



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DISCIPLINE AREA

**FROM "ENERGY BRIDGE" TO "ENERGY HUB"?: EVOLVING
DISCOURSES OF GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY TRANSPORTATION IN
TURKEY (1991-2014)**

GÜLNİYAZ TAHRALI

SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. MİTAT ÇELİKPALA

PHD THESIS

İSTANBUL, JANUARY, 2019

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
PHD THESIS

Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the Discipline Area of International Relations under the Program of International Relations

İSTANBUL, JANUARY, 2019

I, GÜLNIYAZ TAHRALI;

Hereby declare that the work presented in this PhD dissertation is my own. Where information has been derived other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the PhD Dissertation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BOTAŞ	Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (Turkish: Boru Hatları ile Petrol Taşıma Anonim Şirketi)
BTC	Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan
BTE	Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
IEA	International Energy Agency
IR	International Relations
GAZPROM	Russian Public Joint Stock Company
ITG	The Interconnector Turkey-Greece
ITGI	The Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy
JDP	Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-JDP)
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
MENR	Ministers of Energy and Natural Resources
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PKK	The Kurdish Workers’ Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê in Kurdish)
SGC	Southern Gas Corridor
TANAP	Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline
TDK	Türk Dil Kurumu
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
UK	United Kingdom
US/USA	United States of America
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ABSTRACT

TAHRALI, GÜLNIYAZ. *FROM "ENERGY BRIDGE" TO "ENERGY HUB"?: EVOLVING DISCOURSES OF GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY TRANSPORTATION IN TURKEY (1991-2014)*. PHD THESIS, İstanbul, 2019.

This dissertation is an attempt to incorporate the critical geopolitics approach into the debate of “Turkey’s geographical role in energy transportation” which became a part of Turkey’s discourse of geographical exceptionalism in the post-Cold War era. By analyzing the changes in the discourse of the political/governmental elites with a historical outlook, the dissertation tries to highlight the politicized and context-based nature of the concepts and metaphors that are attributed to the geographical role of Turkey in regional oil and gas pipeline projects. Moving from the assumption that discursive constructions on geography, rather than geography itself, determine a state’s position, the study examines how Turkey constructs geopolitical imaginations and images of energy transportation roles through its discourse and how it consequently shapes certain political spaces as a way of responding the contextual changes. The metaphors that are used in the discourse of Turkey’s geopolitical role in energy transportation, i.e. energy bridge, energy terminal, energy center, energy corridor, energy hub, energy trade center, etc. are hence evaluated as tools of preparing certain policy choices. The dissertation analyzes the issue in three chapters. In the first chapter, an overview of theoretical approaches of classical and critical geopolitics are given with their basic arguments, and emphasis is given to “discourse” and “practical geopolitics” as the main theoretical framework of the study. In the second chapter, the post-Cold War context and the discursive effort of Turkey for re-positioning itself is explained as a background of its language of geopolitics. In the last chapter, the way geopolitical discourse of energy is established by the political elites is analyzed to show how Turkey constructs its geographical position in regional oil and gas pipeline projects and shapes policies.

Keywords: Critical geopolitics, discourse analysis, Turkey’s energy policy, pipeline politics

ÖZET

TAHRALI, GÜLNİYAZ. *"ENERJİ KÖPRÜSÜ"NDEN "ENERJİ HUB"INA MI?: TÜRKİYE'DE ENERJİ TAŞIMACILIĞI JEOPOLİTİĞİNİN EVRİLEN SÖYLEMİ (1991-2014)*. DOKTORA TEZİ, İstanbul, 2019

Bu tez, eleştirel jeopolitik yaklaşımını, Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde coğrafi istisnacılık söyleminin bir parçası haline gelen “Türkiye'nin enerji taşımacılığındaki jeopolitik rolü” tartışmasına dahil etme girişimidir. Siyasi elitlerin söylemindeki değişimleri tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla inceleyen çalışma, Türkiye'nin bölgesel petrol ve gaz boru hattı projelerindeki rolüne atfedilen kavramların ve metaforların politik ve bağlamsal temelini vurgulamaya çalışmaktadır. Coğrafyanın kendisinden çok coğrafya üzerindeki söylemsel inşanın bir devletin konumunu belirlediği varsayımından hareketle çalışma, Türkiye'nin enerji taşımacılık rollerine ilişkin jeopolitik tahayyüllerini ve imajlarını söylem vasıtasıyla nasıl oluşturduğunu ve sonuç olarak bağlamsal değişikliklere cevaben belirli politik alanları nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Bu anlamda Türkiye'nin enerji taşımacılığındaki jeopolitik rolü söyleminde kullanılan metaforlar, yani enerji köprüsü, enerji terminali, enerji hub'ı, enerji koridoru, enerji merkezi, enerji ticareti merkezi vb., belirli politika tercihlerini hazırlama araçları olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışma, konuyu üç bölüm halinde koymaya çalışmaktadır. Birinci bölümde, klasik ve eleştirel jeopolitiğin teorik yaklaşımlarına genel bir bakış açısıyla yer verilmekte ve çalışmanın ana teorik çerçevesi olarak “söylem” ve “pratik jeopolitik” konularına vurgu yapılmaktadır. İkinci bölümde, Soğuk Savaş sonrası bağlam ve Türkiye'nin kendisini yeniden konumlandırmaya yönelik söylemsel çabası, Türkiye'nin jeopolitik dilinin arka planı olarak açıklanmaktadır. Son bölümde, Türkiye'nin bölgesel petrol ve gaz boru hattı projelerinde konumunu ve enerji politikalarını şekillendirme biçimini göstermek amacıyla siyasi elitler tarafından enerji söyleminin nasıl oluşturulduğu incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel jeopolitik, söylem analizi, Türkiye'nin enerji politikası, boru hattı politikası

INTRODUCTION

Research Questions and Scope of the Thesis

(...) we are in a position of bridge between Black Sea Cooperation Region and the Middle East, it is not a bridge that connects different continents but, for instance, we appear to closing the energy gap in Europe. Because we transfer oil from Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia to Anatolia and Mediterranean. (1993) (Çiller, 1994, pp. 292-3)

(...) It is an obligation that economic analysis and evolution towards Turkey to have a geostrategic point of view (...) Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline will transport Kazakh and Azeri oil resources to Ceyhan port. It is our target to bring Turkey to a lock point of the world energy communication. (1997) (Yılmaz, 1997c, p. 326)

The world of the next century, will be a world where the motorways that will surround the Black Sea will be completed, telecommunication and fibreoptic networks will connect Black Sea Basin and Central Asia to Europe over Turkey, historical Silk Road will revive, the resources like oil and gas will lie over these geographies to Mediterranean through the new pipelines. Turkey, is the heart of this world. (1997) (Demirel, 2009f, p. 105)

Turkey is located at the very center of the region called as "strategic ellipse", where 70 percent of the world's energy resources are. It is already on its way to becoming the EU's fourth largest energy artery with its current and in-project-phase lines. That day, Turkey who is at the lock point in the Eurasian geography will provide the security of energy supply that the EU needs. (2006) (Erdoğan, 2006-2007b, p. 260)

Turkey's geopolitical and geostrategic importance is a traditional discourse adopted by almost all kind of ideologies in Turkey. The joining of energy dimension, however, has had a reinforcing effect and became one of the strongest component of Turkey's discourse of geostrategic / geopolitical importance. Turkey's geographical position between the energy consumers and energy producers is commonly accepted as a geopolitical reality that makes Turkey naturally advantageous and indispensable both for the consumer and producer side. In fact, this "reality" of energy geography is a result of the change in the context: the fall of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the end of the Cold War and the birth of new energy rich republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At a time Turkey was looking to redefine its position in the new international context, energy has appeared as an area that Turkey can use as a leverage, although it took a little time for Turkey to evaluate regional - international politics and energy as an intertwined web of relations.

While the weight of energy issues in the political agenda increased, Turkey adapted its traditional geopolitical language, of Turkey's "geopolitical importance", to energy field

and developed many metaphors that identify Turkey's position in potential oil and gas transportation projects. This has been quite easy that the language of "geopolitics" and geographical terms have always been acceptable and worked well in explaining both foreign and domestic policies in Turkey.¹

Since Turkey became acquainted with the energy field closer in early 1990s, there have been certain roles that Turkey have been assigned through the discursive expressions of political elites in terms of oil and gas transportation from the surrounding energy reach regions to West. These roles are represented with metaphors such as energy terminal, energy bridge, energy center, energy corridor, transit country, key/lock country, intersection, and more recently energy hub, energy trading hub and energy base. Some of these concepts and metaphors are maintaining to be used from the beginning, mainly since early 1990s, such as energy terminal, energy bridge and energy center, while the addition of the energy corridor and later the hub metaphors to the list of the discursive concepts made a more complex picture. This situation shows itself in the usage of the terms increasingly interchangeably as if they have synonymous meanings or using them together as if they consist the list of targets to reach.

By utilizing the theoretical framework of critical geopolitics and by moving from the assumption that geopolitics is a discourse-discursive constructions on geography rather than geography itself determine a state's position- this dissertation examines the below questions:

- 1- How Turkey's political leadership constructs different geopolitical imaginations and images of energy transportation roles through its discourse?
- 2- How it shapes certain political spaces through discourse as a way of responding the contextual changes?

In answering both questions, this research is primarily committed to explaining the historical evolution of Turkey's discourse-discourse of political leadership- on energy transportation roles and pipeline (geo)politics and understanding the change process that the discursive practice shows. In the historical evolution of discourse, the primary focus

¹ For a comprehensive work on use of geopolitical language in Turkey see Yeşiltaş, Durgun and Bilgin (2015).

is given to the change of the dominant metaphors and timing of the change with a concern on the related political context and reasons behind.

The study of critical geopolitics and post-positivist/post-structuralist approach in Turkish foreign policy is quite new in Turkey when compared to the beginning of the international studies with these post-positivist frameworks. On the other hand, studying energy with post-positivist approaches is internationally very recent and limited, while it is nearly absent for the case of Turkey. But before touching upon the Turkish case, it is important to examine how energy is studied in International Relations (IR) and Geopolitics.

Energy, IR and Geopolitics

Energy in IR

Energy is a quite large field of study that many disciplines are involved from engineering to economics, from law to politics and IR. For IR, energy has increasingly been an important area and integrated into the debates since the energy shocks of the 1970s, when the asymmetries between the geographical distribution of resources and energy consumers had been combined to oil shortages in the petroleum-dependent countries (Choucri, 1977, cited in Belyi, 2007).

Despite the increasing importance of energy in IR, “there has been limited direct application of IR theories” for understanding energy and mineral-related conflicts, collaboration or competition, which means that works on energy within the IR discipline are *implicitly* theoretical, with the main arguments based on fundamental theoretical assumptions (Dannreuther, 2013, p. 80; Stoddard, 2013, p. 43).²

In consideration of the dominancy of classical realist approaches in IR, it can be suggested that a classical realist approach for studying energy - oil or/and gas- has been a common tendency as well. As a manifestation of this realist/positivist look, a very common linguistic usage in approaching to the field of energy has been within the concept of security. It is actually the concept of “energy security” that IR frequently appeals and portrays energy as an issue of security. However, it is not only IR but also many other

² Stoddard notes that the works of Strange (1988), Bromley (1991), Luft and Korin (2009), Cesnakas (2010) and Kuzemko et al. (2012).

different disciplines that talks about “energy security”, in a way lacking a “workable distinction between energy security policy and plain energy policy” and consequently suggesting that energy policy is always energy security policy. (Ciută, 2008, p. 2) Additionally, not only realist account but also liberal account adopts “energy security” concept. So talking about energy, without a need to question the approach behind, becomes unavoidably talking about energy security.

In the classical realist approach the case of no access to energy is a threat and consequently increasing demand that would result with energy scarcity brings an issue of inter-state/global rivalry, war and conflict. It is a security issue since it is either a cause or an instrument of war or conflict (Ciută, 2010, p. 129). So that the classical approach is interested in, basically, access to and control of the energy resources to gain national power and interested in the amount of these resources which may likely bring insecurity in case of its scarcity (Dannreuther, 2013, p. 82). This kind of approach, led by Michale Klare and others such as Paul Roberts, David Goodstein, Duncan Clarke, Jeremy Leggett, Richard Heinberg, has a narrative including the linguistic formations such as “resource wars”, “the end of oil”, “peak oil”, “out of gas”, “corporate oil barbarians”, etc. and maintaining the perception of the “on-going crisis and forthcoming catastrophes, that may lead to an ‘energy clash’ (‘clashes’) following the logic of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations” (Wisniewski, 2013, p. 16). This approach causes the development of a perception of a vulnerability and insecurity, as put by Aalto and Temel (2012, p. 80) : “the vulnerability of energy supplies for energy importers, vulnerability of energy demand for large energy exporters, and the vulnerability of leverage and income for energy transit states when new routings for energy goods are considered.” In this kind of logic, since conflict and competition is what states do, energy is one of the many ways of doing it: the patterns of struggle for land, valuable materials or markets are valid for the struggle for energy, while energy is also seen as a weapon (by supplier states) –so it is not a security issue but an instrument of security (Ciută, 2008, p. 6).

As will be mentioned again below, realist approach is named alternatively as “geopolitics” approach for example by Roland Dannreuther who has contributed to the literature by writing on how energy is theorized or approached in IR. Dannreuther (2013) notes the relation between national power and access to and control of natural resources (fossil fuels, minerals), secondly the perception of scarcity and the consequent

competition are geopolitical approaches. This kind of approach is also named as “regions and empires” approach by Correlje´ and van der Linde (2006).

Other than the realist account, neoliberalism/neoclassical economics suggesting that global energy relations can be managed cooperatively within legal, economic and institutional frameworks is another common in approaching to energy field. Basing on the liberal tradition, the approach points that the capacity of states to influence and to control the markets are overestimated and the tendency of conflict is exaggerated (Dannreuther, 2013). Named as “markets and institutions” approach by Correlje´ and van der Linde, this approach highlights the continuous intensification internationalization or “globalization” of markets, the enduring cooperation in the international political and economic institutions, foresees that further liberalization of markets allows the international flow-which is controlled by market forces- of goods, persons and capital to grow (Ibid., pp. 535-6). Mohapatra (2017) points out that energy crisis of the 1970s provided a major flip to the liberal institutionalization process and forced the formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and also International Energy Agency (IEA) to regulate the flow of energy as well as evolve norms to conduct the “interdependent character” of regulations. EU’s effort on forming a liberal free trade for energy beyond the borders of the EU- including Russia and other producer republics- show another example of liberal approach, as put by Finon and Locatelli (2008, p. 424), since the post – Cold War context brought a prospect of mutual gains from trade and optimism about the market-based rules in the international and regional regimes .

Here Michael L. Ross can also be mentioned as an influential scholar working on energy politics. While realists such as Michale Klare draws his work partly on Ross, Ross is known as liberal. Ross, who can be said to have a political-economy approach, has works on the relation between oil and democracy, resources and civil war, resource curse, etc. Among numberless work on energy and resources and their relation to politics, he for example in his book *The Oil Curse How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*, determines problems of democracy, economic and political stability and peace in the states which are rich in resources, particularly oil. He states that “Among minerals, petroleum—which accounts for more than 90 percent of the world’s minerals trade—produces the largest problems for the greatest number of countries. The resource curse is overwhelmingly an oil curse.” (Ross, 2012, p. 19) Ross, though noting that “oil is

typically a curse” looks at how these developing oil-rich states how they can turn oil from a curse into a blessing (Ibid., p.21)

Therefore, we can say that there is a division, especially since 1970s oil crisis, of pessimistic-realist and optimistic/ rationalist-liberal accounts of energy affairs which often represent the explanations that are privileging either the inter-state political or transnational economic structures of the global (energy) system. A number of naming in the literature, such as “geopolitics and markets”, “regions and empires and markets and institutions” and “energy security realists and energy security idealists” is illustrating this division (Stoddard, 2013, pp. 437-8). It is important to note that these two outlooks are extreme ends of the spectrum, and there are nuances and disagreements within the two central groupings, but one *common* point is that security of supply is a national security issue but those agreeing on it “differ in terms of how to solve this.” (Nyman, 2014a, pp. 28-9). Here it should be noted that explaining energy security from the “security of supply” perspective has been overwhelming but now criticized for excluding many important dimensions. Yılmaz and Sever-Mehmetoğlu (2016, p. 106) also notes that energy security is an “elastic” term that the literature includes many works dealing the subject from different angles of economics and politics or from the narrow perspective of supply security or on the broader perspective including environment, competitive markets and efficiency dimensions.

Ciută (2010, p. 128) summarizes the key debates on energy security in a way representing the above mentioned two approaches and illustrating the differences of the two main approach-realist and liberal-in terms of their focus, availability thesis, historical trend, context, framework, economic logic, outcome and their optimal solution.

On the other hand, Azzuni and Beyer’s (2018) work is a good example of the effort to make a comprehensive definition of energy security in a way that avoiding to reduce it to a limited dimensions concerning the developments that effect the content of the concept in time. In their study Azzuni and Beyer trace the evolution of definitions of energy security with an awareness: “The definitions are context dependent and polysemic in nature and the topic is approached with different assumptions and from different viewpoints. Consequently, researchers have described the term as abstract, elusive, vague, inherently difficult, and blurred” (Ibid., p.2). It should be noted, however, that Azzuni and Beyer does not make their work in the framework of IR, it is a more

comprehensive and more interdisciplinary work, but have parts may not directly relevant to or reflecting IR thought.

Below seen Table 0.1 is composed mainly using by Ciută’s table of “Energy Security – Key Debates” (2010, p. 128)³ and secondly Azzuni and Beyer’s mentioned article and table of “Summary of Energy Security Dimensions and Parameters” (2018, p. 23).

Table 0.1: Key Debates of Energy Security:⁴

Node Context	Key debate	Story
Framework	States	Energy affects state capacity and relations between states. States affect the parameters of energy relations. Energy security is a responsibility of the state
	Global energy markets Global environment	State-focused patterns of energy consumption affect negatively the global economic cycles and environment (issues ranging from extraction and transportation methods to outcomes from energy use) System should be operated by free markets in which practicalities are determined by market mechanisms
	Geopolitics	Energy is vital for state survival and can be used as a political weapon on other states. Location of resources therefore has great importance.
Source and diversity (diversity of sources, fuel (energy carriers), means (technologies, transportation), consumers	Economics (markets and institutions)	The politicization of energy leads to suboptimal solutions and worsens scarcity or conditions of dependency. Liberalization of markets and international mechanisms allow the international flow of energy and have positive effect on providing long-term energy security
	Oil and gas (including LNG)	Energy security means dependable access to affordable oil and gas (including LNG) and from diverse states. Finding diverse consumers (for energy rich states) to prevent customer dependency and having political effect in various states.
	Energy sector as a whole	Includes oil, gas, coal, nuclear power and renewable resources: effective energy mix approach Extraction, distribution; infrastructure and related technology development, markets.

³ Ciută’s table structure is kept but the order of lines is changed and expressions are revised. It is an attempt to partially update Ciută’s table, yet it can be renewed in a more comprehensive way by including constructivist, critical or radical approaches.

⁴ It is an illustration of extreme ends of realist and liberal approach and intentionally does not contain middle way approaches.

Availability thesis (Existence of resources, consumers and means of transport (access))	Depletion	Oil and gas are running out. Depletion is not fully compensated by the discovery of new deposits. Despite the increasing share of renewables, hydrocarbons are still the major energy resources. From energy producers' perspective: Security of demand correlates to increased (government) revenues
	Sufficiency	Existing resources are sufficient in case of effective cooperation; if not, technological innovation will optimize extraction, transportation, the discovery of new deposits, and the development of alternative sources.
Historical trend	Continuity	An ongoing, accelerating and worsening trend. States cope in familiar ways.
	Radical shift	Demand for energy is growing at an unprecedented rate, which requires radical new measures.
Timeframe	Long term	Long term concerns should be in action on energy security as a national security issue
	Short term	Short-term (cost-revenue based) considerations attract attention of private stakeholders
Political-Economic logic	Resource nationalism	Scarcity induces resource nationalism. Abundance induces seeking control over natural resources within the boundaries
	Market liberalization	Market failure produces resource scarcity or environmental risks; functioning and well-regulated energy markets attenuate scarcity, environmental risks and vulnerability. Market based-policy making: Practicalities should be determined by market mechanisms
Outcome	Confrontation, competition energy as political card	Resource scarcity will lead to conflicts over energy sources. Transportation corridors and infrastructures are politically formed.
	Cooperation	Energy problems require cooperative solutions for managing existing resources, discovering new ones and developing alternative sources.
Optimal solution	Independence /Relative independence	Potential disruptions of energy supply create economic, political and security vulnerabilities. Energy independence (by having sufficient sources or an effective energy mix or by having control over some of international conditions of supply) is the only way to avoid them.
	Interdependence	Interdependence is the underlying condition of the energy

In addition to the studies that determines two opposite –realist/liberal-sides as the overwhelming approaches to energy, Dannreuther (2013, p. 95) also mentions the “radical approach” to energy filed, following the IR’s realism-liberalism-radicalism classification. He notes that “the radical and critical tradition highlights the continuing salience of imperial and colonial legacies to the energy and mineral industries, the past and continuing structures of inequality and injustice, and the complex array of actors which are continually engaged in acts of coercion and resistance at the local, national, regional and international levels.”

One of the examples of a radical-anti-Western approach to international energy issues is “The International Politics of the Middle East” by Ray Hinnebusch, while others are by Andrew Barry, Timothy Mitchell, Gavin Bridge and Michael Watts who have a common dissatisfaction with the “resource curse” or “resource dependency” point of view (Dannreuther, 2010, pp. 9-13).

On the other hand, there are also some attempts for a constructivist approach to study energy, “energy security” in particular. An example is the work of David Harriman’s (2009) “Energy is What States Make of it”, a PhD thesis⁵. For example, Harriman notes, Russia’s large energy resources provides advantage in its relations with the EU since the Union needs energy, which means that materialism matter to some degree. From a constructivist point of view, however, how it matters and how it constitutes the actors depend on their shared ideas. The existence of possible/diverse policies and choices on same geography of energy, while the geographical/geopolitical “realities” can also contextually change as the fall of USSR and exploration of new reserves showed.

An article by Popescu (2012) can also be given as an example to energy studies declaring a constructivist framework. In his article titled as “EU – Russia Energy Dialogue: Between Cooperation and Conflict”, Popescu deals with the concept of energy security in the relation between EU and Russia from a Regional Security Complex perspective, concluding with the finding of different identities, different preferences and interests of the EU and Russia-towards the issue of energy security.

⁵ No additional and related articles or publications found that is written by the author.

There is also a growing literature using Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's securitization theory as conceptual framework or reference point for understanding and explaining issues related to energy security.⁶ However these constructivist approaches are not exactly post-positivist due to the theoretically in between position of constructivism. On the other hand securitization approach is inevitably used only when thinking energy with security concept.

A PhD thesis by Jaroslaw Wisniewski (2013) makes an analysis of elite discourses of "energy security" in the United Kingdom (UK), Poland and Germany for the period 2000-2009 is heavily influenced by the Critical Discourse Analysis approach of Van Dijk. So, though taking the issue as energy security like many other scholars, Wisniewski differently uses a more apparent post-positivist method. In his study, Wisniewski (2013, p.3) aims to discuss "whether a common understanding of energy security is emerging across EU Member States' elite discourses and to what extent the energy supply in these three countries seen as threatened in the period 2000-2009, a period in which energy became an increasingly salient theme of newspaper coverage. Another work of Wisniewski (2016) is about the role of geopolitical narratives in explaining pipeline projects. In his short article titled "Geopolitical storytelling: How Russia's Nord Stream 2 narrative is served to the public" Wisniewski points out that "constructing a narrative, elaborating a certain way of 'explaining' or 'selling' the story, is becoming even more important than engaging in discussions about the economic viability of various projects." He adds that the history of EU-Russia relations is a history of competing narratives.

Energy and Geopolitics

As noted above, the realist approach to energy is named alternatively as the "geopolitics" approach. Realism intensively draws from the tradition of geopolitics that was born from the 19th century political geography and especially formed around the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halfrod Mackinder, Karl Haushofer and more recently the works of Harold and Margaret Sprout, and Ronnie Lipschutz. Concerning the framework of these studies, Dannreuther highlights the will of controlling the critical geographies and

⁶ See for example Judge, Maltby and Szulecki (2018), Leung et al. (2014), Nyman (2014b), Christou & Adamides (2013) and Radoman (2007).

resources in the realist approach to energy field, and names it as the geopolitical approach. In other words, he notes that first, the relation between national power and access to and control of natural resources (fossil fuels, minerals), secondly the perception of scarcity and the consequent competition are geopolitical approaches (Dannreuther, 2013, p. 82). That's why Correlje´ and van der Linde (2006) named this kind of approach as “regions and empires”.

Indeed, in addition to energy security concept, one of the most wide spread use of energy especially in relation to politics and interstate relations has been in correlation with the field of geopolitics, as the widespread use of “energy geopolitics” or “geopolitics of energy” terms show. It can be suggested that realism and geopolitics approach is quite attractive not only in academic realm, but for many journalist, analyst, politician, etc. While in one sense this is due to the practicality and popularity of the term geopolitics, the relation of energy with geopolitics comes from that it is a resource and so owes its existence to land, and it is a “vital” resource unequally distributed in the lands and seas of the world -meaning some states have it while others do not-. Therefore, it can be suggested that the space-bound character of energy has made it a “geo” dominant field that has consequently brought a strong relation with geopolitics and energy. The “politics” side of energy issues derives from the inevitability of interstate relations for the delivery of resources, especially with the increasing use of natural gas. Shaffer notes that “dramatic expansion of physical ties between states through energy infrastructure, mainly because of the increasing use of natural gas (..) fosters long-term linkages and at times dependencies between suppliers and consumers, and thus more room for politics (Shaffer, 2009, p. 28). By suggesting that “energy security is an integral part of the foreign and national security policies of states”, Shaffer also notes that “the study of energy in international relations represents a return to the study of the “geo” of geopolitics” (Ibid., p.163). To show the relevance of state and geopolitics, she suggests that “state will need to stay involved in crafting energy security policies. The market does not create the diverse sources, infrastructures, or storage policies that can enhance security of supply (Ibid., p.3).⁷

⁷ Shaffer (2009, p.3) also attracts attention to the additional links between the domestic and foreign policies of states. She notes that the environmental impact of the use of hydrocarbon, energy prices, and concerns about availability of energy supply have made a state's domestic energy consumption habits and policies a matter of international political interest.

In addition, since classical (and realist-positivist) approach has long dominated geopolitics, as in the case of IR as discipline, geopolitics on resource/energy evokes classical thought at first hand. This is also because classical geopolitics “is fundamentally concerned with the role that location and resources play in the exercise of political power over territory.” (Dodds, 2010). Robert Kaplan (2014) explains the relation between energy and geopolitics as follows: “Geopolitics is the battle for space and power played out in a geographical setting. Just as there are military geopolitics, diplomatic geopolitics and economic geopolitics, there is also energy geopolitics. For natural resources and the trade routes that bring those resources to consumers is central to the study of geography.” With this outlook, one can claim that the distribution of oil and gas resources among certain geographies “dictates” some policies and relations between states, as (classical) geopolitics suggests that geography dictates some policies. In this sense, similar objections to the classical geopolitics that was put by post-positivist approach can be directed to “classical energy geopolitics”: “who tend to promote a securitized and geopolitical approach so to advance their particular interest” (Dannreuther, 2013, p. 85). Critical geopolitics rejects the deterministic impact of geography and suggests an alternative view on how geopolitics might serve as a conceptual framework, by assuming that the way in which elites imagine and express geographical concepts shapes the construction of reality through discursive practices. So, according to critical geopolitics approach which will be mentioned in the theoretical chapter, these assumptions are culturally “constructed” geopolitical imaginations which varies for the same geography under consideration. When this understanding is applied to energy geopolitics, it can be suggested that geopolitical imaginations of energy, too, are culturally constructed through discursive practices.

As noted before, there are examples of works that adopt social constructivism or securitization theory, and some works applying discourse analysis approaches in studying energy and energy security. But there are very few examples which use critical geopolitics and their foremost method discourse analysis directly in their analyses of energy issues.⁸

⁸ One important example is the article of Bouzarovski and Bassin “Energy and identity: imagining Russia as a hydrocarbon superpower” inspired by the ideas of the field of critical discourse analysis with special attention to the national identity-building role played by geographical imaginations about the Russia’s energy exports (Bouzarovski & Bassin, 2011). An attempt from the field of geography is the one Matthew Huber’s article “Theorizing energy geographies” in which he suggest that geographers need to connect

This has been identified as a lack in the literature since energy is intertwined with security and geopolitics.

Motivation and Significance of the Study

It is relatively new that an academic outlook that questions and problematize the use of geopolitics, geographical metaphors and concepts in Turkey has developed. So that it is now a growing literature that adopts a constructivist, post-structuralist, critical geopolitics approach that questions the established classical approach dealing with Turkey's geography and geographical roles. These studies highlight the "geopolitical dogma" (Bilgin, 2007) and the intense geopolitical language that tries to justify the de-politicization of the political (Yeşiltaş, 2012) by using the discourses of "realities" of Turkey's regional geography, Turkey's geographical exceptionalism (Yanık, 2009, 2011), uniqueness (Bagdonas, 2012), use of "Eurasia" concept (Erşen, 2013,2014), and constructing a liminality (Rumelili and Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, 2017; Yanık, 2011) and cuspness (Altunışık, 2014). While these studies have applied the theoretical innovation that 1980s and 1990s constructivist-post positivist turn in IR and geopolitics (and political geography) has brought, and thus has made a crucial contribution to Turkish IR⁹, it is observed that these studies are focused on the concepts and geopolitical discourse of Turkey without concerning the field of energy or only touching it limitedly, despite the increasing intensity of energy vocabulary in the discourse of Turkish political elites. There has been some studies adopting a "role theory" perspective using discourse analysis methods, and these studies has identified the use of energy in elite discourses, yet in a way not detailing it and gathering all differently produced metaphors related to Turkey's geographical role in energy under one concept such as energy corridor.¹⁰

There are only a few and recent examples that are come by in last two years that has applied the critical geopolitics and post-structuralist approaches to Turkey's geographical roles in energy transportation. One of these studies uses a comparative approach by handling "hub narrative" in Turkey and the EU (Tangör and Schröder, 2017), while the

better with new debates in critical social theory over energy through an emphasis on energy's role in the social production of space (Huber, 2015). See also Zimmerer (2011).

⁹ See also (Yeşiltaş, Durgun and Bilgin, 2015)

¹⁰ See for example Özdamar (2014), Aras & Görener (2010) and Kara & Sözen (2016) .

other study is focused to directly Turkey and has a historical approach of discourse but its analyses is limited to the speech texts/minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (Aykaç, 2017). On the other hand, there are numberless studies, a literature developing since 1990s, in and out of Turkey that had dealt, with the role of Turkey in energy transportation projects mostly in a traditional or policy-oriented approach. So there is a lack of an explicit analysis to the formulation of discourse on Turkey's geographical roles in the context of energy transportation.

This dissertation aims to add this lacking "energy" dimension to the existing literature on Turkey's discourse of geographical exceptionalism hence aims to highlight the political and contextual in the "material reality" of regional energy geography. The claim of critical geopolitics that discourse and text constructs geography is not easily applicable at first look to the field of energy, since "the destiny" of distribution of energy resources in the lands of the world and the vitality of energy is hardly questionable. However as noted before, critical approach does not deny materiality but attracts the attention to the interpretations and representations on that materiality which are usually presented as the exact expression of reality. Because in fact, though one interpretation of geography can survive long, the historical process and context brings in favor of a new choice on another interpretation for the same land in question.

Hence, this study is in effort of engaging critical geopolitics approach into the debate of "Turkey's geographical role in energy transportation" which became a part of Turkey's discourse of geographical exceptionalism in the post-Cold War era.

It is post-Cold War era because while the pre-1990 discussions of Turkey's foreign energy policy were mostly confined to the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline and the Russian gas coming from the Western line, the ensuing period was the beginning of Turkey's emerging role for the transportation of specifically Caspian energy sources (Akil, 2003, p. 2) and emergence of a discourse of energy. Turkey's expectation from its geography to transport the Caspian hydrocarbons has been quite high that since the very beginning of 1990s that Turkish leaders with no exception referred to Turkey's geostrategic position to deliver oil and gas as a source of power, influence and leverage. This kind of approach is a manifestation of an interpretation of energy in the classical-geopolitics tradition and reflected itself in the leaders' discourse which consisted of various metaphors that promotes Turkey's geography hence trying to form a ground in which pipelines lead to

Turkey in the directions of East-West, later North-South. What is worth consideration is the development of different concepts and metaphors in different meanings for the same geography while these metaphors also had gained new meanings depending on the factors on play in specific periods.

By analyzing the changes in the discourse of the political/governmental elites - i.e. the formal geopolitical discourse-with a historical outlook, the dissertation tries to highlight the politicized and context-based nature of the concepts and metaphors that are attributed to the geography of Turkey in relation to regional oil and gas pipeline projects. Moving from the assumption that discursive constructions on geography, rather than geography itself, determine a state's position, the study examines how Turkey constructs geopolitical imaginations and images of energy transportation roles through its discourse and how it consequently shapes certain political spaces as a way of responding the contextual changes.

The research in this dissertation moving from the formal-practical-popular geopolitics classification of critical geopolitics school analyses the discourse of practical geopolitics that are performed specifically by policy makers/governments in Turkey in the field of energy/pipelines, in the post-Cold War period. By giving the historical flow and hence the evolution of discursive practices, this study tries to explain how Turkey's geography is redefined in terms of pipeline politics to shape policy goals in a certain way.

The metaphors that are used in the discourse of Turkey's geographical role in energy transportation, i.e. energy bridge, energy terminal, energy center, energy corridor, energy hub, energy trade center, are hence evaluated as tools of justifying and preparing certain policy choices. So that these metaphors are presented as expressions of breaking points of policy according to the way/intensity they are used, while the simultaneous use of the metaphors is seen as an effort to enlarge the space of balancing between seemingly contradicting policies.

Methodology and Text Selection

One point about discourse research in critical geopolitics is that there is not a common or a set of defined methodology about how the research on discourse would be conducted (Müller, 2013, p. 58). However, to conduct a research through discourse analysis, there

is need to make some choices that would define the scope of the study. These choices depends on the research questions and the theme of the study.

In this dissertation the analysis is inspired by Lene Hansen’s research model. Hansen forms a research design consisting the pillars of intertextual models -which matches to practical, formal, popular geopolitics classification of critical geopolitics- number of selves, temporal perspective and number of events (2006, p. 72). She illustrates this research design as shown in Figure 0.1:




Figure 0.1: Elaborated Research Design for Discourse Analysis

(Hansen, 2006, p. 72)

In this dissertation the discourse of a Single Self, Turkey, is analyzed through the official discourse on geopolitical roles on energy transportation with a historical development perspective to trace the evolution of discourse of political elite, i.e. practical geopolitics.

This inspired research model is adapted to this study as follows:

Material: Practical geopolitics / official discourse. Speech texts of heads of state (president, prime minister) and ministers of energy and foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey.¹¹

Search for: Metaphors in relation to energy transportation roles, i.e.the metaphors such as energy bridge, energy terminal, energy center, energy corridor, energy hub, energy trade center)

Time: 1991-2014 period (in a historical/chronological way).

Determining the breaking points: Determining the adoption of a new metaphor and maintenance of its use more saliently /frequently compared to others in a specific period.

