THE INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF TURKEY AS A REGIONAL POWER: A STRUCTURAL REALIST ANALYSIS (2002-2014)

NİHAT ÇELİK

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STRUCTURAL REALIST ANALYSIS

NİHAT ÇELİK

ONAYLAYANLAR:

Assoc. Prof. Kostantinos IFANTIS   Supervisor Kadir Has University

Prof. Şule Toktaş   Kadir Has University

Assoc. Prof. Emre İşeri   Yaşar University

(Asst. Prof. Ahmet K. Han   Kadir Has University

Asst. Prof. Ş. İnan Rüma   Bilgi University

ONAY TARİHİ: 22 May 2015

"I, Nihat Çelik, confirm that the work presented in this dissertation is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the dissertation."

NİHAT ÇELİK

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Nihat Çelik

Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

Advisor: Associate Professor Kostas Ifantis

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With the post-Cold War developments Turkey found a suitable
environment to assert itself as a regional leader in the Balkans and Middle
East. In this vein mediation became a tool for advancing Turkey's regional
role with the Justice and Development Party rule that started in 2002. The
aim of this study is to show Turkey's motivations in acting as a mediator
while highlighting its capabilities and limits in the aforementioned regions
based on case-studies of Turkey's mediation initiatives. It will be argued
that Turkey as an emerging middle-power faces important limitations with
regards to material capabilities and also resistance from regional and global
actors against its regional leadership role.

ÖZET

BÖLGESEL BİR GÜÇ OLARAK TÜRKİYE'NİN NİYET VE KABİLİYETLERİ:
YAPISAL GERÇEKÇİ BİR DEĞERLENDİRME (2012-2014)

Nihat Çelik

Doktor, Uluslararası İlişkiler

Danışman: Doçent Doktor Kostas Ifantis

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Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde yaşanan hadiseler, Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu ve Balkanlar'da kendisini bölgesel bir güç olarak takdim etmesine uygun bir zemin hazırlamıştır. Bu anlamda arabuluculuk, 2002 senesinde iktidâra gelen Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ile birlikte bu iddiaya hizmet eden bir vasıta olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı Türkiye'yi arabuluculuk faaliyetlerine sevk eden saikleri ortaya koyarken bir yandan da arabuluculuk konusundaki vakâ tetkikleri yoluyla Türkiye'nin söz konusu iki bölgedeki kabiliyetleri ile birlikte gücünün sınırlarını tespit etmektir. Bu çalışmanın iddiası şudur ki, Türkiye gelişen bir orta-büyüklükte güç olarak maddi güç unsurlarının mahdut olmasından kaynaklanan meselelere ilâveten, bölgesel liderlik iddiasına hem bölgesel hem de küresel güçlerin muhalefeti ile karşılaşmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bölgesel Güç, Arabuluculuk, Balkanlar, Ortadoğu

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BPD: Barrel Per Day

CINC: Composite Index of National Capability

EU: European Union

EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

GFP: Global Fire Power (Index)

IMF: International Monetary Fund

JDP: Justice and Development Party

KFOR: Kosovo Force

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

N-11: Next Eleven Group

NAP: Nationalist Action Party

PRP: People's Republican Party

SFOR: Stabilization Force

TAF: Turkish Armed Forces

TAIF: Turkish Air Force

TBMM: Turkish Grand National Assembly

THY: Turkish Airlines

TİKA: Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency

TLF: Turkish Land Forces

TMFA: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

TNF: Turkish Naval Forces

TOBB: Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industry and Business Association

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

CHAPTER 1

1 INTRODUCTION

With a unique geographical position bridging the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus and common cultural and historical ties with these volatile regions of the world, Turkey is an important actor in international relations. What makes Turkey distinctive is that "virtually no other state – except for the United States—plays a part in so many different geopolitical regions… Consequently, Turkey has one of the most complex foreign policy situations in the world" (Rubin, 2002, p. 1)[1]. This unique geographical position and cultural duality reflecting both the Western and Eastern values, make it harder to classify Turkey because "in religious, historical and geographical senses it is a Middle Eastern country, yet any developments impinging upon the status quo of the Balkans and the Caucasus directly affects Turkey just as much." (Aydin, 1999, p. 153) While the vast majority of its population embraces Islam, it is a Muslim with a secular regime that aspires to be a part of the Western world since the 19th century when the Ottoman elites realized that unless they 'modernize' (read Westernize) the empire, it would be impossible to cope with Western imperialism. This historical past still haunts international relations of Turkey:

> Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of the historical experiences of being reduced from a vast empire to extinction, and then having to struggle back to save the national homeland and its independence. The struggle for survival and the play of *realpolitik* in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints

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[1] Russia may also be added to this list.

on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of its people. (Aydin, 1999, p. 156)

In addition to its attractive geographical position, because of being surrounded by neighbors that won their independence by fighting against the Ottoman Empire, in Turkish foreign policy tradition, security is of paramount importance and the feeling of insecurity is always influential. (Oran, 2004a, p. 24) Guiding principles like caution, balance of power politics, alliance formation and pro-*status quo* approach in Turkish foreign policy can be attributed to the Ottoman legacy as well as to the structural reasons emanating from Turkey's limited power capacity.

In the rigid structure of the Cold War, Turkey, serving as a buffer-state or flank country as a NATO member, had very limited opportunity to pursue autonomous foreign policy from its allies with a few exceptions like the Cyprus Question. Surrounded by the pro-Soviet countries in the Middle East such as Syria and Iraq, with the exception in 1950s which witnessed ambitious engagements of Turkey in the region in order to diminish the Soviet influence (Bağcı, 2001), it perceived threat from its neighbors and chose to stay out of the conflicts by following a minimum-involvement policy and as a result distancing itself from the region until the 1970s. With the 1979 Revolution in Iran, Turkey lost another ally and started to perceive threat, as a result of ideological differences, from Iran too. Mutual mistrust was the dominant feeling that shaped the bilateral relations. In the Balkans too, Turkey did not feel secure. It was bordering Bulgaria which was a Warsaw Pact member. Greece, being another neighbor with common land border that is also a member of the same alliance as Turkey, would have been a better candidate for cordial relations if conflict areas such as Cyprus Question and the Aegean Sea disputes did not poison the bilateral relations for many decades. Last but not least, it

had indirect maritime borders with the Soviet Union in its Black Sea coasts and direct land borders in the Caucasus.

In the peace euphoria of the early 1990s that emerged as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one might have expected Turkey to enjoy this new atmosphere in its foreign policy. However with the end of the Cold War Turkey did not get its share from the peace dividend as its allies in Western Europe did. The Soviet Union was still omnipresent in the form of Russian Federation with its huge military power even though threat perception decreased relatively. Secondly the number of states neighboring Turkey increased by 50 per cent[2] (Kut, 2002, p. 7), a fact that dramatically changed the geopolitics of Turkey. (Lesser & Fuller, 2000). Thirdly, in an environment where NATO's future was hotly debated in the West, Turkish policy-makers were anxious that the security guarantees would not be honored and as a result Turkey would be left alone in a potential regional conflict by its Western allies. For some, Turkey, as NATO member and ally of the United States, lost its strategic importance in the new era (Kut, 2002, p. 8) :

> On the whole, international relations experts were slow to appreciate the new importance of Turkey, even after 1989. At first, it tended to be assumed that systemic breakdown would devalue even further the importance of a state that had only been of peripheral significance before. Even the Gulf crisis, where Turkey's failure to send troops to join the international coalition assembled in Saudi Arabia gave a misleading view of its importance, did little to reverse this impression, save, most importantly, among policy insiders within the Washington beltway (Robins, 2002, p. 2).

Developments in the surrounding regions of Turkey in the early 1990s such as the Gulf Crisis and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, contrary to the views regarding

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[2] Before 1991, Turkey had direct and indirect land and maritime borders with Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Romania and Cyprus. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union the number has risen to twelve: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Cyprus.

Turkey's decreasing importance, forced Turkey to become "a far more active international player" (Rubin, 2002, p. 3) and falsified these views. In addition to these developments, the emergence of independent Turkish republics in Central Asia and Caucasus opened new horizons for Turkish foreign policy because Turkey was considered to be a successful model for those former Soviet Republics in transition. In this emotional atmosphere, the motto 'from the Adriatic to the Great Wall' that depicted the new sphere of influence for Turkey, was met with great enthusiasm by the public (Aydın, 2005, p. 380). With its strategic relations with the US, EC/EU membership vision and close connections with the countries in Asia, Turkey was presented as a country 'bridging' the East and West. In this respect, it is not surprising to see the bridge metaphor dominate Turkish political discourse since then (Yanık, 2009). Still, Turkey continued to perceive threat from its neighbors during the 1990s thinking that it was surrounded by enemies like Greece, Syria and Armenia and in addition the internal threat posed by the separatist terrorism supported by those countries so it had to be ready to fight in two and half fronts (Elekdağ, 1996; Robins, 2002, pp. 163-180).

In search of a new role in international relations, Turkey transformed itself from a flank country to a frontline country and engaged in regional issues. More importantly, it started to consider itself as a regional power. In the current literature, Turkey's status as a regional power, middle or middle-sized power is generally accepted (Yalçın, 2012). Barry Buzan and Ole Waever recognize Turkey as a regional power just like Israel, Iran, Brazil, Indonesia, India and Pakistan. (2003, p. 31) According to William Hale, it is an "emerging regional power" (Hale, 2002, p. 1), Baskın Oran defines it as a middle power (2004a, pp. 29-32) while it is also defined as an "emerging multiregional power". (Rubin & Kirişçi, 2002) It is also

described as a regional hegemon (Erickson, 2004). Multiregional character of Turkey is a very important dimension. While Turkey is effective in the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, another regional power in the Balkans; Greece for example has very limited influence in other regions. (Sander, 1994, p. 192)

As a result of this activism, Turkey developed economic and foreign aid relations and Turkish military forces actively participated in the peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. (Kut, 2002, p. 9) Yet Turkey was still cautious to cooperate with its allies and support the decisions of the international community rather than following policies that would diverge from the position of its allies.

Playing an active role in the resolution of conflicts in the Balkans and Middle East, Turkey also started to act as a mediator in these regions in order to show that it is a country that contributes to world peace and increased its international prestige as well as serving its own interests.

At the face of Western inaction against the atrocities in Bosnia, Turkish governments contributed to the internationalization of the issue and tried to mobilize the international community at various forums. After the United States' involvement in the crisis bore effective results, Turkey's cooperation with the US gave Turkey more leverage in Balkan politics. (Uzgel, 2002, p. 65) Then Turkey brokered an entente between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats in order to counterbalance the Serbs, which resulted with the establishment of a Muslim-Croat Federation under the Washington Agreement of March 1994. (Hale, 2002, p. 262) . In addition to President Süleyman Demirel[3], Richard Holbrooke[4] mentioned him as the "foreign

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[3] Süleyman Demirel (1924), Turkish politician, President of Republic of Turkey, 16 May 1993- 16 May 2000.

leader whom Izzetbegovic[5] probably respected the most" (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 294), Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin[6] was another key figure in active foreign policy regarding the Balkans.

In the post-Gulf War Iraq too, Turkey tried to act as a mediator between the warring factions of the Iraqi Kurds, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani. Following the American failure to end those hostilities and after the KDP's alliance with Baghdad against the PUK, Turkey acted as a mediator between the parties and finally ended the conflict as a result of the long negotiations, the so-called Ankara Process. (Robins, 2002, p. 339) The Ankara Accord of November 1996, signed under the auspices of Turkey, the US and Britain helped ending the hostilities and paved the way for successful implementation of the Washington Agreement (1998).

During İsmail Cem's tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1997-2002), Turkey's active foreign policy continued. He criticized traditional Turkish foreign policy as inactive and ignorant of Turkey's power emanating from its history. He published his views in 2001 in his book *Turkey in the New Century* (Cem, 2001). Later in 2004 he published another book on Turkish foreign policy in Turkish where he dealt with the same topic (Cem, 2004). According to İsmail Cem, traditional approach regarded Turkey as a country surrounded by enemies. Instead, Turkey can develop close relations with its neighbors and as a result foster peace and development. Unaware of its historical past and the relationships formed during the centuries of Ottoman rule, he argued Turkey could not benefit from its history

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[4] Richard Holbrooke (1941-2010), the US Special Envoy to Bosnia and architect of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
[5] Aliya Izzetbegovic (1925 –2003), leader of the Bosnian Muslims and member of the Presidency Council of Bosnia Herzegovina representing the Bosnian Muslims, 1992-2000.
[6] Hikmet Çetin (1937), Turkish politician and Minister of Foreign Affairs 21 November 1991 – 27 July 1994.

properly. He compares the Ottoman Empire to the Roman and British empires in its geographical extent and points that from the territory of the Ottoman Empire twenty-five new states emerged. With this "historical depth", he argues Turkey shares the same history with the countries in the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. In this respect, he is very critical of the Turkish foreign policy regarding the Middle East. According to him, Turkey alienated itself from the region with the suggestions of Western powers and ideological approaches of pro-Western Turkish elites. Touching upon the cliché on the betrayal of Arabs during the First World War, he points out that the number of Arabs cooperating with the British forces constituted around three thousand and represented a very small population. However, Turkey distanced itself from the Arabs and Middle East where other actors filled the vacuum for many decades. The result was that Turkey became dependent on its Western allies for its security. He then suggests that the policies followed during his tenure, diverged from the traditional approach to an important degree and he praises the leaders like Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit for their skills as statesmen and their visions. (Cem, 2004, pp. 7-21) İsmail Cem's social democrat background probably avoided criticisms of Neo-Ottomanism even though he often mentioned *Pax-Ottomana* and built his foreign policy vision mainly on the Ottoman past. However one should keep in mind that, rather than portraying Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire, he emphasized the importance of cooperation with the countries that shared common cultural values and history and suggested developing friendly relations. During his tenure, following the Marmara Earthquake (1999) Turkish-Greek rapprochement process began and he found a good partner for cooperation in his Greek counterpart Yorgo Papandreu (Fırat, 2004). With the Turkish-Syrian relations improved after 1998 and the Second Intifada broke out,

Turkey, though cautiously, started to get involved in the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. More than a mediator, Turkey wanted to present itself as a facilitator. Cem and Papandreou paid a visit to Israel and Palestine in April 2002 to convince the parties to restart the negotiations. (Altunisik & Cuhadar, 2010, p. 380)

With the general elections held on October 3, 2002 the newly established Justice and Development Party (JDP-AKP) under Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership won a victory and secured 34% of the votes with 363 deputies in the Grand National Assembly (TBMM) (AKP, 2013). Many of its founders who called themselves as reformers (*yenilikçi*) were former members of the Welfare Party. After many years of coalition governments, with the 58th Government, a single-party rule was established. In the cabinet formed by Abdullah Gül, a former ambassador Yaşar Yakış, who served in Riyadh, Cairo and Damascus at various positions and in addition to English and French also spoke Arabic, was appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). (yasaryakis.com.tr, 2013)

However the key figure in the foreign policy formulation is Ahmet Davutoğlu who became the Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 1, 2009. Before this appointment, as a Professor of International Relations, he was appointed as the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large following the formation of the government in 2002. Davutoğlu spoke English, German and Arabic, lectured in various universities in Turkey and was a visiting scholar at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (MFA, 2013). Unlike the former ministers, a few books are published that praise his successful foreign policy (Zengin, 2010) and he is also portrayed as the 'strategic mind of Turkey' (Bayhan, 2012). It is also suggested that in the Davutoğlu era, Turkey had a 'paradigm shift' in its foreign policy (Sözen, 2010). He was even nicknamed as the 'Turkish Kissinger' (Tisdall, 2010).

Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance of Turkey's developing good relations and interdependence with its neighbors and in order to succeed in that he argues negative and threat based perceptions should be eliminated and problems should be solved in a peaceful and satisfactory way. This policy is named as the "zero problems with neighbors policy" and it is one of the leading principles of the 'new Turkish foreign policy' according to him. (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 4) Other leading principles are 'rhythmic diplomacy', 'multi-dimensional foreign policy', 'order instituting actor' and 'proactive foreign policy' (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 4). They are also described as 'balance between security and democracy', 'zero problems towards neighbors', 'proactive and pre-emtpive peace diplomacy', 'multi-dimensional foreign policy' and 'rhythmic diplomacy' (Davutoğlu, 2010). He argues that Turkey will follow a value-based foreign policy; it is ready to take responsibilities of a global actor and set the objective to be reckoned as a wise country in the international community (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 5)

In 2001 he published his book *Stratejik Derinlik* (*Strategic Depth)* (Davutoğlu, 2004)*.* Following his coming to the post of Chief Advisor, the book gained more importance and attracted attention since it is believed that the so called 'Strategic Depth Doctrine' guides Turkish foreign policy (Murinson, 2006); (Walker, 2007). In the book he tries to identify Turkey's role in international affairs in the post-Cold War era. Emphasizing Turkey's 'geographical and historical' depth, he suggests that the geopolitical, geoeconomics and geocultural power of Turkey should be the basis of a new foreign policy culture and approach. He sets his focus on the former Ottoman territories and identifies the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus as Turkey's 'near land basins', while he identifies the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and the Caspian as Turkey's 'near sea basins'. Finally,

Europe, the North Africa, South Asia, Cental and East Asia form Turkey's 'near continental basins'. In his strategy, Turkey should try to increase its influence step by step in those basins in a way that it will enable Turkey to exert influence in its continental basins. (Davutoğlu, 2004) According to him the Republic of Turkey which emerged as a nation state at the beginning of the century by ignoring the Ottoman legacy, had to face the geocultural and geopolitical responsibilities of this legacy at the end of the century. These responsibilities that constitute a burden for Turkish foreign policy at the same time open new horizons for it and give it new capabilities. (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 23). While criticizing the dominant foreign policy and security culture of Turkey, he argues that the Muslims in the Balkans regard Turkey as the 'political center' after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey's Balkan policy should consider the protection of rights of Muslims in the Balkans. According to him, because of severing all ties with the Ottoman political culture and its institutions, Turkey has no legal tools that would legitimize its involvement in the problems of the Balkan Muslims. In addition, with a domestic political structure that regarded Islamic cultural groupings as a threat, it is hard for Turkey to protect the Muslim identity in Bosnia and Kosovo because Serbs portray Muslims in those locations as Islamist fundamentalists. (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 316)

In Davutoğlu's understanding the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus form the first priority areas for Turkish foreign policy. In his view, if Turkey as a pivot country follows a foreign policy that combines its 'historical depth' with 'strategic depth' in a successful way, it can become a 'central state'. (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 563) He stresses that Turkey has a special position and it is more than a frontier or bridge country:

Among all these classifications, Turkey holds a special position. Turkey's geography gives it a special central country status, which differs from other central countries. For example, Germany is a central country in Central Europe, which is far from Asia and Africa. Russia is another central country in the lands of Europe and Asia, which is far from Africa. Iran is a central country in Asia, which is far from Europe and Africa. Taking a broader, global view, Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West. (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 78)

With the self-confidence and optimism brought by its successes in the 2000s in the field of economy and with the purpose of contributing to the security of its surrounding regions and fostering trade and cooperation, in the JDP era Turkey also emerged as a mediator in the regional conflicts by voluntarily offering its services as mediator. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, peace and stability contributes to Turkey's development and Turkey devotes great efforts to preventive diplomacy and mediation:

Pursuing a more dynamic foreign policy in this direction in recent years and exerting great efforts to place cooperation and dialogue on solid foundation in Afro-Eurasian, Turkey attaches special importance to preventive diplomacy, pioneers a great deal of mediation attempts in a wide geography and endeavors actively for the peaceful settlement of disputes. (MFA, 2013)

The Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, regards Turkey as a 'wise country' and he points out that mediation and conflict resolution are important dimensions of Turkish foreign policy:

Especially in times of crises, such as the economic crisis the world is going through or the political transformation in our region, the need for wise countries to deliver such essential functions as conflict prevention, mediation, conflict resolution or development assistance becomes particularly evident.

As a wise country, i.e. a responsible member of the international community, we aspire to enhance our capability to shape the course of developments around us and make a valuable contribution to the resolution of regional and international issues (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 5).

In this vein, Turkey willingly assumed mediator role in some regional interstate and intrastate conflicts in areas like Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia-Herzegovina-Serbia Reconciliation Process, Afghanistan, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Israeli-Syrian Conflict, the Philippines, Myanmar and Iran's nuclear program. Turkey was involved in the release of the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas in 2006, release of the 15 British Royal Navy sailors who had been seized by Iran in 2007, release of a French teacher, Clotilde Reiss being held in Iran on spying charges and in the border dispute between Namibia and Botswana and as a result in an article on *The Economist* Ahmet Davutoğlu was named as the 'great mediator' (Economist, 2010). In an interview, George Friedman stated that only Turkey can play the ultimate mediator role in the Islamic world and he argued that Turkey can bring the USA and Iran to the negotiation table (Tuncel, 2010).

Turkey has launched the Friends of Mediation initiative at the UN in cooperation with Finland which later led to the establishment of Friends of the Mediation Group (Aras, 2012, p. 5). Turkey is also host to the annual Istanbul Conference on Mediation since 2012 where foreign ministers, diplomats, academic and representatives of the NGOs exchange ideas. In order to strengthen Turkey's efforts, a department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specializing in mediation is going to be established. Additionally, Turkey wants the U.N. to establish a special center on mediation in İstanbul (Kardaş, 2013). According to Doria Jones, Ahmet

Davutoğlu "is seeking to make Istanbul a center for mediation in resolving international crises" (Jones, 2012)

Against this backdrop, this study will try to find an answer to the following question: What are Turkey's capabilities and limits as a regional power in the Middle East and Balkans? A neo-Realist approach that attaches a central position to power will be followed especially benefiting from the framework developed by Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 2001). With regards to power, an approach that also includes military power (contrary to the general tendency to include only political and economic power) will be employed. In parallel to power, in order to have a more concrete basis, mediation initiatives of Turkey as a tool of Turkish involvement and influence will be used in this respect as mediation became the most visible aspect of Turkey's bid for regional leadership. The main motive will be to find out if there is a gap between Turkey's power capacity and its foreign policy objectives.

Firstly the definition and types of power ranging from the military power to soft power will be elaborated in Chapter 2. Secondly, in the light of the current International Relations literature, classification of states based on their power status will be explained. With regard to the discussions of Turkey being a regional hegemon or not, Miriam Prys' concepts regionally detached hegemon, regional dominant and regional hegemon will be elaborated (Prys, 2010). This chapter will provide a solid base for answering the question if there is a gap between Turkey's capacity and foreign policy objectives and also for the discussions regarding Turkey's mediation efforts in the following chapters as it will introduce the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores developed by Singer (Singer, 1987) for measuring national power.

In Chapter 3, the focus will be on conflict resolution and mediation strategies. After defining mediation, information regarding the types of mediator such as power mediator and neutral facilitator will be provided. The qualities of a mediator, necessary for successful mediation initiatives, will also be touched upon in this chapter. In addition, the relation between the power symmetry or asymmetry between the mediator and the parties to conflict will be analyzed in the current literature to see if there is a correlation between the power levels and fruitful mediation efforts. Finally, the usage of international mediation in world history that highlights the successes and failures will be elaborated and reasons for failure or success will be explained.

In Chapter 4, the focus will be on Turkish foreign policy in the Post-Cold War era though a brief summary of Turkish foreign policy in general will also be provided. Firstly, Turkey's status regarding its national capacity ranging from military to economic capacity will be analyzed for the period from 1990 to 2002. Changes at the structural, regional and domestic levels that made Turkey to follow a more active and high profile foreign policy for this period will also be identified. Turkey's involvement in the Balkans and Middle East will be analyzed in depth to explain if there is a changing balance of power between Turkey and other regional actors. This part will be helpful to define Turkey's role as a middle power in the light of the discussions given in Chapter 2.

Chapter 5 will try to explain the changing parameters of Turkish foreign policy caused by changes especially at regional and domestic levels from 2002 on. It will also try to find out if there is a change at Turkey's national power level ranging

from economic to military and to soft power capacity. Turkey's trade relations, foreign direct investment, foreign military, development and humanitarian aid levels and activities of actors such as TİKA, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Board of Religious Affairs), TOBB (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and other NGOs will be analyzed. Secondly it will try to highlight the main tenets of the Turkish foreign policy under the JDP rule. Its approach to the Balkans and Middle East will also be elaborated. Finally, an account of Turkey's foreign policy activism in the Balkans and Middle East covering the period from 2002 to 2012 will be provided.

Chapter 6 will elaborate Turkey's role as a mediator in the Balkans and Middle East. It will try to highlight the factors that made mediation an issue in Turkish foreign policy and expectations of Turkey as a mediator. Since each mediation process has its own special conditions, case studies will be helpful in understanding Turkey's activities as a mediator. Hence, two cases will be analyzed where Turkey acted as a mediator. First one is the process in which Turkey wanted to find a solution to the problem caused by Iran's nuclear program. The second case is the reconciliation process between Bosnia and Serbia initiated by Turkey.

Chapter 7 will provide conclusions in the light of the discussions in the previous chapters. It will try to highlight Turkey's advantages and disadvantages in its claim for regional leadership. As mediation is used as a tool to reach the objective of regional leadership, Turkey's capacity as a mediator will also be touched upon.

CHAPTER 2

2   POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Even though states enjoy legal equality according to the International Law, with regard to their power, it is impossible to mention equality. (Krasner, 2009, p. 214) Power has always been one of the most important concepts in the field of International Relations. Especially in the Realist and Neo-Realist thinking it is located at the center of all basic assumptions. The concept of power still keeps its prominence in the 21st century as the "rise of the rest" (Zakaria, 2011, p. 4) or "power shift" are hot topics of the day.

The aim of this chapter is to illuminate definitions of power, types of power and the role power plays in international politics. Secondly this chapter will try to identify the possible criteria for the measurement of power and after this it will further try to throw light on the issue of classification of states according to their power status. The concepts such as super-power, great-power and middle power will be elaborated with a focus on middle powers especially by giving examples of middle-power foreign policy activities. The main purpose of this chapter is two-fold: Firstly it will provide a solid ground regarding the foreign policy behaviors of middle-powers and the policy tools available to them. As a result of the relationship

between the national capabilities and policy, it will also shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of middle-powers and this way contribute to the following chapter where the mediation in general and especially mediation attempts of middle-powers will be touched upon. Secondly, by setting a theoretical framework, it will allow us to determine whether Turkey may be identified as a middle-power or not, an issue which will be elaborated in Chapter 5.

2.2. THE DEFINITION AND ROLE OF POWER

Power is an important theme in the International Relations literature however it is the central concept in the Realist International Relations Theory. Even though Realism or "power politics" is challenged by the Liberal and Constructivist Theories especially following the end of Cold War on the grounds that as a paradigm it is inadequate (Vasquez, 2004), in our view it still has the explanatory power regarding the world politics.

Edward Hallett Carr, writing in 1939 in a reactionary way to the claims developed by the liberals or as he names them "utopians" in the post-WW-I Era, rejected the overtly-optimistic approach that did not take power into account and saw power as a reminder of the "old bad days". He built his approach mainly upon the works of Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes and tried to show the invalidity of thoughts that paved the way for the failure of the League of Nations against German and Italian aggression. In his view, power is an essential element of politics: "While politics cannot be satisfactorily defined exclusively in terms of power, it is safe to say that power is always an essential element of politics." (Carr,

1946, p. 102). Hans J. Morgenthau, writing in the post-WW-II era, placed power at the center of his approach:

> International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in terms of a religious, philosophic, economic or social ideal. They may hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force, through divine intervention, or through the natural development of human affairs. But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 13).

Both Carr and Morgenthau were later named as the Classical Realists. This approach assumes states as the main actors in international relations and as unitary and rational actors whose aim is to survive. Interest is defined in terms of power, in contrast to Economics where it is defined in terms of wealth, and all states seek to maximize their power. Human nature plays a great part in this outcome because "the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men". (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 13) Morgenthau defined power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men." (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 13). According to him, the influence may be exerted "through orders, threats, persuasion, or a combination of any of these". (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 14)

Robert A. Dahl, using the metaphor of the police officer who makes the car drivers to turn left or right rather than go ahead defines power in the following way: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957, p. 203). Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz criticized Dahl and claimed that his approach focused on mere use of force and threats so ignored what they called "second face of power". They emphasized the importance of agenda-setting and decision-making in the communal and organizational

processes. They present the case of a discontented faculty member in an academic institution. He refrains from airing his complaints in the academic meeting because he is afraid that his act will be considered as an expression of disloyalty, or knowing the thoughts of his colleagues on the issue he will constitute a minority of one, or aware of the law-making process in the institution he knows that his proposed remedies will be pigeonholed permanently. As a result Bachrach and Baratz argue "to the extent that a person or group – consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power." (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, p. 949) In a later study, they pointed the importance of authority and influence in the relationship between A and B. Again referencing Dahl's definition of power, where B complies with A's demands after A exerts power over B, they claim that the compliance may or may not be result of only power. If A threatens B with the possibility of imposing sanctions, B may comply with A's demands not because of the fear of deprivations but because of accepting A's values. Thus the result is hybrid because A tried to exert power but in fact exercised authority over B (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, p. 641).

K. J. Holsti criticized Morgenthau on the grounds that in his work it is ambiguous whether power is a means to an end or an end itself since he defined politics as "struggle for power" (Holsti, 1964, p. 179). Furthermore, Holsti identified the elements of power in a more detailed way and the interactive nature of a relationship revolving around power. His findings may be summarized as the following:

1. Influence (an aspect of power) is essentially a means to an end. Power is, just as money, is an instrument and states use it primarily for other

goals such as prestige, territory, souls, raw materials, security or alliances.

2. While influencing B to do X, A uses a base of capabilities in its efforts. A capability is any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement.

3. The act of influencing involves a relationship between A and B and if this relationship covers any period of time, it may be called a process.

4. If A wants B to do something, but B cannot get A to do a similar thing, it may be argued that A has more power over B. Power, therefore, is a quantity. But as a quantity it is only meaningful when compared to the power of others. Power is therefore relative. (Holsti, 1964, p. 181)

In addition, Holsti reveals the dependent and interactive nature of a power relationship. The model proposed by Dahl (Dahl, 1957) reflects only a one way relationship. In reality, it is multilateral. While A influences B to do X, B also has some influence over B and it causes A to do Y. There is a feedback mechanism. Imagine that for example, that state A, after making threats, persuades B to lower its tariffs on the goods of state A. If B complies and reduces the tariffs, then it may prompt state A to reward state B in some manner. There is also another aspect of power which might be named as anticipated reaction. State A may wish B to do X, but afraid that if it tries to influence B, B will do Y instead of X, which is more unfavorable to A's interests. This case is also valid for another actor, C, for example, who comes into play and does another thing in reaction to A's influence over B and its response. He also points to "negative power" where A influences B not to do X (Holsti, 1964, pp. 183-184).

Susan Strange, building her analysis on the International Political Economy (IPE) approach, developed the concept of structural power. Even though her approach resembles to the second-face of power developed by Bachrach and Baratz, she maintains that structural power is more than the power of agenda-setting. She argues that structural power

> confers the power how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises. The relative power of each party in a relationship is more, or less, if one party is also determining the surrounding structure of the relationship (Strange, 1988, pp. 24-25).

On the face of discussions regarding the weakening of the US hegemony in the 1980s, she compared Japan and the US according to their role in the global economic structure and claimed that while Japan's power in finance is relational, the US has structural power. She emphasized the level of control the US enjoys over the financial bodies and argues that "the process of equalization if it ever happens will take a long time and would involve radical reform of the international economic organizations over which the US still has constitutional veto power." (Strange, 1990, p. 273) At this point, it would suffice for one to remember the structure of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) where the victorious powers of the Second World War[7] enjoy enormous power with regard to right to veto the resolutions. G. John Ikenberry showed the importance of the pre-war coalitions and post-war institutional structure in his detailed study. The institutions serve a great purpose in order-settling following major wars. The victors preserve their rights to control the system which is in fact a reflection of their new power status following the war while at the same time restraining themselves. They want to legitimize their control while trying to

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[7] The United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia (as successor of the Soviet Union) and China.

build trust between themselves and the unequal powers. In this way institutions serve

the purpose of decreasing the compliance costs:

> The institutional model of order building is based on a potential bargain between unequal states after the war. The leading state—driven by a basic incentive to conserve its power wants a legitimate order that will reduce its requirements to coerce. The greater the asymmetries of power after the war, the more this circumstance should be at the front of the leading state's postwar thinking. Likewise, the sharper the power asymmetries, the more weaker and secondary states will be worried about domination and abandonment. This is where the possibility for an institutional bargain enters, particularly if other circumstances exist that allow states to be confident that institutions will in fact restrain power and lock in policy commitments. (Ikenberry, 2001, p. 258)

Robert Gilpin also argued that the nature of international relations which is

based on power struggle did not change since the ancient times. He suggests that he

takes a different stance:

> [a] stance based on the assumption that the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia. International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy. The classic history of Thucydides is as meaningful a guide to behavior of states today as when it was written in the fifth century B.C. (Gilpin, 1981, p. 7).

Gilpin suggests that as other social and political systems, international

systems are established with the purpose of advancing some economic or political

interests of some actors. As a result, "the particular interests most favored by these

social arrangements tend to reflect the relative powers of the actors involved"

(Gilpin, 1981, p. 9) His basic assumptions may be summed up as the following:

1. An international system is stable (i.e., in a state of equilibrium) if no

   state believes profitable to attempt to change the system

2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., if there is an expected net gain).

3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.

4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.

5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established (Gilpin, 1981, pp. 10-11).

With the development of quantitative methods in the study of International Relations, the concepts developed by the early scholars received increasing criticism. Kenneth Waltz, considered being the founder of Neo-Realism or 'Scientific Realism', criticized Morgenthau regarding his approach to the concept of power, his emphasis on human nature and non-scientific character of his research. Instead he proposed an approach based on structure. He argues that "a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units" (Waltz, 1979, p. 79). Rather than the choices of states, it is the system[8] that determines their foreign policy behavior. He also separated the realm of internal politics from international politics. In national politics, an effective government has a legitimate monopoly over the use of force

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[8] Morton Kaplan identified six distinct international systems: 1) the balance of power system, 2) the loose bipolar system, 3) the tight bipolar system, 4) the universal system, 5) the hierarchical system and 6) the unit veto system (Kaplan M. A., 2005, p. 34).

however in international politics there is no mechanism to prevent the private use of force. While the national system is not one of self-help, the international system is. (Waltz, 1979, p. 104) In his view, states may increase their power by internal and external balancing. In internal balancing, states increase their military power or economic capabilities. In external balancing, states ally with other states in the system and form blocs. (Waltz, 1979, p. 118) According to Waltz, power is not an end itself and states have more important priorities under the conditions of anarchy:

> In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security. Increased power may or may not serve that end (Waltz, 1979, p. 126).

While Waltz is named as defensive realist, John J. Mearsheimer developed, as he calls it, 'offensive realism' (Mearsheimer, 2001) He differed from Morgenthau, as Waltz did, regarding the stability of a multipolar world. Instead, he suggests that a bipolar world is more stable. Contrary to Waltz, however, he argues that states aim at maximizing their power:

> There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 2).

Mearsheimer suggests that this situation is a result of fear, because states fear each other. Three features of the international system cause this fear: a) the absence of central authority, b) states always have some offensive military capability, c)

states can never be certain about other states' intentions (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 3). He defines power as "specific assets or material resources that are available to a state" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 57). His main assumptions maybe listed as the following:

1. The international system is anarchic,

2. Great powers possess some offensive military capability so states are potentially dangerous to each other,

3. States can never be certain about other states' intentions,

4. Survival is the primary goal of great powers,

5. Great powers are rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 30-31).

Kenneth E. Boulding in his study titled *Three Faces of Power* proposed that three types of power exist. They are threat power (the power to destroy), economic power (the power to produce and exchange) and integrative power (the power to create relationships as legitimacy, respect, friendship, love and so on). According to Boulding, they are symbolized by stick, carrot and hug, respectively (Boulding, 1989, p. 10). He emphasizes the importance of creating legitimacy and suggests that without legitimacy both threat and riches are 'naked'. Hierarchical power cannot survive unless it can be legitimized. For this reason, integrative power is the most dominant and significant form of power, in the sense that neither threat power nor economic power can achieve very much in the absence of legitimacy (Boulding, 1989, p. 10).

Joseph S. Nye points out to the difficulty of developing a definition of power, which is a highly contested concept, accepted by all. (Nye, 2011, p. 5) He

emphasizes the importance of specifying the scope and the domain of power. Who is involved in a power relationship refers to the scope of power while what topics are involved refers to the domain of power. He gives the example of pope. Saying that pope has power over Christians does not tell much about the relationship. He has power over Catholics but no power over Protestants (scope of power). He may exert his power on some issues but not over some other issues such as birth control (Nye, 2011, p. 6). A policy-oriented concept of power depends upon a specified context to tell us who gets what, how, where, and when (Nye, 2011, p. 7). Nye also coined the term 'soft power' (Nye, 2004) which will be also discussed in the following pages. He regards it as the third face of power:

> First Face: A uses threats or rewards to change B's behavior against B's initial preferences and strategies. B knows this and feels the effect of A's power.
>
> Second Face: A controls the agenda of actions in a way that limits B's choices or strategy. B may or may not know this and be aware of A's power.
>
> Third Face: A helps to create and shape B's basic beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. B is unlikely to be aware of this or to realize the effect of A's power (Nye, 2011, p. 14).

Not surprisingly, power plays an important role in international relations. If power is like money in Economics, then the distribution of power among states should have some consequences. According to the power transition theory developed by A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, conflicts such as wars are more common, the more evenly distributed power is between potential belligerents. If there is an

imbalance which suggests that one side appears very likely to win in case of war, war is unexpected because the weaker side will be deterred from resisting (Organski & Kugler, 1980). On a regional basis, Douglas Lemke argues that

> the more unequal the distribution of power within a region, and specifically the greater the share of regional power held by the regionally strongest state (Regional Power), the less likely will be interstate conflict within that region, and specifically the lower the incidence of wars and disputes. (Lemke, 2010, p. 32)

While the general term 'power' may seem as an abstract concept, it becomes concrete when states convert their resources into different types of power and choose the most suitable one (generally combined with other types of power) among them to reach their goals in a specific field. In the next part, different dimensions of power (economic, military and soft power) will be illuminated.

2.3. BASES OF POWER

States mobilize their capabilities in order to realize their objectives. As K. Holsti points out "it is difficult to understand how much influence an actor is likely to wield unless we also have some knowledge of the capabilities that are involved" (Holsti, 1964, p. 184). It is for that reason states spend a lot of time estimating one another's capabilities, especially their abilities to do harm (Waltz, 1979, p. 131). In Holsti's view, a capability "is any physical or mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement". (Holsti, 1964, p. 181) In relating capabilities to influence, the skill of the leaders in mobilizing them is a crucial factor. The resources of a state in themselves are effectively inert. The leadership of a country 'activates'

these resources (Smith M. A., 2012, p. 14). Intangible factors such as leadership and national morale have to be taken into account (Holsti, 1964, p. 185).

Then what are the capabilities of states or their power bases? According to Hans J. Morgenthau elements of national power may be both tangible and intangible and they may be listed as the following:

1. Geography: Being the most stable factor, geography may provide advantages or disadvantages to states. Even with the technological and military developments, its importance cannot be ignored. Geography may help a state defend itself or make it open to invasions. While historically Russia has been open to invasions from West, since there are no geographic obstacles on the Western parts of Russia, however the enormous landmass controlled by Russia which 'swallowed the invaders' helped Russia both survive the attacks of Napoleon and Hitler. On the other hand, the USA, separated by the oceans from other continents, managed to isolate itself from the European conflicts. (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 80-82)

2. Natural Resources: It is another relatively stable factor in national power. A nation totally self-sufficient or nearly self-sufficient with regards to food enjoys great advantage over another state that is not self-sufficient. Secondly, control over raw materials necessary for industrial production and waging of war is also an important aspect of power. Other basic minerals such as copper, lead, manganese, sulphur, zinc, aluminum and nickel may be also added to the list of important elements. Amounts of coal and iron production have been considered historically important factors. Thus it is not surprising that Great Britain, self-sufficient in coal and iron, was the one great world

power of the 19th century. New materials may gain importance through time due to technical developments, for example oil gained a strategic character starting with the First World War as uranium became important following the development of nuclear technology. Morgenthau explains the super-power status of the US and the Soviet Union upon being self-sufficient in many types of raw materials and control over at least access to the sources of those raw materials which they do not themselves produce (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 82-86).

3. Industrial Capacity: As having vast amount of necessary resources for waging war is an important advantage, it is not significant alone unless the same state has the industrial capacity to process these raw materials and transform them into industrial products. This fact points to the difference between the potential and actual power. Having vast resources of iron, coal and manganese is important for producing steel. Yet, one should have steel mills to produce steel and more importantly, it should be able to produce weapons such as tanks, missiles or aircraft by using these raw materials. Only then the actual power of a state can be observed. Industrial capacity has tangible and intangible dimensions: the quality and productive capacity of the industrial plant, the know-how of the working man, the skill of the engineer, the inventive genius of the scientist, the managerial organization. As the rise of Germany in the last quarter of the 19th century against France was a result of decreasing industrial capacity of France in relation to Germany, there is an important correlation between the level of national power and industrial capacity. (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 86-88)

4. Military Preparedness: The elements of national power contribute to the military capabilities of a state. "Military preparedness requires a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued". (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 88) Technological innovations and the quality and quantity of the armed forces constitute the most significant factors of military power. Technological innovations such as the invention of fire-arms or artillery in the 15th century may change the course of history as the nuclear weapons did in the 20th century. Secondly, the quality of military leadership also determines the level of national power. The *blitzkrieg* tactics used by the German Army during the Second World War provided Germany great superiority over France whose high command relied on a strategy based on defending the Maginot Line. Thirdly, the military power is dependent upon the quantity of men and arms and their distribution among the different branches of military establishment. (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 88-91)

5. Population: Though population is an important element of national power, it does not mean that the larger the population of a country, the greater the power of that country. Still, without a large population it is impossible to establish and keep going the industrial plant necessary for the successful conduct of modern war; to put into the field the large number of combat troops to fight on land, on the sea and in the air. It is for this reason that imperialistic countries such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy stimulate population growth with all kinds of incentives. The age distribution within a

given population is an important element too. All other things being equal, a nation with a relatively large population of maximum potential usefulness for military and productive purposes (roughly between twenty and forty years of age) will have an advantage over another state in whose population the older age groups predominate. (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 91-94)

6. National Character: Certain qualities of intellect and character occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than in another. Militarist social and political structure of Germany throughout history have paved the way for the aggressive character of German foreign policy while anti-militarism, aversion to standing armies and compulsory military service are permanent traits of the American and British national character. The national character has given Germany and Russia an initial advantage in the struggle for power, since they could transform in peacetime a greater portion of their national resources into instruments of war (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 96-100).

7. National Morale: National morale is the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or war. It is put to test during the times of crises. No policy can be successful without public support so autocratic regimes that do not take the wishes of the people into consideration cannot rely upon much popular support as the examples of the Czarist Russia and Austria during the WW-I (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 100-104)

8. The Quality of Diplomacy: The most important and of the more unstable factor with regards to national power is the quality of diplomacy. The quality of a nation's diplomacy combines different power factors into an integrated whole, gives them direction and weight. Diplomacy is the brains of national power, as national morale is its soul. A nation which can boast of all other elements of power, but not of a diplomacy commensurate with them, may achieve temporary successes through the sheer weight of its natural assets but in the long term it will suffer many weaknesses. At this point, the successful strategies employed by Bismarck with the aim of isolating France and German foreign policy that faced failures following Bismarck's dismissal in 1980 would suffice to show the importance of the quality of diplomacy. (Morgenthau, 1948, pp. 105-108)

According to Kenneth N. Waltz, ranks of states are determined by their scores on all of the following factors: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. Given the hardship emanating from measuring a state's capability with regard to all of the factors mentioned above (some of them are intangible), Waltz argues that "we need only rank them roughly by capability" (Waltz, 1979, p. 131)

John J. Mearsheimer's approach is based more on military power because of the offensive character of his theory. According to him states have two kinds of power which are closely related: Latent power and military power. "Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power; it is largely based on a state's wealth and the overall size of its population" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 55). He argues that great powers need money, technology and personnel to build armies and to fight wars. Military power is "based largely on

the size and strength of a state's army and its supporting air and naval forces." (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 56) The important argument he proposes is the primacy of the land forces even in nuclear age because in his view air force and navy are not useful for conquering territory: "The most powerful states, therefore, are those that possess the most formidable land forces" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 56). Even though he gives more weight to material capabilities in his analysis, he admits that non-material factors sometimes provide one combatant with a decisive advantage over the other. Those factors include, among others, strategy, intelligence, resolve, weather and disease (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 58).

According to Joseph S. Nye, national power consists of military power, economic power and soft power (Nye, 2011). He gives importance to material capacity as well as non-material factors. He also developed the concept of smart power which he describes as the following: "Smart power is the combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction" (Nye, 2011, p. xiii). He argues that attention should also be paid to leadership skills in converting resources into realized power because resources alone cannot guarantee the expected outcome: "Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership – what I call smart power. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge." (Nye, 2011, p. 8)

As mentioned by the scholars above, in addition to resources which can be measured in an easier way, intangible factors such as leadership and quality of diplomacy are also very important. A skilled leadership should have the knowledge of a nation's power capacity. Its foreign policy objectives should be commensurate with the levels of national power. At this point the policy of prestige, as a concept

employed by Morgenthau, may be useful because perceptions in international relations also shape policies. This policy is executed by two main tools: Diplomatic ceremonial and display of military force (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 50). According to him its purpose is "to impress upon the other nations the power one's own nation actually possesses or which it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses". (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 51) Germany in the late 1930s is a good example of a country following a policy of prestige because it was successful in convincing the other nations of Germany's superiority.[9] Policy of prestige may also be followed in order to gain time to increase the national power. For example while Britain was open to invasion by the Germans in 1940-41, its prestige, far exceeding at that time its actual military strength, was probably the most important single factor deterring the Germans from the attempt to invade it. However, if there is a great gap between the real and perceived levels of power then it becomes a risky policy of bluff as the example of Italy under the leadership of Mussolini whose armies faced serious defeats in Greece and the North Africa showed. (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 59). As Holsti sums up, "where there is a great discrepancy between perceptions and reality, the results to a country's foreign policy may be disastrous" (Holsti, 1964, p. 184).

Paul Kennedy in his detailed study on the rise and fall of Great Powers, highlights an important point regarding the accumulation of power. Even though there is a relation between national wealth and national power, "there is a noticeable

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[9] It should be taken into account that from the Roman Empire to the Monghol Empire, from the Napoleonic France to Nazi Germany, the myth of invincibility served the purposes of conquerors. In this respect propaganda as a method of influencing the external audience, the statesmen and citizens of other countries, was best used by Germany as the examples of movies such as *Feldzug in Polen (Victory in Poland), Kampf um Norwegen Feldzug 1940 (The Battle for Norway 1940 Campaign)* and *Sieg im Westen (Victory in the West)* which emphasize the superiority of German soldiers, arms and the *blitzkrieg* tactic in addition to the 'peace and security' the occupied peoples enjoyed. This myth of invincibility suffered a great loss following the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943 with the surrender of German 6th Army (approximately 300, 000 soldiers) under the Command of Field Marshall Friedrich Paulus after being encircled by the Soviet forces.

'lag-time' between the trajectory of a state's relative economic strength and the trajectory of its military/territorial influence". (Kennedy, 1988, p. xxiii) It is not surprising because an expanding economic power would choose to increase its wealth and welfare of its citizens at the first stage of its expansion as the examples of Britain in the 1860s and the USA in the 1890s show. However half a century later priorities may change and that state may start investing in armaments. (Kennedy, 1988, p. xxiii) Thus one should be careful not to fall into the trap that increasing economic power in parallel leads to an increase in the military power at the same time.

2.4. TYPES OF POWER

In the light of the discussions above, different types of power need to be elaborated. In this study, three types of power, namely economic, military and soft power will be considered as the main types of power. In the following pages different types of power with also a focus on their indicators will be explained.

2.4.1. Economic Power

It has been observed that there is a very clear connection in the long run between a Great Power's economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as a military power (Kennedy, 1988, p. xxii). It is not surprising because the resources a state has its disposal are converted into military might since a large military force depends on money and armaments. This is more visible especially after the 19th

century and William H. McNeill names this process as the 'industrialization of war" (McNeil, 1982, p. 223). Mearsheimer also underlines the importance of wealth:

> Wealth is important because a state cannot build a powerful military if it does not have the money and technology to equip, train, and continually modernize its fighting forces" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 61)

The basic economic resources such as the size and quality of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)[10], per capita income, the level of technology, natural and human resources, political and legal institutions for markets, as well as a variety of shaped resources for special domains, such as trade, finance and competition matter in economic power (Nye, 2011, p. 52). Based on their economic power, states use tools such as tariffs, quotas and rules that control access to their markets, legal sanctions, manipulation of exchange rates, creation of natural resources cartels, 'checkbook diplomacy', and aid for development (Nye, 2011, p. 54).

In this part, sources of economic power will be identified and it will support the arguments in the following section regarding measuring power and classifying states based on their power. The Stages of Growth Model developed by W. W. Rostow (Rostow, 1991) in 1960 will be employed to explain the emergence of powerful economic actors from a historical perspective. In this respect, a special focus will be on British economic development both before and after the Industrial Revolution. This focus will enable us to analyze the 'Great Specialization" (Findlay & O' Rourke, 2009, p. 411) that occurred in the late 19th century among states as they could be classified either as industrial or primary-producing economies. In this

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[10] Even though both Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP) are used for measuring economic power, there is a difference between them. GDP stands for an estimated value of the total worth of a country's production and services, within its boundary, by its nationals and foreigners, calculated over the course on one year. GNP stands for an estimated value of the total worth of production and services, by citizens of a country, on its land or on foreign land, calculated over the course on one year.

respect, historical periods that coincided with power shifts such as the primacy of the US economically after the First World War will also be mentioned. Quantitative data will be provided as to enable us make comparisons between states since power is a relative concept.

The Development Model suggested by Rostow, also known as Modernization Theory, will be very helpful in understanding and explaining the emergence of industrialized nations which will be the topic of the following pages. According to Rostow, societies pass through five stages which have different characteristics:

1. Traditional society
   - characterized by subsistence agriculture or hunting & gathering; almost wholly a "primary" sector economy;
   - limited technology;
   - A static or 'rigid' society: lack of class or individual economic mobility, with stability prioritized and change seen negatively.

2. Pre-conditions to "take-off"
   - external demand for raw materials initiates economic change;
   - development of more productive, commercial agriculture and cash crops not consumed by producers and/or largely exported;
   - widespread and enhanced investment in changes to the physical environment to expand production (i.e. irrigation, canals, ports);
   - increasing spread of technology and advances in existing technologies;
   - changing social structure, with previous social equilibrium now in flux;

- individual social mobility begins;

- development of national identity and shared economic interests.

3. Take-off

- manufacturing begins to rationalize and scale increases in a few leading industries, as goods are made both for export and domestic consumption; the "secondary" (goods-producing) sector expands and ratio of secondary vs. primary sectors in the economy shifts quickly towards secondary;

- textiles and apparel are usually the first "take-off" industry, as happened in Great Britain's classic Industrial Revolution.

4. Drive to Maturity

- diversification of the industrial base; multiple industries expand & new ones take root quickly;

- manufacturing shifts from investment-driven (capital goods) towards consumer durables & domestic consumption;

- rapid development of transportation infrastructure;

- large-scale investment in social infrastructure (schools, universities, hospitals, etc.)

5. Age of Mass Consumption

- the industrial base dominates the economy; the primary sector is of greatly diminished weight in economy and society;

- widespread and normative consumption of high-value consumer goods (e.g. automobiles);

- consumers typically (if not universally), have disposable income, beyond all basic needs, for additional goods (Rostow, 1991, pp. 4-17)

With the emergence of the nation-state, states tried to establish strong and effective bureaucratic structures and the finance bureaucracy was responsible for collecting taxes. In addition to increasing production and trade, effective methods of taxation broadened the financial resources of states and enabled them to build up bigger standing armies (see Appendix I, II and III).

Population is an important indicator both for economic and military power however it must be treated with caution. As the first of all, the larger the population of a country, the larger its military force. "Population size matters a lot, because great powers require big armies, which can be raised only in countries with large populations. States with small populations cannot be great powers." (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 61) Secondly, it means a larger work force for the national economy and as a result, a larger Gross National Product (GNP). Yet it should be treated with caution because large population does not always mean great wealth as the examples of India and China show but "great wealth does require a large population" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 62). On the opposite, the French officials were worried observers of the British wealth in the 18th century and they were surprised because England had an area only one quarter that of France, and yet had a total population that was almost half and a total trade that was twice as great, along with an enormous shipping fleet and the ability to carry and service a much larger public debt (Findlay & O' Rourke, 2009, p. 347) (see Appendix IV for the population figures of the Great Powers).

Britain, had managed to establish a trade network even before the Industrial Revolution and trade was one of the main sources of British wealth that the French

were jealous of. It had companies like the East India Company and also served as a mediatory of goods (porcelain, spice, silk, etc.) from the East and re-exported them to other European countries. The British East India Company received a Royal Charter from Queen Elizabeth in 1600. It had monopoly over British trade conducted east of the Cape of Good Hope. As a private company it organized the conquest of India and ruled it from 1757 to 1858 with its private armies. It was the company that contributed a great deal to the establishment of British Empire. (Bowen, 2006, p. 1) To show the strength of the company, it would suffice to mention its amount of stock. In March 1773, its amount of stock reached 3,188,028 £ shared among a total of 2,826 share-holders (Bowen, 2006, p. 86). In addition, other trade-houses were established and had many share-holders. These merchants especially profited from the Atlantic trade (Chapman, 2002, p. 81). A merchant class emerged and this helped the wealth accumulation. Trade statistics of Britain reflect this fact and show that Britain had a positive balance in trade.

In the second half of the 18th century, with increasing levels of manufacture in Britain, it started to import raw materials more and re-exported finished goods to other countries. The amount of imported goods decreased as shown in the trade statistics (see Appendix V and Appendix VI) and the share of manufactures in British imports decreased while the foodstuffs and raw materials increased (see Appendix VII).

The accumulation of wealth inside the country at the hands of merchants and share-holders of British trade companies, manufacturers and farm owners contributed to the strength of state structure. While in times of peace it provided greater tax revenues, at times of war, since the state expenditures increased at enormous levels and state needed more money to conduct war, wealth was mobilized to meet the

financial needs. State, on the other hand, with the help of its naval forces, secured sea-lanes and new markets, which will be touched upon in the next part on military power. French officials were aware of the Britain's "industrial-naval complex" as a French Ministry of Foreign Affairs official declared in 1738 that "trade makes the wealth of England which owes to it her navy and the multiplication of her manufactures" (Findlay & O' Rourke, 2009, p. 347). At this point, it would suffice to state that domestic wealth was employed as a source of loans (treasury-bonds for example served this purpose) as can be observed in the figures (see Appendix VIII). Another fact the figures reveal is that, wars became more costly as a result of more complicated weaponry, armaments and bigger armies.

GNP maybe used as an indicator of economic power but it also should be treated with caution since two countries with the same amount of GNP may differ with regards to their economic power. This is especially the case following the Industrial Revolution. While one of them maybe specialized in industrial production and has a smaller population than the other, the other may have a weak industrial base. In this respect, the Industrial Revolution which first took place in Britain beginning from the 1760s and then in Continental Europe and North America in the following decades, marked the beginning of a new era (Mokyr, 1999, p. 2).

Even though it is a matter of discussion, the Industrial Revolution was preceded by an Agricultural Revolution in Britain. In the mid-17th century, new laws were promulgated which secured the land ownership rights of the larger land owners and abolished the last feudal tenures which in turn led to capital accumulation. In the 18th century, the consolidation movement, which meant the incorporation of smaller agrarian holdings into larger estates, took place. In addition, new techniques in farming led to an increase in the agricultural output while also positively influencing

livestock breeding output (Wyatt, 2009, p. 26). As a result, grain production more than doubled in the period 1600 to 1800 and new fodder crops appeared and these developments meshed to support livestock through the winter months (Wyatt, 2009, p. 27). At the beginning of the 19th century, 40% (four out of ten people) worked in the agricultural sector. This figure was higher in other parts of Europe, ranging from 60% to 80%. In 1850, agricultural workers constituted 22% of the population in Britain. With increasing agrarian worker productivity, even though the amount of agrarian workers decreased, Britain became self-sufficient in the middle of the 19th century as it witnessed also a population increase (Wyatt, 2009, p. 35). (see Appendix X for the population growth in Britain).

Returning to Rostow's model, for Britain the late 18th century was the period when take-off started. The dates differed among states depending on the political and economic stages they went through. Though Rostow himself also admits it is not easy to mark certainly the beginning of these stages, he at least roughly provides satisfactory dates as shown in Table 2.1 below. As a result of the take-off stage, production patterns and manufacturing outputs of states became more differentiated when compared to the past centuries and these developments effectively influenced the distribution of power.

Table 2.1 Preconditions for Take-off: Some Dates for Nine Countries

Country	Initial date: long sweep (say)	Initial Date: Short Period (say)	Take-off Begins
England (UK)	1688 (Glorious Revolution)	1750	1780s
United States	1763 (End of Seven Years' War	1788	1840s
France	1660 (Colbert)	1789	1830s
Germany (Prussia)	1713 (Frederick William I)	1815	1850s
Russia	1696 (Peter the Great)	1861	1890s
Japan	1853 (Commodore Perry arrived in Tokyo Bay)	1868	1880s
China	1842 (Opium Wars)	1895	1950s
Turkey	1789 (Selim III)	1908	1930s
Mexico	1877 (Porfirio Diaz)	1920	1940s

Source: (Rostow, 2008, p. 55)

Britain witnessed a boom in cotton textiles, mining and iron-producing industries with the introduction of coal and steam-powered machines such as the Newcomen and Watt engines. It was a revolution in a sense because the developments changed the economic, political and social structure of the country with the introduction of new modes of production and technology. One may ask why the Industrial Revolution took place in Britain, rather than other places. Among

many factors, according to Wyatt, especially those factors contributed to this development:

> […] Great Britain's geographical location in Europe, rich natural resources, the marriage of science and technology and inspired inventors, revised thinking about national economics, a ready supply of capital for investment and risk-taking entrepreneurs, government support for innovation and economic growth, an available labor supply, the rapid development of commercial economy, and an ever expanding worldwide trade network to secure raw materials and markets (Wyatt, 2009, p. 40).

Starting from the Industrial Age, energy consumption may serve as an indicator for economic development. As it is a sign of industrialization, demand for energy sources dramatically increased following the industrialization in the late 18th century. Coal was the main source of energy in addition to wood at this period. The coke coal was developed and allowed further developments in the field of metallurgy such as smelting pig iron in the blast furnaces. The production of higher quality iron would first enable building engines and machinery and then the railways. Coal production and consumption in Britain may be illustrative at this point. Britain, already in the year 1700 mined 3 million tons of coal a year, six times the rest of the world combined. In 1800, it rose to 11 million tons, in 1830, 22 million tons, in 1845, 44 million tons and in 1870, more than 100 million tons (Wyatt, 2009, p. 41). It consumed 11 million tons of coal in 1800, 22 million tons in 1830, 44 million tons in 1845 and 88 million tons in 1870 (Wyatt, 2009, p. 54).

In parallel to coal, iron output also dramatically increased. In addition to its usage in different fields of industrial production, iron is also heavily used in the defense industries so it is considered as a strategic material. It affects the war-making capability of a nation. In the production of armaments such as swords, bayonets, rifles and artillery pieces and ammunition iron was crucial in the 19th century as steel

is today. With the development of steam engine and explosive shells, it also replaced wood as the main source of shipbuilding material because of the vulnerability of wooden ships. The first examples of those ships, known as ironclad type, were built in the 1850s and they were covered with armor plates. Later ships were totally built of iron and in the following period steel. Because of these reasons, the amount of iron/steel production may be considered as an indicator of economic power. Iron output in Britain, reflects this trend as shown in the table below.

Table 2.2 British Pig Iron Output 1760-1850

Year	1000 Tons
1760	30
1785	50
1796	125
1806	244
1823	455
1830	677
1840	1,400
1850	2,200

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 56)

State support for the building and maintenance of infrastructure was an important determinant for the development of industry. Even before the age of railways, with the initiative of the government, turn-pike roads and canals were built which decreased the travelling time and the cost of transporting bulky material. It was a dramatic step with regards to the integration of the different regions into

national economy once separated by time and distance. The mileage of inland waterways was 1,399 miles in 1760 whereas it reached 3,876 miles in 1830, with an annual compound growth of 1.4 % (Ville, 2006, p. 300). Regions abundant with raw materials were connected to industrial zones, urban centers and ports.

Innovation appears as an important dimension of economic power. The first signs of industrialization were seen in the textiles sector which increased the output dramatically thanks to a few inventors. John Kay invented the 'flying shuttle' in 1735 which doubled the output of a single weaver. On the side of spinning, the 'spinning Jenny' of James Hargreaves, the water frame of Richard Awkwright, and the mule of Samuel Crompton which was in 1825 replaced by Richard Roberts' 'automatic mule' improved productivity (Findlay & O' Rourke, 2009, p. 319). Captain Thomas Savery introduced his steam engine known as the 'Miner's Friend' in the late 18th century. It was very useful in coal and iron mines which faced serious flooding problems (Wyatt, 2009, p. 54). In 1838, Britain had the first electronic telegraph line (from Paddington to West Dayton, in total 13.5 miles) in the world thanks to the efforts of William Fothergill Cooke who developed a telegraph device (Solymar, 1999, p. 53). It was soon to become the main means of communication first all over Britain, then Europe and the USA and to give birth to what is also called 'The Victorian Internet' (Standage, 1998). The length of wires owned by British Electric Telegraph Company was approximately 30,000 miles in 1861 and with an increase it reached 50,000 miles in 1867 (Solymar, 1999, p. 59) Innovation, in conclusion, is closely related to the education levels of the society and at the beginning of the 20th century almost all men and women in the country were literate (see Appendix XI for the estimated illiteracy levels).

In parallel to the increasing education levels, number of patents also increased as can be seen in Table 2.11. Britain had well-established higher education institutions such as the University of Oxford (established before 1167) (The University of Oxford, 2014), University of Cambridge (established in 1209) (The University of Cambridge, 2014), University of St. Andrews (1413) (The University of St. Andrews, 2014), University of Glasgow (1451) (The University of Glasgow, 2014), University of Aberdeen (1495) (The University of Aberdeen, 2014) and University of Edingburgh (1583) (The University of Edinburgh, 2014). Scientific knowledge was transformed into technology with the aim of solving problems in production processes (such as pumping waters out of coal mines) or increasing production (as in the textiles sector). Carrying coal in a faster way was also the idea behind railways. In her detailed study on the English patent system, *Inventing the Industrial Revolution*, Christine MacLeod showed the correlation between patents and industrial growth. The patent system was established as early as 1660 and later it was revised many times to meet the new needs. (MacLeod, 2002). Patentees, while registering their inventions, declared their aims of invention while some of them are unspecified. In a total of 4480 patents granted between 1660 and 1799, 30,8 % of patentees declared their aim of invention as to save capital; 29,3 % to improve quality; 5,2 % to save time, 4,2 % to save labor (MacLeod, 2002, p. 160). George Stephenson, known as the "Father of Railways" improved rails and his rail gauge known also as "Stephenson Gauge" (1,435 mm), is the standard gauge in the world today. He built the first inter-city railway system in the world, the Liverpool-Manchester Railway in 1830. At a competition to choose the best locomotive for that line, he designed his famous "Rocket" which took part in the contest and won it with

a speed of 45 m.p.h.. Intellectual and scientific knowledge and innovation, in sum are indicators of development.

In Table 2.11, it is possible to observe that before the Industrial Revolution, starting from the 19th century, Britain had started to produce scientific knowledge, commercialize it and transform into technology. The share of patents on power sources and textiles machinery forms the majority of patents for capital goods. This led to a boom in the textiles and mining sectors especially (see Appendix XII).

Table 2.3 English Patents Granted 1700-1809

Year	Number of Patents
1700-09	22
1710-19	38
1720-29	89
1739-39	56
1740-49	82
1750-59	92
1760-69	205
1770-79	294
1780-89	477
1790-99	647
1800-09	924

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 48)

With increasing mechanization in manufacturing, a boom especially in the textiles sector (especially in cotton goods) is observed in the 19th century Britain. Textiles sector was the leading industry to use Rostow's terminology. The figures show that after meeting the internal demand for finished cotton products, Britain started to export the surplus to other countries. Not surprisingly, the share of cotton products in British exports dramatically rose up starting from 1784. Mechanization decreased the production costs of British goods relative to the goods produced by labor extensive methods in other countries. Underdeveloped manufacture industries of those countries in Asia and Eastern Europe could not compete with cheaper and higher quality British goods. Increasing exports led to greater wealth in Britain as the total value of exports rose up as can be seen in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Cotton Production and Exports in Britain 1750-1849

	Raw Cotton (000 lbs)	Exports of Piece Goods (million yards)
1750-9	2,820	-
1760-9	3,531	-
1770-9	4,797	-
1780-9	14,824	-
1790-9	28,645	-
1800-9	59,554	-
1810-9	96,339	227
1820-9	173,000	320
1830-9	302,000	553
1840-9	550,000	978

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 51)

The distribution of British exports by product group is given in Table 2.5. It is seen that cotton goods started to dominate exports when compared to other product groups such as woolen goods and other manufactures.

Table 2.5 British Exports, 1784-1856, by Product Group

(percent)

	1784-86	1794-96	1804-6	1814-16
Cotton Goods	6	15.6	42.3	42.1
Woolen Goods	29.2	23.9	16.4	17.7
Other Textiles	10.6	10.6	7.4	8.2
Other Manufactures	38.3	37.4	23.8	17.5
Foodstuffs and Raw Materials	15.9	12.5	10	14.5
Total (£000)	12,690	21,770	37,535	44,474

	1824-26	1834-36	1844-46	1854-56
Cotton Goods	47.8	48.5	44.2	34.1
Woolen Goods	16.3	15.2	14.2	10.5
Other Textiles	9.1	9.8	10.9	12.7
Other Manufactures	19.2	17.6	18.7	23.8
Foodstuffs and Raw Materials	7.6	8.9	12	18.9
Total (£000)	35,298	46,193	58,420	102,501

Source: (Findlay & O' Rourke, 2009, p. 314)

As a direct result of increasing trade and savings, capital formation increased. It served two purposes: As the first of all, it contributed to the development of financial institutions and tools such as banks, stock exchange and bonds. In the second-half of the 19th century, London became the center of world's financial life with its lively London Stock Exchange. British Pound was the reserve money and Britain was one of the most important creditors. The number of banks and branches flourished all over Britain (see Appendix XIII).

Secondly, increasing levels of savings provided domestic investors a source of capital and in turn enabled the realization of ambitious projects such as the railway projects, extension of the current industrial complexes and made it easier for would-be entrepreneurs to start business. Table 2.7 shows the level of investment as percentage of GNP in Britain. It is clear that, the availability of financial sources determines the fate of infrastructure projects and industrial developments. Developing countries may fall into middle-income trap (a situation where a country stuck in GDP per capita levels between 1,000 and 12,000 USD for 2010) and as a result they would have low investment ratios, slow manufacturing growth and poor labor market conditions. In order to overcome middle-income trap, countries should invest more in education and infrastructure in addition to boosting internal demand and finding new markets (Kharas & Kohli, 2011). Table 2.6 shows that the investment level in Britain during the Industrial Revolution was over 10 per cent starting from 1781.

Table 2.6 Gross Domestic Investment and Gross National Product in Britain, 1761-1850

(£m per annum)

	Domestic Investment	GNP	Investment as % of GNP
1761-70	7.5	93	8.06
1771-80	9.0	98	9.18
1781-90	13.0	111	11.70
1791-1800	17.5	134	13.05
1801-10	17.5	161	10.06
1811-20	22.5	203	11.08
1821-30	32.5	278	11.70
1831-40	42.0	372	11.29
1841-50	54.5	460	11.84

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 110)

A developed transportation infrastructure, important for the integration of the national and global economy is a pre-condition for economic growth. Since in an export-oriented economy manufacturing is not solely for domestic consumption, carrying goods at a reasonable price and time are important factors. Yet, improving transportation network be it roads, bridges, canals, ports or railways, is always a costly process. Table 2.7 shows that Britain was able to establish a railway network and this was possible only with available capital for investment.

Table 2.7 Construction of the Rail Network 1830-1900

	km	Annual Compound Growth (%)
1830	157	
1840	2,390	28.1
1850	9,797	13.7
1860	14,603	3.7
1871	21,558	3.6
1880	25,060	1.4
1890	27,827	1.0
1900	30,079	0.7
Annual Compound Growth (%)	7.7	

Source: (Ville, 2006, p. 305)

As an economy becomes export-oriented, it should firstly have markets to export goods and a developed merchant marine to carry on its trade. Innovation and investment play an important role in shipbuilding too. Britain was named "the mistress of the seas" for many decades due to its huge merchant fleet. The first steamship built of iron to go to sea was the *Aaron Manby* in 1821 which passed the British Channel. The first Atlantic crossing by steamship, by the *Savannah* from the United States happened in 1818; the engines were used for only 80 hours of the trip, but nevertheless consumed the whole of the vessel's coal supply. Benefiting from the later developments in the engine technology, in 1838, the British and American

Steam Company's *Sirius* crossed from London to New York via Cork with 100 passengers; and the *Great Western* did the crossing from Bristol in 15 days (Seamen, 2003, pp. 35-36). In Table 2.8 it is possible to observe the growth of British merchant fleet both in number and capacity.

Table 2.8 Shipping Registered in the United Kingdom 1700-1900

	Sailing Ships		Steamships		All Ships	
	Number	000 Tons	Number	000 Tons	Number	000 Tons
1790					13,557	1,383
1800					15,734	1,699
1810					20,253	2,211
1820	21,395	2,436	34	3	21,969	2,439
1830	18,876	2,168	298	30	19,174	2,202
1840	21,883	3,680	771	88	22,654	2,768
1850	24,797	3,397	1,187	168	25,984	3,565
1860	25,663	4,204	2,000	454	27,663	4,659
1870	23,189	4,578	3,178	1,113	26,367	5,691
1880	19,938	3,851	5,247	2,724	25,185	6,575
1890	14,181	2,936	7,410	5,043	21,591	7,979
1900	10,773	2,096	9,209	7,208	19,982	9,304
Annual Compound Growth (%)	-0.9	-0,2	7.2	10.1	0,4	1.7

Source: (Ville, 2006, p. 303)

Thirdly, accumulation of wealth provided Britain a source of leverage in international relations as Britain became a capital-exporting country. Developing countries has lower rates of saving when compared to developed economies thus

they need foreign capital for industrialization or building huge infrastructure projects while developed countries have surplus capital and export it and use this as a tool in international relations. This leverage is best observed in the 19th and early 20th century Ottoman economy. Borrowing for the first time during the Crimean War in 1854, Ottoman external debt increased every year and at the end its economy collapsed in 1881. Along with France, Britain was the other major loan provider for the Ottoman Empire. As Murat Birdal shows in his detailed study, the European Powers had total control over Ottoman public finance and indirectly in politics as a result of the Ottoman debt that was around 106 million Pounds in 1881.The Ottoman Government had to cede its most liquid revenue sources to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (widely known as Duyûn-u Umumîye in Turkish) and this body became a state inside state with its own large bureaucracy and security forces to fight contraband trade of materials such as tobacco (Birdal, 2010). Decisions about providing or refusing credit demands may be based on political priorities rather than financial considerations such as motive for profit. The Ottoman Empire wanted to build a railway line between Istanbul and Baghdad and a German company won the bid in 1903 but lacked the necessary amount of money for the project. It then looked to French and British markets for additional credit. Russia and France became allies as a result of the alliance treaty signed in 1894. For this reason even though financial circles found the project very profitable and supported it, the French Government refused to provide credits, afraid that it would offend Russia and cause isolation of France against Germany as it was in the period before the 1894 Treaty. (Taylor, 1954, p. 411) Russia, as a country with annexation designs on Eastern Anatolia, on its part was well aware that any railway project would enhance the Ottomans' offensive and defensive capabilities since it would allow quicker means of troop

deployment and movement. The building of the railway, later known as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway caused much rivalry between the Powers (McMurray, 2001). To show the importance of economic sources in international relations during the Cold War it would suffice to remember the example of the Aswan Dam project proposed by Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 which caused a great rivalry between the USA and Soviet Union and the Suez Crisis in 1956 when his demand for credit was refused (Dougherty, 1959). In a similar way, Turkey failed in receiving credits from the World Bank in the 1970s for its huge Southeast Anatolia Project which envisaged building of many dams on the Tigris and Euphrates due to the objections of Syria and Iraq. Thus Turkey had to finance that project with its internal sources and as a result it slowed down. In more recent times, following the global economic crisis in 2009, Germany played a great role in the discussions regarding the aid packages to some of the EU countries as the biggest taxpayer in the EU. Germany often resisted demands for fresh loans through the European Central Bank and in return demanded internal reforms and restructuring from the debtors (Evans-Pitchard, 2013).

Industrialization was not under British monopoly even though it started there. Other countries especially in Europe and the North America started to modernize their economy. The United States seem to experience a boom in industrialization since the beginning of the 19th century but it was still lagging behind the United Kingdom until 1913 as can be seen in Table 2.9.

Table 2.9 Per Capita Levels of Industrialization 1750-1913

(U.K. in 1900=100; 1913 boundaries)

Country	1750	1800	1860	1913
Austria-Hungary	7	7	11	32
Belgium	9	10	28	88
France	9	9	20	59
Germany	8	8	15	85
Italy	8	8	10	26
Russia	6	6	8	20
Spain	7	7	11	22
Sweden	7	8	15	67
Switzerland	7	10	26	87
United Kingdom	10	16	64	115
Canada	-	5	7	46
United States	4	9	21	126
Japan	7	7	7	20
China	8	6	4	3
India	7	6	3	2
Brazil	-	-	4	7
Mexico	-	-	5	7

Source: (Findlay & O' Rourke, 2009, p. 323)

The varying level of industrialization among states also has a geographical distribution. With the Industrial Revolution, manufacturing methods and rules of trade changed dramatically and it caused the 'Great Specialization' which also caused stark contrast between economic structures of different regions. Firstly, as shown in Table 2.10 below, regarding the economic growth, gap between Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe deepened in favor of Western Europe and Western Offshoots (such the USA, Canada and Australia). Secondly, the Western offshoots, once colonies at the periphery, managed to have better economic conditions than the metropolis, as a comparison between them and Western Europe proves. Thirdly,

starting from the early decades of the 19th century, Japan managed to increase its GDP per capita, which was less than the Asian countries' levels in the 16th century.

Table 2.10 GDP per Capita in Various Regions of the World, 1500,1820 and 1913

(1990 International Dollars)

	1500	1820	1913
Western Europe	774	1,232	3,473
Western Offshoots	400	1,201	5,257
Eastern Europe and USSR	483	667	1,501
Latin America	416	665	1,511
Asia (exc. Japan)	572	575	640
Japan	500	669	1,387
Africa	400	418	585
World	565	667	1,510

Source: (Engerman & O'Brien, 2006, p. 455)

The Global North-South divide of our century has in fact emerged in the 19th century. At this point, Kenneth Pomeranz warns us about the dangers of Euro-centric approaches and comparisons between different regions. For him, the reason of the 'Great Divergence' is more than a European 'miracle'. He argues that, in addition to many other factors, European development was based on exploitation of non-Europeans and more generally access to overseas resources (Pomeranz, 2000, p. 4). Jeremy Black is also critical of Paul Kennedy for his materialism and Western-centric approach. According to Black, Kennedy excludes Great Powers such as Japan, China and the Ottoman Empire and only accepts Western powers as Great Powers:

One conclusion such a perspective leads to is that a great power is perhaps best defined as a power (of some sort) that people at the time thought was great, that is, thought needed to be taken into account seriously in policy-making. From that perspective, it is hard, for example, not to call the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire a great power in 1550 and for a long time afterwards, no matter what our current view on how it fits in with materialist theories about great powers (Black, 2008, p. 1).

In parallel to their GDP per Capita levels, the share of the countries in world manufacturing output also differed. While European countries were dominating world manufacturing, there were differences among them too as shown in Table 2.11. By the year 1900, the United Kingdom's share started to decrease though it was still on the second rank behind the USA. France lost its comparative superiority over German States after the 1860s. Jeff Horn criticizes this view and contrary to the 'Anglocentrics', he argues that French industry grew rapidly between 1815 and 1850 and France was able to compete with Britain. (Horn, 2006, p. 3) The newly appointed Chancellor of Prussia, Otto Von Bismarck gave a speech to the *Landtag* (Parliament of the German States) in 1862 after it refused to approve the military budget. Known as the "Blood and Iron Speech", he underlined the importance of military power for the unification of Germany. He stated: "It is not by speeches and majority decisions that the great questions of the age will be decided - that was the big mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by blood and iron". (Schulze, 1991, p. 92) German States under the leadership of Prussia waged war against the Habsburg Empire in 1866 and France in 1870 and as a result of its victories on the battlefield, Prussia declared the establishment of unified German Empire, the Second Reich. These political developments were influenced by the growing German economy. By the year 1900, Germany's output almost doubled France and Germany was the second biggest economy behind the United Kingdom. Russia too had increased its

level of manufacturing as a result of its industrialization initiatives. Another striking fact is that, the Third World, consisting of countries such as China, India/Pakistan and the rest of the world, which had dominated the world manufacturing in the 1750s with a share of 73 %, lost its superiority by the 1900s, down to the level of 11 %. From the table below it is possible to infer that, nations that failed to industrialize lost their wealth and economic power.

Table 2.11 Relative Shares of World Manufacturing Output, 1750-1900

	1750	1800	1830	1860	1880	1900
(Europe as a whole)	23.2	28.1	34.2	53.2	61.3	62.0
United Kingdom	1.9	4.3	9.5	19.9	22.9	18.5
Habsburg Empire	2.9	3.2	3.2	4.2	4.4	4.7
France	4.0	4.2	5.2	7.9	7.8	6.8
German States/ Germany	2.9	3.5	3.5	4.9	8.5	13.2
Italian States/Italy	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5
Russia	5.0	5.6	5.6	7.0	7.6	8.8
United States	0.1	0.8	2.4	7.2	14.7	23.6
Japan	3.8	3.5	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.4
Third World	73.0	67.7	60.5	36.6	20.9	11.0
China	32.8	33.3	29.8	19.7	12.5	6.2
India/Pakistan	24.5	19.7	17.6	8.6	2.8	1.7

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 149)

The Federation of German States was a collection of 38 sovereign states which had predominantly agriculture based economies at the beginning of the 19th century. In Prussia, the largest of them, agricultural sector comprised approximately two-thirds of the population while those in industry and commerce made up less than 25 percent. The capital accumulation that took place between the years 1815-1848, the first extended period of calm since the beginning of the Thirty Years' War (1618-

1848), paved the way for industrialization (Fohlin, 2007, p. 15) . With the *Zollverein* (customs union among German states) in 1834, market expansion took place. Railways began to spread in the 1840s and marked a new era. The Bessemer process[11] revolutionized the German iron and steel industry because less brittle steel was produced which was necessary for casting rails. Railway construction encouraged investment in other areas and prompted the founding of new companies in the 1850s (Fohlin, 2007, p. 16). The unification of Germany boosted industrialization as a result of single government and central bank that avoided policy divergences and instability of the past. In addition, a war indemnity, 5 billion Francs – one quarter of German GDP, was paid by France. (Fohlin, 2007, p. 21) The liberalization of incorporation law led to a rapid increase in joint-stock companies. In the 38 years between 1871 and 1908, fifteen times more joint-stock firms, with about three times the capital, were founded than in the previous 45 years. Both political and economic conditions were suitable for industrialization (Fohlin, 2007, p. 21). Following Bismarck's resignation in 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II would follow a more assertive foreign policy, the *Weltpolitik.* (Taylor, 1954, p. 328) Like Italy, as a late-comer to the club of Great Powers, Germany needed new markets and resources for its industrialization in order to compete with Britain and France. It started looking for colonies in Africa and Asia and challenged Britain and France as the Morocco Crisis of 1905 showed (Taylor, 1954, p. 410).

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[11] The Bessemer Process is described as the following: "This technological advance was actually made independently and virtually simultaneously by two men, Sir Henry Bessemer of England and ironmaster William Kelly of Kentucky. In the 1850s both men began experimenting with the idea of removing excess carbon from molten pig iron by blowing air throughout it. This step, they discovered, caused carbon and other impurities in molten iron to combine with oxygen and burn off. At that point, measured amounts of carbon and other materials could be added to the iron to create steel. This innovation almost miraculously reduced the time needed to process five tons of steel from one day to fifteen minutes." (Hillstrom, 2005, p. 11)

The United States of America was once a colony of the Great Britain consisting of thirteen North American colonies. The American Independence War against Britain (1775-1783) ended with success and the United States of America was recognized as an independent state. It was separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean thus gained security from invasion. As Mearshemier puts forward; "large bodies of water are formidable obstacles that cause significant power-projection problems for attacking armies" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 44). That is the reason why both the Britain and the USA have never been invaded by another great power. It was 'a land of abundance' with regards to natural resources and land (Klein, 2007, p. 5). Maury Klein describes it as an 'economic hothouse' and highlights both the abundance of natural resources and ambition of American people in rapid industrialization:

> A hothouse is an artificial environment in which plants can be grown under ideal conditions. The American economy, or at least its potential, had always been robust even in its natural state. It offered newcomers staggering amounts of land teeming with resources ranging from thick forests to ample quantities of game and fish to mineral ores. Nature provided a plentiful supply of water, fertile soil, and a variety of climates for growing crops. Hard work and dogged perseverance was required to wrest a living from this strange and often hostile world, but the resources for success were always there. Without them no amount of diligence and ambition could have transformed the wilderness into an economic powerhouse. Without diligence and ambition little would have been done with the most abundant supply of resources (Klein, 2007, p. 6).

John Steele Gordon emphasizes also geography and cultural factors in industrialization. According to him, firstly similar to Britain's situation, America's isolation from other continents led it to maintain a smaller army and as a result lower levels of taxation. These resources were channeled for investment (Gordon, 2005, p. XIII). Though this issue is the subject of next part, it would suffice here to say that similar to Britain, there was an opposition against a large standing-army in America

because it was seen as a tool of Stuart and Cromwellian autocracy of the 17th century Britain. Militia or 'the citizen-soldier' was the main source of the US Army in case of war (Black, 2008, p. 87). Secondly, political tradition inherited from Britain which was founded on the idea that law, not the state, was supreme, played a great role. The concept of liberty that individuals had inherent rights, including property rights, fostered the development of wealth.[12] He then compares Argentina and the USA; both states enjoyed the same assets such as abundance in natural sources but GDP per capita in Argentina is less than one third of the USA. The reason is that its political culture was based on Spanish imperial culture and prevented rather than fostered wealth creation. (Gordon, 2005, p. XIV) Resonating Gordon, Gilpin also underlines the importance of political and economic domestic structure for growth:

> The most critical factor in the growth of power of a society is the effect of the political and economic order on the behavior of individuals and groups. In the pre-modern world, the most significant effect was on the military efficiency of the society (i.e., on the incentives of individuals to contribute to the

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[12] At this point, it is necessary to compare the Ottoman Empire to Britian in order to understand the importance of secured property rights for capital formation. The lands suitable for agriculture were mostly considered to be state property for which a system known as "*timar*" or "*ikta*" was in use. In some ways similar to fiefs in Western Europe, but also with many differences, land was granted to service nobility under some conditions. The aim of the state was to sustain small-scale family farms, known as the "çift", an area that can be plowed by two oxens. Rather than promoting the growth of market-oriented large scale farming which would have capital to invest and develop new techniques, state policy was to avoid emergence of large land-holdings. This policy worked well until decentralization of the state and losing of efficacy of state structure. At the beginning of 19th century in Macedonia and Western Anatolia families such as Tirsiniklioğlu and Karaosmanoğlu (known as the *ayân*) emerged and they had large lands and population under their command. These large farms were called as "*çiftlik*". Some of these families later became the provincial bourgeoise. Secondly, private property rights were always unsecure as the system of "*müsadere*" or confiscation were widespread as the empire's territory and wealth of its citizens considered to be property of the sultan. It was Mehmed II who for the first time used this method. He ordered the execution of Çandarlı Halil Paşa and confiscated his property. It was later applied in the following centuries in order to fight corruption but it was generally abused for financial and political purposes by rival factions inside the state. Property dedicated to pious foundations, "*vakıf*", was by Islamic Law exempt from *müsadere* since they were considered to be property belonged to God. Many people donated real-estate or houses to pious foundations at their wills and made a condition that his family members would be in the board of trustees (*mütevelli heyeti*). Since they would receive a salary for their service, it was a good way to secure income for future generations. Still they were not always immune to state confiscation as the example of Mehmed the Conqueror shows; in order to meet the financial needs of his military campaigns, he confiscated approximately 20,000 villages owned by pious foundations in Anatolia. His son, Bâyezid cancelled the decision which caused dissent in religious circles and population. *Müsadere* was abolished with the Imperial Decree of 1839 ("*Tanzimat Fermânı*")

military power of the state). In the modern world, the effect of state policies on the incentives of individuals to contribute to the economic growth of the society is of great importance (Gilpin, 1981, p. 103).

The iron/steel industry played the major role in the industrialization of the USA. At the beginning of the 19th century, the iron industry was protected by tough tariffs. The American producers did not need to apply new methods contrary to the British producers and they went on relying on charcoal instead of coke. It was because the British iron could not compete due to the high tariffs and the domestic demand was very high. The iron/steel industry produced 54,000 tons of iron and less than 1,000 tons of steel in 1810. Due to the high demand, iron output reached 200,000 tons. In a huge country like America, the railways played a vital role in connecting the cities. The railway boom also triggered growth in the iron/steel industry. Small family companies of the past could not meet the demand and as a result corporations emerged with large scale production capacity. In 1860, iron production reached 920,000 tons and steel production reached 12,000 tons. (Hillstrom, 2005, p. 10) Following the American Civil War (1861-65) this increase in output went on and it increased dramatically in the 1870s as a result of applying the Bessemer process in steel production. In 1870, the Great Britain produced more than five-times steel than the United States. But by 1890, the US total was nearly 4.3 million tons, about 700,000 tons more than Great Britain and by 1895 the United States accounted for almost half of the steel produced in the entire world. (Hillstrom, 2005, p. 16) Andrew Carnegie established his giant corporation and applied measures for decreasing costs (an anti-unionist stance, long working hours) by relying on cheap migrant workforce. Pittsburgh has become the center of steel industry and by 1901 Carnegie alone produced more than Britain and his corporation was the first billion-dollar corporation of the world. (Hillstrom, 2005, p. 18)

Taking the high level of international trade and increasing costs of war into consideration at the beginning of the 20th century; in 1910 Norman Angell argued that wars have become obsolete. He stated that "military and political power give a nation no commercial advantage; that it is an economic impossibility for one nation to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or for one nation to enrich itself by subjecting another" (Angell, 1910, p. vii).

The last decades of the 19th century were marked by power shifts. Even though Russia and Austria (Austria-Hungary after 1867) started to lose their earlier place, because they were 'less industrialized'; however they still protected the Great Power status. New industrializing actors such as the United States, Germany, Italy and Japan emerged. Britain has managed to achieve a remarkable degree of global preeminence by 1815, "thanks to its adroit combination of naval mastery, financial credit, commercial expertise and alliance diplomacy" (Kennedy, 1988, p. 151). This hegemony was to be challenged especially by Germany.

> As the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend its territorial control, its political influence, and/or its domination of the international economy. Reciprocally, these developments tend to increase the power of the state as more and more resources are made available to it and it is advantaged by economies of scale. The territorial, political, and economic expansion of a state increases the availability of economic surplus required to exercise dominion over the system. The rise and decline of dominant states and empires are largely functions of the generation and then the eventual dissipation of this economic surplus (Gilpin, 1981, p. 106).

The United States started to be considered as a Great Power from 1892 on when the European Great Powers upgraded the rank of their diplomatic representatives to Washington from minister to ambassador (Kennedy, 1988, p. 194). Italy also emerged as a great power. Declaring its independence in 1861 and fighting a war of independence against Austria with the aim of unifying Italy (The

Risorgimento / Resurgence Movement), its independence was accepted by the Great Powers in 1866. Italy had the ambition of becoming a Great Power since its independence but it was not treated equally by other Great Powers:

> After her unification in the 1860s Italy liked to be regarded as a great power, but it was only in the capacity of an ally of the Central Powers after 1882, and as a member of the Concert dealing with the affairs of the Ottoman Empire that she could claim anything like equality with the other five (Bridge & Bullen, 2005, p. 1).

