rumination	0.07	0.02	0.34***	
Reappraisal	0	0.13	0	
Perspective (1, observer; 0, field)	-0.56	0.24	-0.26*	
Emotion (1, shame; 0, sadness)	-0.2	0.22	-0.09	
Perspective X Emotion	0.31	0.34	0.12	

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 3.5 Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Memory Retrieval

Predictor	B	SE	β	R^2
Step 1				0.16***
Rumination	0.08	0.02	0.38***	
Reappraisal	-0.27	0.14	-0.15	
Step 2				0.22***
Rumination	0.09	0.02	0.40***	
Reappraisal	-0.29	0.14	-0.16*	
Perspective (1, observer; 0, field)	-0.07	0.18	-0.03	
Emotion (1, shame; 0, sadness)	-0.60	0.17	-0.26**	
Step 3				0.22***
Rumination	0.09	0.02	0.40***	
Reappraisal	-0.29	0.14	-0.16*	
Perspective (1, observer; 0, field)	-0.07	0.25	-0.03	
Emotion (1, shame; 0, sadness)	-0.60	0.23	-0.26**	
Perspective X Emotion	0	0.35	0	

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 3.6 Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Memory Resolution

Predictor	B	SE	β	R^2
Step 1				0.07**
Rumination	-0.05	0.02	-0.26**	
Reappraisal	0.22	0.14	0.13	
Step 2				0.09**
Rumination	-0.05	0.02	-0.26**	
Reappraisal	0.19	0.14	0.11	
Perspective (1, observer; 0, field)	0.33	0.18	0.15	
Emotion (1, shame; 0, sadness)	0.23	0.18	0.10	
Step 3				0.09**
Rumination	-0.05	0.02	-0.26**	
Reappraisal	0.18	0.14	0.11	
Perspective (1, observer; 0, field)	0.19	0.26	0.09	
Emotion (1, shame; 0, sadness)	0.12	0.23	0.05	
Perspective X Emotion	0.26	0.36	0.10	

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

4. DISCUSSION

The aim of the current study was to investigate the effect of emotion (sad, shameful), perspective (immersed, distanced), and strategy (visual, linguistic) on memory characteristics and emotion regulation. The results revealed that shifting from a field to an observer perspective did not have an effect on memory phenomenology. In contrast, observer-to-field shift increased ratings of vividness and reliving of shame memories in visual distancing, and the ratings decreased in linguistic distancing. The results will be discussed, focusing first on the phenomenology of the original memory report, then continuing with subsequent memory characteristics and shifts between memory perspectives, and concluding with exploratory hypotheses along with study limitations.

4.1 Initial Memories: Phenomenology of the Original Memories

Based on previous literature on memory perspectives, we expected that when individuals adopt the observer rather than the field perspective, they would report lower phenomenological ratings, such as intensity or reliving, for observer memories relative to field memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McIsaac & Eich, 2002). Our findings on initial memory phenomenology revealed that observer memories were more resolved and had higher psychological distance than field memories. However, we did not find group differences in other phenomenological properties. Moreover, participants rated sadness memories as more important and negatively valenced compared to shame memories.

Prior findings on field and observer perspectives showed that recent events are more likely to be accompanied by field perspective with a higher level of experiential memory characteristics compared to observer perspective. Conversely, older memories are more likely to be recalled from an observer perspective with lower sensory qualities relative to field memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McIsaac & Eich, 2002; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). As more time passes after the events, they lose some of the sensory information, and such a fading of more specific information results in the memory

being represented as a form of general knowledge (Rice & Rubin, 2009). Accordingly, observer memories were more likely to involve resolved, in other words, closed events, consistent with our findings on the original memory reports (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Robinson & Swanson, 1993).

One possible explanation for the current findings is that emotion regulation strategies have already been implemented and provided closure for memories from the observer perspective. The research found that closed events had lower levels of experiential and emotional characteristics and retrieval frequency than open events (Crawley, 2010). Additionally, it was stated that adopting an observer perspective served as a distancing function since repeated retrieval from an observer perspective increased closure. More recently, Ergen and Gülgöz (2023) revealed that open events without closure had higher levels of emotional intensity and were rated as more negative than closed events. Also, emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal were found to be an effective way that helps individuals with emotional closure of negative events (Watkins et al., 2008). Thus, the results suggested that memory resolution has an important role in explaining memory phenomenology, and participants who recalled memories from the original observer perspective might have higher memory resolution and psychological distance because they already regulated their emotions about the event leading to emotional closure. Furthermore, we found that sadness memories were more important and negatively valenced than shame memories. Accordingly, even though we did not observe such an effect, it is possible that shame memories, which were more likely to be recalled from the observer perspective, were rated as less important and more positive than sadness memories due to memory resolution (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Nigro & Neisser, 1983).

Another explanation can be made about the nature of basic and self-conscious emotions. Namely, shame is classified as a self-conscious emotion that stems from self-evaluation and evaluation by others. On the other hand, sadness is a basic emotion regarding individuals' goals and needs (Tracy & Robins, 2004). The research revealed the observer perspective, which increases the self and others' evaluation (Leary, 2007; Tangney, 2003). Hence, compared to the field perspective, when people adopt the

observer perspective, they tend to focus more on evaluations by other people (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012). Since people are more likely to recall self-conscious emotions from an observer perspective (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), one might expect opposite results, that is, a higher negative affect and importance for shame memories than sadness memories.