No special software use: The search is conducted through pdf / soft text search and manual search of printed texts/text books.

Through the aim of tracing the evolving discourses of political leadership, i.e. practical geopolitics the below speech text material is analyzed in a way of finding the most frequently and consistently articulated signs, i.e representations of geography through metaphors and specifically developed concepts and they are evaluated in the context they are developed.

List of Analyzed Material

Energy bridge, energy terminal, energy center, energy corridor, energy hub, energy trade hub, energy trade center are searched in the following primary resources:

- All Government Programmes between 1991-2014
- News archive Ayın Tarihi <http://ayintarihi.iletisim.gov.tr/> (previously at ayintarihi.com and ayintarihi.byegm.gov.tr), which contains important news, events and some statements of the leaders and politicians for every day of the month, under the website of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Directorate

¹¹ The speech texts of leaders may be the works of advisors or other bureaucrats who can be described as “ghost writers” behind the speeches or other discursive products. However, by thinking that these texts are approved and performed by the political leader who is the de facto owner of the speech, this dissertation intentionally ignored the real writer of the text -in case it is someone else-.

of Communication (Previously Office of the Prime Minister Directorate General for Press and Information) The search has been done for the period 1991-2014

- Online newspapers (Newspapers that was found by the google search for the use of metaphors by all of the related actors-president, prime minister, related ministers- in the period 1991-2014. Milliyet online newspaper archive portal is used for some specific search.)
- Speech texts of the Presidents of Turkey between 1993-2014
 - Süleyman Demirel (printed book and all speeches at the web site of Presidency of Republic of Turkey)
 - Ahmet Necdet Sezer and (all speeches at the web site of Presidency of Republic of Turkey)
 - Abdullah Gül (all speeches at the web site of Presidency of Republic of Turkey)
- Speech texts of Prime Ministers (1991-2014)
 - Süleyman Demirel (as Prime Minister) (3 volumes from November 1991 to September 1992 published by Prime Ministry Printhouse, 3 press meeting documents)
 - Tansu Çiller (5 volumes from June 1993 to December 1995 published by Prime Ministry Printhouse)
 - Necmettin Erbakan (Some publications of Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
 - Mesut Yılmaz (reached 10 volumes published by Prime Ministry Printhouse: 2 books for March-April 1996, 4 books from September to December 1997, 4 books of January, May, June and October 1998)
 - Bülent Ecevit (13 volumes from 11th January 1999 to 30th December 2001. The other published book for January-March 2002 was not reached)
 - Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (9 books of speeches published by Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) (JDP) for 2003-2007 period, Party Group Meeting Speeches between 2011-2014 at the website of JDP, “Address to the Nation” between 2011-2014)
 - TGNA publication that includes Prime Minister Speeches at the General Sessions of the TGNA for the period June 1991-July 2011 [See İ. Neziroğlu, T. Yılmaz & G. E. Efe, eds. *Başbakanlarımız ve Genel Kurul*

Konuşmaları Cilt 9 (Cumhuriyet Hükümetleri Dönemi:Tansu Çiller, Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, Necmettin Erbakan, Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan). Ankara: TBMM Basımevi.]

- Speech texts of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (1991-2014)
 - Parliamentary minutes including budget presentations and <http://ayintarihi.iletisim.gov.tr/> for the ministers from 1991 to 2014 (as only sources for speech texts for the ministers between 1991-1997)
 - İsmail Cem (3 books containing his speeches: *Turkey in the 21st Century (Speeches and Texts Presented at International Fora (1995-2000)* and *Türkiye, Avrupa, Avrasya*-Volume 1 and 2)
 - Abdullah Gül (web site of MFA: the site gives direct links to the 2 pdfs-one is a collection of some messages and articles between 2003-2007, the other is the book that was published with the title "*Yeni Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikasının Ufukları (Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Century)*) consist of speeches at the international and national meetings, opening ceremonies etc. between 2003-2007.
 - Activity Reports of MFA (2011,2012,2013, 2014)
 - Ali Babacan (web site of MFA: the site gives direct links to almost all of the speeches of Babacan)
 - Ahmet Davutoğlu (web site of MFA: the site gives direct links to almost all of the speeches of Davutoğlu. Articles in journals or newspapers and his book *Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth)* are also included in the analysis)
- Speech texts of Ministers of Energy and Natural Resources (1991-2014)
 - Parliamentary minutes including budget presentations and <http://ayintarihi.iletisim.gov.tr/> for the ministers from 1991 to 2014 (as only sources for the period between 1991-2009)
 - The article of Taner Yıldız that was published in 2 journals, Turkish Policy Quarterly and Insight Turkey in 2010.
 - General sources such as the Ministry Strategic Plans (2010-2014 and 2015-2019 Strategic Plans), other documents and reports produced by the

Ministry (between 2006-2014) and some texts in the web site of the Ministry.

- Online newspapers (newspapers that was found by google search for the use of metaphors)

Dissertation Outline

As an energy non-have state together with an increasing internal demand, Turkey's way of engaging in regional oil and gas transportation projects over the promotion of its geographical position presents a remarkable picture when a focus on discourse is adopted. Evolution of Turkey's discourse on its geographical roles of energy transportation is a process that contains many factors that are related to each other. Changes in the international context, re-imagination of geopolitical roles and maneuvers in foreign policy which carry elements of both old/traditional approaches and new inventions, contribution of outside actors to the establishment of a specific discourse, leader/actor specific effects are all parts of Turkey's (pipeline) discourse which also have its internal dynamics. Finally, however, the metaphors that are used in the discourse of Turkey's geographical role in energy transportation, i.e. energy bridge, energy terminal, energy center, energy corridor, energy hub, energy trade center, becomes tools of justifying and preparing certain policy choices which are shaped by these factors. So that these metaphors are somehow expressions of breaking points of policy according to the way/intensity they are used, while the simultaneous use of the metaphors is seen as an effort to enlarge the space of balancing between seemingly contradicting policies.

The dissertation tries to put the issue in three chapters. In the first chapter, the theoretical approaches of classical geopolitics and critical geopolitics are reminded with their basic arguments, and emphasis is given to discourse as the main theoretical framework of the study. In the second chapter, the post-Cold War context and the discursive effort of Turkey for re-positioning itself is explained as a background of its language of geopolitics. In the last chapter the way geopolitical discourse of energy is established by the political elites is analyzed to show how Turkey constructs its geographical position in regional oil and gas pipeline projects and shapes policies. The analysis includes the period of 1991-2014.

Figure 0.2 is designed as an outline of the study. It is an outline of the dissertation both in terms of the structure and findings of the conducted research. It indicates the dominant concepts and metaphors in the energy discourse of the Turkish leaders in certain periods. Periodization has been done according to the changes in the flow of the discourse seen in the reached texts of political leaders-i.e. the actors of practical geopolitics.

One important point in the figure is that it shows the continuity of the use of a concept or metaphor from the beginning until now, but in a way that highlighting the time of losing its dominancy in favour of the other. In other words, it illustrates the breaking points in the discursive practice in addition to showing a continuity in this practice, i.e. use of the concepts and metaphors by Turkish leadership. The boxes on the left are given at the time point of change in order to summarize the contextual changes that brought the discursive change. In chapter 3 of this dissertation, a bit more extensive versions of these informative boxes are given as tables at the end of the analysis about each period.




Figure 0.2: Evolution of Turkey’s Discourse on Its Geographical Roles in Energy Transportation Roles (1991-2014)

CHAPTER 1

THEORY: GEOPOLITICS AND DISCOURSE

1.1. ON CLASSICAL AND CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS

1.1.1. Classical Geopolitics: An Overview of Pre-Critical Geopolitics Era

Originally a branch or a version of political geography and as a study area in relation with IR discipline, geopolitics has been a contested field and an overused term, both being a tool of analysis and a popular concept which presents different meanings based on where and how it is used. As a result “geopolitics” has become an overused term: It is frequently invoked to “describe, explain, or analyze specific foreign policy issues and problems.” (Sempa, 2002, p. 3). This frequency causes an ambiguity on what the users of the term mean or in what sense the issue handled is evaluated under “geopolitics”. It is important that Leslie Hepple’s 1986 article describing the rise and non-clear use of “geopolitics” which can variously mean “global-strategic”, “ideological (East-West) conflict”, “regional-political”, “geographical contextual”, and even used to title magazine contents and carries connotations of realism (Hepple, 1986, pp. 29-30) is somehow still valid today.

Despite this confusion, however, if we make a general classification, for how geopolitics is understood, we can say that, the term geopolitics operates in two basic meanings; geopolitics as a scholar activity and geopolitics as a practice to be exercised by politicians, strategists, etc. (Moisio, 2015, p. 220).¹² In this way, geopolitics as a scholar activity would mean the study of the interaction of geography and politics as an academic and scientific discipline, while as a practice geopolitics is foreign policy actions. However, the “informing” mission of scholar activity on the practitioners of foreign policy made it difficult to find what really distinct the one from the other. Therefore the blurry character of the line between the two, scholar work and politics, has been another central discussion topic among the filed scholars. This point about geopolitics is a very familiar one with

¹² See also Tuathail (1994b) who explain three usages of geopolitics especially during late Cold War.

that of international relations discipline considering that IR as a field was born to meet the needs of (US-Western) politicians and the line between the scholar work and political activity was not clear from the beginning (Hoffman, 1977). To differentiate the scholar activity and practice of geopolitics, such as differentiating IR and foreign policy, is only a relatively recent claim of a separate school within the field geopolitics, i.e. critical geopolitics.

The scope of “geopolitics” was emerged from the works of 19th century intellectuals Alfred Thayer Mahan, Friedrich Ratzel, Halfrod Mackinder, Rudolph Kjellen and Karl Haushofer (chronological order by birth date) who lived and produced their work around almost the same time period. As shown in Table 1.1, their works constituted the classical thought of geopolitics, with German and Anglo-American versions being aware of and in interaction of each other.

Table 1.1: 19th Century Classical Geopolitics-Leading Thinkers and Political Geographers

German/European Branch of Classical Geopolitics	Anglo-American Branch of Classical Geopolitics
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904)	Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914)
Rudolph Kjellen(1864 – 1922)	Halfrod Mackinder (1861-1947)
Karl Haushofer (1869 -1946)	Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943)

It was 19th century that classical geopolitics was to be a field of research because the period was witnessing newly emerging geographical conditions lead by imperial rivalry, which gave way to the birth of the discipline (Tuathail, 1996, p. 19). It was this contextual change and transformation of space that would bring the birth of the new discipline. That is, “geopolitical thought emerged as geographers and other thinkers sought to analyse, explain and understand the transformations and finite spaces of the fin de siècle world” (Dodds and Atkinson, 2000, p. 2). Geopolitics was born as a rationale of the European imperialists for overcoming the limits of the “closed political system”. In this sense, the basic issue of geopolitics was in fact to shape the rivalry between Anglo-American sea power, Russian land power and Germany willing to proceed to the East thus threatening the West (Tezkan and Taşar, 2002, p. 25). In this sense geopolitics became a useful tool

for every actor using it as a method or science to find objective reasons to actions. It was “state as an organism” or “organic state” scheme in Germany and geostrategic way of thinking in the Anglo-American world that geopolitics was made operational by intellectuals and the state craft advised by them.

While this transformation brought geopolitics as a separate field of research in 19th century, according to Heffernan, the invention of the term “marked only a terminological modification of an existing intellectual agenda, previously labelled as “political geography” (Heffernan, 2000, p. 28). Because as John Agnew suggests that a particular geopolitical visioning already evolved starting from the 16th century, with the Age of Discovery, in a way “seeing the world-as-a-picture” and “a source of chaos and danger” (Agnew, 2004, p. 15). Yet the invention and coining of the field as “geopolitics” was made in 1899 by a Swedish politician Rudolph Kjellen (1864 – 1922). He used the term “Geopolitik” as a category to analyze the state, in an article he wrote on the boundaries of Sweden, along with four other categories and he defined “Geopolitik” as “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space” (Holdar, 1992, p. 312). Kjellen’s categorized other attributes of the state, other than Geopolitik, which are Ethno- or Demopolitik (the study of the population of the state); Ekopolitik (the character of the economy of the state), Sociopolitik (societal politics); and Kvatopolitik (governmental-constitutional politics), however, Geopolitik was the most systematized and developed of Kjellen’s categories for analysis of the state.(Ibid.)

Under his Geopolitik approach, Kjellén, saw the territory as the body of a state whose ultimate aim was to unite with an organic area that is characterized by natural external boundaries (seas or oceans, mountains, large rivers and unpopulated areas such as deserts, swamps or forests). Additionally the state’s location in relation to other states (whether it is buffer, central, peripheral; the form of its territory (concentric or elongated) and its size are key categorize in the Kjellén’s analysis of a state. On the other hand, nation is the soul of the state living in the body-territory. (Ibid., p.312)

While the coiner of the name of the field was Kjellén with the above mentioned content and understanding, his views were actually shaped and influenced by German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) whose views were quite effective in the emergence of German school of geopolitics. Kjellen’s understanding of geopolitics thus highly reflect Ratzel ideas together with Karl Ritter who shifted his focus from the philosophical

organic analogy toward a more social Darwinist analogy of the state (Ibid., p.307) which was identifying the political state “as the anthropological unit corresponding to a natural organism” for the purposes of international politics (Bassin, 1987, p. 476). Ratzel under effect of Darwinism imagined and described each state as a species, needing an ecological niche and a “living space”- Lebensraum the original well-known term - sufficient to its needs, and “grows at the expense of other states if necessary, in order to support a dynamic and successful population.” (Dittmer and Sharp, 2014, p. 4). Darwin’s suggestions such as “natural selection”, “struggle for existence” and “survival of the fittest” for all species on Earth were adopted to the state by Ratzel (Tezkan and Taşar, 2002, p. 25). In his 1896 study “Laws of the Spatial Growth of States”, and 1897 work “Politische Geographie” Ratzel was describing the expansion of a state through war as a natural progressive tendency, laying the foundations for geopolitics around Lebensraum term by suggesting that the greatest success of expansive politics is based on the use of geography (Heske, 1994, p. 205). Cohen notes, Ratzel as the German “father” of political geography, basing his system upon principles of evolution and science, “was the first to treat space and location systematically”. His works were reflecting Germany’s ambitions in the 19th century, “providing scientific basis for state expansionist doctrines” and was fitting to Germany’s view of its future as a giant state (Cohen, 2009, p. 17). The ultimate expression and contribution of his type of expansionist thinking became clear in the development of German expansionism after 1918 (Bassin, 1987, p. 474).

These views on geography and state over the analogy of “organism”, or “biogeographical reasoning” with Tuathail’s words, was followed by Karl Haushofer (1869 -1946) who is the founder of the German geopolitical thought *Geopolitik*. Haushofer would take Kjellen’s concept of geopolitics and build it into a distinctly German school of geopolitical reasoning (Tuathail, 1996, p. 34). According to Karl Haushofer, “Geopolitics is the new national science of the state, a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography” (Cohen, 2009, p. 15). This geographical determinism finds another expression of meaning of geopolitics as a science, as expressed by Heske (1994, p. 136) as follows: “Geopolitics is a science of world politics in its dependence on a geographical base and knowledge of its practical application in foreign policy. Its purpose is to give

the necessary intellectual support for protection and extension of the German living space [Lebensraum] for the benefit of able settlers.”

With these views and definitions of Haushofer, first of all, expression of geopolitics as a science was establishing an objectivity, though Cohen notes “geopolitik” made no pretense of objectivity for it was “designed to fulfill German national and imperial aims” (Cohen, 2009, p. 25), hence the German-nationalist direction of this works would make the views explicitly ideological.

Together with the effects of Kjellén and Ratzel, Haushofer had owed his geopolitical vision to “the greatest of all geographic world views”, Halford Mackinder’s account of the “Geographical Pivot of History” (2009, p. 15). Consequently Euro-Asia and Eastern Europe-as a field of German hegemony received particular attention for him (Natter, 2003, p. 199) .

In the aftermath of the World War II, German geopolitics was discredited due to its Nazi connection almost disappeared, although there were detailed scholarly analyses of international security and strategy published during this time (Chapman, 2011, p. 8):

Around the same time period that started with Ratzel and later Haushofer in Europe, another school of geopolitics were rising in United States (US-USA) and England. Rather than explaining how state is formed, Anglo-American type of geopolitics has a geostrategic way of thinking and is more interested in state’s development and behaviors in a wider geography (Tezkan and Taşar, 2002, p. 25).

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), a US Naval Admirer; and Halfrod Mackinder (1861-1947), a British geographer were founding fathers of the Anglo American branch of geopolitics. The effect of these figures on the development of geopolitics has also been too high that their works have not only been reference sources of war and politics in their homelands and particularly in US but have also affected the geopolitical thought around world.¹³ The basic point of both have been their views on the determinative power of geography on political/military actions. Mahan’s views on the importance of sea power which would allow political and economic/commercial supremacy and Mackinder’s “Heartland” theory have had an enduring effect in “geopolitical” thinking. Though not explicitly making a definition of geopolitics, Mahan and Mackinder shaped the way geopolitics is understood and practiced. Mahan and Mackinder, dealing with

¹³ For an example see Holmes & Yoshihara (2005).

predominantly the effects of geographical conditions and territorial features of a state, whether a sea or land power is advantageous advised on the strategies that brings hegemony and command.

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1898, pp. 29-89) built his theory on the supremacy of sea power. His famous 6 points on what conditions effect the sea power position of a state (1-geographic position, 2-physical conformation, 3-extent of territory, 4-number of population, 5-national character, 6-character of the government) put firstly the material features forward as the factors of supremacy because Mahan finally supposes that dominancy in sea brings world hegemony. The aim of territorial and trade oriented expansion of US was giving Mahan the rationale of his writings while Mahan's work was providing the intellectual-scientific reason pursue such expansionist aims (Tezkan and Taşar, 2002, p. 29). Despite the "sea power" concept was later lost its credibility in an extent and worked for specifically in the 19th century imperialism context, the emphasis on the correlation between the geographic shape of state, positioning on the world map and its relation to hegemony and power left a legacy of geopolitical thinking.

Mackinder's approach to Eurasia and Heartland theory has special place in classical geopolitical thinking that his views have still find resonance and reflection today.

According to Mackinder the basic reason behind the unbalanced development of states was not related to the qualifications of a nation but to the inequal distribution of loam and positioning of states which have not equality of opportunity (Tezkan and Taşar, 2002, p. 79) . A close reader of Ratzel and sharing his organic conception of the state, Mackinder Mackinder (2004, p. 310) was suggesting that the mobilization of land-based resources via the railway would allow to redress the balance between sea- and land-power in favour of land-power, in his article of 1904, "Geographical Pivot of History" (Kearns, 2009, p. 4). Mackinder (1942, p. 106) was naming the core of Eurasia- World Island (the core of the interlinked continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa) as the Pivot Area-Heartland, and as very well-known, suggesting that to rule it is to command the World Island and to rule the World-Island is to command the world.¹⁴ This suggestion drives mainly from Mackinder's views on the advantages of centrality of place and efficient movement of ideas, goods, and people in which geographical realities lay (Cohen, 2009, p. 17). Table

¹⁴ Mackinder's famous dictum: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world".

1.2 is a summary of the main assumptions of classical geopolitics that is represented by after Ratzel, Kjellen, Hausofer, Mahan and Mackinder.

Table 1.2: Main Assumptions and Basics of Classical Geopolitics

German/European Branch of Classical Geopolitics	Anglo-American Branch of Classical Geopolitics
Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) Rudolph Kjellen(1864 – 1922) Karl Haushofer (1869 -1946)	Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1941) Halfrod Mackinder (1861-1947)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State as Organism • Positivism-Social Darwinism • Living Space 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sea or Land Power Determining the fate of and empire/state • Controlling Heartland - World Island • Ruling Rimland to Control Heartland

In the process of development of classical geopolitical thought, after Ratzel, Kjellen, Hausofer, Mahan and Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman is another important name. Spykman (1893-1943) was the person who brought the classical geopolitical thought to the US and best known for his reworking of the Mackinder’s “Heartland” by additionally stressing the significance of the “Rimland” areas of Eurasia, particularly Western Europe and Southeast Asia (Tuathail, 1996, p. 39) in controlling the center. Spykman, who was also interested in German geopolitics along with keeping criticism alongside, therefore had been the American representative of geographical determinism of classical geopolitics by approaching a geography based realist foreign policy as objective (Yeşiltaş, 2012, p. 63). Geography, Spykman declared, is “the most fundamental conditioning factor in the formulation of national policy because it is the most permanent. Ministers come and ministers go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed.” (Tuathail, 1996, p. 39) The very summary of this view of him, in his own words is “geography does not argue, it just is.” (Spykman, 1938). Geography as a stable reality hence shapes and determines politics. While he is intensively effected by realist thought, he was also influent on development of the realist IR in US. Hence not in directly geopolitics but in classical way of thinking about IR and geography he had an important influence. Spykman, “the godfather of containment”, did not served officially for US government but his thoughts gave an important direction to US foreign policy. In US, such as in Europe, from late 1940s the interest in geopolitics started to decline both in

substance and language. Indeed, In the post-war period, there was no policy-oriented geopolitical work, with the exception of Saul Cohen's (1963) attempt to provide an informed regionalization of the world: geographers were largely silent about the grand strategy of inter-state politics (Flint, 2006, p. 23). However, Hepple (1986, pp. 22-3) notes, this decline had been most visible at the level of geopolitical language and terminology due to especially the Nazi connotations while "geopolitical interpretation and analysis continued, but sailed under such other colours as strategic studies or even political geography." Tuathail (1994b, p. 260) notes that although geopolitics is stigmatized as pseudoscience by Isaiah Bowman, Richard Hartshorne and Hans Moreganthau, it became part of Cold War strategic discourse.

The revival of the term "geopolitics" has been by Henry Kissinger who served as Secretary of State between 1973–1977. With Kissinger, the term entered the language "in a way which it never had before, though at the substantial price of ambiguity and confusion of meaning" (Hepple, 1986, p. 27). Gray and Sloan notes (Sloan and Gray, 1999, p. 1) Kissinger popularized the word "geopolitics" with his continual usage of the term in his 1979 book of memoirs titled *The White House Years*. In this usage, geopolitics is meant as "a method of analysis to combat the American liberal policies of idealism" and as "a means of presenting an alternative to the conservative policies of an ideological anti-Communism". Accordingly geopolitics in Kissinger's conception was synonymous with global equilibrium. By this approach which is alternative to idealism and ideology Kissinger was aiming to bring "national interests" back on the top of the agenda of foreign policy makers by assuming a given objectively defined unity of national interests (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006, p. 350).

After decades of being stigmatized and banned, with the process started with Kissinger, geopolitics experienced a revival through the late 1980s which became more visible with the administration of Ronald Reagan. Reagan's geopolitical eye was Colin Gray adopting a grand strategist geopolitics different from the one of Kissinger's everyday tactical conduct guide for statecraft (Tuathail, 1994b, p. 267). Geopolitics returned as a method in one way or other and became a tool and source of foreign policy and globalization process which started through the 1980s did not bring an end to the prominence of geography and territory in reasoning political actions.

The end of the Cold War came with the revival of geopolitics. O'Hara notes that the fall of USSR, which means the fall of the controller of the "Heartland", brought an increase in the interest in the works and ideas of Mackinder. In this era of revival, names such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, the then US National Security Advisor put the Eurasia, and the issue of controlling Eurasia to focus of world geopolitics (O'Hara, 2004, p. 152).

The increase in the interest to Mackinderian ideas has been also seen in post-Soviet Russia that the rise of Eurasianism in Russia has been in connection with appealing to classical geopolitics thinkers and Mackinder's Heartland theory, for example by Alexander Dugin. (Bassin and Aksenov, 2006, p. 106; O'Hara, 2004, p. 152) So, 100 years after Mackinder first published his study, his ideas continue to have supporters and continue to influence policy. (O'Hara, 2004, p. 153).

Although the first versions of geopolitics are criticized by its later versions, approach to geopolitics developed by intellectuals and state craft share many common points in general. This derives basically from the realist-positivist mode of thinking in geopolitical conceptualizations that are grounded in the material factors and power. In this classical approach states are the primary actors who responds the conditions that objective material factors dictate. With this simple and available "realist" and "objective" model which is allowing to explain politics and political actions "(...) classical geopolitics could claim to be the first international relations model utilized by academics and states." (Kelly, 2006, p. 28). In this sense, realism is indeed the strongest common point of geopolitics and IR, in both the Anglo-American and German versions. Dodds notes, classical geopolitics share many of the assumptions of political realism such as the nature of the international arena and the significance of state sovereignty and national interests. But the most crucial part about classical geopolitics in contrast to realist analysis of international politics, "political geography and geopolitics have focused on the power of the land and the sea to shape international relations" (Dodds, 2005, p. 38).

If realism is the basic approach of classical geopolitical thought, there are some other basic concepts that all of the mentioned classical geopolitics writers prioritize. Therefore, the basic concepts of traditional geopolitics can be summarized as follows: power, state, geography, hegemony, the identification of spaces as advanced or primitive; a conceptualization of the state as the highest political entity; and the pursuit of primacy by competing states (Gökmen, 2010, p. 158).

The other characteristics of classical geopolitics derives from its assumptions are visualisation of geopolitical conditions (such as objective maps), demarcation/simplification (Heartland/Rimland), lines of communications and checkpoints (too much focus on territorial struggles on land among nations), balance of power (trying to predict future acts and dynamics based on the relative power balance among them), bases/bridges (especially Spykman’s works) and control (Okuyama, 2012). Colin Flint also lists the features of classical geopolitics as: privileged position of author (white, male, elite, and Western, situated knowledge), masculine perspective (“All seeing” and “all knowing”), labelling/classification (territories are given value and meaning), a call to “objective” theory or history (universal “truths” used to justify foreign policy), simplification (A catchphrase to foster public support) and state-centric (politics of territorial state sovereignty) (Flint, 2006, p. 17).

All these attitudes of classical geopolitical thinking forms “fixed assumptions about the geographical significance of places littered the geopolitical discourses of European and American political geographers” (Dodds, 2005, p. 38).

Table 1.3 is a summary of the above mentioned basic points of the classical geopolitics as put by Dodds (2005, p. 29)¹⁵, Flint (2006), Gökmen (2010, p. 226), Okuyama (2012).

Table 1.3: Basics of Classical Geopolitics

Realism: Power, state, geography, hegemony	A conceptualization of the state as the highest political entity, importance of statecraft, the pursuit of primacy by competing states, control, balance of power, national sovereignty
Labelling/classification/simplification	The identification of spaces as advanced or primitive, geopolitical blocs
Visualization of geopolitical conditions	Cartography and maps
Fixed territories, physical/earthly environments	Fixed assumptions about the geographical significance of places
Territorial enemies	Too much focus on territorial struggles on land among nations
Positivism	A call to “objective” theory or history

¹⁵ Dodds (2005, p. 29) uses a table of comparison of classical-critical geopolitics which he adapted from Tuathail and Dalby. Classical geopolitics part of the table is utilized in the below summary table.

1.2.1. The Turn: Critical Geopolitics

It can be said that critical geopolitics emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s as part of the cultural/linguistic/constructivist turn in the social sciences and human geography. (Moisio, 2015, p. 223). This “cultural turn” that was also seen in the disciplines of geography and International Relations gave way to the emergence of a new, critical form of geopolitics in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dittmer and Sharp, 2014, p. 5).

If we first look at the birth of *critical* IR we can say that the late 1980s witnessed a powerful rejection against positivism-based theories by which Robert Keohane named as reflectivist theories in his presidential address to the International Studies Association in 1988 (Keohane, 1988). However, before the post-positivist criticism was born, IR included many other transformations within its basic theories between 1960s and 80s, known as the inter-paradigm debate.¹⁶ Reflectivism, also known as post-positivism or anti-positivism, gave way to new and intense theoretical debates within IR during the 1980s. Especially “when the positivist mainstream failed to predict the end of the Cold War” a space was opened for the critiques of the positivist orthodoxy (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p. 20). As is often the way, a new theory is called into being by the failure of an old theory (Brown and Ainley, 2005, p. 27).

The new debate and approach was the rejection of basic assumptions of positivism i.e., the scientific and methodological unity of science, the clear distinction of facts that are certainly neutral and values that are not, the regularity of the social world similar to that of the natural world and the reliability of empiricist epistemology (Smith, 1997, p. 168). The difference between the old and this new approach was also expressed in conceptual dichotomies such as interpretive approach vs explanatory or descriptive approach, critical vs problem solving, or basically post-positivist vs positivist. Constructivism has been the fastest growing movement within IR discipline, led by scholars such as Alexander Wendt, John Gerard Ruggie, Nicholas Onuf and Friedrich Kratochwill, strongly defended socially constructed facts rather than the timeless brute facts of the international politics

¹⁶ Waever (1996) notes that an inter-paradigm debate were ongoing between realism, pluralism which was attracting the attention to emerging non-state actors and interdependence and Marxism oriented radicalism (also known as structuralism) proposing a world-system approach and focusing on interdependence from a point directly linking to a critique of imperialism.

such as “anarchy”, and emphasized the role of identity in interstate relations (Brown and Ainley, 2005, p. 48).

While the constructivist school is usually said to remain closely in touch with the research agenda of the mainstream – that is, the relations of states, specifically problems of cooperation and conflict, another group of scholars under post-positivist stream emerged such as Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, feminist writers, writers inspired by the French philosophers–Foucault and Derrida in particular (Ibid., 52-53). Although, these post-positivist thinkers do not have a great deal in common, they share the “unmasking impulse” of Social Constructivism together with the suggestion of “any positivist foundation is untenable” (Monteiro and Ruby, 2009, p. 29). This is a manifestation of their desire to understand International Relations as a manifestation of a broader movement in social thought rather than a free-standing discourse with its own terms of reference, as a theoretical effort to unsettle the established categories and an area to be seen in the context of Enlightenment and post- Enlightenment thought (Brown and Ainley, 2005, p. 53).

In this context, IR’s transformation or the emergence of the new approaches within is the effect of the movement that operated in many branches of the social science. Starting from Social Constructivism, the transformation has found its expression strongly in post-structuralism which is mainly associated with the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, James Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Baudrillard, David Campbell. As Campbell notes "poststructuralism is not a model or theory of international relations; but it is the only critical perspectives-and poststructuralism in particular-which make the issues of interpretation and representation, power and knowledge, and the politics of identity central." In this sense post structuralism sees theory as practice instead of seeing theory and practice as distinct phenomenon, and by doing that it mainly becomes “a theory of theory” (Campbell, 2013, p. 225). In this framework, poststructuralism problematize the production of knowledge and treats it as a normative and political matter (Devetak, 2005, p. 162).

The field of geopolitics has begun to experience a transformation similar to that of IR discipline. Starting from the 1980s, an approach of geopolitics has also been produced by a new critical understanding which defined itself as “critical geopolitics”, producing epistemological discussions from the discipline of political geography (Kelly, 2006, p.

34). Moisió (2015, p. 223) notes that the structuralist openings in political geography at that time, notably the world-systems approach by Peter J. Taylor “paved the way for critical geopolitics” by drawing upon 1983 work of Immanuel Wallerstein.

In the early 1990s, political geographers like Yves Lacoste, inspired by Michel Foucault, a French philosopher and social theorist, -and to a lesser extent Jacques Derrida and Jacques Baudrillard- developed a new approach to geopolitics which aims to disclose geographical assumptions in geopolitical discourses, disclose the politics and the power relations behind the discursive practices of statecraft, hence they “politicized” the fields of geopolitics, political geography, and geography, namely made the political dimension within them visible again (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006, p. 350). This process and approach have continued with the works of the names such as Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, John Agnew, Klaus Dodds, Leslie Hepple, Paul Routledge and Timothy Luke, all scholars in cultural or political geography. After numerous “self-consciously critical” articles and books “critical geopolitics was a clearly discernible and rapidly growing strand within political geography, by the late 1990s” (Kuus, 2010). But the term critical geopolitics was already coined by Simon Dalby in 1990.

So, the disciplinary distinction between geopolitics and IR has maintained to be kept. When in the classical versions of IR and geopolitics, the common point was the dominance of a realist world view, in the newly developed critical versions post-positivism or post-structuralism has been the shared point of the two fields. Scholars, such as Foucault, not a political geographer or IR scholar originally, has been too much inspirational in development of some reflectivist IR theories and critical geopolitics at the same time. Alongwith Foucault, Yves Lacoste, French geographer, and the French journal *Hérodote* under Lacoste’s chief editorship, are shown by some as the main source of the ideological foundations of critical geopolitics. For example Hepple (2000, p. 269), by referring to a corporate Lacoste-*Hérodote* school, notes that the journal developed a critical and radical regeneration of geopolitical discourse several years before the Anglophone construction of ‘critical geopolitics’ by Dalby, Tuathail, Agnew, Taylor and others.

The 1976 interview of Lacoste- Foucault in the first issue of *Hérodote* marked a beginning of critical works of geopolitics and geography. Together with Lacoste and Foucault,

Edward Said's Orientalism is also referred as the theoretical ground of critical geopolitics (Dalby, 2010, p. 50).

On the other hand, Karl Dodds and James Sidaway (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994, p. 516), as critical scholars, expresses that "the single most important influence on the existing literature of critical geopolitics has been a Foucauldian insistence that one should explore the power/knowledge nexus in discourse" since a number of critical geopolitical writers such as Simon Dalby, Karl Dodds, Gearóid Ó Tuathail have cited Foucault's works. This tendency was followed by other scholars that have made their academic work within the critical geopolitics approach.

Foucault himself rejected the labels such as post-structuralist or post-modernist, though in IR theory literature he is placed in the post-structuralist/post-positivist theories. The Foucauldian stance of critical geopolitics has made the approach to be strongly connected to post-structuralism that there has not been a necessary philosophical distinction between the two. On the other hand, with the common point Foucault among others there have also been works named as post-structuralist geography if we consider that post-structuralist influences can be discerned in almost all aspects of geographical endeavor.¹⁷ The fundamental point of critical geopolitics, such as other post-modernist/post-positivist theories, is its stance to the (claim of) objectivity and scientificness which enjoyed a long-time dominance in the classical works of geopolitics. Geopolitics is a human product of subject thus posits a subjectivity. Because the subject is not simply a person but always a certain kind of person: the term "subjects" captures the possibility of being a certain kind of person, which, for the theorists who tend to use it, is typically a contingent historical possibility rather than a universal or essential truth about human nature" (Heyes, 2014, p. 159).

In case of geography and geopolitics this would mean that, in Sharp's words, "the use of geographical description is always selective". So, rather than an unchanging or independent variable, geography "is a form of power/knowledge" though there are some agreeable geographical facts such as the relative size and location of continents and the distribution resources. Sharp (1993, p. 502 (note 1)) notes that even these "geographical facts" or "seemingly objective measures are not independent of their historical construction." This suggestion which is a part the approach of critical geopolitics requires

¹⁷ For a work how the key post-structuralist thinkers affected the study of geography, see Murdoch (2005).

a questioning of any expression of geographical facts. In other words, critical geopolitics aims to question and subvert “taken-for-granted geographical reasoning” underlying the classical form of geopolitics (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008, p. 441).

While this reasoning traditionally contains a conceptual separation of political theory and political practice, the assumption of objectivity of spatial forms and a said atheoretical basis of place-bound characteristics of geography (Agnew, 1993 cited in Sharp, 1993, p.492), critical form of geopolitics claims the opposite. Rather than treating geography as an objective reflector of reality, critical geopolitics see it as a field of social construction of the world spatially, social institutional practice, intellectual practical thinking and information production (Livingstone, 1995, cited in Yeşiltaş, 2012, p.105). Because post-structuralist and Foucauldian understanding of geography suggests that “there is no clear distinction between power, knowledge, practice and space – all these aspects are interwoven with one another”. (Murdoch, 2005, p. 48) and “as power relations come into being, discourses, knowledges and spaces gain shape” (Ibid., p.56).

