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CONSCRIPTION & COUP D'ÉTAT, A CORRELATION ANALYSIS

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ISTANBUL, 25 JULY 2018

I, REBECCA VERWIJS;

Hereby declare that this Master Thesis is my own original work and that due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources.

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25 July, 2018

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

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
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ABSTRACT

VERWIJS, REBECCA. CONSCRIPTION & COUP D'ÉTAT, A CORRELATION ANALYSIS, MASTER'S THESIS, Istanbul, 2018.

The objective of this thesis is to analyse the relation between conscription and coup d'état. The intention of the thesis is to fill a gap in the literature regarding both conscription and coup d'état since no quantitative research on the combination of both topics has been performed yet. Although several countries are currently using conscription with the justification that conscription is supposed to protect the country from coup d'état. These expressions are thus completely speculative since there is no research to back up this claim that conscription in fact protects an country from coup d'état. The relationship between conscription and coup d'état has been analysed through the mean of several variables: democracy; freedom index, polity IV index, and regime type, economy; GDP per capita and the GINI, military management; military expenditures per capita and military personnel per capita, religion; Islam, Christianity and others, fractionalisation; religious and linguistic and lastly through the variable of colonisation. These variables have been chosen in order to reflect the extent and complexity involved with coup d'état as well as with conscription. The research has made use of quantitative research methods using a zero-inflated Poisson regression. The results of the zero-inflated Poisson regression show that there is in fact a relation between conscription and coup d'état. The analyses showed an inverted nonlinear relation between GDP per capita, conscription and coup d'état, where the increase of GDP per capita, and years of conscription exercised in a country showed an increase of coup d'état up to a certain point, after which the relations ceases to exist. Other relations with coup d'état could be found with the variables of democracy, economy, military personnel, religion and linguistic fractionalisation. There, however, does not show to be a relation between military expenditures, religious fractionalisation or colonialism and coup d'état.

Keywords: conscription, coup d'état, democracy, economy, military management, religion, colonisation, relationship, coup-proofing

ÖZET

VERWIJS, REBECCA. ZORUNLU ASKERLİK & DARBE, KORELASYON ANALİZİ, YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İstanbul, 2018.

Bu tez, literatürde zorunlu askerlik ve darbe konularını aynı anda ele almış nitel bir araştırma bulunmaması dolayısıyla var olan boşluğu doldurmaya katkıda bulunma amacı gütmektedir. Öte yandan bazı ülkeler an itibariyle zorunlu askerlik uygulamasının hükümet darbelerine karşı koruyacağı çıkarımında bulunmaktadır. Bu tür ifadeler, zorunlu askerliğin ülkeler için darbeleri engelleyici özellikte olduğunu destekleyecek çalışmalar bulunmaması dolayısıyla spekülatif olma özelliğinden kurtulamamaktadırlar. Bu çalışmada, zorunlu askerlik ve darbe arasındaki ilişki birkaç değişken üzerinden analiz edilmiştir: demokrasi; özgürlük indeksi, demokrasi düzeyi, rejim türü, ekonomi; kişi başına gayri safi yurtiçi hasıla ve gini katsayısı, ordu yönetimi; kişi başına ordu harcamaları ve kişi başına düşen ordu mensubu sayısı, din; İslam, Hristiyanlık ve diğerleri, ayrışım miktarı; dini ya da dil bakımından ve son olarak da kolonileşme değişkeni. Sözü geçen değişkenler, zorunlu askerliğin ve darbenin kapsam ve karmaşıklığını yansıtabilme amacı güdülerek seçilmiştir. Bu çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden sıfır değer ağırlıklı poisson regresyon kullanılmıştır. Sıfır değer ağırlıklı poisson regresyon sonuçları zorunlu askerlik ve darbe arasındaki ilişkiyi işaret etmiştir. Analizler sonucu kişi başına gayri safi yurtiçi hasıla, zorunlu askerlik ve darbe arasında ters-lineer olmayan bir ilişki tespit edilmiş, kişi başına gayri safi yurtiçi hasıla ve bir ülkede zorunlu askerliğin uygulanma süresi yükseldiğinde darbe sayısında da yükseliş gözlenmiş ancak bir noktadan sonra bu ilişki yok olmuştur. Darbe değişkeninin demokrasi, ekonomi, ordu mensubu sayısı, din ve dilsel ayrışım değişkenleriyle de ilişkisi bulunmuştur. Öte yandan, darbe değişkeninin askeri harcamalar, dini ayrışım ya da kolonileşme değişkenleriyle ilişkisi bulunamamıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: zorunlu askerlik, darbe, demokrasi, ekonomi, ordu yönetimi, din, kolonileşme, ilişki, darbe engelleyici.

INTRODUCTION

One of the main objectives people have in life is to be safe. This means that we do not need to worry about any possible threats to our freedom. It does not matter whether this is our freedom of speech, freedom of expression or freedom of democracy. As long as we feel like we live in a stable, honest and threat free country we could call ourselves safe. Yet, often the intention to establish this safety might be there, but the means to establish it could be anything but safe.

One can consider a capable and robust army as a mean to establish safety, after all, it does protect us against any potential threats. However, what if the threat came from within the army? What if was the institute that was meant to keep us safe was the threat in disguise?

Stepping into the shoes of a parent having to send their son or daughter to the military, the mere act would harm our feeling of safety, let alone if this act is involuntary, such as is the case with conscription. We would not give young people the actual choice of whether or not they would be willing to put their lives on the line for what the government would decide.

On the other hand, generation after generation is represented within the army. Whether one is coming from different ethnicities or religions, everybody would have to serve, thus creating an honest representation of the population within a countries most prominent safeguarding institute. So even when threats were to come from within the country at least the army would still try to establish the safety of the people they represent.

This means that if a country would like to protect itself from one of the biggest internal threats, that of a coup d'état, the diversity of a civilian army could potentially protect against any particular groups who would like to seize power. Executing conscription would in theory thus be an excellent way to coup-proof a country. Yet, is it really?

As mentioned, the conscripts form a moderately good representation of a population, so also for all the interests, they might have, such as economic growth and democracy. If those interests were to be threatened, even though it might be by a countries own government, the army would most likely still be trying to safeguard the population's interests. In this case, it would mean that the army would perform the coup themselves and the risk of a coup would be higher by implementing conscription.

This leads to the main inspiration behind this research: does conscription keep us safe or does it form a threat to our safety. Looking at it from a battlefield effectiveness point of view, one can argue that effectiveness is based on a country's ability to develop a cohesive military staff, to train them in at least the basics of warfare and to give them the knowledge and resources to perform complex and effective operations (Talmadge, 2011). Now the instituting of conscription in itself will already harm the military cohesion (Marks, 2016), the short period of time conscripts are in active duty limits the training possibilities, which in the end leaves them often unfit to perform any high-risk and complicated operations (Jehn and Selden, 2002). One can thus conclude shortly that the implementation of conscription harms a country's battlefield effectiveness, especially when it comes to external threats. However, does conscription also decrease a country's effectiveness when it comes to internal threats?

The most significant internal threat against a country will at this moment form the primary focus. Does conscription form a higher or lower risk for a coup d'état and if so, under which circumstances? The following thesis will look at the correlation between several variables and try to establish whether or not conscription has a correlation with coup d'état or forms a unique effect with the variables of democracy, economy, regime type, military management, religion, fractionalization and that of colonisation. The unique effect would show that the risk a certain variable has on its own would increase or decrease towards coup d'état once taken in combination with the presence of conscription.

Background

With currently 64 countries in the world exercising conscription (CIA Factbook, 2018), this way of recruiting military personnel and so seemingly increasing national security shows to be reasonably accessible. It has even been argued that through the implementation of conscription democratic regimes can find a more stabilising existence (Antonis Adam, 2012). It seems that conscription is often also linked to a country's instability, both on a democratic and economic level (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2011), and most present during the high of such volatility, namely that of a coup d'état. So, when countries think they are stabilising their democracy through conscription, they are in fact weakening it.

An example of such a country is Turkey. Here conscription is still used with the intention to consolidate democracy (Sarigil, 2015). Looking at the decline in both democracy (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018) and economy growth (The World Bank, 2017) it seems to do anything but. The country has faced seven coup d'états, of which three were attempts, since the 60's: 1960, 1962, 1963, 1971, 1980, 1997 and 2016 (Powell and Thyne, 2011), during which time the country also exercised conscription (Nathan Toronto, 2014). These coups in itself have weakened the country further by damaging the international trust to invest, and the following states of emergency damaged the national trust in democracy (Catterberg, 2006).

Conscription has faced some recent criticism in Turkey (UNHCR. Besides the current political instability in the country and with its neighbours, Turkey has created a system where the representation of the population within the army does not seem like a fair one anymore. Having created a buy-out situation, possible conscripts could buy themselves out of having to perform their service. If they have worked abroad for a period longer than three years, they could pay up to 18000 Lira to exempt themselves from service (Redvers, 2016). However, this sum of money plus the costs and opportunity to work abroad are difficult to achieve by those coming from lower economic classes within the country. Thus they will have to fulfil their service. The representation within the army will so be less dispersed as generally is the norm with conscription.

Another case is that of Bolivia. Bolivia has used conscription for over almost a century to increase the size of its army and to ensure safety along its border with neighbouring countries (Shesko, 2011). Although it has known mostly safety along its borders, it also had had 16 coups in the period between 1946 and 1981, after which the country established a presidential democracy (Marshall and Marshall, 2016). Over the same period, the GDP per capita showed a slight increase (Bolt and Inklaar, 2018) yet the freedom index showed a significant decrease (Pemstein et al., 2010), meaning that although in income of the country increased, the distribution of this income is highly likely to have been distributed unequally. This would have led to the general sense of dismay amongst the population and could have potentially led to the incentive of the civilian army to commit coups.

