

4 Rethinking Nationalist, Ethno-racist, and Gendered Myths

An Art Historical Take on Minoritarian Variations From Turkey

Eser Selen

In recent history, and through various mechanisms, the Turkish nation-state has attempted to impose a singular identity, homogenizing citizenship and denying belonging to the country's minority communities. Through the works of contemporary artists from Turkey—specifically Şener Özmen's performative photographs, Jujin's performance, and Hale Tenger's sculptural installation and video art—this study aims to probe the homogenous construction of Turkish citizenship and how Turkey as a nation navigates ethnicity, religiosity, gender, and sexuality. An analysis of these artworks requires an understanding of the ideological concepts central to Turkish national identity, which includes Westernization, citizenship, and secularism. Therefore, because of the complexity of the many agents and conflicting ideologies of power that compete for dominance in the country, it is necessary to offer a brief history of the Turkish nation-state. Following a partial history of contemporary Turkey, I will address a number of works by the artists just noted in relation to the nation's central ideological concepts. I do so in order to activate debates about normative Turkish national identity. Questions that frame this study include how religion and language spill over into the construction of Turkish identities and whether religious patriarchy differs from the secular in a nation-state oriented toward modernity.

From the founding of the Republic in 1923 onwards, the application of Western models inscribed Westernization into the Turkey's drive for internal transformation and recognition as a contemporary nation on the world stage. Strong beliefs in secularism, scientific positivism, and modernity shape lifestyles in contemporary Turkey, yet they coexist with the Islamic faith. In the context of Turkey being considered the world's "most secular" Islamic society, evaluating how Republican citizenship encompasses and, thereby, erases ethnicity, religiosity, gender, and sexuality is required. While minority groups increasingly demand to be represented in the public sphere and gain access to the full benefits of citizenship, a culture of patriarchal normativity continues to obstruct the recognition of minority rights. Women and queer citizens indeed run headlong into this barrier, but so do ethnic minorities, most notably the nation's sizable Kurdish minority.

A Partial History of Contemporary Turkey

In a period of a decade (1910–1920), at least three separate wars had been fought in Turkish territory. These conflicts, accompanied by spontaneous and systematic reprisals, resulted in mass civilian casualties of both minorities (Albanian, Arab, Bosnian,

Circassian, Kurd, Laz, Alevi Muslim, Armenian Christian, Greek Orthodox Christian, and Jewish) and majority (Sunni Muslim, ethnic Turkish) populations. When the Republic of Turkey was finally recognized by the 1923 signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in Switzerland, international pressure continued to demand the protection of non-Muslim minorities within the new nation's borders. To establish a new nation and constitution among embattled communities and in these fragile conditions required policies that addressed minority rights. To do so, Mustafa Kemal turned to the rhetoric of modernization and Westernization.

Much of the history of the Turkish Republic centers on Mustafa Kemal's work in building a Turkish nation-state from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. He casts a long shadow over modern Turkish history and earned the moniker of being the founding father of the nation. Hence, in 1934 Turkey's Grand National Assembly gave him the name "Atatürk," meaning "father of all Turks." In the conception of contemporary Turkey, his role as the founding father is analogous to Abraham's patriarchal role in Islam. Atatürk's drive to "catch up" with Western developed and industrially advanced countries profoundly marks twentieth-century Turkish history and its sacrifice of individual rights for the sake of the project of national modernity.

The development of Turkish identity can be divided into three main historical periods: (1) the early Republican era, or the single party regime led by Atatürk (1923–1945); (2) the multi-party "democratic" period to the first military intervention (1945–1980); and (3) the post-1980 military intervention period.¹ In 1946 Turkey became a multi-party democracy, ending the single-party rule of the Republican era. Equal rights for non-Muslim minorities received a boost with a more liberal atmosphere. The institutional orientation toward Westernized Turkish modernity continued uninterrupted, although after 1950 Islam, or "religious sensitivities," became a major theme of nationalist and political discourse. Islamic resistance gained momentum as religious demands found significant support from the new Democratic Party's (DP) populist discourse, which gave a nationalist flavor to Islam as a cultural tradition. A military coup d'état in 1960 ended DP rule and temporarily abolished the party.² In a significant move for some minorities, the following year the government established a new constitution, in which it was indicated that in future Constituent Assemblies an Armenian, a Greek, and a Jew would be chosen to represent minority groups at all parliamentary sessions. The new constitution further expanded citizenship by guaranteeing the freedom of the press, judicial independence, free speech, and political participation. As with the earlier 1923 constitution, however, these rights were almost immediately disregarded in practice.

The international student movements of the 1960s and 1970s proved to be hugely influential in Turkish universities as they radicalized the student population. On the left, this included a revitalized study of communism and exploring modes of production found specifically in Asia. The right committed itself to ultra-nationalist discourses and patriotic fervor (Zürcher 2004, 257). Violent political clashes, initiated first by the left and then by the right, led to police suppression, kidnapping, and, ultimately, disappearances. A 1971 military ultimatum set the stage for a future military intervention as the specters of various revolutionary movements (Islamic, communist, and socialist) became increasingly concrete, and various armed extremist groups began to operate. The first in a wave of mass disappearances began after the ultimatum with some five thousand arrests and clear evidence of the torture of left-leaning intellectuals (259). During this period, Turkey's radical left also began to criticize the

government for its treatment of Kurdish minorities, a discursive development that would have increasingly significant repercussions, particularly after the creation of an armed Kurdish resistance movement at the end of the 1970s.

The 1970s saw a series of economic and political disasters for the country and rising fears of revolutions from multiple ideological fronts. The Kurdish separatist movement gained ground, as did Islamic fundamentalism. Following an abortive coup in 1979, led by General Kenan Evren, a full-scale military takeover succeeded in 1980, triggered, in part, by large-scale Islamic demonstrations for a return to Muslim holy law, or *Şeriat* [Sharia] (268–69). While many in Turkey embraced the coup as a necessary means to deal with the disastrous economic situation and safeguard the future of the state, Turkey's intellectuals, artists, and many of its overtly queer subjects were justifiably alarmed by the coup. The military's nationwide intervention began on September 12, 1980, although the martial law had already been put in place in twenty provinces. Trials and disappearances began soon after. Estimates of the number of people detained after the coup vary from a quarter to over half a million. Nearly a quarter of a million were tried, and some fourteen thousand lost their Turkish citizenship. Additionally, leaders of the coup d'état are responsible for torturing a great many of those detained. Some disappearances from this period remain unresolved, and hundreds of thousands of people were blacklisted and their careers damaged. Many artists affected by the coup either left the country, because of explicit or implicit threats, or faced periods of incarceration.

