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SECURITIZATION OF DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE STUDY OF
GEORGIA AFTER ROSE REVOLUTION

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SECURITIZATION OF DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE STUDY OF GEORGIA
AFTER ROSE REVOLUTION

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BERİVAN AKIN


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
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
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BERIVAN AKIN

ÖZET

DEMOKRATİKLEŞMENİN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ: GÜL DEVRİMİ SONRASI GÜRCİSTAN ÖRNEK OLAY ÇALIŞMASI

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Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılması sonrasında ortaya çıkan ülkeler arasında demokratikleşme sürecinde başarı gösteren ender örneklerden biri Gürcistan'dır. 2003 Gül Devrimi sonrası başlayan Gürcistan demokratikleşme süreci, dünya siyasetinde siyasi değişimin doğasını anlayabilmek için çok önemlidir. Yeni bir konsept olan demokrasinin güvenlikleştirilmesi, bu süreçte ortaya çıkmış olup bu tezin temel kavramını oluşturmaktadır.

11 Eylül saldırıları sonrası ortaya çıkan ABD'nin makro- güvenlikleştirme girişimi Gürcistan gibi ülkelerde mikro düzeyde etkiler yaratmıştır. Gül Devrimi sonrası Gürcistan'da gerçekleşen siyasi dönüşüm süreci demokratikleşmenin güvenlikleştirilmesi açısından en önde gelen örneklerden birini oluşturmaktadır. Demokratikleşmenin güvenlikleştirilmesi, inşa edilmiş tehdit ile baş edebilmek için her türlü yöntemin kullanılmasına yol açan demokratikleşmeye karşı tehdidin söylemsel inşası anlamına gelmektedir. Gürcistan demokratikleşmesi üzerindeki harici ve dâhili gerilimler aşırı bir güvenlikleştirmeye yol açmış ve Rusya gibi farklı dinleyicilerin eklenmesi ile süreç yeni bir güvenlik ikilemine evrilmiştir. Başka bir

değişle, ABD'nin demokratikleşme desteği ile Gürcistan'ın demokratikleşme isteği, Rusya tarafından bir tehdit olarak yorumlanmaya başlamıştır.

Bu tez ilk olarak yeni bir konsept olan demokratikleşmenin güvenlikleştirilmesine değinecektir ve bu sayede uluslararası ilişkilerin iki alt alanına – güvenlik ve demokrasi çalışmalarına – katkıda bulunacaktır. Bunun yanı sıra, bu yeni konsept, güvenlik – demokrasi ilişkisinde, ulusal ve uluslararası düzeydeki iç içe geçmiş ilişkiyi göstermek adına da önemli katkıda bulunacaktır.

Güvenlikleştirmenin bu yeni referans ögesi – demokratikleşme – aynı zamanda Kopenhag Okulu tarafından çok değinilmemiş olan, güvenlikleştirmenin sonuçlarını ortaya koymaya da yardımcı olacaktır. Bu çerçevede, bu tezin ikinci kısmında Gürcistan örnek olay çalışması demokrasinin güvenlikleştirilmesi perspektifinden incelenecektir. Tüm dünyada son dönemde, demokratikleşme sürecinin gerilemeye başlaması nedeniyle bu yaklaşım önem arz etmektedir. Devletlerin demokratikleşmesi önündeki engellerin daha geniş bir perspektiften incelenmesi uluslararası toplumun demokratikleşme çabalarına da katkı sağlayacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gürcistan, demokrasi, demokratikleşme, güvenlikleştirme, demokrasinin güvenlikleştirilmesi

ABSTRACT

SECURITIZATION OF DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE STUDY OF GEORGIA AFTER ROSE REVOLUTION

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Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Mitat Çelikpala

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Georgia is one of the few examples of successful democratization in the post-Soviet region. The trajectory of Georgian democratization, which started with the Rose Revolution in 2003 is critical to understanding the changing nature of political transformation in world politics. Newly conceived, the securitization of democratization that appeared during this process is the main topic of this dissertation.

The United States' attempt at the macro-securitization of democracy after the September 11 attacks had micro-level impacts in countries like Georgia. The process of political transformation in Georgia after the Rose Revolution is one of the prominent examples of a period of securitization of democratization. Securitization of democratization in this context means the discursive construction of a threat towards democratization that paves the way for the use of any means in order to sustain the process. Both external and internal stresses on the democratization process of Georgia led to the excessive securitization of the issue and with inclusion of other audiences such as Russia, a new security dilemma arose. In other words,

democratization assistance to Georgia from the USA and Georgian enthusiasm for democratization was reinterpreted as a threat by Russia.

This dissertation is first interested in presenting a new concept, the securitization of democratization, which contributes to two important study areas of international relations – security and democracy literature. Moreover, this new phenomenon’s addition to the security-democracy nexus critically demonstrates the intertwined characteristic of the domestic and international levels in international studies. The new referent object of securitization –democratization- will also help to pursue the outcomes of securitization, which is not analyzed in detail by the Copenhagen School. In line with this understanding, the second part of this dissertation analyzes the case study of Georgia from the securitization of democratization perspective. This new perspective is noteworthy due to the recession of democratization globally nearly during the last decade. The analysis of the obstacles to democratization of states from a broader understanding will be helpful to the democratization efforts of the international community.

Keywords: Georgia, democracy, democratization, securitization, securitization of democratization.

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INTRODUCTION

At the end of the Cold War, former communist states were expected to rapidly democratize and transition to the western market economy, a testament to the success of the Western Camp's project following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After their declarations of independence which began in 1991, former communist states entered a period of triple transition, i.e. simultaneous nation and state building that intersected with an economic transition, which complicated the political transformation (Offe 2004).¹ The cases of formerly communist countries transformation provided a valuable experiment for researchers. Initial expectations were replaced with obscurity during the process when it was understood that this triple transition period had led to different trajectories and outcomes in the various former communist states instead of the expected success. In some of the countries, the process resulted in the emergence of partially democratic states, while in some cases the process brought authoritarian regimes. Only a few succeeded in establishing liberal democratic states (Ekiert, et al., 2007). Based on the research of the area, the post-communist region can split into two groups. The first group consists of countries that are more successful in the triple transition when compared with countries; and which experienced the third wave of democratization except

¹ Triple transition concept was suggested by Claus Offe in order to describe the transition in East Central Europe, which demonstrates different features when compared with early transitions.

Southern Europe. The second group is formed by the countries that are semi reformed, democratic-autocratic hybrids and those that reversed the triple transition and became authoritarian regimes. This picture demonstrates to us that the post-communist region contains the best and worst examples of the triple transition (Ekiert, et al. 2007). These differences within the post-communist world necessitates comparative political studies enriched by deep case studies as well as new theoretical perspectives for explaining and understanding the political transformation processes in the region.

Despite high expectations from the post-communist region, most of the former Soviet Union states, apart from those in the Baltic region did not display signs of successful political transformation until the 2000s. Georgia constitutes one of the very few special cases in this region, particularly since the Rose Revolution in 2003. The process that started in the country after Rose Revolution, was a turning point for Georgian political transformation. Moreover, this development has also overlapped with a change on the international level of democratization processes.

As seen in the post-communist region, during the 2000s two important and controversial orientations in regime change appeared on the international scene. The first was the rise of democratization efforts both in practice and in discourse; the second was the appearance of more noticeable authoritarian resistance. Though leaders and political elites, all over the world are paying lip services to the democracy, which is the only legitimate “game in town”, statistical data demonstrates an observable regression in the quality of democracies in the world (Freedom House 2014). Freedom House underlined that 2014 was the ninth

consecutive year of decline on the condition of global political rights and civil liberties. The 2015 report starts with a notice that democracy and democratic ideals are under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years according to the systematic research that Freedom House was doing in the world (“Freedom in the World” 2015).

This controversy between the increasing efforts of democracy promotion and the declining of democratic credentials necessitates a study of its causes. In line with the emergence of this phenomenon, the investigation of the impact that the international level has on domestic political transformation became more prominent. In this framework, the Georgian case study has the potential to make an important contribution to understand this controversy with a new theoretical perspective. This new approach developed with the contribution of the Copenhagen School’s securitization approach to the democratization literature. As a new phenomenon, ‘securitization of democratization’ may offer a perspective to understand dilemmas of democratization.

The securitization of democracy at an international level - a macro-securitization- was modeled by Buzan and Wæver (Buzan & Wæver 2009). Securitization of democracy by the US after the September 11 attacks in 2001 had micro level impacts. It can be argued that democratic peace theory and the increasing authoritarian resistance have played an important role in the emergence of the macro-securitization of democracy. The US move after September 11 has to be considered one of securitization because this move was unsuccessful due to the lack of audiences’ acceptance. The Copenhagen School’s approach prioritizes the

acceptance of the audience as a prerequisite for the emergence of successful securitization. However on the micro level, the process was more complicated than the theory predicts. The securitization of Georgian democratization arose on the two dimensions – internal and external- simultaneously, which in turn led to the emergence of two different audiences: the citizens of Georgia and the Russian government. Indeed, the securitization of democratization by the USA and Georgia intentionally or not reached an external audience: Russia. The Russian reaction to this securitization attempt led to the emergence of a security dilemma between these three players, which ultimately resulted in a hot confrontation between Georgia and Russia after the August War in 2008.

The Georgian case study examined with the help of ‘securitization of democratization’ will provide a new perspective on the controversy between the rise of democracy promotion and authoritarian backlash. This new approach, which will be explained step by step and operationalized in this Georgian case study may increase the efficacy of democracy promotion efforts.

1. Scope and Objective

In line with briefly mentioned domestic and international developments, the aim of this dissertation is to analyze and understand the democratization process of Georgia starting from the Rose Revolution in 2003, until the presidential elections in 2013. Through the securitization of democratization perspective, the aim is to understand the impact of the international level on the domestic level political transformation while demonstrating their interconnectedness. The securitization of democratization approach emerged from securitization studies of the Copenhagen

School. Securitization of democratization means the success of a domestic or international actor's discursive move, which is based on the assumption that the democratization of a country is under threat. This construction of a threat is necessary for claiming the necessity to use extraordinary measures in order to protect the process of democratization.

This new perspective will be operationalized in three stages of Georgian democratization: firstly securitization of democratization in the first stage (2003-2005); secondly, an outcome of the securitization of democratization, the emergence of a security dilemma between securitizing actor(s) and audience(s) in the second stage (2005-2008); and lastly, in the third stage, the beginning of a de-securitization process (2008-2013). While analyzing the international dimension of Georgian democratization, the domestic level will not be overlooked. Instead, the interwoven relations between international and domestic level dynamics will enrich the analysis of Georgian democratization.

The objective of this dissertation is to find answers to the research questions below:

1. What is securitization of democratization? How does securitization influence democratization? What are the impacts of macro level securitization of democracy to the democratization of a small country? What is the relationship between the domestic and international contexts of democratization? What are the domestic and international antecedent conditions that influence the correlation between securitization and democratization?

2. Why and how did this new phenomenon emerge in the Georgian context?

What are the impacts of international and domestic securitization of democratization to Georgian political transformation? What are the contributions of the Georgian case study to democratization and securitization studies?

The above research questions led to the main hypotheses of this study. They are itemized as follows:

- Securitization of democratization is a discursive move made by a domestic or international actor that is based on the assumption that democratization of a country is under threat and that it is necessary to use extraordinary measures in order to protect the process.
- The emergence of securitization of democratization in the Georgian context depended both on an international dimension and important domestic dynamics. The discourse that was developed after the Rose Revolution, as a part of identity construction and new foreign policy, also played a role in securitization of democratization in the Georgian context.
- Securitization of democratization occurs in two dimensions: international and domestic. Depending on the case, macro-securitization of democracy can have micro-level impacts: positive or negative. Domestic conditions and policies have tremendous impacts on the securitization of democratization. In cases like Georgia, a country that has an uncompleted nation and state building project complicated by fragile ethnic and religious structures,

economic problems and a stringent foreign policy due to geostrategic reasons, unintended consequences of securitization of democratization may arise.

- The result of the securitization of democratization in the Georgian case was the emergence of a security dilemma between Russia and Georgia. The security dilemma between these players had broken with the outbreak of the August War in 2008. Securitization of democratization in the Georgian context had negative impacts on the process. The negative impact of securitization of democratization was resolved by the de-securitization of democratization after the August War in 2008 as the securitization theory predicts.
- In the Georgian context, which is a deviant case in the post-Soviet region, the securitization of democratization was harmful for political transformation. Fragile Georgian ethnic, political and economic structures played a critical role on the consequences of the securitization of democratization. Therefore, in order to understand the reason behind the harmful impacts of the securitization, it is necessary to analyze the historical, political and cultural backgrounds of developments that are largely disregarded by the literature of democratization.

2. Main Argument and Analytical Framework

In light of the above questions and hypotheses, the study aims to evaluate the post-Soviet region in which security concerns are on the top of the agenda, with a constructivist approach. In general, post-Soviet and in particular South Caucasus regional studies are dominated by realist and neo-realist theoretical approaches. Non-

classical IR theories were not able to penetrate to this research area due to the primacy of security issues. Nevertheless, theoretically, this study will use a constructivist approach based on explanatory capacity of the developments in Georgian political transformation. The questioning of objectivity on the threat perception is a new phenomenon and in this study it is argued that democratization as a referent object of securitization will broaden the perspective of regional studies. The theoretical approach will be discussed in greater detail in the literature review section, but briefly the choice to argue from a constructivist perspective was motivated in part to provide a much needed alternate perspective and in part to contribute to constructivism with a case study from an unconventional region. The main theoretical framework will be securitization studies, which is a sub-field of constructivist IR theory (Barry, et al. 1998, Balzacq 2010).

This constructivist approach of securitization studies will be supported by an evaluation of threat construction in the Georgian case study and an analysis of how democratization is constructed as being in danger. In order to understand the political, social and economic backgrounds of the securitization process, this study will also focus on the period before the Rose Revolution. The period starting from the declaration of independence until Rose Revolution will be conceptualized as the process of political transformation. The reason for such a conceptualization is the lack of a real democratization during this period.

The study will divide regime change in Georgia into two general periods. Political transformation of the first period is followed by a democratization process

after the Rose Revolution.² Moreover, the Georgian democratization process between 2003 and 2013 that constitutes the main focus of this study will be divided into three phases. The main feature of the first period (2003-2005) was the securitization of democratization had triggered by both international and domestic dynamics. Internationally, the attempt of macro-securitization of democracy on the international level had micro level impacts in Georgian democratization. Additionally international macro level securitization intersected with the attempt at identity construction in Georgia, which contributed a great deal to the securitization of democratization with the foreign policy orientation of the new leadership after the Rose Revolution. This new Georgian identity policy was prioritizing the European legacy and Georgian democratic culture. The aim of the Georgian government was to strengthen this identity through close relations with the West and possible membership in Western international organizations namely the EU as a political organization and NATO as a military alliance. Moreover, the requirements that EU and NATO developed for membership and their discourse on the democratization coincided with Georgian policies. The discourses on the both sides of these relationships contributed to the securitization of democratization.

The widening and deepening of the security studies plays an important role in understanding the developments during this period. The claim that the threat perception is not objective and instead it is a constructed phenomenon and the inclusion of democracy and democratization as referent object of security enhance the understanding of Georgian democratization after the Rose Revolution. This study

² Alternative divisions and labels may be argued but the above mentioned structure mostly fits with the general literature and with the framework of this dissertation.

enriches the Copenhagen School's approach to the construction of threats by including Thierry Balzacq's strategic model and by analyzing one of the probable outcomes of this construction, the security dilemma.

The securitization of democracy on the international level was initiated by the US after the September 11 attacks in 2001. It can be argued that democratic peace theory and the increasing authoritarian resistance have played an important role in the emergence of macro-securitization of democracy. Democratic peace theory promises the establishment of predictable, trustable, stable and secure relations between countries that are ruled by democratic governments. Due to this claim, democracy promotion efforts by any means were increased after the terrorist attacks against the US. However, the authoritarian resistance to this initiative became also obvious during this period. One of the main claims of the authoritarian resistance was the hypocrisy behind the democracy promotion efforts. Authoritarian regimes developed new tactics and policies to avoid the spread of democratization that they perceived as a tool of Western interest.

As mentioned previously, securitization of democratization in the Georgian context occurred in two stages – external and internal. Therefore, there were two major audiences whose consent for this securitization was critical: the citizens of Georgia and the Russian government. Internally, the policies of Saakashvili government were successful and Georgian citizens accepted more extraordinary measures than the external audience. However, here it is necessary to underline the differences among the Georgian citizens due to the secessionist movements. Citizens

of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not considered within this framework. Rather they were the ones who resisted to this attempt with Russia.

The attempt of the US and Georgia's securitization of democratization, intentionally or unintentionally reached an external audience, Russia. Russia has been always an important player in Georgian politics, economics and social life. Russia has tried to preserve its influence on Georgia through various means, including the protection of military bases in the country, the extension of membership for Georgia to Russian-led international organizations such as CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), and close relations with the minorities within Georgia as well as its economic linkage and leverage. Therefore, increasing influence of external powers employing democratization rhetoric disturbed Russia. The consecutive colored revolutions³ in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and the rhetoric of the "beacon for democracy"⁴ employed for Georgia particularly increased the tension between Russia and Georgia. Due to domestic turmoil, Russia was not powerful enough to prevent regional countries from seeking external supporters until 2000s although it introduced the policy of "near abroad" in 1993. Yet, at this time Western countries were also unwilling to enter to this chaotic part of post-Soviet space. "Russia First" approaches in Western countries foreign policies can be defined as a kind of secret respect for a Russian sphere of influence. Moreover, another reason was the debate

³ "Revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (2003-2005) are named as colored revolutions. Peaceful protest in these countries pave the way the change of power. These developments created an expectation of democratization and due to the colors that were used during the protest, these changes in the region defined as colored or color revolutions. See: (Lincoln 2012; Way 2008; Hale 2006)

⁴ US President George W. Bush used this rhetoric, when he was addressing Georgians in Tbilisi Freedom Square in 2005. See: "Bush backs Georgia as a "beacon for democracy" <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3cc8ba4e-c128-11d9-943f-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3TDYabHFr>

within Russia on the construction of identity and the foreign policy between Westernizers, Slavophiles and Eurasianists. However, with the global developments in the 2000s, the power politics of the region totally changed, reshaping the relationships between external and internal players involved into the region. Especially important was the rise of Russian power and increased stability in Russia under the leadership of President Putin reinforced by economic recovery due both high oil and natural gas prices and new policies. Moreover, Russia under Putin's leadership preferred play a more active role in the Near Abroad, "as a way of forcing the West to take its claims to Great Power status seriously" (Mankoff 2009: 26). Consequently, Russia sharply resisted the attempt of the US and Georgia for securitization of Georgian democratization; this resistance led to the emergence of a security dilemma, which in turn led to the second period of Georgian democratization.

The main feature of the second term of Georgian democratization was the security dilemma between Georgia, Russia and the US. The developments in the 2000s in Georgia were perceived by Russia as a threat to its national interest. Increasing US support for the Saakashvili government and Georgian disengagement from Russia aggregated the tension between these three states. In the environment of the 'new security dilemma', US democracy promotion activities and the Georgian government's steps towards democratization were demonized by Russia. The Russian interpretation of the developments in Georgia was wholly different from that of Georgia or the US. The process was regarded as an intervention within the Russian traditional sphere of influence in order to prevent Russian increasing power.

In this environment, tension continued to rise as the three parties involved in this ‘new security dilemma’ each developed new sets of policies. Especially during this period, the use of determinants of democratization as a foreign policy tool increased the suspicion between the states. The support for separatist regions, one of the traditional policy tools of Russia for manipulating Georgian policies, was once again employed. The separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia inflamed by the policies of Georgia and Russia had tremendous impacts on Georgian democratization and brought the passage to the third phase of this process.

This ‘new security dilemma’, which has become openly observable in 2005 turned into a military clash between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. After the August War, which was a shock for the international audience, the relationship between these three players once again transformed. This new phase emerged not only in response to the outbreak of the August War, but also changing international and domestic contexts which necessitated the emergence of new policies on all sides and, which shaped and influenced the democratization of Georgia. The defining feature of this new period in the democratization process can be labelled as the de-securitization process. De-securitization decreased the tension on Georgian democratization and provided a much more secure pathway for Georgian democratization.

3. Methodology

This study will use the method of a case study to describe analyze, and understand the process of democratization in Georgia with a focus on a new phenomenon – securitization of democratization. Rather than use quantitative

methods, this dissertation preferred to approach the democratization process with qualitative methods due to the complexity of the structure to be examined. In the process of demonstrating the emergence of securitization, discourse analysis method will be used. National strategy papers of the US will be evaluated to observe the macro-securitization of democracy. Statements of the president and the Department of State in the USA about Georgia and Georgian democratization will be analyzed. On the domestic level, the statements of the president of Georgia and official papers such as the National Security Concept of Georgia on the identity construction and foreign policy orientation will help to examine the securitization of democratization domestically. The declarations of Russian counterparts in response to the securitization of Georgian democratization will also be considered in order to observe the reaction of the international audience to the securitization of democratization.

4. Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of six chapters. After the introductory chapter, the second chapter, made up of literature reviews, aims to combine democratization and security studies in order to define important concepts and to introduce the contribution of this dissertation to this valuable and extensive literature. The third chapter of this dissertation will be based on the historical account of Georgian political transformation between the years of 1991 and 2003. This chapter is necessary to understand the path to democratization and also the political, economic, and social conditions that prepared the democratization process in Georgia. The fourth chapter on the Rose Revolution clarifies the starting events of democratization

process. The fifth chapter which includes the main argument of this dissertation is divided in the three stages as was mentioned before. In the sixth and concluding chapter, the arguments of this dissertation will be summarized and future prospects for the Georgian democratization will be analyzed.

CHAPTER I: ‘DEEPENING’ AND ‘WIDENING’ SECURITY – THE TRAJECTORY OF SECURITY STUDIES

The nexus between democracy and security represents one of the liveliest debates in international relations studies. Various theoretical frameworks approach to the issue from different point of views. One of the well-known approaches, which aim to analyze the impact of democracy or democratization on security is the democratic peace theory (Doyle 1983; Hobson 2011). The claim of the peace among the world of democracies started to be accepted as an empirical norm in international relations. Democratic Peace Theory suggests that democracies do not fight with each other. This approach is more cautious in the context of democratizing states or countries in transition (Doyle 1983). Using the same database as Doyle, who proved democratic peace theory, Mansfield and Snyder argued that when compared with mature democracies and stable autocracies, democratizing countries are more likely to engage in wars (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). In this transitional phase, wars between democratizing and democratic states are even more likely. For example, Neil MacFarlane emphasized the probable negative impacts of transition from authoritarianism to democratic forms of government on both international and regional security through an examination of the South Caucasus (Macfarlane 1997). Beyond the discussion of the security-democracy nexus, there are also studies on the need to democratize security, which focus on the role of civil-military relations

during democratization (Diamond & Plattner 1996; Bruneau & Cristiana 2008). Meanwhile, this dissertation approaches the security-democracy nexus from the opposite perspective. The emphasis is not on the impact of democracy or democratization to security but rather the impact security or specifically securitization has on democracy and democratization.

This chapter on the historical trajectory of security studies will focus on the deepening and widening security debate in order to understand the development of securitization studies. Securitization studies that emerged from the Copenhagen School's writings will be evaluated in the second part of this chapter in order to provide the necessary theoretical background to generate securitization of democratization concept. In this part, critics of the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of securitization will be taken into consideration in order to develop a broader understanding of securitization of democratization. Then, the conceptualization of democracy and democratization will be clarified due to the various definitions in the literature. After constructing democratization as a referent object of securitization, the following chapter will cover the newly developing concept of securitization of democratization.

1.1. 'Deepening' and 'Widening' of Security Studies

The daily implications that security has on people's life and its importance for states place it on the top of many states agendas. Security matters. In line with its importance, various different definitions of security exist, coinciding with several theoretical approaches. As such, a great deal of literature exists about security. The aim of this chapter is not to provide a detailed analysis of security studies but only to

briefly present developments in security studies and especially to clarify the trajectory of the widening and deepening of security studies. The changing role of security studies is important to this dissertation, which claims that the perceptions of threats towards democratization are constructed as a referent object of security by different actors. Constructivism's increasing importance in security studies supports the relevance of the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

Before tracing the journey of security studies, it is critical to underline that security is political, "it plays a vital role in deciding who gets what, when, and how in world politics" (Williams 2008: 1). While analyzing this area of inquiry which change and evolve over time, the researcher should have in mind the basic questions "who gets to decide what security means, what issues make it on to security agendas, how those issues should be dealt with, and, crucially, what happens when different visions of security collide" (Williams 2008: 2). Although the role of other actors apart from the state is accepted, in general this study based its assumptions on a state centric approach. The role of other actors such as international organizations, NGOs, and civil society is perceived as subordinate to the role of states in the Georgian democratization context. The state is still the main practitioner of security in Georgian context. However, this study also accepts that moving democratization to the security area necessitates a broader understanding of international relations that transcends the realist perspective.

Although there is a tendency to ignore pre-Cold War studies on security, this era, and especially the interwar period was not an intellectual vacuum (Baldwin 1995) instead the security studies that appeared in 1940s formed the basis for the

acceleration of this area of study during the first period of the Cold War. During the interwar period, the idealist approach to security was very effective due to the impact of the First World War. The Second World War, by contrast, created a contrary impact on the security studies and realism rose to prominence. The period until mid-1960s is named as the “Golden Age” of security studies (Walt 1991; Baldwin 1995; Bilgin, et all 1998). The détente period influenced the approaches to the security studies by encouraging the broadening of the security agenda but the emergence of Second Cold War⁵ pushed researchers to turn once again to mainstream approaches. However, there were two main groups who rejected this mainstream approaches: the alternative defense school and the third world security thinking (Bilgin et all, 1998). Although there were some signs of challenges to the mainstream approach of security studies, the real opportunity for alternative thinking emerged at the end of the Cold War. Alternative approaches paved the way to the broadening and deepening of the research area of security studies.

As summarized above, security studies have gone through periods of ups and downs depending on changes in international politics. From its emergence, security studies have undergone various theoretical, epistemological and methodological changes. Internal examination of security studies has led to a flourishing research area.

During the interwar period, security studies were focused on solving the war – the disease to be cured – by emphasizing international law and organizations. The cure to this most important threat was seen as in democracy, self-determination,

⁵ The Second Cold War is a conceptualization that refers to the period in which the military tension increased between the two poles – the US and the USSR - of the Cold War after a short period of détente.

disarmament, and collective security that would promote international peace and security (Baldwin 1995). However, idealistic approaches to security were unable to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. One impact of the Second World War was the rise of research on strategic studies and national security. During this period, those who studied security were well aware of military force as an instrument of statecraft, but developments during the Cold War like the increasing nuclear rivalry deeply had shaken the classical hegemony of “national security” (Baldwin 1995). The shift of security and threat patterns towards national security clearly revealed the inefficiency of states and necessitated an international perspective to effectively deal with them. Likewise, the acceleration of globalization and its impact on security was another reason for the internationalization of security. In this international arena, the interdependence of states’ security became obvious and classical remedy of security - power and classical remedy to conflict - balance of power came under question.

During the Cold War period, the dominance of realism in international relations was reflected in the security studies as it came to be perceived as synonymous with military strategy and statecraft (Dannreuther 2007). The classical counterpoint to Strategic Studies, Peace Studies, was intended to reduce or eliminate the use of force. This theoretical opposite critiqued the strategic approach, citing its dangers and prioritizing individual security alongside or sometimes against state security (Buzan & Hansen 2009). Richard H. Ullman, in his 1983 article “Redefining Security” underlines the excessive emphasis on military terms for national security on the part of politicians and analysts in US (Ullman 1983). Ullman argued that by

ascribing importance only to military threats and ignoring other and perhaps more harmful dangers, these elites created a misleading image. In turn, this false image led to the militarization of international relations, and over time, rather than enhancing security, this actually led to increasing insecurity globally (Ulman 1983).

The excessive militarization following the addition of nuclear weapons to the equation induced radical changes for international security studies. The nuclear age overturned competitive, state-based and military solutions to security problems. Although the dominance of realism and neorealism on security studies was accepted, they were impervious to criticism: two alternative views emerged during this period. The first was the 'alternative defense' school, which emphasized the role of the establishment of the conditions for social justice and mutual understanding for real peace and security. This school proposed the development of new ideas and policies like "common security, non-offensive defense, a nuclear freeze, military confidence building, democracy and disarmament, 'détente from below,' and alternative security orders" (Bilgin, et al.1998: 137). The other view that rose in prominence in this period was, the third world security thinking, which criticized the logic of the Cold War by emphasizing the ethnocentric bias of western studies, the establishment of non-aligned movement and economic aspects of security to provide a space for a more comprehensive study of security (Bilgin, et al. 1998). Their contribution to the intellectual environment during the Cold War and their impact on theoretical changes thereafter were very respectable for the development of security studies.

Meanwhile, the changes in politics reverberated to international security studies and its scope and its subject matters proliferated. Many non-military security

threats moved to the agenda of states and non-state actors alike, “the threat of environment degradation, economic disparities and chronic poverty, diseases like HIV/Aids, transnational crime, and international migration” (Dannreuther 2007: 1) due to the challenges to the mainstream approaches on the security studies. This proliferation is called broadening and deepening of security studies. The broadening of security studies’ research areas refers to the inclusion of a broader range of potential threats as mentioned above. Deepening in this study area signifies the inclusion of individual, societal, regional and global security to the understanding of national security (Krause & Williams, 1996).

These changes in scope and the subject matters influenced theory building in this study area. The widening of actors and agenda of international security in the 1970s and 1980s challenged the hegemonic power of realist theory in security studies. One of the main questions during this period surrounded the inability of realist paradigm to explain the decreasing probability of war between some states. An important contribution came from democratic peace theory that aims to explain the peace established between democratic states. Michael W. Doyle’s article in 1983 proposed a new theoretical approach based on early works of Kant, Paine, and Tocqueville (Doyle 1983). Doyle drew attention to the peace established between liberal states and the argument that “liberal states do not fight wars against other liberal states” (Williams 2008: 2) became a widespread discourse in security studies. Classical liberal thinking on security deals to eliminate wars and as Kant suggests, search for a way to “perpetual peace” (Kant 1983). This important literature provides some remedies for conflict and war, republicanism and commerce were their early

solutions. Today, cooperation and liberal institutionalism are thought of as essential tools for the mitigation of conflict (Williams 2008; Keohane & Martin 1995; Axelrod & Keohane 1985; Jervis 1999). Especially with the end of the Cold War, a new optimism emerged with the disappearance of the probable war between major powers, but the fear of conflict has never totally disappeared.

Later on, the Cold War and peaceful collapse of Soviet Union were major developments in world politics that influenced theory building in international relations. Critical events right before and after the end of the Cold War led to the qualification of neoliberalism by many analysts as outdated and problematic as neo-realism (Dannreuther 2007). However, liberal ideas and especially democratic peace theory still played an important role on security considerations.

The “new thinking” in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy generated by Mikhail Gorbachev as well as relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union pushed for a philosophical revolution in IR theory. A theoretical perspective borrowed from sociology, constructivism found a suitable ground (Hopf 1998; Checkel 1998).

“The core idea of constructivism is the rejection of an unproblematized objective external reality and the need to recognize the world as a social construction, mutually constituted through shared meanings and intersubjective understandings” (Dannreuther 2007: 40).

Constructivism allows for the reading of security “beyond the rationalist theorizing that neglects ideational forces in favor of material ones” (Agius 2007: 50). A social understanding of security breaks the limits of the material approach. Moreover, constructivism gives a prominent role to identity and culture in world politics. Identities are critical for understanding interests and interests are critical for

understanding how actors act (Agius 2007). This theoretical perspective challenges the realist assumption of fixed interests. Thus, differences of states' foreign policies became more understandable and explicable. Furthermore, identity construction became one of the main topics of constructivism because of the need to understand the increase of identity-based conflicts, in which elite manipulation plays a very critical role (Dannreuther 2007). In the framework of this dissertation, identity construction in the context of Georgia is very significant because of its determining role on the securitization of democratization.

Security considerations were generally based on the neorealist assumption of the anarchic structure of international politics until the end of the Cold War. In this anarchical understanding of the world order, even defensive actions were generally perceived as a threat and this led to a security dilemma that was always enhancing the structure's self-help feature. However, constructivism's emphasis on the mutual constitution between agent and structure allowed a new point of view on this vicious circle. Wendt's article provided an important opening for security studies by questioning the traditional portrayal of the international system as anarchic and claiming that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt 1992). The questioning of the presupposition of anarchy was a groundbreaking development for security studies (Wendt 1992). The inquiry into the state's role in the construction of threat perception made visible the critical role of states have in the construction of threats, a defining feature of the international system.

In 1994, following constructivist revival, another important contribution to security studies was the emergence of the critical security studies after a small

conference in Toronto entitled *Strategies in Conflict: Critical Approaches to Security Studies* (Mutimer 2007). Whether this was a theoretical framework or only an orientation towards the discipline (Krause & Williams 1997) is debatable but regardless, the aim to address security from a broader perspective would lead to a lively debate in security studies.

Robert Cox's article, famous for the quote "theory is always for someone and for some purposes" proposes a distinction between problem-solving and critical theory (Cox 1981: 128). This formulation helps us to understand the framework of critical theory. The main difference is what is taken as fixed in problem solving theories, "prevailing social and power relationship and the institutions into which they are organized", are questioned by critical theories (Cox 1981: 128). Moreover, Cox underlines that the aim of these fixed assumptions in problem-solving is not "merely a convenience of method, but also an ideological bias" (Cox 1981: 129). Critical theory blames problem-solving theories for "serving particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within given order" (Cox, 1981). In line with this perspective of critical theory, the change in international relations is considered as a goal of theory building.

This discussion of theory's function in practice was examined by Büger and Villumsen in an article that looks more specifically at the role of democratic peace theory in practice (Büger & Villumsen 2007). This research clarifies many aspects of how democratic peace theory led to the securitization of democracy by examining the role of three actors in this process: US peace researchers, the Clinton government and NATO. The author underlined two distinct approaches to the science and policy

nexus. The first is an imaginary gap between science and policy, which describes science as totally isolated from the practice. The second approach designed by post-structuralists, excessively relies on the text and does not explain the practice. The authors found a middle way by looking from a practice theory perspective. They claim that “the theory and politics of IR hang together in a ‘field of practice’” (Büger & Villumsen 2007: 425). The impact of theories to practice constitutes one of the important debates in international relations, due to intended or unintended consequences of what is theorized in practice

The intertwined connection between practice and theory is also one of the components of the securitization of democracy. The negative impacts of securitization of democratization has to be analyzed as the unintended consequences of democratic peace theory.

The commonalities of constructivism and critical theory are important due to their connection in Critical Security Studies (Booth 2007; Bilgin 2008). They share some commonalities in their criticisms of realism such as: the acceptance of the state as the only referent object of security, the excessive emphasis on just military security as a matter of concern and especially the claim by realists of objectivity (Mutimer 2007). However, Wæver and Buzan clarified the difference between Copenhagen School, a strand of constructivist thinking, and Critical Security Studies (Barry, et al.1998). According to them, Critical Security Studies searched for a change, which is called, emancipation, while the Copenhagen School abstained voluntarily from this attempt of “what “real security” would be for people, what are “actual” security problems larger than those propagated by elites, and the like”

(Barry, et al.1998: 35). Constructivism in this sense can be described as a middle way between traditional theories and critical theory.