Tuathail (1994a, p. 532) notes that, geographical discourse has “a history inseparable from international political power.” He suggest that international political power “needs geographical settings in order to be meaningful.” So that it helps to “write how we know the settings or regions of the earth.”

In addition to power, another notion that critical geopolitics emphasizes is “governmentality” with Foucault’s expression, “geo-power” with Tuathail’s (1996, p. 10) expression: it means the “functioning of geographical knowledge not as an innocent body knowledge and learning but as an ensemble of technologies of power concerned with the governmental production and management of territorial space.” In this sense, Tuathail (1994a, p. 533) notes, geopolitics in its classical version is considered “one of many 20th-century forms of governmentality” and it is the politics of geographical knowledge (place-writing) and governmentality/geo-power. Critical geopolitics adopts a mission of historically documenting and displacing “the discursive infrastructure of forms of geo-power” and rather than ‘uncovering’ the hidden meanings of maps of global politics, it aims “(1) to problematize the delimitation of the relationship between geography and politics to essential identities and domains; (2) to document the strategies by which maps of global politics are produced by governmental sites; and (3) to disrupt the infrastructural functioning of such maps.”(Ibid., p.535)

In this sense, it can be said that Tuathail is not motivated by a desire to search or a willingness to find out an original/stable meaning for geopolitics, but he challenges the very notion of essentialised meaning (Antonsich, 2000, p. 204).

One of the best ways to understand critical geopolitics to compare it with the traditional version. Klaus Dodds (2005, p. 29) uses below comparison as shown in Table 1.4, which he adapted from Tuathail and Dalby, especially featuring the contextualizing in critical geopolitics.

Table 1.4: Traditional and Critical Geopolitics

Traditional Geopolitics	Critical Geopolitics
National sovereignty	Globalization
Fixed territories	Symbolic Boundaries
Statecraft	Networks/interdependence
Territorial enemies	Deterritorialized dangers
Geopolitical Blocs	Virtual Environments
Physical/earthly environments	
Cartography and maps	Geographic Information Systems

Phil Kelly makes also a comparison between the two approaches in terms of their basic assumptions, while he adds that critical geopolitics has its own differences between the approaches of its scholars and this makes a comparison between the critical and classical modes of geopolitics more difficult. But, he points out that the most visible critical versions, both of which overlap, first have a de-constructivist stance of examining texts, scripts, and discourse contained within foreign policy and traditional geopolitical statements and theories (characteristic of much of Tuathail) and second, the one that more attuned to Marxist political economy and to critiquing and revising traditional theory (seen in Agnew and Corbridge's, Dalby, Dodds, and others). (Kelly, 2006, pp. 30-1).

Hence, it is important to note that criticism, as the word mean in general, rather than a negatively commenting, is done to show what is not on the scene, in a way of rejecting pure innocence and revealing, the power relations. (Yeşiltaş, 2012, p. 113) If it is not revealing or uncovering, it is problematizing the relation between geography and politics.

1.2. GEOPOLITICS AS DISCOURSE, PRACTICAL/OFFICIAL GEOPOLITICS AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

1.2.1. Discourse and Text: Enabling Eachother

The fundamental characteristic of critical geopolitics is its focus on discourse and text. They are the very basic elements of critical geopolitics that the main research activity is performed through the analysis of discourses and texts. This linguistic approach is one of what makes critical geopolitics post-structuralist. Discourse and text are seen as the basic forces that give geography and geopolitics their existence. So, it can even be suggested that what makes critical geopolitics “critical” is that it is founded upon its suggestions over discourse and its geography making role.

Discourse and text though close in terms of being linguistic products, they are different that they cannot be used or evaluated interchangeably terms, yet they are complementary. Basically, discourse cannot be reduced to texts alone: discourse appears as a more comprehensive and abstract term, they “like grammars, have a virtual and not an actual existence” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 193). In this sense, discourse is conceptually wider and thus contains text. On the other hand, discourse is not limited with the written forms “but extends to all symbolic systems and to any form of social practice that by definition involves such systems” (Edkins, 2007, p. 91).

So that it is first of all discourse that has become an important investigation area in social sciences with the above mentioned cultural turn and especially with Foucault’s effect (Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998, p. 80; Dodds and Sidaway, 1994, p. 516), and it has become one of the main notions that critical geopolitics emphasizes at the heart of its assumptions; because discourses are seen as the key enabling tool of social construction of geography. However, the adoption of discursive approaches in geographical studies seems to be adapted from its application in IR.¹⁸

Definition of the word “discourse”, according to Oxford Dictionary (online) (2018) is “Written or spoken communication or debate.” However, when searched for an academic meaning in social science it is seen that the notion became associated with Foucault that

¹⁸ Tuathail & Agnew (1992, p.192-193) notes that, “within the discipline of international relations, there has been a series of attempts to incorporate the notion of discourse into the study of the practices of international politics. Dalby and Tuathail have attempted to extend the concept into political geography.”

both dictionaries of sociology, Penguin and Sage (2006), refers Foucault in their definitions, while a third one, Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology (2006) direct the readers to “discourse analysis” item. In the mentioned Penguin Dictionary of Sociology discourse (2006, p. 111) is defined as “a domain of language-use that is unified by common assumptions”. According to this definition discourses are the way of talking and thinking and associated practices about a term or concept, which can be seen to change over centuries.¹⁹

Foucault defines discourse as “Systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, and courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Foucault, 2002, p. 54). But “not simply an account or a story about something or somebody” (Steans, et al., 2010, p. 138). Elements what makes discourse or make a discursive formation designated are, according to Foucault (2002, pp. 41-2) , “a system of dispersion”, a regularity which means “an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformation” between a number of statements. Discursive elements, (objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected to “the rules of formation” which are “conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive division.”

Mills (1997, p. 6) notes that the term discourse cannot be reduced to one meaning because the term itself had a complex history and it is used in different ways by different theorists. She, however, quotes Foucault’s (2002, p. 90) definition which is as follows, to show how to discern the discourse: “Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word “discourse”, I believe I have in fact added to its meanings; treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as individualize group of statements, and sometimes, as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.” In this quote, in addition to the meaning we see what makes discourse a discourse, what its constitutive elements are. “The general domain of all statements” can be interpreted as all utterances or texts having meaning and some effects in the real world, “an individualizable group of statements” can be referred to groups of utterances having a regularity, coherence and a force to them in common somehow, and “regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements” can be interpreted through a focus on “rule

¹⁹ The definition item in the Penguin dictionary gives the example of Foucault’s discursive approach to the concept of “madness”. *Sage Dictionary of Sociology* does not give a direct definition of the term, rather, explains Foucaults’s ideas.

governed nature of discourse” rather than actual utterances/texts (Foucault, 1972, p.80, cited in Mills, p.7). While the first two suggestion is about how can we recognize discourse, the last one seem more about the way discourses operate and what they really mean in the post-structuralist way. By moving especially through this last suggestion discourse is taken as a notion with a constructive power, rather than a tool and vehicle that carries or directly reflects/mirrors thoughts ideas.

In the direction of this suggestion, Tuathail and Agnew (1992, pp. 192-3) defined discourse in their famous work titled as “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy” as follows:

Discourses are best conceptualized as sets of capabilities people have, as sets of socio-cultural resources used by people in the construction of meaning about their world and their activities. It is NOT simply speech or written statements but the rules by which verbal speech and written statements are made meaningful. Discourses enable one to write, speak, listen and act meaningfully. They are a set of capabilities, an ensemble of rules by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear and read and construct it into an organized meaningful whole.

About this function of discourse Tuathail (2002, p. 606) also points out that “Rather than sovereign subjects having discourses, discourses constrain and enable subject positionings” or very shortly “discourses enable.” Phillips and Hardy (2002, p. 2) further notes “Without discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves.” In one sense while the discourses are enablers, texts as one of the basic carriers of discourses are the enablers of discourses.

Discourse, in this sense, is not only constructing social word and social reality. It is also in action in signification of any kind of material reality. For example, Jorgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 9) notes, “(...) the rise in the water level is a material fact. But as soon as people try to ascribe meaning to it, it is no longer outside discourse” for many discursive representations ranging from a meteorological one to the “greenhouse effect” one or to religious view based one can occur. Material reality therefore can have various meanings through various discourses. The crucial point is that the occurrence of different discourses “point to different courses of action”, in other words justify or constructs base for the actions. This means “ascription of meaning in discourses works to constitute and change the world.”

Here is the heart of the point that critical geopolitics expresses by emphasizing the role of discourse in classical understanding: Classical geopolitics, its interpretation of geography and the meaning it gave to the spatial world can suggest a course of action but not unavoidable certain types of actions. In other words, building upon “objective geographical facts” bring policy choices and preferences although the “political” aspect in it is covered by the claim of objectivity and inevitability. Lene Hansen also holds a similar position. She (2006, pp. 19-20) notes that “To adopt a discursive approach to foreign policy is therefore not, as is sometimes claimed, to hold that materiality does not matter or to say that the law of gravity is just an idea”, but rather, to hold that for example mathematics and physics is also a discourse, a positivist one, that differently constructed the meaning than the previous ones that articulated the meaning in a religious and philosophical discourse. In other words “There is no ‘extra-discursive’ materiality” but it is not to say that the material facts have no importance or do not exist, but rather that they are “discursively mediated” (Ibid., p.22). In the realm of foreign policy, too, material facts are “produced by and inserted into foreign policy discourses” (Ibid., p.28). So that while the rationalist view suggest that issues such as “security” requires a logic of material factors, poststructuralism contends that “there is no extra-discursive realm from which material, objective facts assert themselves.” That is, “problems or facts” become questions of security, when they are “successfully constructed as such within political discourse”. Without denying the importance of security, therefore, “one should understand its discursive and historic specificity.” (Ibid., p.29-30)

Once such a relation between discourses and realities are defined, the critical approach suggests the need for deciphering the character of this relation and the way of construction by “deconstruction”. Hence in critical geopolitics, understanding geopolitics as text or discourse brings in the concept of deconstruction which is a particular practice lead by Derrida for reading texts (Müller, 2013, p. 51). Here, the possibility of more than one representation of the same reality that is previously constructed in a certain way in texts, brings a requirement of those texts to be subjected to deconstruction and that is the task of critical geopolitics (Ibid., p.52). So that deconstruction is a key concept to understand the scope of critical geopolitics and discourse analysis.

A definition of deconstruction is difficult considering the term is philosophically questions and challenging any conceptual constructions of such as “x is y”, including

definitions. Because according to Derrida (1981, p.24, cited in Vinod and Deshpande, 2013, p. 38); deconstruction transforms concepts “to displace them, to turn them against their presuppositions and to reinscribe them.”

Therefore deconstruction deals with the way something constructed in text. Vinod and Deshpande (2013, p. 43) puts it as follows:

Deconstructionism reveals the unstable nature of the texts by showing the meaning of the words changes. Not only the texts, but also the concepts, ideas, theories and perceptions can be deconstructed. Deconstruction is not destruction, but it is a process of reaching the right meaning if at all such thing exists. Many have followed this approach of Derrida. Edward said deconstructed *oreintalism*, the way Westerners constructed the “orient”, by essentialising the qualities in the orient.

One field that Tuathail adopts a an deconstructionist approach by noting that he uses Derrida’s understanding of “meaning” as “an unstable and shifting nucleus” rather than “a stable atom, a dense core or essence” is the term of “geopolitics” and the question of “what is (critical) geopolitics?” along with the concepts of geography and maps. Tuathail notes that these concepts are not as simple as they are made out (Tuathail, 1994a, p. 526). He notes by referring that “how meaning is never totally mapped” yet acknowledges the existence of the paradox of deconstructionism: that is, it “makes meaning by challenging meaning, it writes to question writing, and maps to render maps problematic.” Therefore, “the task of the critical theorist is (...) to write over that which is reputedly already written and disrupt the legibility of maps, the techniques of observation which make them possible.” (Ibid., pp. 530-1) That is why texts are essential for the research of critical geopolitics.

Discourse when it is a policy discourse, too, reflects this interwoven character. Policy discourse relies upon “particular constructions of problems and subjectivities, but that it is also through discourse that these problems and subjectivities are constructed in the first place” (Hansen, 2006, p. 15). Therefore, for example, identities are articulated as the reason of policies to be enacted, “but they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product.” (Ibid., p.19)

Similarly it is through discourse that geopolitics becomes a practice that would allow and justify actions: discourse is the basis of social construction of geopolitical realities while it relies upon and create those realities simultaneously. This construction relates to power-knowledge integration which is another conceptual expression in critical geopolitics. As Tuathail and Agnew (1992, p. 192) notes, “geography is a social and historical discourse

which is always intimately bound up with questions of politics and ideology” and “geography as a discourse is a form of power/knowledge itself.”

Because, according to Sharp (1993, p. 492), “Strategies of power always require the use of space and, thus, the use of discourses to create particular spatial images, primarily of territory and boundaries in statecraft.” In other words, the use of space means the use of discourse to create that space. By going deep on the notion of discourse, critical geopolitics tries to “deconstruct, unravel and expose discourses in order to lay bare the schemes of power operating beneath them” (Müller, 2008, p. 325). Hence the basic purpose of the research under critical geopolitics is to deconstruct hegemonic discourses of power and space. By the way, Tuathail and Agnew (1992, p. 202) avoids to use “geopolitical discourse” term due to the very suggestion that geopolitics is discourse itself and they prefer the term “geopolitical reasoning” instead to “describe the spatialization of international politics that results from the employment of discourses in foreign-policy practice.” Agnew and Corbridge on the other hand notes, in *Mastering Space* (1995, pp. 46-7), use the term geopolitical discourse to refer to how the geography of the international political economy has been “written and read”: written means “the way geographical representations are incorporated into the practices of political élites” and read means “the ways in which these representations are communicated.”

As answer to the argument of geopolitics cannot be reduced to discourse because it is actually practice, Tuathail and Agnew (1992, pp. 192-3) contend that practices such as “building up of a navy or the decision to invade a foreign country”, despite they are certainly geopolitical, “is made meaningful and justified” only through discourse. Whether discourse is a manifestation of thought prior- or giving rise-to practice or is synonymous with ideology is a question Agnew and Corbridge ask. They suggest that (1995, p. 47):

(...) modes of representation are implicit in practice but are subject to revision as practice changes. Spatial practices and representations of space are dialectically interwoven. In other words, the spatial conditions of material life are shaped through their representations as certainly as representations are shaped by the spatial contours of material life. Another way of putting this would be to say that a discourse is equivalent to a theory about how the world works assumed implicitly in practice by a politician, writer, academic or ‘ordinary person’. Even when actors deny they subscribe to a given discourse, careful textual analysis can reveal persisting themes, tropes and a linking genealogy that provides evidence of a discourse that both enables and constrains their practice.

The emphasis of critical geopolitics on discourse takes the focus unavoidably to discursive productions which are basically texts, and speeches especially in the case of practical geopolitics which will be explained below. Because the existence of discourses is inferred from their realizations in activities, texts and speeches (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 193). Texts, in other words, textuality of geopolitics, is essential. Tuathail (1996,1994) indicates this importance with the term “geo-graphing” (earth-writing) to emphasizing the writing process of geography which is taken for granted. Barnes and Duncan (2013, p. 1) makes a similar point by noting that writing is what geography literally means though it is usually not considered, since even the very root meaning of the word “geography” is earth writing “from the Greek *geo*, meaning ‘earth’, and *graphien*, meaning to ‘write’.

A question arises from focusing on discourses and texts is the difference or relation between them. Müller (2013, p. 54) explains it as follows: “Perhaps the most obvious distinction between the two concepts is that discourse connects texts to politics. It says something about the social effects of texts and therefore is always more than text.”

In this sense discourse refers to “the process of social interaction of which a text is just a part.” (Huisman, 1991, p. 30). Here we can repeat what we note in the beginning of this section. Although discourse and text are the very closely set basic concepts in critical geopolitics research, they cannot be used or evaluated interchangeably terms, yet they are complementary. Basically, discourse cannot be reduced to texts alone. While text is the material discourse is the intended meaning in that material. Thus discourse can be a more comprehensive and abstract term, they “like grammars, have a virtual and not an actual existence” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 193). In this sense, discourse, by being conceptually wider, contains text. Yet, text is the existence source of discourse and for this reason it is at the central focus.

Critical geopolitics is based on the suggestion of “there is no outside text” of Derrida which means world politics can be understood through texts, and assumes there is no understanding or reality independent from language. In other words, Barnes and Duncan notes (2013, p. 2) “there is no pre-interpreted reality that writing reflects.”, that is, in critical geopolitics text constructs and enables geopolitics. Following Derrida and deconstructionist perspective Tuathail, as noted above, emphasizes the shifting rather than the stable-essentialised character of meaning.

The emphasis of poststructuralism and critical geopolitics on philosophy and texts brings a questioning of research on IR which is about the understanding the “real world”, however, Hansen notes (2006, p. 5), even with a narrow definition, “post-structuralist analysis has a research program that speaks directly to the conduct of foreign policy” since it suggests that these “policies are dependent upon representations of the threat, country, security problem, or crisis they seek to address.” For example in case of identity, as one of the very basic concept of IR, this means that representations/discourses of identity “place foreign policy issues within a particular interpretative optic, one with consequences for which foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate response.” (Ibid.) Barnes and Duncan (2013, pp. 2-3) answers the question “what do the texts represent”, if not the reality, as “previous texts” since “meaning is produced from text to text” rather than “between text and world.” This takes us to the concept of intertextuality which is defined by the coiner of the term, Julia Kristeva (1980, p. 36) as “a permutation of texts (..) in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another.” In other words that “texts are constituted from other already produced texts and from potentially diverse text types (genres, discourses)” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 2). The meaning of a text “is always a product of other readings and interpretations” rather than being given by the text itself (Hansen, 2006, p. 49).

The importance of the concept and approach of intertextuality thus comes from its help to explain the constitutive role of text in a process that contains the previous texts as reference in meaning creation. This process is the basis to discern a discourse and thus to make discourse analysis. James Paul Gee (2005, p. 55) explains it process as follows:

Any text (oral or written) is infected with the meanings (at least, as potential) of all the other texts in which its words have comported. Studying the meaning potential of texts, in this sense, is an important part of discourse analysis. Such potential situated meanings can have effects even when they are not fully activated by producers and interpreters.

The most essential thing about intertextuality is that the potential gap or difference between the text in question and the text that is referred. Therefore, while the new texts rely upon the older, it “produces new meaning: references never reproduce the originals in a manner which is fully identical, but weave them into the present context and argument” (Hansen, 2006, p. 6) .

It is not always between the texts but also between the concepts that such a process is performed in discourse. It is called as “conceptual intertextuality” as Hansen. Conceptual

intertextuality operates in two ways; first is the articulation of concepts such as “the Balkans”, “security”, and “democracy” relying upon “implicit references to a larger body of earlier texts on the same subject”. The second way that conceptual intertextuality take place is “through programmatic catchphrases, such as Huntington’s ‘clash of civilization,’ which became a common reference in Western politics and journalism even though Huntington might not always be explicitly quoted.” (Ibid., p.51)

Thus, either by direct quotations from other texts or by referring to key concepts and catchphrases intertextuality help to build arguments. (Ibid., p.6)

Text and discourse therefore becomes the very basis of critical geopolitics for its main assumption is on the constructive role of discourse and its main component: text. By making discourse analysis critical geopolitics aims to problematize and displace objectivized/validated meaning in geopolitics and foreign policy.

In addition to the notion of discourse terms such as “geopolitical storylines”, “geopolitical imaginations”, “geopolitical scripts”, “geopolitical narratives”, “geopolitical visions” and “geopolitical fantasies” are used in the critical geopolitical studies whose difference from each other is quite blurred (Müller, 2008, p. 323) but finally aimed at uncovering the discursive structure.

1.2.2. Contextuality: The Undefinable Core of Discourse

Regarding the enabling and transforming role of the discourse, one key concept is very important for researching within critical geopolitics. It is the “context”, contextuality of geopolitics and discourse. Derrida’s own words on (impossible) definition of deconstruction points to the essentiality of context for the ones trying to approach from Derrida’s (1988, p.136) point of view:

One of the definitions of what is called deconstruction would be the effort to take this limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest possible and broadest attention possible to context, and thus to the incessant movement of recontextualisation. The phrase which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of deconstruction (“there is nothing outside the text” [il n’y a pas de hors-texte]), means nothing else: there is nothing outside context.

Doel (2005, p. 248), after quoting the above passage from Derrida adds that “Context is what deconstructs. This is why deconstruction is an event.” So if there would be understanding of deconstructing fixed realities and meaning the focus then must be turned

to the contextuality of phenomenon, metaphors, concepts, names, etc. but necessarily the meanings of them placed in discourses. Because context is seen as the basic source of what is said and written.

If context is at the heart of post-structuralist type of research it is necessary to see what is meant by context. In the basic sense, the context is about the environment and the conditions that a text, an adopted discourse, notion or concept is born within. In other words context is the sum of situational factors which can be classified as historical, social economic, geographic. Foucault (2002, p. xiv) expresses context as “the point of view of the rules”, that allow the existence of a discourse- not of the individuals who are speaking, nor of the formal structures of what they are saying. Context is too much related to change, as Goertz (1995, p. 29) takes “definition of context as changing meaning” so that trying to define context may cause “precisely the kind of rigidity that thinking contextually tries to avoid.” So that, context is not a pure original point, which would be in contradiction with post-structural and critical thinking, it is not “an objective space/time coordinate, or a final resting place.” , it is an open structure (Tuathail, 1996, p.56):

Derrida (1988, pp. 152-3) puts it as follows: “...nothing exists outside context, as I have often said, but also that the limit of the frame or the border of the context always entails a clause of non-closure. The outside penetrates and thus determines the inside”. In other words “meaning is context bound, but context is boundless” (Culler, 1983, p. 123). Therefore “there is nothing outside the text” and “nothing exists outside a context” are two complementary suggestions that remind the “text” in “context” “without dissolving the specificity of either” (Tuathail, 1996, pp. 56-7).

Context is not something that is reflecting the ideas of the holder of a discourse. Agnew and Corbridge notes that “What is said or written by political élites comes about as a result of the unconscious adoption of rules of living, thinking and speaking that are implicit in the texts, speeches or documents that are produced” (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995, p. 47). Therefore a discourse emerges not from the individuals or institutions but from the context that makes these actors to form a discourse. That is why “discourses are never static but are constantly mutating and being modified by human practice” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 193) in order to be in harmony with the context which are never static, too.

Hence to focus on the discourse in critical geopolitics is to focus on the context that enable a discourse which enables an action/practice: “the study of geopolitics in discursive terms, therefore, is the study of the socio-cultural resources and rules by which geographies of international politics get written.” (Ibid.) So that critical geopolitics is not only dealing with geopolitical texts, it is also making connections with historical, geographical, sociological, political, technological contexts “within which these texts arise and gain social meaning and persuasive force.” (Tuathail, 1996, p. 57) It means that texts are embedded in their context of production in the social world and discourse analysis involves analyzing the relationship between texts, processes, and social conditions (Fairclough, 1989, p. 26).

Therefore, discourse analysis is critically deciphering the texts -written, spoken, drawn- in the framework of the context that they are produced and in anticipation of a specific political agenda; discourse is handled in the social, historical and political context rather than merely being an accumulation of texts effecting each other (Yeşiltaş, 2012, p. 113).

1.2.3. Practical Geopolitics and Discourse Analysis

The essential place of discourse and text bring about questions of research in critical geopolitics and post structuralism. To make research in this field, or with this point of view, requires dealing with texts which needs a categorization according to the research question mind. The basic categorization in critical geopolitics is done by Tuathail and Dalby (See Figure 3), while another model with a poststructural look –having many common points Tuathail and Dalby – is offered by Hansen (See Table 6).

If we first look at Tuathail and Dalby (1998, pp. 4-5), it is seen that they categorize geopolitics according to its (discursive) activity in three realms: the first category is “formal geopolitics” which is associated with the strategic community performing mainly academic activity within a state or across a group of states, as it is “the spatializing practices of strategic thinkers and public intellectuals who set themselves up as authorities on the totality of the world political map” (Tuathail, 1996, p. 46). Hence, it is the activity of so-called intellectuals of statecraft by producing and circulating geopolitical theories and perspectives (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008, p. 441). In the case of formal geopolitics, the discursive product is mainly texts, books, i.e. the written material produced by thinkers, intellectuals, scholars. In this sense, it can be named as “geopolitical thought”

or “geopolitical tradition” to be shaped by intellectuals in particular places and contexts (Tuathail, 1999, pp. 109-10).

The second category of Tuathail and Dalby (1998, p. 4) is “practical geopolitics” associated with state leaders and the foreign policy bureaucracy, which means “the spatializing practices of practitioners of statecraft such as statespersons, politicians, and military commanders” (Tuathail, 1996, p. 46). It refers to “the geographical vocabularies used by political leaders in addresses to help their citizens make sense of the world” (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008, p. 441) in the everyday practice of foreign policy and it points to the way common or traditional “geographical understandings and perceptions enframe foreign policy conceptualization and decision making” (Tuathail, 1999, p. 110). Its discursive products are therefore usually speeches of political elites/leaders, in addition to the written material if any produced by that statecraft.

The third category is “popular geopolitics” is associated with the products of transnational popular culture, whether they be mass-market magazines-news magazines, novels or movies-the visual media, radio, and the internet” (Tuathail and Dalby, 1998, p. 4; Dittmer and Dodds, 2008, p. 441), hence it is seen in the products of agents of geopolitics “outside the realm of the state” such as writers in popular magazines, newspaper reporters, cartoonists, film directors, and social activists of various kinds (Kuus, 2010) who produce the popular culture.




Figure 1.1: A Critical Theory of Geopolitics as a Set of Representational Practices

(Tuathail and Dalby, 1998, p. 5)

In his 1999 article Tuathail (1999, p. 110) also uses a fourth category -“structural geopolitics”- involves the study of the structural processes and tendencies (such as globalization, informationalization and risks related to techno-scientific civilization) that condition how all states practice foreign policy. However, general tendency among the studies that take critical geopolitics approach has been to move over the first three category, by choosing one to conduct a discourse analysis within that category.

Hansen (2006) on the other hand, within the “poststructural discourse analysis” method and by declaring itself to be closer to the works of Foucault, Derrida, and Kristeva, and Laclau and Mouffe, makes a similar classification of research model at some points. One difference of Hansen maybe her emphasis to intertextuality that she names these models as “intertextual research models” in which she categorizes discourses which have their intertextuality within their own category but also between categories which would allow to grasp the discourse in a wider web.

Hansen’s first model (model 1: Official Discourse) is based in official foreign policy discourse, means that of political leaders with official authority by identifying “the texts produced by these actors, including speeches, political debates, interviews, articles, and

books, as well as the texts which have had an intertextual influence on their discourse.” Similar to the “practical geopolitics” of critical geopolitics, the goals of a model 1 are “to carefully investigate the constructions of identity within official discourse, to analyze the way in which intertextual links stabilize this discourse, and to examine how official discourse encounters criticism.” (Hansen, 2006, pp. 53-4).

The second intertextual research model (Model 2: Wider Foreign Policy Debate) deals with the political oppositional parties, the media, and corporate institutions and thus broadens the analytical scope beyond official discourse. (Ibid., p.54)

Model 3 of Lene Hansen consists of model 3A and 3B. Model 3A: Cultural Representations as being very similar to “popular geopolitics” of critical geopolitics”, works on the discourse in the media products such as films, photography, television, computer games, travel writing; and Model 3B: Marginal Political discourses of NGOs, academics, social movements (Ibid., p.55). In Table 1.5, a summary explanation of Hansen’s model is given as originally done by her.

Table 1.5: Lene Hansen’s Intertextual Research Models
(2006, p. 57)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3A</i>	<i>Model 3B</i>
Analytical focus	Official discourse: Heads of states Governments Senior civil servants High ranked military Heads of international institutions Official statements by international institutions	Wider foreign policy debate: Political opposition The media Corporate institutions	Cultural representations: Popular culture High culture	Marginal political discourses: Social movements Illegal associations Academics NGOs
Object of analysis	Official texts Direct and secondary intertextual links Supportive texts Critical texts	Political texts Parliamentary debates Speeches, statements Media texts Editorials Field reporting Opinion—debate Corporate institutions Public campaigns Recurring intertextual link	Film, fiction, television, computer games, photography, comics, music, poetry, painting, architecture, travel writing, autobiography	Marginal newspapers, websites, books, pamphlets Academic analysis
Goal of analysis	The stabilization of official discourse through intertextual links The response of official discourse to critical discourses	The hegemony of official discourse The likely transformation of official discourse The internal stability of media discourses	Sedimentation or reproduction of identities in cultural representations	Resistance in non-democratic regimes Dissent in cases of models 1 and 2 hegemony Academic debates

Apart from the uncommon points of the two research schemes, the basic common point or aim of both Hansen's models and Tuathail and Dalby's classifications is that they work on the identification of the way texts construct reality in foreign policy. Hansen's Model 1 for official discourse, and Tuathail and Dalby's "practical geopolitics" are highly closed both in terms of the material, scope and goal of analysis.

In practical geopolitics field, it is, as noted, the speeches as well as official reports and publications of the government, books/articles of leaders who are active in policy making in the period under research. Among these, speeches of leaders (president, prime minister, minister, etc.) are quite important because they present "us a means of recovering the self-understandings of influential actors in world politics" and "the social construction of worlds and the role of geographical knowledge in that social construction" (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 191).

The leader speeches or official documents are not the discourse themselves alone, as noted that discourse cannot be reduced to texts. Because, texts cannot carry "self-referential meaning, but the recorded traces of discourse activity." According to Angermüller's definition, discourse analysis is to investigate the "link between text and its context" (Angelmüller, 2001, p.8, cited in Müller, 2011).

The case of analyzing official/practical discourse, in this sense, provides a new way of studying politics, foreign policy in particular, which goes beyond to the traditional methods of research and analysis (Hansen, 2006, p. 53). Because, Agnew and Corbridge (1995, p. 48) notes that "political élites" who are specialized in military and foreign policy problem solving are also "involved in mobilizing public opinion behind particular strategies and their associated geographical representations." This brings the conclusion that:

(...) discourse is not simply speech, texts or writing but the rules by which these forms are effected. The presence of rules is inferred from the structure, organization and content of texts and speeches. A discourse is not set for all time but adapts to practice. From this point of view geopolitical discourse signifies the rules and conceptual resources that political élites use in particular historical contexts to 'spatialize' the international political economy into places, peoples and disputes.

1.2.4. Making Choices in Discourse Analysis

One point about discourse research in critical geopolitics is that there is not a common or a set of defined methodology about how the research on discourse would be conducted (Müller, 2013, p. 58).

However, to conduct a research through discourse analysis, there is finally and at least a need to make some choices that would define the scope and draw the framework of the study in question. While whether it is a research on practical/official, formal or popular geopolitics or all is a basic choice, the actor of discourse, the subject/theme of the discourse are the other pillars of such kind of research. Hansen names these pillars as intertextual models (as mentioned above in Introduction), number of selves, temporal perspective and number of events. (See Figure 1)

In this dissertation the discourse of a Single Self, Turkey, will be analyzed through the official discourse on geographical roles on energy transportation with a historical development perspective to trace the evolution of discourse.

Historical perspective matches to the Derridian idea, and in Foucault's terms a genealogy²⁰, that the change in the meaning of a same concept or notion depending on the context, meaning depends on context. Hence the historical approach provides "detailed insights into the structures of present national and civilizational identities, hence show how deeply rooted particular aspects of current identities are. Historical studies have a further genealogical and critical potential in that they trace how previously important representations have been silenced and written out of the discourse of the present" (Hansen, 2006, p. 70). On the other hand they show how later produced meanings becomes valid for older representations (Ibid., pp. 191-2). The historical approach hence show the key position of context in text by illustrating the change from the beginning to the end and questioning of fixation of reality. While the "social context in which the piece was written, the institutional setting (audience, intellectual tradition, school of thought), the genre of which it is a part (textbook, scholarly article, newspaper piece), the political

²⁰ Genealogy "traces the formation of a concept, its evolution, and particular use in the present" (Hansen, 2006, p. 188) . Foucault explains genealogy as follows: "One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy) that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either : transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness 1 throughout the course of history. (Foucault, 2002, p. 204)

position that sustains the authority of the author (colonial administrator, Third World academic, Western journalist)” are key factors to consider for a discursive approach, “the historical context (..) makes all the above factors contingent on particular times and places”. (Barnes and Duncan, 2013, p. 3). Discourse analysis is therefore performed through the suggestions, as Barnes and Duncan (Ibid., p.4) notes, that; “First, the representations are not a mirror copy of some external reality. (..) Second, to understand each representations fully we must know something about the context of its authors and audience.(...) Finally, in each of these representations examined one needs to explore the tropes employed-that is the style used to persuade the reader.”

Agnew and Corbridge (1995, pp. 48-9) attracts attention to four points on geopolitical discourse and political élites. First, geopolitical discourse is not simply identifying spaces or specific geographical influences upon a specific foreign-policy situation. “To identify and name a place is to trigger a series of narratives, subjects and understandings” as in the case of naming somewhere ‘Islamic’ or ‘Western’ means “not only to name it, but also to brand it in terms of its politics and the type of foreign policy its ‘nature’ demands.” Second, “practical geopolitical reasoning relies on common-sense narratives and distinctions” (such as modern or backward, Western or non-Western, civilized or barbarian, and democratic or despotic dichotomies) rather than formal models. Third, geopolitical discourse is reductive and “operates through the active simplification of the complex reality of places in favour of controllable geopolitical abstractions” in a way of allowing specific practices and actions. Fourth, “not all political élites have equal influence over how global political-economic space is represented. Those in authority in the Great Powers or within the hegemonic state (if there is one) have the power to constitute the dominant geopolitical discourse. This happens not only through their own practice but also through the active adoption of the dominant geopolitical discourse by both allies and enemies.”

Hansen (2006, pp. 47-8) also gives some methodological guidelines for conducting a discourse analysis. First, reading of a large number of texts from a wide variety of sources, media, and genres is important for it allows a detailed study of the articulations of identity and policy within these materials. In the analysis of a set of texts “the signs most frequently articulated, the relationship between Self and Other, the policy that is coupled thereto, and the articulations of spatial, temporal, and ethical identity” should be searched.

Second, there should be found “explicit articulations of key representations of identity” which are “geographical identities, historical analogies, striking metaphors, or political concepts” though it is impossible to give a definite list of potential representations. Third, conceptual histories of the representations must be added to not only compare with past discourses, but also “to conduct a genealogical reading which traces the constitution of the present concept back in history”



CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LOCATING TURKEY IN THE POST-COLD WAR GEOGRAPHY

2.1. 1980S: SIGNS OF TRANSFORMATION IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

While the collapse of USSR is a key context changer in terms of transition from the Cold War context to post-Cold War bloc-free context in international politics, changes in the international political, geopolitical, economic settings can start to be seen from 1980s. The age of neoliberalism which emphasized the problems of social state and the necessity of withdrawal of state from economic and social spheres began to spread rapidly together with the acceleration of globalization that neoliberalism and globalization was perceived as almost the same phenomenon. Since the early 1980s, “Neoliberalism has generally prevailed as the reigning policy discourse for globalization” and “Most governments – including in particular those of the major states – have adopted a neoliberalist orientation toward globalization” (Scholte, 2005, p. 39). So, although 1980s began with a revived Cold War, 1980s has been the beginning of a transformation through free market economy with a change in the character of international relations.