Alternatively, people may recall shameful memories as less important and negative as a means of self-regulation. Past research pointed out that shame memories can play an important role in people's identity and life stories (Pinto et al., 2011). Also, D'Argembeau & Van der Linden (2008) found a positivity bias for events involving self-evaluation, including pride and shame but not for the events with others' evaluations, like admiration and contempt. Specifically, shame memories were associated with lower sensory experience and contained fewer details than pride memories. They were also rated as less important and less frequently rehearsed than memories for pride events. It was stated that although both pride and shame are self-conscious emotions, shame involves a negative self-evaluation which may pose a threat to self-concept (Leary, 2007; Tangney, 2003). Conway (2005) suggested that memory is influenced by demands to provide and maintain a self-image. Hence, there is an increased accessibility to self-relevant information, consistent with the current self, and a decreased accessibility to information that challenges it. Thus, people may be reluctant to recall shameful memories involving negative self-relevant information that threatens a positive self-image. Therefore, in the current study, it is also possible that people rated shame memories as less important and more positive than sadness memories, which in turn serves to minimize the event's impact on their self-concept.

4.2 Subsequent Memories: Phenomenology of the Memories After Manipulation

After the initial memory ratings, participants were instructed to adopt a visual or linguistic strategy from the opposite perspective of the original memory. Then, they rated the same memory characteristics a second time using the assigned perspective, creating subsequent memory characteristics. We hypothesized that there would be a difference between visual and linguistic strategies on different emotion categories considering that visual strategy benefits from visual perspectives to create a

psychological distance between self and the distressing memory. In comparison, the linguistic strategy uses language such as first-person and non-first-person pronouns to create this distance. In particular, we expected that adopting a distanced perspective would reduce ratings only for sadness memories and not for shameful memories in visual distancing. As opposed, a distanced self-talk condition would decrease memory ratings for both sadness and shame memories in the linguistic strategy. Contrary to our expectations, the findings showed only an interaction effect for shame memories on psychological distance, and we found no effect on other memory characteristics and sadness memories. Specifically, shame memories were rated with higher psychological distance in the visually distanced condition compared to the linguistically distanced condition. Moreover, there was a lower psychological distance in immersed condition for visual strategy than linguistic strategy.

Previous evidence has shown that psychological distance constitutes a self-regulation mechanism (Kross et al., 2005; Kross & Ayduk, 2008), which may explain how the observer perspective serves individuals to distance themselves from distressing memories. Namely, people who adopted a distanced perspective reported lower emotional reactivity. That is why we expected this effect to be observed in other memory qualities like intensity or reliving. However, we found only an effect for psychological distance and shameful memories. Past research revealed that adopting an observer perspective may not be sufficient to regulate self-conscious emotions like shame as opposed to basic emotions like sadness (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012; Katzir & Eyal, 2013). Therefore, it is argued that there might be a need for additional emotional regulation goals when regulating self-conscious emotions (Krishnamoorthy et al., 2021; Powers & LaBar, 2019). For example, one study with high and low-shame-prone participants found that the observer perspective increased feelings of shame for the high-shame group but not for the low-shame group. However, after using positive reappraisal (by interpreting the event for their own best interest) from the observer perspective, the level of shame was decreased in high-shame participants (Krishnamoorthy et al., 2021). As opposed, Katzir and Eyal (2013) found that when participants used a distanced perspective without an explicit emotion regulation goal

like positive reappraisal, it only reduced feelings for basic emotions (anger, sadness) and not self-conscious emotions (guilt, shame).

Since self-conscious emotions like shame tend to put the self as the target, not the agent, as in the basic emotions, shame memories could have activated greater self and others' evaluation relative to sadness memories. Such increased attention to self, along with self-evaluation and perceived evaluation by others, may, in turn, leads to a difficulty in regulating self-conscious emotions from the observer perspective (Cândea & Szentágotai-Tãtar, 2020; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Katzir & Eyal, 2013). Additionally, self-conscious emotions tend to be recalled from the observer perspective (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Since the field perspective is generally accompanied by higher sensory ratings than the observer perspective (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; McIsaac & Eich, 2002), some researchers suggest that people adopt the observer perspective as a way of cognitive avoidance, which helps individuals to regulate negative emotions associated with the disturbing memory (Kenny & Bryant, 2007; Lemogne et al., 2009).

Conversely, as we mentioned, the other researchers elaborated on the role of self-concept and demonstrated that observer memories were more prevalent for the memories which are inconsistent with our current self (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby et al., 2005). Accordingly, Robinaugh and McNally (2010) found that those who recall shame and guilt memories from an observer perspective reported lower levels of emotional reliving of the event compared to the field perspective, suggesting avoidance of emotional experiencing of the event. However, the findings also revealed that adopting an observer perspective when recalling shame and guilt memories was associated with less personal coherence than a field perspective, indicating an incongruency with one's identity.