It is important to underline the radical approach of some critical theorists to the security concept. These theorists argue out that even the concept is itself deeply problematic and claim that security is,

“A tool defining and constituting the interests of states and their ideological need to posit an enemy ‘other’. As such, security acts as an instrument of oppression rather than emancipation and as an ideological device to prioritize the interests of states and the powerful against the weak and disenfranchised” (Dannreuther 2007: 50).

In line with this conceptualization, critical theory reveals the power politics behind the security issue. This theoretical perspective supports and enhances the understanding of the securitization approach of the Copenhagen School and vice versa. To understand security as “a tool to exclude, to define who are ‘us’ and who are ‘the other’, and to legitimize the rule and practice of the powerful” (Dannreuther 2007: 51) allows for deeper analysis of securitization.

Another contribution to Security Studies in the 1990s was human security. Overemphasis on state security during Cold War was criticized by the proponents of human security and by the anti-statist critical security approach. Although it can be argued that the rise of constructivism inspired in a sense these kinds of anti-realist accounts, the philosophical basis of human security approach stands on the liberal and radical normative traditions, mostly liberal cosmopolitanism and neo-Marxist radicalism (Dannreuther 2007). This tradition was first labelled as ‘human security’ in United Nations policy statements, notably in the *Human Development Report 1994* generated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This document provided a definition of “human security” ambiguously, without the

establishment of a real consensus about its meaning. Human security is described as “a condition where people are given relief from the traumas that besiege human development.” (Kerr 2007: 122). This broad understanding of human security leads to some discussion about the conceptualization. However, although there are debates about the conceptualization, the contribution to the criticism of state centric traditional approaches made with this idea of human security constitutes an important place in security studies.

The human security approach helps to highlight a broad agenda in security studies but is not immune to criticism. The human security, which legitimizes mostly humanitarian intervention and developmental supports of major powers in world politics, is criticized based on the suspicions about the real motivations of major powers. Although the idealist belief is that the needs of the suffering people have to be met in all cases, in some circumstances major powers select within the cases for humanitarian interventions and developmental aids. In the selection of cases, humanitarian motives are accompanied by strategic interests (Dannreuther 2007). Like the concept of collective security, human security has a broad and diffuse conceptualization. When everything is considered a security issue, the meaning of security devalues with overuse and in doing so “it loses its urgency, and collective responsibility for action is weakened rather than strengthened” (Dannreuther 2007: 48).

Cosmopolitan commitment to human security and anti-statist, anti-realist conceptualizations of security share commonalities with critical theory (Dannreuther 2007). However it is important to underline the difference between critical theory

and liberal internationalism out of which, human security was born. As the ideological roots of critical theory is based on the radical neo-Marxist tradition, critical theorists are skeptical about liberal internationalism (Dannreuther 2007). The main idea behind critical theory is human emancipation rather than security. For this reason critical theories that constitute a wide spectrum of different approaches, commonly try to deconstruct deeply nested discourses that hide the interest of power and to create space for emancipation (Dannreuther 2007). Human security is generally linked with development and the push for development to find solutions to human security problems. Human security approaches do not reject the idea of national security but claim that it is insufficient for current security threats.

With the increase of critical and constructivist accounts in security studies, a debate about the framework of security studies appeared in IR studies. Traditionalists, that supported a realist perspective and a narrower agenda of security criticized new approaches to the security studies and accuse them of intellectual incoherence (Barry, et al. 1998). In this point, the Copenhagen School proposed a new framework for demonstrating “how constructivist approach can produce a significant research agenda” (Dannreuther 2007: 43). Firstly, the Copenhagen School categorized the security agenda into five sectors: military, environmental, economic, societal, and political (Barry, et al. 1998). Secondly, with the securitization approach, the School made a radical impact on the democratization of the field of security studies.

“In place of the neo-realist scholar as elite scientist, rationally calculating the multiple security threats ‘out there’, the security analyst focused on securitization stands back and surveys how the general public, and their leaders, ‘construct’ security threats and challenges” (Dannreuther, 2007).

The next section will elaborate on the securitization and de-securitization approaches of the Copenhagen School.

1.2. Securitization and De-Securitization

Within the debate of widening and deepening security, researchers interested to the construction of 'security' and 'security threats' found a suitable analytical framework in the works of the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School provided a distinctive position on the broader theoretical movement to study social construction of security (Williams 2003). The concepts of securitization and de-securitization, which emerged from the writings of Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan (Barry, et al.1998; Wæver, 1995; Wæver, 2011; Wæver, 2012; Buzan & Wæver 2009) rethought the traditional approach to security and started a refreshing debate about security studies. In this section of the paper, the concepts of securitization and de-securitization and critiques of these approaches will be analyzed in order to better understand the conceptual framing of securitization of democratization. The framing of this new concept aims to propose a broader understanding to the constructivist approach of international security that can also respond to some of the critiques of the theoretical framework of securitization.

Three main contributions by the Copenhagen School to security studies can be summarized as theoretical contributions on securitization, different sectors of security and regional security complexes. These three important inputs of the Copenhagen School support and enhance one another. As the founder of securitization approach, the Copenhagen School supported the deepening of the

security concept by underlining the presence of non-state actors. Moreover the school also challenged the traditional understanding of security studies based on the primacy of military sector by proposing four new sectors to be taken into account. These four new sectors are political, economic, societal and environmental security, which all serve to widen issue areas while providing a clear structure in to strengthen the argument of the Copenhagen School against the criticisms of intellectual incoherence and irrelevance (Krause & Williams 1996). Although the Copenhagen School favors the deepening and broadening of security, they were very much attentive about the coherence and conceptual clarity of security studies, which led to another round of criticism about its proximity with neo-realist understanding. The most important contribution of the Copenhagen School to the widening-deepening debate was the concepts of societal security and securitization arising from the work of Buzan and Hansen (Buzan & Hansen 2009). The inclusion of an identity perspective to security with societal sector as well as the questioning of objectivity of threats and construction of security with securitization perspective provided new pathways on the security studies. Besides their contribution, criticisms of the Copenhagen School's new theoretical perspectives offered a suitable environment for new thinking on security.

Even though the intention of Copenhagen School was to challenge the traditional referent object of security - the state - when we analyze proposed new sectors, societal security alone uses a referent object other than state, which is as expected the society. While underlining importance of the Copenhagen School's contribution, it is crucial to lower the expectation from this perspective. Therefore it

is necessary to remember how the Copenhagen School positioned itself in the broader context of international relations theorizing. Scholars from the Copenhagen School locate themselves on the middle of “traditionalist state-centrism on the one hand and equally to traditional Peace Research’s and Critical Security Studies’ calls for ‘individual’ or global security on the other” (Buzan & Hansen 2009). Yet while they self-describe as being in the middle of traditional and modern theories, the critiques of the school have overwhelmingly been about their traditional tendencies.

The Copenhagen School’s questioning of the idea of an objective definition of security was another valuable contribution to security studies. This inquiry led to the flourishing of a discursive conception of security developed by Wæver. In this framework, the definition of security was dependent on the successful construction in discourse, by speech-act and that is conceptualized as securitization (Buzan & Hansen 2009). Securitization is defined by Buzan and his colleagues, as an extreme version of politicization. According to this framework any public issue located in a spectrum made up of three levels: non-politicized, politicized, and securitized. A politicized public issue is securitized when the issue is defined as an “existential threat” that requires “emergency measures” and the “actions outside of the normal bounds of political procedure” and is justified by the securitizing actor (Barry, et al. 1998: 23-24). The securitizing move can be initiated by the state and its representatives or by other social entities (Barry, et al. 1998).

Understanding of how this process works is critical to understanding securitization theory. As previously mentioned, the Copenhagen School rejected the

idea that “security” is an objective condition. According to their frameworks, the social construction of security issues may be followed by examining the speech act through which threats become represented and recognized. “Speech Act” describes an existing security situation but more importantly, it can generate security situations of its own (Williams 2003). In the beginning, security was seen as a speech act and the utterance itself was the act. According to Wæver, even by expressing the word “security”, a state-representative can move a subject to a new realm where he or she can claim a special right to use extraordinary means to block the threat (Wæver 1995). Securitization was drawn as a speech act and it is completed with utterance but later on, the intersubjective nature of securitization is taken into account. Accordingly, securitization scholars began to argue that a successful transition from a securitizing move to a securitization required the acceptance of an audience. The theory argues that a rejection by the audience would cause the transition to fail. Although the role of the audience is defined, this is one of the most criticized parts of this theory due to the lack of evidence for the argument. Indeed, the audience is one of the critical actors in this process and for this reason a much deeper analysis of the role of audience is critical.

When we examine the actors that are involved in the process of securitization, there are two critical roles: the securitizing actor and the audience. The securitizing actor position is directly related with the success of securitization. “Some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define the security” (Barry, et al. 1998: 31). However, the Copenhagen School also claims that “the field is structured or biased, but no one

conclusively “holds” the power of securitization” (Barry, et al. 1998: 31). They emphasize that privilege plays a role in the articulation of security and therefore “to study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept” (Barry, et al. 1998: 32).

For a speech act to be successful, reflected in the acceptance of the audience and by its reflections on emergency policies, the Copenhagen School argues that several “facilitating conditions” must be present:

“(1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor – that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in securitizing attempt, and (3) features of alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization” (Barry, et al.1998: 33)

Even though the concept of de-securitization is under-theorized, it is clear that the Copenhagen School prefers it to securitization in many issue areas. The School does not prioritize or define securitization as a positive act. In only a few security sectors like the environment do, they claim that “securitizing injects urgency into an issue and leads to a sustained mobilization of political support and deployment of resources” (Emmers 2007: 141). Moreover, securitization can help to adopt additional and emergency measures, which will help the survival of the referent object. However, it is also important to note that securitization can be abused by political elites “to legitimize and empower the role of the military or special security forces in civilian activities” (Emmers 2007: 142). Emergency measures can exceed the intention and be harmful to the audience. They can be used as a pretext for pressures towards the society and can conflict with international norms such as human rights. Therefore, in their groundbreaking work, *Security: A New Framework*

for Analysis, Buzan and Wæver viewed de-securitization as a better approach.

Wæver's idea of de-securitization is "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of political sphere" (Barry, et al. 1998: 4).

As argued from the Copenhagen School's approach to de-securitization, the issue based approach and cautious use of securitization is necessary. Excessive or widespread use of securitization can be dangerous and harmful in some issue areas.

In the conceptual framing of securitization there are three types of units, which play a critical role on the process: referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional actors. Referent objects are described as "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim for survival" (Barry, et al. 1998: 36). The traditional approach to referent object was the prioritization of the state and the nation. Accordingly, sovereignty for the state and identity for the nation was highly securitized. However, the changes in international politics led to the widening of the referent objects that claim survival. On the current conjuncture, in different security sectors that Copenhagen School suggested, there are different kinds of referent objects such as environment, nuclear weapons, and immigration. As the selection of the issue depends on the securitizing actor, the expansion of issues is unpredictable. This dissertation also draws its assumption on the expansion of referent objects and on the emergence of democratization as a referent object of securitization.

It is necessary to clarify the term securitizing actor. According to this perspective, "common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure group" (Barry, et al. 1998: 40). Every actor

does not have the same capacity to initiate a successful securitization, but rather an actor's position will determine the pathway of securitization. Although it can be argued that powerful actors have the virtue to be the voice of security, even the most powerful players in world politics cannot force every referent to be securitized. It is critical to describe these initiatives as attempts.

To map the actors that are more or less privileged in articulating security means "to study securitization is to study the power politics of a concept" (Barry, et al. 1998: 32) and is useful in understanding power politics in international relations. Functional actors in the securitization process play an important role according to the Copenhagen School's framework, as they affect the dynamics of a sector like in the case of a polluting company in the environmental sector (Barry, et al. 1998).

The Copenhagen School's success in developing the concept of securitization was evident as it is settled in the lexicon of International Relations and this concept has been applied since then to many different issue areas (McDonald 2008). However, aside from its success, the concept of securitization has been also criticized in many ways. Instead of taking those critics as attempt to dismantle the concept, it is better to analyze them in order to improve the contributions of the Copenhagen School to security studies.

As mentioned previously one of the most important challengers of the Copenhagen School is Critical Security Studies. Ken Booth's criticisms were essential for the acceleration of securitization studies. First, Booth questions the claim of the Copenhagen School on the broadening of security. Booth argues that Buzan and his colleagues' approach is still traditional and that their assumption is

still state-centric, meaning that it is inappropriate to claim that the Copenhagen School provides a radical change for the deepening and widening of security studies (Booth 2007). Due to the commitment to consistency and the relevance of the study area, it is right to claim that the Copenhagen School cannot reject all traditional structures. Even the widening of issue areas that security studies cover was not able to include new actors to the equation. The dominance of the state as the securitizing actor is one of the shortfalls of securitization theory. The implementation of this theoretical structure to new issue areas and cases can break this state-centric perception.

McDonald, while emphasizing the importance of securitization studies “to illuminate key elements of the ways in which security preferences and practices are constructed”, also underlines the problem of the approach by describing security politics as negative and exclusionary (McDonald 2008: 566). Booth also claims that the Copenhagen School perceives securitization as equal to militarization. According to the School, when an issue is securitized it is moved to the area of traditional security considerations that are militarized, conflictual and zero sum. Due to that the Copenhagen School suggests a return to the safe territory of politics by de-securitization. However, Booth defends that securitization of some issue areas is beneficial because doing so puts it on the agenda, making it more visible to the public. Booth claims that the Copenhagen School perceives securitization as a failure to deal within the borders of normal politics (Booth 2007). He accused the Copenhagen School for still having a Cold War mindset “by freezing ‘security’ in its Cold War conceptualization, and so reifying it as military problem-solving, the

Copenhagen school connives in making security studies a static and conservative project – the opposite of its intentions” (Booth 2007: 167).

The Copenhagen School is not only accused of being state-centric but also its approach is defined as elite-based (Booth 2007). Wæver claimed that “by definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (Wæver 2011). Accordingly, this top-down understanding also demonstrates why this approach gave little importance to human rights (Booth 2007). This elitist approach has also normative commitments and implications. This approach gives the role to deciding and constructing security to the powerful while marginalizing the powerless, who are pictured at best as the audience that “can collectively consent to or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite discourses” (McDonald 2008: 574). In line with this elitist side of securitization theory, another deeply analyzed and criticized assumption of Wæver’s is that security is a “speech act.” Although in later studies, some improvements were made with the inclusion of the audience to the context, still there are many valuable critiques that the securitization approach has to take into account. One of them was Lene Hansen’s “The Little Mermaid”, which criticizes the presupposition that speech-act is always possible. Hansen, based on the story of Little Mermaid, comes up with the concept of “security as silence” in order to show that some groups in the world does not have the power to voice their security problems. Moreover, this is one of the dilemmas of the elitist approach. When there is not an actor that can voice the insecurity, “security as silence” occurs (Hansen 2000). The existence of a threat does not depend on the speech act in some cases. Hansen also criticizes the Copenhagen School’s normative

positioning on de-securitization; she underlines the need for a voice in some issue areas. Hansen criticizes the conditions to become a referent object of securitization and underlines that gender security is almost excluded from qualifying a referent object. In line with this criticism, she suggests “to include the body as an additional epistemological focus, and to examine the individualizing strategies employed in keeping security problems from appearing at the collective level” (Hansen 2000). Hansen also underlines the insufficiency of speech acts based on oral and written words and instead proposes a broader definition that encompasses non-verbal forms of speech and communication (2000). Many researchers propose the expansion of securitization to cover visual materials, which are one of the most effective forms of communication in the contemporary world.

Media is one the most effective tools of communication. However, it is important to note that while securitization theory gives the role of securitizing actor to leaders or elites, on the visual side, the actor is changing and new questions arise from this shift as to “agency, intentionality, and the importance of contestation over meaning” (McDonald 2008). Moreover, McDonald also points out that the “facilitating conditions” such as “the form of speech act, the role securitizing actor and conditions historically associated with that threat” are under-theorized (2008: 571). Indeed, as securitization is seen as the speech act by Wæver, the audience and the facilitating factors are not well developed. For future research, as McDonald also clearly reveals there is an obvious necessity to pay attention to the social, political and historical contexts in which it was possible to construct some specific discourses (McDonald 2008). Here are several critical questions that McDonald asks that the

future research take into account regarding the context as a facilitating factor of securitization:

“Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization? To what extent is political possibility defined by the target audience of speech acts? How are some voices empowered or marginalized to define security and threat?” (McDonald, 2008: 573)

Thierry Balzacq makes valuable contributions to securitization theory regarding speech-acts. He proposes a new strategic (pragmatic) model of security, which also can be an answer to the critiques of securitization studies mentioned above. The aim with this strategic model was to correct the securitization approach with three new assumptions “(i) that an effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent; (iii) that an effective securitization is power-laden” (Balzacq 2005: 171). With these corrections, Balzacq claims that “securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq 2005: 172).

The Copenhagen School left aside critiques on “shortcomings in terms of silence, non-verbal securitizations, causal explanations and the need to refine the understanding of audience(s)” (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 254) and tried to answer only the critiques on the level of analysis in securitization theory by proposing macro-securitizations, which aims to establish an understanding beyond the middle range referents (Buzan & Hansen 2009).

Securitization theory does not develop any assumption about what follows the construction of the threat. The theory only briefly discusses the domestic policy implications. The use of emergency measures and actions outside normal politics may lead to the suspension of democratic procedures, which in turn may damage the rule of law or even lead to authoritarianism, but these discussions are not well developed in the framework of securitization theory. Moreover, this also has international impacts, as in the case of securitization of democratization, which necessitates a deep analysis of the ramifications of securitization.

The macro-securitization approach will be evaluated later in detail before the conceptualization of securitization of democratization. The claim of this dissertation is that securitization of democratization will cover the securitization understanding of the Copenhagen School but will look at the construction of threat from a broader understanding like Thierry Balzacq's strategic model suggests. Moreover, this dissertation will also examine one of the probable outcomes of securitization on the international level: the security dilemma.

1.3. Democratization as a Referent Object of Securitization

Democracy a term that is widely used, hardly defined and poorly understood, constitutes a historic problem that has to be dealt in order to understand the term democratization. However, the conceptual debate on democracy and democratization is not an easy task to resolve because it continues to develop as an ongoing debate without real consensus.

The long journey of democracy begins with the first accepted experience of direct democracy in Greek city states, and Athens was the most well-known example

of this period. From that point to now, democracy as a system of governance has come a long and difficult way. The democratic equality ideal was perceived as the whim of the people in early periods. Then, this ideal evolved to its current meaning by its amalgamation with the republican and liberal ideas. In the process of this journey, democracy became one of the main discussions of philosophy. This debate started with the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. The evolution of this debate from the harsh criticisms of Plato and Aristotle to the acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town” is useful in understanding the philosophical and historical background.

Currently the “only game in town”, democracy is accepted as a universal norm that has to be promoted all over the world (McFaul 2004). Earlier, as during the First World War, Woodrow Wilson claimed that the aim of the war was to make the world safe for democracy (Moller & Skaaning 2013) but today the converse version is more acceptable - in order to make the world safe, we need democracy. The idea that democratic peace theory promoted, has led to the strengthening of the belief that democracies did not fight each other, which means if democracy can become the only type of regime, the main problem of international relations – wars – will be eliminated. However, with the developments of similar approaches, the pressure on the spread of democracy legitimized all means for this ‘precious’ end and escalated to a degree that damages the normative value of the term.

Nonetheless, once democracy acquired an unprecedented role as a political regime internationally, democracy promotion was also assumed to be a necessity and even a “world value” by some experts (McFaul 2004). Although we can argue for

universal acceptance of democracy and democracy promotion efforts, it is important to note that there is still considerable criticism about democracy. Moreover, even if we can unite on the virtue of democracy, there is no agreed upon definition of the term. In some cases, this lack of consensus damages the value of democracy due to misunderstandings and misuses. In this context appears democracies with adjectives such as illiberal democracy that are sometimes in conflict with the core meaning of democracy. Due to reasons similar to those mentioned, to understand the evolution of democracy on the historical and philosophical perspective is important to comprehend current debates. However, this discussion is beyond the limits of this dissertation.

This part of this chapter will briefly describe the conceptual debate of democracy and democratization. The reason behind this clarification is that although an increasing number of states claim that they act according to common internationally shared principal of democracy, what they understand from this can be very different. The different understandings of democracy and democratization is evident from the clear decline of the quality of democracy both in democratizing states and consolidated democracies despite the increasing discourse around the belief in democracy and democratization throughout the world (Grugel & Bishop 2014). Hereafter, how this study defines democracy and democratization will be clarified for opening the way to the development a new concept –securitization of democratization.

1.3.1. What is Democracy and Democratization?

Resulting from the merge of *Demos* and *cratos*, democracy essentially means a form of government based on the rule of the people. Democracy is one of the most popular concepts in contemporary life and arouses different meanings for everyone. However, this concept also has a critical role because the use of politicians and scholars has implications on daily lives of ordinary people. Currently, politicians are using the term democracy abundantly in order to legitimize their actions and in response, scholars try to make a clear conceptualization in order to prevent misunderstanding of a normative term. Even to describe these terms is difficult, being far easier to accept that democracy is “a construction about which there will never be agreement because it is multidimensional, abstract, qualitative, internally complex, and evaluative” (Moller & Skaaning 2013: 13).

There are four different approaches on the conceptualization of democracy summarized by Charles Tilly, which are widely accepted: constitutional, substantive, procedural and process-oriented (2007). The constitutional approach that simplifies the understanding and measurement of democracy, gives attention to enacted laws regarding political activities. However “discrepancies between announced principles and daily practices” (Tilly 2007: 7) complicate the assessment of the regime type. Another approach is the substantive one that prioritizes living conditions and evaluates whether the regime promotes “human welfare, individual freedom, security, equity, social equality, public deliberation, and peaceful conflict resolution” (Tilly 2007: 7). Procedural definitions based their assumptions on the presence of a narrow range governmental practices especially elections in order to determine the

regime's democratic level (Tilly 2007). This narrow understanding of democracy makes easier to measure the regime type therefore, it is widely used in democracy literature for positivist reasons and Schumpeter's conceptualization is the well-known example of this approach. The last one of these four approaches is the process-oriented conceptualization of democracy that determines "some minimum set of processes that must be continuously in motion for a situation to qualify as democratic" (Tilly 2007: 9). Robert A. Dahl's conceptualization that will be examined in detail later is the most important contribution to this approach.

Although a remarkable consensus on the minimal definition of democracy is deemed to have reached, there are still many debates starting from the minimal procedural definition of Schumpeter to the wider process-oriented approach of Dahl (Schumpeter 2010, Dahl 1989). Accordingly due to this non-consensus on the conceptualization, we are witnessing a period of flourishing democracy with adjectives. Without discussing the issue of different adjectives in order to define correctly the regime, in this part we will briefly examine well-known explanations of major experts of democracy.

As aforementioned it is not easy define what democracy is when it is widely used but for our purpose, it is critical to understand that:

"Democracy does not consist of a single unique set of institutions. There are many different types of democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects. The specific form of democracy takes is contingent upon a country's socioeconomic conditions as well as its entrenched state structures and policy practices" (Schmitter & Lynn 1996: 50).

Schumpeter who is widely quoted on democracy literature defines democratic method as an "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which

individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 2010: 241). However, this conceptualization led to the fallacy of "electoralism". Participation of the citizen to the policy making cannot be limited with the implementation of regular, free and fair elections. The idea to exclude citizens from the policy making process outside election periods is not acceptable for contemporary modern democracies. Instead, "citizens can seek influence public policy through a wide variety of other intermediaries: interest associations, social movements, locality groupings, clientelistic arrangements, and so forth" (Schmitter & Lynn, 1996: 52).

When we follow the development of the conceptualization of democracy, Schmitter and Karl added the idea of accountability to Schumpeter's basic procedural definition; this critical contribution acknowledges mechanisms other than elections. Schmitter and Karl defined modern political democracy as "a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (1996: 50). This understanding provides more room for citizens. Moreover, the idea of cooperation moves us to the characteristic of deliberative democracy and these two important aspects, deliberation and cooperation add "civil society" to the equation (Schmitter & Lynn 1996).

Currently, the narrow conceptualization of Schumpeter, based on the mechanism of elections, is not compatible with the modern understanding of democracy. While criticizing the redefinition of "democracy" for the justification of authoritarian, Robert Dahl chose the term "polyarchy" for these governments in

order to make a more precise definition. According to him, democracy is not a goal that can be reached in the contemporary nation-state system and instead we now face a decade of polyarchy. He acknowledges democracy as an ideal from the Greek city states era. He emphasizes necessary institutions for polyarchy:

- “1. Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair, and free elections in which coercion is quite limited.
3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections
4. Most adults also have the right run for the public offices for which candidates run in these elections.
5. Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the dominant ideology.
6. They also have access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any single group.
7. Finally they have an effectively enforced right to form and join autonomous associations, including political associations, such as political parties and interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and by other peaceful means” (Dahl 1989: 233).

These procedural and process-oriented requisites for democracy, while acknowledging clearly defined procedures of elections contributes to the conceptualization by adding critical freedoms that will provide a fair background for elections and a free environment for the emergence of civil society. Moreover, Schmitter and Karl added two more criteria to the Dahl’s procedures and process-oriented requisites. According to them, first, “popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials” (Schmitter & Lynn 1996: 55). Secondly, they propose an implicit prior condition to Dahl’s criteria, “the polity must

be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system” (Schmitter & Lynn 1996: 55).

Leaving aside the complicated debate on the requisites of democracy, we can analyze Collier and Levitsky’s article “Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research”, which addresses the difficulties of conceptualizing democracy from a different perspective (1997). According to the authors, two contradictory aims of analytic differentiation and conceptual validity led to the proliferation of alternative conceptual forms that includes various numbers of subtypes involving democracy “with adjectives” (Collier & Levitsky 1997). They examined different strategies of conceptual innovation in order to increase analytic differentiation for characterizing the diverse regimes that have emerged and to maintain conceptual validity by avoiding conceptual stretching (Collier & Levitsky 1997). They argued that the consistency and clarity of meaning is essential for assessing the causes and consequences of democracy (Collier & Levitsky 1997). According to their analysis, it is important not to attribute adjectives that are challenging the core idea of democracy and not to lean on the concept of democracy for expanding procedural minimum definition. In addition, they draw the attention to the differentiation between democratic regime, government and state. “When a given country is labeled “democratic”, the meaning can vary according to the overarching concept to which the term is attached” (Collier & Levitsky 1997: 446).

From this summary of the debate about the conceptualization of democracy, this dissertation, in order to understand the causes of democracy and consequently democracy promotion strategies, will accept democracy as a system of governance

that must carry the seven features designated by Dahl and the two other features that Schmitter and Karl added. Moreover based on the approach of Collier and Levitsky, in the framework of this dissertation, the democratization process also covers a period from a democratic government towards a democratic state.

Democratization, “the process of the evolvement, the sustainment, the expansion/ deepening, or political-cultural rootage of a democracy” (Jawad 2005: 3) is the basis of this dissertation on the Georgia’s political transformation. When the accepted definition of democracy is broader, the understanding of democratization also differs. For example, Charles Tilly who based his approach of democracy on citizen- state relations argued that “a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (Tilly 2007: 13). According to him democratization means a “movement toward broader, more equal, more protected and more binding consultation” (Tilly 2007: 13).

Held sees democracy as needing more liberalism and participation, combining liberal and Marxist values to reach a meaning of democracy that supports a basic principle of autonomy. According to Held, democratic autonomy “requires both an accountable state and a democratic reordering of civil society” (Sorensen 2008: 11). Held draws a development path from political democracy towards democratic autonomy with the increase on the liberalization and participation. He deals with the reforming of the state power and restructuring of civil society (Held 2006).

Approaches to democratization are determinative to clarify the pathway of this dissertation. Two questions – how democracy emerges and why it emerges - appear on the agenda of the study of democratization and as such, these are the basic questions asked by this dissertation. “How” questions lead us to what happens during democratization and emphasizes “the role of elite pacts, mass social movements or international interventions” (Haerpfer, et al. 2009: 4). This classical approach to democratization, while putting forward the role of human agency, describes the process in a highly formalized way like game-theoretical models of transition processes (Haerpfer, et al. 2009). This limited understanding was one of the disappointments of transition paradigm, which influenced democracy promotion policies that failed to establish working democracies despite wasted efforts.

In response to “why” questions, the conditions that predate democratization processes, become more apparent. In order to respond to the question “Why do democracies appear?”, researchers have analyzed the role different dynamics in the emergence and consolidation of democracy such as the role of economic development, historical experiences, social cleavages, class coalitions, political culture, and international alliances. This condition- focused approach can be enlarged and its success is highlighting the causes and the circumstances that pave the way to the emergence of democratic transitions typically (Haerpfer, et al. 2009).

In this dissertation, Wolfgang Merkel’s definition of the concept of *embedded democracy* will be applied for clarifying the conditions that are necessary for democratization. According to Merkel,

“The concept of *embedded democracy* follows the idea that stable constitutional democracies are embedded in two ways. Internally, the specific interdependence/

dependence of the different partial regimes of a democracy secure its normative and functional existence. Externally, these partial regimes are embedded in spheres of enabling conditions for democracy that protect it from outer as well as inner shocks and destabilizing tendencies” (Merkel 2004: 36).

He later attempts to describe the defining elements of a democracy, such as an electoral regime, political liberties, civic rights, horizontal accountability, and effective powers to govern. Additionally he emphasized the stateness, civic culture, and social and economic requisite (Merkel 2004) conditions upon which this dissertation will also focus. Using Merkel’s approach to embedded democracies, Pamela Jawad summarizes a chart of conducive and obstructive factors for democratic consolidation that she applied to the Georgian case. These categories are critical in arranging the theoretical approaches to democratization. She developed five main types using Merkel’s embedded democracy approach: stateness and nation building, political stability, socio economic development, civic culture and political traditions as well as the international context (Jawad 2005).

By using Jawad’s framework, it will be possible to emphasize the most underdeveloped areas of democratization studies- the nation-state building and international dimension - as Kopecky and Mudde also argued. They emphasize that it is necessary “to develop a coherent and broad understanding of the complex relationships between the processes of state-building, nation-building and the process of democratization” (Kopecky & Mudde 2000).

In conclusion, though one of most difficult concepts to define, democracy and democratization are critical to understanding the political transformation process in Georgia between 2003 and 2013. Determinants of democratization, which arose from the understanding of democracy, will enlighten external and/or internal impacts in

this process. The securitization of democratization that will be analyzed in the next part, will contribute to the debate on the international dimension of democratization. Moreover, by using the determinants of democratization, this new framework will also demonstrate the relationship between internal and external dimension during the democratization process.

CHAPTER II: SECURITIZATON OF DEMOCRATIZATON

The relationship between international relations theory and its policy implications is still a contentious issue in international relations studies. However, the impact of the democratic peace theory on the policies of various actors is much more widely accepted. Democratic peace theory's most important implication is the initiation of democracy promotion policies. In the past decade, democracy promotion efforts intensified largely due to the belief that there is an "island of peace" between the democracies. To tackle war is a well-known, mainstream problem of IR and the aim of traditional IR was to search for paths to peace.

While increasing democracy promotion efforts, democratic peace theory also contributed to the emergence of the securitization of democracy and democratization by providing the necessary theoretical tools to practitioners. The knowledge of peaceful relations among democratic countries has clearly shaped global politics. Like a bushfire, this vision spread to the world after 1990s due to the considerable efforts of various states, international organizations and institutions (Büger & Villumsen 2007). However Büger and Villumsen put forth the exclusionary characteristic of the democratic peace assumption. To claim that democracy secures means conversely that non-democracies are the reason of war existence. These non-democratic states are excluded and blamed as a cause of war (Büger & Villumsen

2007). Moreover, there is a belief that the democratic peace approach led to the normalization of violence between democratic and non-democratic states (Büger & Villumsen 2007). The excessive focus on regime type as a reason or remedy of war, increased tension on the democratization processes all over the world. Particularly the discourse that various leaders used during this period inflamed the process of securitization for protecting democracy and democratization. Determining the real intention of leaders is out of the scope of this dissertation, but intentionally or unintentionally the securitization of democratization paved the way to negative consequences in some cases.

The denomination of democratic peace as exclusive reminds us Buzan's approach about universalisms. Buzan and Wæver claim that there are four different universalisms: inclusive⁶, exclusive⁷, existing order, and physical threat universalisms. According to them, the only candidate for an inclusive universalism is the liberal market democracy but they also acknowledge that there is some resistance towards this universalism, especially in the Islamic world and Asia. They also underline the suspicion that arose after 9/11 that this is an imperial universalist project of the US military be enforced all over the world (Buzan & Wæver 2009).

As Büger and Villumsen claim, democracy promotion can be structured in an exclusivist and hierarchical universalism framework. The idea that the "US can only

⁶ "*inclusive universalisms*: ideological beliefs, whether secular or religious, about the best way to optimise the human condition. These are universalist in the sense that they claim to be directly and immediately applicable to all of humankind (for example, Liberalism, Marxism, Christianity, Islam." (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 260).

⁷ "*exclusive universalisms*: ideological beliefs that claim superior rights and status for one group over the rest of humankind (for example, Nazism, white supremacy European imperial doctrines; Japanese imperial doctrine). These are universalist in the sense that they claim the right of one group to rule over, or even replace, all of humankind" (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 260-261).

be secure when the world is safe for its version of democracy and capitalism” (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 263) pushes for a kind of universalism that may be confronted with another exclusive and hierarchical universalism. As Buzan and Wæver predict, the clash between two exclusivist universalisms will lead to a conflictual macro-securitization and the creation of a large-scale constellation.

It is now evident that the US attempt for an inclusive universalism in democracy did not successfully transform into macro-securitization. These kinds of efforts led to increasing suspicion about the US conceptualization of democracy. Therefore, in contemporary world system, we witness a rise of exclusivist universalisms on democracy, which start to evolve on two large-scale constellations between democratic and non-democratic countries.

The attempt for the macro-securitization of democracy, which began at the end of Cold War has magnified after the September 11 attacks to US. The current rhetoric on the US the promotion of democracy should not be taken to mean that US has always supported democracies globally. During Cold War, US relations with non-democratic countries were consistently criticized. At times, the US has supported authoritarian regimes and in some other was indifferent towards them due to its national interests. Even there was period of times that US was hostile towards democracy, illustrated by President Richard Nixon’s declaration that democracy was “not necessarily the best form of government for people in Asia, Africa and Latin America” (Kagan 2015: 25). Still, national interest plays an important role in relations between the US and non-democracies. Recently, democracy has taken a new role in the formation of US policies. The change is observable through the

examination of US National Security Strategy papers are examined in the last decade. Democracy and democratization played a critical role for US national security and became increasingly important for foreign policy. An obvious attempt at the macro-securitization of democracy is seen in the discourse employed by the US in these documents it. However, it is important to underline that this is only an attempt because macro-securitization necessitates more than the move of the securitizing actor but it must be accepted by the audience as well. The details of macro-securitization will be discussed hereafter; what is truly important to this dissertation is the micro-level impacts created by the attempt of the macro-securitization of democracy. One example of these micro-level impacts is witnessed in the case study of this dissertation during the Georgian democratization.

Securitization of democratization can be analyzed in a country, in a region, or in at global context, but the aim of this dissertation is to analyze securitization of democratization in the context of a single country. Securitization of democratization in a country occurs in two interrelated dimensions: domestic and international. To put it more clearly, the intertwined characteristic of domestic and international dynamics obstructs any analysis that excludes or ignores one of the levels. Therefore, securitization of democratization will put forward one aspect of the democratization, which can successfully demonstrate the interplay between the domestic and international dimensions by the securitization approach.