The reason for this treatment was Italy's backwardness when compared to other Great Powers as R. J. B. Bosworth names it as the "least of the Great Powers". Even after a decade of economic expansion from 1896 to 1907, there was a development gap between its northern and southern regions, industrialization was limited; it had a limited railway network and almost had no coal sources. It was dependent 90% on British coal. (Bosworth, 2005, pp. 2-3) However two factors contributed to its Great Power status. As the first of all, it had a population of 35 million and a rich history. Secondly, it was treated as a Great Power by the others as the turn of the century approached. For Germany, it would be an ally against Austria-Hungary in a future war to solve the 'German question' and for Britain a client state helping controlling the Mediterranean. Italy was willing to participate in international mechanisms and offer its services for the title of Great Power while its relative weakness was ignored:

> Despite all these figures, and despite Italy's consistently disastrous military record, European statesmen went on talking as though Italy were a Great Power. 'The Concert of the Great Powers', which, notwithstanding its formal demise under Metternich, continued until 1914 to act as a *de facto* steering body for world international affairs, always accorded Italy membership. No international conference could be held without an Italian delegation. If a Great Power force was needed for police duties in Macedonia or Crete, then Italy would be invited as a possible member (Bosworth, 2005, p. 5).

The First World War (1914-18), was the result of the 'Middle Power Crisis' as named by Kennedy (Kennedy, 1988, p. 198). The rising powers like Germany tried to change the *status quo* in their favor. However this understanding which blames Germany for the outbreak of war in 1914 has been criticized recently. Sean McMeekin who studied published and unpublished Russian archival materials following the end of the Cold War when they became accessible, heavily criticizes this traditional view. He argues that "the war of 1914 was Russia's war even more than it was Germany's". (McMeekin, 2011, p. 5) German political and military elites had a sense of being encircled by France and Russia. Especially increasing power of Russia was a serious concern as Chancellor Theobald Von Bethman-Hollweg muttered in his diaries: "Russia grows and grows. She lies on us like a nightmare." (McMeekin, 2011, p. 6). The new Military Service Law in France increased the duration of obligatory military service from two to three years and Russia started its 'Great Program' for rearmament. Industrialization and population trends also contributed to these fears. German elites felt that time was not on their side: "Indeed, there existed in German ruling circles a desperate belief that time was running against Germany and that war alone could rejuvenate the Reich" (Hamilton & Herwig, 2005, p. 76). 'The Great Program', approved by Tsar Nicholas II in July 1913, envisaged increasing the number of troops by 500,000, establishment of 560 additional battalions on the M-Day (the first day of mobilization), investment in all calibers of artillery and military aviation (Hamilton & Herwig, 2005, p. 104). This reform would increase the number of Russian Army to 2.2 million by 1917/18 (roughly triple of Germany) which was already the largest in Europe in 1914 with a number of 1.42 million. (McMeekin, 2011, p. 6) In addition to railways and infrastructure, Russian industry and especially military industry was developing with

French financial sources. This was logical for France since a strong and fast-mobilizing Russian Army would force Germany to a two-front war, which was 'the nightmare of Bismarck". Russia had started its industrialization program especially in the 1890s. At the beginning of the 20th century it had the second largest track in the world and 40 percent of it had been laid in the 1890s. Foreign loans played a very important role in this economic growth as it would be impossible to industrialize an economy which had serious deficits. Boris Ananich highlights this role, especially after the introduction of gold standard in 1897: "Henceforth, the empire's loans were often needed not only for military expenditures, but to maintain the gold standard" (Ananich, 2006, pp. 413-414). To show the importance of French leverage by granting loans to Russia, it is enough to note that during the Morocco Crisis of 1906, Russia supported France in return for credit. On 22 April 1906, it secured a loan worth of 2,250 million francs, of which 1.2 million was paid by France alone. (Ananich, 2006, p. 417).

Table 2.12 shows the economic indicators of the warring parties in 1914. It shows also the leader position of the USA in all areas except population. The First Word War was the first war of attrition and a total war that necessitated mobilization of all sources of nations. In an 'industrialized' trench war of machine guns, fortifications, barbed wires, long-range artillery on the land, air combat by aircrafts in the air and fleets of large warships in the seas, production of arms and ammunitions was vital. "In fact nearly every combatant experienced a shortage of munitions in 1915, as their artillery might fire as many shells in one day's barrage as both sides in the American Civil War expended in the entire conflict" (Morrow, 2006, p. 80). The French Army, at the beginning of German offensive from March

through July 1918, fired 250,000 shells daily (Morrow, 2006, p. 269). Then it is not surprising that the entry of the USA, the most industrialized power, into the war on the side of Allies in 1917, changed the course of war. Jacque Bariéty emphasizes the importance of steel production especially and the role played by the US in the outcome of the war (see Table 2.14 for a comparison of steel manufacturing output of the Powers):

> It could even be said that Germany was able to stand up to the Allied coalition for more than four years because it had become the leading steelmaking power of Europe, its production, having surpassed Britain's before 1900, far exceeding France's and being second only to that of the United States. One can only wonder about the outcome had the United States not entered the war in 1917, along with its tremendous population and military manpower, its financial and industrial strength. It can be said, however, that victory went to the side possessing the greatest quantity of steel (Bariéty, 2005, p. 30).

Table 2.12 National Income, Population, and per Capita Income of the Powers in 1914

	National Income	Population	Per Capita Income
United States	$ 37 billion	98 million	$ 377
Britain	11	45	244
France	6	39	153
Japan	2	55	36
Germany	12	65	184
Italy	4	37	108
Russia	7	171	41
Austria-Hungary	3	52	57

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 243)

Victors of the First World War drew maps of the world, changed borders and created new states (such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Syria, etc.) from the territories of vanished empires. Their designs created a huge resentment on the side of the defeated powers, especially Germany. France tried to crush Germany forever by dictating its terms. John Maynard Keynes, who was present as an expert in the British delegation during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, resigned in disgust, naming it as a "Carthaginian peace" (Boyce, 2005a, p. 1). The Allies, set up an intergovernmental organization to solve conflicts, avoid future wars and keep the international system under their control to maintain the *status quo*. The League of Nations was established on 28 June 1919 for these purposes. Its structure reflected the power shifts of the post-war era. Member states formed the Assembly in which every state had one vote and for most decisions unanimity was necessary. The Permanent Secretariat was comprised of experts to help the Secretary General run the business of the League. The most important organ was the League Council which acted as the executive body (Van Ginneken, 2006, p. 64)[13].

At the beginning, there were four permanent members; the United States refrained from being involved in the League, namely Britain, France, Italy and Japan. They were the Principal Allied and Associated Powers according to the Article IV of the Covenant. Also according to the Covenant, four other members would be selected as temporary members and until they are elected, Belgium, Brazil, Greece

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[13] "Only the Council was entitled to supervise the reduction of armaments (Article VIII) and to preserve the territorial integrity of the member states (Article X). Disputes or threats of war had to be brought to the attention of the Council (Articles XI, XII, XV) and the Council could propose what steps should be taken if a member state failed to carry out a decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Article XIII). Disputes that could not be settled by arbitration or judicial settlements were to be submitted to the Council, which would draw up a report. Any member could ask for a settlement by the Assembly, but only after the Council had been informed (Article XV). According to the collective security article (Article XVI), it was the Council's duty to recommend which military forces the members should put at the disposal of the League. The Council could even inquire into disputes between non-member states and take measures to prevent hostilities (Article XVII)." (Van Ginneken, 2006, p. 64)

and Spain shall be members of the Council (Ellis, 1928, p. 139). In 1922, the number of seats in the Council was increased, four permanent seats and six non-permanent seats. With the admission of Germany in 1926, it was also given a permanent seat and total number of seats rose up to 14. Two semi-permanent seats were created for Poland and Spain and for the remaining seven non-permanent seats, were reserved for countries of Latin America, Asia, Little Entente, the British Commonwealth and former neutral countries for duration of three years. Japan left the League in 1933 after its hostilities in the East. (Van Ginneken, 2006, p. 65) The same year Germany also left the League, the Soviet Union started to occupy its permanent seat until it was expelled in December 1939. Though Italy was on the side of the victors at the end of the war, as a 'dissatisfied' power, under the leadership of Benito Mussolini it also decided to withdraw in 1937. Its ineffective structure and non-presence of the United States, the economically and militarily strongest state in the world, paved the way for the League's failure to deal with the aggressors in the 1930s.

In 1924, writing *Mein Kampf* during his prison sentence, Hitler reacted to the harsh clauses of the Versailles Treaty with regards to the territorial adjustments which caused loss of 65,000 km^2 including mineral rich areas such as Alsace-Lorraine, Saar and eastern plains, breadbaskets of Germany and 7,000,000 population (Slavicek, 2010). His language fits well to the distinction developed by Carr between 'haves' (satisfied) and 'have-nots' (dissatisfied) (Carr, 1946, p. 212) as he emphasizes the 'have-nots' characteristics of post-war Germany. For Hitler, the new and 'small' Germany was not enough for the nation. Agriculturally, it was not self-sufficient. He suggested acquiring new territory "in which work and bread could be secured for the increasing population" (Hitler, 1939, p. 117) and it was vital for the survival of the nation:

One must calmly and squarely face the truth that it certainly cannot be part of the dispensation of Divine Providence to give a fifty times larger share of the soil of this world to one nation than to another. In considering this state of affairs to-day, one must not allow existing political frontiers to distract attention from what ought to exist on principles of strict justice. If this earth has sufficient room for all, then we ought to have that share of the soil which is absolutely necessary for our existence (Hitler, 1939, p. 118)

As a result of the humiliation suffered at the Versailles Treaty, huge reparations ($5 billion), three-digit hyper-inflation caused by internal disorder, spread of Communist ideas and strikes; German people voted for the National Socialist Democrat Party (NSDP) led by Adolf Hitler who promised for order, wealth and prestige. Coming to power in 1933 as Chancellor and following President Hindenburg's death in 1934 serving as President, Hitler represented the idea of revisionism and started to execute his plans in the following years.

Table 2.13 shows the iron/steel production of the Powers and it also reflects the political and economic developments in the first half of the 20th century: the USA's emergence as the largest economic power and Germany's rise and expansion to the second rank by recovering quickly after the First World War. By the year 1890, the United States became the largest producer of iron/steel. At the beginning of the century, Britain lost its second position to Germany. On the eve of the First World War, in 1913, Germany alone produced more than Britain, France and Russia combined. In 1920, Germany lost its position to Britain due to internal instability, loss of manpower, hyper-inflation caused by its defeat in the war. Russian production levels also decreased as a result of the internal turmoil and nationalization of steel mills following the 1917 Revolution. The Great Depression of the 1930s caused a steep decline in growth and investment and led to decreased demand for steel. Yet Germany started to recover and gained the second position again. French production

dramatically increased and for the first time France was the third largest producer of steel. Even though its production increased, Italy was still the 'least of the Great Powers'. The same period also reflects increasing level of industrialization for Japan as its production rose above France's.

Table 2.13 Iron/Steel Production of the Powers 1890-1938

(millions of tons; pig iron production for 1890, steel thereafter)

	1890	1900	1910	1913	1920	1930	1938
United States	9.3	10.3	26.5	31.8	42.3	41.3	28.8
Britain	8.0	5.0	6.5	7.7	9.2	7.4	10.5
Germany	4.1	6.3	13.6	17.6	7.6	11.3	23.2
France	1.9	1.5	3.4	4.6	2.7	9.4	6.1
Austria-Hungary	0.97	1.1	2.1	2.6	-	-	-
Russia	0.95	2.2	3.5	4.8	0.16	5.7	18.0
Japan	0.02	-	0.16	0.25	0.84	2.3	7.0
Italy	0.01	0.11	0.73	0.93	0.73	1.7	2.3

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 200)

The consolidation of the regime in Russia, industrialization efforts and the First and Second Five Year Plans seem to bear their fruits in the 1930s as production increased excessively. It had almost tripled production of France in 1938. Following the Revolution, a civil war against the White Army was waged until 1921. During that time, economy and monetary system came to the point of collapse. In 1921, to solve the problems New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced and it revoked the law that had nationalized all branches of industry previously. Private individuals were allowed to form small enterprises or to lease them from the state even though state maintained its total control over industries such as banking and mining. (Kenez,

2006, p. 47) In 1920 and 1921 due to bad harvest and structural problems of the economy, millions of people perished because of the famine (Kenez, 2006, p. 48). In the year 1924, agriculture sector started to recover and return to the pre-war production levels (Kenez, 2006, p. 63). Following Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin rose to power. He abolished some aspects of the NEP since it could not solve the problems of the Soviet economy such as unemployment and productivity (Gatrell, 2006, p. 393). He started collectivization of farms and the establishment of collective farms (*kolkhoz)* system with machine tractors stations and the ratio of collective farms reached to the level of 60% in 1930. This caused the influx of peasants to the cities but with violence order was maintained (Kenez, 2006, p. 85). Starting from 1928 on, the First Five Year Plan was introduced. Interpretation of its results varies because statistical data is not reliable. Official statistics show an enormous growth rate, 13.7 % yearly, between 1928 and 1941. Though it seems an exaggeration to many observers, the rapid increase in Soviet production is visible in many areas so 3.2 % of yearly growth between the same years seems as a realistic figure (Gatrell, 2006). The results may be summed up as the following:

> The total stock of capital more than doubled between 1928 and 1941; this increase was all the more remarkable, given the sharp fall in livestock herds. Defence production increased twenty-eight-fold during the 1930s (far in excess of total industrial production), imposing a heavy burden, particularly after 1936. The Stalin era witnessed Russia's emergence as a modern military power. The hallmarks were the new tank and aviation industries, supported in turn by steel, metalworking, fuel, chemicals and rubber production. (Gatrell, 2006, p. 397)

However, this expansion in the field of producer goods and defense took place at the expense of consumption goods because the capital was limited and

priority was given to investment in producer goods. This decision made the life quality worse:

> The decline in incomes meant poor diet, clothing, and housing for the urban population. Although bread remained available in the cities, meat and milk consumption fell significantly. Since the production of textiles actually decreased during this period, it is obvious that the standards of clothing also deteriorated (Kenez, 2006, p. 95).

With regards to the world manufacturing output levels for the same era, the USA held its position as the largest manufacturer of the world though its share decreased as a result of the Great Depression in the 1930s as seen in Table 2.14. Germany seems to have recovered from the war and held the second position. Britain as a decaying economic power kept the third position. Russia is the fourth power by doubling the share of France. As in steel production, Italy again showed the worst performance.

The figure shows that in Europe, in the face of falling Britain and France as Great Powers, Germany and Russia started to rise. They would soon try to change the *status quo* in their favor by using their economic base and transforming it into military might.

Table 2.14 Relative Shares of World Manufacturing Output 1880-1938

(percent)

	1880	1900	1913	1928	1938
Britain	22.9	18.5	13.6	9.9	10.7
United States	14.7	23.6	32.0	39.3	31.4
Germany	8.5	13.2	14.8	11.6	12.7
France	7.8	6.8	6.1	6.0	4.4
Russia	7.6	8.8	8.2	5.3	9.0
Austria-Hungary	4.4	4.7	4.4	-	-
Italy	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.8

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 202)

Figures for energy consumption of the Powers reflect their level of industrialization. It is natural that the USA as the most industrialized power of the world had the largest consumption of energy as shown in Table 2.15. The demand for energy gained importance with the introduction of oil as a source of energy. It brought many advantages in naval warfare too. In Britain, the shift from coal to oil in the Royal Navy was supported by Admiral John Fisher, the First Sea-Lord from 1904 to 1910 but it was during his friend Winston Churchill's tenure as the First Lord of Admiralty in 1911 the Royal Navy decided to use solely oil in its ships in the future however previously built ship still depended on coal (Rose, 2007, p. 32). Introduction of oil would bring the Middle East to the center of international conflicts in the following decades as it was used in cars, tanks, ships and aircraft. Oil brought many advantages both for merchant marine and naval forces:

It had double the thermal content of coal so that boilers could be smaller and ships could travel twice as far. Greater speed was possible, and oil burned with less smoke so the fleet would not reveal its presence as quickly. Oil could be stored in tanks anywhere, allowing more efficient design of ships, and it could be transferred through pipes without reliance on stokers, reducing manning. Refueling at sea was feasible, which provided greater flexibility (Dahl E. J., 2001, p. 51).

Table 2.15 Energy Consumption of the Powers 1890-1938

(in millions of metric tons of coal equivalent)

	1890	1900	1910	1913	1920	1930	1938
United States	147	248	483	541	694	762	697
Britain	145	171	185	195	212	184	196
Germany	71	112	158	187	159	177	228
France	36	47.9	55	62.5	65	97.5	84
Austria-Hungary	19.7	29	40	49.4	-	-	-
Russia	10.9	30	41	54	14.3	65	177
Japan	4.6	4.6	15.4	23	34	55.8	96.5
Italy	4.5	5	9.6	11	14.3	24	27.8

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 201)

Russia had oil resources along the Caspian Sea and started exploiting oil in the 1870s. In 1873 Alfred Nobel arrived in Baku and established the Nobel Brothers Oileum Company. In the following decades production increased and by the year 1901, Baku supplied 51 percent of world oil (LeVine, 2007, p. 15). Starting from 1908, the British started to invest in the field named Masjed e Suleiman in Iran. Within a year, the venture offered its stocks to the public and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later to become British Petroleum) was born. The field produced 5,000 barrels per day (BPD) in 1913; its production increased to 108,734 BPD by 1927. It was the only source of oil for Britain in the Middle East at that time (Rutledge, 2005, p. 23). In the aftermath of the First World War, Britain and France started to

implement their partition schemes in the Middle East. For Britain, three purposes determined its policy: Firstly to protect the Suez Canal, the shortest way to India; secondly since it was dependent on oil, to secure and maintain free access to the oil-rich regions of the Persian Gulf; and thirdly, to protect and expand its interests in the former Ottoman lands (Kamrava, 2005, p. 37). As a result states such as Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Arabia[14] were established. Britain had three airbases in Iraq and relied on them for protecting the oil rich areas of the Persian Gulf. Britain also had enormous interests in Iraq with regards to oil. As a result, when the British mandate in Iraq ended in 1932, it had secured its special rights for airbases and oil industry and thus retained its 'informal empire'. The Iraqi Petroleum Company had four equal share-holders (23,75 % for each), except for the 5% shares held by Calouste Gulbenkian: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British), Royal Dutch-Shell (60 % Dutch and 40 % British), Compaigne Française des Pétroles[15] (French) and Near East Development Corporation (American, a consortium of American companies, early in the 1930s Standad Oil got its control) (Silverfarb, 1986). Iraqi oil industry began to develop as a result of increasing investment and discovery of new reserve areas and it exported over 4,000,000 tons in 1937 (Silverfarb, 1986, p. 97).

The United States started extracting oil on its territory since 1859 in the area named Oil Creek in Pennsylvania but John D. Rockefeller who established the Standard Oil[16] in 1870, was the man beyond the development of oil industry (Yergin,

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[14] The Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire started in 1916 with the British support and led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Following the war, Hussein declared himself the King of Hejaz. His son Faisal was declared the King of Iraq, after his unsuccessful claims to Syria; his other son Abdullah was declared King of Transjordan (later Jordan). Iraq and Jordan were under British mandate. Of the three kingdoms established by the Hashemite Dynasty, only in Jordan monarchy is still intact. In Hejaz, Sharif Hussein lost its bid for power against Ibn Saud and had to abdicate and the Saud monarchy was established in 1926, since then the country is named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In Iraq, the military coup led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim against King Faisal II was successful and the monarchy was overthrown in 1958.
[15] It was renamed Total CFP in 1985, then Total in 1991.
[16] It was later renamed Exxon.

2008, p. 19). During the First World War, it provided 80% of Allies' oil supplies.

(Rutledge, 2005, p. 24) With the introduction of automobiles, the US demand for oil increased dramatically. As early as 1907, there were 143,200 registered automobiles. Its motorization rate of 1.65 per 1,000 was greater than Britain (1.56), France (1.02) and Germany (0.26). By 1913, there were 1,258,060 registered automobiles. By 1929, 55% of American families owned a car, 10 % owned two or more. The automobiles industry was also the biggest industry in the USA; in 1929 it had produced 85% of the world's cars (Rutledge, 2005, p. 13). With increasing demand for oil, the US authorities wanted to benefit from other sources of oil in other parts of the world order not to deplete domestic reserves. However, Britain had almost a monopoly over Iraq and Iran by using the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) with regards to oil and it tried its best to keep American companies away from these areas and allowed them only when they accepted its terms. It was very logical from Britain's perspective because as a Great Power it knew that control over resources provides advantage over others and oil was a rare and vital source. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Walter Hume Long, had rather unwisely told a meeting of the Institute of Petroleum Technologists in October 1921 that, 'if we secure the supplies of oil now available in the world we can do what we like,' a remark which was reported to the US Secretary of State by his Consul General in London (Rutledge, 2005, p. 25). In 1932, Standard Oil of California (Socal) struck oil in Bahrain. (Bronson, 2006, p. 17) This development brought Saudi Arabia, approximately 20 kilometers far from Bahrain, to the interest of investors, an area which had been ignored until that time. Both IPC and Socal tried to get concessions from King Abdulaziz ibn Saud. IPC was trying to block Socal's initiatives:

> It seemed that IPC's primary goal in obtaining the concession was not to
> make money for Saudi Arabia, or itself for that matter, but rather to keep

Socal out of the Middle East oil hunt. Because of the global oil glut, IPC did not intend to explore for oil if it won the Saudi concession (Bronson, 2006, p. 17).

In 1933, King Abdulaziz awarded Socal the concession and in return the company agreed to provide the king with a £30,000 interest-free loan and an annual payment £5,000 (Bronson, 2006, p. 17). Socal's subsidiary was named Californian Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc) and it merged with Texas Oil Company in 1936.[17] After a series of disappointing drills, Casoc found oil in 1938. The Dammam 7 well was producing 1,500 BPD in contrast to average production of American wells 100 BPD (Bronson, 2006, p. 18). As a result of these developments, the importance of Middle East and especially the Persian Gulf, once remote parts of the world, started to increase rapidly in American public and political circles. In the light of these discussions, it is evident that having rich resources of energy or securing control over other countries' sources plays a vital role for sustaining economic growth and economic control over other actors.

On January 13, 1935 the population the Saar region which was under the mandate of League of Nations since the Treaty of Versailles, voted for reunion with Germany (90.8 % in favor) in a plebiscite. The same year, March, 16, Hitler declared that Germany would introduce universal military system in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. Germany started to rearm itself which was forbidden according to the treaty. On November 1, 1936, the Italo-German Treaty was signed and 'axis' of revisionist states was created, on 25 November, German-Japanese Anti-Komintern Pact was signed. In the same year, the German forces entered Rhineland in violation of the Versailles Treaty. (Stackelberg, 2007, pp. 12-13) Italy had occupied Ethiopia in 1935

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[17] In 1944 it was renamed as Arab American Company, Aramco.

and the League of Nations could not do anything to stop Italian aggression. In the face of German violations too, they could not do anything.

In 1919, Sir Halford Mackinder published his book *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, after observing the possibility of Germany's acquiring the Heartland during the war, in order to avoid the same possibility again, he suggested the creation of buffer states between the Baltic and Mediterranean which would check German influence. He argued "It is a vital necessity that there should be a tier of independent States between Germany and Russia" (Mackinder, 1919, p. 196). The post-war agreements in Eastern Europe created new states and changed the borders. The 'haves' were Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes[18] while 'have-nots' were Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Afraid of Hungarian, Italian and Austrian revisionism, in the 1920s Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia created the Little Entente. France then concluded treaty of Friendship with each of these countries (Stackelberg, 2007, p. 282).

The situation in Eastern Europe in the 1930s is a good example to show the importance of supporting policies with financial tools. France tried to support these newly created or weak states in Eastern Europe through economic diplomacy in order to form a bulwark against Germany:

> Through the *Banque de France* credits were extended to central banks in Eastern Europe: to Poland in August and again in October 1931, to Romania in September, and to Czechoslovakia in October. […] It also allowed Romania to raise a loan of 575 million francs on the Paris market, and Yugoslavia to raise 675 million francs. In April 1932 French loans to the region for the preceding twelve months amounted to 1.2 billion francs (£9.6 million); and in June the government agreed to support Austria with 100 million of a 239 million schilling international loan (Boyce, 2005b, p. 121).

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[18] Renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.

However, after 1933 French position in Eastern Europe became weaker. As a result of the Great Depression, states started to follow a policy of autarky and étatism prevailed as the dominant economic idea. The commodity prices went down as demand decreased and it hurt economies based on agriculture seriously. France started to employ protectionism as a policy to overcome its economic problems and failed to support those states in Eastern Europe with trade relations and credits (Boyce, 2005b, p. 21). This Western policy paved the way for German economic penetration of Eastern Europe and brought it under the German sphere of influence as Rothschild and Wingfield underline:

> The agricultural price disaster was paralleled and compounded by the West's abrupt, and probably unnecessary, withdrawal of all its capital credits to East Central Europe in the midst of the Depression. Unnecessary because while the sums involved were critical for the area's stability (even though they had often been applied unwisely), they were a relatively small fraction of the Western creditors' total international investments. Industrial output, capital formation, and employment fell precipitously, with calamitous political repercussions. This politico-economic myopia of the West, which had been foreshadowed by France's persistent refusal to support its alliances in the area with adequate trade relations, virtually invited Nazi German penetration. Germany, in turn, did not intend to integrate East Central Europe into the world economy, but the reverse: Germany wished to tie it to its own economy and thus create an autarkic *Grossraumwirtschaft*[19], supplementing and facilitating its projected political and military conquest of Europe (Rothschild & Wingfield, 2000, pp. 19-20).

This German economic penetration was exerted by the clearing agreements. In this method of trade, Germany was able to import raw materials for its industry and food sources for its society while under the condition that with the money paid by Germany (kept in blocked accounts in the *Reichsbank*) these countries would import German commodities. Nazi Germany thus acquired control over the region's economy by first dominating its exports, then (through exports) controlling its imports, and finally rendering it utterly dependent on continued German purchases,

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[19] *Großraumwirtschaft*: A continental economic zone similar to *Lebensraum*.

supplies, spare parts, and infrastructure. In this way, Germany achieved a position approaching both monopsony and monopoly (Rothschild & Wingfield, 2000, p. 20). German economic penetration found its way in the Balkan countries too. As Lampe and Jackson showed in statistics, with regard to the Balkan states, the volume of trade with Germany and Austria[20] increased and its share was the highest (for exports and imports respectively): Bulgaria 42.4 % and 29.8 % in 1929, 67.8 % and 65.5 % in 1939; Greece 25.7 % and 10.5 % in 1929, 40.4 % and 30.4 % in 1939; Romania[21] 37.0 % and 36.6 % in 1929, 32.3 % and 39.3 % in 1939; Yugoslavia 24.1 % and 33.0 % in 1929, 31.9 % and 47.7 % in 1939 (Lampe & Jackson, 1982, pp. 458-460).

In addition, the German 'miracle' in industry and increasing commercial ties with Germany created a very positive image of autocratic regimes in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Communist ideology was seen as a threat in many Eastern European societies but Fascism and later National Socialist ideology appeared more attractive. France was seen as a decaying power while Germany was seen as a rising power. As a result, Nazi Germany was regarded as a successful model in many societies:

> States of lesser power, especially new or restored states, generally take as their model the political institutions and values of the seemingly strongest and most successful Great Power of the day. On the morrow of World War I, it appeared to be France; after the Depression, it became Germany. (And after World War II, it was to be the Soviet Union for a substantial portion of intellectuals and of the intelligentsia.) (Rothschild & Wingfield, 2000, p. 17)

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[20] Germany annexed Austria in 1938.
[21] Romania is especially important as it was an important oil producer in Europe. Romanian oil exploited in the Ploesti fields was the main source of oil for Germany during the Second World War. For its strategic importance, on August 1, 1943 it was bombed by an American fleet of B-24s that took off from Libya. The Operation Tidal Wave, or as also know the Black Sunday, was costly to the US Air Force because of the 178 bombers took part in the operation, 54 bombers in addition to 660 crew were lost. For details of the operation see: (Stout, 2003)

Countries 'dissatisfied' with the post-World War settlements found a potential ally and supporter in Germany so revisionist countries like Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria; and countries that afraid of losing what they received, like Romania (Germany successfully exploited the rivalry between Hungary and Romania due to Erdel/Transylvania and Bulgaria with regards to Dobrudja), band-wagoned with Germany. Seen as a successful model of development, autocratic regimes were established in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Following the diplomatic victories of Italy and Germany against Britain and France and especially after the Munich Settlement of 1938 which was a bloodless conquest (Jelavich, 1999, p. 1939), Nazi Germany was a source of admiration for many and its practices were imitated:

> As if introverted and illiberal political and economic nationalism were not enough, most of these states sought additional ideological and geopolitical support and justification for these policies by developing closer economic and political relations with Italy and (from as early as 1932 onwards) Germany. They also began to emulate some of the trappings, style, rhetoric, institutions, cultural policies, political violence, intimidation and 'mass mobilization' techniques of first the Fascist and later the Nazi regimes (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007, p. 372).

With rising power and self-confidence, Germany demanded annexing the German populated areas of Czechoslovakia also knows as the *Sudetenland*. A clear example of Great Power diplomacy, at the Munich Conference (the Agreement was signed on 30 September 1938) that determined the German-Czech border, Czech delegation was not present (Stackelberg, 2007, p. 285).[22] The policy of appeasement was hailed as a success for peace yet in retrospective the size of its failure was realized when the German armies marched to Prague in March 1939 with the purpose of invading whole of Czechoslovakia. In the face of inactivity of Britain, France and

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[22] Adolf Hitler (Germany), Benito Mussolini (Italy), Neville Chamberlain (Britain) and Edouard Daladier (France) signed the agreement.

of the USA that started to follow isolationist policies following the First World War and continuous eastward German expansion, Soviet Russia decided to bandwagon with Germany and the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939 contained clauses for the mutual partition of Poland. On September 1, 1939 German forces started invading Poland and on the September 17, Russian forces joined from the east. On September 3, France and Britain declared war on Germany. Thus, the Second World War started. In addition to occupation of Norway in April 1940, on May 10, 1940 occupation of France started and it ended with the surrender of France in 22 June (Havers, 2002, p. 12). In Britain, Winston Churchill became prime minister on the day of German attack on France and as many other contemporaries deceived by the exaggerations of French strength, he was sure that France would resist and in his view if they succeed in resisting for three months, things would change. (Boyce, 2005a, p. 3) According to Khrushchev, Stalin was enraged with the news of fall of France:

> Stalin's nerves cracked when he learned about the fall of France. He cursed the governments of England and France: 'Couldn't they put up any resistance at all?' he asked despairingly.' He too had counted on the French army, with British support, to grind down the German war machine before it could again turn east. 'Now', he complained, 'Hitler was sure to beat our brains in.' (quot. in) (Boyce, 2005a, p. 4)

Stalin was right as Germany launched the Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. The purpose was to occupy especially the western and southern parts (modern Ukraine) of Russia (rich with minerals and high fertility in agriculture) and the Caspian Basin (rich with oil). For this reason, the city of Stalingrad, situated at the banks of Volga River, became the point where both sides did their biggest sacrifices.

As a result of the Japanese attack on the American naval and air bases in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States joined the war. The war ended

on May 8, 1945 with the fall of Berlin to the Soviet forces and surrender of Germany in Europe and in the Pacific theatre of war on August 15, 1945 with the surrender of Japan. The United States, Britain and Soviet Union, emerged as the victors of the war.

The US was worried about the developments in Europe and rise of Germany. As early as January 1939, President Roosevelt shared his fears in a secret meeting of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate:

> The next perfectly obvious step, which Brother Hitler suggested in the speech yesterday, would be Central and South America. . . . We cannot afford to sit here and say it is a pipe dream. . . . It is the gradual encirclement of the United States by the removal of its first line of defense (Loveman, 2010, p. 248).

Already before its direct participation in war, the US promulgated the Lend and Lease Act on March, 11, 1941. The US used its strong economic base to support firstly Britain with weapons, ammunition, equipment and machinery. When Germany attacked Russia, Winston Churchill thought that it would be a great opportunity to support Russia against Germany in order to force it to fight a two-front war. Though some people in the US administration were hostile to the Soviet Union, such as the future president Harry Truman who declared publicly that he hoped as many Germans and Soviets would kill each other as possible" (Weeks, 2010, p. 5), President Roosevelt agreed supporting the Soviet Union. As a result, countries fighting against Germany, Italy and Japan were supported with products ranging from weaponry, ammunitions, machinery, raw materials, agricultural products and petroleum products worth of 46 billion dollars (1945 dollars) from 1941 to 1945 (Van Tuyll, 1989, p. 152).

The importance of economic power and the American aid to the Soviet Union is reflected in the words of Field Marshall Zhukov in 1963:

When we entered the war, we were still a backward country in the industrial sense as compared to Germany… Today [in 1963] some say the Allies really didn't help us… But, listen, one cannot deny that the Americans shipped over us materiel without which we could not have equipped our armies held in reserve or been able to continue the war (Weeks, 2010, p. 1).

The shipments were sent by convoys to Britain and the Soviet Union. The Germany Navy (the *Kriegsmarine*) was weaker than British Royal Navy especially with regards to surface navy. As a result, Germany started submarine attacks all over the Atlantic. The well-known wolf-pack tactics used by German submarines cost the Allies 8.3 million tons of shipping in 1942 and 4 million tons in 1943. Thanks to the huge industrial base of the US, the Allies were able to build new merchant ships of 7 million tons in 1942 and 9 million tons in 1943 (Kennedy, 1988, p. 353).

A comparison of wartime GDP values of the Powers between the years of 1939 and 1945 reveals that the Allies always had a higher GDP level in total. As shown in the Table 2.16, in 1945, the Allies had 5 times bigger GDP than the Axis Powers. The biggest contribution to the Allies' side came from the USA; its GDP was approximately 61 % of the Allied total in 1945. As in 1917, its entry into the war again changed the course of war. It was the strongest state in the world at the end of the war. France and Italy were very weak as Great Powers as Japan was devastated and lost its Great Power status.

Despite the great devastation brought by the war and great human losses (approximately 26.6 million (Ellman & Maksudov, 1994)), the Soviet Union also emerged as a giant from the war. All of Eastern Europe and the Balkans (except Greece and Yugoslavia) were under its military occupation or control in the post-war era. Britain could not recover from the war and lost its economic and military leadership. Britain though in better position than Germany, Italy, France and Japan,

just like them became, in Kennedy's terminology "middle-weight countries" after the war (Kennedy, 1988, p. 365). It was still a Great Power but only the third following the USA and the Soviet Union:

> Its chief partners were economically (the United States) and militarily (the United States and Russia) in the ascendant. Whilst not weak vis-à-vis other Great Powers like newly liberated France or Italy, Britain lacked the military and economic power of the United States and Russia. And the Russians and Americans were making decisions that in crucial ways were anathema to Britain's survival as a Power of the first rank (McKercher, 2004, p. 335)

In 1944, W. T. R. Fox published his book *The Superpowers* and it is the first recorded use of the term. In his book, he regarded the USA, Soviet Union and Britain as superpowers (Dukes, 2001, p. 85). However it was the USA that started leadership in establishing both political and economic intergovernmental organizations. The United Nations, which replaced the League of Nations, was a product of the victors of the war. In August 1944 delegates from China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States met at Dumbarton Oaks, to draw up the basic blueprint for the new international organization. By October the outline for the UN Charter was ready (Hanhimaki, 2008, p. 14).

Table 2.16 Wartime GDP of the Great Powers, 1939-1945

in international dollars and 1990 prices (billions)

	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
Allied Powers								
USA	800	869	943	1,094	1,235	1,399	1,499	1,474
UK	284	287	316	316	353	361	346	331
France	186	199	82	-	-	-	-	101
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	117	92
USSR	359	366	417	359	318	464	495	396
Allied Total	1,629	1,721	1,757	1,798	1,906	2,223	2,458	2,394
Axis Powers								
Germany	351	384	387	412	417	426	437	310
France	-	-	82	130	116	110	93	-
Austria	24	27	27	29	27	28	29	12
Italy	141	151	147	144	145	137	-	-
Japan	169	184	192	196	197	194	189	144
Axis Total	686	747	835	911	903	895	748	466
Allies/Axis	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.5	3.3	5.1
USSR/Germany	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.3

Source: (Harrison, 2000, p. 10)

The aim of the establishment of the UN was firstly to avoid any future wars. Secondly, the victorious Powers wanted to legitimize the new order they created. As Ikenberry notes, "the United States gained the acquiesce of secondary states by accepting limits on the exercise of its own hegemonic power" (Ikenberry, 2001, p.

199). The main problem was the conflict between international idealism and national sovereignty. It was solved by introducing the veto system in the United Nations Security Council. While institutionalizing the preeminence of Great Powers by assigning them a special position, it aimed at keeping them within 'the system' as the experience at the League of Nations showed its importance (states such as Germany, Italy and Japan had left the organization).

> The men who drafted the UN Charter addressed this issue with a simple mechanism: the veto power. In other words, the Charter gave superior powers to five of the founding members of the UN—China, France, Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR—that allowed them to prevent any decisions that they viewed inimical to their interests from being made. They became the Permanent Five (P-5) of the UN Security Council, countries that would have both a seat in the most important body of the new organization as long as it existed. This strategy, it was thought, would provide the key countries with an incentive to remain part of the UN. It also provided them with the means of neutralizing the world organization. (Hanhimaki, 2008, p. 15)

In April 1945 diplomats from 51 countries were invited to take part in the San Francisco Conference to vote for the Charter and establish the UN (Bookmiller, 2008, p. 9). During the conference, many medium and small powers objected the veto power given to UNSC members: Belgium, Australia, the Netherlands, Honduras, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Norway, New Zealand, Colombia, and Canada (Hurd, 2008, p. 89). They demanded a change of the veto system but they were told that no substantial change was possible. Similar to the League of Nations, seemingly there was a balance in favor of the lesser states because six of them could be elected as non-permanent members of Security Council by the General Assembly for a term of two years[23]. The Powers provided verbal assurances on the veto power. The Great Powers' most important purpose during the conference was to legitimize

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[23] In 1966, the number of non-permanent members rose to 10 with the modification of the Charter.

the system, for this reason "the Great Powers did not set aside the rules of procedure of the conference to force a solution on the others" (Hurd, 2008, p. 108). Matters were discussed but lesser Powers at the end accepted the design. The commitment of Great Powers for security was better than anarchy. The General Headquarters of the UN is located in New York.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was conceived at a United Nations conference convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944. The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries (and their citizens) to transact with each other. It also provides financial assistance to its members and future assistance possible on the condition that the policy program designed by the IMF and national authorities effectively implemented (IMF, 2014a). The IMF loans are provided by the amount given by states as their quotas. Quotas also reflect the economic development levels of the member states. More importantly, because weighted voting system is implemented, it also determines the weight of countries in voting process. In Table 2.17, voting power of the selected IMF members can be seen.

Another institution under the aegis of the United Nations is the World Bank Group located in Washington D.C. It consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. Same procedure of weighted voting is also in force in these institutions. In Table 2.18

voting power of selected countries in International Bank for Reconstruction Development (IBRD) is listed.

Fostering free trade and regulating it while reducing trade barriers (tariffs and quotas) have been the major aim of the US in the post-WWII era. The trade regime was established with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948. In 1995 it was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) (The World Trade Organization, 2014). Contrary to the World Bank and IMF, weighted voting is not implemented in the WTO and for this reason negotiations (organized as Rounds, such as the Uruguay Round) take longer time. There are many disagreements between the developing and developed countries. While the developing countries support free trade on industrial goods, since they are in much better position than developing countries with regards in exporting industrial goods; they always resist to initiatives to include agricultural goods in the free trade regime. Developed countries use protectionist measures and subsidies for their agricultural sector and they are afraid that their agricultural sector might be damaged when agricultural goods flock to their markets from developing countries.

Table 2.17 IMF Members' Voting Power

	Member	Per Cent of Total	
1	United States	16.75	P5
2	France	4.29	P5
3	United Kingdom	4.25	P5
4	China	3.81	P5
5	Russian Federation	2.39	P5
6	Japan	6.23	
7	Germany	5.81	
8	Italy	3.16	
9	Saudi Arabia	2.80	
10	Canada	2.56	
11	India	2.34	
12	Netherlands	2.08	
13	Brazil	1.72	
14	Spain	1.63	
15	Switzerland	1.40	
16	Australia	1.31	
17	Sweden	0.98	
18	Indonesia	0.85	
19	Norway	0.78	
20	South Africa	0.77	
21	Malaysia	0.73	
22	Iran	0.62	
23	Turkey	0.61	
24	Greece	0.47	
25	Pakistan	0.44	
26	Egypt	0.40	
27	Bulgaria	0.28	
28	Serbia	0.21	
29	Bosnia	0.10	
30	Georgia	0.09	

P5: Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council

Source: (IMF, 2014b)

Table 2.18 IBRD Members' Voting Power

	Member	Per Cent of Total	
1	United States	15.11	P5
2	France	4.08	P5
3	United Kingdom	4.08	P5
4	China	5.28	P5
5	Russian Federation	2.29	P5
6	Japan	8.18	
7	Germany	4.59	
8	India	3.08	
9	Canada	2.90	
10	Italy	2.54	
11	Saudi Arabia	2.29	
12	Netherlands	1,98	
13	Spain	1.94	
14	Brazil	1.71	
15	Iran	1.57	
16	Switzerland	1.54	
17	Australia	1.45	
18	Turkey	1.29	
19	Sweden	0.92	
20	Indonesia	0.95	
21	South Africa	0.83	
22	Norway	0.66	
23	Pakistan	0.49	
24	Egypt	0.47	
25	Malaysia	0.44	
26	Bulgaria	0.29	
27	Serbia	0.17	
28	Greece	0.11	
29	Georgia	0.11	
30	Bosnia	0.06	

Source: (World Bank, 2014a)

As shown above, the post-WWII economic and financial regimes and institutions are created by the US and they still regulate these areas. The US is in a preponderant position in these institutions a fact that reflects its economic power. As already mentioned, in the face of arguments regarding the US decline in the 1970s, Susan Strange has argued that its main rival, Japan, does not have the same level of power in these institutions (Strange, 1990).

In the light of the discussions in the preceding pages, it would be beneficial to have a closer look on the economic tools that are emanating from economic might. The close relations between the economic power and military power have already been touched upon in the previous pages. However economic power provides other tools to states for their foreign policy purposes. Knowing that economic base provides a source for military power, states started to employ economic tools more often in the post-WWII era and as a result the increasing importance of "economic statecraft", the term "economic warfare" gained currency (Dobson, 2005). Due to the increasing levels of financial flows, $2 trillion worth of currency moves cross-border every day, Benn Steil and Robert E. Liton also add "financial statecraft" to the arsenal of economic weapons as seen in Table 2.19 below.

Table 2.19 Forms of Economic and Financial Statecraft

Economic Statecraft	Financial Statecraft
Trade privileges, tariffs and quotas	Capital flow guarantees and restrictions
Trade sanctions on states	Financial sanctions on non-state actors
Foreign aid in drought or disaster	Underwriting foreign debt in a currency crisis
Regional trade agreements	Currency unions or dollarization

Source: (Steil & Liton, 2006, p. 4)

In this respect, here we will try to highlight how economic power is used as a tool in different areas, namely foreign aid, trade, finance and technology.

1.   Foreign Aid: Foreign aid has become an important aspect of foreign policy since the end of the Second World War even though examples of it might be found in earlier centuries. It may be defined in the shortest form as "the transfer of money, goods and services from one nation to another" (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 301). In the 1970s, the term "official development aid" became used more and it is defined as the following:

> [ODA consists of] those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b)

it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent" (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 7).

Whether states act with only philanthropic purposes or with political interests in mind while providing foreign aid is a highly disputed issue, it is obvious from the past experience that there are various motives for foreign aid. According to Hans Morgenthau, six types of foreign aid can be distinguished: 1) humanitarian foreign aid, subsistence foreign aid, military foreign aid, bribery, prestige foreign aid and foreign aid for economic development (Morgenthau, 1962, p. 301). Past experience shows that states are very selective while providing foreign aid and it is a strong argument developed by those who claim it is a foreign policy tool:

> Some poverty is more important than other poverty and helping some countries develop is more important than helping other countries. Foreign aid is not, and cannot be, divorced from foreign policy goals. Foreign aid is a tool that policymakers use and have used to achieve their larger aims of dominating, pacifying, protecting, strengthening, or changing countries (Taffet, 2007, p. 1)

In this respect, it is not much different from other policy tools; states provide foreign aid for their wider foreign policy goals:

> Aid, like diplomacy, propaganda, or military action, is an instrument of statecraft. Aid policy has been a component of diplomacy and ultimately "a sophisticated instrument of control" or at least influence (Picard & Groelsema, 2008, p. 7).

In the preceding pages we have mentioned the French failure to back its allies in Eastern Europe and the Balkans with financial assistance against Germany in the 1930s. As a policy not supported by economic tools, it had failed. On the other hand, France was successful after its alliance with Russia to back Russia, though not with aid, with credits in order to increase Russia's military efficiency and improve its infrastructure and make Russia a stronger ally against the German threat. We have

also mentioned how the US decided to back countries fighting against Nazi Germany during the war through the Lend and Lease Act by providing military and industrial products, raw materials and food supplies. At the end of the Second World War, many countries in Europe, including Great Powers Britain, France, Germany and Italy were in a terrible financial situation. With the great divergence between Soviet and Allied political aims at the end of the war and also as a result of the material and human losses caused by the war, there was a risk of a Communist take-over politically in European societies in addition to the possibility of Soviet occupation. Not repeating the mistake of the 1920s by returning to isolationist policies, this time the US showed a determined commitment to protect Europe from the "Communist threat".

Two events caused alarm in Washington. First one was the Greek Civil War carried on by Communist groups armed and supported by the Communist regimes in the Balkans since 1944. Britain was supporting the Greek government forces both economically and militarily. However as a country worn out at the end of the war, Britain could no longer continue its support. In February 1947, London informed the State Department it could no longer keep forces in Greece. The Soviet demands for naval bases in the Turkish Straits and revision of Turkey's border with the Soviets, was another source of worry since 1946. President Truman tried to secure the approval of Congress for an aid bill of $400 million to Greece and Turkey. In his speech at the session of the Congress, President Truman called upon the United States "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." (Herring, 2008, p. 615) The bill was approved and it was later known as the Truman Doctrine. From 1946 to 1948, the United States spent

on average about $40 billion a year (in 2006 dollars), or about 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), on foreign aid (Korb, 2008, p. 29).

The US helped the recovery of Europe in two ways: Firstly it provided military security against Soviet threats in the form of a formal military alliance with the establishment of NATO as a collective security organization in 1948. Especially important was the inclusion of allies under the American 'nuclear umbrella'. Though not a NATO member, countries in Asia such as Japan and South Korea were under the US protection as a result of the Containment Policy.[24] In this way the US solved the 'butter or guns'[25] dilemma for its allies by stationing thousands of troops, lots of aircraft and missiles. Thus, the European states (also Japan and South Korea) would focus all their energy on rebuilding and development. Secondly, it both encouraged European economic integration and provided financial support for rebuilding efforts. The Marshall Plan named after Secretary of State George Marshall (officially known as European Recovery Program, ERP), dispensed $13 billion between 1948 and 1952 to Western European countries (Wood, 1986, p. 29). It is estimated as $100 billion in 2006 dollars. Other countries in Asia, Latin America and Middle East were also supported. In the FY1949 budget, the first full year of the Marshall Plan, aid jumped to about $70 billion, or more than 3 percent of the U.S. GDP. From 1949 through 1952, aid averaged about $50 billion a year, or 2.5 percent of GDP (Korb, 2008, p. 29). The Marshall Plan is probably the best and most generous example of foreign

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[24] South Vietnam was under the US protection too. The US involvement in Vietnam started with US financial and military aid. However in 1975, the US had to accept its loss to the regime in the North and Vietnam fell under Communist rule.
[25] This metaphor was first used by Air Marshall Herman Göring in 1936, Commander of the German Air Force (*Luftwaffe*) and minister in charge for the Four Years Plan: "We can do without butter, but, despite all our love of peace, not without arms. One cannot shoot with butter, but with guns". He went on, "Too much fat, means too-big bellies". (Irving, 1989, p. 243)

aid in history. It is also a good example to show that political initiatives should be supported with economic and military means in order to reach the objectives.

During the Cold War, both the US and Soviet Union supported their allies by providing aid. The US and other states provided foreign aid under the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has currently 29 members.[26] However the scope of US aid to its allies was limited when compared to the Marshall Plan. After 1951, foreign aid never again exceeded 2 percent of GDP. And from 1963 through 1990, it never went above 1 percent. After 1980, aid never exceeded 0.5 percent of GDP, dropping to about 0.25 percent of GDP by 1990 (Korb, 2008, p. 29) as can be seen in Figure 2.1. Some developments led to increase of the total amount of aid such as the $ 10 billion increase in the amount of aid given to Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords in 1979 but the total never reached the levels of Marshall Plan.

The stimulus for increase in the amount of aid provided by the US was the occupation of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in the 2002 (Korb, 2008, p. 35). The US aimed at rebuilding the infrastructure in these countries and as a result its aid rose up rapidly as can be seen in Figure 2.2. It also shows the clear connection between foreign aid and foreign policy.

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[26] Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

Figure 2.1. US Foreign Aid, Fiscal Year 1946-2004
Source: (Korb, 2008, p. 35).

Figure 2.2. US Foreign Aid Funding Trends
Source: (Korb, 2008, p. 37)

In 2006 there were rumors about the restructuring of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). According to the rumors the USAID would be folded into the Department of State. Instead of long-term goals of development, US foreign aid would be directed to short-term security issues such as state-building and conflict resolution (Picard & Groelsema, 2008, p. 3). This did not happen and the USAID continues its operations as an individual agency however it is seen that the State Department has increased its share in the total amount of aid. For the Fiscal Year 2012, it is the second agency with a share of 37%, just after the USAID with a share of 38%. The US Treasury, Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also have important shares as seen in Figure 2.3. The impact of the war against terrorism is reflected in the recipients for 2012 in Table 2.20.

Figure 2.3. US Economic Assistance by Funding Agency
Source: (USAID Foreign Assistance Database, 2014)

Table 2.20 Top Ten Recipients of US ODA (2012)

(USD Million)

1	Afghanistan	2,924
2	Congo, Dem. Rep.	1,060
3	Pakistan	951
4	Iraq	926
5	Kenya	768
6	South Sudan	740
7	Ethiopia	720
8	Tanzania	555
9	South Africa	535
10	Haiti	524

Source: (OECD-DAC, 2014)

Japan also emerged as a donor country, thanks to its rapid economic development and financial preponderance in the 1980s. Because of being an economic giant but militarily a dwarf due to the post-WWII restrictions, foreign aid plays an important role in the Japanese foreign policy. During the 1980s and especially 1990s, it was the world leader in foreign aid (Arase, 2005, p. 1). It was named as "Aid Superpower" (Lancaster, 2007, p. 110). In 1998 due to its fiscal problems, it had to decrease the amount of its foreign aid and lost leadership position in 2001 (Arase, 2005, p. 1). Japanese aid initiatives have been criticized because of being motivated by commercial interests and its narrow focus on East Asia, but search of prestige by the government was another motive:

> Japanese aid has long been viewed as driven by commercial motives—expanding exports and ensuring access to needed raw materials imports. Commerce certainly played a major role in the country allocation and use of Japan's economic assistance. But this purpose was always embedded in the government's fundamental goals of prosperity, autonomy, and international respect (Lancaster, 2007, p. 110).

In the face of these charges, Japan started to provide aid to other countries such Afghanistan as can be seen in Table 2.21 below.

Table 2.21 Top Ten Recipients of Japanese ODA (2012)

(USD Million)

1	Vietnam	1,693
2	India	1,580
3	Indonesia	918
4	Afghanistan	812
5	China	697
6	Congo, Dem. Rep.	655
7	Pakistan	438
8	Philippines	423
9	Sri Lanka	422
10	Iraq	376

Source: (OECD-DAC, 2014)

The British, French, Belgians, and Portuguese all use their aid to support their postcolonial policies of maintaining influence in their former territories (Lancaster, 2008, p. 55). In Table 2.22, it is seen that France mostly provides aid to its former colonies, namely Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal and Vietnam. Though Congo was a Belgian colony, since French is widely spoken in that country, it gets a high share from French foreign aid.

Table 2.22 Top Ten Recipients of French ODA
(2012)

		(USD Million)
1	Côte d'Ivoire	1,005
2	Morocco	648
3	Congo, Dem. Rep.	596
4	Brazil	464
5	China	367
6	Tunisia	365
7	Mexico	273
8	Senegal	257
9	Vietnam	241
10	Egypt	189

Source: (OECD-DAC, 2014)

A. Maurits Van der Veen, conducted a study (Van der Veen, 2011) by using discourse analysis method for foreign aid patterns of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway in order to find out if they are motivated by different factors. His study covers the period from 1955 to 2000 and he uses the debates in the legislative bodies of these countries as datasets. He identified seven broad frames with regard to foreign aid as can be seen in Table 2.23 below.

Table 2. 23 The Seven Broad Frames Relevant to Aid Policy

Frame	Goals for aid
Security	Increase donor's physical security: support allies, oppose Communism, etc.
Power/Influence	Pursue power: increase leverage over others, win allies and positions of influence in international fora
Wealth/economic self-interest	Further economic interests of donor economy; support export industries
Enlightened self-interest	Pursue global public goods: peace, stability, environmental health, population control, etc.
Reputation/self-affirmation	Establish and express certain identity in international relations; improve international status and reputation
Obligation/duty	Fulfill obligations, whether historical or associated with position in international system
Humanitarianism	Promote the well-being of the poorest groups worldwide; provide humanitarian relief.

Source: (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 7)

His results show that each country motivated by all these factors however their share depend on the colonial past, economic relations and search for status. They are seen in Table 2.24. From the table, it is obvious that humanitarian motives are the most important factor for Norway and the Netherlands in their foreign aid

decisions. Obligation, be it historical due to being colonial power or rising from being rich, is also an important factor. For Belgium, as a former colonial power it is the most influential factor (see Table 2.25 for Belgium's foreign aid recipients). Concerns for economic interests also shape decisions of foreign aid as can be seen in the case of Italy and Belgium. When compared to the Netherlands and Norway however this factor does not have much weight. Reputation by providing foreign aid plays an important role too. States want to portray themselves as benign powers. This is the case for Norway and other rich Northwest European states.

Table 2.24 Average Weight of Each Frame per country (1955-2000)

Country	Security	Power	Wealth	ESI	Rep.	Obl.	Hum.
Belgium	0.07	0.04	0.17	0.11	0.15	0.26	0.20
Italy	0.08	0.07	0.22	0.13	0.20	0.15	0.15
Netherlands	0.05	0.11	0.08	0.13	0.18	0.17	0.28
Norway	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.15	0.22	0.18	0.31

ESI: Enlightened Self-Interest, Rep: Reputation,
Obl: Obligation, Hum: Humanitarianism

Source: (Van der Veen, 2011, p. 64)

The amount of ODA provided by DAC member states in 2013 can be seen in Figure 2.4 in billion dollars. However, there is a new trend in measuring ODA. In the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, the Millennium Development Goals were accepted by the member states. According to them, the ODA amount of each country should reach at least 0.7% of Gross National Income. In 2013, only five countries accomplished this goal as can be seen in Figure 2.5.

Table 2.25 Top Ten Recipients of Belgian ODA (2012)

(USD Million)

1	Congo, Dem. Rep.	236
2	Côte d'Ivoire	138
3	Rwanda	65
4	Burundi	61
5	Togo	44
6	West Bank & Gaza Strip	32
7	Benin	28
8	Tanzania	25
9	Liberia	25
10	Vietnam	25

Source: (OECD-DAC, 2014)

Figure 2.4. ODA USD Billion (2013)
Source: (OECD-DAC, 2014)

Figure 2.5 ODA as per Cent of GNI (2013)
Source: (OECD-DAC, 2014)

As seen in the figures above, countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia emerged as important donors. These countries that have limited impact in international relations use foreign aid as a policy to increase their global visibility. As a supranational organization, the European Union also provides a large amount of aid. In 2012 the EU provided $17.48 billion though it went down to $15.19 billion in 2013. In total amount, it was in second position in 2012, after the US, but lost its position to the UK in 2013. The EU uses foreign aid as a tool to increase its international standing. The recipients of the EU aid can be seen in Table 2.26. There are two emerging trends in the field of foreign aid. One involves the reentry of China, former socialist bloc countries, and a number of middle-income developing countries into the category of aid donors (even as many

of these governments are still recipients of aid) (Lancaster, 2008, p. 40). China has been providing foreign aid in competition with Taiwan for recognition since the 1970s. Chinese foreign aid mostly focuses on infrastructure. China financed one of the largest and most expensive aid projects in Africa in the 1970s: the Tanzania-Zambia railway, which is said to have cost $500 million at that time. It also provided aid for infrastructure—it is especially known for constructing sports stadiums—and turnkey industrial plants (Lancaster, 2008, p. 42). Though the exact amount of Chinese foreign aid is not known, it is considered to be "state secret", it is estimated to be between $1-2 billion a year. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America China provides foreign aid in pursuit of access to petroleum, minerals, and other raw materials as well as recognition and influence (Lancaster, 2008, p. 43).

Table 2.26 Top Ten Recipients of the EU ODA (2012)

(USD Million)

1	Turkey	2 967
2	Serbia	998
3	Tunisia	541
4	Morocco	463
5	Egypt	455
6	West Bank & Gaza Strip	359
7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	317
8	Afghanistan	310
9	Congo, Dem. Rep.	303
10	South Africa	287

Source: (OECD-DAC, 2014)

Foreign aid has also been used a tool especially in post-conflict states. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Democratic Republic of Congo receive aid from many

donors as seen in the tables in the previous pages. A study conducted by Joppe de Ree and Eleonora Nillesen with regards to Sub-Saharan Africa shows that foreign aid decreases the risk of civil conflict (de Ree & Nillesen, 2009). For this reason, donors try to provide aid to conflict-ridden societies (Balla, 2008).

As shown, foreign aid is an important tool used by states in order to reach their foreign policy goals. It is also a reflection of the economic power a state enjoys. As Spyros Economides and Peter Wilson emphasize, in its extreme form, foreign aid may take the form of extortion or blackmail, "a donor state threatening to withhold or not renew a promised or existing aid package if the recipient state does not carry out its wishes" (Economides & Wilson, 2001, p. 131).

2.   Trade: International trade maybe described as the exchange of goods and services between countries. In the previous pages, we have tried to show how Germany in the interwar era managed to exert influence over Eastern Europe and Balkans by concluding trade agreements. It had almost established monopoly and monopsony over these countries by forcing them to buy its goods in return for their exports. This is named as the market power; a state with large and lucrative market may offer access to its market under certain conditions (Economides & Wilson, 2001, p. 11). Some former colonial powers exert influence over their former colonies by using their economic power. As underdeveloped countries lacking the necessary capital and know-how to extract and process their natural sources, these former colonies are dependent on their former metropolitan centers for selling their raw materials. As Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo points out African states such as Kongo (a colony of Belgium) "have stronger links with the North through international

market mechanisms and former colonial institutions than between themselves (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1999, p. 9).

Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements play an important role in determining which state has access to one's market. A state may provide benefits and privileges to a country for its trade or it may impose tariffs and non-tariff measures to limit one's trade. Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) started to become more popular with the success of the EU integration which started with economic integration. Having access to a large market is attractive for every country and especially more important for a country with relatively less-developed economy. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which came into power in 1994 forms a free trade zone consisting of the USA, Canada and Mexico. It is also defined as "rule constrained hegemonic order in which acceptance of US objectives is traded for access to US markets" (Economides & Wilson, 2001, p. 171).

States also use their economic power as a tool in the form of sanctions. Meghan L. O'Sullivan defines sanctions as "the deliberate withdrawal of normal trade or financial relations for foreign policy purposes" (O'Sullivan, 2003, p. 12). A state may either stop selling to or buying things from another state in order to damage its economy. Even if there is interdependence between them and trade is beneficial for both of them, one state may decide to stop the mutual trade because political concerns play a much greater role. States may have different levels of vulnerability with regards to their mutual trade. As Joseph S. Nye points out, "Being less dependent can be a source of power. If two parties are interdependent but one is less so than the other, the less dependent party has a source of power as long as both

value the interdependent relationship" (Nye, 2011, p. 55). So it is the structure of symmetry or asymmetry between two states that decides the level of vulnerability.

Economic sanctions do not always give the expected results especially if they are unilateral in nature. Multilateral sanctions are generally more successful (O'Sullivan, 2003, p. 300). In 1905, Bulgaria and Serbia signed an agreement that included unification of both economies by 1917. Seeing it detrimental to its economic interests, the Habsburg Empire placed an embargo on the Serbian livestock, as its biggest importer, in order to force Serbia to nullify the clauses of the treaty. Known as the "Pig War", it lasted until 1911. In the short term it damaged Serbian economy but soon alternative markets were found. It further damaged the relations between the two countries since Serbia relied more on Russia and France. (Jelavich, 1999, p. 33) The scope of the embargo, i.e. which commodities it includes, is also an important factor for success. In 1935, the League of Nations imposed an embargo on Italy for its aggression against Ethiopia however Britain and France decided to exclude oil which could hit the Italian economy and Italian war-making capacity. In the end, the embargo did not coerce Italy (Dobson, 2005, p. 4).

During the Second World War, the US imposed embargo on those states which had trade relations with the Axis powers and during the Cold War, the US imposed a 'strategic' embargo on the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. In 1951, with the Battle Act (named after Senator Battle, author of the bill, its official name was the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act) the US also imposed restrictions on allied trade with communist states as a condition for receipt of US aid (Dobson, 2005, p. 20). However, if an economy is autarkic (i.e. self-sufficient), such as the

Soviet Bloc, sanctions again may not produce the expected results. Having control over the production of vital commodities such as oil may provide states leverage. Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Arab members of the OPEC imposed an oil embargo in protest to the USA's and its allies' policies with regard to Israel. In the short term, oil prices quadrupled from $3 to $12 as seen in Figure 2.6 and economies of countries suffered from high prices and shortages. However, other producers increased their production and the Arab countries dependent on Western markets for selling their oil had to give up the embargo. It failed because the Arab states did not have a total monopoly over oil production.

Figure 2.6 Crude Oil Prices
Source: (Economy Watch, 2014)

While energy sources such as oil and natural gas bring wealth to producer countries, it also causes them to have leverage over other countries and a source of

strength. With growing energy demand in today's industrialized world, energy dependency becomes an important issue. Since energy sources are limited and concentrated in some countries, producers will always find customers to buy their energy products. The US tries to undermine Iran's energy exports in order to undermine the regime. However the US does not have a monopsony position and sanctions that aim at limiting Iran's oil exports cause problems with other states and even with its allies. Countries such as China, India, Japan, South Korea and Turkey import oil and natural gas from Iran as it is the fifth top producer of oil in the world, with a 4.5% share in total production and fourth top producer in natural gas with a share of 4.6% in 2013 (IEA, 2014, pp. 11-13). In sum, it can be argued that having vast amount of energy reserves, increase the leverage of a country over the others.

As we have seen, trade is used as a tool by states in order to accomplish their foreign policy goals.

3.   Finance: As mentioned in the previous pages, having financial institutions capable of providing loans to other countries provides a source of influence. Without capital accumulation, a state cannot have capital to export. So it must have high ratings of saving in order to have surplus capital. This economic power is used as a tool for foreign policy purposes. It was the French capital that contributed to the infrastructure and military improvement of Russia since the late 19th century. The Ottoman Empire, in a financial crisis, tried to obtain loan from France and Britain on the eve of the First World War. All its efforts failed. The secret alliance treaty with Germany was concluded on August 2, 1914. However the Ottoman statesmen managed to keep the empire out of war with excuses such as using the claim that

mobilization was not completed yet. It tried to secure a loan from Germany during this period while staying out of war. On October 1, 1914 the Ottoman Ambassador in Berlin, Mahmut Muhtar Pasha met Deputy Foreign Secretary Zimmermann to negotiate a loan agreement about 5 million Ottoman pounds. Zimmermann made it clear that no money was available upon entry into war. He proposed the following deal: while 250,000 Ottoman pounds would be paid out right away, an amount of 750,000 pounds would follow after intervention. Furthermore, half a million Ottoman pounds would be paid out each month until the payments had reached the total of 5 million (Aksakal, 2008, p. 166). The rest is well-known as the Ottoman Empire entered into war on October 29, 1914.

As shown in Table 2.17 and Table 2.18, in the post-WW2 economic and financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, the US has a preponderant position with its heavy voting power. Using this power it may influence the development plans of other countries with a negative vote in the World Bank or it may vote against a stand-by agreement when an IMF member faces an economic crisis thus block loan decision. The US is also home to the largest banks in the world though other countries such as China, the UK, France, Japan and Germany have large banks and started to undermine the position of the US. According to an index developed by Relbanks based on total assets for the year 2013, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is on the top of the list, followed by HSBC Holding (UK), Credit Agricole Group (France), BNP Paribas (France), Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (Japan) and JP Morgan Chase & Co (US) (Relbanks, 2014). The same trend can be seen also in the Forbes Global 2000 index which lists the biggest public companies of the world. China and the USA have 4 companies each in the top 10 biggest companies of the world list as seen in Table 2.27.

Less developed countries (LDCs) need credits for their development projects or to survive economic crises which hit their fragile economies hard. Developed countries with financial sources may provide credits and do it conditionally for some political gains. One may argue that private banks are not under the control of governments. It may be the case however governments exert influence on banks or corporations in various ways. A case examined by Steil and Litan maybe demonstrative in this respect. When the Arab oil producing countries imposed an embargo on oil, the prices quadrupled as mentioned earlier. This brought great wealth to these countries. Even though they decided on embargo with the purpose of hurting Israel and its allies, especially the US, they put their oil revenues in American banks. This caused huge amounts of surplus capital. The oil crises would hurt the less-developed economies in Latin America more than the USA. In an indirect way however, since the US economy exported a good amount of goods to these countries, decreasing demand would also hurt the US economy. As a result, government officials gave "friendly" suggestions to bankers. Bill Seidman, as one of the top economic advisers, admitted this: "The entire Ford Administration, including me, told the large banks that the process of recycling petrodollars to the less developed countries was beneficial and perhaps a patriotic duty" (Steil & Liton, 2006, p. 13)

Table 2.27 The World's Biggest Public Companies According to Forbes (2013)

(In USD billions)

Rank	Company	Country	Sales	Profits	Assets	Market Value
1	Industrial and Commerce Bank of China (ICBC)	China	134.8	37.8	2,813.5	237.3
2	China Construction Bank	China	113.1	30.6	2,241	202
3	JP Morgan Chase	United States	108.2	21.3	2,359.1	191.4
4	Genereal Electric	United States	147.4	13.6	685.3	243.7
5	Exxon Mobil	United States	420.7	44.9	333.8	400.4
6	HSBC Holdings	United Kingdom	104.9	14.3	2,684.1	201.3
7	Royal Dutch Shell	Netherlands	467.2	26.6	360.3	213.1
8	Agricultural Bank of China	China	103	23	2,124.2	150.8
9	Berkshire Hathaway	United States	162.5	14.8	427.5	252.8
10	PetroChina	China	308.9	18.3	347.8	261.2

Source: (Forbes, 2013)

The surplus capital may also be used in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). The LDCs have low saving power and they need both know-how and capital to build up factories or other industrial plants. Since they have high unemployment rates, they try to attract FDI in order to fight unemployment. Countries like China and India provide great incentives such as tax-holidays, free land and infrastructure support in addition to low wages. Countries in Eastern Europe compete with each other to attract FDI. In addition to similar policies of India and China, they also compete with each other in the field of taxes (Sedmihradsky & Klazar, 2002).

Through privatization of state-owned enterprises or by establishing new facilities, developing countries exert influence over the LDCs. In the choice of host country for FDI, having good relations is also an important factor. In the opposite case, such as the US sanctions on companies trading with or investing in Iran (such as freezing assets, a state may influence the behavior of investors (Steil & Liton, 2006). In Table 2.28 the FDI inflows and outflows for selected countries can be seen for the year 2012. From the table it is seen that, the EU and USA have high values for both inflow and outflow. It is because they have huge markets and also a safe environment for investment. Countries such as Australia, Canada, Norway, India, Republic of Korea, Russia and especially China both receive and provide FDI in significant amounts. China is the fourth biggest provider of FDI following the US, EU and Japan. Brazil also receives a great amount of FDI inflow though it showed a bad performance with regards to FDI outflow.

Industrialized states benefit from their strong position in international institutions that regulate the economic and financial activities. In addition, they also benefit from their high level of wealth and export this capital in the forms of loans or

FDI. As mentioned above, the decisions of banks and companies support or obstruct foreign policy.

Table 2.28 FDI Inflows and Outflows for Selected Countries (2012)

(millions of dollars)

Country	Inflow	Outflow
EU	258,514	323,131
USA	167,620	328,869
China	121,080	84,220
Brazil	65,271.8	-2,821.4*
Japan	1,730.7	122,550.9
Canada	45,374.8	53,938,7
Russia Federation	51,416	51,058
Australia	56,958.9	16,141
Mexico	12,659.4	25,596.6
India	25,542.8	8,582.7
Nigeria	7,028.8	1,539.2
Norway	12,774.5	20,846.7
South Africa	4,572.4	4,368.7
Republic of Korea	9,904	32,978.1
Saudi Arabia	12,182	4,402
Turkey	12,419	4,073
Iran	4,869.8	430
Serbia	352.2	54.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	632.9	36.4

*(-) refers to disinvestment.

Source: (UNCTAD, 2013)

4.   Technology: As already mentioned, technology contributes a lot to a nation's economic and military power. It was the innovations in Britain that paved the way for increasing manufacturing output thus starting the Industrial Revolution and

Britain's rise as the world leader. During the Cold War, the USA became the leader in economic and military terms and this was reflected on its scientific production level. Science became a field of rivalry between the Soviet Union and the USA, especially in the fields of space programs and nuclear research.

In order to make innovations, one has to devote resources (both human and capital) for research and development (R & D) activities. The so-called "information economies" allocate huge funds for R & D. For this reason, the share of R & D budget in GDP maybe used as an indicator. In the same vein, the ratio of researchers to the population also is a good sign of the importance attached to science and technology.

At the end of the research process, innovations are filed as patents. For this reason the number of patents reflects the levels of scientific production. Research process also may end up with the publication of academic research papers. Thus, in addition to the indicators mentioned above, the total number of published papers can be counted in as an indicator.

On the following pages, all of the four indicators for selected countries will be shown. While data for some countries is unavailable, the tables still provide important insight into the processes of scientific production. It is seen that, countries such as the USA, China, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, West and North European countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland), Russia, South Korea and Israel allocate remarkable attention and resources to science and technology. Some of these countries have small populations (such as Belgium and Finland) so their total output (in patents and publication) is limited when compared to countries like the USA and China. Still, their performance

is good. From the tables it is also possible to observe that China is also rising in the field of science.

As seen in Table 2.31 with regards to patent applications, China more than doubled its patent applications from 2009 to 2012. As a result, it became the number one country in that score. It is also seen that India in spite of its huge population shows a limited performance in the field of science and technology. In Europe, Germany and the UK are in a better position than France.

Table 2.29 Research and Development Expenditure as Per Cent of GDP

(selected countries)

Country	2009	2010	2011
Israel	4.49	4.35	4.39
Finland	3.94	3.9	3.78
Sweden	3.6	3.39	3.37
Republic of Korea	3.56	3.74	N/A
Japan	3.36	3.26	N/A
Denmark	3.16	3.07	3.09
United States	2.91	2.83	2.77
Germany	2.82	2.8	2.84
Austria	2.71	2.79	2.75
Australia	N/A	2.38	N/A
France	2.27	2.24	2.25
Belgium	2.03	2.0	2.04
Canada	1.94	1.85	1.74
United Kingdom	1.84	1.8	1.77
Netherlands	1.82	1.85	2.04
Norway	1.78	1.69	1.66
China	1.7	1.76	1.84
Italy	1.26	1.26	1.25
Russian Federation	1.25	1.16	1.12
Brazil	1.17	1.16	N/A
Serbia	0.92	0.76	0.73
South Africa	0.87	N/A	N/A
Turkey	0.85	0.84	N/A
Saudi Arabia	0.08	N/A	N/A
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.02	N/A	N/A
India	N/A	N/A	N/A
Iran	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: (World Bank, 2014b)

Table 2.30 Researchers in R & D (per million people)

(selected countries)

Country	2009	2010	2011
Finland	7,644	7,717	7,423
Denmark	6,659	6,774	6,723
Norway	5,433	5,408	5,504
Japan	5,147	5,151	N/A
Republic of Korea	5,068	5,451	N/A
Sweden	5,046	5,256	5,191
Canada	4,317	4,368	N/A
United Kingdom	4,151	4,134	4,202
Austria	4,141	4,312	4,397
Germany	3,814	3,950	N/A
France	3,727	3,789	N/A
Belgium	3,519	3,502	3,679
Russian Federation	3,078	3,078	3,120
Netherlands	2,835	3,232	3,218
Italy	1,691	1,709	1,759
Serbia	1,076	1,139	1,221
China	853	890	963
Turkey	811	892	N/A
Brazil	667	710	N/A
South Africa	389	N/A	N/A
United States	N/A	N/A	N/A
Australia	N/A	N/A	N/A
Saudi Arabia	N/A	N/A	N/A
Bosnia and Herzegovina	N/A	N/A	N/A
India	N/A	N/A	N/A
Iran	N/A	N/A	N/A
Israel	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: (World Bank, 2014c)

Table 2.31 Patent Applications, Resident

(selected countries)

Country	2009	2010	2011	2012
Japan	295,315	290,081	287,580	287,013
China	229,096	293,066	415,829	535,313
United States	224,912	241,977	247,750	268,782
Republic of Korea	127,316	131,805	138,034	148,136
Germany	47,859	47,047	46,986	46,620
Russian Federation	25,598	28,722	26,495	28,701
United Kingdom	15,985	15,490	15,343	15,370
France	14,100	14,748	14,655	14,540
Italy	8,814	8,877	8,794	8,439
India	7,262	8,853	8,841	9,553
Canada	5,067	4,550	4,754	4,709
Netherlands	2,575	2,527	2,585	2,375
Turkey	2,555	3,180	3,885	4,434
Brazil	4,271	4,228	4,695	4,804
Australia	2,494	2,409	2,383	2,627
Austria	2,263	2,424	2,154	2,258
Sweden	2,186	2,196	2,004	2,288
Finland	1,806	1,731	1,650	1,698
Denmark	1,518	1,626	1,574	1,406
Israel	1,387	1,450	1,360	1,319
Norway	1,246	1,117	1,122	1,009
South Africa	822	821	656	608
Belgium	669	620	636	755
Serbia	319	290	180	192
Saudi Arabia	N/A	288	347	N/A
Bosnia and Herzegovina	N/A	56	43	2
Iran	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: (World Bank, 2014d)

Table 2.32 Scientific and Technical Journal Articles

(selected countries)

Country	2009	2010	2011
United States	208,601	N/A	N/A
China	74,034	79,991	89,894
Japan	49,632	47,043	47,106
United Kingdom	45,689	45,978	46,035
Germany	45,017	45,338	46,259
France	31,757	31,368	31,686
Canada	29,017	N/A	N/A
Italy	26,770	26,348	26,503
Republic of Korea	22,280	24,106	25,593
India	19,924	20,882	22,481
Australia	18,932	19,517	20,603
Netherlands	14,868	15,506	15,508
Russian Federation	14,057	13,500	14,151
Brazil	12,307	12,530	13,148
Sweden	9,480	9,419	9,473
Turkey	8,307	7,950	8,328
Belgium	7,222	7,389	7,484
Iran	6,313	6,993	8,176
Israel	6,306	6,139	6,096
Denmark	5,307	5,639	6,071
Finland	4,952	4,869	4,878
Austria	4,833	4,923	5,103
Norway	4,440	4,461	4,777
South Africa	2,864	2,972	3,125
Serbia	1,173	1,165	1,269
Saudi Arabia	711	1,003	1,491
Bosnia and Herzegovina	64	68	54

Source: (World Bank, 2014e)

As shown in the tables above, the quality of the population of a country (its skills, knowledge, education levels and productivity) is equally important as its

quantity. In this regard, it would be beneficial to provide statistics about population, GDP and GDP per Capita for selected countries.

Table 2.33 Total Population, GDP and GDP per Capita (2012)

(Current US $)

Country	Population	GDP	GDP per Capita
China	1,350,695,000	8,227,102,629,831	6,091
India	1,236,686,732	1,858,740,105,864	1,503
United States	313,914,040	16,244,600,000,000	51,749
Brazil	198,656,019	2,252,664,120,777	11,340
Russian Federation	143,533,000	2,014,774,938,342	14,037
Japan	127,561,489	5,961,065,540,384	46,731
United Kingdom	63,612,729	2,475,781,990,521	38,920
Germany	80,425,823	3,428,130,624,839	42,625
Iran	76,424,443	552,397,273,213	7,228
Turkey	73,997,128	789,257,487,307	10,666
France	65,696,689	2,612,878,426,331	39,772
Italy	59,539,717	2,014,669,579,720	33,837
South Africa	52,274,945	384,312,674,446	7,352
Republic of Korea	50,004,441	1,129,598,273,324	22,590
Canada	34,754,312	1,779,634,707,766	51,206
Saudi Arabia	28,287,855	711,049,600,000	25,136
Australia	22,722,000	1,532,407,884,934	67,442
Netherlands	16,754,962	770,555,412,702	45,990
Belgium	10,796,493	483,261,763,950	43,427
Sweden	9,519,374	523,942,287,823	55,040
Austria	8,429,991	394,707,863,204	46,822
Switzerland	7,996,861	631,173,029,582	78,928
Israel	7,910,500	257,621,957,027	32,567
Serbia	7,223,887	37,488,935,010	5,190
Denmark	5,591,572	315,163,055,675	56,364
Finland	5,413,971	247,545,641,55	45,723
Norway	5,018,573	500,029,909,755	99,636
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,833,916	17,465,958,606	4,556
Qatar	2,050,514	192,390,104,345	93,825

Source: (World Bank, 2014f), (World Bank, 2014g), (World Bank, 2014h).

As seen in Table 2.33, China has the largest population in the world. However it does not mean that China is the wealthiest nation in the world. Its GDP per Capita is just 6,091 dollars. On the other side of the coin, Norway, with a population just above 5 million, is the wealthiest nation with a GDP per Capita level near 94,000 dollars. Yet a comparison between China and India shows that, while China has a slightly higher population (approximately 114,000,000 more) than India, China's GDP is approximately four-times bigger than India. In the same way, while India's population is almost nine-fold of Japan, its GDP is less than one third of Japan's GDP. This is because the countries we compared have different levels of industrialization. Japan focuses more on high-tech products and capital-intensive methods of production while India, still an industrializing country, uses labor-intensive production methods.

The contribution of natural resources to wealth, especially energy sources such as oil and natural gas is observed if Table 2.34 is analyzed with the data on the following page that shows the biggest producers of oil, net exporters of oil, biggest producers of natural gas and net exporters of natural gas respectively. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar that have enormous reserves of oil and natural gas have high GDP per Capita levels. Both oil and natural gas contribute to the growing Russian economy as it has a surplus after meeting the need for domestic consumption. Canada is a net exporter of oil and natural gas. Even though the USA is the third largest producer of oil, it still needs to import oil to meet its huge economy's needs. For this reason, it is the biggest importer of oil with 500 million tons for 2011. It is followed by China, Japan, India, Korea, Germany, Italy, France, Singapore and the Netherlands respectively. These economies, like many others, are dependent on oil from other countries for their increasing consumption.

Table 2.34 Top 10 Producers of Oil (2012)

	Producers	Million Tons	% of world total
1	Saudi Arabia	544	13.1
2	Russian Federation	520	12.6
3	United States	387	9.3
4	People's Rep. Of China	206	5.0
5	Islamic Rep. Of Iran	186	4.5
6	Canada	182	4.4
7	United Arab Emirates	163	3.9
8	Venezuela	162	3.9
9	Kuwait	152	3.7
10	Iraq	148	3.6
	Rest of the World	1,492	36.0
	World	4,412	100.0

Source: (IEA, 2014, p. 11)

Table 2.35 Top 10 Net Exporters of Oil (2011)

	Producers	Million Tons
1	Saudi Arabia	353
2	Russian Federation	247
3	Islamic Rep. Of Iran	122
4	Nigeria	121
5	United Arab Emirates	114
6	Iraq	108
7	Venezuela	93
8	Kuwait	89
9	Canada	82
10	Angola	79
	Others	574
	Total	1,982

Source: (IEA, 2014, p. 11)

Table 2.36 Top 10 Producers of Natural Gas (2012)

	Producers	bcm*	% of world total
1	United States	681	19.8
2	Russian Federation	656	19.1
3	Qatar	160	4.7
4	Islamic Rep. Of Iran	158	4.6
5	Canada	157	4.6
6	Norway	115	3.3
7	People's Rep. of China	107	3.1
8	Saudi Arabia	95	2.8
9	Netherlands	80	2.3
10	Indonesia	77	2.2
	Rest of the World	1,149	33.5
	World	3,435	100.0

*billion cubic meters

Source: (IEA, 2014, p. 13)

Table 2.37 Top 10 Net Exporters of Natural Gas (2012)

	Producers	bcm*
1	Russian Federation	185
2	Qatar	120
3	Norway	109
4	Canada	57
5	Algeria	48
6	Turkmenistan	37
7	Indonesia	37
8	Netherlands	34
9	Nigeria	27
10	Malaysia	21
	Others	154
	Total	829

* billion cubic meters

Source: (IEA, 2014, p. 13)

We have investigated the contribution of economic power to a nation's power in the preceding pages. While its contribution is enormous, it is not the only component of power. If it was the only component, one would expect Japan, a country with the third largest GDP, to be a very important actor in international relations. However, that is not the case. Military power, which is vital for a nation, is the subject of next part.

2.4.2. Military Power

Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) on his three volumes study titled *On War* (*Vom Kriege*) explains the relationship between military power and politics. According to him, "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means" (von Clausewitz, 1908, p. 22). Military power serves the policies of a state and contributes to its power. War is considered to be *ultima ratio regum* (final arguments of kings). It is almost as old as man himself (Keegan, 1994, p. 3). Between 1816 and 2007, 95 inter-state wars took place (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). Military power is employed in wars, yet it might be useful even only with its presence, by causing coercion. In addition, military aid to another state (i.e. transfer of weapons or providing military experts) might be used as a political tool.

Population is an important dimension of military power. Only states with considerable amount of population can mobilize large numbers of troops in the battlefield. States that are not protected by natural barriers such as oceans need to maintain large armies. If it is isolated from other states as the example of Britain

shows, it may have a smaller standing army. States in continental Europe, take France or Prussia (Germany) needed to maintain large armies to protect their borders as seen in Table 2.39.

The need for larger armies increased as the war became more complex with the introduction of new weapons and due to the alliance systems more states involved in wars. In Table 2.38, the rise in military personnel can be seen in comparison especially for the years that witnessed the Seven Years' Wars (1756/60) and Napoleonic Wars (1812/14). In 1812/14, France was able to muster 600,000 men.

Table 2.38 Increase in Military Manpower, 1470-1660

Date	Spain	United Provinces	France	England	Sweden
1470s	20,000		40,000	25,000	
1550s	150,000		50,000	20,000	
1590s	200,000	20,000	80,000	30,000	15,000
1630s	300,000	50,000	150,000		45,000
1650s	100,000		100,000	70,000	70,000

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 56)

Table 2.39 Size of Armies 1690-1814 (men)

	1690	1710	1756/60	1778	1789	1812/14
Britain	70,000	75,000	200,000		40,000	250,000
France	400,000	350,000	330,000	170,000	180,000	600,000
Habsburg Empire	50,000	100,000	200,000	200,000	300,000	250,000
Prussia	30,000	39,000	195,000	160,000	190,000	270,000
Russia	170,000	220,000	330,000		300,000	500,000
Spain		30,000			50,000	
Sweden		110,000				
United Provinces	73,000	130,000	40,000			
United States	-	-	-	35,000	-	-

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 99)

Population became more important as the weapons became more deadly, thanks to technologic developments, and wars lasted longer. A state has to support its armies with fresh soldiers as the casualties decrease the total number of troops in the field. As an army advances in the enemy territory and occupies it, it has to station troops to guard its back and provide order since it is enemy territory. Worse, its supply lines would become longer and need more soldiers to maintain it. Thus, it may be argued that as an army advances into enemy territory, its fighting strength decreases. It is best seen in the German experience during the Second World War and especially in the Eastern Front against Russia where Germany became unable to fill the gap in troop numbers due to its limited manpower. In Stalingrad, in the fall of 1942, one German battalion that should consist normally approximately 500 men was reduced to three officers and 73 NCOs and enlisted men (Mitcham, 2008, p. 654). During the war, the Allies enjoyed superiority over the Axis with regards to

population. In 1942, if China and colonies are excluded, the USA, Soviet Union and Britain had a total population of 345 million while Italy, Germany, Austria and Japan had a total population of 190.6 million (Harrison, 2000, p. 7).

Before Napoleon, war was the business of relatively small numbers involved in it. Mercenaries were available all over Europe. It was Napoleon Bonaparte who introduced the conscription system, *levee en masse*, on 23 August 1783 and it became institutionalized in 1798[27]. Population was mobilized for the military needs of the state and it was in some sense a part of the so-called Military Revolution which took place between 1500 and 1800 to use Geoffrey Parker's terminology (Parker, 2003). Other states such as Prussia, the Habsburg Empire and Russia followed the suit. Though it was very unpopular in France as high rates of desertion shows, it was a necessary measure in a *guerre à outrance* :

> Without the coercive tool of conscription, the young French Republic would have been extinguished by the monarchical powers of Europe. Even more so, Napoleon Bonaparte's grand empire required a steady flow of manpower that only this administrative mechanism could provide (Blanton, 2009).

Innovation has always been an important aspect of military power. By time, new technologies were adopted and they had important impact on the conduct of war. William Weir in his book titled *50 Weapons That Changed Warfare* traces back the developments in weapons and the changes they brought (Weir, 2005). In feudal Europe, fortifications provided a level of safety and wars were mostly in the form of sieges. The bow, spear, sword and catapults were the main weapons. Cavalry had advantages over infantry in the field battles. With the introduction of gunpowder, warfare started to change. Gunpowder was known in China and used in firecrackers.

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[27] In the USA, conscription or as widely known drafting (Selective Service System) was in use during the First World War, Second World War and Vietnam War. It was abolished in 1974 and a transition to professional army took place since then.

In 1281 Kublai (Kubilay) Khan sent his forces to invade Japan but after suffering from two typhoons, approximately 4,000 ships were sunk and the invasion was unsuccessful. In parallel to the Japanese tradition, recent discoveries in the shipwrecks revealed that the Mongol armies shot ceramic pots filled with gunpowder and equipped with fuse by mechanical artillery against the Japanese defenders. However it was not used in weapons and the horse-mounted archer was the main fighting force. The reason is that, at that time they used unrefined potassium nitrate and it did not cause powerful explosion. In Europe, the density of potassium nitrate was increased after a mixture process and blocks of gunpowder, known as corn, was produced in the 15th century. (Weir, 2005, p. 52) In 1405, Berwick-upon-Tweed's Scottish soldiers surrendered only after one mortar shot. However these early versions of artillery were very heavy. As a result they could be only transported by boats on rivers and they could not be used everywhere. A few decades later smaller and mobile canons were produced especially by France and they reduced the British fortresses in Normandy and Aquitaine in the 1440s and 1450s (Parker, 2003, p. 8). It in return, led to improved design of fortifications and wars took the form long-lasting sieges. The fall of Constantinople, famous with its three-level defense system consisting of from 7 to 10 meters thick walls and moats, marked a new era. In addition to cannon and mortars shooting marble balls, miners, of Turkish, German and Slavic origins, employed in the army worked as sappers (known as *lağımcı*) and they dug tunnels under the city walls, filled them with gun-powder and helped the destruction of the walls (Emecen, 2011). The French also improved the gun design and produced mobile guns that could be carried by wheeled-carriages. Charles VIII started his campaign against the Italian city-states in 1494 and had quickly conquered fortifications thanks to 40 guns in his army (Keegan, 1994, p. 321).

Another important development was the invention of matchlock musket widely named as harquebus. Though they were very big, almost miniature cannons, and took long time to reload them after one shot, it increased the importance of infantry and proved superior to cavalry (Weir, 2005, p. 71). Body armors that provided protection against arrows were now useless. The Ottomans used rifles against the Mamluk forces in Egypt in 1517, Hungarian cavalry in Mohacz in 1526 and rifles proved to be very useful (Emecen, 2011). Probably in 1610 or 1615 a flintlock rifle was developed in France. It had many advantages when compared to the matchlock muskets and provided greater security (Weir, 2005, p. 75). It was the matchlock muskets that made the colonization possible since it provided greater accuracy and firepower against bows. Still they had a limited range, approximately 115 meters (150 paces).