Alternatively, Küçüktaş & St. Jacques (2022) proposed that the continuous use of a certain visual perspective might be the result of implicit emotion regulation, which means people unintentionally regulate their emotions using a certain perspective (Mauss et al., 2007). It is possible that adopting an observer perspective for certain types of

memories, such as memories with self-conscious emotions, can be a habitual strategy that occurs without a deliberate effort (Braunstein et al., 2017). In addition, the researchers pointed out a need for a certain level of negativity in order to observe the effect of distancing. For instance, Kross and Ayduk (2012) found that the distancing strategy had no regulatory benefit for healthy participants as opposed to depressed participants, emphasizing the role of negative affect. They concluded that to see the effect of distanced perspective, there might be a need for a particular level of negativity. Hence, there is a possibility that the memories participants recalled did not reach the required level of negativity to be regulated successfully in the current study.

As a whole, the earlier research suggested that the relationship between memory perspective and emotions is complex and can be influenced by many personal and situational factors, including the nature of the emotion, the presence of additional strategy or implicit emotion regulation as well as congruency with the identity, appraisal of the event and cognitive avoidance of the emotional experience (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Katzir & Eyal, 2013; Krishnamoorthy et al., 2021; Küçüktaş & St. Jacques, 2022; Lemogne et al., 2009; Libby & Eibach, 2002). Here, it is possible that these factors influenced our results separately at the individual level or together as a group. In the current study, people who adopted the observer perspective were able to distance themselves from their shameful memories, but there was no effect on other memory characteristics. Likely, participants did not want to re-experience shameful events that were inconsistent with their current selves and avoid the emotional experience. Also, attaching an additional emotion regulation goal might provide a better emotion regulation strategy for self-conscious emotions and individuals who are hesitant to re-experience the disturbing event. Alternatively, the recalled memories might have been resolved and lack adequate negative affect, which can explain why we did not observe an effect on other memory phenomenology.

4.3 Change Between Perspectives: Field to Observer Shift

We found no significant effect of immersed to distanced shift on memory characteristics together with the type of strategy and emotion. The current findings contradicted our hypothesis as well as the prior literature showing that shifting from a

field to an observer perspective decreased experiential ratings such as emotional intensity, vividness, or distress (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Williams & Moulds, 2008).

Different accounts have been proposed to explain the effect of the field-to-observer shift on sensory memory characteristics. For example, in memory literature, it was suggested that when participants shifted from field to observer perspective, emotional ratings decreased as a function of inhibiting affective information (Robinson & Swanson, 1993). More specifically, it has been argued that memory reconstruction at the time of recall depends on the accessibility of the information about the event. When we recall a past event from a field perspective, we recall both affective and cognitive information, which creates a similar emotional response to the original event. However, when the observer perspective is used, there is only cognitive information because affective information is inhibited or lost with time. Therefore, when participants shifted from field to observer perspective, emotional ratings were reduced through this inhibition.

As an alternative model, Kross and Ayduk (2017) proposed the self-reflection model, which points out the importance of psychological distance for adaptive self-reflection in distancing studies. According to the model, a distanced perspective can facilitate meaning-making by objectively interpreting the event from a psychologically distanced point of view, which in turn regulates negative emotions. As opposed, an immersed perspective can lead to maladaptive processing of events due to the emphasis on emotions and the event itself, which further can give rise to negative emotions (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Further, the earlier research investigated the change in the thought content with the distanced perspective, assessed by participants' recounting and reconstruing (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). Recounting was described as concentrating on the specific features of the event, whereas reconstruing was associated with individuals' perceptions about the event, like insight and closure. The relationship between self-distancing and emotional reactivity was mediated by thought content. Particularly, self-distancing caused people to have less recounting and more

reconstruing of the experience, which led to lower emotional activity (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross et al., 2005).

Taken together, there were different accounts explaining the effect of the visual perspective on memory qualities. Although both memory and distancing literature use the observer perspective, their purpose and methodology differ. Thus, the disparity between prior studies and our results may stem from the instruction effect. In particular, the difference between analyzing memories from a certain perspective and recalling memories from a perspective was emphasized (Ayduk & Kross, 2010). While memory literature focuses on the changes in memory characteristics, the distancing paradigm is more concerned with regulating emotions related to that memory. Accordingly, in memory literature, people recall a memory from the assigned perspective, a process in which a memory is retrieved from long-term memory. In contrast, in distancing literature, participants are asked to analyze their feelings and thoughts about their memory, which is more about the elaboration of recalled memory.

Similarly, in one study, Sutin and Robins (2010) found that natural field memories had higher sensory ratings for memory characteristics than observer memories. However, as they manipulated the perspective, the difference between vantage points diminished to only one quality: valence; that is, the observer perspective led to higher positive valence than the field perspective. Nevertheless, it should be noted that they used a between-subject design to eliminate the potential effects of repeated retrieval on results, while in other studies, participants shifted from an original memory perspective to an assigned perspective (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Hence, the differences between methodologies can produce different outcomes, and the instruction effect might be the reason why we did not find an effect with the field-to-observer shift.

Furthermore, due to the high retrieval effort, the observer perspective can be more difficult to use and maintain than the field perspective. It was reported that adopting an observer perspective required more effort relative to the field perspective (St Jacques et al., 2018). Moreover, when participants shifted from field to observer perspective, it

was more difficult to maintain the assigned perspective compared to the non-shifted perspective in which participants sustain the same perspective (Robinson & Swanson, 1993; St Jacques et al., 2017). These results also can be supported by underlying neural activity. Namely, there was increased precuneus activity, an area associated with mental imagery (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006), when participants shifted perspective compared to non-shifted condition (St. Jacques et al., 2017).