This approach will broaden the understanding of democratization studies on two points: first, by demonstrating the nested domestic and international processes and second, by challenging the single perspective on the impact of international

dimension. Democratization literature is generally based on the domestic dimension of the process or otherwise emphasizes the international dimension separately. In the era of globalization, it is not possible to claim that a country's democratization process is isolated from external impacts. It is also unfair to show a democratizing country as a solely a puppet of external powers. For this reason, a balanced approach that will critically examine the impact of the two levels is necessary. By the same token, democracy promotion literature draws a generally positive picture of the external impact. However, it is important to underline that the international dimension involves more than just Western powers that support the spread of democracy and also that their impact is not always positive. Critical analysis of the international dimension that brings the impact of other countries apart from Western countries into the picture and the impartial understanding of their impacts is a necessity.

How to define securitization of democratization? Securitization of democratization is the corollary of the macro-securitization of democracy in those countries in which the context is suitable for the emergence of a securitization of democratization. Securitization of democratization means the development of a discourse by a securitizing actor(s) that warns the audience about the dangers towards democratization. The securitizing actor(s) can be an external actor, a state or an international organization or an internal actor, again state (state representatives), or civil society. Once the securitizing move is initiated, if the audience accepts this discourse and supports the application of procedures and methods out of the normal

boundaries of politics, emergency measures can be applicable on the democratization process.

There are two important players in this process: the securitizing actor and the audience. As mentioned previously, securitization of democratization is a two-dimensional game in that the audience can also be an internal or an external actor, or in some cases both, depending on the context. This approach is different from the Copenhagen School's securitization understanding because of the impact of the international dimension. The securitization of democratization approach broadens the Copenhagen School's understanding of a wide range actors and audiences.

The Copenhagen School considers the acceptance of the audience as a prerequisite for successful securitization. When you have two dimensions, acceptance by the external and internal audience is important for legitimizing policies. However, the external actor's rejection of securitization is not an obstacle for the internal securitization, though the clash of interest can lead to the emergence of a security dilemma. An external actor's rejection of securitization can actually strengthen the domestic acceptance of the emergency measures, depending on the context. Internally, it is necessary that the audience accepts securitization particularly in democratic environments. In authoritarian contexts, it is important to underline that securitization does not have to be for domestic use because many authoritarian regimes will not wait for audience's approval for securitizing an issue. These regimes call for external acceptance in order to legitimize their suppressive policies in the international arena.

As the Copenhagen School suggests, to analyze the securitization of democratization it is first necessary to examine discourse that is constructed by the actors in this process. Moreover, as critiques of the Copenhagen School demonstrate, speech acts alone are not enough to understand the process. Therefore, the facilitating conditions that Balzacq underlines in his strategic model, “configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq 2005: 172) will be analyzed in the framework of securitization of democratization. The historical context of the securitization of democratization is of particular importance. This historical context provides critical hints on the discursive act.

As it was mentioned previously in detail, there are three important moves in the construction of threat: the securitizing move, the speech act; the acceptance or rejection of the audience; and the transformation of the speech act to real policy implementation. The Copenhagen School did not address the policy implementation and the impacts of those policies. However, in this dissertation, the impact of securitization of democratization will be also evaluated. The determinants of democratization used as the tools of policy makers in the securitization process will be analyzed. Due to the limits of this dissertation, three main determinants of democratization that play a critical role during securitization - stateness and nation building, socio-economic development, and civic culture will be the focus point of this study.

2.1. Policy Implications of Securitization of Democratization - Determinants of Democratization as a Policy Tool

In the framework of securitization of democratization, some determinants of the process are the tools for enhancing democratization at the hands of securitizing actor(s). Internal or external audience(s) can perceive the use of those determinants as a foreign policy tool as a threat. This perception may create a spiral of tension between the securitizing actor and the audience. This spiral can lead to a security dilemma between these actors. This security dilemma, which is emerging not due the difficulty of distinguishing the defensive or offensive nature of weapons, but rather appears due to the impossibility of knowing one another's mind, will be examined in the following section.

2.1.1. Stateness and Nation –Building

The sharp and clear assumption of Linz and Stepan started one of the very critical debates on democratization – “Democracy is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 17). According to their approach, stateness is one of the basic prerequisites of democratization (Linz & Stepan 1996). This understanding gave priority to the fixed idea of stateness before democratization. However, while the concept of the state is still debatable in international relations, what we have to understand from stateness become another problem for understanding the relationship between democratization and stateness. Linz and Stepan emphasize Weber's conceptualization of modern state: the state as an established order in a defined territory, composed of members of states that we name as citizens, as well as

entitled structure with the monopoly of violence. Moreover, they add to this conceptualization Charles Tilly's idea of sovereignty. According to Linz and Stepan "Democracy requires statehood. Without a sovereign state, there can be no secure democracy" (Linz & Stepan 1996: 19). They clarify four basic components of state: territory, people / citizens, government, and sovereignty, all of which are essential for stateness.

This understanding is further enhanced by two important characteristics of stateness, "the existence of a monopoly of violence in a sovereign territory and an agreement about citizenship within this polity" (Moller & Skaaning 2011: 16). The conceptualization of stateness by Linz and Stepan leads us first to look at the state building process based on the idea of the monopoly of violence a state has in a sovereign territory and second, to consider nation building considering the idea of an agreement about citizenship within this polity. While accepting the difficulty of distinguishing these interconnected processes, these two sometimes parallel, sometimes interwoven processes will be briefly examined and criticized separately.

It has to be underlined that in the framework of this dissertation, stateness will not be considered as a prerequisite of democracy. Rather stateness, an important component of stability will be described as a determinant of democratization. Another importance of stateness, formulated also as nation and state building, is that the policies of internal actors during these processes may generate a domestic structure in which external powers may exert intervening policies on their internal affairs.

The state building process aims to establish the four main components of a state. Without going into great detail, firstly, during the democratization process, having a clearly defined territory is vital because conflicts over land with neighbors or minorities adversely influence democratization processes. Conflictual relations with neighbors or minorities endanger political liberalization, which is an important component of democratization. When security is at the top of the agenda, democratization is generally sacrificed for security. In the Georgian case study, this parameter is critical because the country experienced a very problematic period of state building because of the secessionist movements. Moreover, Lipset also made an examination of other requisites of democracy such as legitimacy and effectiveness of the political system that are correlated to but distinct from economic development (Lipset 1959). Two concepts, effectiveness and legitimacy, are keywords for the democracy promoter community. These requisites posed another critical problem for the Georgian government following the Rose Revolution. The Georgian economy was on the verge of collapse due to the lack of effective and legitimate governance.

The issue of sovereignty created new debates flourished again with Stephen D. Krasner's proposition for democratization in some parts of the world with "shared sovereignty". This understanding challenges Linz and Stephan's idea of stateness that prioritizes sovereignty in a clear territory with a monopoly of violence. Krasner claims that external powers can play a guiding role if there is an internationally accepted legal sovereign in the country, which can have an agreement with an external power for sharing sovereignty in some policy areas (Krasner 2005). This contradicting idea about the impact of sovereignty to the democratization process

describes how some prescriptions that democracy promotion community suggests to non-democratic states emerge. In the Georgian case until the Rose Revolution, rather than share its sovereignty in some issue areas with external powers as Krasner suggested, the central government instead the central government shared this with some illegal formations that will be analyzed in detail during the examination of the historical background of Georgian political transformation.

Secondly, according to Linz and Stepan's approach, the feeling of belonging of citizens to the state also demonstrates the capacity of stateness. This means that citizenship policies and their coverage have a determinative impact on stateness. Rustow also claimed that there is a single background condition for democratization, the national unity. "It simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to (Rustow 1970: 350)." Linz and Stepan also claim that "in a multinational setting, the chances to consolidate democracy are increased by state policies that grant inclusive and equal citizenship and that give all citizens a common "roof" of state-mandated and enforced individual rights" (Linz & Stepan 1996: 33). At this point, Jawad's approach to the complementarity of nation and state building processes helps us. Three elements of state are completed by the evolution of a common identity among the inhabitants of a country that we call people. As Jawad urges, when individual living in a part of the country do not identify themselves with the central government and claim their own state or accuse the state of unfair distribution of resources, the political community will be endangered and societal developments will not occur (Jawad 2005). This describes Georgia in the beginning

of 1990s well, when the country was hit hard by ethnic wars. The Georgian population is composed of different ethnic groups and the Soviet heritage of different administrative systems in some regions caused crisis during the nation building process.

With their article “Stateness First”, Moller and Skaaning deepened the debate that began with Linz and Stepan. They attempted to answer the question “To what extent is stateness a necessary condition for electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights, respectively?” (Moller & Skaaning 2011:5). By using Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), they encountered some manifest empirical regularity. According to them, stateness is a requisite for certain attributes of democracy such as electoral rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and social rights. However, empirical findings demonstrated that it is more of a prerequisite for rule of law and social rights, which means “a fortiori in the contemporary era of ‘liberal hegemony’ problems of stateness are more relevant for the thicker types of democracy (liberal democracy and social democracy) than for thinner types of democracy (electoral democracy and polyarchy)” (Moller & Skaaning 2011: 17). As it was mentioned before, there are various adjectives for describing types of democracy, and the research produced by Moller and Skaaning is important in their differentiation.

Jawad also challenges Linz and Stepan’s limited understanding of stateness by. She claims that a narrower concept of stateness has to extend beyond the security dimension and has to “approximate the ideal of a democratic welfare state, and also postulate legitimacy, the rule of law, or welfare as further dimensions besides

security” (Jawad 2005: 6). In this way, this will cover a broader understanding of state and nation building, which is further enriched by Lipset’s idea of legitimacy and effectiveness problem.

Besides the additional traits of stateness, the basic understanding of security is also critical for some cases like Georgia. Indicators that Jawad set for stateness in Georgia are the degree of control in state’s territory; the degree of control over the external borders, the existence of ongoing or recurring violent conflicts, the number and political relevance of violent non-state actors; the state of the national security forces, the level of development of crime rates, the degree of threat executed by state institutions towards its citizens (Jawad 2005).

There can be even an opposite relationship between stateness and democratization different than Stepan and Linz predicted. If the Georgian case is considered, democratization can support stateness. For example, in a multinational country like Georgia, democratization supports the country’s process of stateness. For this reason, rather than being prerequisites for democracy, these two concepts are boosting each other. For the Georgian case, stateness was a critical issue and it is impossible to wait for the success of this process before beginning democratization.

In conclusion, to understand stateness is critical in democratization literature because stateness “entails to the attitudes and identities of citizens, in particular, their attachment to the state” (Elkins & Sides 2008). Elkins and Sides claim that “identities are variable and can change over time in response to events, elite political strategies, and government policies” (Elkins & Sides 2008: 5) and political leaders “mitigate stateness problems” (Elkins & Sides 2008: 6), which show us how the

nation building process plays a vital role for the democratization of a country. In this dissertation, the impacts of nation building on the democratization will be analyzed in detail through the examination of Georgian case study. In this case, it can be argued that nation-building process can be considered a tool in the hands of governing elites for solving the problems of state building.

State and nation building processes create the base for political stability. In the literature, a degree of political stability is accepted as a necessary condition for democratization process. Lipset's approach will leads us to the second part of this section. Lipset claims that "a stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among the contending political forces. ...The conditions maximizing political cosmopolitanism among the electorate are the growth or urbanization, education, communications media, and increased wealth" (Lipset 1959: 97). This understanding paves the way to examination of modernization theory as a determinant of democratization.

2.1.2. Socio-Economic Development - Modernization Theory

The modernization theory is one of the main theoretical frameworks that shaped democracy promotion policies of states, international organizations, and civil society. The belief that economic development leads to democracy constitutes the basic understanding but the debate surrounding the validity of this assumption extensive.

The modernization theory, which based its assumption on the dichotomy of modern and traditional, emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. The Western experience created developmental optimism and during this period, various versions of the

democratization theory relied on the premise that other parts of the world would sooner or later follow in the path to prosperity and democracy (Moller & Skaaning 2013). In the framework of this study, this approach to democratization needs examination because of its critical role in the determination of democratization policies of states, civil societies and international organizations. Modernization theory is one of the approaches that create generalization logic for democratization, but those generalizations are the most criticized policies of democratization. The debate on the end of the third wave of democracy is related to the generalizations of modernization theory.

An examination of the historical evolution of modernization theory helps in understanding the basic parameters of the theory. The contribution of Lipset to the modernization theory is praiseworthy. In his seminal work, Lipset underlined some social requisites of democracy. He based his assumption on the positive relationship between democracy and socio-economic development (Lipset 1959). According to him, economic development and legitimacy are structural characteristics of a society that sustain a democratic political system (Lipset 1959). Correspondingly, modernization theory emphasizes on the correlation between socio-economic development and democracy. The main generously quoted claim of this study is “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1959: 75). Even though this quote is quite popular, it still creates much confusion. The debate on the issue has yet to reach a common understanding. It is unclear that whether economic development is a cause of democracy or helps to sustain

democracy. This dissertation will set aside this debate and instead focus more on the development of modernization theory.

Lipset's definition of economic development is critical. He analyzes indices of economic development such as wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education (Lipset 1959). His theory not only emphasized on purely economic terms such as per capita income or growth, but on social conditions that promote democratization.

Lipset's thinking contains reflections of ideas shared by Rousseau and J. S. Mill, who agreed that socioeconomic inequality hampers citizens' ability to obtain equal rights (Sorensen 2008). Lipset reveals that "a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popularly based dictatorship)" (Lipset 1959: 75). However, the discussion on the impact of socioeconomic development to the establishment and survival of democracy still continues. According to Lipset, factors that determine socio-economic development help to open the class system and the establishment of a larger middle class. He claims that a strong middle class is beneficial for the democratic transition or democratic stability (Lipset 1959).

One of the most important contributors to this discussion was Karl Marx. Marx regards the abolishment of capitalism and its replacement with socialism and ultimately communism as the only way to achieve real political and economic equality and full democratization of state and society (Sorensen 2008). His criticisms

on the inequality between the classes produced by capitalist system led to another discussion on the correlation between capitalism and democracy.

Lipset's groundbreaking article opened many new discussions that enriched modernization theory. The most discussed argument was whether Lipset wrote of correlation or causation. Some studies argued that the correlation between socio-economic development and consolidation of democracy can be more easily proven but they rejected the correlation between the transition to democracy and socio-economic development. Though many argue that the article was unclear on the debate, Lipset's title also indicates correlation because he preferred requisites not prerequisites.

Discussions have been moved from the general development – democracy correlation to detailed economic analyses based on such things as income inequality and democracy relation. It is argued that when income inequality is higher, the expectation of redistribution from popular governments decreases, which also reduces the elite fear of democracy. Another determinant critical for elites is capital mobility, which provides alternative options to them (Geddes 2007). Research on the subject demonstrates that before 1950, development and income distribution has a much stronger impact on the likelihood of democratization (Geddes 2007). This change over time calls to question the changing role of elites in the emergence and consolidation of democracy. Previous assumptions based on the claim state that elites perceive democratization as a threat towards their interests. However, this decrease demonstrates that currently elites are less afraid of democratization in the world.

In the Georgian context, the major obstacle for democratization was the corruption problem during the 1990s. Corruption had been an endemic problem in the country as a legacy of the Soviet period. The major success of the Rose Revolution was the effective struggle to end corruption. Corruption was the major reason of income inequality in the country, which created a group of elite that used every means to protect their privileges. However, if we look at the support for the Rose Revolution, it is evident that even elites were backing a change in their country.

Another contribution from father of the modernization idea, Lipset, was the rejection of Max Weber's idea that Western democracy flourished in unique and perhaps unrepeatable circumstances and the emphasizing of the importance of understanding more fully the various conditions under which democracy has existed in order to make possible the development of democracy elsewhere. While rejecting European exceptionalism, Lipset tried to replace pessimism and leave students of politics in charge of furthering democracy (Lipset 1959). This understanding is crucial in order to recognize the role of academia and intellectuals on the formation of democracy promotion efforts. Excessive emphasis on the European exceptionalism could lead us to ignore some deviant cases even in the least likely democratized regions, like Georgia in the post-Soviet region.

This understanding is helpful to the democracy promotion community which faces the challenge that underlines the difference between the early and late developers. The claim that the conditions - late developers faced - were different from the early developers (Bollen 1979), distort the idea of continuity and complicates the strategies of democracy promoters. In his research, Bollen looks at

the claim of societies' greatest strains for late developers. He analyzes the *demonstration effect*, which is defined as a negative impact on the pathway of late developers. He defines demonstration effects as

“The latecomers are well aware of what goods economic development can bring to their society and at the same time they are aware of their own economic backwardness. Rather than having a population willing to save and invest for an unknown future there is a great deal of pressure in the late developers for immediate consumption and social welfare as is found in more mature economies. A political democracy allows these rising and often competing demands to impinge upon the political system while the developing country's economic system is not advanced enough to satisfy the demands. These pressures may lead to the collapse of democratic regimes and give rise to a more authoritarian government which may or may not be better able to meet the demands but will be more successful in suppressing the demands” (Bollen 1979: 573).

In addition to the very important contribution on the latecomers and the problems that they face in development, Bollen's support for Lipset's understanding is also important. He TOO argues that the most significant variable is the level of development. According to him, the level of development is a more important explanatory variable than the timing variables (Bollen 1979).

If we apply this demonstration effect to the post-Soviet region, we can observe that in the 2000s Russia created a new model of development and political system that strongly impacted countries in its near abroad. This model made easier Russian resistance to the political changes in post-Soviet region. This Russian type of development and 'democracy' created an optimism in many authoritarian regimes especially in Central Asia. China was another success story that exemplified a new type of development that was more suitable for non-democratic states. For this reason, the West lost some its leverage and was replaced by China and Russia, countries that could now also provide regime security without the West's criticisms.

However, Georgia was an important Trojan horse in this environment. The success of another model like the case in Georgia after the Rose Revolution is considered as an example of the *demonstration effect* and optimism for regional states.

Another contribution to the modernization theory was made by Adam Przeworski et al. with their book “Democracy and Development”. Rather than rejecting Lipset’s assumptions, they attempted to clearly set the conditions under which development works for democracy. Some writers define this as a neo-modernization theory (Moller & Skaaning 2013). They underline the impact of development in the survival of any regime. Adam Przeworski et al. marked a difference between endogenous and exogenous democratization. The “endogenous” explanation put forward the explanation of a democracy that emerges in economically developed country while the “exogenous” explanation underlined that regardless reasons led to the emergence of democracy, economically developed ones would more likely survive. These are the two kinds of explanations for the incidence of democracy, which are related with level of economic development (Przeworski, et al. 2000). According to these explanations, development defined by per capita income is significant. However, it is also important to note that, as Przeworski and Limongi claimed, not only wealthy democracies survive and that economic development is also significant for the sustainability of authoritarian regimes (Przeworski & Limongi 1997). From this, additional problematic democracy promotion strategies appeared. Increasing GNP or GDP per capita using foreign aid alone is not enough to establish democracy. These kinds of strategies are also

effective in sustaining non-democratic regimes, so the democracy promoter community must be very careful in these instances.

Various thinkers of modernization theory are influenced by the enlightenment idea and for this reason according to them; education constitutes an important place for democratization. Lipset underlines the importance of education as one of the necessary conditions for democracy (Lipset 1959) and modernization theorists argued “income is just a proxy for education, and more highly educated people are more likely to embrace democratic values” (Przeworski, et al. 2000). This argument cannot be proven in the post-Soviet region. The legacy of the Soviet Union in the newly independent states was a highly educated population but this statistical data did not generate an observable democratization effort. As an index of development for Lipset, education was not significant in this part of the world.

At this point, it is crucial to remember Valeri Bunce who underlines regional differences on democratization:

“Although there is in practice a correlation between income per capita and democratization in the 30 or so post-Socialist countries, the best predictor of democratization in that context (after eliminating a range of economic, political, and cultural variables) seems to be economic reform. Thus, those countries that score higher on economic reform (as indicated by the private sector share of the economic product along with trade and price liberalization) also score higher on measures of democratization” (Bunce 2000: 706).

Georgia after the Rose Revolution was one example of country that was able to reform its economy in support of its democratization process.

In conclusion, the impact of modernization theory on democratization literature is undeniable although its applicability is disputed. In the framework of this study, to understand modernization theory is important in order to observe the trace

of modernization theory on the foreign policies of the USA and Russia in Georgia. The debate still continues as to whether there is a correlation or causation between economic development and democracy and whether economic development is necessary for the emergence or the survival of democracy. Although it opens many new windows, modernization pushes a linear and inevitable pathway from economic development to democracy. Its repercussions on the democracy promotion strategies are critical.

2.1.3. Civic Culture

Another determinant of democratization, which is widely researched, is the impact of civic culture to democratization. This research area looks at the causal relationship between the attitudes of the general public and the establishment or stability of democracy. Almond and Verba first proposed the theory of civic culture and then it was enhanced by Inglehart, as well as criticized by many scholars. The main idea that advocates of civic culture as a determinant of democratization proposed was that some traits of civic culture attitudes determine the likelihood of a state to adopt or sustain democracy. The higher the level of civic culture, the probability of democracy increased regardless of socio-economic development (Muller & Seligson 1994).

Almond and Verba examined five different cases in order to observe the new political characteristics of world culture, shaped by an improved industrial technology that was followed by the rise of efficient bureaucracy. They argued that “Although the movement toward technology and rationality of organization appears with great uniformity throughout the world, the direction of political change is less

clear” (Almond & Verba 1989: 2). According to them, the main characteristic of the new political culture was the participation explosion. However they differentiated two types of regime according to the mood of participation: democratic and totalitarian. The main differentiation between these two regimes according to them was how they treat people: “The democratic state offers the ordinary man the opportunity to take part in the political decision making process as an influential citizen; the totalitarian offers him the role of the “participant object” (Almond & Verba 1989: 3). Formal institutions of democracy – universal suffrage, the political party, and the elective legislature – are also commonly used in totalitarian regimes both functionally and formally. For this reason, Almond and Verba claim that a democratic form of participatory political system necessitates a political culture with which it is consistent, in addition to formal institutions (Almond & Verba 1989).

From the British example, Almond and Verba developed a definition of civic culture “neither traditional nor modern but partaking of both; a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it” (Almond & Verba 1989: 6). Their approach to civic culture is critical due to their claim of the difficulty of transferring it to the new nations. They underline two main difficulties behind the transfer of the political culture from the Western democratic states to the emerging nations. Firstly, “the image of the democratic polity that is conveyed to the elites of the new nations is obscure and incomplete and heavily stresses ideology and legal norms. What must be learned about democracy is a matter of attitude and feeling, and this is harder to learn” (Almond & Verba 1989: 4). Secondly, the leaders of these new nations are

squeezed between the benefits of technological development and their own traditional culture (Almond & Verba 1989).

Welzel and Inglehart have very valuable works on the role of political culture in democratization. They resisted the classical approach to political culture with “congruence theory”. The main argument of this theory is that “in order to be stable, the authority patterns characterizing a country’s political system must be consistent with people’s prevailing authority beliefs” (Welzel & Inglehart 2009: 134).

According to them, the components that Almond, Verba, and Putnam offered for the cultural dissertation were not enough to explain the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. These arguments can explain the consolidation of an existing democracy but are insufficient to explain the motivation behind the resistance towards authoritarian rule (Welzel & Inglehart 2009). They underlined that the political culture literature that emphasized mostly the communal, supportive, and allegiant kind of orientations drew a picture of a stable cultural context in which elites do not face any resistance. Due to that, there is no motivation for people to push for developments towards democratization. Instead, the emancipative cultural orientation pushes for democratic freedom. “These beliefs are an important mass orientation for democracy, operating in favor of its emergence, survival, and deepening” (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009: 141).

The most important aspect of congruence theory is the claim that the emancipative mass beliefs and socio economic modernization are interrelated. Socio-economic development prepares the ground for the emergence of emancipative values that are encouraging to democracy. It is socio-economic development that

provides the resources to fight for democratic freedoms, and emancipative values motivate them in this difficult struggle. The success in this mission lies in the joint impact of these two variables: “making people both motivated to seek democracy and able to exert effective pressures to obtain it” (Welzel & Inglehart 2009: 138).

As it was observed for the other determinants of democratization, there are two explanations about the relationship between the civic culture and democratization. Firstly, civic culture can effect rather than cause democratization. Secondly, the relationship can be vice versa, which means democratization can cause the increase on the civic culture. Muller and Seligson created a model in order to control this relationship, which covers twenty-seven countries. While acknowledging the limits of their model, they opposed the civic culture impact theory. They tested two variables: interpersonal trust and the support for revolutionary change. They found out that “interpersonal trust appears to be a product of democracy rather than a cause of it” while “support for gradual reform has a positive effect on change in level of democracy, and it is unrelated to long-term experience of democracy” (Muller & Seligson, 1994: 647). They also rejected other variables that, under the rubric of civil culture, Inglehart argued had significant effects on the change in democratization (Muller & Seligson, 1994). Muller and Seligson developed the idea that the most important determinant for democratization is a macroeconomic variable, income inequality in a country. Despite the general public culture, a special emphasis needs to be directed to the attitudes of elites. In political culture models, due to the greater ability and opportunity of elites to influence the regime of a country, their attitudes have greater importance compared to the general public. (Muller & Seligson 1994)

In a study that aimed to control for specific societal factors impact on democratization, 16 countries in Central and Eastern European countries between 1993 and 1998 were examined and important findings released. This study was based on the five components of civicness that were proposed by Almond and Verba (1963) as well as Putnam (1993). The study found that “political culture and the level of tolerance within societies are directly related with democratization” while three societal features were unable to explain democratic performance: interpersonal trust, authoritarian attitudes, and materialist approaches (Braghiroli & Gherghina, 2008). Two implications according to their findings are critical: the relevance of the attitudinal dimension for democratization and the idea that the argument that Eastern and Western countries are completely different was unfounded (Braghiroli & Gherghina 2008).

Civic culture is another determinant of democratization to enhance this determinants is harder from outside and it took a much more time than other aspects of democratization. In the Georgian case, its political culture is one of the most important factors that make it such a special case. The changes in culture during Georgian democratization were critical. Domestic and international actors invested in this determinant for the acceleration of democratization.

2.2. Security Dilemma as an Outcome of Securitization of Democratization

In some cases, the outcome of the securitization of democratization or macro-securitization of democracy may be the emergence of a security dilemma. Though debates about the validity of this old concept still continue, as Ali Bilgiç underlines in his article, there is a necessity to rethink about “security dilemma” (Bilgiç 2011).

This concept was conceptualized sixty years ago; the security dilemma was one of the most appealing concepts of the Cold War. During these past sixty years, the concept evolved and was redefined by different thinkers (Bilgiç 2011). This evolution will be briefly analyzed in order to understand the security dilemma as an outcome of the securitization of democratization.

In 1950, firstly John H. Herz had taken from Butterfield, Hobessian the idea of fear and the uncertainty about the intentions of others, developed the concept of security dilemma under Cold War conditions. According to him, the security dilemma is a natural ramification of the anarchic world system. In such an environment, individuals and groups are always at risk and must seek more power for more security. This endless search for security in an anarchic international system creates a competitive configuration with vicious circles of security and power accumulation (Herz 1950).

The same approach to the security dilemma can be found in other studies from the Cold War but the real issue here is that there was no “real” dilemma at all. The “security dilemma” concept was used for describing the power struggle between units that always had to make worse-case scenario analyses in the anarchic world system. The dilemma was presented between attack and kill or to be destroyed but destruction was never really an option available to either group. For this reason, it is difficult to discuss any real dilemma and the expected result of this security dilemma was always negative during the Cold War conceptualization (Bilgiç 2011).

As we can trace from the above explanation, the realist paradigm assumptions shaped the understanding of the security dilemma in the first period. This approach

increased the perception of a self-help and anarchic system of international relations and the questioning of “reality” of threats. However, with the changes in international relations, the security dilemma concept also had to renew itself according to the necessities of the current system. The widening and deepening of security influenced the actor and subject understanding of security dilemma. However, these challenges were also a direct attack towards the concept and to its validity.

Philip G. Cerny, defines the security dilemma as “the notion that *in a context of uncertainty and bounded rationality* (1) perceived external threats (real or imagined) generate feelings of insecurity in those states that believe themselves to be the targets of such threats, thereby (2) leading those states to adopt measures to increase their power and capability to counteract those threats (alliance creation, arms buildups, and so on)” (Cerny 2000: 624). However, he acknowledges the changing nature of the security dilemma in the globalization era and urges that the New Security Dilemma also involve the potential for a vicious spiraling, but this time contain “logic rooted in the complexity and uncertainty of the post-modern world and the uneven and multilayered nature of globalization itself” (Cerny 2000: 626). In his framework, the rise of the actors outside of states and new potential sources of uncertainty may lead to a more chaotic system and this understanding is groundbreaking for the analysis of securitization of democratization.

Understanding the emergence of new potential sources of uncertainty betters one’s understanding of the security dilemma. Though many factors were accepted as drivers of unresolvable uncertainty, two in particular were crucial: the ambiguous

symbolism of weapons and the “other mind problem”. The difficulty of distinguishing between the “offensive” or “defensive” aims of weapons and the general inability to predict the real intention on the other’s mind were the main reasons behind the security dilemma. (Booth & Wheeler). In the contemporary international system, we acknowledge the presence of new sources of uncertainty, as in the case of societal security dilemma.

The traditional understanding of the security dilemma based its assumption on the ambiguity of weapons but the societal security dilemma demonstrates that non-military measures can also provoke a security dilemma. Paul Roe’s contribution to the societal security dilemma literature is very important in that it questions the means by which security is sought. In his book, Roe tries to answer how others can perceive the defense of ethnic identity as a threat and this can escalate to become a security dilemma (2005). This is also the case in the securitization of democratization.

A challenge to this concept came from Brian Job, when he analyzes Third World security and coins a new concept in his analysis: the “insecurity dilemma”. Sorensen shares the idea of the insecurity dilemma with Job and argues that weak states are generally exempt from external threats but that they constitute severe threats to the security of their own population (Sorensen 2007). His contribution to this approach is the conceptualization of the value dilemma, which complicates an effective handling of the insecurity dilemma. He argues that although there is a decrease in the security dilemma, fear and violent conflict have not been eradicated due to the emergence of new dilemmas (Sorensen 2007). According to him, the

liberal responses to the insecurity dilemma are complicated and create a liberal value dilemma, which means the problematic about insiders and outsiders relationship. The liberal value dilemma proposes two options: forcing liberal values on others and leaving others to choose their own path (Sorensen 2007). While the first idea of imposition contradicts the core liberal values of autonomy and self-determination, refraining from intervention in the insecurity dilemma can be costly for everyone (Sorensen 2007). These two challenging approaches to the insecurity dilemma can be seen in the National Security Strategy papers published by the USA.

Although Sorensen emphasizes the emergence of new kind of dilemma, he accepts that the security dilemma is still alive in some regions like the Middle East while asserting “the classical security dilemma is either irrelevant (among post-modern states) or in sharp decline (among modernizing and democratizing states)” (Sorensen 2007: 362). This understanding is one of the claims about the post-Soviet region that rejects the detail analysis about the reasons behind the emergence of security dilemma. Indeed, it is accepted as a natural process but this dissertation aims to analyze the emergence of the security dilemma that, due to poor handling, resulted in a military conflict between Georgia and Russia.

Andrej Krickovic examined how developing countries’ internal weaknesses can create a cycle of suspicion about the aims of external powers, which directs the relations between them from security to insecurity dilemmas. He applied the insecurity dilemma approach to four developing countries, China, Russia, Brazil and India, where he argued that Western promotion of human rights and democracy is seen as detrimental (Krickovic 2015). He claims that “the internal weaknesses and

vulnerabilities of some states give rise to concerns about foreign interventions and meddling and thereby intensify conflict between itself and the states it believes will take advantage of these weaknesses” (Krickovic 2015: 18). He also urges that the tension that this insecurity dilemma will create between emerging and Western countries can be the bigger threat to peace and stability in our contemporary state system. The case in Georgia was not an insecurity dilemma but instead, internally, the Western support was perceived as a cure for the weakness while the security dilemma was projected to Russia, whose actions were perceived as the reason of those weaknesses.

Ali Bilgic claims that Booth and Wheeler redefined the security dilemma and that this redefinition changed the concept radically. With support from Bilgic, the concept of the security dilemma became more complex. (2011). First, by rejecting the traditional understanding on the security dilemma, Booth and Wheeler differentiated the security paradox from the security dilemma, which they viewed as one of the main misunderstandings of the concept. They defined the security paradox as “a situation in which two or more actors, seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their words or actions an increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all round” (Booth & Wheeler 2008: 9). This differentiation had an important impact security paradox in advance has a fix result but security dilemma means having two options, security dilemma can be concluded with a security paradox or can't be so. This means that at the heart of the security dilemma there is a choice, a reminder of the role of humans in the process (Bilgiç 2011).

According to Booth & Wheeler, the security dilemma consists of two phases: firstly a dilemma of interpretation and secondly a dilemma of response. “The first and basic level consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others; the second and derivative level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding” (Booth & Wheeler 2008: 9). When we analyze the dilemma of interpretation, the ambiguity of weapons is often discussed. However, in an era of widening and deepening security talks, to consider only weapons as leading to a dilemma of interpretation is inadequate. In the case of the securitization of democratization and on the emergence of security dilemma, the tools for the promotion of democracy can be perceived as a threat during the dilemma of interpretation. The dilemma of response can lead to some policies that will be perceived as a threat by the other party. As Booth and Wheeler argue, the security dilemma is not always a security paradox but the policies and actions of the parties can lead to a security paradox.

Another important contribution by Booth and Wheeler was their emphasis on trust. They underlined that the impact of globalization increased the competence problem of states not just in welfare and economics but also in security. Increasing internal demand for states’ competences in various areas coincides with increasing uncertainties and decreasing trust between states. Therefore, the security dilemma dynamics will be widespread (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). Lastly, historical legacies are also influencing the trust shared between states. As Christensen argues, historical legacies between states play an important role on the emergence of the security dilemma and spirals of tension (Christensen 1999). The role of historical mistrust

between countries is the most important step to overcome the emergence of a spiral of tension or a security paradox.

The security dilemma is one of the most important concepts of international relations and is examined in this part in order to understand the evolution of the concepts, which will be developed as one of the consequences of securitization of democratization in the framework of this dissertation. The evaluation of the security dilemma that emerged out of securitization can be considered to be one of the major contributions of this dissertation to the literature.

2.3. De-securitization of Democratization

De-securitization is a concept not theorized in detail by the Copenhagen School. By using the conceptual tools that the Copenhagen School provided, de-securitization means to return a referent object, which was securitized by a speech act, to the sphere of politics. The Copenhagen School was generally in favor of de-securitization because they acknowledge the probable negative impacts of securitization. This understanding from the Copenhagen School constitutes one of the main criticisms of securitization studies. There is a common belief that in some sectors, securitization can be an issue as vital and pressing as the environment and gender issues.

In the context of this dissertation, it is accepted that the referent objects like democracy and democratization may be harmed by the securitization. However, the international environment in which securitization takes place and the role of the securitizing actor(s) as well as the position of the audience both play important roles in the selection between securitization and de-securitization. As Büger and

Villumsen also argued in the case of the securitization of democracy, the democratic peace theory had an important impact on the process. This means theoreticians played an important role on the emergence of securitization of democracy in practice, as for example it was used to legitimize the US intervention in Iraq. The certainty that researchers provided to politicians was welcomed but their effect on the practice was absent. The likelihood of the application of emergency measures is not under their control. Due to that, theoreticians prefer de-securitization in many sectors of security (Büger & Villumsen 2007).