In line with the trends, Turkey’s foreign policy has started to evolve since 1980s with a neoliberal turn that was represented by the “January 24 Measures” and it consequently continued the gradual opening up of the economy to the outside world (Nas, 2010, p. 119).

“1980 January 24 Measures” aiming at an outward oriented growth model in the economy and restoring the worsened problems that emerged in the late 1970's had made radical changes in the economic realm (Yücel, 2009, p. 36). With the Measures it was switched in the economic policy from “an inward looking import substitution model, to an outward-looking strategy emphasizing export led growth” (Öniş, 1999, p. 130). The measures foresaw the limitation of state’s role in the economy, growth of private sector, the operation of free market rules, increasing export with outward looking economy approach

and attracting foreign investment (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2009, cited in Ertosun, 2014, p. 296).²¹

Turgut Özal, the then undersecretary of Prime Minister was the architect of the January 24 Measures and his mission continued as the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the economy for the implementation of the measures under military governance. After transition to democracy government policies of 1983-1993 period were shaped overwhelmingly by Turgut Özal as Prime Minister between 1983-1989 and President between 1989-1993. His policies went in line with the January 24 Measures. This period was characterized by an understanding of making politics according to economic priorities in addition to an active, multifaceted policy that had an attitude of challenging the status quo and taking risks (Ertosun, 2014, p. 291). So the economic transformation of Turkey went hand in hand with political (domestic and foreign) transformation and regional relations. Moreover, the priority that is given to economy became the ideology of the state itself which also brought a multifaceted foreign policy that was shaped by the new economic mentality rather than previous motivations such as decreasing the international loneliness and covering foreign trade gap (Balçı, 2013, pp. 157-8).

It can be suggested that 1980s economic transformation paved the way in the increase of energy demand in Turkey. Depending on the population and industrialization, energy consumption in Turkey, has entered into a rapid growth period especially after 1980 as the change in the overall structure of the economy required more energy use (Mucuk and Uysal, 2009, p. 106). It was an important political development that at a date as early as 1984 Turkey decided to diversify the sources by purchasing gas from a state in the “other bloc”, USSR, to meet its energy demand, while many areas of cooperation especially on contracting services and trade with USSR was born in the following periods (Tellal, 2002, p. 163).

In terms of the political and geopolitical transformation in this era Turkey developed its relations with Middle Eastern states, created initiatives such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and actively participated in The Organization of the Islamic Conference (later changed as Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)) in line with its economy based multifaceted foreign policy. Regional openings went hand in hand with deepening relations with USA after the elimination of anti-Americanism of 1960s and 1970s (Balçı,

²¹ For a detailed work on January 24 Measures, see Ulagay (1984).

2013, p. 185), and although the relations with EU locked around some points of disagreement (Erhan and Arat, 2002, pp. 90-2), with official approval for full membership to EU 1987, Özal administration kept the Western ideal alive and concrete.

In this sense, this period was shaped by the discourse of a dual or hybrid identity especially with the help of bridge metaphor. To be a bridge, between the East and the West, has really been a dominant metaphor to express the international function and position of Turkey since 1970s as “a perfect representation of Turkey’s cuspness” (Altunışık, 2014, p. 31). So, it is not surprising to see leaders mention Turkey as a bridge of any value, i.e. peace, culture, religion, nations, goods, etc. In addition to the duality in identity and middleman function, with Özal’s approach in 1980s, a successful bridging role was to imply Turkey’s indispensability both for the West and the East (Bagdonas, 2012, p. 119). Hence, Turkey’s “European country” rhetoric was maintained for European audiences while a liminality discourse which was pointing to role of middleman that Turkey could play the between the Middle East and Europe (or West in general) was adopted in defining Turkey’s identity in Middle East (Yanık 2009, 2011).

It would be after the collapse of USSR that Turkey strongly felt the need to re-describe its geographical position and identity in line with the new context, and to do this, it initially kept some existing discourses such as “Turkey as a bridge” while it also developed new geographical expressions.

2.2. CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

2.2.1. The New Environment

When Kızıl Ordu entered Baku in 1990 and Turkey noted that it was USSR’s internal affairs, it was the last time that Ankara stayed uninterested in the Central Asia and the Caucasus as it did during the history of the Republic of Turkey (Tellal, 2005, p. 51) . With the collapse of the USSR, a new era for Turkey opened. Indeed, the effects of the end of the Cold War on Turkey’s both foreign and domestic policies had been very strong. As Sayarı notes, “Turkey is one of the countries that was most profoundly affected by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union” and by the subsequent transformation of the

political landscape of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus (Sayarı, 2000, p. 163).

Even in the most simplistic look, Turkey found new neighbour states in its inner geography which was now “post” Soviet states. The number of Turkey’s new neighbours hence increased and the half of Turkey’s all neighbors now consisted of states in transition period having historical, ethnic and cultural ties with Turkey (Kut, 2002, p. 7). These developments made radical changes in Turkey’s foreign policy environment, “creating opportunities to expand its role while also posing new risks and challenges” (Sayarı, 2000, p. 169) and made Turkey to distance from its traditional policy of isolationism from regional conflicts and crisis, which derived from “entrusting her security to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership and the United States’ nuclear umbrella” and forced her active participation in regional issues in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, while the western pillar tried to be kept as untouched (Aydm, 2004b, p. 110). Moreover the western pillar was consolidated with the victory of the western neoliberal world order which was to bring changes to domestic political sphere on a direction to market economy and integration to world as the liberal transformation that had already started in 1980s in Turkey showed, as noted above. This new context was creating an urgent requirement of a new definition for Turkey’s position and strategic importance in the international and regional settings.

While Turkey had to face and deal with many internal problems (PKK terrorism, instability derives from coalition governments, economic crisis, etc.) in this period, relations with the European Community (EC)-EU and the Customs Union, relations with Greece, Cyprus issue, the war in the Balkans, the Gulf War and (the effect of embargo on Kirkuk oil pipeline), Middle East peace process, and relations with new republics in the Caucasus and the Central Asia were all the areas that kept their importance in the agenda in 1990s. Hence, “the combined impact of these external and internal developments may have made the difficult task of adjustment to the post-Cold War international system even more challenging for Turkey than for most other countries” (Sayarı, 2000, p. 169).

Relations with new republics in the Caucasus and the Central Asia, i.e. Turkic states was providing a great application area of this new inevitable foreign policy activism in the context of post-Cold War world. Despite Turkey adopted a multifaceted foreign policy approach that tried to utilize from the loosening of Cold War isolationism since 1980s,

the new context brought a quite different ground for foreign policy making. The concept of “Eurasia” started to largely occupy Turkish foreign policy agenda with the independence of these states which Turkey would approach with a policy based on ethnicity, language, culture, religion (Tellal, 2005, p. 51) and with an emotionally loaded enthusiasm. Hence “Eurasia” became a geopolitical concept that Turkey defined the new political geography. In the initial period Eurasia consisted of a Turkic World stretching “from Adriatic to Great Wall of China”, as the motto popularized by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel with his first use in 1992²² described although this wide geographic definition included not only the republics of Central Asia and Caucasus, but also the Turkish minorities living in the Balkans (Erşen, 2013, p. 27).²³

New independent “Turkic states” were providing a special opportunity based on ethnicity to make a regional opening in the post-Cold War political environment. Turkey’s apparent historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic affinities with the newly independent states of Central Asia (plus Azerbaijan) was positioning Turkey as an important actor, as discussed not only within Turkey but also in the West (Aydın, 2004a, p. 1). This advantageous climate was providing Turkey a growing self-confidence to be translated into great activity in the region that Prime Minister Demirel in April 1992 could mention on a possibility of establishing a “Union of Turkic States” together with providing military training to the regional countries, and encouraging the adoption of the Turkish, that is Latin, alphabet for all the Turkic states and building gas and oil pipelines through Turkey to market the Caspian energy resources (Ibid., p.5).

In this sense, a Turkist/nationalist geopolitical approach started to dominate the policies towards the region, however, as a pragmatic instrument of economic, political and cultural assertion, rather than Pan-Turkism (Erşen, 2017, p. 268), in the practical geopolitics discourse. In this context and environment which Russian Federation also emerges as the major rival of Turkey, presenting Turkey as a “model country”, as an actor that represents Western interests or values, to these states by Western actors found its response in Turkey easily with a sense of being a “big brother” and as a requirement of historical legacy (Çelikpala, 2015, p. 123).

²² The concept of "from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" was first mentioned by Henry Kissinger (Kut, 1994, footnote 6).

²³ Sengupta (2014, p.80) notes that while the Balkans were in the Euraisa definition of Turkish leaders, with the development of closer links between the Balkans and the EU, “concept of Eurasia became more associated with the Caucasus and Central Asia” consequently “Turkic World”.

Turkey's policy also included another kind of pragmatism which was supporting Turkey's EU membership debate. Turkey's "special" relations with the Turkic republics would be used as a political leverage in which Turkey was portrayed as "a bridge between Europe and Eurasia through which both the EU and the USA could develop their relations with the newly independent states" (Sengupta, 2014, pp. 81-2). This would be an attitude that kept its existence in also recent Turkish foreign policy in a form of geopolitical leverage vis-à-vis EU, especially deriving from the energy issues.

Indeed, the issue of transportation of energy resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia made an irreversible entrance into the agenda of Turkish governments just after the fall of USSR although Turkey's relations with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) overwhelmed by the political-cultural approach between 1991-1994. Paralelly, classical geopolitical approaches meant Eurasia as the Caspian region in an energy resources context while the region was understood by others as a political term and in a narrow meaning which refers to the Caucasus and Central Asian states after the fall of USSR (Tellal, 2005, p. 55). The classical geopolitical approach increasingly dominated the attitude towards Euraisa and helped to the rise of energy as a top international issue.

It was the "rise of energy" in era's politics in two ways as will be touched up on again in the next section. First, the increasing demand for energy sources, especially the most used/highest energy-dense sources, oil and natural gas which affected Turkey too in terms of interest in meeting its increasing energy demand and re-designing its regional relations, a trend that started in 1980s. Second, the geographical distribution of these resources which was now presenting a very new political situation in terms of the resource owners, demanders/buyers who were especially looking for decreasing energy the dependency on Russia and resource diversification, and the actors that would aim to effect the control of the energy routes. Among these Turkey emerged as a transit country by geography, looking for regional leadership, EU Membership and strong relations with newly independent states. Turkey was additionally seeking to prove its international importance and geographical position in respect to energy distribution that it developed a new discourse that described its geographical role through the new energy routes.²⁴

²⁴ Although the region entered foreign policy agenda of Turkey not basically and solely with the parameter of energy resources Turkey's expectation from its geography to transport the Caspian hydrocarbons has been quite high during 1990s that Turkish leaders with no exception referred to Turkey's geostrategic position to deliver oil and gas as a source of power, influence and leverage. This attitude is manifested in the leaders' discourse which consisted of various metaphors that promotes Turkey's geography hence trying

It can be said that in these early years, limiting Russian activity, including the energy field as major area, in the region was the common target that USA, Europe, Turkey and CIS was united around with their own motives. In this context, Turkey was regarding itself as a potential regional power, and a rival of Russia (Bilgin, 2005, p. 288). This positioning was clearly in line with the Western policies. In addition to political-cultural assertive approach to CIS, energy emerged at the beginning of the 1990s as a topic that emphasized the competitive direction of Turkey-Russia relations and possible pipelines, as reflected in the intertwining of Turkish-Russian relations with global policies and mutual distrust (Çelikpala, 2015, p. 124). For limiting Russian influence, becoming a regional power and pursuing its economic and security interests in the post-Soviet geography Turkey relied on partnership with the West (Kardaş, 2012, p. 84).

2.2.2. Justifying Geographical Exceptionalism and Deciding on Location: Metaphors for Locating Turkey after the Initial Period

Turkey's geographical position has always been a basic and determinant part of identity and security issues in politics. In P.Bilgin's words (2012p, p. 151), "references to geopolitical assumptions and language have never been far from central to Turkey's security imaginary." Referring to Turkey's "unique" history and geography has therefore been a way of creating a claim to exceptionalism (Yanık, 2011, p. 83).

An example to a so widespread usage is representing Turkey by the metaphor of bridge as touched upon above. "Bridge" metaphor is used since 1970s to express Turkey's mixed, hybrid, exceptional position between the East and the West, as "a perfect representation of Turkey's cuspness" justifying Turkey's relations with both without belonging neither (Altunışık, 2014, p. 31). The expression of Turkey's bridging role, implying Turkey's indispensability both for the West and the East, continued in 1980s as seen in the languages of not only Turgut Özal but of Kenan Evren too (Bagdonas, 2012, p. 119). Yet, Turkey's exceptional geography during the Cold War was based on its role of "bastion" or a "bulwark," on the southern flank of NATO, while this description lost its validity with the end of Cold War and foreign policy elite chose to capitalize on

to form a context in which pipelines lead to Turkey in the directions of East-West, later North-South. However the developed concepts and metaphors also had gained new meanings depending on the factors on play in specific periods.

Turkey's geographical "exceptionalism in respect its to the East, especially with the Turkic Republics" (Yanık, 2009, p. 536). According to Altunışık (2014, p. 33), in the aftermath of the demise of the Cold War Turgut Özal's expressions on Turkey's multiple identity were the first example of an emerging discourse among the political actors in Turkey. In this context, a proactive, opportunity-focused foreign policy which foresees to be also at peace with the Ottoman past of Turkey and multi-ethnic and Islamic identity should have been the features of new foreign policy that was required as a response to the demise of bipolarity and increasing influence of globalization. Altunışık adds that after Özal these views were also voiced by Ismail Cem but it was under the JDP governments that such views really came to prominence.

The post-Cold War period was shaped by the discourse of a dual or hybrid identity especially with the help of bridge metaphor as an already existing handy metaphor. Yanık notes that after portraying Turkey also as a "gate" to Eurasia- a "gate" between East and West- simultaneously with the "bridge" metaphor in late 1994 and early 1995, the Turkish foreign policy elite settled on the "bridge" metaphor (Yanık, 2009, pp. 536-7). On the other hand energy field was also contributing to Turkey's bridgeness in the new international context that even in 1993 the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Veysel Atasoy was noting in a speech at the Parliament in December 1993 that Turkey is an energy bridge between energy rich countries and consumer countries (Atasoy, 1993, p. 82). So, the indispensability and uniqueness emphasis, together with the new "model country" presentation, continued well into the 1990s not only in cultural and political arena. Turkey found a great opportunity to apply its promotion of geography and a concrete functionality in regional energy projects. This has gradually been one of the basic ground to talk on the importance of Turkey's geographical position. Therefore, apart from implying cultural, religious, ethnic, regional spheres, bridging the energy demanders especially Europe and the owners –Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, Middle East, has been a critical issue of Turkish foreign policy.

In addition to the bridge role, "center of Eurasia" concept was to be used by politicians increasingly. Since the space that Turkey's foreign policy concentrated on post-Cold War world is coined as Eurasia, Turkey's location in this geographical space has been very much related with where is Turkey in Eurasia. So, the geopolitical significance of Eurasia is attributed only "when Turkey is imagined as its focus or leader" and "Turkey as the

real centre of Eurasia.” (Erşen, 2017, p. 276). Demirel (2009d, p. 77), in a speech at TGNA was noting that it is enough to look at the map to see the central position of Turkey in Eurasia such as Hikmet Çetin mentioning Eurasia as the center of focus of the world’s political and economic balances and Black Sea at the heart of this region in which Turkey was leading an initiative of cooperation (Çetin, 1992, p. 204) . This kind of expressions on “centrality” of Turkey was to increase from mid 1990s through the end of the 1990s. This increase can be seen for example in the transition period from Çiller Governments to Erbakan Government²⁵ not only because of the difference between the ideologies of these leaders but also stemming from the regional context. On the European side of the relations, after the enthusiasm of concluding the Customs Union in 1995, EU-Turkey relations was experiencing a negative momentum especially with the effect of crisis between Turkey and Greece in 1996 and the 1997 Luxembourg Summit in which Turkey was not declared as candidate country. A turn in the relations was to come with the approval of Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 Helsinki Summit which would mark the beginning of the deeper Europeanization process of Turkey, yet the EU membership ideal has kept its special place in foreign policy during 1990s. On the other hand, however, a new sort of Eurasianism - a leftist, anti-imperialist and Kemalist interpretation (Erşen, 2013, pp. 31-2; Çelikpala, 2015, p. 127) - with slightly different form the previously Turkist/nationalist and anti-Russian type started to be salient until early 2000s. In the official/practical geopolitics, not an anti-Westernism but a gradual change towards cooperative relations with Russia and a more balanced discourse of foreign policy on the Turkic states would be adopted²⁶ try to shape the context where Turkey’s geography is at the center again. The distancing of the both Turkey and Russia (Çelikpala, 2015, pp. 126-7) from the West in these days and heading towards the idea of close political and economic cooperation had been effective in this transformation that found its manifestation in the discourse of –Eurasianism/being Eurasian- in both sides (Ibid., p.127).

The transformation has also some other factors at the background even before the years 1996-1997. The failure of finding the expected result from the Caucasus and Central Asia

²⁵ The three month government of Mesut Yılmaz between April-June 1996 is not included to the analysis of the texts.

²⁶ Erşen (2017, p.270-273) states formal geopolitics was even in a form of an anti-Western, Kemalist-socialist and pro-Russian discourse of Eurasianism.

policy of Turkey made to revise its previous policy which was to rely on West for a new order in the post-Cold War period contrary to Russia willing to maintain the old order in a new form (Ibid., p.125). With fall of the Turkish model (Bal, 2000) and as Russia started to implement its “Near Abroad” policy²⁷ by which it was showing that it was seeing post-Soviet geography as its sphere of influence, Turkey’s approach to the relations with both Russia and post-Soviet Turkic states increasingly transformed into a geo-economic one (Erşen, 2013, p. 30) from the previous cultural-historical approach. Therefore, the high expectations of both Turkey and new Turkic states have been replaced by “a more subdued, pragmatic approach with primary emphasis on relations based on mutual economic benefits.” (Öniş, 2001, p. 68). Turkey turned its focus more intensively on to attracting the attention to its geographical position as a convenient and reliable transit route for Caspian and Central Asian energy resources by proposing the construction of pipelines on its territory. Thus, Demirel’s “Eurasian Project” i.e. the bid for linking Europe with Asia through various oil and natural gas pipelines to be built via Turkey, was making Turkey to play a new geo-economic role (Erşen, 2013, p. 30).

On the other hand, Turkey's increasing need to natural gas as the main source of energy and emergence of Russia as the leading reliable partner to meet this demand, was requiring a change in the policy towards cooperation with Russia (Çelikpala, 2015, p. 124). The most concrete indicator in this sense has been the 1997 Blue Stream Gas Pipeline Agreement and the subsequent Turkey-Russia rapprochement. This also marked the beginning of a period that energy and economic considerations has a determining effect in foreign policy choices. Therefore the relative divergence of energy and foreign policy area in the 1991-1994 period was becoming more converged both in terms of transit roles and Turkey’s own energy needs and this was marking the beginning of a long process of foreign and energy policy interplay.

²⁷ Bohuslav Litera (1994, p.45) noted that “The Russian term "blizhneye zarubyezhe" ("near abroad") is used to refer to those states neighbouring the Russian Federation which, until its collapse, formed part of the Soviet Union—as "Union Republics". From the geo-political point of view it corresponds to the borders of the former Soviet Union. Today it covers the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States and also those countries which, though formerly in the U.S.S.R., did not join the CIS: i.e. the Baltic states. From the position adopted by the representatives of official Russian foreign policy it follows that Russia's attitude to this "near abroad" has seen a relatively pronounced and officially declared shift, especially after the October events and the elections in December 1993. Everything that Russia was doing up until then in a more or less concealed manner is now admitted officially. It is evident that Russia has begun to restore and strengthen its dominant influence on the territory of the entire former Soviet Union”.

In this period “center” or center-like metaphors, including usages in the energy field such as energy terminal, as explained in detail in following section, started to be used more frequently to express the position of Turkey. Expressing Turkey as a center was foreshadowing a shift to a policy by which Turkey’s orientation was not limited with Europe. In this sense, 1994-1996 period is a transition period that Turkey found new ways of policy making. “For instance, in August-December 1994 then Foreign Minister Mumtaz Soysal was stressing Third Worldism, nationalism and anti-Westernism in contrast to Turkey’s traditional Western-oriented policy” (Torbakov, 2005, p. 126).²⁸ These alternative openings based on questioning West-centered foreign policy of Turkey was to give birth of political streams such as leftist nationalism-known as “ulusalcılık” in Turkey (Çelikpala, 2015, p. 127).²⁹

Although the short coalition government (of Welfare Party and True Path Party) under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (08 July 1996 - 30 June 1997) seemed as out of the traditional foreign policy conducted until the time, due to the conservative/Islamist approach of foreign policy, this was happening at a time of serious questioning of the Western dimension in foreign policy that and Erbakan’s anti-westernism had a common point. In many of his speeches, Erbakan (1997a, p. 94) . noted that Turkey is at the center of the world: Turkey was not only a bridge between East and West, but also between North and South: Turkey was at the center of the world and a leader of the new world Turkey was at the center of the region (Erbakan, 2014, p. 393) and at the center of the world (Erbakan, 1997b, p. 165) during the history, and will be so today and in the near future (Erbakan, 1996, p. 18). However, considering ideological support of the prominent Eurasianists of the time for the so-called post-modern coup of February 28, 1997 (Aktürk, 2015, p. 63), it is difficult to talk about Erbakan’s positioning of Turkey was in the context of Eurasia.

If not being “center of the world”, center of Eurasia, world state, terms have also been seen in the speeches of Demirel, İsmail Cem and Mesut Yılmaz. For example “World state” (dünya devleti) was a new phrase which was firstly seen in the speeches of İsmail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1997-2002. In his words “a world state

²⁸ Phillip Robins (2003, p.365) notes that “Soysal had argued for a complete revision of Turkish foreign policy in the aftermath of the 1991 election, the central planks of which would be reduced dependence on the US and the cultivation of a leadership role within the Third World.”

²⁹ For more on “ulusalcılık” see Uslu (2008), Grigoriadis & Özer (2010) and Bora (2003).

level” is the assessment that Turkey is not obliged to make a "choice" between the East and the West (Cem, 2000a, p. 13). Cem was adding that Turkish foreign policy initiatives have a significant impact on a wide geography from the Balkans to Central Asia; from the Middle East to the Mediterranean, the Caucuses and the Black Sea (Ibid., p.20). Thus Turkey was defining a large area of activity without a total belonging to any of the geographical parts that it is in relation with. According to Cem (2000b, p. 26) Turkey would enjoy the opportunities deriving from the emergence of a “Eurasian Order” and “is firmly positioned to become the strategic ‘Center’ of Eurasia” due to its privileged two-dimensional identity-both Asian and European.

Very similarly, in 1998 Mesut Yılmaz (1998b, p. 186) was to say Turkey would not have the luxury of being uninterested to a block by being totally integrated to one because it is a very important transit country on the most important land and sea routes of the world:

In such a region by having the largest number of neighbours (...) a very important transit country on the most important land and sea routes, I think Turkey does not have the luxury of integrating into one block and being oblivious to other blocks (...) when all the factors derives from Turkey’s location is considered, a multidirectional foreign policy is not a choice of us, but appears as a choice that conditions dictate.

At the end of 1990s Turkey entered a new phase in terms of both economic and political liberalization with the effects of the developments such as Turkey’s EU candidacy, 2000-2001 economic crisis and subsequent re-structuring process. In 1999, at the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December, Turkey was recognized as a candidate without a precondition. This has marked a beginning of a Europeanization process in Turkey. Along with the Europeanization, another remarkable point has been the increasing importance of economic relations as a determinant of foreign policy, as 2000 and 2001 economic crisis strengthened this approach and economic gains were thought to bring solutions of political problems (Balçı, 2013, p. 235). As İsmail Cem (2002, p. 2) was pointing out, the new paradigm has brought a new approach to “power” concept which relies on sustainable economic activity. This was to reinforce and intensify the process of mid 1990s that prioritize economic relations in regional relations.

While Europeanisation of Turkey gained a momentum compared to negative tune of relations until the declaration of Turkey’s candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki Summit, “Eurasia” in the sense of an enlarged vision for foreign policy maintained to exist. Above mentioned Turkish-Russian rapprochement became even more visible after Vladimir

Putin came into power in the Kremlin in 2000 and this had impacts on the perception of Eurasia in Turkish foreign policy and also in political views that created a leftist, anti-imperialist and Kemalist interpretation of Eurasianism which was promoted by the circles close to the Democratic Left Party (Erşen, 2013, pp. 31-2 ; Çelikpala, 2015, p. 127).

Bülent Ecevit, who was the Prime Minister of the coalition government between 1999-2002 was favouring "region-centered foreign policy" in his article written in 1995. He was pointing out that the end of the Cold War brought the integration of Europe and Asia under "Eurasia" and Turkey's multi-dimensional and unique geopolitical position has gained a lot larger functionality than before. With a "region-centered foreign policy" the possibilities that was missed in the early 1990s can be recovered, thus, Turkey may come to the position of a leading country in the region without facing its Western allies and Russia (Ecevit, 1995). During his mission between 1999-2002, one of the most prominent element of his speeches was to describe Turkey as the "key country in the process of Eurasianisation (Avrasyalaşma)" (Ecevit, 2000a, p. 34; 2000b, p. 485; 2001b, p. 136). He also frequently touched upon the increasing importance of Turkey in the post-Cold War, Europe that was not aware of it and the US, as a world state, that realized Turkey's importance from the very beginning. The frequent emphasis on Turkey's importance in the process of Eurasianisation was reinforcing the multi-civilizational and hybrid character of Turkey (Yanık, 2011, p. 85). Ecevit's use of "Eurasian energy corridor" (Ecevit, 1999a, p. 16; 1999b, p. 24)³⁰ expression -instead of East-West energy corridor which is a name coined in an overwhelmingly "Western" context- was also constituting a reproduction of this character over the issue of pipelines. Therefore, pipelines and names of their direction or geography were continuing to be subject to geopolitical imagination as well.

In İsmail Cem's expressions a pivotal role in Eurasia was defined as a superior function for Turkey. The then Foreign Minister Cem (2002, p. 1), was noting that Turkey: "aspired to join the European Union as a full member and to be a leading economic and political actor in Eurasia. We envisage an international mission that is no longer peripheral and

³⁰ The term ("Avrasya Enerji Koridoru" in Turkish) was also used by Energy and Natural Resources Minister, Mustafa Cumhur Ersümer (1999, p. 466), Süleyman Demirel (2009h, p. 926) and Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000) as well.

confined to the outskirts of Europe. Our mission envisions a pivotal role in the emerging Eurasian reality.”

2.2.3.2000s: Governmental Change, Foreign Policy and Turkey as a Center State

Since November 2002, the governing party of Turkey is JDP which has come to and stayed in power with the majority of the votes in the elections.

While there had been attempts in the previous governments to change some of the traditional approaches in Turkish foreign policy, and since the second half of the 1990s a change through a more active and multi-directional foreign policy was already in progress, JDP governments have been decisive to make a transformation and in fact been able to do so with the motivation and power of sustained majoritarian rule. This transformation has been intensively related with identical issues in the way that identity, role and position of Turkey was redefined in the way of allowing to a multidirectional foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey is defined as a “central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character” and simultaneously is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea Country (Davutoğlu, 2008, pp. 78-9). İlhan Uzgel (2006, pp. 69-72) notes that JDP somehow patterned Turgut Özal’s pragmatism and practicalness in foreign policy and on the other hand a more positive EU policy after 1999, establishing good neighborhood relations through the direction expressed by Ismail Cem and energy relations with Russia and Iran in 1990s were the signs of a change process which JDP took over.

One important element of this change process was in the discourse about Turkey’s position. Though “center state” metaphor is not new to Turkish Foreign Policy discourse, 2000s brought it to be established more firmly. In fact, center state, and geopolitics in common, is a discourse that nationalist (ulusalcı), conservative-military, Islamist adopt in common. P.Bilgin notes that “the “central state” metaphor has evolved from a tool of domestic politics (produced and used by the military) to one of foreign policy (used by civilians); from a tool advising caution (military authors) to one calling for activism (JDP actors’ twist on the military’s pro-status quo construct)” (Bilgin, 2007, p. 749).³¹ Although center state metaphor was used not only by military geopoliticians but also by the

³¹ See also Yeşiltaş (2013).

government leaders as a tool of foreign policy in the pre-JDP period, especially in the form of “center/heart of Eurasia”, it can be suggested that JDP’s discourse firmly established “Turkey as a center state”.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was putting Turkey to center at its region as seen in his speeches of early 2000s. Erdoğan, since the very beginning of his Prime Ministry, referred Turkey as a central country of its region (2003-2005a, p. 20; 2003-2005b, p. 33; 2003-2004b, p. 135; 2003-2004c, p. 235), of the world (2003-2005a, p. 19; 2003-2007b, p. 132; 2003-2004e, p. 116), of Eurasia (2003-2005e, p. 104) in a similar way with Necmettin Erbakan. So his geographical imagination was already placing Turkey at the center. While this can be seen as part of an ongoing process that started with late 1990s and Eurasianism, JDP’s “central state” view has also its own dimensions that sees Eurasia from a “neo-Ottomanist” perspective. Davutoğlu the then Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister, was placing Turkey to a central geography that contains the interaction areas of the world (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 8) and of east-west north-south power centers and transit line (Ibid., p.116) in his book *Strategic Depth* which was said to be somehow a handbook of JDP’s foreign policy. If we accept that especially in the 2002-2009 period that Erdoğan was representing the visible face of the foreign policy together with the important actors such as Gül and Babacan while Ahmet Davutoğlu was determining the rationale and language of this foreign policy, we can say that the conceptual base of the central state imagination was produced by Ahmet Davutoğlu. On the other hand, though not a JDP member, the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2004) was also putting Turkey to the center of international geopolitical environment and center of Eurasia (Sezer, 2005) in the same period.

What was taking place starting from 2003-4 was not only coining Turkey’s position as “center” but also a clear comparison of Turkey’s previously established roles, first and foremost through the questioning of the “bridge” metaphor. While the bridge metaphor as a tool for Turkey’s role conception was never abandoned, a questioning of the function of bridge began to take place. Interestingly, one of the first areas that this moving beyond the bridge role was firstly expressed in the context of energy transportation which was becoming highly integrated to regional power imagination. In April 2003, Erdoğan was noting that Turkey will not be a mere energy bridge between Europe and Asia. Turkey will utilize this geographic advantage, and must be a much more active economic power

by increasing investments (Erdoğan, 2003-2004a, p. 30). While this expression was including a visional change in the direction of a more active power to act with economic motives, it was also expressed that Turkey is not just a bridge. This is in fact not the first expression of such a differentiation was that made in different ways. As noted before, Erbakan was telling that Turkey was not only a bridge between East and West, but also between North and South: Turkey was at the center of the world and a leader of the new world (Erbakan, 2014, p. 393). In late 1990s İsmail Cem was noting that Turkey will meet the 2000s not as a bridge but rather as a “terminal, station”, meaning that it will become a country not carrying the energy, products and raw materials it imported but processing, consuming, re-producing and re-exporting them to its West or East (Aydın Tarihi, 1998a). In 2000s, a government with its own ideological motives was emphasizing quite the same point. However, the recurrent uses of the metaphors in speeches and in written materials and the common approach and language of the JDP government elites were strengthening the power of the discourse and therefore easing the conceptual construction. In the JDP camp meeting, i.e. the in-party consultation meeting, of JDP on 27th September 2004, Erdoğan (2003-2004d, p. 452) was putting center versus bridge more explicitly: “Turkey has felt and made feel that it is no longer just a "bridge" but a "center" country that contributes to the construction of history.”

The view on Turkey’s role as a center state was written by Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu before and also in his 26th February 2004 article published on Radikal. This well-known article titled as “Turkey must be central country” was explaining what this conceptual change from bridge to center mean. Davutoğlu (2004) was stating that Turkey was usually defined as a bridge but in fact the only function of a bridge is to carry one side to other without being an independent actor. The long time adopted role of bridge meant for Turkey imposing Western values on East while carrying a negatively perceived Easternness to the West. The new era was to bring a change in this mentality in a way that defining Turkey as central country. In this sense, Davutoğlu was suggesting an explicit change in role conception which would better match to Turkey’s geographical and historical background.

So that, while it was not the first time that Turkey was defined as a “center”, it can be said that it was new to compare this role with the bridge concept which is now presented as an ineffective carrier function that is not satisfactory for Turkey. So, it was now the

difference between “Turkey as/is a center” and “Turkey must be/is a center, not (only) a bridge”. Core-periphery dichotomy was also included in the role conception changes in the direction of excluding periphery roles. Erdoğan (2003-2007a, p. 211) in his Address to the Nation in February 2005 was stating Turkey’s new foreign policy vision based on some essential points and one of them is the “reality of Turkey is a central country” and Turkey is not placed at the periphery of the EU or the Middle East .

This central position was requiring a multidirectional, active-proactive foreign policy that “Turkey’s engagements from Africa to Central Asia and from EU to OIC are parts of new foreign policy vision” (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 77). Another expression of this vision has been “zero problem policy” (Davutoğlu, 2004) and “360 degrees foreign policy” (Milliyet, 2009).

What distinguish JDP from the previous periods was despite describing Turkey’s role with a discourse loaded with geopolitical terms, making this description based on the concept of civilization, rather than basing this role on nation state as was adopted since the beginning of Republic. (Oktav, 2015, pp. 532-3) While Davutoğlu is one of the most important producers and proponents of the civilizational discourse Erdoğan adopted it too and even the EU membership process is framed within the “alliance of civilizations”-in the civilizational discourse (Yeşiltaş, 2013, p. 675). In this vision, the vision of center state/zero problem/360 degree foreign policy/alliance of civilizations, relations with European Union had a special place especially at the first years of JDP governments. Europeanization process which gained a relative momentum after the approval of Turkey’s membership status has been pursued decisively and consistently in the period from November 2002 until the formal opening of EU accession negotiations in October 2005 (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009, p. 7). After having a perception that it reached at the end of the possible level of relations with EU, JDP started to change its foreign policy starting from 2006 and directed a maximum level of interest to the surrounding regions which it named as Afro-Eurasia as coined by Davutoğlu (Tüysüzoğlu, 2013, p. 305).

Tüysüzoğlu notes that, in fact, foreign policy did not have an extensive place in the election campaign of JDP, rather, issues of social welfare and unjust treatments and stability of the state weakened by past coalitions had been the basic points of the campaign discourse. However the symbolic importance of EU Membership ideal was to unite both the public and the West around it and this was to bring the domestic reform process going

parallel with EU reform process. Hence, foreign policy as seemed to be at the background became a basic anchor of political legitimacy of JDP (Ibid.). Domestic and economic reforms are seen as the requirements and natural results of Turkey's modernization process (AK Parti, 2002, p. 13) in addition to the fact that they are conditions for membership. However, the way to the EU membership was not only related to the transformation of Turkey but also acceptance of Turkey's geostrategic importance by Europe as all previous governments insistently emphasized. Therefore, in addition to domestic transformation, "Turkey's entry into the Union is viewed as a goal that could be accomplished through strategic-level bargains" which includes "capitalizing on the country's unique geographic location and its strategic importance to the West" (Kardaş, 2011, p. 37). In this sense Turkey's location which is providing opportunities in energy transportation has been a major area among many to argue on Turkey's indispensability for Europe even after the slowing pace of relations after 2004-2005.