Since the observer perspective is an effortful process, repeated retrieval from the observer perspective might be needed in order to observe the effect of the shift from field to observer perspective on memory phenomenology. Investigating the role of repeated retrieval, Butler et al. (2016) showed that repeated retrieval from a first-person perspective helped people to retain visual information and slowed the shift from field to observer perspective. However, when memories were repeatedly retrieved from a third-person perspective, the visual details of the event were lost. Since repeated retrieval from a third-person perspective reduces visual details, repeated retrieval might be needed to investigate the effect of perspective on memory qualities.

4.4 Change Between Perspectives: Observer to Field Shift

Previous studies investigating the effect of the perspective shift demonstrated that while shifting from a field to an observer perspective decreased experiential ratings, a reverse effect, which is an increase in sensory qualities, was not observed from observer to field shift (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Williams & Moulds, 2008). However, we found a reverse effect with the shift from distanced to the immersed condition, more specifically, showing reliving and vividness -only for the shame memories- ratings increased in visual strategy and decreased in linguistic strategy. In subsequent memory characteristics, we found that those who used visual strategy had lower psychological distance than those who used linguistic strategy in immersed condition. So, in visual strategy, participants were more immersed in their memory after adopting an immersed perspective relative to linguistic condition. Hence, the results were consistent with the findings on the observer-to-field, in other words, distanced-to-immersed shift showing an increasing pattern in reliving and vividness

ratings in visual strategy, who were more immersed in the experience than linguistic strategy.

As we mentioned, the decline in the rating of emotional properties with the field to observer shift was assumed to be achieved through the inhibition of affective information present in the field perspective (Robinson & Swanson, 1993). On the contrary, when participants shifted from an observer to a field perspective, there was no increase in memory characteristics because of the inability to access emotional information from an observer perspective. Moreover, it has been stated that increasing one's subjective experience about an event can be harder than decreasing the emotional response to it (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). Therefore, observer to field shift was not expected to lead to an increase in memory phenomenology.

One possible explanation for the current findings could be that as the participants pictured the event visually, the imagery in their recollections became more prominent, leading to a greater sense of vividness and reliving. Although field and observer perspectives differ on memory characteristics, they both involve visual aspects which may be lacking in linguistic strategy. Namely, field memories were richer in details of sensory experience, whereas observer memories involve more objective aspects like actions and spatial features (McIsaac & Eich, 2002). On the other hand, the visual aspects might be less highlighted in linguistic strategy leading to a decrease in vividness. Even though participants in the linguistic strategy reported original memory perspective, after initial ratings, they were assigned to linguistic strategy and instructed to use first-person or non-first-person pronouns as a strategy. As opposed, participants in the visual strategy analyzed their memories from either field or observer perspective.

Furthermore, earlier research suggested that despite the overlap between visual and linguistic distancing, they are not equivalents (Kross et al., 2014). For example, it was found that linguistic strategy was a cognitively effortless method (Moser et al., 2017) which clearly cannot be stated for emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal, which shares many similarities with visual distancing (Braunstein et al., 2017; Buhle et al., 2014; Moser et al., 2014). Moreover, Kross et al. (2014) proposed that the online

environment might not be the best suited for visual self-distancing, where there is a demanding task with potential distractors, pointing out a possible influence of context.

Overall, we showed that the field-to-observer shift did not affect memory phenomenology, while we found a reverse effect from the observer-to-field shift on reliving and vividness. In particular, reliving and vividness ratings increased in visual and decreased in linguistic strategy for shame memories. The disparity between our results and previous findings was discussed in terms of differences in methodology, retrieval effort, and the differences between visual and linguistic methods. Together, these might be helpful explanations for understanding the current findings.

4.5 Exploratory Hypotheses

As for exploratory hypotheses, we predicted that participants with higher rumination levels would have lower psychological distance and rate higher on initial sensory memory characteristics. In contrast, those with higher reappraisal levels would have higher psychological distance and rate lower on experiential memory qualities. The results revealed that, as opposed to our hypotheses, participants' reappraisal and rumination tendencies did not predict psychological distance for the memories. Moreover, reappraisal ratings did not predict any of the memory characteristics. However, ruminative tendency was a significant predictor for memory resolution, emotional intensity, and memory retrieval. Namely, we found that those with higher ruminative tendencies recalled less resolved and more emotionally intense memories. Also, they reported higher memory retrieval, which means they more frequently thought about their recalled memories.