The conscription in Bolivia has also been criticised, but mostly from an international perspective. Since the army in Bolivia is relatively small, the country sticks to a quota to maintain a certain level of security. Whenever this quota is not met, conscription is executed to fill the missing numbers. Generally, this would mean that eligible men and women above 18 would be drafted. However, Bolivia has shown throughout the years that it is willing to recruit boys as young as 14, thus enforcing child labour (UNHCR. Since the use of child soldiers under the age of 15 has been made illegal by the additional protocols in 1977 to the 1949 Geneva convention, it means that act of Bolivia drafting conscripts as young as 14 is in itself against international law, and thus illegal (Child Soldiers International, 2018).

The following thesis will try to explain the relation between the variables of conscription and coup d'état; How is conscription, the economic and democratic state of a country, military management, religion, fractionalization and colonisation related to coup d'état and the risk of having one? By analysing this relationship, this thesis hopes to give a broader and updated view of existing literature as well as challenging general views on the use of conscription as a mean of coup-proofing.

Problem definition

The problem at hand here exists out of the belief that conscription actively contributes to the coup-proofing of one's state, yet the harmful effects of conscription argue the opposite. The challenge though is that the availability of literature and research on the matter is low and lacks any results beyond mere speculation. So far there has been no evidence that either qualitative or quantitative research exists on the relation between coup d'état and conscription. Data is available on the short-term and long-term effects of conscription when it comes to both economy and democracy (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2011), but although many scholars argue that conscription should work as a mean of coup-proofing, no research has been performed on the matter to check the legitimacy of this claim.

The reason why conscription should work in theory as a successful way of coup-proofing is that an army existing out of conscripts are more likely to side with civilians than their professional superiors (Antonis Adam, 2012). Often civilians are the ones who stand to lose rather than gain during a coup d'état, which would make it highly unlikely that an

army made up out of conscripts would actively participate in a coup against its civilians (Antonis Adam, 2012).

Another reason working in favour of the claim that conscription can be used as a way of coup-proofing is that a conscript army is less organised than a complete professional one (Albrecht, 2015). Soldiers swap positions based on the length of their service which makes them less able to get organised and learn the necessary skills to perform a successful coup d'état. This lack of necessary skills can also be explained by the short period of time which conscripts are serving their service. This restraint limits the training possibilities, which in the end leaves them often unfit to perform any high-risk and complex operations, such as a coup d'état (Jehn and Selden, 2002).

Lastly, conscription ensures an equal distribution and representation of the population within the army. Minorities and different ethnicities are represented amongst the group of conscripts. This equal representation lowers the chance of discontent within these particular communities and helps to prevent any particular ethnic, social or religious class or groups to take control of the military power (Albrecht, 2015).

On the opposite of the spectrum, there are also several reasons to believe that conscription does not benefit a country and thus should not be used as a way of coup-proofing. One of the reasons to believe that conscription is not beneficial is the economic burden conscription puts on a country (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2011). It is argued that conscription takes away the comparative advantage which should ensure that people perform the jobs they do because of their skills and knowledge rather than “forced” assignment (Konstantinidis, 2011). Next to this, the costs of conscripts might seem lower than that of a professional army, but one should not forget the comparative loss that conscripts are causing outside of the army where specialists and professionals are needed but now have found their place to be in an unrelated job within the military (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2007).

Another reason not to implement conscription is that of an ethical and democratic nature. The major problem with conscription is the seemingly mere lack of human rights. The fact that actively participating in the military service is forced rather than free will takes away the fundamental natural right to liberty (Donnelly, 1982). There is a general acceptance that forced labour is a violation of human rights, and yet this does not seem

to be the case with forced military service. Thus, although a country might want to stabilise and grow its democracy by implementing conscription, the mere act of conscription does not seem to be democratic by itself. Hence a paradox exists.

So far, the effect of conscription on a countries democracy, economy and risk of coup d'état does not reach much further than mere speculation. It is thus highly interesting to research the correlation conscription has with the level of democracy and economic growth in relation to the risk of coup d'état and possible coup-proofing.

Expected contribution

Beyond the mere interest and to fill a visible hole in the literature, the research into conscription, coup-proofing and various other variables such as democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalisation and former colonisation, would be of importance for multiple reasons. The following thesis will intend to falsify the claims of previous scholars about conscription.

The literature suggests that conscription is a successful mean of coup-proofing. It is supposed to form a natural bond between the army and the civilians and keep the army from executing any violent takeover on its people. The unprofessional organisation of the conscripts should also make it more complicated to organise a coup (Albrecht, 2015). The data of the thesis will hopefully show whether or not implementing conscription does in fact protect a country from coups.

Moreover, the thesis will try to explain why, while implementing conscription, coups are still happening. Even though conscription is argued to be a way of coup-proofing a country it does not seem to prevent it entirely. This thesis will look at several other variables as well to see what their relationship is with coup d'état and if this relation gets stronger or weaker when taken in combination with conscription.

It is important to highlight though, that before this thesis, there had been no evident research done on the possible correlation between conscription and coup d'état. The statement that conscription is a successful method of coup-proofing is thus mere speculation based on other variables and not on actual proof. The outcome of this thesis could thus falsify these speculations or could support them with actual data.

Structure

The structure of the following thesis will begin with an extended literature review summarising existing research and information available on the thesis topic in question. The literature review will start with an elaborative explanation of both the terms conscription and coup d'état, what it is, where it comes from and how it is being used in current operations. The literature review will then continue by looking at the already available literature on the correlation between conscription and coup d'état, after which it will look at their relationship with the variables of democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalization and colonisation. Each of the variables has been speculated to be related to both conscription as well as coup d'état, yet also with these variables, no reliable research has been conducted on the relation to the combination of conscription and coup d'état.

The thesis will then proceed with the hypothesis and explain the different research questions at hand. It will then move on to the methodology, in which it will give a thorough explanation and justification of the used dataset and will explain how the dataset was designed as well as which statistical formulas have been used to analyse it and why. Within the methodology, the thesis will also touch upon the validity and reliability of the research. This to establish transparent and honest research which can be taken seriously in academia.

Continuing with the research results and discussion, the thesis will present the findings resulting from its analyses conducted with the dataset. The discussion will then try to answer the hypothesis as well as the several research questions by using the analysed data. After which the results will be compared to the presented information in the literature review.

The thesis will finish by stating the conclusion and by recommending any future research. Within the conclusion, the thesis will touch upon the process of the research, any possible imperfections and the justification of these. The recommendation will then elaborate on future options of future research, either to strengthen the research conducted in this thesis or by answering still existing questions which this thesis was unable to answer due to the various limitations.

CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW

Since both the concepts of conscription and coup d'état are vital to understanding the future research on their correlation, both concepts deserve to be highlighted. To truly understand the full meaning of conscription and coup d'état, this literature review will start by explaining not only their meaning but also their origin, history, different utilizations before concluding on their possible correlation being referenced in the already existing literature.

Researching the origin and history of conscription and coup d'état shows the place both have had in different cultures and during different times and helps to explain the possible perception and understanding which the public might have of both variables. The utilisation of both conscription and coup d'état paints a general overview of how they are practised in the current day and which differences are present within themselves.

Since scholars have argued that coup d'état shows significant relations to other variables, such as democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalization and whether a country has been a former colony (Belkin and Schofer, 2003), the literature review will also summarise these findings by showing the relation these variables have to coup d'état and how they in combination with conscription might show a unique effect on coup d'état.

1.1. CONSCRIPTION

“Compulsory enlistment for state service, typically into the armed forces.”

(Oxford Dictionary, 2017)

1.1.1. Origin

The term conscription has first been mentioned in early 19th century France, where it had been implemented in 1798. The word derived from the Latin words such as; *Conscriptio* which means ‘levying of troops’; and the word *conscribere*, loosely translated to ‘writing together’ and ‘enrol’ (Oxford Dictionary, 2017).

1.1.2. History

Conscription is by no means a modern concept, and although the term itself only dates back a couple of centuries, the concept itself goes back as far as 1791 BC. During this

time the Babylonian Empire used a system which they called 'Ilkum'. It stated that all those who were eligible to fight were required to do so during times of war and had to provide services and labour during times of peace. This Ilkum was not only executed as a kind of way for the general population to pay for their mere existence in the country but also to fulfil the wishes of king Hammurabi. Under his reign, the country increased its army extensively and managed to conquer several neighbouring countries (Postgate, 2017).

A similar system was implemented during the Middle Ages. Men between the ages of 15 and 60 were called for military service by their king or landlords. They were obliged to fight for several months yet were released during harvest time. The service of fighting allowed the men to maintain their rights to their lands and farms and insured them of protection during hostile invasions (David Sturdy, 1996).

The modern definition, and the way it is known today, where men and sometimes women between eligible age must serve for a set period, was established during the French revolution and was further explored during the Napoleonic wars (Mulligan, 2005). Impressed with the growing size of the French army, other states such as those of the Prussians and Russians followed the practice of conscription soon after (Walter, 2003). By the time World War I had started, conscription had become the norm for most Western armies, including the United States of America (Perri, 2013).

Currently 64 countries in the world practice full conscription, eight have selective conscription, and 13 countries practise conscription only in emergencies (CIA Factbook, 2018). Recent debate has stirred up the execution of conscription since many argue its sexist and patriarchal understanding (Hubers and Webbink, 2015). This reflects in the fact that out of the 64 countries who have conscription, only nine enforce this for women as well (Reuters, 2013). However, the exclusion of women amongst the conscripts would help enforce a stronger social pressure for the men to adhere to patriarchal gender roles and thus ultimately spread these ideas into society when conscripts are being rehabilitated into the normal life (Wilcox, 1992).

1.1.3. Utilization

Although 64 countries execute conscription, there are many different utilizations of the concept. For instance, there are differences in age, time served, and the activities involved during the conscription period. There are also several countries who allow conscripts to buy out their obligatory military service, or when conscripts can object to serving their time based on religious and ethical beliefs.