Another perspective that gained momentum in Turkish Foreign Policy in the JDP period has been to reach a new level in the Eurasianist view. In terms of Turkey-Russia Relations a new phase has begun in which discourses of strategic cooperation rather than competition is dominant and balanced and sustainable relations are formed under single party rule with powerful leaderships (Çelikpala, 2015, p. 128). This process has been accelerated with beginning of cooler relations of both Turkey and Russia with US and the EU: For Turkey it is after the US invaded Iraq without the support of Turkey- and with the EU -after May 2004 /entrance of the Greek Cypriot government the EU with the claim of representing the whole island-, while for Russia it is with the Iraqi war and "colour revolutions" (Erşen, 2013, pp. 33-4).

CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION OF TURKEY'S DISCOURSE ON ITS GEOPOLITICAL ROLES IN ENERGY TRANSPORTATION

3.1. BRIDGING FOR ENERGY: INITIAL DISCOURSES ON TURKEY'S NEW GEOGRAPHICAL ROLES (1991-1994)

3.1.1. A New Phase of Geographic Importance? Meeting with Energy

As noted in the previous section, Caucasus and Central Asia entered foreign policy agenda of Turkey not basically with the parameter of energy resources Turkey's relations with CIS overwhelmed by the political-cultural approach in the 1991-1994 period. In this sense, it is difficult to talk about an energy agenda which would be the part of the interest to Central Asia and the Caucasus within a proactive strategy from the very beginning: it took time that energy has become an important parameter in Turkish foreign policy and relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus (Bilgin, 2012, p. 783). This assumption can also be proved with the absence of a specific terminology production for energy, which would actively turn to a discourse in the next periods.

Despite the relative divergence of energy and foreign policy areas (Ibid., p.784), the issue of transportation of energy resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia made an entrance into the agenda of Turkish governments step by step. While pre-1990 discussions of Turkey's energy policy were mostly confined to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık Oil Pipeline³² which became operational in 1977 and the Russian gas coming from the Russia – Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline (West Line)³³ which became operational in 1987, the ensuing period

³² As stated in the website of MENRA "Iraq - Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline was built in order to transport the crude oil produced in Kirkuk field and other fields of Iraq to the Ceyhan (Yumurtalık) Marine Terminal within the framework of the Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq signed on 27 August 1973. The first pipeline with a 40" diameter and 986 km length was operated in the year of 1976 and first tanker was loaded on 25 May 1977." (ETKB, 2018a)


³³ As stated in the website of MENRA "As a result of the research on alternative energy sources, an Intergovernmental Agreement was signed between the governments of the Republic of Turkey and the former Soviet Union regarding natural gas delivery on 18 September 1984. After the signature of the agreement, related works has been started by BOTAŞ and with the Natural Gas Usage Survey, which has been done in 1985, the potential natural gas consumption and feasible route has been determined. In this context, a 25-year Natural Gas Purchase-Sale Agreement was signed between BOTAŞ and SoyuzGazExport on 14 February 1986 in Ankara. Within the scope of the agreement; natural gas imports started gradually from 1987 and reached to the maximum amount of 6 billion m³/year in 1993." (ETKB, 2018b)

was the beginning of Turkey's emerging role for the transportation of specifically Caspian energy sources (Akil, 2003, p. 2). On the other hand it can be suggested that 1980s economic transformation paved the way in the increase of energy demand in Turkey. Depending on the population and industrialization, energy consumption in Turkey, has entered into a rapid growth period especially after 1980. In this process, which is based on exports, the agriculture sector has lost its importance, the industry and services sector has come to the forefront and demand for petroleum, natural gas and coal-type fossil fuels increased, as the change in the overall structure of the economy required more energy use (Mucuk and Uysal, 2009, p. 106). In this sense Turkey started to seek for energy providers. The 1983 research of Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) titled as "Natural Gas Demand and Supply"³⁴ was followed by USSR-Turkey energy cooperation. The Intergovernmental Agreement between the governments of the Republic of Turkey and the former Soviet Union regarding natural gas delivery (Russia –Western Line) was signed on 18 September 1984. The construction works started on October 26, 1986 and the pipeline reached to its first stop, Hamitabat, on June 23, 1987 (ETKB). Hence the first gas transportation and trade agreement of Turkey became realized. The agreement was meaningful not only in the economic sphere. It was an important political development that at a date as early as 1984 Turkey decided to diversify the sources with a state from the "other bloc" to meet its energy demand, while many areas of cooperation especially on contracting services and trade was born in the following periods (Tellal, 2002, p. 163). The post-1990 period would in fact the "rise of energy" in two ways which are connected each other. First has been the increasing demand for energy sources, especially the most used/highest energy-dense sources, which are oil and natural gas, for boosting economy, industry and everyday life. World energy projections foresees a continuing increase in the demand, with some changes in the rates of the fuel types.

³⁴ The original source cannot be reached. Some sources mentions the report. See for example Toprak & Tatar (2011) and TMMOB (1996).

Graph 3.1: World Primary Energy Demand

(BP, 2018, p. 14)





Graph 3.2: World Primary Energy Consumption by Fuel

(BP, 2017a, p. 14)

Primary energy consumption by fuel

Shares of primary energy




*Renewables includes wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and biofuels

Turkey's case also worth to attention. First is the rise in Turkey's own energy demand. During the period of 1990-2008, the primary energy demand increase rate in Turkey was about 3 times higher than the world average in the same period and realized at 4.3 percent

and similarly in electricity and natural gas it has become the second largest economy after China having the largest increase in demand (Güler, 2010, p. 5). The trend has been in a similar direction till today. Primary energy supply increase rate has been 4,2 percent (average) 2003-2016 (Albayrak, 2017, p. 1).


Graph 3.3: Turkey Primary Energy Consumption - 1965-2016 (mtoe)

(BP, 2017b)



Graph 3.4: Primary Energy Demand of Turkey by Source - 1970-2030

(BOTAŞ, 2016, p. 13)



Parallel to the first issue, i.e. the increasing demand for energy sources, second point that has brought “the rise of energy” has been the geographical distribution of these resources

-in terms of resource ownership and exploration of new resources- in the new political context. The emergence of Caucasian and Central Asian Turkic states as energy rich states and alternative energy providers due to the “rediscovery” (Sasley, 2002, p. 327)³⁵ of energy resources in Caspian Basin and the new possibilities of routing for transporting these resources created an area of competition as well as cooperation. Out of Russia, Iran and other OPEC countries as the existing energy-have actors, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for oil reserves, Turkmenistan for natural gas reserves became new providers to negotiate new projects. Other actors have been EU/Europe as the partner who needs alternative energy sources; US as the superpower mainly looking for preventing Russia to play major roles in oil and gas transfer to world market from new independent energy rich states; Russia as the former owner of the pipelines and the authority to sell the oil of the said new republics from its ports; and Turkey as a transit country by geography, looking for regional leadership, EU Membership and strong relations with newly independent states. Turkey was trying to strengthen these relations by resorting to proving its international importance over its geographical position this time additionally in respect to energy distribution. So, as will be mentioned below, Turkey’s discursive adoption of energy issues started not with related to its own needs but of Europe, and its geographical role in meeting this demand. Turkey’s awareness of its own needs and making a political connect between its needs and its geography was to take place after mid-1990s.

Hence, Turkey’s re-emphasizing its international importance over geographical position in respect to energy distribution has been one of the basic elements of political elite discourse in 1990s. The initial discourse of Turkey was to be a bridge for energy: the role of bridging the energy rich new independent states to energy poor West and geographic importance that was stemming from this geographic position was Turkey’s main argument. However, along with the Western policies, being the alternative to Russian territory for energy transportation was more on the front than “being an energy actor” as an individual policy. In the context of regional rivalry with Russia energy along with political and cultural areas emerged as a sub-field of competition.

In this context the political/cultural affinities of Turkey with Caucasus and Central Asia and Turkey’s hybrid (western and eastern) identity was used to justify Turkey’s active

³⁵ Sasley (2002, p.327 5th endnote.) notes that he uses “rediscovery” because in 19th century and in the aftermath of 2nd WW large amounts of oil was explored in Azerbaijan.

turn to the region and its functioning as a bridge for transporting the energy sources of sister-states of Caucasus and Central Asia whose economies need to integrate into the liberal economic system by exiting the Russian system.

The wave of transit oil and gas pipeline projects to transport energy resources of Caucasus and Central Asian states in international politics falls with the time of Süleyman Demirel's coalition government³⁶ in Turkey under the Presidency of Turgut Özal, 8th President of Republic of Turkey (1989-1993). The advantageous climate took its source mainly from the fall of USSR was providing Turkey the self-confidence to make Prime Minister Demirel to mention on a possibility of establishing a "Union of Turkic States" in April 1992 (Aydın, 2004a, p. 5), and though political and cultural aspects were overwhelmingly on the front, building gas and oil pipelines through Turkey to market the Caspian energy resources was an item of this agenda.

On 30th June 1992, Demirel (1992, p. 236) in his speech at World Economic Forum was declaring the role Turkey would adopt in energy transportation:

There is no energy in Europe. There is natural gas in Turkmenistan; it is not clear how much it is, but so much to fit in the numbers. And in Kazakhstan there is oil and natural gas. Uzbekistan also has this kind of resources. They will need to be transported to Europe, where the population and richness is, and some of them will be able to pass through Turkey.

This was a new role definition for Turkey's geographic position in the new regional political context. Turkey was hence paving the way for an activity in the area of energy through these initial movements in discourse, yet the creation of new original terms for Turkey was to wait a few years more. At the level of action, Turkey took his first important step in 1992. On 4th November 1992, Süleyman Demirel together with President Turgut Özal negotiated with Elchibey, President of Azerbaijan, that a pipeline to transport the oil through the lands of Turkey and the first document on the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan, which would be named later as Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC) was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on 9 March 1993 in Ankara (Sabah, 2000). Although energy cooperation for transit projects were being planned in a larger region with additional partners such as Kazakhstan for crude oil, Turkmenistan for natural gas, in a way that was excluding Russia, Azerbaijan-sourced BTC Pipeline has been the main project that could be insistently worked on. Hence, the

³⁶ The coalition was between True Path Party- Social Democrat People's Party, 1991-1993.

pipeline discourse was formed around the BTC pipeline and expectations from its possible realization during 1990s. The project increasingly gained a very special place that the importance of the project was overemphasized for a long time. Promotion of Turkey's geography over energy transportation roles would initially be constituted around the BTC project and maintained to be so for a long time, and serving the energy security of Europe has been the approach at the foreground that would continue in the discourses of future leaders in similar or different forms.

In this period, Turkey started to emphasize firstly its geographical position and secondly its reliability as a partner; and started to develop an energy discourse that would gradually intensify and transform.

3.1.2. Preparation to Energy –Foreign Policy Convergence: Turkey as a Bridge to Meet the Energy Gap of Europe

As noted in the previous section, bridge is one of the most used metaphors to express Turkey's exceptional geographical role. The new post-Soviet context that created new neighbors with rich energy resources made Turkish leaders to expand the metaphoric usage of bridge into the field of energy through the mid-1990s.³⁷ In this context, bridge has been a metaphor used by the leaders to explain the exceptional geographical role that Turkey would play in energy transportation in the newly emerged political context of Post-Cold War era.

The metaphor's usage in the energy area, however, has been under a larger "Turkey as bridge" concept and with implications rather than a continuous labelling such as "energy bridge" as a geographical role in foreign policy, according to the leader speech texts of the early 1990s. This is probably due to the relative divergence of energy and foreign policy area in this period. So that, the bridge metaphor when used for energy transportation roles looks as it was a re-application of an existing handy concept that suits to the situation, before other metaphors for energy transportation roles have been produced. For example, chronologically early actors of the period Süleyman Demirel and

³⁷ The use of the bridge concept in relation to energy transportation is seen especially since 1993 according to the reached speech texts are of Demirel and Çiller as Prime Ministers, Demirel as President, Veysel Atasoy as Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Hikmet Çetin as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Özal as President is not included in the analysis.

Tansu Çiller as prime ministers respectively³⁸ did not use “energy bridge” as a unified specific phrase, rather they used it indirectly starting from the end of 1993 and the year 1994, when especially the BTC project started to occupy the agenda. The Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Veysel Atasoy, on the other hand, noting in a speech at the Parliament in December 1993 that “Our country is an energy bridge between energy rich countries and consumer countries in terms of its location. Our efforts to transport oil and natural gas with pipelines from these countries through our country are going on rapidly” (Atasoy, 1993, p. 82). Hence, directly or indirectly bridge metaphor pointing to Turkey’s geographical role in energy area in the new regional context started to be seen as a sign of the birth of a new discourse.

Why “bridge”? Turkey’s quickest discursive response to the contextual change it could perceive at that moment could be over Turkey’s existing traditional “bridgeness” to be adapted to new conditions and opportunities in energy transportation basically from Caucasus. The perceived contextual change was the emergence of the opportunity for Turkey, as a politically Western state, to replace Russia geographically to carry the energy resources of CIS and re-gain a strategic geographical importance. Emphasizing the need of Europe to Turkey and Turkey’s geography hence became at the center of early years of the newly developing energy discourse: “geography (should) determine(s) politics”. In other words, “Turkey’s geography (should) determine(s) Europe’s policy on Turkey”.

As noted, some highest-level state actors appealed to bridge concept indirectly in their evaluations of possible energy projects. Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (1994, pp. 292-3), in her US visit in 1993 was noting that “(...) we are in a position of bridge between Black Sea Cooperation Region and the Middle East, it is not a bridge that connects different continents but, for instance, we appear to *closing the energy gap in Europe*. Because we transfer oil from Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia to Anatolia and Mediterranean”. Similarly, in her speech to Egyptian businessmen in November 1994, Çiller (1995a, p. 382) was talking about Turkey’s “destiny” to play the bridge role which is also functional for Turkic Republics:

If there is something such as geographical destiny, Turkey’s destiny is to fulfill the mission of bridge between Middle East and Europe. But also, our other hand is on Turkic Republics

³⁸ Süleyman Demirel was Prime Minister between 20 November 1991-25 June 1993, his successor was Tansu Çiller between 25 June 1993--5 November 1995 while he became the President of Turkey between 1993-2000.

that reached their independence. We have given credits over 2 billion dollars to these countries.

Also, we work on energy project with these countries. We have been working on the pipeline passing from Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. This pipeline will probably go through Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan and transport natural gas to the Mediterranean or Europe via Turkey. Do not forget that 200 millions of people around the Middle East and the Black Sea is speaking Turkish.

It was quite apparent that the bridging role in Çiller's usage was imagined in a strong Western orientation. But in fact this was quite common attitude in Turkish politicians' language. For example a recent discourse analysis study by Erdoğan Aykaç on parliamentary debates which includes all Turkish parliamentary debates from the 18th Parliament up to the current 26th Parliament i.e. between 1988-2016 suggests that "the energy bridge metaphor was used initially to contribute to European energy security, thus demonstrating a strong Western orientation (Aykaç, 2017, p. 218). Çiller's words is therefore representing exactly the common discourse. In many other speeches of her, Çiller refers to "choose on Europe" among other regions/civilizations, and cooperation on energy is one of the component of cooperation resulting from this choice. Thus, meeting the energy need/energy security of Europe seemed as the final benefit of the relation among the parties, as the East side of the bridge and the bridge itself is serving to the Western side. On the other hand being a bridge for energy seemed to have only an instrumental function and a tool not the target itself. The main target was, undoubtedly, to provide not be excluded from Europe:

We are entering Turkey (to Europe) as a peace bridge with a great hinterland of 200 million Turkish speaking people, connected to Turkey with historical and cultural ties, sharing folklore, food and many other values. And while we were talking about strength, when we were talking about why Turkey would not be excluded, we accepted it as our source of power. Today, Turkey will be a country where the energy gap of Europe is covered by oil and natural gas pipelines coming from the Caspian Sea. The basic agreements have been made. America has adopted this as its official vision. With all these steps, if Turkey is excluded from Europe, it becomes a historical mistake for Europe. I think we can explain this well (Çiller, 1995b, p. 249).

Here, it is important to note that bridge metaphor was implying a functional connection that would be synonymously used with transit and corridor concepts in the following years. In addition, despite some changes in the emphasis and content, using geography as a leverage in relations with EU can be said to be a heritage of this period. In this sense, "Turkey's as an energy bridge" is somehow a previous version of energy corridor concept considering both of the concepts are the products of "Turkey for Europe" context. Yet,

the 1990s versions of the bridge metaphor especially until 1999 as the official candidate status was achieved had a more anxious tune of language trying to persuade the EU. In this kind of role imagination, being a geography for pipelines has been crucial and perceived as a role that was taking Turkey strategically to a very important level. This attitude was foreseeing an acceptance by Europe/West for bringing the opportunities of the (new) Asia and at the same time, a dominance/guidance on the (new) Asia for being ethnically, religiously, culturally, and -though limited-lingually relative of CIS³⁹. In this sense, Çiller's speeches were also carrying the traces of the cultural approach that was actually fading in the second half of 1990s. In one of her speeches Çiller (1995b, p. 181) mentioned energy relations in the same category with credits and loans to the CIS. Energy projects was a tool of help to these states:

In addition, we have a great potential with our 200 million hinterland created by people who broke up in the Soviet Union some time ago. We provided loans and assistance to these people, approaching 3 billion dollars, even without the support of anyone even in the crisis environment we are in. We are continuing to invest and credit in addition to the energy roads that connect to Europe via Turkey. All this is the potential that Europe cannot ignore.

Demirel (2009a, p. 1326) as President also appealed to the bridge metaphor in respect to energy in an indirect way. In his speech of "Turkish Foreign Policy at the Edge of 21st Century Conference" in November 1994, he was telling that: "Turkey is among those who have energy needs like Turkey itself and those who have energy. Turkey is a bridge between a developing China, Far East, Asia, the Pacific, a developing Europe and America. Today the size of the bridges has increased." One point in this sentence of Demirel is that Turkey's awareness on its own energy need was included in the expression, which would mean to heading to new discourses in the next periods.

Usage of "energy bridge" as a unified phrase increased in the speeches of leaders after mid-1990s, but this time a new concept, "energy terminal" was to dominate the newly emerging vocabulary of pipeline geopolitics since 1994, while the usage of "energy bridge" accompanied it.

³⁹ In a US visit in April 1995, Çiller (1995c, p. 406) was pointing out that in addition to the cultural ties, shared religious and cultural heritage (Everything from carpet designs to music), the passing of the Caspian oil and natural gas pipeline from Turkey should have been a cooperation area in this region which has the reserves at a level to compete with OPEC. And US support on pipeline to pass through Turkey instead of Iran was appreciated that it is very important since "the newly-independent countries need to make a choice between the Turkish model and the Iranian model in their search for identity."

Table 3.1 summarizes elements and factors related to Turkey's discourse on energy transportation for the period 1991-1994.

Table 3.1: Turkey's Energy Discourse (1991- 1994)

Turkey's Energy Discourse (1991- 1994)	
Context:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Post-Cold War context. Turkey's search for defining a new geographical position and function. ▪ Strong western orientation ▪ Cultural ties with Turkic States as the dominant foreign policy approach. Euphoria and enthusiasm. ▪ Regional rivalry with Russia
General geopolitical imagination:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bridge ▪ Perception of increased geopolitical importance. ▪ Intense promotion of geography.
List of headlines seen in the leader speeches that the energy discourse was constructed around:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy projects as one of the areas to help to Turkey's 200 million Turkish speaking Hinterland ▪ Turkey as being a model vs the Iran model to Turkic States ▪ Turkey as a leader in its region / center of Eurasia ▪ Bridging energy rich Caucasus and Central Asia with energy poor Europe: Turkey's indispensability to Europe for meeting the energy need - EU Membership relation
Main Concept/Metaphor:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy Bridge (mostly as the meaning implied, less direct use). Started to appear in 1993-1994
Meaning:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Connecting energy rich states to Europe first and foremost. ▪ Critical importance attributed to transit role. ▪ A sign of closer ties between foreign policy and energy areas and the search for defining the geographical position. ▪ Can be seen as the previous version of energy corridor concept
Used By:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Almost all leaders whose speech analyzed. Limited use in the beginning. Increased in time.

3.2. CONSTRUCTING A GEOGRAPHY OF ENERGY: TURKEY AS AN ENERGY TERMINAL/ ENERGY CENTER (1994-1998)

3.2.1. Emergence of the Energy Terminal Concept as a Role for Turkey

It can be said that it was the 7th President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel who spread the usage of the term by first using it in 1994 (2009b, p. 1156). Demirel (2009b, p. 20), while noting that Turkey will be an energy terminal, he was also pointing out that by fulfilling its role as a terminal country Turkey was not being in competition with any country in the Eurasia region for establishing influence. In a way of balancing Russia, he was also adding that “We see Russia as a partner in which we will work together in the integration of Eurasia with the world.” It was a sign of a Turkey that was now “becoming more conscious of the dangers of confrontation with Russia and adopted a policy of stressing the benefits of cooperation with Russia” by the end of 1994 while it appeared to be shifting its priorities away from Russia after the fall of USSR (Aydın, 2004a, pp. 8-9). Since then, “energy terminal” has been one of the mostly used metaphors explaining an imagined geographical role in energy transportation from Caucasus and Central Asia since the mid-1990s. The usage of the term have never disappeared from the Turkish leaders’ speeches since its appearance in 1994 and it has been widely used. It has been the first metaphor, specifically developed for energy transportation roles before the other concepts joined to the leaders’ energy and pipeline discourses, and kept a prominence and dominance in a long period. Being the first special term was especially because Turkey started to approach energy area as an opportunity in foreign policy rather than a separate area of relations. Therefore “energy terminal” became a role for Turkey not within a separate energy policy, rather, a role in foreign relations and regional geopolitics. It can be suggested that “energy terminal” goal and discursive coining was invented to find a gateway from the failure caused by the political expectations that could not achieved until the mid-1990s in Caucasus and Central Asia.⁴⁰ As a result of a new economic approach towards the region, Turkish leaders started to promote Turkey “not merely as a “bridge”,

⁴⁰ Aydın (2004a, p.10) notes that “Although cultural, linguistic, and religious affinities were initial stimulants of closer ties, Ankara’s new attitude toward the region was based more on pragmatic economic and foreign policy considerations than on simple nationalist rhetoric or sentimental concerns.”

but a “junction, “terminal” and “centre” in the transportation of Central Asian and Caspian energy resources to the West (Erşen, 2013, p. 30).

In this sense, geography has become an important discursive element to be resorted in converging foreign and energy policies since 1994. While the usage of the bridge metaphor as a role defining concept in regard to oil and gas in the context of EU-Turkey relations was a sign of a transition to a new language since the end of 1993, it was after 1994 that energy and foreign policy areas started to converge both in terms of transit roles and Turkey’s own energy needs. Starting from 1994 the birth of energy as a foreign policy area took place and the invention of geographical metaphors for energy transportation, such as energy terminal, meant also the invention of a new geographical role for Turkey in the post-Cold War regional and international relations. This process densely continued into the 2000s and 2010s.

“Energy terminal” concept is different from the bridge metaphor for being more specifically and intensively used for the new role that Turkey can play transporting newly explored energy resources, mainly oil in the beginning. Originally being English, “terminal” is a word transferred to Turkish language without change in writing and meaning and used for decades in all related areas of daily life. The word terminal in English is defined as “The end of a railway or other transport route, or a station at such a point” and one of the sub-definition is done as “an installation where oil and gas is stored at the end of a pipeline or at a port” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018). In these first and second senses, “terminal” has also been in use in Turkish language. For example, Ceyhan - Yumurtalık Terminal is the arrival point of Iraqi-Kirkuk oil since 1977 until the Gulf War which caused Turkey to stop the operation of pipeline until 1997. Yet the Turkish dictionary (TDK) (TDK, 2018) makes a definition only in the first sense: terminal is “the place where the passengers of buses, airplanes and similar vehicles are first or last left.” In mid 1990s when first started to be heard from the leaders who are explaining on the BTC Oil Pipeline, “being an energy terminal” was not too much clearly definable despite Ceyhan and the word terminal corresponds to a certain meaning. That was probably because the use of terminal was actually metaphoric rather than technical: being a terminal of energy was assigned to a state/country. However it can be understood that this term which can be simply defined as the destination point for transportation of (Caspian/Central Asian energy resources) was pointing-more necessarily- to an

advantageous position and bringing considerable assets to Turkey. This was the point that gives the term the discursive power.

Though there was not an “energy terminal” definition made in Turkey in the context it was born and for this kind of metaphoric use, in a more recent study (2011) on the produced concepts of Turkish Foreign Policy in the JDP period, it is pointed out that energy terminal means collecting the energy supply in Turkey and provide the transfer to consumer countries from this collection point (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2011, p. 27). This definition can be accepted as valid for the term in the time of its birth. What is remarkable in this definition made in 2011 is that the English translation of the Turkish version of the (enerji terminali) that is written near the Turkish is “energy hub” which was not meant in 1990s when it was first used. The writers of the definition points out that the idea of Turkey as an energy terminal to transport Eurasian energy resources came into use in late 1990s, but it was circulated in JDP period to point to the activism and possible roles that Turkey can play in energy field (Ibid.).

At the time of its birth, consequently, the metaphoric usage of the “energy terminal” was representing the effort of attracting the potential parties engaged in the possible energy transportation projects to cooperate with Turkey in a way that Turkey’s geography would physically be the arrival point of the transported oil and gas. With the probability of BTC project, Ceyhan was now becoming a destination point for not only Iraqi oil, but also for Caspian oil. The probable inclusion of Kazakhstan to the projects would strengthen this position and make the terminal function closer to be realized since more than one new resources would be added and increase Ceyhan’s activity. Therefore, promoting Turkey as an “energy terminal” was to try to convince parties over the advantages of Turkey’s geography, thus giving Turkey a political gain that would be attained through energy partnership. In October 1995 in a speech at the Parliament Demirel (2009c, p. 57) told that BTC was a project that regional geography made a must: “this pipeline is an urgent need for the oil companies that have invested in the region, as well as for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and even Russia, and an imperative that regional geography obliges to make access to open sea and international markets.”

In shaping Turkey’s energy agenda and discourse the relations with Azerbaijan was quite effective. Especially after the realizing Central Asia was not so close yet, Turkey’s expectations turned to Caucasus which was evaluated as closer and primary (Çelikpala,

2010, p. 97). The agreement of the consortium under BP's leadership in 1994 on sharing the oil production in Azeri, Çirag and Güneşli oil beds in Azerbaijan was also very effective in the change of Turkey's attitude (Bilgin, 2012, p. 784) since the way of expectations was meeting with real opportunities. US support for the BTC project over Turkey, as part of its strategy to strengthen the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus against the influence of Russia (Aydın, 2004a, p. 14) was speeding up the process and completing the context that Turkey could promote itself as "energy terminal" and a turn to an economy-energy based policy towards the post-Soviet region in general.

In this turn, there is also the effect of US's policy on the region which turned into an energy-focused one since the second half of 1990s. (Uzgel, 2010, p. 281) With the support of the U.S. government, the US oil companies "have led efforts to tap into the energy reserves of the Caspian region" (Croissant, 1997, p. 353). In February 1995, Washington, decided to support the pipeline that will pass through Turkey, not through Russia and tried to prevent energy-based maneuvers of Russia to weaken Moscow's control over the CIS countries (Erhan, 2005, p. 5). Turkey's energy terminal discourse was created under a strong support of US for Turkey in such a position. In other words, Turkey moved parallel to US strategy that was being shaped around energy starting from 1994, to be intensified in late 1990s, and the emergence of the energy terminal discourse in 1994 coincides with and corresponds to US's new energy policy. Turkey's invention of itself as an energy terminal, in this sense, is quite practical that it enables harmony with West, "proves" geographical importance, and foresees partnership with not only with West but also with Russia.

Indeed, a possible oil pipeline from Russia might have also contributed to what coined as energy terminal. At that time, an oil pipeline from Samsun to Ceyhan was also being negotiated (Akyol, 1994, p. 15). The Russian administration was suggesting that the Novorossisk-Samsun-Ceyhan project was the ideal way to transport Caspian oil to the West. According to this project, Azerbaijan and Kazakh oil would be transferred to Novorossisk port of Russia first, then to Samsun port with tankers and then to Ceyhan Yumurtalık terminal line again. Due to its competing character with BTC and whether Kazakh or Russian oil would be transport through this pipeline stayed controversial, no progress was attained (Ibid.). The project would be on the agenda again between 2005-

2010, but differently, it would be in the North-South corridor concept. These possible projects directed to Ceyhan port, in addition to the existing Iraqi oil pipeline, was thus contributing to the energy terminal conception of Turkey through Ceyhan.

On the other hand since 1994-1995 gas purchasing projects (with such as Turkmenistan, Iran, Russia) which had a potential to be extended and turn into transit projects started to be negotiated. By using the terminal concept, Turkey started to ideationally construct an energy (oil and gas) geography on its territory to enable the projects in the agenda. However, the relative dominance of oil over natural gas at that time was making Turkey's terminal mission mainly for oil. Because in 1994, the future of rich Caspian natural gas reserves was not on the agenda yet as much as oil, so that the calculations were considered to divert the Caspian oil immediately to the Mediterranean since the strategic product for the US was oil, while natural gas was evaluated as a more local policy (Gazel, 2003, p. 58). Consequently, Turkey's efforts were to attract mainly the oil flow and this policy could be possible with the advent of "energy terminal" metaphor. Considering the only strong possibility and support was over the BTC project, it can be suggested that the dominance of energy terminal concept finally went hand in hand with the BTC oil transportation project. An important point to mention is that BTC project later became the essential part of the East-West energy corridor concept which is the official version of US policy on diverting energy routes from Russia to other geographies. But, despite this Western character of the BTC project, energy terminal concept included a hidden hybridity not limited to serving West.

Starting from 1994-1995 gas purchasing projects (with such as Turkmenistan, Iran, Russia) started to be negotiated especially to meet the increasing energy demand of Turkey. After Turkmenistan gained independence, some protocols for the expression of interest were already signed for the transportation of natural gas from Turkmenistan to Turkey and parties started to negotiate since the end of 1993 (Akyol, 1993, p. 17; Milliyet, 1993, p. 9). The proposed route for the Turkmen gas was over Iran to Turkey. President Demirel, was also informing about the negotiations with Iran in 1994. In 1995 Iran and Turkmenistan made an agreement on the pipeline which would pass over Turkey. Another agreement was signed between Turkey's Minister of Energy Veysel Atasoy and Iranian Oil Minister Golamrıza Agazade in 5 May 1995. Veysel Atasoy, the minister of energy of Çiller government, speaking at the signing ceremony, recalled that oil negotiations

between Iran and Turkey lasted for 40 years and stated that the project of Tabriz-Ankara pipeline is certain (Aydın Tarihi, 1995). The agreement was signed again in August 1996 during Necmettin Erbakan's visit to Iran (İsmayilov and Budak, 2014, p. 45).

To speak for the Russian gas, according to Firat Gazel (2004, pp. 30-1), Russian involvement to new gas deals in the region since 1995 would change the picture of gas issue. Firstly, a contract to purchase 8 billion m³ additional Russian gas to existing 6 billion m³ was made by Refahiyol Government on December 1996, while the feasibility study of the project which would be called as "Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline" project which was later agreed as a Black Sea pipeline, was started in Refahiyol Government, too. Gas agreements with Russia would start new debates that would continue long time. The controversies were over whether Turkey really need the Russian gas, corruption claims, and prevention of Trans-Caspian Project by Russian gas projects and the creation of long time gas dependence to Russia. In fact this 1 year period (28 June 1996-30 June 1997) has been very important for the making of the steps of energy agreements that effect the overall balance in Turkey's international energy relations.⁴¹

3.2.2. Turkey as the Energy Center of the World (1996)

According to the reached texts, Necmettin Erbakan-the short time Prime Minister of the coalition government which was formed between the Welfare Party and the True Path Party (28 June 1996-30 June 1997) after Çiller governments and named as Refahiyol-, did not frequently used a terminal or bridge role for energy transportation roles. He, in general, was adopting a definite center position for Turkey's place in the world. The reflection of this geographical imagination in the energy transportation role has been as a direct application of this view. At the ceremony of Kirkuk Ceyhan Oil Pipeline on 16th December 1996, Erbakan was noting that "Caspian Sea and Central Asian oil will come to this region. If you consider that both Baku oil and natural gas come, you will see that Turkey will be the world's energy center" (Aydın Tarihi, 1996). Here, it can be seen that

⁴¹ Russian involvement to new gas deals since 1995 would create the Blue Stream Agreement and according to Gazel (2004, p.42) this agreement is the final version of Lasserre Project; the project that was started by Israel to purchase gas from Turkmenistan with the inclusion of Turkey, continued as Russia as the gas provider to Turkey and Israel. The transformation of the Lasserre project into a Russian project was related to Russia-Israel relations of the time, while it was already not possible to move without Russia in Eurasia (Ibid. p.30-31). On the other hand Russia later would give up Lasserre Project and propose Blue Stream with no reaction of Israel (Ibid., p.121)

the pipeline issue was defined in terms of physical arrival-distribution of oil and gas, such as the meaning meant by “energy terminal”. However, considering Erbakan’s role imagination for Turkey as the center of the world”, “world’s energy center” expression is a politically more intense version of the terminal concept.

As known, energy relations with Iran and Russia in terms of gas purchasing also condensed in these days. Erbakan’s first visit to abroad was to Iran in which the gas pipeline agreement was signed in August 1996. Despite Erbakan’s Iran visit and the mentioned agreement was being perceived as a product of Erbakan’s and his party’s world view, some pointed to the chronological process of the energy relations with Iran which was showing a continuation rather than a new opening. For example, Robins (1997, p. 91) notes that “the motivation for the deal had nothing to do with ideology”: it reflected Turkey's increasingly desperate need to secure new sources of energy imports which resulted with the emergence of a major gas trade with Russia, the delivery of liquid natural gas supplies from Algeria and serious talks about buying gas from Nigeria, Qatar and Turkmenistan. Sasley (1998, p. 36, note 4) also shares this idea by noting that the agreement had been in negotiation for some time before Erbakan came to power, and was a reflection of Turkey's energy needs rather than a sharp turn in foreign policy. Yet, if not a pure ideological motive, an effort to move to a more “central” position from the Western orientation/West-motivated projects seemed to make Erbakan to negotiate on energy projects overwhelmingly out of the Western context. As putted out by the reporter of the Erbakan’s East Asia trip, Ömer Bolat, the then General Secretariat of Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD), Iran visit as part of Erbakan’s East Asia visit and the initiated cooperation was showing that “Turkish foreign policy would be shaped through Turkey’s interests, without the discrimination of east-west” after a long time of Turkey’s turning its back to the Islamic world (Bolat, 1996, p. 8). Considering the previously initiated contact with Iran on energy, Winrow notes that Erbakan differently from the previous governments “strongly favoured” to finalize energy agreements with Iran (Winrow, 2002, p. 241).