The 1980 constitution imposed by the coup leaders made significant changes to the construction of Turkish citizenship, particularly regarding labor, human rights, education, and the recognition of civil society organizations. Indeed, the military leaders' major political objective following the coup was a return to Kemalism, particularly to its emphasis on secularism and nationalism, which also marks the birth of Atatürkism.³ These changes to the constitution brought religiosities and Turkish secularism into marked opposition.⁴ The secularists' reactions to these developments appear to reflect an assumption that Turkish modernity involves a singular identity; consequently, they have been unable to recognize the minorities' demands, such as the demand for racial, ethnic, or religious representation in the public sphere and access to the full benefits of citizenship at the state level. Nativists, from both left and right, have challenged minority group's demands for recognition, accusing them of fomenting an Islamic revolution or Kurdish separatism. It remains difficult for secularists to comprehend any demand they perceive as radical and different from their understanding of modernity.⁵ By rejecting these demands based on their conception of Turkish religious identity, the secularists have fueled political Islam. Their opposition, including the policies of the military regime in the early 1980s, has given political Islam substantial grounds for further accusations against the state and legitimized its social base, from which it has gathered wider national and international support.

The Turkish military, with its strong Kemalist conscience at the time, followed the developments of the 1990s with increasing tension. After criticizing, or rather warning, the coalition government of the Islamist Welfare Party and center-right True Path Party, the military intervened on February 28, 1998, citing the rise in Islamic fundamentalism, sectarian separatism, and discourses by the Welfare Party politicians promoting the Islamicization of the state (see Çolak 2005). Whereas during the 1980s the military had been more anxious about the left, which appeared to threaten its Atatürkist nationalist agenda with communist ideals, by the 1990s the leading figures

of the Turkish military had become concerned about rising Islamism challenging its secular agenda with *irtica*, or reactionism.⁶

With the rise of the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP) [Justice and Development Party], which was elected to power in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015, Islam once again became an aspect of daily life as opposed to its former restricted status as an official religion. Up until the 2010s, Islamic ideals were not overtly represented in AKP's public policies, and their promotion of fundamentalist ideals appeared suppressed or concealed. In Parliament, arguing from principles of human rights and democracy, AKP has, within its "moderate" public Islamist agenda, called for a series of changes regarding secularist politics and the performance of religious identity in the public realm. These demands have included not only the right for *İmam Hatip* graduates to a university education and an attempt to overturn the headscarf ban in official institutions, but also criminalizing adultery and regulating abortion at the state level.⁷

All of these moments in Turkey's history have resulted in a continuous suppression of various minoritarian citizenships that Şener Özmen, Jujin, and Hale Tenger perform their critiques of through art making. The three artists' works illuminate this study as they formally and conceptually display the effects of the coup followed by the 1980 constitution. In particular, the layered narratives of their works reveal the ways in which the freedom of expression of diverse racial, ethnic, religious, gendered, and sexual identifications was ignored, suspended, or banned entirely, while a patriarchal, heteronormative, Sunni Islamic and secular Turkish identification has been fostered at the state level.

Citizenship and Contemporary Art in Turkey

Citizenship is one of the key concepts of state-society relations and the fundamental legal bond between individuals and the state. In their "What is the Matter with Citizenship?: A Turkish Debate" (1999), Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak, and Nalan Soyarik promote citizenship "as a shared identity [that] would integrate previously ignored groups within the society and provide a source of unity" (190). The authors emphasize legal, psychological, political, social, and cultural aspects of citizenship, drawing on the pioneering democracy and human rights scholar Tomas Hammar's delineation of citizenship's interrelated meanings that "[correspond] to the contract-like status of membership in a nation-state." They argue further that "[f]undamental to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, was the development of a new concept of citizenship in the national policy that would go hand in hand with the nation-building process." A Republican understanding of citizenship has played a crucial role in the implementation of the state-centric and "top down" modernization reforms since the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (190).

The Kemalists maintained that Turkish citizenship would not become an expression of identification until the nation's "non-modern" and "uncivilized" people had been trained to become "modern" and "civilized" citizens according to the model of Western citizenship. Forging a direct link between Westernization and modernity lies at the core of Turkish nation-state construction and how it operates today (see Kahraman 2005; İçduygu, Çolak, and Soyarik 1999; and Soyarik 2000). Through processes of nation building, patriarchal notions of modernity inform and construct citizenship in Turkey. While Kemalism sought economic, industrial, and cultural modernization

from within the nation-state, its primary goal was to modernize, or enlighten, the people themselves by transforming them into a homogenous people: the Turks.

The state's attempt to homogenize the people of Turkey under the contested name "Turk" included a mechanism to assimilate minorities into the Turkish language: Turkification. The practice of Turkification, however, not only marginalized non-Muslim minority groups, but it also ostracized Muslim minorities, such as Bosnians, Circassians, and Kurds, by restricting the use of their languages, thus relegating them to the periphery of the public sphere as markers of non-citizenship and non-Turkishness. The Kemalist state precisely did what Atatürk claimed to want to avoid in his May 1, 1920, speech—confirm linguistic and religious assimilation under the banner of equal (masculine and heterosexual) likeness.⁸

As a result, in 1932, and under Atatürk's leadership, intellectuals, scholars, and the state elite convened the First Turkish History Congress with the aim of defining the terms "Turk" and "Turkishness," both within the nation and for the rest of the world (Çağaptay 2006, 50). The proceedings of the Congress, the *Türk Tarih Tezi* [Turkish History Thesis], published in 1932, explicitly defined the markers of Turkishness as "ethnicity-through-language" (52). Thus, Atatürk's evaluation of the Turkish language was performative. He not only made the use of language itself a practice of citizenship but also situated language as the determinate of possible utterances and actions that denote Turkishness, even though many groups living in Turkey spoke a mother tongue other than Turkish. As a single codified language, Turkish did not even exist at this time other than as various, more or less mutually comprehensible, regional dialects.