The age on which conscripts get called for service differs amongst the different countries, with 15 years of age being the youngest and 50 being the oldest. However, there is some fluctuation possible for young conscripts, since military service is only mandatory at 15 for those who will be military cadets and thus want to make a career out of their service (CIA Factbook, 2018). One can then debate whether the service is then mandatory and voluntary. The age itself is also a reason for criticism since young men and women have less time to establish themselves academically and will find that they have a harder time adjusting to society and school when they return from their military service rather than when they join the army with already a diploma in their hand (Hubers and Webbink, 2015).

Table 1.1 Conscription Summary (CIA Factbook, 2018)

#	Country	Time	Age	Gender	Alternative draft
1.	Albania	12 months	19	male	
2.	Algeria	18 months	19-30	male	
3.	Angola	24 months	20-45	male	
4.	Armenia	34 months	18-27	male	
5.	Austria	6 months	18-35	male	9 months civilian service
6.	Azerbaijan	12-18 months	18-35	male	
7.	Belarus	12-18 months	18-27	male	24-26 months civilian service
8.	Benin	12-18 months	18-35	male/female	
9.	Bermuda	38 months	18-45	male	
10.	Brazil	10-12 months	18-45	male	
11.	Cambodia	18 months	18-30	male	
12.	Cape Verde	24 months	18-35	male/female	
13.	Chad	12-24 months	20-49	male/female	1-year civilian service for women
14.	Colombia	18 months	28-24	male	

15.	Côte d'Ivoire	12 months	18-25	male	
16.	Cuba	24 months	17-28	male	
17.	Cyprus	14 months	18-50	male	
18.	Denmark	4-12 months	18	male	
19.	Egypt	18-36 months	18-30	male	
20.	Eritrea	16 months	18-40	male	
21.	Estonia	8-11 months	18-27	male	
22.	Finland	6-12 months	18-60	male	
23.	Georgia	12 months	18-27	male	
24.	Greece	9-12 months	19-45	male	
25.	Guatemala	12-24 months	18-50	male	
26.	Guinea	18 months	18-25	male	
27.	Iran	18 months	19	male	
28.	Israel	24-48 months	18-51	male/female	
29.	Kazakhstan	24 months	18	male	
30.	North Korea	6-10 years	17	male/female	
31.	South Korea	21-24 months	18-35	male	
32.	Kuwait	12 months	18-30	male	
33.	Kyrgyzstan	12 months	18-27	male	
34.	Laos	18 months	17-26	male	
35.	Libya	24-48 months	18-35	male/female	
36.	Mali	24 months	18	male	
37.	Mauritania	24 months	18	male	
38.	Mexico	12 months	18	male	
39.	Moldova	12 months	18	male	
40.	Mongolia	12 months	18-25	male	
41.	Morocco	18 months	18	male	
42.	Mozambique	24 months	18-35	male/female	
43.	Myanmar	24-36 months	18-35	male/female	
44.	Norway	18 months	18-44	male/female	18 months civilian service
45.	Paraguay	12-24 months	18	male	
46.	Russia	12 months	18-27	male	
47.	Senegal	24 months	18	male	
48.	Singapore	24 months	18-21	male	
49.	Somalia		18	male	
50.	Sudan	12-24 months	18-33	male/female	
51.	Sweden	7-15 months	18-47	male/female	12 months civilian service

52.	Switzerland	260 days	19-26	male	
53.	Syria	30 months	18	male	
54.	Taiwan	14 months	19-35	male	
55.	Tajikistan	24 months	18-27	male	
56.	Thailand	24 months	21	male	
57.	Tunisia	12 months	20	male	
58.	Turkey	6-12 months	21-41	male	
59.	Turkmenistan	24 months	18-27	male	
60.	Ukraine	18-24 months	20-27	male	
61.	Uzbekistan	12 months	18	male	
62.	Venezuela	12-30 months	18-60	male/female	
63.	Vietnam	18-24 months	18-25	male	
64.	Zimbabwe	12 months	18-24	male	

The time served by conscripts also very much differs from country to country. Living in Qatar, one would only have to serve up to four months, while if one lived in Israel they would have to work for 32 months, given it was a male conscript (women only are required to serve 24 months). There might even be a difference in time-based on the military department or rank of the conscript. Looking at South Korea for example. One would have to serve three months longer in the Airforce then if they would be serving in the Army. Another example would be Turkey, where non-graduates must serve 12 months, and higher education graduates only have to serve for six months (CIA Factbook, 2018).

Although being a conscript means in all cases that one serves the military, it can take several forms. Several countries currently have what is called a ‘civilian, unarmed option’ for conscripts to serve out their term. Although in some instances this option means an increased period of conscription, it also allows conscripts to serve their time by working on social projects in the community rather than having to go through combat training (CIA Factbook, 2018). For a full summary of the different utilizations by country, please see table 1.1.

It is even possible in some countries to buy out the mandatory military service. In countries such as Turkey and Iran opportunities are given in which a conscript would have to pay a certain amount of money to be exempt. In other countries such as Russia

and Ukraine this ‘buy out’ often happens illegally due to the high level of corruption in the country (Redvers, 2016).

The system of buyout seems to be an unfair one since only the rich would be able to get exempt from conscription. Yet, on the other hand, the army does tend to receive much funding for its operations through these very buyouts as well. Looking at the discussion in Turkey the then prime minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu said the following in October of 2014: *“[We cannot allow a system] where the poor boy is drafted, and the son of the rich man is exempted because he can pay for it.”* (Bekdil, 2018).

This seems that also the Turkish government is opposed to the unfair distribution of population amongst the conscripts. Yet a month later, the prime minister seemed to have changed his opinion:

“There is significant demand for paid exemption [from conscription]. We are assessing the situation in view of producing a solution for the hundreds of thousands of citizens who have passed beyond the practicable age of conscription.” (Bekdil, 2018)

Another country in a similar situation to Turkey is that of Iran. Having previously allowed the buy-out system, the country notes that it is now trying to manage a more consistent policy and closed the option of a buy-out. In 2013 general Moussa Kamali stated: *“Because of its discriminatory nature, paying off military service was never desired by the armed forces, and that option has been closed.”* (Karami, 2014)

However, in a 2015 EA worldview report it has shown that exemption fees might be reintroduced:

“The latest state budget reintroduces a controversial program to sell exemptions from mandatory military service [...] ‘Military exemptions haven’t been sold in more than a decade, and critics say the policy risks deepening a social divide in Iran between haves and have-nots [...] ‘In the past, the fee was the equivalent of several hundred dollars. Today it starts at roughly \$6,500 and can run to more than double that.” (Lucas, 2015)

Although Turkey and Iran are thus on the fence whether to allow the ‘buy-out’ system, Estonia is trying to enact measures to prevent an illegal system. The country has put legislation in place to minimise corruption and maximise the draft. According to the minister of defence, it is a civilian’s obligation to serve in the military:

“In a small country such as Estonia, the reserve army plays a critical role, and failure to fulfil one’s national defence obligation is not a laughing matter. It is an obligation, the fulfilment of which must be taken seriously.” (Ministry of Defence, 2018)

Methods which supposed to prevent conscripts from dodging their service now include the suspension of driving licenses, suspension of weapon licenses, hunting and fishing permits and finally the suspension of health insurance (Ministry of Defence, 2018).

It is apparent that it is hard for countries to find a balance between the income from the buyout and the justification of the ‘fair’ representation. It also creates higher unrest amongst those who do need to serve their mandatory service and unable to a buyout (Seibert, 2011). Unrest within the military, whether amongst conscripts or not could, in the long run, have a serious consequence and within an unequal representation of the society would form, according to the literature, a higher risk for any coup d’état.

It some states it is also possible to refrain from conscription by opposing military draft based on religious or ethical beliefs. This would make the conscript in question a conscientious objector, meaning that he or she claims that they have the right to refuse their mandatory military service based on either freedom of thought, conscience and religion (OHCHR, 1966). When opting for conscientious objection countries often offer alternatives to their conscripts. This could be in the form of having to perform social services or armies will have the option of weapon-free service. Sweden, for example, allows those who object, to serve as a firefighter, medical professional or telecommunications technician (Stover, 1975)

1.2. COUP D’ÉTAT

“A sudden, violent, and illegal seizure of power from a government.”

(Oxford Dictionary, 2017)

1.2.1. Origin

Coup d’état or just the word coup originates from late 18th century France. It is based on the word colpus, meaning ‘blow’, the term coup d’état can thus loosely be translated as blow of the state (Oxford Dictionary, 2017).

1.2.2. History

One of the early uses of the term coup d'état was in the 18th century, yet this does not mean that this was also the first occurrence of a coup. Registrations go as far back as 876 bc. Israel, where king Elah gets overthrown and murdered by his military commander Zimri (Thiele, 1983). In fact, the land of Israel will maintain the playground of several coup d'état which have been registered in early history (Thiele, 1983).

Another country well known for early registered coups is China. During 860 bc. Duke Hu of Qi was violently replaced by his half-brother Xian of Qi (Feng, 2006). After this, the country faced with a multitude of other coups, of which the latest took place on the 12th of December 1936 with the Xi'an incident. Here the seize power was attempted to create an anti-Japanese front before the second Sino-Japanese war (Taylor, 2009).

Looking at more recent history, research shows that between 1950 and 2010 around 457 coup attempts have taken place. 49,7% of these were successful and 50,3% unsuccessful. Most of the coups have taken place in Africa and South America with a combined 68,4% while Europe has experienced the fewest with only a mere 2,6%. All though there shows to be a decrease in the number of coups taking place every year, the percentage of the successful coups seems to be on the rise (Powell and Thyne, 2011).

One of the most well-known and successful coups in recent history is, for instance, the coup in Uganda on the 25th of January 1971. Then top general Idi Amin toppled president Milton Obote while away on a conference in Singapore. The army violently took control over the airport and several administrative buildings while moving to the capital city of Kampala. Amin promised the country democracy while announcing his take-over on the national radio, but instead, his rule became known as one of an iron fist and violence. Amin, self-proclaimed 'last king of Scotland', went on to murder more than 300.000 of his opponents over an eight-year period before fleeing to Saudi Arabia (Twaddle, 2008).