Beside the gas cooperation with Iran, a contract to purchase 8 billion m³ additional Russian gas to existing 6 billion m³ that reaches through the Russia –Western Line was made by Refahyol Government on December 1996, while the feasibility study of the Blue Stream pipeline project which was first started as Russia-East Pipeline, later agreed as a

Black Sea pipeline, was started in Refahyol government, too. According to Kardaş, overtime, the evolution of Turkey's relations with notably Russia and Iran, was to affect Turkey's position on energy cooperation with the West. He adds that with the motive of ensuring supply security, Turkey would start to deviate from the west's energy policies (Kardaş, 2012, p. 84). It can be said that the steps for this new position was made in the 1996-1997 period with the updated discourse that included the "energy center" in addition to "energy terminal" with the effect of Erbakan's Turkey as the "center" and "energy center of the world" expressions. Energy terminal and energy center terms thus connected to each other and became the elements of a continuity that includes little semantic shift as they started to be used interchangeably.

Yet, Turkey did not totally leave its initial stand in terms of the energy transportation opportunities-to be the rival of Russia (in addition to be a customer of Russia) in the new political context- and continued to strengthened the western part of the emerging dual character of its energy policy. In this period, another utterance that contributes to the construction of geography under new roles has been "new energy geography" as frequently appealed by President Süleyman Demirel starting from the end of 1996, at the time Turkey increasingly expressed the ideal of being an energy terminal and center. With the possible projects, basically BTC, Turkey was appearing to open its lands for energy transportation from the "new energy geography" to Europe. By saying "new energy geography", Demirel (2009e, p. 688) was pointing to the post-Soviet energy-rich states while the old energy geography was to indicate Russia and the geography on which the Soviet energy transportation system operated:

The next century will be the century that new energy resources will be brought in to world economy, *new energy geographies* will be connected to world market. Turkey which has a strategic location for the integration of new energy geography with the world, *as for the old energy geography*, is a candidate for playing an important role for international peace, stability and prosperity.

Turkey maintains its commitment on the issue of passing of a portion of the alternative transit routes over Turkey to transport Caspian and Central Asian energy resources and continues its efforts in this direction.

Demirel's old and new dichotomy was certainly contributing to the construction of an "energy geography" for which Turkey has a crucial position. Expressing "old" and "new" was a clear guidance or routing through a way in favour of the "new" since the "new" can mean the one "currently valid" and the old means the one "passed." Considering the support of the West for the "new", we can say that "new energy geography" is an

expression in line with the policies of the West. On the other hand, although Demirel did not include Turkey in this “new” geography which consisted of Caspian and Central Asian states, it can be suggested that the roles and importance attributed to Turkey’s location were to imply that Turkey was a part of the new energy geography. Demirel maintained to use the phrase during his mission. However, in his later usages Demirel connected the term with the term Eurasia, -“Eurasia which contains the new energy geography” (Demirel, 2009g, p. 787)-.

While energy terminal and center terms also started to slide to a more central place than an understanding of a full engagement to West, the simultaneous promotion of the new energy geography and its later connection to Eurasia concept somehow reflected the emerging duality of Turkey’s energy policy: The rivalry with Russia and increasing awareness on the power of Russia and Turkey’s own energy needs. As a matter of fact, the above quotation of Demirel which was also slightly touching to the strategic position of Turkey for the “old energy geography” can be interpreted as a reflection of this duality.

3.2.3. Emergence of the East-West Energy Corridor Concept and Balancing the Competing Projects (1997-1998)

Turkey’s agreement with Iran including the probability of transporting the Turkmen gas to Europe through Iran-Turkey route brought the US proposal for a Trans-Caspian pipeline to transport Turkmen gas to Europe over Turkey’s territory in 1996. The idea was foreseeing one pipeline for oil and one for gas (Crandall, 2009). Subsequently it was decided that BTC should be considered as part of an energy corridor project that targets to realize Trans Caspian gas pipeline project and Washington has invited Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to participate in this project (Gürpınar and Kesici, 2005, p. 185). Hence, the idea of the East-West Energy Corridor was first introduced to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs by US officials in December 1997 to link the hydrocarbon resources of the Caucasus and Central Asia (mainly Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan) to Europe with the aim of diversifying the EU’s energy sources (Ediger and Durmaz, 2016, p. 141). The interaction between Turkey and Russia on natural gas, considering the strategy of US on the impediment of Russian dominance on energy supply to Europe, was constituting another major rationale of this corridor idea since US was seeing Blue Stream

Agreement as an obstacle to a Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline that would carry Azeri and Turkmen Gas (Sezer, 2002, p. 215). By the corridor idea US supported non-Russian, though it was not totally excluded (Winrow, 2004, p. 26),⁴² and non-Iranian pipelines for Caspian energy to reach world markets (Baran, 2002, p. 223).

Although the direction of the initiated energy projects, specifically BTC, were mainly the Western markets through Turkey's territory from the beginning, an officially declared East-West energy corridor was firmly establishing the content, the aim and the direction of the energy cooperation among parties as defined by the US. In other words the existing corridor idea was formalized with the declaration of the concept by US. Though the adoption of the corridor role in the discourse was intensified later, declaration of East-West energy corridor concept presented a great opportunity for Turkey to promote its geographical importance over energy at a time it converted its policy in the region towards an energy-focused one and coined itself as a future terminal.

While the East-West corridor project was occupying an important place for Turkey, expression of "Turkey as an energy corridor" has not taken place immediately, even until 2000s, dominant metaphor as the terminal/center metaphors continued at that time. It was the time of 55th Coalition Government of the Prime Minister of Mesut Yılmaz that BTC and Trans-Caspian Pipeline (the East-West Energy Corridor) and Blue Stream Pipeline projects, seemingly contradicting projects, were occupying the agenda. This period also has been the beginning of a policy of balancing projects offered by Russia and the projects by-passing Russia, which continues even today.

This contradiction or the need for balancing was stemming from two points. Below quotations from Yılmaz's (1997b, p. 138; 1997a, p. 152) two speeches in same day illustrates it well:

We are faced to an energy problem due to the policies that was conducted 6 years (...)if we don't bring energy from abroad, if do not urgently commission thermal power plant, energy cut will be inevitable.

(...) Another important project is taking Turkey to the position of a strategic country in the re-shaping world energy map in the aftermath of the fall of USSR. The way of it [taking Turkey to the position of a strategic country] is to provide energy transportation lines to pass over Turkey. This is at stake for both Azeri oil, Central Asian oil and Russian Federation oil. We are in the effort of directing the Ceyhan route which is the most economic and, for us,

⁴² See also Ambassador Richard Morningstar (1988), the then Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, pointing out the place of Russia in the corridor idea.

the matchless route in terms of the pollution of Black Sea and Istanbul and the traffic of Straits.

Yılmaz's words was indicating the gas purchasing from Russia to prevent a dramatic energy cut problem while he was at the same time promoting the BTC as the rival of Russian transportation system. In another speech (1997c, p. 326), he again reflected this two sided approach, grounding BTC project to a "geostrategic" point of view, and gas agreement with Russian to a domestic demand issue:

(...) It is an obligation that economic analysis and evolution towards Turkey to have a geostrategic point of view (...) Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline will transport Kazakh and Azeri oil resources to Ceyhan port. It is our target to bring Turkey to a lock point of the world energy communication.

On the other hand, completely to meet the energy need of Turkey (...) we foresee natural gas purchasing (...) from Russia.

In time, Blue Stream Pipeline Project also contributed to the discourse apart from reasoning it with "Turkey's energy need". As seen in Yılmaz's speeches, initially, this deal was usually connected to the "Turkey's energy demand" since it was a gas purchasing project aimed at Turkey's natural gas market. A clear division was made between Turkey's needs/Russian gas and Turkey's strategic aims/BTC that the comparison of two projects was resulting with.

However, Yılmaz later started to emphasize other aspects of Blue Stream in the days East-West Energy Corridor was officially announced considering the other possible gas projects. For example Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project as part of the East-West Energy Corridor would be feasible only if more than one gas receiver is included in the route. In other words "the basic condition for Europe to get Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan gas was that Turkey, which is the intermediate consumption market, consumed some of the gas" (Gazel, 2003, p. 88). The government was working on both projects but Blue Stream increasingly needed more powerful arguments at the existence of Turkmen gas choice. Considering a possible extension of Blue Stream to Mediterranean to become a transit project, in May 1998, Yılmaz (1998c, p. 122) said that the pipeline was not only a project that was feeding Turkey's energy system, but "a prestige project" and an access route to Mediterranean for Russians.

Yılmaz (1998d, p. 247) was also noting that Turkey was favouring a comprehensive approach for East-West Energy Corridor and this approach consisted of BTC oil pipeline,

Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe natural gas pipeline and finally the natural gas transportation under the Black Sea (Blue Stream). Yılmaz's inclusion of Blue Stream to the East-West energy corridor concept was therefore adding a strategic element for the justification of the project. Similarly he (1998a, p. 17) was mentioning Turkmen gas and Blue Stream projects in the same framework: "In parallel with the proliferation of the usage natural gas, the projects of bringing natural from Russia and Turkmenistan to Turkey and transporting Caspian oil to world markets over Turkey will be given weight. These two projects are mega projects that has the quality of changing world energy geography."

Yılmaz's concern of Russia was also seen in his expression of North-South direction in energy projects. He was pointing out that (1998d, p. 248) Turkey would be pleased to be the energy source and gate both between East-West and North-South and finally contribute to the stability of the region. Hence the rationale of Blue Stream Project was reinforced with the expression of an additional North-South direction to Turkey's geographical role in the energy transportation in the East-West direction.

On the other hand, as said, there was an ongoing "energy terminal" and "center" discourse which was adopted by Yılmaz as well. So it can be said that energy discourse of the time has been in harmony with President Demirel's that Yılmaz (1997a, p. 153) used the energy terminal and also "oil terminal" concept and thus reinforced the adoption of the term. While showing Rotterdam as the model to apply to this terminal role which was differently indicating a trade management component⁴³ rather than being a mere physical destination point, Russia was also among the mentioned partners. In 20th October 1997, in the 100th Day Joint Press Meeting, Yılmaz (1997d, p. 171) was telling that once Turkey completes Bakü-Ceyhan project Turkey will "not be just a peninsula linking Asia and Europe, it will become a major *energy island* linking Russia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia to the Mediterranean in the 2000s, and it will be an effective *center* for the formation of oil prices." Therefore Turkey's "central position" that is associated with energy became a common discourse of all governing actors of the time. On 1st October 1997, Demirel (2009f, pp. 104-5) in his speech at the Grand National Assembly, told that Turkey became a transport, communication and trade *center* of Eurasia and reached to a

⁴³ This was a similar idea with "energy trade hub" that would become popular in 2000s-2010s. However there are less example of such use in 1990s, so it is evaluated that it is a premature version of energy hub idea.

level of a *real world state* while it is leading cooperation in new energy geographies of Black Sea and Caspian Basin regions. He added that the new century's world will be a world where oil and natural gas resources will flow over the lands of historical Silk Road and Turkey is the *heart* of this world.

Use of the metaphors such as center and heart, when read together with the increasing popularity of the Eurasia concept at those days, evokes Mackinder's heartland theory which was suggesting that who controlled East Europe could control the extensive resources of the Heartland (Russia and most of the Black Sea area) and could dominate the world. The ongoing effect of Mackinder in the 21st century, especially after the fall of USSR, showed itself very strongly in the energy area. In O'Hara's words (2004, p. 148), it now turned to: "Who controls the export routes, controls the oil and gas; who controls the oil and gas, controls the Heartland". Seemingly referring to this new version of Heartland theory of Mackinder, and recurrently emphasizing on the center concept, Turkey used energy to assert its geostrategic importance and prove its connection to the "new energy geography". Applying these classical concepts strengthened the established approach/belief on the determinative role of geography, but on the other hand, it is an effort of constructing new realities within which Turkey gains leverage.

In this context, a bridge-center comparison which manifested an effort of defining and constructing Turkey's geographical function was already on the way that is similar to the one that attracted the academic attention in 2000s: At the 2nd World Turkish Businessmen Convention held in İzmir on 30 April 1998 İsmail Cem noted that Turkey will meet the 2000s not as a bridge but rather as "terminal, station", meaning that it will become a country not carrying the energy, products and raw materials it imported but processing, consuming, re-producing and re-exporting them to its West or East (Ayın Tarihi, 1998a). Here, terminal function is used as a more active, hence superior, type of role than the bridge function can provide.

Table 3.2 summarizes elements and factors related to Turkey's discourse on energy transportation for the period 1994-1998.

Table 3.2: Turkey's Energy Discourse (1994-1998)

Turkey's Energy Discourse (1994-1998)	
Context:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ongoing Post-Cold War context. Turkey's search for defining a new geographical position and function. New approaches to Eurasia concept. ▪ End of euphoria and enthusiasm in foreign policy towards Caucasus and Central Asia. ▪ Gradual increase in the awareness of domestic energy demand ▪ Search for other regional partnerships including Iran and Russia ▪ Dual policy towards Russia: Rivalry and cooperation
General geopolitical imagination:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Center of Eurasia ▪ Center of World ▪ World State ▪ Intense promotion of geography ▪ Eurasianism
List of headlines seen in the leader speeches that the energy discourse was constructed around:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Turkish Thesis vs the Russian: The risk of transferring oil through the Turkish Straits. Protecting the Straits from environmental disasters.⁴⁴ ▪ BTC project rising as the competitor of OPEC ▪ Gratitude for the US Support to the BTC Project ▪ Turkey as energy terminal, oil terminal, energy center of the world ▪ Turkey as a leader / center of Eurasia , linking Europe and Asia via pipelines ▪ Cooperation - not Competition- with Russia ▪ Ending Historical Tensions for the Sake of Economic Wealth
Main Concept/Metaphor:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy terminal (Started to appear in 1994) ▪ Energy center (Almost synonymous with energy terminal. Started to appear in 1996)
Meaning:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Physical arrival-distribution point of energy flow. Tried to attract mainly the oil flow in the beginning. Popularized with BTC and perceived as the sign of competition with Russia. Evolved into a concept indicating to be a multi-directional energy flow point. ▪ Critical importance attributed to the role of being arrival point of oil. ▪ Increasing convergence of foreign policy and energy areas. Energy terminal not as role in solely in energy field but necessarily in foreign policy and international relations.

⁴⁴ "Protecting the Straits from an environmental disaster" started be an important element of the discourse in the reasoning of BTC Pipeline to pass over Turkey. So the period also includes the rise of an environmentalist discourse.

Used By:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Can be seen as the previous version of energy hub concept ▪ Almost all leaders since 1994. Invented and mostly used by Demirel.
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3.3. TURKEY BETWEEN ENERGY TERMINAL/CENTER AND ENERGY CORRIDOR (1998-2006)

3.3.1. Beginning of a mixed discourse in the Changing Context: Which role? (1998-2002)

As noted before, the “energy corridor” as a role to be played by Turkey has made an entrance to the energy discourse of leaders starting from 1998, inspired by the declaration of the idea of East-West energy corridor by US. US proposed for a Trans-Caspian pipeline to transport Turkmen gas and included Azeri oil to Europe over Turkish territory. Subsequently BTC became the basic and crucial part of this East to West concept. As declared with the name “East-West Energy Corridor” the energy flow is metaphorized with the corridor concept which basically marks the beginning and the end points of the direct energy flow between the producers and consumers. Since the geographical coverage zone of the corridor directly matched Turkey both for the BTC project under negotiation and for a possible Turkmen gas project, Turkey started to express its geography/itself as an energy corridor. So, it can be suggested that the energy corridor concept was originally born from the East-West Energy Corridor concept.

In fact as a function, corridor was seemingly equal to the bridge concept which was used in the beginning of Turkey’s energy discourse within the same “East to West (Europe)” idea. Ambassador Richard Morningstar (1998), Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State, for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy, was noting Turkey’s role in the East-West energy corridor at a conference in 1998:

Turkey will play a critical role in this effort, serving as the geographic, commercial, and cultural bridge between the Caspian region and Europe. It would indeed be difficult to overstate Turkey's importance to the emergence of this framework. Turkey, the United States' only NATO ally in the region, enjoys immense geographic significance, straddling the continents of Europe and Asia, bordering directly on Syria, Iraq, Iran, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Greece, as well as Ukraine and Russia across the Black Sea. In addition, Turkey is the region's commercial locomotive, with Istanbul serving as the financial and business hub of the entire Caspian Basin. Moreover, modern-day Turks enjoy a centuries-old heritage of ethnic ties to the Turkic peoples on both sides of the Caspian Sea.

At the Turkish side this meaning translated into a “Turkey as an energy corridor” utterance. Speaking to the public Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz in Erzurum, talked about making Turkey the most important energy transit country of the world in the beginning of the 21st century, making Turkey a center with the plans of gas purchasing from Russia, Bulgaria, Turkmenistan and Iran; and Turkmen gas project that would make Turkey an energy corridor (Milliyet, 1998, p. 7; Ayın Tarihi, 1998c) This expression was representing two points. First, Yılmaz’s sentence was establishing a role as “energy corridor” for Turkey by making a direct connection with the corridor metaphor and Turkey. Therefore another geography/role expression for Turkey which was directly linked to energy field was taking place as a manifestation of the increase in the degree of integration of energy field to Turkey’s foreign policy and geographical role conceptions. Second, simultaneity of the usage of center and corridor concepts was becoming clearer and making a more complex picture in terms of the meanings of the roles of Turkey’s as an energy transporting country. This complexity was to be inherited by the governments of the 2000s.

What is to be an energy corridor? By the corridor metaphor “a variety of gas and oil pipelines pass between the hydrocarbon-rich East to the energy-hungry West as a natural bridge” (Meydan, 2016) was to mean at the time it began to be used. So it can be suggested that it was close to a bridge function as in the 17th World Energy Congress in US, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Cumhuriyet Ersümer was mentioning the importance of the *bridge* role of Turkey in the Europe-Asia energy corridor (Ayın Tarihi, 1998b). According to Tangör and Schröder (2017, p. 186), too, a “corridor” resembles a bridge where the passage country owns nothing but offers its geography. However, at the time of its birth, it was not on the agenda yet whether a corridor role should be deeply questioned in terms of its assets. One point, energy corridor, such as “energy terminal”, appeared as a more specific and even technical term than a wider “bridge” metaphor.

Yeşiltaş and Balcı (2011, p. 27) noted that corridor is used to express the direct transfer of energy with pipelines whereas terminal is used to describe the transfer of energy after the gathering of energy supply in Turkey. However, considering BTC, a project that was associated with Turkey’s terminal role, was within the concept of the now declared East-West energy corridor as the most crucial part of it, defining Turkey as an energy corridor

becomes consequently and paradoxically something equal or interwoven to “energy terminal” concept.

M.Bilgin (2005, p. 291) points out that what was establishing a corridor, as aimed with the East-West Energy Corridor, was the inclusion of Kazakhstan to the BTC project and Turkmenistan as the supplier of gas transportation which was meaning more than one state were to exit the Russian system. This political aspect was the thing making these projects form a corridor. So that an energy corridor was about making a considerable number of energy providers found a new system -around Turkey- which would not be possible only with the BTC project that would physically pass over Turkey as an energy corridor. According to this approach to corridor, Turkey by providing its geography could not “fully” operate as a corridor without canalizing the sources of more than one post-Soviet state. However, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of the period Mustafa Cumhur Ersümer (2000, p. 141) , in his parliamentary speech on the approval of BTC Oil Pipeline Agreement in June 2000, was noting that “you will vote for an agreement that will once again certify that Turkey is an energy corridor between the East and the West in the 21st century”. The successor of Ersümer, Minister Zeki Çakan was similar in saying, in 2001, that millions of tones oil that flows to Ceyhan made the country an energy corridor (Aydın Tarihi, 2001). This was manifesting that the corridor is understood in more physical terms and as an accessible target with the strong possibility of the realization of BTC project. Though the BTC project has been an important step to realize a full corridor role in the political sense, Turkey did not want to exclude Russia by mentioning Russia in the East-West corridor, as Yılmaz did.

Although “energy corridor” as a role to be played by Turkey entered in the dictionary of Turkey’s energy discourse in late 1990s, the intensity in the usage of the term increased with the 2000s. By making a clear distinction between “being part of or important in the East West energy corridor” and “being an energy corridor”, it is suggested that the latter’s salience as a role increased gradually. Turkey’s role is maintained to be defined as terminal as used by İsmail Cem (2000c, p. 45):

Balkans, Caucuses, and Central Asia will witness substantial economic development during the next decades. Turkey, lying at the hub, will become an energy terminal in its own right, connecting in more than one sense of the word, the wealth of the two parts of Eurasia, witnessing their increasing interconnectedness. We are determined to take part in this great journey and see the mega projects of the next century erected in our country and region. As we connect continents, we will bring in our contribution the bridging of differences between cultures at the crossroads of the world.

In another speech at an energy panel organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Istanbul on 13th April 1999, Ismail Cem was stating that Turkey aimed to be a "pivotal member of Eurasia" and this could be achieved by the construction of energy pipelines across Turkish territory (Cem, 1999, cited in Winrow, 2003, p. 78).

Similarly, although Mesut Yılmaz is one of the actors that stimulated the "Turkey as an energy corridor" discourse which is more associated with the East-West direction, he balanced it not only with his expressions on Blue Stream but also his approach to Turkey's transit position. According to him, Turkey's energy transit position is one of the reasons to be not belonging to any block of international politics (Yılmaz, 1998b, p. 186):

In such a region by having the largest number of neighbours (...) a very important transit country on the most important land and sea routes, I think Turkey does not have the lux of integrating into one block and being oblivious to other blocks (...) when all the factors derives from Turkey's location is considered, a multidirectional foreign policy is not a choice of us, but appears as a choice that conditions dictate.

Turkey as Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (PM between 1999-2002) was not so different in expressing Turkey's central position in energy issues, moreover his preferences was apparently on such position. Energy terminal and energy center have been the main metaphors he used as the previous leaders of post-Cold War Turkey. The thing different in Ecevit's speech was a clear and strong Eurasia reference as he differently referred to the East-West Energy Corridor not with the original name but as the "Eurasian Energy Corridor" in the both two of the Government Programs, while "energy corridor" term as a direct role description for Turkey did not exist in Ecevit's speeches. While describing Turkey as the "key country in the process of Eurasianisation" and frequently emphasizing the increasing importance of Turkey in the post-Cold War era, Ecevit's preference on terms related to energy transportation has been on "energy terminal" and "energy center" and moreover "energy trade center" (Ecevit, 2001a, p. 76) and corridor only with a "Eurasian" adjective.

At the end of the 1990s there appears two concepts to describe the "strategic" and crucial geographic role of Turkey not only specific to energy field but also as a player in the international politics and world geography. We can summarize it as follows:

First is the energy terminal. Its use marks the beginning of the integration of foreign and energy policies. Semantically it began to be used to indicate Turkey as the destination of

point of the resources of “new energy geography”, and a point of energy distribution to world, to Europe specifically. The term associated with Ceyhan terminal and oil as the end point of BTC pipeline project however Iraqi-Turkey oil pipeline and possible other resources from such as Russia was in fact the main reason that would allow such a function. Although BTC is a US/West backed project and enables the use of energy terminal concept, when read together with the period’s frequently used concept “center”, “energy terminal” points to need of Turkey to locate itself in a central position in both foreign and energy policies. By using the term Turkey both strengthened its commitment to the BTC project and its position as center. As a matter of fact, the term was sometimes replaced by the “energy center” concept.

Second metaphor is “energy corridor” which was born after the declaration of the East-West energy corridor. It appeared as the more energy-specific version of the bridge concept. Since the land between the Eastern energy resources and the Western energy poor countries matches to Turkish land, Turkey adopted to be the corridor itself, and used the term to promote its geography and its transit function in energy transportation. East-West label of the concept, together with the routes in the content of the concept, was clearly showing the aim of decreasing dependence of Europe to Russian energy resources. So that Turkey as an energy corridor seemed politically European. Besides, BTC as the main source of the “energy terminal” concept had the biggest role in the corridor which resulted an ambiguity between “energy terminal” which is a more center-like term and “energy corridor” roles of Turkey. However, in both role imaginations, Turkey tried to balance its discourse in the context of improving energy relations with Russia. The expression of north-south dimension is a clear reflection of widening the corridor concept. On the other hand, it can be suggested that “energy terminal” concept” overwhelmed that it was more frequently used than corridor during the 1990s.

Besides the difference between corridor and terminal which was consequently not too necessary comes from a lack of definition in minds that leaders chose on the terms randomly and meant finally how Turkey’s geography is important in the post-cold war context and how it can be the part of the new energy geography.

Table 3.3 summarizes elements and factors related to Turkey’s discourse on energy transportation for the period 1998-2002.

Table 3.3: Turkey's Energy Discourse (1998-2002)

Turkey's Energy Discourse (1998-2002)	
Context:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Multi-directional foreign policy approach. ▪ 1999 EU candidacy and stronger attachment to EU membership ideal. ▪ Increasing attention of EU on its energy gap and Turkey's roles in energy transportation.
General geopolitical imagination:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bridge ▪ Center of Eurasia ▪ World State ▪ Regional Power ▪ Intense promotion of geography
List of headlines seen in the leader speeches that the energy discourse was constructed around	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Turkey as energy terminal/center ▪ East-West Energy Corridor /Eurasian Energy Corridor ▪ Turkey as an energy corridor ▪ The key country in the process of Eurasianisation, world state ▪ Increasing importance of Turkey in the post-Cold War, Europe that was not aware of it and the US, a world state that realized Turkey's importance from the very beginning. ▪ Protecting the Straights from the oil tankers, importance of the BTC project ▪ Multidirectional foreign policy, multiple identity
Main Concept/Metaphor:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy terminal and energy center ▪ Energy corridor (Inspired from East-West Energy Corridor)
Meaning (Energy Corridor):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Physical transit of energy flow first and foremost from East to West. ▪ Critical importance attributed to corridor and terminal roles. Terminal metaphor still dominant over corridor. ▪ Increasing convergence of foreign policy and energy areas. Energy terminal not as role in solely in energy field but necessarily in foreign policy and international relations. ▪ Can be seen as the new version of energy corridor concept.
Used By:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Almost all leaders since 1998. Vastly increased after 2002.

3.3.2. Towards a New Level in Energy Policy: Condensing Energy Agenda and Competitive Projects Context

Developments in 2000s inevitably increased the intensity of the energy issues and accelerated the process of energy-foreign policy integration for Turkey. If the early 1990s witnessed the rise of energy in international politics, 2000s brought a second wave of rise with the new agreements and negotiations on new pipelines and it directly reflected itself in Turkey's agenda of foreign and energy policies.

In this context, the exploration of Shah Deniz Gas Field of Azerbaijan in May 1999 as "one of the world's largest gas-condensate fields located on the deep water shelf of the Caspian Sea (BP) was a necessary development that would affect the future of the possible pipeline options. As a result of negotiations on the supply of natural gas from Azerbaijan, which started in October 2000, on 12 March 2001, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and the Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan signed the Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer of Azerbaijan natural gas to Turkey and on the same date BOTAŞ and Azeri SOCAR has signed the 15 years The Natural Gas Purchase and Sale Contract (Ateş, 2006). The project was called as Phase I of Shah Deniz Project in Azerbaijan or the Bakü-Tblisi-Erzurum pipeline project.

Early 2000s brought other developments on natural gas. In May 2001, Iran-Turkey pipeline became operational. In April 2001, the Natural Gas Market Law that was foreseeing to make steps for the liberalization of the Turkish Natural Gas Market was published.

On the other hand Brussels was becoming increasingly interested in guarantying their long-term energy security. European Commission was making energy relations with transit countries a priority area as an official policy. In November 2000, European Commission's (2000, p. 24) "Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply" was noting that "It is essential for the Union to maintain satisfactory relations with transit countries if it is to have stable access to the energy products it needs" which is to be valid especially for gas. The paper was also putting that "Particular attention should therefore be paid to transit States such as Turkey, the CEEC (China Energy Engineering Group) countries, the Ukraine, the Baltic States and the Caucasian countries" (Ibid.) with regard to supplies from Russia, the Caspian Sea basin, North

Africa and the Middle East. The paper was also mentioning on the EU membership will of energy transit states that presented opportunities (Ibid.):

In the light of their intention to join the Union, Europe should consider what support it could give to Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, to develop transit facilities for Caspian basin gas and oil, in addition to existing plans for transporting Russian supplies. The natural gas interconnection project linking Greece and Turkey opens up the potential for European access to new sources of natural gas, providing an alternative to seaborne trade. It could also provide an export route for Middle Eastern production.

The project that the Green Paper 2000 mentioned, namely the Turkey-Greece Natural Gas Pipeline Project, which constitutes the first step of the Southern Europe Gas Ring, is among the first projects developed in order to meet the European gas supply through Turkey: Within the European Union's Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) Program, it is aimed to transport the natural gas from the Caspian and Middle East to Europe via Turkey and Greece with the interconnection of the natural gas networks of Turkey and Greece, as decided in the meeting held in Brussels on 7th July 2000 and stated in the 18 January 2001 Memorandum of Cooperation (Pala, 2007, pp. 167-8). Intergovernmental Agreement between Turkey and Greece was to be signed in 23th February 2003.

On the other hand preparations of OMW and BOTAŞ for the Nabucco project started in February 2002, a cooperation protocol was signed between additional possible partners in June 2002, and a feasibility study was agreed up on in October 2002 (Petkova, 2015, p. 79). With a five-company consortium (See Table 10), Nabucco, was a 31 bcm/year pipeline to carry gas extracted in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran to Southeast (Bulgaria, Romania) and Central Europe (Hungary, Austria) via Turkey.

JDP rule has taken over the processes started in late 1990s in the fields of both foreign policy and energy policies. The intensity of the energy agenda has brought a new level of actorness which energy was not used not only as policy tool but also apparently an end itself. Therefore, one of the main facts of JDP period has been an increasing activity in the field of energy, which already started in the late 1990s. The 2000s were therefore already loaded with an intense energy agenda. Table 3.4 shows the projects that JDP governments took over and continued to work on:

Table 3.4: Oil and Gas Projects of Early 2000s

BTC:	The intergovernmental agreement was signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey on 18 November 1999, The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co.) was established in London on 1 August 2002 and the ceremony launching construction of the pipeline was held on 18 September 2002.
BTE (Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum) Pipeline:	Negotiations started in October 2000. on 12 March 2001, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and the Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan signed the Intergovernmental Agreement
A possible Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline:	A Framework Declaration signed by the presidents of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey in November 1999. The problem of legal status of Caspian Sea, Russian and Iranian factor, Turkey’s decreased need to additional gas, etc. caused to stop the project until 2006.
Turkey-Greece Pipeline:	Started to be negotiated in 2000 and Intergovernmental Agreement of it was to be signed in 2003.
Nabucco:	The preparations of the Nabucco project began when the first talks took place between Austrian OMV and Turkish BOTAŞ in February 2002. The five partners (OMV Edsgas of Austria, MOL of Hungary, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, Transgaz of Romania and BOTAŞ of Turkey) concluded a protocol of intention to construct the proposed pipeline in June 2002 and a Cooperation Agreement in October 10,2002 in Vienna.
Middle East Sourced Projects:	Possible inclusion of Middle East energy resources to Europe directed projects over Turkey as put in Green Paper 2000.
Blue Stream:	Started to be constructed in May 2002, commissioned on 30 December 2002 and supplied commercial gas in February 2003. However, due to the discussions on price and volume issues, the gas pipeline was interrupted from time to time and the official opening was delayed. Blue Stream at its birth had possibilities of extension to Mediterranean.
Iran-Turkey Gas Pipeline:	Completed in January 2002

Hence this period was showing the transition to a new level in which many competitive projects need to be handled in a coherent energy and foreign policy analysis.

3.3.3. The EU Effect and “Turkey as Energy Corridor” as the Dominant Discourse: A Reinforced Emphasis (2002-2006)

JDP’s Election Manifesto of 2002 (AK Parti, 2002, p. 61) and 2002 government program under the prime ministry of Abdullah Gül (2002, p. 54) was setting the target of “being a regional power in the field of energy”, thus making an International Relations concept incorporated to energy area. It is said that Turkey will be a “regional power in energy area” by utilizing the opportunities of being a distribution “terminal” for oil and gas of neighbor states getting into market. On the other hand, oil and natural gas policies are said to be harmonized with foreign policy and “provide a uniting element in our relations with sister countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus” (Ibid.). These expressions were to imply a continuation of Turkey’s energy policies that was started to be shaped in late 1990s, but this time with an emphasis of “harmony with foreign policy”. Indeed, in this period, energy started to occupy a central place in economic, foreign and security policy. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in October 2003 was to say in Kyrgyzstan that “Turkey aims to evaluate possibilities of being a distribution terminal in the best way for transporting the oil and natural gas in neighboring regions to the world markets” (Hürriyet, 2003). Abdullah Gül, in June 2003, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs also used Rotterdam analogy for Ceyhan’s position and terminal for Turkey (Gül, 2007a, p. 535). On the other hand, energy is one of the first areas that bridge-center dichotomy or difference was expressed as showed in Erdoğan’s above quoted 2003 sentence on being not just an “energy bridge”. Erdoğan’s describing Turkey’s location and position in the context of energy issues beside Turkey’s general international position was also matching to “center” by stating that Turkey is located at the center of transport and energy networks between Europe, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East (Erdoğan, 2003-2005c, p. 23; 2003-2005d, pp. 199-200). Similar to Ecevit he noted that Turkey is in the midst of the geo-political phenomenon called Eurasia (Erdoğan, 2003-2005f, pp. 215-6) and is at the *heart* of Eurasia, at the center of energy and transportation routes (Erdoğan, 2003-2005h, p. 319; 2006-2007a, p. 250). He sometimes used a direct geopolitical language as he said Turkey is located at the very center of the region called as *strategic ellipse* where the 70% of the energy resources exist (Erdoğan, 2006-2007b, p. 260). Emphasis to Turkey’s geographic and strategic/geo-strategic importance and advantage in energy area is frequently touched upon in terms of “utilization”. The other political figures of this

period, i.e. President Sezer, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül and Ali Babacan, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi Güler, were not so different in emphasizing geopolitical/geostrategic importance and relating it energy. Geopolitical importance as a given fact has been the reason for the revision of the energy policy. Hilmi Güler (2004, p. 499) for example, was noting that they are working on making an energy policy “suitable for Turkey’s geopolitical and geostrategic position.”

While the location in the energy rich region is therefore “center”, yet, much more than every other previous Prime Ministers or actors did, Erdoğan used and emphasized the concepts of corridor, bridge and transit roles as the type of function to be played by Turkey especially until 2006. Therefore, in the first years of JDP rule Turkey’s role as an “energy corridor” and “energy bridge” more than “energy terminal/center” has been strongly, even more strongly than the previous decade, promoted by JDP governments.⁴⁵ Kardaş reaches a similar conclusion by quoting the deputy undersecretary of Turkish Energy Ministry of the time: ‘the existing Turkish administration has taken up this new ‘corridor’ role much more eagerly than previous ones ... to take advantage of [Turkey’s] unique geographical location [between energy-resources rich countries generally in the East and energy-poor countries in the West] to a maximum extent’ (cited in Kardaş, 2011, p.39; Yazar and Erkaya, 2008, p. 6).

Since the energy corridor concept was originally born from the East-West Energy Corridor concept as noted before, the first meaning of the promotion of the corridor role to be played by Turkey was to imply the importance of Turkey for EU energy security considering the enthusiasm for EU membership. In this sense eagerness for EU membership in early 2000s has much contributed to the promotion of energy corridor role by Turkey. Therefore serving as an energy corridor has basically been in the EU context, especially in the first years of JDP governments.