The developments in the field of weaponry necessitated changes in strategies and especially tactics. It was Maurice de Saxe (1696-1750), *maréchal générale de France*[28], who recognized the changing nature of warfare. He suggested changes in the formation of armies and according to him self-sufficient *legions* consisting of infantry, heavy and light cavalry and field artillery with the capability of independent operation and maneuverability should be the main type of formation. In addition, he realized the importance of supply system and argued that by attacking the supply lines of the enemy it would be possible to win a war even without fighting. He deeply influenced Frederick the Great (1712-1786), the King of Prussia (1740-1786) (Telp, 2005, p. 4). Frederick the Great, though implicitly, made a distinction between the two levels of art of war what is today made between the strategy and tactics. He named the lower level of the art of war *petite service*; it was about

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[28] The original title is *maréchal général des camps et armées du roi* and it means that the recipient had the authority over all French armies while a *maréchal* had authority only over his army.

discipline, drill, tactical formations and recruitment. The higher level of the art of war was called *connaissances du général,* dealing with campaign plans, conduct of battle and sieges. He valued a small, controllable army of high quality more than a large army (Telp, 2005, p. 5). He opposed universal conscription and supported relying on mercenaries. As a reflection of the Prussian military tradition, he envisaged a great role for the nobility to fill the officer cadres. Since he believed only nobles to have the necessary sense of honor and martial spirit; officers had to be noblemen[29] (Telp, 2005, pp. 5-6). Frederick argued that wars should be short because Prussia's modest resources would be quickly exhausted in long campaigns. The army should act aggressively. He paid great attention to supply and suggested the war of ambushes and snatch-attacks on communication lines of the enemy. He valued offensive in all situations. In addition, he understood the value of cooperation among different branches of the army (Telp, 2005, p. 6). Increasing maneuvers such as encircling the enemy forces, necessitated organization, coordination, effective timing and discipline, thus drills and training started to became more important. Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) introduced new methods in the conduct of war. As the first of all, as a result of the revolution, nobility lost its position and rights and Napoleon introduced meritocratic principle in promotions. Rather than family connections and class, success and bravery were the values that made promotion possible. He paid great attention to *esprit de corps* and since conscription was used it was vital to reward the soldiers. He invented *Légion d'honneur* as a military decoration in 1802

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[29] The landed nobility of Prussia, *junkers*, formed the backbone of Prussian military machine. Officer ranks were closed to common people. General Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein (1870-1948), known in Turkey as General von Kress or Kress Pasha, serving in the Ottoman Army in Palestine observed the many differences between the German and Ottoman military traditions. In his memoires he notes that "here even the son of a porter can become an officer" (von Kress, 2008) . Because of this limitation, Germany had problems in forming new armies during the First World War due to lack of officers. The so-called democratization of the army, took place in the inter-war era. Adolf Hitler, himself a commoner, had a deep hatred against the nobility and especially the higher echelons of the *Wehrmacht* Command.

(Telp, 2005, p. 57). At the operational level, speed was the key concern for Napoleon. He reorganized the French armies and made the army corps the basis of his military organization as independent but cooperating units instead of the divisions which were relatively weaker. He extensively used light artillery in the field before attacking enemy positions. (Telp, 2005, pp. 60-61) In sum, the quality of the operational instruments, the corps system and the staff system, provided the *Grande Armée* with superior responsiveness, speed and maneuverability (Telp, 2005, p. 64).

The 19th century witnessed new developments in the field of weaponry. Explosive shells dramatically increased the role of artillery. A British artillery officer, Lieutenant Henry Shrapnel (later major general, 1761-1842) saw a way to improve the shell's performance against personnel by adding lead bullets, gunpowder and a fuse into the shells. The explosive shells changed the nature of artillery both on land and sea as it gained more destruction power (Weir, 2005, p. 90). Another invention was the rifle musket or the Minié rifle, after Captain Charles Claude Etienne Minié of the French army. It was similar to muskets, loaded from the muzzle but it had grooves in the barrel that caused the bullet to spin when fired. It provided greater speed, range and accuracy for the bullet. The range as a result increased to approximately 700 meters. Given the increased range and accuracy of the rifles, the cavalry charges started to become more dangerous since a mounted soldier made a bigger target for infantry's rifle fire. The rifles were used extensively during the American Civil War by forces of the North (Weir, 2005, pp. 94-95). Another major invention was the breech-loading rifle. It changed the infantry tactics totally. During the First Boer War in 1880, the British forces were annihilated by the Dutch farmers. The British still clung to the tactics used with muzzle-loading rifles and it was almost

impossible to load them in prone position. Since it was loaded while standing, soldiers also fired in that position often by taking turns while one squad reloaded its rifle, a tactic from the times of Frederick the Great. The British continued the same tactic with breech-loading guns. The British forces were equipped with the Martini-Henry single-shot breech-loader and they were blue trousers with red jackets. The Boers had single-shot breech loaders such as the Westley Richards, the Martini-Henry while some had repeaters like the Winchester or the Swiss Vetterli. The Boers were good at marksmanship as they had to hunt for their livelihood. They took cover in bushes or behind the rocks while firing while the British stood up in accordance with their tactics and they lost the war (Weir, 2005, pp. 110-111). The Winchester 1866 repeater rifle can be considered as the father of modern machine guns since for the first time it allowed rapid fire without reloading after every shot thanks to its 15 round tube magazine[30]. Rifling was also applied to artillery pieces due to the development of steel. It also increased its range and accuracy. In addition, breech-loading mechanism shortened the time for reloading and allowed rapid fire. Muzzle-loading artillery pieces had to be cleaned before they were reloaded. Aligning the position of gun after every shot was a problem caused by the recoil. However in 1897 the French design for 75 mm. solved this problem by using a pneumatic piston system that neutralized the recoil power (Weir, 2005, p. 152). It further decreased the reloading time since there was no need to realign the gun's position. In return, due to rapid firing, the amount of shells used increased dramatically.

With the industrialization of war and development of lethal weapons, wars started to end with bigger human losses. In order to compensate the losses, states

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[30] The US Armed Forces started to use Springfield 1903 at the beginning of the 20th century. It had a five-bullet cartridge. Then in 1937 it was replaced by M1-Garand which had eight-bullet cartridge. Yet, Springfield 1903 was used as a sniper rifle even at the Vietnam War.

increased the size of their armies as shown in Table 2.40. It is seen that Russia had

the largest army in 1880 as in 1914. France had the second largest army in the same

year. Germany was in the third position. Britain had a relatively small army and its

focus has always been on its navy. (Black, 1999, p. 273) Though a naval power,

Britain still had a larger army than the Habsburg Empire which was a Central

European empire. Italy followed the Habsburg Empire as another Great Power of

Europe, but the weakest of them. Starting from the 1890s, the US started to increase

its military strength almost fivefold in three decades. Of course its secure

environment, being away from the European Great Power rivalries did not

necessitate the US to maintain a large army as the European Powers. It is also seen

that, as an economic giant, the United States had a very small army in 1880. Another

rising actor was Japan at the other end of the world. It almost tripled its military

strength in three decades.

Table 2.40 Military and Naval Personnel of the Powers 1880-1914

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1914
Russia	791,000	677,000	1,162,000	1,285,000	1,352,000
France	543,000	542,000	715,000	769,000	910,000
Germany	426,000	504,000	524,000	694,000	891,000
Britain	367,000	420,000	624,000	571,000	532,000
Austria-Hungary	246,000	346,000	385,000	425,000	444,000
Italy	216,000	284,000	255,000	322,000	345,000
Japan	71,000	84,000	234,000	271,000	306,000
United States	34,000	39,000	96,000	127,000	164,000

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 203)

On the side of the naval warfare too, due to technological developments many

changes took place. Even before the Industrial Revolution, Britain had superiority

over other European powers with regards to naval power. France was once superior to Britain however with the Nine Years' War (1689-1697) it lost its position as the largest naval power. As Jeremy Black points out "thanks to her naval strength, Britain could be a world power, France only a European one" (Black, 1999, p. 221).

Table 2.41 Size of Navies 1689-1815 (ships of the line)

	1689	1739	1756	1779	1790	1815
Britain	100	124	105	90	195	214
Denmark	29	-	-	-	38	-
France	120	50	70	63	81	80
Russia	-	30	-	40	67	40
Spain	-	34	-	48	72	25
Sweden	40	-	-	-	27	-
United Provinces	66	49	-	20	44	-

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 99)

Naval power provided Britain a source of strength to protect its lands, the Royal Navy played the same role an advance post plays in land warfare. Britain was able to play the role of off-shore balancer by blockading the access of its rivals to oceans with the help of its navy and of course other sources of power:

> British sea power thus naturally compressed ambitious European tyrants from Philip II to Hitler within continental limits. Even there, unifying aspirations could be frustrated by balance-of-power politics as London consistently threw the weight of its financial, political, and, when necessary, military might onto the scales in defense of Europe's weakest nations (Rose, 2007, p. 7).

Navy was vital to protect the British colonies and sea-lanes as British commerce depended on them. Those who praise Britain's success in industrialization and its leading role in commerce sometimes miss the point and underestimate the role played by the British military power. With this regard, Robert E. Harkavy touches upon a very important issue in his detailed study *Strategic Basing and Great Powers*, 1200-2000. He provides a data-set for the bases used by the Mongol Empire, China, Venice, Genoa, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, France, the Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Italy, Germany and the USSR. The access to bases was gained through diplomacy, colonialism or conquest. At the height of its power Britain had more than one hundred bases spread around the world (Harkavy, 2007, p. 9).

These bases served as entrepots for trade, as garrisons, *point d'appuis*, naval bases, with the invention of steam engine as coaling stations and with the introduction of underwater telegraph cables as terminals. Comparing Britain with other empires, especially Portugal, Harkavy argues that only Britain reached a global or near-global reach (Harkavy, 2007, p. 11). Britain controlled important choke-points such as the North Sea, English Channel, Greenland-Iceland Gap, Cape of Good Hope, Malta, Cyprus, Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of Malacca, Taiwan Strait, Strait of Magellan and Suez. Controlling the seas by the navy was vital for checking the rivals as Jeremy Black points out:

> British trade was also protected, and, with it, empire. The value of colonies and trading stations was largely a function of their ability to trade. Naval power was crucial to this, because of the maritime nature of western European colonization and long-distance commerce. The value of this trade, as a source of imports and re-exports, employment, processing and profit, and as a market for exports, could be huge. British naval power ensured that Britain gained this wealth and her opponents lost it, and this was vital to the ability to the British state to finance its actions in peace and war (Black, 1999, p. 221).

The American admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) upon investigating the history of naval wars published his book in 1890: *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783.* He suggested that by controlling strategic points through navies, a state may control the world. For this reason, he advocated the deployment of a larger navy for the United States and acquiring bases such as Hawaii to check the Japanese threat (Rose, 2007, p. 2). In 1898 Hawaii became American territory and played an important role as a naval base in the middle of the Pacific Ocean during the American-Spanish War same year. Cuba and the Philippines also came under the US control as a result of the war. Thus the American expansion in the Pacific began. Mahan influenced many officers and statesmen with his views and his arguments contributed to the naval arms race especially between Britain and Germany that started at the end of the 19th century.

In 1822, Colonel Henri Joseph Paixhans, a French army officer, proposed firing shells in naval warfare. Shells, being much lighter for their size than cannonballs, had no chance of penetrating those massive oak hulls, so they had never been used. However since the targets were made from the wood, shells would burn them. It was the Russian who tested Paixhans' theory: At the Battle of Sinope in 1853 a Russian squadron firing shells burnt 12 Turkish ships. With the news of this attack, ships firstly started to be armored with iron and in the following years they were to be produced from iron totally. Both the developing iron/steel industry and invention of steam engine made this change possible. In 1859, France launched the first armored steam-powered ship, *La Gloire* (Weir, 2005, p. 103).

However it was *HMS Dreadnought* that started a new age in naval warfare. Built with the suggestions of Admiral Sir John Fisher, the *Dreadnought* entered into service in 1906, it was the fastest ship in the world with a speed of 21 knots and it could steam for 6,620 nautical miles at a speed of 10 knots. It was equipped with 12 inch guns in five twin turrets with a range of approximately 18,000 meters. Its armor was 11 inches thick (Roberts, 2001). The *Dreadnought* was a great development so it became also the name of the class and ships were dated as pre or post-*Dreadnought*. Its superior design contributed to the naval arms race between Germany and Britain. Germany started to build same type of ships and its High Seas Fleet sailed to the Atlantic in 1908 (the only time it ever did so) and rising German power caused alarms in the British public (Rose, 2007, p. 54).

In Table 2.42, the naval arms race can be observed. In 1880 Britain had the largest navy while France had the second and Germany the third. From 1890 on the arms race started but its pace increased after 1900s. By 1910 Germany had the second largest fleet in Europe and gained a superiority against France; a trend that went on up to the First World War. In this period of 34 years, the USA enlarged its navy almost six-fold. However the biggest expansion took place in the Japanese navy, its navy was larger approximately 47 times in 1914. Japan destroyed the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur during the war in 1904-05 and Russia was still trying to recover from that wound before the First World War.

Table 2.42 Warship Tonnage of the Powers 1880-1914

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1914
Britain	650,000	679,000	1,065,000	2,174,000	2,714,000
France	271,000	319,000	499,000	725,000	900,000
Russia	200,000	180,000	383,000	401,000	679,000
United States	169,000	240,000	333,000	824,000	985,000
Italy	100,000	242,000	245,000	327,000	498,000
Germany	88,000	190,000	285,000	964,000	1,305,000
Austria-Hungary	60,000	66,000	87,000	210,000	372,000
Japan	15,000	41,000	187,000	496,000	700,000

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 203)

Many new weapons and crafts were introduced during the First World War. The introduction of machine guns, barbed wire, long-range siege artillery and improved fortifications provided advantage to defense and the caused unending trench warfare. With the introduction of submarines and aircraft, for the first time in history, warfare became three dimensional. Britain was far superior to Germany with regards to surface navy. In the Battle of Jutland (31 May-1 June 1916) German High Seas Fleet steamed to the Atlantic. Britain had access to German codes and the Grand Fleet also steamed and engaged the German naval forces near Norway. It was the largest encounter of surface ships of modern times. Some 250 ships were at sea, and the British held a decisive preponderance over the Germans: 28 to 16 dreadnoughts; 9 to 5 battle-cruisers; 8 to 0 armored cruisers; 26 to 11 cruisers; and 78 to 61 destroyers. In the ensuing battle both sides lost a few ships, none of the parties managed to win a decisive victory. (Morrow, 2006, p. 150) Germany relied on its submarine fleet in order to blockade Britain and started to engage both British and neutral merchants. However even in the field of submarines Britain had superiority to

Germany: it had 77 submarines, the Germans only had 29 (Preston, 1998, p. 21). The sinking of *RMS Lusitania* on 7 May 1915 by a German submarine and the death of American citizens aroused the public opinion in the USA and paved the way for its entry into the war in 1917.

Wilbur and Orwill Wright built the first aircraft and as it was tried on 17 December 1903, it was a success. However this new technology did not quickly attract the attention of states and Wright Brothers' efforts to sell their invention failed many times (van Creweld, 2011, p. 5). Interest in aviation started to increase slowly. First country to buy airplanes was France in 1909. Shortly after it Britain also ordered planes and established the Aerial Navigation Committee. By the year 1910, Germany had 5 aircraft, Britain 4, Russia 3, Italy, Austria, Japan, Belgium and the US had 2 each. France, however, had 36 aircrafts (van Creweld, 2011, p. 14). They proved their worth in the Italo-Turkish War in 1911-12. The Italians had 11 aircraft yet the campaign witnessed many first-times. These included the first recorded flight by a military aircraft over enemy territory (October 22), the first use of aircraft to lay naval gunfire (October 28), the first wartime use of wireless for air-to-ground and ground-to-air communication, the first wartime attempt at aerial bombing (November1), the first wartime use of aerial photography (November 23), the first wartime mission flown by night (March 4, 1912), and the first experiment with nighttime bombing (June 11) (van Creweld, 2011, p. 18). Though the bombs and engines were very primitive, the aircrafts added a new dimension to the warfare. When the First World War began in 1914, Russia had the largest air fleet with 263 airplanes; Germany 232, France 165, Britain 63, Austria-Hungary 48 and Belgium had 16 airplanes.

In addition to airplanes, machine guns and poisonous gasses, tank was also invented during the First World War. As war turned out to be a long-lasting war of attrition, *la guerre d'usure,* and troops stuck between fortified trenches protected by machine gun nests, something new was necessary to penetrate these defense lines. Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Swinton had seen the tractors using an American invention, the caterpillar track while they were pulling artillery in 1914. He thought it would work very well to the muddy terrains of Flanders and started his design. However his offer was refused by the British military authorities because they still believed that it was human valor that made the victory rather than machines. He sent his design to a friend, Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Hankey who was the secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defense. Since all matters related to motor vehicles were handled by the navy, the issue came before Winston Churchill, the First Lord of Admiralty, and received his support. He secured the support of the prime minister too. Project went on after Churchill left the cabinet after the failure in Gallipoli, a campaign which was his brainchild. These "armored machine gun destroyers" were named as "tanks" to confuse the Germans, it was claimed that they were designed to carry water in the deserts (Weir, 2005, p. 171). The War Office ordered 150 tanks in 1916 (Morrow, 2006, p. 134). Without preparing necessary facilities, training mechanics and stocking spare parts, the British used them hastily on September 13, 1916. Though they penetrated German lines, at the end of the day, most of them broke down. Field Marshall Douglas Haig, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France, found tanks useless and due to his opposition their production was almost to be cancelled if a few people at the bureaucratic structures did not intervene (Weir, 2005, p. 172). It might be argued that tanks did

not play an important role during the war however tanks were still at their infancy in this period and there was no strategy to use them in an effective way.

When the First World War ended in 1918, the US was by far superior to other Powers both in economic and military aspects. Britain and France were exhausted, Japan was not industrialized enough to compete with the US. Germany was in experiencing hyper-inflation due to huge war indemnities and political instability In addition, strict restrictions were imposed on it at the Versailles Treaty. Still, important developments took place in the field of naval warfare. We have already mentioned the importance of naval and air bases for the purpose of power projection. The aircraft carriers, introduced in the post-war era, almost served as air bases for aircraft and provided important capabilities. Though the British battleship HMS *Furious* had a flight deck, it had capacity only for one plane. It was an amphibian plane and after it landed it was winched back to the ship (Weir, 2005, p. 175). The Japanese navy had *Wakamiya* which had two airplanes on its deck during the First World War. After the war, they started to build aircraft carriers. However the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, brought limits for all states with regards to total ship tonnage. The British and American navies were given the highest tonnage and Japan was in the third position after them. Japan was allowed 81,000 tons in total for aircraft carriers as the US and Royal Navies were each permitted 135,000 tons. Conversion of two cruisers into aircraft carriers was permitted and they were later converted. These restrictions continued until the collapse of the system in 1936 (Stille, 2005a, p. 4). When it entered the war, it had 6 aircraft carriers in service, namely; *Hosho* (21 aircraft capacity), *Akagi* (60 aircraft capacity), Kaga (90 aircraft capacity), Ryujo (48 aircraft capacity), Soryu (71 aircraft capacity), Shokaku (84

aircraft capacity). During the war, Japan had 45 aircraft carriers in service (Stille, 2005a, pp. 10-18). In the same way, Britain's early aircraft carriers were converted from other ships. Britain had three aircraft carriers when the war ended in November 1918 (*Argus, Hermes* and *Eagle*) (Konstam, 2010, p. 8). Due to the limitations brought by the Washington Treaty, that limited the displacement of battleships to 35,000 tons, Britain also started to convert some of its battleships into aircraft carriers (*Furious*, *Courageous* and *Glorius*) in the interwar era and they carried between 20-30 aircraft depending on its type (Konstam, 2010, p. 10). In the 1930s, the Royal Navy started to build the *Ark Royal*. It was finally commissioned in November 1938 and cost about £3 million, the most expensive ship ever built for the Royal Navy. Its aircraft capacity was 60 (Konstam, 2010, pp. 14-15). Germany had only one aircraft carrier, *Stuttgart* (Fonteney, 2006, p. 10). Russian Navy had four aircraft carriers during the war, one of them operating in the Baltic Sea (The *Orlitza*), and the others were in the Black Sea (the *Imperator Alexandr I*, *Imperator Nikolai I*, *Almaz*) with a capacity of 10 aircraft (Fonteney, 2006, p. 11). The French had too converted their cruisers into aircraft carriers namely, the *Normandie* and *Béarn*. In the 1930s France decided to build two new type aircraft carriers, *Joffre* and *Painlevé*, however they were not completed yet when France fell to German occupation. The US Navy converted ships of other types into aircraft carriers in the pre-war era. The *Langley*, *Lexington* and *Saratoga* were the earliest designs with 90 aircraft capacity. The *Ranger* was the first ship built as a carrier. It was commissioned in 1934 and had 76 aircraft capacity. It was followed by the Yorktown Class aircraft carriers. The Yorktown, the Enterprise, the Hornet. They entered into service in 1937, 1938 and 1941 respectively and had a capacity of 90 aircraft. The Wasp entered into service in 1940 and had a capacity of 72 aircraft (Stille, 2005b, pp. 12-26).

The industrialization and mechanization of war intensified with the Second World War. New models of aircrafts, tanks, machine guns, submachine guns, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, recoilless guns and submarines were developed (Weir, 2005). In addition new techniques for amphibious warfare and airborne warfare were introduced. Radar[31] against air and surface vessels and sonar[32] for submarines and surface vessels were developed due to improving technology in the field of electronics. Yet new weapons and improvements did not mean anything alone. Strategy and tactics were necessary to use them in an effective way. In France, the French and British had more tanks than the Germans. However, they were considered as fixed pill-boxes and scattered to different divisions. The Germans on the other hand, formed armored divisions supported with mechanized infantry, mechanized artillery and close air support (with Stuka dive-bombers). Their tactics was based on high mobility, high firepower and coordination among various units and branches. The *blitzkrieg* or lightning warfare was first tried in the Spanish Civil War by the German "volunteers", actually they were sent there by Adolf Hitler as also Benito Mussolini sent his own "volunteers" to fight on Francisco Franco's side. As Steven J. Zaloga argues, Spain was the "proving ground for *blitzkrieg*" (Zaloga, 2010). While it was tested successfully in Poland too by the German forces, the French General Staff still clung to the idea of defending the Maginot Line. They could not grasp the changing nature of warfare in the post-World War I era and the result was the fall of France in about one month. As some observers noted "even though the Germans and the French were almost equally matched in numbers and types of equipment, the Allies were plagued with poor, hesitant decision-making at

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[31] Acronym for Radio Detection and Ranging.
[32] Acronym for Sound Navigation and Ranging.

the highest command echelons, coupled with bad luck" (Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 1993, p. 10).

If left alone, Britain would not be able to resist Germany during the Second World War. The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill often sent warning messages to the US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt about the expected results of rising German power. While Britain was under German air raids for nine months in 1941 (The Battle of Britain) and its ships were sunk by the German submarines, Churchill told Roosevelt that the fall of Britain would open the way for Germany's expansion into the Western Hemisphere since it would occupy the British bases in Western Atlantic. Roosevelt was both cautious and concerned with the isolationist and pacifist opposition in his country. Many regarded Britain almost "gone". Among them was the American Ambassador John P. Kennedy (Sr.).[33] Upon his return to home in 1940, he publicly stated "England is gone" and "I'm for appeasement one thousand per cent". After meeting with President Roosevelt he said to journalists: [I] "devote my efforts to what seems to me to be the greatest cause in the world today … to help the president keep the United States out of war." (Olson, 2010, p. 9). While Churchill was urging for more equipment and Roosevelt knew about German activities in Latin America, he was still not sure if Britain could stand against Britain as he said to a friend that British chances for survival was "one to three" (Dallek, 1995, p. 243). Churchill especially pressed for 50 American destroyers, mostly old class, to use against German U-boats. As Britain lacked the war-material, protecting the maritime shipping was vital as Churchill also admitted "the only thing that really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril" (Weir, 2005, p. 138). This

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[33] He was the father of future president John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Ted Kennedy.

demand resulted with the Destroyers for Bases Agreement on September 2, 1940. The US was to give the 50 destroyers and in return gain the right to establish naval and air bases in British possessions such as Newfoundland, Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, British Guyana and Bermuda for 19 years (Dallek, 1995, p. 247).

The entry of the US into war in December 1941 changed the course of the war. Its military and economic power altered the balance of power at the expense of the Axis Powers. It supported the Allied Powers with money, raw materials, food, oil, equipment and arms. The Soviet Union too, as a command economy, completed organization of industry and formed a powerful defense industry to support the war aims. Tanks and aircraft were the most produced arms during the war due to huge numbers of losses occurring in encounters with the enemy. In Table 2.43 aircraft production of the Powers can be seen. It shows that the US upon the start of the war increased its production and upon its entry, it boosted its production. The Soviet Union also did the same and its production capacity increased dramatically though it produced less than half of what the US factories produced in 1944, the year production was at maximum level for both states. Germany also increased its production but at its maximum levels it produced less than the Soviet Union. In the Pacific theater of war, even though Japan approximately quadrupled its production between 1939 and 1943, it always produced less than what the US produced. The imbalance between two parties can be seen clearly from the table. For the tanks too, superiority of the US and Soviet Union to Germany can be seen as shown in Table 2.44.

Table 2.43 Aircraft Production of the Powers, 1939-1945

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
United States	5,856	12,804	26,277	47,836	85,898	96,318	49,761
USSR	10,382	10,565	15,735	25,436	34,900	40,300	20,900
Britain	7,940	15,049	20,094	23,672	26,263	26,461	12,070
British Commonwealth	250	1,100	4,575	4,575	4,700	4,575	2,075
Total Allies	24,178	39,518	64,706	101,519	151,761	167,761	84,806
Germany	8,295	10,247	11,776	15,409	24,807	39,807	7,540
Japan	4,467	4,768	5,088	8,861	16,693	28,180	11,066
Italy	1,800	1,800	2,400	2,400	1,600	-	-
Total Axis	14,562	16,815	19,264	26,670	43,100	67,987	18,606

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 354)

Table 2.44 Tank Production in 1944

Germany	17,800
Russia	29,000
Britain	5,000
United States	17,500 (in 1943 29,500)

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 353)

As innovation played a great role both in economic and military sphere, both parties devoted their energy to improve the current weapons or invent new ones. The Germans came up with the first cruise missile in world history. It was the V-1 "Flying Bomb" (official name FI-103) and it caused great panic in Britain in 1943 and 1944 and killed thousands of civilians. It had a jet engine, carried a warhead of

850 kilograms and its range was 250 kilometers. It used a gyrocompass based autopilot for navigation. The autopilot mechanism though was not very accurate, was a great innovation as the introduction of the jet engine. Following the occupation of German bases in France by the Allies in 1944, the Allies took away the spare parts and copied the technology. Then they produced the JB-2 rockets in late 1944. Both the German and British engineers were hard at work for developing a jet engine. The Germans managed that and produced Messerschmitt-262, the world's first jet aircraft. It was developed earlier however first squadrons equipped with M-262s entered into service in January 1945. Hitler has ordered its production as a bomber plane because its high speed would make it immune to the Allied fighter planes. However its production was delayed due to raw material problems. Unlike the British, who had full access to the world markets, the Germans had difficulty in securing the kinds of special metals needed to make the engines resistant to high temperatures. The British also built the Gloster Meteor aircraft. They became operational in 1944. Both planes that had jet engines flew approximately 200 km. faster than any fighter aircraft at the time, with a speed about 800-850 km. (van Creweld, 2011, p. 192)

Another innovation also took place during the war years. It was the nuclear technology and it revolutionized military power. The Germans were working on nuclear weapons. In the Reich Research Council nuclear research was conducted and it was led by Werner Heisenberg who won the Nobel Prize in 1932 for the creation of quantum mechanics (Walker M. , 1995). The American team in Los Alamos in New Mexico was led by J. Robert Oppenheimer. The Government allocated $2 billion for the Manhattan Project but the project proved its worth (Kelly, 2006, p. 3).

On 16 July 1945 the first nuclear bomb was tested and it was successful. It created energy equal to the explosion of ten thousand tons of TNT[34] (Delgado, 2009, p. 62). As well-known, two bombs were used against the Japan cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 15 August 1945 and 20 August 1945 respectively. The destruction caused by the nuclear weapons was unequal to any other weapon and these bombs brought the unconditional surrender of Japan and end of the Second World War.

The US enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear power until 1949. However on 29 August 1949 the first test for Soviet nuclear bomb was successful. In 1952 the USA developed the Hydrogen Bomb and tested it on 31 October 1952 in the Pacific. The Soviets in November 1955 tested their own H-bomb. Causing more damage than other atomic bombs, the H-Bombs (thermonuclear bombs) could affect an area of 400 square miles. The blast at the Soviet test in 1955 was equal to 1.6 megaton of TNT. Britain joined the nuclear club in 1952 and the thermonuclear club on 1957. It was followed by France as France did the same in 1960 and 1968 respectively. China joined both clubs in 1964 and 1967. Israel became nuclear in 1960 though Israel does not accept its nuclear arsenal explicitly. It was followed by India (1974) and Pakistan (1998). North Korea became a nuclear power in 2006 (Siracusa, 2008, p. 51).

Having nuclear weapons without the efficient delivery means does not produce nuclear power alone. The bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were delivered by B-29 bomber planes. With time, both the Soviet Union and US tried to improve their long-range bomber planes and also developed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that would travel some thousand kilometers. The Russians used R-7 *Semyorka* ICBM (range 6,000 km.) when they launched the *Sputnik*-1 in 1957, the

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[34] One thousand ton of TNT is equal to 1 kiloton.

first artificial satellite of the world (Crompton, 2007, p. 3). If the R-7 ICBMs were capable of carrying a satellite for that distance, then they would also carry nuclear warheads to American cities. The launch of Sputnik caused a space race between the USA and Soviet Union as the Americans were in panic after the Sputnik incidence and convinced that they were lagging behind the Soviets in the field of science. Even before the *Sputnik*, on February 14, 1955, the president's Science Advisory Committee's Technological Capabilities Panel, formed by James R. Killian, published its findings and briefed Eisenhower that it found the United States' security was at risk by Soviet advances in nuclear weaponry. Killian recommended that Eisenhower make ballistic missile development a national priority. Following the *Sputnik* incident, also the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established in 1958 (Chun, 2006, p. 64). In the same year, the US also managed to launch its first satellite, *Explorer*-I, on 31 January 1959.

The Strategic Air Command (established in 1946) had its first missile division in 1958. The first American ICBM was Atlas (14,500 km. range) and it became operational in 1959. With these development, the "push-button warfare" that was the main character of the Cold War started (Chun, 2006, p. 66). As the Soviet space program went on, they also accomplished another success, the first man in space was Russian cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin (12 April 1961). A few weeks later, Gagarin was followed by the American astronaut Alan Shephard (5 May 1961) (Crompton, 2007, pp. 30-32). In July 1969, the Americans managed to land on the moon surface for the first time in history (astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin made the moon-walk) (Crompton, 2007, p. 78).

Both the US and Soviet Union had to spend enormous amount of money due to their competition in various fields, especially in the area of military power. The Soviet economy began to falter in the early 1980s because it was not keeping pace with the American economy. Also in the field of developing computers and information technologies the Soviets lagged behind. The Soviet leaders recognized that this technological backwardness in the long-term would also hurt the Soviet military as well. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 74) "Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov was dismissed as the chief of staff in the summer of 1984 for saying publicly that Soviet industry was falling badly behind American industry, which meant that Soviet weaponry would soon be inferior to American weaponry" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 75). Facing both domestic and external problems the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and Russian Federation became its successor state.

Though they were not used during the Cold War, the nuclear weapons provided great amount of coercion due to the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) they would cause if used. After the Cold War, nuclear weapons still contribute in enormous levels to a state's military power. In Table 2.45 the nuclear powers and the amount of nuclear warheads at their disposal can be seen.

Table 2.45 World Nuclear Forces (January 2013)

(All figures are approximate)

Country	Year of First Nuclear Test	Deployed Warheads[a]	Other Warheads[b]	Total Inventory
United States	1945	2150[c]	5,500	~7,700[d]
Russia	1949	~ 1,800	6,700[e]	~8,500[f]
United Kingdom	1952	160	65	225
France	1960	~ 290	~10	~300
China	1964	..	~250	~250
India	1974	..	90-110	90-110
Pakistan	1998	..	110-120	100-120
Israel	..	..	~80	~80
North Korea	2006	..	..	6-8
Total		~4,400	~12,865	~17,270

a 'Deployed means warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces.

b These are warheads in reserve, awaiting dismantlement or that require some preparation (e.g. Assembly or loading on launchers) before they become full operationally available.

c In addition to strategic warheads, this figure includes nearly 200 non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.
d This figure includes the US Department of Defense nuclear stockpile of c. 4650 warheads and another c.3000 retired warheads that are awaiting dismantlement

e This figure includes c. 700 waheads for nuclear-powered ballistic missiles on submarines (SSBNs) in overhaul and bombers, 2000 non-strategic nuclear weapons for use by short-range naval, air force and air defence forces, and c. 4000 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement

f This includes a military stockpile of c.4500 nuclear warheads and another c.4000 retired warheads await dismantlement.

Source: (SIPRI, 2013)

As seen from the table, the US and Russia have bigger stockpiles than other nuclear powers while North Korea has the smallest nuclear arsenal. Some countries such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, South Africa and Brazil have the capability to develop nuclear weapons but due to their political and military preferences they do not prefer to produce them.

While nuclear power is an important aspect of military power, as witnessed during the Cold War, they were never used. The USA facing defeat in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan refrained from using nuclear weapons. Conventional military forces still retain their importance as the main source of military power. It is not easy to measure military power. Though some quantitative indicators such as the size of military forces, military expenditures, the development of defense industry, number of aircraft carriers, aircraft, tanks, warships, submarines, artillery units, etc. maybe used, other important contributors to military power such as the quality of leadership, quality of training, discipline and morale are not quantitative. While the size of the armed forces is an important indicator, it should be treated with care since the quality and efficiency of weapons an army uses (such as firepower, speed, reliability, range etc.) matter to an important degree. To further complicate the issue, not only the quality of weapons but also the skills and training levels of the military personnel who uses them also matter.

We have seen in the previous pages that during the Second World War, the French and British forces in France had more tanks than the Germans in the battlefield; however they used them as fixed batteries while the Germans used them smartly as a part of the *blitzkrieg* tactic and invaded France. On the other hand, the

performance of armies, all other things being equal, may reasonably change if one of them has relatively better quality and high technology weapons and equipment. Simply put, a platoon equipped with machine guns will have superiority over the other equipped with bolt-action rifles all other factors being equal. States, with lower quality of weapons and equipment than their perceived enemy, tend to fill the gap by maintaining larger armies as the Soviet Union did in the early phases of the war against Germany. In this pattern, a large population provides an advantage. In Table 2.46, countries, their active military personnel, total population and ratio of active military personnel to total population can be seen.

Table 2.46 Armed Forces Personnel and Total Population (2012)

(Selected Countries)

	Country	Personnel	Population	Ratio
1	China	2.993.000	1.350.695.000	0,22%
2	India	2.728.000	1.236.686.732	0,22%
3	United States	1.492.200	313.914.040	0,48%
4	Dem. Rep. of Korea (North)	1.379.000	24.763.188	5,57%
5	Russian Federation	1.364.000	143.533.000	0,95%
6	Pakistan	947.800	179.160.111	0,53%
7	Egypt	835.000	80.721.874	1,03%
8	Iraq	842.000	32.578.209	2,58%
9	Brazil	713.480	198.656.019	0,36%
10	Indonesia	676.500	246.864.191	0,27%
11	Rep. of Korea (South)	659.500	50.004.441	1,32%
12	Turkey	612.800	73.997.128	0,83%
13	Iran, Islamic Rep.	563.000	76.424.443	0,74%
14	Vietnam	522.000	88.772.900	0,59%
15	Myanmar	513.250	52.797.319	0,97%
16	Thailand	453.550	66.785.001	0,68%
17	Colombia	440.224	47.704.427	0,92%
18	Italy	359.500	59.539.717	0,60%
19	Afghanistan	338.150	29.824.536	1,13%
20	Mexico	329.750	120.847.477	0,27%
21	France	326.500	65.696.689	0,50%
22	Japan	259.800	127.561.489	0,20%
23	Saudi Arabia	249.000	28.287.855	0,88%
24	Spain	215.600	46.761.264	0,46%
25	Ukraine	214.850	45.593.300	0,47%
26	Germany	186.450	80.425.823	0,23%
27	Israel	184.500	7.910.500	2,33%
28	United Kingdom	169.150	63.612.729	0,27%
29	Malaysia	133.600	29.239.927	0,46%
30	Canada	66.000	34.754.312	0,19%
31	South Africa	62.100	52.274.945	0,12%
32	Australia	56.200	22.722.000	0,25%
33	Netherlands	43.300	16.754.962	0,26%
34	Serbia	28.150	7.223.887	0,39%
35	Norway	25.800	5.018.573	0,51%
36	Kuwait	22.600	3.250.496	0,70%
37	Denmark	17.200	5.591.572	0,31%
38	Bosnia	10.500	3.833.916	0,27%
39	Papua New Guinea	1.900	7.167.010	0,03%
40	Iceland	180	320.716	0,06%

Source: (World Bank, 2014f) & (World Bank, 2014i)

As seen from the table, China and India maintain a larger army than the US. They have a bigger population and they are involved in regional conflicts. In addition, the weapons they use are less high-tech than the US though China has been modernizing its defense industry. The former superpower Russia also continues to maintain a large army. Former Great Powers, Britain, Japan, France, Italy and Germany now have limited military power in terms of military manpower. It is clear that states maintain large armies either if they are located in an unsecure region, involved in regional rivalries or if they have aspirations for a global or regional hegemony in military field. The cases of India, Pakistan, China, South Korea, North Korea, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are good examples. North Korea, keeps more than 5% of its population under arms. As we have already mentioned, wealth does not always mean greater military power and this is proved by the military personnel figures of countries such as Denmark, Norway, Canada and Australia. Denmark's military personnel figure is probably less than many country's law-enforcement forces, not to mention military personnel. It is seen that developed countries, located in peaceful regions where the probability of war is very limited, keep their armies at minimum numbers and instead of spending on military, they spend that amount in more lucrative areas. On the other hand, as especially seen for the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel, they need to maintain a large army, modernize it and import weapons. Being a war-prone region penetrated by global actors and affected by regional rivalries, the Middle East provides a different picture as Benjamin Miller depicts:

> The danger of war looms large in the region almost constantly and the actors behave accordingly and prepare themselves for that possibility, mainly by arming themselves and building alliances. Thus, the Middle East surpasses other Third World regions in defense spending and in the deployment and import of various categories of weapons systems. Indeed, the Middle East is the most highly militarized region of the globe (Miller, 2007, p. 130).

In this respect, the amount of defense expenditure might serve well as an indicator. States that want to maintain effective and modern armed forces spend enormous amounts on defense. Figure 2.7 shows the share of countries in defense expenditures.

Figure 2.7 The Share of World Military Expenditure of the 15 States with the Highest Expenditure in 2013
Source: (SIPRI, 2013)

Though military expenditure fell by 1.9% in 2013, it still amounts to $1,747 billion and while it falls down in North America and Western Europe, it rises everywhere. As seen in Figure 2.7, the USA has the biggest defense spending; it alone spent 37% of the world total ($640 billion). It is followed by China with a share of 11% ($188 billion). The USA and China made nearly half of the total military expenditure. Russia, the third country with a share of 5% spent approximately $87 billion. The fourth country, Saudi Arabia, as an oil rich country that wants to protect itself (not to repeat the example of Kuwait in 1991) and assert itself as a regional hegemon, spent 3.8% of the world total, amounting to $66 billion. Other members of the UNSC and former great powers France and the United Kingdom spent 3.5% ($61 billion) and 3.3% ($57 billion) of the world total respectively. Another former Great Power, Germany spent 2.8% ($48 billion) of the total. The total personnel number of German Armed Forces is limited by the agreements that allowed unification in 1990. According to the agreements, the allowed size is maximum 370,000 though German army has approximately 186,000 personnel under arms, very much below the maximum allowed figure. It seems Germany prefers quality to quantity. Japan, another former Great Power, spent the same amount. It still faces the limitations put in the country's constitution (drafted by American lawyers) following the defeat in the Second World War and its armed forces are named as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Still, Japan maintains an army of approximately 260,000 personnel. However, its offensive capabilities, especially of the naval forces are limited. India has the second largest armed forces. However its defense spending of 2.7% ($47 billion), it seems, is not enough to equip efficiently an armed force consisting of 2.7 million personnel. India has to fight against poverty, develop its national economy and at the same time compete with its

traditional rival Pakistan as they clash over the Kashmir issue. Similar to India and Pakistan, South Korea and North Korea, the enemy brothers divided by ideology and regimes, also compete with each other. South Korea spent 1.9% ($33 billion) of the world total as it is also has the eleventh largest army of the world. Italy, another former Great Power, has the least defense spending among former Great Powers. It spent 1.9% of the world total as South Korea. It is followed by Brazil, a regional power in South America with 1.8% ($31 billion) of the total. Australia, a close ally of the US and Britain in the South Pacific and a developed state, spent 1.4% ($23 billion) of the world total. It maintains relatively a small army, consisting approximately of 56,000 personnel. Surrounded by weak states, mostly island countries, it wants to act as a source of stability while increasing its regional hegemony. It is followed by Turkey, a developing country situated between the crisis-zones of the world, with a share of 1.1% ($19 billion). Turkey spent less than Australia but it maintains the twelfth largest army of the world (612,000 men). The asymmetry on defense spending is best reflected in the case of United Arab Emirates which spent same amount of money on defense as Turkey. It maintains a relatively small army consisting of 51,000 personnel though wants to modernize its armed forces. As seen, developed and wealthy countries such as Canada, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands are not among the 15 states with the highest military expenditure. They spent $18 billion, $7 billion, $4billion and $10 billion respectively (SIPRI, 2013). These states are wealthy however they have limited military power.

In order to form a formidable military power, a state should be self-sufficient on defense industry. More, some states also export their arms and defense industry is an important component of their national economy. It is not surprising to see the US leadership in the field of arms sales. Of the 10 companies that had the largest arms

sales in 2012 (excluding Chinese companies due to lack of data), 7 are American companies, Lockheed Martin being the first with a sales level of $36 billion. Boeing is the second company with a sales figure of $27 billion. The third company is the British BAE Systems with a sales figure of $26 billion. It is followed by Raytheon (US, $22 billion), General Dynamics (US, $20 billion) and Northrop Grumman ($19 billion). The European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS, known also as the Airbus Group) as a multinational EU company is the seventh with a sales figure of $15 billion. It is followed by an American firm, United Technologies which sold arms worth of $13 billion. A non-American firm, Finnmeccanica is the ninth company with a sales volume of $12 billion. The tenth company is another American company, L-3 Communications with a sales level of $10 billion (SIPRI, 2013). As seen, from these figures, the developed countries and especially the US are the main arms suppliers of the world as they also meet the domestic demand.

"The stopping power of water" (Mearsheimer, 2001) has always made power projection a difficult task for centuries. States try to overcome this obstacle by improving their power projection capabilities. In this respect they either maintain military bases on foreign territory or benefit from aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, Landing Ship Dock (LSDs), Landing Platform Dock (LPDs) and helicopter carriers.   These ships help transporting aircraft, helicopters, troops and amphibious vehicles (smaller landing ships, tanks and armored fighting vehicles).

To start with military bases, it may be argued that though technology helped a lot to overcome the stopping power of water, bases are still very important. Robert E. Harkavy identified 47 US military bases abroad at the time of completing his book in 2007 (Harkavy, 2007, p. Appendices). However the real number of US military presence abroad seems higher, Harkavy's figures excludes facilities. During the

presidential elections campaign in 2011, Ron Paul, a candidate from the Republican Party, sparked a debate after claiming that "the US has military personnel in 130 nations and 900 overseas bases" and arguing that state should be down-sized. The official report published by the Department of Defense titled *Base Structure Report; Fiscal Year 2010 Baseline* stated that the US has 611 military facilities around the world in 40 countries excluding combat zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It is also claimed that 549 of them are very small sites and cannot be named base (Kessler, 2012). On the other hand, it is also claimed that since of these facilities are kept secret; the number may reach 900 as Ron Paul argued (Politifact.com, 2011). Still, the official data provided by the Department of Defense proves that the US has a global network of bases and facilities. This global reach is also reflected in the command structure of the US Department of Defense. Regionally, it has the Africa Command, Central Command (responsible for the Middle East), European Command, Northern Command (responsible for the North America), Southern Command (responsible for the South America) and Pacific Command (US Department of Defense, 2012). Britain and France also retain military bases in their former colonies and overseas territories. Britain has military bases in Scotland, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Germany, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Falklands, Brunei and Canada (Alexander, 2013). France has military bases especially in Africa: in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Congo, Chad and Eritrea (Hansen, 2008). Russia maintains military bases in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. During the Cold War, it had many bases in different countries (Harkavy, 2007, p. Appendices). With the end of the Cold War, it lost the majority of its bases. Outside the area of the former Soviet Union, it has currently one base and also it is the only Russian base in the Mediterranean. The Tartus naval base in Syria, also explains Russia's siding with the

Assad regime in Syria since a regime change may bring an end to the Russian presence in the area (Harmer, 2012).

The application of nuclear technology to aircraft carriers enabled greater power and eliminated the need for refueling. Following the Second World War, the US Navy built its surface battle forces around the aircraft carrier. Where the battleship was once the symbol of naval might, today it is the aircraft carrier. The *USS Enterprise* (CVA-65) that entered into service in 1962 was the world's first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Stone, 2006, p. 10). With the decommissioning of the *USS John F. Kennedy* and *USS Kittyhawk* in 2007 and 2009 respectively, all aircraft carriers in the US Navy are nuclear-powered. The US Navy currently has only Nimitz Class aircraft carriers and their decks can hold 85 aircraft in addition to approximately five thousand personnel (Edward, 2010, p. 7). Aircraft carriers are accompanied by cruisers, destroyers and submarines and they altogether form a task force (Stone, 2006, p. 17). The US Navy currently has 10 aircraft carriers while the construction of the new Ford-Class *USS Gerald R. Ford*, *John F. Kennedy* and *Enterprise* is going on. Britain currently has no aircraft carrier since HMS Illustrious was transformed into a helicopter carrier. However Britain is planning to finish two new aircraft carriers, *HMS Queen Elizabeth* and *Prince of Wales* by 2020. Italy has two aircraft carriers; *Garibaldi* and *Cavour*. India has two aircraft carriers; *Viraat* and *Vikramaditya*. France has one aircraft carrier; *Charles de Gaulle*. Russia has one aircraft carrier; *Admiral Kuznetsov*. Spain has one aircraft carrier; *Juan Carlos I*. Thailand has one aircraft carrier; *Chakri Naruebet*. Brazil has one aircraft carrier; *Sao Paulo*. China also has one aircraft carrier; *Liaoning* (ex-*Varyag*, entered into service in 2012) (Globalsecurity.org, 2014). Realizing that without sufficient power-

projection capability, it will not be able to protect its interests abroad, China started to build a high-seas fleet[35] and this created concern especially in the US:

> China has begun to construct a blue-water navy and expand its naval presence from North Korea clockwise down the coast as far as the Red Sea, where it is part of the international patrol squadron intended to deter Somali piracy around the Horn of Africa. This "string of pearls" of naval bases and attendant materiel to stock them represents a fundamental extraterritorial expansion for China beyond its traditional "Middle Kingdom" territory (Petersen, 2011, p. 85).

As seen, the US has a clear superiority in power projection capabilities over other actors with regard to aircraft carriers[36]. Other actors try to maintain or improve their power projection capabilities by ordering new aircraft carriers such as China.

Despite the technological developments, the land forces still preserve their primacy among the naval and air forces. That does not mean naval and air forces are unimportant or ignorable. Land forces without the support of both may face failure. In Vietnam, the US had control of the skies and bombed Northern Vietnamese positions and transported its troops and supplies by helicopter yet it faced a defeat against an enemy fighting with relatively low-tech weapons. The unique characteristics of the jungle warfare, dense forests, limited number of enemy strategic points, the hardship of distinguishing civilian population and enemy; limited the ability of the air forces. As Martin van Creveld suggests "one must agree with those who claim that airpower did not break the will of North Vietnam" (van Creweld, 2011, p. 398). Yet, one cannot deny the importance of air power as the

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[35] It contrasts to coastal navy that has limited power projection capability and focuses on coastal security, protecting the territorial waters from enemy surface vessels and submarines.

[36] In addition to aircraft carriers, the US Marine Corps has 9 Landing Helicopter Ships (LHAs). Each of them carries up to 3,000 marines in addition to helicopters, tanks and smaller amphibious boats. Aircraft of Vertical/Short Take-Off Landing (V/STOL) type too can be stationed on these ships. Each of these ships forms a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The presence of combat ready troops in different regions of the world provides the US a unique capability for rapid deployment and reaction in addition to power projection (Globalsecurity.org, 2014).

example of Six Days War (1967) showed. It was the preemptive strike of Israel by flying it jets at low altitude just over the sea in order not to be detected by enemy radars and destruction of Syrian and Egyptian air bases and aircraft while they were on land, changed the course of the war (Oren, 2002, pp. 171-175). Having control of the skies, the Israeli land forces (especially tanks and mechanized infantry) were able to defeat enemy armored groups in the Sinai desert with the help of close air support. The Gulf War in 1991, created a false optimism about the use of air power. The cruise missiles, stealth bombers and anti-tank aircrafts were used extensively firstly against enemy air defense units and air bases and then against the Iraqi armored groups, infantry units and strongholds. They eased the job of coalition land forces to a great degree. They have really been useful in a conventional warfare as they succeeded in forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. In total, 90,000 tons of bombs were used, this was equal to two months bombing in the Second World War but in 1991 the air force was much more effective in bombing (Finlan, 2005, p. 17). However, following the destruction of Iraqi forces and reaching the political objectives, the Coalition forces left the area and returned to their bases. They had no purpose of invading and controlling Iraq by stationing troops inside the country. In Bosnia and Kosovo too, the "smart bombs" , unmanned aerial vehicles (the UAVs) and other air force units played a vital role in defeating Serbian forces (Oliver, 2005, p. 98). Yet, the examples of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) showed in an asymmetrical warfare where one state wants to control the territory and especially urban areas of an enemy, air power has limited use. One cannot occupy a country by using the navy and air force and it can only be done by using land forces. Mearsheimer also makes this point clear:

Armies are the central ingredient of military power, because they are the principal instrument for conquering and controlling territory – the paramount political objective in a world of territorial states. In short, the key component of military might, even in the nuclear age, is land power. (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 43)

Though it is not easy to measure military power with exact precision, some indicators might be used to give a rough picture of military power. The index provided by the Global Firepower (GFP) might be useful in ranking states according to their conventional military power[37]. Table 2.47 shows the top-25 most powerful states of the world as of March 2014. As seen in the table, the USA has the highest military power, followed by Russia, the former superpower. China is in the third position followed by India. The United Kingdom is the fifth military power followed by France. With the exception of India, top-five military powers are also the permanent members of the UNSC. France is followed by Germany and Turkey. South Korea and Japan have, respectively, the ninth and tenth most powerful armed forces of the world. Developed countries such as Canada and Australia are also included in the list and they are the 16th and 20th most powerful military forces respectively. Other developed and wealthy countries such as Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands do not have enough military power to be included in the list. Rising powers such as Turkey, South Korea, Egypt, Brazil, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Saudi Arabia and Iran are also included in the list. Not surprisingly, five of the states are included in the Middle East. Asia-Pacific region also is home to strong military forces. Though Japan might be labeled as an "economic superpower", it is the 10th military power of the world. It will need the protection of the US in a future clash with China in order to survive. For this reason, a country like Japan cannot be a major power or regional hegemon due to its insufficient military power. At this point the US in the 19th century could serve as a good example:

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[37] The Global Firepower Index uses 50 indicators to calculate military power and covers 106 countries. However these points should be kept in mind:
•Nuclear capability is not taken into account,
•Geographical factors influence every country's ranking,
•Ranking does not solely rely on total number of weapons available,
•Natural resource reliance (use/production) is taken into account,
•Land-locked nations are not penalized for lack of a standing navy,
•Naval powers are penalized for limited naval capabilities,
• Current political/military leadership is not taken into account (GFP, 2014).

The United States was wealthy enough by 1850 to qualify as a great power, but it is generally agreed that it did not achieve that exalted status until 1898, when it began building a muscular military that could compete with those of the European great powers (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 77).

Table 2.47 Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2014)

Rank	Country	Power Index
1	United States of America	0.2208
2	Russia	0.2355
3	China	0.2594
4	India	0.3872
5	United Kingdom	0.3923
6	France	0.4706
7	Germany	0.4899
8	Turkey	0.5171
9	South Korea	0.5536
10	Japan	0.5581
11	Israel	0.5887
12	Italy	0.5991
13	Egypt	0.6122
14	Brazil	0.6663
15	Pakistan	0.7369
16	Canada	0.7432
17	Taiwan	0.7564
18	Poland	0.7565
19	Indonesia	0.8008
20	Australia	0.8253
21	Ukraine	0.8255
22	Iran	0.8255
23	Vietnam	0.8962
24	Thailand	0.9287
25	Saudi Arabia	1.0035

Source: (GFP, 2014)

States benefit from their military power in various ways. They are firstly the use of force and deterrence, secondly security guarantees and alliances and thirdly military aid and arms sales.

1)   The Use of Force and Deterrence: The war is last resort in international relations as a tool. However it sometimes might be necessary to use military force either to protect itself (self-defense), to execute international law and norms or to stop enormous humanitarian losses in a civil war (the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect). The display of force may also be a sign given to states that carries on policies unwelcome by another state. The US for example increases its military presence either in the Persian Gulf or the Mediterranean by deploying additional aircraft carriers in these areas as it did during the Crimea Crisis in 2014 by deploying USS George H. W. Bush in February in the Mediterranean (The Voice of Russia, 2014). Conduct of large scale military exercises or increasing the war-readiness level by halting leaves, are also used as warning signals in diplomacy. Military power is also used in conflict resolution. It was the US-led military operation both in Bosnia and Kosovo that ended the ethnic conflict (Oliver, 2005). In addition, in post-conflict countries it is necessary to maintain military forces with the purposes of peace-building and peace-keeping. Though it is often criticized for its failures, the UN itself runs or provides mandate for that kind of operations. Between the years 2000 and 2010, nearly 600 peace operations were conducted worldwide (SIPRI, 2013).

Military power, may also work as a tool of foreign policy even without being directly used. The presence of a large, powerful and efficient military with capabilities of power projection and rapid deployment serves as a source of

deterrence. In a conflict resolution process for example, the weaker party may have confidence in the process if it is supported by a willing military power that would devote its sources to exert influence on the other party in the case he violates the final treaty that ended the conflict. It was the US military power that brought Yugoslavia to the table in the Dayton Process (Holbrooke, 1998). Though Serbia claims Kosovo is a part of its territory, Kosovo declared its independence in 2008 and Serbia refrains from annexing it aware of the fact that any attempt will be blocked by a US led coalition and it will be punished militarily for its aggression. In sum, military power might be used as a tool in conflict resolution process both for ending the conflict by coercion and maintaining the post-conflict order.

2)   Security Guarantees and Alliances: States relatively weak when compared to their neighbors, regional hegemon or major powers, tend to balance against the threat. Alliances serve this purpose (Walt, 1987). The weaker state joins another state to balance the threatening state. The US retains its control over the oil sources of Middle East thanks to its military forces. It provided security to the relatively small states in the Persian Gulf against the Soviet Union and their more powerful neighbors such as Iraq and Iran. Even in the early phases of the Cold War, President Truman assured the US support for Saudi Arabia many times, providing a security guarantee:

> […] the president of the United States repeatedly assured the king in writing that the United States was "interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia [and that] no threat to your Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States." This was interpreted by both Saudis and Americans as an implicit security guarantee (Bronson, 2006, p. 46).

With the Eisenhower Doctrine (a speech by President Eisenhower on 5 January 1957), this support became official and it made US economic and military

support available to the countries in Middle East available upon request (Herring, 2008, p. 678). In 1991, it was the US, in the form of off-shore balancer, which opposed militarily to invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and later liberated the country. For their security, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar provide military bases to the US. In return, they put their petro-dollars in American banks and let the US control their oil sectors though sometimes indirectly. For this reason, these states are also named as client-states (Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 27).

As seen, security guarantees and alliances help a state to increase its influence over other states and regions. However for these tools to work well, a state should have the necessary military capacity and capability to fulfill its obligations. Security guarantees provided by a militarily weak state (i.e. Denmark or Norway) would not deter the potential aggressors in the Middle East. In conclusion, military power is a vital component of national power that provides many opportunities for states.

3)   Military Aid and Arms Sales: As we have seen in the section on foreign aid in the previous part, it is an important tool for diplomacy. In the same way, states also use military aid (weapons, training, etc.). Military aid provides a source of leverage over the recipient states. The US always threatens with blocking the military aid to Greece and Turkey when they come to the edge of military conflict (Economides & Wilson, 2001, p. 67). In the same vein, the US also provides huge amounts of military aid to Israel and Egypt following the Camp David Agreement. In 2012, the US provided $17.2 billion in military aid (Top-five recipients are Afghanistan, Israel, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan). It might be used for granting weapons, vehicles or vessels, for buying the US produced arms and for the training of personnel in American universities and academies (USAID Foreign Assistance Database, 2014).

In many countries, selling arms to other states have to be approved by the national parliaments according to their constitutions. Given that the developed countries such as the USA, Britain, France and Germany are the main producers of high-tech arms and equipment, these countries form an oligopoly. Arms exporting countries may use the parliamentary process as leverage. Countries that are not at good terms with the US or EU countries choose Russia and China as their arms supplier. In the same vein, an arms embargo or its threat may influence the behavior of the targeted state. We have mentioned the Gulf countries that are dependent on the US for their security. They also invest their petro-dollars in American arms and they are the best customers of the American weapons industry.

In conclusion, in the light of the information provided above, it is clear that military power is a vital ingredient of national power. Political initiatives have to be supported by economic and military power. However, economic power is not a suitable tool for all purposes and for this reason, states with regional or global hegemonic aspirations try to maintain a large and effective military force.

We have mentioned the economic and military power, often named as "hard power assets". In addition to hard power, states also have soft power assets at their disposal. In the next part, soft power will be evaluated.

2.4.3. Soft Power

Among the different dimension of power, probably it is the soft power that is the hardest one to measure due to its intangible nature. According to Joseph S. Nye, who coined the term, "soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" (Nye, 2004, p. 5). It is based on agenda-setting, positive attraction and persuasion. "Hard power is push; soft power is pull" (Nye, 2011, p. 20). Ideologies or regime types may produce sources of attraction as we have mentioned the examples of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and some of the states in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. In the same way, the integration method applied by the EU countries also produces a source of attraction.

Basic sources of soft power are culture, values, legitimate policies, a positive domestic model, a successful economy, and a competent military. These sources are sometimes shaped in the forms of national intelligence services, information agencies, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange programs, assistance programs, and training programs. While having attractive sources is an important dimension, converting these sources into soft power depends on conversion skills (Nye, 2011, p. 99). As we have seen the mutually supporting nature of economic and military power, soft power is also supported by economic and military aspects of national power.

Culture and values can create a source of attraction if only it is transformed into things such as movies or novels and transmitted to other people. The movie industry of the US, the Hollywood, produces the movies with highest grossing worldwide. The characters of the movies from Spiderman to Superman, actors and actresses become famous globally. Hollywood movies are watched almost

everywhere in the world that has cinemas. For example in 2012, the movie, Avengers had the highest grossing with $1.5 billion (Acuna, 2012).

We have mentioned the importance of technology and innovation and its contribution to economic and military power. It is also important with regards to soft power. The quality of universities reflects the level of scientific knowledge production of countries. According to an index provided by Academic Ranking of World Universities for the year 2013, the US has 17 universities in Top 20, while it has 149 universities in Top 500. The United Kingdom has 2 universities in Top 20 and 37 universities in Top 500. Switzerland has 1 university in Top 20 and 7 in Top 500. China has 42, Germany has 38, France has 20, Canada has 23, Japan has 20, Australia has 19, Italy has 19, the Netherlands has 12, Sweden has 11, South Korea has 11, Spain has 10, Israel has 7, South Africa has 3, Russia has 2, India, Egypt, Iran and Turkey each has 1 university in the Top 500 list (Academic Ranking of World Universities, 2014). The leadership of the US in the field of higher education is visible and for that reason yearly nearly 750,000 foreign students come to the US for education. Research has shown that majority of the foreign students leave the country with a positive image of the US. Student and leadership exchange programs also serve to foster the US soft power. 46 current and 165 former heads of government are products of US higher education system. (Nye, 2011, p. 96)

As seen, soft-power is not automatically a result of sources such as culture and values. In addition to investment, conversion skills are necessary to produce soft power. If produced, it contributes to national power by causing a source of attraction worldwide.

We have seen the components of national power and even though by international law all states are equal, there are stark differences between states with regard to the national power levels. In the next part, measuring national power will be touched upon.

2.4. MEASURING NATIONAL POWER

In the preceding pages, different aspects of power such as economic, military and soft power were illuminated. In addition, indicators for measuring up each component of power were such population, GDP, military personnel and military expenditure, were touched upon. However, national power is a combination of economic, military and soft power. For this reason, a unified method for calculating national power is necessary. Many indicators might be used for this task though employing too many indicators, would make it harder to measure national power. For the sake of simplicity, the most vital indicators should be selected.

In this respect, the Correlates of War Project started by David Singer, provides a good example for measuring power. Singer developed the National Material Capabilities Dataset (NMCD). Its latest version (v4.0) covers the period between 1816 and 2007 (Singer, 1987). It uses six indicators for measuring national power: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditures. One may criticize it for not including other indicators such as the education level of the society, innovations (i.e. number of granted patents), development level of defense industries, GDP and income per capita; yet it still covers enough indicators to measure material capabilities. As we have mentioned urban population and iron and steel production

reflect the industrialization of the society. The NMCD offers an accurate picture with regards to material capabilities, though roughly.

Relying on NMCD, Singer also developed the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). This measure is generally computed by summing all observations on each of the 6 capability components for a given year, converting each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the 6 components.   It allows us to rank states according to their material capabilities. In Table 2.48, CINC ranking and scores of selected 40 countries for the year 2007 can be seen.

With regards to the material capabilities indicators mentioned above, China is the most powerful state and it is followed by the United States. Though population is an important indicator for the CINC score, other indicators provide a balance as the example of India shows. India has approximately four times bigger population than the United States but lags behind it. India is followed by Japan and Russia. These countries make up the most powerful five. As we have seen in many other areas in figures, the current structure of the UNSC does not reflect the current balance of power. Brazil, Germany and South Korea are stronger than the other UNSC permanent members, the United Kingdom and France respectively. Italy follows them. Turkey is on the 12th rank and as the data shows, with the exception of Russia, it is relatively stronger than any other country in its region, though there is almost symmetry with Iran.

Table 2.48 CINC Ranking for Selected Countries (2007)

Rank	Country	Score
1	China (P5)	0.1985779
2	United States (P5)	0.1421487
3	India	0.0734437
4	Japan	0.0426745
5	Russian Federation (P5)	0.0392739
6	Brazil	0.0245967
7	Germany	0.0240815
8	South Korea	0.0238778
9	United Kingdom (P5)	0.0211575
10	France (P5)	0.0189237
11	Italy	0.0174203
12	Turkey	0.0143170
13	Pakistan	0.0137718
14	Indonesia	0.0137077
15	Iran	0.0134501
16	North Korea	0.0129246
17	Mexico	0.0122686
18	Ukraine	0.0118350
19	Saudi Arabia	0.0108829
20	Canada	0.0106829
21	Egypt	0.0097128
22	Taiwan	0.0080096
23	Thailand	0.0079734
24	Australia	0.0071125
25	Poland	0.0069389
26	South Africa	0.0063162
27	Netherlands	0.0056463
28	Iraq	0.0052218
29	Argentina	0.0047209
30	Venezuela	0.0045591
31	Syria	0.0044535
32	Malaysia	0.0044027
33	Greece	0.0038126
34	Norway	0.0016396
35	Denmark	0.0014931
36	Bulgaria	0.0014218
37	Yugoslavia (Serbia)	0.0007711
38	Armenia	0.0006142
39	Georgia	0.0005039
40	Bosnia Herzegovina	0.0004001

Source: (Singer, 1987) v4.0

In Table 2.48, it is also seen that countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, North Korea, Mexico, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Taiwan, Thailand and South Africa have important capabilities. Wealthy and developed states such as Canada (20th), Australia (24th), the Netherlands (27th) Norway (34th) and Denmark (35th) have national power scores disproportional to their wealth. Probably it is due to having relatively smaller populations and spending less on defense.

Following the end of the Cold War, whether a power transition has taken place or not has been discussed in the academic circles. Due to rise of states such as China, India and Brazil, the new era is named as "the post-American world" (Zakaria, 2011). It is also seen as a transition process from unipolarity to multipolarity with Russia reemerging as Great Power in addition to rise of China (Smith M. A., 2012).

The CINC scores would also be useful to test the hypothesis that a power transition has occurred. In Figure 2.8, the CINC scores for the United States, China, Russia, India, Japan and Brazil for the period from 1990 to 2007 are shown. From the figures, it is clear that Chinese power rose dramatically in that period. With the decline of American power from 1994 onwards, China continued rising and by 1997 its power surpassed the US power, a trend that continued to 2007. This growth of power made China the most powerful state from 1997 on. Russia, experiencing domestic instability and facing the hardships of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, started to decline sharply from 1992 onwards. By 2007, its power level is just below Japan but still over Brazil. India continues its swift rise and it is the third most powerful state by 2007. Japan continues its decline though it is the fourth most powerful state. Brazil witnessed a very small decline at the end of this period and mostly stayed stable and it is the sixth most powerful state of the world by 2007.

Since the dataset is not updated yet to cover the period up to 2012, it is not possible to comment on the more recent developments. However it still supports the hypothesis that a power transition is in process and China, India and Brazil should be treated as important actors in international relations.

Figure 2.8 The CINC Scores of China, the United States, Russia, India, Japan and Brazil in the Post-Cold War Era (1990-2007)
Source: (Singer, 1987) v4.0

We have seen the new power distribution in the post-Cold War era. As the power shifts changed the place of the countries at the top of the list, other actors also started to rise though their power levels are well below the countries mentioned above. In the next part, we will deal with the issue of classifying states based on their power status and analyze the recent trends in the global power shift.

2.5. STATES AND POWER STATUS

We have seen though states are considered to be equal in the international system, their power capacity varies to a great degree. Since the Congress of Vienna (1815), the powers of Europe that settled order in the era following the upheaval caused by the Revolutionary France, are called as Great Powers. The rest, states with lesser capabilities are named as small powers. The European system of states was destroyed at the end of the First World War and following the Second World War, during the Cold War years, a new term, "superpower" came into circulation. In the post-Cold War era, as the discussion regarding power shifts and rising powers, the term "middle power" (though it is originated in earlier periods) started to gain importance to label the newly rising powers. In this part, we will try to elaborate the status of states based on their national power capacity. This part will provide a solid ground for the fourth chapter where the issue whether Turkey is middle power or not will be discussed.

2.5.1. The Great Powers

The international politics, especially in Europe, was dominated by the Great Powers[38] between 1815 and 1914. Sometimes also called as "major powers", they were: Austria (Austria-Hungary after 1867), France, Great Britain, Prussia (after 1871 Germany) and Russia. Though defeated in the Napoleonic Wars, France was admitted into the system in order to keep it under constraint. The case of Italy is a bit controversial though it was sometimes treated as a Great Power following its unification in 1871 (Bosworth, 2005).Then, why they were named as Great Powers? It was because of their large capabilities which marked a clear distinction between them and other states:

> There was always a clear distinction between what contemporaries called 'first-rate powers' and 'secondary states', and there was rarely any doubt into which category any state should be placed. The great powers jealously guarded their status and were at all times disinclined to admit new members into their ranks (Bridge & Bullen, 2005, p. 1).

The members of the system realized the stability provided by it and tried to maintain it. Thinking that it would create another wave of instability as the French Revolution created, Russia, for example, helped Austria when it was at the brink of disintegration following the revolutionary movements in 1848. The Great Powers all had a stake in the maintenance of the system.

At the end of the 19th century, the US also emerged as a Great Power. It joined the First World War and changed the course of the war. Japan also emerged as a Great Power. Following the war, the distribution of power within the structure of the newly established League of Nations reflected the dominant position of the victors. The US refrained from being involved in it and it was Britain, France, Italy

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[38] *Les Grandes Puissances* in French, *die Großmächte* in German and *Düvel-i Muazzâma* in Turkish.

and Japan that dominated the international system. Germany had lost the war and the Austria-Hungarian Empire was dissolved. The Soviet Union which replaced the Russian Empire was in internal turmoil and it was excluded from international politics. We have mentioned that the Second World War was caused by the harsh treatment of defeated states following the First World War and revisionist states unhappy with the status quo challenged it. The Second World War caused another power shift and led to decline of Britain, France, Italy and Japan as the USA and Soviet Union rose. The structure of the UNSC and the permanent membership reflected the will of the victors of the war to control the system as the USA, Soviet Union, China, Britain and France became permanent members with a veto power. Defeated powers such as Germany, Japan and Italy were denied a seat in the UNSC. Today we can argue that the permanent membership structure of the UNSC is like a continuation of the Great Powers system.

The Second World War changed the balance of power in favor of the USA and Soviet Union. While all other traditional Great Powers were in decline, they were increasing their power. The system was dominated by two "super powers". Unlike the Great Power status, the superpower status is not a recognized status in International Law yet it is useful to mark the vast differences between the two powers and the rest, especially the former Great Powers. In 1944, W. T. R. Fox published his book *The Superpowers* and it is the first recorded use of the term. In his book, he regarded the USA, Soviet Union and Britain as superpowers (Dukes, 2001, p. 85). It can be defined as the following:

> A 'superpower' must be able to conduct a global strategy including the possibility of destroying the world; to command vast economic potential and influence; and to present a universal ideology. (Dukes, 2001, p. 1)

During the Cold War years, Japan and Germany managed to recover from the wounds of the Second World War and Japan especially emerged as an "economic superpower". With the end of the Cold War, China and India emerged as rising powers. Today, China deserves a seat more at the UNSC as a permanent member than it did in 1945. In addition, non-existence of states such as Japan, India and Germany at the UNSC contradicts the global power distribution as they fare better in many indicators (economic and military) than some of the UNSC permanent members as mentioned in the previous pages with regards to various indicators.

2.5.2. The Small Powers

The small powers are the most numerous group in the international system. In the period between 1815 and 1914, almost all states except the six Great Powers were considered as small states. However it is possible to add another category: micro-states. In Europe for example states such as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican can be considered as micro-states if the criterion is having population less than 100,000. If one million is considered as a limit, then Iceland, Cyprus, Malta and Luxemburg can be added to the list. Micro states did not have diplomatic representatives in the majority of foreign capitals and international organization membership. For example, in 1920, Liechtenstein's application for membership in the League of Nations was rejected because it had "chosen to depute to other some of the attributes of sovereignty" and maintained no army (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p. 6). Liechtenstein, San Marino, Andorra and other micro-states joined the UN in the 1990s (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p. 7). However, small states

should not be confused with weak states that cannot fulfill the functions of state properly. (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p. 6).

The small powers are marked by the limited resources (economic and military) available to them. Their limited resources make them vulnerable. Small states lacked diversification in their economy and were therefore more reliant on trade than larger states. Limited domestic market size and high transportation costs further reduced their competitiveness and return. When the proximity to a larger state was close, economic dependence on a larger power merged into geo-political vulnerability (as found in the case of Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana vis-à-vis South Africa) (Cooper & Shaw, 2009, p. 3). One may think that they are easy prey for more powerful states in the international system however that is not always the case. These states aware of their weaknesses and vulnerability develop tactics to deal with this asymmetry. Annette Baker Fox in her study titled *The Power of Small States* showed that small states such as Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain managed to keep themselves out of war during the Second World War due to their geographical position, successful diplomacy and survival tactics such as playing off one power to another. They were successful in averting the dangers of war while they faced the danger of being surrounded by much stronger powers (Fox, 1959).

Small states value international law and international organizations a lot because they have mostly equal power there and other powers need to legitimize their moves and in order to do so they need the approval of small powers which are numerous. During the Cold War, they were organized along the Third World Movement in the UN to make their voice heard (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p. 5). The rivalries between the superpowers also helped to increase their space of maneuver. It

might be argued that with the end of the Cold War, they are more vulnerable to external pressures.

2.5.4. The Middle Powers

We have seen that states are classified based on their national power in two broad categories as Great Powers and small powers. However there are some states that cannot fit into these categories easily again based on their national power levels. An intermediate category is developed to define these second-rate powers because they are neither great nor small. They cannot be compared to micro-states such as Liechtenstein or to the United States with regards to their economic and military capabilities. In addition to that, they may exert some amount of influence over other actors in their geographical region. The term "middle power" is used to define that kind of states. Carsten Holbraad defines the middle powers and their role as the following:

> [Middle powers are the] states that are weaker than the great powers in the system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small states with which they normally interact. […] In very large systems, particularly the global system of the second half of the twentieth century, middle powers often play their most conspicuous parts within their own regions, where their immediate interests usually lie (Holbraad, 1984, p. 4).

Though the genealogy of the term might be dated to the late 16th century (Holbraad, 1984, p. 12), it more visibly emerged at the Congress of Vienna (1815). There the status was given to states such as Spain (former Great Power), Portugal (former Great Power) and Sweden (Holbraad, 1984, p. 20). The idea of middle power was also used in the German Confederation following the Napoleonic Wars. In

addition to more powerful states like Austria and Prussia, south German states Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden were considered as middle-powers (Holbraad, 1984, p. 29). Regarding the 19th century, in Europe only Turkey (Ottoman Empire), Sweden and Denmark could claim a status as middle power while the rest were small powers (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006, p. 5).

In the 20th century, following the establishment of the League of Nations middle-powers claimed to have a seat at the League of Nations Council. Spain, Brazil, Australia, Canada, China and Poland opposed being treated as minor powers. China pointed to its huge population and civilization while Iran argued that it is the only Muslim power in the League. At the end Spain and Poland gained permanent membership. Other middle-powers such as Sweden and Uruguay also received non-permanent seats (Holbraad, 1984, p. 51).

In the establishment process of the United Nations countries such as Belgium, Australia, the Netherlands, Honduras, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Norway, New Zealand, Colombia and Canada objected the power given to the "Big Five" (Hurd, 2008, p. 89). It was especially Canada and Australia, and to some extent Brazil that demanded a special status for themselves. Francis Forde, deputy prime minister and a member of the delegation, restated the Australian case for representation:

> It will have to be recognized that outside the great powers there are certain powers who, by reason of their resources and their geographical location, will have to be relied upon especially for the maintenance of peace and security in various quarters of the world. Like France, Canada, and other countries, Australia has consistently maintained this principle. But there is another principle of even greater importance. Certain powers, not classified as great, have proved by their record in two world wars that they not only have the capacity but also the will to fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the world with tyranny. These powers are in a sense proved veterans in the struggle against Fascist dictatorship threatening the security of the world. They are in truth security powers. They have a claim to special recognition in any security organization (Holbraad, 1984, p. 61).

In a similar fashion, Canada also pointed to the war efforts of Canada during the war and argued that it should give Canada a right for representation. Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1944 informed the Big Five about Canada's position and suggested that membership in the Council should be based on the functional idea:

> The simple division of the world between great powers and the rest is unreal and even dangerous. The great powers are called by that name simply because they possess great power. The other states of the world possess power and, therefore, the capacity to use it for the maintenance of peace − in varying degrees ranging from almost zero in the case of the smallest and weakest states up to a military potential not far below that of the great powers. In determining what states should be represented on the council with the great powers, it is, I believe, necessary to apply the functional idea. Those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected. The military contribution actually made during this war by the members of the United Nations provides one good working basis for a selective principle of choice (Holbraad, 1984, p. 58).

The middle-powers during the San Francisco Conference worked in solidarity to ensure their representation and special treatment. However this cooperation was on an *ad hoc* basis and did not bring about further and institutionalized cooperation between them. Yet, their efforts were not totally fruitless. Their opposition helped to find a middle way to the problem. As there will be six non-permanent members in the UNSC[39], they shaped the Article 23 of the UN Charter which emphasized the contribution of states to world security as criteria for election:

> The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid,

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[39] In 1965 the number was extended to 10. The first non-permanent members were, not surprisingly, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Netherlands and Poland.

in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution (The United Nations, 2014).

During the Cold War years, the importance of middle-powers decreased due to the rigid bloc structure. However this did not lead to stopping defending the idea of middle power by its prominent supporters, Australia and Canada. With the détente, they wanted to play a bigger role in foreign policy. Canadian statesmen and scholars often pointed to Canada's middle-power status. In this respect, Canada chose two fields of international political activity to increase its role in world politics: mediation and the UN peace-keeping. "Indeed, in the 1960s there was a tendency among some of those who contributed to Canadian thinking on the subject to characterize middle powers in terms of mediatory activities rather than with reference to relative power" (Holbraad, 1984, p. 71).

In a similar fashion, Australia also started to emphasize its position, like a bridge between the "two worlds". In 1964, the Australian minister for external affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick argued that his country was a middle-power in more senses than one:

> It is clearly one in the general sense in which the expression is used. But also it has common interests with both the advanced and the underdeveloped countries; it stands in point of realized wealth between the haves and have-nots. It is at the one time a granary and a highly industrialized country. It has a European background and is set in intimate geographical propinquity to Asia (Holbraad, 1984, p. 72).

With the end of the Cold War, as Buzan and Weaver argue, better conditions appeared for higher level of activity of the middle-powers especially in their respective regions:

> Without superpower rivalry intruding obsessively into all regions, local powers have more room for manoeuvre. For a decade after the ending of the Cold War, both the remaining superpower and the other great powers (China, EU, Japan, Russia) had less incentive, and displayed less will, to intervene in security affairs outside their own regions (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 3) .

We have mentioned the rise of China, India and relatively Brazil. These countries emerge as an alternative power bloc to Group of 8 (G-8). The G-6, the organization of the most industrialized countries came to be institutionalized since its first meeting in 1975. Next year, with joining of Canada, it became G-7. It became a forum for world leaders to discuss the problems of the day at its meetings. In 1998, Russia also joined and it became G-8 (member states: the USA, the UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan and Russia).

It reminds one of the Great Power conferences or Concert of Europe of the 19th century. In 2001, Goldman and Sachs published its first report (written by Jim O'Neill) on the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) titled *Building Better Global Economic BRICs* and afterwards it became a popular term. The report showed that the BRIC countries had a bigger growth rate than the average of G-7 countries and forecasted that they will have a larger place in the world economy in the following decade. In parallel to this growth, the report suggested that international structures should be reformed to include these rising powers for better relations with them (Goldman Sachs, 2001).

The BRIC head of governments started to participate at the yearly summits since 2009. In 2010, South Africa was invited to join too and at the next summit in

2011, it was also present (BRICS2013, 2013). So it became BRICS with the addition of South Africa, a key actor from the sub-Saharan Africa. The BRICS countries increased cooperation and coordination between them.

Alasdair R. Young compared the BRICS based on their power sources (economic power, military power, knowledge creation levels based on patent filings, institutional power based on membership and voting power in IGOs and ideational power). He argues that they still lag behind the USA in these categories. With regards to South Africa, he argues that it is far from being a candidate for being global actor, it can only be a regional or middle power. Yet he included it in the list because it made a claim to continental leadership, it is the only African country in the G20, and there is formal coordination among India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) as rising powers that are also democracies (Young A. R., 2010).

The table below shows the agendas of the powers for international governance and it shows the differences between the BRICS and other powers. Brazil and India have been the main proponents of the UN reform, claiming a larger role for themselves in parallel to their rising power.

Table 2.49 Ideational Power: Agendas for International Governance

US	Human rights/democracy Washington Consensus/neoliberal economics
EU	Human Rights Rule of Law
Japan	Preserving the status quo
Russia	Sovereignty/non-interference
South Africa	Human rights (liberal) - non-interference (liberationist)
Brazil	'Democratizing' the international order
China	'Democratizing' the international order Alternative model of development Sovereignty/non-interference Redefining norms
India	Sovereignty/non-interference 'Democratizing' the international order

Source: (Young A. R., 2010, p. 10)

In addition to the BRICS, with the changing distribution of power, other states were included in different groupings. The first one is the Group of 20 (G-20) which includes the twenty largest economies of the world, like an extended version of the G-8. Since 1999, its members come together in meetings to discuss especially the issues related to economic and financial areas. Its members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United

Kingdom, United States, and European Union. G20 members represent around 85 per cent of global gross domestic product, over 75 per cent of global trade, and two-thirds of the world's population (G20, 2014).

In 2007, Goldman Sachs invented another term, the Next-Eleven (N-11). In a report titled *The N-11: More Than An Acronym* and written by Salman Ahmad it was argued that the eleven countries in the long-term would become the next BRICS countries and then catch up with the G-7 countries with regards to their economic performance. These countries are: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and Vietnam (Ahmed, 2007). Figure 2.13 shows the time when some of the N-11 countries will catch up the G-7 countries with regards to GDP in a 50 years projection. From the figure it is possible to observe that among the N-11 countries, Mexico will have the best economic performance and it will catch up with Canada in about two decades and with Japan in about 45 years. South Korea will have the second best performance and it will do the same by 25 years. The third best performing country will be Turkey and it will catch up with Canada in about 45 years (Ahmed, 2007, p. 3).

In addition to N-11 group, an alternative group was suggested by others. In 2010, the HSBC Bank CEO Michael Geoghagen suggested that the CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) will take over as the new BRICS. He added that "each has large, young, growing population. Each has a diverse and dynamic economy. And each, in relative terms, is politically stable" (Reuters, 2010).

Figure 2.9 Overtaking the G7: When BRICs' and N-11's GDP Would Exceed the G7
Source: (Ahmed, 2007, p. 3)

Former Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill produced another group, the MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey). He championed the MINT group of countries, similarly blessed with fast economic growth and large, young populations - Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey - as the next economic giants after the BRICs (Cocks, 2014).

According to Eduard Jordaan, despite some disagreements, Sweden, Norway, Australia and Canada are middle-powers. With the inclusion of Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Malaysia, South Africa and Turkey in the category of middle-powers, the term started to lose its analytical power. For this reason he suggests a distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers (Jordaan, 2003). In Table 2.50, the main differences between the emerging and traditional middle-powers can be seen.

Table 2.50 Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers

	Traditional middle powers	Emerging middle powers
	CONSTITUTIVE DIFFERENCES	
Democratic tradition	Stable social democracies	Relatively unstable, recently democratised with some very undemocratic aspects
Time of emergence as middle powers	During the Cold War	After the Cold War
Position in world economy	Core	Semi-periphery
Domestic distribution of wealth	Very equal	Highly unequal
Regional influence	Low	High
Origins of perceived neutrality	Regional ambivalence and relative unimportance	Regional self-association and significance
	BEHAVIOURAL DIFFERENCES	
Regional orientation	Fairly low	Moderately high
Attitude to regional integration and cooperation	Ambivalent	Eager (often assuming leadership role)
Nature of actions to effect deep global change	Appeasing and legitimising	Reformist and legitimising
Purpose of international identity construction	Distance from powerful in region	Distance from weak in the region

Source: (Jordaan, 2003, p. 168)

John Ravenhill points out to the cycles of middle-power activism with regards to Australia and Canada. Both countries, especially Canada, have placed the idea of middle-power at the center of their foreign policy cultures. However, it is hard to observe sustainable level of activity. Activism of both countries, "the middle-power internationalism", peaked and went down in different periods in the post-Cold War era. It is possible to infer that the foreign policy decisions are more influenced by the domestic developments rather than systemic changes. According to Ravenhill, partisanship and interests and personalities of prime ministers and foreign ministers are the main determinants of foreign policy activism (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 324). A Canadian scholar, Andrew F. Cooper invented the term "niche diplomacy" in 1995. According to him, niche diplomacy calls for selectivity in areas of foreign policy in an age of fiscal restraint and Canada has to be selective in order to keep its commitment-credibility gap at minimum (Cooper, 1995, p. 1). It is generally argued that for Canada human rights, peace-keeping, reform of financial institutions, protection of natural resources appear to be niche areas. Heather A. Smith argues that there are parallels between the arguments of scholars such as Andrew F. Cooper and the government practice. (Smith H. A., 1999, p. 60). He further argues that though Canada tries to portray itself as a member of the global "moral minority", its foreign policy started to be directed by economic interests rather than moral values since the 1990s. Canada was a champion of environment protection against climate change in the 1980s but now even it does not care much about it in order not to hurt its national economy. Since the term "niche" was too much market oriented, later it was replaced by the term "priorities" in the discourse of foreign policy elites and scholars and Canada's priorities are identified as small arms, children's rights and child labor (Smith H. A., 1999).

From Jordaan's analysis as seen in Table 2.50 it is possible to infer that the newly emerging middle-powers have the characteristics of a regional power when compared to the traditional middle-powers. At this point, a definition of regional power is necessary. The generally accepted assumptions on the regional powers maybe listed as the following: a) These states belong to the region considered. b) They display superiority in terms of power capabilities, that is, that they possess the largest power share in the region. c) They exercise some kind of influence on the region (Destradi, 2010, p. 905). Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver points out the results of the end of the Cold War and increasing role of regional powers:

> Without superpower rivalry intruding obsessively into all regions, local powers have more room for manoeuvre. For a decade after the ending of the Cold War, both the remaining superpower and the other great powers (China, EU, Japan, Russia) had less incentive, and displayed less will, to intervene in security affairs outside their own regions (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 3) .

Buzan and Weaver argue that rather than only focusing on the systemic level, including regional level in security analysis bring lots of benefits. They have developed the concept of Regional Security Complex (RSC) that took regional patterns of amity/enmity and securitization/desecuritization into account. Though sometimes the regional security complex might be penetrated by the other powers (occurs when the outside powers make security alignments with states within an RSC), its dynamics still have some level of autonomy (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 46). The RSC is described as the following: "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 44). In this vein, the Middle East for example, is considered as an RSC.

It is generally accepted that regional powers try to influence the developments in their region, provide stability and gain followers. Andrew Hurrell explains the motivations beyond this tendency:

> […] a regional power may seek to assert its power within the region precisely because it sees this as central to its global status, role or power: the extra-regional status that may come from being seen as a successful power or the provider of a stable regional order; the role as a representative of the region and of its interests and values; or the power aggregation that may follow from the successful creation of a supportive regional coalition (Hurrell, 2010, p. 22).

However this regional power activism is only one of the strategic patterns that maybe followed by these states. Miriam Prys defined three behavioral patterns for regional powers. In her model, a regional power may act as a dominant regional power, regional hegemon or detached regional power. In the first concept, force prevails over consensus and relations are highly asymmetrical. The dominant regional powers give priority to private good provision rather than public goods provision. By relying on force, the dominant regional power dictates its will on the secondary states in the region. In the second concept, the regional hegemon creates a political order in which the hegemon's mode of thinking becomes dominant without a regular reference to violence. These states undertake to make a disproportional contribution in solving challenges and providing stability in the region. At least partly, they ensure the pursuit of common goods for all or most members from within its sphere of influence. The third concept, detached regional power refers to a state that either by the absence of adequate resources or lack of identification with the region is induced to focus largely on domestic and/or on global politics instead of their regional roles. According to Prys, the third category is vital in order to

overcome the general assumption on regional powers that argues regional powers will automatically strive for control, be it benevolent or coercive, over the region. A regional power may try to disentangle itself from the potential costs and constraints arising from a regional role (Prys, 2010).

In another study, Prys also uses the concept of embeddedness of regions[40] in the international system to capture how the integration of regions into the global world system affects the roles of regional powers, their capacity to act within and to influence their region and also their behavior toward secondary powers. (Prys, 2013, p. 5) In this study she shed more light on the detached regional power typology. By analyzing two case studies with regards to the Indian foreign policy (the Indian mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Sri Lanka and the political instability and democratization efforts in Nepal), she shows that asymmetrical power distribution does not lead to an active role in India's 'region'. India clearly refrains from being involved in the problems of South Asia. In the internal instability that occurred after the military coup of Prince Gyanendra in 2001, India attempted to mediate between the monarchy, political parties and the Maoists. However India exerted very moderate pressure on the oppressive regime of King Gyanendra. Facing a Maoist threat itself, same as Nepal, India welcomed his autocratic rule that fought mercilessly against the Maoists. Rather than democratization of Nepal, India was more concerned with the possible spillover effects of a Maoist take over (Prys, 2013, p. 13). India preferred to cooperate with other influential external actors such as the United States, the European Union and its member states, Japan (which provide

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[40] Miriam Prys defines the two characteristics of 'regionness' as the following: "First, geographic proximity and, secondly, the fact that the region is less than the whole or, in other words, there are 'insiders' and 'outsiders' to a region. Regions are embedded to the international system and therefore, can be classified as open systems with permeable borders. Embeddedness makes regions and even their most powerful states vulnerable to external impacts, yet also provides additional opportunities for regional powers to pursue external partnerships or other forms of interactions, which in turn can alter regional dynamics." (Prys, 2013, p. 5)

development aid) and China over Nepal. This strategy enabled India to both enhance its international profile by collaborating with international actors while at the same time reducing the costs of its engagement significantly (Prys, 2013, p. 16). In Sri Lanka, India intervened by sending a peace-keeping force in 1987 in the conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Eelam and the government. After clashes with the rebels, India stationed at times 70,000 Indian soldiers and 1100 of them were killed. It was forced to withdraw by the Sri Lankan government after three years. In 1992, the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was killed by Tamil terrorists. When the Tamil terrorists started to gain the upper hand against the government forces in 2000, India was asked to provide military aid, India refused this request. It was Norway who offered its mediation and organized a cease-fire in 2003. The cease-fire began to crumble in 2006 and India was asked to co-chair the peace process by the Sri Lankan President Rajapakse. This time again, India refused to be involved in the problem. While it is a very active participant in the UN peace-keeping operations, it followed a hands-off policy in Sri Lanka. As in Nepal, it encouraged the involvement of external actors with the purpose of minimizing its own engagement and costs arising from it (Prys, 2013, pp. 22-24). The results proved that contrary to the general assumptions, a regional power may refrain from being involved in crisis management to provide peace and stability in its region in order not to shoulder the burden. The resources that would be allocated for regional involvement may be used in other more lucrative foreign policy areas. In sum, a regional power may give priority to its global role over the regional.