Another example of a recent violent coup is that of Thailand in 2006. On September 29, prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown by the military. The coup involved intrigue and bribery of several military officers. As a result of the coup, elections were cancelled, the constitution dismissed, protest violently ended, and martial law became the national law system (Prasirtsuk, 2007).

In the last years, the world also has seen a lot of unsuccessful coups, one of which would be the attempted coup in Lesotho on the 30th of August 2014. In 2012 Tom Thabane was elected as prime minister, following up the long regime of former prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili. In 2014 Thabane halted suspended his government due to an expected coup d'état and was able to take control with the full support of the king. Due to pressure from South Africa, however, the country was forced to maintain a democratic process, and early elections were scheduled eventually resulting in the previous opposition taking over power (Al Jazeera, 2014).

1.2.3. Utilization

Table 1.2 Types of Coup d'état

Coup Type	Definition	Example
Self-coup	A coup committed by the already existing leader of a country	Venezuela, March the 29 th , 2017 - President Nicolás Maduro
Soft coup	The execution of the coup did not involve any violent acts or conflict	Turkey, February 28 th , 1997 – Prime minister Necmettin Erbakan
Putsch	An unsuccessful coup committed by a minority group	Germany, November 8 th , 1923 – Beer Hall, Adolf Hitler
Traditional	A violent and illegal takeover from the existent rulers to the new, and often military, regime	Mali, March 21 st , 2012 - National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State

There are different types of coups, the first one being that of a self-coup. A self-coup, otherwise known as autocoup refers to a coup committed by the already existing leader of a country. He or she has legally obtained their power through the means of for instance election of by birthright in that of a monarchy. However, by using measures unlawfully he or she tries to abolish the current legislature to get sole authority over the management of the country (Sampford, 2010). An example of which is that of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro on March the 29th, 2017. During the coup, Maduro eliminated the national assembly from its power and directed this to the supreme court, which is evidently a great supporter of the president. Thus, leaving him with the sole indirect authority over Venezuela (Romo, 2018).

Another form of coup is that of a soft coup, otherwise known as a palace coup. This means that the execution of the coup did not involve any violent acts or conflict. Often a conspiracy has been carried out with the goal to take over the power of the state. An example of a soft coup was that of 1997 Turkey when the Turkish military decided to

overthrow the then prime minister of Turkey; Necmettin Erbakan. A prepared memorandum initiated his resignation and ultimately meant the end for his parties' coalition run (Maigre, 2013).

The next form of a coup, next to the traditional one, is that of a putsch. A putsch references to an unsuccessful coup committed by a minority group. An example hereof would be the beer hall putsch on the 8th of November in 1923. This was an unsuccessful coup executed by the Nazi party led by Adolf Hitler in Munich, Bavaria. During this coup Hitler attempted to seize power in the city, leading to a violent clash between the Nazi party and the police officer in the centre of the city. In the aftermath, Hitler was arrested on the charges of treason (McCormick, 1997).

Lastly, there is the traditional coup d'état; a violent and illegal takeover from the existent rulers to the new, and often military, regime. History has known many instances of coups. However one of the bloodiest and most violent must have been the Malian coup d'état of 2012. Starting on March the 21st, Malian soldiers committed mutiny and attacked the capital city of the country, including the presidential palace. They announced on national television that they had formed the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State with the intention to re-establish democracy. In the following period after the coup, the official state army has found support with France and has been in constant violent conflict with the 'national committee' as well as several other rebel groups who see an opportunity to grasp power. This has led to the displacements of hundreds of thousands of civilians as well as the death of thousands of soldiers (Ploughshares, 2018).

Indicators

Whether successful or not or even if they are a different type of coup, there are several indicators researched which can potentially increase the risk of a coup (Belkin and Schofer, 2003):

Officers' personal grievances. Triggering features for a coup d'état are often not deeply rooted and can quickly change. Such is the case with officers' personal grievances. Examples of such grievances could be not enough salary, not enough power, or the feeling that the government is not valuing the contributions of the officers enough. Although personal grievance does not lead directly to a coup it can when the system is already

weakened and vulnerable to a coup. Such would be the case when more of the different facets in this list were to be found within a single country (Decalo, 1975).

Military organisational grievances. This trigger refers to the status and resources available to that of military personnel. If they feel that they are wronged or not been given enough means or incentives to perform their job, a coup would be more likely to happen (Thompson, 1975). An example of a coup which included a high level of military organisational grievance was the 2012 coup d'état in Mali. Here soldiers found that they were understaffed, underpaid and not provided enough resources to protect their country and themselves against the rebels' violent presence in the country at that time.

Military popularity. When the military institute is more popular than the ruling party a coup is more prone to happen. This is often due to the wish of the population for the military to intervene in the general corrupt government they are suffering under and to (re)-establish democracy (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). A great example of this would be the 1974 coup d'état in Portugal, otherwise, known as the carnation revolution. The wish amongst the population to overthrow the authoritarian regime was so large that the military received immense popularity. When the military eventually committed the coup the support from civilians made the coup known as a revolution, in which army and civilians had come together to change the power of the state (Bruneau, 1974).

Military attitudinal cohesiveness. If different ideas and opinion are distributed within the army, it will make it hard to get organised to perform a coup d'état. However, when the army shares a cohesive attitude on a particular topic, such as the discontent about a current ruler, there would be a more natural environment in which a collective operation can be organised. Cohesion could also work as a trigger for a coup d'état if it were to appear within a single unit. If this unit has access to enough resources and feels the need to increase their power over both the army as well as the current regime, these incentives could be enough for them to organise a coup (Thompson, 1976).

Economic crisis or decline. This trigger both refers to an economic crisis within and outside of the army. If the distribution of resources is unfair or not up to expectancy for the military forces a growing discontent will grow within the army and thus an attitudinal cohesiveness will adhere. Although economic crisis and decline are often linked to being

a result of a coup d'état, it is important to remember that it can thus also work as a trigger (Belkin and Schofer, 2003).

Domestic political crisis. When a domestic political crisis appears, this often results in a countries political instability. This instability could affect economic growth, affect the democracy level of a country, or could even cause violent conflict between the several oppositions. This instability not only creates the opportunity for the military to grasp power but often also a need from the people themselves (Thyne et al., 2017).

Contagion from other regional coups. Research argues that a coup can be contagious. This means that if a country finds itself admits other coups within the region they are more prone to have a coup themselves. This either because the population was affected by the contagiousness and wants to see a governmental change in the country, or because the army was inspired by the grasp of power other armies in the region demonstrated (Li and Thompson, 1975). One can observe the contagion effect last during the Arab spring, what started as a revolution in Tunisia soon became a widespread list of several coups, revolutions and uprisings in the North of Africa and the Middle East (Shihade et al., 2012).

External threat'. Several external threats have the potential to increase the likelihood of a coup d'état. One of such examples is the American involvement in the Iranian coup of 1953. Here an external threat infiltrated the national systems to change the countries regime type to create a more pro-western approach. It is important to note here though that the perception of an external threat can have just as much of an effect then when an actual external threat is present (Dehghan and Norton-Taylor, 2013).

Participation in war/military defeat. If a country is at war, but the conflict seems unjustified to its population and moreover to its military institute the chance of a coup significantly increases. Military personnel will feel they have to fight a war they cannot relate and are unnecessarily putting their lives on the line; hence they are more prone to rise up and organise a coup d'état. This can apply to either a war with another power or a civil war (Sampford, 2010).

Military's national security doctrine. A military's national security doctrine could potentially increase the possibility of a coup d'état. If the military institute is of the

opinion that a particular group or perhaps a minority forms a threat to the country, the measures taken to establish safety could trigger a reaction from that group or minority and thus inspire them to organise a coup. Such could have been the case in the latest coup attempt of 2016. Here the Gülen organisation had been identified as a threat to national security in 2013. Three years later the same group is being held responsible for instigating the coup on the 15th of July (Djavadi, 2016).

However, none of these factors has a strong statistical quality of evidence and should just be treated lightly (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). Mind herein though, that again there has been no research done on whether conscription could also be one of these indicators for coup d'état risk.

Stages

According to Sampford (2010), when a coup has been put into action it will go through various stages (Sampford, 2010):

- 1. Genesis.** In this stage, the spark is lit, and the discontent is growing. This could be for instance because of economic hardship, freedom restrictions or discrimination against a minority group.
- 2. Planning.** A group gathers who share their discontent. A plan gets made in which strategies are developed to resolve the issues of the group ultimately.
- 3. Recruiting.** To execute the plan and thus the coup, the organisational group needs ground workers to collaborate. In a military coup soldiers would be naturally recruited; however, it is also a possibility to recruit within minority groups or amongst those with equal opinions.
- 4. Seizing key points.** This is the starting point of possible physical alterations. Several strategic points need to be captured. These points can be a presidential palace, governmental buildings, airports amongst others.
- 5. Neutralizing.** Having taken over the key points, it is now case that those under the direct new control do not rebel in order to prevent any more violent conflict. It will be tried to persuade other military staff to join the cause or to stand down at least.

6. Taking over unarmed institutions. Now the armed forces are neutralised and form no direct threat, the same should go for the civilians. Civil servants and the rest of the law institution have to fall under the new control without an uprising.

7. Coping with the international response. It is unlikely the international environment is going to respond favourably to a coup d'état. In this stage, it is critical to convince them of the justification and deflect any criticism or attacks.

8. Participating in international trade. Without international trade, there is no way a new regime originating from a coup is going to be recognised as legit. It is essential to keep the trade on a national and international level going. Not only for the international diplomatic process but also to eliminate any possible new growing discontented amongst the population (Sampford, 2010).