Indeed, energy was presenting a great opportunity for a rapprochement with the EU since EU Member States were becoming increasingly interested in developing an east-west gas

⁴⁵ While usage of energy corridor metaphor starts in the pre-JDP period, the intense use of it comes with the JDP governments. In a research project (Özdamar, 2014) on Foreign Policy Roles in 1997-2014 period which was conducted over speech materials of the leaders, it has been found that “energy corridor” is a foreign policy role among 24 others such as global system partner, defender of peace and stability, staunch ally, regional partner, trading state, model state, developer, center state, regional power, eastern or western state, bridge, etc. It can be claimed that the majority of the usages of the corridor metaphor coincides with the JDP period.

transportation corridor to guarantee their long time energy security at a time that US-Russia Energy Dialogue (The Guardian, 2002) started and Bush administration became less interested in energy corridors extending through Turkey (Winrow, 2004, p. 27). While European Commission's Green Paper 2000 which was stating the importance of satisfactory relations with transit countries such as Turkey, in the 2004 progress report European Commission was noting on "a pivotal role in diversifying resources and routes for oil and gas transit from neighbouring countries to the EU" (European Commission, 2004, p. 116). The annex to the Green Paper 2006 (European Commission, 2006, p. 37) was also emphasizing the "strategic importance" of Turkey for the delivery of crude oil and natural gas to Europe from Russia, the Caspian region, the Middle East and North Africa (Winrow, 2006, p. 2). As 2006 Ukraine-Russia energy crisis showed, Turkey was not only a route for non-Russian energy sources but also Russian energy sources to be transported to Europe. Hence, for Europe, Turkey has been relevant as an energy actor in terms of ensuring Europe's energy security.

Turkey's awareness on this position was making it to see its location for oil and gas transportation a bargaining tool. Because the possible material benefits for the EU's energy security is seen to effect member states' preferences and the EU public's perceptions which would be as important as negotiation period (Müftüler-Baç and Başkan, 2012, p. 362). As a matter of fact, it is recurrently noted that, in one way or another, Turkey has a great importance to secure energy transportation to EU countries (Erdoğan, 2007a, p. 18; 2007b, p. 28). In this context, the metaphoric use of Turkey as an energy corridor, energy bridge and energy transit country vastly increased. As seen especially in the daily usage of Erdoğan between 2003-2007, energy corridor, bridge and transit roles dominated over energy terminal, key country or energy center.⁴⁶ The related visible actors of the period, i.e. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül and Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Mehmet Hilmi Güler, there is a commonality in terms of the used terminology, though some minor differences can be observed when each of them is analyzed within their speech texts.

While the promotion of Turkey as an energy corridor has very much to do with Turkey's EU goal and gaining regional power in addition to transit fees as an economic gain, one

⁴⁶ In the published texts of Erdoğan's speeches between 2003-2007, "energy corridor" as a role used nearly 30 times, "energy bridge" nearly 11, transit 10, "energy terminal" 7 times.

practical reason to promote energy corridor approach of Turkey was also about a fact about the over-contracting problem, according to Winrow. Long-term natural gas sale and purchase agreements made by BOTAŞ notably with Russia and Iran were to cause importing more gas than real requirements of Turkish economy. Therefore “economic imperatives rather than strategic considerations were impelling Turkish officials to promote an east-west gas transportation corridor” (Winrow, 2004, p. 32). This means that promotion of strategic importance as an energy corridor has been a justification tool. If this is not the only reason, a two sided advantageous discourse was in place: Turkey’s own economic considerations or energy security in terms of affordable energy and energy security of EU which Turkey traditionally targets to be a member of.

The special necessity that Europe give to Turkey was reinforcing this approach and discourse, though EU side has not been unified about the degree of Turkey’s importance. While Baku – Tblisi – Erzurum (BTE) and Turkey-Greece Gas Pipeline projects were ongoing as Europe directed projects, Nabucco with its extensive plan including various partners has been the main agenda of East-West gas transportation. In June 2004, the Nabucco International Company was established with the participation of the five partners and on June 28, 2005, these partners signed the Joint Venture Agreement and Ministerial statement on the Nabucco pipeline on June 26, 2006 in Vienna (Aras and İşeri, 2009, p. 4).

3.3.4. Constructing Corridors Intersecting at Ceyhan: East-West + North-South Energy Corridor and Ceyhan as an Energy Terminal

While the role of energy corridor was strongly adopted in discourse in terms of the East-West/Europe directed projects, since 2005 a North-South dimension of corridor was being added in a similar way done by Mesut Yılmaz in 1997: the basis behind this expression has been the Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline which, this time, became operational in 2003 with some problems and officially opened in 2005 and opened the way for discussions of new projects.

Among these projects, Blue Stream 2 Project which was proposed firstly in 2002 to expand the Blue Stream by the Samsun-Ceyhan link and by branch to South Eastern Europe was now on the agenda more visibly. It was in 2005 that Putin and Erdoğan officially discussed building this second line which was to run parallel to existing Blue

Stream with a branch to follow the same route with Nabucco. The project stayed on the agenda until the idea of expansion to southeast Europe was replaced by the South Stream project in 2007. (Baykal, 2009, p. 13)

Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project has been another project started to be in the foreground since 2005. Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline which was firstly offered by Turkey in 1994 as an alternative to the oil tanker traffic of the Straits, came into the agenda again in early 2000s. Italian ENI and Turkish Çalık Enerji Company carried out technical and commercial studies, filed for the construction license on 31 March 2004 and agreed on November 2005 (Çalık and ENI, 2006). After the steps from 2006 to 2009, the intergovernmental agreement was to be signed in 2009 and project was to stay in the agenda until its cancellation in 2013 due to the economic concerns of Russia (Varol, 2018, p. 210). During these projects kept their possibility, the North-South corridor discourse continued to exist.

In December 2004 in the budget presentation speech, the Minister of Energy Hilmi Güler (2004, p. 499) was noting that Turkey's geostrategic and geopolitical position is too much important, Turkey is a bridge and corridor between energy producers and consumers. He was adding that their look on the issue is not only in the east-west direction, but also includes the north-south which means that the east-west direction consists of Azerbaijan with the BTC, BTE projects, Turkmenistan and Iraq and north-south includes gas and oil of Iraq, Syria, Egypt, but also Blue Stream to be necessarily extended to south. In fact Middle East providers were to reinforce to supply side of the projects that are directed to Europe, hence the east-west corridor. Therefore Middle East component of the corridor was actually directed to the West though Güler mentioned the projects inside the north-south. North-South dimension was foreseeing basically Russia as provider of oil and gas to be transported to Mediterranean. Diversification of the directions of the possible pipelines made over the concept of corridor and therefore making the concept of corridor not limited to European context.

These developments were resembling much the 1990s starting with a West-dominant policy and turns to a Russian and Eurasian one especially through the end of 1990s. A strong European direction of the first years of JDP's policy on transit energy projects policy and the later inclusion of North-South dimension seems like a repetition of a situation of Turkey going between Europeanization and Eurasianization not only in its

foreign policy but also in its energy policy. Yet, Turkey's Europeanization in JDP's initial period differs from the traditional one that was maintained for long for especially the new version has been part of a pragmatism and multi-identical character which has its rationale in being at the "center". This, however, brought a more strong commitment to EU principles and reforms than the previous decades. Öniş and Yılmaz (2009, p. 13) notes the second stage of JDP foreign policy deviated from this "all-out Europeanization drive to a possible retreat to what could be described as a kind of 'loose Europeanization' or 'soft Euro-Asianism' strategy." Developing energy partnership with Russia can be seen as a reflection of this approach.

With the inclusion or revival of the North-South dimension idea, the policy of making Ceyhan Terminal an energy center - a supermarket- or energy terminal has become the basis of a general "energy terminal" metaphor which would be used increasingly for Turkey in the coming years. Ceyhan oil terminal, as the destination point of BTC which is the basic element of the East-West energy corridor, and destination point of Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline and a possible Russia-sourced pipeline, i.e. Samsun-Ceyhan, became a suitable symbolic point that allows to use both corridor and terminal concept. Thus, such as the BTC as the main component of east-west energy transportation corridor since the birth of corridor idea became a tool for the promotion of energy terminal role with its destination point Ceyhan terminal, now possible north-south projects were doing the same. Possible extension of Blue Stream Gas Pipeline to south (Israel) over Ceyhan –the second version of above mentioned Blue Stream 2, has been inside the "energy terminal/trade center" concept (Meixler, 2005).⁴⁷

Therefore, promotion of Turkey's geography over "energy corridor" concept in the East-West direction and later North-South direction, and over energy terminal concept by Ceyhan been the main practice in the language of foreign energy policy. As put by Erdoğan (2003-2005f, pp. 215-6);

- Taking advantage of its geographical and geostrategic position to create a corridor between energy rich countries and energy consuming countries,

⁴⁷ Mithat Rende, the then deputy director general for energy, water and environment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was noting that "Taking into account the BTC and the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipelines as well as the Samsun-Ceyhan bypass oil pipeline, which is under development, on the one hand, and the possible extension of Blue Stream to Ceyhan and then to Israel and the future construction of an Iraqi natural gas pipeline on the other, the Ceyhan terminal is envisaged to be a major energy trading center of the region" (Hürriyet Daily News, 2006).

- To be an energy transit country on the East-West and North-South axis,
- Transformation of Ceyhan Terminal into an energy trade center,

have been the main pillars of foreign energy policy.

3.3.5. Emergence of the Energy Hub Metaphor and Semantic Shift in Terminal Concept

Just like the “energy corridor” concept, the emergence of the hub term may be sourced in the usage of the United States politicians. The then President George W. Bush's Advisor for resources in the Caspian Seabed Ambassador Steve Mann would note in December 2003 at a press conference jointly held with Minister Hilmi Güler, that “the U.S. wanted broader cooperation with Turkey and supported Turkey becoming a regional energy hub” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2003). Güler in the same press conference would say that he had briefed the ambassador on Turkey's plans on becoming a regional energy distribution center”(Ibid.). What Güler described as energy distribution center was coined as energy hub by US officials and news headline was: “Mann: US supports Turkey becoming energy hub”. Although it is difficult to know whether the hub term spread from this meeting exactly, it can be suggested that the term started to take attention in early 2000s and these sentences show how the energy hub term was understood by Turkey in that period.

“Energy distribution center” is also a meaning for “energy terminal” concept that allows to make energy terminal as almost synonymous with “energy hub” concept. However “distribution center” concept was implying a more physical function which “energy hub” and “energy terminal” concepts were not exactly meant considering that the “control of trade” approach was increasingly being integrated to pipeline issues. According to M. Bilgin (2010, p. 114) “energy hub” means “Turkey’s extensive influence on a web of oil and gas pipelines as well as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trade, not only in terms of its ability to influence transit terms and conditions, but also in re-exporting some of the hydrocarbons passing through this system.”

Gareth Winrow (2013, p. 154), on the other hand, differentiate a physical and trading energy hub: A physical energy hub requires “substantial energy infrastructure—ie., pipelines and facilities such as refineries, storage units, terminals, petrochemical

factories, gas liquefaction plants, etc.” and a trading hub requires “suppliers and consumers (to) meet and trade in hydrocarbons in an open and transparent market.”

Another definition of a country of energy hub similarly but more clearly explaining the situation is referring to “a country that buys energy resources in its borders and then re-exports them to other purchasers. In doing so it sets the selling conditions (theoretically) independently from the original producers and final buyers. Another component of an energy hub is the bigger infrastructure that is constructed for the production of petrochemicals for export, which Turkey aims to achieve” (Krauer-Pacheco, 2011, p. 27, note 23).

In this direction, the term energy hub was started to be used increasingly in time. In fact in the beginning, in English speeches or translations from Turkish, energy hub term is used more often while in Turkish “energy terminal (enerji terminali)” is preferred. In other words, English speeches of Turkish leaders included the energy hub term more frequently than the “energy terminal” which is in fact the direct translation of “enerji terminali” in Turkish. In Turkish speeches, however, the preferred term has been the original “enerji terminali”. This means that the English translation of the “terminal” as a Turkish word started to be taken as “hub” in English usage by Turkish leaders.

It is observed that the first usages of the “energy hub” term are in the speeches of Abdullah Gül, according to the reached texts. Abdullah Gül’s speeches, when compared within itself, included terminal and energy hub metaphors more than bridge and corridor roles. Possibly with the effect of making the international speeches in English, Abdullah Gül often used the “energy hub” metaphor as seen in the speeches since 2004 (Gül, 2007b, p. 302). But energy hub term would enter also to Turkish usage as “enerji hub’ı” and the vocabulary of energy issues would therefore meet another new concept.

Consequently, a crowded list of metaphors and terms were being used to describe Turkey’s locational role in energy transportation. And interestingly, all of the produced terms now could be placed together at the same time. In 2007, Gül (2007c, p. 225) was mentioning on Turkey’s roles as follows:

Standing as a natural *bridge* between the demand and supply side of the equation, Turkey is playing and will continue to play its role as a reliable partner in global energy security. Some 70% of world’s mineral energy resources lie in Turkey’s close vicinity. As you well know, Turkey is not only a major consumer. It is also an increasingly vital *terminal*, *energy hub* and transport *corridor* between the East and the West.

This usage of Gül shows the interesting path that Turkey’s energy discourse evolved. He starts with the very familiar bridge metaphor which is the first metaphor that Turkey used to describe its role, then pronounce terminal and hub just after it as they are synonymous and later corridor which was living the strongest days at that time in leaders’ discourse. This is also about the continuing need of making emphasis on the importance of Turkey’s geography and as in the previous period it can be taken as an unnecessary crowd of terms having more or less the same meaning. However the usage as “terminal-energy hub and transport corridor”, represents in fact two situations and functions which was clearer than the previous period. It was the meaning of corridor that was now becoming more associated with gas demand. On the other hand terminal-hub consequently became the term for oil and Ceyhan more strongly, but hub term also marked a sign of a new function which cannot be limited to oil. Because gas already became the main energy resource and energy trade started to focus around gas. Therefore hub has become associated with energy as oil and gas together, with latter’s increasing weight.

For the hub metaphor it can be said that it has been a subject on the agendas of Turkey and also the EU since the early 2000s but BTC, Nabucco and Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) projects prompted use of the term as its use started to spread quickly both in the EU and Turkey (Tangör and Schröder, 2017, p. 186). Therefore especially post-2006 period Turkey’s hub role is intensively discussed when compared to its corridor or transit roles, as will be explained in the next section.

Table 3.5 summarizes elements and factors related to Turkey’s discourse on energy transportation for the period 2002-2006.

Table 3.5: Turkey’s Energy Discourse (2002-2006)

Turkey’s Energy Discourse (2002-2006)	
Context:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ JDP period, increased activity in foreign policy. ▪ Strong commitment to EU ideals ▪ Bridge / Center State questioning ▪ Trading state-soft power ▪ Rapprochement to Russia
General geopolitical imagination:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Center of Eurasia ▪ Central State/not only Bridge (2004-onwards) ▪ Regional Power, Regional subsystem-collaborator ▪ Intense promotion of geography

List of headlines seen in the leader speeches that the energy discourse was constructed around	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Taking advantage of its geographical and geostrategic position between energy rich countries and energy consuming countries ▪ To be an energy corridor ▪ To be an energy transit country on the East-West and North-South axis ▪ Transformation of Ceyhan Terminal into an energy trade center ▪ Turkey as an energy hub ▪ Turkey is not only a bridge, it is a center state
Main Concept/Metaphor:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy corridor (Dominant discourse) ▪ Energy terminal/energy trade center/energy hub /emerging discourse)
Meaning (of energy corridor):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Multiple transit pipelines passing over Turkey (mainly East to West, later North to South) ▪ East to West projects: BTC, BTE, ITG, Nabucco projects. Maintaining the role of being Europe's energy route ▪ North-South projects: Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, Blue Stream 2
Used By:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All related actors

3.4. REDEFINING THE EXISTING GEOPOLITICAL ROLES FOR ENERGY TRANSPORTATION: UPGRADING FROM CORRIDOR TO TERMINAL/HUB (2006-2014)

3.4.1. Differentiating Energy Corridor and Energy Terminal

While the concept of energy corridor was enriched with North-South direction and connected to the terminal concept, a comparison of corridor and terminal roles started to be expressed since the end of 2006, emerged short after the same questioning on Turkey's bridge/center dichotomy. However it was not a direct confrontation of two roles, but rather beginning of a new role phase after the one which was successfully closed. So, one reason behind this change is that in 2006-2007 the projects that were on the energy agenda for a long time became operational such as the BTC oil and BTE gas pipelines that started to operate in 2006 in 2007⁴⁸, while Kazakhstan, too, officially accepted to join the BTC oil-pipeline project in 2006⁴⁹. On the other hand, the Interconnector Turkey-Greece (ITG)

⁴⁸ BTC's became operational on 4 June 2006. BTE's operation started in July 2007.

⁴⁹ Kazakh oil started to be transported through BTC starting from October 2008 (CNN Türk, 2009b).

started to operate since 17th November 2007 and the Trilateral Intergovernmental Agreement for the Interconnector Turkey–Greece-Italy (ITGI) Pipeline was also signed on 26 July 2007. These have been the important components for the realization of East-West energy corridor. It was also recent that the Blue Stream Pipeline to start to fully operate in 2005 as a North-South project, while Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline construction license was granted in June 2006 and groundbreaking ceremony was made in April 2007. On the other hand as noted above, the Annex to the Green Paper on energy of the European Commission (2006) was emphasizing “the strategic importance of Turkey for the delivery of crude oil and natural gas to Europe from Russia, the Caspian region, the Middle East and North Africa and it was noting on the Nabucco Project in which Turkey is on the route of the sources both from Caspian - Iran and North Africa through a Trans-Mashrek pipeline is “likely to provide a very significant additional import capacity”.

2006 Ukraine-Russia energy crisis was showing that Turkey was not only a route for non-Russian energy sources but also Russian energy sources to be transported to Europe via Turkey. In the European context, being a route for Russian or non-Russian energy sources has become Turkey’s advantage of being a player not only as business partner but also politically in competing projects. Despite some problems such as the non-presence of a Common European Energy Policy (İşeri, 2007, p. 21), Turkey was becoming increasingly confident about its importance to various regions which are energy importers and exporters. So in the context of the almost highest level of international energy demand and at the edge of the Europe- Russia energy crisis, Turkey found great opportunity to promote its role.

However, the before mentioned decreasing pace of Turkey-EU relations with the problems of accession of Cyprus into the EU and suspension of chapters due to the stand of Cyprus, approach of France and Germany against Turkey and internal EU crisis in addition to Turkey’s domestic concerns and attitudes made a negative turn which had also some effects on the energy area. Turkey’s geostrategic importance in EU’s energy security debate has been insufficient for EU about Turkey’s membership “even at a time when European countries appeared most dependent on Turkey to ensure energy independence from Russia” and this was to impede cooperation in Nabucco. Turkey’s closer energy relations with Russia and increasingly commercial attitude towards energy projects changed its role perception (Kardaş, 2011, p. 42).

Minister Hilmi Güler was explaining this commercial attitude over the terminal concept. He was noting in May 2006 that Ceyhan region was taking Turkey from the point of transit country to the point of terminal country. At the same time, while creating the Ceyhan region, there will be a slight glide of the center of gravity in favour of Turkey and they would put the concept of *trade* into these relations.⁵⁰ In December 2006, he was further explaining this meaning in the Parliament;

We are elevating into an energy terminal, of course, along with being an energy bridge, an energy corridor. There is a difference between corridor and terminal: You pay when you cross the corridor, it provides a transit income. When you are a terminal you are *trading* at the same time. Thus, it becomes a matter of buying and selling and makes additional value. So, the bridge and corridor were in the old concept, now we do not leave it, we add the terminal concept in addition to it (Güler, 2006b, p. 720).

This approach showed itself also in the Ministry's official budget presentation of 2007, made in December 2006, too, by the target of making Turkey an *energy trade center*. (Güler, 2006a). The presentation mentioned Turkey to carry the features of both an energy bridge and terminal. This shows a clear differentiation of bridge/corridor and terminal/center concepts which had a blurred line previously. In the new phase, bridge/corridor role which explains a carrying function is something important, a kind of a minimum level of gain, hence cannot be left, but it is politically insufficient to realize the Turkey's aspirations of being a central state. So the new meaning of energy terminal, i.e. energy trade center, is expressed as an "added value" to a corridor function.

As noted before, though terminal concept was signalling to an active role when first started to circulate in 1990s, it was not understood in the sense that Güler explained. The new usage of the term was clearly indicating a new function in such a way that it has not been declared before. As given in the definitions of hub above, "trading", in addition to attracting the oil and gas pipelines into Turkey's geography, was something about "setting" the selling conditions in oil and gas trade, re-exporting the resources arrive in Turkey, forming transparent international energy market and sufficient infrastructure allowing storage and production. In this sense, from that time on, the usages of "terminal" concept could be read as synonym to energy hub concept in terms of what is meant. As a matter of fact, Güler (2006b, p. 719) was noting that:

(...) main element in our energy policy is to be an important actor in the energy world. This is the first. Second: To be an active –not a passive–country. This is the most important point.

⁵⁰ Güler's expressions appeared in some web news. See for example 'Dikili'de jeotermal sempozyumu' (2006) and 'Tiflis-Ceyhan 13 Temmuz'da start alıyor' (2006).

And, of course, being at the control of the fountain⁵¹ in terms of fuels like oil, natural gas. This is very important, because now, natural gas and oil are also used as a weapon, as a foreign policy instrument. This is a remarkable advantage for us in this respect.

In this sense, with the start of the operation of the mention projects, Turkey perceived a contextual change with regard to its role and needed to develop and strengthen the new discourse which started to be seen in the speeches of Erdoğan's as well. Starting from 2006 and 2007, the target of functioning as an energy corridor or bridge became something achieved and in several speeches of the time Erdoğan noted Turkey has become an energy corridor.⁵² While the possibility of various projects were supporting this change, it was mainly due the long-delayed/now realized BTC Project's special importance and its becoming a tool for both corridor and terminal/center metaphors to become popular.

In a speech in January 2007, Erdoğan (2007a, pp. 18-9) was contributing to the establishment of a distinction between corridor and terminal roles in a way that becoming an energy terminal means moving forward from the achieved corridor status.

We have boasted for years with Turkey's "geostrategic importance", but we could not fill it up for this reason. We would have expressed the need to make an opening towards Eurasia, the Balkans, and the Middle East, but we could not find it with the realities of the world. Now, we are completing our foreign policy with a strong economic policy, with export, with energy policy.

Since Turkey has become an "energy corridor" today, our country has become indispensable for the European Union as much as it has been for the Central Asia, the Turkish world and neighboring countries.

Our relations with the international community are now developing and strengthening on the basis of 'interdependence'. We are no longer satisfied with being an 'energy corridor' Starting from Ceyhan, we move our targets to a more advanced stage. We turn Turkey into an 'energy terminal'.


Therefore, the blurred distinction between an energy corridor/bridge and terminal/hub that existed until that time became more visible. Along with these expressions, first of all, geostrategic importance is firmly associated with the roles in energy transportation. Second, energy terminal is constructed as a superior function over corridor or bridge and transformed into something different –or at least more concrete–than the meaning at the time of its birth. Third, a long time's discourse on being energy terminal and energy center therefore found a more clear definition that is integrated with trade specifically to be

⁵¹ In Turkish Güler expressed it as "çeşmenin başında olmak"

⁵² For example see Erdoğan saying that "We said we would make Turkey an energy corridor. Now we're doing this" (Ayn Tarihi, 2006). See also Erdoğan's "Address to Nation" in December 2006 (Erdoğan, 2003-2007c, p. 455).

applied for Ceyhan at first. At this point, an ambiguity existed whether Turkey saw itself as successful in achieving the terminal function and set “the trade center” as the new target. According to discourse, the corridor status was achieved, terminal which now gained a meaning same with energy trade center or hub became the new target. BTC project, together with BTE and ITGI, was seen as to make realize the corridor function rather than the terminal concept.⁵³ The below figure shortly summarizes the change in the discourse.

Figure 3.1: Re-definition of Geopolitical Role (2002 – 2006, 2006 onwards)



It is important here again to note that the evolving discourse of energy terminal-hub-trade center is first constructed through an imagination of Ceyhan’s role and then attached to Turkey. This can be grasped from the above sentence of Erdoğan: “Starting from Ceyhan, (...)We turn Turkey into an ‘energy terminal’”. Minister Güler, too, expressed Ceyhan or Turkey interchangeably as a future energy trade center. Yet, some details about Ceyhan’s function is specifically mentioned, such as the creation of a “Ceyhan Crude Oil Blend” (Güler, 2006a, p. 15), an oil center like Rotterdam (Hürriyet, 2006) , an integrated energy center where crude oil with different qualities and characteristics can be offered to international markets and refineries, petrochemicals plants and liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals exist. In such discourse, it is also important to remind again the negotiations on a possible Blue Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline and Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline were quite effective. The new terminal discourse was increasing the positive perceptions on Ceyhan and Turkey and thus paving the way for realization of these projects.

⁵³ In the 2011 Election Manifesto of JDP it is said that “in the period of our rule Turkey has become an energy base and energy corridor” (AK Parti, 2011). However it should be noted that although corridor status is expressed as “achieved”, it also maintained to be a target as many of the presentations made by MENRA at TGNA mentions corridor, terminal, hub functions as targets.

When looking at the larger picture, Kemal Kirişçi's application of trading state theory of Rosecrance (1986) to Turkish foreign policy of the first decade, suggesting that Turkish foreign policy was increasingly being shaped by economic considerations (Kirişçi, 2009, p. 39), has been an explanation to the way regional activity and policies were being shaped. As Kirişçi notes, Davutoğlu's *Strategic Depth* book, though not too elaborately dealing, touches to the issue of economics in his coverage of geo-economic factors (such as oil), assesses the importance of the Middle East for Turkey and pursuit of economic interest as the main element of diplomacy (Ibid., p.42; Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 25,332). Turkey's approach to pipeline issue has been a leading one in this sense, as Erdoğan's emphasis of "completing the foreign policy with a strong economic policy, with export, with energy policy" shows clearly. On the other hand, being trade and economy oriented can be handled with "Soft power" concept which the JDP government also adopted it to define Turkey's role in the region. Prime Minister Erdoğan, in his US visit in June 2005 was telling that Turkey's soft power is increasing (Çakır, 2005). Therefore a "more attractive way of exercising power than traditional means" (Nye, 1990), if we use Joseph Nye's words, was going hand in hand that a mixture of an approach trying to prioritize economics in foreign policy without leaving but softening power and geopolitics was at front. It was pointed out by Minister Güler that while energy had been a sub-unit of the foreign policy umbrella, it has been on top of that umbrella and gained a dominant feature that guided the economy (Ayın Tarihi, 2009).

Therefore Turkey's foreign policy direction from bridge to center, as started to be emphasized in 2003 and 2004, found its reflection in energy dimension of foreign policy beginning from especially 2006 and 2007, after the completion of BTC, BTE and ITG.

3.4.2. Possible Gas Projects and Turkey's Hub Role

In the post-2006 period, it is seen that Turkey started to involve in various gas projects routing to Europe, in addition to efforts on making Ceyhan an energy trade center. Although the realization of BTC and other project opportunities was giving oil issues and targets on Ceyhan a special place, the fact that gas started to occupy a larger part in the demand projections of consumers and the existence of a plenty of gas pipeline projects (BTE, Turkey - Greece, Nabucco) has made gas issue to keep increasingly a larger part in the role conceptions of Turkey.

Hence, possible natural gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Iran, from Iran to Turkey, from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia and the possibility of extensions from Iraq and Egypt (via the Arab gas pipeline) helped Turkey to implement pipeline politics as leverage in regional relations: with the EU and EU members (mainly Greece and Italy) on the demand side; Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Qatar on the supply side; Georgia, Syria, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy as transit countries. (Bilgin, 2010, p. 120). (See the full list of projects in Table 14 at the end of this section). In terms of the abundance of possible pipelines from multiple energy regions, which can be the minimum physical requirement of an energy hub-terminal-trade center, it can be suggested that Turkey was to pursue the new discourse with its practice.

However, one of the basic practical reason behind this activity was the EU's energy security concerns which was expressed since 2000 with Green Papers gained a new momentum. "Southern Gas Corridor" (SGC) initiative of the EU, as expressed in the "EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan" (European Commission, 2008), was foreseeing a range of pipelines to supply a significant amount of gas from Caspian and Middle East –southern- resources. The initiative was identifying a number of partner countries: Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Egypt and Mashreq countries. It is stated that "when political conditions permit" Uzbekistan and Iran "should represent a further significant supply source for the EU". Due to the less flexible arrangements and the network-bound structure of natural gas that is sold with long-term contracts to fixed outlets in regional markets, it is more difficult to reduce dependence on gas imports in contrast to crude oil (Winrow, 2006). Therefore, that Europe had to provide its gas supply security at least by diversifying its source country. In this sense, the initiative and the previous EU Green Papers 2000 and 2006 were creating a context in which Turkey takes place in almost all routes of the possible pipelines.

Within this context, Turkey was already working on its multilateral cooperation required by its new geopolitical projection. On 15 July 2007, it signed an agreement with Iran on cooperation for natural gas, allowing Turkey to produce and sell Iranian gas, therefore helping Iran in the embargo problem and providing Europe an additional alternative route. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Iran-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project (ITE) was signed on 17 November 2008. On 7 August 2007, Turkey signed

another MoU with Iraq declaring their will of cooperation for transporting gas to Europe.⁵⁴ Arab Natural Gas Pipeline with the route Egypt–Jordan–Lebanon–Syria–Turkey and Europe (after negotiations agreement was signed in 2009) and Qatar-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline project with the route Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria-Turkey to link Nabucco (agreement was signed in 2009) were the other Middle East sourced projects that Turkey sought for cooperation in these years.

Year 2008 had seen some regional developments. First, Russia lowered the volumes of gas supplies to Ukraine leading to supply disruptions in 18 EU countries – including Turkey and secondly, during the Russia–Georgia conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia destroyed large parts of Georgia’s infrastructure, and there are conflicting reports whether Russia intended to target the BTC pipeline or not, since the war had tremendous effects on the supply of Azeri oil (Nussy, 2014, p. 39). However, Erdoğan had noted that “relations with the Kremlin could not deteriorate following the Russian invasion of Georgia because then the lights would go out” and Gazprom has been a reliable supplier of gas over the Blue Stream Line when another crisis-the Russia-Ukraine crisis over gas pricing issues- broke put in 2009 the Western Line did not supply gas (Winrow, 2014, p. 6).

The renewal of attention on the European side on Nabucco Project was in these days. The Russian-Ukrainian-European gas crises of 2006 and 2009 both stimulated the formulation of a new EU gas security strategy, and more specifically, paved the way for stronger EU support for Nabucco which already launched in 2002 (Tagliapietra, 2015, p. 179). Following the European Commission’s November 2008 initiative- Strategic Energy Review–An Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan- to promote the project and to create a Caspian Development Corporation (CDC), in January 2009, the formal negotiations for the Nabucco began in Brussels. Finally, the intergovernmental agreement for Nabucco Pipeline was signed in 13th July 2009 in Ankara. Nabucco hence became the flagship project of the Southern Gas Corridor (Ibid).

⁵⁴ The energy relations with Iraq started with the federal government but towards 2010 and energy-based rapprochement took place between Turkey and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The exploration of large amount of oil and gas reserves in 2009 in the region has been quite effective while problems with Iraqi federal government also contributed in the developing relations of Turkey and KRG (Balci, 2014, p. 15) This was a manifestation of the determinative role of energy- Turkey’s dependence on oil and gas- in foreign policy.

Presentation of South Stream Pipeline Project⁵⁵, instead of the before mentioned Blue Stream 2, by Russia in 2007 as an alternative to Nabucco gradually turned into a competition between two rival projects, Nabucco and South Stream, in which Turkey occupied the center stage (Kardaş, 2011, p. 43). Turkey tried to keep balance between cooperation with Russia and Europe, while Middle East part was simultaneously handled. In these days, “Turkey as an energy hub” was also a discourse of EU officials. Moreover, attaching this role to Turkey in relation to gas was probably by EU-despite it is questionable that the definitions of both parts were same- and prompted Turkey’s adoption. Because Turkey’s energy hub-trade center target was still being defined overwhelmingly in relation to Ceyhan by Turkish officials (Güler, 2008; CNN Türk, 2009a⁵⁶; Yıldız, 2010, p. 18; ETKB, 2010, p. 31) while corridor role was expressed both as an achieved status to be reinforced and as a target (ETKB, 2010, pp. 2, 29-31). Regarding that Ahmet Davutoğlu, the minister of foreign affairs between 2009-2014, did not use a direct hub discourse⁵⁷, and any of the previously produced metaphors for energy, hub debate in relation to gas can be said to be heated up firstly by the EU. Yet, an existing role conception of hub-even it was mainly for oil-seemed to help EU to follow a similar discourse for Turkey’s role in gas transportation.

It was first in 2007 that high-ranking EU officials mentioned Turkey as an energy hub: In 2007 Günter Verheugen (2007) had underlined Turkey’s importance as a future energy hub at the “Bosphorus Prize for European Understanding” Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) award ceremony in Ankara (Tangör and Schröder, 2017, p. 187). It was followed by Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner for Enlargement. In his speech at the “Turkey as an energy hub for Europe: prospects and challenges” Conference

⁵⁵ South Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Project was foreseeing to transport natural gas from Russia through the rout of Black Sea, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria.

⁵⁶ Prime Minister Erdoğan, in his address to Nation in May 2009, was noting that “It can be seen from today that Ceyhan is considered to be an important energy distribution center and the largest oil sale terminal in the Eastern Mediterranean. This network of projects, which I have tried to make a panorama of in general terms, has created one of the world’s most important and largest energy maps. Turkey, in terms of location is right at the center of this map.”

⁵⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu as the architect of foreign policy of the era, did not frequently used the energy related terms or metaphors as much as their former counterparts. In speech texts of Davutoğlu, interestingly, none of the terms related to energy roles, i.e. energy bridge, energy corridor, energy center, energy hub, is used. But the intensive concept production and role construction of Davutoğlu and his geopolitical approach for Turkey’s position in general has much contributed to meaning world and expression style of JDP. In this sense Davutoğlu not directly but indirectly produced and inspired the pipeline discourse.

held on 4 March 2009, Rehn (2009) was emphasizing Turkey's role in gas transportation as follows:

The title of this Conference refers to hubs, and specifically Turkey as an energy hub. Clearly the EU can assist in turning Turkey into an energy cross roads. Nabucco is an important project in this respect. But as you know Turkey would also need to introduce a number of changes into its energy policy. Such changes are for instance the introduction of clear and enforceable rules on gas transmission, the liberalization of Turkey's domestic market at least for gas and the increase of investment on infrastructure, most importantly in gas storage.

At the Turkish side, starting from 2010, "hub" term with the exact usage in Turkish (not only by meaning but also as the word itself) and as not limited to Ceyhan, became more visible in the language of Turkish leaders (Gül, 2010; Yıldız, 2012, p. 41; Gül, 2013) and some official reports and documents (Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2013a, p. 38; ETKB, 2014, p. 25). On the other hand, use of the "energy center" concept continued (Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2011, p. 75; 2012, p. 69; 2013b, p. 91; 2014, p. 139; 2015, p. 114).⁵⁸ In the academic sphere there has also been an abundance of works that describe Turkey as an energy hub. As seen in the promotion of the other roles, i.e. bridge, corridor, terminal, center, Turkey's involvement in competing gas projects of EU and Russia, which are different in their nature and goals, was giving Turkey again a strategy card that supports its own conception about a hub role. Moreover, for the supply side, Turkey's large market and growing gas demand was also making Turkey a lucrative partner as an end consumer of gas, rather than just a transit country (Siddi, 2017, p. 51).