In *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan* (2006), Ali Kemal Özcan situates the "seed" of Turkey's "Kurdish Question" in history, emphasizing the different ethnic backgrounds of Turks and Kurds and the "deep roots in dispute since Ottoman rule" (83). Within the categorizations for nation and citizenship, Kurds have always been presented as the "most problematic" minority among those residing in Turkey, because they are rendered as members of the ethnicity least susceptible to homogenization (141). Much research demonstrates the importance of traditional tribal structure to Kurdish society, while "the only element of Kurdish culture to change in the 4,300 years of known Kurdish life is the language" (141). While Sunni Muslims form the majoritarian religious affiliation in Turkey, the majority of Kurds in Turkey, like Bosnians and Circassians, are also Sunni Muslims. Thus, the problematic aspect of a normative Turkish citizenship that excludes Kurdishness is not based on language or religion, but the ethno-racial lineage of Kurds, which does not fit in with the modernizing economy of the nation-state's body politics that stem from the early Republican era. Nor does Kurdish tribal culture fit with the neoliberal Islamist political agenda of the current government. Özcan observes, "Kurds were not assimilable [throughout history], due to their deep-rooted cultural existence and large indigenous population [. . .] and Turkey could not 'digest' them" (83). In this statement, he pinpoints the most important layer to the problem for the nation-state that Kurdish identification poses—even before terrorism became the marker that often signifies a Kurds' body, conduct, and everyday life—that of Kurdishness. Kurdish exclusion was and is based on long-held beliefs and generated from stereotypes of "uncivilizability" and "rebellion" (141).

In response to the manner that Turkey tends to define and treat Kurds, Şener Özmen's performative photographic series *Untitled* (2006) suggests a layered structure of



Figure 4.1 Şener Özmen, *Untitled, Megaphone*, 2005. Photographic installation. 100 × 120 cm. Image courtesy of the artist.

Turkish citizenship and its effects on minoritarian subjects, particularly with regards to language, race, gender, and sexuality. Displayed at Milan's 2008 *Triennale Bovisa* in the section entitled *Save As . . . Contemporary Art from Turkey*, the series consists of five large-scale (100 × 120 cm) photographs showing Özmen, half naked, posed with a megaphone in his hand (Figure 4.1). He staged all of the photographs against a blue-to-white gradient background as the lighting highlights his naked upper torso. Each pose is in a distinctive gesture, a variation of holding a megaphone while the artist's mouth is wide open, signaling a scream, except in one image in which Özmen holds the megaphone as if it is a weapon directed at a target. The compositions of the photographs recall the uncanny feeling of a nightmare. Despite screaming at the top of one's lungs, nothing comes out. In the photograph, the silence of his scream is displaced with his critique and the idea of using one's voice as a weapon. He aims his rifle/megaphone toward his target, the nation-state's disablement of the use of Kurdish language for decades. His nude upper torso is an active confrontation with his "uncivilizability" and rebellious nature by just being a Kurd (Özcan 2006, 141).

In *Untitled* Özmen performs Kurdishness and highlights the impediments created by the Turkish nation-state concerning difference, in/equality, and the citizenship as summarized above. Although staged, the potent angst of his expressions and poses are not frivolous. The viewer does not see a scared man, or a scary man, but a man who is profoundly scarred from the systematic exclusion of Kurdish identification in Turkey. The viewer also senses that this man focuses his life's work on taking back his right of ethno-racial identification through his art.

The exclusion of minority representation and rights in Turkish citizenship, such as Kurdishness in Özmen's work, is founded upon the nation-building process of the Republican era, significantly the ways in which the Turkish nation-state's elite proved to be unwilling to address the signification of ethnic markers within the terms of their conception of civilized citizenship. The national policy, as outlined in the 1932 *Türk Tarih Tezi* [*Turkish History Thesis*], attempted to construct a racial, ethnic, and historical genealogy of the Turk and uncover the people's origins. And yet, the stereotypes regarding minorities, and perhaps predominantly Kurdish identification, were produced with a plausible motive to create a dichotomy and demarcate Turkishness.

Placed on the “other” side of the dichotomy, the signification of what Kurdishness entails has been sustained throughout the changing political climates in Turkey.

The objective of the *Türk Tarih Tezi* was clear: to link European and Turkish “man.” This account gained prominence and resilience despite other contemporary studies that claimed, “the Turks belonged to the yellow race” (Çağaptay 2006, 51). Dr. Sevet Aziz’s research in the early twentieth century is an example of the incoherent foundation of Turkish racial lineage in this historic document. Aziz presented his anthropological and craniological research on skulls and live humans to the History Congress in 1932, claiming a significant similarity, even sameness, in the sizes and proportions of French and Turkish skulls. Interestingly, Aziz’s presentation, and particularly the political nature of the claim with which he concluded his research, are equally as provocative as is the forceful manner in which he addressed his newly Turkish audience. He described,

Height above average (5’ 5”), a brachycephalic skull, a long and narrow nose, average ears, no Mongol eyes. This type is the same as the Alpine man, who is known to be the European type. There is no difference at all. However, we need to ask the Turkish researchers and Turkish scholars who also live in Turkey: Where does this European type come from? Are you going to link this to Europe as well? Or should we link Europe to this? Let us answer, without a doubt that the brachycephalic Europe is linked to us. [*Applause . . . applause . . . applause*]
(272–73, emphasis in original)

Following his assessments, as if to prove his points, Aziz brought a family of three Anatolian peasants onto the stage. Aptullah, the patriarch of the group, an ordinary type from a village called Bağlum in central Anatolia near Ankara, happened to have fair hair, very light skin and blue eyes, and ultimately was chosen to represent a living example of the entire “Turkish” race. He provided a vision of “Europeanness” with its source in Anatolia. Thus, with Aziz’s enthusiastic endorsement of their racial heritage, Aptullah and his family were presented to an “educated” and “civilized” audience in the new national capital, Ankara, as living evidence of European features and characteristics within Turkish citizenship, a perfect match for the so-called Alpine man (272–73).