With regards to the policies followed by regional powers, Sandra Destradi developed a typology based on three policies: empire, hegemony and leadership. In the imperial model, a state that is clearly dominant in terms of material power

resources creates a security environment for itself through unilateral pursuit of its own national interest. It uses coercion and military power if necessary. States that adopt an imperial strategy are forced to resort threat of military intervention if subordinate states do not comply, failing to do that may destroy their dominant position. These states show the tendency of solving the problems unilaterally and a sense of exemptionalism and they seek to impose one's own rules on others while rejecting the rules contrasting with one's interests (such as the US response to the Kyoto Protocol). (Destradi, 2010, pp. 910-911). In the hegemonic model, though the purpose of the state is the same with the imperial model, the means used to accomplish this objective differs. The means may vary from exertion of pressure to the provision of material incentives, up to the discursive propagation of the hegemon's norms and values. The nature of the hegemony, either benevolent or coercive hegemony, has been a point of dispute in the literature. In the benevolent hegemonic model, a state provides public goods such as stability and it bears all the cost. The benevolent actor does not try to serve its interests. In the coercive hegemonic model, the hegemonic state provides public goods but it imposes a sort of 'tax' on subordinate states, obliging them to contribute to the costs of provision. The subordinate states are weak so they comply with the wishes of the hegemon. However since the public goods provided by the hegemon are also to the advantage of the subordinate states, the hegemon may induce them to accept its hegemon and legitimize it. A cost/benefit calculation shows that the realization of interests through the establishment of an order acceptable to the other actors in the region is 'cheaper' than resorting to the use of force (Destradi, 2010, pp. 914-915). The hegemon may both use material and ideational power resources to establish an acceptable order. In sum two main features of the hegemonic model appear as the following:

a) Hegemony is essentially self-interested and aims primarily at the realization of the hegemon's goals, which, however, are presented to subordinate states as collective goals.

b) Hegemons operate by employing a combination of material incentives and 'ideational' power instruments (the changing or reshaping of norms and values in the subordinate states) in order to gain consensus in the subordinate states (Destradi, 2010, p. 917).

Another typology for regional powers is leadership. In contrast to hegemony, in the leadership typology, a state guides a group of states in order to facilitate the realization of their common objectives (Destradi, 2010, p. 921). The followers follow the leader voluntarily independent of its material capabilities. Destradi uses the models of hegemonic order developed by Ikenberry and Kupchan (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990). In the normative persuasion model, the leader engages in a process of socialization and ideological persuasion in which legitimacy emerges through the osmosis of norms and values from dominant to secondary elites. Based on the voluntary participation of followers it is possible to produce two legitimation models. The endogenous learning model is based on the development of identical norms and values in different states due to coincidence or to a common reaction to structural conditions. The emulation model focuses on the adoption by the followers of the dominant state's norms and policies in an effort to imitate its success, but without attempts by the leader to influence their normative orientations or policies (Destradi, 2010, p. 924). The leadership can be established in two ways. In the leader-initiated leadership, for achieving the collective goals, the leader engages in a socialization process with the aim of creating shared norms and values and tries generates followership. In the follower initiated leadership, smaller states either too heterogeneous or too weak to reach a common objective need a leader to become

capable of acting. For this reason, it is initiated by the followers. This might happen in times of crisis such as in the case a group of states is threatened from outside (Destradi, 2010, p. 925).

Middle-powers may base their claims for a higher level of representation on the argument that they represent a region. However they also face rivals in their region, states of either equal or less power. At the League of Nations Brazil claimed that it was the biggest state in Latin Africa and it represented the whole South America and demanded that it should have a permanent seat at the council. Before the Great Powers such as Britain and France, it was the other Latin American countries such as Mexico and Argentine that opposed Brazil's claims. At the end, a middle-way was found and Uruguay was selected as a non-permanent member. Brazil most of the time did not want to engage too much the countries in its region, finding the region too complex. Its interest only started to grow in the 1980s and its involvement increased in the 1990s. It has been a regional organization builder (such as MERCOSUR) but the structures it built do not push into deeper integration. It has also acted as a mediator in the regional conflicts: the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru (1995-1998) and coup attempt against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. It also acted as a peace-keeper in Haiti. Still, the countries in Latin America oppose Brazil's demand for a seat at UNSC today (Spektor, 2010, p. 193). Another problem Brazil faces is that, its population does not support the regional foreign policy activism and suggests caution. Activism of different governments was criticized as being "hyperactive", "exhibitionist" and "pretentious" in the press (Spektor, 2010, p. 196). It is another reason that Brazil does not want to deepen regional integration and claim a leadership position.

Middle-powers also have difficulty in aligning their relations with the global hegemon. Annette Baker Fox analyzed the relations of four-middle powers (Mexico, Brazil, Canada and Australia) with the USA during the Cold War years. She found out that on security related issues they generally tend to cooperate with the hegemon. Yet in issues related to trade and finance, they try to negotiate and bargain with it in order to secure their interests. They also try to promote at least the appearance of maintaining an independent foreign policy (Fox, 1977). Australia between 1996 and 2007 was led by Prime Minister John Howard and in that period Australia chose to bandwagon with the US. Especially during the Bush era, Australia sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq and it followed a very pro-American foreign policy. Geoffrey Barker for that reason calls him "the global deputy and regional sheriff". In return, the US supported Australia's initiatives in its region such as intervening in Papua New Guinea and Timor (Barker, 2012, p. 13). Barker also argues that he militarized and politicized foreign policy for domestic electoral advantage (Barker, 2012, p. 30). Another alternative policy with regards to the global hegemon is to challenge it. Both Venezuela (after 1999) and Iran (after 1979) chose this policy. They try to also challenge the authority of other states that act in accordance with the US in their region. Ideology plays an important role in their foreign policy however they can follow this way because both are important oil exporting countries. Otherwise, they would not be able to hold against the pressure emanating from the global hegemon (Fürtig & Gratius, 2010, p. 173).

In conclusion we can argue that the emerging middle powers would face opposition from their regional rivals and need to deal with the global hegemon with regards to its regional designs. They may also choose to negotiate or directly act as a proxy of the global hegemon and combine their relatively limited national power

assets with the global hegemon's capabilities. Since these powers are newly emerging and have fragile economic structures and risk of potential domestic instability, they may have cycles of activism and retreat in their foreign policies. What is certain is that these powers should try to increase their economic, military and soft power assets in order to play a certain role and make it accepted by other actors both in their region and abroad.

2.6. CONCLUSION

We have seen that even though states are equal in international law, there are great differences between them with regards to their national power assets. The chapter also tried to show that all types of power are intertwined deeply. It is impossible to have a formidable military power without being strong economically and political initiatives not supported by economic power are doomed to fail as the German and French policies in the Eastern Europe in the interwar-era showed. We have also tried to show what other tools states have at their disposal for use in their foreign policy, ranging from foreign aid to alliances.

Quantitative methods also help us to understand the global shift of power. The rise of China and India, Russia's reassertion of itself as a Great Power and rising of middle-powers in different regions imply that the international politics will be more complex in the next decades.

As a result of the global diffusion of power, we mentioned the new trends and changing power status of states. Turkey's inclusion in the N-11 or the MIKT group implies that Turkey maybe accepted as an emerging middle-power. However this

needs further elaboration by having a closer look in Turkey's national power levels and it will be done in Chapter 4.

As shown the middle-powers try to act as a leader in their region and bring order and stabilize it. In this respect, we have shown that mediation appears as an activity area for middle powers. With regards to Turkey, a possible candidate for an emerging middle-power, mediation is also an important area. The next chapter will deal with mediation and provide a theoretical framework for other chapters dealing with Turkey's mediation initiatives.

CHAPTER 3

3   MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The history of the human beings is also a history of conflicts (Gilpin, 1981, p. 7). If there are clashing interests between A and B (be them individuals, ethnic/religious groups or states), it is a starting point for a potential conflict. Conflict is "present in all social systems, however simple or complex, and irrespective of their location in time and space." (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 7)

In a world with scarce resources and without an overarching authority, conflict is inevitable in international relations. Its most extreme form is war. The escalatory process may develop in the following way:

> International disputes arise initially because two (or more) parties clash over competing interests or values. Transformation from dispute to crisis typically occurs when one (or both) of the parties perceives little prospect of a satisfactory resolution and decides to communicate the strength of its resolve by making explicit or implicit reference to the availability military options. Once threats are made and armed forces are set in position, the step across the next threshold to military violence seems regrettably short. (Dixon, 1996, p. 656)

Melvin Small and David Singer (he also initiated the Correlates of War Project in 1963) developed a typology of war. According to them, war is defined as

sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum 1,000 battle related fatalities (Small & Singer, 1982, pp. 205-206). Between the years of 1816-2007, 95 inter-state wars took place in addition to the many intra-state and extra-state wars (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010).

According to the Uppsala Dataset which had a lower threshold of 25 annual battle deaths, in the period between 1946-2001, 225 armed conflicts took place and 34 of them were still active in all of or part of 2001 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002). Only for the year of 2012, a total of 396 conflicts were counted on the global scale. 18 were wars while 25 were limited wars which made the total number of highly violent conflicts 43. Another 165 conflicts were classified as violent crises. 188 non-violent conflicts (subdivided into 105 disputes and 83 non-violent crises) were also observed. (Ellerbrock, 2013, p. 2) Even though with the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts seems to drop down, they still affect the global stability and security dramatically.

Figure 3.1. Global Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2012
Source: (Center for Systemic Peace, 2014)

If there is a conflict, the parties would try to find a solution. They may initiate negotiations in order to overcome their differences on the issue knowing that otherwise the result would be war. Apart from war, there are some tools for peaceful conflict resolution which follow different procedures, processes and have different characteristics. A conflict can be dealt with through one or more of the following means: violence and coercion (both physical and psychological), various forms of direct or indirect negotiation, or the involvement of an outside or third party in a binding (e.g. adjudication) or non-binding (e.g. mediation) fashion. (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 7). According to Ho-Won Jeong's classification, the methods can be divided into two main groups:

1) Evaluative Decision-Making

    a) Judicial Decisions,

    b) Arbitration,

    c) Ombudsmanry.

2) Collaborative Problem-Solving

    a) Negotiated Agreements,

    b) Mediation,

    c) Group Facilitation (Jeong, 2009, p. 136).

In negotiations, the negotiators have two things to offer: threats and promises. These can be supported by good or ill will and a continuum from blind trust to ironclad verification. However negotiations only succeed if there is a set of outcomes that each party prefers to no agreement. (Borash & Webel, 2009, p. 244) It is not always easy to find an acceptable solution to both parties. Worse, due to the hardened stereotypes, negative perceptions and because of the motive to avoid appearing as the weak side, negotiations may be hard even to initiate. Mediation comes into play as a conflict resolution method when the parties of the conflict fail to find an acceptable solution. An acceptable third party intervenes in the conflict to assist the principle parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settlement (Moore C. W., 2003, p. 8). As a quantitative study conducted by Derrick V. Frazier and William J. Dixon demonstrates, third-party intermediaries play a crucial role in the negotiated settlements. Even the frequency of these interventions for the period

between the years of 1946-2000 may be demonstrative for the importance of mediation as a conflict resolution tool: Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) intervened 620 times, individual state actors 433 times, coalitions of states 99 times and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 49 times. (2006, pp. 388-389) In K. Holsti's study, it is shown that between the years of 1919-1965, in a total of 94 international disputes, third parties were involved in 45 of them (45 per cent) and that such intervention was successful in 30 cases (71 per cent) of interventions. (Holsti, 1983). William J. Dixon shows that for the inter-state disputes between the years of 1945-1984, chances of peaceful settlement appear to be strengthened by the presence of adjudication (60 percent), mediation efforts (41 percent) and communication (39 percent). (Dixon, 1996, p. 664) As a result, it can be argued that mediation is a very useful tool for conflict resolution. While measuring the 'success' of mediation is not an easy task, in this study in parallel to (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 8), mediation success will point to producing a cease fire, a partial settlement or a full settlement.

In the following parts of this chapter, more information will be provided starting from the definition of mediation to qualities of a successful mediator, mediator types, the impact of leverage on mediation and power parity between the parties while some examples of successful and failed mediation initiatives will be mentioned.

3.2. DEFINITION OF MEDIATION

Mediation has a different nature when compared to the other conflict resolution methods. For this reason, its definition should be done properly. In the

current Conflict Resolution literature, there are many definitions of mediation. According to the definition made by Oran Young, mediation is:

> any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship, and therefore to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself (Young, 1967, p. 34).

Christopher W. Moore defines mediation as the following:

> the intervention in a negotiation or a conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power, who assists the involved parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute (Moore C. W., 2003, p. 15).

Michael Barkun defines mediator as one "who comes between the conflicting parties with the aim of offering a solution to their dispute and/or facilitating mutual concessions" (Barkun, 1964, p. 126). Some scholars make a distinction between facilitation and mediation because in the former the third party refrains from making any suggestions while in the latter it even uses leverage to affect the outcome of the process (Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1979, 1982). However facilitation is also often considered as a specific style of mediation. (Beardsley, 2011, p. 18) In fact, in the complexity of mediation process, a mediator may play a number of roles, sometimes simultaneously, ranging from passive roles (acting as a go between) to active roles (offering proposals for settlement, exerting direct influence on the adversaries' perceptions). (Bercovitch, 1985, p. 743) In this study the following and broader definition of mediation will be employed so mediation will be defined as:

> a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical

force or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 8).

Main characteristics of mediation may be summed up as the following:

1) Mediation is an extension of peaceful conflict resolution.

2) Mediation involves the intervention of an outsider – an individual, a group, or an organization – into a conflict between two or more states or other actors.

3) Mediation is a non-coercive, non-violent, and, ultimately, non-binding form of intervention.

4) Mediators enter a conflict, whether internal or international, in order to affect, change, resolve, modify, or influence it in some way. Mediators use personal or structural resources to achieve these objectives.

5) Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agendas about the conflict in question.

6) Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management. The actors involved retain control over the outcome (if not always over the process) of their conflict, as well as the freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediators' proposals.

7) Mediation usually operates on an *ad hoc* basis only. (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 35)

Mediator maybe a state (the United Kingdom in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe dispute, the US in the various occasions in the Middle East, Norway in the Israeli-

Palestinian Peace Process), an IGO (United Nations in many cases such as the Vietnam-Kampuchea dispute, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, the Arab League and the Islamic Conference in the Iran-Iraq War), or an individual (the Pope in the Beagle Channel dispute). (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 8). The Carter Center, established by the former US President Jimmy Carter in 1982, might be a good example for NGO activity in mediation. Carter mediated in Nicaragua and North Korea even though he sometimes frustrated the White House and state officials (Taulbee & Creekmore Jr., 2003) Regional organizations started to play an important role in the conflict resolution initiatives in the last two decades. The reason maybe that the parties of the conflict because of the cultural and identity linkages assuming that actors from the same region will be more sympathetic and sensitive to their needs and preferences than an outside group. Another reason maybe their charters which mandate them to mediate in the conflicts among its members (Frazier & Dixon, 2006, p. 390) as the Article 5 of the Arab League commits it to a policy of involvement in regional disputes (Bercovitch, 1985, p. 739).

3.3. THE OCCURRENCE OF MEDIATION

Mediation is a conflict resolution tool and it is initiated when there is a deadlock among the disputants or when it is hard to start negotiations. Mediation as a method offers some advantages over other conflict resolution methods. Both the parties of the conflict and the mediator have some motivations to be involved in a mediation process. In this part, these issues will be elaborated.

3.3.1. When Do They Mediate?

As mentioned on the preceding part, due to the voluntary nature of mediation process, call for a mediation initiative should either come from the parties of the conflict or when offered by another actor it should be accepted by both of them.

Conflicting parties have bargaining power and it is determined by each party's best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA). They might try to increase their bargaining power by resorting to tactics such as threatening to use force (Beardsley, 2011, p. 19). The disputants may be initially reluctant to solve their conflicts peacefully because they may believe that they can achieve a better outcome through violent means. In militarized disputes, it is not easy to convince the public opinion to negotiate with the enemy. Especially in long and violent disputes, the actors aim to punish each other rather than find a settlement to the conflict. The role of diplomacy in this case is firstly to bring the parties to the negotiation table by softening up the conflict (Greig & Diehl, 2006, p. 358). Still, the disputants may refuse the mediation offer by another actor.

Generally mediation occurs when 1) disputes are long, drawn out and complex; 2) the disputants' own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse; 3) neither side is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of the dispute; and 4) the disputants are prepared to break their stalemate by cooperating with each other and engaging in some communication and contact. (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 8) Mediation is preferred when it is hard for the disputants to initiate bilateral negotiations themselves. According to Ho-Won Jeong, third party intervention is inevitable when there is a high level of continuing uncertainty surrounding distrust, power imbalance and a lack of efficient and direct

communication channels. (Jeong, 2009, p. 141) Under the following conditions a third party maybe called into negotiations or the disputants accept the offer of mediation:

1) The emotions of the parties are intense and preventing a settlement;

2) Communication between the parties is poor in either quantity or quality and the cannot change the situation on their own;

3) Misperceptions or stereotypes are hindering productive exchanges;

4) Repetitive negative behaviors are creating barriers;

5) There are serious disagreements over data – what information is important, how it is collected, and how it will be evaluated;

6) There are multiple issues in dispute, and the parties disagree about the order and combination in which they should be addressed;

7) There are perceived or actual incompatible interests that the parties are having difficulty reconciling;

8) Perceived or actual value differences divide the parties;

9) The parties do not have a negotiating procedure, are using the wrong procedure, or are not using a procedure to its best advantage;

10) There is not an acceptable structure or forum for negotiations;

11) The parties are having difficulties starting negotiations or have reached an impasse in their bargaining (Moore C. W., 2003, p. 14)

Timing of the mediation initiative is also an important factor affecting the mediation outcome. The concept of ripeness, developed by William Zartman, is very useful in this regard. As a party of the conflict that believes it can win a clear victory over the other will be less likely to accept a mediation process, it is necessary to reach a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS). The actors should start to realize

themselves that they are in a deadlock or persuaded into that perception by the mediator. Numbers and nature of casualties and material costs may serve as indicators for MHS. Yet as Zartman also underlines, while ripeness is a necessary precondition for negotiation, not all ripeness leads to negotiation. In contrast, it may strengthen the will to continue fighting with the discourses such as 'whatever the cost, 'if at first you don't succeed, try, try again' and justified struggles call for greater sacrifices so this situation may absorb the increased pain occurring as a result of the conflict (Zartman, 2001, p. 12) The disputants should perceive that there is a stalemate and the costs of the conflict became unbearable so they look for a way out. Zartman also points out that the mediator should seize that 'ripe moment' and persuade the parties about the presence of a MHS or if it is a power mediator, it should work for creating one. In this regard, he gives the example of US arming of Israel during the 1973 War with Egypt (Zartman, 2001, p. 15). In reality, Kissinger's mediation efforts were successful because the result of the war was not a victory for neither of the parties and both countries' leaders were anxious to start negotiations under the aegis of the US (Mandell & Tomlin, 1991, p. 48).

J. M. Greig tried to statistically calculate the necessary duration of time for mediation occurrence. According to him, mediations attempted early in the lifetime of a rivalry are more likely to result in an agreement than those attempted later in the rivalry. His results showed that there was more than 60 % probability of achieving a partial or full mediation agreement on the issues under dispute for mediations attempted 6 months after the first rivalry dispute (Greig, 2001, p. 706). In a later study, Greig and Diehl found out that the costs of conflict push rivals toward negotiation and mediation in enduring rivalries. They criticized 'the later, the better' approach suggested by the ripeness concept. In their view, rivals are on average two

and a half times more likely to participate in mediation and five and half times more likely to negotiate during an ongoing militarized dispute. If there is an ongoing war, the likelihood of mediation increases more than seven fold. In an interesting way, an ongoing war does not lead to increasing likelihood of negotiation or mediation initiated by the disputants (Greig & Diehl, 2006, p. 372). It might be a good sign for the importance of third party intervention. Another interesting result is that there is a curvilinear relationship between rivalry duration and both negotiation and mediation. According to their results, increasing the age of a rivalry from 88 to 289 months increases the likelihood of negotiation by 160 % however after 25 years (300 months) the likelihood of negotiation declines (Greig & Diehl, 2006, p. 378).

3.3.2. Why Mediation is Preferred?

Both the disputants and potential mediator have expectations from the mediation process. These expectations motivate them to start a risky process and form the demand and supply side of mediation. In this part the motivations of the disputants will be touched upon.

Realizing that they reached a stalemate and are unable to resolve the conflict on their own, the disputants resort to mediation. In this way, the dyadic structure of the conflict becomes triadic. Mediation offers some advantages to the disputants so they accept this new situation. Mediator plays very different roles in the resolution of the conflict. It may alter the power and social dynamics of a conflict relationship by changing the beliefs or behaviors of the parties by providing information or by introducing a new negotiation process (Moore C. W., 2003, p. 16). A third may help

reach agreements for which the disputants may be grateful but which neither party could suggest or even accept if it was proposed by the other (Borash & Webel, 2009, p. 253). Many factors, for example, to avoid seeming like the conceding party so as the weaker side play an important role in this reluctance. Marvin Ott identified seven roles for a mediator (Ott, 1972, p. 598):

1) He can change for the better the behavior of the disputants just by being present.

2) He can facilitate communication, particularly in situations where the emotional involvement of political leaders precludes rational face-to-face negotiation. He can screen out those communications and memories which make agreement more difficult.

3) He can clarify the facts in a situation and thereby eliminate misunderstandings and ignorance as a source of hostility.

4) He can provide a break in hostilities while inquiries are made and alternatives discussed – a breathing spell in which tempers can cool.

5) He can suggest specific solutions, made more palatable by the presumed objectivity of their author. The may or may not include alternatives that the disputants had failed to perceive themselves… The mediator, in short, benefits from a very real power of suggestion.

6) For reasons that are not entirely clear, concessions made through an intermediary are not thought to convey an image of weakness in the same way as those made directly between the principals. The mediator, then, provides a partial answer to the 'bargainer's dilemma,' i.e., how to offer concessions while retaining the appearance of toughness. In so doing he

permits the parties to save face while facilitating the necessary process of compromise.

7) Finally, the mediator can provide such 'service activities' as supervision of a cease-fire, verification of troop withdrawals, or inspection of demilitarized zones.

Kyle Beardsley offers three reasons for the acceptance of mediation. 1) Domestic political cover: the disputants will accept mediation when they face high domestic audience costs for unpopular concessions. It will help the leaders 'save face' in an environment where backing down will mean losing support at home. First, mediators can share the burden of responsibility for concessions. Second, mediators can help inform the domestic audiences about the merits of the concessions; it may signal to the domestic public that the agreed outcome is fair. These dynamics were at work during the Iran hostage crisis where the domestic audiences in both the USA and Iran made it very costly to negotiate directly; Algeria relayed the messages of the parties to each other and hosted the parties during the signing of the documents (Beardsley, 2010, pp. 396-397). Norway's role in the Oslo Process for the secret Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that started in 1993 may also be reflective of the mediator's role. Norway brought the parties together in secrecy. Even though the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the financial resources and the locations of the meetings, it was conducted by the Oslo-based Institute for Applied Science (Siniver, 2006, p. 820). In case of leaks, the parties could suggest that it was only an 'academic activity' since some of the Israelis and Norwegians were affiliated with non-governmental organizations. At that time it was illegal for any Israeli citizen to meet with Palestine Liberation Organization officials

(Aggestam, 2002, pp. 75-76). In this secret mediation process, Norway managed to get the parties to the negotiation table by applying semi-formal methods.

2) Third-party incentives: Because of the spill-over effects of a conflict, states that have a stake in the regional stability may offer positive inducements (aid) or threaten with negative inducements (sanctions) in order to pressure the parties to reach a solution. This may bring the disputants to the negotiation table (Beardsley, 2010, p. 397).

3) Conflict Costs: With the actors face costly and unending conflict, the disputants may be eager to try alternative resolution mechanisms. In this case, domestic audience cost may be lower so the leaders would have less need for political cover when making concessions. (Beardsley, 2010, p. 398)

Calling for mediation or accepting an offer of mediation are not enough for a successful outcome because mediation may also be used in an insincere way as a stalling tactic to avoid the audience costs at domestic and external levels. A disputant may fear that rejecting mediation would damage relations with the would-be mediator (Zartmann, 2013, p. 17). In addition, the break might be used as a time for regrouping and recruiting so the belligerents would hope to get better results in the battlefield. The actors might use it to gain recognition or to provide a veneer of cooperation that might be rewarded by various audiences and after some time one of the actors may renew fighting while blaming the other actor for lack of progress. This especially happens in civil wars (Beardsley, 2011, p. 20) Oliver Richmond names this situation as negotiating with 'devious objectives' and according to him the objectives may be to gain time to regroup and reorganize; internationalization; the search for an ally; empowerment; legitimization of their negotiation positions and

current status; face saving; and avoiding costly concessions by prolonging the process itself. Especially in intra-state wars, where one of the disputants are named as 'rebels', initiation of a mediation process may lead to legitimization (Richmond, 1998). The government body may consider the involvement of a third party as an act of breaching its sovereignty. That was the case when the Sri Lankan government refused mediation for about 17 years in its conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and nationalist circles also criticized Norway for its mediation efforts (Melin & Svensson, 2009, p. 250) As Melin and Svensson argue, the political cost of accepting mediation (the recognition cost) will be felt strongly by the governments and regarded as a sign of weakness so one can assume that civil wars would receive a lower offer of mediation and also lower level of acceptance however their quantitative study showed different results. Using two datasets covering the period of the years 1946-1999, one for militarized inter-state disputes (MIDs) that reached the level 3 or 4 (show or use of force) and the other for civil wars (intra-state conflicts), they found that civil wars receive a higher rate of mediation offer. In a total of 153 civil wars, 22 conflicts (14.4 %) received mediation offers with 201 total offers to mediate and 172 (85.5 %) of offers were accepted. On the other hand in a total sample of 2274 MIDs, only 38 (3.2 %) of conflicts received mediation offers with 101 total offers to mediate and 67 (66.3 %) of offers were accepted (Melin & Svensson, 2009, p. 260).

As mentioned above, the mediation efforts may be accepted or rejected and acceptance of mediation does not necessarily lead to successful mediation outcome such as an agreement or reduction of escalation. This was the demand side of mediation and mediators are motivated by some factors for offering mediation. In the following part, types of mediators and motives of the mediator will be touched upon.

3.4. WHO MEDIATES?

The intervention of a third party and initiation of mediation turns the dyadic structure of the conflict into a triadic structure. Mediators use different tactics and styles in mediation and this choice shapes the strategies and tools used in mediation. While being involved in a conflict necessitates devoting time and sources in the process, the mediators expect some positive outcome from the process in return. In this part, firstly the mediation style and its impact on the mediation process will be elaborated.

3.4.1. Mediation Style

In the current literature on mediation, different concepts are developed regarding the mediation style and mediator behavior. They are helpful in analyzing a mediation process because they help the researcher to better focus on the strategies employed by the mediator.

Regarding the character of the mediator, Thomas Princen developed a concept based on the mediator's interest in the resolution of the conflict. In his classification, the mediator with a stake in the conflict is a principal mediator while the mediator without a clear stake is named as neutral mediator (Princen, 1995). Having a stake at the conflict may have an important impact on the mediation strategy adopted by the mediator. Regarding the mediation style, the simplest form is active and passive mediation. While a passive mediator only conveys messages and information between the parties of the conflict, an active mediator interpret information, make tentative suggestions, inject opinions, make recommendations,

evaluate preferences and demands of the parties and propose solutions and modifications. In some cases, an active mediator may even twist arms of the adversaries (Jeong, 2009, p. 142). In a detailed concept, Christopher W. Moore suggests five types of mediators (2003, pp. 44-45):

1) Social Network Mediator:

- Prior and expected future relationship to parties tied into their social network.

- Not necessarily impartial, but perceived by all to be fair.

- Very concerned with promoting stable long-term relationships between parties and their associates.

- Frequently involved in implementation.

- Generally has ongoing relationships with parties after dispute is terminated.

- May use personal influence or peer community pressure to promote adherence to agreement.

2) Benevolent Mediator

- May or may not have a current or ongoing relationship with parties.

- Seeks best solution for all involved.

- Generally impartial regarding the specific substantive outcome of the dispute.

- Has authority to advise, suggest or decide.

- May have resources to help in monitoring and implementation of the agreement.

3) Administrative/Managerial Mediator

- Generally has ongoing authoritative relationships with parties before and after dispute is terminated.

- Seeks solution developed jointly with the parties, within mandated parameters.

- Has authority to advise, suggest or decide.

- May have resources to help in monitoring and implementation of an agreement.

- Has authority to enforce agreement.

4) Vested Interest Mediator

- Has either a current or expected future relationship with a party or parties.

- Has a strong interest in the outcome of the dispute.

- Seeks solution that meets mediator's interests and/or those of a favored party.

- May use strong leverage or coercion to achieve an agreement.

- May have resources to help in monitoring or implementation of agreement.

- May use strong leverage or coercion to enforce agreement.

5) Independent Mediator

- Neutral/impartial regarding relationships and specific outcomes

- Serves at the pleasure of the parties.

- May be 'professional' mediator.

- Seeks a jointly acceptable, voluntary and non-coerced solution developed by the parties.

- May or may not be involved in monitoring implementation.

- Has no authority to enforce agreement.

Another typology which is simpler and has more explaining power is developed by I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval. In their typology, three types of mediation style are proposed (Zartman & Touval, 1985) and this typology is also accepted by other scholars sometimes with different names (Bercovitch & Gartner, Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 2006):

1) The mediator as facilitator or communicator: The mediator serves as a channel of communication among disputing parties. It ensures continued discussion and dialogue. It provides the necessary information for overcoming misunderstanding and miscalculation to the parties. Norway's mediation initiative that resulted with the Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO is the best example for this type of mediation.

2) Mediator as formulator: In contrast to facilitation, formulation includes an important contribution to the negotiations and the mediator proposes new solutions to the parties. The mediator also has a certain level of control over the conduct of negotiation procedures such as setting the agenda.

This type of mediation strategy is also named as procedural strategies and New Zealand's mediation of the Bougainville conflict in 1995 may serve as a good example. The mediator brought the parties to a military camp and exercised full control over the procedural aspects of negotiations (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 339).

3) Mediator as manipulator: Manipulative or power mediators (also named as directive strategies) (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 339) can increase the immediate costs of continuing conflict and the future costs of reneging on an agreement. These type of mediators offer 'carrots and sticks' or as conceptualized by Peter J. D. Carnevale, 'compensation' and 'pressing'. 'Carrots' may include direct compensation, favorable economic policies, other diplomatic concessions or security guarantees while the 'sticks' may include economic or diplomatic sanctions and the threat of direct military intervention (Carnevale P. J., 1986). During a crisis between North and South Yemen in 1972, it is reported that the Libyan leader Colonel Qaddafi threatened to hold captive the delegation leaders of both sides if they failed to reach an agreement while promised $50 million in annual aid if they reach an agreement (Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas, & Wilkenfield, 2006, p. 64) 'Carrots' are also used by the US during the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978 in the form of economic and military aid. To this day, the amount of aid to Israel is annually more than $2 billion on average (Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid since 1976), while Egypt receives annually $2 billion on average (Sharp, 2010, pp. 3,23). The mediation process led by Richard Holbrooke for the

Dayton Accords also present a rare example, where both traditional diplomacy and military action was used, because it blurred the criterion of nonviolent tactics (Beardsley, 2011, p. 18). This type of mediators also offers to monitor the post-crisis situation and enforce the settlement which increases the cost of renewing the conflict as the US stationed observer forces in the Sinai Peninsula to monitor the cease-fire (Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas, & Wilkenfield, 2006, p. 65).

The mediation strategy is not chosen in a random way by the mediator. It is clearly affected by the nature of the relationship between the belligerents. The mediators adapt the necessary style of intervention to meet the requirements of the situation (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 339). In high intensity conflicts the mediators adopt a more active form of intervention in order to prevent further escalation (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 177). Yet it should be kept in mind that these strategies may be employed by the same actor simultaneously in the same mediation process in different phases of the negotiations and of course regarding manipulation depending on the resources available to the mediator.

3.4.2. Motivations of the Mediator

Mediation is a time and resource consuming process for the mediator. Even in the simplest forms such as shuttle diplomacy or organizing meetings and providing venues and recruiting personnel, cost the mediator time and financial resources. These 'fixed costs' in mediation suggest that peripheral and poor states are likely to enter the mediation market (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000). In case of power mediation where both positive and negative incentives might be used, the cost of

mediation might become a burden for mediator. Furthermore, failure might also bring a loss of face as Henry Kissinger puts forward: "A reputation for success tends to be self-fulfilling. Equally, failure feeds on itself: A Secretary of State who undertakes too many journeys that lead nowhere depreciates his coin." (Quot. in (Beardsley, 2011, p. 23) Still, countries continue offering mediation. What are the motivations of the mediator for initiating a risky and costly process?

According to Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, it is possible to observe five main motivational factors behind the mediation where a mediator acts in an official capacity, representing a government or an organization:

1) they have a clear mandate to intervene in disputes (e.g. the charters of the Arab League, African Unity, and the Organization of American States each contain an explicit clause mandating that their members seek mediation in regional disputes;

2) they may want to do something about a conflict whose continuance could adversely affect their own political interests;

3) they may be directly requested by one or both parties to mediate;

4) they may wish to preserve a structure of which they are a part (e.g., the frequent mediation attempts by the United States in disputes between Greece and Turkey, two valued NATO member-states);

5) they may see mediation as a way of extending and enhancing their own influence by becoming indispensable to the parties in conflict or by gaining gratitude (and presumably the political goodwill) of one or both of the protagonists (e.g., the frequent efforts by the United States to mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict). (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 41)

As the first of all being involved in a peace process brings personal prestige. For example President Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) won a Nobel Peace Prize for his successful mediation between Russia and Japan for his efforts to end the war in 1905 (Borash & Webel, 2009, p. 255). Statesmen, following the end of their tenure, like to be involved in mediation initiatives and they share their knowledge and experience in order to end conflicts. Former US President Jimmy Carter (1924) was deeply involved in mediation processes following his establishing of the Carter Center (Taulbee & Creekmore Jr., 2003). He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002 "for his decades of untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts, to advance democracy and human rights, and to promote economic and social development" (The Nobel Prize, 2002). Another statesman, Martti Ahtisaari (1937), the former President of Finland and the architect of the Ahtisaari Plan for the conflict over Kosovo, became involved in conflicts after his tenure as a mediator and established the Crisis Management Initiative. He mediated the Aceh conflict between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement and was successful in reaching the Aceh Accord in 2005. He was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 "for his important efforts, on several continents and over more than three decades, to resolve international conflicts" (The Nobel Prize, 2008). A renowned US diplomat and the architect of the Dayton Accords that ended the war in Yugoslavia, Richard Holbrooke (1941-2010) was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize many times even though he was not awarded.

Secondly, some actors value the humanitarian benefits of peacemaking. They might not have a direct stake in the resolution of the conflict. (Beardsley, 2011, p. 23) Individuals, NGOs, IGOs and small states might be good examples for this type of mediator. Still, they might seek a higher level of international prestige and try to

develop better relations with the disputants and great powers. Norway and Sweeden try to establish a reputation as a peacemaker (Melin, 2013, p. 80). Frequent involvement of small states in international conflicts disproportionate to their power also illustrates this type of mediators.

Thirdly, mediators might have direct and indirect interests in the resolution of the conflict. For this reason, the mediation efforts should not be regarded as only altruistic activities (Beardsley, 2011, p. 24). Keeping in mind that being a power mediator necessitates the allocation of enormous resources and sometimes deployment of military forces in the field, it is against the rational logic to assume that mediators expend their resources without expecting any benefit in return. In this regard, Saadia Touval brings a new approach and suggests that 'mediation is foreign policy' (Touval, 2003, p. 92). He sees mediation as a part of foreign and domestic policy. The involvement of the US in the conflict between Israel and Egypt as a mediator was motivated with the aim of expelling Soviet military presence in Egypt. Secondly, during the war in Bosnia, until the year 1995, the US left the search for a settlement to UN and EU mediators who failed in the end. It had to intervene because the looming crisis threatened to impact US-European relations and to avoid the possibility of sending American troops to Bosnia to serve as peace-keepers just before the US presidential campaign (Touval S. , 2003, pp. 92-93). In another case, when the Soviet Union decided to mediate the conflict between India and Pakistan, the expectations of the mediator are visible. The Soviet Union tried to establish better relations with Pakistan, a country that had better relations with the USA and China, and also aimed at establishing a precedent that would justify its future involvement in the region (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 41).

Conflicts often cause disruption in trade, refugee flows and political instability which may have negative consequences for a mediator. Geographical proximity serves as the main source of motivation for mediators. This is especially true for civil wars which might have spill-over effects. If the major powers have limited interests in the region and refrain from offering mediation, it is generally the neighbors who start the process. In their quantitative study, J. Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan found out that neighboring states are significantly more likely to offer mediation to civil wars than states further away from the fighting. "A state contiguous to a civil war state is nearly 14 times more likely to offer mediation to the conflict than an average state 1,265 miles away." (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 773). Molly M. Melin found out that states closer to the conflict zone (maximum 1,000 miles distance between the capital cities) are quicker to offer mediation (Melin, 2011, p. 708). States are more willing to offer mediation in both civil and interstate wars if they are located geographically close to the conflict zone (Melin & Svensson, 2009, p. 263). In this respect culture might also be very influential in the mediation process. Peter J. Carnevale and Dong-Won Choi argue that culture plays a positive role. They emphasize that Iran and Iraq in 1975 agreed on mediation by the Algerian leader Boumedienne, because he was a Muslim leader and he was seen as "a member of the same family". Then they ask a question: Could the Pope have served as a mediator in the conflict between Iraq and Iran? Their answer is probably not. However the Pope was accepted as a mediator in the Beagle Channel Dispute between Argentina and Chile, countries with Catholic population (Carnevale & Choi, 2000, p. 108). Regarding the insider mediators, coming directly from the same society that experiences conflict, it is suggested that as 'insider-partial' mediators they play a very important role in non-violent conflicts such as the Chilean

Arcbishop Juan Fransisco's mediator role between the repressive government of Augusto Pinochet and opposition o Allianza Democratica (Svensson & Lindgren, 2013, p. 699). This might suggest that states and regional organizations with cultural similarities to one or both of the rivals may serve as effective mediators.

The relationship between the mediator and one or both of the disputants may also serve as a catalyst for the initiation of mediation. In this respect, former colonial ties may be a good example. A quantitative study covering the period 1946-1999 proved that in civil wars former colonial ties increase the likelihood of mediation offer however it decreases the likelihood that such offers will be accepted. Rivals refrain from including the formal colonial power in civil wars. In contrast, former colonial powers are less willing to offer mediation in militarized disputes but they are more likely accepted in interstate conflicts (Melin & Svensson, 2009, pp. 261,264). Agreeing with this result, Michael Greig suggests that this kind of mediation initiatives is primarily driven by the shared history between the colonial power and its former colony (such as Belgium's role in the conflicts in Central Africa). In addition, significant economic, political and emotional ties that persist even after the colonial ties are broken might be influential (Greig, 2005, p. 253). Especially France and Great Britain as former colonial powers were often involved in mediation initiatives. However as it is emphasized by Jacob Bercovitch and Gerald Schneider, pure status of an ex-colonial power might not be a sufficiently convincing attribute in the mediator market. As former colonial powers, Spain is completely and Portugal is nearly completely (with 2 instances of mediation) absent in the mediator market (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000, p. 159).

Regarding the trade relations between the parties of the conflict, Tobias Böhmelt argues that if two countries have strong and dense trade ties, then they will

be more willing to accept mediation. However if they have additional trade ties to outside parties, they will be less likely to accept mediation. Also third parties that provide alternative markets will have an incentive in the continuing conflict because they will make profit from it. If the rivals have outside trade channels, it will be harder to enforce mediation by using sanctions. (Böhmelt, 2010, p. 587) Quantitative studies offer contrasting views on trade relations. Melin and Svensson argue that trade interests increase the probability of a mediation offer in civil conflicts but do not have a significant effect on interstate conflicts (Melin & Svensson, 2009, p. 263). In contrast, Greig and Regan argue that trade ties between a third party and a civil war state does not increase the offer of mediation. Instead, a third party with no trade with a civil war state is 10 times more likely to offer mediation (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 773). According to Jacob Bercovitch, states that are neither dependent upon nor require outside help would not be particularly amenable to mediation. These states are well able to resist any form of external pressure or influence which a mediator may bring to bear (Bercovitch, 1985, p. 746).

3.4.3. Qualities of the Mediator

The necessary qualities for being a good mediator are a hotly debated topic in the current literature. Many qualities such as intelligence, stamina, energy, patience and a sense of humor may be listed (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 36). However, three qualities emerge as the most necessary ones: impartiality, credibility and having leverage.

Mediation is a voluntary process and it is important for a potential mediator to have the trust of the both parties as honest-broker. Being impartial (also named as

neutral and unbiased) is credited by some experts as very important asset. Young claims that "a high score in such areas as impartiality would seem to be at the heart of successful interventions in many situations" (Young, 1967, p. 81). However this view has been heavily criticized in the following decades. Having good relations (historical, political or economic ties) with one of the disputants (having bias towards one of them) does not necessarily make a mediator to behave in unfair way. In contrast, it is argued that biased mediators are more successful. Andrew Kydd gives the example of American mediation effort between Argentina and Britain during the Falkland crisis. The US officials told their Argentinian counterparts that the British had high resolve and will fight however their views were not taken seriously because the US was regarded as biased towards Britain. As well known, Britain started military operations against Argentina. In another case, in 1999, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Victor Chernomyrdin warned Slobodan Milosevic that a ground attack by the NATO was very likely and Milosevic accepted the latest NATO proposals and the mediation was success. Kydd argues that an unbiased mediator who is simply interested in minimizing the probability of conflict will have a strong incentive to make false statements regarding the will of other party to fight so the parties will not find the mediator credible. A biased mediator will be believed if it counsel restraint (Kydd, 2003, p. 597).

James D. D. Smith approaches the impartiality issue from the perspective of mediation style (low power-low stake mediator and high power-high stake mediator). According to him, impartiality is *sine non qua* for a neutral or pure mediator while for a power mediator or manipulator more than impartiality, the leverage (the resources the mediator has at its disposal to reward or punish the disputants) is much more important. A manipulator does not have to be or probably cannot be impartial

(Smith, 1994). Many scholars in the field argue that leverage is valued more than being impartial, rather than being unbiased or neutral, but when a mediator possesses resources either party values its mediation efforts will be successful (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000, p. 149) (Zartman & Touval, 1985), (Touval S. , 2003). Asaf Siniver notes that Henry Kissinger could not deny the American priorities in the Middle East, nor could he hide his Jewish origins. However, despite the apparent bias toward Israel, Egypt and Syria willingly cooperated with Kissinger. More importantly, it was the special relationship with Israel that enabled Kissinger to push the parties towards concessions (Siniver, 2006, p. 817).

Mediator credibility concerns the extent to which disputants think that 1) the mediator's offer is believable (ie., the mediator is not bluffing and/or is not being deceived by the opponent), and 2) the mediator can deliver the offer (i.e., it can make the offer stick) (Maoz & Terris, 2006, p. 410). Credibility of the mediator in the eyes of disputants is a subjective estimate. It may have some 'objective' components such as a mediator's capabilities (Maoz & Terris, 2006, p. 418). Assume that a small power with very limited military capability and no direct interest in the conflict intervenes in a civil-war and promises to provide a peace-keeping force consisting of 50,000 troops and requests the non-state actor to deliver all the weapons they have at their disposal. In this case, fearing for their security and afraid that the peace-keeping force may withdraw at any time because it cannot sustain the deployment of this high number of troops, the non-state actor would not be willing to accept the settlement and hand in their weapons.

Regarding impartiality, the explanation offered by Smith which relates being impartial or partial to the mediation style seems more realistic. In cases such as the US mediation between Israel and Egypt, even though it is known that the mediator is

biased towards the one of the disputants, it is also known that only the US may persuade or coerce Israel towards withdrawal from the occupied territories and offer security guarantees and military aid. A mediator with leverage would bring in its economic and military power in the form of carrots or stick to the mediation process. Still, for pure mediation without leverage, impartiality is important. The importance of leverage will be touched upon in the following part.

3.5. POWER IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

Power is a key concept in the field of International Relations as we have shown in the previous chapter. As a result it might have an important impact on the mediation process. The mediator may bring more resources to the negotiation table as it is a powerful actor in order to solve the conflict. In this part, power will be dealt in two aspects. Firstly the impact of power parity/disparity (symmetry/asymmetry) between the disputing parties will be mentioned. Secondly, the impact of power parity/disparity between the parties of the conflict and the mediator will be touched upon. With respect to their power status, states will be classified as Major Powers, Middle Powers and Small Powers.

3.5.1. Power Parity/Disparity Between the Rivals

Mediation is a voluntary process that is initiated with the acceptance of both rivals in a conflict. For this reason, if one of the disputants refuses mediation, the process cannot start. Is there a relation between the power parity of the disputants and the decision to accept mediation?

It is generally accepted that mediation occurs if there is power parity between the rivals because it would also lead to a hurting-stalemate. If one of the disputants believes that it has richer resources than the other and conflict will end up with victory for him or he can get the same objectives through bilateral negotiations by forcing the weaker side to concede, it would not accept mediation. As Modelski puts forward "it goes strongly against the grain of human nature to seek a negotiated solution when one can be imposed merely by demanding it" (Modelski, 1964, p. 149) (quot. in (Kleiboer, 1996, p. 368). Ott showed that in his study by comparing two cases (Ott, 1972). A comparative study also proved this relationship. No mediation occurred in 48% of disputes between countries of unequal power and those disputes that were mediated between unequal states only 6% were successful. Where both parties were roughly equal power, the probability of mediating successfully was over five times as great (32%). Adding more to this, it is argued that the probability of successful mediation increases when the parties were not only equal in power, but were both relatively weak states. In 65 cases involving two such parties, the probability of success was 40%. In contrast, where one state was very powerful and one very weak, mediation stood little chance of success. In 47 cases, involving that kind of dyad, only three cases (6%) were successful. (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, pp. 11-12) Another quantitative study shows that symmetric crises are more likely to be mediated than are asymmetric crises. It also shows that manipulation and formulation are more successful than facilitation at bringing about a formal agreement and tension reduction under conditions of symmetry. Under the conditions of asymmetry, facilitation appears to be the best way for tension reduction. (Quinn, Wilkenfield, Smarick, & Asal, 2006, p. 465)

In asymmetric conflicts, the stronger party generally does not accept the involvement of a third party in the conflict. Even if it accepts, it is half-heartedly. In an asymmetrical relationship like that, it is the weaker party who calls for a powerful intervention from the international community. As Karin Aggestam shows in her analysis of the US led mediation between Israel and the PLO (between a state and non-state actor), mediation in asymmetrical conflicts is harder than symmetric conflicts. Normally, the mediator is expected to balance the demands of the stronger party however that is not the case. Since stronger parties have less political willingness to negotiate, they start to set the rules of negotiations by imposing conditions. The mediator and the weak party, willing to start and continue negotiations, end up with satisfying the demands of the stronger party (Aggestam, 2002, p. 86)

In this regard, if there is power symmetry between the disputants it is more likely to end up with a successful mediation outcome.

3.5.2. Power Parity/Disparity Between the Rivals and the Mediator

Power parity/disparity between the rivals and the mediator also plays an important role in the mediation process. The mediator uses a mixture of tools ranging from foreign aid to diplomatic support in order to make the settlement more acceptable to conflict. The more powerful a mediator is, the more he can offer as positive or negative inducements, an influential factor generally named as mediator leverage. However if there is a power disparity between the rivals and the mediator, the mediator (a minor power) simply will not be able to persuade or coerce the rivals

for a settlement. As J. Michael Greig emphasizes if a major power is involved in a rivalry, it is unlikely to attract mediation:

> Although all rivalries are theoretically susceptible to mediation, in practice some types of rivalries are unlikely to experience mediation. In particular, rivalries in which there is at least one major power are unlikely to attract mediation. Conflicts involving minor powers may benefit from the assistance of both principal and neutral mediators (Greig, 2005, p. 253).

Working on an interstate conflict data-set covering the period from 1945 to 1974, Butterworth found that states were less willing to offer mediation if a super-power is involved in the conflict. Mediators were active only in the 22% of the conflicts involving a super-power (Butterworth, 1978, p. 207). Due to their power status, it is not possible to persuade them by providing incentives or by coercion. In addition to the huge resources and nuclear weapons at their disposal, major powers are also permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC, the USA, Soviet Union/Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) so they have the opportunity to veto any resolution against their interests in the UN. Thomas Princen observed this point:

> no European power, not Japan or China, can dictate terms to superpowers on arms control, human rights, or trade. And the UN has been rendered impotent when it comes to the rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. (Princen, 1995, p. 18)

For these reasons, major powers prefer bilateral negotiations instead of mediation where a third-party is involved. They refrain to lose control of the process by legitimizing the involvement of a third-party and lose their leverage on other country. They may reach their objectives in bilateral negotiations. This also explains the non-involvement of third-parties because mediation process occurs when the

parties of the conflict demand and approve the involvement of a mediator. The mediation process led by Algeria during the hostage crisis between the US and Iran is an exception to the rule because of the special characteristics of the case (Greig, 2005, p. 253). James Bercovitch argues that states that receive or depend on external help are considerably more inclined to accept mediation. Taking into these factors into consideration, he suggests that "mediation, it seems, is an effective method of conflict management only when it is applied to disputes involving small or medium powers" (Bercovitch, 1985, p. 746).

In contrast, major powers are more likely to be involved in disputes as mediators. They have political, economic and security interests in various parts of the world and requirement to intervene as a result of their alliance ties. Analyzing the period between the years 1950-1990, Bercovitch and Schneider found that with 84 instances of mediation, the USA had the chance of being chosen as a mediator approximately one in three and it is argued that superpowers are likely to be more successful in their initiatives (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000, p. 158). Five major powers are also permanent members of the UNSC and they may also block any unwelcomed resolution regarding the conflict so they might be especially chosen by the disputants. Bercovitch and Schneider argue that having a permanent seat at the UNSC is a much more significant factor in the choice of mediator when compared to an official policy of neutrality (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000, p. 162).The current literature considers sources of leverage a state has at its disposal necessary for a successful mediation outcome (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 15), (Beardsley, 2013), (Touval S. , 2003). According to Maoz and Terris, "the more 'assets' a mediator possesses that the disputants value, the greater her ability to influence the parties. Therefore, mediators with relevant 'moving power' are more

capable of putting a settlement in place." (Maoz & Terris, 2006, p. 412) It is argued that the more intense a conflict is directive strategies will be more successful (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 339). Bercovitch and Houston found that while communication-facilitation might be more successful in intrastate conflicts, directive strategies are more suitable for interstate conflicts (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 189). Analyzing the cases of mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Asaf Siniver found out that power mediators have been markedly more successful than pure mediators in the Arab-Israeli conflict because only powerful mediators can successfully monitor and ensure the implementation of the agreement. Norway as a country with very limited interests in the region was successful at bringing the parties together for negotiation but for the latter stages of a settlement process a powerful mediator was necessary (Siniver, 2006, p. 822).

Using leverage in mediation brings some advantages however it also brings some disadvantages. Kyle Beardsley points out to the possible risks in using 'too much' leverage. According to him, when third parties use too much leverage, the risk of creating artificial incentives for agreements that are not likely sustainable over time emerges. He presents the case of Rwanda where at the beginning of the process third-party involvement was strong and included leverage. Following the signing of Arusha Records (1993), the mediator involvement waned and the peace-keeping force necessary for the implementation of the agreement turned out to be weaker than expected. It paved the way for the Rwanda genocide in 1994 (Beardsley, 2013, p. 61). The damage caused by the mediator involvement in Rwanda is also underlined by Alan Kuperman (Kuperman, 1996). It is also argued that mediated settlements are generally short-term settlements. According to Gartner and Bercovitch, unless non-state actors are involved, mediated settlements are bound to be short-lived (Gartner

& Bercovitch, 2006). The important thing Beardsley emphasizes is the sustainability of leverage (Beardsley, 2013, p. 65). In this respect Maoz and Terris point out to the importance of mediator credibility. It is about a) sufficiently honest to make credible offers, and b) sufficiently capable to deliver her promises. A perfectly credible mediator is one whose promises are trusted and whose capacity to deliver those promises are not in doubt (Maoz & Terris, 2006, p. 418). Firstly the disputants will stick better to an agreement if they perceive that violation will bring punishment by the mediator so mediator's involvement in the implementation process (by overseeing the situation or deploying peace-keeping forces) is a very influential factor. Secondly assume that a mediator offered foreign aid to the disputants as a reward for settling the conflict but due to its fragile economy the disputants are in doubt if the mediator may sustain the amount it promised.

While emphasizing the importance of power in mediation, it should be kept in mind that the leverage a state has its disposal does not mean that all its mediation efforts will result in successful settlement. Efraim Inbar analyzed the mediation process initiated by the US between Lebanon and Israel in 1983. The US used leverage and succeeded in producing an agreement between the parties. While other Arab countries in the region gave a tacit approval to the agreement, Syria and Libya opposed it. However, Syria managed to form a coalition in Lebanon consisting of Druse, Sunni and Christian elements to undermine the necessary support for the Lebanese government and only one year after its signing, the agreement was abrogated by Lebanon in April 1984. Inbar asks: was it a successful operation but the patient died? He suggests that the US underestimated the resistance of an actor from the region, Syria. Secondly in countries like Lebanon where social cohesion is limited and divided, it is harder to reach a sustainable settlement. He points out that

the US was successful in mediation efforts with strong state structures such as Egypt and Syria. (Inbar, 1991)

Small-and medium-sized powers such as Finland, Turkey, Canada, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zaire, South Africa, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Algeria, Costa Rica and Colombia consider mediation of the conflicts in their regions to be a major element of their foreign policy. (Zartmann, 2013, p. 22) Even though small states cannot offer valuable 'carrots' or threatening 'sticks' as major powers do, they still perform a very important role in international relations. They generally mediate in regional conflicts and their strategies tend to be low profile (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009, p. 39). According to Kyle Beardsley, the acceptance of small states with less leverage by the rivals as mediators can be explained in two ways: 1) They act as surrogates for stronger states or since the conflict zone is located in the periphery, it does not get the attention of major powers. 2) Rivals thinking that the mediator will impose a solution on them, or one of the rivals feeling that the other party will use the mediator for its 'devious objectives', weak mediators are preferred. (Beardsley, 2009, p. 274) He found out that if the amount of FDI into a state increases the chance of weak party mediation decreases. Secondly if the state is surrounded by more powerful states on average, mediators with less leverage are less likely. However if a state is surrounded by democratic neighbors all types of mediators are more likely to be involved (Beardsley, 2009, pp. 290-291). These states increase their prestige and visibility in the international arena even though they lag behind the major powers regarding economic and military power. Switzerland for example is famous for organizing and providing venue for negotiations among the disputants. Algeria for example mediated the Iran Hostage Crisis between Iran and the USA in a successful way. In the last decade, regarding the Middle East, Qatar

also started to emerge as a mediator. As a small-state when compared to traditional actors in the Arab World such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, Qatar has some advantages. First of all, its initiatives do not threaten other small actors in the region because Qatar has no claim to be the leader of the Arab World or aspire to be a regional hegemon. Secondly it does not bear the weight of historical baggage as other more involved regional actors do. As an insider, mediator from the region, it uses personal ties between the leaders in the region in addition to its financial power base to provide side-payments either in the form of aid or FDI while also trying to cooperate with all regional and global actors. For example Qatar gives importance to getting the consent of the USA and Iran at the same time. (Kamrava, Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy, 2011). Studying small state mediation on this case R. M. Slim argues that "the power of a small state as a mediator usually resides in its neutrality" (Slim, 1992, p. 207) then he explains the reason why this type of states is accepted by both parties:

> For the powerful party, a small state can provide a face-saver to whom capitulations can be made without threatening the public-bargaining posture of the powerful party. For the weaker party, a smaller state can provide a sympathetic ally who can understand what it means to negotiate from weakness. (Slim, 1992, p. 207)

Other states, situated between the major powers and small states mostly named as middle powers also started to play an important role in international mediation. They are motivated by self-interest some of which is related to domestic concerns. The possibility that a conflict spills-over to the mediator's territory; the fear that the local conflict may expand and draw in powerful actors; the reluctance to take sides in a conflict between other nations; and the attempt to promote norms that tend to enhance the mediator's own security (Zartmann, 2013, pp. 21-22).

Countries like Norway and Canada mediate the conflicts out of their regions in order to increase their international prestige and visibility. In addition to its role in the Oslo Accords, Norway also served as a mediator in Sri Lanka. Norway aspires to promote an image of being a global peacemaker and its approach is based on impartiality and getting the consent of regional and global powers (Höglünd & Svensson, 2009). Canada was involved as a mediator in Nicaragua in 1989, in the Dominican Republic in 1994 and in Niger in 2008 (Hoffman, 2013). Canada started the Dubai Process to build trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan, two countries that had border related problems (Hampson, Özerdem, & Koser, 2011). On Canada's activism in international crises it is argued that Canada intervened because the prime-ministers of Canada regarded these cases as 'crises' so personal choices rather than systemic or bureaucratic factors played a role (Meren, 1999, p. 142). Australia also aspires to play a prominent role in its region. It was involved in Cambodia peace process in the early 1990s (Gyngell & Wesley, 2007, pp. 51-62). Surrounded by developing states, Australia uses foreign development aid as the main pillar of its policy in the South Pacific area and Indonesia, in its 'near abroad' (Hawksley, 2009). Analyzing the factors beyond the middle-power activism of Australia and Canada, John Ravenhill argues that partisanship plays an important role, supported by the interests and personalities of prime ministers and foreign ministers. (Ravenhill, 1998, p. 325) Saudi Arabia has been a traditional actor in the Middle East as a mediator especially regarding the conflicts in the Arab World. The Kingdom uses mediation for two purposes: 1) Ensuring and furthering regime and state security, 2) Playing a central coordinating role in regional affairs (Kamrava, 2013).

Regarding the differences between middle-power states, it is possible to classify them in two groups which also show their main motives in acting as mediator:

1) The conflict takes place in the region where the mediator is located. It has the potential to cause regional instability, trade disruption and waves of refugees if left to its course. In this case the mediator feels obliged to intervene in order to protect its interests and sustain its security. Even though resolution of the conflict will increase the country's prestige and visibility, the priority is on protecting its interests. The decision to intervene is more than a choice; it is a necessity. It is also vital to intervene if the country is aspiring to become a regional hegemon and order-maker in its region. However this may also cause reactions from other regional actors so their mediation efforts may be undermined. Countries in this group would generally offer mediation on their own, before they are asked by the conflicting parties. Potential mediator countries located in or proximity to instable regions such as the Middle East, Balkans, Africa, Southeast Asia and Pacific belong to this group (e.g. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Australia).

2) The conflict takes place in a faraway place but being involved in a conflict as a mediator and especially being successful in resolution will bring political prestige and increase the country's visibility. These countries have limited foreign policy agenda because of being located in a stable region. The region they are located in lacks any conflicts and these countries lack the capacity to become a regional hegemon. Their room for

maneuver is limited in their own region. They might behave in a more selective way while offering mediation. Mediation initiation is not motivated by concerns for national security and national interests (e.g. Norway and Canada).

3.6. CONCLUSION

In the light of the discussions above, it might be argued that a mid-power may serve as a mediator both as a power mediator and a neutral facilitator. It is easier for a mid-power to perform the role of power mediator if there is a power asymmetry between itself and the parties of the conflict, especially if they are relatively weak states. Even though it has limited sources to allocate in terms of development aid, credits, military aid and foreign direct investment, it can still offer incentives for the resolution of a conflict. It might also contribute to the implementation process of a settlement by providing peace-keeping forces or by applying sanctions to the violating party. If it wants to play the role of a neutral facilitator, in this case it should pay attention to being impartial. In addition to this limitation, mid-powers have to arrange their policies in parallel to their more-powerful allies and should try to get the consent of the other regional actors.

CHAPTER 4

4 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR: SEARCHING FOR A NEW ROLE IN WORLD POLITICS (1990-2002)

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will try to highlight the main principles of Turkish foreign policy and provide an introduction to its conduct starting from 1923. The economic and military capabilities will be mentioned in parallel to the developments both in domestic and external dimensions. By highlighting the foreign policy shift starting in the 1960s, it will help understanding the new approach of the 1990s. Systemic, regional and domestic level will be the main levels of analysis. In addition, Turkey's mediation attempts will receive further focus. It will try to show that foreign policy activism and involvement in the regions such as the Middle East and Balkans started with the détente and it increased in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War. While touching upon strengths of Turkey, it will also highlight the weaknesses of Turkey.

4.2. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Republic of Turkey replaced the Ottoman Empire following the First World War (1914-1918) and the Independence War (1919-1922). It took over a very underdeveloped industrial base and a limited amount of railway network. It was a

late-comer in the field of industrialization. In addition to the damage brought to the country's infrastructure due to the long wars, the already limited skilled human capital of the empire perished. To overcome this obstacle, the Republic tried to modernize the education system and sent skilled students to European universities for higher education in order to have experts and scholars in different areas. (see: (Şarman, 2005). It was vital for the incoming industrialization initiatives.

Between 1920 and 1930 a mixed economic policy with liberal tones was in force. However for major investments the state still played a vital role. The companies owned by foreign investors (coming from the Ottoman period such as the railway companies) were bought out in this period. In 1925 the tobacco monopoly (*Régie de Tabac*) was nationalized (Tekel). By the 1930s a total of 5,400 km. of railways were bought out from foreign companies. In addition new lines were being built. Between 1923 and 1929, 800 kilometers of railways were built while another 800 kilometers of track were under construction in 1929 (Zürcher, 2003, p. 195). Between 1923 and 1940, 3,208 kilometers of track was laid. The number of harbors connected to the railway network increased from 6 to 8. These developments would connect the areas rich with natural resources to production and consumption zones[41]. In this regard the coal line (between Irmak and Filyos, connecting the Ereğli coal basin to the network), the copper and cotton line (Adana-Fevzi Paşa-Diyarbakır) and iron line (Sivas-Çetinkaya) were built (TCDD, 2014).

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[41] Ereğli, a rich town with coal was connected to the railway network in 1935 (the Irmak-Filyos Line). Ereğli was the most important source of coal for the Ottoman Empire and the coal was shipped to Istanbul by sea. However during the First World War due to Russian naval preponderance this route was cut off and the Empire depended on coal (a train every week) coming from Germany (following Bulgaria's entry to war on the side of the Axis Powers) for running the trains and ships. This lack of transportation network left bitter memoires in the minds of military officers who formed the cadres of the Republic in the following decade.

To finance the economic development, establishment of national financial institutions were also important. The financial sector was at the hands of the British, French and German capital in the Ottoman Empire. In 1923, the Republic reorganized the Bank of Agriculture (Ziraat Bankası) that was established in 1863. In addition, the Business Bank (İş Bankası) was established in 1924 as the first national bank. Mustafa Kemal was among its shareholders and Celal Bayar[42] was its first general-manager.

In 1927, there were a total of 65,000 industrial firms employing 250,000 workers. However only 2822 of these firms used mechanical power. The majority of these firms were artisan shops. In 1927 the 'Law on the Encouragement of Industry-Teşvik-i Sanayii Kanunu' was passed and it provided tax exemptions to the new and expanding firms. However the lack of entrepreneurial know-how and a prosperous market prevented a quick expansion of the industrial sector. While attention was directed at the industrial sector, agriculture was not neglected. The agriculture sector witnessed a boom in the post-war period (90% between 1923 and 1926) and farmers were helped with the abolition of the tithe (*aşar vergisi*) (Zürcher, 2003, p. 196). Turkey's exports mainly consisted of tobacco, cotton, cereals, figs and grapes. The Republic also paid the Ottoman debt from 1929 to 1954. It was 962,635,916 French Francs (79,778,590 Turkish Liras in 1933). The payments constituted a big burden on the state budget (6,77 % in 1929 at its maximum) so it is seen as the 'century lasting yoke' as the Ottoman Empire received foreign debt for the first time in 1854 (Özdemir, 2009, p. 135). In sum, the Turkish economy grew at an annual average of 7.5% in the period between 1923 and 1929 (Utkulu, 2001, p. 11).

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[42] Minister of Economy (1932-1937), Prime Minister (1937-1939), President (1950-1960).

The Great Depression of 1929 necessitated a new approach to the economy. The private sector could not fully play the role expected from it due to lack of capital and know-how. The Great Depression hit the Turkish economy severely and caused catastrophic falls in the prices of agricultural commodities (Okyar, 1979, p. 327). In this regard a more interventionist policy, *étatism*, was employed to foster economic development. Textiles, food processing, mining, railways and iron-steel industry were chosen as the main areas of investment. The state-owned enterprises (kamu iktisâdî teşekkülleri) started to be established. Not only economic, but also strategic, cultural and other factors influenced the decisions. Economic nationalism and the will to establish a self-sufficient economy were a result of the Ottoman past. Writing in 1979 Osman Okyar emphasizes this point:

> Toward the turn of the twentieth century, feelings were that capitulations and the debts were instruments used by foreign powers to intervene in the affairs of the country. The foremost desire of all concerned with politics, Ottoman officials as well as reformers and nationalists, came to center on getting rid of these infringements of national sovereignty. This was achieved in 1923 in Lausanne, but the feelings of reserve, verging sometimes on open hostility toward foreign capital and credits, generated at the time, have not totally disappeared even today (Okyar, 1979, p. 330).

In this respect, Sümerbank was established in 1933. As a corporation it had a bank and various industrial facilities mostly in the textiles sector. The purpose was, rather than exporting cotton and wool to the countries like Britain and then importing textiles manufactures from them, to produce these goods inside the country in order to meet the domestic demand. Starting with 4 factories built in the Ottoman era in 1933, it had 58 factories in the following years (SÜMER HOLDING, 2014). These investments went hand in hand with the First Five Year Development Plan (Birinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı) that was accepted in 1934. The construction of the first steel-mill of Turkey, Karabük Demir-Çelik Fabrikası, began in 1937 and it was

operational in June 6, 1939 (KARDEMİR, 2014). Average annual industrial growth in the 1930s was about 10% and while the share of industry was 14% in 1929, it rose to 19% in 1939. The Second Plan which started to be implemented in 1939 was interrupted by the Second World War and resources were devoted to defense expenditures. Between 1940 and 1945 the average annual decrease in GNP was 6.3% (Utkulu, 2001, p. 2012).

Following the Second World War, Turkey found itself threatened by the Soviet Union and sided with the USA and its allies. After a long struggle it became a NATO member in 1952. It started to follow pro-American policies in many areas. With regards to the decolonization after the war, Turkey sided with its Western allies in the United Nations assuming that the newly established states would be Soviet satellites in the Middle East. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1948 in a period Israel's establishment created anti-Western sentiments in the Arab world. Turkey tried to play a leadership role in order to integrate the newly independent Arab regimes to the Western system and acted as a representative of the Western world (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004a, p. 615). In this regard it tried to form a bloc in the Middle East against a possible Soviet expansion. The Baghdad Pact signed on 24 February 1955 between Iraq and Turkey (later Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined but Iraq left in in 1958 with the Baathist military coup) was a visible example of the Democrat Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East. However this pro-Western activism harmed the relations of Turkey with the Arab World and especially with countries like Egypt and Syria where Baathism was on the rise (Bağcı, 2001). Turkey was surrounded with states such as Iraq and Syria that were mostly supported by the Soviet Union.

The 1960s had profound impact on Turkish foreign policy. As the first of all, changes on the global level, the détente process that emerged following the Cuban Missile Crisis, led to a rapprochement between the USA and the Soviet Union. It also led to a revival in the Turkish-Soviet relations which were almost frozen for nearly two decades. The first steps were taken even before the détente with the establishment of the new regime in Turkey following the military coup on 27 May 1960. In October 1960, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Selim Sarper, met Khruschev in New York. It was the highest level bilateral meeting since the meeting between Şükrü Saraçoğlu (Minister of Foreign Affairs 1938-1942, Prime Minister 1942-1946) and Joseph Stalin in 1939 (Tellal, 2004, p. 774). The removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey following the Cuban Crisis further contributed to the rapprochement. In November 1964, Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid an official visit to Moscow. It was the first visit at this level for the last 25 years (Tellal, 2004, p. 775). This improvement in the political field also influenced the economic relations. In March 1967, for seven industrial projects Turkey received US$ 200 million credit from the Soviet Union. It was followed by two further credits of US$ 288 million and US$ 700 million in 1972 and 1975 respectively. By the end of the 1970s Turkey was reported to have received more Soviet economic assistance than any other Third World country (Hale, 2002, p. 151).

Secondly, the emergence of the Cyprus Question as an issue of high priority in Turkish foreign policy necessitated some alterations. Turkey needed the support of Arab states in general and the non-aligned countries in the UN. Also the cadres of the new regime following the military coup against the Democrat Party were very critical of its foreign policy in the Middle East. The first signs of foreign policy reorientation came with a declaration of the National Union Committee on 16

September 1960 with regards to the independence of Algeria. It stated that Turkey would support any national independence movement and was especially in favor of the Algerians against the French. As known, a decade ago Turkey had supported France in the UN on the issue of Algerian independence. The next day, President Cemal Gürsel stated that Turkey as a country that had fought an independence war in the past would naturally support the Algerians. He further offered his service as a mediator between France and the Algerians while this initiative was accepted by the Algerians, no official reply came from France (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 786). Turkey refrained from intervening into the domestic affairs of the countries in the Middle East and considered incidents such as military coups domestic issues of states. This policy change did not bear fruits in the short period as the Arab states did not support Turkey's claims in the UN in 1965 (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 788). However Turkey increased its efforts especially during the Justice Party government headed by Süleyman Demirel. As a result bilateral contacts increased and new agreements were signed with countries such as Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In May 1967, Turkish ambassadors serving in the Middle Eastern capitals were invited to Ankara for a meeting where principles of Turkish foreign policy in the region were set. They were; a) Turkey should try to improve its relations on all areas with the Arab states, b) Turkey should refrain from interfering in the problems between the Arab countries and take side, c) Turkey should refrain from joining the regional agreements and organizations that would divide the Arabs (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 789).

This rapprochement process coincided with the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the establishment of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Turkey's position during the 1967 War was very different when compared to the war in 1956.

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil declared that the US bases in Turkey under no conditions could be used for supporting Israel's war aims and he protested Israel while Turkey provided humanitarian aid to the countries like Syria that suffered from the war. In the UN General Assembly, Çağlayangil gave a speech and criticized Israel. In addition, in contrast to its Western allies, Turkey voted in favor of the UN Resolution 242 that demanded from Israel to withdraw its forces to the pre-war borders. As a result, Arab countries, especially Egypt and Syria welcomed Turkey's new stance. In a similar way, during the uprisings in Jordan that was led by the Palestinians in 1970, Turkey denied access to the USA for the İncirlik military base (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 790).

According to Oral Sander, the main motivation beyond the normalization of the relations with the Arab states in the 1960s was, from Turkey's point of view, to receive support for the Cyprus Question. Economic concerns did not play a determining role. The improvement in economic relations was the result of the political rapprochement. However, following the Oil Crisis, the importance of economic factors increased. Turkey paid US$300 million in 1972 for importing oil but this amount rose to US$ 2 billion next year. The solution was to increase Turkey's exports to the Middle East. As a result, the share of exports to the European Economic Community (EEC), main trade partner of Turkey, started to decrease from 64% to 49% while Turkey's exports to the Middle East increased (Sander, 2000, p. 236).

In the early 1970s Turkey also witnessed the establishment of the OIC. Turkey was invited to the Rabat Summit in 1969 however this invitation created confusion and problems in Turkey. President Cevdet Sunay declared that as the head of a secular state he had no intention to participate in a summit which included

'Islam' in its title. He stated that it is the responsibility of the government whether to take part or not in the conference. Since the countries that organized the conference were Saudi Arabia and Jordan, countries regarded as the ultra-conservative and unprogressive by the Turkish elites, the conference was seen as an initiative to form an alternative block against the revolutionary Egypt under the rule of Nasser. Finally Prime Minister Demirel had to find a middle way and stated that though the conference had the word Islam in its name; it was convened to discuss issues of foreign policy. Taking part in it, according to him, would not contradict either the principle of secularism or Turkish foreign policy. At the Rabat Conference, Turkey was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Çağlayangil. There it was decided that minister of foreign affairs from the Muslim countries meet every year to discuss the new developments. It was the first step toward the establishment of the OIC. Another important decision was on the suspension of diplomatic relations with Israel. Turkey, along with Iran, refused to accept this decision. In conclusion, the members of the CENTO (it replaced the Baghdad Pact) were regarded as the representatives of the West in the eyes of many Arab states while in domestic politics Turkey's participation was heavily criticized by the opposition parties (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 792). As a result when the second conference convened in Jeddah in March 1970, Turkey was represented by the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkey presented a letter to the executive body of the conference and declared that it will accept the decisions of the conference as long as they do not contradict its constitution and its foreign policy. Still, the member countries welcomed Turkey's participation. Turkey's limited engagement with these countries started to bear fruits. In the Lusake Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab states refused the suggestions of Makarios III (President of Republic of Cyprus) with

regards to the Cyprus Question and they demanded that the rights of the Turkish Cypriots should be protected. When the OIC's covenant was opened for signature in the Jeddah Summit in 1972, Turkey refrained from signing it. Yet it was a participant in the meetings. In 1975, Turkey for the first time since 1969 was represented at the ministerial level in the Jeddah Conference. A delegation of Turkish Cypriots headed by Rauf Denktaş was also invited to the conference in the 'guest' status. He gave a speech and at the final communiqué of the conference, points similar to Turkey's arguments were mentioned. While it was a hotly debated topic a few years ago, in 1975 Turkey's participation started to be seen as an ordinary issue in domestic politics. The Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers took place in Istanbul in 1976 and President Fahri Korutürk sent a message to the meeting while Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel gave a speech as the host. It was stated that Turkey would support the Arabs with regards to the Palestinian Question (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 794)

In other fields, the multi-dimensional foreign policy of the Justice Party (headed by Süleyman Demirel) were left during the government of technocrats (headed by Nihat Erim) installed by the military following the 12 March 1971 intervention. The new government started to follow a more Washington-oriented foreign policy and accepted to ban the cultivation of opium in Turkey at the US request. However with the normalization of the domestic politics in October 1973, Turkey returned to the multi-dimensional foreign policy both under the coalitions headed by Bülent Ecevit and Nationalist Front Coalitions (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 794). For this reason, the period between 1960 and 1980 is also named as 'partial disengagement' (Hale, 2002, p. 148).

Thirdly, the problems with the USA over the issues such as Cyprus Question, opium cultivation and military bases in Turkey forced Turkey to follow a less pro-American foreign policy. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Turkey was never consulted when it was decided to withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. It was realized that the US may sacrifice the security of its allies for its own interests. As Turan Yavuz named his book *An Ally for Sale (Satılık Müttefik)* and investigated the issue, the crisis caused concerns about the US commitments among the Turkish foreign policy and military elites (Yavuz, 1999)[43]. Not surprisingly, after the details about the Cuban Crisis became public, France under de Gaulle decided to withdraw France from NATO's unified command structure in 1966 (After that decision NATO had to move its headquarters from Paris to Mons in Belgium).

In the April of 1963, Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey and instead Polaris type submarines capable of launching nuclear missiles were deployed in the East Mediterranean. Turkish public opinion believed that the Jupiter missiles were removed not because they were outdated; but as a result of a bargaining process between the USA and USSR. Eight years after the Cuban Crisis, in 1970, in a speech he gave at the Parliament, İsmet İnönü (he had served as prime minister in 1962) showed the signs of mistrust against the US:

> The Americans had told us that the Jupiters were outdated and it was the reason for their removal. Polaris submarines would replace them. However we later found out that, they had bargained with the Soviets. This incident showed us that today the Turkish statesmen must be very careful and not let the USA to drag Turkey into an unpleasant crisis (Erhan, 2004, p. 685).

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[43] In the minutes of a meeting between President Kennedy and his secretaries, the sacrifice of Turkey is seen very well. Kennedy instructed Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense) to issue orders to the US command in Turkey with regards to the use of nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey. It stated that in the case of a nuclear attack against Turkey, they would not retaliate with the nuclear weapons. In addition, if Turkish officers in the bases try to get control of the nuclear missiles in the case of a nuclear war, the US officers were ordered to destroy the missiles. For details see: (Yavuz, 1999)

Another point of concern in the Turkish-American relations was the flexible response strategy that replaced the massive retaliation strategy in the 1960s. This new strategy, in the case of war with the Soviet Union, would lead to the sacrifice of Turkish territory by NATO in order to gain time (Hale, 2002, p. 146). However the Turkish-American disagreement over Cyprus was probably the biggest problem in the bilateral relations. Turkey decided to intervene in Cyprus by using military force. In June 1964, the US President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü. Known as the 'Johnson Letter', it became public in the daily *Hürriyet* on 13 January 1966. In the letter President Johnson stated that the military equipment given to Turkey by the USA cannot be used for other purposes without the consent of the USA. Another point that created disappointment and dissent in the Turkish public, led to the questioning of NATO membership in Turkey. President Johnson argued that in the case of an attack against Turkey by the Soviet Union, NATO members would not have the opportunity to consult each other if they have the responsibility to protect Turkey. He implied that the Fifth Article of NATO Treaty may not come into force in that case and Turkey would have the face the Soviets alone (Erhan, 2004, pp. 686-687). As a result of the letter, the view that Turkey should leave NATO because it does not guarantee Turkey's security, started to find large group of supporters as it had never done before. Secondly, it was a milestone in the transition to multidimensional foreign policy in Turkey. Turkey started increase the level of diplomatic and economic relations with the USSR and the Third World countries. Thirdly, Turkey refrained from being a supporter of all US policies. In the UN General Assembly in 1965, it voted against the military intervention of the USA in Vietnam. As opposition grew against the US military presence in Turkey, former bilateral treaties were revised upon Turkey's request and

the Joint Defense Agreement was signed in 1969 and it limited the legal privileges of the US personnel in Turkey and restricted the use of military bases and put them under a more strict control of Turkey (Erhan, 2004, pp. 689-690,697-699). Turkey also did not support the new initiatives in NATO. After sending naval officers to the *USS Rickets* battleship under the framework of Multilateral Force (MLF) in early 1964, following the Johnson Letter, it called them back in January1965 (Erhan, 2004, pp. 691-692). One of the most important results of the Johnson Letter was on the Turkish defense industry and arms procurement processes. Turkey was almost totally dependent on the USA for military equipment. Seeing this source of weakness, Turkey wanted to differentiate its arms providers (though in a very limited way). It also started to develop its own defense industry. In order to allow a landing on Cyprus, landing ships started to be constructed. Turkey also established a marine battalion in 1966 in Gölcük/İzmit to fulfill amphibious landing tasks[44] and the First Commando Brigade (paratrooper, deployed in Talas/Kayseri) and Second Commando Brigade (airborne, deployed in Bolu) were established in 1965 as elite units[45].

The 1970s witnessed important developments in the Middle East. While Iraq and Syria (both neighbors of Turkey) started to improve their relations with the Soviet Union (a development that alerted Turkey, Iran and Israel), Egypt under the rule of Anvar Sadat switched to the other side. He sent the Soviet military personnel and experts back and shut down the Soviet military bases. This allowed Turkey to improve its relations with Egypt which was its main rival under the rule of

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[44] In 1971 its headquarters was moved to Mersin and in 1973 another battalion was established. On 18 April 1974, it became a regiment. In 1974 two battalions were added to it. In 1977 its headquarters were transferred to Foça/İzmir where it is today. On 26 October 1994 its status rose to brigade and it was always deployed in peacekeeping operations abroad.

[45] As a paratrooper unit, the First Commando Brigade was the first unit to land on Cyprus on 29 July 1974. It was followed by the Marines. The Second Commando Brigade was transferred by helicopters to the battle zone.

Abdelnasser. In the Middle East, Turkey started to follow a more pro-Arab policy especially with regards to the Palestine Question. In the Arab-Israeli War that started on October 6, 1973, it opened its airspace to the Soviet aircraft that carried military aid to the Arab states while not allowing the US to use the Incirlik Air Base in order to support Israel. The pro-Arab stance was also a result of the oil embargo that started in 1973. Due to the pro-Arab policy of Turkey, the OPEC countries declared on 20 November 1973 that Turkey would be exempted from the embargo (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 795).

The Turkish-American relations started to deteriorate even deeper after the 1973 elections in Turkey. The new coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit and Necmeddin Erbakan cancelled the law that illegalized opium cultivation in Turkey on 1 July 1974. The US had promised to pay US$ 30 million in order to compensate for the losses of peasants that worked in the opium sector and Turkey had illegalized its cultivation in July 1971. However the US paid only one third of the promised amount and this caused economic losses for about 100,000 families. In reaction to Turkey's decision on opium, the US Congress voted in favor of suspending credits and military aid to Turkey on 2 July 1974 (Erhan, 2004, p. 703). Turkey's military operation in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 caused the greatest crisis on Turkish-American relations. The Congress put enormous pressure on the Ford Administration. Even though both President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger opposed the decision with regards to an arms embargo against Turkey and suspension of economic and military aid, they had to give in. As a result, the embargo came into force on 5 February 1975. This decision provoked the Demirel Government and the Turkish public opinion. It also created disagreements between the House of Representatives and the Senate in the USA. Due to the Ford Administration's failure

to convince the House of Representatives, Turkey on 25 July 1975 terminated the Joint Defense Agreement which led to the shutting down of all US bases in Turkey except İncirlik (it was allocated for NATO use) (Erhan, 2004, pp. 706-707). Due to Turkey's decision to shut down all US bases, the US was unable to monitor Soviet troop movements and missile and underground nuclear tests in the southern parts of the Soviet Union. The embargo became harmful for the both sides and finally in August 1978 it was completely lifted (Hale, 2002, p. 161).

Bülent Ecevit talked about a new National Defense Doctrine after he came to government following the elections in 1978. He argued that Turkey was shouldering an unfairly large burden within NATO and was over dependent on the United States. Accordingly, it should slim down its forces; develop its own defense industries and "establish an atmosphere of mutual confidence in our relations with the neighboring countries" (Hale, 2002, p. 162). In this period, under the leadership of Gündüz Ökçün, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Turkey tried to increase its international standing by founding new diplomatic missions in different countries and Turkey also started to provide development aid to underdeveloped countries. However due to increasing economic problems, Turkey had to suspend these activities and shut down some diplomatic missions. It caused disappointment and loss of prestige abroad (Oran, 2013, p. 213).

As a result of pro-Arab policy of Turkey, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was recognized by Turkey in January 1975 as the sole representative of the Palestinians. The PLO was allowed to have an office in Ankara and it was opened on 5 October 1979 with the participation of Yasser Arafat. Though Turkey started to follow a pro-Arab policy in the Middle East, one should not forget that Turkey never made concessions that violated its main foreign policy principles.

Contrary to the calls from many Arab states, it never severed its diplomatic ties with Israel and following the Camp David Accords when many Arab states severed diplomatic ties with Egypt, Turkey stated that it supported the peace process (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004b, p. 796). Turkey showed its protest against Israel by lowering the level of its diplomatic mission, for many years Turkey was represented at the level of *charge d'affaire* in Telaviv (Erhan & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004, p. 798).

At the end of the 1970s, Turkey witnessed domestic instability and terrorism due to the polarization of the society along the left and right wing political views. Following the 1960 military coup, the newly promulgated Constitution (1961) paved the way for plurality in politics. Workers and students became the dynamic force behind the public opinion (Oran, 2004b, p. 669) Foreign policy became a hot topic for the public and in the issues like Cyprus, Palestine and the relations with the US it became very influential. In the field of economy, with the establishment of State Planning Agency (DPT) with the 1961 Constitution, import substitution model was accepted. However, Turkey's industrialization was not supported by its Western allies. From 1967 on, Turkey started to improve its economic relations with the Soviet Union. Its share rose to %6 in export and import (it was almost ignorable in Turkey's trade before). The US refused to provide credits for industrialization efforts of Turkey while the Soviets provided long-term credits with low interest rates. Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister in 1967, explains the situation in the following way many years later:

> The West did not want industrialization of Turkey or did not see that possible. They suggested us agriculture and […] light industry and they did not welcome heavy industry and other branches of industry. We started negotiations with the Soviets and started building the industrial facilities. They [the US] were disturbed from this development too. […] In 1967 the US Ambassador came to my office to visit me. The incident is still in my eyes.

He entered the room and before taking seat he asked 'Are you shifting axis?' (Oran, 2004b, p. 676).

Turkey's economy started to boom in the 1960s as a result of the industrialization efforts. The GDP started to increase. It was US$ 5,479.6 million in 1961 and reached 81,696.2 in 1979. Inflation was single-digit up to 1971, a situation not witnessed since the start of the Second World War. However since the import substitution policy necessitated imports of equipment, foreign debt started to increase. The foreign currency stock provided by the Turkish guest-workers in Western countries also helped Turkey financing its debt. Its amount was half of Turkey's exports in 1970-1971 and 90% in 1973. However Turkish economy was vulnerable to foreign shocks and the Oil Crisis of 1973 hit it hard. Due to increasing oil prices, Turkey's oil consumption constituted 49.1% of Turkey's export income. The economic situation started to get worse and Turkey witnessed high inflation and increasing foreign debt in the second half of the 1970s. The inflation rose to 107.2% in 1980. Shortages in consumption goods led to the emergence of black-market (Oran, 2004b, p. 662).

At the end of the 1970s, another set of important developments took place in the Middle East. The most important one was the Islamic Revolution in Iran that occurred in 1979. As Iran was a key ally of the USA in the region, its loss increased the strategic importance of Turkey. The new regime in Iran severed its diplomatic ties with the US while it also retained the diplomatic personnel in the US embassy in Tehran as hostages. In the early months of 1980, the Carter Administration demanded from the US allies to suspend diplomatic and economic relations with Iran. Dependent on the oil coming from Iran, Turkey refrained from applying sanctions to Iran. Turkey also did not let the US to use the Incirlik Air Base for an

operation against Iran to rescue the hostages from the US embassy in Tehran. Instead, Turkey offered its mediation in the crisis but the US did not welcome this initiative and started to question Turkey's reliability as an ally (Erhan, 2004, pp. 714-715). Still, Turkey continued to be a key ally, especially after the fall of pro-American regime in Iran.

Another development showed the importance of NATO as a source of security to the Turkish public and elites though sometimes problems emerged with the USA in bilateral relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved that the Soviets may still pose a threat to its neighbors, especially if it is a weaker state. It is possible to make a list of the important issues in Turkish foreign policy agenda in the 1980s.

a) Due to the increasing tension between the USA and USSR, Turkey's situation became more sensitive as this period is also named as "the Second Cold War". Security again became a paramount priority for Turkey and cooperation with the US more important,

b) Following the military coup, Turkey has been criticized by its Western (European states more than the USA) because of human rights abuses. Turkey felt isolated and in order to overcome this isolation it tried to increase its relations with countries that would not mind the military rule such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan[46] and Iran,

c) Problems with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea continued to influence Turkish foreign policy,

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[46] President Kenan Evren had developed very friendly relations with the Pakistani President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the military general who organized a coup in 1977 against Zulfiqar Butto. Evren called him as "my brother". When he died as a result of sabotage on his plane, on 17 August 1988, Kenan Evren explained his sadness and the TRT (State Radio and Television) changed its programs to reflect the mourning for him (Milliyet, 1988).

d) The regime change in Iran,

e) Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988),

f) Emergence of the PKK terrorism

g) Problems with Bulgaria over the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.