In line with the theoretical background of democracy and securitization, the claim of this dissertation is also based on the negative impacts of securitization on democratization. Decreasing the tension on normative values like democracy and democratization is evaluated as a much more preferable strategy in the long run. Short term interests that lead to securitization can be harmful when one of the audiences perceive this securitization as a threat to its national interest; this creates a resistance towards democracy and democratization, as can be seen in the Georgian case study. This resistance and the emergence of a security dilemma between players will be destructive for the context in which democratization takes place. Due to these reasons, this dissertation advises de-securitization of democratization for a healthier process of political transformation. In the Georgian context, the government policies of the de-securitization of democratization started to be pursued slowly after the August War in 2008 and gained momentum with the election of the new prime minister in 2012 and the new president in 2013. Both the outbreak of a war between Russia and Georgia and the total loss of power in two separatist regions paved the

way to the emergence of more balanced and rational discourses on democratization, which in turn decreased the tension on democratization in the country.

CHAPTER III: POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN GEORGIA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE ROSE REVOLUTION

One of the shortfalls of the democratization literature is the disregard for differences in the specific political, cultural and economic histories of each cases, all of which have a deep impact on the process. Due to the principle of parsimony and the search for intellectual coherence, critical details are generally disregarded during the theory building in international relations studies. However, the failure of democracy promotion that is based on a one fits all understanding demonstrated that there is a need for deep case studies. Therefore, this study aims to underline the political, economic, and cultural historical background that shaped the democratization process in Georgia after the Rose Revolution.

This chapter will concentrate on the political, economic, and social changes and developments just before the collapse of the Soviet Union up to the Rose Revolution. Moreover, the internal and international developments that has an impact on the Georgian political transformation will be examined hand-in-hand.

Georgia, one of the critical players in the dissolution of Soviet Union, was one of the states most deeply the effected in the process. The extent of political opening from the Soviet Union to the Georgian context was incredible. Georgian political transformation starting from 1988 until 1995 was traumatic. After 1995, a

kind of political stabilization was reached but at that time many new problems have arisen and deeply influenced the transition to democracy. This period's problems about minorities, economics, and politics still constitute major obstacles to the process of democratization.

With the changes in the political sphere in the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Georgian historians started to re-evaluate Georgian national history and to criticize the Soviet version of the story. Their assumption was based on the 1921 Red Army occupation of the first Democratic Republic of Georgia. Moreover, in the 1990s, the first experience of Georgian statehood and national sovereignty was also enhanced by an historical tradition that was pro-European and by freedom-seeking Georgian intelligentsia (Torja 2014). This settlement of the new official foundation narrative grew stronger when Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet in October 1990.⁸ He was a dissident who had been jailed several times and became the charismatic leader of the independence movement at the end of 1980s (Nodia 1996). When the Soviet Union intervened in Tbilisi in 1989, Gamsakhurdia and his close friend Merab Kostava were the leaders of the crowd that was crushed by Soviet Army. They were active in the Georgian nationalist movement since 1950s and the nationalist intelligentsia of this period was severely anti-Russian and had fairly religious tendencies (Cornell 2001).

⁸ Zviad Gamsakhurdia, first president of Georgia was born in 1939. He became politically active in 1950s. He became first elected president on May 26, 1991. He was dismissed from Office by a coup d'état on January 6, 1992. He died on December 31, 1993. For more details see: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-zviad-gamsakhurdia-1396384.html> and <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/georgia/politics-gamsakhurdia.htm>

Georgian nationalism started to get stronger in the 1970s and the leader of Georgia at this time was the well-known Eduard Shevardnadze.⁹ Shevardnadze was brought to leadership as the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party in 1972 with a mandate from Moscow to fight the problem of corruption. Georgia had been one of the most corrupt republics in the Soviet Union and was heavily criticized by Moscow. Shevardnadze's first step was the effective resolution of the problem of corruption and his second was to attack "isolationist" Georgian nationalism. He urged Georgians to learn Russian. In the late 1970s, the Georgian government opened a public debate on the changes of a clause in the constitution that would give equal status to Russian and other languages in the republic (Cornell 2001).¹⁰ The most important development in this event was the outburst of student protests which effectively pushed back the government on the issue. To shape policies according to public opinion was really exceptional in this period, a reflection of the Georgian government's caution towards the new nationalism. Moreover, Shevardnadze's subsequent rise in his career in the ranks of Soviet Union¹¹ demonstrates Moscow's support for Shevardnadze's policies (Cornell 2001). Even though this kind of nationalist unrest was unwelcome, Georgia was generally the "rebellious child" of the Union and the same trend continued during the post-Soviet period.

⁹ Eduard Shvardnadze, second president of Georgia, born in 1928 and died in 2014. He was one of the key figures of Soviet history. Especially his role on the end of Cold War has been appreciated by the West as the foreign minister during the introduction of glasnost and perestroika. He was invited to be the leader after the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia. He ruled the country until the Rose Revolution in 2003. For more details see: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/07/eduard-shevardnadze>

¹⁰ According to the constitution, Georgian was the sole official language of the state.

¹¹ Shevardnadze was promoted to candidate for Politburo in 1978 and became a politburo member in 1985. He was the Soviet Foreign Minister from July 1985 until early 1991 (Marantz 2004).

The main characteristics of the dissident movement, which started in 1970s with the leadership of Merab Kostova, Valentina Pailodze and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, shed light on the future prospects of Georgian politics. The Human Rights Defense Group, established by in Tbilisi by Kostova and Gamsakhurdia, was reporting to Russian dissidents and Western media. Their anti-Soviet struggle was defined on the one hand by the use of human rights discourse and a discourse for defending Georgian national symbols, language, and culture. Human rights discourse was oriented towards external partners aiming to expose the Soviet regime, its inconsistency with the Helsinki Accords, and violations of basic rights within the country (Cheterian, 2008). On the other hand, another kind of discourse was developed for domestic use. The main problem of the Georgian dissidents' struggle was that their perspective was squeezed between Soviet cosmopolitanism and Georgian national heritage. This approach isolated a third of the Georgian population because they did not belong to the titular nation. Therefore, ethnic minorities in Georgia were afraid of Georgian nationalistic policies like the weakening of the status of the Russian language. The strengthening of the Georgian language and culture were perceived by them as an action that would undermine their social status and political power in Georgia and in the Soviet Union more generally (Cheterian 2008).

During this period, Moscow took up its traditional role as the guarantor of status-quo for the Georgian ethnic minorities. In response to Georgian nationalism, ethnic minorities, especially Abkhazians started to demand the same rights as their compatriots such linguistic and cultural rights and political representation. Moscow

rejected any revision regarding the social status of the Abkhazia but partly met some of the demands for cultural rights (Cheterian 2008).

While the tension between ethnic minorities and Georgian nationalists was rising, the event of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi occurred. This event was one of the most important traumas in Georgian history and had an incredible impact on the independence movement and on the construction of Georgian identity. When the demonstrations in Tbilisi for independence was crushed by Soviet Army, 19 people, most of whom were women, died and dozens were wounded. This event only exacerbated the tension and further destroyed the legitimacy of the Communist government in Tbilisi (Cornell 2001). Rather than crushing the nationalist demands, this Soviet move weakened the power of the Communist Party in Georgia. The Party's new leadership decided to follow the path of the Lithuanian Communist party, which incorporated nationalist policies into the party program. The party made some populist moves during this period in order to gain its lost legitimacy, like the declaration of Georgia's sovereignty in March 1990, which "nullified all treaties concluded by the Soviet government since 1921" (Zürcher 2005: 90). However, the Communist Party in Georgia was never able to regain its legitimacy after April 1989 (Cornell 2001). Indeed, this unfortunate event was transformed into a driving force and an important step for Georgian independence.

In this lively political environment, in October 1990, Gamsakhurdia's Round Table bloc won a definite victory in the first free parliamentary elections on a multi-party basis in one of the republics of the Soviet Union (Nodia 1996; Waal 2010). After Lithuania's declaration of independence from the USSR on 9 April 1991,

Georgia became the second republic to leave the Soviet Union and held its first free presidential election in May of 1991 (Nodia 1996). The short and critical period of Gamsakhurdia's leadership constitutes one of the cornerstones of Georgian political transformation. In order to understand the problem of ethnic minorities in Georgia, it is vital to analyze Gamsakhurdia's presidency. In the framework of this dissertation, the secessionist movements and ethnic minorities are critical in order to understand the "stateness" which is one of the most important determinants of democracy. Therefore, the next part will focus on the aforementioned problem in Georgia during Gamsakhurdia leadership.

The ethnic structure of Georgia is one of the most diversified cases in the post-Soviet region. However, the reason behind the ethnic conflicts that tore apart the country was not the diversified structure but rather the legacy of the Soviet Union and the policies of Georgian governments after independence. The ethnic tension between Georgians and minorities became visible right before the collapse of the Soviet Union with the rise of Georgian nationalism as a way to independence. In the current territory of Georgia there are five major ethnic groups: Georgians, Armenians, Russians, Azeris, Ossetians, and Abkhazians.¹² Historically, Armenians and Azeris, two of the biggest minorities according to the 1989 population census, have had relatively peaceful relations with Tbilisi. Although they were neighboring their ancestral homelands, the relations between these groups and the central government were largely positive. Until 1993, due to the widespread lawlessness in the country, the Armenian southern region of Javakheti was controlled by a local

¹² According to the 1989 population census, national composition of Georgia was as shown: Georgians 70.13%; Abkhazians 1.77%; Ossetians 3.04%; Armenians 8.10%; Azerbaijanis 5.69%; Russians 6.32% and others 4.95%. See for more details: Wheatley 2009

ethnic Armenian self-help organization called Javakh..Kvemo Kartli, which was home to a large Azerbaijani population, was under the rule of a number of Georgian and Azerbaijani criminal gangs which were carrying out smuggling activities (Wheatley 2009).

The major crisis and conflicts between minorities and the central government emerged in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Meanwhile, Ajaria, which was an autonomous republic during the Soviet era, established relatively peaceful relations with the central government in Tbilisi. Ajarians are ethnically Georgian but religiously were Muslim during the Soviet Union era. Currently, there is an accelerating conversion to Christianity and today the number of Christian Ajarians surpass Muslim Ajarians (Pelkmans 2002; Liles 2002).¹³ Although there was some tension between Batumi and Tbilisi in the beginning, relations were generally peaceful in comparison to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ajaria's elite also had a clear interest in retaining their autonomy but their tactic was different from the other two regions that turn to conflict zones. Aslan Abashidze¹⁴, originally appointed by Gamsakhurdia, was the autocratic leader of Ajaria. Abashidze preferred to cooperate whomever was in power in Tbilisi and in return maintained significant control over the region's economy and political life (Slider 1999). Abashidze established a very autocratic regime in the region and the Georgian central government had little control over the region until 2004 when it was reunited with Georgia and Abashidze was dismissed.

¹³ See for a more detailed account of the Christian Expansion in Ajaria, Pelkmans 2002 and Liles 2002

¹⁴ Aslan Abashidze born in 1938, he was the leader of Ajaria between 1991 and 2004. For more details about Aslan Abashidze, please see: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3683629.stm> (accessed in 13.03.2016)

In this framework, it is more logical to consider Abkhazia and South Ossetia in greater detail due to the conflicts between these ethnic groups and the Georgian government during the independence period, and the corresponding impact on Georgian politics even to this day. In order to understand the emergence and the evolution of the ethnic conflicts in Georgia, it is important to consider three factors: the Soviet legacy, the Georgian government's policies, and ethnic minorities' relations with outside power(s) and foreign governments.

Soviet Legacy

The Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union had an incredible impact on the political, economic, social, and cultural systems in Eurasia. The most devastating impact of this history was seen in the relations between ethnic minorities and newly established states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Georgia was one example of a country that experienced a devastating process. Therefore, it is critical to understand the Soviet legacy, starting with the administrative formation during the Soviet era. Throughout the Soviet rule, there were four hierarchical levels of autonomy. At the top of the system, there were fifteen union republics of which Georgia was one. The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) were under the jurisdiction of Union Republics and unlike Union Republics, ASSRs did not have the legal right to secede from the Union. Abkhazia and Ajaria were two autonomous republics in Georgia and enjoyed a high degree of political, administrative, and cultural autonomy. Autonomous oblasts or regions had much more limited autonomy than autonomous republics and South Ossetia was the only autonomous oblast in Georgia. The last group in this hierarchy was autonomous okrugs with a very low

degree of sovereignty (Cornell 2001). These administrative structures were territorial arrangements and when the Soviet Union map is analyzed, it is obvious that some borders were awkwardly drawn. Especially when the ethnic identities are considered in regions like Central Asia and South Caucasus, states' borders did not match with the real ethnic demographic structures. There have always been various interpretations about the intention of Soviet elites. Some argue that this situation was simply due to the aim of establishing a communist identity at the end, in which national identities are perceived as a transition process. Another possible explanation is that, due to the overlapping settlement patterns in these regions, a clear-cut separation was nearly impossible. The need for economically viable entities was yet another obstacle behind the pure ethnic divisions. However, the most accepted version of the story is the intention of Moscow's to divide and rule in this region. Consequently, Moscow would be able to control ethnic groups that could otherwise create troubles for the Soviet Union (Cornell 2001). The "divide and rule policy" served many different purposes other than containment; for example, this policy weakened strong ethnic administrative units within union republics, which prevented them from taking advantage of their constitutional right of secession. The central government had the ability to use ethnic groups for provoking against each other in such a system. As it was mentioned, there were three autonomous structures in Georgia, and only South Ossetia was an autonomous oblast, despite its neighboring ethnic kinships with North Ossetia, which was an autonomous republic like Abkhazia and Ajaria. North Ossetia is considered the homeland of the Ossetians

(Cornell 2001). These differences also created tension and they will be discussed in detail when the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is analyzed.

This national delimitation that created new administrative structures was followed by the nationality policy of the Soviet Union. This policy also had a broad impact on the ethno-national relations within the system. The extension of territories in the 1920s and 1930s to more ethnically complex and diverse regions necessitated new policies to extend and consolidate control in those territories. In order to gain the support of the people living in those regions, Soviet leadership decided to adopt Soviet nationality policy. This policy aimed to extend cultural and political privileges to “nations” in some regions even where they had never experienced statehood before. While the real intention behind this Soviet policy is still debatable, the policy did support “co-optation of titular elites into the administrative bureaucracy, industry and cultural and educational institutions” and even has even been called nationalization, though in reality it was more an ‘indigenization’ policy (Blauvelt 2014a). The aim behind this indigenization was also a cultural reform that would support these minorities in their progress along the stages to national development. However, this support was not entirely innocent; for example, the support for local languages increased the reach of the regime’s agitation and propaganda to these minority groups (Blauvelt 2014b).

Brubaker summarizes the intention behind the Soviet nationality policies:

“Those policies were intended to do two things: first, to harness, contain, channel, and control the potentially disruptive political expression of nationality by creating national-territorial administrative structures and by cultivating, co-opting, and (when they threatened to get out of line) re-pressing national elites; and second, to drain nationality of its content even while legitimating it as a form, and thereby to promote

the long-term withering away of nationality as a vital component of social life” (Brubaker, 1994: 49).

However, the events at the end of the Soviet Union era demonstrates that nationalism never disappeared from the agenda and that this feeling was seen as the stronger binding force during this period. In one of the important accounts of nationhood and the nationality problem in the Soviet Union, Brubaker claims that:

“The Soviet institutions of territorial nationhood and personal nationality constituted a pervasive system of social classification, an organizing “principle of vision and division” of the social world, a standardized scheme of social accounting, an interpretative grid for public discussion, a set of boundary-markers, a legitimate form for public and private identities, and, when political space expanded under Gorbachev, a ready-made template for claims to sovereignty” (Brubaker 1994: 48).

As Brubaker underlines, the policies during the Soviet Union prepared a ready ground for nationalist claims in Georgia while simultaneously increasing the nationalist awareness within the minorities, which would ultimately lead to devastating ethnic conflicts in the country.

Other than the national delimitation and nationality policy of the Soviet Union, another legacy from this period is Stalin’s conceptualization of the nation. Stalin’s definition of the nation emphasized the importance of a common history, language, territory, and economic life. (Blauvelt 2014b). Due to this conceptualization, the linguistic differences in Georgia played an important role in the division of ethnic groups. Therefore, the changes on the laws of official languages created tensions between ethnic minorities and Tbilisi during the rise of Georgian nationalism. Ethnic minorities perceived the language law that tried to increase the use of Georgian as a threat to their survival. The tension between groups began with the war of laws but later turned to armed conflict. The conflicts in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia that started at the end of 1980s will be analyzed in the next section in detail because of their great impact on Georgian politics even today.

The environment provided by Gorbachev's policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) in Moscow, which not only led to a relief in federation republics but also in other autonomous regions, created a very lively political environment for independence demands in Georgia. Georgian nationalism and the demand for Georgian independence gained important ground during this period. However, this process created a resistance and reaction from minorities. When Gamsakhurdia was elected, all minorities in Georgia were alarmed by his election campaign, which had focused on the rights of Georgians in especially Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as by motto "Georgia for Georgians". In response to this, minorities in Georgia protested "the new policies of homogenization, Georgianization, and Christianization of Georgia announced by the Gamsakhurdia regime, which turned increasingly chauvinistic with time" (Cornell 2001: 151). Suspicion from the past flared up with new policies and tension between Tbilisi and the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia increased. Minorities perceived the independence of Georgia as a threat to their autonomy and to their culture while Georgia accused them of being agents of Russia attempting to destabilize Georgia and prevent its independence (Cornell 2001). The reciprocal moves during this period led to deep suspicion, anger, and hatred between the conflicting sides, all of which were very difficult to overcome. The situation was further complicated by the addition of third parties in this picture. The perception of each side and the narrative that they propagated is very important in their relations.

The Georgian government's relationship with minorities in the country has had a vital impact in its democratization.

Unrests began in Abkhazia first as a "war of laws" but then the issue spread to South Ossetia and the course of the events developed very quickly when an empire was declining. The first military clash occurred in South Ossetia during the Gamsakhurdia leadership. In the next part, the course of the events between the ethnic minorities and the new leadership in Tbilisi under Gamsakhurdia will be examined.

Abkhazia – Georgia Relations during Gamsakhurdia Leadership

The Abkhazia ASSR was the largest autonomous area in Georgia during the Soviet Union. Its population was around half a million and only around 90.000 people were Abkhazian in 1989.¹⁵

Abkhaz	93,267 (17.7%)
Kartvelians (incl. Samurzakianians)	239,872 (45.7 %)
Russians	74,914 (14.2%)
Greeks	14,664 (2.7%)
Armenians	76.541 (14.5%)

The majority of the region were Mingrelian Georgians. Abkhazians are ethnically close to Circassians (Cornell 2001), which from a Georgian perspective made them less reliable due to their connection with the Russian Federation. Religiously, within the population there are Orthodox and Muslim believers. Linguistically, one of chief determinants of nationality in the Georgian context, "the Abkhazian-Adyghean

¹⁵ In 1989, Abkhazia had "525,000 inhabitants, of whom 45.7 percent were Georgians, 14.3 percent Russians, and 14.6 percent Armenians." Only 17.8 percent of the population was ethnically Abkhazians. See for more details Zürcher, 2005

¹⁶ Svante E. Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A study of ethno-political conflict in the Caucasus*, (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 144.

language group belongs to the northern Caucasian linguistic family, akin to the Chechen-Dagestanian group and not related to the Kartvelian family of languages of which Georgian is a member” (Zürcher, 2005: 87). As it can be observed from their demographic features, Abkhazians has close connections with the Northern Caucasus, which is under the Russian Federation control. This connection created suspicion from both of Abkhazia’s neighbors. Both for Russian Federation and Georgia, Abkhazians could be perceived as a security threat depending on the conjuncture.

When the Bolsheviks seized Georgia, Abkhazia was not a part of Georgia. Instead, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia was declared on 4 March 1921 but, due to the pressure from Lenin, Abkhazia entered the Transcaucasian Federative Republic as an entity associated with Georgia in late 1921. However, the status of Abkhazia was reduced to an autonomous republic of Georgia in 1931. This change constitutes the legal position of Abkhazians in their quest for independence before 1931 (Cornell, 2001). After the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Federation in 1936, Abkhazia entered under the rule of the Georgian SSR (Cornell 2001). Abkhazians claim that “the inclusion of Abkhazia as an ASSR under Georgian jurisdiction in 1931 was accordingly seen as illegal, an act carried out by the ‘Georgian Stalin’ against the Abkhaz” (Cornell 2001: 136).

Relations between Abkhazia and Georgia were always tense during the Soviet era due to the fear from Abkhazian of repression by Tbilisi, especially under the leadership of Stalin, who was a Georgian (Zürcher 2005). The Abkhazian request for integration with Moscow was rejected two times before 1977. The Abkhazian

request to return to the status it held before 1931 or to unite with Russian North Caucasus was inflamed during 1977. One Abkhaz intellectual wrote a letter to Moscow and the USSR Supreme Soviet in order to protest “the influx of Georgians, assimilationist policies including Georgianization in schools, and economic exploitation” (Cornell 2001: 144). Some improvements were made due to Moscow’s pressure on the Georgian government. After this period, the Abkhazians seized the state apparatus, despite their minority position (Cornell 2001).

In March 1989, mass demonstrations by the Abkhazians requesting to upgrade the status of their state to a union republic started in near Sukhumi. In July, the first intercommunal violence broke out and sixteen people died. Fortunately, this did not transform into a war due to the lack of capacity on both sides (Zürcher, 2005). The Georgian reaction to Abkhazian demands was a mass demonstration in Tbilisi, in which anti-Communist and Anti-Abkhazian slogans started to be voiced loudly. One of the largest protests in Tbilisi was held in March 1989 after the news of the Abkhazian mass demonstration for independence. The Georgian government asked for Soviet help due to the fear of losing control and the Soviet army crushed the demonstrators on April 9, which would come to totally change politics in Georgia. As it was mentioned before, the Georgian communist party lost its legitimacy and Georgian nationalism was strengthened (Zürcher, 2005). While Georgian nationalism inflamed, the trust between Abkhazians and Georgians declined. This distrustful ground resulted in the ethnic conflicts between these two groups, which would constitute one of the main obstacles to the stateness of Georgia and therefore to the democratization process.

In August 1990, Abkhaz Soviet Supreme declared its secession from Georgia and proclaimed that Abkhazia was a full union republic. However, the relations based on the federative basis until 1931 was still an option for Abkhazia during this period. When in January 1991 Georgia was declared a unitary state without internal boundaries, which meant the abolition of all autonomies, ethnic unrest in Abkhazia and low-intensity warfare in South Ossetia began. The height of the tension was marked by the referendum¹⁷ in which Abkhazia and South Ossetia voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union and Georgia refused to participate in the vote. The official declaration of Georgian independence in April 1991 can be considered as a response to Moscow and to the ethnic minorities within the Georgia.

South Ossetia- Georgia Relations during Gamsakhurdia Leadership

Another secessionist movement in Georgia emerged in South Ossetia. The South Ossetian Autonomous oblast was created in April 1922 in the neighboring region to their kinships where North Ossetian lives. The North Ossetia then became an autonomous republic and this difference between the two Ossetian regions formed the basis of the request for upgrading the status of South Ossetia. Contrary to Abkhazia, in South Ossetia, Ossetians constitute a majority as an ethnic group. 66.2 percent of the South Ossetian population (100,000 people) was Ossetian and only 29 percent was Georgian ethnically. The Ossetian language belongs to the northeastern group of Iranian languages and Ossetians are mostly Orthodox Christians, though there is a minority of Sunni Muslim Ossetians (Zürcher 2005).

¹⁷ All-Union referendum on the Union Treaty took place in March 1991. It was proposed by Gorbachev as a last move for saving Soviet Union by establishing a more loose federative system.

Relations between Georgians and South Ossetians were stable until the end 1980s but the rise of Georgian nationalism and the Abkhazia's demand for independence inflamed the situation in South Ossetia too. Instances of violence in South Ossetia started during the spring 1989 when South Ossetia's leadership declared support for Abkhazian request for independence. The aim to make Georgian the sole official language brought a response from South Ossetia on the side of a declaration of Ossetian as the state language of the region (Cornell 2001). Increasing tension also led to appeals for unification with North Ossetia. In the discourse used by Georgian nationalist movements, minorities were defined as "immigrants" or "guests of Georgia". Especially South Ossetians were seen as immigrants that needed to return to their homeland, North Ossetia. However, Abkhazians were generally seen as an autochthonous ethnic group and they were defined as a Georgian tribe mixed with Circassians (Cornell, 2001). The guest or immigrants perception of South Ossetians paved the way for the pressure to resettle them in their bordering homeland.

The "March on Tskhinvali", which lasted from November 1989 to January 1990, was organized by Gamsakhurdia. The march of Georgians into the South Ossetian capital was prevented by the Soviet military, but clashes continued on the outskirts of the capital until January because of Gamsakhurdia's desire to expel Ossetians from the region (Cornell, 2001). The stability of the first half of 1990 was disrupted by a Georgian law that banned regional parties from entering the upcoming elections. In response, South Ossetia upgraded its status to "Independent Soviet Democratic Republic". After the elections in Ossetia for its Supreme Soviet, the

Georgian Supreme Soviet abolished the autonomy of South Ossetia in December and instituted a state of emergency the next day (Cornell 2001). “On January 5, 1991, Georgian military formation, comprised of local militias and members of recently created Georgian National Guard¹⁸, entered Tskhinvali, looting and attacking the civilian population. The South Ossetian militias resisted fiercely, and at the end of January, the Georgian troops withdrew, taking up position in the heights around the city, and enforced a blockade which lasted until the Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping mission came to South Ossetia in July 1992 (Zürcher 2005: 92). The internal uprising in Tbilisi against Gamsakhurdia government, which turned out to be a coup d’état, prevented a full-scale clash between South Ossetians and Georgians.

The coup d’état against Gamsakhurdia

Gamsakhurdia’s anti-Russian nationalist discourse and his personal features were the main reasons for the strong support of people for his leadership and also were the reason he lost power. Although he came to leadership with a popular mandate, as he was not able to fulfill his promises of stability, territorial integrity, and economic recovery, he lost ground very quickly (Çelikpala, 2012). His policies were generally unpredictable and his moves emotional. He was very period. He was elected by 86 percent of the votes but ultimately lost the majority of his supporters. He stayed in power just nine months. Although Gamsakhurdia was elected lawfully, due to his undemocratic policies towards ethnic minorities, which included intolerant discourses, he acquired an image of a post-communist dictator. His characteristics

¹⁸ The National Guard was formed in November 1990 and was supposed to become the core of a Georgian army. Since the Georgian state did not yet exist, the recruitment and maintenance of the troops was carried out almost exclusively by private individuals. The guard was financed through an almost nonexistent state budget as well as through contributions from successful black-market entrepreneurs” (Zürcher 2005: 104).

and policies during his short presidency led to a military deposal in the name of democracy (Nodia 1996). Military coup d'états were unexpected in post-Soviet region due to the lack of strong armed forces. The case in Georgia was complicated. The group that came together for the expulsion of Gamsakhurdia was composed of a group of opposition politicians and entrepreneurs of violence rather than an organized and functioning military. After the coup d'état, the supporters of Gamsakhurdia initiated an uprising that created other traumas in the memory of Georgian citizens. The Civil War during this period would generate suspicions for Georgian citizens towards any kind of unrests until the Rose Revolution.

During the coup d'état, parties whose cooperation had earlier seemed unimaginable united under the common feeling of anti-Zviadism. Two events, which led to the defection of his closest supporters, brought about his ruining. First, he failed to make a clear assessment of the military putsch in Moscow in August 1991. He wanted to be neutral on the power struggle within Soviet Union and complied with the Soviet military commander's demand to integrate the Georgian National Guard into the structure of the Soviet Interior Ministry. The National Guard and Mkhedrioni¹⁹ were two paramilitary groups that were outside state control.

¹⁹ "The Mkhedrioni ("knights") was a loose union of criminal groups and juvenile gangs from Tbilisi, created in 1989 by Jaba Ioseliani, a former patron of the Soviet underworld. It funded its activities from criminal dealings, including extortion and racketeering. In 1992, it also gained control over lucrative sectors of the economy, such as the gasoline trade. The Mkhedrioni saw itself as a patriotic society for the protection of Georgia, and its members often played with patriotic symbols. Many displayed a large amulet with a portrait of Saint George on their chests. Essentially, the Mkhedrioni was the weapons-bearing arm of successful businessmen-patriots who put their private army at the service of the state when it was waging war against secessionist minorities" (Zürcher 2005: 104).

Gamsakhurdia was able to destroy Mkhedrioni and its leader Jaba Ioseliani²⁰ was imprisoned in February 1991. However, the leader of the National Guard, Tengiz Kitovani, resisted and withdrew from Tbilisi in September 1991. Now the president in Tbilisi was without any effective military force that could protect him (Zürcher 2005). His former minister, Tengiz Sigua (1934-) and former foreign minister Giorgi Khoshtaria (1938-), also decided to support Kitovani's resistance. At the beginning, the National Guard preferred to camp outside Tbilisi and refrain from deposing the president by force. The president trusted the police force in Tbilisi but when police brutality attacked peaceful demonstrators on 2 September 1991 his power was further undermined. After these events, the National Guard started to protect the protesters in Tbilisi and "on 22 December, after another bloody incident in front of the Parliament building, the National Guard entered the city once more and stormed the building" (Nodia 1996). On January 6, 1992, after two weeks of siege of the parliament building, the president fled from the capital (New York Times 1992). Then when Gamsakhurdia was in exile in Armenia, his supporters started resistance in Mingrelia, Samegrelo, where the ex-president was born. The civil war between the Georgian government and Zviadists had peaked when Gamsakhurdia returned to Western Georgia in September 1993. With the help of the Russian Federation, Shevardnadze was able to suppress this rebellion. During the war between the supporters of Gamsakhurdia and the central government in Tbilisi, paramilitary groups gained ground due to the lack of military power of central government. These

²⁰ Jaba Ioseliani (1926-2003), a warlord and later a politician in Georgia in the beginning of 1990s. For further details see: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/jaba-ioseliani-36372.html> (accessed in 13.03.2016)

groups were also effective in the fight against the uprisings in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Georgia under Shevardnadze Leadership (1992-2003)

When Gamsakhurdia fled the country to Armenia, Eduard A. Shevardnadze offered help to his native land in its transition (New York Times 1992). The new interim ruling committee composed of Ioseliani, Kitovani and Sigua called Eduard Shevardnadze back to Georgia. Shevardnadze was back in Georgia in March 1992 as the chairman of the State Council, which was a transitional government. His assigned task was leading the country on the way out of the civil war (Zürcher 2005). There are many rumors about Shevardnadze's return to Tbilisi and some researchers claim that he was forced by the Kremlin to install order in Georgia (Cohen 2004). Whatever the reason behind his return, Shevardnadze played an important role in Georgian history and its political transformation from 1992 until 2003.

Shevardnadze was an old Georgian veteran, the Supreme Soviet leader from 1972 to 1985, and the foreign minister of the USSR between 1985 and 1990. When he returned, he found his country in a very difficult position. When Shevardnadze took the power in the country, Georgia was on the verge of collapse. Two of three autonomous regions resisted the control of the central government. The civil war in South Ossetia was ongoing and the resistance of Zviadists started to create trouble in the Western part of the country. Moreover, disturbances in Abkhazia were leading towards another military clash. Militarily, the central government had leaned on paramilitary forces, entrepreneurs of violence that were untrustworthy for various reasons. In foreign policy, Gamsakhurdia's anti-Russian foreign policy inclination

harmed relations with Russia, which was working to renew relations with post-Soviet states. Russia started to apply pressure on Georgia for its membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to agree to Russian military presence in the country (Zürcher 2005). In this terrible picture, Shevardnadze preferred to resolve the problems one by one. In the first period, Gamsakhurdia put aside his anti-Russian stance in favor of stability. However the situation was very difficult even for an experienced leader and until 1995 the country was on the threshold of a failed state.

When Shevardnadze came to power, the conflict in South Ossetia intensified. A ceasefire between the parties was only reached with the help of Russia. After the meeting between Russian President Yeltsin and Georgian leader Shevardnadze, Dagomys Agreement, which signified a ceasefire, was signed between the parties on 24 June 1992. The Russian position in this conflict has long been discussed. That Russia offered military support to the Ossetians is an enduring conspiracy, but the political pressure from Moscow on Tbilisi was more obvious and easily proven. After the treaty, a Joint Control Commission and a peacekeeping body, the Joint Peacekeeping Forces group composed of Russians, Georgians, and Ossetians under the Russian leadership was established in South Ossetian territory (Çelikpala 2012, Zürcher 2005).

Right after the suspension of the conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia, Abkhazia declared its independence on July 23, 1992 (Çelikpala 2012). The story behind this move shows the complicated politics in the domestic and international affairs of Georgia. Indeed during Gamsakhurdia rule, a power-sharing deal was reached between the parties in Abkhazia and the situation was relatively stable.

However, the State Council rejected this power sharing agreement because the council was trying to delegitimize Gamsakhurdia's policies in order to end the Zviadists' resistance. Moreover, in order to gain public support, the Council tried to prove that they were more nationalist than Gamsakhurdia in order to show that they were not the "puppet of Moscow". Inconsistent policies from the central government towards Abkhazia created a suitable environment for the demands of the region's leadership. Without attempting to have the approval of the Abkhazian parliament, in which Georgians have veto power, the Abkhazian leadership declared Abkhazia as a sovereign state (Zürcher 2005). Georgia responded to this move with a full scale military operation on the region. Although in the beginning Georgian forces were successful, subsequent developments led to the total withdrawal not only Georgian forces but also many Georgians who were living in the region. Georgia was caught in the crossfire of Abkhazian and Zviadists in September 1993. Shevardnadze had to appeal for Russian help. Within two weeks, the Zviadist uprising came to an end and in June 1994 Abkhazia and Georgia agreed to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the border between Georgia and Abkhazia. This Russian help was, of course, conditional and Georgia agreed to become a member of CIS (Zürcher 2005). Again, Russia played the role of the "savior" of Georgia.

The position of Russia in Georgia during this period has been a determining factor for Russian – Georgian relations. Russian foreign policy towards Georgia was uncertain and ambiguous right after the dissolution of Soviet Union; this was the reflection of an identity crisis within Russia itself. After the declaration of the Russian Military Strategy, Russian foreign policy towards the post-Soviet area

became obvious. The first version came in 1992 and a revised version came into force in November 1993. The full text was never published; only a summary of it is accessible (Slagle 1994). However, the terminology of Russian 'near abroad' started was coined by the draft version in 1992.