The transcript of Aziz’s speech records mounting applause and demonstrates the initiation of how these regulations gained prominence, especially at Aziz’s well-timed and clearly pervasive introduction of his living examples and at the moments when he linked Europe to Turkey and identified Turkey as the source of “European Man.” The History Congress’ findings did “bleach” the “complexion” of the nation, constituting it as a homogenous race even at the expense of the country’s diverse ethno-cultural history. In *Untitled*, Özmen puts his darker complexion on display, countering the ongoing myth of the fair and, thus, civilized Turks that extends back to Aziz’s time. Additionally, Aziz’s performance brings another issue to light, that of gender politics. At the Congress there was no comment on Aptullah’s wife, providing neither a name nor a proper introduction for the woman. Perhaps, as a married woman, Aziz considered his introduction of her husband to be sufficient, or even that, as a woman, she needed no introduction. Additionally, the absence of the recognition of their child is equally significant. Özmen critiques such erasure in another of his performance photographs.

Özmen's *I am Innocent* (2008) addresses the nation-state's systematic erasure of racial, ethnic, or religious identifications and exclusion of gender equality and sexual difference. These erasures and exclusions have contributed to the construction of a monolithic national ideal. As a sustained national policy, such an ideal's homogenization and implications became detrimental to Turkish citizens that did not comply. Staged as a family photograph, *I am Innocent* signifies a Kurdish identification through color, ornamentation, and costume, while the title of the photograph declares the innocence of this family, of these communities, and of Kurds. Posed as a football player, Özmen signals a masculine tradition of Turkey's favorite pastime, which also doubles as the national sport (Plate 4.1). The woman in the photograph represents a wife and a mother as she holds a child who is too big to carry in her arms. The family group directs their gaze at the camera with a decisive look of their pride. The wife's apparel is indicative of Kurdish identification and where she is from—the southeast region of Turkey, where a sizable Kurdish population lives. She also wears a customary head covering, which is explicitly not *türban*, yet still resonates with religious affiliations.

The young girl wears simple contemporary clothing, but she is barefoot, perhaps to communicate poverty and, possibly, a lack of civility. Being barefoot also evokes her youth and innocence as well as the reason her mother carries her—for protection. It is significant that Özmen casts the woman into the role of mother and primary caretaker of their child. The burden of the weight of a child this size upon her mother may suggest an imposed and perpetual infantilization of the child and, in turn, upon the Kurds vis-à-vis the nation-state. It also illustrates the gendered burden placed upon women as those who bear the responsibility of socializing children. Yet the man and woman lean slightly against one another, creating a sense of familial bonding and an acknowledgment of the value of being in each other's presence.

Özmen's work fosters a layered understanding of the state's prescription for citizenship, particularly with its title, "*I am Innocent*." Posed as a full Kurdish family, the setting recalls Aziz's efforts on the stage of the 1932 History Congress, while the group simultaneously undermines the idealized ethnic makeup of Turkish identity. Registering the country as a motherland of Turks, Özmen reintroduces belonging to a nation as an affiliation that is as simple as birthright and innocence. Through this work, Özmen claims innocence as a member of an ethnic minority who is almost always facing deliberate social prejudices and legal delimitations of Turkish citizenship based on barbarism, separatism, and terrorism. While the elimination of these markers has been evident in the ethno-racist regulations of Turkish citizenship, the artwork points to how Turkish policymaking imposes a singular identification while absorbing the "variation" of the country's minorities. Furthermore, *I am Innocent* effectively pinpoints the "Kurdish Question" and raises the issue of the individual's lack of agency in the face of the state's refusal to grant legal recognition to the large Kurdish minority.⁹ In particular, the artist rearticulates the nation-state's relentless ideal and violent efforts to enforce Kurdish assimilation into Turkish citizenship and culture.

Ideologically and contextually, the Kurdish Question adds multifaceted dimensions to intricate layers of the "Woman Question" (Selen 2007 and 2010), as Özmen's staged family portrait raises both questions. The "Woman Question" includes, but is not limited to, violence against women (femicides, honor killings, and child marriages), girls' access to education, gender discrimination, and sexual harassment in

contemporary Turkey.¹⁰ Historically women were at the center of the modernizing process, and women's secular roles have been a major concern for the modernizing elites. Women's public and private duties, labor, attire, and procreation, along with their manners, wisdom, consciousness, and conscience, had to be regulated and designed to represent the nation. Everything about contemporary Turkish femininity had to be modernized, but not without a significant application of traditionalism.¹¹ For instance, in the Turkish heteronormative order, women find themselves entangled in roles defined by relationships with men, most significantly as a wife and/or mother. The mainstream can show deep contempt for women who "act" outside moral values—in general women should be very discreet and should not refer to (her) sexuality in public. While Turkish women's gender roles are well-established, women's sexuality within the normative order is often overlooked as "nonfemale" or "asexual."

In her "Green, Red, Yellow and Purple: Gendering the Kurdish Question in South-East Turkey" (2015), Hanna J. Clark focuses on the gendered dimension of the Kurdish Question, highlighting how the conflict effects women spatially, which "means that the classroom, the home, and city streets—not the mountains—are emerging as the most important sites of geopolitical struggle." Unlike being a mere representation of the homogeneous ideals of Turkish nation-state, women have been active participants in the transformation of the longstanding conflict between the state and the Kurdish movement. Clark writes, "[F]or the Turkish state, women represent the historical struggles between a modern and urbanized Turkish 'west' and a backward and rural Kurdish 'east'; for the pro-Kurdish movement, women represent the struggles between an oppressive Turkish nation-state and a modern and internationalized Kurdish population." Thus, "This brings women directly to the center of conversations over security and territory" (1463–64). Despite the assumed stereotypes of "uncivilizability" and "rebellion," Clark pinpoints that women, such as the woman in Özmen's *I am Innocent*, are at the very center of the Kurdish movement; the movement has benefited from women's inclusion, particularly with their implementation of various forms of alternative resistance since the early 1990s.

Created a decade before Özmen raised the Kurdish and Woman Questions with his performative photographs, Jujin, whose nickname means "female porcupine" in Kurdish, performed one of the most significant examples of an alternative artistic resistance with her *Sehe Mehe [Period]* (1998). The title of the work is of importance because, at the time that Jujin performed this work, Kurdish was a strictly banned language in the everyday life of Turkey.¹² To this day, Jujin's performance can be thought as a unique confrontation to the nation-state's not only ethno-racial but also gendered political regulations regarding its citizens who do not fit, ethnically or otherwise, in the homogeneous and heteropatriarchal framework of Turkish citizenship. She did not produce any other work after performing this piece at the *Youth Art: Chaos*, a collectively curated exhibition in Istanbul in 1998.