The deteriorating economic conditions inside the country in addition to the domestic political problems necessitated a new stand-by agreement with the IMF. It was signed on 10 July 1979 and the Turkish Lira was devaluated (1 US$=40 TL). The government of Süleyman Demirel started to apply a new economic program based on neo-liberal principles. It was the end of the state planned and mixed economic model based on import substitution industrialization. Known as the 24 January Decisions (24 Ocak Kararları, 1980), the new economic program liberated economy, decreased state control over it and wanted to integrate Turkey to the world economy by following an export-oriented development model. The package was prepared by Turgut Özal who was the Undersecretary for the Office of Prime Minister (Başbakanlık Müsteşarı) and had worked in the State Planning Agency as an engineer. It brought a great burden on the low-income groups however the military coup of 12 September 1980, a few months after it, avoided any social reaction by its strict rule (Oran, 2004b, p. 668).

The fall of the Shah regime in Iran changed the regional dynamics. With the revolution and ideological shift, Iran almost became antithesis of Turkey, which was once, like Turkey, a Western oriented state and ally of the USA. However Turkey and Iran managed to find a middle-way. In 1979 the Ecevit Government recognized the new regime (Ecevit had negative views about the Shah regime) and opposed any

foreign intervention. Turkey was afraid that if the internal instability continues, Iran would fall prey to the Soviet intervention, as it did in the 1920s and after 1945. In addition, this instability could provide a fertile ground for the Kurdish separatist movements and threaten Turkey. In July 1979 Gündüz Ökçün (MFA in the Ecevit Government) paid an official visit to and an agreement on oil export from Iran to Turkey was signed. Ökçün also had an interview with Khomeini. In November 1979 there were signs of deterioration in the relations. That month the Hostage Crisis took place while also in Turkey Süleyman Demirel came to power. According to Demirel, the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran was "a rare and inhuman action in history". The reply came from Khomeini; he stated that "the government in Ankara, just like the toppled Shah regime, survives only with the help of bayonets". Still the Justice Party government did not want to harm the relations and denied access to the military bases for an operation against in Iran by the US (Akdevelioğlu & Kürkçüoğlu, 2004, p. 806). In 1980, Iran and Iraq started to fight a war that would last 8 years. In this climate, both Turkey and Iran needed each other and this was the main motivation for improving bilateral relations. For Turkey, Iran was a provider of oil and a market for its exports and for Iran, Turkey was a neutral country providing vital corridor for its survival. As a result of this interdependence, economic relations improved and reached the level of US$ 2 billion in 1985 (Çetinsaya, 2008, p. 337). During the war, two points concerned Turkey. The first one was Iran's support to the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq and especially to PKK that started terrorist attacks against Turkey in 1984. PKK had safe-havens in northern Iraq near the Turkish border. Against this common threat, Turkey and Iraq signed a treaty in 1984 which allowed Turkey to conduct hot pursuit operations against the terrorist groups in the Iraqi territory. Turkey wanted to make a similar agreement with Iran too but

Iran refused. Iran also claimed that agreement between Turkey and Iraq was against the principle of neutrality because Turkey's operations would strengthen the government in Baghdad. Still, Iran agreed to sign an agreement in which it undertook not to allow the PKK terrorists to use Iranian territory. Second concern was on the conduct of the war. The Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline could become a target for Iran. In the same way, the railway connecting Turkey and Iran could become a target for Iraq. Any sabotage attempt would damage Turkey's trade. Fortunately, both states refrained from attacking these strategic corridors (Akdevelioğlu & Kürkçüoğlu, 2005, pp. 153-154).

With the end of the military rule, Turgut Özal came to power in 1983. His term in office was marked by neo-realist economic policies and pro-American approach in foreign relations. His approach to foreign policy has been heavily criticized and sometimes he made serious gaffs and caused problems to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He tried to decrease the domestic demand and in order to succeed in that huge price increases and devaluations took place. As a result imported goods became very expensive. In addition, real wages went down, it was half of the 1977 values in 1983. The Özal Governments tried to encourage exports. In this regard, state provided incentives for exports while devaluations made Turkish goods cheaper abroad. The result was a boom in exports; it was US$ 4.7 billion in 1981 and 12.9 billion in 1990. However, as a result of the liberalization imports grew faster than the exports and it caused deficit in foreign trade and a source of weakness for Turkey (imports was US$8.9 billion in 1981 and US$ 22.3 billion in 1991). From 1981 to 1990 GDP more than doubled, rose from US$ 72 billion to 152 billion. However debt stock also increased dramatically, it rose from US$16 billion in 1981 to 49 billion in 1990 (Oran, 2005a, pp. 25-26) With regards to foreign policy, Özal was

often criticized. For some observers, Özal's policies diverged from the traditional foreign policy principles and caused great harm to Turkey. The criticisms can be summed up as the following:

a) The rapid liberalization of the economy, without bringing any control measures, unlike countries such as South Korea and Singapore, made Turkey heavily dependent and indirectly weakened its foreign policy.

b) Turgut Özal believed that if trade relations are established with a country, the problems in the field of politics would be solved easily. Especially with Greece and with some Middle East countries with which Turkey has a long history of problems, this policy did not work.

c) He was personally interested in foreign policy and dealt with it personally. He many times bypassed the bureaucratic establishment. He established the Ministry of Treasury and Foreign Trade and tried to weaken the Ministry of Finance, one of the key actors in the bureaucracy traditionally. Bypassing the bureaucracy and acting without consulting or even informing them caused serious problems and confusing policies. In sum the bureaucracy and the government could not cooperate effectively. Also this conflict was not limited to the bureaucracy. Inside his cabinet too he had problems. Ali Bozer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had to resign after Özal did not let him in during an official meeting with President Bush, while the his counterpart the US Secretary of State James Baker was present during the meeting. During the crisis with Bulgaria, though he encouraged the exodus of Turks in Bulgaria to Turkey, Mesut Yılmaz was seen responsible for this tragedy according to him. During the Gulf War, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Spokesperson for the Ministry

were informed by the journalists that Turkey had closed the oil pipeline between Turkey and Iraq. He thought he can solve the Palestine Question by providing water to Palestine and Israel and to other Arab countries (the well-known Water for Peace Project-Barış Suyu Projesi). When he proposed the project, it was seen that there was no preparatory study of the technical side of it. Further, it caused criticisms from Syria and Iraq (Oran, 2005a, pp. 28-29)

For Mehmet Gönlübol, the Turkish foreign policy of the 1980s was 'arabesque' in nature. With the increasing economic and political relations with the Arab countries, criticism against Turkey in the West following the military coup of 1980 and the ensuing sense of isolation in addition to the domestic factors such as increasing conservatism, "the Turkish foreign policy started to show the traces of Islamism in an unseen level before in the Republican period" (Gönlübol, 1996, p. 629).

From another point of view, it is argued that Turgut Özal had a great vision; he transformed Turkey, its foreign policy culture and economy and integrated Turkey to the world. As he once stated "[We] should make a synthesis from the science and technology of the West and the belief and value systems of the Middle East; then present it to the service of humanity" (quot. in (Demiray, 2008, p. 260). In his vision, Turkey was "a country surrounded by conflicts" and Turkey "should be able to produce political, rather than military solutions, contribute to the solution of conflicts by the way of negotiations, a powerful, influential and wise state" (quot. in. (Demiray, 2008, p. 274) He was seen as neo-Ottomanist because he wanted to increase Turkey's influence in the regions surrounding it, especially in the former

Ottoman territories. He envisioned Turkey to become a source of attraction for other countries surrounding it, a central state. For this reason he welcomed the end of the Cold War with great enthusiasm and saw it as the biggest opportunity for Turkey in the last 400 years. For Turkey, he stated, "the gates of wishes are opening (hâcet kapıları açılıyor)" so it could bring the region stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia under its political, economic and cultural influence (Demiray, 2008, p. 278).

As a neutral country and neighbor, Turkey became a very important trade partner both for Iran and Iraq during the war. Turkey tried to use its neutral status to end the war. In 1984, during an official visit to Iran, Prime Minister Turgut Özal offered to mediate between the two countries. However, Iran refused the mediation offer (Demiray, 2008, p. 269).

With the Gulf countries Turkey improved its relations in this period. King Haleed of Saudi Arabia was among the first heads of state that sent a proclamation message to General Kenan Evren after the coup. Kenan Evren visited Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Between 1980 and 1983, Turkey, Saudia Arabia and Kuwait decided to cooperate in the fields of military training, arms trade and joint investment. With an agreement signed during Evren's visit to Saudi Arabia, both countries agreed to exchange military officers, experts and students. Turkish experts would train Saudi officers and modernize military facilities. Soon, pilots from the Turkish Air Force (TAIF) were sent to Saudi Arabia to train pilots. A similar agreement was signed with Kuwait too. Iran, Greece and the USSR were disturbed from this military cooperation. Following the elections, the Özal Government followed the same policy and also tried to bring the Gulf capital to Turkey by promulgating new laws to enable foreigners buy property and establish financial institutions in Turkey (later the

Supreme Court ruled out the law with regards to buying property) (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2005a, pp. 125-126).

Turkey's activism in the Middle East was also reflected in the OIC summits. Though Turkey never became a de jure member of the OIC since Turkish Parliament never ratified its charter, Turkey started to use this forum more often in the 1980s (Hale, 2002, p. 171). In the OIC summit that took place in 1981, Turkey was for the first time represented by its prime minister, Bülent Ulusu. In this summit, the Turkish Cypriot delegation headed by Rauf Denktaş was given an official status as the representative of the Cyprus Turkish Federate State. In the Casablanca Summit (1984) for the first time Turkey was represented by its president. Kenan Evren[47] was also elected as the Deputy Chairman of the conference (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2005a, pp. 127-128). According to William Hale, the success of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East in this period was a result of the following strategies:

> Essentially, Turkish foreign policy towards the region tried to uncouple its regional policy from its alliance with the Western powers as far as possible, and to build up bilateral rather than multi-lateral linkages with the main states in the region. Above all, Turkish policy sought to avoid taking sides in regional disputes, either between states or within them" (Hale, 2002, p. 170)

In the same period, the Turkish-Syrian relations started to deteriorate. Syria's territorial claims against Turkey (Hatay or Alexandretta province) and trans-border rivers had already complicated the relations. In addition, Syria provided a solid support to PKK. Its leader was given shelter in Syria and it had training camps in the Syrian controlled Lebanon (Hale, 2002, p. 173). The cold relations between Syria

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[47] Kenan Evren often referenced to the religious sources in his speeches. He also paid a visit to Mecca for *umrah* in 1984 during his term in office. He made it known publicly. Even though for many he is the first president who performed *umrah*, actually he is not. President Cevdet Sunay (1966-1973) also performed *umrah* in 1973. However it is claimed that he requested from the Saudi officials to destroy the photographs showing him wearing *ehram*. Prime ministers Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan and Turgut Özal also performed *umrah* during their tenure at the office. Umrah is different from hajj, for his reason Abdullah Gül is the first president who fulfilled the hajj duty while in office (2013).

and Turkey were the most important factor for the improvement of relations between Turkey and Israel. In the UN, Turkey abstained from a resolution that protested Israel's invasion of the Golan Heights in 1981. However Israel's invasion of Lebanon caused strong reaction in Ankara. Yet, this unwelcome event fostered the relations. Lebanon was a safe-haven for Armenian terrorist organizations such as Armeé Secréte Arménien pour la Libération de l'Arménie (ASALA) and Justice Commandos for the Genocide of Armenians (JCGA). Both organizations targeted Turkish diplomats abroad since the 1970s. Upon its invasion of Lebanon, Israel secretly informed Turkey and offered cooperation. As a result, Turkish and Israeli operation teams destroyed the terrorist camps[48]. The leader of the JCGA, Agop Ahcıyan, was also killed during the operation. However, the beginning of the *Intifada* in 1987, establishment of the Palestinian state in 1988 and Turkey's recognition of the new state, avoided further improvement in the Turkish-Israeli relations (Erhan & Kürkçüoğlu, 2005, pp. 150-151).

In the Turkish-Iranian relations, the differences that always existed started to have more influence in the second half of the 1980s. Ideological problems played a great role. In 1985 during an official visit to Ankara, Husayn Mir Musavi (Prime Minister) refused to visit Anıtkabir which is always included in the diplomatic programs. Turgut Özal, aware that Turkey's trade volume with Iran reached the level of US$ 3.5 billion, accepted this demand. The opposition parties and the press criticized this concession (Demiray, 2008, p. 280). During the war, both Turkey and

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[48] Erkan Gürvit, Kenan Evren's son in law and Şenay Gürvit, Evren's daugther, worked for the National Intelligence Agency (MİT). Erkan Gürvit interrogated the Armenian terrorist Levon Ekmekçiyan who was caught alive following the terrorist attack at the Esenboğa Airport. Şenay Gürvit was responsible for the External Operations Section and she organized the transfer of a team headed by Hiram Abas to Lebanon for special operations. It is also claimed that in France too they organized some covert operations. In 2004, Evren confirmed that both worked for the MİT but he stated that he did not know whether they took part in the operations against ASALA or not. (Sabah, 2004)

Iran tried to harness their ideological confrontations and kept it at a manageable level. However when the war ended in August 1988, the suppressed problems started to reassert themselves. According to Gökhan Çetinsaya, the period between the summer of 1988 and 1989 maybe named as the 'longest year' in Turkish-Iranian relations. The ambassador of Iran in Ankara left Turkey as a result of the crisis. However with the death of Khomeini in June 1989 and election of Hashemi Rafsanjani, who followed a more pragmatic approach, avoided further crisis (Çetinsaya, 2008, p. 338). The reason of the crisis was that the Iran Embassy in Ankara refused to half-mast its flag on 10th of November. The crisis was more than a fight between the media of both countries. President Kenan Evren heavily criticized Khomeini for his words against Atatürk. He said "who are you and how you dare to talk about Atatürk like this? You destroyed Iran. You will take your place in history as the leader who brought his country centuries back." For his words, in the Iranian media Evren was considered to be like Salman Rushdie. In addition it was argued that for the purpose of 'regime export' Iran was supporting the radical Islamist groups in Turkey[49]. With Rafsanjani in power, the embassy in Ankara lowered its flat to half-mast and the newly appointed Ambassador M. Bagheri paid a visit to Anıtkabir. However the trade between Iran and Turkey decreased dramatically following the end of the Iran-Iraq War. (Akdevelioğlu & Kürkçüoğlu, 2005, p. 157).

In the Balkans, Turkey also faced important developments in the Cold War era. Turkey had three important objectives in the Balkans. a) The Balkans constitutes the main route to Europe. Turkey's trade partners have been European states. For this reason, the stability of the Balkans is very important for Turkey to keep that trade

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[49] In 2008, Kenan Evren shared his views on the headscarf (*türban*) issue. He said: "Where this *türban* came from? It is all because of Khomeini who came to power in Iran first. After 1979, by spending lots of money, Khomeini also dragged young girls in Turkey to this way. This still goes on. Seems we want to become like Iran. We get rid of this *inshallah"* (CNNTurk.com, 2008)

route open. As its neighbors, Bulgaria and Greece have the potential to block this route. As a result, Turkey always had concerns about a possible Bulgarian-Greek alliance. b) The Turkish Thrace or European Turkey constitutes about 5% of total Turkish territory. While it is one of the most populated areas and close to industrial zones and vital for the defense of Istanbul and the Straits, its hinterland is very limited and it lack geographical depth. The lack of any large rivers or mountain chains and the flat character of the region make it vulnerable to any attack and once a defense line is penetrated it is hard to stop the enemy forces as the example of approaching Bulgarian forces to Çatalca (approximately 30 km. to the city center) during the First Balkan War (1912) shows.[50] So for Turkey, it was important to avoid a Greek-Bulgarian military alliance. As the relations with Greece were already hostile, Turkey tried keeping Bulgaria always neutral. c) The presence of Turkish and Muslim minority groups in the Balkans and a Balkan lobby inside Turkey, forces Turkey to act on behalf of these groups when they face discrimination or violence (Uzgel, 2005a, p. 171).

With the establishment of the communist regimes in the Balkans and deterioration of relations with the USSR, Turkey faced also a military threat from the Balkans. The split between Stalin and Tito in the late 1940s and Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform, created hopes for the establishment of a defensive axis in the Balkans: the Ankara-Athens-Belgrade axis. With the US support, the Balkan Pact was established in 1953. The next year it was transformed into Balkan Alliance based on joint defense against military threats. However it was the Soviet threat that motivated Tito to enter this alliance. With the death of Stalin in 1953, the

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[50] During the Second World War, the hastily built Çatalca Line or as also known the Çakmak Line (named after Field Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, the Chief of the General Staff) constituted the last line of fortifications against a possible German attack. Some of the concrete bunkers can still be seen today.

Soviet-Yugoslav relations started to improve and in 1955 the Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin and the Secretary General of the Communist Party Khrushchev paid a visit to Belgrade. In addition, due to the Cyprus Question starting from 1955 on, the Turkish-Greek relations deteriorated and the atmosphere of friendship that paved the way for the Balkan Alliance was lost. In a few years, this initiative failed totally (Fırat, 2004, pp. 588-591).

In the following decades, Turkey's relations with the Balkan countries remained at a limited level. With Greece due to the Cyprus Question the relations were already hostile. Turkey started to develop friendly relations with the Balkan countries in the 1970s. The Cyrpus Question played an import role in this decision. Especially Bülent Ecevit governments supported this policy and when he came to office in 1978 his first official visit was to Yugoslavia (Uzgel, 2005a, p. 175). However in the 1980s Turkey faced another challenge in the Balkans. Bulgaria under Zhivkov's rule started a campaign to assimilate the Turkish minority in Bulgaria (approximately 10% of the total population). It alerted the Turkish public. Due to the public pressure, the Özal Government gave a note to Bulgaria in March 1985 and demanded negotiations with regards to the problems of Turkish minority. At the same time Turkey tried to get the attention of the international community on the issue. At this stage, Turkey demanded that Bulgaria should allow the Turkish population to leave Bulgaria for Turkey. In 1989, the Zhivkov regime decided to expel Turks *en masse* and during June-August 1989, 312,000 people fled to Turkey (Hale, 2002, p. 169). Though Turgut Özal once stated "let everyone come, Zhivkov may come too", Turkey started to impose visa on entry to Turkey to stop the massive flow of the refugees. In the demonstrations slogans such as "Army to Sofia" were heard. During this crisis, another fear increased Turkey's concerns. The Greek-

Bulgarian rapprochement that led to the signing of Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1986 was seen as an alliance against Turkey. Greece was also supportive of Bulgaria's policies against the Turkish minority (Uzgel, 2005a, pp. 179-180). Fortunately the crisis ended with the fall of Zhivkov regime in November 1989 (Hale, 2002, p. 169).

The 1980s was also a period for strengthening the Turkish defense industries. In fact, following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, both state and private enterprises were established. In 1921, during the war to meet the need for ammunition and to repair guns and artillery pieces, the General Directorate of Military Factories was established. At the end of the 1920s new factories were established in Kırıkkale. Turkey produced German Gewehr 98 (G-98) which was also used in the Ottoman Army. This Mauser rifle was also named as Kırıkkale Rifle in public. In 1938 instead of 8 mm., 7,62 mm barrel size was chosen for the new model. It was known as T-1938 or Kırıkkale 38. It was the main infantry rifle until the 1950s (MKEK, 2014). Zümrezade Ahmet Şakir or as he is known in the Republican era, Şakir Zümre established the first private arms company in Turkey in 1925. His factory located at the coast of the Golden Horn produced hand grenades, artillery ammunition, bombs for aircraft, torpedoes and depth charges against submarines. His company exported to Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. In 1937 he sold armaments to Greece worth of TL 1.5 million and it was greeted in the newspapers as the 'great success of our defense industry' (Oral, 2012). Another important businessman was Nuri Killigil or as he was widely known Nuri Pasha. He was the brother of Enver Pasha and he had liberated Azerbaijan during the First World War. He established a factory at the coast of Golden Horn ad produced military equipment in 1938. During the Second World War, he was pro-German and

in touch with the Germans as a supporter of Pan-Turkism. He designed the first Turkish gun a 9 mm. pistol (known as the Nuri Paşa Tabancası-Nuri Pasha Pistol)[51] and started to produce artillery ammunition. His factory received orders from Syria and Egypt following the war. On 2 March 1949 an explosion killed him and other 27 people in his factory. Rumors surrounded the event; it was thought to be a result of sabotage (Karaköse, 2012). Another businessman was Nuri Demirağ. A banker and later a civil servant in the Ministry of Finance, he became a famous businessman in the 1920s. He was the most important person in the Turkish railway boom of the interwar era and his surname Demirağ was given by Atatürk. In 1931 he suggested to build a bridge over the Bosphorus and four years later he presented to Atatürk. Accepted by Atatürk, it was rejected by the government due to financial problems. In 1936 he started to build his aircraft factory in Beşiktaş. He produced Nu. D.-36 and this model entered into service same year (decommissioned in 1942). In 1938, his factory produced Nu. D. 38 (it carried 6 passengers and could also be used as a bomber) and it started commercial flights between Istanbul and Ankara. The Turkish Aviation Institution (THK) ordered 65 planes. He bought a farm in Yeşilköy and established an aviation school (Gök Okulu) and built airfield and hangars. Denmark also ordered planes but the government forbade selling of arms to other countries. In addition, the THK cancelled its orders. In 1944, his aviation school and airfield was confiscated by the state. Today, it is the Atatürk Airport. In 1945 he founded the National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) but his party was not successful in the elections (www.nuridemirag.com, 2014) (Dervişoğlu, 2010) (Kline, 2010).

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[51] It can be seen in the Harbiye Military Museum in Istanbul, his family donated a full set of this pistol to the museum.

The 1950s changed the fate of Turkish defense industry. After becoming a NATO member, Turkey preferred to get arms from the US. This development hit the Turkish defense industry hard. While Turkey got these US made weapons for free as a result of the Lend and Lease Act and military aid, it became dependent on the US for spare parts. Due to lack of demand, Şakir Zümre started to produce goods for civilian use and his heaters (Şakir Zümre sobaları) became very famous. His company was closed in the 1970s.

The state owned enterprises were also affected by this development. The General Directorate of Military Factories was renamed as the Machinery and Chemical Industry Institution (MKEK) in 1950. With regards to the rifles, the US made M-1 Garand rifles became the standard infantry rifle in the 1950s. The MKEK produced a basic trainer aircraft in 1954 (Uğur 44- M4) and the TAIF ordered 100 of them but later due to increasing expenses the demand was decreased. 57 MKEK-M4 were produced between 1955 and 1957. The last of them was decommissioned in 1969 and 3 of them were donated to Jordan in 1955 as military aid (MKEK, 2014).

This inactivity in the defense industries lasted until the late 1960s. As mentioned, the emergence of the Cyprus Question and the Johnson Letter (1964) showed the hardships of being dependent on another country for arms. In this respect, Turkey started to produce amphibious landing ships itself for the Turkish Naval Forces (TNF) (TNF, 2014). In 1975, following the US embargo, ASELSAN was established to produce military equipment. In 1980, it produced radios for personnel and tanks. In 1983 it started to export them for the first time. In addition, it started to produce data terminals and other equipment like laser range-finder. It also became a member of the consortium consisting of four NATO members to produce Stinger air defense missiles in 1987 (ASELSAN, 2014). In 1985 Under-secretariat

for Defense Industries (Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı) was established to foster development in this sector. New companies were established by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV). HAVELSAN was established in 1985 (for aviation electronics) and TUSAŞ (Turkish Aviation Industry) in 1984. (SSM, 2014). In cooperation with the US, Turkey started to produce F-16s (160 aircrafts were to be produced). In addition, as off-set rights were provided, Turkey was to produce some parts of the aircraft for the aircraft factories in Belgium and the USA. However, the private sector could not play an important role in the 1980s contrary to the expectations (Uzgel, 2005b, p. 42) Still, the 1980s was an important period for Turkey as for the first time submarines (the Ay Class) and frigates (the Yavuz Class, first two of them, *TCG Yavuz* and *TCG Turgutreis* were produced in Germany while *TCG Fatih* and *TCG Yıldırım* were produced in the Gölcük Shipyard) were built.

4.3.   CHANGES AT THE STRUCTURAL LEVEL

During the Cold War, Turkey was considered to be a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Its most important task was to tie up around 24 Soviet divisions and to provide bases and facilities (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003, p. 1). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and emergence of newly independent states in Eurasia, many analysts assumed that Turkey's strategic importance would decrease rapidly (Robins, 2002, p. 2). According to Baskın Oran, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact decreased Turkey's importance and as a result Turkey tried to prove its importance by offering its help in the regional conflicts starting from the Gulf War. This approach contradicted the general principles of Turkish foreign policy (pro-*status*

quo stance and search for relative autonomy) and risked Turkey's security (Oran, 2005a, p. 210). With the disappearance of one of the blocs, the areas it indirectly controlled came out of control and the emergence of newly independent states contributed to the security problems. It was seen that interstate and intrastate problems would replace the rivalry between the blocs and the relative stability brought by the Cold War.

In addition, there was now a risk for Turkey. As Europe enjoyed the peace dividend, it would isolate itself from these conflict-prone areas. The Turkish statesmen often emphasized Turkey's role as a bridge however this time as William Hale noted "there was a risk that Western Europe might prefer to see it as a barrier against a hostile 'other', left outside European structures" (Hale, 2002, p. 193). Turkey and the USSR among other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries signed the European Conventional Forces Treaty on 19 November 1990. It envisaged a reduction in conventional weapons such as tanks, artillery units, armored personnel carriers (APC), war planes and attack helicopters. Countries were to decommission, sell or donate the weapons that exceeded the total ceiling figure. However, countries such as Syria, Iraq and Iran did not take part in this treaty. As a result, reflecting the troubled neighborhood of Turkey, Southeastern parts of Turkey were exempted from the treaty and known as 'out of area'. Even this agreement, which was an important milestone in disarmament, provided relatively little benefit for Turkey in terms of security. Its only benefit was that Turkey was able to buy the weapons systems from other signatory countries that exceeded that accepted levels at a cheaper price. The ceiling system for countries was revised in 1999. In the new system the ceiling figures for Turkey are the following: 2,795 tanks, 3,523 artillery pieces, 3,120 APCs, 750 warplanes and 130 helicopters (Oran, 2005a, p. 207).

Located in a volatile and conflict ridden region, Turkey tried to find a new role for itself in the 'New World Order'. Statesmen were afraid that Turkey might be left alone by its Cold War allies if they choose isolationism and non-intervention strategies so Turkey would have to face security challenges alone.

4.4.   CHANGES AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

The end of the Cold War, at the regional level, brought both risks and opportunities for Turkey. As the first of all, unified Germany became an important political actor in addition to being an economic giant in Europe. It started to follow a more assertive foreign policy in Europe and favored the accession of the former Warsaw Pact countries into the EC. In the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Germany hastily recognized Slovenia and Croatia and imposed this on other members of the EC, contributed to the increase of the tension in the region. It appeared that countries like Britain and France tried to balance increasing German influence by supporting the Serbs during the conflict. According to Richard Holbrooke, the decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia was a mistake but the war in Yugoslavia cannot be attributed to Germany's decision alone (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 65).   Germany's emergence as a power had implications for Turkey since Turkey had membership vision for the EC-EU as it applied for full membership in 1987. For some observers, as a result of the new environment, in parallel to its national interests, Germany attached priority to the membership processes of the former Warsaw Pact countries. This weakened the possibility of Turkey's membership. In addition, the geographical location of Turkey (whether it is a European or Middle Eastern country) and its culture, factors that were less emphasized during the Cold War, also started to dominate the agenda in the

process (Baharçiçek, 2006, p. 71). The EU had no intention of allowing Turkey as a member state but wanted to benefit in the economic realm from Turkey's ties with the EU. While criticizing it many areas such as the human rights abuses, the EU saw no problem in signing the Customs Union Treaty in 1995 (at that period human rights abused peaked) without assuring Turkey of a full membership vision (Oran, 2005a, p. 229).

Another risk was that with the end of the Cold War, NATO accepted the out of area concept in order to sustain itself in the new security environment. It meant that NATO may conduct operations in the areas such as the Middle East. This would harm Turkey's position as its priorities were not always the same with its allies in the region (Baharçiçek, 2006, p. 70).

Iraq, the Piedmont of Arabs, had fought a war against Iran in the 1980s. In this war it was supported by the US and Gulf countries. Though the war caused lots of damage to the Iraqi military forces and economy, Iraq was still a powerful state in military terms. The border dispute between Kuwait and Iraq always existed since their independence. The British policy-makers had created Kuwait (which was actually a part of the Ottoman province of Basra as Iraq claimed) to limit Iraq's control of the Persian Gulf. As a result, Iraq was not able to build deep-water ports and it was dependent the Basra Port. This port was destroyed and the Shatt-al Arab waterway was blocked during the war with Iran and as a result Iraq became a landlocked state that only relied on the pipelines passing through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. These pipelines could be shut down by the states through which they passed. So Saddam Hussein decided to invade and annex Kuwait as the Iraq's 19th province and establish deep-water ports there. During this period the Iraqi-American relations were very cordial. The Bush Administration courted with Iraq and provided it with

billions of dollars' worth of agricultural credits while turning a blind eye on its human rights abuses and its nuclear program (Cleveland, 2004, p. 480).

Iraq has also become an active supporter of the Palestinian cause which was getting more attention due to the Intifada that started in 1987. As the champion of the Palestinian cause, Saddam Hussein managed to increase his popularity and found a receptive Arab audience after starting his anti-American and anti-Israeli propaganda campaign. He justified the military build-up of Iraq as the only way to balance Israel and protect Palestinians. He was determined to change the *status quo* in the Middle East and on August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait (Cleveland, 2004, p. 478). As Raymond Hinnebusch notes the Middle East witnessed wars while other regions of the world enjoyed relative peace and stability:

> While for much of the world globalization is associated with growing interdependence and the spread of zones of peace, in the Middle East the decade of globalization was ushered in by war, was marked by intrusive US hegemony, renewed economic dependency on the core and the continuing insecurity, and ended with another round of war in 2001 (Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 204).

During the Iran-Iraq War, Syria had followed a pro-Iranian policy. It is possible to trace the alliance between Syria and Iran to the period following the revolution in Iran. Iraq's increasing military power had forced both countries to cooperate. When the war ended in 1988, the Iraqi army was war-hardened and fifth largest army of the world. The end of the war gave free-hand to Saddam Hussein to follow an active foreign policy. It wanted to become the pivotal state in the Arab world. It provided military aid to Mauritania in its conflict with Senegal, tried to unite the divided Yemen and backed the Islamic regime in Sudan in its struggle against the rebels in the south. In the political crisis that erupted in Lebanon, Iraq

decided to punish Syria. Iraq supported General Michel Aoun who followed anti-Syrian policies. In 1988 Iraq began to provide arms to the supporters of General Aoun (the Maronite Christians in Lebanon) and tried to rally the other Arab states against Syrian control in Lebanon. In the conflict between these groups in Lebanon, Iran and Syria cooperated against Iraq. Iran coordinated the activities of Shiite movements such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon and they followed a pro-Syrian policy. In addition to these reasons, the Syrian-Iranian alliance was result of another consideration. In the Middle East, during the 1980s regional groups emerged to balance Syrian and Iranian power. The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) included Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Northern Yemen. Another group was the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Syria and Iran were isolated in the region. Most of the Arab states suspended diplomatic relations with Iran following the revolution in Iran. When Iraq occupied Kuwait, militarily weak Iran decided to be neutral. Iran tried to mediate between Iraq and the anti-Iraq coalition. Tehran thought that by mediation, it could gain leverage over them and exploit the subsequent events. Iran's dialogue with Iraq and the concessions the former received, alarmed Syria and for clarifying that Iran would not join the war on Iraq's side, Hafez Assad paid a visit to Iran (Goodarzi, 2006, pp. 288-289).

In response, the US managed to form an Arab coalition against Iraq, by receiving the support of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt (Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 212). It was believed that Saudi Arabia would be the next target of Iraqi aggression. Thus, the US started the Operation Desert Storm and by October 1990 over 200,000 US troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia. In addition the Arab states, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Canada committed forces to Operation Desert Shield. The Soviet Union also criticized Iraq and suspended arms shipments to Baghdad. Jordan,

afraid of the Palestinian population that formed majority in the total population, condemned the intervention against Iraq while the PLO openly sided with Iraq. Egypt was rewarded by the US for its cooperation; its US$7 billion of military debt was cancelled while Syria received loans from Saudi Arabia and the European Community. The US worked through the UN and secured a UN resolution that imposed a trade embargo on Iraq. However, the presence of a major military force (deployed in Saudi Arabia) was extremely unpopular in the eyes of many Arabs and it was thought that the US had double standards in the Middle East. The US never enforced UN resolutions when they targeted Israel (Cleveland, 2004, p. 481). In January 16, 1991, air raids against Iraq began upon Iraq's refusal to withdraw from the Kuwaiti territory. Following the bombing, a land operation began on February 24 and lasted only 100 hours. The war was also a show of the US military might and technology (Cleveland, 2004, p. 484).

The Gulf War encouraged Gulf States to make bilateral defense agreements with the US, Britain and France. It also opened the way for direct American involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process starting from the Madrid Conference of 1991 to the Oslo Accords of 1993 (Owen, 2004, p. 90). As Hinnebusch emphasizes, the anti-Iraqi coalition of Arab states which were motivated by different factors, was a sign of increasing American penetration of the region (Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 212).

The developments caused by the Gulf War deeply affected Turkey because they created security and economic problems for it. Turkey was the destination of the refugee flows from the Northern Iraq upon the return of Iraqi forces from the south to subdue the Kurdish insurgence. As a response, to protect the civilian population from Iraqi military attacks, with the US leadership the UN imposed no-fly zones over Iraq

(north of the 36th parallel and south of the 42nd parallel). This decreased Baghdad's authority in the areas bordering Turkey and fostered the emergence of a Kurdish entity in the region. In addition, the PKK found a better environment in this power vacuum in Northern Iraq. The embargoes on Iraq which later became a part of the Dual Containment Policy, also hit the Turkish economy severely. As a result of these developments Turkey felt compelled to get involved in the Arab Middle East for its own security (Owen, 2004, p. 92).

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey had three new neighbors in the Caucasus. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan emerged as independent states. Disappearance of the common land border with Russia might have been a source of relaxation for Turkey. However the emergence of these fragile regimes that were mostly dependent on Russia on economy and security, and the eruption of the ethnic problems (the Abkhaz Question in Georgia) and the Nagarno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia led to disappointment. Besides, Armenia was a close ally of Russia in the region and it was host to the Russian military bases (sometimes named as 'the Israel of Russia in the Caucasus'). The independence of Azerbaijan had created great hopes in Turkey (Azerbaijan is the closest country to Turkey when compared to the Central Asian states with regards to the language, culture and geography). Despite the highly romantic and promising relations under the presidency of Ebulfeyz Elçibey in Azerbaijan, Turkey could not play the role expected from it during the Nagarno-Karabakh War. Armenia was supported by Russia militarily and Russian authorities warned Turkey to stay out of the conflict. It is commented that Süleyman Demirel refrained from confronting Russia and he is reported to say "We should not create another Cyprus Question". As a result, when Elçibey demanded two helicopters to rescue and transfer the wounded from Kelbecer

after Armenia's attack in 1993, Turkey denied this request (Cafersoy, 2001, p. 128). Turkey; economically and militarily was far from challenging Russia in the Caucasus and Russia protected its interests in the region stubbornly when compared to Eastern Europe where it left the region. It did so by playing the role of final arbiter between these small-states. By helping Armenia to occupy the Nagorno-Karabakh, especially the Laçin Corridor, it managed to cut the direct communication between the Nahcevan Autonomous Republic and the rest of the Azerbaijan and as a consequence between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Russia also tried to keep these states in its orbit by establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which allowed it to establish military bases in some countries and provide peace-keeping forces in the areas of conflict.

Iran also emerged as a rival of Turkey in the Caucasus. Having a Turkish population around 30 million, the emergence of an independent Azerbaijan in the north bordering its Turkish populated areas (Tabriz is considered to be the Turkish capital of Iran), alarmed Iran. In addition, Iran and Turkey, with their different political systems rivaled to represent themselves as a model to the new states. Not surprisingly, Iran cooperated with Russia and Armenia in order to balance the Ankara-Baku axis.

In the Balkans, the rise of ethnic nationalism and the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars became the main concern of Turkey. In Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito died in 1980 and Enver Hoxha of Albania died in 1985. The disappearance of these autocratic and charismatic leaders brought new cadres to power. In Romania, Ceausescu's regime was toppled by mass protests and clashes between the security forces and people on December 27, 1989 (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007, p. 142). Transition from command economy to market economy made the

transition to democracy harder. Unlike Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania were a part of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and Soviet energy sources and raw materials were sold on preferential terms. However, from January 1991 on, the Soviet Union started to sell these commodities at world market prices and in hard currency rather than barter. In addition, the Gulf War and the UN embargo on Iraq, hit Bulgaria and Romania severely. Iraq was one of Bulgaria's main customers. Romania also had lost US$ 3 billion due to the war on Iraq. These losses increased dramatically when the UN imposed an embargo on Yugoslavia too (Gallagher, 2003, p. 33).

The problems in Yugoslavia surfaced in the late 1980s. It consisted of six federal republics and two autonomous regions, reflecting the ethnic and religious diversity of the country. In Slovenia, richest and most industrialized of the republics, opposition started against the economic reforms demanded by the IMF in 1987. Croatia also voted against the drastic economic measures. Strikes followed and added to the instability of the country (Woodward, 1995, p. 83). In Slovenia opposition to the federal structure and calls for more sovereignty increased with attacks on the federal institutions. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) became the main target. The Slovene youth started a campaign and demanded social service instead of the military service and also demanded to serve in their country rather than serving in other republics. It came to the point of publishing of military secrets in the newspapers in Slovenia. Croatia also joined the campaign and demands for 'nationally homogenous armies' increased (Woodward, 1995, p. 90). In one of the autonomous regions of Serbia, in Kosovo, the tension between the Serbs and Albanians increased. The Albanians demanded more autonomy and status of republic just like other republics in Yugoslavia. At this stage, in 1987, Slobodan Milosevic

who was a 46 years-old banker and President of the Serbian Communist Party came to power by ousting Ivan Stambolic who had brought Milosevic to power. Milosevic decided to re-centralize the state structure in autonomous provinces of Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina) and bring them under Serb control. He rehabilitated the Serbian Church and regarded it as the vehicle of Serbian nationalism (Ramet, 2002, p. 26). On April 24, 1989 at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, he made it clear that he is the protector of the Serbs in Kosovo. He appealed to the crowd during the ceremony (after the police used force on the crowd) by saying "No one should be allowed to beat you" (Woodward, 1995, p. 90).

During the Cold War, Yugoslavia had enjoyed a special position in the Western strategy. As a neutral state it was expected to tie up Soviet troops and to ensure this, economic advantages such as credits were given to it. With the end of the Cold War, it lost this status. After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, Central European states rushed to join the West European institutions and the Yugoslavs had to enter the competition on the same terms as others (Woodward, 1995, p. 104). While the European countries devoted their attention to the Central and East European states, the US also directed its focus to the Middle East and Russia. According to a member of the Bush Administration, "no vital interests were at stake" in the ensuing Yugoslav conflict though in November 1990 the New York Times had reported that "the US intelligence is predicting that Federated Yugoslavia will break apart, most probably in the next 18 months and that civil war in that multi-national Balkan country is highly likely" (Gallagher, 2003, p. 42).

In the elections that took place in 1990 in the six republics especially the nationalists came to power and it "gave the initiative to parties who wanted to either to take their republic out of Yugoslavia, or recentralize it around their own ethnic

group" (Gallagher, 2003, p. 13). While the public opinion in Croatia and Slovenia supported independence, in Serbia it was in favor of preserving Yugoslavia under the Serbian leadership. These conflicting views would naturally cause conflict and violence in Bosnia hence it had a diverse population. Bosnia had a multi-ethnic character, 43.77 % 'ethnic Muslim', 31.46% Serbian, and 17.34% Croatian (1991 census results) (Ramet, 2002, p. 27). In parallel to the calls for independence and increasing nationalism, minority groups increased their efforts too. The Serbs of Croatia constituted about 14% of the total population and they were over-represented in the police, the military, the judiciary, the state bureaucracy, education and the media and they were regarded as a potential 'fifth column' by the Croat nationalists. The new regime of Franjo Tudjman started a purge against the Serbs in the bureaucracy and replaced them by the Croats (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007, p. 197).In Croatia, the Knin Serbs fearing from Croatian nationalism declared independence in October 1990. By early 1991 tension increased as Croatia and Slovenia threatened to secede from Yugoslavia (in February) and the Knin Serbs that declared independence in Krajina started to receive arms supplies from the Milosevic Government and the JNA (Hupchick, 2004, p. 440). In addition, the Tudjman regime adopted symbols resembling those of the *Ustasa* regime (*coat d'arms* of Croatia really resembled the *Ustasa* version). As Bideleux and Jeffries note, these developments created fears in the Serbian population of Croatia:

> The fact that Tudjman's strongest backers were Germany and Austria, the countries which had given the *Ustasa* the power to carry out a programme of genocide from 1941 to 1944, further inflamed the Serb and Montenegrin fears that history might be about to be repeated (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007, p. 198).

The Slovene government decided to hold a plebiscite on December 23, 1990 for independence. It was 88.5% in favor of independence (Woodward, 1995, p. 139).

Already before it, in October, a new Slovene currency was being printed in Austria secretly (Woodward, 1995, p. 130). A similar plebiscite was held in Croatia on 19 May 1991. With an 86% turn-out (the Serbs protested) it produced a 93% "yes" vote for independence. On 25 June 1991 Croatia declared its independence in parallel to Slovenia. However on July 7, the European Community persuaded them to accept a 3 month moratorium in order to allow more time for the EC-mediated negotiations (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007, p. 201). The JNA fought a short war against Slovenia upon its decision for independence in July 1991 but the Slovene secession was accepted as a *fait-accompli* and the Serb forces needed to focus on Croatia, another secessionist republic. By mid-September 1991, the JNA and the Croatian Serbs controlled about a quarter of Croatia (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007, p. 2002).

In the last months of 1991, the EC tried to mediate for cease-fires (which often failed quickly) and also proposed a peace plan. Milosevic rejected the plan and the EC imposed an embargo on Yugoslavia by 8 November 1991. Hitherto the EC managed to maintain unity in its dealing with Yugoslavia. But then Germany broke ranks. In early December 1991, the *Bundestag* voted unanimously to mandate the government to opt for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia before the Christmas. Germany declared that if the EC refrains from recognition, it will recognize the new republics (Gallagher, 2003, p. 70). As a consequence, the EC recognized both republics on 15 January 1994 (Gallagher, 2003, p. 74). It is claimed that the Catholic voters in Germany played a role in Germany's decision (Glenny, 2000, p. 637). It is also claimed that Vatican, Austria and Germany openly supported Croatia and Slovenia in order to increase their sphere of influence in the region (Woodward, 1995, pp. 148-149). This is regarded as a conspiracy theory by others (Gallagher, 2003, p. 71). Still, combined with the fear caused by the unification of Germany, at

the elite-level this theory was very influential in France and Britain. The EC could not have a strong stance with regards to the violence in Yugoslavia. As Susan Woodward notes, "by March 1991 Western powers began to intervene directly, but not as neutral mediators or with the procedures so patently needed" (Woodward, 1995, p. 145). Tom Gallagher agrees at this point:

> EC decisions in this crucial period were made not on the basis of general principles but according to the degree of pressure certain countries were prepared to exert. It was a bad omen what was called for was a clear indication that the EC was not partial to, or antagonistic towards, any ethnic group or republic (Gallagher, 2003, p. 76).

Alija Izzetbegovic requested a UN peace-keeping force to be deployed in Bosnia but this demand was not met. On 29 February-1 March 1992 a referendum on independence was held and 63.4% of the population took part (the Serbs protested it) and 99.4% of votes were in favor of independence. Izzetbegovic declared independence on 3 March. In April, serious clashes between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats on the one side and the Serbs on the other began (Ramet, 2002, p. 207). The inactivity and failure of the world to stop the violence mainly targeted against Muslim Bosnians for different reasons made Bosnia a high-priority issue in Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s. Macedonia and Kosovo also necessitated efforts. In addition, the Greek-Serb rapprochement process added another dimension to the question.

Turkey also acted as a regional organization builder in the 1990s. In 1992 it led other countries for the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) to foster economic cooperation in the Black Sea basin. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed the Bosphorus Statement on 25 June 1992 in

Istanbul (BSEC, 2014). According to Ambassador (ret.) Nurver Kureş, Deputy Secretary General in 1999, some factors impeded the development of the organization such as the problems emanating from history, suspicions, stereotypes, the domestic, political and economic problems especially of member states that are in transition process (Kureş, 1999, p. 589).

Maybe for the first time, Turkish foreign policy became deeply involved in the Balkan affairs which also can be said for Central Asia. Turkey had a long list of priorities in the Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. The developments in these regions would affect Turkish foreign policy while shaping the relations with the global hegemon, the USA.

In the next part, domestic developments of Turkey will be touched upon. It will help to highlight the factors that influenced the policy-making process and also power capabilities of Turkey.

4.5.   CHANGES AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL

As the end of the Cold War and eruption of wars and conflicts in the surrounding regions of Turkey brought new challenges and threats as well as opportunities sometimes, Turkey tried to find a new role for itself in its neighborhood. The dominant discourse of the 1990s was being a 'model' for other states, especially for those in the Middle East and newly independent states of Central Asia. With its democratic (far from being perfect), secular regime and liberal economic structure, Turkey would be an example for other countries in transition from communism to democracy. 'The Turkish model' discourse was supported by the Turkish statesmen because this would increase the diminishing strategic

importance of Turkey in the new era. Turkey had a predominantly Muslim population and market economy with a democratic regime. In the past it had also experienced state-led planned economic development model but the role of the state in the economy had decreased as a result of the reforms of the 1980s. In this respect, the Turkish experience would guide the countries during their transition period. This discourse was also supported by Turkey's allies. Especially for the Turkish republics in Central Asia, Iran would emerge as a model in which religion and anti-Western tendencies dominated the political life (Bal, 2006, p. 399). For those like Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, in a new geopolitical environment stretching from the Balkans to Western China, Turkey was now located at the center of world politics (Fuller & Lesser, 1993). In the early 1990s, President Turgut Özal noted that "the twenty-first century will belong to the Turks" (Hale, 2002, p. 194). At a later date, in 2000, President Süleyman Demirel, at the Summit of the Turkish Speaking States, transformed it to 'from the Atlantic to Pacific' and stated the following:

> In fact, the idea that brings us together through these summits as the presidents of independent and sovereign states located in the vast lands where the Turkish World is placed, which stretches from the Adriatic to the Great Wall and even from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is to strengthen our friendship, brotherhood, spiritual partnership and cooperation and our common target of moving it to the new millennium with a fresh enthusiasm (Demirel, 2000).

However, to avoid the criticisms that claimed Turkey was following a pan-Turkist policy (especially from Russia) he went on to state the following:

> No one needs to worry about meetings of the representatives of the Turkish World which always proved its loyalty to the sublime ideals of humanity, for various reasons and at various levels, because our solidarity is for friendship, brotherhood and cooperation (Demirel, 2000).

Turkish public opinion started to have more interest in the Turkish groups (and also non-Turkish but Muslim groups living in the Balkans and Caucasus) living outside Turkey along the state bureaucracy. It was a departure from the past because similar to communism, starting from the 1930s pan-Turkism (Turancılık) has been suppressed by the state and its suppression had reached its apex in 1944 when some leading figures and intellectuals such as Nihal Atsız, Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Zeki Velidî Togan and Alparslan Türkeş (a captain in the army at that time, he later took part in the 1960 coup while he was a colonel and later formed the Nationalist Action Party) were imprisoned due to Soviet pressure with the charge of planning a military coup and establishing a pro-German regime (known as the Turancılık Davası) (Bakiler, 2010).

In order to meet the expectations arising from its new role bestowed upon it, Turkey established new bureaucratic and intergovernmental structures. The Summits of Presidents of Turkish Speaking Countries has been convened in 1992 for the first time. Its headquarters are located in Istanbul, its academic center in Kazakhstan, its parliamentary assembly in Baku. It envisaged cooperation in the political, economic, social and cultural fields. In 2009, it became the Turkic Council (TÜRKKON) (member states: Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) (TURKKON, 2014). In 1993, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TÜRKSOY), also called the UNICEF of the Turkic World (member states: Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). It also has eight observer states, mainly autonomous republics from the Russian Federation (TURKSOY, 2014).

Turkey did not have an official body for humanitarian aid. The Turkish Red Crescent had sometimes provided humanitarian aid in the case of natural disasters. However in 1985 Turkey had allocated humanitarian aid to the Sub-Saharan Africa

countries worth of US$10 million. In parallel to this development, the necessity of an administrative body became visible. In this respect, under the aegis of the State Planning Agency, the Turkish Agency for Cooperation (TAC) was established in 1987. Though the budget allocated to it was very modest (US$ 128,000 in 1987, it rose to 689,000 in 1991), it paved the way for the incoming institutionalization of the foreign development aid in Turkey (Akçay, 2012, p. 67). In 1992, to coordinate Turkey's foreign aid efforts and to use it effectively as a foreign policy tool, the Presidency for Economic, Cultural, Educational and Technical Cooperation (Ekonomik, Kültürel, Eğitim ve Teknik İşbirliği Başkanlığı-EKETİB) was established as a bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The TAC, under the State Planning Agency also continued its operations by mostly focusing on technical aid. It is estimated that the TAC provided aid worth of US$ 12.7 million between 1985 and 2003 (Akçay, 2012, pp. 71-72).

EKETİB which was later renamed as TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Directorate) started to establish coordination offices. It is possible to observe that priority was given to the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Caucasus[52]. In Moldova where the Orthodox Christian Turks (known as the Gagauzes) live, an office was established. Though Bosnia-Hercegovina became a high-priority issue in Turkish foreign policy, the war prevented Turkey from establishing a coordination office there until 1995 (Akçay, 2012, p. 72).

From the amount of the aid Turkey provided, it is possible to observe the ups and downs in Turkish economy as seen in the table below. Of these numbers, the amount provided by TİKA was around 2%. The biggest contributor was the Ministry

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[52] 8 April 1993 Kyrgyzstan, 16 August 1993 Turkmenistan, 9 February 1994 Azerbaijan, 20 May 1994 Uzbekistan, 3 June 1994 Moldova, 1 January 1995 Georgia, 1 June 1995 Kazakhstan, 11 November 1995 Bosnia-Hercegovina, 15 July 1997 Ukraine.

of Education (71.5 %). Though 86.5% of the aid was provided to the Turkish republics and minority groups, in a limited was aid was also provided to countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Albania, Romania and Hungary (Akçay, 2012, p. 74). From 1997 on, as the economy started to recover, the amount of aid provided by Turkey started to increase.

Table 4.1 Aid Provided by Turkey

(million US$)

1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
1,182	283	54	149	188	383.37	400.77	446.50	202.17	139.65	144.76

Source: (Akçay, 2012, pp. 73,76,79)

Under the three-party coalition established in 1999 (Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit – 57th Government), TİKA was brought under the control of the Office of Prime Minister. Prof. Dr. Abdülhaluk Mehmet Çay (historian, MP from the Nationalist Action Party) was appointed as the Minister Responsible for Coordination with the Turkish Republic and Brethren Societies. Though Abdülhaluk Çay managed to establish a strategy for aid, the economic crisis and the destruction caused by the two earthquakes in 1999 limited Turkey's capacity as a donor. In addition, some wrong practices that took place before the 57th Government, such as the military coup attempt against Haydar Aliyev in 1994 in which a TİKA official was also involved, created a perception that TİKA was involved in covert operations in coordination with the National Intelligence Agency (MİT). In the Azeri press it was once stated that "TİKA and MİT are working hand in hand". Still, radio

channels in Moldova, Kosovo and Kyrgyzstan were established in addition to new offices in Tajikistan, Mongolia and Albania (Akçay, 2012, p. 78).

According to Mustafa Aydın, in the period 1991 and 1993, Turkey tried to portray itself as a model and leader and tried to limit the influence of Russia by following an active foreign policy. In the increasing competition with Russia and Iran, pan-Turkist and Islamist discourses gained currency and Turkey acted with an enthusiasm but without a proper strategy in the region (Aydın, 2005, p. 371). Still, Turkey contributed to the development of these new states. Turkey donated telephone switchboard units and satellite systems to eliminate their dependence on Russia for the telecommunication network. The Turkish Airlines (THY) started direct flight to their capitals. Süleyman Demirel promised for a credit amounting to US$ 1.1 billion. The Turkish Ministry of Education established schools in the region. In an ambitious step, Turkey provided scholarships to students (2000 for each country). In this respect only 2,133 students managed to graduate from a total of 16,692 up to January 1999. 5,889 of them returned to their country due to different reasons while the rest continued their studies. Later, in 1998, Uzbekistan ceased sending students to Turkey (Aydın, 2005, p. 385).

Despite its will and passion, Turkey could not play the expected leadership role in the region. Many problems emerged. While some of them originated from external factors such as Russia's return to the former Soviet territories with increasing influence, some of them originated from the domestic weaknesses of Turkey.

As the first of all, the weak political leadership undermined Turkey's capacity. In the general elections that took place in 1991, 1995 and 1999 none of the

parties were able to secure a majority. That opened the way for weak coalition governments. William Hale argued that "Turkey suffered from a lack of domestic political leadership" (Hale, 2002, p. 196). Baskın Oran identifies this as a problem for the conduct of foreign policy. By using statistical data he observed that in the period between April 1920 and February 1990 (838 months), 28 different persons served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The average term in office was 29.9 months. However in the period from February 1990 to June 1997 (87 months) 11 different persons served at the same post for an average duration of 7.9 months. In addition, generally individuals unfamiliar with foreign policy issues were appointed to this post (appointment to certain important posts such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Ministry of Defense has always been a matter of bargaining process in the coalition governments). Worse, the governments could not devote sufficient energy to foreign policy due to domestic problems such as the terrorism, human rights, economy (Oran, 2005b, pp. 238-239). In this period three persons served as president: Turgut Özal (09 November 1989-17 April 1993), Süleyman Demirel (16 May 1993-16 May 2000), Ahmet Necdet Sezer (16 May 2000-27 Ağustos 2007). Mesut Yılmaz, Erdal İnönü, Tansu Çiller, Bülent Ecevit and Devlet Bahçeli were the important politicians that marked this era. With regards to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Çetin (20 November 1991-27 July 1994) and İsmail Cem (30 June 1997-11 July 2002) are the leading figures. İsmail Cem is also the longest-serving minister at that post in this decade. The short-lived governments with ministers serving sometimes for four months (Emre Gönensay 06 March 1996-28 June 1996) made foreign policy planning harder.

Economic problems also added limits to Turkish foreign policy. The 1990s is referred to as the 'lost decade' of Turkey due to economic instability. As a result of

the liberalization and economic dependency, imports grew up rapidly. As the Turkish

economy became dependent on foreign debt, its economy became more vulnerable to

foreign shocks. Turkey faced three economic crises in this period (1994, 1998 and

2000). Excluding the years 1994 and 2000, the GDP started to rise (US$ 152 in 1991,

160 in 1992, 181 in 1993, 130 in 1994, 171 in 1955, 184 in 1996, 194 in 1997, 205 in

1998, 187 in 1999, 201 in 2000 and 148 in 2001 respectively). Inflation became a

chronic problem in the 1990s. While it was 55.3% in 1991, it rose to 120.7% in 1994,

then started to drop slowly until 2001 (74.6% in 1996, 81% in 1997, 70.2% in 1998,

62.9% in 1999, 32.7 in 2000), in which year it rose to 88.6%. Foreign debt

dramatically increased and its ratio to GDP became 77.7% in 2001 (Oran, 2005b, p.

214). The crisis of 1994 was triggered by the decision of Standard & Poor's and

Moody's Investors Services to downgrade Turkey's credit rating. However as Tevfik

Nas highlights, the Turkish economy was already in crisis before this decision:

> Before this critical downgrading decision, the Turkish economy was in a state
> of disequilibrium, struggling with persistent imbalances in both goods and
> money markets. The budget and current account deficits were at
> unsustainable levels, and excessive reliance on debt financing to meet the
> record high public-sector borrowing requirement had resulted in high levels
> of capital inflow, domestic debt stock, and interest rate payment. At the time,
> the government seemed reluctant to introduce a much-needed stabilization
> plan to correct the situation. Because of a highly turbulent political
> environment and the populist tendencies that the forthcoming March 1994
> local elections had led to, it made more sense, at least from the politicians'
> perspectives, to leave the stabilization issue to a more politically favorable
> date" (Nas, 2008, p. 51)

According to the same author, increasing populism and government

expenditures starting with democratization efforts from 1987[53] on, the decision of the

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[53] On 6 November 1987 a referendum was held to decide whether to cancel bans on former politicians
such as Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş. The Motherland
Party of Turgut Özal campaigned for a 'No' vote in order to keep these veteran politicians away from
politics. However the result was in favor of these politicians with a little margin: 50.23% in favor and
49.77 against.

Demirel government in 1991 to fight high inflation by keeping the interest rates down and the destabilizing effects of short-term capital inflows, the so-called 'hot money' (the capital account was liberalized in 1989), were among the main causes of the crisis (Nas, 2008, p. 54). Ziya Öniş argues that it is possible to observe 'cycles of populism' in Turkish economy starting from the 1950s. According to him the crisis was caused by premature capital account liberalization and debt trap. He points out that economic performance of Turkey was found satisfactory in the 1980s however it was in these years the seeds of the future crisis were planted:

> It may appear rather paradoxical today, but during the mid-1980s key international organizations highlighted the Turkish experiment as a model case of successful adjustment. Perhaps the most striking achievement of Turkish neo-liberalism concerned the dramatic increase in exports and a structural shift in favor of manufactured exports in a comparatively short space of time. Turkey has also been able to sustain reasonably rapid economic growth—in the order of four to five percent per annum during its first decade of neo-liberalism (Öniş, 2003, p. 6).

Sumru Altuğ and Alpay Filiztekin argue that the 'ambitious program of infrastructure investment' that begun under Özal's rule, financed by external and internal borrowing, in addition to 'hot money', was another reason:

> As successive governments followed, the government expenditures begun during the Özal years were increasingly financed by monetary expansion. The liberalized capital account regime allowed for the unfettered capital movements. Instead of providing funding for long-term investment projects, as Özal had hoped, international capital flows turned out to be short-term, volatile 'hot money' (Altuğ & Filiztekin, 2006, p. 21).

As a consequence of the economic crises, the Turkish Lira was devalued in the 1990s. In 1991, 1 US$ was equal to TL 4,169.85, in 1994 it rose to 29,704.33, in 1999 to 417,580.86 and in 2001 to 1,225,412 (Oran, 2005b, p. 214). Other factors also contributed negatively to Turkey's deteriorating economy. According to Utku

Utkulu, political instability and the problems caused by the Gulf War and 'uncontrolled and ambitious financial liberalization' can be observed as the main causes (Utkulu, 2001, pp. 28-30). The Gulf War and its direct and indirect costs are not easy to calculate but in 2000, it was claimed, according to the information provided by the Under-secretariat for Treasury, that it cost Turkey approximately US$ 100 billion (Uzgel, 2005b, p. 258). William Hale gives the number as US$2 billion annually (Hale, 2002, p. 225). In 2001, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit claimed that Turkey lost US$ 35 billion due to the embargos (Bozkurt, 2006, p. 794). In addition, though the US had promised to compensate for Turkey's losses, its contribution around US$3 billion was far from meeting the expectations. Even Jordan, a country which was very inactive and did not take any risks, received more than Turkey (Uzgel, 2005b, p. 258).

In addition, the war against terrorism which necessitated the deployment of around 250,000 – 300,000 troops in Eastern Turkey (almost half of the total strength of the armed forces) and in 1994-1995, when the campaign was at its height, it cost US$ 7 billion annually (Hale, 2002, p. 203). Turkey had to increase its defense expenditures while the general trend in the world was to decrease it. The deteriorating economic conditions contributed to the rise of terrorism. Also it paved the way for the rise of Islamist Welfare Party, that promised for a 'just order-*âdil düzen*' and it secured a victory in the 1995 elections.

Table 4.2 Turkey's Defense Expenditures

(in US$ Billion)

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
5.5	5.6	5.9	6.5	6.4	6.6	7.3	7.7	8.0	9.5

Source: (Uzgel, 2005b, p. 320)

In 1996, the Islamist Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan came to power in a coalition with Tansu Çiller's True Path Party (08 July 1996-30 June 1997, 54th Government). Erbakan showed some tendencies of Islamism in foreign relations too. His first official visit was to Iran (10 August 1996) as a part of his Asia tour. Before the visit, Nicholas Burns (Spokesperson for the Department of State), warned Turkey about it. Before his visit, the MİT had informed Erbakan about the support Iran provided to PKK. As it became public later on, though he denied his words but the minutes of the meeting proved that the claims were correct, in his interview with Rafsanjani, he put forward that even though the intelligence agency informs him about Iran's support to PKK, he never believed it to be true and the MİT was generally under the influence of CIA and MOSSAD (Hürriyet, 1996). His choice to trust in Iran rather than his own country's security bureaucracy created concerns in Turkey.

Erbakan argued for Islamic solidarity between countries with Muslim populations. The D-8 (the Developing Eight, consisting of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria) was one of his projects. It was officially declared in a summit in İstanbul on 15 June 1997. As the official web-site of the D-8 notes, "the idea of cooperation among major Muslim developing countries

was mooted by Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, during a Seminar on cooperation in Development which was held in Istanbul in October 1996" (D8, 2014). His visit to Africa, witnessed the 'greatest scandal in Turkish foreign policy' as one of the journalists who accompanied Erbakan during the visit noted. The first stop of his visit was Egypt (6 October 1996). In his interview with Husnu Mobarak, Erbakan stated that "the members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhvaan al Muslumeen) are good people". Mobarak replied: "If you like them so much, we can send all of them to you". The scandal took place at the second stop of the visit, in Libya. President of Libya, Moammar Qaddafi organized a press meeting in his tent with Necmettin Erbakan. After insulting both the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey, he claimed that Turkey is under occupation, a Kurdish state should be established and if Turkey continues killing Kurdish people, its airspace must be declared no-fly zone, he also stated that he was not satisfied with the general conduct of Turkish foreign policy (Çakır, 2011).

Erbakan's policies also were criticized heavily by the public opinion, media and NGOs. Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) warned the government and public about the increasing radicalization of some religious groups and the support they found in the Welfare Party. On 28 February 1997, in a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, the high command demanded some reforms from the government. It was later understood that Süleyman Demirel avoided a military coup by convincing the high command as the General Chief of Staff General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı has said "we returned from the main gate of the barracks" (Milliyet, 2009a). On 21 May 1997 the Chief Prosecutor of Republic Vural Savaş claimed that the Welfare Party has become a center for anti-republican and anti-secularist activities and demanded the abolishment of the party. On 19 June 1997, Necmettin Erbakan resigned from his

post. President Süleyman Demirel, gave the task of forming a new government to Mesut Yılmaz (leader of the Motherland Party) rather than Tansu Çiller even though her party was the second biggest party in the parliament. On June 30, a new government was formed by the Motherland Party (Mesut Yılmaz), Democratic Left Party (Bülent Ecevit) and Democratic Turkey Party (led by Hüsamettin Cindoruk, it was formed by MPs resigned from the True Path Party; they were mostly under the influence of Süleyman Demirel). The 28th February incident is also named as post-modern coup.

In November 2000, Turkey witnessed another economic crisis. It was caused by the current account deficit in addition to the corruption in the banking sector. Trust in the three-party coalition with regards to the reforms also decreased by time due to their half-hearted approach. In consequence speculative attacks and mass exodus of short-term capital damaged the economy (Öniş, 2003, p. 11). The crisis was exacerbated by the disagreements between President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. It became public during a NSC meeting on February 19, 2001. Three days later Turkey decided to let Turkish Lira float freely. Combined with the effects of the 1998 Asian Crisis Turkey did not have enough time to recover and its economy deteriorated again. Growth rate, which was 7.4% in 2000, was minus 7.5%, in 2001. Inflation also rose from 39% to 68.5%. The economy started to recover next year thanks to the rough measures. Growth rate rose to 7.9% in 2002 while inflation fell down to 29.7%. (Nas, 2008, p. 87).

Drastic measures for economic recovery, devaluation and high inflation, in addition to the illness of Bülent Ecevit and suspicions on the fate of his government, discredited the government. In the election that was held on 3 November 2002, the Justice and Development Party secured victory with 34% (363 seats out of 550). The

parties that formed the Ecevit government received less than 10% of votes and remained below the national threshold. The People's Republican Party led by Deniz Baykal was the only party that gained right for representation in the Parliament with 19% (178 seats). 9 MPs were elected as independent.

In this era, Turkey started to modernize and restructure its armed forces in order to cope with the new threats. As the first of all, in the Turkish Land Forces (TLF) division commands were disbanded with some exceptions[54] and a command system based on army corps, brigades and battalions were accepted. It would allow for greater accuracy in command. Many of the infantry divisions were converted into mechanized infantry or armored infantry brigades to allow rapid deployment and provide firepower to conduct operations independently (TLF, 2014). In the Naval Forces, the National Ship Project (Milli Gemi Projesi-MİLGEM) that aimed building corvettes (a ship type between the frigates and patrol boats) capable of conducting anti-submarine warfare and surface operations was launched on February 15, 2000. In the project maximum contribution of the Turkish defense industry was seen as a vital objective[55]. In addition, another research project that aimed at combat management system was completed with national sources: Ship Integrated Combat Administration System Project (GENESIS) (TNF, 2014). The Turkish Air Force (TAIF) aircraft took part in the Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995. Due to the closure of airspace by Bulgaria and Greece, the aircraft that took off from the bases in Bandırma and Dalaman had to travel through the Adriatic Sea and this limited their operation time (another F-16 squadron was deployed in Italy). This

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[54] Exceptions are a few tactical divisions located at strategic points. The 52nd Tactical Armored Division (Hadımköy/İstanbul), 23rd Tactical Motorized Infantry Division (Hasdal/İstanbul), 3rd Tactical Infantry Division (Yüksekova/Hakkari), 9th Tactical Infantry Division (Kars), 15th Infantry Division for Training (İzmit).

[55] These ships are named as the Ada Class (99.5 x14.4 meters with 3.9 meters draft).The first ship was completed in 2011 (TCG Heybeliada, F-511), the second was completed in 2012 (TCG Büyükada, F-512).

showed the Turkish authorities that in order to become a regional military power; Turkey should obtain tanker aircraft that allows refueling during flight. As a result, two KC-135R aircraft were rented from the USA (they served until 1998) and in 1998, following their modernization 7 aircraft of the same type entered into service in 1997 (Metin, 2014)[56]. However Turkey also faced obstruction from the Congress with regards to the sale of arms to Turkey due to the complaints about human rights abuses in Turkey and activities of some lobbies in the USA. Turkey wanted to buy 50 AH-1 Cobra helicopters but only 10 were sold to Turkey (Uzgel, 2005b, p. 288). In this period Turkey also started to sign military training agreements with some countries and cadets from these countries started to get their training at the military academies and war colleges in Turkey. The Turkish Armed Forces provided training to 27,277 personnel from 52 countries under the status of Guest Military Personnel. Also, mobile teams were sent to some countries to train military forces (TAF, 2014a). The Partnership for Peace Training Center under the aegis of NATO was established in Ankara in 1998 and in total 13,935 military personnel from 91 countries took part in its training courses since its establishment (BIOEM, 2014). In addition to countries like Turkish Republics and Azerbaijan, African countries also benefited from Turkish military experts. Turkey deployed Gendarmerie platoons in Senegal and Gambia to train troops there. Training activities also includes countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Algeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, Chad, Zimbabwe and Morocco. In the same way, officers from Bosnia, Macedonia and Georgia received military training in Turkey (Uzunay, 2003).

Despite the weaknesses of Turkey emanating from its domestic problems mentioned in the preceding pages, it still has important capabilities. The Figure 4.1

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[56] These tanker aircrafts allowed the Turkish fighter planes to take part in the Exercise Red Flag in the Nellis Airbase in the USA without any landing during their flight.

shows the CINC scores for Turkey and its neighbors, covering the period from 1923 to 2002. It is possible to observe that, Turkey has always been the strongest actor among its neighbors. This power enables Turkey to play the role of a regional power if the opportunities arise. However, it should be noted that there is a precarious balance between Turkey and Iran with regards to the national power. So Iran emerges as a regional rival for Turkey. Another risk for Turkey is that, its neighbors may try to balance Turkey by forming alliances with other neighbors (such as the possibility of a Greek-Syrian alliance in the 1990s) or they may rely on another power as Armenia (one of the weakest as seen in the figure) did by allying with Russia. The figure also shows that regional groupings against Turkey might be dangerous and Turkey is not able to play the role of regional dominant power, a concept mentioned in Chapter 2.

In the next part, the foreign policy developments of the 1990s will be mentioned with regards to the Balkans and Middle East. It will help understanding limits of Turkish power in some areas.

Figure 4.1. The CINC Scores for Turkey and Its Neighbors
Source: (Singer, 1987)

4.6. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ERA

This era started with an important foreign policy crisis: the Gulf War. President Turgut Özal supported an active pro-American policy during the crisis and he is reported to say "we will stake 1 but get 3". It was also implied in some circles that Turkey should incorporate the Northern Iraq by establishing a federation with Turkey. He is also reported to say "with these policies we can only remain a small power" while criticizing the traditional pro-status quo stance both in the diplomatic and military bureaucracy of Turkey (Oran, 2005b, p. 238). His policy met with opposition both from the public and bureaucracy. Bülent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left Party (he was not an MP at that time) heavily criticized Özal for his 'siding with the imperialist forces' and as a journalist he visited Baghdad. He argued that Turkey should behave as a mediator and try to solve the crisis before it turns into war. He had an interview with Saddam Hussein and it was published on *Milliyet* on 20 September 1991. During the interview that lasted two and half-hour, Ecevit explained the reason of his visit. According to him, though Turkey was a neighbor of Iraq, the events were portrayed from the American perspective in the Turkish media so he had decided to see it with his own eyes. Saddam Hussein talked about the friendship between Turkey and Iraq while criticizing the Özal administration for being a follower of the US policies. He also stated that Turkish people should not expect any attack from Iraq unless Turkey attacked Iraq (Milliyet, 1991).

Özal's policies caused concerns in the bureaucracy. On 3 December 1990, the Chief of the General Staff General Necip Torumtay resigned from his post. In an interview with a journalist in 1993, he stated that the state procedures were not followed by Özal, the government was inactive and it failed to provide a directive for

the Armed Forces with regards to Iraq and rather than the government which was responsible for the conduct of foreign policy and defense policy, it was President Özal at Çankaya who controlled the events. There was no clear policy and Özal used 'a gambling-term' while dealing with state affairs (mentioning his statement of "staking 1 and getting 3") (Milliyet, 1993). At the end, rather than opening a northern front in Northern Iraq by using the TAF against Iraq, Turkey only opened its airspace and İncirlik Airbase for use during the war.

Özal's policy was later criticized as harmful economically to Turkey and it was said "we staked 45 and got 3 in return" pointing to the economic losses in billion dollars and the US aid given to Turkey to compensate its losses (Hürriyet, 2002b). In addition, Turkey had to accept the presence of US military aircraft for the Operation Provide Comfort which provided autonomy to Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. General Doğan Güreş, who replaced Necip Torumtay upon his resignation, later claimed that the US forces in Operation Provide Comfort provided support to PKK by dropping material from planes and helicopters. He warned the US officials about it while ordering the forces in the area to shoot any US aircraft taking off without permission (Haber Vitrini, 2002). Interviewed by journalist Fikret Bila in 2007, he stated the same and argued that both the USA and EU want partition of Turkey and they want a smaller Turkey (Bila, 2007).

In this period Turkey felt that it was being encircled by an alliance of Greece, Syria, Armenia and Iran while some countries supported PKK's terrorist activities covertly. While bearing the burden of fight against terrorism with casualties, it was also criticized by its Western allies with regards to the human rights issues. The official strategy was declared by Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ in a paper titled *2 ½ War Strategy* (Elekdağ, 1996). It envisaged Turkey to militarily fight against two

countries and domestic PKK terror at the same time. The armed forces would be the main instrument of this policy. Turkey regarded its existence under threat and this understanding shaped its policies. While conducting military operations against PKK both inside Turkish and Iraqi territory, Turkey also came to the brink of war with Greece over the Kardak/Imia rocks in the Aegean (1996) and Syria (1998) over its support to PKK in the 1990s. Russia also tried to undermine stability in Turkey by supporting PKK and to show the world that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project that Turkey has been advocating for will be open to attacks and unreliable. Though it was not economic but strategically built pipeline, the talks for the pipeline that started in 1997 led to the beginning of construction in 2002 over the route Turkey suggested.

Thinking that its strategic importance decreased in the post-Cold War era, Turkey chose to cooperate with the USA though problems always existed between the two countries. As the first of all, Turkey started to use its military power as a tool by taking part in peacekeeping operations. Excluding the Korean War, Turkey sent its military forces abroad for the first time in the 1990s. Turkey sent a mechanized company to the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia in 1993 (UNITAF and later renamed as UNOSOM). Next year a Turkish general (Lieutenant General Çevik Bir) became the commander of the peacekeeping force (TAF, 2014b).

Baskın Oran notes that the success of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s mostly emanated from its cooperation with the US in areas such as the Balkans, Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus. However this success also had risks inside. Turkey's activism in these regions coincided with the periods the US also had interest in them. That is not acceptable for a middle power because it should have its

own policy with regards to these regions. Secondly it brings the risk of becoming a satellite of the hegemon power (Oran, 2005b, pp. 240-242).

In the Balkans, Turkey opted for cooperating with the US in contrast to Greece. This served to fulfill its foreign policy goals in the region. As İlhan Uzgel highlights "although Turkey is an important power by any criteria in the Balkans, its cooperation with the United States gave it more leverage in Balkan politics" (Uzgel, 2002, p. 65).The 1990s necessitated high profile Turkish activity in the Balkans. As Şule Kut notes "Balkans can safely be stated as a prime area of action, concern and interest for Turkey in post-Cold War era. This, however, is more imposed by regional developments than being the free choice of Turkey" (Kut, 1995, p. 295).

Turkey recognized all of the former Yugoslav republics on February 6, 1992 and official diplomatic relations started on August 22, 1992 (Ülger, 2006, p. 269). As the violence went on, Turkey needed to get involved deeply in the crisis. The public opinion saw the international community as an inactive and passive bystander in the Bosnian issue while Bosnians were massacred. Everywhere mass demonstrations were organized and some circles demanded unilateral military action by Turkey. However that was both diplomatically and militarily impossible. In addition to Russia, also the Balkan countries would not welcome unilateral Turkish intervention. Secondly, Turkey lacked the military capacity to conduct military operation in Bosnia. The Balkan countries closed their airspace for Turkish aircraft and in this case, lacking also any airbase in the region for refueling, Turkish aircraft could only stay in the skies of Bosnia for a few minutes (Uzgel, 2005c, p. 497). Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his book heavily criticizes the security policy of Turkey on this account. According to him, the fact that Turkish air squadrons cannot conduct military operation in Bosnia is the result of a security

policy that ignores Turkey's regional and global role and mainly based on protecting the borders. It is an example of 'minimizing the scale-*ölçek küçülmesi*' in foreign policy of a country (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 73)[57]. This fact shows that Turkey either should have necessary military complex consisting of air bases abroad, aircraft carrier and tanker aircraft or the cooperation and active participation of other actors in the region. Another solution would be benefitting from the military capabilities of the global hegemon. As we mentioned in Chapter 2, power projection capability and military bases abroad are still very important factors in the national power capacity. However, states also have to decide about their priorities while allocating their scarce sources. In this respect, while it is easy to criticize Turkey for lacking the power projection capacity to conduct operations in Bosnia, one should keep in mind that it had to organize its military forces with a focus on defending its territory rather than conducting military operations at the regional level during the Cold War years.

Still, Turkey managed to act as a responsible and reasonable regional actor (Kut, 1995, p. 295). Turkey used every possible opportunity to raise the Bosnia issue in the international organizations such as NATO, CSCE and ICO. It also tried to mobilize major powers and emphasized the importance of multilateral military action to stop violence (Robins, 2002, p. 346).

Turkey was a frequent stop for the parties of the conflict. Izzetbegovic visited Ankara on July 15, 1991 and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Safa Giray visited Sarajevo on August 30, 1991 (Kut, 1995, p. 297). According to Richard Holbrooke,

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[57] The air distance between İstanbul Atatürk Airport and the Sarajevo Airport is approximately 915 km. as mesaured by Google Maps Software. It increases to 1,964 km. if the route passing through the international air space in the Aegean and the Adriatic is used. The combat range for F16-C aircraft is 550 km. (with four 450 kg. bombs loaded on the aircraft) while its ferry range 4,220 km. with added drop tanks and no ordinance on the aircraft. It shows that Turkey could not conduct any operation in the area without having any bases, aircraft carrier or tanker aircraft. As we have mentioned in the previous pages, this experience in Bosnia urged Turkish authorities to procure tanker aircraft in the 1990s.

Süleyman Demirel was the most respected leader by Izzetbegovic (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 132). Other low-level diplomatic delegations visited Ankara too. On April 16-22, 1992, a Turkish diplomatic delegation visited Belgrade and Sarajevo and also met the Serbian leadership in Bosnia and heads of the EC and CSCE missions. Turkey urged other countries by sending letters to their presidents on the situation of Bosnia and also secured a fund from the Islamic Development Bank for humanitarian aid to Bosnia (Kut, 1995, p. 299). Turkey came up with a tangible plan to stop the violence in Bosnia. Named as the 'Plan of Action for Bosnia' it envisaged supporting economic sanctions with limited air operations. Hikmet Çetin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited the Western capitals in August 1992 to convince other actors of the necessity to use military force (Kut, 1995, p. 302). As Philip Robins notes, Turkey's activism "resulted in a new willingness on the part of international mediators to recognize and utilize a role for Turkey in the peace negotiations" and Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg paid a visit to Ankara in 1993 as Turkey worked for a rapprochement between the Croats and Bosniacs (Robins, 2002, p. 347). William Hale underlines the importance of Turkey as a country with Muslim population in eliminating the rise of radical Islamism in the Balkans during the crisis:

> In all these efforts, Turkey was evidently concerned to prevent independent initiatives by radical Muslim states like Iran, and to persuade the Western powers that it would be better to have Turkey, as an officially democratic, secular and pro-Western state, to head reactions by the Muslim world (Hale, 2002, p. 262).

The Croat-Bosniac rapprochement was one of the biggest contributions of Turkey in the Bosnian Crisis. The two factions have been fighting each other in Bosnia for control since 1992. Turkey realized that for stability in Bosnia and stop Serbian aggression it was vital to form a coalition between the two parties. President

of Croatia, Frandjo Tudjman had visited Ankara in April 1993. Tudjman acknowledged that Turkey was a major regional player and Croatia should strike up good relations with it. However Turkey was unwilling to play the mediator role. As the Bosnian government forces became better equipped and trained, the Croat forces started to suffer more and it was the main motivation for Tudjman's demand for mediation. As a result, at the invitation of Bosnian and Croatian governments, Hikmet Çetin took part in a tripartite meeting with representatives of both states in Zagreb on September 24, 1993. Another meeting took place in Sarajevo on November 12, 1993 and it was attended by the Croat Prime Minister Mate Granic, the highest ranking Croat to visit Bosnia since the onset of the conflict. Turkey's initiative was also supported by the USA and EC. Finally, the Washington Agreement that ended the war between the two parties was signed in March 1994. It was a diplomatic success for Turkey (Robins, 2002, pp. 370-371). The next month, Turkey and Bosnian governments wanted to include the Bosnian Serbs in the confederation and Turkey tried to play the mediator role again. However its initiative was rejected by the Serbs (Robins, 2002, p. 372).

Turkey also argued for the lifting of bans embargo on Bosnia which was trying to defend itself. While Russia and other countries provided arms for Serbia covertly, Turkey also did the same for Bosnia as Doğan Güreş (Chief of the General Staff) made clear upon his retirement. However he stated that the Croats confiscated[58] major part of these shipments (Milliyet, 1994). Richard Holbrooke also mentions this and also Iran's arms supplies to Bosnia. He had given a memorandum on the issue and the USA was aware that Croats took some part of these arms shipments for themselves as 'tax'. (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 33).

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[58] The Croats had control over the ports.

Turkey contributed to Operation Sharp Guard that aimed to support arms embargo on Serbia under the NATO command of Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and at one point its command was given to a Turkish admiral. Turkey devoted a task force in the size of a regiment to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the aim of forming safe zones between 1993 and 1995. Turkey also contributed to the air power that supported the UNPROFOR operations and deployed an F-16 squadron in Italy for the Operation Deny Flight (TAF, 2014b). However especially Turkey's participation in the UNPROFOR did not come easily. Turkey declared its willingness to devote troops to that force but the UN refused it on the grounds that countries with cultural or historical links with either side should be excluded. When it was announced in early 1994 that Russia, a pro-Serb country, will send its troops to Bosnia, this argument was weakened and Turkey was allowed to send 1,500 troops to Zeneca (Hale, 2002, p. 262).

The capture of Srebrenica and Zepa by the Serb forces and massacre of their inhabitants in July 1995, showed the validity of Turkey's arguments with regards to the military intervention. On 30 August, NATO air forces started attacks against Serb ground positions. It was the beginning of the Operation Deliberate Force and it lasted until 14 September. It brought the Serbian administration to the negotiation table and the Dayton Agreement which ended the war in Yugoslavia was signed on November 21, 1995 (Hale, 2002, p. 263). It is a clear example that, political and economic initiatives cannot always bear fruits when they are not supported with military force. The bombings that lasted about 15 days brought an end to the conflict while diplomatic initiatives that had been launched since 1991 failed to do so.

Following the Dayton Agreement Turkey increased it military presence to a brigade and it served under the IFOR and SFOR (TAF, 2014b). Turkey also took part in the US-led program to train and equip the army of the Muslim-Croat Federation (Hale, 2002, p. 263). However the importance of Bosnia in Turkish foreign policy agenda started to decrease once the hostilities ended. When İsmail Cem visited Bosnia in March 1998, he was the first Turkish foreign minister visiting the country for three years (Robins, 2002, p. 377). Despite some construction projects, Turkey's economic commitment to Bosnia lagged behind its diplomatic and military commitment. Turkey had promised for US$ 80 million credits but in reality it only granted US$ 26 million (Uzgel, 2002, p. 72). With regards to the trade, Turkey's trade remained at low levels. In exports it reached its maximum in 2002 with US$ 43 million and in imports it was at its maximum in 1999 with a figure of US$16 million (TUIK, 2014). Both the domestic developments (such as the economic problems) and crisis in the other regions limited Turkey's further involvement in the Balkans.

Turkey also tried to act as a mediator between the warring groups in northern Iraq: the KDP (led by Masood Barzani) and PUK (led by Jalal Talabani). Acting with the USA and Britain, Turkey managed to bring the two factions together and they signed the Ankara Agreement in October 1996. Turkey's own security concerns played a great role in this initiative. The clashes between these factions created a good environment for the PKK and they were also eager to form alliances with the PKK, Baghdad and Teheran to crush each other. The agreement stipulated that aid from outside parties (Iraq and Baghdad) was banned. A force consisting of Turcomans in Iraq would inspect the cease-fire between the two groups. However just after signing the agreement the KDP complained about these stipulations. The diplomatic negotiations went on in January; and in May 1997 a meeting was

organized in London to overcome the differences between the parties. Unfortunately, the efforts failed. A cease-fire between them was achieved later with a US initiative that resulted with the Washington Agreement in September 1998 (Robins, 2002, pp. 339-341).

Turkey came to the brink of war with Syria during the Mesut Yılmaz government. A supporter of PKK for long time, Syria was also host to the leader of it. In September 1998 at the NSC meeting Turkey emphasized its determination to fight terrorism and also the countries supporting it. On 16 September 1998, General Attila Ateş (Commander of the Land Forces) went to Reyhanlı (a town in the Hatay province at the Syrian border) and gave a speech there. He gave Syria's name openly as a country supporting terrorism and he went on to say that some neighbors misinterpret Turkey's goodwill. Finally he warned Syria by saying "we are running out of patience, if we do not get what we want, we will have all rights to implement other measures." Turkey resorted to coercive diplomacy and followed a policy of aggrandizement. Troops were transferred to the Syrian border and at the beginning of November military maneuvers that lasted one week at the Syrian border with the participation of 50,000 soldiers were organized (it was named Exercise Determination - Kararlılık Tatbikatı). Units from the land forces, navy and air force took part in the exercise and also the navy exercised a naval landing operation (Demir, 1998a).

At the same time, Turkey started a diplomatic campaign and presented a report to other countries which documented Syria's support to terrorism with photographs and other information (Demir, 1998b). While receiving the support of the USA in his policy against Syria, Turkey also left Syria space for peaceful resolution. Syria should keep the PKK terrorists out of its territory in order to avoid

war. According to General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, he was the Chief of the General Staff, who talked about the events in after his retirement at the end of a conference on terrorism at the Military Academy in 2005; Turkey had developed a multi-stage plan to deal with Syria. Turkey informed Husnu Mobarak, President of Egypt, and other states in the region and convinced them about Syria's role in terrorism. General Kıvrıkoğlu put forward that most of Syria's forces were concentrated near the Golan Heights and also two and half division was deployed in Lebanon. There was only a tank regiment, consisting about 100 tanks, on Turkey's border. According to him, with a clear superiority over Syria in military terms, Turkey had about 3000 tanks, it would first bomb some targets inside Syria with artillery and air force and if Syria prefers war, land forces were to invade Syria (Mercan, 2005). As a result of this policy, Hafez Assad had to accept Turkey's demands and expulsed Abdullah Öcalan, leader of PKK, on 9 October 1998. He travelled to countries such as Greece, Russia and Italy. Turkey applied diplomatic pressure on these countries and especially against Italy a boycott started in Turkey. At the end, thinking he was to fly to the Netherlands, he got on the airplane at Nairobi Airport and caught by a Turkish Special Forces team and he was brought to Turkey on 15 February 1999 (Milliyet, 2013d). After that, terrorist activities gradually decreased and ended in 2002.

Turkey tried to act as a mediator in two instances in 2002. They were initiatives started by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. The first instance was the coming war against Iraq. The Ecevit Administration wanted to avoid war and demanded from Iraq to comply with the requests of the UN with regards to the inspection of military facilities. Bülent Ecevit and his cabinet were strongly against the war as they knew that it would damage Turkish economy and destabilize the region as well causing direct security concerns for Turkey. Ecevit paid a visit to Washington and met with

President Bush in January 2002. However before the visit the US administration, aware of the tendencies of Ecevit with regards to Iraq, gave a message to Turkey. An anonymous high level official from the State Department talked to the daily Hürriyet on January 2, 2002. The official stated that Ecevit should not come to Washington with an offer of mediation for Iraq. If he does so the visit will not be much productive. He also implied that the official statements from Ankara in the recent months disturbed the Bush Administration (Cindemir, 2002). The second initiative was a result of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Turkey had improved its relations with Israel[59] in the 1990s, especially with the trade and defense cooperation agreements of 1996 that were signed in Necmettin Erbakan's term (Inbar, 2002, p. 153), and wanted to use its good relations with both sides to stop the violence that started with the Second Intifada. While Israeli forces laid siege to the headquarters of Arafat and the building lacked access to electricity and water, in September 2002 Bülent Ecevit declared that he will write a letter to President Bush about the situation and offer Turkish mediation to the parties after contacting them (Hürriyet, 2002a). He had claimed in 2000 in a TV program that Turkey can play the role of mediator. He stated that though both parties came very near to an agreement, the mistrust and also concerns for domestic politics avoided it. He also stated that both parties trust Turkey more than any other country in the world and they discuss proposals with Turkey that they refrain from discussing with each other. He concluded that on that issue Turkey can play an important role (Türkiye Gazetesi, 2000). However in 2002 his government had limited life. On November 3, 2002, just about two months after his plan to serve as mediator, the general elections took place and his party could not reach the threshold.

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[59] The relations with Israel helped Turkey in its effort to balance Syria in the region. It also led to Israel's increasing involvement in Turkey with regards to sale of arms and modernization such as the project to modernize the F-4 aircrafts and the M-60 tanks.

4.7. CONCLUSION

The new era brought many opportunities and risks for Turkey. In the ensuing environment of uncertainty, it tried to prove that its strategic importance did not vane. In this respect, even though it had sometimes problematic relations with the US, Turkey chose to side with the US while trying to protect its national interests. The ambitions to follow a very active foreign policy in some areas were obstructed by Turkey's power capabilities and domestic problems. It was best seen in the Central Asia and Caucasus and to some degree in the Balkans. In addition, Turkey's high profile foreign policy caused concerns in some countries and they tried to undermine Turkey's role in the emerging rivalry. Still, the 1990s witnessed important developments for Turkish foreign policy and despite its weaknesses; Turkey managed to conduct a busy foreign policy agenda with multi-regional approach. It refrained from taking unilateral steps and tried to influence other actors by using bilateral relations and international organizations. This was seen especially in the case of Bosnia where Turkey acted as the champion of the issue at various forums and tried to form a coalition to deal with it. It tried to establish new bodies to deal with the new issues of the era such as the foreign aid. While Turkey became aware of limits of its capabilities by experience in the field, it can be said that its foreign policy was mostly successful in the 1990s.