The finding on memory retrieval was in line with characteristics of a ruminative state, that is, repeatedly and passively thinking about the same event (Teasdale, 1988). Hence, it is expected that participants with higher ruminative tendencies would think about their memories more often compared to participants lower on this trait. Moreover, the results were consistent with previous research showing that unresolved memories were rated higher in sensory memory characteristics and retrieval frequency compared to resolved memories (Crawley, 2010). More specifically, unresolved events had higher

emotional intensity and were more negatively valenced than resolved events (Ergen & Gülgöz, 2023). However, the results also contradicted the research suggesting that rumination was negatively correlated with psychological distance; that is, participants with higher ruminative tendencies reported lower psychological distance since we did not find such a relationship (Ayduk & Kross, 2010). Furthermore, prior research revealed that reappraisal abilities help people to achieve higher memory resolution (Watkins et al., 2008). Yet, we did not find any support for the hypothesis on reappraisal. Thus, future research can examine the relationship between rumination, reappraisal, and memory characteristics in a more controlled design. Since we found that higher rumination predicts lower memory resolution, focusing on resolved and unresolved events could also be valuable.

4.6 Limitations and Future Directions

While current findings provided novel insights about visual and linguistic distancing, there are several limitations to the study which would be beneficial to examine in future research. First, as we mentioned, the difference between the past and our findings can result from an instruction effect. In particular, the primary focus of memory literature is to examine the effect of visual perspective on memory phenomenology, whereas perspective is seen as a way to regulate emotions in distancing literature. Accordingly, the instructions and methods they use in order to implement a distanced point of view also differ. Namely, in memory literature, participants are assigned to different visual perspectives and instructed to recall their memory from the assigned perspective. On the other hand, in distancing literature, first, participants were assigned to a certain perspective and asked to recall their memory from a given perspective. After that, they were told to elaborate on their thoughts and feelings using the assigned perspective. Hence, future research should consider the role of instruction effects when studying memory perspective and its impact on memory phenomenology and emotion regulation. It may be fruitful to compare the effect of different instructions (with and without reflection) on memory characteristics and regulating emotions to explain conflicting results in the field.

Similarly, it was proposed that an additional regulatory goal, such as positive reappraisal paired with an observer perspective, may better regulate self-conscious emotions like shame (Krishnamoorthy et al., 2021). The results revealed that using the observer perspective with positive reappraisal reduced shame levels for high shame-prone participants, whereas using the observer perspective alone increased the shame levels. As opposed, a distanced perspective, which had no instructions to interpret the event in a positive light, did not regulate shame and guilt (Katzir & Eyal, 2013). Accordingly, it can be beneficial for future researchers to investigate the effect of explicit emotion regulation goals along with self-conscious emotions and memory perspectives for a greater understanding of distancing. For example, they may use emotions like shame and guilt for memory recall. Then, they can assign participants to immersed and distanced conditions with and without the positive reappraisal to see the effect of an explicit emotion regulation goal on self-conscious emotions.

Secondly, we did not investigate the content of the memory reports. Earlier literature suggested that the information people concentrate on about an event is influenced by visual perspective. For instance, the observer perspective was associated with thoughts about the meaning behind the events (Libby & Eibach, 2011). Furthermore, participants were more likely to focus on the situational characteristics of the stimulus when they used field perspective. In contrast, they thought more about evaluations from others in the presence of an observer perspective (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012). As we have already stated, in distancing studies, thought content for the events was assessed by participants' recounting and reconstruing (Ayduk & Kross, 2010; Kross & Ayduk, 2008). Self-distancing caused people to do less recounting and more reconstruing of the experience, which means they focused more on the meaning and less on the emotional characteristics of the event, which in turn led to lower emotional activity (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Kross et al., 2005). Since we investigated visual and linguistic strategies with different emotion categories, analyzing memory content might have provided greater information on how different strategies and emotions influenced participants' thinking. Therefore, future studies may benefit from analyzing the thought content of memories participants wrote, providing an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of strategies.

Lastly, we conducted the study online due to the circumstances of the pandemic, which can also be considered a study limitation. Prior research suggested that visual distancing is a demanding task, and the online environment might not be the best condition to implement the strategy, unlike the linguistic strategy, which is shown to be cognitively effortless (Kross et al.,2014; Moser et al., 2017). That is why future studies could compare visual and linguistic strategies in a controlled laboratory setting, eliminating potential distractions. This may provide a better environment to investigate distancing strategies, especially visual distancing.

5. CONCLUSION

The current study investigated the effect of perspective (immersed, distanced), strategy (visual, linguistic), and emotion (sadness, shame) on memory phenomenology and regulating negative affect. Earlier research showed that shifting from a field to observer perspective leads to a decline in experiential memory characteristics like vividness or emotional intensity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Williams & Moulds, 2008). In contrast, the observer-to-field shift did not cause any increase in memory phenomenology. Moreover, the effect of the distanced perspective differed depending on the type of emotion and strategy (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012; Katzir & Eyal, 2013; Orvell et al., 2021). Namely, in visual distancing, distanced perspective was beneficial attenuating only basic emotions like sadness or anger and not self-conscious emotions like guilt or shame. Opposingly, in linguistic distancing, both types of emotions were successfully regulated. However, we did not find support for the hypotheses regarding perspective, different types of emotions, and strategies. In particular, the results showed that the field-to-observer shift did not have an effect on memory ratings. In contrast, shifting from an observer to a field perspective increased vividness and reliving ratings for shame memories in visual strategy and decreased in linguistic strategy.