Jujin's three-hour performance began as the artist sat naked on the ground in a confined space. She menstruated onto the floor throughout the course of her performance. In preparation for the event, the artist medically manipulated her menstrual cycle to delay her flow, discontinuing medication four days before her performance to ensure her timely bleeding. Jujin's nude body and the menstrual blood signify the powers of women, reproduction, and sexuality. She also emphasized what marks her as different: her long, black hair; her dark complexion; her bangles; and the blood seeping from her naked body. These markers present an ultimate subjectification of her being

a Kurdish woman and participate in making space for minorities. She invokes her gender and sexual identification along with her ethnicity, which governmental policies subject to a deliberate erasure. The spilled blood on the floor inscribes what is deemed natural and unnatural, and, ultimately, the artist reminds her audience of her humanity, as a woman and a Kurd.

The performance documentation of *Sehe Mehe* shows her in a confined space as she sits in a corner with her head on her knees, grabbing her ankle with both hands while her hair covers the rest of her naked body.¹³ Her stance embodies an alarming melancholia and a sense of abjection as red light fills the narrow, confined rectangular space in which she performed. In many contexts, red light reflects the color of flesh, objectifying it as a meat product in a butcher shop. It also signifies spaces of prostitution. That is, it signifies the exchange between bodies that are bought and sold. Jujin's display of her body initially suggests this kind of exchange, until the viewer becomes aware of what is importantly taking place through menstruation. As a result, the color red invokes blood and life, sex for money, and the violence against those deemed unnatural and non-citizen. It also invokes blood and death, symbolizing the heroic sacrifices of people for the nation as it backgrounds the Turkish flag, however mythological, by reflecting the crescent and a star on the puddle of blood. Jujin's performance ultimately takes this mythology as a measure in exchange for her minoritarian existence.

Both Özmen's and Jujin's works suggest fundamental challenges to binary models of Turkish citizenship—majority/minority, Turkish/Kurdish, secular/religious, traditional/modern, male/female, heteronormative/queer (see Selen 2007, 2010, and 2012). Throughout the historical processes concerning nation building in Turkey, as well as within the present unstable circumstances, the nation-state has remained uncompromising when confronted with identity demands, be they racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual. However secular or religious the nation-state's ideals may have been throughout the history of Turkey, the government sustained a model of citizenship that guides not only what roles ought to be performed, but also how to perform them. Özmen's works showcase his experiences amid socio-cultural perceptions that objectify him as a Kurdish man. Jujin's work depicts the very space of socio-physical exclusion, with her self-imposed isolation in the confined space of her performance as a realistic representation of the space that Kurdish women have held in Turkey.

Formally and conceptually, *Sehe Mehe* is no doubt an introspective work. However, the performance can also be regarded as a litmus test, which implicates citizens' degree of detachment from the nation-state's exclusion of minoritarian subjects in policymaking. The citizens of Turkey have been witnessing a panorama of political clashes since the mid-1950s, accepting the consequences of these events in complete silence, while one side gains significant economic and political power and restricts the rights and freedom of the others. In her installation entitled *Böyle tanıdıklarım var II [I Know People Like This II]* (1992) (Plates 4.2–4.3), Hale Tenger gives a critical account of the cyclical nature of politics and the longstanding detachment between the nation-state and its citizens in Turkey. As a witness to the violent clashes of the left and right in the 1970s and the resultant strict military rule, Tenger lost friends to incarcerations, disappearances under police arrests, and forced exiles. Deviations from the political and social status quo have always been persistent themes in the internationally acclaimed artist's works.

Exhibited in the 3rd *Istanbul Biennial*, her 1992 installation consists of an ingenious arrangement that, as a rectangle, abstracts the outline of Turkey. Two

hundred and eighty brass figurine sets of three monkeys, which embody the proverbial principle “See no evil. Hear no evil. Speak no evil.,” make up this map of the nation. Additionally, sixty-four brass figurines of the ancient Greek fertility god Priapos form the crescent and six stars, recalling the crescent and star on Turkey’s flag. Distinctively and literally, the work communicates with the repetition of figures—Priapos and the three monkeys—who invoke the conscious making of the “modern” nation-state. Thus, Tenger reproduces the land of the “Turks,” Anatolia, with Priapos, representing the nation-state as the guardian of reproduction in the form of male genitalia and further empowering heteronormative patriarchy. The sets of three monkeys symbolize the citizens of Turkey who are complicit in sustaining the nation-state’s monolithic ideal, even though it violently erases minoritarian rights.

Böyle tamdiklarım var performs a necessary critique, not just because of its exemplary display of the Turkish nation-state’s prescription regarding minorities, but also because the work reprimands the country’s citizens as silent and complicit witnesses. The Three Monkeys are witnesses whose judgments have been congealed through indifference and repression, while the installation’s layout points all-too-directly toward the state’s heterosexual phallogocentric structure symbolized in the figure of Priapos. The juxtaposition of two brass elements—Three Monkeys and Priapos—in large numbers signifies the rigid conditions, unchanging nature, and permanent structure of heteronormative patriarchy, be it religious or secular.

While apolitical citizenry engulfed the generations after the 1980s-military coup into the status quo, in May of 2013 the status of citizenship both in meaning and form perhaps changed in Turkey with the Gezi Park Protests; citizens no longer enacted the Three Monkeys found in Tenger’s 1992 piece. The 2013 protests began as a gathering of a couple of dozen young people and a member of the parliament from *Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi* (BDP) [Kurdish: *Partiya Aştî û Demokrasiyê*; The Peace and Democracy Party] to protect the trees in Gezi Park from being uprooted.¹⁴ This decision was illegally executed by the Istanbul Governor’s office to open space for a reproduction of an Ottoman artillery barracks to be used as a shopping mall in Istanbul’s Taksim Square. The in-situ gathering quickly gained momentum by attracting more and more “concerned” citizens from Istanbul and later from all across the country. These citizens were mostly youngsters ranging from teenagers to young adults who then decided to “occupy” the park with makeshift tents throughout both day and night.¹⁵

The citizens’ initial concern was the lack of preservation of nature and the environment. As the crowds grew, layers of concerns, such as minoritarian rights, were added to the protests’ agenda. Political in nature, the protests manifested from a buildup of frustration and opposition to the AKP’s policies against the rights and freedoms of people. Soon after, large-scale demonstrations spontaneously took over the park and the streets of Istanbul with groups who would identify as environmentalists, artists, feminists, LGBTQ organizations and individuals, Kemalists, Kurds, Alevis, anti-capitalist Muslims, soccer supporters, but, most importantly, people with interchangeable and diverse identifications and backgrounds.¹⁶ The demonstrations turned quickly into the Gezi Resistance, a leaderless movement that affected many lives cross-generationally, ideologically, and internationally.