CHAPTER 5

5 TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE JDP RULE

5.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, firstly the changing dynamics at the systemic, regional and domestic level between the years 2002 and 2012 will be cited. A closer look at these developments will enable us to have a better understanding of under what circumstances the JDP-led Turkish foreign policy operated. It will show that as the US became more interventionist and unilateralist in its foreign policy, Russia started to increase its weight as an actor in the international politics and it sometimes also challenged the US and its allies on areas such as Georgia and Ukraine. Russia's return to the Middle East encouraged its allies like Iran and Syria. In addition, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 that led to the demise of the Saddam regime caused a power vacuum. As it was known as "Prussia of the Arabs" before, struggling with internal turmoil and state-building process, Iraq lost its importance in the Arab world as an actor. As these developments fueled anti-Americanism in the Middle East, Iran started to increase its influence especially in Shia populated areas like Iraq and Lebanon. In addition to Iran, other actors like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey tried to benefit from this new environment and wanted to increase their influence. Analyzing these factors will make understanding Turkish activism in the Middle East easier.

Secondly, the purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the foundations of the JDP's approach to foreign policy. Understanding the mindset of the cadres that shape the foreign policy, their preferences, perceptions and the world views will help us to explain changes in Turkish foreign policy. Citing the discourse adopted by the JDP cadres will highlight the reasons why Turkey searches a mediator role for itself.

Thirdly, since a literature on "the rise of Turkey" started to emerge, it is necessary to have a closer look at Turkey's power capacity. It will enable us to detect if there is an increase in the areas of hard and soft power capabilities and based on this knowledge to confirm or refute the arguments about Turkey's rise. In addition, it will make it easier to compare Turkey to other actors in the Balkans and Middle East with regards to candidacy to regional hegemony. Last but not least, it will provide us an insight into the tools and resources available to Turkey in its role as a mediator.

Finally, after examining Turkey's power capacity and changing discourses of foreign policy, the implementation of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans and Middle East will be summarized.

5.2. CHANGES AT THE STRUCTURAL LEVEL

Following the September 11 incident, under the Bush Administration the US adopted a more interventionist and unilateralist stance. The National Security Strategy that came into force in September 2002 had great emphasis on preventive strikes, fight against terrorism and weapons of mass-destruction (WMD) (The White House, 2002). Many believed that after Afghanistan, Iraq would be the next target.

To support this view, the CIA publicized a report about the WMD capacity of Iraq in October 2002. The report stated:

> Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (The Central Intelligence Agency, 2002, p. 3)

The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was against a war in Iraq. He expressed his concerns many times. As early as January 2002 he offered Turkish mediation to solve the crisis. However his efforts were not welcomed by the US. Just before his visit to the USA, in January 2002, a high level US official spoke to the daily Hürriyet anonymously and stated "we hope he will not offer mediation for Saddam, in that case, the visit would not be much fruitful" (Hürriyet, 2002c). Still Ecevit continued his efforts and tried to convince Saddam Hussein to accept the demands of the UN weapons inspectors. In March 2002, he made it clear that he did not want war. Defining a possible war on Iraq as unnecessary, he wanted the USA to help end the war in Palestine rather than declaring war on Iraq (Hürriyet, 2002d). As the US became more prone and the war on Iraq became a possibility more than a scenario, on November 3, 2002 general elections took place in Turkey and Ecevit and his coalition allies even failed to get enough votes to reach the 10% threshold. The newly established JDP secured the 37% of the votes and came to power (AKP, 2013).

The war against Iraq also strained the relations with the European allies of the USA. France and Germany opposed the war however other countries who were destined to be EU members by 2004, mostly Central and East European countries,

supported the US position. This led to Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld's statement on the "old Europe" which caused outrage in France and Germany (BBC, 2003).

In addition to the deaths caused by the war in Iraq, internal instability and establishment of a pro-American government, the failure to find stocks of WMD also contributed to increasing anti-Americanism in the world. Following the occupation 1,625 UN and US inspectors spent two years searching 1,700 sites for the WMD. However they could not find the expected stocks or production sites (Borger, 2004). Furthermore the leakage of torture photographs taken at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad created another wave of anti-American sentiment especially in the Muslim world. As the second purpose of the war was to bring democracy and human rights to Iraq, with these events people started to question reliability of the US more and many started to argue that the US is looting the oil resources of Iraq (Renner, 2003). In his book titled *The Second Chance* Zbigniew Brzezinski compared the three American presidents and their foreign policies. The chapter for G. W. Bush is titled as "the Catastrophic Leadership". He criticizes Bush because his policies caused "a calamitous damage to America's global standing" and the lies on the Iraq's WMDs weakened the US position on Iran and North Korea and as a result "discredited America's global leadership" and weakened American soft power. (Brzezinski, 2007, pp. 46-47). He also underlines the damage caused by Bush to the US image in the world: "Because of Bush's self-righteously unilateral conduct of U.S. foreign policy after 9/11, the evocative symbol of America in the eyes of much of the world ceased to be the Statue of Liberty and instead became the Guantanamo prison camp" (Brzezinski, 2007, p. 185). A survey conducted by the Pew Global, showed that

favorable view of the US decreased dramatically in the Muslim world and even in the US allies in Europe as seen in Table 5.1 below. It is interesting that in Turkey in 2006 the US was even less favorable than any other Muslim countries.

Table 5.1 Favorable Opinion of the US

	1999/ 2000 %	2002 %	2003 %	2004 %	2005 %	2006 %
Great Britain	83	75	70	58	55	56
France	62	63	43	37	43	39
Germany	78	61	45	38	41	37
Spain	50	--	38	--	41	23
Russia	37	61	36	47	52	43
Indonesia	75	61	15	--	38	30
Egypt	--	--	--	--	--	30
Pakistan	23	10	13	21	23	27
Jordan	--	25	1	5	21	15
Turkey	52	30	15	30	23	12
Nigeria	46	--	61	--	--	62
Japan	77	72	--	--	--	63
India	--	54	--	--	71	56
China	--	--	--	--	42	47

1999/2000 survey trends provided by the Office of Research, U.S. Department of State

Source: (Pew Global, 2007)

Russia had suffered from economic crisis in the 1990s and this had decreased the military capacity of the country. The defense budget was overly limited and procurement of the new equipment was stopped. Even the low salary payments of the officer corps were not made regularly and as a result many officers had to work at second jobs, mostly for manual labor at the weekends. No divisional level military

exercise had taken place since 1992. As Benjamin Lambeth emphasized in 1995 as the bus drivers of Moscow received a higher salary than fighter pilots, the experienced and talented personnel of the armed forces started to leave their military career (Lambeth, 1995). However Russia's fortune started to change especially after Vladimir Putin came to power first as prime minister and then acting president in 1999 and president in 2000. He, through an autocratic rule, provided stability to the country and established a state monopoly on the revenue bringing sectors such as the oil and natural gas sectors. He was also helped by the increasing oil prices following the September 11 events. With the reforms conducted by Putin and increasing energy prices, Russian economy grew annually at an average 7% until the global economic crisis in 2008 (Marson & Kolyandr, 2013). The Russian defense expenditures can be seen in Figure 5.1 below:


Figure 5.1 Military Expenditures of Russia
(in constant 2011 USD billion)*

* Estimations by SIPRI

Source: (SIPRI, 2014)

As seen in the figure above, from 1998 on Russia started to increase its military expenditures. From the year 2000 on, it started to rise dramatically. These figures are a clear reflection of Russia's political and economic recovery. Still, Russia under Putin's rule refrained from challenging the USA. Russia benefited from the "global war against terrorism" discourse of the Bush Administration especially in Chechnya and it provided cooperation opportunities to the USA (such as access to the military bases and intelligence sharing) following September 11 (Sakwa, 2004, p. 217). Though Russia opposed the war in Iraq especially without a UNSC resolution, its criticisms remained at an acceptable level. Still following the invasion of Iraq, in addition to the German and French firms, Russian firms were also excluded from the bids for the reconstruction of Iraq (Jehl, 2003). Furthermore, the new regime in Baghdad cancelled all agreements made in the Saddam era and as a result Lukoil's agreement made in 1998 (for the exploitation of oil reserves in the West Qurnah-2) was cancelled (Kennedy C. , 2011).

The real deterioration in the bilateral relations started with the so-called "color revolutions". In Georgia following the elections for the parliament in November 2003 people started protests that led to the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze. With the Rose Revolution a pro-Western leader Mikheil Saakashvili came to power. In the same way, following the presidential elections in Ukraine in December 2004, people protested against the fraud cases in favor of pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovich. Supporters of the pro-Western candidate Victor Yushchenko started countrywide sit-ins and strikes which came to be known as the Orange Revolution. As a result, the election results were annulled and in elections that took place in December 2004, Yushchenko secured 52% of the votes (Karatncky, 2005). Comparing the attitude of Russian and Chinese press to the color

revolutions, Jeanne L. Wilson argues that the press in both countries regarded them as the result of activities of the Western-supported NGOs. Feeling threatened, Russia enacted new laws to prohibit NGOs receive funding from foreign sources (Wilson, 2014). NATO's enlargement in the Central and Eastern Europe and scenarios for membership of Georgia and Ukraine further alarmed Russia. As a result Russian foreign policy became more aggressive and Putin did not refrain from confronting the US in many areas. As Leon Aron put forward, the undeclared Putin Doctrine aims at "the recovery of economic, political, and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state in 1991" (Aron, 2013). Russia used especially natural gas as a weapon to punish the pro-Western regime in Ukraine. In January 2006, due to the disagreements between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices, Russia cut off the gas supply. Many European countries were affected by the crisis as the pipelines passed through Ukraine (BBC, 2006). When Kosovo declared its independence and many Western countries recognized it in 2008, Putin opposed this step, calling it a "terrible precedent" and warned: "They have not thought through the results of what they are doing. At the end of the day it is a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and hit them in the face". (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2008)

It used the conflicts in Georgia, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to increase Russian influence over the country. The two regions, parts of Georgia, had claims for independence and they were supported by Russia and Russia had military units in those areas as a part of peace-keeping mission. Using the clashes between the Georgian military units and Ossetian militants and as a result death of a few Russian soldiers as a pretext; on the night of August 7 Russia started military operations against Georgia and units marched easily into the country. The authorities in Georgia claimed that the Georgian troops withdrew to defend the capital city, Tbilisi. The

Russian forces approached approximately 30 km. to the city (Harding, 2008). Nicholas Sarkozy, President of France, conducted shuttle-diplomacy to broker a cease-fire plan and he succeeded in that and the agreement was reached on August 12 (BBC, 2008a). It is reported that Putin wanted to topple the Georgian leader Saakashvili by force. Jean-David Levitte, the chief advisor to Sarkozy who took part in the negotiations, made interesting statements. It revealed that Putin took the invasion of Iraq and hanging of Saddam Hussein as an example and though his country also had the same right. He said to Sarkozy "I am going to hang Saakashvili by the balls". Sarkozy asked in surprise "Hang him?" He replied "Why not? The Americans hanged Saddam Hussein" (The Telegrapgh, 2008). On August 26, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev signed an order that recognized the two secessionist republics in Georgia as independent states (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) in a similar fashion to Kosovo[60].

It was a real set-back for the US diplomacy as the US could not do much to protect its ally and Russia won a clear victory. It also showed the importance of having access to the seas. Due to the Montreux Convention, as a non-littoral state the US faced many limitations even when deploying a destroyer (tonnage and duration limitations) to provide humanitarian aid to Georgia. It also showed the importance of hard power capabilities. Not only militarily, but from an economic point of view Russia had leverage over Georgia. Following the war Saakashvili lost his popularity. As he could not run as a candidate due to constitutional reasons in the elections that took place in 2013, the candidate he supported only received 22% of the votes. Georgy Margvelashvili received 62% of the votes (The Economist, 2013). Georgia

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[60] Following the Russian occupation of Crimea and the referanda that resulted with the decision of joining to Russia in 2014, Putin again made a reference to Kosovo and argued that the case of Crimea is similar to Kosovo: "In a situation absolutely the same as the one in Crimea, they recognized Kosovo's secession from Serbia as legitimate while arguing that no permission from a country's central authority for a unilateral declaration of independence is necessary" (Fox News, 2014).

started to make up with Russia by realizing the realities of the political and economic conditions. Russia had enough tools to punish Georgia and cause a policy and even leadership change: "Travel to Russia, even to visit relatives or work, became difficult while Georgian companies found themselves cut out of their most important market" (BBC, 2013a).

The discourse adopted by the Bush administration that focused on importing democracy to other countries, if necessary by force, also alienated the autocratic regimes in Central Asia. As Russia and China themselves are autocracies, they do not mind doing business with these regimes. As a result, the US lost its influence in these areas and Central Asian states came closer to Russia and China. Especially China needs the hydrocarbon resources of the region to sustain its enormous economic growth. Alexei Vlasov points out to the increasing Chinese influence in Central Asia:

> Eighty percent of goods sold in Kyrgyzstan are made in China. As for loans, they are mostly issued for the purchase of Chinese goods, and in this way Beijing not only consolidates its position as the main creditor of Central Asian regimes, it also boosts its own economy. China uses Kyrgyzstan for the transit of its goods to the CIS markets, while Kazakhstan continuously supplies hydrocarbons for the Chinese economy. This is a simple but very effective division of labor (Vlasov, 2012).

The increasing US unilateralism caused further rapprochement between China, Russia and the Central Asian states. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which was established in 1996, started to get more attention. Uzbekistan joined in 2001. From 2003 on, activities in the field of security cooperation began. It includes intelligence sharing, anti-terrorist activities and military exercises. From 2005 on, Russia and China started to conduct large-scale military exercises, named Peace Mission (Andrew, 2005). Other SCO members also contributed troops to the

next exercises. These developments caused alert in the US for its future in Central Asia (Petersen, 2011).

The Bush administration, in addition to the popularity abroad, lost its domestic popularity too. His policies that caused high losses in Iraq were not approved by the US public. He witnessed the historic low-level approval rates among the US presidents. In a poll conducted in May 2006 by CBS News and New York Times showed that his approval rate was as low as 31% and just three years before the end of his term, he was called as "lame duck" (Meyer, 2006). As a result, the candidate from the Democrat Party, Barack Obama, who built his presidential campaign on slogans like change and hope, won the presidential elections on November 4, 2008. He had also made it clear that he is in favor of US troops' withdrawal from Iraq. As he received public support for this policy, the US withdrawal was completed at the end of 2011. The US failure in state-building in Iraq and withdrawal of the US troops, were criticized in the following years as Iraq went into chaos (Brownlee, 2014). The Obama era in the US foreign policy resembles the Khrushchev era in the Soviet Union in which the previous era, Stalin's era, was heavily criticized and policies were reversed. In this respect the Obama administration left the policy of relying on hard power and unilateralism of the Bush era. He tried to mend the fences with the US allies and increase the prestige, popularity and soft power of the US globally. The Bush era foreign policy was especially regarded among Muslim communities on the world as an undeclared war on Islam. His mistake to name the War on Terror as a "crusade" (Bush, 2001) caused concerns in the Muslim communities. Upon his inauguration on January 20, 2009, he organized a visit to the Middle East in June. The speech he gave at Cairo University on June 4, 2009, titled "Remarks on a New Beginning" is an important source for

observing the US policy change. At the beginning of his speech he greeted the audience in Muslim style by saying "Assalaamu alaykum". Citing passages from the Holy Quran and emphasizing the Muslim identity of his father's family he stated that "America is not – and never will be – at war with Islam" (Obama, 2009). He then put forward that Islam is a part of America and the Muslims enjoy freedom there:

> Moreover, freedom in America is indivisible from the freedom to practice one's religion. That is why there is a mosque in every state in our union, and over 1,200 mosques within our borders. That's why the United States government has gone to court to protect the right of women and girls to wear the hijab and to punish those who would deny it (Obama, 2009).

He then criticized the wrong acts committed by the Bush administration such as detention of Muslims in Guantanamo prison without any proper reason and violation of human rights:

> And finally, just as America can never tolerate violence by extremists, we must never alter or forget our principles. Nine-eleven was an enormous trauma to our country. The fear and anger that it provoked was understandable, but in some cases, it led us to act contrary to our traditions and our ideals. We are taking concrete actions to change course. I have unequivocally prohibited the use of torture[61] by the United States, and I have ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed by early next year (Obama, 2009).

He also touched upon the Palestine Question and while accepting the special bonds between the USA and Israel, he expressed his sympathy towards the Palestinian people who suffer from the Israeli occupation and violence. He opposed the Israeli plans for new settlements in the occupied territories. His remarks about Iran were also important as he gave signals for negotiations and dialogue in contrast to the Bush administration. However he also made clear the US opposition to Iran's

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[61] In December 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee published its report on the CIA's brutal interrogation techniques against detainees captured after the September 11 events. It heavily criticized the CIA and Bush administration and caused a hot debate (Sanchez, 2014).

initiative to produce nuclear weapons. Citing the historical enmity between the two countries he stated the following:

> Rather than remain trapped in the past, I've made it clear to Iran's leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward. The question now is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build. […] I recognize it will be hard to overcome decades of mistrust, but we will proceed with courage, rectitude, and resolve. There will be many issues to discuss between our two countries, and we are willing to move forward without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect. But it is clear to all concerned that when it comes to nuclear weapons, we have reached a decisive point. This is not simply about America's interests. It's about preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead this region and the world down a hugely dangerous path (Obama, 2009).

The US decision to leave unilateralism and stop relying solely on military power made another war in the Middle East, in a similar fashion to the Iraq War, less possible in the Obama era. Russia's shift to a more aggressive and assertive foreign policy had reflections especially in the Middle East following the Iraq War. In the Balkans, the EU enlargement process which led to the membership of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013 and the membership vision of other Balkan countries made the EU one of the most influential actors in the region. In the next part, developments at the regional level in the Balkans and Middle East will be touched upon.

5.3. CHANGES AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

The Coalition Forces completed the invasion in a relatively short time. However the real task was to provide stability and establish state institutions in Iraq from the beginning. That was not easy. The US disbanded many of the state establishment and fired former staff of the security bureaucracy assuming that as all

being pro-Saddam it would not be possible to work with them. However it was a great mistake and the ensuing violence in the country was attributed to this mistake later. It seems that the British authorities planned to cooperate with the Iraqi Army in the post-invasion era for maintaining order in the country. But the US administration refused to accept this idea and decided to disband the army (Taylor R. N., 2004). The new political structure also contributed to the increasing levels of violence. A country with a majority Shia population, Iraq used to be ruled by Sunni groups. With the elections, the Shia majority managed to control the country while this alienated the Sunni groups who used to rule the country. The country is almost split up into three parts along ethnic and sectarian lines: the Sunni Kurds in the north, the Sunni Arabs in the center and Shia Arabs in other areas. Though the Shia groups, especially led by Jurist Muqteda Al-Sadr, are in power, they are not in control of the country as one observer noted (Cockburn, 2013).

As mentioned above the US initiatives that risked national interests of Russia, made Russia follow a more aggressive foreign policy from 2005 on. An authority on the issue, Marcel de Haas, defines the Russian foreign policy between 2000 and 2004 (Putin's first term at the office as president) as "pro-Western" and the period from 2004 to 2008 as "assertive stance to the West". He identifies the threat caused by the regime changes in Russia's near abroad and increasing Russian self-sufficiency in the field of economics due to the increasing energy prices as the main reasons beyond this policy shift (de Haas, 2010, pp. 156-157). Russia's presence in the Middle East was relatively limited before this time though it was still a member of the Quartet for the Palestine Question. It had stopped selling weapons and arms to Syria for example not to alienate Washington and Tel Aviv. For many with 2005 on Russia "returned" to the Middle East and this also signed the "return of geopolitics"

as Walter R. Mead emphasized while pointing to the risks caused by the "revisionist powers":

> But Westerners should never have expected old-fashioned geopolitics to go away. They did so only because they fundamentally misread what the collapse of the Soviet Union meant: the ideological triumph of liberal capitalist democracy over communism, not the obsolescence of hard power. China, Iran, and Russia never bought into the geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War, and they are making increasingly forceful attempts to overturn it. That process will not be peaceful, and whether or not the revisionists succeed, their efforts have already shaken the balance of power and changed the dynamics of international politics (Mead, 2014).

An expert on Russia, Bobo Lo, in his detailed study comparing the Yeltsin and Putin eras in Russian foreign policy points out geopolitical imperatives continue to dominate the policy:

> Notwithstanding increasing recourse to economic methods and the sanitization of public presentation, both the underlying spirit and the end-game of Russian foreign policy remain firmly centered in the primacy of geopolitical imperatives (Lo, 2002, p. 171).

Michael Weiss argues that "Russia's restoration in the Middle East has been built upon America's abdication" while defining Putin's objective as "to offer himself as a steady alternative to a fickle Obama: a partner in arms deals and Security Council obstruction who won't run away or downgrade a relationship over such trivia as human rights, mass murder or *coups d'état*" (Weiss, 2013).

Russia started to support Syria more from 2005 on. It used its membership in the UNSC to veto a resolution that envisaged imposing sanctions on Syria due to its alleged role in the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Al-Hariri. Next year Russia made a contract with Syria for selling air defense missiles (the Strelets). (Kreutz, 2007, p. 31) With Iran too, Russia started a process of

rapprochement. Russia had shied away from building the Bushehr Nuclear Plant by using some tactics, such as using technical difficulties as pretext, to gain time. It was actually to be finished in 1999 according to the agreement made in 1994. When the relations with the US were cordial in the 1990s Russia did not want to risk them by supporting Iran. Also Russia was not in favor a very strong Iran as it would later pose a threat to Russian interests in the region. However the relations continued and Iran found a source of technology and know-how in Russia in addition to Russia's protecting role in the UNSC. As Shireen Hunter notes "despite the Russian show of unreliability, Iran continued its efforts for expanded relations with Moscow. Russia, meanwhile, stopped just short of totally abandoning Iran and instead used the Iran card to get concessions from the West" (Hunter, 2010, p. 113). Iran stopped its nuclear activities in 2003 following the US invasion of Iraq. On these days the possibility of war against Iran or Syria was on the table and discussed everywhere. This forced Iran to find ways to accommodate with the US to avert the danger of war:

> It is clear that the United States' initial successes in the Iraq war had encouraged Iran to suspend their nuclear weapons-related activities. The arrival of the United States on Iran's border was rightly seen as a formidable challenge by Tehran (Ehteshami A. , Iran and Its Immediate Neighborhood, 2008, p. 132).

The US intervention in Iraq also urged Syria and Iran to increase their level of cooperation. Since the beginning of the US occupation of Iraq, Syria and Iran have intensified their contacts and tried to coordinate their policies to meet the new challenge (Goodarzi, 2006, p. 293). In 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president in Iran. When compared to his predecessor, Khatami, he was more radical in his views. Iran stopped cooperating with the international community and started

nuclear activities again. This change is also explained by other factors, especially

Iran's rich energy sources, in addition to leadership change as Roger Howard puts

forward:

> The key difference was not the election as premier of the hot-headed
> Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who came to power in the summer of 2005, but the
> rise in the price of oil from a relatively meager $33 per barrel in early 2004 to
> a peak of $70 in August the following year. Not only did this make the
> passage of meaningful sanctions impossible but it also gave Tehran scope to
> threaten retaliation against its critics while rewarding those countries, notably
> China, that took its side (Howard, 2007, p. xii).

It can also be added that Iran's power increased in the region thanks to the US

invasion of Iraq. As the first of all, Iran got rid of a hostile Saddam Hussein regime.

Once a remarkable military power, Iraq has to build its state institutions from the

beginning and provide internal stability so it lost its influence in region's fate.

Secondly, due to the political elections, the Shia majority gained control of Iraq's

administration and this also served to Iran's interests. It can be claimed that Iraq

today is a part of the Shia Crescent stretching from Iran to Lebanon. As Emma Sky

observes Iran became the most influential actor in Iraq:

> Iran is undeniably the most influential external actor in Iraq today. This was
> not pre-ordained when the United States-led coalition overthrew the staunchly
> anti-Iranian regime of Saddam Hussein: Iraq and Iran had fought a bloody
> conventional war from 1980 to 1988. Rather, it is the outcome of Iraq's
> internal divisions that lead its elites to turn to external powers for support in
> domestic affairs (Sky, 2013).

Iran also started to develop new military equipment such as Shahed 285

attack helicopter and Shahab 3 (1300-1800 km. range) Medium Range Ballistic

Missiles (MRBM). Its upgraded version, Ghadr is announced to have a range of 2000

km. (Fars News, 2007).

Iran's leader Ahmadinejad used the anti-American and anti-Israeli discourse heavily and this led his popularity to rise among the Muslim world, especially in the Arab regimes whose leaders cannot even criticize Israel properly. He stated:

> The nations of the region will soon finish off the usurper Zionists in the Palestinian land.... A new Middle East will definitely be formed. With the grace of God and help of the nations, in the new Middle East there will be no trace of the Americans and Zionists (France 24, 2012).

Other developments also increased his prestige. In July 2006, Israel started a 33 days military operation against the Iran-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon. It was a failure for Israel in military terms. As an Israeli government report after the operation stated "inconclusive 33-day war with Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon undermined the military deterrence Israelis consider indispensable to their survival" (Knickmeyer, 2008). Ahmadinejad, aware that both due to ethnic and sectarian differences, Iran should emphasize common Islamic ties in order to increase standing of Iran in the Muslim world and especially in the Sunni Arab world. He portrayed Iran as the only power to destroy the plans of the USA and Israel against Muslims. It seems that this policy seemed to work well for Ahmedinejad. In 2008 he visited Istanbul and attended the Friday prayer at the Sultan Ahmet Mosque. A space was arranged for him at the front part of the mosque but he refused to go there and took his place among ordinary people. Following the prayer, the congregation wanted to see him and the crowd caused problems so the *imam* had to warn people to show their respect to the guest outside of the mosque. He was greeted with *takbir*. Many people tried to kiss his hand to show respect while some greeted him with slogans like "Mujaheed Ahmadinejad". Outside of the mosque people again came together to salute him and he got out of the car to salute people where they shouted slogans in favor of him. Due to the high interest in him, the Turkish security teams responsible for protecting

him had hard times (Radikal, 2008). Next day he commented on his attendance of the prayer at the Sultan Ahmet Mosque, naming it as "a great political event". At this point we should emphasize that it is an important move because due to the Shia/Sunni divide normally members of these sects have their own mosques and do not attend prayers in other sect's mosques. However it was a good public relations initiative for Iran. Ahmedinejad also emphasized the importance of his act by saying:

> Is not my presence there as a president a great political event? Islam is beyond the political borders. It is much bigger. The Friday prayer brings politics and worshipping together[62]. The reason for me being together with Turkish people is to show that I am with them and from this perspective it is a great political act (Deutsche Welle, 2008).

Iran's popularity was at high levels in the 2000s. A public poll conducted in 2006 by the Arab American Institute showed that Iran was very popular in the Arab countries ranging from 68% to 82%. Naturally, the military buildup of Iran worries other countries in the Middle East. Especially after the invasion of Iraq, it is possible to mention that in the absence of Egypt and Iraq as influential actors, the power vacuum enabled Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to play bigger roles in the region. The increasing power and influence of Iran, the perception that it follows a sectarian foreign policy in the Middle East and especially during the Arab Spring uprising of the Shia groups in Bahrain, seem to have caused great fears about Iran and as a result its popularity started to decline in the eyes of Arabs. It seems due to the sectarian ties its influence is still strong in Lebanon. Many believe that Iran plays a negative role in the Middle East. The results of the public poll conducted by the same institution for 2011 can be seen below:

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[62] According to the state tradition in Muslim states, two things are essential for claiming independence. First one is having the ruler's name read in the Friday prayers during the *hutba* and the second is to have his name on the coins.

Figure 5.2 Iran's Popularity in the Arab Countries
**Survey includes all Arabs in UAE, not just nationals.

Source: (Zogby, 2011, p. 3)

The so-called Arab Spring began in December 2010 after a young, unemployed man, Mohamed Bouazizi, set fire to himself in Tunisia. It erupted into mass protests all over the country and President Abidine bin Ali had to resign in January 2011 (BBC, 2013b). The mass protests spread to other Arab countries with long history of economic poverty, autocratic rule and corruption. In Egypt President Hosni Mubarak resigned in February 2011 after ruling the country for 29 years following the protests and death of 846 people. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces started to rule the country for a transition period and in the presidential elections that took place in June 2012, Mohammad Norsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Justice and Development Party won 51% of the votes and was elected as president (Al Jazeera, Celebration in Egypt as Morsi declared winner, 2012a).

In addition to Egypt, Islamist parties won victories in other Arab countries. In Tunisia En-Nahda won a clear victory in the elections in October 2011 (The Guardian, 2011). In Morocco, the Party of Justice and Development secured the majority in the general elections in November 2011 (BBC, 2011a). In Libya protests against the Gaddafi rule began in February 2011 and the events led to a civil war. With a humanitarian intervention, NATO conducted military operation and overthrew the Gaddafi regime. He was killed in Sirte in August 2011. However since then all efforts to stabilize the country failed. Following the humanitarian intervention, the Western oil companies started to control the oil resources of Libya such as the French company Total. Russian, Chinese and Brazilian companies that had vast contracts with the Gaddafi regime lost their position. One Russian official commented "We have lost Libya completely" (Russian Times, 2011). In Bahrain, a country with majority Shia population under minority Sunni rule, unrest started in February 2011. However the security forces, with direct military help from Saudi Arabia, crushed the revolt (BBC, 2013b).

In Syria, the protests that began in Deraa in March 2011 ignited a civil war in the country. It is estimated that 191,000 people lost their lives during the course of the conflict (Bruce, 2014). Russian support has been vital for the Assad regime's survival. Russia obstructed all initiatives in the UNSC that would lead to a humanitarian intervention in Syria. In September 2013, it is believed that after the alleged chemical weapons attack in Syria, a US military intervention against Syria was only stopped by Russia's reaction. Putin warned that Russia would come to Syria's aid in case of a US attack (Fox News, 2013). Vladimir Putin, in a column

published in the New York Times on September 11, 2013 warned the US public

opinion about the consequences of a military intervention against Syria:

> The potential strike by the United States against Syria, despite strong opposition from many countries and major political and religious leaders, including the pope, will result in more innocent victims and escalation, potentially spreading the conflict far beyond Syria's borders. A strike would increase violence and unleash a new wave of terrorism. It could undermine multilateral efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and further destabilize the Middle East and North Africa. It could throw the entire system of international law and order out of balance (Putin, 2013).

In the face of Russian reaction, a solution was found that aimed at destroying

the chemical weapons stocks of Syria with Assad's cooperation. Russia brokered and

supported this solution and it was able to convince Assad thanks to Russia's leverage

on Syria. According to Max Fisher, it is possible to identify four reasons for Russia's

support to Syria:

1) Russia has a naval installation in Syria, which is strategically important and Russia's last foreign military base outside the former Soviet Union[63].

2) Russia still has a bit of a Cold War mentality, as well as a touch of national insecurity, which makes it care very much about maintaining one of its last military alliances.

3) Russia also hates the idea of "international intervention" against countries like Syria because it sees this as Cold War-style Western imperialism and ultimately a threat to Russia.

4) Syria buys a lot of Russian military exports, and Russia needs the money (Fisher, 2013).

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[63] Russia courted with Cyprus and Montenegro to obtain a naval base however its efforts failed due to the reactions of the USA and EU.

Not only Russia, but also China and Iran support the Assad regime (Yan, 2013). Especially Iran sees Syria as its chief regional ally. Syria, a country with a Sunni majority is ruled by the Nusayris who are closer to Shia Iran. Iran is also aware that if a pro-American regime would be established in Syria, Iran would lose its only ally in the region and a military intervention against Iran would become easier. In addition, Syria provides a corridor of communication for Iran with the Hezbollah in Lebanon. For these reasons, Iran supports the regime in Syria by providing weapons, elite troops and military specialists (Saul & Hafezi, 2014).

On the other side of the coin, the Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia are acting as a "Sunni bloc" to oust Assad. One Saudi official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, commented that "Syria is Iran's entry into the Arab world, take down Assad and you inflict a strategic blow on Iran" (Sullivan, 2012). It has been publicly known that Saudi Arabia's chief of Intelligence Agency, Prince Bandar bin Sultan urged the Obama administration for a military operation against Syria. It is alleged that during his visit to Putin on July 31, 2013 he offered to buy up to $15 billion of Russian weapons if Moscow agreed to cease its support of Assad and stop blocking future UN Security Council resolutions on Syria but Russia refused the offer. Russian authorities denied any bargaining on this issue (Recknagel, 2013). It has been claimed that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar funded and supported different radical groups in Syria which later turned out to be the Islamic State (ISIS). It is claimed that these countries did not directly support the radical groups in Syria but the militants they supported later changed their side and started to work with the

radical groups (Stephens, 2014). It has also been claimed that the oil bought by Turkey from the ISIS constitutes a major source of revenue:

> ISIS is taking in about $1 million a day from all sources. The largest source of cash now, say U.S. officials, is oil smuggling along the Turkish border, with ISIS leaders willing to sell oil from conquered Syrian and Iraqi fields for as little as $25 a barrel, a quarter of the going world price (Windrem, 2014).

It is obvious that there are also disagreements among the Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates ceased its support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and rather gave a quick support and recognition to the military regime established by General Sisi following the military coup on July 3, 2013. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE provided the Sisi regime foreign aid worth of $12 billion. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt risked the legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty as Maha Azzam observed:

> What they had was a lethal equation, democracy plus Islamism, albeit under the Muslim Brotherhood. That was a lethal concoction in undermining the kingdom's own legitimacy in the long run. They know full well they do not want democracy, but to have another group representing Islam was intolerable (Hearst, 2013).

On the other hand, Qatar and Turkey supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and condemned the military coup. Turkey's stance caused a deep split with the Gulf countries except Qatar (Jones, 2013). It is argued that Qatar's stance is motivated by two factors: 1) To maximize Qatar's influence on the regional and international stage 2) In the face of rivalry with its stronger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, Qatar's objective has been to preserve the security of the ruling family and state by supporting the Brotherhood (Boghardt, 2014).

In this period important developments took place in the Balkans too. Following the Yugoslav Wars, the US became involved in state-building in Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Kosovo. The EU also became involved in that process. By the end of 2004, the European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) replaced the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR). This decade witnessed the emergence of two new states in the Balkans. A referendum was held in Montenegro on May 21, 2006 for independence. The result was in favor of independence (55.5%) and Montenegro seceded from Serbia (FOX News, 2006). With this decision, Serbia lost its direct access to the Adriatic and became a landlocked state. Following the war in 1998-1999, Kosovo started to be ruled by international governance. As the discussions about its status went on, on February 17, 2008 the Kosovar Parliament declared independence (BBC, Kosovo MPs proclaim independence, 2008b). Since Serbia considered Kosovo an integral part of Serbia applied to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that independence of Kosovo violates the international law. However the ICJ decided that (on July 22, 2010) Kosovo's independence is legal. (Beaumount, 2010) The EU got involved in the state-building efforts in Kosovo by deploying the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), a unit consisting of 2,000 personnel including police officers, judges and prosecutors. It replaced the UN-led United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The EULEX became fully operational in April 2009. In addition to the 28 EU countries, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States contribute to its efforts (EULEX, 2014).

The EU also became more influential in the region due to the membership vision of the Balkan countries. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria became members while in July 2013 Croatia also became a member state. Croatia became the second former Yugoslav state (following Slovenia) that completed the EU accession process

(European Parliament, 2014). The membership visions of the Balkan countries provided the EU with a considerable level of leverage over these countries while creating also an incentive for reforms. As it is necessary to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria to become a candidate country for membership, it is vital for the Balkan states to have regimes based on the rule of law, democracy and respect to human rights with a functioning market economy. In addition, the countries should solve their border problems and other problems with their neighbors in order to sign Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Then they can get the candidate status and start accession talks. Currently, only Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are candidate countries while Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are the potential candidates (The European Commission, 2014a).

The EU used this leverage to broker an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia in order to normalize their relations. After 10 rounds of talks chaired by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, prime ministers of Serbia (Ivica Dacic) and Kosovo (Hashim Thaci) signed the Brussels Agreement on April 19, 2013. It provided some sort of autonomy to Serbs living in northern Kosovo on the fields of education, health, policing and courts. In return, Serbia agreed not to block Kosovo's path to the EU membership. Just three days after signing the agreement, on April 22, the EU's General Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council decided to start accession negotiations with Serbia and to start SAA negotiations with Kosovo (Vasovic & Pawlak, 2013). The EU conditionality forced both countries to come to terms.

Also the EU provides Structural Funds to the EU members in the Balkans and Pre-Accession Assistance (PAA) to the countries that started negotiations with the

EU. PAA induces the candidate and potential candidates to establish liberal economic systems which are beneficial for the EU. Arnaud Kurze explains the role of PAA in the reform process in the Balkan countries:

> […] if the EU inducements are linked to a tangible goal, such as EU membership, they then incite candidate countries to implement political and economic reforms because eventually they strive to receive the next aid package (Kurze, 2009).

The benefits of the EU membership with regards to the funds can be seen in the table below. While the smaller amount of PAA provides an incentive for conducting reforms, the real rewards are the EU membership and the Structural Funds provided following the accession. The member states such as Romania and Bulgaria provide an example to the other Balkan countries for their future.

Table 5.2 EU Structural Funds vs. Pre-Accession Assistance (PAA)

	Total (2007-2013) (billion Euros, rounded)	Total Per capita (Euros, rounded)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.42	20
Romania	18	2,400
Bulgaria	6.7	1,500

Source: (Kurze, 2009)

Table 5.3 Allocated PAA by the EU in 2013

(million Euros)

Country	Amount
Turkey	902.9
Serbia	208.3
Macedonia	113.2
Albania	95
Kosovo	71.4
Bosnia	47.26
Montenegro	34.6

Source: (The European Commission, 2014b)

Though smaller in amount when compared to the Structural Funds, the PAA is an important source for the development of the Balkan countries. It contributes to the capacity building efforts of these countries. The amount of allocated PAA can be seen in Table 5.2. It is seen that countries receive PAA in various amounts. It is certain that the EU is the main source of foreign aid for the Balkan countries and this provides the EU with an important leverage on these countries. In addition to the PAA, the EU also uses other incentives in its relations with the Balkan states. Firstly, the EU provides autonomous trade concessions to the countries that go through the Stabilization and Association process. The Balkan countries benefit from an unlimited duty-free access to the EU market for nearly all products. As a result of this process, the EU's exports to the Western Balkan countries (non-member states in the Balkans) almost quadrupled in the period from 2003 to 2012 as seen in Figure 5.3

below. In addition, the EU became the biggest trade partner for these countries. In 2012, the trade volume of the top five countries in the imports of the Western Balkan countries were the EU with 69.8%, Croatia 6.8%, Turkey 3.5%, Russia 3.2% and China 3.1%. In exports, the figures are as the following: the EU 67.4%, Croatia 6.2%, Russia 5.6%, Serbia 4.2% and Turkey 2.8% (The European Commission, 2013, p. 9). It is clear that in terms of trade relations the region is penetrated by the EU.


Figure 5.3 EU Trade Flows and Balance with the Western Balkans 2003-2012
(million Euros)

Source: (The European Commission, 2013, p. 3)

Another source of leverage for the EU is the visa-free travel regime for the Western Balkan countries. Citizens of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia since December 2009 and citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina since

December 2010 enjoy the visa free travel to the EU countries. Even though the public authorities in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands complain that visitors from the Balkan states abuse the visa-free travel regime (by requesting asylum), it is still in force (EU Observer, 2012).

It is seen that both in the Middle East and Balkans other actors tried to increase their leverage and influence in the 2000s. These developments also influenced Turkey's policies in these regions. In the next part, domestic developments that took place in Turkey will be mentioned.

5.4. CHANGES AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL

In this section, domestic developments in Turkey under the JDP rule will be elaborated. The developments will be divided into three main sections, namely economy, politics and military. It will shed light on Turkey's changing power capabilities in addition to its strengths and weaknesses.

5.4.1. Economy

Following the general elections on November 3, 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power. As a party established by the former members of the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan, it argued for being conservative democrat. The economic crisis of 2001 also contributed to the downfall of the three-party coalition government (the 57th Government) because it had to make an agreement with the IMF and accomplish reforms that were a bitter pill for the population.

The economic reforms demanded by the IMF and applied by the 57th Government started to bear its fruits and helped stabilize the economy in the following years. The next year after the economic crisis, in 2002 Turkish economy grew at a rate of 6.2%. This trend continued with the new government. Amid the discussions with regards to the JDP's Islamist background, Turkey recovered quickly from the economic crisis and between 2002 and 2009, the economy grew at an average 6% annually as seen in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 Turkey-Growth Rate

(as percentage)

2000	6.8
2001	-5.7
2002	6.2
2003	5.3
2004	9.4
2005	8.9
2006	6.9
2007	4.7
2008	0.7
2009	-4.8
2010	9.2
2011	8.8
2012	2.1
2013	4.1

Source: (World Bank, GDP Growth, 2014j)

This high level growth was sustained by sound economic policies, political stability and increasing trade, in addition to changing trade patterns. As Kemal Kirişçi argues Turkey started to transform itself from the "regional coercive power" to "benign power". Turkey especially focused on its neighborhood for strengthening economic ties hoping that interdependence will cause improvements also in the political sphere. As a result, when compared to 1995, in 2007 Turkey's exports to its neighborhood increased more than six-fold (from $9.6 billion to $67.7 billion) and the JDP cadres always had economic concerns in mind when dealing with other countries at the diplomatic level (Kirişçi, 2009, p. 49). The diversification of trade led to increasing trade with the Muslim countries as Soner Çağaptay noted:

> Turkey has emerged as an economic powerhouse thanks to the successful blending of the country's traditional connections to European and other economies situated within the OECD with the dynamism of the emerging markets, especially Muslim majority societies in nearby nations (Cagaptay, 2014, p. 5).

The high growth rates also led to an increase in the GDP per capita figures for Turkey. It more than doubled in 2010 compared to 2002 and exceeded ten thousand US$ for the first time in Turkish history as seen in Table 5.5. As a result Turkey is classified as a high middle-income country in the World Bank classification.

Table 5.5 Turkey-GDP per capita

(Current US$)

2000	4,220
2001	3,058
2002	3,576
2003	4,595
2004	5,867
2005	7,130
2006	7,736
2007	9,312
2008	10,379
2009	8,626
2010	10,136
2011	10,605
2012	10,661
2013	10,972

Source: (World Bank, 2014k)

Turkey also fought against the high-inflation in the 2000s. It reached almost 55% in 2000. Due to the strict economic regulations it was almost halved in 2003. It was kept at one-digit level in 2006. However on the following years the inflation figures were volatile. Still it never reached the two-digit levels except 2008 as seen in Table 5.6 below.

Table 5.6 Turkey-Inflation

(Consumer prices, annual %)

2000	54.9
2001	54.4
2002	45.0
2003	25.3
2004	10.6
2005	10.1
2006	9.6
2007	8.8
2008	10.4
2009	6.3
2010	8.6
2011	6.5
2012	8.9
2013	7.5

Source: (World Bank, 2014l)

Despite the high growth rates and increasing amount of GDP per capita, the 2008 global economic crisis showed the weaknesses of Turkish economy. In 2008, the growth rate went down to 0.7% and the next year the Turkish economy began to shrink (-4.8 %). Despite the efforts by the JDP to portray the high growth rates as a miraculous development, it has been subject to controversy. A leading economist Mahfi Eğilmez, criticizes the JDP for comparing the economic indicators of their era especially with the early years of the Republic. He points out that the JDP claims to

have succeeded in areas that the Republic failed in 80 years.[64] Warning about the risks of comparing economic indicators of the 1920s with today's data because of the changes in the methods of calculation and data collection, in the face of increasing comparisons of this kind, he also provides a comparison in economic indicators. It reveals that between 1923 and 2002 Turkish economy grew at an average of 4.9% despite the Great Depression, Second World War, Cold War tensions, military coups, economic crisis and regional wars. However the average economic growth between 2003 and 2012 is only 4.92% (Eğilmez, 2013) and this "miraculous" growth rate is not much higher than the average of 80 years.

The export-led growth model followed by Turkey, also have some disadvantages. The economy becomes vulnerable to foreign shocks when the export markets enter into a period of recession. However Turkey managed to control the effects of the global economic crisis thanks to its diversification of trade patterns which will be touched upon in the following pages. Also the reforms initiated by the previous government in 2001 which regulated the banking sector and led to the bankruptcy of many weak banks, strengthened the banking sector. Yet, high growth rates witnessed in the 2000s cannot solve the economic and social problems of Turkey. As a developing country with increasing population, unemployment is an acute problem in Turkey. As shown in Table 5.7, the ratio of unemployed individuals

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[64] Erdoğan resorts to this method quite often in order to show that the period before the JDP was like a "lost era" for the country. He made another comparison with regards to the railway construction in a ceremony for the opening of the Kartal-Kadıköy subway line in August 2012 and it caused reaction from the various circles of the society. He cited the verses of the Tenth Year March (*Onuncu Yıl Marşı*) which was composed for the tenth anniversary of the Republic in 1933. It reads "We plaited the motherland with iron nets on four sides ("*Demir ağlarla ördük anayurdu dört baştan*")" and praises the new railway projects. It was due to his success in railway construction as a businessman Nuri Bey, who was mentioned in the previous chapter for his airplane production facility, was given the surname Demirağ by Atatürk in 1934. Erdoğan opposed the idea in the march. He asked "What have you done? You did not build anything. We are now plaiting Turkey with iron nets". ("*Biliyorsunuz 10. Yıl Marşı'nda geçer, demir ağlarla ördük falan... Neyi ördün hiçbir şeyi örmüş falan değilsin; ortada duranlar belliydi. Demir ağlarla şimdi Türkiye'yi biz örüyoruz*") (Haberturk, 2012).

to the labor force peaked up to the level of 14% in 2009. It seems that in the following years it will continue to float around 10%. As the economic growth cannot keep pace with the population growth, unemployment will continue to be a social problem for Turkey. This problem will be more severe if a period of recession is witnessed. This will definitely hinder Turkey's FDIs and as a result its influence.

Table 5.7 Turkey-Unemployment

(% of total labor force)
(modeled ILO estimate)

2000	6.5
2001	8.4
2002	10.4
2003	10.5
2004	10.8
2005	10.6
2006	10.2
2007	10.3
2008	11.0
2009	14.0
2010	11.9
2011	9.8
2012	9.2
2013	10.0

Source: (World Bank, 2014m)

Table 5.8 shows the population figures for Turkey. It is seen that Turkey is going through a population increase. From the year 2000 to 2010, its population

increased almost 6 million, a figure that is equal to total population of many countries. However as shown in Table 5.9, the population growth in Turkey is slowing down. It was 2.3 % in 1980, 1.7% in 1990, and 1.5% in 2000. It slowed down to 1.2 % in 2008 later to increase slightly to 1.3 % in 2010.

Table 5.8 Turkey-Population

Year	Total Population	Ratio of 15-64 Year-Group (%)
1935	16,158,018	54.4
1940	17,820,950	54.3
1945	18,790,174	57
1950	20,947,188	58
1955	24,064,763	57.1
1960	27,754,820	55.1
1965	31,391,421	54
1970	35,605,176	53.7
1975	40,347,719	54.8
1980	44,736,957	55.8
1985	50,664,458	58
1990	56,473,035	60
2000	67,803,927	64.4
2007	70,586,256	66.5
2010	73,722,988	67.5
2013	76,667,864	67.7

Source: (TURKSTAT, 2014a)

Table 5.8 also reveals that the ratio of 15-64 year group to the total population has been increasing continuously. While it is beneficial for a country to have higher amount of this age group, which is called also active population for being eligible to work, it also causes other problems. The presence of young population makes high quality public education services vital for the future of a country and they require more public funds.

Table 5.9 Turkey-Population Growth Rate

(Annual %)

1980	2.3
1985	2.1
1990	1.7
1995	1.6
2000	1.5
2001	1.5
2002	1.4
2003	1.4
2004	1.4
2005	1.3
2006	1.3
2007	1.3
2008	1.2
2009	1.2
2010	1.3
2011	1.3
2012	1.3
2013	1.3

Source: (World Bank, 2014n)

As though it may seem that Turkey has advantages due to having young and dynamic population, with the current trends it will not be sustained. The decrease in the population growth rate is mostly influenced by the increasing levels of urbanization. In 1927, only 24.2% of the population lived in province and district centers. It rose to 43.9% in 1980, to 64.9% in 2000 and to 91.3% in 2013 (TURKSTAT, 2014a). With decreasing population growth rate, the median age will continue to increase. It was 25.8 in 2000; it rose to 27.6 in 2005, 29.2 in 2010. It is estimated that it will rise to 31.1 in 2015 and 34 in 2023. It is for that reason, especially after witnessing the population decline in Russia, Tayyip Erdoğan keeps insisting on his campaign, "at least three children for each family". However one should not ignore the quality of the population by only focusing on quantity. Russia due to social and economic factors, suffered from a population decline. Its population was 148,160,126 in 1996. It started to go down in the following years: 146,596,870 in 2000, 143,821,212 in 2004 and 141,956,409 in 2008 (World Bank, 2014f). The population started to increase from 2008 on thanks to the financial incentives provided by the government. In 2007, the government introduced the incentives. Russian families are entitled to a certificate for 429,408 rubles ($12,500) after the birth or adoption of a second child (Nechepurenko, 2014). As a result, the population rose to 142,385,523 in 2010, to 143,499,861 in 2013 (World Bank, 2014f). However Russia has other problems and the growth is hard to sustain. There were 17.2 million women aged between 20-35 in 2013, the most active group for maternity. This number is estimated to decrease to 12.9 million in 2019 so there will be fewer births (Nechepurenko, 2014). As mentioned above, the Russian example worries the decision-makers in Ankara. In 2013, Erdoğan again called for three children and stated the following:

One or two children mean bankruptcy. Three children mean we are not improving but not receding either. So, I repeat, at least three children are necessary in each family, because our population risks aging. We are still on the good side, as we still own a young and dynamic population. But we are slowly aging. Presently, the whole western world is trying to cope with this problem. Please do not take our susceptibility lightly; this is a very serious issue (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013).

According to the population projections prepared by TURKSTAT, based on three different scenarios which have different birth rate trends, Turkey's population will continue to increase. According to Scenario A, it will be 88,427,604 in 2030 and 93,475,575 in 2050. According to Scenario B, it will be 90,874,077 in 2030 and 104,309,596 in 2050. According to Scenario C, which envisages the highest birth rate, it will be 92,115,182 in 2030 and 110,546,401 in 2050 (TURKSTAT, 2014b).

This period brought many developments with regards to Turkey's foreign trade. As a detailed report by the World Bank acknowledges, Turkey was successful in boosting its trade. As the first of all it managed to broaden its market reach. Turkey was exporting to 90 countries in 2000. This figure increased to 137 in 2014. This development surely contributed to Turkey's trade. Merchandise exports increased from $36 billion in 2002 to $150 billion in 2012. Turkey's export basket has also witnessed changes. While textile goods were the main export item for Turkey in the past, automotive exports replaced them reflecting the transition to capital-intensive export goods. In addition to the increasing export competitiveness of Turkey, also its global market share rose from 0.55% (2002) to 0.82% (2012) (World Bank, 2014o, p. ii).

Table 5.10 shows the foreign trade volume of Turkey. It is seen that the exports started to increase from the year 2000 on. The amount of exports was more than doubled in 2004, reaching approximately $63 billion. In 2008 it was almost

five-times of the amount for 2000, reaching $132 billion. That was an important increase, showing the growth of Turkish economy and its integrated status to the world economy. However integration also makes economies vulnerable to foreign shocks. As the global demand went down with the global financial crisis, Turkey's exports also decreased dramatically in 2009. In one year it fell down to $102 billion, about 22%. Only in 2011 Turkey's exports volume reached the 2009 level and then it started to rise again. As shown in Table 5.5, the GDP per capita levels went down to $8,626 in 2009 and a recovery was possible in the next year. Also the ratio of the unemployed to the total labor force rose to 14% in 2009 (11% in 2008). In the field of imports, it is also possible to observe a high level of increase. Because of being a developing country, Turkey imports machinery and equipment. In addition, Turkey's energy dependency impedes its development. As a growing economy, its energy demand is increasing and as a result its dependency increases. In 2000, Turkey's net energy imports (% of energy use) were 66 %. This figure rose to 70% in 2004, 72 % in 2006, slightly fell to the level of 71% in 2008. With the global financial crisis, demand decreased as Turkey's economy started to slow down and it was 69% in 2010 but rising again to 73 % in 2012 (World Bank, 2014p). In addition to the increasing demand of Turkey, the rising energy prices also caused a burden for Turkey. In 2002 its energy imports was around $9 billion. It rose to $14 billion in 2004; it doubled in 2006 and reached $28 billion, again with a sharp increase it reached $48 billion in 2008. In 2010, it fell to the level of $38 billion however in 2012 it reached $60 billion, almost one quarter of Turkey's total imports (Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade, 2014).

Table 5.10 Turkey-Foreign Trade 2000-2012

Year	Exports	Imports
	(Thousand USD)	
2000	27,774,906	54,502,821
2001	31,334,216	41,399,083
2002	36,059,089	51,553,797
2003	47,252,836	69,339,692
2004	63,167,153	97,539,766
2005	73,476,408	116,774,151
2006	85,534,676	139,576,174
2007	107,271,750	170,062,715
2008	132,027,196	201,963,574
2009	102,142,613	140,928,421
2010	113,883,219	185,544,332
2011	134,906,869	240,841,676
2012	152,460,737	236,545,141

Source: (TURKSTAT, 2014c)

In this decade, Turkey managed to diversify its trade. In addition to establishing trade relations with new partners, the share of Turkey's partners in total trade started to change. In exports, the share of the EU started to decrease dramatically. As seen in Table 5.11 below, the share of EU was 58% in 2004 and it decreased to 39% in 2012. On the contrary, the share of the Near and Middle-Eastern countries more than doubled. Its share was 12.5% in 2004 but it rose to 27.8% in 2012. Also the shares of North African, South American, other Asian and other European countries started to increase. However the EU continues to be Turkey's top exports partner.

Table 5.11 Turkey-Exports by Country Groups

(Share in Total %)

	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012
EU (EU 28)	58.1	56.3	48.3	46.5	39.0
Other European Countries	6.9	9.1	11.6	9.8	9.3
North African Countries	3.5	3.6	4.4	6.2	6.2
Other African Countries	1.2	1.7	2.4	2.0	2.6
North American Countries	8.2	6.4	3.6	3.7	4.4
Central America and Caribbean	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
South American Countries	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.1	1.4
Near and Middle Eastern Countries	12.5	13.2	19.3	20.5	27.8
Other Asian Countries	4.0	4.6	5.4	7.5	6.9
Australia and New Zealand	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
Other Countries	0.1	0.2	1.1	0.1	0.1

Source: (TURKSTAT, 2014d)

On the basis of countries, Germany was Turkey's top exports partner in 2012 as always has been (8.6%) though with a decreasing share (13.8% in 2004). The interesting development is that, Iraq became the second most important export market of Turkey. Its share was 2.9% in 2004, with a steep increase it raised to 7.1% in 2002. In a similar fashion, Iran's share in total exports started to increase. It was 1.3% in 2004. In 2010, it reached to a higher level with 2.7% and sustained that share in 2011 too. Due to the increasing sanctions on Iran, in 2012 Iran became Turkey's top-third export market with a share of 6.5%. The United Kingdom, the fourth export partner, lost its higher share of the past (8.8% in 2004) and its share was 5.7% in 2012. Italy was Turkey's fifth largest export partner with a share of 4.2% in 2012 (it was 7.2% in 2004) (TURKSTAT, 2014d).

In the realm of imports, thanks to energy imports Russia is the top import partner of Turkey. Its share started to increase dramatically from 2004 on, it was 9.3% in 2004 reaching the highest level in 2008 with a share of 15.8%. Then it started to decrease slightly, down to 11.3% in 2012. In 2012, Germany and China had an equal share in total imports of Turkey with 9%. However as Germany's share decreased from 2004 (it was 12.8%), China started to increase its share. In eight years, China's share almost doubled from 4.6% in 2004 to 9% in 2012. The USA became the fourth largest import partner of Turkey, increasing its share from 4.9% in 2004 to 6% in 2012. Italy was Turkey's fifth-largest import partner in 2012 with a share of 5.6% (TURKSTAT, 2014d).


Figure 5.4 Crude Oil Prices (2000-2012)
Source: (Adomanis, 2013)

The increasing energy prices created bigger problems for Turkey's current accounts. It led to a higher deficit and increased Turkey's vulnerability to foreign

shocks. The current accounts deficit was $ -21.4 billion in 2005 and it continuously increased reaching $ -31.8 billion in 2006, $ -37.7 billion in 2007, $-40.4 billion in 2008. With the global crisis, the oil price started to drop from May 2008 on and also Turkey's imports decreased. As a result, the current accounts deficit was $ -12.1 billion in 2009. However it started to increase again with the increasing oil prices. In 2010 it was $ -45.4 billion, in 2011 $ -75 billion and in 2012 with a decrease it was $ -48.5 billion (World Bank, 2014r). However great amounts of money, with unknown origin, entered into Turkey and helped with the current accounts deficit. It is seen that between 2003 and 2013, the amount of this money was $29.3 billion. According to experts, this money might have come from Iran, Syria and Gulf countries (Çetingüleç, 2014).

In fostering trade, Turkey used free-trade (FTAs) and visa-free travel agreements as tools. Currently, Turkey has 17 FTAs in force; namely, EFTA, Israel, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria[65], Egypt, Albania, Georgia, Montenegro, Serbia, Chile, Jordan, Mauritius, and South Korea. To foster tourism and contacts, thanks to the visa-free travel agreements, citizens of Turkey can travel to 72 countries without visa. This number was 42 in 2002. The most important of them are the agreements concluded with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo and Iran (Office of Public Diplomacy, 2014a). In parallel to these developments the Turkish Airlines (THY) also started direct flights to many new destinations. THY had flights to 55 countries in 2003. This figure increased to 219 destinations in 96 countries in 2012. With this figure THY holds the title of airline that flies to the highest number of countries in the world. As a result of this development, Istanbul became a transit

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[65] It was suspended on 6 December 2011.

center for flights to many countries. As put forward on the webpage of The Office of Public Diplomacy;

> THY has agreements with 29 different airlines from different regions and countries, and it is one of the most important elements of Turkey´s active foreign policy. When expanding its flight network, THY follows a growth strategy in line with the priorities of Turkish foreign policy, while it also minds the balance of demand. The political, cultural and economic partnerships established with numerous countries from different regions in recent years, the visa agreements signed, opening of new diplomatic missions, and THY commencing flights to these destinations, stand out as complementary improvements (Office of Public Diplomacy, 2014b).

The program published by the JDP (2012) for the centenary of the republic titled "Political Vision of Ak Parti 2023" which has a motto of "Great Nation, Great Power" set ambitious goals for Turkey. After listing the successes achieved in the JDP era, such as the contribution of political stability for investments and the increasing GDP, it lists the goals in the realm of economy. It points out to the successes in the administration of economy. It emphasizes that during the financial crisis Turkey managed to survive without borrowing from the IMF. To remind the people about the nature of the past relations with the IMF, when Turkey accepted all IMF demands in order to receive new credits, it puts forward that "We have paid off almost all of our debt to IMF. We are now in the position of lending $5 billion to IMF". (AKP, 2012, p. 50) It is true that Turkey did not need to borrow from the IMF. However, Turkey's external debt stocks increased at an enormous pace. It was $129.5 billion in 2002; it increased to $158.1 billion in 2004, $209.5 billion in 2006, $288.9 billion in 2008, $299.1 billion in 2010 and $337 billion in 2012 (World Bank, 2014q). The 2023 goals of the JDP are listed below:

- To be among the top ten economies of the world in terms of the GDP.

- To maintain a stable reduction in inflation and keep interest rates to a single digit.

- To increase exports to 500 billion dollars per year.

- To increase per capita income to $25.000.

- To reach annual GDP of 2 trillion dollar.

- To reduce unemployment rate to %5 and to increase the present employment rate to at least 50 % (AKP, 2012, p. 52).

According to the report published by the World Bank, Turkey still can achieve these goals: "Size, geographic location, excellent connectivity to East and West, and a young labor force are also key factors that will contribute to success" (World Bank, 2014o, p. ii). However, Turkish economy faces some structural problems. To reach the goals mentioned above, due to slow down of growth in advanced and emerging economies, Turkey has to increase its market share by increasing its competitiveness. This can be done either by providing goods at more attractive prices or at higher quality" (World Bank, 2014o, p. ii). In this respect, science and technology play a very important role. Turkey has managed to increase the share of medium-technology exports from 20% to 32% in the last decade (World Bank, 2014o, p. 14). The same cannot be stated with regards to the high-technology exports. Turkey has stagnated in this area. Their share was 2% of manufactured exports in 2002 and this figure remained the same throughout the decade. For a comparison it was 7% for Spain, 9 % for Slovakia, 6% for Romania, 16% for Mexico, 10 % for Brazil, 9% for Greece, 8% for Bulgaria, 18% for Hungary, 8 % for Russia, 13 % for Australia, 5 % for South Africa in 2012 (World Bank, 2014s).

It does not mean that Turkey did not try to increase its share in this area. As the first of all, R&D expenditures of Turkey increased significantly from 2002 on. It was TL 1.8 billion in 2002 and rose to TL 13 billion in 2012. Its share in GDP rose from %0.53 to %0.92 in the same period (TURKSTAT, 2014e). Secondly, the number of researchers in R&D (per million people) rose up. It was 369 in 2002 and 987 in 2011 (no data available for Turkey for 2012). Even though there is an increase, when compared to other countries this figure is not sufficient for Turkey. For 2011, the same figure was 4,026 for the UK, 5,142 for Sweden, 2,800 for Spain, 2,817 for Slovak Republic, 4,225 for Slovenia, 6,602 for Israel, 2,389 for Hungary, 2,219 for Greece, 4,085 for Germany and 1,623 for Bulgaria (World Bank, 2014c). In a similar way, the number of scientific and technical journal articles increased for Turkey from 5,226 in 2002 to 8,328 in 2011. However it shows the weakness of Turkey in the field of science when compared especially to other countries that have smaller population than Turkey. The figure for the same indicator in 2011 was 46,035 for the UK, 10,019 for Switzerland, 9,473 for Sweden, 22,910 for Spain, 25,593 for Republic of Korea, 26,503 for Italy, 8,176 for Iran, 4,534 for Greece and 650 for Bulgaria (World Bank, 2014e).

In the field of patent applications, Turkey showed great success too. It increased more than ten times. It was 414 in 2002, 682 in 2004, 1,072 in 2006, 2,221 in 2008, 3,180 in 2010 and 4,434 in 2012. However Turkey still lags behind other countries. This figure was 148,136 in 2012 for South Korea, 14,540 for France, 15,370 for United Kingdom, 268,782 for the USA, 28,701 for Russia, 4,804 for Brazil, 535,313 for China (World Bank, 2014d).

However it is certain that Turkey faces problems in the field of scientific production. It is observed clearly in the index published by the Scimago Institutions

Rankings (also known as the SJR Index). Turkey was ranked 21st in this index in 2002 (with 11,957 documents) while Iran was ranked 40th (2,926 documents). For a comparison, Spain was the 10th (31,798 documents) and Italy was the 7th (43,668 documents). To the top of the list, China was the 6th and France was the 5th country. Germany was the 4th, United Kingdom the third, Japan the second and the USA was the first country. Turkey's rank started to improve. It was the 20th in 2004, 19th in 2008 and 18th in 2009. However in 2010, Turkey started to lose its position and became the 19th country again. In 2012 this situation continued. Surprisingly, Iran surpassed Turkey in the field of scientific publications from 2011 on. It was ranked 17th in 2012. Top ten countries for 2012 are as the following: the USA, China, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France, India, Canada, Italy and Spain (Scimago Institutions Rankings, 2012). Columnist Taha Akyol warned the public about Turkey's decreasing production in the field of science and listed the current problems in Turkey such as the insufficient funds for scientific research and political influence on the scientific institutions (Akyol, 2014). In the index prepared by the Times Higher Education, in 2011-2012 Turkey had only four universities (Bilkent, ITU, METU and Boğaziçi) among the four hundred top universities of the world (The Times Higher Education, 2014). İsmet Berkan commented that, based on the index score of Turkey as the 38th in the Nature Publishing Group's index, Turkey cannot be a world power with this score. It cannot become the world's 10th largest economy if it does not contribute to science. Without patents and designs, Turkey can only be a country specialized in assembly industry (Berkan, 2014).

Worse, Turkey also experiences brain-drain problem. In order to reverse brain drain, the projects and funds introduced by TÜBİTAK managed to bring 248 researchers back to Turkey (TÜBİTAK, 2013). However, as Suat Kınıklıoğlu claims,

due to political reasons, especially after 2011 secular Turks are trying to leave Turkey which can be named as the human capital flight. It would damage Turkey's already decreasing scientific production:

> The authoritarian tendencies, the corruption and the growing religious impositions on society over the past two years have scared off the human capital that Turkey so much needs. In previous years, the flights were driven mostly by economic and opportunity-related reasons, while today the motive is mostly ideological. The human capital flight is being further accelerated by the increased fanning of social polarization and alienation in recent years (Kiniklioglu, 2014).

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can provide Turkey the necessary technology transfer for producing high-tech export goods while also providing employment for its young population. It can be said that Turkey managed to increase FDI inflows in this decade. It was $3.35 billion in 2001 but with the economic crisis it decreased to $1.08 billion in 2002. Then it started to increase again: $1.70 billion in 2003 and $2.78 billion in 2004. The dramatic increase started from 2005 on: It reached to the level of $10.03 billion in 2005 and doubled in 2006 reaching $20.18 billion. It was $22.04 billion in 2007, its highest level for this decade. It started to decrease from 2008 on, firstly to the level of $19.76 billion in 2008. However the dramatic decrease came in 2009, it was less than the half of the previous year's amount, $8.62 billion. It reached $9.05 billion in 2010 and then rose to $16.17 billion in 2011. In 2012 it was $13.22 billion (World Bank, 2015a).

Various factors such as the size of market, availability of raw materials, labor costs, education level of the population, transportation network, geographical position and the business climate, determine the FDI levels. However the FDI levels can be volatile depending on the global economic conditions. For example Spain

received $39.99 billion in 2002, it was $41.42 billion in 2006 and next year it almost doubled, reaching the level of $83.39 billion. In 2009 it dropped to the level of $19.42 but in 2010 rose to $45.38 billion. Spain's geographical position and its EU membership probably contribute to this high level of FDI. In the example of new EU members (joined in 2004) such as Hungary and Poland, it is possible to see the impact of EU membership on the FDI levels. Hungary received $3.01 billion FDI in 2002. It rose to $4.28 billion in 2004. It doubled in 2005, reaching to $8.50 billion and more than doubled in 2006, reaching $18.67 billion. Its increase went on; $70.63 billion in 2007 and $75.01 billion in 2008. However with the economic crisis it witnessed outflow of FDI, it was $ -2.96 billion in 2009 and a higher amount in 2010, $ -20.93 billion. It recovered and the FDI inflow reached the level of $10.58 billion in 2012. Another new member, Poland, also received high level of FDI following the EU membership. It received $4.13 billion FDI in 2002. It rose to $12.71 billion in 2004, $21.51 billion in 2006, $15.03 billion in 2008, $14.38 billion in 2009, $17.07 billion in 2010, $17.35 billion in 2011 and $6.70 billion in 2012 (World Bank, 2015a). The share of high-tech exports in Poland's foreign trade was 3% in 2002; it rose to 4% in 2005, 6% in 2009 and 7% in 2010 (World Bank, 2014s).

Tax and incentive policies and legal assurances also contribute to the level of FDI. An index, based on the ease of doing business that takes into account 10 variables (such as starting a business, construction permits, trading across borders etc.) provides a ranking for each country. Turkey was ranked 55th in 2012. Spain was 33rd, Poland 32nd, Japan 29th, the United Kingdom 8th, the USA 7th, Republic of Korea 5th and Singapore was the first country (Doingbusiness, 2012). It shows that, in order to compete with other developing countries for attracting FDI, Turkey has to

improve its business climate. Democracy, rule of law and transparency may also help Turkey to attract more FDI. However the case of the biggest media tycoon in Turkey, Aydın Doğan, created fears for investors in Turkey. A few weeks after the calls for boycotting his media group by Tayyip Erdoğan, his companies were swarming with tax inspectors and he was fined $2.5 billion in 2009. An observer commented that Turkey's tax laws are very complex and "they can be used as a spear or a shield" (The Economist, 2009). Another observer commented that Turkey takes Putin's Russia as a role-model. The reason for fining the Doğan Media Group with a fine of $2.5 billion (his personal wealth is around $750 million) and making him sell his two newspapers (*Milliyet* and *Vatan*) is the oppositional stance of some of the journalists (Yilmaz, 2012).

There is a risk for Turkey in the field of economy. As some other developing countries, Turkey may fall into middle-income trap with a GDP per capita around $10,000. The decreasing growth rate of Turkey may be a sign of this process. As Seyfettin Gürsel and Barış Soybilgen observed, Turkey is on the brink of middle-income trap because the labor productivity stagnated from 2011 on:

> In the coming years, it is not likely that the Turkish economy will experience another high growth period. Due to high current account deficit and the end of abundant global liquidity, it is hard for the Turkish Lira to appreciate (Gürsel & Soybilgen, 2013).

In order to overcome the middle-income trap, Turkey should boost scientific production, R&D funds and follow successful education policies in order to increase the quality of its labor force. Cem Okan Tuncel emphasizes this point:

> Technological deficiencies in the Turkish economy are a fundamental obstacle to sustainable economic growth. Turkey remains very much behind in terms of technological capability and scientific knowledge, skills and human capital accumulation, which are the fundamental elements of

competition superiority in high technology, high value-added industries (Tuncel C. O., 2012).

In sum, in order to avoid the middle-income trap, attract FDI, provide employment and be a source of stability for its surrounding regions, Turkey has to sustain economic growth, have political stability and a democratic regime based on the rule of law. Otherwise economic problems will undermine the rise of Turkey as a regional power. In the next part, domestic political developments will be touched upon.

5.4.2. Politics

The JDP after coming to power tried to show that its cadres severed all ideological ties with the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan. The JDP argued for being conservative democrat, emphasized the importance of values such as human rights and freedoms, democracy and liberalism. Tayyip Erdoğan was very much in favor of Turkey's EU membership in his early years in the office. He tried to defend the EU membership vision against critics from inside (Hürriyet, 2003). As a result of the reforms, Turkey was allowed to start accession negotiations with the EU in December 17, 2004.

The JDP governments received support from the EU while its legitimacy was questioned in Turkey. As Can Baydarol notes, an expert on the Turkey-EU relations, the JDP used the EU to strengthen its rule (Kanal D, 2012). While the secularists in Turkey were discussing that the JDP has a "hidden agenda", the EU support provided the JDP the necessary leverage over the secular institutions, especially the military establishment as Banu Eligur observed:

> The JDP successfully exploited Turkey's long time quest for EU membership as a political opportunity for advancing Islamist demands. The JDP reframed its Islamist agenda in terms of EU reform packages intended to democratize the country. These EU demands helped the Islamist movement diminish the power of certain secular state institutions, utilizing a liberal tool kit calling for democratization (Eligur, 2010, p. 281).

The JDP maintains that the JDP era in Turkey witnessed a "silent revolution". It is also the title of the book published in 2012. The book argues that the JDP led to a great success story for Turkey in the field of democratization and increasing environment of freedom. The elimination of the military as a political actor is portrayed as another success too (T.C. Başbakanlık, 2013). Tayyip Erdoğan uses the motto "fight against 3 Y" (Yasaklar-Prohibitons, Yolsuzluk-Corruption and Yoksulluk-Poverty) often (Milliyet, Erdoğan'dan '3Y' mesajı, 2011a). However there are concerns about the future of the country. The political language used by the JDP that sees all groups that opposes the JDP as the other contributes to this negative outcome. Especially increasing conservatism and intervention to the private lives of people through social pressure, exclusion, insult and sometimes even physical violence, damage the personal freedoms in Turkey. In 2008, a research group led by Binnaz Toprak conducted research in many smaller Anatolian cities. They found out that social exclusion, discrimination and insult is very common against the Kurds, Alevis, the urban youth and people with a secular lifestyle. Especially a high proportion of the educated urban youth wants to live in another country if possible. Especially university students in cities like Trabzon and Erzurum become the target of conservative social pressure. It may arise from clothing style (long hair or wearing an earring for men and wearing things like mini-skirts for girls), from not fasting during the month of Ramadan (in many cities all restaurants are closed during the day due to the pressure from some groups) or from a guy walking hand in hand with

his girlfriend (Toprak, Bozan, Morgül, & Şener, 2008, pp. 19-36). It also shows that for appointment to the posts as civil-servant or for promotions, rather than merit, political connections play the most important role. There is also considerable pressure on doctors, nurses and teachers who do not wear headscarf and have a secular life style. They face mobbing, appointment to the far towns of the city for punishment or frequent inspections (Toprak, Bozan, Morgül, & Şener, 2008, pp. 110-120). The study also mentions that there is an undeclared ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages. This can be done through the municipal administration by cancelling the current licenses for restaurants and shops to sell these beverages and also by denying new applications for this license. In Kayseri for example, the authors note that the restaurant where alcoholic beverages are served is almost out of the city limits. Worse, well-known people in small cities, such as Kayseri, who in the past drank these beverages in meetings, now refrain drinking publicly, thinking that it may damage their carrier or business life (Toprak, Bozan, Morgül, & Şener, 2008, pp. 126-130).

The JDP always portrayed that there is a risk of military coup against its rule and it would mean the end of economic stability. In this regard, used probes like Ergenekon and Balyoz to imprison generals, admirals, other senior officials, academics and journalists. High level of influence of the government on the press, bureaucracy and judiciary, made this outcome easier. While it was mostly supported by the external actors such as the EU and USA, it divided the society in Turkey. Gareth Jenkins, at the early stages of the probe, published the first detailed report in English on the probe, especially showed the controversies in the case and regarded it as a plot by the Islamists for revenge against the secular groups (Jenkins, 2009).

The biggest problem for Turkey is high level of polarization in addition to increasing authoritarianism. The election results show the level of polarization: In 2007 the JDP received 46% of the votes while the PRP received %20 and NAP 14% (NTVMSNBC, 2007). In 2011, the JDP strengthened its position and received 49.9% while the PRP received 25.9% and the NAP 12.9% (Radikal, 2011). This distribution of the votes in elections would not cause a big problem if there was not much political polarization in the society. A survey conducted by a think-tank, Bilgesam, shows how deeply the Turkish society is divided in this decade along ethnic, sectarian and political lines. 10% of the Turks do not want to live together with Kurds. 50% of the people who do not vote for the JDP are unhappy with having a prime minister and president who are members of the JDP. Every 1 person in 5 who vote either for the NAP or Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) wish the end of JDP rule even if it meant civil war. This ratio is higher among the supporters of the PRP, one third of its voters. Excluding the people who vote for the JDP, 90% of the people voting for opposition parties are worried about the future of Turkey (Akyürek & Koydemir, 2014, pp. 1-9). In addition to their ethnic and religious background, people also think that they face discrimination because of their political views. Figure for this variable is 27.5% for people supporting the JDP, 64.3% for the supporters of the PRP, 52.8% for the supporters of the NAP and 86.3% for the supporters of PDP (Akyürek & Koydemir, 2014, p. 78). 56.1% percent of the participants think that Turkey is going through a process of ethnic partition, 54.2% think that in the field freedom Turkey's score is getting worse, 58.4% think that Turkey is becoming an autocratic country and 64.5% think that polarization becoming stronger day by day (Akyürek & Koydemir, 2014, p. 83). Last but not least, there is an increasing worry about the political influence on the bureaucracy

and the judiciary. This figure is 65.8% for the bureaucracy and state institutions. 70.6% think that developments which damage the independence of the judiciary take place. 59.7% think that in the freedom of press, Turkey is getting worse (Akyürek & Koydemir, 2014, p. 86). As Soner Cagaptay notes, this polarization is very risky for Turkey:

> Unless the country heals this split, it will be difficult for Ankara to realize its potential to become a global player. Political polarization could keep Turkey bogged down and looking inward. Turkey has to bring together its disparate social segments if it wants to emerge as a regional and global player, especially considering that the country is currently debating drafting its first-ever civilian-made constitution (Cagaptay, 2014, p. 11).

This polarization is also observed on the support given to the foreign policy by the population. It is vital for a government to receive the support of the large segments of the public to be successful in foreign policy. Turkey has a tradition that kept foreign policy matters over the domestic politics which considered foreign policy to be "national". However due to the polarization, the public support for the foreign policy is restrained. Kadir Has University conducted surveys that included also the support for foreign policy as an indicator. In 2011, the results showed that only 41% of the participants supported the JDP government's foreign policy. While 24.1% of the participants had no clear position, 34.9% of the participants declared that they do not support the foreign policy of the government (Kadir Has University, 2012, p. 54). Especially for the Middle East while the 37.7% of the participants considered Turkish foreign policy successful, 44% thought of it as unsuccessful (Kadir Has University, 2012, p. 58). It also shows that, in comparison with the 2012 results, people started to think that Turkey is witnessing a democracy deficit. In 2011, 50.7% of the participants agreed that Turkey is a democratic country. In 2012, only 34.2% of the participants agreed with that. In a similar way, in 2011 42.7% of

the participants agreed that in Turkey the freedom of expression exists. In 2012, only the 29.2% of the participants agreed with that. Belief in press freedom in Turkey went from 38.5% to 28.8% in 2012 (Kadir Has University, 2013).

Especially the Gezi Movement that started in 28 May 2013 and the JDP's (read Tayyip Erdoğan) reliance on brute force to suppress the protesters seriously damaged the freedom discourse adopted by the JDP. Starting as a protest to stop the construction project of a mall at the Taksim Gezi Park, it soon turned out to be a country-wide protest against autocratic rule and practices of the JDP. 8 people died while 8,163 people were wounded as a result of excessive police brutality (Yurt Gazetesi, 2014). It is worth noting that protestors both in İstanbul and other cities were mostly educated urban youth but at later stages their parents also took part in the protests. They were worried that their private space and secular lifestyle was under attack as Nilüfer Göle emphasizes:

> Moralizing intrusions into the citizen's way of life have abounded. New decrees and moralizing discourses have aroused the suspicion that government was intending to intervene in secular ways of life and reorganize public life to align with Islamic values (Göle, 2013, p. 10).

The uncompromising rhetoric adopted by Erdoğan during the events, such as calling the protesters as "thugs-çapulcu" further alienated the masses. In addition, rather than trying to understand the demands of thousands of people, the JDP claimed that the protests were organized by external actors ("the interest lobby") who wanted to topple Erdoğan as Emre Tarim analyzed this rhetoric:

> For long Mr Erdogan's rhetoric of being the victim-turned-hero who can advance Turkey behind a military tutelage has helped his popularity among the masses. Now that Mr Erdogan seems to have harnessed most of the branches of state authority, he turns to shadowy rhetorical figures such as the interest lobby to explain the growing national discontent with his polarizing rule and reinforce his rank and file (Tarim, 2013, p. 52).

During the protests, in a way reflecting the position of the media under strong government pressure, the mainstream television channels refrained from broadcasting the protests. The CNN affiliated CNN Turk broadcasted a documentary about the penguins in the Southern Pole and this led to the naming of the mainstream channels as the "penguin media". As Kerem Öktem notes, the media and business interests are intertwined and media companies that are part of larger corporations are under direct government influence: "Apart from shaping the content of broadcasts, the increasing frequency with which the prime minister's office has been communicating directly with senior editors is an influential factor" (Öktem, 2013a). Many Turkish people chose to watch the events through CNN International and BBC and a few independent Turkish TV channels. However the limited media coverage was overcome by the extensive use of social media by the protesters.

Journalists who oppose the government practices are fired from the journals and television channels and it becomes impossible for them to appear at any other media institution at the mainstream as the examples of well-known journalists such as Emin Çölaşan, Yılmaz Özdil, Bekir Coşkun and Ayşenur Aslan show. To this list journalists like Tuncay Özkan and Mustafa Balbay who were retained in prison during the Ergenekon probe can be added. In 2012, with 49 imprisoned journalists, Turkey was on the top of the list prepared by the Committee to Protect Journalists. Turkey was followed by Iran (45 journalists) and China (32 journalists) (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012). The Press Freedom Index published by the Reporters Without Borders also confirms the decreasing press freedom in Turkey. Turkey was ranked 99th in 2002. However as autocratic tendencies and pressure on the media increased, in 2009 it was 123rd and in 2012 148th (Reporters Without Borders, 2012).

These events and policies seriously undermined Turkey's role as a model for the Middle-Eastern countries which was very popular in the early 2000s. Even in the post-Arab Spring era, the Turkish model was attractive though it was not working at home: "The irony is that the AKP was building an illiberal system just as Washington was holding up Turkey as a model for the post-uprising states of the Arab world" (Cook & Koplow, 2013). In this vein Yüksel Sezgin argues that the Turkish model lost its validity:

> If there is any model of Muslim democracy post-Arab Spring, it is Tunisia, not Turkey. In fact, Turkey has a lot to learn from Tunisia's compromise- and tolerance-based politics. The repression following the 2013 Gezi demonstrations reflects the increasingly authoritarian and police-state character of the Turkish regime (Sezgin, 2014).

Having domestic stability, a democratic, free and legitimate regime in Turkey, will have a clear impact on its image in its surrounding regions. Turkey can increase its influence and soft power only by blending economic growth and democracy together. In the next section, the developments in the field of military power will be touched upon.

5.4.3. Military

As mentioned in the chapter related to different forms of power, Turkey has the 8th most powerful armed forces in the world according to the index provided by the Global Firepower. Excluding Russia (2nd most powerful state), Turkey is the most powerful country in the Balkans and Middle East. The list ignores the possession of nuclear weapons and concentrates on conventional military forces.

Still, Israel emerges as the second most powerful country in Turkey's neighborhood (11th in the global list) as the others have lower scores, Iran 22nd, Saudi Arabia 25th, Syria 26th and Iraq 68th (GFP, 2014).

Turkey's defense expenditures did not increase in this era. It was $20 billion in 2002 and it remained $16.5 for 2004 and 2006. From 2010 a slight increase can be observed: it was $16.9 billion in 2010 and $17.8 billion in 2012. The defense expenditures as share of GDP also decreased. It was 3.9% in 2002, 2.8% in 2004, 2.5% in 2006, 2.3% in 2008, 2.4% in 2010 and 2.3% in 2012. In 2012, the defense expenditure per capita was $244 for Turkey (SIPRI, 2014).

In Table 5.12, figures for other countries are shown. It is seen that oil rich Middle Eastern countries and Israel have very high defense expenditures. However these figures are high for countries with small population. It is still seen that Turkey is in a better position than many of the countries in its surrounding regions. However Israel emerges as the greatest rival for Turkey even if the nuclear weapons are not taken into consideration. It is clear that Turkey cannot impose its will as a dominant regional hegemon by relying on its military power.

Table 5.12 - Military Expenditure Per Capita (2012)

Country	$
Oman	3,722
USA	2,181
Saudi Arabia	1,997
Israel	1,905
UK	925
Bahrain	723
South Korea	633
Netherlands	631
Switzerland	574
Germany	567
Italy	554
Greece	524
Spain	301
Turkey	244
Croatia	223
Iraq	185
Iran	139
Serbia	118
Syria	114
Bulgaria	110
Albania	58
Macedonia	56
Egypt	54
Bosnia	52

Source: (SIPRI, 2014)

In the field of defense industry, Turkey managed to make progress to decrease its dependence on weapons systems. Especially the reluctance of the USA to provide technology transfer and export rights to Turkey if Turkey bought American weapons (main battle tanks and attack helicopters), forced Turkey to develop its own technology. The problems with Israel on the modernization (M-60

Tanks) and procurement schemes (Heron UAVs) also contributed to this result. The progress in this field can be seen in the amount of funds allocated for R&D in the defense industry. It was only $49 million in 2002. It started to increase dramatically and in 2002 reached the level of $773 million. This progress is also seen on export figures. In 2004 Turkish defense industry exported only $196 million but this figure rose to $1,039 million in 2012 and Turkey became the 24th biggest arms exporter in the world (SSM, 2012). Turkey managed to sell artillery units, patrol boats, armored personnel vehicles (APV) and APCs to countries like Bangladesh, Colombia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Rwanda and Nigeria. Turkey developed new models for APVs such as Cobra II (Otokar), Kirpi-Hedgehog (BMC) and Kaya (Otokar). Also 6x6 and 8x8 vehicles Pars (FNSS) and Arma (Otokar) joined the family of combat vehicles produced by Turkey. The most important development in the field of land vehicles is the development of the Altay tank (Otokar) which will be mass-produced in 2015. As a third generation plus tank, it will replace the second generation tanks (M-48, M60, Leopard 1-A1, Leopard 1-A2) in the TAF. In cooperation with Agusta Westland (Italy), TAI also started to produce T-129 Atak helicopters. The project envisages the production of 59 helicopters in total. TAI also developed basic training aircraft (Hürkuş) and various models of UAVs (Anka) and drone systems (Keklik, Şimşek and Turna). In addition to laser guided missiles (Cirit), Turkey started to produce its own infantry rifle (MPT-76) and sniper rifle (Bora) which will replace the foreign weapons such as G-3, AK-47, M-16 and Dragunov (SSM, 2014, pp. 10,13,38,39,40,70,83). Turkey also ordered a Landing Platform Dock (LPD) which will carry helicopters and amphibious vehicles in order to increase its power projection capacity. After Turkey procures Vertical

Take-off and Landing aircraft (F-35), it will be possible to use the LPD as an aircraft carrier (SSM, 2012).

Turkey faces a great problem in the face of ballistic missile threats. Currently, Turkey does not have any anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. As the crisis in Syria escalated, Turkey demanded Patriot ABM batteries from the NATO and they are deployed in the areas bordering Syria. Turkey has since the 1990s wanted to obtain these systems but its initiatives were unsuccessful. The reason was that the USA was not willing to accept either selling the Patriot systems or allow technology transfer. As a result of this failure, in 2013 Turkey decided to buy FD2000 ABM systems from China. This caused a great reaction from the US and NATO. The critics argued that since China is not a NATO country, the missile systems would not be suitable for interoperability with the ABMs in other NATO countries. They urged Turkey to cancel the agreement (Milliyet, 2013a). However Turkey's decision on China was motivated by the unwillingness of the USA to sell these systems to Turkey. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu in an interview emphasized this point. He argues that when Turkey wanted to procure ABMs and requested technology transfer and joint production, ridiculous questions such as "Why do you want these systems? Against whom will you use them? Can Turkey develop these systems and use against us in the future?" were asked by the US decision-makers. According to him they ignored the security challenges Turkey faced and disappointed Turkey (Yıldız, 2013).

However this decade has been a terrible era for the TAF. The probes such as Ergenekon, Balyoz and Espionage highly demoralized the officer corps and caused personnel shortage. In addition to many retired senior officers, also senior officers on active duty were trialed. The charges varied from organizing a military coup to being involved in espionage activities against Turkey. They were mostly remanded in

custody and unable to fulfill their tasks in the armed forces. Due to these probes, 37 general/admiral (the TAF has 348 in total), 125 colonel, 6 lieutenant colonel, 16 major, 5 captain, 4 lieutenant and 5 non-commissioned officers were sent to jail (Milliyet, 2013c). Too many retired personnel were also sent to prison. For the first time, the Chief of the General Staff was also jailed. General İlker Başbuğ was charged of establishing a terrorist organization and leading it (Radikal, 2012). The TNF suffered the greatest losses, 25 admirals in a total of 48 admirals were jailed and it led to serious staffing problem and comments such as "there is no admiral left in the Navy" (DHA, 2011). For this reason to many posts staff with lower rank had to be appointed, for example a colonel for the post that was normally filled by a two-star admiral.

In addition to the staff that was sent to prisons during the trials and faced mandatory retirement, many senior officers also resigned from their duties in protest the ongoing process. In July 2011, General Işık Koşaner (Chief of the General Staff) along with the Chiefs of the Land Forces Navy, Air Force, resigned from their posts after they failed to prevent the mandatory retirement of many senior officers during negotiations with the government at the Military Council (Milliyet, Orgeneral Işık Koşaner istifa etti, 2011b). Admiral Nusret Güner, Commander of the Fleet[66], resigned from his post at the beginning of 2013 and after that publicly criticized the whole process. He felt responsible to protect his colleagues and unable to find a solution to the problem after his consultations with the government, he resigned. He argued that the main purpose of these probes was to eliminate the Turkish Navy because the TNF started to become a high seas fleet and managed to decrease its dependency on foreign sources for weapons systems (Hürriyet, 2013a). He also

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[66] In the TNF there are only two admiral (four-star admiral) positions. One of them is the Commander of the Fleet and the other is the Chief of the Naval Forces.

published a book on this issue (Atilla, 2014). Güner was expected to become the Chief of the TNF. However upon his resignation, for the first time a vice-admiral was appointed to that post[67] because there was no admiral available. Vice Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu was firstly promoted and then appointed to that post (Vatan, 2013). Rear Admiral Türker Ertürk, Commander of the Naval College, resigned from his post in protest following the campaign against the College in some newspapers that claimed practice of religion was forbidden and adultery was common. Repeating the words of İlker Başbuğ in his farewell speech, he also claimed that the TAF and especially the TNF was target of an asymmetrical psychological warfare. (Hürriyet, 2010). Resignation decisions also hit the TAIF hard. It is officially declared that between 2002 and 2013, 291 pilots (the figure is only for fighter aircraft pilots) applied for retirement. Only in the first few months of 2013, 110 pilots applied for it, as they were disturbed by the recent developments and probes and it led to comments such as that the TAIF lacks the necessary number of fighter pilots in case of emergency (Milliyet, 2013e).