Additionally, in the subsequent memory ratings, we observed higher psychological distance for shame memories in visual than linguistic strategy when participants were assigned to distanced condition. Opposite results emerged when participants used immersed strategy, showing a lower psychological distance for the visual strategy in immersed condition compared to the linguistic strategy. Thus, using an observer perspective increased psychological distance, whereas a field perspective decreased psychological distance for participants in visual strategy. In contrast, the linguistic strategy was not as effective as the visual strategy in creating distance. However, since we did not find an effect on other memory characteristics, the results did not support our hypothesis that distanced perspective will reduce sensory memory qualities.

The findings were discussed in light of the possible explanations of the current results and the study's limitations. One of the main contributions of the study lies in the investigation of distinct distancing strategies with basic and self-conscious emotions. To our knowledge, it is the first study to directly compare visual and linguistic strategies, which both aim to increase psychological distance using specific methods across different types of emotions. Additionally, the study provided insight into the impact of shifting between perspectives using distancing strategies. The distancing strategy differs from studies with a memory perspective. One requires participants to elaborate on their thoughts and feelings about the event, and the other focuses only on recalling it. That is why future studies can consider methodological differences while studying memory perspectives. Also, the changes in the thought content and how people appraise the event could provide a better understanding of the distanced perspective. Accordingly, future studies may benefit from an analysis of the written content. Other explanations, like cognitive avoidance, explicit emotion regulation goals, and memory resolution, were discussed in consideration of the current findings.

Although the results did not align with our initial hypotheses, future research can build upon the study's strengths and limitations, further exploring the interplay between memory perspectives, emotional categories, and strategies. We discussed various factors that can provide guidance for future studies focused on exploring memory perspectives.

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APPENDIX A

Informed Consent Form

Bu araştırma, Kadir Has Üniversitesi Lisansüstü öğrencisi olan Senanur Dilek tarafından yüksek lisans tezi kapsamında, Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Sezin Öner Yaman danışmanlığında yürütülmektedir. Bu formun amacı ise katılımcıyı araştırma koşulları bakımından bilgilendirmek ve çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılması hususunda onayını almaktır.

Çalışmanın amacı olumsuz anıların hatırlanması ve düzenlenmesinde rol oynayan psikolojik etkenlerin araştırılmasıdır. Çalışma sırasında sizden bir anı hatırlamanız ve hatırladığınız bu anıyla ilgili bazı soruları cevaplamanız istenecektir. Araştırma yaklaşık 15-20 dakika sürmektedir ve araştırmaya katılım hiçbir risk içermemektedir. Çalışmadan elde edilecek bilgiler yalnızca araştırma amacıyla kullanılacak olup, bu bilgiler tamamen gizli tutulacaktır. Araştırmaya katılımınız gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Katılım sırasında herhangi bir nedenden dolayı devam etmek istemezseniz, neden belirtmeksizin, çalışmayı yarıda bırakmakta serbestsiniz. Araştırmamıza yaptığınız katkı için teşekkür ederiz.

Araştırma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak isterseniz aşağıdaki adrese mail atabilirsiniz:

Araştırma çalışması hakkında bilgi edindim ve yukarıda yazılanları okudum. Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman yarıda kesip çıkabileceğimi biliyorum. Verdiğim bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı yayımlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum. Bu şartlarda çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum. (Kabul etmeniz halinde çalışma başlayacaktır.)

Kabul Ediyorum   Kabul Etmiyorum

APPENDIX B

Information on Memory Perspectives

Bazen bir anıyı kendi bakış açımızla hatırlarız. Bu şekilde kendi bakış açımızdan hatırladığımızda, anıyı olayın gerçekleştiği anda bizim kodladığımız gibi gözümüzde canlandırırız, yani olayı kendi gözlerimizden izliyormuş gibi hatırlarız.
Bazen de bir anıyı gözlemci bir bakış açısıyla hatırlarız. Bu şekilde gözlemci bir bakış açısından hatırladığımızda, dışarıdan bir gözlemcinin gözünden izliyormuş gibi kendimizi ve çevreyi aynı resmin içinde canlandırarak olayı hatırlarız.

Örneğin laptop kullandığınız bir anınızı, kendi gözlerinizden ve gözlemci bakış açısıyla şu şekilde hatırlayabilirsiniz:
(Görsellerdeki kişinin siz olduğunu varsayınız)

Kendi bakış açımızdan bakarken   Gözlemci bakış açısıyla bakarken

APPENDIX C

Demographic Information

E-mail adresi :
(İletişim bilgilerinize araştırmacıdan başka kimsenin erişimi olmayacaktır.)

Doğum tarihiniz nedir?

Cinsiyetiniz nedir?

Kadın
Erkek
Belirtmek İstemiyorum

APPENDIX D

Memory Recall Task

Üzgün

İnsanlar hayatlarından çok memnun olduğunda bile, üzgün hissettikleri zamanlar vardır. Lütfen birkaç dakikanızı ayırın ve son beş yıl içinde gerçekleşmiş, o zaman sizi çok üzen ve hatırladığınızda halen çok üzüldüğünüz bir deneyimi düşünün.

Utanmış

İnsanlar hayatlarından çok memnun olduğunda bile, utanmış hissettikleri zamanlar vardır. Lütfen birkaç dakikanızı ayırın ve son beş yıl içinde gerçekleşmiş, o zaman sizi çok utandıran ve hatırladığınızda halen çok utandığınız bir deneyimi düşünün.