When the Istanbul governor moved to evict the occupiers from Gezi Park at 11 p.m. on May 24, 2013, the events escalated from peaceful public protests to clashes between

the police force and protesters, where unequal force and immense brutality was inflicted on protestors. The police shot rubber bullets, pepper gas canisters, and water cannons with uninterrupted pressurized water laced with chemicals at unarmed demonstrators for hours on end and for more than a month. During these protests, seven people died as a result of a brutal use of police force or at the hands of the government's supporters. Thousands were injured. Many protestors who were brutalized by the police were tried in court, both as groups and as individuals. The courts released some protestors, but sentenced a significant number of people to jail on trumped up charges. For some, the investigations remain ongoing.

During the 2013 Gezi Park Protests, Tenger reworked her 2011 video entitled *Swinging on the Stars*, which, like *Böyle tanıdıklarım var II*, featured the group of three monkeys. Tenger revised her artwork in an attempt to “add a layer of hope” while acknowledging and celebrating the “awakening” of the citizens of Turkey (“Hale Tenger” 2015). Composed with a patterned animation, the original video profoundly hypnotized its viewer with an endless loop of the display of the three monkeys in a dreamlike state as they contently sway to Frank Sinatra’s classic song “Swinging on the Stars.” In her later version of the video, the three monkeys are joyfully animated and chant one of the most famous slogans from the 2013 protests, even though the saying endorses a “soccer mouth” that is laced with a hint of patriarchal language: “*Sık bakalım/Sık bakalım/Biber gazı sık bakalım/Maskeni çıkart/Coğunu bırak/Delikanlı kim bakalım*” [“C’mon then, shoot it/C’mon then, shoot it/Fire the tear gas/Drop off the baton/Take off the helmet/We shall see who is braver”].

Doubtlessly, the Gezi Park Protests are the most powerful demonstrations in the history of contemporary Turkey, during which concerned citizens formed a united front against the AKP’s single-dimensional, oppressive, and destructive governmentality. The “layer of hope” Tenger imagines through her work was visible from within the Gezi Movement. Many formations appeared, some short-lived and some still ongoing, but Gezi Park itself and the streets where the protests took place all over the country have become the spaces that allowed the physical and psychological gathering of countless people with diverse identities, ideologies, and lifestyles.¹⁷ Clark’s argument regarding women’s active inclusion in Kurdish resistance significantly resonates with the inner workings of these protests, at least as a possibility: a united front, inclusive of diversity, could confront oppression. The effects of the Gezi Park Protests have also been observed in the AKP government’s policies, especially when the newly established *Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (HDP) [Kurdish: *Partiya Demokratîk a Gelan*; Peoples’ Democracy Party] gained representational rights in the general elections in 2015. The HDP became the third largest parliamentary group. Meanwhile, despite the hope Tenger suggested by re-editing and updating her video art, AKP seized recent peace negotiations, halted the dialogue with the Kurdish resistance indefinitely, and, finally, has been taking violent military action in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey.¹⁸

Conclusion

Through an examination of contemporary Turkey’s history, citizenship, and artworks, this study explicates how the Turkish nation-state’s past and present policies have generated identificatory obstacles for minoritarian subjects, rendering them sacrificial to its ultra-nationalist, heteronormative, and patriarchal existence. Through their works, the artists Şener Özmen, Jujin, and Hale Tenger challenge and counter

national policies regarding Turkish citizenship and minorities' place in politics. In their artworks race and ethnicity intermingle with gender and sexuality as facets of repression, while religion imposes its affiliation. Each work included in this study presents a paradox related to nation-state's policy-making, and each artist takes a stance against the nation's political shortcomings.

In *Untitled* Özmen incorporates his masculine difference into Kurdishness. He enacts a minoritarian subject on the verge of a breakthrough while displaying the most vulnerable in him, his humanity, through artmaking. For *I am Innocent* he extends his racial identification into a familial context, representing a child as the face of innocence. Doing so claims innocence as a birthright that every citizen should have. Jujin's *Sehe Mehe* uniquely displays the everyday life inclusive of the most intimate aspect of a woman's body: a Kurdish women's sexuality. Tenger's *Böyle tanıdıklarım var* suggests the nation's haunted and traumatic past will always inform the present, but there is always an alternative. Tenger adamantly demands active civilian participation to obtain rights for minoritarian citizens who would benefit.

The socio-political and historical extents of these works should be taken as an urgent call for the nation-state to revise its policymaking and to incorporate ethno-racial, religious, gender, and sexuality based rights within the ongoing debates about secularism. With the reinstatement of political Islam, the revival of Ottoman-Turkish nationalism, and the deterioration of Kurdish political representation, along with the indefinite halt on peace talks and the suppression of what was once an extremely vocal civil society, at the state level Turkey today is torn between profoundly different ideological views. What will be the repercussions of this political shift on the nation's citizens whose lives are measured by their visible or invisible differences?

The current political agenda in Turkey benefits both religious extremists and ultranationalist groups, while ordinary citizens of various racial, national, ethnic, or religious backgrounds and sexual orientations stand to suffer the consequences in a mandated silence.¹⁹ To open up rights for all of Turkey's citizens is going to require a seismic transformation not only in the structures of the state, but also of core beliefs concerning identity in Turkey. Still, having for so long sacrificed so many subjects and identifications in the name of a unified national whole, it may now be the right move to unite multinational, multiethnic, and multireligious groups. Such a transformation would shift from a nation that currently perpetuates acts of violence based on ethnic, racial, religious, gendered, and sexual variances to one that promotes tolerance. That is, as Özmen's, Jujin's, and Tenger's artworks propose, Turkey is a nation-state of difference and variation, not a nationalistic myth. Every citizen should be treated equally.