In order to protect the country against a coup, a country can take several measures of coup-proofing to reduce the risk. Generally, these actions of coup-proofing include: creating diversity within its army, using parallel armed forces, and establishing overlap amongst its security sector, so all hold a stronger overview of internal security (Quinlivan, 1999).

The diversity in the army is supposed to help with the equal distribution of the population within the army. Equal distribution is to ensure no minority feels discriminated against, yet also does not have enough resources to commit a coup themselves (Quinlivan, 1999). Another reason for equal population distribution within the army is so that if groups within the army were to initiate a coup, conscripts would be less likely to start a coup d'état (Pion-Berlin et al., 2014).

1.3. CONSCRIPTION & COUP D'ÉTAT

In order to thoroughly understand the question: How does conscription relate to the occurrence of a coup d'état? One will have to dive into the already available information known about this question. However, the difficulty, in this case, is the huge lack of literature on this correlation. Although several articles try to explain why coup d'état happens and several others have researched the implications of conscription, neither have combined the two concepts beyond the point of mere speculation. This literature review will try to highlight these speculations before summarising several literature pieces which

have researched conscription and coup d'état as a separate phenomenon in relation to other variables.

The first hint of a possible relation between coup d'état and conscription can be found in a research done by Pion-Berlin, Esparza and Grisham (Pion-Berlin et al., 2014). Their research on military disobedience showed that out of the ten cases of military disobedience; eight cases had a conscript force). Although military disobedience has been defined as the period before the coup d'état where military forces are asked to act against the civilian force, it does show that those countries which execute conscription are more likely to experience military disobedience when the military is forced to use violence against the civilians of the country (Pion-Berlin et al., 2014). One could argue that a conscript army is thus more loyal to its civilians than it is to its government. This statement is reinforced by Smbl Kaya (Kaya, 2013) who observed that amongst most Turkish conscripts, the love for fatherland is larger than the love for the organisational state and thus they are more prone to act against their government than against their people.

The second and most reliable source which lets to believe there is a correlation between conscription and coup d'état, is a research done by Ozan O. Varol in 2012 (Varol, 2012). Writing about a democratic coup d'état, Varol argues most literature has been analysing coup d'état as entirely anti-democratic, which means that; *"All coups are perpetrated by power-hungry military officers seeking to depose existing regimes in order to rule their nations indefinitely."* (Varol, 2012, page 292).

Through his research in both Egypt and Turkey in 2011 found that although all coup d'états have anti-democratic features, some can be seen as more democracy-promoting than others because; *"They respond to popular opposition against authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, overthrow those regimes, and facilitate free and fair elections."* (Varol, 2012, page 292).

This thus states that armies often act upon the already existing disagreement the civilians feel towards their autocratic regime. It is this threat against the fatherland and its people that then sparks the execution of a coup by the military. Yet in order for it to be democratic Varol specifies seven features;

“The military coup is staged against an authoritarian or totalitarian regime; the military responds to popular opposition against that regime; the authoritarian or totalitarian leader refuses to step down in response to the popular opposition; the coup is staged by a military that is highly respected within the nation, ordinarily because of mandatory conscription; the military executes the coup to overthrow the authoritarian or totalitarian regime; the military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span of time; and the coup ends with the transfer of power to democratically elected leaders.”

(Varol, 2012, page 295)

The most important point here is: the coup is staged by a military that is highly respected within the nation, ordinarily because of mandatory conscription. Varol thus argues that because a country has conscription, the military is more likely to be highly respected and having these features allows the military to perform a coup d'état more easily and more successfully. Further on in his research Varol mentions that although military coups are more likely to happen in nations which execute conscription. This, however, does not mean that nations with conscription will always have a coup d'état or that the coup will be entirely democratic (Varol, 2012).

Overall the little speculation which is in favour of the correlation between conscription and coup d'état argues that this is because of the high respect the army holds within society and because of the high love the army holds for the country. Due to this love and loyalty towards their own country, the army is more likely to stand against the ruling government when they believe their people, and thus their country, are being wronged.

There seems to be some evidence however that there indeed might not be any correlation between conscription and coup d'état, although also this has still been pure speculation and has not been up for recent review. Immanuel Wallerstein stated that there is only a little evidence which shows that the policy of conscription in newer states increases the proneness to military intervention in politics (Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1966)

1.4. VARIABLES

Through browsing the literature on conscription and coup d'état one can tell both have several implications, and although the correlation between the two variables has never been thoroughly researched, conscription in combination with several others has, such as

democracy and economy. Both democracy and economy are relevant to the central research question since both hold a strong relationship with both conscription and thus possibly coup d'état.

So, in the end, although there might not be a direct relation between conscription and coup d'état, there might be one through the means of democracy. Speculation could be that conscription where to decrease a countries democracy; the low democracy could then increase the likelihood of a coup, thus indirectly conscription is related to the occurrence of coup d'état.

1.4.1. Conscription vs. Democracy

According to several scholars, the mere act of conscription influences the level of democracy. A German institute which was asked to research the justification of the use of conscription within a democracy came with the following statement:

“The military service obligation constitutes a profound restriction of the citizen’s right to liberty. It is justified because the state can only fulfil its obligation to protect basic liberties and Pfaffenzeller 483 freedoms if it is assisted by its citizens.” (Pfaffenzeller, 2010)

Since it damages the right, a person has to liberty, on can thus argue it also damages their level of democracy. However, there is also academia who argue that conscription, in fact, increases the level of democracy.

“It is widely believed that conscription increases the likelihood of democratisation, either because of an implicit contract between conscripted citizens and the state or because of the revolutionary threat posed by conscript armies.” (Ingesson et al., 2018)

Looking at the relation between conscription and democracy one can see that conscription by itself is often undemocratic. The draft system is rarely fair, and from an equality point of view seems highly unethical (Sternlicht, 1975). Conscription is often misunderstood to be contributing to democracy. After all, on the surface, it seems that the conscripts are a good representation of the society and they form a breach between the political system and the normal folk. Yet research shows that conscription has not shown to be a protector of democracy at all. One of the biggest threats to democracy: coup d'état still happened

in democratic countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece and Turkey (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2011)

When investigating the relation between coup d'état and democracy, Varol claimed that there is such a thing as a democratic coup, yet this does not mean coup d'état cannot be a threat to democracy itself (Varol, 2012). Whether a coup is a threat to a democracy strongly depends on the intentions with which the coup was staged. If the coup has more democracy-promoting features such as explained by Varol and is intended to overthrow a dictatorship one could argue a coup is in favour of the development of democracy and thus should happen more in autocracies than already established democracies. However, until this democratic point of view of Varol, no other scholar can be found who would argue the same. In fact, democracies show to be more vulnerable to coup d'état than non-democratic states. This is often because democracies seem to experience more coup d'état attempts than non-democracies. Military institutions often feel they have more to lose since operating in a democracy, their housing within the political system is unclear and thus more prone to change. Staging a coup is a direct response to this uncertainty and is an attempt of the army to increase their grasp on the system and ruling of their country (Bell, 2016)

There seems to be ground to believe conscription does correlate to coup d'état, yet this is more evident in a “democratic” coup d'état. The literature lets to believe that in these cases the love for the nation and its people and the direct perceived threat on their livelihoods is of higher importance to conscripts than a professional army, and thus sparks the initiative to execute a coup d'état.

1.4.2. Conscription vs. Economy

Conscription can have several repercussions for a country's economy. First of which would be an effect on the job market since a significant portion of eligible workers is being forced out of the general working population in order to fulfil their military service. On the other hand, there a quite a lot of workers who have to re-enter the working field after having spent a couple of months up until a few years doing a job they were not originally trained to do. So, imagine a recent graduate in IT studies, having to take a two-year break in order to be a conscript. After these two years, the field of IT has changed immensely, and it might be hard to find a job again without having to do update training.

“Military conscription violates the principle of comparative advantage, which demands that jobs be assigned to those who are relatively most productive in doing them, by forcing everybody into a military occupation, irrespective of relative productivities. In consequence, the match between people and jobs will be inefficient.” (Smith, 1976) (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2011)

Job assigning will be unequally distributed within a country because of the use of conscription, which in the end will charge up the costs of a country due to inefficiency (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2011). This is what we would call opportunity costs

“The cost to society of drafting someone to be a soldier or a nurse is not what government chooses to pay him or her. Rather, it is the value of his or her lost production elsewhere, as well as the potential disutility arising from any inconveniences related to the service. Conceptually, the cost of drafting someone is the amount for which he or she would be willing to join the army voluntarily.” (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2007)

Next, to bringing imbalance to the job market, conscription is also often linked to a change in GDP for the countries who execute conscription. Due to the decreasing labour productivity, losses in GDP can be seen as a direct result (Lau et al., 2004). This is highly interesting though since military expenditures and the size of military force does not directly seem to affect the country’s GDP (Dunne et al., 2005).

A decreasing GDP or that of economic growth has also often been linked to increasing the likelihood of a coup d’état. The difficulty here, however, lies in the dividing opinions of scholars. Some say GDP is negatively related to a coup (Powell, 2012) and some say it is not (Narayan and Prasad, 2004). This might have something to do with the errors that are being made when calculating GDP (Johnson et al., 2013). However, even when taking into consideration that there might be errors, or by fixing them, the research still seems to be inconclusive, since the variations in results are weak and should thus be treated lightly (Kim, 2014). So, although one can say that conscription affects the GDP of a country, it is unclear whether or not this GDP decline really has an effect on the likelihood of a coup.

1.4.3. Conscription vs. Military Management

Within this chapter, the military management has been split into two: military expenditures and military personnel. This has been done in order to create a distinction between two of the major facets of military management which both could have a significant relationship with conscription as well as with coup d'état. This thesis does acknowledge that military management exists out of a wider arrange of variables but to the availability of pre-existing data choose to exclude them.

As mentioned before, conscription has a relatively high cost when it comes to a countries economy (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2011). This is often an element which is forgotten when analysing the monetary costs and gains of conscription. When looking at only the military expenditures, one can see that these, in fact, lower when a country implicates conscription (Lamb et al., 1992).