APPENDIX E

Strategy Manipulations

Görsel Strateji

Kendine odaklı perspektif

Bu çalışmada insanların anılarını hatırladığı bakış açısı ile ilgileniyoruz. Şimdi gözlerinizi kapatın. Az önce hatırladığınız deneyimin olduğu yere ve zamana geri dönün ve olayı zihninizde canlandırın. Şimdi olayı kendi gözlerinden sanki tekrardan başınıza geliyormuş gibi görün. Olayı kendi gözlerinizle hayal gücünüzde yeniden oynatın. Olayı kendi gözlerinizle görmeye devam ederken, duygularınızı anlamaya çalışın. Neden bu duyguları hissettiniz? Bu duyguların altında yatan nedenler nelerdi? Bunu yapmak için bir dakikanızı ayırın. 60 saniye sonra devam edeceğiz.

Kendine mesafeli perspektif

Bu çalışmada insanların anılarını hatırladığı bakış açısı ile ilgileniyoruz. Şimdi gözlerini kapatın. Az önce hatırladığınız deneyimin olduğu yere ve zamana geri dönün ve olayı zihninizde canlandırın. Şimdi birkaç adım geri gidin. Olaydan, uzaktan bir mesafeden gelişmesini izleyebileceğiniz bir noktaya kadar uzaklaşın ve kendinizi o olayın içinde görün. Bunu yaparken, artık uzaktaki siz haline gelen şeye odaklanın. Şimdi, olayın uzaktaki size yeniden oluyormuş gibi gelişmesini izleyin. Uzaktaki benliğinizi gözlemlerken, olayı hayal gücünüzde yeniden oynatın. Olayın uzaktaki sizle yaşanmasını izlerken, onun (uzaktaki sizin) duygularını anlamaya çalışın. Neden bu duyguları hissetti? Onun bu duygularının altında yatan nedenler nelerdi? Bunu yapmak için bir dakikanızı ayırın. 60 saniye sonra devam edeceğiz.

Dilsel Strateji

Kendine odaklı perspektif

Bu çalışmada insanların duygularını anlamak için kullandığı dil ile ilgileniyoruz. Kullanılan stratejilerden biri de insanların duygularına kendi açılarından bakarken "Ben ne düşünüyorum, ne hissediyorum" gibi olayı kendi bakış açılarından anlamalarını sağlayan bir dil kullanmalarıdır. Bu aşamada sizden yapmanızı istediğimiz budur. Lütfen hatırladığınız anınızdaki olayı " Neden böyle hissettim?" , " Duygularımın altında yatan nedenler nelerdi? gibi soruları kendinize sorarak anlamaya çalışın. Bunu yaparken "ben, benim" kelimelerini olabildiğince çok kullanın. 60 saniye sonra devam edeceğiz.

Kendine mesafeli perspektif

Bu çalışmada insanların duygularını anlamak için kullandığı dil ile ilgileniyoruz. Kullanılan stratejilerden biri de insanların duygularını kendilerine yabancıymış gibi bir

dil kullanarak anlamaya çalışmasıdır. Bunu yaparken örneğin, adınız Esra olsaydı, "Esra neden böyle hissetti?, Esra'nın duygularının altında yatan nedenler nelerdi?" diye kendinize sorardınız. Bu aşamada sizden yapmanızı istediğimiz budur. Lütfen hatırladığınız olayı " Neden böyle hissetti?" , " Duygularının altında yatan nedenler nelerdi? gibi soruları sanki bir yabancıymış gibi kendinize sorarak duygularınızı anlamaya çalışın. Bunu yaparken "sen" kelimesini ve kendi adınızı olabildiğince çok kullanın. 60 saniye sonra devam edeceğiz.

APPENDIX F

Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire

Lütfen hatırladığınız anıyla ilgili aşağıdaki her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı size en uygun seçeneği işaretleyerek belirtiniz.

1	3	5
Hiç katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum

1. Olay sırasında hissettiğim duyguları şimdi de aynı yoğunlukta hissediyorum.

2. Olayı hatırlarken, olayı yeniden yaşıyormuş gibi hissediyorum.

3. Olayı hatırlarken, gözümde canlandırabiliyorum.

4. Bu olay olduğundan beri, olay hakkında düşünmesem de, sık sık aklıma gelir.

5. Bu olay benim için önemli bir olaydır.

6. Bu olay benim kendimi nasıl tanımladığımı etkileyen bir olaydır.

7. Bazı olaylarda insanlar kendilerini olaya katılmış biri olarak, diğerlerinde ise kendilerini dışardan seyreden biri olarak hatırlarlar. Siz bu olayı hangi biçimde hatırlıyorsunuz? (1: Olayın içinde yer alıyor gibi 2: Olaya dışarıdan bakıyor gibi)

8. Şu anda nasıl hissettiğinizi belirtiniz. (1: Çok kötü 10: Çok iyi)

9. Bu olayın sizin üzerinizdeki etkisi nasıldır? (1: Çok olumsuz 5: Çok olumlu)

10. Bu olayın üzerinden ne kadar zaman geçmiş gibi hissediyorsunuz? (1: Bugün olmuş gibi 10: Çok uzun zaman önce olmuş gibi)

