Review
Reviewed Work(s): Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization by Hasan Kösebalaban
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peninsula calling for the overthrow of conservative regimes. The promise of greater opportunity for political participation led many educated middle- and merchant-class Bahrainis to engage in cautious but optimistic campaigning. At the same time, working-class Bahrainis focused their energies on organizing themselves into labor unions and striking for improved labor conditions and pay. This nascent large-scale political activity created an increasingly tense political environment in Bahrain.

During the campaigns and elections for the Constitutional Assembly, the government arrested and detained several candidates. In the following months, as the Assembly attempted to establish a constitution and prepare for the National Assembly elections, the government continued to arrest and interrogate political candidates and labor organizers and shut down a local newspaper on the basis of a long-standing public security decree. At the end of 1972, the Constitutional Assembly presented a petition to the ruler requesting an end to the state of emergency. Three years later, the elected National Assembly again tried to put an end to the state of emergency following a series of labor strikes; the ruler, ‘Isa bin Salman, dissolved the Assembly and suspended the constitution.

Nakhleh’s first three chapters describe the elements of political socialization in Bahraini society at the time of the 1971 and 1972 elections, and he includes detailed statistics about the development of education, social and recreational clubs, and the press. These chapters are much more theoretical than the later chapters, and the data are much less relevant to the current situation. Education in Bahrain has expanded substantially since 1971, when only 50 percent of the population was literate. Today, both men and women have greater access to education, and more than 80 percent of the population is literate. Likewise, though social and recreational clubs continue to play a role as gathering places in society, Bahrain now also has political parties. Nevertheless, Chapters 1 through 3 will be invaluable to scholars interested in Bahrain from the 1950s to the 1970s, because Nakhleh not only includes detailed statistics but also provides a detailed bibliography of various periodicals and newspapers published in Bahrain during that period. Chapters 4 through 7 are the most valuable for Gulf specialists and non-specialists alike, in that they not only describe the political climate in Bahrain at the time of the elections but also consider the dynamics of domestic Bahraini politics as well as their intersection with wider foreign policy concerns (especially as they relate to the United States’ role in the region). Here, at last, is where readers can see the long arc of suppression in Bahrain of a sophisticated, modern political population.

Unfortunately, Bahrain suffers from being a largely dated political science study. As a glimpse into Bahrain’s political culture, the work is useful, and scholars of the region will no doubt be able to tease out the connections between the elections of 1972 and the current protests. The book would have benefitted greatly, however, from an extended preface or postscript expanding on the ways in which education, the press, and political parties and clubs have evolved over the last several decades.


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The majority of published works on Turkish foreign policy, whether journal articles or books, tend to be detailed chronicles of developments of the day that rarely incorporate theory. In
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this book, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, Hasan Kösebalaban attempts to overcome this tendency for presentism, overempiricism, and undertheorization in the study of Turkish foreign policy by utilizing a historical perspective and situating his study within the constructivist framework of international relations theory. The author begins with the assumption that identity is shaped by the ideational/ideological cleavages between different groups at the domestic level and that it (along with material forces) is one of the driving forces of foreign policy. In terms of the Turkish case, Kösebalaban identifies and distinguishes between four identity groups and the different foreign policy behavior patterns that accompany them: secularist nationalism, Islamist nationalism, conservative liberalism, and Islamist liberalism. These identity groups, Kösebalaban argues, emerged as a result of the clash between Islamism versus secularism and liberalism/globalism versus nationalism, or what Kösebalaban calls “classical fault lines in Turkish politics” (p. xiv). According to Kösebalaban, while liberals followed a more assertive foreign policy, the nationalists followed a more isolationist one.

According to this categorization, “secularist nationalism,” which corresponds to the first years of the modern republic, or the early Kemalist period, gave rise to a policy of “isolationism.” Although this period was not free from what Kösebalaban calls “rival ideological groups,” such as “statist corporatists,” “socialists,” and “liberals,” he argues that the secularist nationalism of the Cumhuriyet Halk Fikrasi (Republican People’s Party, or RPP) led to an “active isolationism” (p. 54), or “defensive isolationism” (p. 72), in which (with the exception of two instances—Hatay and Mosul) the primary goal was to secure Turkey’s borders and minimize various threats.

