Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKaragozoglu, Emin
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, Kerim
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-27T08:06:13Z
dc.date.available2019-06-27T08:06:13Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681
dc.identifier.issn1879-1751
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/1170
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.002
dc.description.abstractWe study an alternating-offers bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair Moreover we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e. their sensitivity to violations of their fairness judgments) decrease over time as the deadline approaches. Our results offer a new explanation to delays and disagreements in dynamic negotiations. We show that even mutually compatible fairness judgments do not guarantee an immediate agreement. We partially characterize conditions for delay and disagreement and study the changes in the length of delay in response to changes in the model parameters. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherElsevier Science
dc.subjectBargaining
dc.subjectDeadline effect
dc.subjectDelay
dc.subjectDisagreement
dc.subjectFairness concerns
dc.subjectJustice sensitivity
dc.titleTime-varying fairness concerns delay and disagreement in bargaining
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.startpage115
dc.identifier.endpage128
dc.relation.journalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
dc.identifier.volume147
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000429760500008
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.002
dc.contributor.khasauthorKeskin, Kerim


Files in this item

FilesSizeFormatView

There are no files associated with this item.

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record