Understanding Russian foreign policy objectives during 1990s is useful to comprehend Russian policies and increasing Russian influence in the region. This document framed Russia's aim to protect its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet territory, which is now called 'near abroad'. In this document, the importance of 25 million Russian minorities living in the 'near abroad' was specifically underlined. After a short period of debate about Russian identity and Russian Foreign Policy, realist perspectives returned to Russian policy calculations. Russia was considering the power vacuum in the Caucasus, which could be fulfilled by Turkey, Iran, or by a global player like USA, all of which would pose a threat to its national interest (Trenin, 1996). Moreover, the probable spread of ethnic conflicts to the North Caucasus was a concern for Russia, which was dealing with insurgencies in Chechnya.²¹ In this period, Russia was unsupportive minorities' right to self-determination due to prospective impacts in its federation. Any retirement from the region was perceived as detrimental for Russian national interest as Russia preferred to have a more assertive role in the region. Russian considerations were generally military-centered, and therefore Russia's main goal in the region was to protect its military presence. However, it is important to underline that although on paper the Russian strategy seemed ambitious, during this period, Russia still lacked the

²¹ Chechnya declared its independence from Russian Federation in 1991. The first Russian- Chechen War broke out in 1994.

capacity to implement its plans due to the political and economic crisis storming the country.

The problem with ethnic minorities in Georgia has always been one of the main obstacles to Georgian 'stateness'. Minority problems in Georgia in two regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were put aside without resolution; thus, they were called "frozen conflicts" until the August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia. The freezing of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the end of Zviadists uprising, especially after the death of Gamsakhurdia, provided Shevardnadze more room for maneuver in domestic politics. During this complicated period, Shevardnadze was able to secure a very powerful position as a chairman of the new parliament, which possessed the titles of chief executive, supreme commander of the armed forces, and head of state. Shevardnadze had acquired the democratic and constitutional legitimacy that he was lacking as the chairman of the State Council. After having the legitimate power, Shevardnadze was ready to solve another obstacle to the 'stateness'. Georgia lacked one of the features of a state as defined by Weber; the monopoly of the legitimate use of force was not concentrated in the hands of central government. Instead, within the state there were autonomous paramilitary groups which were not controlled by Tbilisi. Unlike Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze tried to solve the problem slowly and smoothly. First, the National Guard of Kitovani was neutralized and integrated into the state structure. Later Kitovani, the Minister of Defense, was dismissed in May 1993 and was later arrested when he tried to regain power by retaking Abkhazia in January 1995. In autumn of 1993, Shevardnadze was relying on the Ioseliani's Mkhedrioni to defeat Zviadists

but the next step was to abolish this paramilitary group for Shevardnadze. In early 1995, Shevardnadze took the last step for Mkhedrioni and he ordered the Interior Ministry to take Ioseliani's forces. Ioseliani was not arrested until the failed assassination of Shevardnadze in August 1995 (Zürcher 2005).

As illustrated by Zürcher, during the first three years, Shevardnadze used his experience and leadership skills to strengthen his power base and Georgian stateness was reestablished slowly. According to Zürcher, "Shevardnadze's great personal prestige, his capacity to tap not inconsiderable funds in the West, as well as his talent as a mediator allowed him to forge a viable coalition, which included former cadres, members of influential patronage networks, and former parts of the national movement" (Zürcher 2005: 103). Although at the beginning of his leadership, like Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze resisted CIS membership, after the defeat in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze had to yield to pressures coming from Moscow and Georgia became a member of CIS. In this way, Georgia was awarded with the help to put down the Zviadists uprising. Moscow's backing also helped to isolate of two most important entrepreneurs of violence, Kitovani and Ioseliani.

Georgian political transformation during the first period of independence until the constitutional order established in 1995 was very chaotic. Two secessionist movements and a power struggle were the main determinants of this period. Democratization was not on the agenda until 1993 due to the urgency of security problems. Security had priority over democracy. When we examine three determinants of the democratization on which this dissertation based its assumption,

stateness, socio-economic development and political culture, each was deeply problematic in Georgia during this period.

Shevardnadze was able to create stability in the country even while two major regions of the country – Abkhazia and South Ossetia- were not under the control of central government. These regions were immobile for some time. Rather than the loss of territory, Shevardnadze's major failure was the deepening of corruption. Ironically, the man who was appointed to finish corruption during the Soviet era became the victim of corruption in the post-Soviet era. The endemic corruption in the country prevented the establishment of effective, efficient political and economic structures. These problems in the state-building process would bring about the end of Shevardnadze's leadership.

Democracy and Democratic Institutions during Shevardnadze

When he returned to the Georgian politics, Shevardnadze preferred not to associate with a political party and maintained his independent status by being the chairman of the parliament, who could not belong to a party (Slider 1999). However in 1993, the instabilities in the country necessitated the consolidation of his power with a political party base. In August 1993, the Union of Citizens of Georgia (CUG) was created and remained at the center of Georgian politics until Rose Revolution. Shevardnadze became the chairman of the party in November, while Zurab Zhvania was the secretary general and effectively the leader of the party²²(Slider 1999). Zhvania would come to play an influential role on Georgian politics.

²² Zurab Zhvania (1963-2005) for further details see:
http://gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=29 (accessed in 13.03.2016).

Rather than the ties of ideology and class, the main driving force within the CUG was loyalty to Shevardnadze as the *old nomenklatura* in Georgia aimed to protect their economic and political position. The most important success of Shevardnadze was to establish a web of relationships among various upper class groups that he had known before going to Moscow. However as in the case of Zhvania, the CUG was also able to attract the support of the younger generation and reform-minded groups from civic organizations (Zürcher 2005). Although the CUG was established for the consolidation of the Shevardnadze's power Georgia lacks a dominant party system. Georgian politics, as designed by the new constitution adopted in August 1995, is defined by a strong presidential system that was modelled in line with the American system. This reflected Shevardnadze's desire to have effective control over the executive for quick and easy state and nation building. A proposition for a semi-presidential system was rejected due to the urgency of state's problems (Matsaberidze 2014).

Georgia was the last country in the post-Soviet region that passed to a constitutional order. This is a reflection of hardship in its transition process. After establishing constitutional order, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Georgia in 1995. In the presidential elections, Shevardnadze was formally elected as the president of Georgia by the support of 70% of voters. Meanwhile his party, CUG gained a majority in the parliament. The government was formed with a coalition of independent MPs. The opposition was composed of two parties, the Union of Revival and the National-Democratic Party, but they could hardly be considered the opposition in the proper sense (Nodia & Scholbach, 2006). Union of

Revival was under the leadership of Abashidze, an Ajarian autocrat. Its contribution to the democratization of the country is questionable while the National-Democratic Party was weak collectivity. The political culture, which lacked an understanding of multi-party system due the Soviet legacy of single party, prevented the flourishing of a lively political system with opposition parties.

Although Shevardnadze was brought to the leadership as a savior, he was unsuccessful in the battlefield. However, his popular support did not disappear as it had for Gamsakhurdia. Due to his skillful moves in politics, a degree of stability was established in Georgia during Shevardnadze's rule. However, his increasing power changed expectations in the country. A leader that came with a promise of change and who established his own system became the guardian of status quo. Meanwhile, the CUG served as a mechanism for protecting Shevardnadze and the positions of his supporters, who were mainly Soviet-era elites. Rather than transforming the state and increasing its capacity and stateness, the party captured the state apparatus (Zürcher 2005). This was also another feature of Georgian political culture, another impressive impact of the old regime. The Soviet legacy was once again revived in the country during the Shevardnadze era.

During the leadership of Shevardnadze, the political parties that constitute one of the main components of a democratic system were undeveloped at best. The disappearance of the CUG after the Rose Revolution is indicative of the poor development of party politics. The political scene was fragmented, and while there were some initiatives for forming blocs, these were generally ineffective until the Rose Revolution. Only the Union for Revival displayed continuity with the CUG

and, as mentioned previously, this party generally supported Shevardnadze in exchange for the continuity of Ajarian autonomy and the rule of Abashidze.

Free, fair, and regular elections are a minimum requirement in a democratic system. In the period of Shevardnadze rule in Georgia, from 1992 until 2003, two presidential and three parliamentary elections were held, but none fully met the international standards. The 1995 and 1999 elections were considered freer and fairer by international observers, despite some irregularities, but the 2000 presidential election in which Shevardnadze secured 81% of the votes was declared fraudulent. The leader of Abkhazia was one of the candidates for the presidency but he withdrew from the race only one day prior to elections. In return, he was awarded with a change in the constitution that recognized the formal autonomy of Ajaria (Freedom House, 1999). The fraudulent presidential elections were described as a regression, even to the flawed 1999 parliamentary vote. Irregularities in this election had deeply damaged Shevardnadze's international reputation and the country's efforts for democratization. One of the monitoring organizations drew attention to the irregularities: "including the stuffing of ballot boxes, the presence of police in polling stations, a lack of transparency in the vote tabulation process, and a strong pro-Shevardnadze bias in the state media" (Freedom House, 1999).

Though there were critical problems in the political parties and the process of elections, the parliament remained an important space for democracy. Political institutions were not well developed and the parliament was not an equal partner of the president, but under the parliament roof it was possible to discuss political issues and criticize the government. The parliament became an institution to which the

media, civil society, and ordinary citizens were paying attention (Mitchell 2010). Although its impact on daily life was very minimal, it was a relevant development for Georgia that helped to strengthen the democratic culture.

Other institutions were worse off in the country, especially the judiciary branch. There was no rule of law in the country. Corruption was so widespread that there was no effective state system nor was there even a functioning state. Though it was impossible to call Georgia a democracy at this time, it is inaccurate to describe Shevardnadze's regime as authoritarian, particularly when compared to other post-Soviet countries and especially those in Eurasia. One of the important positive features of this hybrid regime – neither democratic nor fully authoritarian- was that it led to a free environment for the emergence of media and civil society. There was some intimidation but this had financial rather than political motives. Georgia witnessed the flourishing of an independent and vibrant NGO community, largely with the help of Western states and non-state actors (Mitchell 2010).

Another important process that deeply influenced the process of democratization was the foreign policy of Georgia. Georgian foreign policy will be examined in the next part, and this examination will demonstrate the main characteristics of the country's foreign policy options and decisions. Those options and decisions played a crucial role in the political transformation of the country.

Georgian Foreign Policy from Independence until Rose Revolution

Georgia is a small country enclosed by powerful neighbors that historically ruled the country. This small country struggled to define its foreign policy orientation due to various domestic and international deadlocks and difficulties in the beginning

of 1990s. The main driving forces of Georgian foreign policy were concerns about sovereignty and security. Internal conflicts and the perception of Russia as a threat to its independence shaped Georgian foreign policy until 1993. It can be argued that during Gamsakhurdia's short rule in Georgia, the country was unable to establish a real framework for its foreign policy because of internal unrest and economic problems, but the first sign of a pro-Western orientation for balancing the impact of Russia started under his leadership. Gamsakhurdia intended to develop a strategy to enter under the umbrella of Western security structures. However, the Western powers' strategy towards the post-communist world prioritized Eastern Europe and Russia. Unfortunately, Gamsakhurdia was not able to acquire the support that he was expecting from the West (Çelikpala 2012). Moreover, the West also perceived this nationalist leader not as a democratizing agent but an authoritarian leader.

Relations with Russia were problematic. Gamsakhurdia rejected becoming a member of CIS and asked Russia to close its military bases on Georgian soil. He described the Soviet military presence as "occupation forces", meaning that the Russian military bases were a legacy of the Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and were illegitimate (Souleimanov 2013). Gamsakhurdia's foreign policy orientation and its results gave the first hint about the context in which Georgian foreign policy exists, which would also deeply influence the political transformation process of Georgia. Clashing interests with Russia without the backing of Western countries and internal discontent led to the coup d'état against Gamsakhurdia.

Although some viewed Shevardnadze's return to the country as a Russian plan, he too resisted membership in the Russian dominated CIS until 1993. However,

the internal turmoil that tore apart the country and the unwillingness of Western states to provide aid showed Georgian leadership that the only option was Russia. Shevardnadze was backed by Russia in his fight against Gamsakhurdia and Russia played an active role in the establishment of a ceasefire between Georgia and the two separatist regions.

These were the first signs of a paradigm change in Georgian foreign policy: the idealism of the early days of independence was replaced by a more realistic foreign policy (Rondelli 2001). Countries like Georgia did not have many options in their foreign policies. During this period, Georgia was economically and politically weak and surrounded by major powers that had historical claims to the country. Furthermore, Georgia was located in the claimed sphere of influence of a declining empire. Idealist policies in this region, as seen in the case of Azerbaijan, led to the collapse of the state just after their independence.

Stephen Jones described four features of the country that impacted Georgian elites' formation of foreign policy. Georgia was surrounded by great powers like Russia, Turkey, and Iran and had always needed to be cautious in geoeconomic and geopolitical calculations. Its geographic situation was a constraining variable that necessitated the careful consideration of outside powers' positioning. Another variable for Georgian foreign policy was its domestic politics. Internal weaknesses in Georgia such as the secessionist movements and collapsed economy were important determinants of foreign policy under Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze leadership. Jones describes Georgia as a post-colonial state. The impact of Soviet colonialism was a controversial one. Georgian elites had an idealized image of the West in

reaction to their Soviet experience. The Soviet experience that immersed civic values and eliminated political negotiation from the public sphere had a deep impact on the foreign policy making process (Jones 2004).

In addition to these constraining determinants of Georgia, it is possible to observe four global paradigms in Georgian politics that influenced its foreign policy: religious identity, western identity, pans Caucasianism, and anti-Russianism. Jones underlines the difficulty in determining the real impact of these global paradigms to the choices of foreign policy elites (Jones 2004). Within these global paradigms, the observers of Georgian foreign policy put forward the impacts of Western identity and anti-Russianism but a more careful analysis demonstrates that in the Georgian context, it is not possible to talk about a pure version of Western identity or anti-Russianism. Rather, these two identities are mixed and possess different meanings for everyone. With this background, the Georgian foreign policy orientation in the 1990s can be summarized as:

“(a) the re-establishment of the territorial integrity of the country; (b) friendly, balanced relations with all neighboring countries; (c) the reduction of the Russian military presence on Georgian territory; (d) integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures; (e) the development of regional cooperation within the region; (f) the internationalization of local conflicts in the region; (g) attracting foreign economic interests to Georgia and the region; and (h) participation in regional economic projects” (Rondelli 2001: 196).

Even at the end of 1993 when Georgia became a member of CIS in return of Russian help for the stability of the country, Russian-Georgian relations have never been far from tension. Russia secured its military presence in the country by the signing of an agreement that allowed for the Russian military bases to remain in Georgia for 25 years (Rondelli 2001), but when the tension increased between these

two countries the presence of these bases created a serious problem. Moreover, although Georgia has close relations with Russia during this period, Tbilisi also started to search for other partners in order to balance Russian power. Georgia became a partner of NATO PfP in 1994 and Tbilisi was a founding member of GUAM in 1996, which was perceived as a direct threat by Russia (Rondelli 2001).

Tbilisi had been always suspicious about Moscow's moves towards Georgia. For example, Gamsakhurdia accused his opponents of being "KGB agents" even while opposition groups were labeling him with the same charges (Slider 1999). The problems with ethnic minorities had always been described as a Russian tactic of divide and rule. The main claim in this approach is that the two sides of this relationship, Georgians and Russians, triggered suspicion and mistrust towards each other with the discourse that they used and with their foreign policy moves.

Two attempts of assassination towards Shevardnadze in 1995 and 1998 increased his paranoia about the Russian role in Georgian domestic politics and Shevardnadze openly accused elements in Russia of participating in the attempt in 1998 (Freedom House 1998). This tension continued after the speech of Zhvania in Washington on the legal status of Russian military bases in Georgia. Russia responded to this move from China and stated that they had no plans to close their bases in Georgia (Freedom House 1998). However, in a 1999 OSCE meeting in Istanbul, Russia agreed to start its withdrawal from the military bases on Georgian soil in 2000 (Rondelli 2001). "During a November 1999 OSCE meeting in Istanbul, Moscow agreed to close two of its four military bases in Georgia by mid-2001. While Russia began its withdrawal from the Vaziani and Gudauta bases in

2000, the fate of the other two bases remained inconclusive at year's end" (Freedom House 1999). This move was welcomed by Shevardnadze leadership but the war in Chechnya once again led to the rise of the tension between these two countries.

At the end of 2000, Russia decided to establish visas for Georgian citizens but the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were excluded. The reason behind the change of visa regime was the flow of rebel fighters and weapons from Georgia to Chechnya. However the effectiveness of this policy is debatable. This move was seen as a blow to the trade relations between two countries, which was sustaining the Georgian economy. One of the reason behind the increasing tension between Russia and Georgia were the developments in Georgian relations with NATO in the second half of 1990s. Russian moves during that time are evident of Russian resentment about Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy orientation.

Georgia's Western-oriented foreign policy was much more cautious during the Shevardnadze administration in order to not alienate Russia. Rondelli claims that Georgian elites preferred not to publish even the concept of the country's security and political orientation until 2000 due to the "unwillingness of the authorities to annoy neighboring Russia with loud pro-Western statements" and the lack of internal consensus on many issues (2001: 196). However, after stability was established to some extent in the country, Georgia started to look for more integration with the West. Although the general approach was a Georgian sense of belonging to the West culturally, the pragmatic reasons were more logical like the economic necessities of the country. The Georgian economy was in a very difficult situation. In line with

these aspirations, the first talks with the IMF and World Bank started in 1994 (Rondelli 2001).

At the same time, American economic and security interests in the Caucasus region mostly served Georgia's interest. During the Shevardnadze period, Georgia was one of the countries most supported by US foreign aid. The USA's interest towards Georgia increased since the mid-1990s. The economic interest of the United States in the region was generally for the energy resources in the Caspian Sea. After the "contract of a century" with Azerbaijan, the major issue in the region was the transportation of these valuable resources to the Western market. The conflict between Turkey and Azerbaijan on one side and Armenia on the other side, in addition the sanctions against Iran made the route through Georgia the best option to carry Azerbaijani reserves to the world market. The idea of a Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline emerged in this context. The motives behind the USA's extensive support to the BTC were to break the Russian monopoly on the energy sector and diversify the supply, which was extensively based on the Middle Eastern market (Miller 2004).

1999 was lively and critical for Georgia and the events of this year paved the way to the Rose Revolution. While joining to the Council of Europe in April 1999, Georgia refused to renew the Tashkent Treaty that expired in 1999, which meant it would withdraw from the CIS Collective Security Treaty with two other members, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. With the inclusion of Uzbekistan to GUAM, the challengers of the Russian position in the end of 1990s became more obvious. The widening of the gap between this group and Russia would influence their internal and international relations deeply in the next decade.

Georgian accession to the Council of Europe, Europe's human rights and democracy body, necessitated various reforms for reaching the European standard, particularly in the area of human rights and judicial procedures. However, Georgian leadership not only "failed to comply with the Council's mandated reforms, but some of the legislation adopted before it became a member has been reversed or watered down" (Zürcher 2005: 99). The uneasiness from the public due to poverty and pervasive corruption led to the frustration from the leadership and the escalation of pressure towards public. In order to protect their status, Shevardnadze and the ruling elites demonstrated more authoritarian tendencies, which prepared the end of their rule. Although Georgia was a member of the Council of Europe, international human rights organizations reported the rise of "power abuses including extra-judicial killing, police torture, state-condoned violence against religious minorities, and death threats to journalists coming from state officials" (Jawad 2012: 147). The rise of internal problems led to divisions within the ruling party between the supporters of the status quo on the one side and the young reformers in the opposition.

However, international developments prolonged the survival of the Shevardnadze regime. Georgian support to the war on terror after the September 11 attacks in the USA increased the closeness of the relations. "Coalition aircraft en route to Afghanistan and Central Asia were allowed to overfly or refuel in Georgia. When al-Qaeda terrorists were identified in the Pankisi Gorge in early 2002, Washington launched the high-profile, two-year \$64 million Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), answering Tbilisi's request for assistance in building up its counter-terrorism capabilities" (Miller 2004: 13). In 2002, Georgia declared its

willingness to join NATO during the summit in Prague (Miller 2004). American support for the Shevardnadze regime were vital for Georgia, but the US's critical stance towards Georgia's democratic credentials were not taken seriously by Shevardnadze's leadership. Although American experts urged the Shevardnadze government for secure and credible elections in 2003, it seems that the leadership preferred their own way, which would lead to a turning point of Georgian history: the Rose Revolution in 2003.

In the next chapter, a detailed analysis of the Rose Revolution will be helpful provide a background to democratization process between 2003 and 2013 and will assist in a deep analysis of this process.

CHAPTER IV: ROSE REVOLUTION

The process of political transformation in Georgia has always demonstrated different features from the rest of the Eurasian states. When in 2003, Azerbaijan was witnessing the first dynastic succession in the post-Soviet region (Fairbanks 2004), Georgia was experiencing a bloodless revolution, which some argue would change the destiny of the country. The Rose Revolution in 2003 can be described as a turning point in the turbulent political transformation process of Georgia. In this chapter, first, the features of politics that brought such a change in Georgia will be examined. Then the course of events just before the elections in November 2, 2003 until November 23, when Shevardnadze resigned from his post, will be described. Finally, those actors who played a critical role in the subsequent phases of Georgian development will be examined.

The features and developments of Georgian politics in the 2000s that made the Rose Revolution possible were numerous. Georgians were angry about the corrupt and poor system but were hopeless that anything would change in the new millennium. The corruption in Georgia was endemic. It was strange that Shevardnadze, who was once appointed to fight corruption in Georgia, was now at the middle of a corrupt system. The political elites that captured the state demonstrated a kind of pluralism and the president acted as a kind of ‘supreme

arbiter' within these informal centers (Wheatley, 2005). The relationship between economics and politics in the country was deeply interwoven and both were failing. Although it is possible to accuse the president for the corrupt system in Georgia, he was also surrounded by economic and political impasses. In any case, the political choices of Shevardnadze were always slightly different from other post-Soviet countries. For example, Zurab Zhvania, who served as the chairman of the parliament from 1995 until November 2001, was the former head of Georgian Green Party when he became secretary general of the CUG. He was a real reformist compared to other post-Soviet nomenclature (Fairbanks 2004). Later, he became the leading figure of reformers within the CUG that resisted Shevardnadze in the beginning of 2000s.

Shevardnadze initiated a political transformation in the beginning of his term, but the legacy of Soviet Union reproduced itself, not in the political culture but in the system itself. The corrupted system was deepened by “the twin principles of rule-breaking and the collection of *kompromat* for purposes of control”, which was a Soviet legacy (Wheatley 2005: 107). This means that due to economic problems, the state was only able to afford very low salaries for employees and pensioners. These low salaries necessitated other kinds of revenue in order to survive. Even to become a civil servant, one needed to pay a fee and then attempt to regain this money in the position. Once within the vicious circle of the rule breaking, the surveillance capacity of the government, another Soviet legacy, prevented one from breaking the rules inside the system. The whole system was designed for the continuation of the corruption (Wheatley 2005).

The highly centralized, hierarchical system both granted Shevardnadze the highest rank and entrapped him in the system. His position was depending on many deals between various groups. Wheatley claims that there was ‘feudalization of power’ in two dimensions: sectoral and regional. “First it was feudalized sectorally in that certain individual ministries or informal ‘circles of friends’ within the political elite themselves constituted their own power centers. Secondly, power was feudalized geographically, since at local level power would rest with regional bosses, primarily the ‘governors’ or authorized representatives to the region, and to a lesser extent, the *gamgebelis*²³” (Wheatley 2005: 109-100). Wheatley identifies five important centers of power in Georgia during 1996-2001: “Shevardnadze and the State Chancellery, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Abashidze and the government of Ajaria, the so-called ‘reformers’ and the leadership of the Georgian parliament, and a group of ‘selected businessmen’ from Taxpayers’ Union” (Wheatley 2005: 100). Their prominence, role, and the collaborations altered time to time and tensions between them constrained Shevardnadze who was playing a difficult role on this equation. In this system, foreign aid from external powers only served political elites who held power. Georgia received aid from many international organizations and states until the Rose Revolution. The largest donor to Georgia during this period was the US and Georgia was among the worst countries in post-Soviet region in the abuse of financial aid and development assistance (Esadze 2007). As foreign aid was not used for development or democratization, the USA, IMF, and the World Bank declared just one month before the Revolution that they would reduce, or in some

²³ Gamgebelis in Georgian refers to the heads of municipalities.

cases cease, financial assistance to Georgia (Esadze 2007). The change in the foreign powers' aid policies led to conspiracies about the American role during the Revolution. Whether there was American support for the revolution or not more important to the discussion was the corrupted structure of Georgian politics that misused foreign aid and undermined the democratization process of Georgia.

Another problem of stateness in Georgia before the Rose Revolution was the power centers outside the control of the central government, which had the capacity to use force and violence. One of the important successes of the Shevardnadze regime in the beginning of the state building process was eliminate the entrepreneurs of violence, though this success did not continue very long. The country lost its monopoly on the use of force again at the end of 1990s and this time the problem in Pankisi Gorge, where Chechen fighters and Middle Eastern jihadists were active, turned into an international problem that affected Georgian foreign relations. Moreover, some state units and employees were engaged in some of the same criminal activities as Georgian paramilitaries such as the White Legion and the Forest Brothers and other guerrilla groups that were active in western Georgia and in the Gali region of Abkhazia. Insecurity became persistent in the country. "Georgia, which had just moved from the brink of civil war to be recognized by the outside world as a "weak state," was again moving towards the precipice of "failed state" (Cheterian 2008b: 694). In addition to illegal structures, the police and the army were the most corrupt and loose state institutions. The central authorities were unable to control both legal and illegal structures. Society trust in the state's ability to provide

security was very low because those that had power found ways to protect themselves, deepening insecurity in the country.

This period in Georgia was shaped by three important components: endemic corruption, increasing criminalization within the regime, and the inability of the government to provide basic services to the public (Welt, 2006). One of the major problems of the country was its chronic poverty. The state was unable even to provide electricity efficiently and broadly, which prevented foreign direct investment and economic development. However, these problems did not provoke any upheaval due to the fear to return of the instability from the first years of independence. The traumatic memory spread the fear of instability by referring to the old times. Moreover, as president, Shevardnadze as the president carried two qualifications that helped the survival of his regime. The first was his role as the balancer in very fragile political deals between the interest groups in the country; the second was the continuation of Western support for Shevardnadze and the regime (Welt 2006). Changes in this equation helped bring about the Rose Revolution. NGOs, the media, and the reformers were key players in revealing the hope inside the population and for creating a change. They were also successful in acquiring Western support to their cause.

As it previously stated, it would be unfair to call the Shevardnadze government authoritarian. Whether Shevardnadze was by not an authoritarian by nature or whether he never had enough power to establish an authoritarian regime, it was apparent that civil society and the media found a safer haven to progress in than

in most post-Soviet countries, especially until 2000s. In the 2000s, when Shevardnadze started to lose control, pressure on NGOs and the media increased.

During the independence period in Georgia, the division between politics and civil society disappeared due to the high level urgencies in the country. Until 1994 and 1995 when a minimum level stability and security was established, politics was open to nearly everyone. However after this period people started to be less engaged in politics due to fatigue for this turmoil and economic problems (Wheatley 2005). Common people returned to the issue of their own economic survival. Only external assistance and financial support with the help of the relatively free environment for civil society generated a lively setting for NGOs.

As one of the components of civil society, NGOs had an important role in Georgian politics. The number of registered NGOs in Georgia reached nearly four thousands by the end of 2000, a very high level for a small country. In this period, underfunding and public apathy posed greater problems for NGOs than official pressure or intolerance like in most authoritarian regimes (Wheatley 2005). When the features of civil society in Georgia prior to the Rose Revolution are analyzed, some qualities different from the Western type can be observed. Although the number of registered NGOs seems high, the number of effectively functioning ones was very low; only between 20 and 50 NGOs could be considered to be effectively running at this time (Wheatley 2005). Those NGOs were dependent on the foreign aid that external partners were providing. Due to deep economic problems, participation in NGOs was not based on volunteers. A group of 'NGO people' appeared, are they were generally full time employees in the system (Wheatley 2005). NGOs were the

means by which the democracy promotion community provided democracy development assistance to Georgia. The expectation was that the NGOs would transform civil society but the role of NGOs, though critical during the Rose Revolution, diminished afterwards. This was because of the elitist and politicized nature of NGOs in Georgia (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009).

NGOs in Georgia are one of the structures in which external influence can have direct impact. International development agencies financially support civil society, and especially NGOs which can provide development and democratization. A one-fits-all understanding of democracy promotion perceives NGOs as a magic bullet that can be effective in every case. In a critical approach, it is evident that technical and financial assistance do not always lead to the expected result. In some cases, financial assistance may lead to professionalization and projectionization, as well as to NGO-ization. The positive impact of NGOs on development and democratization is taken for granted by the literature but newly emerging studies have started to emphasize some of the negative impacts of NGO-ization. The capacity to provide the financial means for the development of democracy grants external players some manipulative power. For example, foreign support during the Rose Revolution was not seen during the 2007-2008 uprisings. External players that sided with the opposition during the Rose Revolution did not supported to newly emerging opposition and instead backed Saakashvili leadership during this period (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009). The change of the external players' approach to the NGOs demonstrates the context-based character of external support. However, in

a fragile democracy, the sustainability of a free environment for civil society has a primary role in the democratization process.

Rather than representing society, civil society in the Georgian context was a part of it. Many leaders of Georgian NGOs defined their role as leading rather than representing society (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009). In line with this understanding and contrary to the Western expectation of open-endedness and diversity, Georgian civil society was ideologically monolithic and closed. In this context, important players of Western civil society like universities, churches, research institutions, and other social networks were kept out in the Georgian context (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009).

NGOs in Georgia were the main beneficiaries of financial assistance for the democracy promotion before the Rose Revolution. External support for the establishment of NGOs in Georgia started in 1994 and 1995, when the two important actors of the sector were the Open Society Georgia Foundation and the Eurasian Foundation. The funding to NGOs was coming from various organizations and states (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009). When the situation in Georgia is examined “keeping in mind the criteria of mass voluntary inclusion, representative capacity, openness, and self-sustainability that were assumed by donor organizations”, the external democracy promotion efforts were unsuccessful in the enhancement of civil society (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009: 688).

Though Georgian NGOs were ineffective in developing a Western type of civil society before the Revolution, their role before and during the event deserves consideration. The NGO sector had close connections with the reformers in the CUG

(Wheatley 2005). Especially when the reformers in the CUG started to quit the ruling party and establish their own political basis, transfers from the NGO sector to politics slowly began. Later, these transfers would result in a brain drain in the NGO sector which would negatively impact the sector and to some extent Georgian democratization after the Rose Revolution. In the beginning of the 2000s, the NGO sector's support for the reformers that constituted the opposition to Shevardnadze caused reactionary policies from the president towards NGO sector. Although freer than other post-Soviet countries, the decrease in the president's power and rising opposition led to some pressure against NGOs and the media. Pro-governmental organizations and state media were also presented as an alternative to the critical independent NGOs and media (Grotsky 2012). As it was mentioned before, the external support for Shevardnadze dropped in the 2000s due to his inefficient state management and increasing authoritarian tendencies to protect his power. Pressure on the independent NGOs and media was one of the reasons for his loss of Western backing. The western democracy promotion community increased its support for independent NGOs that they were saw as struggling under and against the president's oppression (Grotsky 2012).

The relationship between NGOs and the media was another important aspect of Georgian civil society before the Rose Revolution. Newspapers were expressing a wide range of views and some of them were quite critical of the ruling party and the president. However, according to a survey, the access to newspapers within the population was low in Tbilisi and even worse in the provinces because of high prices (Wheatley 2005). The television sector to which people had more access was

composed of three major channels that two of them channel 1 and 2 was state-run and only Rustavi 2 was a private channel with national coverage (Wheatley 2005).

The external support for the freedom of media constitutes one of the most important branches of democracy promotion efforts. In the end of 1990s, democracy assistance changed its methods in Georgia. Before, the journalist community as a whole was the beneficiary of this support but later, the television channel Rustavi 2 became the primary target of this assistance (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009). The reasoning behind it was rational in the Georgian context. The number of people that newspapers reached was very few compared to the Rustavi 2 channel. The Rustavi 2 channel, with its more professional coverage, was able to cultivate a reliable image in the public sphere before the revolution and to reach a wide range of the population.

External support to the NGOs and the media established ‘pro-democracy’ public discourse in the country (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009). This was a critical development in the Georgian political transformation. As it was mentioned, in Georgia, there was a wide-spread disappointment about the change. NGOs became the locomotive for creating a belief within the society. Their contribution to political culture in Georgia deserves appreciation but still should be subject to critique regarding their capacity and motivation. Especially the events after the Rose Revolution demonstrate that the NGO sector in Georgia was lacking some features of a real civil society, which is one of the most important aspects of a democratic regime.

NGOs, the media and the reformers within the CUG were the three crucial elements of the Rose Revolution. The CUG started to collapse at the beginning of

2000. The first group that left the party was the representatives of the business community, which formed the New Rights Party. Turmoil in the party led to the resignation of the president Shevardnadze from the position of chair in the CUG with the hope that the party could recover without his presence. However the collapse continued. Mikheil Saakashvili, the most important political figure of the Rose Revolution resigned when he was the Minister of Justice in September 2001. His motivation was the inability of the government to put an end to the political culture of corruption (Welt 2006). One of the important figures in the reformist camp of the CUG was Zurab Zhvania. Zhvania resigned from his post as the speaker of the Parliament of Georgia,²⁴ a role he held since 1995, as a result of a scandalous operation against the television channel Rustavi-2 (Welt 2006). Nino Burjanadze became the speaker of the parliament after Zhvania's resignation. She was perceived as a neutral figure. Zhvania and Saakashvili diverged in their political plans during this period. Saakashvili preferred to establish his opposition movement, while Zhvania chose to stay within the party to capture the leadership and change its ideological orientation. Saakashvili established the 'New National Movement' in December 2001 (Wheatley 2005). Local elections in 2002 were an important test for the opposition. In Tbilisi, the ruling party was unable to obtain even one seat. The most successful party throughout the whole country was the New Rights Party. However, Saakashvili's National Movement and the Labor Party were very effective in Tbilisi but not in the other parts of the country. The Labor Party leader, Shalva Natelashvili, accepted that in Tbilisi, Saakashvili became the head of the city council

²⁴ The speaker of Georgian Parliament was possessing the highest role in Georgian Parliament, which was supreme representative body in the country. The constitution in 1995 did not design a post of Prime Minister in Georgia.

(Welt 2006). In 2002, Zhvania's new party, United Democrats, was reinforced by the coalition with Burjunazde, who was ranking on the top of the list of trusted politicians while Zhvania was doing very badly (Welt 2006). The opposition was not able to establish an effective coalition before the 2003 parliamentary elections and they were divided between different parties and groups, while the ruling party established a coalition named 'For a New Georgia'.

Kmara! (Enough) was first the declaration signed by fourteen NGOs and two opposition leaders, Saakashvili and Zhvania, which lists "ten steps to freedom". Soros Open Society Foundation was the initiator of this idea for the creation of an alliance between NGOs to increase their impact on politics and society. Later on, a youth organization appeared in Georgian political scene in the beginning of 2003 with the same name (Companjen 2010). *Kmara*, the student group in Georgia was influenced from its Serbian version, *Otpor* (Resistance) that successfully overthrew the president, Slobodan Milosevic. The youth movement in Serbia worked together with opposition parties, independent media, and civic groups to push Milosevic to resign with peaceful activism. This experience was important for Georgian people, who were still influenced by the legacy of April 1989 and the violent times after the independence but who were discreetly approaching to street demonstrations (Anglely 2013).

The Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), two of the most active NGOs in Georgia, promoted the Serbian Model. The trip that took three opposition leaders, Zurab Zhvania, Mikheil Saakashvili and David Gamkrelidze to Belgrade was financed by OSGF and planned

by NDI in January 2003. The aim was to establish a coalition between these three reformers before the 2003 parliament elections but the NGOs were not successful in this initiative (Angley 2013). Another OSGF trip to Serbia by Georgian civic activists in February 2003 served a template for action to civic activists. Young Georgian activists learned the techniques for creating societal pressure on undemocratic regimes peacefully. Another round of this education was held in Tbilisi by the activists from Serbia's *Otpor* youth movement for over 1,000 Georgian students during the summer before the elections. The documentary 'Bringing Down a Dictator' capturing the *Otpor*'s success was on air promoting the Serbian model just before and after the election (Angley 2013). *Kmara* youth organization was cooperating closely with the Liberty Institute and Rustavi 2 as well as with the opposition political parties (Angley 2013).

As it shown by the flourishing of NGOs and the emergence of independent media, the first priority for the opposition in Georgia was not the freedom of expression or a solution to human rights problems. Instead, reformers "were mainly fed up with the corrupt, inefficient, and rotten regime of Shevardnadze" and the leadership was alienating itself from reformists since 2001 and was captured by corrupt and criminalized elites (Cheterian 2008: 693). Opposition existed outside of the country as well. Western states were anxious about the orientation of Georgian regime. The importance of Georgia for the West increased at due to at least two important developments. The first was its role as a transit country for the energy resources coming from Eurasia to Europe that broke the Russian monopoly and the second was its changing role after September 11. Georgia was among the supporters

of the War on Terror and a close ally of the USA. Though Shevardnadze was a well-known ally of US and of the West, it became obvious that democratization had stagnated in Georgia during the early 2000s. Since 1999, the country had failed to conduct even the basic requirement for a functioning democratic regime, free and fair elections. The increasing pressure on independent NGOs and the media led to close western observation of the 2003 elections, which even turned to direct interventions in some cases. For example, the visit of US former Secretary of State James Baker, a close friend of Shevardnadze, was one of the critical examples of direct intervention. Baker urged Shevardnadze for democratic elections. Baker even presented advice on the Central Election Commission's structure. The official statement from the White House about the US president envoy to Georgia reveals some clues about the US' position during the elections.

“Former Secretary of State James Baker will visit Tbilisi, Georgia on July 4 and 5 on behalf of President Bush. The mission's primary objective will be to discuss with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze ways to advance political and economic reform in Georgia through free and fair Parliamentary elections this fall. Mr. Baker will also discuss U.S. -Georgian cooperation on counterterrorism and other security matters. The Baker mission reflects the United States' readiness to work with all Georgian citizens who are committed to advancing reform and fighting corruption in pursuit of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Georgia”(White House, 2003).

Baker's Plan for the Central Election Commission (CEC), the authority for counting the votes, was planned according to a rational division between the government and the opposition. There were fifteen seats, with five members from the government, nine to be divided amongst the opposition, and the chair, who would be appointed by the OSCE (Miller 2004). This was a critical opportunity for Georgian democratization. Though the government seemed agreed on the plan, after Baker left the country a new structure of CEC appeared that demonstrated that the leadership

was ready to oppose every group in order to protect its power. The opposition parties, the National Movement, the United Democrats, New Rights and Labor Party, got one seat each. By guaranteeing “appropriate” election results, pro-government opposition groups, the Revival Party and the Industrialists, were granted three and two seats respectively (Miller 2004). This disappointing change in the structure of CEC demonstrated that the ruling elites risked even a skirmish with the US in order to win the elections. Whatever the reason behind this decision, the structure of the new committee totally changed the atmosphere of the elections.

The critical day of elections came. On November 2, 2003, Georgians went to vote for the parliamentary elections. The opposition was disunited as major opposition parties were not able to create a bloc before the election while the leadership was able to present an electoral bloc called ‘For a New Georgia’. The opposition was hopeless and began preparing itself for the 2005 presidential elections. The Rose Revolution came as a surprise even for the ones who achieved it.

Before the CEC even published the results, rumors started to spread about fraud and excessive irregularities during the elections. Rustavi 2 broadcasted the results of the elections revealed on exist polls and the parallel voter tabulation that claims Saakashvili’s National Movement came in first in the elections. While before the completion of the counting, CEC announced that For a New Georgia was leading in the elections. The contradictory declarations from both sides about the results became much more complicated with the evidence collected by civil society. Georgian civil society was more experienced and educated during this election than at any time previously and were therefore able to collect various proofs of the fraud.

They had also the chance to present this evidence to the public with the help of Rustavi 2 (Companjen 2010). High importance was endowed to the elections by the international organizations, institutions, and states. Domestic civil society was enriched with many tips and tactics for the prevention of irregularity and the protection against fraud for the evidence. There was great interest from the international organizations that send various observers. ISFED's election monitoring activities in 2003 were extensive and well calculated. Election observers were even recruited from Russia and Ukraine in order to observe the elections in the pro-Russian region, Ajaria (Anglely 2013).

The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) was funded by NDI in Georgia and they were the ones who implemented the first parallel vote tabulation (PVT). PVT is alternative way to count the votes that delivers a system to check the official vote records (Anglely 2013). ISFED's election monitoring system confirmed the fraud and provided the opposition with concrete statistical evidence. It is possible that the 2003 elections were less corrupt than previous elections but what was critical for this election was the ability the fraud using the tools provided by the international community (Anglely 2013).

One day later after the elections, various organizations that came to observe the elections declared that the election was not able to reach the Western standards. There were around 450 international observers who came from the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the US government. Foreign observers are generally less critical in their election reports compared with domestic NGOs reports but in 2003 they were sharper than the expected (Companjen 2010).

The rallies started on November 4 in front of the Tbilisi Municipality building. While CEC delayed declaring the results of the elections, anxious opposition parties came together and discussed joint actions. When the opposition started to move together, a coalition appeared. The first requests for new elections turned to demands for the resignation of Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze resisted these demands and the number of people on the street increased day by day.

While uprising continued in the capital, the president decided to seek out the Ajarian dictator's support and went to visit Abashidze. The support that Ajarian leaders provided to Shevardnadze by having a counter rally in Batumi and then later in Tbilisi backfired (Companjen 2010). The rally that was organized with the support of the Ajarian autocrat who was mostly despised was harmful to the President's prestige. The rally that Abashidze arranged in Tbilisi for supporting the president against the opposition was political suicide for Shevardnadze as this move only exacerbated reformists.

On November 20, eighteen days after the elections, the CEC was able to declare the intriguing and stressful results of the elections after counting and recounting the votes. Shevardnadze's bloc and the Revival Party of the Ajarian dictator were declared the winner of the elections (Companjen 2010). This was the Shevardnadze's single greatest mistake and would result in the loss of his power. He backed both the fraudulent election results and the Ajarian dictator for his support during this turmoil. The experienced leader was unable to interpret what was going on the country he had ruled in one way or another since the 1970s. At this point, he was not able to rationally play with different interest, as he had during the 1990s to

stabilize the country. At the end, his last major success was to resign without returning the country to bloodshed.

The opposition planned a huge demonstration for the opening day of the newly elected parliament in 22 November. Georgians from around the country came to the capital. When Shevardnadze was making his opening speech inside the parliament, the supporters of the opposition entered to the building with Saakashvili. They were carrying roses and asking for the resignation of Shevardnadze. When the opposition stormed the building, Shevardnadze escaped from the building with the help of his bodyguards while still resisting resignation. He declared a state of emergency on the same day.

Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov came to Tbilisi to meet first with Shevardnadze and then together with the opposition leaders and Shevardnadze. When the opposition leaders were leaving Shevardnadze's residence, they declared that the president agreed to resign. On November 23, 2003 Shevardnadze resigned from his post. His resignation created a wave of celebration that was concentrated in Tbilisi but that occurred all over the country. Some opposition leaders described the feeling during this period as the first success of the Georgian nation since its independence. According to them, Georgians regained their dignity and a new wave of hope was initiated for the future of Georgians (Wertsch 2005).

The picture of the Rose Revolution presents two important aspects of Georgian politics. The American support to the revolutionary elite is a well-known truth. Moreover, the role of Russia in the country once again became apparent. The opposition leaders that were supported by the USA and the West came together with

Shevardnadze in a meeting arranged by the Russian foreign minister Ivanov. Two important external powers of this period were the US and Russia. Russian policy helped the peaceful transition of power and the resignation of Shevardnadze.

After the resignation of Shevardnadze, it was obvious that ‘Misha’ of the crowd was the new leader of Georgian opposition but Burjanadze became the interim president of Georgia until new elections could take place in January 2004 (Companjen, 2010). Different from the color revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the Rose Revolution in Georgia did not lead to a political turmoil between the revolutionary groups after they took the power. Instead, the Georgian elites that triggered the revolution were able to unify and establish a monopoly on politics that allowed for the creation of radical changes, especially before November 2007, when the Georgian opposition was again able to mobilize tens of thousands people to express their rejection of Saakashvili’s monopoly of national politics (Cheterian 2008a). In this way, the Rose Revolution was not an end for Georgian democratization but rather a new beginning.

CHAPTER V: DEMOCRATIZATION IN GEORGIA

In November 2003, Georgia was witnessing a turning point in its political transformation process. Although the unconstitutional change of power was not a democratic practice theoretically, the Rose Revolution created an environment that was hopeful for the future. The non-violent nature of the revolution was especially appreciated. The roses that activists were carrying became the symbol of the revolution and this change of power became a symbol of hope for activists in other post-Soviet countries. The Rose Revolution demonstrated its impact with the flourishing of subsequent revolutions in the region. The process begun by the Rose Revolution is significant for democratization studies. A deep analysis of the Georgian case can provide important insights to the literature and to the promotion of democracy.

Besides the internal expectations that followed Rose Revolution, the success of the revolution had created a new hope for democratization on a regional and international level. Lincoln Mitchell who was working for NDI in Georgia during the Rose Revolution defined the event as “a victory not only for the Georgian people but for democracy globally” (Mitchell 2004: 342). He claimed the revolution “demonstrated that, by aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic

opposition can defeat a weak semi-democratic kleptocracy” (Mitchell 2004: 342). While having some positive impacts domestically, the role that was attributed to the Rose Revolution internationally also complicated internal dynamics for democratization. Feeling the need to protect this great success was one reason the discourse became securitized, which would have a negative impact on the democratization process in Georgia. Though the securitization of democratization was harmful, the democratization process did not stop in Georgia. Georgian democratization is one of the few examples in the last decade of a state that managed to democratize in spite of securitization.

After the resignation of Shevardnadze, Burjanadze as interim president took the country to the elections on January 4, 2004. In this election, Saakashvili got 96% of the total votes and became the president of Georgia president in free and fair elections which were confirmed by international organizations. Parliamentary elections were scheduled on March 28, 2004. After the elections, major figures of the late opposition took the leadership of the country. Zhvania was appointed to the newly created post of prime minister and Burjanadze became speaker of the parliament (Çelikpala 2012). The presidential and parliamentarian elections were evaluated as free and fair generally (Mitchell, 2004).

With the election of the new president and parliament, Georgia entered into a new period. This new time contained developments domestically and internationally that influenced and impacted the democratization process in the country. These domestic and international developments will be analyzed in the consecutive three parts, which are divided according to their theoretical background: the first phase,

securitization of democratization; the second phase, the emergence of the security dilemma; and the third phase, the de-securitization of Georgian democratization.

5.1. The First Phase of Democratization in Georgia: Securitization of Democratization (2003-2005)

This section will begin by briefly summarizing the political, economic, and social developments during the early period of Saakashvili leadership. Then, in order to analyze the securitization of democratization, the domestic and international factors that triggered this phenomenon will be discussed. On the international level, first the attempt at the macro-securitization of democracy and later the securitization of Georgian democratization by the US will be examined. On the domestic level, the construction of a national identity and the emergence of a new foreign policy paradigm will be evaluated in order to follow the securitization of democratization.

Political, Economic and Social Developments in the First Phase of Georgian Democratization

When Saakashvili and his allies came to power in the beginning of 2004, all the economic, political, and social problems that brought down Shevardnadze still existed with the same urgency. The new leadership faced various hardships that were the legacy of the overthrown regime. However, the domestic and international support to the new leadership helped the new government tremendously. Corruption Economic problems, corruption, and threats toward the territorial integrity of the country remained the largest issues for Georgia. The new leadership quickly went about solving these problems.

First of all, the transfer of power in Georgia to the reformers after the revolution changed the political calculations in Ajaria. Abashidze, the Ajarian authoritarian leader, was ruling the region without the central government's real control and based on an informal settlement with Shevardnadze. Although the Revival Party and Abashidze defined themselves as in opposition to one another, it seems that there was a secret deal between these two parties and the Revival Party was sharing and supporting the power with the CUG (Mitchell 2004). The relationship between Abashidze and Shevardnadze is difficult to define but it is a good example of the ostensible opposition parties in hybrid regimes. Though at times tension increased like during the presidential elections of 2000, as their relationship was based on interest the two parties tended to get along well. Generally when Abashidze's demands were met, the Revival Party supported the ruling party. Other opposition parties criticized this complicated relationship. A multi-party system is one of the most important components of democracy but can lead to deadlocks and crises in parliament in countries without a deliberative culture. In addition, when the country does not have a tradition of tolerance, opposition is generally perceived as a threat. However, in an international system that prioritizes democratic regimes, many hybrid regimes create ostensible opposition parties for preventing criticisms from the outside world. It is necessary to explain that those ostensible opposition parties are generally weak in authoritarian regimes, but that due to the weakness of the central government in the Georgian case, the Revival Party that emerged in one part of the country with a strong hand became very powerful.

With such power, Abashidze failed to recognize the new leadership in Tbilisi and declared to a freeze in relations with the central government. This move created tension between Tbilisi and Batumi as the leadership in Tbilisi began its project to reestablish territorial integrity in the country (Çelikpala, 2012). Later on, this tension turned to military preparations but the riots that started in Batumi prompted Abashidze to escape to Moscow before any clash broke out. Some argue that this was the second phase of the Rose Revolution (Mitchell 2004). To call the reintegration of Ajaria into Georgia a second Rose Revolution is likely an exaggeration, but it was the first success of the new leadership, which importantly increased its self-confidence.

How the central government evaluated and reflected this development in its discourse is critical. Saakashvili's statement on this success was quite political and he presented this success as an example for the future moves in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, Salome Zurbishvili, then foreign minister of Georgia, warned about the dangers of drawing a parallel between the problems of Ajaria and Abkhazia. Zurbishvili presented this event in Ajaria to the domestic and international audience as "a conflict between democracy and, if you can call it that, non-democracy. But it shows the Georgian government can resolve such a conflict with democratic and peaceful methods" (New York Times, 2004). A victory for the territorial integrity of Georgia was presented to the audiences as a success against non-democracies. The discourse developed during this event is significant to follow the correlation between stateness and democratization in the Georgian context and

discourse. Moreover, it is important to underline that in this intervention Georgia was supported by the West as well as by Russia and Turkey (Çelikpala 2012).

Contrary to the expectations of the central government, the impact of the successful integration of Ajaria was detrimental for the problems in Abkhazian and South Ossetian. The confidence that this success created, decreased the chance for peaceful resolution in the other cases. Saakashvili's policies that prioritized a military solution in South Ossetia were perceived as a sign for a conflictual approach to Abkhazia. Increasingly nationalistic discourse, enlargements of the military, and the rise in military spending were evaluated as evidence of an increased probability of confrontation and war (Çelikpala 2012). Though there were some tensions in Tbilisi's relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the conflict did not become truly tense until the August War in 2008.

Unemployment and corruption were urgent problems in the country. The secessionist regions also negatively impacted the economic problems of Georgia. In these regions, an alternative system of profit, power, and protection was created (Kukhianidze 2009). For this reason, the resolution of the Ajarian problem was economically beneficial for the new leadership.

Economic development was one of the priorities of Saakashvili leadership and for economic recovery, the most important obstacle was endemic corruption. In 2003, the country ranked 124th out of 133 in the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2003). The government policies to fight corruption began to show positive results in 2006 and the country has improved since then. In 2014, Georgia ranked 50th out of 174 countries (Transparency International 2014).

From 2003 to 2005, there was a massive number of arrests of corrupt government officials, ‘thieves-in-law’, and other key criminals (Kukhianidze 2009).

As mentioned earlier, the criminalization of the police was one the major security problems in Georgia before the Revolution. This reached such a level that while there were many crimes, professional racketeering was not widespread because “badly paid law-enforcement bodies implemented racketeering functions and did not allow gangsters to compete – the police themselves controlled markets, small businesses and smuggling” (Kukhianidze 2009: 221). The Georgian police would earn money from the widespread gangsterism like kidnappings as well as from the stealing of cars and robberies of families or banks because the release of these criminals was a source of income. Narcotic trafficking was another source of income and there were many suspicions about the involvement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kukhianidze 2009). The traffic police in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was one of the most corrupt departments and underwent radical changes after the Revolution. In the summer of 2004, the department was closed and up to 2700 traffic police officers dismissed. A new system of recruitment and education was established based on the western type patrol police. The number of women and the salaries of the police were increased in order to prevent the corruption. The Police Academy led trainings with the help of experts from the US and EU (Kukhianidze 2009). This renewal was not limited only to traffic police officers; the whole system was improved and the impact of this development became apparent in public opinion polls that demonstrated the increasing trust for the police in Georgia in 2005 (Kukhianidze 2009). The dismissal of around 16,000 of 60,000 policeman helped to

abolish corrupt networks and links with criminals (Kukhianidze 2009). Increasing trust in security forces is beneficial to the general trust in the country for the civic culture, which is necessary for democratization.

After resolving some of the security problems, the new Georgian leadership worked hard in this first period for the effective and efficient functioning of state institutions. For the restructuring of the state economy, various new regulations were made. The bureaucracy was simplified (Çelikpala 2012) while bureaucratic accountability increased (Jones 2004). In order to create a well-functioning system that could sustain foreign capital inflows and foreign investment, taxation and a banking system ameliorated. At the same time, public services started to function more effectively, the salaries of retired and working people increased, and foreign investment and aid increased during this period. With the new credits that the IMF provided to the leadership, the state budget that previously was 350 million dollars before Rose Revolution reached three billion dollar in 2006 (Çelikpala 2012).

In addition to these successes, one of the first actions of Saakashvili was to increase the constitutional power of the president. With this decision, the power became concentrated in the executive, the parliament that used to be filled with numerous parties turned into pro-presidential one party assembly, and the independence of the media and the civil society diminished (Jones 2006). NGOs, which played a critical role during the Rose Revolution, lost their power because of the brain drains from NGOs to the parliament or the government. The separation of powers and the checks and balances mechanisms that are vital for the functioning of democratic system was in a sense injured by the new leadership. Such changes,

which continued incrementally, caused social unrests in the next period. This demonstrates the importance of democratization in the recovery period. Georgians did not accept decline in democratic credentials for the sake of the economy or security. The state was more efficient and dynamic in the political and economic field but the expectation of a dramatic change in the daily lives was not met during the first period (Jones 2006). The search for more democratization did not stop. Though the opposition was small, they continued to observe the pace of the process.

The first period's most important impact on the democratization process was two simultaneous developments on the international and domestic levels: the securitization of Georgian democratization.

Domestic Level of Securitization of Georgian Democratization

Identity Construction Pillar

One of the prominent and increasingly important research areas in contemporary international relations is the role of identity. The Copenhagen School also paid attention to this study area and one of the most critical contributions of the School is considered to be societal security, which is structured from an identity security perspective. Identity studies are a broad area of study; there are various aspects of interrelation between democratization and identity. The impact of identity construction to the securitization of democratization is the main concern of this dissertation.

The motivation behind this concern is the increasing use of securitization as a mechanism of identity making. The use of securitization as a method in the construction of identity is based on the exclusion of the "other" rather than the on an

internal belonging of people to the community (Hellberg 2011). This method affects the domestic and international policy options of countries like Georgia. The use of securitization as a method for identity construction played a critical role in the first period of Georgian democratization, which will be analyzed in greater detail later in this section. The discourse analysis method will help to reveal the securitization in the public statements of Saakashvili and also in Georgian National Security Concept. This excavation into the discourse will contribute to the analysis of the role of the new Georgian identity in the securitization of democratization.

The constructivist understanding of identity rejects the claim that identities are given. Particularly the objectivity of national identity that plays a vital role in current state affairs started to be questioned. While there are some objective factors like language in location in the construction of national identities, the most important determinant is the acceptance or voluntary compliance of the community. In other words, even though there are some historical or contemporary ties, national identity depends firstly on political and personal choices (Barry, et al. 1998). It is obvious from different nation building processes that there are various ways to influence these political and personal choices. For this reason during the nation building process, the construction of identity is one of the main concerns for establishing internal cohesion within a community. In this process, one of the main tools of elites is threats towards identity, which increase the loyalty to the identity as well as to the state and also create a collective attitude towards the outsiders. As it was underlined by the Copenhagen School “threats to identity are thus always a question of the construction of something as threatening some “we” – and often thereby actually

contributing to the construction or reproduction of “us” (Barry, et al. 1998: 120). An external enemy can be shaped as a good reason for the construction of an identity. Especially in the case of internal divisions, references to an external enemy and the use of historical comparisons work effectively due to their physiological impacts. Hellberg, in her study of the construction of European identity, made the analysis of the role of securitization as a mechanism of identity making by using the Copenhagen and Paris Schools’ approaches. She concluded that European identity historically and currently is constructed by “rejection”. The crisis on the solidarizing impact of common values was cured by the injection of threatening the “other” (Hellberg 2011). In addition, she also underlined the probable negative impacts of constructing identities with the method of securitization. “The outcomes of the securitization become threatening for the referent object such as internal identity that brings into question feasibility of societal security as a whole” (Hellberg 2011: 10). This feature of European identity is critical for analyzing Georgian identity that refers to its European characteristics. Exclusive features of European identity can also be observed in the Georgian identity. Therefore, the dangers that exist within European identity also apply to the Georgian context. Hellberg touched upon the two probable negative impacts of securitization: the first is the intensification of the ‘clash of civilizations’ and the second is the harmful impact on common values (Hellberg 2011). The danger of the intensification of clashes due to the securitization of the “other”, which for Georgia is Russia, was witnessed during the democratization process.

The construction of the threats is one of the determinants of identity security. In their societal sector analysis, the Copenhagen School emphasizes the three main threats towards identity security: migration and horizontal and vertical competition (Barry, et al. 1998). These three issues may be constructed as a threat towards the national identity of a country. Migration of a new group may influence the identity of indigenous people of the country while the identity of the neighboring country can also be harmful, as in the case of horizontal competition. In addition, either an integrating project or a secessionist “regionalist” project can be perceived or constructed as a security threat to the national identity, called vertical competition (Barry, et al. 1998). The Copenhagen School’s approach helps to make sense of the Georgian case. In Georgia, ruling elites constructed horizontal competition with Russia and defined Russian influence to their identities as harmful, while portraying EU and NATO integration as beneficial. The construction of threats towards identity is not limited to Buzan’s approach but these three examples presents one part of the larger picture.

In the Georgian context, identity construction and politics constitutes one of the critical determinants of the democratization process in Georgia. In earlier periods of political transformation, the construction of national identity was one the main goals of the nation building process. Secessionist movements increased the importance of the construction of national identity. Though an inclusive national identity would have been beneficial, Georgia’s alienated minority groups within the country. During the Shevardnadze period, the nationalist rhetoric and anti-Russian rhetoric decreased. Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze did not emphasize a European

identity and orientation. Instead, especially during Gamsakhurdia's leadership, the Caucasian identity was more important. References to European identity started to be broadly used during the 2000s when the European Union was more developed and institutionalized. In this period, the EU's interest in the region also increased (Beachain & Coene 2014). Reciprocal interest was reverberated both in discourse and policies on both sides. However, the experience during the first years of independence and the knowledge on Russian interest and policies led Shevardnadze to have a balanced foreign policy rather than a purely Western orientation. This perspective had important impacts on the construction of identity during this era and after Rose Revolution.

The main criticism that the Rose Revolution leaders had during the Shevardnadze period was that, although friendly relations were established with main international actors, this had not transformed to positive developments within the country. For this reason, the aim of the Revolution was defined "to reverse this decade of decline and to re-chart Georgia's destiny so that a strong state, protecting democratic and liberal values might win back the lost territories and restore Georgian national pride and confidence" (Beachain & Coene 2014). They believed that the European identity of Georgians would be effective in the "reimagining of the country and its destiny" (Beachain & Coene 2014: 924). However, it seems that the impact of excessive emphasis on the European features of Georgian identity and the use of securitization for identity construction had consequences that were outside of the control of the new Georgian leadership. This new identity construction process in Georgia after the Rose Revolution triggered domestic securitization of

democratization. The discourse generated by ruling elites is critical to examine the securitization of democratization. Saakashvili was one of very few figures in the Georgian context during the first period that had the capacity to have a discursive influence. To begin, the speech that he delivered during his inauguration in January 2004 will be analyzed in terms of identity construction.

In Georgian identity constructions, old Georgian culture is paramount. The ties of Georgian culture with the European culture are always underlined. However, the use of this discourse by the new leadership gained new momentum. As can be followed in President Saakashvili's first official speech, belonging to the European civilization supported with the Rose Revolution added a new task to Georgia: "a paragon for democracy"

"Georgia is the country of unique culture. We are not only old Europeans, we are the very first Europeans, and therefore Georgia holds special place in European civilization. Georgia should serve as a paragon for democracy where all citizens are equal before the law, where every citizen will have an equal opportunity for the pursuit of success and realization of his or her possibilities" ("President Saakashvili's Inauguration" 2004).

While stating that Georgia had to establish benign relations with all its neighbors, Saakashvili highlighted sharply that it also had to regain its place in European civilization where it belongs.

This event was the first time the European flag was used with the new Georgian flag. The use of the European flag demonstrates that identity construction is not only a discursive process but also visual references are very critical and they are used a great deal as support in the process. Georgian leaders always emphasized on European connections and roots of Georgian identity but the use of the European flag was a step further. The European flag is still used in the government's building

side by side with the Georgian flag. Moreover, the use of the European flag became a trend in pro-democracy riots outside of Georgia as well. The use of the European flag in such a way on one hand demonstrates the success of European normative power and also on the other hand presents the power Georgia and the Rose Revolution have as role models. Saakashvili's emphasis on the European flag during his speech was illustrative for the understanding of his future steps but can also be interpreted as a rejection of historical ties with Russia. Moreover, it was a clear declaration of the future foreign policy inclination of Georgia.

“Today, we have not raised European flag by accident - this flag is Georgian flag as well, as far as it embodies our civilization, our culture, essence of our history and perspective, and vision of our future” (“President Saakashvili's Inauguration” 2004).

The change of the Georgian flag to the Five Cross Flag, which stressed Georgia's Christian character, was another sign of the European character of Georgian identity because Christianity is one of the main binding ties between Europe and Georgia. During the speech, Saakashvili made a reference to Georgian religious identity and a connection with European integration, too. Christian faith has been always the driving force for the Georgian elites to view themselves a part of Europe (Beachain & Coene 2014). However, after the Rose Revolution, the primary concern was not about being accepted in Western civilization. The discourse demonstrates that Georgian leadership was certain about the Georgian place on the Western civilization. Christian faith was one of the keys for the opening of the doors to the membership in Western international organizations.

While emphasizing European identity and the aim for the integration with Europe, Saakashvili did not forget the US and offered his gratitude for American

support to Georgia. In this speech, Saakashvili was careful about Russia and underlined that the aim of Georgia was not a conflictual relationship with Russia. Rather, he offered a friendly hand to Russia during his inauguration.

The geographic position of Georgia leaves the country in a middle ground between Europe and Asia. Moreover, the historical legacies of Russia and the Soviet Union have tremendously impacted the political, social, economic, and cultural structures of Georgia and have shifted it away from the West.. In order to handle this complicated structure, the new government decided to go about bold identity construction, which stressed the Western features of the Georgian identity. The use of securitization as a tool during this period necessitated an “other”. An ordinary “other” of the West, Russia was a good candidate in this process. The use of securitization and Russia as the “other” started slowly but turned to a direct challenge when Saakashvili leadership enhanced its power domestically and internationally.

First National Security Concept of Georgia, published in July 2005, underlines Georgian aspirations to build a cooperative relationship with Russia based on the principles of good neighborly relations, equality, and mutual respect. However in this text, the emphasis on Russian political transformation is remarkable.

“Georgia would welcome transition of Russia into a stable democratic state with a functioning market economy and respect for European values. Democratization and foreign policy predictability of the Russian Federation would positively influence Georgia’s and the regional security environment” (“National Security Concept” 2005).

This statement demonstrates that Georgia now confidently desired to be a part of Western civilization, and presented itself as an agent that was in a position to advise to its “historical ruler”. Such moves in the new discourse of Georgian

leadership started to harm its relations with Russia. The changes in Georgia were perceived as dangerous to Russian national interest. Democratization that would open the doors to the European integration was a high priority for Russia due to the probable threats this would pose for its national interest.

The relational feature of the identity construction is critical for international relations. Generally, it is claimed “identity can be understood in general terms of self-consciousness of an individual or a group that is founded on a particular relation to ‘others’” (Hellberg 2011: 3). However in international relations, the ‘other’ is optional. There are various options for a country to choose its ‘other’ and to create a narrative based on this ‘other’ in order to strengthen its own identity. In general, the identity is a construction and the ‘other’ is a constructed concept or image that is a product of a discursive phenomenon. “The significance of the ‘other’ in identity formation is not to be underestimated – it can affect identity both in contradiction to the ‘alien’ and in connection with the community of belonging” (Hellberg 2011: 3). Neighboring countries especially can play a critical role. “The neighbors you want to dissociate yourself from are more important in these processes than the ones you want to emulate” (Kolstø & Rusetskii 2012: 139). The place of Russia in Georgian identity construction after the Rose Revolution is extremely important. Russia has been always a critical determinant in the process of national identity construction in Georgia but since the Rose Revolution, the increasing emphasis on the Western identity of Georgians is totally related with the balance of power between Russia and Georgia. Georgian leadership statements and the major documents during this period explicitly state where Georgia thought it belonged - Europe and the West. Moreover,

they carefully presented Russia as the ‘other’. “Scapegoating” the Soviet Union and later Russia was a tradition for Georgia but after the Rose Revolution during the new identity construction process, this reached a new and more professional level.

It is important to note that though the identity construction process that influenced securitization of democratization is analyzed in detail only for the first part of Georgian democratization, the process did not finish after the first period. Identity construction is not a process that can end; it renews itself over time with new discursive moves. In the following sections, instead of detailed analysis, the new discursive moves will be analyzed very briefly due to the constraints of this study. The next part will analyze the foreign policy aspect of the securitization of democratization, which was also deeply influenced by identity construction discourse.

Foreign Policy Pillar

The impact of new identity construction to the securitization of democratization is analyzed in the previous part of this dissertation. This part will focus on the intertwined relationship of identity and foreign policy. Identity influences foreign policy decision making, while foreign policy strengthens identity construction. Due to this gift relationship, the securitization of democratization could be observed in both arenas. However, this part will not examine the international aspects of securitization of democratization; these will be analyzed in the next section. The aim now is to evaluate the domestic aspects of the securitization of democratization; only Georgian foreign policy making will be correlated with

securitization of democratization, rather than Georgian bilateral or multilateral relations, which are international aspects.

Since its independence, there were clear signs of western orientation in Georgian foreign policy. This orientation was not declared openly due to domestic and international conditions that limited Georgian foreign policy making. The conditions that were analyzed in previous chapters in detail necessitated a more balanced approach to foreign policy due to the urgency of the political, economic, and security problems that the country was facing. After Georgia reached relative stability under Shevardnadze's leadership in the mid-1990s, the aim of membership to Western institutions became more noticeable. However, it is since the Rose Revolution that "Georgia's western orientation starkly defined and officially justified with arguments of cultural belonging and through the explicit definition of Russia as an existential threat" (Kakachia & Minesashvili 2015: 178).

Some critical events in the second part of Georgian democratization demonstrate that the classical understanding of foreign policy, based on materialistic and systemic factors, is insufficient to explain the path of Georgia. The classical approach provides two options to a small state like Georgia, which is limited by geography and history in its foreign policy. The two options that the balance of power theory suggest are "balancing" the most powerful or "bandwagoning" with the powerful. Stephen Walt revised this approach, which was inadequate in explaining various anomalies in foreign policy. Walt replaced the idea of "balancing the most powerful" with the most *threatening*. His new suggestion was that threat perceptions are shaped by geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions"

(Walt 1987). Although this hypothesis can be interpreted as a good explanation of Georgian foreign policy until the August War in 2008, the Western unwillingness to play a balancing role demonstrated that classical understandings are inadequate to explain the pro-Western inclination of Georgian foreign policy. Therefore, Kakachia and Minesashvili made an analysis of Georgian foreign policy which put forward the impact of ideas and identity. According to them;

“The formulation of national interest and foreign policy of Georgia cannot be discussed without reference to identity and social order preferences within the state. Georgia’s pro-western orientation arises partly through the Georgian political elite’s idea of the country belonging in Europe by virtue of its history, values and democratic aspirations. The type of social order is the central notion in this linkage. Georgian elites also assume that the West has an interest in Georgian democratization and see a pro-western orientation as a tool for internal development” (Kakachia & Minesashvili 2015: 178).

Georgian foreign policy is determined by six internal contexts: the economy, political culture, national minorities, public opinion, institutional structures, and leadership (see for more details: Jones & Kakhishvili 2013). However, as it is claimed above by Kakachia and Minesashvili, rather than focusing on the material and systemic impacts, the analysis of the impact of identity on foreign policy is much more meaningful for the Georgian context. In addition to its pro-Western identity, positioning in relation to Russia within identity construction is very critical. An anti-Russian stance and Western inclination were the main two features of Georgian foreign policy after the Rose Revolution that enhanced the securitization of democratization domestically.

After making an analysis of the general features of Georgian foreign policy that had an impact on the securitization of democratization, it is important to analyze Georgian foreign policy after the Rose Revolution, which inflamed the securitization

process. The claims of the Rose Revolution exceeded the country's borders, as do many revolutions. Domestic and international actors presented the Rose Revolution as a new global model. The new leadership in Georgia was in need of international support and used the opportunity to market their revolution. The reason behind this international expectation was the probable spillover effect of the revolution to the one of the most resistant regions to democratization after the Middle East. The gap between democratic countries and non-democracies enlarged, especially with rising revolutions that threatened regime security in non-democracies. Role models like Georgia were perceived as a potential threat when there was an expectation for diffusion. In the 2005 National Security concept under the title of "Strengthening Freedom and Democracy in Neighboring States and Regions", the role of Georgia was discussed:

"Georgia welcomes and contributes to the strengthening of democracy, free markets and civil society in neighboring states and regions, and considers them as important preconditions for ensuring regional stability and security" ("National Security Concept" 2005).

The use of the Rose Revolution as a foreign policy tool led to reactionary policies from Russia, which perceived this move as a threat to its national interest. Georgia reacted to this perception with more securitization of democratization. To protect the democratization that would pave the way to the membership in Western organizations was on the top of the Georgian agenda. In reply to Russia's reactionary policies, the West and the US in particular responded by increasing support to Georgian leadership, which created the security dilemma that will be analyzed in the second part on Georgian democratization.

The Rose Revolution's most important impact was the initiation of the Color Revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.²⁵ Though there are still debates about the commonalities of these revolutions and whether they should even be called revolutions, it is obvious that the success of the Rose Revolution had an impressive effect on other countries due to its non-violent nature. However at the same time, these revolutions had an opposite impact on the probable revolutions in the post-Soviet region. As Polese and O'Beachain argued, other authoritarian governments learned from these experiences how to protect their regimes (2011). This revealed the impact of external agents on the initiation of the revolution and for this reason potentially vulnerable post-Soviet regimes adopted some measures to limit the impacts of civil society. Those regimes created new civil society that was support to creat pro-government declarations. The aim was to balance the impact of civil society, which had the financial aid and support of the West.