“Proponents of the military draft and compulsory labour services usually evoke the high budgetary costs of manning a voluntary army or staffing the social sector. They argue that the government needs access to cheap labour provided by draftees in the military or in welfare-related civilian sectors – and especially in the face of war, demographic transition, terrorist attacks, and other crises of society. But this argument confuses budgetary costs with opportunity costs.” (Poutvaara and Wagener, 2007)

It is thus apparent that there is a relation between conscription, military expenditures and the economic welfare of a country. Although the military expenditures go down when conscription is enforced, it ultimately decreases the GDP, as explained in the previous chapter. Conscription might seem like a cheap option to ensure a countries safety, yet in the end, it ends up being a more significant financial burden than anticipated.

When it comes to coup d'état and military expenditures, literature mentions that if military expenditures are low, the likelihood of a coup d'état increases. This analysis is both true when one takes military expenditures as an independent or as a fraction from the GDP (Leon, 2014). The research does, however, specify that if the military expenditures are low due to it being a punishment for the military after a failed coup, this does not seem to have a direct effect on the likelihood of a coup d'état to happen (Leon, 2014).

When one investigates the relation between conscription and military personnel, one can easily see that when conscription is enforced, the numbers of military personnel go up. This relation is an obvious one and for the purpose of this research not interesting to research. What is interesting however is the relationship between military personnel and coup d'état.

The literature mentions that when an army becomes too powerful the chances of a coup d'état to take place increases. One way of decreasing the power of an army is to increase its size by the implementation of conscription (Besley and Robinson, 2010). This means that if a country were to use conscription to increase the size of its army, it decreases the chance of a coup d'état. This because the larger the size of the army, the higher the representation of the population and so the less likely conscripts are to stand against their people. The larger size of the military also makes it more difficult to get organised amongst the non-military educated conscripts.

1.4.4. Conscription vs. Religion

Religious arguments are often a reason for potential conscripts to object against their mandatory military service. Still, there are also quite some countries which hold religion as one of their building blocks in society but implement conscription at the same time. A prime example of which is Israel.

To start with the use of religious arguments to oppose mandatory military service.

“Exemption from conscription provides a particularly telling example due to the entirely secular nature of conscription, its importance to preservation of the state in times of war, and the high costs the granting of exemptions imposes on others.” (McConnell, 1990)

So, allowing religion as a valid argument to oppose would, on the one hand, allow people to exercise their rights of religion, yet on the other hand, would create a rift within society. This rift would appear due to the fact that conscription is supposed to be a mean of generalisation. Everybody needs to go and fulfil their duty, no exceptions. Being able to get out of mandatory military service is a significant exemption, to say the least. Unfortunately, there has been no data or research done yet on which religion seems to be more prone to exercise conscription. The same can be said about the relationship between

religion and coup d'état. No research has been done on which religions have faced the most coups or are more likely to have one.

1.4.5. Conscription vs. Fractionalization

Although studies have shown that ethnic, linguistic or religious fractionalization has no impact on the onset of civil war in a country, it could contribute to a weak or strong sense of cohesion amongst conscripts (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). An example of which would be Israel, a country where conscripts only need to serve when Jewish or Druze (CIA Factbook, 2018). In these cases, the goal to have a complete representation of the population within the army fall flat and could potentially even increase the chance of a coup d'état (Besley and Robinson, 2010). Fractionalization can also contribute the amount of coup d'états taking place in a country. This could be due to misrepresentation of specific groups within the country as well as a possible presence of inferiority amongst the larger factions (Böhmelet and Pilster, 2015).

1.4.6. Conscription vs. Colonisation

A quick search on CIA factbook results in the finding that; out of the 112 countries which have known colonisation in their past, over 74 also have known, or still know, conscription. This is a 66% of all countries which have been colonised. In comparison, 90% of all countries which have not been colonised have known, or still know, conscription (CIA Factbook, 2018). The reason behind this finding is unknown since no research has been performed on the relation between conscription and colonisation.


A speculative argument here could be that colonies generally have had bad experiences with conscription. Having gone through the process of colonialism, countries were often forced to send eligible conscripts from their own country to fight in that of the oppressor. Have suffered much loss and despair it could be a possible reason that after liberation those countries chose to withhold from using conscription as a way to enforce their armies (Echenberg, 1991).

Looking at the relationship between colonisation and coup d'état academia have made speculations on a negative relationship between them both. If a country has been colonised, there is a higher chance that it will experience a coup d'état as well (Belkin

and Schofer, 2003). However, there is more than meets the eye. Although the two might show a relation, many different aspects have to be taken into consideration.

“Colonial legacy is underspecified and, in fact, refers to many causal factors, such as legitimacy, strength of civil society, and wealth that are already included in our list of predictors.” (Belkin and Schofer, 2003)

In order to claim that colonialism impacts the likelihood of coup d'état one would thus have to look at its impact on all these variables as well. Due to the size and complexity of this research, colonialism will be discussed as a whole concept, and possible reasons why colonialism and coup d'état are related will only be gathered from the data since no such reasoning can be found in the already existing literature.



CHAPTER 2, RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research will put up three questions for further investigation. By analysing all three, the result will be able to give a conclusive answer to the central research question:

Main-question - How does conscription relate to coup d'état?

Sub-question 1 - How does democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalization and colonialism impact the risk of coup d'état?

Sub-question 2 - How does the presence of conscription influence the impact democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalization and colonialism impact the risk of coup d'état?

The argument of linking the variables to coup d'état is originally based on the idea that conscripts represent the voice of their people (Varol, 2012). Having generations of sons, family, friends and neighbours being part of the army, the conscripts have become a representation of society. So, when the variables, these 'citizens' see as the stable, change and citizens show discontent. It is up to the conscripts to fight the corrupted institutions which are impenetrable to civilian and establish stability in the country again (Varol, 2012).

This leads to believe that when these variables change positively, conscription will not influence the possibility of a coup d'état since the people's voice will most likely be content and not in any need of a coup. In a different situation, the opposite could be true. If the variables were to change negatively, so for instance when a country shows a decline in democracy and in economic growth the voice of its population will be that of discontent. Representing this discontent could thus be resulting in an increase of risk for a coup d'état.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

The sample of the research shall entail all the countries recognised by the United Nations within the timeframe of 1991 to 2008. However, because of the size and relevance the sample size of countries will entail 142 countries, excluding those countries without an active army and those of which data was unavailable or proportionally incomplete. The dataset will consist of variables coming from several datasets, which will be further explained in the data description. The thesis will investigate the relationship between the dependent variable of coup d'état to conscription and the other explanatory variables: democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalization and colonialism.

Due to the different scales used in the variables originating from the datasets, the data has been standardised before analysis. This is to ensure that all the data uses the same kind of format and is internally consistent. The standardisation has been done by equalising the range of all the different variables. In other words, the data has been rescaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one (IBM Knowledge Center, 2018).

The data will be analysed using a zero-inflated Poisson regression test. The reason why the Poisson regression test has been chosen as a mean for analysis is because the dependent variable in the dataset is a count variable: the number of coups registered in a country. The integers of which are positive, a coup either happened, or it did not. The explanatory variables are continuous and/or dichotomous, and the observations are independent. The few variables in the dataset which are categorical will be analysed by changing the environment and comparison. For instance, in the case of regime type, the data is split into democracy and dictatorship. By dropping data which includes one or the other and then running several models, a comparison of the environment can be made, and one can conclude whether or not there is a significant difference.

Poisson regression is often used to characterise a rare event in a sizable population. Although the setting for the event to happen might be present often, the chance of it actually happening is rare. In this case that refers to the rare event of a coup d'état happening within a state, there might be a lot of possibilities for a coup d'état to take place, but generally, it is very uncommon to happen. First published by Siméon Denis Poisson in 1837, Poisson was initially used to predict the number of deaths amongst

Prussian soldiers by horse kicks. Although many soldiers got kicked, they rarely died because of it (Riffenburgh, 2012).

Before running the Poisson regression, one has to see whether or not to implement a zero-inflated Poisson regression or a normal Poisson regression. The reasoning behind the use of a zero-inflated test is due to the fact that the used dataset and the counted y -value in the Poisson regression includes an excessive number of zeros. A method to find out which method to use is by first using the Vuong test. Since in several models the z -test showed to be significant it indicates that for the analysis used in the research, the zero-inflated Poisson regression test is a better fit than the normal Poisson regression test.

Since it is recommended to also use robust standard errors for Poisson regression, this particular analysis will apply this as well (Cameron et al., 2018). In order to re-ensure the use of a zero-inflated Poisson regression rather than a zero-inflated negative binomial regression, one can look at the variance, if this is not much larger than the mean, it means the data is not overdispersed, and the zero-inflated Poisson regression is more suitable than a zero-inflated negative binomial regression. In this case, the data did not appear over-dispersed, and thus the zero-inflated Poisson regression showed to be the right fit for analysis.

The zero-inflated Poisson regression thus allows for count-models to include excess zeros. The regression does so by giving two possible data generation processes for each observation. For observation i the first possible outcome is calculated by using probability ϕ_i , while the second possible outcome uses probability $1-\phi_i$. While the first outcome produces counts which are only zero, the second outcome produces counts from the Poisson model (Charles University, 2018).

$$P\{Y_i = 0 | x_i, z_i\} = F(z_i^T \gamma) + (1 - F(z_i^T \gamma))e^{-\mu_i},$$

$$P\{Y_i = y_i | x_i, z_i\} = (1 - F(z_i^T \gamma)) \frac{e^{-\mu_i} \mu_i^{y_i}}{y_i!}, y_i > 0.$$

The conditional expectation and conditional variance of Y_i is established through:

$$E\{Y_i | x_i, z_i\} = \mu_i (1 - F(z_i^T \gamma)),$$

$$\text{Var}\{Y_i | x_i, z_i\} = E\{Y_i | x_i, z_i\} (1 + \mu_i F(z_i^T \gamma))$$

In this equation Y_i would be representing the dependent variable of coup d'état, x_i represents the presence of conscription, an explanatory variable. While z_i represents the other explanatory variables such as polityIV, GINI, religious fractionalisation etc.