During the subsequent period under the “conservative liberal” rule of the Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party, or DP), foreign policy became “assertive integrationist” in so far as it allowed the interests of the Western alliance to extend into the Middle East (pp. 72–85). This “assertive” foreign policy, according to Kösebalaban’s categorization, came to an end with the 1960 military coup and was not readopted until the arrival of the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, or JP) to power in 1965 (p. 97). During the JP period, Turkish foreign policy became assertive again through Turkey’s normalization of relations with the United States and establishment of good relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab world. This form of politics came to a halt with the 1971 military memorandum, after which, according to the author, an assertive Turkish foreign policy only reemerged in three periods, all when conservative liberal leaders or parties were in charge: the first period corresponds to Turgut Özal’s rule after the 1980 military coup and until his death in 1993; the second to Tansu Çiller’s rule in the mid-1990s but only vis-à-vis relations with the European Union; and the third to the period of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) rule beginning in 2002. Kösebalaban classifies Turkey’s foreign policy under the leadership of Foreign Minister İsmail Cem during the late 1990s and early 2000s as a “semi-exception.” Although the country was led by coalition governments that included “liberals and nationalists,” and despite Cem’s leftist background, Cem apparently adopted a “civilizational bridge” discourse that was “clearly a departure from the unidimensional and reticent foreign policy orientation of Kemalism.” However, in the author’s view, the adoption of this discourse was also an acceptance of a “reduced role [for Turkey] between the two geographies, without asserting itself as a central element in either,” thus making Turkish foreign policy active and isolationist simultaneously (p. 143). Finally, Kösebalaban labels the policies pursued by the “pro-Islamist” Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, or WP) during its tenure as a coalition partner in the mid-1990s as “nationalist” (p. 134). He argues that although the WP engaged with the outside world, this engagement was limited to predominantly Muslim countries, thus implying that the period during which the party was in rule would not qualify as a period of assertive foreign policy.
Kösebalaban’s attempt to put Turkish foreign policy into an analytical framework from a historical perspective and to distinguish between different identity factors as one of its driving forces deserves special commendation. What is more, in his effort to combine theory with empirical data, the author runs into several conceptual problems that complicate the argument of the book and at times cause the reader to question his categories and labels. The first concern relates to the author’s equation of identity with ideology. While ideology is evidently one part of the tool box called identity, identity includes much more, such as worldview and relational belonging. Second, Kösebalaban assigns certain labels to certain parties and, in doing so, tends not to look closely at shades of gray. For example, under Kösebalaban’s classification, the RPP falls under the “secularist nationalist” category. Although this categorization may hold for most of the RPP’s rule, the party was responsible for the establishment of earlier prototypes of the present-day Imam Hatip schools. Further, the term secularism did not enter the constitution until 1937.

In an attempt to solidify his labels, the author also categorizes certain events as exceptions (as described previously) or leaves them outside the scope of analysis. If, for example, the DP’s term is considered a liberal one, with a very pro-America orientation, would identity or pragmatism explain the DP’s flirtation with the Soviet Union just prior to the 1960 military coup? A similar point can be made in regard to his classification of İsmail Cem and his policies. Cem served as minister of foreign affairs for several coalition governments that included the Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) and parties on the right of the political spectrum. Kösebalaban states that the period of coalition governments was “in many respects a complete failure” but nevertheless credits Cem for initiating a “civilizational bridge” discourse (p. 142-43), suggesting that this discourse might count as an “assertive foreign policy.” Then, so as to make Cem’s foreign policy fit into his own categorization scheme in which nationalists do not pursue an active and assertive foreign policy, he states that Turkey’s attempt to serve as a bridge ultimately spelled a reduced role in international affairs. It is ironic that the “Turkey as bridge” trope did not start with İsmail Cem but rather can be traced to the late 1940s, when Turkey was making its case to be part of the Western camp, and later, when it was attempting to justify membership in NATO; in other words, it can be traced to the last years of RPP rule and the DP years, and to the Öz period, when Turkish foreign policy, according to Kösebalaban, was assertive. A similar reappropriation of history is at work when the author presents the historical background for the transformation of Turkish–Russian relations in the 2000s (and most probably hinting at the Turkey–USSR rapprochement in the mid-1960s). He states that, “contrary to the conventional opinion, it was the liberals who approached the Soviet Union with a great degree of pragmatism and secured Soviet financial and technical assistance” (p. 173). This statement is a historical leap that turns a blind eye to the gold and ammunition that the Bolsheviks poured into Anatolia during Turkey’s war of liberation, as well as to the USSR’s aid during the early republican period when Kemalists were in charge.

Overall, categorizing and periodizing Turkish foreign policy is no easy task. The shortcomings discussed here do not mar the book’s overall attempt to place Turkish foreign policy in a theoretical framework. This attempt, combined with the wealth of empirical data that the author presents, will be appreciated by all students, scholars, and policymakers interested in Turkish foreign policy.