For many, the reason for these probes is to eliminate the TNF. Former Chief of the TNF, Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu commented that in the last two decades the TNF started many R&D projects in order to become self-sufficient from manufacturing submarines to destroyers. Last development was the project named MİLGEM (National Battle Ship Construction Project) which envisaged building a battle ship in Turkish shipyards. However he believes that these developments disturbed some external actors and now as a result of the probes, by eliminating the experienced officers and engineers working on these projects, this progress came under great danger. He also emphasized that many senior officers started to resign in

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[67] An admiral can be appointed to this position only after serving as the Commander of the Fleet for 2 years.

order to avoid a similar outcome (Hürriyet, 2013b). Another admiral, Cem Gürdeniz who was imprisoned published a book and also tried to shed light in the international aspects of the issue. He argues that the increasing strength of the TNF, its cooperation in the Black Sea with Russia (the BLACKSEAFOR) and improvements in technology and R&D activities disturbed the USA and EU. He notes that reflecting the transition from a coastal navy to a blue water navy, the Turkish Navy started activities for the first time in Indian Ocean for the first time (Gürdeniz , 2013).

While Turkey tried to decrease its dependency on foreign sources for weapons procurement, it also lost a very important part of its experienced military staff. In addition to the loss of personnel, the mentioned developments demoralized the officer corps.

5.5. CHANGING POWER CAPACITY OF TURKEY: AN EMERGING REGIONAL HEGEMON?

The foreign policy approach of the JDP reflects the search for grandeur for Turkey in global politics. Its architect, Ahmet Davutoğlu, insists on accurately redefining Turkey's position urgently. In his view, Turkey is a central country with historical and regional responsibilities. In 2007 he redefined Turkey as a "rising actor" and set the target for the year 2023 for Turkey to become a "global actor" (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 96).

Davutoğlu emphasizes the importance of Turkey's developing good relations and interdependence with its neighbors and in order to succeed in that he argues

negative and threat based perceptions should be eliminated and problems should be solved in a peaceful and satisfactory way. This policy is named as the 'zero problems with neighbors policy' and it is one of the leading principles of the 'new Turkish foreign policy' according to him. (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 4) Other leading principles are 'rhythmic diplomacy', 'multi-dimensional foreign policy', 'order instituting actor' and 'proactive foreign policy' (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 4). They are also described as 'balance between security and democracy', 'zero problems towards neighbors', 'proactive and pre-emtpive peace diplomacy', 'multi-dimensional foreign policy' and 'rhythmic diplomacy' (Davutoğlu, 2010). He argues that Turkey will follow a value-based foreign policy; it is ready to take responsibilities of a global actor and set the objective to be reckoned as a wise country in the international community (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 5)

In 2001 he published his book *Stratejik Derinlik* (*Strategic Depth)* (Davutoğlu, 2004)*.* Following his coming to the post of Chief Advisor, the book gained more importance and attracted attention since it is believed that the so called 'Strategic Depth Doctrine' guides Turkish foreign policy (Murinson, 2006); (Walker, 2007).

In the book he tries to identify Turkey's role in international affairs in the post-Cold War era. Emphasizing Turkey's 'geographical and historical' depth, he suggests that the geopolitical, geoeconomics and geocultural power of Turkey should be the basis of a new foreign policy culture and approach. He sets his focus on the former Ottoman territories and identifies the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus as Turkey's 'near land basins', while he identifies the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and the Caspian as Turkey's 'near sea basins'. Finally, Europe, the North Africa, South Asia, Cental and East Asia form Turkey's 'near

continental basins'. In his strategy, Turkey should try to increase its influence step by step in those basins in a way that it will enable Turkey to exert influence in its continental basins. (Davutoğlu, 2004)

According to him the Republic of Turkey which emerged as a nation state at the beginning of the century by ignoring the Ottoman legacy, had to face the geocultural and geopolitical responsibilities of this legacy at the end of the century. These responsibilities that constitute a burden for Turkish foreign policy at the same time open new horizons for it and give it new capabilities. (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 23) While criticizing the dominant foreign policy and security culture of Turkey, he argues that the Muslims in the Balkans regard Turkey as the 'political center' after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey's Balkan policy should consider the protection of rights of Muslims in the Balkans. (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 316)

In Davutoğlu's understanding the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus form the first priority areas for Turkish foreign policy. In his view, if Turkey as a pivot country follows a foreign policy that combines its 'historical depth' with 'strategic depth' in a successful way, it can become a 'central state'. (Davutoğlu, 2004, p. 563) He stresses that Turkey has a special position and it is more than a frontier or bridge country:

> Among all these classifications, Turkey holds a special position. Turkey's geography gives it a special central country status, which differs from other central countries. […] A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West. (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 78)

Especially the high growth rates witnessed during the JDP era led to increasing self-confidence and assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy. The 'rise of

Turkey' became a hot topic. Turkey is defined as an "emerging multiregional power" (Rubin & Kirişçi, 2002) in addition to "regional hegemon" (Erickson, 2004). Soner Çağaptay names Turkey as the "twenty-first century's first Muslim power" (Cagaptay, 2014). Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay define Turkey as a "near-BRICS country". They note, as a near-BRIC country, Turkey "has added an increasingly assertive and independent style of foreign policy with aspirations to establish itself as a major regional actor" (Öniş & Kutlay, 2013). According to Sotiris Serbos, Turkey has a new role in which economic factors are critical:

> Depending on how Turkey fares in the economic realm, it can become an active participant in the process of shaping rules and institutions for the global economy's new structure and pursue a diversified set of relationships in its foreign policy course (Serbos, 2013, p. 138).

In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that as a rising power, Turkey is included in different groupings, namely the N-11, CIVETS and MINT. It was also mentioned that, there are differences between the Great Powers, Small Powers and Middle Powers. It is also possible to differentiate between the traditional and emerging Middle Powers. The theoretical background provided in that chapter will be helpful in understanding Turkey's search for hegemony. In this regard, the concepts developed by M. Prys (regional dominant, benign and detached powers) and S. Destradi (empire, hegemony and leadership) on the strategies followed by regional powers will also be helpful.

The JDP-led Turkish foreign policy regards Turkey as the "order-setting country" and "security actor" in Turkey's neighboring areas. It is presented as Turkey's historical and regional responsibility. In the words of Davutoğlu:

"Given this picture, Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighboring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs". (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 79)

Turkish foreign policy activism in the JDP era has been debated a lot in the academic circles (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). Though activism is not something new in the Balkans as Turkey followed a very active foreign policy in the 1990s (Rüma, 2010), for the Middle East it can be put forward that Turkish foreign policy went through a transformation. It is named as foreign policy revision or paradigm change by some experts (Yeşiltaş, 2014, p. 26). According to the same author, Turkey cast itself as the "historical source of order" and tried to integrate this leadership role into the international system (Yeşiltaş, 2014, p. 35). Others note that in the Middle East Turkish foreign policy went through a transformation and as a result instead of non-involvement policy, Turkey started to portray itself as the regional leader: "Turkish leaders believe that the country has gathered enough economic and political power to play for a leadership role in the region" (Dinç & Yetim, 2012, p. 80). According to Cengiz Dinç, Turkey has become a security actor in the Middle East by being "trading power, stabilizing force and peace-promoter" and its foreign policy style which relies on soft power, resembles the EU (Dinç, 2011, p. 61). As Şaban Kardaş noted, "Davutoğlu expects Turkey to play a proactive role in shaping its neighborhood, for Turkey's security and prosperity at home necessitates the establishment of peaceful and stable orders in the immediate regions that surround it" (Kardaş, 2013, p. 66). It is also possible to see the traces of what Kardaş calls

"regional ownership"[68] and an emphasis on the common future and destiny in the speeches of the JDP cadres. As Emel Parlar Dal observed, the civilizational discourse has become dominant in the Turkish foreign policy rhetoric (Dal, 2012). In this regard, the speech given by Tayyip Erdoğan following his elections victory on June 12, 2011 is very illustrative:

> All friendly and brotherly nations from Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku and Nicosia . . . the hopes of the victims and the oppressed have won," and that "Beirut has won as much as Izmir. West Bank, Gaza, Ramallah, Jerusalem have won as much as Diyarbakır. The Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans have won, just as Turkey has won (Dal, 2012, p. 45).

Joerg Baudner also underlines the importance of some events that changed the direction of Turkish foreign policy. He argues that between 2002 and 2005 Turkey acted as a civilian power (Baudner, 2014, p. 80). In this period, Turkey had still hopes of becoming a member of the EU and accomplished many reforms. However the loss of EU vision due to the opposition from some EU countries led Turkey to focus more on the Middle East. After 2010, especially with the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkey shifted to regional power concept. In this respect, Turkey rather than emphasizing its role as a mediator, started to claim regional leadership (Baudner, 2014, p. 92). In his view;

> The shift towards a 'regional project' first by using visa exemptions and free trade agreements and later also by taking sides in the domestic conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Egypt and towards the emphasis on multiple (including military) resources of power and the ambition to act as a representative of a group of (Muslim) states in international organizations display the characteristics of a regional power (Baudner, 2014, p. 80).

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[68] It implies that "direct military involvement of external actors in Turkey's immediate neighborhood should be limited to the extent possible and that the management of economic and security affairs should be organized at the regional level" (Kardaş, 2013, p. 66).

Figure 5.5 The CINC Scores for Turkey and Its Neighbors (2002-2007)
Source: (Singer, 1987)v.4.0

The CINC scores mentioned in Chapter 2 illustrate that even though from 2002 to 2007 Turkey's material capabilities increased only very slightly, Turkey is still the most powerful country when compared to its neighbors. Unfortunately it does not cover the years after 2007. For this reason, it is not possible to trace the decreasing power of Syria following the civil war. Iran, probably due to increasing energy prices and its positive impact on GDP, increased its power from 2005. Already with the current data it is possible to mention the presence of power symmetry between Turkey and Iran. The US invasion of Iraq and ensuing domestic instability weakened Iraq as seen in Figure 5.5.

In order to fulfill the responsibilities of the new role it shouldered, Turkey started to enhance its repertoire of foreign policy tools. In tandem with its ambitions, Turkey started to improve its capacity, established new institutions and started new projects ranging from diplomacy to media. These developments will be touched upon on the following pages. It will show that Turkey started to increase its soft power and popularity.

As it aimed at increasing its trade relations and finding new markets, Turkey started a leap in the field of diplomacy. It was a precondition for effective diplomacy and increasing visibility of the country. In this regard, Turkey opened many new offices abroad. The number was 163 in 2002. This total increased to 221 in 2013, consisting of 129 embassy, 80 consulate-general, 11 permanent representatives and 1 trade office. In the following years with the new offices it is expected to be 243 in total (Office of Public Diplomacy, 2014c). The increase from 134 in 1990 (Dinçer & Kutlay, 2012, p. 14) to 221 in 2013 is a very remarkable improvement. It is also worth noting that an important part of these new offices were established in Africa in parallel to Turkey's "Africa opening". The number of embassies in Africa in 2002

was 12 but in 2013 this number rose to 35. In addition, as Turkey had only 4 embassies in South America, this figure also rose to 9 in 2013. Turkey is ranked the 7th among other countries based on the number of diplomatic offices abroad. France is the leader country in this regard and has 271 offices abroad. It is followed by the USA with 266 offices. Chine is the third country with 256 offices. It is followed by Russia and Britain with 252 offices. Italy as the 6th country has 233 offices abroad. Turkey is followed by Spain (220), Germany (219) and Japan (205) (Office of Public Diplomacy, 2014c). For many years, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA) suffered from the lack of personnel. In this regard, the law that regulated the activities of the TMFA was modified in 2010 and in parallel to the increase in number of offices, the number of both career employees and administrative employees increased. In 2002 the TMFA only had 1,542 career employees and 2,647 administrative employees. In 2013, these figures rose to 2,108 and 3,447 respectively. In addition to quantitative improvement, initiatives were launched to improve the quality of the career employees. While encouraging them to receive MA degree, the Ministry also encourages learning of foreign languages such as Arabic, Spanish, Chinese, Greek, Persian, Russian and Serbian (Office of Public Diplomacy, 2014c). Especially the lack of knowledge of Arabic was a real problem for Turkish diplomats. For many years, it was an ignored language when compared to English, French and German[69]. In 2011, Turkey had a total of 135 career staff in its missions in the Arabic-speaking countries and only 6 of 135 could speak Arabic. The number for the whole ministry was 10 in 1990. However it reached 26 in 2011 due to encouraging policies (Dinçer & Kutlay, 2012, p. 17). Yet, the TMFA faces

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[69] In this regard there was no incentive to learn languages such as Arabic and Persian. Diplomats were afraid that they would be stationed in the Middle Eastern countries throughout their career if they can speak Arabic. Rather than serving in these countries, many diplomats preferred serving in Europe and North America.

another challenge with regards to the ministry's budget. Its budget was only €436 million in 2011. The budget of other countries could enable us to compare: the US €39,336 million, Germany €3,194 million, France €2,625 million, England €2.324 million, Italy €1,706 million, Spain €1,503 million, Brazil € 986 million, Russia €915 million and India €674 million (Dinçer & Kutlay, 2012, p. 16). It would be fair to state that Turkey tried to increase its diplomatic power by increasing its staff and number of offices abroad, Turkey's power in this field is very limited. It will take time for the new initiatives to bear fruits. Dinçer and Kutlay emphasize this point:

> Turkey's current institutional and human infrastructure is not sufficient enough for it to be an "order-establishing" actor or "central country". Likewise, compared to other "order-establishing countries", Turkish foreign affairs is in a weak position. What is more, these numbers does not reflect more vital variables like specialization, technical sophistication, and operational capability" (Dinçer & Kutlay, 2012, p. 17).

As mentioned, Turkey is enhancing its repertoire of foreign policy tools. In this regard, the role played by foreign aid is of vital importance. In Chapter 4 it was mentioned that in 1999 TIKA came under the control of Office of the Prime Minister and after this restructuring its dynamism increased. However the economic crisis in 2001 limited the amount of Turkish foreign aid. Still between 2002 and 2002, TIKA established three new project coordination offices (PCO), in Tajikistan, Mongolia and Albania (Akçay, 2012, p. 82).

From 2002 on, TIKA increased its activism as foreign aid became an important dimension of Turkish foreign policy. It can be said that Turkey started to follow humanitarian diplomacy (Haşimi, 2014) and as Reşat Bayer and Fuat Keyman note, it is an emerging humanitarian actor that contributes to global security with its activities in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance (Bayer &

Keyman, 2012). As a result of the policy that considers foreign aid an important pillar of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey started to widen its scope of activities. 16 new PCOs were established in total in the following countries: Afghanistan, Kosovo, Ethiopia, Palestine, Macedonia, Sudan, Senegal, Montenegro, Ukraine, Syria, Pakistan and Serbia.

In addition to the increasing responsibility and authority of TIKA in coordinating humanitarian aid provided by the Turkish NGOs, its budget and the amount of aid it provided increased rapidly. In 2003, Turkey provided foreign aid only worth of $133 million. The year 2004 witnessed this rapid increase and it rose to $1.12 billion. There were up and downs in this amount. In 2005 it was $1.05 billion, in 2006 $1.70 billion, in 2007 $1.33 billion, in 2008 $1.57 billion, in 2009 $1.51 billion and in 2010 $1.71 billion (Akçay, 2012, p. 83). In 2012, aid provided by Turkey for the first time surpassed the $2 billion level by reaching $2.36 billion. As a result of this rapid increase, Turkey became the 4th largest donor in the world in 2012 and it is the country that witnessed the biggest increase. This is especially important because following the global economic crisis; the traditional donors decreased their amount of aid. In 2012 Spain decreased it by half, Japan by 38% and the USA 11%. Still the USA provided the biggest amount of aid, 29% of the total aid provided that year. It provided $3.8 billion. The second biggest donor was the EU with an amount of $1.9 billion. The United Kingdom as the third biggest donor provided aid worth of $1.2 billion. It was followed by Turkey with $1 billion and Sweden was the 5th largest donor with a value of $784 million. However, Turkey was the third most generous donor in 2012. It is estimated by taking into account the share of humanitarian assistance in Gross National Income (GNI). In this respect,

Luxembourg provided aid worth 0.16% of its GNI, Sweden 0.14% and Turkey 0.13% (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013).

In 2013, Turkey improved its position and became the third biggest government donor following the USA and UK. Turkey was followed by Japan. If the EU is taken into account as an actor, Turkey was the 4th largest donor for the same year. The USA provided $4.7 billion, the EU $1.9, the UK $1.8 billion, Turkey $1.6 billion and Japan $1.1 billion. As these actors constituted the top-five, they were followed by Germany, Sweden, Canada, Norway and France. As a result of its increasing aid, Turkey became the biggest donor outside the Development Assistance Committee in the OECD. In this respect Kuwait became the second country. In 2012 it only provided $14 million but it increased to $327 million in 2013. As a result, Kuwait became the 32nd largest government donor. Comparing the amount of aid provided by the oil-rich Gulf countries and the amount provided by Turkey would show the importance of Turkey's contribution. The UAE provided $90 million and Saudi Arabia $109 million of aid in 2013. Turkey became the most generous country by providing aid worth of 0.21% of its GNI in 2013 (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2014).

Turkey provides development assistance to 131 countries (Haşimi, 2014, p. 127). At a regional basis, Central Asia and Caucasus get the biggest share. It is followed by the Balkans and Eastern Europe. However, as a result of continued involvement, some countries have a higher share. Afghanistan is one of them. In 2010, it received 24.5% of Turkish foreign aid. It is followed by Macedonia with an amount of 14.9%. The third country is Lebanon with a share of 14.7%. Formerly the focus was more on Eurasia however in the recent years with increasing Turkish

involvement in Africa, TIKA also started to conduct projects in African countries (Akçay, 2012, pp. 83-89).

Especially in Afghanistan Turkey has been involved in a wide range of activities from reconstruction to providing healthcare (TIKA, 2014a). Somalia also became a success story for Turkey. Devastated by the civil wars, Somalia faced serious humanitarian crisis especially famine. Somalia received the attention of Turkey and personally of Tayyip Erdoğan. In this regard, Turkey firstly started aid campaign and many of the Turkish people contributed money for Somalia. Then Erdoğan paid a visit to Somalia with his family, and a large delegation (300 people) of MPs, representatives of the Turkish NGOs, singers and businessmen in 2011. It is important to note that it was the first visit to Somalia at this level from any country in the last 20 years (Sabah, 2011). As a result of Erdoğan's personal dedication, Somalia became the target of Turkish development activities. The Turkish Airlines started flights to Mogadishu in order to connect it to the world. Turkey built the Mogadishu airport, highways, water infrastructure, and hospitals, collected the garbage and donated trucks in addition to providing food and medicine (TIKA, 2014b). Another thing is that, as Turkish officials were in Somalia ignoring the security threats, many Western NGOs did not have offices there. They preferred to work from their offices in Nairobi while using intermediaries for the services they provided in Somalia. This also had a positive impact on Turkey's efforts. Turkish organizations are more effective than the UN as Mohamed Nour, the Mayor of Mogadishu, emphasized in 2013: "If I request computers from the UN, they will take months and require a number of assessments. They will spend $50,000 to give me $7,000 of equipment. If I request computers from Turkey, they will show up next week" (quot. in (Haşimi, 2014, p. 127). In addition to TIKA, the Turkish Red

Crescent (Kızılay) started to become an important policy tool and provided urgent humanitarian aid especially following wars, famine and natural disasters. It provided these services to countries ranging from the Philippines to Bangladesh. It also became the main body for assisting the Syrian refugees and their number amounted to 2 million. Turkey hosts the largest group of Syrian refugees when compared to other neighboring countries. It provided shelter, food and medical services to the refugees (Kızılay, 2014).

In parallel to state bodies, Turkish NGOs are improving themselves and starting to get involved in humanitarian operations abroad. Here we will suffice only with a few examples to show the extent of their works. The TOBB is going to build up an industrial estate (organize sanayi bölgesi) in Palestine in a project named Industry for Peace. The aim is to fight unemployment in Palestine and provide an environment of security by attracting FDI while encouraging Palestinian and Israeli businessmen to cooperate (TOBB, 2014). Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (TDV) which was established in 1975 started the extent of its activities to many countries in the 2000s. It has schools in the Turkic republics and in Bulgaria, Romania, Somali, Haiti, Pakistan, Malaysia and Bangladesh. It currently provides scholarship to 2,954 students. It hosts students for education in Turkey and provides scholarship and also provides higher education in the Islamic theology. It provides an important amount of humanitarian aid, ranging from food to drilling water wells and medical services. It is especially active in Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Arakan, Chad, Haiti, Mali, Philippines, Afghanistan and Bosnia. It also builds new mosques or repairs the damaged mosques abroad (TDV, 2015). Kerem Öktem in a detailed paper analyzed the importance of the activities of Diyanet by building or renovating mosques and providing scholarships. It serves to increase Turkish influence in the Balkans while

also promoting Turkish version of Islam against the activities of Salafi/Wahhabi version (Öktem, 2012). In another paper, he argued that due to increasing activities, Turkey acts as a patron state of Muslim communities in the Balkans (Öktem, 2013). The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) was established in 1992 by the volunteers who wanted to provide aid to warn-torn Bosnia. It is very active in Palestine and Syria. It also provides aid to Syrian refugees in Turkey and other countries. In addition to building mosques in countries ranging from Nepal to Rwanda, it is active in 100 countries and provides medical support, shelter, food and education to people (IHH, 2015). It received public interest association status in 2006 and the new legislation made it easier for these associations to collect donations. In the same way Kimse Yok mu (KYM) received the same status same year. It was established in 2002. It is active in 113 countries with a network of 180,000 volunteers. It also provides a wide range of aid. In the last three years it drilled 1,622 water wells in 17 African countries while 25,557 people had cataract surgery since 2008 in countries such as Niger, Sudan, Nepal and Nigeria. It builds schools, orphanages, hospitals and provides scholarship for students as well as vocational training (KYM, 2015). Another Turkish NGO is Yardımeli which was established in 2007. It is active in Syria, Palestine, African countries, Pakistan and Myanmar. It established a hospital in Somalia, an orphanage in Sudan and a village in Pakistan after the monsoon disaster. It is also very much engaged in drilling water wells through donations in Africa. It is possible to drill a well in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia with a sign showing your name on it for about $5,500. Another project they run aims at sustainable development and villagers are provided with livestock for milk production (Yardımeli, 2015). It is seen that many of the Turkish NGOs involved in humanitarian aid are relatively new. However they

have made great progress in short time and contributed a lot to Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy efforts.

Radio and television broadcasting has always played an important role in spreading ideas. In the Nasser era, *Sawt al Arab* (*Voice of the Arabs*) as a radio channel reaching all Arabs became the main source for spreading the idea of independence and Arab nationalism (Alahmad, 2011). In this regard, Turkey started to establish television channels broadcasting in other languages in order to increase popularity of Turkey and its influence in the surrounding regions. In 2009, *TRT Avaz* was established which mainly focused on the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. *TRT 6* broadcasting in Kurdish was established the same year. Next year, *TRT et-Türkiyye* was founded for broadcasting in Arabic (TRT, 2015). Another state institution, *Anadolu Agency* provides news in English, French, Arabic, Kurdish, Albanian, Serbo-Croat-Bosniac and Russian languages.

Turkey increased its popularity in the surrounding regions also thanks to an unexpected development: Turkish soap operas. In the 1990s Latin American, especially Brazilian soap operas were very famous in many countries including Turkey. In parallel to increasing investment in production and spread of private television channels, Turkish production companies in the 2000s entered into a period of boom. Turkey now exports over 70 soap operas to 75 countries ranging from Latin America to China. They are very widely watched in the Balkan and Middle Eastern countries. The boom can be seen in the amount of exports. Turkey exported soap operas worth of $10,000 in 2004 but this figure rose to $200 million at the end of 2012 (Office of Public Diplomacy, 2015a). According to Ay Yapım, a leading Turkish production company, some top series are sold for $150,000 per episode but it was only average $4,000 five years ago, a fact that proves the skyrocketing in this

industry (Candemir, 2013). It is believed that soap operas also contributed to the increasing number of tourists coming from the Arab countries. Turkish actors and actresses became very famous especially in the Middle East. Kıvanç Tatlıtuğ, starring at series like *Gümüş* (named *Noor* in the Middle East) and *Aşk-ı Memnu* (*Forbidden Love*), has been dubbed "halal Brad Pitt" (Williams, 2013). However the influence of soap operas with regards to spreading values and lifestyles is more important than the export revenues. They also make Turkish language popular. They are dubbed in many countries but some people also watch them online with original dubbing and subtitles. As a result they start to develop familiarity with Turkish language. For example, Dalia Ahmed, 32, is an assistant researcher in agricultural studies in Egypt, started to learn Turkish at the Turkish cultural center after watching the series *Asi* (el Masry, 2013). Nina Maria Paschalidou, a Greek director made a documentary named *Kısmet* where she interviewed many women and tried to answer the question how Turkish soap operas transform women in the Middle East especially. According to her, in the Middle East these soap operas are influential because of the life-style and the status of women in the society they depict and they empower women: "Viewers in the Middle East see the Turkish woman as a model of the modern Muslim female. This is a bit who they would like to be, who they struggle to become" (van Versendaal, 2014). Semiz İdiz also emphasizes this point and shows the importance of secular life-style in Turkey where women have more rights when compared to many Arab countries:

> But it is the depiction of modern living, and the civilized relationships between men and women, that provide the principle attraction. All of this and much more exists in Western soaps, of course. But people in the Middle East appear to be saying, "Why look to the West with its alien and anti-Arab culture, when one can get inspiration from a Turkey, which is modern but whose culture is not alien, given our shared religion and history" (İdiz, 2013).

In the Balkan countries too, Turkish soap operas are very popular. Hamzic et al conducted a research by interviewing media experts, sociologists and ordinary audience on the Turkish soap operas (Hamzic, Nedelkovska, Demolli, & Cabric, 2013). They found out that Turkish soap operas are popular because they have the traditional family life and values that existed in the Balkans but recently started to change due to various factors. For example, Nefisa Bubic, a pensioner from Sarajevo commented in the following way: "I like the way they represent relationships between children and parents in shows like '*When Leaves Fall,*' which is full of the deep respect that once existed here as well". Artan Muhaxhiri, a sociologist from Kosovo also underlined the importance of cultural similarity on the popularity of these shows: "Social norms and values, the general mentality, family relationships, lifestyle, clothing, food, furniture, character names - Albanian viewer can easily identify with all these cultural elements in Turkish soaps" (Hamzic, Nedelkovska, Demolli, & Cabric, 2013).

However, as they started to become influential, Turkish soap operas also caused reaction. In Macedonia for example, the country passed laws to restrict broadcasting of Turkish series. Macedonian Minister of Information Society Ivo Ivanovski stated that "They're all fascinating, but to stay under Turkish servitude for 500 years is enough" (Zalewski, 2013). Snjezana Radenkovic, from Serbia, for example commented that many people are afraid to admit that they watch Turkish soap operas due to social reaction: "It's not 'in', although it is perfectly all right to watch Hollywood productions. But I do not feel ashamed at all. On the contrary I am delighted." (Hamzic, Nedelkovska, Demolli, & Cabric, 2013) Especially in the Middle East, after couples started to name their babies after the main characters and reports that claimed divorce rates increased due to Turkish soap operas, conservative

groups started to argue that these soap operas destroy the traditional family life. After broadcasting of *Noor* (*Gümüş*), even though many scenes were censored, highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, called the series as "subversive and un-Islamic" and another Saudi cleric, Saleh al-Luhaidan, chief justice of the supreme judicial council declared a death *fatwa* for the owners of the television channel that broadcasted "depravation and debauchery" (Al Jazeera, 2008). Despite the reactions, it seems that Turkish soap operas will continue to be an influential tool in increasing Turkish soft power and spreading Turkish culture and language through the Balkans and Middle East.

Turkey established the Yunus Emre Institute in 2009 in order to provide training in Turkish language in other countries. It has 30 cultural centers abroad where people are enrolled to learn Turkish and also attend other cultural activities (YEE, 2015). In addition, Turkey aims at increasing the number of foreign students enrolled at Turkish education institutions. In this respect, a project named Turkey Scholarships has been very influential. As a result of these scholarships the number of foreign students increased about 70% in the last decade. For the year 2012-2013, 140,000 students from 150 countries applied for scholarship and around 4,000 students were successful. The biggest number of students comes from Central Asian countries. In 2013, 1,908 students came to Turkey from Asian countries. Students from the Balkan countries also benefit from the scholarship scheme. 688 students from European countries gained this scholarship in 2013. In parallel to Turkey's increasing involvement in Africa, the number of students also increased. It was only 333 in 2010 but it rose to 1,091 in 2013 (Office of Public Diplomacy, 2015b).

There are various reasons beyond Turkey's foreign policy activism and portraying itself as a security actor, an "order-setting country", especially in the

Middle East and Balkans. As the first of all, Turkish foreign policy aims at developing interdependence by increasing trade with neighbors. It has been mentioned that Turkey increased its trade with its neighbors and also that exports are vital for Turkey's export-oriented growth model. If Turkey wants to provide jobs for its young and dynamic population, it has to increase its exports. In addition to direct security threats and refugee problems that would emanate from instability in the regions surrounding Turkey, insecurity of the important trade routes and disruption of trade would hurt Turkey's economic interests. For example, following the instability and internal chaos in Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion, Turkish trucks were targeted by some terrorist groups and it had negatively influenced Turkey's trade (NTVMSNBC, 2006). More recently as the IS became a source of threat in Iraq, Turkish trucks became potential targets too. As a result, Turkey consulted Iran and a new route which will bypass insecure areas of Iraq will be established through Iran for trucks going to the central parts of Iraq (Serçe, 2014). Davuoğlu emphasizes the importance of interdependence and economic integration. He regretted that, due to the civil war in Syria his project that aimed at establishing a free trade zone between Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon with the Turkish province Hatay at its center, is now far from becoming real (Taraf, 2014). Kadri Renda argues that the new activism in Turkish foreign policy seems "to facilitate international cooperation among regional actors and to create a complex interdependence between Turkey and its neighborhood" (Renda, 2011, p. 90). In this respect, Davutoğlu regards proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy as an operating principle for Turkish foreign policy. Peace diplomacy serves to the national interests of Turkey by promoting stability in his view and mediation is an important pillar of it. He defines this role as the following:

The third operative principle is proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, which aims to take measures before crises emerge and escalate to a critical level. Turkey's regional policy is based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence. Consider Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria, a role that was not assigned to Turkey by any outside actor. Other examples of pre-emptive diplomacy include Turkey's efforts to achieve Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, reconciliation efforts in Lebanon and Palestine, the Serbia-Bosnia reconciliation in the Balkans, dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reconstruction of Darfur and Somalia (Davutoğlu, 2010).

Secondly, the JDP leadership believes that Turkey will have better chances for EU membership if it acts as a security actor and provides stability. As Özpek and Demirağ observed, Davutoğlu uses the bow and arrow analogy for Turkish foreign policy. In his view, Turkey is an archer and the more it draws the back of the bow through the East, the farther the arrow flies West. The aim is to use the Turkish activism in the East as leverage and thus pave the way for Turkey's more serious treatment in the West. Also Turkey's engagement in the East, would serve the interests of the West (Özpek & Demirağ, 2012, p. 118). The JDP leadership emphasizes the potential contribution of Turkey to the EU. For example, according to Davutoğlu the EU will become a stronger actor with Turkey's membership (Milliyet, 2009b). In the same vein, Tayyip Erdoğan remarking upon the EU process noted that Turkey would not be a burden to the EU; rather it will contribute to the EU and shoulder its burden. He noted that, more than the half of the 27 members is a burden to the EU when compared to Turkey (DHA, 2012). Especially in the military sphere, Turkey can contribute to the EU. Turkey made an enormous contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan and took part in the EU-led EUPOL Kinshasa in Democratic Republic of Congo. More recently, Turkey accepted the request of the EU and decided to provide troops to peacekeeping operations in Central African Republic and Mali (AA, 2014).

Thirdly, the power vacuum in the Middle East created a suitable environment for Turkey's activism. For the Gulf States the increasing power of Iran is a real regional threat and the toppling of the Saddam regime in Iraq undermined the regional balance against Iran. Iran's nuclear program is another source of concern for the Gulf States. As a result, they increased armament procurements and in late 2014 decided to set up a joint military command in order to unite their forces against Iran (Kerr, 2014). This decision came after the US signaled that it will decrease its military presence in the region by 2020, deploying troops and warships in the East in order to balance China. The US wanted the Gulf States to shoulder a bigger amount of defense burden in the region (Critchlow, 2014). The regional developments also led to a convergence of interests between the Gulf States and Israel (Cooper H. , 2014). Given Turkey's military capabilities and the power symmetry between Iran and Turkey in material capabilities as shown in Figure 5.5, the Gulf States regarded Turkey as the best candidate to balance Iran in the region (Baskan, 2012).

In this environment, especially after Turkey's EU membership option seemed to be blocked by some EU countries, leadership in the Muslim world was suggested as a new role for Turkey. Graham Fuller is the most prominent advocate of this view. In 2008 he published a book titled "The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World".He argues that following the 2002 elections, for the first time in its modern history Turkey is becoming a major player in the Middle East politics in order to fulfill its historical role in the Muslim world (Fuller, 2008, p. 5). In this respect, Turkey has also tried to mend the fences between the Muslim world and the West especially after the 9/11 events and the thesis proposed by Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations) gained popularity. In 2005 Turkey and Spain started the Alliance of Civilizations Initiative with the aim of overcoming suspicions

and improving relations with the Muslim world. First co-chaired by Turkey and Spain, it soon became a UN initiative and number of the member countries rose to 139 in 2014. Various forums were organized to foster cooperation and dialogue (UNAOC, 2015).

Turkey's activism was also reflected in the OIC which is the second biggest IGO following the UN. For the first time in its history, a Turkish person was elected as its secretary-general (2005-2013) (OIC, 2015). Turkish activism in the IGOs was reflected at the UN. Turkey has served as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in the past: 1951-52, 1954-55 and 1961 (UNSC, 2015). However after 1961, Turkey lost its interest in the UNSC. In this respect Turkey announced its candidacy for the seat for the 2009-2010 periods. Turkey was elected with 151 votes and it was an important success for Turkey. Tayyip Erdoğan commented that Turkey's election "is a reflection of our increasing weight in international politics and the confidence that the international community has in us" (Hurriyet Daily News, 2009). In this respect, Turkey also started to call for reforming the UNSC. As mentioned in Chapter 2, emerging powers such as Brazil has a reformist discourse about the international governance (Table 2.50). Rising powers, not represented in the UNSC, want to have a bigger role and influence in the world affairs and they argue that the present structure of the UNSC is unfair. Also as shown in Table 2.51 in the aforementioned chapter, it is important to realize the differences between the traditional and emerging middle powers. Emerging middle powers are prone to play a leadership role in their region and they also have a reformist approach to the IGOs. Turkey started to show the same tendencies under the JDP rule. For example in 2012 upon the UNSC's failure to produce a solution to deal with the crisis in Syria Tayyip Erdoğan commented that the current system is unfair and it does not reflect the will

of most countries and added: "It's high time to consider a structural change for international institutions, especially for the UN Security Council" (The Guardian, 2012). In 2013, during a TV interview, he increased the tone of his criticism and mentioned the possibility of establishing an "alternative" UN: "If we are really saying that the world is bigger than 'the five,' then with other countries coming out, they would form their own United Nations. Such a boom could be realized. The realization of such a boom would prompt them [the permanent five] to reform themselves" (Hurriyet Daily News, 2013). In 2014, at the UN General Assembly he again mentioned this problem and used the slogan "the world is bigger than five" and later this become the motto of a Turkish youth NGO that works for the democratization of the UN (Biggerthanfive, 2015). Later he started to criticize the lack of any Muslim country in the UNSC and continued his calls for reform. On 21 January 2015, at a meeting of the OIC in Istanbul he stated the following:

> Is there any single Muslim country among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council? Is the entire world surrendered to the five members? Can justice be there? We are 56 countries. Won't we question what our function is? Islamic countries make up almost one-third of the United Nations (Hurriyet Daily News, 2015).

Turkey's efforts to claim leadership in the Muslim world increased after 2009. Especially following the Davos incident and the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara, as Turkey's relations with Israel deteriorated, Tayyip Erdoğan and Turkey started to become more popular in the eyes of the Arab people. For example, in 2010 he was voted by the readers of the CNN Arabic as the Man of the Year receiving 74% of the votes that took part in the survey (Today's Zaman, 2011). In the early periods of the Arab Spring, Turkey's popularity increased as a Muslim and democratic country. In a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 6 Muslim

majority countries (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Pakistan) in 2012, Erdoğan was the most popular leader. He received 65% approval rating and was followed by Saudi King Abdullah (with 58% approval rating) (Hurriyet Daily News, 2012).

This popularity was reflected in other surveys. In this regard especially the survey conducted by TESEV from 2010 on in 7 Arab countries (Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Iraq) is very important and shows the regional trends in Turkey's acceptability for the regional leadership. In 2010 75% of the participants had favorable opinion of Turkey. Saudi Arabia received the highest rating with 78%. Turkey received the highest approval rate in Palestine 87% and shared this position with Syria. It was in Iraq where the participants were least favorable of Turkey (69%). It shows that Turkey managed to improve its image in the Middle East (Akgün, Perçinlioğlu, & Gündoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, 2010, p. 11). In addition to popularity, the participants expected Turkey to play a mediator role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict with an average of 79%. It was highest in Palestine with 89% (Akgün, Perçinlioğlu, & Gündoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, 2010, p. 17). When asked, "Should Turkey play a bigger role in the Arab world?", 77% of the participants strongly/agreed with that while 16% strongly/disagreed. It showed that despite the opposition from some groups, the majority of the Arabs wanted Turkey to get more involved in the problems of the Arab world (Akgün, Perçinlioğlu, & Gündoğar, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, 2010, p. 18). Showing the reflections from Turkey's active foreign policy, 71% strongly/agreed that Turkey has become more and more influential on Arab world politics in the recent years while 15% strongly/disagreed and 5% neither agreed nor disagreed (Akgün, Perçinlioğlu, & Gündoğar, 2010, p.

23). More importantly, Turkey was seen as a model by the 61% of the participants and also a successful example of the coherence between Islam and democracy by 63% of the participants (Akgün, Perçinlioğlu, & Gündoğar, 2010, p. 22). In 2011 the results again confirmed Turkey's popularity. It was the most favored country with 78% approval rate. It was also seen that Turkey was considered as the most influential security actor in the region. 77% of the participants thought Turkey has played the most positive role for peace in the region. Turkey was followed by the EU and UN both with 58% rating (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, pp. 9-10). The participants also believed that Turkey played the most positive role on the Arab Spring with 56%. France followed with 36% and the USA with 35% (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, p. 11). 75% of the participants wanted Turkey to play the mediator role in the Palestinian Question while 71% a bigger role for Turkey in the Middle East (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, p. 20). With regards to question being a model for other countries in the region, 61% considered Turkey to be a model. When asked the question "Why can Turkey be a model?" 32% of the participants stated for its democracy, 25% economy, 23% Muslim background, 17% secular political system and 8% for its strategic value (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, p. 21). This result alone shows that for Turkey to be a successful model democracy, economy and Muslim identity are very important. With regards to being the strongest economy of the region at the moment 26% answered Saudi Arabia, 20% Turkey and 7% UAE. But for ten years later, 25% saw Turkey as the strongest economy while 16% saw Saudi Arabia and 8% UAE. Turkey's increasing trade was also observed in the survey results. When asked the question "Have you ever consumed a Turkish product?" 71% answered Yes, 28% No and 1% Do not know. With regards to the influence of soap operas, when asked the question "Have you ever watched a Turkish TV series?"

74% answered positive while 26% answered negative. It also showed that Turkey was seen as the first holiday destination in the region with 30% score (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, pp. 23-24).

However, in 2012 positive perception of Turkey started to change. Despite the fact that Turkey was still regarded the most favorable country, its score fell down to 69% (it was 78% in 2011) (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, p. 9). Especially Turkey's Syrian policy played a negative role in this outcome. Also a new question was asked to the participants on their perception of regional power. With regards to political power, 12% of the participants regarded Turkey as the regional power. Turkey was followed by Iran (9%), Saudi Arabia (9%) and Egypt (8%). With regards to economic power, Saudi Arabia was seen as the regional power by the 29% of the participants. It was followed by Turkey (14%), Iran (5%) and Egypt (2%). This result is natural for a country like Turkey that lacks energy sources when compared to Saudi Arabia. With regards to cultural power, Saudi Arabia is seen as the regional power with a score of 9%. Even though language is a barrier between Turkey and the Arab countries, Turkey is seen as the second most important regional power in the cultural field with a score of 7%. Egypt followed Turkey with a score of 6% and Iran with 1%. In terms of military power, the results are surprising. 14% of the participants regarded Iran as the most powerful country. It is followed by Turkey (8%), Egypt (7%) and Saudi Arabia (4%). When asked which countries follow a sectarian foreign policy, Iraq emerged as the first country (62%). It is followed by Iran (55%), Syria (53%), Saudi Arabia (37%), Egypt (30%), Qatar (30%), Turkey (28%) and UAE (25%). Though Turkey's score is relatively low on this issue, it is still important because 28% of the people think that Turkey follows a sectarian foreign policy. It also shows the sectarian polarization in the region (Akgün &

Gündoğar, 2012, p. 11). When asked specifically on Turkey about following a sectarian foreign policy, the scores are high especially in countries with Shia population. It is interesting that the highest score for Turkey on this issue comes from Tunisia with 37%. Maybe it is because of the strong secular tradition in Tunisia and people do not approve Turkish foreign in the recent era. It is followed by Syria (36%), Iran (35%), Yemen and Libya (31%), Lebanon (30%) (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, p. 12). Criticisms of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East are also seen in the survey. While 64% of the participants regarded the policies followed by Turkey in a positive light, 24% of them had negative views. Syria (66%), Iran (45%), Iraq (40%) and Lebanon (23%) have the highest negative views of Turkish foreign policy. Especially Turkey's policy in Syria caused problems. Only 52% of the participants approved it while 36% disapproved (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, p. 19).

The survey also showed that the percentage of people who thought that Turkey can be a model for the region decreased. It fell to 53% from 61% in 2011. In a similar way, the percentage of people who thought that Turkey blends Islam and democracy together fell from 67% to 58%. The percentage of people who wanted to see Turkey as a mediator in the Palestinian Conflict also fell from 75% to 66%. Only 66% of the participants wanted Turkey to play a bigger role in the Middle East while it was 71% previous year (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012, p. 20).

The results of the 2013 survey should be seen as a warning by Turkey despite the fact that Turkey still enjoys high popularity. As the first of all, favorable view of Turkey fell to 59% (78% in 2011). A surprising finding is that the UAE emerged as the most favorable country with 67%. Egypt and Iran suffered a loss; their scores fell to 45% and 34% respectively (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2014, p. 9). In terms of political power Turkey and Saudi Arabia shared the same score (12%) as the strongest actors.

They are followed by Iran (9%), Egypt (8%), Israel (3%) and UAE (2%). In terms of economic power, Saudi Arabia is again regarded as the most powerful country (29%). It is followed by Turkey (16%), UAE (12%), Iran (5%), Israel (1%) and Egypt (1%). It is important that in terms of cultural power this year Turkey had the highest score (12%). It is followed by Saudi Arabia (11%), UAE (8%), Egypt (6%), Iran (3%) and Israel (1%). In terms of military power the results are also surprising. Egypt appeared as the strongest state (13%) followed by Iran (12%), Turkey (9%), Israel (6%), Saudi Arabia (5%) and UAE (1%) (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2014, p. 12).

Another alarming finding for Turkey is that the percentage of the people who think Turkey follows a sectarian foreign policy increased. It rose to 39% (28% previous year). Especially in Egypt it rose from 24% to 45%, in Lebanon from 30% to 42%, in Syria from 36% to 54% and in Yemen from 31% to 44% (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2014, p. 13). In a similar fashion, the percentage of people who thought that Turkey had a positive effect on the Arab Spring fell to 37% (56% in 2011). Favorable opinion of Turkey fell down dramatically in Egypt. It was 86% in 2011 but in 2013 it was 38%. Even in countries where it was very high, like Libya and Palestine, it fell down. It was 79% in Libya (93% in 2011) and 75% in Palestine (89% in 2011) (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2014, p. 18). Also the percentage of people who saw Turkey as a successful model decreased to 51% (61% in 2011, 53% in 2012). Less people started to see Turkey as a successful example of coherence of Islam and democracy as Turkey scored only 55% in 2013 (67% in 2011 and 58% in 2012). The number of people who wanted Turkey to act as a mediator also fell to 61% in parallel to those who wanted Turkey to play a bigger role in the Middle East (60% in 2013, it was 71% in 2011) (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2014, p. 21). It seems that in addition to Turkey's policy especially in Syria, the Gezi Park Protests and the government's

harsh treatment of the protesters contributed to this negative result. 71% of the participants were aware of the Gezi Park Protests. They followed the developments through media. However when it comes to interpreting it, the opinion seems to be split up. 50% of the participants who followed the developments think that it is a positive development for Turkey's democracy while 45% of the participants disagree (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2014, p. 24). Still, it shows that, especially after taking into consideration that those who think Turkey can be a model saw economy and democracy as the main reasons in the past years, if only Turkey improves democratic rule at home it is a better candidate as a model. The problems about democracy and freedom of expression also damaged Tayyip Erdoğan's image in the Middle East despite his continuing popularity. For example, a young train driver from Tunisia commented in the following way: "Erdogan was just a flash in the pan. After he talked so much about human rights, the events on Taksim Square have unmasked his true face. He's a hypocrite. He'll never be a model for us" (VOA, 2013).

It is seen that Turkey wanted to become a regional hegemon in the Middle East and Balkans by fostering regional economic cooperation and contributing to regional security as a security actor. It managed to increase its soft-power in the last decade. It started new projects (such as scholarships for foreign students) and established new institutions (such as TRT Arabic), allocated more sources to the existing institutions (such as TIKA). Turkish NGOs for the first time started to get involved in humanitarian projects abroad at this scale while new NGOs were founded. Turkey became one of the most important donor countries in the world. These achievements are quite remarkable given the fact that these initiatives mostly started after 2002. As shown in this part, Turkey became a popular country in the Middle East and Balkans while in the Middle East especially it was seen as a model

by the others. Despite the ensuing problems, Turkey showed that it is ready to shoulder a bigger responsibility for the regional security and stability. In the terms of hard power, even though Turkey is still the strongest country in both regions, it is not the single center of power. Especially with Iran it is obvious that there is a delicate balance. Besides, in penetrated regions like the Middle East and Balkans, there are other candidates for regional hegemony in addition to the extra-territorial actors that have vital interests. When compared to South Africa for example, another middle-power, it is harder for a regional state to establish its hegemony in the Middle East. It is for this reason more than hard power; Turkey chose to emphasize soft power and tried to integrate other states to its regional project.

Using the terminology (detachment, domination, hegemony) developed by M. Prys (Prys, 2010), Turkey could be defined as the detached regional power in the 1990s especially with regards to the Middle East where its involvement was limited. From 2002 on Turkey, unable to become regional dominant power due to its limited power resources, left the policy of detachment and tried to establish its hegemony. However though easier to use, soft-power has its weaknesses too. Especially in the Middle East, Turkey faced the limits of its soft-power. It shows that Turkey cannot rely only on soft-power and it has to increase its material capabilities, its hard-power, in order to establish and sustain its hegemony. In this regard, Turkey can be best defined as an emerging regional hegemon. Of course, the establishment of Turkish hegemony will depend on Turkey's willingness for this role in addition to the negative or positive perception of its role both by the countries in these regions and other actors involved in regional politics. Sustainability of Turkey's policies and claim for regional hegemony, however, will be the most important factor. As mentioned in Chapter 2, middle powers act in cycles of activism in regional politics.

Leadership change, changing priorities in foreign policy or pressing domestic problems may lead to changes in policies thus the claim for regional hegemony can be given up. As the emerging middle powers are different than the traditional middle powers in terms of social and economic development, the amount of material sources devoted to the regional hegemony project (such as foreign aid, military aid or defense spending to sustain peace-keeping operations etc.) may decrease and this change can also lead to abandonment of the regional initiatives. One should also take into consideration that accumulation of power, as mentioned in Chapter 2 with regards to the rise of the USA and Japan as Great Powers in late 19th century, always takes time. Depending on the amount of efforts and devoted sources, it may take at least a few decades (for the USA it started in the 1850s and it was accepted as a Great Power in the 1890s). For this reason, it can be argued that Turkey as an emerging regional hegemon made a good start for this position in the early 2000s.

5.6.   CONCLUSION

As has been mentioned, Turkey started to claim a leadership position in the Balkans and Middle East. It is possible to argue that Turkish foreign policy entered into a period of activism and growing self-confidence caused by the high level economic growth. Emphasizing cooperation and economic integration, the JDP leaders believed that the regional problems can be solved by increasing interdependence between the countries. This understanding formed the ideational framework of Turkish foreign policy starting from 2002. It was believed that Turkey acting as a security actor, by relying on soft power rather than its hard power, would transform the conflict-ridden regions and while contributing to regional peace it

would also increase its influence and prestige. In order to accomplish this goal, Turkey started to establish new institutions, reformed the existing institutions, developed projects and started to support the activities of its NGOs abroad. Turkey proposed itself as a successful model for the Muslim world especially. Blending democracy and Islam and sustaining a high-level growth, Turkey managed to attract the attention of many people from different countries through its achievements in this era.

Defining itself as a security actor, it undertook to solve regional problems by offering mediation, taking part in peace-keeping operations and allocating sources for humanitarian aid. In this respect, Turkey spent great efforts to fulfill this task while demanding a bigger say in world affairs in return. In the next chapter, two cases in which Turkey offered its services as a mediator will be analyzed. It will shed light on the motivations of Turkey, the methods and tools used by it and also reactions to Turkey's initiatives at the systemic and regional level. It will also help us to understand capabilities and weaknesses of Turkey both in hard power and soft power fields.

CHAPTER 6

6   TURKEY AS A SECURITY ACTOR: THE GAP BETWEEN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

6.1.   INTRODUCTION

It has been mentioned that in the JDP era Turkey declared itself as a security actor and tried to solve regional conflicts by offering its services. Turkey participated in peace-keeping and peace-building operations, became an important donor in foreign aid and conflict-resolution started to have a higher priority in the foreign policy agenda. In this chapter, mediation initiatives as a conflict resolution method in Turkish foreign policy during the JDP era will be analyzed.

As the first of all the instances where Turkey offered to mediate between the parties will be touched upon very briefly. Then Turkey's motivations behind offering mediation will be elaborated. In this respect, two case studies on Turkey's mediation initiatives will be analyzed in a detailed way. The causes and emergence of the chosen conflict cases will be cited briefly. The focus will be on the mediation strategy, the tools and leverage used by Turkey in order to find a solution to the conflict and how Turkey's mediation is perceived by the parties of the conflict and both by the global and regional actors. In this respect, the nuclear crisis started by Iran's decision to enrich uranium and the reconciliation process between Serbia and

Bosnia-Herzegovina which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries will be analyzed as case studies.

In the next part firstly, the developments that led Turkish decision-makers to attribute importance to conflict-resolution schemes in foreign policy will be touched upon in order to highlight the motivations behind Turkey's initiatives.

6.2. MEDIATION IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

It was cited in the previous chapters that in some instances Turkey had offered to act as mediator before the JDP. It had offered to mediate between the Algerian nationalist groups and France in the early 1960s but its offer was not accepted by France. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), as a country that had important economic and political ties with the belligerents, Turkey again offered to mediate. The offer made by Prime Minister Turgut Özal was not accepted by Iran.

With the end of the Cold War the number and intensity of the conflicts in the regions surrounding Turkey increased rapidly. This also led to an increase in Turkish mediation efforts. While trying to get the attention of the international community to the massacres of Bosnian Muslims, at the same time Turkey tried to mediate between the parties. Its mediation effort was also supported by the USA and as a result Turkey managed to bring the Bosniacs and Croats together, which later led to the formation of a federation between the two groups. Again with the backing of the USA Turkey mediated between the Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq and brought these factions together. In the Caucasus, in addition to Russia, Iran and the Minsk Group Turkey had also offered to mediate between the conflicting parties but Turkey's efforts were not fruitful. The government led by Bülent Ecevit also tried to

avoid the escalation between Iraq and the USA however Turkey's efforts were not welcomed by the USA.

Turkey's role as a mediator in different regions has to be elaborated in depth however there are only a few studies on the topic. Altunisik and Cuhadar have tried to analyze this role within the framework of Conflict Analysis and Resolution field and explained the factors that made Turkey a willing mediator in the Arab-Israeli Conflicts. While highlighting challenges, they also showed changing nature of Turkey's role as a mediator: from a neutral third party mediator to power mediator after 2008. This transformation was a result of Turkey's openly siding with Hamas and as a result by becoming a party of the conflict, losing its credibility and impartiality. (Altunisik & Cuhadar, 2010) Rudolf Sulnik analyzed Turkey's role as a mediator on a multiregional level and concluded that due to some factors, Turkey can only be a successful mediator in areas like Afghanistan, according to him Turkey's initiatives will definitely fail in the Balkans and Middle East. (Sulik, 2013). An important case study is conducted by Reina Zenelaj, Nimet Beriker and M. Emre Hatipoğlu compared the mediation efforts of the U.S., E.U. and Turkey in Bosnia. They found out that, Turkey was a more successful mediator than the U.S. and E.U. in Bosnia because Turkey's initiative bore results, even though it was a modest success. Contrary to accepted view in the current literature that considers mediation efforts by superpowers to be more likely successful than mediation attempts by medium or small power, they argue that in this case it did not hold. Secondly they argue that impartiality does not appear to be an important variable (Zenelaj, Beriker, & Hatipoglu, 2012). Talha Köse in his paper focused on Turkey's conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East and he pointed out to the importance of cooperation with other influential actors in the region (Köse, 2013).

Mediation, as a part of the conflict resolution and transformation strategy gained more importance with the JDP since it declared Turkey as the "order-instituting actor". As a result, Turkey started to act as regional peace-broker (Köse, 2013).The JDP came to power in the eve of the Iraq War. It was the most important issue in foreign policy agenda and the JDP leadership also tried to mediate between Iraq and the USA. Kürşat Tüzmen, a member of the cabinet went to Baghdad to convince Saddam Hussein in January 2003. Turkey also urged the Egyptian leader Husni Mubarak to send a delegation to Iraq for convincing Hussein to accept the demands of the international community. However Egypt informed Turkey that without the acceptance of the mediation process by the USA, it was futile to proceed to this step. The USA was not in favor of mediation and naturally it did not lead to a successful outcome under these conditions (Radikal, 2003).

In its party program the JDP attaches special attention to providing security and stability to the regions surrounding Turkey. Contributing to the solution of regional problems is seen vital for fostering economic cooperation and development:

> Turkey is an element of stability in the region where it is situated, with its democracy, economy and its attitude of respect for human rights. With these qualities, it shall take more initiative in the spots of crisis in regions neighboring Turkey and try to make a more concrete contribution to the solution of the crises. Our Party is of the opinion that the regional security environment makes an important contribution to economic development. For this reason, Turkey shall make more efforts for providing security and stability in its near surroundings, shall increase its attempts to maintain good relations with its neighbors based on dialogue, thus it shall contribute more to the development of regional cooperation (AKP, 2002).

In the *2023 Political Vision* document published in 2012, it is again stated that from the beginning the ideal of the JDP was to "make Turkey one of the key players of global politics and a major actor for regional peace and stability" (AKP,

2012, p. 56). Even though it is very ambitious at some points and ignores that Turkey

is also a party to some conflicts, the document underlines the importance of

mediation in Turkish foreign policy: "Turkey is not party to any conflicts in its

region; rather, it is sought after for contribution, vision and mediation. With its

democratic standards and economic development, Turkey has become a token of

regional peace and stability". (AKP, 2012, p. 57)

According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA), preventive

diplomacy and conflict resolution strategies form an important pillar of the Turkish

foreign policy. The resolution of conflicts and mediation efforts are also beneficial

for Turkey since Turkey is located very near to the conflict zones and contributes to

Turkey's efforts in becoming a regional security actor:

> As one of the most important centers of power of the region and as a nation
> directly affected by any development in this geography, Turkey strongly feels
> the need for conflict prevention and spares no effort to bring about lasting
> peace, stability and welfare in the region. In this vein, Turkey in recent years
> has pursued a more dynamic foreign policy, and endeavors to place
> cooperation and dialogue on solid footing in the Afro-Eurasian landscape.
> Turkey attaches special importance to preventive diplomacy, pioneers a great
> deal of mediation attempts in a wide geography and works actively for the
> peaceful settlement of disputes (MFA, 2013).

According to Ahmet Davutoğlu mediation is an integral part of Turkish

foreign policy and Turkey is a very suitable mediator with its unique features:

> Turkey's unique access to both the global north and south makes it a suitable
> mediator over a wide geographical range. Turkey's cultural-civilizational
> background and long experience with Western political and security
> structures creates an advantage in the field. […]Turkey has assumed for itself
> a central role in regional and international politics, and mediation is a
> necessary tool for contributing to peace and stability at various levels
> (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 90).

Especially the US decision for relying on hard power only in dealing with the problems in the Middle East delegitimized it as a neutral mediator and as a result, Turkey as an emerging country tried to fill the void (Karajah, 2012, p. 3). Under these domestic and regional conditions, Turkey started to act as a mediator in many cases. In 2006 when Israel started a massive military operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, it was Tayyip Erdoğan who spoke about Israel's excessive use of force and he worked for a cease-fire and started telephone diplomacy. As Graham Fuller noted "while Turkey's ability to change the situation on the ground was quite limited, the regional press took note of this high-profile Turkish activism –especially in the face of silence from most Arab leaders" (Fuller, 2008, p. 77). Turkey managed to convince Iran to release 15 Royal Navy soldiers captured in the waters of Persian Gulf in April 2007. In addition to other countries, Turkey also started diplomatic initiatives for the release of British soldiers. After their release Tony Blair thanked to the allies of Britain in Europe for their support and to Turkey and Syria (The Telegraph, 2007). In 2008 during the Russian-Georgian War, the PM Tayyip Erdoğan suggested the establishment of Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact (similar to the Balkan Stability Pact) to foster peace in the region. During his visit to Moscow and Georgia, he shared this view with his counterparts and they were welcomed the idea. However Turkey did not inform the US about this initiative and later it did not support the idea. Matt Bryza from the Secretary of State[70] complained about it by saying the following at a press conference:

> I hadn't been briefed that that was going to happen. We have a partnership with Turkey on the Caucasus, and I presume that we'll be able to work together very closely now with our allies in Turkey since we do have clearly

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[70] Another US diplomat anonymously complained at a higher degree: "We don't think that the effort is realistic, plus our strategic partnership [with Turkey] should normally require closer consultations with us" (Hurriyet Daily News, 2008).

shared interests, not to mention values, throughout the Caucasus with our Turkish ally (Hurriyet Daily News, 2008).

In another captured military personnel case Turkey again became involved. Turkey brokered the release of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas. He was captured in 2006. Five years later, in 2011 he was released by Hamas following an agreement that led to the release of 1027 Palestinian prisoners by Israel. His father, Noam Shalit had sent a letter to Tayyip Erdoğan through Turkish and Israeli businesspeople and requested his help to convince Hamas to accept the prisoner swap agreement proposed by Germany. Then Turkey got involved in the process. Released Palestinian prisoners were sent to countries like Turkey, Qatar and Syria to reside. Following Shalit's release, the Israeli President Shimon Peres thanked Turkey for its efforts despite the cold relations following the Mavi Marmara incident. He stated that he was "pleasantly surprised by the Turkish government's stand" and added: "I was told that it was done by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. They put everything aside and favored the humanitarian side over politics" (YNETNews, 2011).

In addition to these initiatives, Turkey worked for internal peace of Iraq by bringing different groups together and especially in convincing the Sunni groups not to boycott the elections. It started a trilateral forum with Afghanistan and Pakistan for solving the problems between the countries mostly related to security matters. It tried to end the war situation between Syria and Israel while also working to solve the Palestinian Question by mediating between Israel and Palestinian groups. Especially after 2007 the clashes between Hamas and Al-Fateh increased, Turkey offered to mediate between the two groups and bring them together. However it was already started by Egypt and Sami Abu Zuhri, the spokesman for Hamas told the

Turkish reporters that the negotiations are already underway under the Egyptian mediation (Milliyet, 2013b). On May 4, 2014 both parties signed an agreement in Cairo and Turkey was also invited to the ceremony, represented by Ahmet Davutoğlu (Haberturk, 2014). Following the toppling of the Gaddafi regime, Libya entered into a period of internal chaos and the country became almost divided into two parts where alternative governments ruled. In this environment Prime Minister Omar al-Hassi requested Turkey to mediate for the unification of Libya. Pointing to Turkey's investments in Libya, he suggested that Turkey is respected by everyone and has direct interests in stability of Libya because of its economic interests and for that reason Turkey can solve the crisis (Yeni Akit, 2014). In Lebanon following the domestic political crisis that erupted after the Hezbollah pulled out its ministers from the unity government in early January 2011. Turkey and Qatar tried to bring these groups together in order to avoid a civil war. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and the Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim al-Thani held negotiations with the political parties for two days. However backed by Syria, the Hezbollah was not eager for a solution and as a result Turkey and Qatar suspended the talks on January 20, 2011 (BBC, 2011b). Jihad El Zein from the influential daily *Al Nahar* in Lebanon pointed out to the limits of Turkish power in Lebanon in an interview. He stated that in Lebanon the main players are the USA, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria. Turkey has limited influence but still can act as a mediator. Turkey's influence is indirect; it can influence Syria for example and in this way affect the developments in Lebanon (this was valid only when Turkish-Syrian relations were in a good mood). He warns that Turkey is confused about its mediator role and rather pretends to show that it has influence in Lebanon similar to the other countries mentioned above. Turkey could be a mediator in Lebanon because it had good

relations with the aforementioned four countries (Milliyet, 'Türkiye Lübnan'da rolünü karıştırıyor', 2011c).

Turkey also tried to institutionalize its role as a mediator. Together with Finland, it spearheaded the establishment of Mediation for Peace Initiative at the UN in 2010. They also established the Group of Friends of Mediation on September 24, 2010 and co-chaired it. 40 states and 7 international organizations joined this group that aimed at increasing awareness on mediation as a conflict-resolution method (UN Peacemaker, 2015). Turkey started another initiative and it hosts the annual Istanbul Conference on Mediation from 2012 on. As the host of this forum, Turkey wants to host a UN office in Istanbul dedicated to mediation activities.

Despite the mixed record of Turkey as a successful mediator, its efforts were welcomed. In an article in the Economist, titled The Great Mediator, after praising Turkey's successes as a mediator, it was also revealed that in its conflict with Namibia, Botswana wanted Turkey to act as mediator. Davutoğlu confessed that he was stumped with this request (Economist, 2010). It can be argued that, even though Turkey initiated mediation processes in the past, it became more systematic in the JDP era and a part of Turkish foreign policy.

At this point, it would be beneficial to identify the motivations of Turkey in order to understand its activism as a mediator. The normative rhetoric in Turkish foreign policy has gained upper hand in the JDP era as Davutoğlu argues for a value-based foreign policy: "While paying utmost attention to defending our national interests, we will also pursue a value-based foreign policy" (Davutoğlu, 2014). One can argue that Turkey tries to act as a security actor and as a normative power just for the sake of its love for peace. However despite the increasing emphasis on a

normative foreign policy, Turkey sometimes faces a conflict with its national interests and the values it tries to promote. Emel P. Dal by using case studies tried to show the contradictions between the two visions and she argues the following:

> Despite increasing normative representations and rhetoric in Turkish foreign policy, Turkey does not currently possess a cohesive and ambitious NFP agenda, and thus it is still far from being a normative power in practice. Turkey's current NFP gives it an appearance of using normative instruments in a very realpolitik type of way (Dal E. P., 2013, p. 726).

Turkey acts as a mediator in most cases for serving its national interests (political, security, economic interests). While trying to portray itself as the regional leader and claiming "regional ownership" that aims to limit the intervention of global powers into its surrounding regions, Turkey relies on its past experience. Especially the damage caused by the wars, refugee flows and disruption of trade to its interests motivates it to avoid escalation of crisis in its neighborhood. It was mentioned that the economic losses and increasing security threats due to the security vacuum in Iraq following the First Gulf War left a bitter memory in the minds of many Turkish statesmen. Especially convincing a superpower like the US and harmonizing conflicting interests of both parties in the region became a very difficult task for the Turkish decision-makers. As a natural consequence, both the coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit and the new JDP government following the 2002 elections tried to mediate, in a futile way, between Iraq and the USA to avoid a new war. Thus providing regional security and stability appears to enjoy the highest priority in the foreign policy agenda. This point is observed by Richard Weitz who argues that Turkey plays a new role as a security actor:

> The Turkish leadership recognized that regional conflict and competition would persist, but hoped the parties would keep these negative elements constrained to enjoy the positive benefits of improved economic relations and

a more secure region, which would provide Turkey with the "strategic depth" Ankara needed to become a great power (Weitz, 2014, pp. 1-2).

In Chapter 3 it was mentioned that geographical proximity to the conflict zone is one of the biggest motivations for states. Since they are located very near to the conflict zone, they are also the first to suffer from the negative results of an increasing conflict. In this regard, it can be argued that Turkey has a stake at the resolution conflicts and for that reason it offers it services as a mediator. That is the reason why in many of the instances Turkey itself offered to act as a mediator rather than being invited by the parties of the conflict. By acting as a mediator, it not only serves to regional peace and stability but at the same time serves its own interests, a point also observed by Talha Köse: "Turkey would also be one of the primary beneficiaries of regional peace and integration, therefore Turkey's efforts also aim to serve its own political and economic interests as well" (Köse, 2013, p. 176).

Even in conflicts where it does not have a direct security, political and economic interests at stake, such as the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict or in the disagreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Turkey still acts in parallel to its claims for regional leadership. Especially within the civilizational geopolitics approach of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey tries to portray itself as the leader of the Muslim world and patron of the Muslim societies in the world. Talha Köse noted that the Ottoman legacy also shapes Turkey's approach to mediation. Davutoğlu believes that because of his experience in ruling the nearby regions for centuries, Turkey has many advantages that can help it to understand the concerns and sensitivities of different groups (Köse, 2013, p. 178). In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that cultural affinity could provide an advantage for a country or person as a mediator. The Pope was a better candidate as a mediator between Latin American countries than the

leader of a Muslim country. Davutoğlu thinks that thanks to its historical legacy, Turkey can empathize with the neighboring peoples in the Balkans and Middle East:

> The important thing is this: If we are mediating between Iraqi people, we should be speaking like Baghdadis. We have to speak like Damascenes if the issue is Syria, or like someone from Sarajevo if the issue is related to the Balkans. This is the most important aspect, if we are to convince others (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 85).

It explains Turkey's involvement in the establishment of the Alliance of Civilizations Initiative as well as its interest in the suppressed Muslim groups in Myanmar. As it claims to represent the Muslim world, Turkey also started to question the structure of the UNSC which does not have a Muslim member. In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that in the League of Nations and later the UN some countries insisted on becoming a member of the decision-making bodies of these organizations on the claims that they represent a region (Brazil) and representing a faith group (Iran, as the only Muslim member of the League of Nations at its establishment, claimed to represent Muslims). Mediation efforts also serve to promote the prestige and influence of the countries offering mediation. It should be kept in mind that in addition to serving national interests and supporting Turkey's claims for leadership, increasing prestige of the country is also an important motivation for Turkey.

In the following pages two case-studies will be used in order to have a more detailed understanding of Turkey's role as a security actor and in particular as a mediator in the Middle East and Balkans.

6.3. CASE I: THE IRAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

Iran, under the rule of Turkish dynasties for centuries has been a regional rival for the Ottoman Empire. The Safavid dynasty (1501-1736) led by Shah Ismail (1487-1524)[71] managed to control Iran at the turn of 16th century and *Twelve Imam Shia* (*Isna Ashariyya*) became the official religion of the state. The Battle of Chaldiran (Çaldıran) in 1514 between the Ottoman Empire and Safavids marked the beginning of a new struggle for controlling Anatolia and Caucasus that lasted three centuries. The sectarian differences also contributed in a negative way to the ongoing rivalry. Even though it is often stated that the Turkish-Iranian border did not change for four centuries (the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin-1639), both states waged war for centuries and the last battle took place between the years 1821-1823. Border issues and local skirmishes always poisoned the relations between the two countries. Finally, Turkey and Iran tried to solve this problem in 1932 through a treaty that revised the borders[72] (As, 2010, p. 245).

Allies of the USA in the Middle East during the Cold War, Turkey and Iran, despite their rivalry for regional leadership, had cordial relations. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and ousting of the Shah Pahlavi added tension to the relations. Still, Turkey welcomed the relation. Gökhan Çetinsaya notes that, increasing power of Iran, especially its military build-up based on its oil revenues had worried the Turkish statesmen in the 1960s and 1970s. "Turkey was pleased to see that Iran had lost its prestige, power and capacity in regional politics, as the pendulum swung once

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[71] Ruling also the territories that belong to modern Azerbaijan today, Iran had an enormous Turkish population. The language spoken at the imperial palace was Turkish and Shah Ismail himself, writing in Turkish, was also a well-known poet of his era, known as *Hata'î*. For the collection of his poems (*divân*) see: Şah İsmail, *Şah İsmail Hata'î Külliyatı*, Kaknüs Yayınevi, Istanbul, 2000.

[72] The 560 km. long and mountainous border is hard to control from both sides. The 1932 treaty at least made it easier around Mount Ağrı by giving the whole area to Turkey and in return Iran received the town named Kotur.

more in favor of Turkey" (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 128). In Chapter 4 it was mentioned that despite the ideological rivalry, Turkey benefited from trade with Iran especially during the Iran-Iraq War. Prime Minister Turgut Özal was the architect of this policy which was often criticized by President Kenan Evren, as he also did not hide his enmity toward Iran in his *memoirs* after Özal chose Iran as his first destination for an official visit upon coming to office in 1984:

> Özal returned today from Tehran...Iran has never looked to Turkey as a friend...Since the day Yavuz Sultan Selim defeated Shah Ismail Safavi, Iran has watched for a chance to take revenge on us. Naturally, Shi'i-Sunni [antagonism] lies at the roots of this desire for revenge. I have told Ozal, from time to time, that he should never trust Iran, Libya and Syria and that the administration of these three countries did not view Turkey in a friendly way. But I could not convince him. He always sees the matter from a point of view of trade, and tries to establish friendship with Iran and Libya to an unnecessary extent (Çetinsaya, 2003, p. 128).

Despite the ideological rivalry, regional rivalry and border problems (the use of Iranian territory by PKK), both countries felt forced to accommodate due to the power symmetry and geopolitical necessities. Trade and energy needs also force Turkey and Iran to cooperate. Especially after Turkey put pressure on Syria in 1998 by employing coercive diplomacy, Iran became another target. Turkey and Iran, on Turkey's strong insistence signed a border security agreement on August 14, 1999 and it paved the way for establishing more cordial relations (Sabah, 1999).

Energy has always been an important dimension of the relations. With its increasing population and growing industry, Turkey is always in need of energy sources. Natural gas, in addition to heating houses, is also widely used for electricity generation through natural gas conversion terminals. In 1991, Turkey generated 60,246 GWh of electricity and the share of natural gas was only 20.9%. In a decade, the total more than doubled (122,725 GWh) while the share of natural gas increased

to 40.4%. The Tabriz-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline Project (the agreement was signed in 1996) was completed in 2001 in this new atmosphere and Iran became a vital natural gas provider for Turkey. This development, though slightly, helped Turkey to decrease its dependency on Russia for gas. In 2013, total electricity generation figure increased to 240,154 GWh and 43.8% of it was generated by using natural gas (TURKSTAT, 2015a). With the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline from 2007 on Azerbaijan also became another source of natural gas for Turkey. In 2013, Russia was still Turkey's biggest gas provider (58%). It was followed by Iran (20%), Azerbaijan and Algeria (9%) and by Nigeria (3%) (EPDK, 2014, p. 21). If the share of Iran in Turkey's natural gas imports is taken into account, it will be seen that Turkey cannot risk deterioration of relations with Iran. Equally, embargos on Iran, if observed strictly by Turkey under the pressure of its Western allies, would be harmful to Turkey's economy. This situation is almost valid for Turkey's oil imports too. In 2011 Turkey imported 51% of its total oil imports from Iran. In 2012 Iran's share fell to 39%. In 2013, Iran's share went on to decrease and it was 28%. Despite its decreasing share, Iran is still vital for Turkey's oil imports. But Turkey managed to diversify its energy sources as Iraq increased its oil production and imports. It was the biggest partner of Turkey with a share of 32%, followed by Iran (28%) and Saudi Arabia (15%) (Haberturk, 2014).

As Turkey wants to be a regional energy hub, it regards Iran's energy reserves vital for this goal. Iran, due to the sanctions, negative investment environment and mistrust, only received limited amount of FDI. It is in need of investment especially in its energy sector to improve the infrastructure and exploit new reserve areas. In this regard, Turkey and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2007 which envisaged building of a natural gas pipeline. It would

be connected to another pipeline to Iran from Turkmenistan. TPAO would also invest in Iran's South Pars gas field. In this way Turkey would provide the necessary gas resources for the Nabucco Pipeline Project that aimed at building a pipeline from Turkey to Austria. However it became impossible to find credit to finance Turkey's pipeline project in Iran due to the opposition of the USA and EU. Later TPAO declared that it would finance the project ($3.5 billion) from its own resources (McCurdy, 2008, p. 90).

In addition to energy, Iran is also a very important trade partner for Turkey. Though there is an imbalance in foreign trade due to Iran's energy imports to Turkey, in 2014 Iran was Turkey's 10th largest export partner with $3.8 billion (2.5% in total exports). Especially in 2012 the amount of exports to Iran had reached its highest level with $9.9 billion (6.5% in total exports) (TURKSTAT, 2014d). Iran is also a gateway to Turkish exports to the East. Every year more than 90,000 Turkish trucks pass through Iran. Being a favorite destination for Iran, with the help of the visa-free travel agreements, Turkey annually received around 1 million tourists from Iran (Mercan M. , 2009, p. 17). Iran and Turkey especially from 2002 on started to deepen their economic relations and cooperation and it is not easy for both to stop this lucrative relationship.

Especially with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, security concerns brought Turkey and Iran closer. Turkey's independent action with regards to the US plans in Iraq and the common Kurdish separatist threat emanating from Northern Iraq brought the countries together. In 2004 Iran and Turkey signed a security agreement and Iran recognized PKK as a terrorist organization. On its part, Turkey started to cooperate with Iran against the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) and Turkey and Iran

started to share intelligence in dealing Kurdish separatist groups (McCurdy, 2008, p. 98).

However as will be mentioned in the following pages, tightening of the sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program, limited Turkey's prospects for trade and energy cooperation with Iran.

6.3.1 The Emergence of the Crisis

Iran's nuclear program goes back to the 1960s. An ally of the USA in the region, with the support of the USA, (West) Germany and France, Iran started to acquire nuclear infrastructure and accumulate scientific knowledge. The development of the program came to a halt with the Islamic Revolution in 1979 as the Western powers stopped supplying Iran with the necessary materiel for nuclear research and build-up. However, Russia and China started to fill the vacuum and replaced them as supporters of Iran (Kibaroğlu, 2006, p. 207). The Hostage Crisis further deteriorated the relations between the USA and Iran. The Carter Administration wanted to isolate Iran and cause an economic collapse. However Japan and Germany despite the sanctions and decision to freeze the Iranian assets went on to buy oil from Iran. This created a division between the USA and its allies. The Carter Administration wanted its allies to choose their side and threatened that otherwise the USA would blockade Iran unilaterally by mining Iranian ports. This pressure bore results and as a result in the following years the European allies of the USA started to depend more on the Soviet-Russian oil (Ganji, 2006, p. 168).

Having an asymmetrical conflict with the USA, Iran regarded nuclear weapons vital for its survival and the project went on in the 1990s. Saira Khan argues

that the pace of Iran's nuclear program increased, contrary to the general belief, before Ahmadinejad's rise to power in 2005. The nuclear plants in Arak and Natanz were built in 1996 and 2000 respectively (Khan, 2010, p. 89). On August 14, 2002, Iranian exiles in the USA (members of the National Council of the Resistance of Iran) revealed the facilities. Iran, as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty has the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However its facilities, like other signatory countries, should be under the inspection of the IAEA. If a country starts uranium enrichment, it has to inform the IAEA about this development and also declare the nuclear sites for inspection. The Iranian failure to inform the IAEA, especially by the USA and Israel was seen as the breach of treaty. On the other hand, the Iranian officials claimed that they did not inform the IAEA yet because they are still not at the stage of uranium enrichment (Khan, 2010, p. 90).

The enrichment of uranium serves both military and civilian nuclear programs and as a signatory of the NPT Iran has the right to enrich uranium under the condition that its activities are inspected by the IAEA. Uranium in its natural form only includes a small amount of U-235 (0.72 percent) which is fissile with thermal neutrons. It is enriched and the amount of U-235 is increased through isotope separation. Fuel for nuclear reactors should include at least 3-4% U-235. It is named Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU). The LEU is also used in medical industry. For example Iran's Tehran Research Reactor runs on 19.75% of U-235 and produces radioisotopes for cancer patients. However in order to produce a nuclear bomb, the amount of U-235 should be minimum 90% (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 68).

Iran started to attach more importance to its nuclear program as the USA from 2002 on increasingly threatened Iran. It was included in the "Axis of Evil" in the State of the Union address of President Bush on January 29, 2002. The invasion of

Iraq by the USA increased the fears of the Iranian decision-makers. The Bush Administration put a special emphasis on preemptive strikes and regime change. On the other hand, Iran's unexpectedly increasing influence in Iraq and the collapse of the Saddam regime, created deep concerns in the Arab states and the USA. However about 6 months after the US invasion of Iraq and with the aim of avoiding further sanctions, through its negotiations with the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) Iran agreed in October 21, 2003 to temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment activities, cooperate with the IAEA with regards to inspections and sign the Additional Protocol of the IAEA's safeguards regime for more effective inspections. In return, the EU would support Iran in the transfer of nuclear technology and the matter would not be raised at the UNSC (New York Times, 2015). Following the inspections, it was revealed that, as mentioned in the IAEA reports, Iran had in the last decades breached the NPT with regards to its obligations many times (Kibaroğlu, 2006, p. 211). However, Iran used the ambiguities in the definition of uranium enrichment activities and continued to some tests. The EU-3 carried on negotiations and finally the Paris Agreement was reached. On November 14, 2004 at Paris, Iran notified the IAEA that it would suspend its activities during the negotiations. However as an expert noted, it was not compulsory for Iran to suspend its activities; rather it was a confidence-building measure in the face of increasing US pressure: "The agreement recognizes Iran's rights under NPT and states that the freeze is voluntary, rather than a legal obligation." (Sinha, 2005)

Under these conditions, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (former mayor of Tehran) who exploited the nuclear program issue in the elections process was elected as president on August 3, 2005 (Ehteshami & Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives, 2007, p. 100). He tried to increase Iran's power and popularity in

the Middle East. Graham Fuller points out that there is an acute leadership crisis in the Middle East following the loss of Egyptian leadership with Anwar Sadat and the Muslim World, especially the Arab world looks for someone to put forward their complaints and demands. However that is not the case. Most Arab leaders are silent in the face of Israeli violence in Palestine or American brutalities in Iraq. According to Fuller, Iran has been acting in parallel to this dynamic since the Revolution and Turkey also started to benefit from this dynamic with the JDP and both states appealed to the Arab and Muslim public for leadership (Fuller, 2014, p. 50). Ahmadinejad became the harshest critic of Israel and the USA and advocate of the Palestinian cause[73]. For example on June 19, 2005 he criticized the structure of the UNSC due to lacking a Muslim country: "It is not just for a few states to sit and veto global approvals. Should such a privilege continue to exist, the Muslim world with a population of nearly 1.5 billion should be extended the same privilege." (Ehteshami & Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives, 2007, p. 97) Ahmadinejad also was quick in trying to increase the number of his allies. In this regard he became one of the supporters of HAMAS. HAMAS was grateful for the Iranian support as its political-wing leader Khaled Meshal stated during his visit to Tehran in December 2005:

> Just as Islamic Iran defends the rights of the Palestinians, we defend the rights of Islamic Iran. We [Hamas] are part of a united front against the enemies of Islam. Each member of this front defends itself with its own means in its region. We carry the battle in Palestine. If Israel launches an attack against Iran, we will expand the battlefield in Palestine (Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2007, p. 105).

The policy of Iran on nuclear issue also started to change with Ahmadinejad. On June 28, 2005 President Bush signed the Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which

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[73] At this point, it appears that some of the statements and acts of Tayyip Erdoğan aim to counter-balance Iran in order to avoid Iran gain more popularity even over the Sunni Arab masses.

blocked property of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters (including the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran) (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015). In August 2005 the EU-3 offered a new and long-term agreement to Iran. Iran would suspend its uranium enrichment activities for 10 years and in return the EU-3 would provide the necessary nuclear fuel to Iran for its peaceful activities and take back the disposal of spent nuclear fuel while offering concessions in trade (such as aircraft spare parts for the civilian aircraft of Iran; due to the sanctions Iran cannot get them). On August 5, 2005 Iran rejected the proposed agreement. The USA also increased pressure on Russia, one of the main actors in supporting Iran's nuclear activities. On November 22, 2005 President Bush signed the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act of 2005. It amended the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 and conditioned the Russian-American space cooperation by demanding Russia to stop transfer of technology in nuclear energy, missiles and conventional weapons systems (Foreign Policy Initiative, 2015). In January 2006, there was no hope for negotiations and Iran declared that it will break open internationally monitored seals at its nuclear facilities and start uranium enrichment activities (New York Times, 2015). In February it declared that it will stop voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol of NPT. As a result the Board of Governors of the IAEA decided to report Iran's case to the UNSC (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2015). In April 2006, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had developed the capability to enrich uranium (Khan, 2010, p. 91).

As its case was transferred to the UNSC, a new negotiation team was formed. It was 5 members of the UNSC and Germany, widely known as "P5 plus Germany-P5+1". It was seen as a matter that should be dealt by the "Great Powers." Except Germany they all had veto power at the UNSC and including Russia and China, the

main supporters of Iran, in the negotiating process would make it a multilateral process and provide greater legitimacy. Germany was included because it is the most important economic power in the EU and also an important trade partner of Russia, of which it is vital to convince for the success of negotiations. It was also included in the previous cycle of negotiations in the EU Troika (Germany, France and the United Kingdom). The P5+1 proposed the same agreement which had been proposed by the EU3 before. It offered to build light-water nuclear reactors in addition to economic cooperation in the fields of communication, civil aviation and other areas. Iran refused the proposal and the UNSC passed a resolution on July 31, 2006 that demanded Iran to suspend its activities in a legally-binding way. If not accepted by Iran by August 31, it envisaged new set of sanctions (Foreign Policy Initiative, 2015). On December 23, 2006 the UNSC approved sanctions on Iran in the face of failed negotiations. It bans the import and export of materials and technology used in uranium enrichment, reprocessing and ballistic missiles (Gootman, 2006). In September 2007, the UNSC passed a new resolution, increasing the scope of sanctions against Iran such as banning Iran's arms exports and expanding the list of sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities (Foreign Policy Initiative, 2015).

A US-led military operation against Iran was always on the table. Michel Chossudovsky in his book titled *Towards a World War III Scenario* argues that the USA and Israel started military preparations against Iran in the 2000s. Conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, in addition to air strikes and covert operations (Arab and Turkish minorities of Iran) would be used in this war (Chossudovsky, 2012). Now we know from the published memoirs of President Bush (*Decision Points*) military option was always on the table, in addition to diplomatic efforts:

The final option was a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. This goal would be to stop the bomb clock, at least temporarily. It was uncertain what the impact on the reform clock would be. Some thought destroying the regime's prized project would embolden the opposition; others worried that a foreign military operation would stir up Iranian nationalism and unite the people against us. I directed the Pentagon to study what would be necessary for a strike. Military action would always be on the table, but it would be my last resort (Bush G. , 2010, p. 428).

There was another risk: Israel could unilaterally bomb Iran's nuclear facilities and spark a war in the Middle East. It had already done that in 1981 by bombing a nuclear plant (Osirak) near Baghdad (BBC, 1981). On September 8, 2007 an interesting headline appeared on Turkish newspapers. A few shepherds from the Hatay (near the town named Samandağ, on the Turkish-Syrian border) province of Turkey found two external fuel tanks (3 km. far from the border). Investigations showed that they were for F-15 aircraft modified by Israel. Eye-witnesses told that at around 24.00, they saw 4 planes flying at very low altitude. It was on 6 September, 2007 and Syria had claimed that Israeli aircrafts violated its airspace and after the Syrian missiles locked on them, they had to leave (Hürriyet, 2007). However the story provided by Syria did not reflect the full event and Israel maintained a silence on the issue. From the memoirs of Bush we find out that the Israeli aircraft destroyed a Syrian facility. Ehud Olmert, prime minister of Israel, had shared an intelligence report in the spring of 2007 that showed the presence of a well-hidden compound in desert in Eastern Syria. It was believed to be a nuclear research facility. Olmert and Bush made a phone call: " 'George, I'm asking you to bomb the compound,' he said in a phone call shortly after I received the report. 'Thank you for raising this matter,' I told the prime minister. 'Give me some time to look at the intelligence and I'll give you an answer.'" (Bush G. , 2010, p. 431) The Bush Administration found it very

risky without enough intelligence and did not bomb the facility. It was Israel's

decision:

> Prime Minister Olmert's execution of the strike made up for the confidence I
> had lost in the Israelis during the Lebanon war. I suggested to Ehud that we
> let some time go by and then reveal the operation as a way to isolate the
> Syrian regime. Olmert told me he wanted total secrecy. He wanted to avoid
> anything that might back Syria into a corner and force Assad to retaliate. This
> was his operation, and I felt an obligation to respect his wishes. I kept quiet,
> even though I thought we were missing an opportunity. Finally, the bombing
> demonstrated Israel's willingness to act alone. Prime Minister Olmert hadn't
> asked for a green light, and I hadn't given one. He had done what he believed
> was necessary to protect Israel (Bush G. , 2010, p. 432).

President Bush was in a hard position following the publication of the

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report in November 2007. He could not classify

it as he was sure it would leak to the press. The report stated that Iran had stopped its

covert nuclear weapons development program. It frustrated the Administration and

its allies in the Middle East because it would cool down the demands for further

sanctions on Iran (Bush G. , 2010, p. 429). In January 2008 he took a trip to the

Middle East. The US allies were pressing for dealing with Iran in a tougher way:

"Israel and our Arab allies found themselves in a rare moment of unity. Both were

deeply concerned about Iran and furious with the United States over the NIE". (Bush

G. , 2010, p. 429). The Wikileaks documents also reveal important information about

the insistence of Gulf countries and Israel on a military operation against Israel. The

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is reported to suggesting the Americans to "cut off

the head of snake" while officials from Jordan and Bahrain also demanded a military

operation. Israel also was in total agreement with them. Ehud Barak, the Minister of

Defense, in June 2009 estimated that a military operation should take place within 6

to 18 months because after that Iran would have a nuclear weapon and that would

cause unacceptable collateral damage (The Guardian, 2010). The Bush

Administration toughened the sanctions on Iran unilaterally in October 2007 and it cut three state-owned Iranian banks and 20 associations linked to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps from the US financial system (Al Jazeera, 2012b).

President Barack Obama dealt with the nuclear program of Iran and withdrawal of American troops from Iraq upon his inauguration in January 2009. Previous negotiations with Iran, conducted by the EU-3 and the IAEA were not fruitful. The P5+1 also had tried but Iran all the time brought counter-proposals to the table rather than negotiating the existing proposals. The US was under pressure from its allies to conduct military operation against Iran.