3.1. DATA DESCRIPTION

The dataset will include information on all countries recognised by the UN with an active army and of which data was found to be available. The time frame used will lie between 1946 and 2008 due to the convenience and availability of data. The variables will include country, year, the occurrence of a coup, the presence of conscription, regime type, the freedom index, the Polity IV democracy score, GDP per capita, the GINI index, military expenditures per capita, military personnel per capita, religion, religious fractionalisation, linguistic fractionalisation, colonialism history, and population. Please see table 3.1 for a full summary of the data collection.

Table 3.1 Summary data collection

Variable	Dataset	Source	Measures
Coup	Coups d'état, 1946-2017	Centre for Systematic Peace(Center for Systematic Peace, 2018)	Occurrences of Coup D'état 1946-2017
Conscription	Military Recruitment Data	UAE National Defence College(Nathan Toronto, 2014)	Lists of military recruitment methods since 1800
Democracy	Regime	Cheibub et al.(Cheibub et al., 2010)	Classifies political regimes between democracy or dictatorship
	Freedom Index	Freedom House(Freedom House, 2018)	Scores the civil and political liberties
	Polity IV	Centre for Systematic Peace(Marshall, n.d.)	Scores countries on a level between autocracy and democracy
Economy	GDP per Capita	The Maddison Project(Bolt and Inklaar, 2018)	GDP of each country from 1926 to 2010 based on the 2011 Dollar value

	GINI Index	World Bank(Humanitarian Data Exchange, 2018)	Scores the unequal distribution of values within a country
Military Management	Military Expenditures per Capita	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI, n.d.)	The military expenditures from all countries between 1949 and 2017
	Military Personnel per Capita	Correlates of War Project(The Correlates of War Project, n.d.)	Personnel of all countries between 1816 and 2012
Religion	Religion	Correlates of War Project(The Correlates of War, n.d.)	Dominant religions between 1945 and 2012
Fractionalisation	Religious	Alesina et al.(Alberto Alesina et al., 2003)	Religious fractionalisation for 190 countries
	Linguistic	Alesina et al.(Alberto Alesina et al., 2003)	Linguistic fractionalisation for 190 countries
Colonialism	Colonialism	Correlates of War Project(The Correlates of War, n.d.)	History of colonialism of all countries
Population	Population	Correlates of War Project(The Correlates of War, n.d.)	World population between 1945 and 2012

Coup - The dataset to measure the occurrence of coup d'état originates from the centre of systematic peace and its integrated network for societal conflict research (Center for Systematic Peace, 2018). They have defined a coup d'état as:

“A forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime (although not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of governance)” (Marshall and Marshall, 2016)

Thus, this thesis will stick to the same definition.

Conscription - The variable relating to the presence of conscription during the set period of time will be originating from the Nathan W. Toronto, who is a researcher and academic at the UAE National Defence College and is specialised in strategy and security studies. The data includes information as far back as 1800 on the presence of conscription for each consecutive year for all the countries recognised by the UN who have an active army (Nathan Toronto, 2014).

Regime - The dataset defining the different regime types comes from the research done by José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland on democracy and dictatorships (Cheibub et al., 2010). They have classified six different regime types based on the definitions given by Przeworski, who came up with the Democracy and Development (Przeworski et al., 2000). The different types are parliamentary democracy, mixed (semi-presidential) democracy, presidential democracy, civilian dictatorship, military dictatorship and royal dictatorship (Cheibub et al., 2010).

Freedom Index - The next variable is referring to the Freedom Index (Freedom House, 2018). This is an annual score given by the Freedom House and refers to the civil and political liberties of all people dependent on country. The liberties have been taken from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and scored accordingly between the values of 1 and 7 (Freedom House, 2018).

Polity IV - The dataset has included another variable related to democracy which is the Polity IV data. The polity IV provides a broader range for calculation democracy and autocracy by scoring them between -10 and 10 (Marshall et al., 2017). This will give the research extra security on measuring the regime type and democracy level of a country.

GDP per c. - The variable of GDP per country is originating from the Maddison project. Set up at Groningen University in the Netherlands, the project has gathered a database showing the GDP of each country from 1926 to 2010 based on the 2011 Dollar value. The Maddison project is to be recognised as one of the essential datasets when it comes to analysing the economic change in history (Bolt and Inklaar, 2018).

GINI Index – The GINI index is originating from the World Bank. The coefficient of the GINI index measures the unequal distribution of values within a country. Often this index

is used to show the income inequality within different countries. The GINI index score countries between perfect equality and complete inequality using a cumulative frequency curve which analyses distribution (Humanitarian Data Exchange, 2018).

Military expenditures - The variable of military expenditures per capita comes from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It contains the military expenditures from all countries between 1949 and 2017 (SIPRI, 2018). Although the dataset for this particular research starts in 1946, the dataset from the research institute was still applied. This because the availability and inclusiveness from other datasets were low. Within the statistical analysis, the years between 1946 and 1949 are being given as missing data.

Military personnel - The variable of military personnel per capita is originating from the correlates of war project. This project is part of Penn State University and intends to gather reliable quantitative data on International Relations. The dataset covers the period between 1816 and 2012 and shares information on every country with an active army (The Correlates of War Project, 2018).

Religion, Colonialism & Population - The religion variable, as well as the history of colonialism and the total population variable, come from the correlates of war project. They all go back to 1945 until 2012 and have information on every country recognised by the UN. Within the religion dataset, a definition has been made of the following religions: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Folk Religion, Hindu, Buddhism and no primary religion (The Correlates of War, 2018). The colonialism hold record which country has been colonised in history and the population dataset shows the population increase and decrease in every country between 1945 and 2012.

Fractionalisation – Both the religious and linguistic fractionalisation data is originating from the same dataset; fractionalisation by Alesina et al. (Alberto Alesina et al., 2003). They have measured the level of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity within 190 countries. This allows to see the fractionalisation within the variables of religion and linguistics within the allocated countries and to compare them to one another.

3.2. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

3.2.1. Reliability

The reliability of research indicates how consistent the research has been executed. In other words, if the research would be executed by another party under similar results, the same outcome would appear. This thesis has tried to establish reliability through a combination of the following actions.

Firstly, the dataset itself is highly reliable. The variables are linked to a specific country, in a specific year. Meaning that this data is set in stone and unable to change. There are no temporary characteristics, neither are there any who depend on luck or speculations. Were one to use the same dataset combination as has been used in this thesis, they would thus get the same results.

Another way to establish reliability is the size of the dataset. By including all countries which are recognised by the UN, excluding those with limited data availability and those without an active army, allows for a country to country comparison. If the dataset had been smaller, there would have been the possibility of misrepresentation, but by including all countries the research eliminates this option.

3.2.2. Validity

Validity in academic research refers to how accurate research is in relation to the actual world. So, in short, does the research measure what it is supposed to measure? This thesis has tried to establish its validity through a combination of the following actions.

The first mean of validity is the fact that the research does not only refers to the sole relation between conscription and coup d'état but also to the relationship with other variables which are often linked with both. This will eliminate the error of dismissing the relation between conscription and coup d'état solely based on a single statistic. It is highly possible that the two are related but through the means of other variables, yet this will not show in just a correlation analysis between the two single variables.

The second mean of validity is that of again the size and inclusiveness of the dataset. By including all countries over a set period of time, and by adding the extensive amount of variables, the research includes a significant amount of data. What makes this valid, is that this allows for a good representation of the population which is to be researched and prevents any outcome to be biased due to the exclusion of several countries or by focussing on a short period of time.

CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The following result section will start off by showing the relation between each variable, coup d'état. It will show its effect on coup d'état and whether this effect gets influenced by the presence of conscription. The relation of the variable will then be compared to the existing literature. The chapter will end with a final reflection on the relation between conscription and coup d'état. As mentioned, the following results are originating from a zero-inflate Poisson regression test.

4.1 DEMOCRACY

The element of democracy has been split into three different variables in order to manage and account for the complexity of this item. The first variable to discuss within the term of democracy is that of the freedom index, the second will be the polity IV, and the third will be that of the regime type.

Looking at table 4.1 one can see that the freedom index shows an overall robust and strong significant relation to coup d'état since the p-value tends to linger between $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$. Since the relation is negative, one can interpret this by saying that if the freedom index decreases, the likelihood of a coup d'état increases.

Since it has shown that the freedom index and the polity IV are highly related to each other, the two have not been run together during analysis. The relation of the polity IV does show in table 4.1, which show that also here a strong negative relation present with the p-value again lying between $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$. Thus, when the polity IV decreases, the likelihood of a coup d'état increases.

The options within the variable of regime type are civilian dictatorship, military dictatorship, mixed (semi-presidential) democracy, parliamentary democracy, presidential democracy and royal dictatorship. These have been split into two; democracy and dictatorship. Because this variable is a categorical variable, rather than focussing on

Table 4.1 Regression Table Conscripton#GDPpc.

