Now showing items 1-3 of 3

  • Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model 

    Authors:Keskin, Kerim; Sağlam, Çağrı
    Publisher and Date:(Walter De Gruyter Gmbh, 2019)
    Although most contest games are modeled in such a way that the outcome depends only on the efforts exerted by the contestants what is arguably more important is the contestants' effective efforts which may be influenced also by their ability human capital strength etc. In this paper we investigate an extensive model including such an effectiveness parameter and analyze the optimal investment behavior in a dynamic conflict framework. At each period two contestants compete for a common prize by ...

  • Multi-player race 

    We present a model of race with multiple players and study players' effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that in equilibrium once any two players win one battle each the remaining players do not exert any effort anymore. This turns the continuation game into a two-player race. This is different than the results in previous two-player models of race which report that all states of the game are reached with positive probabilities. We also provide a set of comparative static ...

  • Sabotage in team contests 

    Authors:Dogan, Serhat; Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, Cagri
    Publisher and Date:(Springer, 2019)
    In the contest literature sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent's likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that anticipating a possible sabotage contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team's aggregate effort which in turn determines the contest's outcome. For the ...