Notes

1. The latter, which began with a military coup in 1980, followed by a return to the parliamentary system, marks contemporary Turkey, although the outbreak of Gezi Resistance in 2013 provides a significant disjuncture of this study.
2. The military takeover was greeted with explosions of public joy in Ankara and Istanbul, notably among the large student populations in both cities and, in general, among the intelligentsia. The rest of the country showed no such reaction (Zürcher 2004, 241).
3. Kemalism acted as a state-building ideology that laid the groundwork for the construction of the new nation through a sometimes incoherent mix of principles and ideologies borrowed from the West, all of which presupposed Turkish modernity. Eric von

Zürcher, author of the comprehensive and analytical *Turkey: A Modern History* (2004), asserts that Kemalism “never became a coherent all-embracing ideology” (182). Atatürk’s ideas provided “the legitimate political vocabulary [as well as] fundamental principles and values of Turkish modernity.” In this respect, Kemalism became the missing link in the ideological conceptualization of the Turkish nation-state, filling in the gaps between the six principles—republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism—Atatürk had put forward in founding the new Turkish Republic (182). Atatürkism connotes a reconciliation of “the state with religion,” which places Atatürk as a cult leader, “rather than [placing] his ideals, at the center of the republican ideology” (Yanarocak 2016, 411).

4. While the roots of these tensions lie in the Republic, and even in the Ottoman Empire, after 1983 the stakes rose in these heated controversies. Fundamentalist Islam [*irtica*], sometimes with the support of a popular Islamist movement, has significant support in Turkey, particularly through interventions from abroad, notably from Iran, which shares Turkey’s southeast border, and reactionary Islamist immigrant communities in Europe. Armed Islamist groups with indistinct relationships to both foreign nations and the Turkish establishment, such as Turkish Hizbullah, have led forceful campaigns within Turkey since the mid-1990s. Their actions include a series of political kidnappings, tortures, and murders (see Selen 2007). At the other end of the political spectrum, militant Kurdish separatists organized themselves into organizations that the Turkish state declared as terrorist organizations, most notably the Communist Kurdish PKK [Kurdistan Workers Party, Turkish: *Kürdistan İşçi Partisi*; Kurdish: *Partiya Karkeran Kürdistan*]. The PKK, agitating for Kurdish minorities, have led a campaign against the Turkish state for over twenty years, causing considerable civilian and combatant casualties on both sides. In addition to fighting the state, its military, and citizens, Turkish Hizbullah and the PKK have been involved in long-standing violent clashes with one another.
5. The Kemalist secularists’ knee-jerk refusals to respond to repeated requests for expanded religious rights have ultimately been a significant contributor to the development of an Islamist opposition movement in Turkey. Therefore, Turkish secularism has proved to have little or no tolerance of challenges, particularly when these challenges include granting or protecting religious rights.
6. In “Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries” (2002), Nilüfer Göle discusses the differences between Islam, Islamism, and Islamist. She writes,

In speaking of Islamism, we are differentiating between Muslim, which expresses religious identity, and Islamist, which refers to a social movement through which Muslim identity is collectively reappropriated as a basis for an alternative social and political project. Thus, Islamism implies a critique and even a discontinuity with the given categories of Muslim identity; it is an endeavor to rename and reconstruct Muslim identity by freeing it from traditional interpretations and by challenging assimilative forces of modernism.

(173)

7. *İmam Hatip* is an alternative form of schooling. It adds religious content to the regular curriculum of the secularist state centered school system, which is still strictly surveyed by the National Education Council of Turkish Republic. According to *Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu* (YÖK) [The Council of Higher Education], the graduates of *İmam Hatip* could not enter the central university admission exams and, therefore, could not pursue higher education in the Turkish system of higher education. These graduates could only apply to the *İlahiyat Fakültesi* [Theology Faculty], also regulated under YÖK. Ironically, before the threat to state “secularism,” YÖK encouraged the *İmam Hatip* schools as a supposed counterweight to left-wing ideologies. Recently, this regulation has changed as *İmam Hatip* graduates have access to and obtain degrees from all universities.
8. The minorities might have felt that their concerns were being taken into account, as by Mustafa Kemal’s reassurances in a speech on May 1, 1920. He described, “The gentlemen making up your august assembly are not only Turks, or Circassians, or Kurds. They are a sincere gathering of all Islamic elements.” He continued, “There are Kurds as well as Turks

in the north of Kerkük. We have not distinguished between them” (quoted in Mango 1999, 12).

9. According to Hanna Clark (2015),

The Kurdish Question describes the longstanding debate in Turkey over the political status and rights of its Kurdish population. Since the inauguration of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kurdish Question has been addressed through a variety of means: assimilation policies, warfare and most recently socio-economic and gendered development.

(1463)

10. The “Woman Question” has been explicitly adopted as a discourse at several key political moments within the nationalist terminology of Turkish modernity. Modernity in this context operates through the inclusion of the elite and to the exclusion of women in other social classes, relegating newly educated and enfranchised sectors of the population to the home. Historically, in 1928, to “rationalize” women’s housekeeping and childcare and to return “order” to family life, a number of *Kız Enstitüleri* [Girl Institutes] and *Akşam Kız Sanat Okulları* [Girl Handcraft Night Schools] were set up under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Today various mechanisms rearticulate the “Woman Question” in a contemporary Turkey, addressing its undisclosed systems of differentiation, domination, and subservience, which materializes between these women’s bodies and their performances. These apply specifically to the Turkish political and socio-cultural contexts in which women identify themselves as either Muslim, secular, or both from a discourse based on the gendered and sexualized subjecthood to the over-determined status of women as public figures and, in particular, the visibility of women’s bodies. In this regard, Turkish womanhood engages with the failures of both the secular and religious aspects of the nation-state.
11. In her influential essay “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case” (1987), Deniz Kandiyoti elaborates on Fatna Sabbah’s point that “Muslim patriarchal discourse . . . sets itself the urgent task of ‘neutralizing women and their sexuality’ ” in the Turkish context. Kandiyoti problematizes this act of neutralizing:

[Whether this discourse] reduces women to the rank of the “animal,” as in erotic discourse stressing female sexual potency at the expense of their humanity, or weakens her physically and morally, as in the sacred discourse, the result is a distortion and crippling of women’s essential humanity.