11. Olay yaklaşık olarak kaç ay önce gerçekleşti? (1'den 60'a)

12. Bazen bir olay ne kadar olumsuz olursa olsun aradan zaman geçtiği ve olayın üzeri kapandığı için olayın etkisi azalır. Böyle bir olaya çözülmüş diyebiliriz. Bazense olumsuz olay daha dün olmuş gibi kişiyi etkilemeye devam eder. Böyle olaylarsa daha çözülmemiş olaylardır. Hatırladığınız anıdaki olayın ne kadar çözülmüş olduğunu hissediyorsunuz? (1: Hiç çözülmemiş 5: Tamamen çözülmüş)

APPENDIX G

Emotion Regulation Questionnaire

Lütfen aşağıda verilen ifadeleri okuyunuz. Maddede verilen fikre katılma derecenizi 5 (Tamamen Katılıyorum) ve 1 (Hiç Katılmıyorum) arasında değişen ifadelerden size en uygununu seçerek belirtiniz.

1	3	5
Hiç katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum

1. Olumlu duygularımın fazla olmasını istersem (mutluluk veya eğlence) düşündüğüm şeyi değiştiririm.

2. Duygularımı kendime saklarım.

3. Olumsuz duygularımın az olmasını istersem (üzüntü veya kızgınlık gibi) düşündüğüm şeyi değiştiririm.

4. Olumlu duygular hissettiğimde onları ifade etmemeye dikkat ederim.

5. Stresli bir durumla karşılaştığımda, bu durumu sakin kalmamı sağlayacak şekilde düşünmeye çalışırım.

6. Duygularımı, onları ifade etmeyerek kontrol ederim.

7. Olumlu duygularımın fazla olmasını istediğim zaman durumla ilgili düşünme şeklimi değiştiririm.

8. İçinde bulunduğum duruma göre düşünme şeklini değiştirerek duygularımı kontrol ederim.

9. Olumsuz duygular hissettiğimde onları ifade etmediğimden emin olmak isterim.

10. Olumsuz duygularımın az olmasını istersem, durumla ilgili düşünme şeklimi değiştiririm.

APPENDIX H

Ruminative Responses Scale (Short Form)

İnsanlar kötü bir deneyim yaşadıklarında bir sürü farklı şey yapar ya da düşünürler. Lütfen aşağıdaki cümleleri okuyup belirtilenleri ne kadar sıklıkta yaptığınızı 1(Hiçbir zaman) ve 4 (Her zaman) arasında değişen ifadelerden size en uygununu seçerek işaretleyin. Lütfen, ne yapmanız gerektiğini değil, gerçekte ne yaptığınızı belirtin.

1: Hiçbir zaman   2: Bazen   3: Çoğunlukla   4: Her zaman

1. "Bunu hak etmek için ne yaptım" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

2. Son zamanlarda yaşadığın olayları analiz edip "Kendimi niye böyle üzgün hissediyorum" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

3. "Niye bu şekilde bir tepki gösteriyorum" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

4. Bir köşeye çekilip "Neden bu şekilde hissediyorum" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

5. Ne sıklıkla düşüncelerini yazıp, çözümlemeye ve anlamaya çalışıyorsun?

6. Son zamanlarda yaşadığın olaylar hakkında "Keşke daha iyi sonuçlansaydı" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

7. "Niye benim problemlerim var da, diğer insanların yok" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

8. "Neden olayları daha iyi idare edemiyorum" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

9. Kişilik özelliklerini analiz edip, "Kendimi niye böyle üzgün hissediyorum" diye ne sıklıkla düşünüyorsun?

10. Ne sıklıkla tek başına bir yere gidip duygularını anlamaya çalışıyorsun?

APPENDIX I

Manipulation Checks

Görsel Strateji

1.Bakış açınızı istenilen şekilde değiştirmek ne kadar kolaydı/zordu?

1: Çok kolaydı   3: Ne kolaydı ne zordu   5: Çok zordu

2.Sizden istenilen bakış açısını (kendi bakış açınız vs gözlemci) verilen süre boyunca ne ölçüde koruyabildiniz?

1: Hiç koruyamadım
3: Ne koruyabildim ne de koruyamadım
5:Tamamen koruyabildim

3.Lütfen sorulara ne kadar dikkatinizi vererek cevapladığınızı belirtiniz.

1: Hiç dikkatimi vermedim
3: Ne dikkatliydim ne dikkatsizdim
5: Tamamen dikkatimi verdim

Dilsel Strateji

1.Bakış açınızı istenilen şekilde değiştirmek ne kadar kolaydı/zordu?

1: Çok kolaydı   3: Ne kolaydı ne zordu   5: Çok zordu

2.Sizden istenilen stratejiyi (ben/benim vs sen/adınız kelimelerini) verilen süre boyunca ne ölçüde uygulayabildiniz?

1: Hiç uygulayamadım
3: Ne uygulayabildim ne de uygulayamadım
5:Tamamen uygulayabildim

3.Lütfen sorulara ne kadar dikkatinizi vererek cevapladığınızı belirtiniz.

1: Hiç dikkatimi vermedim
3: Ne dikkatliydim ne dikkatsizdim
5: Tamamen dikkatimi verdim

CURRICULUM VITAE

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