Therefore, in 2006-2014 period gas projects that were supported by Europe and their Russian competitors occupied a large part in Turkey's energy agenda and discourse. From 2007 until 2014, the South Stream pipeline was the Russian competitor of the Nabucco and SGC projects. Siddi (2017, pp. 59-61) notes that, from the Russian perspective, South Stream was meant to end GAZPROM's dependence on Ukrainian transit pipelines for its exports to Europe. Despite the strong support that it received from Moscow, the South Stream project was considerably hindered by its high cost and worsening market conditions. In 2013, following the decision of the Shah Deniz-2

⁵⁸ The above referred 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 Activity Reports of MFA described Turkey's energy strategy as follows: "The diversification of resources and routes in the supply of imported oil and natural gas, the increase of the share of domestic and renewable energy, the inclusion of nuclear energy in our energy cart, strengthening our role as a transit country, transforming our country into an energy center and contributing to Europe's energy security."

consortium to abandon the Nabucco project and supply instead the more modest TAP-TANAP pipelines, South Stream also lost its main geopolitical competitor. According to the Commission, South Stream did not comply with the EU's Third Energy Package. Shortly after the Commission's pronouncement, relations between the EU and Russia deteriorated considerably as a result of Ukraine crisis which resulted with the annexation of Crimea. In this context, Vladimir Putin announced the cancellation of South Stream and, during a press conference with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 1 December 2014, he stated that the project would be replaced by TurkStream which is 31,5 bcm capacity pipeline projected to carry gas from Russia to Turkey and to Europe.

Emergence of TANAP as the main pillar of the Southern Gas Corridor worth consideration that it constitutes a change in the formation of the cooperation: The project was created with the financial and technological capabilities of Azerbaijan and Turkey. As the co-financer of the project, Turkey showed its willingness "to play an autonomous role, unlike in the case of the Nabucco project, which appeared predominantly European", while Azerbaijan too manifested a growing confidence by expressing its demand for financing a major portion in the project (Kardaş, 2014, p. 8). In other words unlike similar projects, TANAP is driven by the supply side (Demiryol, 2013, p. 118) and by the motivation of Turkey to become an energy hub. BOTAŞ later increased its share in the project from %20 to %30 (with %58 SOCAR, and %12 BP) (HASEN, 2014, p. 12), which is "a significant indicator that through its active engagement in energy partnerships, Turkey is trying to move beyond its initial position of being a merely energy transit country towards becoming an energy hub" (Yılmaz and Sever-Mehmetoğlu, 2016, p. 120).

Table 3.6 summarizes elements and factors related to Turkey's discourse on energy transportation for the period 2006-2014.

Table 3.6 : Turkey's Energy Discourse (2006-2014)

Turkey's Energy Discourse (2006-2014)	
Context:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ JDP period, increased activity in foreign policy (increasing multidirectional foreign policy approach). ▪ Slowing pace of relations with EU, close relations with Russia ▪ Bridge / Center State differentiation

General geopolitical imagination:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trading state, soft power ▪ Start of operation of corridor projects (BTC, BTE, ITG) and upgrading to terminal approach ▪ Turkey’s involvement of competing projects of EU and Russia (Nabucco, South Stream, TANAP, Turk Stream)
List of headlines seen in the leader speeches that the energy discourse was constructed around⁵⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Central state/not only bridge (2004-onwards) ▪ Regional power, regional subsystem-collaborator, global partner, model country ▪ Intense promotion of geography ▪ Rhythmic diplomacy, vision-oriented, proactive, self-confident foreign policy ▪ Zero problem with neighbours ▪ Order-building actor ▪ Peace basin ▪ Maximum cooperation and economic interdependence ▪ Taking advantage of its geographical and geostrategic position between energy rich countries and energy consuming countries ▪ Turkey as an energy hub and corridor
Main Concept/Metaphor:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Energy terminal/energy trade center/energy hub (Dominant discourse) ▪ Energy corridor (continuing secondary discourse)
Meaning (Energy terminal/energy trade center/energy hub):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ An integrated energy center where oil and gas can be offered to international markets, petrochemicals plants and liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals and storage facilities exist, price conditions are set or controlled (since 2006. Formation of energy exchange ▪ Multiple oil and gas pipelines passing over Turkey
Used By:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All related actors except Davutoğlu

Winrow (2014, p. 11) notes that “For Turkey to become a genuine commercial hub where suppliers and consumers trade in an open, transparent, and well-regulated competitive market, the necessary physical infrastructure must be in place”.⁶⁰ Despite it is difficult to talk about a full realization, however, there is an abundance of possible pipelines, as noted before, from multiple energy regions, as the minimum physical requirement of an energy

⁵⁹ Utilized from Yeşiltaş & Balcı (2011).

⁶⁰ According to the report of World Energy Council Turkish National Committee (WEC Turkey, 2018, p. 45), too, a trading gas hub requires: “an advanced physical infrastructure, an improved regulatory infrastructure, independent transmission system operator, reforms to open up the free market and trade”

hub-terminal-trade center. It can be suggested Turkey's new discourse created this environment brought and intense activity especially with the help of the EU-Russia competition. Although it cannot be denied that Turkey's geographical position creates a motivation for international oil and gas transport projects, Turkey, without having resources, could promote itself as an energy state and partially attracted pipelines with its discourse.

However, Bilgin (2015, p. 68) notes that Turkey's energy strategy does not merely stems from a geopolitical agenda: "the growth of Turkey's domestic energy demand leads to initiatives to diversify supplies and suppliers." As noted before, Turkey's energy demand has a growing trend since 1990s (See Graph 3.4 in previous chapter). During the period of 1990-2008, the primary energy demand increase rate in Turkey was about 3 times higher than the world average in the same period and realized at 4.3 percent and similarly in electricity and natural gas it has become the second largest economy after China having the largest increase in demand (Güler, 2010, p. 5) and the trend has been in a similar direction till today. Primary energy supply increase rate has been 4,2 percent (average) 2003-2016 (Albayrak, 2017, p. 1) and expected to double in next ten years (Albayrak, 2016b, p. 1).

The increase of energy demand mainly derives from power generation sector which depends highly on imported natural gas (35,7 %) and secondly coal (31,9%), while it is followed by hydro (22,2 %) and wind energy (6%) as of 2017 (Albayrak, 2017, p. 23). In terms of primary energy supply, oil has also a big share. As of 2016, Turkey's primary energy supply was 136.2 million TEP. The share of natural gas in the primary energy demand was 28%, of coal was 28%, of oil was 31%, the share of hydraulic energy was 5% and of non-hydraulic renewable energy sources was 8% (Albayrak, 2017, p. 22). As a result Turkey tries to balance hydrocarbon use and decrease emissions with an effort to increase the share of renewables and nuclear power (ETKB, 2010, pp. 1-2; 2014, p. 9). Yet, oil and gas as imported sources have the largest portion in the energy mix. Possible delays on nuclear power may also bring more gas consumption and encourage further gas imports (Winrow, 2014, p. 4).

Table 3.7: Amount of Imported Natural Gas by Countries of Origin (Million Sm³)

Year	Russia	Iran	Azerbaijan	Algeria	Nigeria	SPOT LNG	Total
2017	28.690	9.251	6.544	4.617	2.080	4.068	55.250
Share (%)	51,93	16,74	11,85	8,36	3,76	7,36	100

Source: (EPDK, 2018)

Thus oil and gas demand in fact have a considerable effect on Turkey's activity on pipeline geopolitics especially in terms diversification of suppliers, despite the visibility and weight of the discourse belongs rather to geopolitical "hub" and "corridor" role of Turkey. In most of the projects Turkey is both a buyer and transit country. On the other hand, projects such as Turk Stream keeps the dependence on Russia as the same, if it does not bring an additional dependency. Yet, additional Azeri gas through TANAP to supply Turkey may help to change the share of suppliers.

For gas, beside the pipeline network, there are efforts to meet other requirements such as refineries, receiving terminals and storage units, liberalization and related market regulations (Winrow, 2014, p. 11; WEC Turkey, 2018, pp. 47-9) but not at a sufficient level. The 2015-2019 Strategic Plan of MENR (ETKB, 2014, p. 25) states itself that: "Due to its location, our country is suitable for being an energy hub, but there is a need for related infrastructure, market formation and regional activity requirements." The efforts on developing the pipeline network and developing the capacity of supply remains as the most active part of both discourse and practice.

In order to show the pipeline politics and activity of Turkey below there is Table 3.8 which is adapted from Krauer-Pacheco (2011, pp. 62-4) by doing some changes in the order of the list and expressions, and with addition of new columns, descriptions and updated information taken from MENRA, BOTAS, and several news websites and articles. It shows almost all of the oil and gas pipelines that are involving Turkey as buyer or as transit. 24 projects with realized, planned or not realized/cancelled/no progress status are included in the table. The projects are listed in a chronological order according to the time of first negotiations or their visibility in the agenda.

The letters at the beginning of each line of the table are used to indicate the current status of the projects, as follows: **E: Existing**, **C: Cancelled**, **IP: In Progress**, **PP: Project Phase**. The lines of E's are highlighted with green, IP's with lighter green, C's with grey

and PP's with light orange for an easier classification for the reader. This table also gives the latest status of the projects that are given in Table 10.

The projects in line 1 and 2 are pipelines feeding directly the Turkish market and resulted from Cold War period agreements. All of the other projects-realized or not- (Lines 3-24) belong post-Cold War period.

In detail, the post-Cold War period projects in line 3-11 are the ones that started to be negotiated 1991-2002 period and the ones in lines 12-24 started be on the agenda starting from 2003.

Except Iran-Turkey pipeline gas purchasing project (Line 6), the ones that are realized – 5 projects-are became operational starting from the year 2006 (Line 3,7,8,9 and 20).

In almost all of the projects, whether the source country is Russia, Azerbaijan or Middle East states, the final direction of the projects is Europe. However an obvious competition has taken place between the Russia projects and others.

Table 3.8: Existing, Cancelled and Project Phase Oil and Gas Pipelines Involving Turkey

	Status	Pipeline	Route	Length/Capacity	Oil-Gas Sources	First negotiations	Status Description	Turkey's role
1	E	Kirkuk–Ceyhan Pipeline	Iraq (Kirkuk)–Turkey (Ceyhan)	970 km/1.6 million barrels/day	Iraq	1970s Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 1973	Operating since 1977 (except 1990-1996 period due to Gulf War)	Final destination of Iraqi oil
2	E	Russia–Turkey West Natural Gas Pipeline	Russia-Ukraine-Romania-Bulgaria-Turkey	845 km / 6 bcm (initial capacity) + 8 bcm (according to the 1996 gas purchasing agreement) 14 bcm (current capacity)	Russia	Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 1984	Operating since 1987. Will be out of service after Turk Stream pipeline becomes operational.	Supplies Turkish market
3	E	Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline	Azerbaijan (Baku)–Georgia (Tbilisi)–Turkey (Ceyhan)	1,768 km/1.2 million barrels/day	Azerbaijan (Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field), Kazakhstan (Tengiz) and Turkmenistan	In 1992 Turkey started to negotiate with Azerbaijan. Production sharing agreement was signed in 1994. Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 1999.	Operating since 2006	Internal oil consumption and transit country (charging transit fees)
4	C	Trans Anatolian (Samsun–Ceyhan) Pipeline	Samsun–Ceyhan (inside Turkey)	550 km/1.5 million barrels/day (designed capacity), 1 million barrels/day (envisioned)	Russia, Kazakhstan	Started to be negotiated in 1994 Revitalized in 2005-2010	Start point was changed as Ünye instead of Samsun. Russian side declared the project to be economically unfeasible. Project was cancelled in 2013.	Supported by Turkey because it by-passes the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits

5	C-PP	Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline	Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey	2,400 km/30 bcm/year	Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan	1991 Agreement between Turkey-Turkmenistan Officially declared in 1997 under the concept of East-West Energy Corridor A Framework Declaration signed between the states in 1999.	Consortium cancelled in 2000. 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute renewed EU's interest in the project. In 2011 Turkish Minister Taner Yıldız stated that Turkey will buy gas from Turkmenistan through the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. In 2015 Turkey-Turkmenistan-EU-Azerbaijan Meeting was held. Ongoing negotiations, opposition of Russia.	Final destination of Kazakh and Turkmen gas for internal consumption of Turkey and Turkey as a transit country for Europe
6	E	Iran-Turkey pipeline	Iran (Tabriz)-Turkey (Erzurum)	2,577 km/10 bcm/year	Iran	1994-1995	In use since 2001	Supplies Turkish market and potentially Europe
7	E	Blue Stream I	Russia-Black Sea-Turkey	1,213 km/16 bcm/year	Russia	1994-1995	In use since 2003, opening ceremony was held in 2005.	Supplies Turkish market
8	E	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline (Also known as South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP))	Azerbaijan (Baku)-Georgia (Tbilisi)-Turkey (Erzurum)	691 km/6.6 bcm/year (phase I) 692 km/20 bcm/year	Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz 1)	Negotiations started in 2000. The Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 2001	Operating since 2007	Final destination of Azeri gas Supplies Turkish market; linked to Turkish gas distribution system
9	E	Interconnector Turkey-Greece-(ITG)	From Turkey (Karacabey Pig Station)-Greece (Komotini).	Turkey-Greece: 296 km/ 0,7 bsm	Caspian and Middle East	Started to be negotiated in 2000. Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 2003.	Operating since 2007	Turkey is a transit country for gas to Europe

10	C	Nabucco Pipeline Project	Turkey (Georgian/Turkish border and Iraqi/Turkish border)–Romania–Bulgaria–Hungary–Austria (Baumgarten gas hub)	3,800 km/25.5–31 bcm/year max. [Half to the transit countries and the rest distributed from the Baumgarten hub to Austrian, German and Italian markets]	Principally Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, but also could be Kazakhstan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt	The preparations began in 2002. Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 2009.	Cancelled in 2013.	Turkey is a transit country for gas to Europe
11	C	Blue Stream II	-	-	Russia	In 2002 Blue Stream 2, was proposed to expand the Blue Stream by the Samsun-Ceylan link and by branch to South Eastern Europe. In 2005, Putin and Erdoğan officially discussed building this second line. The idea of expansion to southeast Europe was replaced by the South Stream project in 2007. In 2009, Putin proposed a line parallel to Blue Stream 1 under the Black Sea, and further from Samsun to Ceyhan, for natural gas to be transported to Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Cyprus.	The project was replaced by South Stream, and later TurkStream. Extension to Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Cyprus was not realized.	Turkey is a transit country for gas to Europe or Mediterranean
12	PP	Iraq–Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline	Iraq–Turkey	185 km/Approx. 10 bcm/year	Northern Iraq	First negotiations started between Shell, BOTAS and TPAO in 2003-2004. Proposed to run parallel	Political crisis currently impedes progress.	Supply Turkish market and Turkey is a transit country for gas to Europe through

						to the Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline. MoU was signed in 2007. Turkey’s relations with KRG impeded progress In 2013, KRG independently signed an agreement with Turkey to build new pipelines with the ultimate capability of exporting 2 million barrels of oil per day and 10 bcm of natural gas per year from the KRG to Turkey		Nabucco or other projects related to Southern gas Corridor.
13	C	Arab Natural Gas Pipeline	Egypt–Jordan–Lebanon–Syria. Possibly to Turkey and Europe	1,200 km/10 bcm/year. 2–4 bcm/year to Turkey, and 2–6 bcm/year to Europe through Turkey	Egypt	Negotiations started with Egypt in 2004. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey signed an agreement to extend the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline through Syria to Turkey in 2009. Pipeline was built until Syria	Cancelled due the turmoil in the region.	Projected to supply Nabucco. Turkey is both buyer and transit country
14	PP	Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI)	From Turkey (Karacabey Pig Station)–Greece (Komotini). Extension beneath the Adriatic Sea from Greece to Italy of the Turkey–Greece Natural Gas Pipeline	Turkey–Greece: 296 km; Greece–Italy: 807 km/Approx. 12 bcm/year	Caspian and Middle East	Intergovernmental Agreement signed in 2007.	Currently no progress.	Turkey is a transit country for gas to Europe

15	C	South Stream	Russia–Black Sea–Bulgaria– 1)Serbia, Hungary, Austria, 2)Greece, Italy	900 km/63 bcm/year	Russia, Central Asia	MoU was signed in 2007 between Russian and Italian companies. Projected completion was in 2015.	Cancelled and replaced by Turk Stream in 2014	Use of Turkey’s exclusive economic zone
16	PP	Persian Natural Gas Pipeline Project	Iran (South Pars)– Turkey. Possibly Turkey–Greece and Italy	3,300 km/37–40 bcm/year	Iran	MoU between Turkey and Iran signed in 2008 for the pipeline to be operational in 2014. Turkish Council of Ministers took an expropriation decision in relation to the pipeline in 2013.	Currently no progress.	Supply Turkish market and possibly go further to Greece and Italy
17	C	Qatar-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline	Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria and link to the proposed Nabucco Gas Pipeline.	2000 kms	Qatar	Proposed by Qatar and MoU was signed in 2009 Rejected by Syria	Cancelled.	Supplies Turkish market and Turkey is transit country for Europe
20	E	Anatolian Transit Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP)	Azerbaijan–across Turkey–Europe	1850 km/16 bcm/year (projected to upgrading to 30 bcm) 6 bcm for Turkey 10 bcm for Europe	Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz 2)	MoU was signed in 2011, Intergovernmental Agreement signed in 2012. Construction started in 2015	Operation started in June 2018. Projected to reach full capacity in 2022. Gas flow to Europe will start in 2020.	Supplies Turkish market and Turkey is transit country for Europe 6 bcm for Turkey 10 bcm for Europe
21	IP	Trans-Adriatic Natural Gas Pipeline (TAP)	Turkey-Greece- Albania- Adriatic Sea-Italy	800 km/ 10 bcm	Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz 2)	In 2013, the Shah Deniz Consortium (SDC) announced that it has decided to reach Europe via Southern Europe through the TAP project. The Groundbreaking Ceremony of TAP	In progress. The first gas delivery to TAP is planned to be made in 2019-20.	To be connected to TANAP and supply Europe

						Project was held in Thessaloniki in 2016.		
22	IP	Turk Stream	Russia-Turkey-Europe	1090 km / 15,75 bcm/year x 2= 31,5 bcm (twin pipelines)	Russia	Russia declared the project to replace South Stream 2014 Intergovernmental Agreement was signed in 2016. Sea part of the pipeline was completed in November 2018.	Projected completion in 2019	Supplies Turkish market and Turkey as transit country for Europe 15 bcm for Turkey 15 bcm for Europe
23	IP	Turkey-Bulgaria Interconnector (ITB)	Bi-directional natural gas flow (according to the EU's 994/2010 Directive)	-	Bi-directional natural gas flow	Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2014.	In progress	Bi-directional natural gas flow
24	PP	Israel – Turkey Pipeline	Israel gas to Europe over Lebanon	-	Israel	On the agenda since 2013. Officials started to be discussed in 2016	The announcement in November 2018 that Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Italy agreed to build a natural gas pipeline from Israel's offshore gas fields to Europe seems to imply the cancellation of Turkish option.	Supplies Turkish market and Turkey is transit country for Europe.

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the discursive practices of Turkish political-governmental elites on Turkey's energy and pipeline policy in the post-Cold War era, for the years between 1991-2014. These practices, which have been subject to change, are assumed to serve the subjective construction of certain images, meanings or understandings to create a political space in foreign policy, specifically in the energy field. Using the framework of critical geopolitics and discourse analysis, the study is therefore an attempt to analyze Turkey's "evolving" discourses of geopolitics of energy transportation within the historical process of the given period.

First of all it should be noted that critical geopolitics is not a problem-solving approach and does not aim to give policy recommendation for decision makers. In this sense, it is limited to academic field in a scholarly way of questioning the geopolitical patterns that is accepted as self-existent, given or stable.

This thesis has moved from the suggestion that geography and geographical position does not have a reality by merely existing, rather, discursive practices attach meaning and function to a geography. In this sense, the case of Turkey's geographical position and function in energy transportation constitutes an example of discursive construction, not an exception to it. Hence, differently from the numberless classical, policy-oriented or policy critique point of view dominating the literature, this dissertation brings a different point of view for analyzing Turkey's role in regional energy geopolitics. Scholar works that deals with Turkey's general geopolitical position and geographical exceptionalism from a post-positivist/critical geopolitics perspective do exist, but there is only a recent few studies that applies this perspective to energy field. In this sense, this thesis is an attempt to fill the gap.

On the other hand, this research basing on only governmental elite discourse, i.e. practical geopolitics, makes unavoidably a partial account. Because discourse is produced not only by policy makers, as the practical-formal-popular geopolitics classification of classical geopolitics suggests. Formal-academic discourse and practical-official discourse has an intertwined relation and "policy recommendations" in academic works form the basis of this relation. In this sense there is need for a wider analysis that would contain the formal/academic discourse on Turkey's energy transportation roles, as a subject of a

future study. Yet, despite its limitations, the research contributes to the development of the studies of discourse analysis in Turkish foreign policy and especially the area of foreign energy policy which has been mostly studied utilizing classical approaches. It gives also a historical background for Turkey's foreign energy policy for all researchers wishing to study in the field.

Regarding the findings about the research, there can be noted some general points. Firstly, the discourse which is produced over energy geopolitics since 1990s has presented new policy tools and functions for Turkey: Turkey's geographical position in the new energy geography has been a new indicator of having/being a geographical exception in the post-Cold War context, has brought a new role in regional and world geography and even an additional identity that is correlated to a resource without having it. Hence, Turkey's geopolitical role in energy transportation whether it is expressed as bridge, corridor, terminal or hub, became one of its international roles among many others: energy became a major component of the discourse of exceptionalism. The validity of this role has been quite related to the context where the majority of the energy demand maintains to exist in the West and suppliers is in the East (Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East) or North (specifically Russia).

In relation to the first point, secondly, the discourse that supports Turkey's crucial role in energy transportation and gives it a new "energy identity" is adopted by almost all leaders since 1990s. This can be seen as a manifestation of the power of the global/upper or supra-context, i.e. the post-Cold War location of the majority of the energy demand and suppliers. It is this context that has shaped Turkey's discourse with lots of common points despite the differences in ideologies and views of governmental actors.

However, beside the global context there are sub-contextual changes that actually brings changes to Turkey's energy discourse. So, thirdly, beside the fact that the new geopolitical imaginations brought a new phase for Turkey's international representation in general, energy-pipeline policy has also had its own dynamics. The elements of regional energy relations, Turkey's own energy concerns and political relations that have become increasingly intertwined are among these dynamics. In this sense Turkey's formation of its energy discourse and policy has been connected to Turkey's general foreign policy direction, its relations specifically with Europe and Russia, and also the Middle East, and

its energy demand. Turkey in a way of enlarging the space of movement by the use of language in a geopolitically attractive way, tried to balance all these relations.

In relation with the third point, fourthly, Turkey's distance to Europeanness or Eurasianness as more general identifications has also been quite related with the use energy discourse. In the analysis of speech texts of leaders, the headlines that the energy discourse was constructed around has been identified as the indicators of the features of the related context, as given in the tables. In this sense, signs of attachment to Europeanness or Eurasianness have been among important headlines. This can also be translated as that the character of the relations with Russia and the EU has been effective almost in every period.

When it comes to the main specific findings of this study which is related to the sub-contextual changes, it can be said that the details lay behind the evolving uses of the concepts and metaphors. Turkey's geopolitical importance in regional energy transportation is constituted through concepts and especially metaphors that have different meanings and foresees different functions for the same geographical position. So, remarkably, one of the metaphors dominated the discourse in certain time periods, while another did so in another time period. On the other hand, simultaneous use of metaphors helped keeping multiple policy choices available at hand, while re-defining the metaphors in use such as terminal, corridor/bridge brought new understandings of role imaginations and policies.

Here it is important to emphasize firstly the role of metaphor: "The pervasiveness of metaphors in thought and words is so commonplace that people typically do not take note of the metaphorical origins of everyday expressions" (Michael, 2011, p. 10). What differs a metaphor from a simple expression is that they direct the listener/reader to understand the thing in question in a certain way, resulting with the creation of a meaning presenting more than what it is. "Metaphors trigger a mental association between two things that is not immediately apparent through overt comparison by explicit analogy" (Michael, 2011, p. 11). Using metaphors to describe and characterize geography does the same. Geography when described with a metaphor becomes more than what it is and evokes certain types of understandings and consequently actions, policies according to the meaning the metaphor create. In this sense, metaphors are somehow symbols and symbols are not the thing they represent. Hepple (1992) gives Ratzel's organic state metaphor as

an example to how a geographic metaphor affect a wider scene and have social and political consequences, even tragedies in the sense that how a metaphor can be tool of a justification. In the case of Turkey's geographical roles in energy transportation, it is difficult talk about such metaphors that would result with tragedies. However, it is apparent that Turkey acts in a specific way according to how it characterize itself through the metaphors it uses. Describing Turkey's geography as a bridge by its governors, in this case, is so much different to say that it is "important" since it implies the role that the state wants to play (Yanik, 2009, p. 544).

On the other hand, when one metaphor is preferred to another, it means that the tie and relation between the discourse/metaphor and the thing referred is weakened (Yeşiltaş, 2012, p. 125) as a result of the change in the context and a new metaphor is needed to be applied.

In this sense, the years between 1991-1994, 1994-1998, 1998-2006 (with two sub-periods: 1998-2002, 2002-2006), 2006-2014 have been identified as the periods that one representation is preferred, while the others has become weaker although not totally abandoned. Following the assumption that discourse is followed by policy, it is assumed that a specific metaphor has become the tool of a specific policy. That is, changes in the use of metaphors have been the expressions of breaking points of policy, while the simultaneous use of the metaphors is seen as an effort to enlarge the space of policy for balancing between seemingly different policies.

1991-1994 has been a period of meeting with the energy field. Energy and pipelines started to appear in speeches within the early euphoria towards Central Asia and Caucasus. Turkey's traditional bridge role is adapted to energy in a post-Cold War pro-Western context, but it is difficult to talk about a specific energy discourse. Thus bridge as an existing and handy concept has been superficially applied to a possible role in energy transportation, almost without a mention of Turkey's lack of energy sources. Here the function of the bridge of energy is mainly characterized by serving to West/Europe: Turkey would serve as a bridge, from East to West, to close the energy gap of Europe by transporting rich energy sources of the East, thus be indispensable for Europe and prevent exclusion from the EC-EU.

1994-1998 is the exact beginning of constructing a geography of energy in which Turkey is an actor. The language of the political leadership is focused around the metaphor of

“terminal”, i.e. “energy terminal” and later “energy center”. The metaphoric usage of the “energy terminal”, which is innovatively developed for the first time in Turkey, was representing the effort of attracting the potential parties engaged in the possible energy transportation projects to cooperate with Turkey in a way that Turkey’s geography would physically be the arrival point of the transported oil and gas. This meaning of terminal is not directly defined by leaders but can be grasped from the way that it has been used in mid-1990s. The use of the term has represented a change of policy towards Caucasus and Central Asia, from a cultural-political policy to a policy with economic concerns. It has also given a sign of the new policy and energy cooperation with Russia that was realized through the late 1990s.

So, by using the terminal concept, Turkey started to ideationally construct an energy (first and foremost oil and later gas) geography on its territory to enable the projects in the agenda. Though the term was evoking a more powerful and active function than bridge, and a more multi-directional position that is not limited to East-to-West, it can be said that the difference between the two –bridge and terminal–has seemed ambiguous. Because, “energy terminal” concept finally went hand in hand with the BTC oil transportation project which is the essential part of the East-West energy corridor concept and the official version of US policy on diverting energy routes from Russia to other geographies. This has made the bridge and terminal metaphors hardly inseparable. However, when read together with Turkey’s increasing Eurasianist discourse, rapprochement with Russia and the changing foreign policy understanding on those days, it seems that the terminal metaphor included a hidden hybridity or centrality not limited to serving West. In this sense Turkey’s invention of itself as an “energy terminal” has been quite practical that it enables energy cooperation with West by the matching of BTC project-Ceyhan as terminal of East to West energy transportation, “proves” geographical importance, foresees partnership not only with West but also with Russia since new oil and gas projects was started to be negotiated. In addition to BTC, the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline agreement (and its possible extension), negotiations on Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline project and energy relations with Iran have been the practices of this discourse. The accompanying use of “energy center” term since mid-1990s has reinforced the multifaceted foreign policy of Turkey in engagement to possible routes of energy transportation.

Years between 1998-2006 presents a mixed discourse in which simultaneity of the usage of corridor and terminal/center metaphors was becoming clearer. “Energy corridor” as a role to be played by Turkey has made an entrance to the discourse of leaders starting from 1998, inspired by the declaration of the idea of East-West energy corridor by US. To be a corridor quite resembled the bridge function in terms of the direction East-to-West and the transit role but it had a different character. As a matter of fact the official name of the project was not coined as East-West Energy Bridge but “corridor”. Because corridor, beside the meaning of being a passage way for oil and gas, has also implied technical-political dimensions. Actually a corridor would be possible with the final agreement of many partners starting from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan as suppliers, Europe at the user side and Turkey as both user and transit. The corridor metaphor hence is a whole. However, Turkey by presenting itself as “the corridor” tried to attract the attention on its own inclusion to possible agreements and stay involved in the transportation projects, thus focused on “being the essential part” of projects. Thus it redefined and used the corridor with a closer meaning to “bridge”, but by speaking with the Western energy terminology. On the other hand, however, late 1990s was years Turkey’s Eurasian and also multifaceted direction was also quite strong that “center of Eurasia” and “energy terminal” or “energy center” uses was dominating the discourse until early 2000s.

In early 2000s energy agenda of Europe and Turkey’s Europe agenda was reciprocally intensified and created a European context both for foreign and energy policy of Turkey. In practice, the number of the projects negotiated have increased both with the effect of EU’s new concerns of energy security and Turkey’s increased activity in foreign policy with special focus to EU. So that till 2006, Turkey promoted itself as an “energy corridor” more than ever, while “terminal” concept has also been used without a change. So that, remarkably Turkey’s relations with the EU and the intensity of the use of corridor metaphor went very parallel. While the discourse of “energy corridor” was strongly adopted in terms of the East-West directed projects, a North-South dimension of corridor has been added, resembling much the 1990s starting with a West-dominant policy and turns to a Russian and Eurasian one especially through the end of 1990s. Moreover, the projects on the agenda have been the renewed versions of the previous ones: Blue Stream 2 and Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline projects have again added the North-South directions to Turkey’s role. Therefore, the strong European direction of the first years of JDP’s

policy on transit energy projects policy and the later inclusion of North-South dimension seems like a repetition of a situation of Turkey going between Europeanization and Eurasianization not only in its foreign policy but also in its energy policy.

What makes 2006 a breaking point is redefining the existing geographic roles for energy transportation in a way differentiating energy corridor and energy terminal, moreover “upgrading” from a passive corridor to an active terminal that turns Turkey into an energy market in which Turkey controls energy trade and have the right to re-exporting energy, mirroring the transformation of Turkey’s geopolitical imagination and self-perception from bridge to “center state”. So while the roles are differentiated they are redefined and constructed differently than their previous versions.

Previously, to be an energy corridor meant an advantageous role that would be aspired and understood as replaceable with terminal function. With the realization of BTC, BTE and ITG projects which have said been said to make Turkey an energy corridor, it has now become a secondary role with regard to terminal that now means to be an energy “trade” center. Similarly while “energy terminal” previously meant a physical distribution point more to imply a physical-directional center including North-South not only East-West, now the type of function has gained a different meaning which has been completed with the emergence of the discourse of “energy hub”. Ceyhan and oil has been the starting point in the adoption of the role, regarding especially the Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline project.

In the post-2006 period, it is seen that Turkey started to involve in various gas projects routing to Europe, in addition to efforts on making Ceyhan an energy trade center. In terms of the abundance of possible pipelines from multiple energy regions, which can be the minimum physical requirement of an energy hub-terminal-trade center, it can be suggested that Turkey was to pursue the new discourse with its practice. So that, in the context of the increase of the role of gas and the intense agenda of competing gas pipeline projects through 2010s, such as Nabucco, Blue Stream 2, Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, South Stream, TANAP and Turk Stream, “hub” concept-as being not limited to oil and Ceyhan- became more visible in the discourse of Turkish leaders. “Hub” has become a suitable metaphor for Turkey’s geopolitical role, regarding that the EU was also describing Turkey as a future energy (gas) hub. Having in mind that it is a question whether the perception of the EU about Turkey’s role has matched the one adopted by

Turkey, it can be suggested that EU's discourse has reinforced that of Turkey. A future study on a comprehensive analysis of practical discourses of both sides can contribute more to this discussion. On the other hand, energy relations with Russia has also been effective in Turkey's adoption of the hub discourse, especially in terms of giving Turkey a geopolitical leverage and card, and credibility as the transit partner for Russia. This has been a "classic" in the post-Cold War era since the Blue Stream Pipeline's coming to the fore. Turkey's dependency on Russian gas has stayed behind in the discourse, while it is one of the basic determiner of the relation.

It is important to note again that since the emergence of the energy discourse in Turkey, none of the metaphors and concepts are totally abandoned. The given periods are showing the dominant metaphor among others which now represent weaker ties with the related context. However, simultaneous use of metaphors (for example corridor and terminal) with nearly equal visibility in some periods has created a conceptional chaos. This can be evaluated as a way of keeping multiple policy choices, with concerns of both EU and Russia, at hand.

Regarding the research questions of this dissertation below answers can be a summary of findings: "How Turkey's political leadership constructs different geopolitical imaginations and images of energy transportation roles through its discourse?" The answer in short is "by using acceptable utterances that are suitable to the context, such as corridor, hub and which were already in use and familiar to the related actors, Turkey tried to shape the context in favour of itself." "How it shapes certain political spaces through discourse as a way of responding the contextual changes?" The answer in short is "by simultaneous use of metaphors and keeping multiple policy choices available at hand and re-defining the metaphors in use in tandem with the new imagined role and context."

Recently it is seen that the discourse of energy hub is sometimes replaced by "energy base" concept that in 2016 and 2017 the then minister of Energy and Natural Resources Berat Albayrak (2016a; 2016b) used "energy base and terminal", "energy trade and distribution base" and "energy base and energy corridor" expressions for Turkey in his 2016 and 2017 budget presentations to TGNA. Quite interestingly, 2018 budget presentation of Albayrak (2017) does not mention corridor, terminal or base concepts for the first time, but notes Turkey as a stable and secure "energy actor" not only being a

bridge connecting west and east, while he does not abandon the expression of the target of being an energy trade center. It is a question whether this is an effort of gathering all the produced utterances under the “actor” concept or whether these slight differences in usage of the concepts bring a policy change or a major discursive change in the future. As told before, discursive changes occur as a response to contextual changes. So, contextual changes will likely to transform discourse and practical geopolitics as it did before. Then what kind of contextual changes can Turkey face in relation its role in energy transportation?

Among these contextual changes, rise of LNG is worth consideration. While the increasing share of LNG in the inter-regional energy trade which may provide alternatives for diversification of supply for Turkey such as LNG purchases from Qatar, it can also undermine financial feasibility of alternative pipeline projects and threat Turkey’s “crossroad” or hub position. (Yılmaz and Sever-Mehmetoğlu, 2016, pp. 108-9). Another contextual change is the increasing energy demand in Asia (as China and India foremost) which becomes rival of Europe as the “buyer” side and change the current dynamics of energy geopolitics (Ibid., pp. 109-10) and affect Turkey’s current geopolitical imagination. Because as noted before, the validity of Turkey’s strategic role in the energy geography has been quite related to the context where the majority of the energy demand is in the West. Therefore, geopolitical roles and discourse on them are contextually bounded, rather than being natural and stable.

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