Kandiyoti further draws our attention from women’s humanity to her femaleness when she asserts, “[A]lthough women’s very humanity may be in question, her femaleness never is” (327).

Additionally, the Republican era’s impact on the modernizing process on women’s education was particularly significant, with the education of girls becoming mandatory. Ayça Alemdaroğlu (2005) notes, “Women’s increasing public visibility and changing clothing style was seen as a sign of changing morality and emerged as a significant political issue” during the tricky business of transforming gender in the service of Turkish modernity (61). At the same time, the participation of women in the labor market was encouraged, polygamy was abolished, and universal suffrage was mandated. Such change, of course, had an enormous impact on women’s personal aspirations and political claims but has almost always been derailed in practice.

12. The ban on the Kurdish Language is registered with the law number 2932 (Tekin 2012, 303).
13. To view an image from Jujin’s performance, see Arkunlar (2014).
14. BDP was a Kurdish political party in the Republic of Turkey. The party dissolved itself in June of 2014 by joining with the leftist *Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (HDP) [Kurdish: *Partiya Demokratik a Gelan*; Peoples’ Democratic Party].
15. Later *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP) [Republican People’s Party] parliamentarians joined the Gezi Park crowd to support the protesters and stayed with them until the morning. Some stayed even longer.

16. The issues that instigated such a powerful uprising compose a long list: the policies regarding women's rights, specifically abortion; the pure absence of LGBTQ rights; the lack of justice for femicides in honor killings and domestic violence; unsubstantiated arrests of journalists; limitations to alcohol consumption; internet censorship; the illegal destruction of the natural environment and flora in order to build hydroelectric dams; the attempts to build nuclear power plants; government sanctioned illegal contracts and unjust schemes for the green areas of the country; and the demolition of sculptures, theater buildings, and cinema halls.
17. The gatherings in and out of the park made such an impact that the already existing solidarity between LGBTQ people and Kurds has coagulated, and severe antagonism between the ultranationalists and Kurds lessened. The immediate effect of the Gezi events for the advancement of LGBTQ rights showed itself in the 2013 Pride Parade, when a record fifty thousand people walked the length of İstiklal Street from Taksim Square (see "LGBT Onur Yürüyüşü").
18. A significant deterioration within and defamation campaigns against HDP started looming both internally and externally. Once again the state declared Kurds as terrorists and the enemy of the state. In 2016, there was an absolute martial rule and strict curfew orders in five cities, which are mostly populated by Kurdish citizens of Turkey.
19. It is expected that severe ruptures in the freedom of expression will no doubt effect artists as much as it has been affecting journalists, lawyers, and academics in Turkey.

References

- Alemdaroğlu, Ayça. 2005. "Politics of the Body and Eugenic Discourse in Early Republican Turkey." *Body and Society* 11 (3): 61–76.
- Arkunlar, Merve. 2014. "Jujin, neredesin? [Jujin, Where Are You?]." *Time Out Istanbul* (March 8). www.timeoutistanbul.com/istanbulunritmi/2051/ujin-neredesin/.
- Çağaptay, Soner. 2006. *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern History. London: Routledge.
- Clark, Hanna J. 2015. "Green, Red, Yellow and Purple: Gendering the Kurdish Question in South-East Turkey." *Gender, Place and Culture* 22 (10): 1463–80.
- Çolak, Yılmaz. 2005. "Citizenship between Secularism and Islamism in Turkey." In *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, edited by E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, 242–66. London: Routledge.
- Göle, Nilüfer. 2002. "Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries." *Public Culture* 14 (1): 173–90.
- "Hale Tenger." 2015. YouTube video, 0:49. Posted by "SALT Online" (June 12). www.youtube.com/watch?v=8he-6sh4RI8.
- İçduygu, Ahmet, Yılmaz Çolak, and Nalan Soyarık. 1999. "What Is the Matter With Citizenship? A Turkish Debate." *Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (4): 187–208.
- Kahraman, Hasan Bülent. 2005. "The Cultural and Historical Foundation of Turkish Citizenship: Modernity as Westernization." In *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*, edited by E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, 70–86. London: Routledge.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1987. "Emancipated But Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case." *Feminist Studies* 13 (2): 317–38.
- "LGBT Onur Yürüyüşü: Tayyip ver bi dudus" ["LGBT Honorable Walk: Tayyip Give Us a Kiss"]. 2014. *Gerçek Gündem* (June 29). www.gercekgundem.com/spor/53759/lgbt-onur-yuruyusu-tayyip-ver-bi-dudus.
- Mango, Andrew. 1999. "Atatürk and the Kurds." *Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (4): 1–25.
- Özcan, Ali Kemal. 2006. *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan*. London: Routledge.
- Selen, Eser. 2007. "Framing Gender Politics, Racialization and the Significance of Islam in The Lives of Ajda Pekkan and Konca Kuriş." *Policy Matters* 17 (3). A special issue of *Women and Performance*, edited by Sandra Ruiz and Traci Morris: 347–68.

- . 2010. “The Work of Sacrifice: Gender Performativity, Modernity, and Islam in Contemporary Turkish Performance.” Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, Tisch School of the Arts (May).
- . 2012. “The Stage: A Space for Queer Subjectification in Contemporary Turkey.” *Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography* 19 (6): 730–49.
- Soyarık, Nalan. 2000. “The Citizen and the State and the State of the Citizen: An Analysis of the Citizenization Process in Turkey.” Ph.D. Thesis, Bilkent University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara.
- Tekin, Gülçiçek Günel. 2012. *Beyaz Soykırım [The White Genocide]*. Istanbul: Belge.
- Türk Tarih Tezi [Turkish History Thesis]*, Ankara. 1932.
- Yanaracak, Hay Eytan Cohen. 2016. “Turkish *Staatsvolk* vs. Kurdish Identity: Denial of the Kurds in Turkish School Textbooks.” *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 7 (4): 405–9.
- Zürcher, Erik Jan. 2004. *Turkey: A Modern History*. 3rd ed. London: I. B. Tauris.