“Once familiar with the main features of a color revolution, the regime's capacity to contain the “color virus” could be seen as depending on the ability of the elite to identify its own potential weak points and to defend key institutions, people and groups from potential threats. This has led some states to become extremely color-revolution-proof, thanks to an effective strategy of protecting the regime's vital organs with appropriate measures” (Beacháin & Polese 2011: 129).

The counter measures of the authoritarian regimes increased the tension, which exacerbated securitization of democracy on the global level and securitization of Georgian democratization on the micro level.

Even before the color revolutions, Georgia and Ukraine had been trying to move away from the Russian sphere of influence. The common aim to become a

²⁵ Consecutive revolutions started in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Electoral fraud was the common reason of color revolutions. The resistance of the public to the declared election results led to the changes of leadership by the renewal of elections.

member of European and Euro-Atlantic organizations brought them together and their collaboration started with GUAM, which led to a Russian reaction. After the revolutions in both countries, a new initiative began with the signing of the Borjomi Declaration in August 2005. The declaration called for “a ‘Community of Democratic Choice’ that will free ‘our region from all remaining dividing lines, from violations of human rights . . . frozen conflicts and thus . . . open a new era of democracy, security, stability and lasting peace for the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Caspian Sea,’ which reflects this revolutionary chiasm” (Jones, 2006: 35). Although this post-revolutionary enthusiasm did not give any concrete results, the discourse that was used increasingly estranged Russia.

The foreign policy orientation of Georgia had clear impacts on its process of democratization. The discourse that was chosen by the new leadership inflamed the securitization of democratization. It aimed to promote the country as a role model in the post-Soviet space, thus targeting the Russian regime. This discourse was combined with regional initiatives that alienated Russia and increased the securitization of democratization. Foreign policy and identity construction pillars are two issue areas in which the securitization of Georgian democratization on a domestic level during the first phase is observable. The next part will focus on the international level of securitization of democratization.

International Level of Securitization of Georgian Democratization

The Attempt of Macro-securitization of Democracy

In this part of the chapter, the macro-securitization of democracy, which was analyzed in the literature review part, will be operationalized by analyzing US

National Security Papers that were published in 2000, 2001, and 2002. The first two of these papers reflect the foreign policy prepared under the Clinton administration whose target was the new era, while the 2002 paper was written after September 11th during the Bush presidency and reveals changing American foreign policy in various issue areas. National Security Papers are suitable to expose the securitization of democracy because of their official status and their access to wide audiences.

In the framework of this dissertation, securitization will be followed in prepared documents and speeches rather than instant declarations. The aim behind this is to reveal the official and planned policies of securitization rather than to focus on the populist policies of politicians that are used to manipulate the public with security concerns. The attempt at the macro-securitization of democracy in these papers was incomplete until the audiences accepted this move. This move was an attempt by US administrations in the beginning of 2000s.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century was published in December 1999 and this paper expressed the US strategy for the new millennium. While the first two aims were to enhance security at home and abroad as well as to promote prosperity, the third target of the national security strategy was defined as the promotion of democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law (“A National Security” 2000). This paper necessitates a critical reading in order to reveal the theoretical background behind its thinking. As this is a security strategy paper, references to security are of course very natural, but to place democracy in this text complicates the context. For example, two parts of this paper shown below

demonstrate the correlation made between democracy and security based on the democratic peace theory.

“The spread of democracy and respect for the rule of law helps to create a world community that is more hospitable to U.S. values and interest” (“A National Security” 2000: 2).

“Our strategy has three core objectives: enhancing American security; bolstering our economic prosperity; and promoting democracy and human rights abroad, which we strongly believe will, in turn, advance the first two goals” (“A National Security” 2000: 3).

The correlation between the spread of democracy and American security was mentioned on various instances in the text. Any positive development on the spread of democracy, rule of law, and human rights is evaluated as a positive sign for American security and prosperity. The wording here generally calls for the acceptance of internal audiences. Internal audiences are worth consideration in this context because they are the ones who give the approval for the budget that the government spends for the promotion of democracy. However, as it was mentioned in the literature part, macro-securitization’s audience exceeds the boundaries of a country. How external audiences understand this text is also critical. That the spread of democracy is correlated to American interests impacts the perception of the promotion of democracy in countries that make calculations based on realist paradigms and/or perceive American power as threat to their survival.

A more detailed version of the American approach to the democracy and democracy promotion is quoted below.

“Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats, encourage free trade, promote sustainable economic development, uphold the rule of law, and protect the rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States will support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world,

bolstering democratic institutions and building the community of like-minded states. This strategy will take us into the next century” (“A National Security” 2000: 4).

This paragraph prepares the ground for the claims of American hypocrisy in democracy promotion. The aim to create a “community of like-minded states” deranges many countries around the world. Especially those with different regimes or different understandings of democracy perceive this American aim as a threat towards the security of their regime. The Cold War examples of regime changes backed or initiated by the US also contribute to this environment of fear.

Moreover, other than the context and the perception of the audiences, another important point for democracy studies is how democracy is defined by US administration. In this strategy paper, the Clinton administration preferred to have a comprehensive understanding of democracy. The passage below from 2000 Security Strategy Paper defines the need for a broader understanding of democracy.

“The sometimes-difficult road for new democracies in the 1990’s demonstrates that free elections are not enough. Genuine, lasting democracy also requires respect for human rights, including the right to political dissent; freedom of religion and belief; an independent media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; a robust civil society; the rule of law and an independent judiciary; open and competitive economic structures; mechanisms to safeguard minorities from oppressive rule by the majority; full respect for women’s and workers’ rights; and civilian control of the military” (“A National Security” 2000: 25).

The broader understanding and definition of democracy is critical in order to analyze the democracy promotion policies of the US. Democracy promotion efforts struggled for the acceptance of a minimal definition of democracy, which is based on free and fair elections, and to understand the problems in the functioning of these so-called democracies.

“The United States works to strengthen democratic and free market institutions and norms in all countries, particularly those making the transition from closed to open

societies. This commitment to see freedom and respect for human rights take hold is not only just, but pragmatic. Our security depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption and instability could engulf a number of countries and threaten the stability of entire regions” (“A National Security” 2000: 25).

Although in the 2000 Strategy Paper, US broad understanding of democracy was clear, Thomas Carothers criticism in his 2002 article “The End of Transition Paradigm” demonstrates that some parts of texts of this sort are written only for paying lip services. (Carothers 2002). As it was mentioned, the acceptance of democracy as the “only game in town” paves the way to the appearance of various kinds of “democracies” without even minimum credentials. This strategy paper underlines various aspects that have to be developed in an emerging democracy as shown in the quotation below.

“The sometimes-difficult road for new democracies in the 1990’s demonstrates that free elections are not enough. Genuine, lasting democracy also requires respect for human rights, including the right to political dissent; freedom of religion and belief; an independent media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; a robust civil society; the rule of law and an independent judiciary; open and competitive economic structures; mechanisms to safeguard minorities from oppressive rule by the majority; full respect for women’s and workers’ rights; and civilian control of the military” (“A National Security” 2000: 25).

US support for the integration of emerging democracies into Western institutions can be followed in the 2000 Strategy Paper as seen in the part below.

“Integrating new democracies in Europe into European political, economic and security organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe, will help lock in and preserve the impressive progress these nations have made in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms” (“A National Security” 2000: 25).

This strategy paper provides detail on the methods of democracy promotion. They can be summarized as “efforts to mobilize international economic and political resources”, strengthening the pillar of civil society, “supporting administration of

justice and rule of law programs, promoting the principle of civilian control of the military, and training foreign police and security forces to solve crimes and maintain order without violating the basic rights of their citizens” (“A National Security” 2000: 26) as well as supporting market economy, independent media, and fighting against corruption. These kinds of references to the promotion of democracy in the National Security Strategy document increased the securitization of democracy and democratization. American support for the membership of Georgia to the EU or NATO is evaluated as serving American national interest. NATO activities in partner countries like Georgia are perceived as a tool for increasing American security interests. Suspicions of the promotion of democracy were increased due to the open correlation between democracy and American security in an official document like the one analyzed.

The emphasis on governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as private firms as natural allies for the promotion of democracy increased suspicions about those institutions. The perception that they were working for American interests increased when mentioned in the national security strategy paper. These kinds of approaches by the US also decreased the credibility and effectiveness of institutions when the perception of the US as a hegemon in world politics is considered. The passage below demonstrates the discourse that is developed by US policy makers on the democratization efforts of the private firms and non-governmental organizations.

“Private firms and non-governmental organizations are natural allies in activities and efforts intended to address humanitarian crises and bolster democracy and market economies. We have natural partners in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, chambers of commerce and election monitors in promoting

democracy and respect for human rights and in providing international humanitarian assistance; thus, we should promote democratization efforts through private and nongovernmental groups as well as foreign governments. Supporting the global movement toward democracy requires a pragmatic, long-term effort focused on both values and institutions. Our goal is a broadening of the community of free-market democracies, and stronger institutions and international non-governmental movements committed to human rights and democratization” (“A National Security” 2000: 27).

In this National Strategy Paper, Georgia was mentioned five times. Two of them was about the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian territory. There is also a reference to Abkhazia under the title of “Promoting Prosperity”. The claim is that the resolution of Abkhazian problem is important to create stability for the development and transport of the resources in Caspian Sea. However, other territorial problems in Georgia, like South Ossetia and Ajaria were not referred. This dilemma based on the economic interest of US led to the questioning of American initiatives on democracy promotion in Georgia. Rather than the stability and prosperity of Georgia, the motivation behind US involvement in the Abkhazian conflict could be seen as a part of US energy security strategy.

The paragraph below shows that US policy makers establish a direct correlation between democratization and security by emphasizing the impact of democratic reforms on the ethnic violence and regional conflict. Although a broad understanding of democracy is valuable, the securitization of democracy and democratization by presenting it as a remedy for various security issue is problematic.

“Democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are the best measures to avert conditions that could foster ethnic violence and regional conflict. Already, the prospect of joining or rejoining the Western democratic family has strengthened the forces of democracy and reform in many countries of the region” (“A National Security” 2000: 34).

The emphasis on Eurasia and the integration of the region to Western democratic family led to the emergence of concerns in Russian leadership, which tried to protect its “natural” sphere of influence. Russia declared in 1993 that it considers the “near abroad” as its sphere of influence. The emphasis on Russia and Newly Independent States (NIS) can be seen from the passage below.

“The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic and economic reform of the NIS are important to American interests. To advance these goals, we are utilizing our bilateral relationships and our leadership of international institutions to mobilize governmental and private resources. But the circumstances affecting the smaller countries depend in significant measure on the fate of reform in the largest and most powerful—Russia. The United States will continue to promote Russian reform and international integration, and to build on the progress that already has been made. Our economic and political support for the Russian government depends on its commitment to internal reform and a responsible foreign policy” (“A National Security” 2000: 34).

Until the presidency of Putin in Russia, the democracy promotion community and western countries were able to push for reforms in this Russia but various structural problems domestically prevented the establishment of a democratic system in the country. When President Putin came to power, with the rise of economic power, Russian resistance towards democratization efforts of external power started to increase. The rise of Russian political and economic power was followed by a decrease in democratic reforms and credentials in the country.

Another document published during Clinton presidency was “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age”. The reflections of the Democratic Peace Theory are similar to the previous document.

“For the first time in history, over half of the world's population lives under democratic governance. Our national security is a direct beneficiary of democracy's spread, as democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, more likely to become partners for peace and security, and more likely to pursue peaceful means of

internal conflict resolution that promote both intrastate and regional stability” (White House 2000).

The discussion of emerging democracies was the same in 2000 and 2001. The wording and the content of the national security strategies written during Clinton’s presidency are very similar, but the first paper written during the Bush administration made obvious the changing structure of American policies by its wording and content. This change was not only based on the change of president but also on the September 11 attacks on the US that had shaken American policies. On even the first page, the changing tone of US politics is apparent. For example, the role of the US was defined as to protect the values of freedom “against their enemies” and “to extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continents” (“The National Security” 2002).

Due to the emergence of resistance towards democratization, US foreign policy discourse towards China and Russia changed in this National Security Strategy. An alternative to the Western modernization was mentioned in the passage below.

“America will encourage the advancement of democracy and economic openness in both nations, because these are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order. We will strongly resist aggression from other great powers—even as we welcome their peaceful pursuit of prosperity, trade, and cultural advancement” (“The National Security” 2002).

Macro-securitization, which is based on the democratic peace theory, is more apparent in the 2002 paper and the construction of security constellations in the discourse can be followed in this text. The idea of “us and the others” defined as good and evil was the reality of US policy after September 11, inflaming the macro-

securitization of democracy and democratization. This macro-securitization led to the creation of camps on the following years.

When the strategies to reach the main goals of US National Security Strategy were underlined, the only mention of democracy was made in reference to “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” (“The National Security” 2002). The impact that realist paradigm has on this text is very clear and to emphasize democracy as a means for development reflects the changing approach of the American administration.

US guide to champion aspirations for Human dignity:

“We will:

- speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom;
- use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take;
- make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future; and
- take special efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.

We will champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it.” (“The National Security” 2002: 4).

As it was mentioned regarding the previous text, how the US defines democracy in its official documents is critical to analyze the country’s democracy promotion policies and strategies. In the 2002 document, democracy was correlated much more with freedom and development. This changing understanding can be followed in the text. The reemergence of modernization theory as a prerequisite of democracy led to fundamental changes in the democracy promotion strategies. While US policies did not completely reverse directions, the discourse used by the Bush

administration was very harmful for US prestige as the biggest contributor in the democracy promotion community. As Thomas Carothers claims, “under George W. Bush, democracy promotion has been widely discredited through its close association with the Iraq War” (Carothers 2007).

The reason behind calling the move of macro-securitization of democracy an attempt was the rejection by the audiences. In this case, the American public as well as the global audience did not accept the claim that there is a need for emergency measures in order to protect democracy all over the world. Though there was clear public support for the operation in Afghanistan, the Iraq War changed the equation and public support for democracy promotion declined even more in this period.

In his analysis of democracy promotion during the Bush administration, Carothers underlined a very important point. To combine “idealism in words and semi-realism in deeds” was not unique to the Bush administration. Instead “the foreign policies of Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all combined in various proportions an emphasis on democracy with substantial realist elements. Yet to the extent the Bush approach to democracy promotion is distinctive, its distinguishing features—the centrality of military intervention, the focus on the Middle East, and the tie-in with the war on terrorism—have all been highly problematic” (Carothers 2007).

Carothers draws attention to the point that Bush administration engaged in the issue of democratization more than previous administrations, especially in the Middle East. However, uncertain commitment and conflicting necessities arising from other US interests were major obstacles before the success of this enthusiastic

rhetoric. Moreover, Carothers criticizes the “rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion as the centerpiece of the war on terrorism” (Carothers 2007), which is one of the main reasons behind the macro-securitization of democracy and democratization.

The impact of the macro-securitization of democracy by the Bush administration on a micro level was the securitization of Georgian democratization. In November 2003 during the Rose Revolution, President Bush redefined the purpose of American intervention in Iraq and used the rhetoric of “the beginning of a global democratic revolution” (Beissinger 2006). Bush continued this stance during a visit of Tbilisi in 2005 “where he praised the Rose Revolution as an example to be emulated throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia” (Beissinger 2006: 18). The opposition leaders in Azerbaijan and Armenia perceived an opportunity in these discourses for possible support in toppling their repressive governments, but American officials quickly denied that the US was in “the revolution business” (Beissinger 2006: 18).

Although the US role during the Rose Revolution was facilitating rather than determinative (Carothers, 2007), the Iraqi War, which strengthened the perception of “democracy promotion as a tool of hegemonic intervention” (Carothers 2007: 15) increased macro-securitization of democracy. Macro-securitization of democracy during the Bush administration had micro effects on Georgian democratization. The “harmful image of democracy promotion as a cynical exercise in power politics” (Carothers 2007: 15) influenced the power relations between Georgia, the US, and Russia. These power politics transformed into a security dilemma during the second

phase of Georgian democratization, which will be analyzed in the second part of this chapter.

Authoritarian Resistance

The macro-securitization of democracy analyzed in the previous section created its contrary pole as predicted by Buzan's security constellations. As Buzan and Wæver claim, there are four different universalisms that shape the character and likely dynamics of the macro-securitizations and security constellations: inclusive, exclusive, existing order, and physical threat universalism (Buzan & Wæver 2009). Democracy as universalism can be projected as inclusive or exclusive.

After the end of the Cold War, the claim of "the end of history" led to the presentation of democracy as the winner in this struggle between ideologies. The US gained a new status for projecting democracy to the world market. During this period, the US had the capacity and the will to promote democracy as an ideal regime type. However it is vital to underline the changed stance of US foreign policy in regards to democracy promotion due to changes in the leadership. Although the US has a clear inclination for the promotion of democracy, the policies for the promotion of democracy change according to leaders, as it was analyzed in the previous section. These alterations in the foreign policy of US have influenced the construction of democracy as a universalism.

One of the main concerns of this dissertation is the increasing macro-securitization of democracy by the US, starting from the new millennium. The attempt of macro-securitization of democracy necessitated a choice between exclusive and inclusive universalisms. As it was argued by Buzan and Wæver, liberal

market democracy was a good candidate for inclusive universalism (Buzan & Wæver 2009). Though the end of Cold War presents the major success of this project supported by the US in particular and the West in general, it is still contested by the Islamic world, Asian values, and the authoritarian regimes. Authors also underlined “the worries about the ‘neocon’ doctrine dominant in Washington after 9/11”, which creates suspicions on “an imperial universalist project bent on using the superiority of US military power to enforce its model across the world. Unipolarity has therefore been securitized as a threat by both other great powers and by smaller powers fearing to become the object of this project” (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 263-264). As it was seen in the National Security Paper of 2002 and the policies that were initiated from this paper demonstrates the reality of emergence of an understanding of exclusive universalism on democracy and democratization. Buzan and Wæver defined exclusive universalisms as “ideological beliefs that claim superior rights and status for one group over the rest of humankind” (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 261). Striking examples such as Nazism or Japanese imperial doctrine made obvious that exclusive universalism claims superiority over other options and in some cases aims to extinguish other options. Whether it was projected as inclusive or exclusive universalism, as Buzan and Wæver predict “almost any mixture of exclusive and/or inclusive universalisms, especially when driven by great powers, points towards the generation of rival macro-securitizations and large-scale constellations” (Buzan & Wæver 2009: 263). In our case also, the attempt at macro-securitization of democracy, whether successful or not, whether inclusive or exclusive, triggered a

reactionary universalism, or as Buzan and Wæver claimed, a constellation. Using a new discourse, authoritarian resistance became the reality of the 2000s.

As aforementioned, though democracy is accepted as the “only game in town”, the definition and the components of democracy varies around the world. Resistance to democratization does not use any discourse that favors authoritarianism or discredits democracy. The new discourse uses democracy and democratization in a way that led to the loss its real meaning, which is harmful for democratization efforts. Ambrosio emphasizes this as a strategy for authoritarian regimes to counter external promotion of democracy. *Redefining* as a strategy arose in different forms, such as mispresenting the nature of a political system by using adjectives such as “sovereign democracy” in the Russian case, having culturalist arguments for discrediting demands for democracy, or shifting the attention on the opposite side (Ambrasio 2009). Ambrosio emphasizes five different strategies that will be analyzed and later operationalized in the second phase of Georgian democratization in order to follow Russian strategies that were developed against US democracy promotion in Georgia.

The aim of this section is to analyze authoritarian resistance in general in response to the macro-securitization of democracy and in particular to understand the Russian reaction to the micro securitization of democratization in Georgia after the Rose Revolution. However, it is important to note that Russian policies in the first phase of the Rose Revolution were much smoother than the second phase of Georgian democratization. The Rose Revolution created a sense of confusion for Russia. Russia played a critical role in the resignation of Shevardnadze. Moreover,

Russian assistance in the removal of the Ajarian dictator, Abashidze, was a well-known fact. This means that Russia's attitude towards Georgia immediately after the Rose Revolution was not hostile. Georgian discourse on Russia was also less critical due to the new regime's instability, but the rise of Saakashvili's power and the increased Western support for the new leadership changed the picture. Saakashvili's discourse towards Russia changed severely in the second phase that started in 2005.

There is a respectable literature on authoritarian regimes but authoritarian resistance in the new millennium has drawn little attention. The strategies that authoritarian regimes developed to resist waves of democracy are very valuable not only to understand the new phenomenon but also to enhance democratization efforts. In her groundbreaking work of "Democracy Challenged", Marina Ottaway defines contemporary semi-authoritarian regimes as "ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits"(2003: 3). She underlines the deliberate choice these regimes make to try to protect the appearance of democracy while rejecting the risk of free competition. (Ottaway, 2003).

The basic incentive for leaders in semi-authoritarian regimes is to protect their power. The democracy promoter community has little to entice those in leadership to take the risk of losing power. For example, Levitsky and Way examined the role of the Western linkage and leverage on the democratization of different regions and they found out that Western leverage and linkage has a positive impact on the democratization processes. They also underlined the weakening impact

of Russia on Western influence in post-Soviet region (Levitsky & Way 2010).

However, regional differences have to be considered while analyzing the leverage and linkage of external powers. The Russian role in the democratization of the post-Soviet region is critical due to its historical role in the region as well as its political, economic, and social relations with those states. Russian leverage and linkage to Russia generally determines the pathway of democratization in post-Soviet and particularly in Georgia.

The Russian stance towards the democratization in Georgia was determinant for the sake of this process and macro-securitization of democratization that was shaped by the exclusive universalism understanding of the Bush administration. Micro-securitization by Saakashvili's policies led to Russian resistance to the Georgian democratization. Russia has always tried to protect its sphere of influence but its attacks on the democratization efforts of the West began with the changing US discourse on the role of democracy and democratization for American interest. Linking democracy with the security interest of the US and the securitization of democracy increased the tension on democratization. Suspicions about the motivations of the West in the promotion of democracy shaped the policies of Russia. In response, changing Russian policies towards democratization efforts created concern about authoritarian resistance or backlash for both the academics and policy makers, resulting in a spiral of mistrust.

In studies of democratization, three factors were agreed upon on the international level for effective democratization efforts: diffusion, conditionality, and integration (Ambrasio 2009). The success of these three factors had been the main

concern of Russia after the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Especially the fear of diffusion due to the consecutive color revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan increased Russia's perception of a threat. Diffusion is a factor that is considered unintentional, while conditionality and integration are used intentionally by the US and other Western states.

The 2000s demonstrated that, especially after the rise of Russian and Chinese power, non-democracies are not passive targets of democratization efforts. Instead, these countries acquired an ability to resist those forces with various international-level strategies (Ambrasio 2009). As Burnell touched upon, authoritarian regimes generally imitate democracy promotion and assistance strategies but with different understandings. Burnell emphasizes active and passive, direct and indirect promotion and assistance of democracy while drawing attention to four possible permutations in these kinds of assistance. He underlines the possibility for anti-democratic versions of these methods (Burnell 2006). In line with this understanding, Ambrasio developed five categories for analyzing international-level strategies of authoritarian resistance that he operationalized in a Russian case study. These categories were insulate, redefine, bolster, subvert, and coordinate. These five categorizes will be supportive for the analysis of the Russian impact on Georgian democratization in the second phase. Although some of them were still effective in the first phase of Georgian democratization, Russian foreign policy towards the new Georgian government after the Rose Revolution can be defined as "wait and see" politics. Not only Georgia but international politics in general were changing with the Iraqi War.

In the literature, there are some contrary arguments about the emergence of the authoritarian backlash. For example, Saari claimed that some of the key measures to counter-attack democracy promotion started even before the revolutions. Though it is obvious that after the color revolutions authoritarian resistance has become more visible, according to Saari, a more detailed examination is necessary to understand “Russia’s re-invigorated semi-authoritarian challenge” (2009: 734). Saari claims that Russian resistance towards democratization started before the Rose Revolution. This backlash had two dimensions: domestic and international. During the Yeltsin presidency, with the help of non-convenient Western democratization policies, Russia institutionalized the basic features of the undemocratic system in which power is legitimized through elections. Those elections are manipulated and managed in way that eliminates the effective functioning of true competition (Saari 2009).

“Manipulation of political processes means in the Russian context that officially the name of the game is democracy, but in fact the unwritten rules are inherently antidemocratic. The aim of the system is ‘to manage, manipulate and contain democracy’ with the help of the elite and the experts in political manipulation employed by them. Examples of this unhealthy political process are the creation of ‘opposition’ groups by the ruling elite, buying of parties and politicians, manipulation of the media, and paying for negative, false stories and publishing false opinion polls” (Saari 2009: 737).

Saari underlines the intertwined feature of the domestic and international dimensions of Russia’s counter-democracy promotion strategy especially after the Rose Revolution. She emphasizes Russian policies that aim to decrease the impact of Western election monitoring. Although Russian reactionary policies towards Western democracy promotion was a historical phenomenon, it reached a new level after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which “politicized the issue of international election

monitoring for good” (Saari 2009: 745). It is necessary to emphasize that the establishment of CIS election observation organization precedes the color revolutions. In addition, during this period Russia started to accuse Western countries of double standards, especially in the field of election monitoring (Saari 2009). The Russian policy of mimicking Western values, institutions, and structures with a different spirit is made clear with the example of election monitoring. Moreover, one of the events that had an important impact on Russian policies towards democratization was the US intervention in Iraq in the name of democracy. The discourse that was used for legitimizing the American intervention changed the international dimension of democratization. The use of force as a strategy for democracy promotion was seen as an opportunity for resistance to democratization. Russian reactionary policies towards Georgian democratization, which intensified after 2005, will be analyzed in detail in the next section using Ambrosio’s research on the strategies employed by authoritarian regimes to resist democratization.

5.2. Second Phase of Democratization in Georgia: The emergence of a Security Dilemma (2005-2008)

Excessive securitization in the first phase of Georgian democratization led to the questioning of the success of the Saakashvili leadership in the second phase in both the domestic and international arenas. Georgia under the leadership of Saakashvili showed various successes in state and nation building in a very short period of time. As aforementioned in the first stage of democratization, some determinants of democratization was brought in the right direction but the

securitization of democratization was an important aspect that started to hinder the process.

As Mitchell also claims, in a country like Georgia that was torn apart by various political, economic, and security problems, the prioritization of the state building process was very rational. However, one of the major mistakes of the Saakashvili leadership was to enhance state building at the expense of democratization. Those policies were tacitly supported by the West, especially in the beginning (Mitchell 2009). The interconnectedness of state building with democracy that was analyzed on the first chapter underlines that increasing stateness will enhance democratization. However, the logic behind Saakashvili's policies was to increase stateness at any cost. This approach led to the overlooking of the negative impacts of securitization of democratization.

Different people evaluated the successes of the Georgian regime during the presidency of Saakashvili in different ways. These ranged from admiration to outright contempt. While there is a generally an emphasis on the economic performance and state building efforts of the regime, the criticisms are centered on the grave mistakes in foreign policy as well as on the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president domestically (Khelashvili 2010). Constitutional changes that increased the president's role and the rising pressure on the media and civil society in the first stage of democratization enhanced the debates about the backtracking of democracy in Georgia. In addition, debates about irregularities during the elections inflamed the questioning of the quality of democratization. However as it is mentioned before, although there were an observed backtracking of

democracy that even Western institutions measured in their evaluation of Georgian democratization²⁶, Western backing for Georgian leadership continued to some extent during the second phase of democratization. Even though there were some signs of concerns from the Western countries, Saakashvili and his team failed to notice the diminishing support until the outbreak of the August War in 2008.

Domestic developments in the second phase of Georgian democratization contributed to the emergence of the security dilemma between Georgia, Russia, and the US. The major domestic problem of Georgian democratization was the super-presidency, which left the president without any checks and balances. This was not operationalized until 2005 because Zurab Zhvania, an influential politician and the prime minister during the Saakashvili presidency, played a balancing role in Georgian politics. However the tragic and unexpected death of the prime minister in February 2005 left Saakashvili nearly unrivaled in terms of power and influence (Khelashvili 2010).

In November 2007, when peaceful protestors were dispersed violently by the police, Saakashvili defined the events as a test for the statehood of Georgia (“Test for Georgia’s” 2007). He interpreted a crackdown on peaceful demonstrators as a proof of the strength of the Georgian state. This new discourse of the leadership that had come to power with the promise of democracy led to questions about the president’s priorities. The reason for change of discourse and the loss of its orientation towards democracy could be evaluated as the increasing internal and international support

²⁶ The decline of Georgian democratization is obvious in Freedom House ratings starting from 2008 report, which shows the situation in 2007. Freedom House ratings constitutes only a general overview but it is one of the commonly accepted measurement of democracy all over the world. For detailed information: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/georgia#.VY5xcvntmko>

(Mitchell 2009). Another determinant that played a critical role in Georgian democratization was the orientation of Saakashvili's foreign policy Saakashvili during the second phase.

The main determinant of the second phase of Georgian democratization was the emergence of a security dilemma between Russia and Georgia in which the US contributed. While it was never proven that the US played a role in initiating the Rose Revolution, it was very apparent that the Bush administration supported Saakashvili. At the same time, Russia grew increasingly alienated from the Saakashvili administration.

After Georgia's independence, relations between Georgia and Russia were full of ups and downs as was briefly analyzed in the historical chapter. The Russian aim to keep up its historical influence over its neighbors necessitated the development of new strategies. Some of the traditional strategies Russia used during the 1990s were the mobilization of secessionist movements for the establishment of Russian peacekeeping mechanisms and Russian military bases in Georgian territory that facilitated Russia's influence on Georgian domestic and foreign policies. Moreover, Russia tried to establish international organizations for gathering post-Soviet states under the same roof in a manner similar to the Cold War era. However in the 1990s, Russian power was not enough to provide necessary financial support for establishing an effective organization. Due to these shortcomings, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty (later it became an Organization in 2002) were not influential in world politics until Russia gathered its power in the 2000s. One of the important tools of Western powers,

international organizations, were not actively used for Russian national interest during 1990s. Instead, Russia used economic sanctions, energy blackmail, and political assassinations in order to protect its presence in Georgian politics and economics during the first period of Georgian political transformation.

Russia's strategies resulted in reactionary policies in Georgia even during the Shevardnadze presidency. Russia was playing the role of a guarantor of stability and security by taking advantage of Georgia's domestic problems, but after Shevardnadze established a degree of stability and security in the mid-1990s, Georgian foreign policy started to look for other options to balance Russia. The divergence of Georgian and Russian interests was not the product of the Rose Revolution. Actually, in order to prevent chaos in the Caucasus region, Russia initially preferred to support the Rose Revolution (Ambrasio 2009). However, with the increasing interest and support from the US, Georgian rhetoric and foreign policy towards Russia progressively became harsher. Moreover, the increasing democracy promotion of the West in Georgia and later the Rose Revolution had critical impacts on Russian strategies towards Georgia. The Russian policy of "all stick and no carrot" (Cornell & Starr 2009) towards Georgia failed and it became obvious that a renewal of strategies was necessary. Although Russia started to use new strategies like multilateralism with effective international organizations and establishing pro-Russian civil society or election monitoring mechanisms, the goal was very obvious: to resist the democracy promotion of the West by using the same tools for a different goal. Secessionist movements and NATO membership were the traditional security tools of the parties involved in this security dilemma in the second phase of Georgian

democratization. Authoritarian regimes and Russia in particular responded to the diversification of democracy promotion tools with new strategies that attacked the determinants of democracy. This new tension points during the security dilemma in the second phase of Georgian democratization will be briefly analyzed in order to understand the path that led to the August War in 2008.

In his analysis of new strategies that Russia developed for authoritarian resistance, Ambrosio emphasized five different techniques, while analyzing the Georgian case with the strategy of “subvert”. He also examined the Russian strategies of “insulate, redefine, bolster and coordinate” in different cases. Firstly, the “subvert” strategy will help to understand the developments on the second phase of Georgian democratization. Secondly, the impact of other strategies to Georgia also will be evaluated. For the analysis of the “subvert” strategy, Ambrosio emphasizes three issue areas: economic pressures, rhetorical attacks, and support for sub-state ethnic groups (Ambrasio 2009).

The Russian reaction to the Rose Revolution in the beginning was controlled due to very critical ties with Georgia. Russia preferred to have a wait and see policy. In the beginning, the new Georgian administration’s attitude towards Russia also was very constructive. 2005 was a turning point in the relations, in which researchers are accustomed to divergences. The claims of Georgian leadership to export its revolution and especially the Orange Revolution changed the aura of the relations. The fear of the contagion of revolution first to Russia and then to all its sphere of influence made Russia take a negative stance towards the color revolutions and their leaders. The way that Putin perceived the Rose Revolution and the discourse that he

used was critical and in March 2005, after meeting with some of European leaders, the Russian president underlined that they considered the Rose Revolution as an act outside of constitution boundaries and he urged that the problems be resolved “in constitutional frames”. Putin’s statement below exposes many details behind the president attacks of the Rose Revolution after two years. The timing demonstrates that Russia started to worry about the developments in the post-Soviet region. The reflection of a probable domino effect or contagion to Russia and/or other countries in the region started to appear in the discourse that the Russian leader was using against Georgia and the West. In this declaration, Putin was attacking the West and Saakashvili while reminding his audience of the hypocrisy of the West regarding the resignation of Shevardnadze.

“We are against solving political issues through unlawful ways... let’s speak of Georgia’s case: the West actively supported [Georgia’s ex-President Eduard] Shevardnadze there. Why was it necessary to ouster him through revolution? And if it was necessary, then the question emerges of who the West supported and why? All issues should be solved through legal means and in constitutional frames” (“Putin’s Comments on” 2005).

In this statement, the real target of audience was Saakashvili and the Georgian citizens in general. Putin was discouraging Saakashvili from relying heavily on the West and attacking the West using same discourse that they themselves employed, emphasizing constitutional and legal means. Moreover, in a 2006 commentary Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, underlines the unconstitutional change of power in the post-Soviet region as security threat towards Russia.

“Chief among them is interference in Russia's internal affairs by foreign states -- either directly or through structures that they support -- and the attempts of some countries, coalitions and extremist terrorist organizations to develop or gain access to weapons of mass destruction. We must also be prepared for the possibility of a violent assault on the constitutional order of some post-Soviet states and the border

instability that might ensue from that. Arms and drugs trafficking and other kinds of cross-border criminal activity must be closely watched” (Ivanov 2006).

In order to decrease the credibility of the color revolutions in the post-Soviet region, the architect of “sovereign democracy” Vladislav Surkov claimed that the events in the region cannot be named as revolutions.

“Those were not revolutions. The revolutions in those countries took place in the nineties, as in Russia, and they brought about fundamental changes in social structures. Since then, they have had market economies, multiparty systems, free elections and freedom of the press.” (Surkov 2005).

Attacking the revolutions with a new discourse that imitates Western style was the reality of the second phase. Russia, which typically used hard power tools, enhanced its realist approach of foreign policy by adding soft power tools as well. Perception management was one of the major tools of Putin’s foreign and domestic policies. The claim here is not that Russia left its traditional approach towards its ‘near abroad’; Russian hard power tools were certainly still on the table. As it is witnessed during the August War, Russia used a variety of tools for harming Georgian democratization, which was viewed as a threat Russia’s its national interest.