On March 20, 2009 Obama appealed to Iran through a video message on the Nowruz Day with Farsi subtitles. He offered a new beginning between Iran and the USA while emphasizing diplomacy and engagement: "This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect" (The Guardian, 2009). The P5+1 group welcomed the Obama Administration's policy with regards to Iran and in April 2009 issued a statement and officially invited Iran for talks again. Iran did not respond to this call until September but it applied to the IAEA in June 2009. It requested nuclear fuel for its research reactor in Tehran that produced radioisotopes for the treatment of cancer. It was to run out of fuel in late 2010. Some countries would provide the necessary nuclear fuel to Iran. It would be hard for the USA to do so due to the sanctions regime but Argentina or France would provide 20% enriched uranium. None of the countries were willing to sell the fuel to Iran. Iran stated that it would produce it itself, by building new enrichment plants, but it would take time and cancer patients would have problems during the production process. It might be a tactic employed by Iran to legitimize its uranium enrichment project as later Iran declared that it started

enriching uranium for the research reactor. The USA saw the bluff and a set of new negotiations started in Geneva in September 2009 between the Iranian officials and representatives of the P5+1 (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 69). On 1 October 2009, an agreement was drafted which envisaged that a new Iranian nuclear facility would be opened to inspection in addition to nuclear fuel swap. The nuclear fuel swap deal would remove the necessity for Iran to enrich uranium. Its 1,200 kg stock of LEU would be transferred to Russia and France and in return Iran would receive fuel rods for its research reactor. It must be kept in mind that the amount was equal to approximately 80% of Iran's nuclear stock while it is also the necessary amount to start producing a nuclear bomb. By transferring this stock to other countries, under the condition that Iran will stop enrichment, it would be impossible for Iran to produce a nuclear bomb and this would satisfy the worried countries in the Middle East, especially Israel. Though Israel was skeptical about the deal, with the keenness of the USA it had to accept it. Especially the US officials believed that it was beneficial for the USA and would lead to further normalization and confidence-building with Iran while at the same time it would be the first success of Obama's engagement policy. If it failed due to Iran's unwillingness, it would be easier for the USA to press for coercive measures (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 70). Volker Perthes argues that Ahmadinejad wanted a deal with the USA and regarded it as a victory. However, the complex structure of the decision-making process in Iran and opposition of the different factions made it impossible. Mir Hossein Mousavi, who was defeated in the presidential elections and leader of the Green Movement, denounced the agreement as "giving up national interests". Ali Larijani, the speaker of the parliament, suggested that France and Russia cannot be trusted and they can hold back Iranian uranium (Perthes, 2010, p. 102). It is not surprising that for many Iranians having the

chance of producing nuclear bomb is seen as the best way of Iran's survival in the face of American and Israeli aggression. Given the mistrust, giving up in the nuclear project would be seen betraying the national interests.

Following the Geneva deal, Iran did not officially accept the plan. It again brought many counter-proposals. It suggested simultaneous exchange of LEU and fuel rods, rather than transferring all of Iran's LEU to another country. It also insisted on transfer should not be necessary and the LEU stocks should be stored in Iranian territory under the IAEA seals. It seemed that Iran did not want to give its LEU stock to Russia and France. The Geneva negotiations which caused many hopes ended without any concrete results due to Iran's tactics. On February 11 2010, the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran started producing 20% rich uranium in its new facility at Natanz (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 79).

6.3.2 Turkey's Mediation Efforts

With the failure of the Geneva talks, harder sanctions at best and military operation against Iran at worst for Turkey could come to the table. These developments, given Turkey's ties to Iran for trade and energy and the possibility of regional violence and instability, alarmed Turkish decision-makers. Turkey defends the right of Iran to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes along with the IAEA monitoring. Yet it opposes Iran to develop a nuclear bomb and advocates the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free-Zone in the Middle East. The prospect of a nuclear Iran does not worry Turkey as it does other countries in the region. Turkey has also been critical of Israel's nuclear arsenal, the only nuclear power in the Middle

East. In opposing sanctions against Iran, Turkey thinks that denying the right to a country to enrich uranium (which is legal according to the NPT) would set a precedent for states such as Turkey who want to develop nuclear energy program (Gürzel, 2012, p. 144). When Turkey becomes a nuclear state with capacity to benefit from nuclear energy for civilian purposes, it may face the same treatment, while no one criticizes or applies sanctions on Israel which has a nuclear arsenal and even not a party to the NPT.

Turkey tried to revive the nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran in order to avoid further sanctions and war against Iran. As Tarık Oğuzlu emphasized, Turkey would be the most benefiting country from an agreement between the USA and Iran. A deal would remove the possibility of sanctions and war. Turkey's involvement in its resolution would in addition to contributing Turkey's security, prosperity and stability, also increase its soft power and prestige (Oğuzlu, 2010).

Turkey was a non-permanent member of the UNSC along with Brazil in 2010. Both countries, as rising-powers, cooperated to deal with Iran's nuclear program. Taking into account the structure of the P5+1 group, which resembles the conference diplomacy of the 19th century by only allowing the Great Powers to decide about the fate of countries, and their threatening with more sanctions, Turkey and Brazil wanted to show that as rising powers they can shoulder bigger responsibility. They were despite their willingness to play a role in the nuclear negotiations were excluded. The USA wanted only the UNSC members plus Germany, which is the biggest country with regards to population and economy in the EU and a former Great Power, to take part in the negotiations. With their support and approval, it would be easier to impose further sanctions or even decide on military operation. Other countries like Turkey, which would be harmed by these

decisions taken without even consultation, would only need to apply them strictly. In this respect, the initiative of Turkey and Brazil can be regarded as a call for reforming the structure of the UNSC. A success in their initiative would show that a hard task was accomplished, in which Great Powers failed, by middle-sized powers that are denied a permanent seat at the UNSC.

Turkey and Brazil believed that they can find a peaceful solution to the problem. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim, worked for a peaceful solution for about 18 months (BBC Türkçe, 2010). Though we do not know the details of the negotiations, Ahmet Davutoğlu says that, with Amorim, they negotiated incessantly for about 17 hours in Iran in the last round of meetings (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 89). At the end, on 17 May 2010 Iran accepted the deal and Brazilian, Turkish and Iranian ministers of foreign affairs issued a joint declaration, also known as Tehran Agreement or Tehran Agreement (for the full text see: (TMFA, 2010). The deal was based on the conditions proposed by the P5+1 (named the Vienna Group). According to the deal, Turkey would deposit Iran's 1,200 kg LEU in Turkish territory, which would still be a property of Iran; Turkey would return it back to Iran without any conditions if Iran wished so. In return the Vienna Group would supply Iran with 120 kg fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TMFA, 2010). The deal did not address the question of Iran's continuing uranium enrichment activities (to 20%).

What kind of incentives did Turkey use in negotiating with Iran? Why it accepted it just after a few months following its refusal of a similar plan? It is possible to state that there is a power balance between Turkey and Iran in terms of economic and military power (CINC scores shown in Figure 4.1). Turkey cannot simply threaten Iran with military intervention and impose its will on Iran. Turkey's

possible offer of foreign aid or credits also would not be attractive for a country like Iran. Then what leverage did Turkey use on Iran? We have mentioned that Iran and Turkey have deep economic relations in the field of trade and especially energy. It is true that Turkey is dependent on Iranian energy sources but Iran also needs to sell its energy in order to keep its economy on track and in this regard Turkey is a good customer as many countries prefer not trading with Iran. Secondly, Turkey is neighboring Iran and it is a US ally and NATO member. As was the case in the US invasion of Iraq, the US would demand deploying ground forces in Turkish territory or at least deploy airplanes and use Turkish airspace for attacks against Iran in case of war. For a disappointed Turkey with Iran's goodwill in nuclear issue and worried about the prospects of a nuclear Iran, it already has the means of delivery (ballistic missiles), it would be easier to join the US-led coalition despite its risks. It was the main motivation of Turkey, to avoid a war that would damage Turkey's national interests whether it took part in it or remained neutral, to engage diplomatically in Iran's nuclear problem. Thirdly and more importantly, at the time Turkey and Brazil started their initiatives, the long-time supporters of Iran, Russia and China, which voted against further sanctions against Iran at the UNSC in the past, were also disappointed with Iran's attitude in the negotiations. Especially Russia would be very worried if Iran became a nuclear power and does not want Iran to produce nuclear weapons (India, Pakistan and China are the nuclear powers in Russia's neighboring areas). Secondly Russia wants Iran to be dependent on it for the fuel of reactors rather than enriching uranium and producing fuel itself. It would provide Russia an important leverage over Iran. For this reason, China and Russia joined the USA in pressing a deal on Iran (Topychkanov, 2014). At the time of deal, it became known that the UNSC members agreed on further sanctions against Iran in order to punish

its refusal to accept the deal proposed by them after negotiating for months. Iran, by accepting the deal suggested by Turkey and Brazil, would have aimed at avoiding the new sanctions while gaining more time for negotiations. The domestic political groups in Iran that had rejected the previous deal could feel more pressure and cannot reject it as fiercely as they did in the past in the face of increasing sanctions. Also the lack of any clause on Iran's enrichment activities in the Turkish-Brazil deal could be regarded as an advantage by them. By accepting the deal, Iran would show the world that it was working for peace and stability and put the UNSC members in a bad position. It has been mentioned in Chapter 2 that states do not always negotiate with good faith; they use mediation for their devious objectives.

For Turkey, the deal was a real success and a historical event. Davutoğlu stated the following on the next day of signing the deal: "With the agreement yesterday, an important psychological threshold has been crossed toward establishing mutual trust. This is the first indirect deal signed by Iran with the West in 30 years" (Yinanç, Davutoğlu calls on Iran skeptics to accept nuclear deal, 2010a). Davutoğlu informed the journalists that all relevant parties were informed during the negotiations. About the amount of 1,200 kg LEU he stated that it was the amount mentioned in the letter sent by Obama to Erdoğan in a recent letter. This was important because some criticized the deal about the amount. It was argued that 1,200 kg was the amount proposed last year and since then Iran continued enriching uranium and it has more in stock. If the purpose was to disable Iran to produce nuclear bomb, the deal would not work because even after transferring its LEU to Turkey, Iran would still have the necessary amount to produce a nuclear bomb. Despite the fact that Turkey and Brazil regarded the deal as a victory, they were surprised by the reactions of the USA and its allies. Davutoğlu was very critical on

the issue and he blamed the USA: "I think there is no problem with the text of the deal. The problem is that they were not expecting that Iran would accept. They had a reflex conditioned on the expectation that Iran will always say no. That's why they were a little bit caught by surprise" (Yinanç, Davutoğlu calls on Iran skeptics to accept nuclear deal, 2010a). Davutoğlu meant that the USA allowed the negotiations with Iran because of "devious objectives". If Iran refused it, it would show the world that Iran rejected the final diplomatic effort to find a solution to the problem and it would legitimize further sanctions. Failed in its attempt to convince Iran, Turkey would stop objecting new sanctions. On their part, Brazilian officials were also surprised with the US reaction to the deal. As a result, they leaked a letter to the press written on April 20, 2010 by Obama to Lula de Silva. In the letter Obama stated the following:

> For us, Iran's agreement to transfer 1,200 kilograms of Iran's low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran's LEU stockpile. I want to underscore that this element is of fundamental importance for the United States (Today's Zaman, 2010).

It was regarded by some journalists abroad as proof of Turkey's emerging diplomatic power (Peterson, 2010). Turkey and Brazil were seen as "highly promising new force on the world stage" and the deal was a positive development for everybody "except those in Washington and Tel Aviv who have been looking for an excuse to isolate or attack Iran" as Stephen Kinzer of *the Guardian* noted (Kinzer, 2010). Some claimed that, such as Fred Kaplan, Iran now had 2,300 kg of LEU and even if it deposited 1,200 kg of LEU in Turkey, it would still have the necessary amount for a nuclear bomb at its disposal. Also the right of Iran to request its LEU from Turkey anytime, if the deal was not respected, seemed as a loophole. In this

view, the deal had no meaning at all and the motives of Turkish and Brazilian statesmen were questioned: "The only question is whether the Brazilian and Turkish leaders are delusional or up to no good" (Kaplan, 2010).

The USA reacted to the deal in a very negative way. High-level officials anonymously shared their views and one of them stated that the deal "is not a solution for the core of the Iranian enrichment program" and others also regarded it as a delaying tactic employed by Iran (The New York Times, 2010). A few hours after the declaration of Brazil, Turkey and Iran; the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the permanent members of the UNSC have agreed on a draft about a new round of sanctions against Iran. On the following week speaking at the Brookings Institution Clinton stated that the approach of Turkey and Brazil makes the world "more dangerous, not less" and that the USA has voiced its "serious disagreements" to Lula on Iran (Today's Zaman, 2010). A few weeks later, on June 10, 2010, the UNSC accepted new sanctions on Iran. Turkey and Brazil voted against it while Lebanon abstained. Russia and China supported the sanctions. The Resolution 1929 brought stricter limitations on Iran. It extended the assets freeze to the banks and companies related to Iran's nuclear activities, prohibited the sale of ballistic missiles, aircraft, warships and military vehicles to Iran, and gave the right to other countries to stop and inspect all Iranian cargo on ships and aircraft (UNSC, 2010). The USA further extended its unilateral sanctions on Iran. Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act on July 1, 2010. It extended restrictions of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. As Iran produces crude oil but imports refined oil products, due to its limited oil industry and refinery facilities, it brought certain limitations to financial transfer and selling oil to Iran. In addition, it prohibits the third parties to invest in Iran's oil industry if the amount of investment

exceeds $20 million (US State Department, 2010). As a result of unilateral sanctions imposed by the USA, in August 2010, Turkey had to cancel the project started by the TPAO for exploiting natural gas reserves in the Southern Pars area. The project, which was mentioned in the previous pages, envisaged approximately $3.6 billion investment by Turkey (Global Enerji, 2010). If carried on, the project would promote Turkey as an energy hub while helping meet the increasing demand for natural gas in Turkey.

The USA continued to impose new sanctions on Iran which hurt Turkey. It wanted countries importing oil from Iran to decrease the amount they import. As a result of the Executive Order 13622 signed by Obama on July 30, 2012, Turkey was on the blacklist (a total of top 12 oil importers from Iran[74]). The US Ambassador to Ankara, Francis Riccardone stated that "Turkey has to decide. Certain countries have reduced their Iranian oil imports substantially, and we expect Turkey and others to take similar steps". However Turkey was critical of the sanctions. The USA keeps selling foodstuff to Iran, because the sanctions do not prohibit selling of foodstuff, but wants Turkey to stop buying oil from Iran. It might be said that Iran can still buy foodstuff from Turkey but if it cannot sell any oil to Turkey, it will probably not be willing to buy from Turkey. It is seen unfair because it hurts Turkey's economy while the USA keeps trading with Iran (Yaşar, 2012). By July 2012, the EU also banned the import of Iranian oil while freezing the assets of Iran's central bank in the EU (EUEA, 2012). Turkey, though half-heartedly, had to comply with the sanctions. It was mentioned in the previous pages that Iran's share in Turkey's oil imports fell from 51% in 2011 to 28% in 2013 as a result of the US pressure. Worse, Iran has been kicked out of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial

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[74] China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Taiwan.

Telecommunication (SWIFT) on March 15, 2012 due to international pressure (SWIFT, 2012). The system enables banks to transfer money worldwide and kicked out of it, Central Bank of Iran or any other banks would not be able to transfer the money to their country even if they managed to sell oil. This incident shows the importance of control enjoyed by the USA and its allies on the world financial system.

As the restrictions became stricter, Turkish-Iranian economic relations faced other problems. Turkey did not want to lose its lucrative trade with Iran. It should also be kept in mind that the new set of sanctions is not imposed by the UN. They are unilaterally imposed by the USA. For this reason, Turkey does not have to comply with them in theory. However it would risk Turkey's economic and political relations with the USA. Still, Turkey and Iran found ways to continue the trade. For the oil imports, Turkey deposited money in Halkbank accounts in Turkish Lira. As it was impossible to transfer it to Iran through the international banking system, Iranian officials converted the money into gold in Turkey and carried gold bullions to Dubai where they exchanged it to US dollars (the direct gold export to Iran was left when it became public and the Dubai route started to be used) (Pamuk, 2012). In April 2012 alone, Iran imported gold worth of $1.2 billion. However the new sanctions imposed by the USA in the summer of 2012 and which came into power on February 6, 2013 forbade the export of precious metals to Iran. Iran is only allowed to buy food, medicine and industrial products with that money. It shows that as Turkey and Iran try to find ways to continue their trade, the USA tightens the restrictions. Even these developments show the importance attached by Turkey to trade with Iran and explains why Turkey tried to find a peaceful solution to the problem by starting a mediation process.

6.3.3 Conclusion

In the light of the above-mentioned developments, especially the US refusal to accept the deal proposed by Turkey and Brazil, it can be argued that Turkey's efforts ended in total failure. However one should keep in mind that, a mediator cannot control the intentions of the parties of the conflict, it cannot change their course of action if they are negotiating with devious objectives. It also shows that negotiating with the most-powerful state of the world in our time, the USA, Turkey does not have any leverage to bring to the table. Even if it seems that the USA encouraged Turkey and Brazil to reach a deal with Iran, later it changed its policy and did not support the deal agreement. More importantly, the Turkish-Brazilian joint-initiative was seen harmful for the prestige of Great Powers and they did not welcome the involvement of two "rising powers" to challenge their authority on a globally important matter. Despite the fact that Turkey bears the burden of sanctions against Iran as its neighbor, Turkey is excluded from the negotiations. Rather, a style which resembles the 19th century conference diplomacy, in which Great Powers are involved, is preferred. In Chapter 3 it was mentioned that the Great Powers are mostly unwilling to let new members into their own club. Inclusion of Italy in the early 20th century was a result of the German and British insistence who though that it would be beneficial for their interests. It seems that the UNSC members are trying to limit the voice of the rising powers in the field of international politics and are not keen to include them in important processes in order not to bestow legitimacy on their demands for more say in world affairs.

Still, it is not fair to argue that the Turkish-Brazilian efforts were in vain and they did not achieve anything. One might say the scope of the agreement was limited; it did not address the uranium enrichment of Iran. However, as Volker Perthes notes on this issue "One of the lessons from the Cold War is that even minimal agreements that do not solve the main problem can be useful, precisely because they help to regain diplomatic space" (Perthes, 2010, p. 110). Secondly, it might be argued that Turkey's initiative paved the way for further negotiations with Iran which take place between P5+1 and Iran albeit the USA preferred continuing the negotiations by employing coercive diplomacy by imposing new sanctions on Iran.

The incident also showed the limits of Turkey's power as an emerging middle-power. It can resist to the demands of more powerful actors only to some degree. It does not have the necessary power to make them revise their policies. As a result, Turkey, after some hesitation, had to accept being a part of the NATO's Missile Shield and agreed to build a radar station in Kürecik/Malatya (no need to mention that it is against Iran's ballistic missiles) in late 2011 (Kibaroğlu, 2013).

In addition, Turkey realized the limits of cooperation with Iran in the Middle East and they became rivals again. In this respect, the turning point has been Syria. Both states followed diverging policies in Syria, Turkey wanted to oust Assad by arming and training different resistance groups while Iran regarding Syria as its only ally in the region, did its best to keep Assad in power. Tayyip Erdoğan who stated that Iran is like his second home in January 2014 during an official visit to Iran, (Today's Zaman, 2014) started to have bigger disagreements with Iran over Syria. In the following months (October 13, 2014), he directed his criticism to Ayetollah Ali Khamanei, Iran's Supreme Leader, after he praised Assad: "What kind of religious leader is this [who] says '[Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad is the only one

challenging Israel'? Assad didn't shoot a bullet at Israel. Assad killed 250,000, and you're still supporting him, sending him money and arms". It was the first time, Turkey openly criticized Iran publicly for its Syrian policy (Hashem, 2014). Talking to journalists on his way to Turkey returning from Estonia on October 26, 2014, Erdoğan continued his criticisms of Iran, even questioning the sincerity of Iranian statesmen:

> When we have bilateral meetings with Iran, they agree on 'solving this issue together.' When it comes to taking action on this issue, unfortunately, they have their own way of working and they work in that way. This is very saddening. This is why we cannot find comfortable ground to work with Iran (Beki, 2014)

It may be argued that in the face of increasing regional rivalry, the limited capability of Turkey to risk its relations with the USA and the security provided by NATO membership, Turkey realized the limits of its autonomy in a region like Middle East and started to re-align its foreign policy, with some exceptions such as Egypt, to its traditional allies.

6.4. CASE II: SERBIA AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

In the post-Cold War era the Balkans has emerged as the main area of Turkish foreign policy activism. Rather than being a free choice of Turkey, this was imposed on Turkey by the violent events resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In addition, the presence of significant population with Balkan origin in Turkey and the family ties with relatives living in Balkan countries added a domestic dimension to the issue. Turkey did its best to attract attention of the

international community to the massacres the Bosnian Muslims faced and tried to mobilize the international organizations for intervention to stop the bloodshed. It emerged as one of the defenders of Balkan Muslims while at the same time refraining from acting unilaterally. With the decision of the USA for direct involvement, Turkey became an important ally in the Balkans and proved that its strategic importance continued. This was mostly due to the fact that Turkish and American interests were in harmony in the Balkans, a situation different than the Middle East. Turkey and Greece competed in the Balkans but Greece initially lost its influence due to its opposition to the American designs in the region. As a result, while cooperating with the USA, Turkey managed to benefit from the US leverage to reach its national interests. Excluding the UN mission to Somalia, the Balkans was the main area for peace-keeping and peace-building efforts of Turkey in the 1990s. This provided an important experience to Turkey for its future involvement in other areas and led to capacity building in this field. It should be noted that Turkish foreign policy activism started in the 1990s in the Balkans. However as the conflicts died out, Turkey's involvement in the region started to decrease. Especially following the Dayton Agreement and US-led military Kosovo War, the EU started to become the main actor in the region. Turkey especially could not compete with the EU countries in the economic sphere. Still, Turkey's actions in the 1990s increased Turkey's prestige and influence especially among the Muslim Bosnians and Turkey emerged as an actor contributing to the regional security and stability in the Balkans.

It was mentioned that Turkey wanted peace and stability in the Balkans because firstly it feels responsible for the well-being and security of Turkish/Muslim groups in the Balkans. Secondly the Balkans constitutes the main route for its trade partners in Europe (as the EU is still Turkey's biggest partner) and instability on this

route may damage Turkey's trade. Thirdly, Turkey thinks that conflicts in the region may lead to grouping which may target Turkey. Last but not least Turkey is afraid of massive refugee flows in case of conflicts as it hosted thousands of Bosnians in Turkey in the 1990s.

Ahmet Davutoğlu regards the Balkans as a high priority area in Turkish foreign policy where it has "historical responsibilities" (Davutoğlu, 2004). According to the TMFA following principles shape Turkish foreign policy in the region:

> High level political dialogue, security for all, utmost economic integration and the preservation of the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious social structures in the region constitute four main axes of Turkey's Balkan policy, which is shaped by the principles of "regional ownership" and "inclusiveness" (TMFA, 2015).

Speaking at a conference in Sarajevo in 2009 (the conference proceeding published as a book in 2011) Ahmet Davutoğlu underlined important points in Turkey's approach to the Balkans[75]. He defined the Balkans as a "buffer zone" and claimed that it was victim of rivalries and regarded as periphery of Europe. The only exception to this understanding was the Ottoman era in which the Balkans enjoyed its "golden age".

> If you are placed in a region with these three crucial characteristics, namely geo-political buffer zone, geo-cultural interactions and geo-economic transactions, you are likely to face two alternative destinies in history: You could either be placed in the center of world politics, or you fall victim to global competition and become periphery of major global powers (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 13).

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[75] This speech surprisingly did not receive much attention in Turkey. However it alarmed many groups in the Balkans, especially the Serbs. Davutoğlu's remarks on Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (Mehmed Paşa Sokolovic), a famous Ottoman statesman (originally Serb) converted to Islam through the child levy system, infuriated Serbs. Davutoğlu stated the following: "The Balkan people were running world politics in the 16th century, and ethnically they were not all Turks; some were from Slavic origin, some from Albanian origin, some were from converted Greek origin. But they run world politics in harmony. The personality of Mehmed-paša Sokolović (*Sokullu Mehmet Pasha*) was a perfect example. If there was no Ottoman state in history, Mehmed Pasha could have been an ordinary Serbian man dealing with agriculture or commerce". (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 14)

He mentioned in a detailed way about this success story that was achieved in the Ottoman era and urged the audience to work to achieve it again: "We can reinvent and reestablish this success by creating a new political ownership, a new multicultural coexistence and a new economic zone" (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 16). He also emphasized Turkey's objectives in the Balkans which has its focus on establishing a new regional order and Turkey's role as a security and economic actor: "The Turkish perspective in this region is to reestablish a new regional order based on the understanding of a political dialogue, solving problems through dialogue, intensive economic relations and cultural coexistence and harmony" (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 17). Later he devoted more words to Turkey's role as an order-setting country in its surrounding regions and its motivations:

> Therefore, our foreign policy aims to establish order in all these surrounding regions; the Balkans, the Middle East and Caucasia. Because, if there is no order, then, we will pay the price together. For a diplomat from the West or another part of the world, the Bosnian issue is a technical issue to deal with, a technical diplomatic process. But for us, it is a life and death issue, it is so important. The territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina is as important for us as the territorial integrity of Turkey. The prosperity and security of Sarajevo is as important as the security and prosperity of Istanbul (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 19).

It might be expected that Turkey's relations with Serbia would improve following the overthrow of Milosevic regime in October 2000. However Turkey and Serbia had conflicting ideas about the future of Kosovo. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize independence of Kosovo in 2008. Süha Umar, Turkish Ambassador to Belgrade (2008-2010), commented the following in an interview:

> When I arrived in this country… relations between Serbia and Turkey were at their lowest level because of [Turkish support for] Kosovo's independence but also because of the lack of common interests, some prejudice and a lot of manipulation from outside. We managed to overcome the obstacles (Stankovic, 'Balkans Stability Impossible Without Serbia', 2010a).

However both Ankara and Belgrade, aware of their mutual importance, had to mend fences despite their differences. Umar explains the reason for that Turkish-Serbian rapprochement:

> If we are after peace and stability, without Serbia truly seeking peace and stability, it won't happen. If we are looking for trouble, without Serbia it is very difficult to create trouble. This is why Serbia is the key country and Turkey has realized this fact (Stankovic, 2010a).

It was to Turkey's advantage that pro-EU Democratic Party was in power in Serbia, represented by President Boris Tadic (2004-2012). Serbia was not in a position to destabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina by supporting the secessionist claims of Bosnian Serbs and declared that as a signatory Serbia will respect the Dayton Agreement. Even though it was against independence of Kosovo, it did not want Kosovo issue to block Serbia's path for EU membership. Its slogan in 2008 elections was "Both EU and Kosovo" (Barlovac, 2012). On December 23, 2009 Serbia officially applied for the EU membership (BBC, 2009). It was in this environment Turkey tried to improve its relations with Serbia. As the first of all, Turkey and Serbia signed a free trade agreement in 2009 which came into force on January 1, 2010. It was very advantageous for Serbia. It opened up the 75 million-big Turkish market to Serbian exports and enabled Turkish investors to invest in Serbia. Serbian officials commented that "the deal would be implemented in accordance with an 'asymmetric trade liberalization model' that favors Serbia" (Balkan Insight, 2009). It was followed by a visa-free travel agreement in 2010 (Hürriyet, 2010). In this period official visits also increased. To give an example, President Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Serbia in October 2009, the first presidential level visit in the last 33 years (TCCB, 2009).

Table 6.1 Turkey's Trade With Serbia *

($)

Year	Exports	Imports
2002	122,050,967	11,146,422
2003	184,676,117	29,987,915
2004	211,944,311	87,404,983
2005	257,879,358	96,718,847
2006	278,784,345	49,081,198
2007	475,096,383	70,703,334
2008	458,102,571	61,705,095
2009	306,468,718	55,896,658
2010	306,114,624	109,523,846
2011	354,670,111	213,300,967
2012	380,869,396	205,537,807
2013	440,650,201	251,956,743
2014	506,697,699	273,921,127

*Due to the secession of Montenegro, the figures from 2006 on only include trade with Serbia.

Source: (TUIK, 2015)

Turkey and Serbia did not have a high volume of trade as seen in Table 6.1 above. Serbia is not an important trade partner for Turkey mostly because of its small population and low income. Serbia is not in the list of Top 20 foreign partners of Turkey as a result of the modest amount of trade. Still, it is seen that trade started to increase from 2002 on. Following the independence of Kosovo in 2008 Turkey's exports started to fall down (from $ 458 million to $ 306 million in 2009). The free trade agreement, which was advantageous to Serbia, came into force on January 1, 2010 and seems that it had a dramatic effect on Turkey's imports from Serbia as they doubled in 2010. In 2011, the amount of exports almost doubled rising to $ 213

million. With the exception of 2012 which witnessed a slight decrease, it is observed that Turkey's imports from Serbia keep increasing. One might infer that, Turkey wanted to use the agreement to increase its imports from Serbia and use it as leverage. With the agreement, Turkey also managed to increase its exports to Serbia and the figure was $506 million for 2014. TIKA is also involved in development aid projects and renovating Ottoman architectural legacy in Serbia. In 2013, Serbia received $6.06 million aid from TIKA though this is the lowest amount among Balkan countries (TIKA, 2014, p. 91).

Despite the free trade agreement, Turkey could not become a key partner of Serbia for foreign trade. It was not included in Top 10 countries for exports of Serbia in 2014 and it was only the 8th in imports. The EU is the main trade partner of Serbia. In 2014, Italy, Germany, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russian Federation, Romania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia and France were the Top 10 export partners in order. With regards to imports, the Top 10 countries for 2014 are as the following: Germany, Russian Federation, Italy, China, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Turkey, Romania and France (SIEPA, 2015a).

In terms of FDI, which is very important for a country like Serbia in fighting high unemployment rates, it is again the EU countries who took the lead. From 2000 on, Serbia received approximately $26 billion FDI in total ((World Bank, 2015a). Almost 70% of the FDI came from the EU countries. In this regard Top 10 partners are in order: Austria, Norway, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Switzerland, France, Croatia, Hungary and the United Kingdom (SIEPA, 2015b). Turkey invested only $ 49 million in Serbia between 2002 and 2012 (Turkish Ministry of Economy, 2015a). This amount is very limited when compared to the EU countries and limits Turkey's leverage.

Turkey has donated €10 million for the construction of Kraljevo Airport and promised that THY will run flights to Istanbul. However with the deterioration of the relations in 2013, Serbia refused another €10 million donation package from Turkey for the runway of the airport. Serbian officials stated that they will find other means to finish the construction of the airfield but to this day it is still unfinished and known as "ghost airport" (Ex-Yu Aviation News, 2015).

The EU does not always welcome Turkey's increasing trade in the Balkans despite the often repeated wishes for stability and growth in the Balkans. It wants to bring the Balkan countries under its economic sphere of influence. Turkey wanted to mobilize state institutions to increase imports from Serbia. In this regard, after a visit (in July 2010) to the Sandzak region of Serbia which is inhabited by Bosnian Muslims mostly, Erdoğan instructed the Meat and Milk Board (MMB) of Turkey to import livestock and meat from Sandzak in order both to decrease the meat prices in Turkey and boost the poor region's economy (unemployment is about %50 in the Sandzak region). Head of the MMB paid a visit to the region and signed an agreement for buying 600 tons of meat from Serbia in two months in late August in 2010. The deal was for €3 million. Following the deal Muziz Turkovic, the Mayor of Sjenica, sent a letter to the head of MMB and thanked for Turkey's contribution to the economy of the area. However the EU opposed the deal. Yalçın Doğan, a well-known columnist from the daily Hürriyet informed the public about the EU's attitude. The EU warned Turkey because of the Customs Union Treaty with the EU, in case of importing meat from Serbia, Turkey has to buy the same products from 27 members of the EU. They also warned the Serbs not to risk their EU membership vision (Doğan, 2010). The EU officials commented that they do not try blocking the

deal but Turkey protects its market against EU beef products and this is a breach of the Customs Union Treaty as Turkey buys beef from Serbia (Stankovic, 2010b).

Table 6.2 Turkey's Trade With Bosnia

($)

Year	Exports	Imports
2002	43,263,770	6,317,459
2003	63,227,277	8,342,736
2004	99,938,327	11,475,737
2005	128,217,363	15,399,051
2006	150,861,753	9,379,107
2007	445,172,814	21,469,124
2008	572,348,652	24,545,114
2009	226,566,745	52,058,789
2010	224,299,335	72,328,496
2011	268,941,651	90,252,176
2012	251,523,302	111,648,688
2013	274,086,165	124,330,053
2014	322,449,373	171,424,364

Source: (TUIK, 2015)

Turkey and Bosnia signed a FTA on June 3, 2002 before the JDP and the agreement came into force on June 1, 2003. It helped to foster the economic relations (Turkish Ministry of Economy, 2015b). As seen in Table 6.2 trade increased from 2002 onwards. However with the global economic crisis in 2008, from 2009 on Turkey's exports to Bosnia almost halved. Still, Turkey's imports from Bosnia kept on increasing though it was still very modest in 2014. TIKA is involved in many projects in Bosnia. Bosnia received the biggest amount of aid when compared to other countries in the Balkans, $ 22.28 million. Projects range from health and education field to agriculture (TIKA, 2014, p. 91). Between 1994 and 2012 the FDI

flow to Bosnia was €5.6 billion and Turkish investment was only €149 million for this period. The vast majority of the FDI comes from the EU countries (Turkish Ministry of Economy, 2015b). Turkey has established 25 branches of Ziraat Bankası in Bosnia. Still Turkish investments cannot provide enough employment for a country struggling with unemployment. Only two of the 44 Turkish companies in Bosnia invested in production: Sisecam Soda Lukovac and Natron Hayat Maglaj (Vracic, 2014, p. 189).

Despite the limitations imposed by Turkey's material capacity, Turkey thanks to its policies in the 1990s has a positive position in the eyes of Bosnian Muslims. Haris Slajdzic, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1990-1993) and Prime Minister of Bosnia Herzegovina (1993-1996), was elected to the post of Bosnian-member for the rotating presidency in 2006 (served until 2010). He favored a constitutional change and a stronger, unified government structure in Bosnia (Setimes, 2006). He attributed a special importance to relations with Turkey and saw Turkey's role for fostering cooperation and normalization in the Balkans very positive: "Turkey's role in this is big. This role is creating a new climate, new relations in a region where all are neighbors. We need to be in better cooperation if we are thinking about the betterment of our societies. Turkey is working in this regard" (Sunday's Zaman, 2010). Bakir Izzetbegovic, was elected to the same post in October 2010. (BBC, 2010a) Following his election, he had no less than 25 formal meetings with Turkish government officials (Vracic, 2014, p. 188). Just after his election victory in an interview he defined Turkey as a "powerful and wise big brother" while praising its involvement in the Balkans:

> Turkey has a positive role in the region. It is soothing and introducing appropriate solutions. Turkey is not someone who came to the region by force or without being invited. It [Turkey] is displaying a significant policy both for

us and for all countries in the Balkans. I hope that this policy will continue in a more expanded way (Balkans.com, 2010).

Turkey's perception in the Balkan countries is mixed. It depends on religion of the group concerned or the bilateral relations (as in the case of Macedonia). Muslims have generally more positive view of Turkey. A survey conducted in 2010, Gallup Balkan Monitor, showed that 75.1% of the people in Albania, 60.2% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 93.2% in Kosovo and 76.6% in Macedonia view Turkey as a friend. However in Croatia only 26.7%, in Montenegro 33.5% percent and in Serbia 18.2% see Turkey as a friend (Türbedar, 2012). Another survey conducted by Bilgesam in 2012 in 8 Balkan countries show similar tendencies. In Bosnia, conducted only among Muslim Bosnians, it shows that Turkey with 72.5% enjoys the highest sympathy, followed by Arabs (68.4%) and Germans (56.9%). The USA and Russia are at the bottom of the list with scores of 36.6% and 29.2% respectively (Bilgiç & Akyürek, 2012, p. 21). 74.1% of Bosnian Muslims think that Turkey is a regional power (Bilgiç & Akyürek, 2012, p. 25). 90.8% of them want to visit Turkey, 66.2% want to study in Turkey, 50.3% want to settle in Turkey and 34.2% want to get married to Turks (Bilgiç & Akyürek, 2012, p. 26). In Serbia 46% of Christian Serbs have sympathy toward Turkey. However the highest rate is for Russia with 50.5% (Bilgiç & Akyürek, 2012, p. 69). 52.6% of them think that Turkey is a regional power (Bilgiç & Akyürek, 2012, p. 73). Among Serbs the percentage of those who wish to visit Turkey is 60.5%, 34.3% for working in Turkey, 34.7% for studying in Turkey, 25% for settling in Turkey and 19.8% for marrying Turks (Bilgiç & Akyürek, 2012, p. 75). However the Serbs of Bosnia are mostly critical of Turkey. Turkey's policy of supporting Bosniaks and taking part in the international military coalition against Serbs contribute to this negative result. Milorad Dodik, President of

Republika Srpska (RS), never hides his antipathy to Turkey and Turkish involvement in the Balkans: "Turkey is causing a lot of problems in BiH. It does not have absolute right to meddle into regional issues." (Vracic, 2014, p. 187) The discourse adopted by Turkey in the last decade with an emphasis on the Ottoman past also worries the Croats in Bosnia. Veso Vegar, a well-known politician from the Croatian Democratic Union commented that "I do not believe that someone likes to hear that BiH is an Ottoman legacy" (Vracic, 2014, p. 187).

Turkey wants to become an influential actor in the Balkans and despite its appearance as the protector of Balkan Muslims tries to prove that its sole purpose is peace and stability in the Balkans. It is also aware of the fact that Bosnia is still divided along religious lines and a fertile ground for conflict as will be seen in the next part.

6.4.1 The Emergence of the Crisis

The Dayton Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia established a state structure on a very precarious balance. It set up an autonomous entity in the Serb populated areas centered on Banja Luka, Republika Srpska (RS) with very limited control from the central government, and established a Bosniac-Croat federation in the rest of the country. Presidential system is based on rotation by the members of the three ethnic-religious groups while other important posts in the state bureaucracy are allocated to some groups based on a ratio. The country is also under strict international control to oversee the developments (Chandler, 2000).

Bosnia witnessed many government crises and the constitution of the country with the above-mentioned power-sharing and safeguards mechanisms made the country ungovernable. With the independence of Kosovo in 2008 the Serbs of Bosnia started to have bigger hopes for independence. In 2008 the RS Parliament adopted a resolution which condemned the declaration of independence of Kosovo and urged the Bosnian authorities not to recognize it while at the same time claimed that when half the UN members recognize Kosovo, the international system will have changed and Republika Srpska will consider it also has a right to separate (Kosovocompromise, 2008).

In the light of these developments, pressing need for a constitution change and the fear of increasing division in Bosnia, the EU and USA started talks with the Bosnian leaders in the Butmir military camp near Sarajevo in October 2009. The USA was represented by the Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and the EU by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. The package included: reforming state structures to make them comply with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR); creating a larger, more powerful and unicameral legislature and a larger and more powerful Council of Ministers with a prime minister; and giving the state authority to assume responsibilities and make commitments in the EU accession process. In return, an accelerated integration into the EU and NATO was promised (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 4). However the Butmir process failed. Bosnian political leaders, especially the Bosnian Serbs were against the reform package. On October 20, Dodik threatened to organize a referendum if Western nations tried to pressure Bosnian Serbs into accepting the package. He also asked Bildt and Steinberg to include the right for entities to organize referendums in proposed constitutional changes (Latal, 2009).

The Butmir process failed due to some reasons. This incident shows that mediators should take other factors into consideration when starting a mediation initiative. As the first of all, according to Florian Bieber, the US and EU were ill-prepared and they offered 'quick fix' solutions (Bieber, 2010, p. 1). Secondly, the package was designed as a "take it or leave it" package which limited the prospects for negotiations and a possible solution based on minimal reforms (Bassuener, 2010). Thirdly, both their carrots and sticks were very vague in the face of costs of accepting the constitutional changes and domestic opposition to Bosnian political leaders. Last but not least, the timing of the initiative was not good. General elections were planned to take place in October 2010, just in one year after the initiative started. The politicians would need to harden their nationalist stance, especially taking into consideration the divided structure of Bosnia along ethnic-religious ties, and accepting the demands of the international community would cause loss of votes.

As the talks in Butmir failed to address the governance and other problems of Bosnia, the hopes for unifying Bosnia started to decrease. In February 2010, the Parliament of RS passed a law making it easier to hold referenda on national issues (BBC, 2010b).

It was in this environment; Turkey stepped in and offered its services to Bosnia and Serbia for a reconciliation process which will be analyzed in the next part.

6.4.2 Turkey's Mediation Efforts

Turkey, like Russia, was excluded from the Butmir process despite its willingness to take part. Turkey has been concerned about the fate of Bosnia. A

Turkish diplomat anonymously stated that "Bosnia is collapsing" and he regarded the separatist tendencies of the Bosnian Serbs as a threat for the future of the country (Yinanç, 2010b). Excluded from the Butmir process (first round of talks took place on October 20, 2009), following its announcement Turkey started a parallel mechanism. The first Turkish-Serbian-Bosnian Trilateral Consultation Council meeting took place on October 10, 2009 where the ministers of foreign affairs of the three countries (Ahmet Davutoğlu-Turkey, Sven Alkalaj-Bosnia and Vuk Jeremic-Serbia) met for the first time. The meeting took place in Istanbul during the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) summit. In Istanbul it was decided to continue the dialogue process and the ministers of foreign affairs of the three countries to meet every month to discuss the recent developments in the Balkans and Bosnia. Later another trilateral mechanism between Turkey, Bosnia and Croatia is also established (Yaşin, 2010).

Rather than directly bringing the parties of the domestic conflict in Bosnia to the negotiation table, Turkey chose to engage the kin-state of the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, to ease the tension in Bosnia[76]. When compared to the Butmir process which envisaged a modification of the constitution of Bosnia, the Gordion-knot of the conflict, Turkey worked for modest steps in the way of reconciliation. Aware of the hostile attitude of the Bosnian Serbs against Turkey, Turkey thought that it can influence the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs by cooperating with Serbia. The relations between Serbia and Bosnia were always strained before and after the Dayton Accords. Serbia has been sheltering many war-crimes suspects. In 2012 the prosecutors in Serbia found out that many of the suspects were aided by the army, police and the Orthodox Church as the example of Ratko Mladic (the Bosnian Serb

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[76] It may be considered as a shortcoming in the negotiation method to exclude the Bosnian Serbs.

military leader) who lived openly in Serbian army barracks for many years with the help of senior officers (Borger, 2012). Naturally, as they had been the victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing, this attitude created resentment among the Bosniaks. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs always looked to Serbia as kin-state for support in case of a referendum for independence. Turkey thought that by negotiating with Serbia and convincing it for the territorial integrity of Bosnia, it can bring pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to be more cooperative in the domestic politics of Bosnia. As the Bosnian Serbs call for independence and propagate that Bosnia has no future, it encourages the Bosnian Croats for independence as in case of secession of the SR, the Croats also would secede from the Croat-Bosniak federation and cause total chaos in the country. For this reason, Turkey established another mechanism for dialogue with Croatia since the Bosnian Croats would wish to join Croatia in case of dissolution. This nightmare scenario, supported by the never ending governmental crisis in Bosnia, worries Turkey and reminds the fatal consequences of a return to the bloodshed of the 1990s. That is an outcome Turkey wants to avoid. While doing this to provide security and stability in its neighboring region (with the purpose of keeping a transportation corridor open for its trade with Europe, avoiding waves of refugees and protecting its trade and investment in the Balkans), Turkey also wants to prove its worth by contributing to the resolution of an important regional issue in which Great Powers such as the EU and USA failed so far. This source of motivation was also observed by the others:

> Turkey has been able to use tensions among Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethnic groups to exert influence in the Western Balkans by acting as mediator. This is part of Turkey's plan to reassert itself geopolitically and show Europe that without Turkey, the Western Balkans will not see lasting political stability (STRATFOR, 2010).

According to Poulain and Sakellariou, Turkey's diplomatic initiatives in the Balkans have three complementary goals: 1) to strengthen Turkey's good relations with traditional Balkan partners; 2) to make openings toward countries with which Turkey has had problematic relations; and 3) to play the role of a mediator and lead multilateral initiatives to improve regional stability (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

In Turkey's view, the lack of dialogue and trust between Serbia and Bosnia are main causes of reconciliation. Bosnia did not have an ambassador in Belgrade (from 2007 on) as Serbia does not approve the Bosnian ambassador and this was seen as a problem from Ankara's perspective. In this regard, at the trilateral meeting that took place in Ankara in February 2010, Serbia declared that it will accept the Bosnian ambassador (Niksic, 2010). Though it can be seen as a very small step, it is still important to foster dialogue between the two countries and it was a result of Turkey's initiative. Turkey also contributed to another successful outcome for the reconciliation process: the Serbian apology over Srebrenica where 8,000 Bosniaks were killed by the Bosnian Serb militants in 1995. The Serbian parliament negotiated a motion about apology for 13 hours with a heated debate. It was accepted by a narrow margin, 127 MPs voted in favor out of a total of 250. It was also seen a crucial step by the Serbian government in Serbia's EU membership process (BBC News, 2010). Though it refrained from calling the incident as "genocide" as the Hague Tribunal defined it, it was an important step for Serbia to share the sorrows of people in Bosnia. A Serbian official speaking on the condition of anonymity emphasized that without Davutoğlu's efforts this result would be unthinkable and stated "there was an atmosphere of chaos before. We thank Mr. Davutoğlu for resolving the deadlock" (Yanatma, 2010). In an interview Davutoğlu made it clear that the he and the Bosnian leader Haris Silajdzic saw the text of the Serbian apology

before it was accepted. Davutoğlu met him late at night at the Sarajevo Airport. Silajdzic smoked furiously. Davutoğlu made an exception and smoked too while convincing Silajdzic to accept the apology. He also told that he negotiated the names of acceptable ambassadors to both countries to solve the problem of suspended diplomatic relations (Traub, 2011).

Following these steps, on April 24, 2010 another important development took place. At the Trilateral Balkan Summit in Istanbul, Turkey managed to bring together the presidents of Bosnia and Serbia for the first time (TMFA, 2015). More importantly, the Istanbul Declaration signed by the heads of the states emphasized their determination to respect the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia. Boris Tadic, the President of Serbia, stated Serbia's position to the journalists as the following:

> All legitimate decisions by the institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, representatives of all three peoples, are absolutely acceptable to Serbia. That way we demonstrate the principled position that Serbia, as a good neighbor to Bosnia-Herzegovina, will not interfere with the affairs of its neighboring, friendly country (Jovanovic, 2010).

During the negotiations for the Istanbul Declaration (concluded in April 2010) it is possible to argue that Turkey applied a low level facilitative strategy rather than power mediator (Zenelaj, Beriker, & Hatipoglu, 2012, p. 19). The free trade agreement with Serbia was signed before the negotiations in 2009. It might be said that Turkey used only one source of leverage in convincing Serbia. It is the visa-free travel agreement that was signed in September 2010 and came into force in December 2010. Turkey acted as a facilitator and did not use much leverage, given its limited leverage especially in the field of economy.

As Turkey tried to limit the actions of the Bosnian Serbs by cooperating with Serbia, not surprisingly, the leader of Bosnian Serbs Milorad Dodik reacted

aggressively. He claimed that Turkey has a hidden agenda in the Balkans. His anger was also partly directed to the Serbian President Boris Tadic. Dodik criticized Serbia and stated the following: "We haven't given anybody mandate to solve issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina with Turkey in this way" (B92, "Turkey has hidden Balkan agenda", 2010a). The EU also was not much happy with Turkey's involvement in the region. An analysis by Stratfor claims that the Butmir process failed because excluded from the process, Turkey lobbied the USA to step away. Turkey wanted to convey a message to the EU: Not only does Turkey consider the Balkans its backyard (and therefore Ankara should never again be left out of negotiations), it also has the ability to influence Washington's policy. It further claims that Stratfor sources in the European Union and the Bosnia-Herzegovina government indicated that the Europeans were caught off guard and displeased by just how much influence Ankara has in the region (STRATFOR, 2010). According to Türbedar, Turkey's goals in the Balkans did not diverge from the EU in recent years. The initiatives started by Turkey, such as establishing good neighborhood relations between Serbia and Bosnia, are parallel to the EU policies. Despite this fact, it is possible to observe a lack of cooperation between Turkey and the EU in the Balkans. He also emphasizes the importance of collaboration between Turkey, the EU and USA and other important actors for sustainability of Turkey's efforts. However he is also critical of the EU: "European diplomats should not look to Turkey with suspicion, but should treat it as a partner, who can make significant contributions for peace and stability in the Western Balkans" (Türbedar, 2011, p. 154). Karl Bildt, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden-representative of the EU during the Butmir talks, criticized Turkey in an interview following Turkey's initiative on the grounds of being pro-Bosniak:

> On Bosnia, we have suggested to the Turkish Foreign Minister to go not only to Sarajevo –Sarajevo is already an open door– but also to Banja Luka (Republika Srpska). Not Belgrade, but Banja Luka, for reconciliation in the country. Turkey can do more than Turkey has been doing to contribute to reconciliation inside the country. Silajdzic is playing the Ankara card but this is not necessarily what is going to bring a solution (Göksel, 2009, p. 21).

A senior Western diplomat speaking on the condition of anonymity commented the following on the failure of Butmir process: "We put everything the U.S. and the European Union could get together, and yet we could not succeed". He underlined the importance of Turkish and Russian involvement for peace in Bosnia. He argued that without Russia working to persuade leaders of Bosnia's Serbian entity and Turkey pressing Bosnian Muslim leaders, a deal was "out of our reach" (Champion, 2010). However his claim on the "carrots" offered during the Butmir process is not true as the EU and USA only offered vague commitments such as faster integration into the EU and NATO.

In Serbia, even though some groups appreciated Turkey's contribution to the regional peace and security by naming Turkey as "a factor of regional stability", both Turkey and the Serbian government were criticized by the nationalist circles. They claimed that the government betrayed the Bosnian Serbs by cooperating with Turkey in applying pressure on the Republika Srpska. An MP from the Radical Party, Bozidar Djelic, asked: "Where the government plans to take Serbia: to Europe or to the Ottoman Union?" (Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2010, p. 4). An expert on the region, Hajrudin Somun, regards Tadic's attitude towards Bosnia insincere. He thinks Tadic is under pressure by coalition partners more nationalist than himself. He allowed a newly formed Serbian government to have its first cabinet meeting in Banja Luka (in Srpska Republic in Bosnia) to show Serbia's support to the common Serb cause (Somun, 2011).

Despite criticisms, Turkey continued the trilateral summits. On July 11, 2010 Boris Tadic and Tayyip Erdoğan met at Srebrenica with their Bosnian counterparts and took part in the commemoration ceremonies for the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacres. This historical visit was decided during the Istanbul Summit in May with Turkey's support. As Tadic named the violent events that led to the death of more than 8,000 people in Srebrenica as a tragedy, he also promised to do his best for capturing the war-criminal Ratko Mladic (known as "the butcher") who was the chief of the Bosnian Serb military forces (Haberturk, 2010). Mladic was arrested in a village in Serbia in May 2011 (BBC, 2011).

In 2010, Bakir Izetbegovic was elected as the Muslim member of the rotating presidency, replacing Silajdzic. On November 1, 2010 he apologized for the innocent victims killed by the Bosniaks during the war. He also stated that the relations between Serbia and Bosnia have improved following the Serbian declaration on Srebrenica and Tadic's visit to the same city while emphasizing the importance of normalization (B92, 2010b). On December 7, 2011, Boris Tadic visited Republika Srpska and he also met Izetbegovic there. Though it was not an official visit, none of the presidents of Serbia paid an official visit to Bosnia, both statesmen agreed on further cooperation and arranging official visits (Serbianna, 2010). The second presidential level summit took place in Serbia where President Abdullah Gül met with his Serbian and Bosnian counterparts in Karadjordjevo on April 26, 2011. Bosnia was represented by its three-member presidency. The place had some symbolic importance. Serbian and Croatian presidents, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, met in Karadjordjevo in 1991 and agreed to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the summit Tadic told the reporters that Serbia "would never support a referendum that would lead to the breakup of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in

any way bring into question the integrity of that country" (Hadzovic, 2011). During the summit, it was decided for Tadic to visit Sarajevo at the beginning of July, being the first official visit by President of Serbia to Bosnia (B92, 2011a). As scheduled, the visit took place on July 7, 2007. Leaders of both countries emphasized the importance of cooperation. Izetbegovic commented that "BiH has the biggest dealing of goods with Serbia. More than one million Serbs live in BiH, and more than 300,000 Bosniaks live in Serbia. We have all the reasons to develop better relations, and this can't be done without conversation" (Kaletovic, 2011).

The third presidential level trilateral meeting took place on May 15, 2013 in Ankara. The new president of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic, Bosnia's presidency members Bakir Izetbegovic (Bosnian), Nebojsa Radmanovic (Serbian), and Zeljko Komsic (Croatian) were hosted by Abdullah Gül. All parties emphasized the importance of increasing cooperation. In addition to foster trade and investment, an agreement on cooperation on fields of trade and economy was signed. It envisaged cooperation between the chambers of commerce of the three countries and establishment of a trilateral trade committee. Nikolic underlined the importance of economic cooperation with Turkey: "Turkey is a partner that can help us reach markets we have not opened; it can help us achieve this through its investments and our technology, because we have an exceptionally educated workforce" (B92, 2013a). According to Gözde K. Yaşin, in addition to its own investments directed in the Balkans, Turkey also encourages Azerbaijan and Arab countries to invest in these countries. Turkey sees the investment pillar as a key to provide stability and foster economic cooperation between the aforementioned countries (Setimes, 2013).

It may seem Turkey and Serbia had a honeymoon on their relations after 2010. However, as the relations with Turkey were established on a fragile basis in

Serbia due to the domestic opposition from the nationalist circles, from 2013 on some problems emerged between the two countries. During his visit to Kosovo in October 2013, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan made a speech and emphasized the common ties between Turkey and Kosovo while stating that he feels home in Kosovo: "We all belong to a common history, common culture, common civilization; we are the people who are brethren of that structure. Do not forget, Turkey is Kosovo, Kosovo is Turkey!" (Baydar, 2013). It created fierce resentment in Serbia and President of Serbia asked for an apology for what he called a "scandal" on October 26, otherwise he threatened that Serbia would pull out of the trilateral talks with Bosnia and Turkey. Ahmet Davutoğlu had a lengthy phone call with his Serbian counterpart, Ivan Mrkic, to convince him that Erdoğan's words were misunderstood (B92, 2013b).

The deterioration of the relations was visible at the reception organized by the Turkish ambassador on October 29 for the National Day of Turkey. It was boycotted by the top Serbian officials. On November 1, 2013 Serbian government withdrew the draft laws from the parliament for the accords signed with Turkey on mutual legal assistance on commercial and criminal matters. The fourth presidential level summit was planned to take place in Belgrade in December 2013 however it was cancelled as Serbia decided to pull out of the talks (Mitrovic, 2013).

Turkey wanted to resume the trilateral talks with participation of Serbia and in order to accomplish this goal tried to mend fences with Serbia. Ahmet Davutoğlu requested to visit Serbia in March in 2014 however his request was denied by the Serbian authorities on the grounds that the parliamentary elections would take place that month. In April 2014 Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary, paid a visit to Serbia to discuss the problems and arrange a visit by Davutoğlu to Serbia.

According to a senior Turkish diplomat, the Serbs are keen on the tripartite talks however they are only interested in economic, cultural and educational side of it, not political matters (Arslan, 2014). Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Belgrade on June 10, 2014 and met his Serbian counterpart Ivica Dacic. Davutoğlu stated that the Balkan nations were as one family and they could settle their differences in a brotherly way. Dacic thanked Turkey for its assistance during the recent floods and emphasized the need for Serbia to collect aid from international donors for repairing the destroyed areas by the flood. Answering a question if the tripartite talks would be resumed soon, Dacic avoided a direct answer and said "the focus now should be on rebuilding the relations between Serbia and Turkey" (B92, 2014a).

Next month, in July 2014, another incident increased the tension in bilateral relations. It was allegedly a statement of Tayyip Erdoğan and appeared on the social media and media of Bosnia and Serbia. It emerged just after a port visit by the two ships of Turkish Navy to the Bosnian port of Neum was cancelled. It read "I swear to Great Allah that if anybody touches Bosniaks by any means he will face 100 million Turks as long as I am alive. Therefore don't be surprised when Turkish warships sail into Neum, because this is our support to the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina". It was also controversial because Erdoğan allegedly criticized the Ottoman Empire for leaving Bosnia to Austria in 1878 without a fight (Zambak, 2014). Though it was denied by the Turkish officials and regional media that cited it failed to show any source, it created a great reaction in Serbia and Bosnia among the Bosnian Serbs. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs sent an official letter to Aleksandr Vucic, Prime Minister of Serbia and called for urgent meeting for consultations upon Erdoğan's alleged statement. In the letter he stated the following:

The latest threat is considered by us as particularly dangerous and alarming, because this time the Turkish Prime Minister moved from daydreaming about the restoration of the Ottoman Empire to the open threats of military intervention in the territorial waters of BiH, without common consent of the common institutions in which the Republic of Srpska has its vote. We express justifiable concern that the escalation of threats, coming from the highest Turkish officials, would pass without reaction of other European countries, which have so far shown incomprehensible tolerance towards assaults on peace and stability in BiH that came from Turkey (Dodik, 2014).

Meeting Dodik the next day in Belgrade, Vucic stated "Serbia has always been committed to peace and stability and will remain such in the future as well, and will not allow others to destroy what Western Balkan countries and nations have created in the past decade" (B92, 2014b).

This incident alone is enough to show how Turkey's involvement in the Balkans is seen in a negative way by many groups. Even an alleged statement can cause reaction. Other statements mostly made for domestic political use by Turkish statesmen, mentioned in the previous pages, may harm Turkey's image in the Balkans so Turkey must be very careful and take into consideration the regional opposition to its increasing involvement in the Balkans. It was Erdoğan's speech in Kosovo that inflamed the already suspicious public opinion in Serbia, increasing nationalism should be taken into account, and which led to the demise of the trilateral talks between Turkey, Bosnia and Serbia with Serbia's decision to pull out. It may take long time for Turkey to revive the process again.

6.4.3 Conclusion

The developments also show that only an economically strong Turkey that is capable of investing enormous amount in the Balkan countries which fight against

poverty and unemployment and provides markets for their goods will have a better chance to influence the states in the region. Turkey's imports from Serbia reached its maximum level in 2014, $274 million and the total Turkish FDI in Serbia is around $113 million. Turkey's imports from Bosnia reached $171 million in 2014 while it is the 9th country in terms of FDI with a total amount of €149 million. Another problem with Bosnia is that Turkey does not have any investment in Srpska Republica, for example the Ziraat Bank does not even have a branch there. This may be due to the security concerns for Turkish investments in that area but it is certain if Turkey contributes to the improve economic conditions its image may get better in the eyes of Bosnian Serbs. Though not unimportant, these figures are very limited. Turkey does not have the wealth accumulation to invest necessary amount of capital in other countries to support its foreign policy initiatives. Turkey itself also fights against poverty and unemployment. Still Turkey can provide benefits to companies that trade with Bosnia and Serbia in order to increase its trade and support its political power. Another disadvantage of Turkey is that it has to compete with the EU countries, which have larger amount of capital for investment and trade, in the Balkans. Their FDI in the Balkan countries surpass Turkey's FDI. In addition as all Balkan countries have EU membership as an important pillar of their foreign policy, they have another source of leverage. Turkey can only use its membership position in NATO for lobbying in favor of the Balkan states, as it did with Bosnia's Membership Action Plan. Yet, as Serbia is still not considering becoming a NATO member, Turkey has even more limited leverage over Serbia. The EU regards Turkey as a rival for its influence in the region and tries to limit Turkey's involvement by excluding it from the regional initiatives.

Despite the initial success of Turkey fostering dialogue between Bosnia and Serbia and its facilitative strategy aiming at confidence-building and achieving modest improvements, the process was built on shaky ground. In the presence of strong nationalist reactions to Turkey in Bosnia and Serbia, the very limited leverage used by Turkey also limited the sustainability of the process. With Turkey unable to have strong leverage over Serbia, aware of this fact, Serbia without suffering any harm decided to pull out of the trilateral talks. If Turkey were able to have at least greater economic leverage over Serbia in terms of trade and FDI, it would be harder for Serbia to reach this decision because of its potential harm to Serbia's economy.

It shows that in order to establish a long-term influence over the region and increase Turkey's standing, Turkey has to support its initiatives especially with increasing economic leverage.

6.5. CONCLUSION

It has been showed that mediation emerged as an important aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. The main motivation behind Turkey's activism as a mediator is the risks caused by increasing possibility of the conflicts. In this respect the potential damage that would be caused by conflicts, sanctions, wars and refugee waves in addition to Turkey's security, stability, economy and trade is the main concern of Turkey. Secondly Turkey, while meeting the former needs for its own national interests, wants to portray itself as a security actor contributing to peace and stability in its surrounding regions. This would enable Turkey to have a better position in world politics and increase its visibility. Thirdly especially in the conflicts where Muslims are involved Turkey claims that it is the best advocate for suffering

Muslims all over the world and tries to portray itself as the responsible actor for the Muslim world if the Western nations, the USA and EU especially, want to deal with these problems. In its problematic relations with the EU and darkening horizons for membership, Turkey argues that rather than a burden to the EU, it will contribute to the EU's wealth, security and stability. Last but not least, success in mediation would open new horizons for Turkey and it would support Turkey's bid for regional hegemony as Turkey in the last decade tried to portray itself as a benign hegemon. As its power is increasing mostly due to its growing economy despite the setbacks and being named as an "emerging-middle power", Turkey gave higher priority to terms such as interdependence, confidence-building, stability, wealth and regional security with the aim of transforming the conflict-ridden regions by becoming the main champion and ideational leader of these values. As a result of this new understanding, Turkey wanted to use its role as a security actor and in particular mediation as a strategy for promoting its regional leadership claim.

However, Turkey's material capabilities as an emerging middle-power are limited when compared to other global actors. Especially its economic power is not enough to support its political initiatives in the Balkans and Middle East. Worse, Turkey has to compete with the EU and Russia as they are not much happy with Turkey's involvement in the regions surrounding Turkey. It is lagging behind them in terms of trade and FDI despite the ambitious remarks of the Turkish statesmen. It is possible to observe a gap between the foreign policy goals and capability (Petrovic & Reljic, 2011, p. 169). In a Wikileaks document (dated January 20, 2010), the US Ambassador to Ankara, James Jeffrey also observed this gap ("Rolls Royce ambition but Rover resources") while complaining about Turkey's independent foreign policy:

Despite their success and relative power, the Turks really can't compete on equal terms with either the US or regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans, Russia in the Caucasus/Black Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even Iranians in the ME). With Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover resources, to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays to Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or Ahmadinejad, who will be happy to have the Turks take up his cause. The Turks then attempt to ram through revisions to at least the reigning "Western" position to the favor of their guy (Wikileaks, 2015).

It is because, not only of Turkey's limited material power capacity, but also due to the penetrated structure of the regions. The areas surrounding Turkey are different from the region where South Africa, as another middle-power, is located. Turkey cannot force its will on global actors such as the USA, EU and Russia and they have vital interests in these regions. Another disadvantage for Turkey is the regional rivalries and enmities in these regions. Turkey, due to the power balance especially in the Middle East with other actors, cannot emerge as the regional dominant power. Other states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel can always obstruct Turkey's initiatives and claim for leadership and for this reason Turkey's neighborhood is very different than Australia, another middle-power, which is surrounded by smaller states and island states. Especially in the Middle East and to some degree in the Balkans where the regimes lack legitimacy and mostly concerned with regime survival and regional rivalry is important, the language used by Turkey based on interdependence and positive-sum game logic is not much useful. Increasing power of Iran always worries the Gulf States and it is not easy to have good relations both with Iran and Saudi Arabia at the same time or the gain of the Bosniaks are seen as the loss of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia.

Turkey can play the role of mediator in these regions depending on its acceptability by the concerned parties. As it cannot be a power mediator but only a facilitator, its neutrality, by neutrality we mean not favoring one side of the conflict,

is of paramount importance. In the reconciliation process between Serbia and Bosnia Turkey, despite its discourse emphasizing the Ottoman past and Turkey's role as the protector of the Muslims in the Balkans, with intensive dialogue and modest steps aiming at confidence-building, Turkey managed to achieve some important goals in improving the bilateral relations between these countries. However the decision of Serbia to pull out of the trilateral mechanism showed that as a facilitator the success of Turkey's initiatives will be determined by the will of the actors to engage for further steps.

Still it is possible to argue that Turkey can play the role of mediator with careful approach to the regional conflicts and equally importantly, by cooperating with other regional and global actors in its initiatives. This would enable Turkey to bring more carrots and sticks to the negotiation table, otherwise Turkey's initiatives will be seen as a move towards competition and obstructed by the very same actors.

CHAPTER 7

7   CONCLUSION

It has been mentioned that Turkey in the JDP era wanted to portray itself as a regional security actor responsible for the peace, security and stability in the conflict-ridden regions surrounding it such as the Balkans and Middle East. Themes like "order-setting actor" and "central-state" thus became oft-cited terms by the Turkish statesmen. As a result, conflict resolution and transformation methods in general and mediation in particular as well as foreign aid started to receive more attention in Turkish foreign policy agenda in the given period. Throughout this study, it was aimed to identify the reasons beyond Turkey's increasing emphasis on its responsibilities in these regions and its motivations for allocating energy and resources to this end.

The JDP came to power at the end of 2002 and Turkish economy started to recover from the 2001 crisis. With abundant liquidity at the global level Turkey attracted foreign capital. In addition with the initiatives such as the free trade agreements and visa-free travel agreements, Turkey increased its trade with its neighbors and diversified its network. This led to high growth rates in the following years and as a result Turkey started to have more confidence in itself. With its increasing GDP per capita and the declared aim of democratization, Turkey was seen as an island of peace, democracy and stability especially in the Middle East by many.

But as an economy integrated to the world economy Turkey suffered from the foreign shocks of the 2008 global financial crisis. Structural problems of Turkish economy (high employment, limited FDI, limited technology) also negatively contributed to this process. The high growth rates were not sustainable in the following years. Mehmet Karlı even questions what he calls "the myth of Turkish growth miracle". Turkey's economy is historically prone to sharp up and downs and it generally has high growth rates in the wake of economic crisis. Turkey's growth rates gain more meaning in comparison to other countries. Between 2003 and 2010, the Turkish economy grew at an average rate of %4.9 while the number for developing countries was %6.6. The average for the MENA countries was %5.1 (Karlı, 2012, p. 117). Having to finance its own growth through FDI, its own FDI abroad is very limited and it has never reached even one percent of global FDI outflow (Karlı, 2012, p. 135). In addition, failing to complete the structural reforms to transform the economy and pave the way for transition to information economy, as shown by low level of the share of high-tech goods in its exports, Turkey fell into middle-income trap like many other developing countries.

Despite the setbacks in the field of economy, Turkey strengthened its tools for influence abroad and restructured the legal framework of the existing institutions while it also established new ones. Tools like foreign aid and cooperation in the area of education through scholarships became more important and started to be supported with more resources. Turkish NGOs for humanitarian and development aid extended the scope of their activities and started to work globally. However as the resources are always scarce, Turkey's economic success will determine the level of resources allocated for these purposes in the future.

It has been touched upon that in the last decade many experts named Turkey as a middle-power. However it is important to realize the difference between the traditional middle-powers like Norway, Australia and Canada and emerging middle-powers like Brazil and Turkey (MIKT and N-11 countries at large). Countries in the former group are developed countries with mature democratic systems. The latter group consists of developing countries with many domestic problems such as unemployment and weak democratic institutions and traditions. Another important difference is their geographic position and neighborhood. Countries of the latter group are mostly located at the periphery and their proximity to the conflict zones causes risks for them while they also strive for regional leadership. Still it can be argued that, as shown in Appendix XIV with regards to the CINC scores, Turkey is the most powerful second country following South Korea among the N-11 countries and has important material capabilities (economic and military).

In the light of this information, it may be argued that mediation becomes a necessary instrument for emerging middle-powers. Traditional middle-powers are also very much influential in mediation initiatives but they mediate just for portraying themselves as the responsible members of the international community and increase their international standing and visibility given the fact that many of them have limited military power. In contrast to the traditional middle-powers, emerging middle-powers offer mediation not only for the purposes listed above but also to serve their own political, economic and security interests, a fact that makes it harder for them to be a neutral mediator. As they are located nearby to the conflict zones, they are most likely to suffer from the negative results of a conflict in their region. In Chapter 3 it was mentioned that geographical proximity to the conflict zone increases the chances for offering mediation. Secondly, a successful mediation

attempt that leads to peace may support their bid for regional leadership and increase the respect of both regional and global actors. This is also important as these countries want to have a bigger say in world affairs proportionate to their power status and they want to be the actor that global powers consult for the resolution of regional problems.

These arguments are valid for Turkey as the two case-studies showed in this study. Turkey offers mediation because it is aware that the conflicts in its proximity will disrupt trade, block trade routes, cause waves of refugees and many other economic, political and security problems. In case of Turkey, especially in the Middle East, it wants to fill the regional leadership vacuum and portray itself as the representative of the Muslim populations in the aftermath of the chaos caused by the US invasion of Iraq. In the Balkans too, it is possible to mention, due to global and regional developments, a power vacuum that enabled Turkey to play a bigger role. According to Othon Anastasakis, the international community has turned their attention to other areas which are more imminent areas of conflict and insecurity. Secondly, due to the EU's enlargement fatigue and the Balkan countries' lack of progress, the EU membership vision of the Balkan countries is not bright. Thirdly, Greece's diplomatic and economic influence suffered a decline due to the economic crisis of 2009 (Anastasakis, 2012, p. 202). So it can be argued that the regional environment was favorable for Turkey's bid for regional hegemony. Mearsheimer suggests that "the best way for any state to maximize its prospects for survival is to be the hegemon in its region of the world" (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 397). For this purpose, Turkey emphasized its potential as an order-setting actor that is finding peaceful solutions to regional problems and promoting peace, development and democracy. Turkey's successes in mediation and its increasing regional popularity

would support its claims for regional leadership. In the regional power typologies suggested by Miriam Prys, Turkey can be best classified as a candidate for becoming regional hegemon. It cannot be a regional detached power that ignores the developments in its region and isolates itself. Also it cannot be a regional dominant power that imposes its will if necessary forcefully on other states because of its limited power capacity. Turkey's success on becoming a regional hegemon will depend on its willingness to play this role, its capacity, the attitude of other regional actors (either support or resist it) and in the same way the attitude of global actors.

At this juncture, it is vital to take power capacity into account. Naturally, it would gain meaning in comparison to other actors in Turkey's neighborhood as power is a relative term. In the Middle East it is very hard for Turkey to impose its will on other states. In addition to Turkey, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia are also identified as middle-powers or near the "great regional power status" (Ehteshami, 2014, p. 36). There is power symmetry between Turkey and Iran. Worse, despite its small population Israel is the only country with a nuclear arsenal in the region. Other actors such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with varying material capability levels, cannot be ignored. This fact is confirmed by the CINC scores as shown in Appendix XV. Even weaker states, like Syria, in addition to regional balancing (alliance with Iran) may also use off-shore balancing in order to survive as countries like Russia are eager to find allies in the Middle East. Turkey's neighborhood is very different than Australia or South Africa in terms of the capabilities of the neighboring countries. In the Balkans it is possible to argue that Turkey is in a better position. The CINC scores for Balkan countries show that Turkey's power surpasses any other country in the region as seen in Appendix XVI. However, this is not sufficient for Turkey to become regional dominant or regional hegemon. Both the Middle East and Balkans

are penetrated regions where global actors such as the USA, Russia and EU have vital interests to protect. Again Turkey's neighborhood is different than the neighborhood of countries like South Africa or Australia with regards to the level of penetration by foreign powers and material capabilities of the neigbors. It is an onerous task for Turkey to challenge the policies of these powers and design the region on its own will. Worse for Turkey, it is not easy for Turkey to establish regional alliances as the rules of the game in the Middle East especially and to some degree in the Balkans are shaped by the logic of zero-sum game. Its policies cannot always converge even with its allies in the region as the example of different reactions from Turkey and Saudi Arabia to the military coup in Egypt shows. While Turkey emphasized democratization in its agenda in the Middle East, for Saudi Arabia regime survival and legitimacy have higher priority. Turkey's increasing involvement and influence may even lead to balancing by other regional actors. Especially the tendency of becoming a party of the interstate and domestic conflicts in the Middle East, which diverges starkly from the traditional approach of Turkish foreign policy, may cause serious problems for Turkey. Turkey's deteriorating relations with Israel and Egypt led to increasing cooperation between these countries and Greece and Cyprus.

Turkey's main mistake was to ignore the validity of realist theory and importance of hard power and setting ambitious policy goals incompatible with the power capacity of Turkey. As Mearsheimer rightly argues "the real world remains a realist world". (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 360) Themes like persistent anarchy, centrality of state as actor, survival and rivalry are still valid in Turkey's surrounding regions. Despite this fact, Turkey relied heavily on its limited soft power and tried to transform the rules of the game in these regions. Policies contradicting the regional

realities and lacking the necessary leverage are doomed to failure. Emphasis on interdependence and positive-sum game logic that gained a central place in Turkish foreign policy rhetoric lately led to a dangerous illusion and neglect on hard power. Europe was interdependent between 1900 and 1914 as it was today but this did not avoid a great-power war (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 370). Analyzing the crisis between Turkey and Syria, Raymond Hinnebusch notes that it is the failure of liberal peace: "the earlier achievements of the liberal peace were rapidly lost as each side sacrificed the shared benefits of cooperation and resumed the use of trans-state interdependencies against the other" (Hinnebusch, 2014, p. 21). In a dynamic, complex and instable regional system like the Middle East (Brown, 2004, p. 304), power status shifts more frequently than perhaps anywhere else in the world as Anoushiravan Ehteshami suggests. The 20th century witnessed the rise and fall of regional powers like Egypt, Syria and Iraq (Ehteshami, 2014, p. 33). Ehteshami also underlines the importance of material capabilities for power projection in the Middle East:

> In the Middle East, it is a combination of brute force and money that help the projection of power and those states with the greatest military machines and resources have shown the greatest potential to sustain them, often then managing to set the tone for regional interactions as well (Ehteshami, 2014, p. 34).

Furthermore, it is not easy to create a win-win situation for Iran and Saudi Arabia or Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. In these regions games still follow zero-sum logic. Worse, soft-power alone is not enough for advancing the national interests of a state and hard-power remains the main source of influence especially in the Middle East. To this end, even Nye who coined the term soft-power warns us about regional differences and the changing level of importance of soft power:

> The transformation of power is not the same in all parts of the world. The twenty-first century will certainly see a greater role for informational and institutional power, but as events in the Middle East demonstrate, hard military power remains an important instrument. (Nye & Welch, 2011, p. 42)

Still, one can say that Turkey is in the process of capacity building, a process that modestly started in the 1990s with the aim of increasing cooperation with the Turkish republics in Central Asia. In the JDP era, as the example of higher importance attributed to the knowledge of regional languages such as Arabic in the diplomatic corps and establishing TV channels broadcasting in other languages, Turkey started to improve its existing institutions or build new institutions to increase its regional influence. Most of the Turkish NGOs active in humanitarian aid abroad were established in the last decade. At this point it is important to underline that capacity building takes time. The USA, in terms of its economic power could be counted as a great power after the 1850s however its status was exalted to this position only in the 1890s after it started to build up a large army in the preceding decades. In a similar fashion, ASELSAN, a company established in 1975 and produced simple field radios at that time, is today producing more complex weapons system and exporting its products. Turkey's military cooperation agreements that were signed in the 1990s are bearing results today as the graduates from Turkish military schools are now at more influential positions. Be it diplomatic corps, academic institutions engaged in scientific research or military establishment, human capital emerges as the most important variable and investments in human capital can bear fruit after some time. As a natural result, the power status of a state does not increase overnight. It may take years or even decades. It needs sustainable and planned efforts to increase the power capacity of a state.

It has been mentioned that there are cycles of activism in middle-powers' foreign policy behavior. Especially emerging middle-powers with fragile economies and domestic problems, cannot always allocate the same level of resources for foreign policy initiatives as they have limited sources and changing priorities in their agenda. They may not provide the same level of foreign aid following an economic crisis even if their statesmen wish to do so. Sustainability emerges as the Achilles' heel for these states.

Emerging middle-powers like Turkey may become influential regional actors either with the backing of global actors by acting as a proxy or partner for them (Italy's acceptance as a Great Power by other states) or by establishing a wide level regional alliance. These states may benefit from the abundant resources of global powers in order to advance their own interests. However it is sometimes hard to integrate national interests and policies with these global actors. Limited leverage of middle-powers, limit their independence in foreign policy. As a natural consequence, the middle-powers would lack the support of these more powerful allies if they follow policies that contradict to the national interests of the latter. Despite the differences, middle-powers and their allies abroad may share indispensable common interests or they cannot resist the pressure of their stronger allies, a limitation imposed by the structure of the international relations. Emerging middle-powers like Turkey, due to the structural reasons may have some sort of autonomy in foreign policy. It has been shown that in the détente period Turkey also benefited from the relaxation of the bipolar conflict and gained more autonomy. Yet, even this autonomy has limits and Turkey has to operate in a limited space dictated by the structure given the American preponderance in global affairs and arrange its policies accordingly. It is best observed in the changing nature of Turkish-Iranian relations

from 2011 on following the Syrian crisis as Turkey and Iran emerged as regional rivals contrary to the very friendly rhetoric of the preceding years. Turkey realized that it cannot contain Iran alone and had to realign its policies with regards to Iran and came closer to American line of policy. Turkey also realized the limits of its power when its efforts to oust the Assad regime failed. As Ziya Öniş argues "the crisis in Syria reflected the limits of Turkey's soft-power resources in economic and diplomatic terms". (Öniş, 2012, p. 58) Not only its limited soft-power, the Syrian case also showed that Turkey does not have the economic and military capability to force a regime change in Syria in spite of its claims for regional leadership without the support of a US-led coalition.

With regards to mediation, it can be said that Turkey can be a mediator in both regions. However at this stage, the mediation strategy gains more importance. Mediation is a voluntary process in which an accepted third party gets involved in the resolution of the conflict. A state can be either a power mediator or neutral facilitator. If it chooses to act as a power mediator, it should have the necessary material capacity to influence the behavior of the parties of the conflict. Even if a state has that necessary material capacity, that is not enough as there are many factors that should be taken into account in mediation process ranging from the timing to negotiation patterns. It should make the carrots and sticks clear and its threats and promises should not be vague. Impartiality is not much important for a power mediator. Credibility, having the capacity to deliver both the rewards and punishment, appears to be more important. However if a state chooses to be a neutral facilitator, impartiality gains more importance since the mediator will use very limited leverage during the negotiations. It must be acceptable to all parties and must be seen as an honest broker. Yet, as states often mediate with devious objectives, the

mediator's success will also depend on the goodwill and honesty of the parties of the conflict.

The two case-studies showed that Turkey's mediation initiatives can be blocked by other actors. In the case of Iran, the USA did not welcome Turkey's initiative and half-heartedly let Turkey continue it hoping that Iran would refuse the nuclear fuel exchange deal proposed by Turkey as it had refused a similar agreement a few months ago. Iran on the other hand, realized that even its supporters like China and Russia were about to agree with the USA on tougher sanctions and accepted the deal to avoid them and gain more time. It was the USA that refused the agreement. Turkey and its partner Brazil were very disappointed with this outcome but they simply did not have any power to impose it on the USA. The negotiations continue in a pattern similar to the great power conferences of the 19th century which includes UNSC permanent members plus Germany while Turkey is excluded from the process.[77] The USA regarded Turkey's involvement in the problem and its initiatives from a negative perspective and saw them as obstructing moves for its efforts. We may argue that given the very limited leverage of countries similar to Turkey, they may act as mediator if only the superpower wishes them to do so.

In the second case where Turkey tried to reconcile Serbia and Bosnia, Turkey had limited success where the combined EU and USA efforts failed. Again it should be noted that in addition to leverage mediation tactics are also important. The skill of transforming material capacity into influence in negotiations is equally important. Turkey used very limited leverage and chose to engage the parties of the conflict for modest steps in reconciliation contrary to the EU/USA led initiative that aimed at

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[77] As the biggest country in the EU both with regards to population and economy, Germany is also a former great power. It also has the potential of becoming a great power today in addition to Japan.

solving the internal problems of Bosnia at once by proposing solution in a take it or leave it manner. Turkey acted as a neutral facilitator as much as it could do since it is regarded pro-Bosniak by Serbs. Turkey's initiative was short-lived and later Serbia announced its withdrawal from the three-partite mechanism established by Turkey. Doing so would not cause much damage to Serbia as Turkey has very limited leverage over it. Capacity of Turkey either to reward or punish determines the success level of Turkey's initiatives. Worse for Turkey, like the Middle East, the Balkans is also a penetrated and contested region and the USA, EU and Russia appear to be the most influential actors and this limits Turkey's prospects to increase its influence. Despite Turkey's tendency to act unilaterally, its aims and policies in the Balkans did not diverge much from the aims of its Western allies as Dimitar Bechev observed:

> For the time being, activism vis-à-vis ex-Yugoslavia has coincided with Western preferences. Turkey is pursuing, albeit on its own, what the West wants anyhow. The potential for a clash with the EU and the US is much lower than in volatile regions such as the Middle East (Bechev, 2012, p. 227).

In addition to these obstacles, Turkey's policies harm its role as a mediator. From selective engagement or limited involvement, Turkey switched to policies that led to over-involvement in the Balkans and Middle East. This is especially more visible in the Middle East. Turkey faces the risk of becoming a direct party to conflicts rather than a mediator trying to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts. It seems to have lost its mediator position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to the deterioration of relations with Israel and the USA tries to mediate between Turkey and Israel as it regards them valuable regional allies. Turkey can combine regional leadership role with mediator role if only it has enough material capacity to impose its will on all states in the region by acting as a power mediator. However

that is not the case. To inflict harm on Israel after the crisis in bilateral relations Turkey only cancelled military procurement plans and joint military exercises and this clearly shows the limits of Turkey's power. As a party acceptable to Palestine and Israel, Turkey could contribute to the peace efforts however its policies alienated Israel and also other groups except Hamas in Palestine. As a result, it was Egypt, not Turkey, which mediated between Israel and Hamas for a cease-fire in summer 2014 when Israel started military operations. At this point, Ziya Öniş points out to the risks emanating from these policies that undermine Turkey's mediator role:

> The more Turkey is actively engaged in the region and becomes an active participant in on-going conflicts, the less likely it will have the ability to play a constructive stabilizing and reformist role (Öniş, 2012, p. 57).

Given its relatively limited material capacity it does not seem possible for Turkey to become a regional hegemon in the Balkans and Middle East in the foreseeable future. It may continue to increase its material capacity and still be titled as an emerging middle-power but this will not eliminate the limitations imposed by the structure (unless radical changes take place at the structural level[78]) and Turkey will have to act within its limits. Any policy that ignores this reality would probably fail due to the gap between capabilities and ambitions. For this reason in order to be successful in its regional initiatives, rather than acting unilaterally, Turkey should try to form a consensus based on regional partnerships with influential actors and global actors such as the USA and EU. Even in that case it is possible to witness the resistance of some regional actors but a wide consensus and support would make it easier for Turkey to deal. In short, Turkey needs to combine hard and soft power capabilities and act as a smart power.

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[78] As Waltz notes "the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units." (Waltz, 1979, p. 97)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I – EMPLOYEES IN FINANCIAL BUREAUCRACY IN BRITAIN

Source: (Harris, 2006, p. 216)

APPENDIX II – TOTAL TAX REVENUE IN BRITAIN (1665-1805)

Source: (Harris, 2006, p. 215)

APPENDIX III – INCREASE IN MILITARY MANPOWER (1470-1660)

Date	Spain	United Provinces	France	England	Sweden
1470s	20,000	-	40,000	25,000	-
1550s	150,000	-	50,000	20,000	-
1590s	200,000	20,000	80,000	30,000	15,000
1630s	300,000	50,000	150,000	-	45,000
1650s	100,000	-	100,000	70,000	70,000

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 56)

APPENDIX IV –POPULATION OF THE POWERS (1700-1800)

(in millions)

	1700	1750	1800
British Isles	9.0	10.5	16.0
France	19.0	21.5	28.0
Habsburg Empire	8.0	18.0	28.0
Prussia	2.0	6.0	9.5
Russia	17.5	20.0	37.0
Spain	6.0	9.0	11.0
Sweden		1.7	2.3
United Provinces	1.8	1.9	2.0
United States	-	2.0	4.0

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 99)

APPENDIX V –ENGLISH TRADE 1700-1749 (£M)

	Imports	Exports	Re-exports	Exports and Re-exports
1700-9	4.7	4.5	1.7	6.2
1710-9	5.5	4.8	2.1	6.9
1720-9	6.8	4.9	2.8	7.7
1730-9	7.5	5.8	3.2	9.0
1740-9	7.3	6.5	3.6	10.1

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 96)

APPENDIX VI –ENGLISH TRADE 1750-1799 (£M)

	Imports	Exports	Re-exports	Exports and Re-exports
1750-9	8.4	8.7	3.5	12.2
1760-9	10.8	10.0	4.4	14.4
1770-9	12.1	9.3	5.1	14.4
1780-9	13.8	10.2	4.3	14.5
1790-9	21.8	17.5	9.4	26.9

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 96)

APPENDIX VII –THE COMPOSITION OF BRITISH IMPORTS (1699-1800)

Year	Manufactures (%)	Foodstuffs (%)	Raw Materials (%)
1699-1701	31.5	33.7	34.8
1752-4	22.2	41.4	36.3
1800	8.4	45.1	46.5

Source: (Berg, 2006, p. 365)

APPENDIX VIII –BRITISH WARTIME EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE (1688-1815) (£)

Inclusive Years	Total Expenditure	Total Income	Balance Raised by Loans	Loans as % of Expenditures
1688-97	49,320,145	32,766,754	16,553,391	33.6
1702-13	93,644,560	64,239,477	29,405,083	31.4
1739-48	95,628,159	65,903,964	29,724,195	31.1
1756-63	160,573,366	100,555,123	60,018,243	37.4
1776-83	236,462,689	141,902,620	94,560,069	39.9
1793-1815	1,657,854,518	1,217,556,439	440,298,079	26.6
Totals	2,293,483,437	1,622,924,377	670,559,060	33.3

Source: (Kennedy, 1988, p. 81)

APPENDIX IX – REAL OUTPUT IN AGRICULTURE IN BRITAIN

(1700=100)

1700	100
1720	105
1740	104
1760	113
1780	126
1800	143

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 31)

APPENDIX X – POPULATION GROWTH IN BRITAIN (1710-1851)

(in millions)

Date	England and Wales	Scotland	Ireland
1701	5.30	1.04	2.54
1751	6.50	1.25	3.12
1761	6.70		
1771	7.20		
1781	7.50		
1791	8.25	1.50	4.75
1801	9.20	1.60	5.22
1811	10.20	1.80	6.00
1821	12.00	2.10	6.80
1831	13.90	2.40	7.80
1841	15.90	2.60	8.20
1851	17.90	2.90	6.50

Source: (Brown R. , 2005, p. 20)

APPENDIX XI – ESTIMATED ILLITERACY OF WOMEN AND MEN IN ENGLAND (1500-1900)

Source: (Mitch, 2006, p. 344)

APPENDIX XII – PATENTS FOR CAPITAL GOODS (1750-1799)

Type of Invention	1750-9	1760-9	1770-9	1780-9	1790-9	Total
Power sources	10	21	17	47	74	169
Textile machinery	5	6	19	23	53	106
Subtotal	15	27	36	70	127	275
Agricultural equpt	1	3	5	22	27	58
Brewing equpt	0	1	2	4	17	24
Machine tools	1	4	1	2	3	11
Salt making equpt	2	3	2	1	2	10
Sugar making equpt	0	1	7	1	1	10
General chemical equpt	0	3	2	9	9	23
Building tools and machinery	1	2	4	2	5	14
Mining machinery	1	5	3	7	5	21
Metallurgical equpt	6	9	11	18	19	63
Shipbuilding	4	14	7	17	37	79
Canal and road building	2	1	1	2	24	30
Other Industrial	1	5	11	13	18	48
Total	34	78	92	168	294	666
% of all patents	37.0	38.0	31.3	35.2	45.2	38.3

Source: (MacLeod, 2002, p. 148)

APPENDIX XIII – BRITISH BANKS IN 1873

	Britain	London	London Based Provincial	Provincial England and Wales	Scotland
Commercial Banks	376	61	9	296	10
Joint-Stock Banks	135	17	9	99	10
Private Banks	241	44	0	197	0
Bank Branches	2,558	90	433	1,188	847
Deposits, in millions	£469	£131	£52	£210	£76

Source: (Quinn S. , 2006, p. 148)

APPENDIX XIV– THE CINC SCORES FOR N-11 COUNTRIES (2007)

Source: (Singer, 1987) v. 4.0

APPENDIX XV– THE CINC SCORES FOR THE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES (2007)

Source: (Singer, 1987) v. 4.0

APPENDIX XVI– THE CINC SCORES FOR THE BALKAN COUNTRIES (2007)

Source: (Singer, 1987) *v. 4.0*

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