During Bush’s visit to Georgia, he praised Georgian democratization and Putin responded by criticizing Georgia’s democratic credentials. Russian rhetorical attacks on Georgian democratization had two aims: to continue projecting the Russian image as a democracy and to discredit and undermine the color revolutions, especially the Rose Revolution (Ambrasio 2009).

The traditional Russian policy of supporting secessionist region in Georgia continued during this period and reached a point of war in August 2008. During this

period, Russian support to South Ossetia and Abkhazia reached a high level economically, politically, and militarily. The Russian government increased its economic support to the secessionist regions since 2004 by gradually raising Russian subsidies. Support for the build-up of the military sector was especially impressive. “By the beginning of 2006, Russian deliveries of military equipment to Abkhazia and South Ossetia reached such a level that the total amount of equipment, arms, and ammunition in these two regions, with a combined population of 250,000, exceeded the total military capacity of Georgia, with a population of 4.5 million” (Illarionov 2009). This rise in the support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be evaluated as a response to the increasing support of the West in general and the US in particular to Tbilisi. Here is important to underline that during this period, US financial support to Georgian civil society before the Rose Revolution changed direction and the Georgian government became the main beneficiary of US financial assistance. This change also influenced the success of Georgian civil society, which played a very important role during the Rose Revolution. Moreover, brain drain from civil society to the government also decreased the effectiveness of civil society in Georgia after the Rose Revolution, which is one of the vital components of democratization processes (Muskhelishvili & Jorjoliani 2009).

The year 2006 was very challenging for Georgian-Russian relations as tension increased in various issue areas. The “subvert” policies of Russia gained momentum during this period. In 2006, Moscow decided to oppress Tbilisi using economic sanctions which were incrementally expanded. First, energy, the classic card of Russia, was used after Saakashvili announced that Tbilisi would diversify

energy imports. This precautionary measure was taken after Moscow's cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine in January 2006. Two explosions in natural gas pipelines and problems on a high-power electricity transmission tower in the following days of Saakashvili's declaration yielded suspicions and accusations about Russian wrongdoing. These accidents left the country in a very problematic state during a cold winter (Ambrasio 2009).

The use of energy was followed by more open challenge to Georgia. Two main export products of Georgia to Russia - the popular wine and mineral water brands of Borjomi and Nabeghlavi – were banned (Illarionov 2009). Health reasons were used as a pretext but Georgian leadership argued that the import restrictions were a tool for pressuring Georgia (Ambrasio 2009). Economic sanctions are critical in terms of resistance strategy to democratization. Though the real impact of socio-economic development to democratization is unclear, it is obvious that economic stability is vital for the survival of a regime. Therefore, although the tone of Tbilisi towards Moscow improved slightly, Russia continued to increase its economic pressure on the Saakashvili government. This demonstrates the importance of the determinants of democratization as tools of counter strategy for resistance.

After an espionage operation against Russian intelligence officers in Georgia, Russia cut all air, sea, and land transport links with Georgia, applied pressure on Georgian immigrants in Russia, and even promised to deport them. A total embargo was solidified by an increasing anti-Georgian propaganda that turned into a witch hunt in Russia against Georgians (Illarionov 2009). At the end of 2006, NATO responded to this spy war between Georgia and Russia with an offer of an

“intensified dialogue” with Georgia in order to complement and enhance the Individual Partnership Action Plan (“Georgia begins” 2006). Economic sanctions was also one the strong tools of subvert strategy of Russia in order to discourage Georgia on its way to NATO membership.

Though Russian pressure towards Georgia increased intensively in 2006, Georgia’s anti-Russian and pro-Western stance resisted the Russian move. Despite Russia’s stance towards Georgia, 2006 was a period of development for the new Georgian leadership. This period has been the year in which the returns of reforms had started to be collected. Corruption started to decline; with the foreign aid and investment, the economy started to grow; with the increase of stability and security, the confidence in Georgia and the new leadership had risen, and the self-reliance of the Saakashvili government had improved significantly.

In 2007, Putin made an important speech at the Conference on Security Policy in Munich where he expressed his concerns on unipolarity, nuclear weapons, and the goal of some international organizations such as NATO and OSCE. This speech is perceived as a declaration of confrontation with the West (Illarionov 2009). Moreover, this speech is also a demonstration that Georgian-Russian relations were not free from the effects of Russia’s relations with the Western world. Rather, Georgia’s moves towards NATO and the EU led to tension in Russian foreign policy towards the West. Putin criticized unipolarity by claiming that it was against democracy and he made a definition in line with this understanding. He underlined the characteristic of democracy as “the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority” (“Putin's Prepared” 2007). Ambrosio argues that

“redefine” is a strategy that is used as a rhetorical defense against external criticism (Ambrasio 2009). This is very clear from Putin’s words below in which he criticizes the Western attitude towards Russia and the democratic credentials that Western countries have.

“Incidentally, Russia - we - are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves” (“Putin's Prepared” 2007).

Moreover, how Putin promotes his own country is also critical. In 2007, Putin defined himself as the only democrat in the world since Mahatma Gandhi. The quotation below was used by Western media. This is a rhetorical war between Russia and the West. The constructivist approach of Putin shows the aim to create the reality.

"Of course I am an absolute, pure democrat. But you know the problem? It's not even a problem, it's a real tragedy. The thing is that I am the only one, there just aren't any others in the world"(Reuters 2007).

The Russian redefinition of democracy led to a new concept called “sovereign or managed democracy”, which represents the Russian fear of external forces and its desire to protect its regime from external pressures (Ambrasio 2009). Contrary to the changing Russian stance, the West and especially the US intensified its criticism towards Putin’s regime (Ambrasio 2009). Russia’s criticism of the West’s double standards and hypocrisy in democracy promotion policies increased after the release of scandals from Guantanamo Bay. The human right abuses in Guantanamo contributed to the security dilemma caused by the securitization of democratization.

The critical stance towards the US was very apparent in Putin’s Munich speech. The Russian leader underlined the necessity of Russian independent foreign

policy and the goal of Russian leadership in this line. He also stressed the rules of cooperation for Russian foreign policy. Putin also used similar rhetoric to the West by putting democracy and security on the same pot supported the securitization of democratization. However, he criticized the Western selective approach in the statement below.

“Of course we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all” (Reuters 2007).

The high tension that the rapprochement between NATO and Georgia created in Russian foreign policy led to a spiral of policies. The impact of NATO membership talks to the securitization of democratization was tremendous. Traditionally, the changes in the enlargement strategies of NATO towards Eastern Europe were perceived as the emergence of geostrategic and geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia. The NATO membership of Baltic States in 2004 also was not a surprise for Russia and this was not perceived as a real threat for the rest of the post-Soviet region because the differences between Baltics and other regions had been always noticeable. Georgia, which was rebellious child of Soviet era, was perceived as relatively controllable during the post-Soviet period due to its domestic problems. However, the changes in NATO membership criteria, which emphasized democracy credentials, paved the way for the support of NATO on Georgian domestic reforms. Geostrategic and geopolitical competition turned to conflict on regime security due to the macro-securitization of democracy and micro-securitization of Georgian democratization.

The Georgian perception of NATO membership and the discourse that the ruling elite used in regards to this process is essential for understanding the impact of membership talks on the relations with Russia and on the democratization process.

The National Security Concept of Georgia in 2005 clarified the Georgian perception of NATO as below.

“Georgia’s cooperation with NATO contributes to strengthening of democratic values in the country, accomplishment of democratic reforms, especially in the field of defense, as well as establishment of a secure and stable environment” (“National Security Concept” 2005).

The changes in the membership criteria in 1995 after the publication of “Study on NATO Enlargement”, which included the addition of the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law as the basic principles for membership also contributed to the securitization of democracy and democratization in the 2000s. Especially in the Georgian case, where membership is seen as a threat by Russia, the developments in the NATO-Georgia relations has had impacts on the democratization process. Georgia got an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO members’ approval in October 2004. An IPAP can be defined as the Georgia’s road map for the membership, which encompasses reforms in various areas such as politics, defense, security, and economics. This plan aims to initiate developments in Georgia in order to establish a stable democracy that will be a reliable partner for NATO (“National Security Concept” 2005). The aim of Georgian leadership with NATO membership was apparent in the National Security Concept published in 2005. As it can be followed from the direct quotation below, the approach of Georgian leadership to NATO membership was also based on the

democratic peace understanding and the discourse used was openly securitizing the democratization process.

“IPAP encompasses complex reforms in political, defense, security, economic and other fields, which are necessary to develop Georgia into a stable democracy and a reliable partner for NATO” (“National Security Concept” 2005).

On March 2007, the Georgian Parliament unanimously voted for accession to NATO and two days later, the US Senate decided to support Ukraine and Georgia on the way to NATO membership. Russian leadership continued to play the secessionist regions card against the developments in Georgian-NATO relations. NATO’s main reason of existence is its collective defense feature, which necessitates careful examinations in the process of accession. The idea is that any country that has internal or external conflicts, which can be transformed to issues that will need collective action, has to solve its problems before accession. In the case of Georgia, any conflict in secessionist regions or between Georgia and Russia would be perceived as an obstacle to Georgian membership. The picture was obvious and very suitable for Russian manipulation.

At the end of 2007, Russia completed the withdrawal of its forces from Georgian territory, which was one of the highly problematic issues in the relations between these two countries. Russia refused to withdraw many times due to its difficulty but a sudden and easy withdrawal of Russia from Georgian territory was assessed as a Russian preparation for war. It is argued that Russia took this step in order to prevent any hostage crises during a conflict between Russia and Georgia (Illarionov 2009).

In April 2008, NATO met in Bucharest at a summit and declared that Georgia would become a member after all necessary requirements were met (“NATO’s Relations” 2015). However, German Chancellor Angela Merkel underlined that countries that have territorial disputes could not join NATO. Moreover in this summit, NATO denied to provide a Membership Action Plan to both Ukraine and Georgia (Illarionov 2009). NATO support to Georgia had always been conditional and officials in Russia made open statements of their intention to prevent Georgian membership into the international organization. Even though NATO members had unsteady attitudes towards Georgian membership, the US support under the Bush administration was unreserved. The Russian response to the US support for Georgian NATO membership during the Bucharest Summit was to initiate formal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tuathail 2008). Russia established direct official relations with South Ossetian and Abkhazian authorities by a presidential decree (Allison, 2008).

Three effective international factors during the Color Revolutions - non-governmental organizations, election monitoring, and youth groups (Ambrasio 2009) - were also active during the Rose Revolution, as was analyzed. Although their impact on the revolutions is a divisive issue in the literature, Russian policies to weaken or counteract these international forces demonstrate that policy makers took them seriously. Ambrosio entitled Russian strategy against these forces as “insulate”. He defines this strategy as Russian policy to insulate its country from external democratic forces, but this strategy cross the boundaries and becomes an international strategy too. Russian initiatives such as the NGO law that created

concerns in the international community in 2006 were a domestic measure towards democratization (Ambrasio 2009). However, after the precautions were taken domestically, Russia generalized this policy in its “near abroad”. Russian “insulate” policy has two dimensions: to pressure NGOs that are critical of the government’s policies and to support government friendly NGOs (Ambrasio 2009). In 2015, the debate on Russian soft power in Georgia by supporting NGOs started to be discussed (“How strong is”, 2015) but in the second phase of Georgian democratization, Russia was supporting pro-Russian NGOs in separatist regions. By financing various NGOs in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia intended to insulate democratization in Georgia. The US responded to the policies of Russia for insulating the impact of NGOs by increasing aid to NGOs and by releasing statements that backed NGOs and human rights defenders all over the world (Ambrasio 2009).

Election monitoring missions of Western countries and organizations such as OSCE had been always perceived as tool for increasing Western penetration and pressure in non-democratic regimes. With the intensification of the relations between the US and Russia, the Russian stance towards Western international organizations also changed due to the perception of them as US agents. Russian officials accused OSCE of having double standards in election monitoring and of interfering in the domestic politics of states (“How strong is” 2015). In response to Western election monitoring missions, CIS also designed an election monitoring system starting in 2004, which extended it gradually. However starting from the first day, the differences between OSCE and CIS missions on their evaluation were obvious and created concerns (“CIS: Monitoring” 2015). The aim of CIS election monitoring was

to decrease the impact of criticism of the OSCE monitoring mission. The discursive war continues in the reports that are published after the elections generally in post-Soviet region.

Another tool in the hands of Russia for insulating democracy was to establish and support youth groups loyal to Moscow. The perception of youth movements in Georgia and Ukraine as the agents of Western interests brought forth the idea of establishing pro-Kremlin youth groups in order to counter Western democracy promotion. Financed by Russia, those groups waited for instructions from Russia in need of support in the streets (“Georgia Conflict” 2008). This was a new strategy of Russia, which accommodated its policies on the rules of West with the same weapons but different goals.

Increasing resistance to democratization in Russia was backed by many Eurasian States. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can be evaluated as a group that protects its members from the criticisms of Western countries and provides regime security to its members. Moreover, Russia also established the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in 2007. “It is remarkable that while criticizing Western actors for funding civil society activity in Russia and thus interfering in its internal affairs, Russia is simultaneously openly stepping up its engagement in counter-promotion and anti-assistance” (Saari 2009: 747).

To refer to democratic reforms as security aims and democratization for NATO membership discourses increased the securitization of democratization in the second phase of Georgian democratization. Reciprocal moves of the parties involved in this process – the US, Russia, and Georgia - brought the tension to a point that the

security dilemma turned to a hot conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008.

August War 2008

The causes and consequences of the August War as well by whom it was first initiated - Russia or Georgia – are the main issues discussed around the war that took place between Georgia and Russia over the secessionist regions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008. Whether the first move was from Russia or Georgia is still disputed and the causes as well as the consequences of the war are complicated, but the claim of this dissertation is that while considering other causes such as geo-strategic considerations, one of the reasons behind the war was the micro-securitization of Georgian democratization. The security dilemma that the securitization of democratization inflamed resulted in the August War. For that reason, the war between Georgia and Russia had very important consequences for the democratization process of Georgia.

Rebuilding territorial integrity was one of the primary promises of Saakashvili leadership after the Rose Revolution. The resolution of the Ajarian problem by peaceful means created optimism for the other parts of the country for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which had semi-independent regimes. However, the resolution of the Ajarian problem in 2004 caused a flurry in these regions that obstructed the peaceful resolution of these conflicts. In addition, the reforms in the Georgian army worsened the perception about the intention of the Georgian government in separatist regions. The rise in military spending from 2004 until 2008 combined with the rhetoric of the need to unify Georgia, increased suspicions in

these regions about military operations. The change between 2003 and 2007 was remarkable; Georgian defense spending has risen from US\$30 million to US\$940 million and from 0.7 to 8% of Georgian GDP (Mitchell 2009). The Russian response to this change was on the same degree as was mentioned before.

Due to non-democratic discourse and policies, the state building process which is one of the determinants of democracy was transformed to a trap for Georgian democratization during Saakashvili leadership. The conflict between the Russian and Georgian presidents passed through the stages of war of words to real conflict with the emergence of the August War. On 8 August 2008, Russia initiated the largest military incursion into a neighbor since the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to “coerce Georgia to peace”.

The discourse that the two sides used during the crisis is critical in order to follow the war of words. The table prepared by O Tuathail is illustrative. The aim of this dissertation is not to make a deep analysis of discourses developed during the August War, but still this difference is important in order to understand the constructed realities of the two parties. The references to Georgian democracy and regime demonstrate the continuation of the securitization of democratization process even during the August War.

Table 1: The table prepared by Gearóid Ó Tuathail – Competing Georgian and Russian Federation Storylines on the August 2008 War (Tuathail 2008: 691)

Storyline features	Georgian Government storyline	Russian Government storyline
Situation description	Russian invasion. Unprovoked attack on the West, freedom, civilized values and democracy. Cutting the bloodlines of the economy	Humanitarian action to prevent genocide
Historical analogies	Invasion of Hungary (1956) Czechoslovakia (1968,1938), Afghanistan (1979), German attack on Poland (1939), Russian attack on Finland (1939)	Appeasement of Hitler by the West. Tskhinvali, a hero city, like “Stalingrad of the Caucasus.” Like NATO intervention in Kosovo. Saakashvili as Saddam Hussein
Local Analogies	Bolshevik invasion and takeover of independent Georgia (1921)	Third Georgian genocidal campaign against Ossetians (after 1921 and 1988-1992)
Downscaled primary metaphor	Aggression. A big bully is attacking a small nation (person). “Looking into the eyes of evil.”	Aggression. Madness. Deranged person attacking innocents.
Description of South Ossetians	Illegal separatists. Controlled by Russians. Fifth columnists. Criminals. Sudeten Germans	Russian citizens (passport holders) A small victimized people.
Description of Other	People with KGB backgrounds: return of Soviet system. Twenty-first century barbarians.	NATO ally. American stooge
Geopolitical metaphor	(Westernizing) Not a “faraway place” (chamberlain) but a modern normal country that loves America.	(Localizing) Area of privileged interest.
Explaining discordant information	(that Georgia started it): Big Powers lie and use minorities to serve pre-established aims.	(that Russia is the aggressor): The West uses double standards to judge the behavior of Russia. Their actions are cynical
Triggering events	Russian build-up and tanks moving through Roki Tunnel.	Georgian attack on Tskhinvali and murder of Russian peacekeepers.
Attribution of motives	Regime change; reassertion of Soviet/Russian Empire. Desire to distinguish vibrant democracy on the border. “They need control of energy routes. They need sea ports.”	Desperate attempt to get into NATO and acquire Western aid. Distraction from domestic problems. Actions of bloodthirsty lunatic.
Meaning of crisis	Invasion of a sovereign country. Wake-up call to new cold War between freedom-loving peoples and restored KGB regime/evil empire. Ukraine next.	War against states that violate international law. Responsibility to protect. Need for new security architecture for Europe.

The American and Georgian claim was that the Russian intervention’s real aim was “regime change” and the Russian move inside Georgia towards the capital increased suspicions of a planned *coup d’état*. Saakashvili claimed that the Russian

aim was to establish its own government in Tbilisi after taking over the whole country killing Georgian democracy (Tuathail 2008). Russian rhetoric based on international law and human rights was using references to the Kosovo case. Later on during the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Western discourse during Kosovo's independence would come to aid of Russian leadership in order to legitimize their act. This new strategy of imitating Western discourse demonstrates the acceptance of some norms of the West as well as the hypocrisy of the Western countries.

The consequences of the war for Georgia were serious and heavy. Saakashvili's understanding of state building that undermines or excludes democratization paved the way to questioning the acquisition after the Rose Revolution. It became obvious that despite many investments made to the army during this period, it was still not possible to win against Russia without Western backing. Moreover, this conflict revealed that the expected Western backing was an exaggeration. Russia was still a very important partner for Western countries. Georgian calculations about Russian foreign policy were off. Georgia lost the chance to reintegrate its country and now the chance was even lower than before.

The impact of the August War exceeded the Georgian territories and it became obvious that Russia left its defensive position. "Moscow decided on a sharp blow that would weaken or topple the West's most important outpost in the former Soviet Union and serve notice to others that they would have no choice but to reach some kind of accommodation with their former hegemon" (Mankoff 2009: 242). This clear message of Russia reached its audiences in the post-Soviet region.

Moreover, the Russian threat also became a legitimizing factor of authoritarian policies in this region.

Moscow underlined before the August War that Kosovo's declaration of independence constitutes a precedent for many breakaway regions in the world. Accordingly, Medvedev based his speech on the right of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to declare independence like Kosovo in 26 August 2008 (Coppieters 2012).

The most important point of the August War for the framework of this dissertation is not the legitimacy of the Russian intervention or its recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. The main issue here is the discourse that Russia employed. The way that Russia legitimized its move provides various clues for democratization studies. Though used with a different perspective from Western understanding, Russia explained its intervention in a sovereign state by emphasizing international law. The Kosovo precedent and the right to protect Russian citizens were two main arguments that Russia used to legitimize this intervention. This discourse accepts the presence of some international laws but demonstrates that there can be different understandings. It also demonstrated that the varieties on the implementation can cause unexpected consequences.

The underlining feature of the second phase of democratization, which culminated with the conflict between Georgia and Russia and the declaration of independence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, was the security dilemma that emerged between three parties: Georgia, Russia and the USA. This security dilemma had a very negative impact on the democratization process. However, as it will be analyzed in the third phase, although it took some time after the August War, the necessity to

decline the securitization of democratization became obvious. Even though the Saakashvili government did not really understand the necessity for the de-securitization of democratization, the demand from the public became clear. This demand reverberated in the elections in 2012 and 2013.

5.3. Third Phase of Democratization in Georgia: De-securitization of Georgian Democratization

There are various international and domestic causes of de-securitization of democratization that started after the August War. First of all on the international level, changes in world politics and in domestic politics of the US and Russia had tremendous impacts to micro level de-securitization of Georgian democratization.

Even during the war, the US in particular but many countries in the world was dealing with the financial crisis. Financial crisis hit numerous countries during this period. The economic recession changed US foreign policy priorities. Moreover, Barack Obama's election as US president in 2008 and his inauguration in January 2009 also changed the course of US foreign policy. The financial crisis also affected the Russian economy. "Buffeted by the global financial crisis, the Russian state has moved away from bellicose rhetoric and appears to be re-prioritizing around geo-economic rather than geopolitical goals for the state" (Tuathail 2008: 700).

Revolutionary changes in the Middle East starting from December 2010 led to the shift of world attention towards this region. The Post-Soviet area lost its importance in the course of time due rising tension in the Arab world. Revolutionary upheaval in various countries and civil wars arising after them necessitated the full attention of major powers.

In addition to the international events that led to de-securitization of democratization, Georgian policies were also effective in the de-securitization process. After Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia developed new approaches towards these two regions. The new strategy of Georgia was to engage with these territories by focusing on economic cooperation and societal interaction in order to facilitate future reintegration (Coppieters 2012). Since the problems arose with these regions in the beginning of 1990s, Georgia had applied a policy of isolation towards Abkhazia with the help of CIS until the change in Russian policy in 2008. Meanwhile, economic relations with South Ossetia were much better until the Ergneti market was shut down in 2004 (Coppieters 2012). When Georgian economic pressures towards secessionist regions had not yielded the expected result even with Russian support, it became obvious that under the new conditions after the August War to expect any significant result from an economic blockade or sanctions was illogical. The Georgian government put together its new strategy in a policy paper called “State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement through Cooperation” in January 2010 (Coppieters 2012).

The changing approach towards the “occupied regions” was meaningful in order to observe de-securitization of democratization. Under the title of strategic intent, Georgia clarifies the aim to increase the socio-economic conditions in both “occupied regions” and the other parts of Georgia (“State Strategy” 2010). Rather than to prioritize state building for democracy, Georgia preferred to emphasize socio-economic development that would increase democratization while enhancing the chance for state building. In this paper, the Georgian attitude towards Abkhazia and

South Ossetia was much more constructive than their traditional stance. The use of Russia as the “other” still continues in this paper but the tone towards Russia is much more diplomatic. The aim was not to provoke Russia, which demonstrates the start of a new discourse in Russian relations. Although Georgia accepts some of its mistakes, it still continues to externalize the causes of conflict by claiming that “the primary nature of conflicts on the territory of Georgia is of an international character” (“State Strategy” 2010: 3). The most important point of this paper is that Georgia declared that reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be pursued by only peaceful means and diplomatic efforts and openly rejected the option of a military solution.

The human centric discourse that Georgian government developed also reveals changing patterns in security studies, which was discussed in the second chapter.

“Georgia opposes the isolation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia and recognizes the negative repercussions of isolating the populations living there; the Government of Georgia is therefore pursuing a human-centric policy aimed at engagement with residents of these territories” (“State Strategy” 2010: 6).

The bold emphasis of European identity of Georgia was replaced by the benefits that wider European integration would provide. This is also presented as an opportunity for the breakaway regions.

Another important text in order to follow the discourse of the Saakashvili leadership after the August War was the new National Security Concept published in 2011. In this text, Georgia claimed that Russian intervention was not only targeting Georgia’s sovereignty but also aiming to detract its “choice of democracy and its independent domestic and foreign policy.” (“National Security Concept” 2011).

The two critical papers emphasize socio-economic development for democracy and security; the triggering factors behind this change can be the negative impact of August War and the financial crisis to the Georgian economy. This change of approach supported de-securitization of democratization.

The importance of socio-economic development on the way to democratization also became apparent after the emergence of revolts in Arab World due to economic problems that people experienced over years. The non-democratic overthrow of authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring made obvious the importance of socio-economic indicators during democratization processes.

The foreign policy pillar of de-securitization consisted of a normalization process with Russia after the parliamentary election in 2012 and presidential election in 2013. The Georgian Dream coalition that replaced Saakashvili-led United National Movement preferred to pursue “a policy of normalization with Russia, whilst maintaining the main target of Euro-Atlantic integration” (Kakachia & Minesashvili 2015: 175). The relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia also changed in 2013, as indicated by the replacement of the name of a critical ministry from reintegration to reconciliation (“Georgia renames” 2013).

Materialist and systemic approaches to the foreign policy of Georgia are inadequate to explain the foreign policy orientation of this small country. Especially after the Russian economic sanctions towards Georgia in 2006 and the August 2008 War, even with the lack of clear Western backing, Georgia has resisted to bandwagon with Russia as the neorealist approach predicts. The continuation of pro-Western policies demonstrates that though Russia can provide short term benefits to

the ruling elites, their ideational and interest-based reasoning favors long term benefits that Western oriented foreign policy will provide (Kakachia & Minesashvili 2015). Moreover, another reason behind this decision can be the probable short term effect of a pro-Russian strategy. Due to the consolidated pro-Western foreign policy orientation and Western identity, the public may react to any kind of axis shift in foreign policy. The ruling elite could lose the leadership due to such a change in foreign policy. However, the increasing democratic and pro-western identity of Georgia is also preventing an identity construction on the offensive anti-Russian stance. The new identity in Georgia prefers a more balanced discourse that does not alienate or threaten Russia with a clear emphasis on the Georgian claim for membership to Western institutions.

The real de-securitization of democratization started after the presidential election in 2013 but the signs of the process started before the change in power. The Georgian presidency election in 2013 was important in various ways for the democratization process of the country. This was the first change of president in a democratic and legal procedural way.

CONCLUSION

The rising impetus of democratization after the end of the Cold War has demonstrated its effects as increasing research in wide range of subject areas. The nexus of democracy and security is one of the research areas to which cases in the post-Soviet region contributed greatly. The triple transition through which post-Soviet countries passed, complicated the process of democratization with the contribution of their specific historical, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds. Georgia in particular is considered one of the prominent examples of democratization since the Rose Revolution. A new phenomenon called the ‘securitization of democratization’ contributed to the evaluation of Georgian democratization in this complicated structure.

This new phenomenon, which is operationalized in the three stages of Georgian democratization starting with the Rose Revolution until the election in 2012 overcome the shortcomings of the current literature on democratization studies. With the help of this new phenomenon, democratization studies are completed with the incorporation of security studies. A constructivist approach provided a new window full of opportunities to understand the international dimension of democratization that is interconnected with the domestic level of the process. The Georgian democratization process after the Rose Revolution was a perfect example

of this new phenomenon in order to analyze the emergence, development and outcomes of securitization of democratization.

Securitization of democratization is a discursive move and can be initiated by an international or/and domestic actor, whose claim is that the democratization process is under threat and there is a necessity for emergency measures for protecting the process. International or/and domestic securitization has a two dimensional and intertwined structure. Its impact can be negative or positive depending on the case, the lack of determinants of democratization such as stateness, socio-economic development, and political culture increase the negative impact of securitization to the process of democratization. The Copenhagen School prefers de-securitization without distinction of subject but as critics of the Copenhagen School underline, in some areas, de-securitization can be harmful, as in the case of gender. For this reason, in democratization further research is necessary to analyze a case where it has a positive impact due to domestic or international conditions.

The findings of this study demonstrates that macro-securitization of democracy enhanced by micro-securitization had a negative impact on the Georgian democratization process. Domestic and international dynamics that shape Georgian politics are the main determinants that led to the negative impact of the securitization of democratization. Domestic dynamics such as ethnic tensions, economic problems, and political instability as antecedent conditions shaped international and domestic policies. Internationally, Russian resistance to Georgian democratization was one the main intervening variables on which Georgian democratization were dependent. Georgia's domestic problems increased the chance of Russian intervention and

manipulation as it was analyzed through the dissertation. Moreover, complex international dynamics increased the negative impact of securitization with the addition of domestic policies. The increasing authoritarian tendencies of Saakashvili leadership were ignored by Western countries and domestic audiences for the sake of increasing the stateness of the country. Western backing despite increasing authoritarian tendencies also had a negative impact on the Georgian democratization.

As the Georgian case study highlights, it is obvious that securitization of democratization not only contributes to democratization studies but also fills the gaps in securitization studies. The Copenhagen School explains the emergence of securitization but did not have any projection about its developments and outcomes. The case study of Georgian democratization from the securitization perspective contributes on the further steps that Copenhagen School did not refer. The operationalization of the securitization of Georgian democratization in three steps took the securitization approach one step further and reveals one of the outcomes of securitization: the security dilemma. Moreover, this case also demonstrates the conditions under which a country changes its policy of securitization and starts the policy of de-securitization. The Georgian case highlights this lacking aspect of securitization studies after the August War in 2008.

Besides the securitization of democratization, the study also emphasizes the negative impact of international democracy promotion, which is generally neglected. The case study of Georgia revealed the harmful impacts of securitization of democratization, such as the emergence of the security dilemma. As it can be followed in the Georgian case, an external audience of securitization can develop

policies that puts at risk the process of democratization. One sided approaches to democracy promotion overlook possible negative impacts of the endeavor, which leads to securitization. Moreover, to reveal the possible negative impacts is critical in order to ameliorate the capacity of democracy promotion. As it was underlined throughout the dissertation, although democracy promotion efforts in practice and in discourse have increased in recent years, the global score of democratization is decreasing. The authoritarian resistance has deepened and the consolidation of authoritarian regimes became a phenomenon of the new era. Authoritarian regimes successes created a new model for various governments. There are various reasons behind the emergence of authoritarian regimes as role models but one is the securitization of democratization, which alienated transition countries.

Securitization of democratization reveals intertwined international and domestic dynamics in the process of democratization. Democratization, which was perceived as the traditional research area of comparative politics, lacked the analysis of international dynamics. Moreover, although the international level of democratization attracted some attention in the last years, studies that demonstrate the relations between the international and domestic levels are scarce. However in this study, the securitization of Georgian democratization reflects the correlation between domestic and international dynamics. Without internal securitization, macro-securitization of democracy cannot be effective in Georgia and vice versa, without macro-securitization, internal attempts for securitization of democratization will not be able to find the proper ground.

The Georgian case study openly introduced why emergency measures, steps, and policies may damage the real cause. The acceptance of the audience was critical but the theory did not foresee an external audience like Russia. However, in the case of Georgia, Russia played a critical role as an audience. Emergency measures taken by Georgia in order to protect democratization were perceived as a threat by an external audience, which complicated the whole process. The inclusion of an external audience is another contribution of this study to the securitization studies. As it was argued, the acceptance or rejection of the external audience does not influence the emergence of securitization but affects the development and outcomes of securitization. If the securitization negatively influences the reference object, the rejection of the external audience had a critical share in this process, as was the case in Russia's rejection of securitization of Georgian democratization.

Another contribution of the Georgian case study to democratization literature was to present how the determinants of democracy or democratization may turn into threats in the process of the emergence of a "new security dilemma". The use of determinants of democracy in the process of securitization of democratization leads the way to their perception as a threat by the external audience. For example, the relation between stateness and democracy is critical as it was mentioned in detail on the literature review section. Therefore, Saakashvili's efforts for reforming the country and enhancing stateness were valuable but to do so in a way that curtailed democracy was one of the major mistakes during this period (Mitchell 2009). The Georgian case study makes obvious the intertwined relationship between stateness

and democracy. The perception of stateness as a precondition for democracy disrupts democratization.

The democracy promotion community based their strategies on the enhancement of socio-economic dynamics. Due to that, during the securitization process another determinant socio-economic development became seen as threat in the rise of the security dilemma. In order to curtail the democratization, Russia developed strategies that attacked the socio-economic development of Georgia. Embargos were used effectively as a tool to curtail the economic development of Georgia as it was analyzed on the previous chapters.

Civic culture became another target for deteriorating the democratization process of Georgia. Russia targeted the people's trust in the leadership and confidence within the community with the aim of harming the environment for the development of democratization. The discourse analysis of Russian resources demonstrates that Russian leadership developed a rhetoric to target the trust and confidence in the Saakashvili government while Western civil society was working hard for the trust and confidence building in the country.

To evaluate the perception of three important determinant of democratization -socio-economic development, stateness, political culture - as a security threat due to the securitization of democratization is one of the main contributions of this dissertation to democratization studies. An important reciprocal process exists with on one side, the democracy promotion community that perceives the enhancement of the determinants of democratization as vital and on the other side, external players that evaluate this enhancement as a threat to their national interest. This reciprocal

process transformed to a “new security dilemma” in the Georgian context. By this case study it became clear that in addition to military development, depending on the case, democratization may also lead to a security dilemma. Due to this analysis, de-securitization is presented as a much more secure strategy for the pathway to democratization in the Georgian context.

Although this study argues that securitization of democratization has negative impacts on the democratization of Georgia, there are also other aspects that negatively influenced the democratization process there. Their impact on Georgian democratization may be studied in future research. For example, in foreign policy analysis, the increasing importance of the role of leaders can be helpful in order to analyze the impact of President Saakashvili’s personal traits on the stagnation of Georgian democratization during the same period. This study can be another research subject that can enrich the understanding of Georgian democratization after the Rose Revolution.

In the framework of this dissertation, priority was not given to Russia but instead Georgian and American policies were preferred as the main reference point because the starting point was the securitization of democratization and the actors that initiated this process was Georgia and the USA. A deep analysis of Russian foreign policy may be helpful in order to understand the motivation behind the Russian strategy towards Georgia. It is also important to underline that this study is careful in the use of Russian threat because external threats are effective in order to legitimize internal pressures.

Due to this, it is argued that rather than the impact of Russia, the negative impact of the Western states and institutions to Georgian democratization by backing Saakashvili without checking the pathway of democratization was more harmful in the Georgian context. Western backing for the Saakashvili government was exaggerated to a point that Georgians were expecting the West to come to their aid during a confrontation with Russia. However, the August War demonstrated that the West will not confront with Russia for the sake of Georgia. The financial and political backing that the West provided until the August War created a false self-confidence for the Saakashvili leadership.

If the democracy promotion community and Western countries decline to make country specific analysis, their general approaches to democratization in Georgia will be harmful, especially due to the changing atmosphere between the West and Russia after the Ukrainian Crises. Western countries and Georgia have to be careful in any kind of policies that will alienate and threaten Russia in the Georgian context. Though it may seem that after August War, Georgia has nothing to lose in its relations with Russia, confrontational relations with neighbors prepares the ground for securitization of democratization, which legitimizes authoritarian policies. De-securitization of democratization will provide a smooth and secure environment for the consolidation of democracy in the Georgian context.

This study suggests that de-securitization of democratization provides a much more secure pathway for Georgian democratization. Additionally, for the democracy promotion community, detailed case studies are critical in order to understand the process and for making the best contribution to the process. The understanding of

transition studies, which neglects the historical, political, economic, and social backgrounds and prefers generally one-fits-all strategies, is harmful for the development of democracy all over the world.

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