VARIABLES	(1) Coup	(2) inflation	(3) Coup	(4) inflation	(5) Coup	(6) inflation	(7) Coup	(8) inflation	(9) Coup	(10) inflation	(11) Coup	(12) inflation
ncons	5.456*** (1.471)	13.90*** (4.632)	3.365*** (1.291)	0.701 (1.434)	3.345** (1.454)	2.294* (1.240)	4.003*** (1.397)	2.267 (2.137)	4.348*** (1.446)	5.831** (2.630)	4.011*** (1.388)	2.231 (2.647)
nGDPperc	-8.200*** (2.045)	0.608 (1.572)	-6.290*** (1.673)	-0.925 (1.163)	-6.444*** (1.964)	-4.449*** (1.655)	-6.697*** (1.887)	1.617 (1.304)	-7.285*** (1.985)	7.825*** (2.868)	-5.862*** (2.002)	-0.00730 (5.586)
c.ncons#	6.568***		4.061**		3.950*		4.864**		5.338**		4.874**	
c.nGDPperc												
nlingfract	(2.127)	-0.438 (0.403)	(1.840)	-0.0894 (0.648)	(2.120)	-1.676* (1.008)	(2.050)	0.283 (0.898)	(2.109)	0.652 (1.135)	(2.034)	0.319 (0.854)
npolityIV			-0.639*** (0.174)	-2.056 (1.284)	-0.306** (0.136)		-0.979*** (0.211)	-10.86** (4.298)	-0.943*** (0.234)	-24.83*** (7.492)	-1.010*** (0.222)	-10.39* (5.405)
nfreesdom					0.771*** (0.215)	6.075** (2.526)						
ngini							0.565*** (0.185)	7.730*** (2.962)	0.585*** (0.184)	16.20*** (4.798)	0.595*** (0.193)	7.412* (4.134)
nmilpers									0.145 (0.173)	-2.925** (1.174)		
nmilexp											-2.253 (2.393)	3.678 (15.25)
Constant	-5.927*** (1.416)	-13.35*** (5.018)	-4.719*** (1.182)	-3.439* (1.873)	-5.057*** (1.347)	-12.73*** (4.362)	-5.319*** (1.320)	-13.60** (6.284)	-5.686*** (1.377)	-28.80*** (8.805)	-5.858*** (1.462)	-12.49 (10.73)
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138	132	132	132	132	132	132

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

how the variable is related to coup d'état and conscription, the focus will lie on how the other variables behave when the circumstances of this variable change. For instance, does the relationship between coup d'état and polity IV change depending on if a country is a democracy or a dictatorship.

Looking at table C in the appendices section of this thesis one can see that in the circumstances a country is a democracy the linguistic fractionalisation shows to be significant as well as polityIV, the freedom index, and military personnel. The Gini index and religious fractionalisation do not seem to have a significant relation. Where the results differ in a democracy to table 4.1 is that the variable of the GINI index is not significant, and the variable of military personnel is. One can thus say that in a democracy there does not seem to be a significant relation between the Gini index and coup d'état, yet there is a positive relation between military personnel, and coup d'état. In other words, when military personnel increases, coup d'état will also show an increase.

Table D shows the environment of a dictatorship. Here one can see that linguistic fractionalisation and the GINI index are significantly related. The variables of polityIV, and the freedom index, however, do not show to be significantly related. This is a different outcome than that of table 4.1. One can thus say that in the environment of a dictatorship, the polityIV index, as well as the freedom index are not significantly related to coup d'état.

According to the literature, the mere act of conscription has been argued to be undemocratic (Pfaffenzeller, 2010) and democratic countries face more coup d'état since military institutions have more to lose in a democracy, their place in the system is unclear and thus more prone to change. Staging a coup is a direct response to this uncertainty and is an attempt of the army to increase their grasp on the system and ruling of their country (Bell, 2016). On the other hand, Varol argues that undemocratic countries should be more prone to experience a coup d'état since he believes a coup d'état often promotes democracy (Varol, 2012).

The analysis from this research supports this claim by Varol since both the freedom index, as well as the polity IV show to have a negative relation with coup d'état under the circumstances of a democracy. This means that if the level of democracy goes down and in a democracy the number of coup d'état is likely to go up. Yet when looking at a

dictatorship, the level of freedom does not seem to matter, here it shows that if the GINI index goes down the occurrence of a coup d'état will go up. The claim made by Varol is thus only valid in a democratic environment.

4.2 ECONOMY

In order to analyse the relationship between both conscription and economy as well as coup d'état and economy, this thesis has chosen to look at the GDP per capita for each country, based on the 2011 Dollar as well as the GINI index.

When investigating the relationship between coup d'état, conscription and GDP per capita, it showed that there was a non-linear relationship between GDP per capita and conscription. As one can see in table 4.1, the relation between the GDP per capita is a strong negative one since the p-value is at a constant $p < 0.01$. Thus, when the GDP per capita increases, the amount of coup d'état will increase.

However, looking at the effect of conscription and GDP per capita on coup d'état, one can see a strong positive relation. This means that if the GDP per capita increases, the length of conscription present in a country increases, the amount of coup d'état would also increase. Since this seems odd against the current literature and the other analyses done in this thesis, the nature of the non-linear relationship between GDP per capita and conscription was tested by adding the square of GDP per capita to the analysis, the results of which showed an inverted relationship. One can interpret this that up until a certain level an increase of GDP per capita and conscription would mean an increase in coup d'état.

Table 4.1 also shows a relatively strong and robust relation between the GINI of a country and coup d'état, with the p-value around $p < 0,01$. Since the relation is a negative one, it means that if the GINI of a country decreases, the occurrence of coup d'état increases.

The literature on the relation between coup d'état and GDP per capita seems to be inconclusive. There is not a lot of data available, and what is available argues on both sides of the spectrum with weak arguments existing out of speculations. However, the general belief is that countries with lower GDP per capita are more prone to experiencing a coup d'état (Adam Taylor, 2016). The results from the analysis seem to support this ideology. It shows that when the GDP per capita of a country or the GINI where to

decrease the occurrence of coup d'état were to increase. However, there is no mentioning in the literature of a possible relation between conscription and GDP per capita. It is new information and a significant contribution to the literature that this thesis can show that an inverted nonlinear relation exists between conscription and GDP per capita.

4.3 MILITARY MANAGEMENT

The element of military management has been split into two different variables in order to manage and account for the complexity of this item. The first variable to discuss the term of military management is that of military expenditures per capita. The second will be that of the military personnel per capita. Both indicate an element of military management which has been researched and/or speculated to be related to conscription and/or coup d'état.

Table 4.1 also shows the significance of military expenditures in relation to coup d'état, or in this case, the lack thereof. One can see that there does not seem to be a relation between military expenditures per capita and coup d'état. One can thus assume that the occurrence of a coup d'état is not related to how much a country spends on its army. It must be mentioned though that this thesis does not show the allocation of the military expenditures. One might find that military expenditures are relevant to the occurrence of coup d'état when the money is being distributed unequally within the military.

Switching to military personnel there does not seem to be a relation between military personnel per capita and coup d'état. As table C in the appendices showed previously, there does seem to be a relation between military personnel and coup d'état in the circumstances of a democracy. As one will later see with the variable of religion, military personnel also seems to have a positive relation with coup d'état in the countries which have Islam as their dominant religion.

Comparing the findings to the literature, the analysis shows an interesting contradiction. Where the literature says that those countries with a lower military expenditure have a higher likelihood of coup d'état, the analysis of this thesis shows that there is no relation (Leon, 2014). This could perhaps have to do with the distribution of the military expenditures within the army. So even when the military expenses are low, when they are distributed towards the highest segment of the army, it would still be a significant

contribution in order to keep them happy, and thus less likely to commit a coup d'état. Alternatively, when the low military expenditures are due to the fact that they are used as a form of punishment after a coup d'état, the literature agrees that there is no relation between the two variables (Besley and Robinson, 2010).

The literature and the analysis also show a contradiction in the relationship between military personnel and coup d'état. The literature shows that if the military is of greater size, the likelihood of experiencing a coup d'état goes down. This is supposedly due to the fact that the larger the size of the military, the more difficult it is to organise as a cohesive unit due to the inexperience of the conscripts. On top of this is the fact that the bigger the military, the higher the representation of the population in it. This is supposed to decrease the chance that conscripts were to stand against their population who they are a representative of (Besley and Robinson, 2010). However, when looking at the results from the analysis, there seems to be evidence that the bigger the army, the more chance for a coup d'état in certain cases. This is a significant contribution to the literature since alternative explanations will have to be found in order to explain why a larger army allows for more coup d'état since there is currently not an explanation to be found yet.

4.4 RELIGION

The variable of religion has been split up into three: Islam, Christianity and other. Since this is a categorical variable, this thesis will be looking at the change of the other variables when the circumstances of religion change. In other words, whether or not countries which have different dominant religions show different relations between the variables and coup d'état.

Comparing table 4.1 and table E in the appendices, one can see a distinct difference. While linguistic fractionalisation appears to be significantly related in the general setting, it does not show to be longer related in countries which have Islam as their dominant religion. The same goes for the polityIV index, which also shows no longer to be significantly related. Military personnel and expenditures, however, do seem significantly related while they do not in table 4.1. Since both of the relations appear positive one can say that when military personnel increases, or when military expenditures increase, there will also be an increase in coup d'état.

Due to this difference between the two different tables, it is safe to assume that religion indeed has a significant relation to coup d'état. Comparing these findings with the literature is quite difficult since there has been no distinctive research done on either the relationship between religion and conscription, as well as the relationship between religion and coup d'état. This by itself is new information and thus a great contribution to the literature which goes beyond the mere speculations and opinions which are shared on the internet.

4.5 FRACTIONALISATION

The variable of fractionalisation has been split up in two: religious, and linguistic fractionalisation. When first looking into the relation between religious fractionalisation and coup d'état as shown in table 4.2, one can see that there does not appear to be a significant relation between conscription and coup d'état.

Analysing the relation between linguistic fractionalisation and coup d'état however, once again can see that there is evidence of a relationship. This is apparent in table 4.1 as well as the other tables. This means that whether or not a country has a high linguistic fractionalisation does impact their occurrence rate of coup d'état. Since it is a negative relation one can say that when linguistic fractionalisation increases, so does coup d'état.

The findings of this analysis seem to be in line with the limited literature. The literature argues that fractionalisation can lead to misrepresentation and a lack of cohesion within the army, which in itself will increase a countries risk of experiencing a coup d'état (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015). The fact that this is not the case for religious fractionalisation but is the case for linguistic fractionalisation is new information and can thus be considered as another new contribution to the literature.

4.6 COLONISATION

Since the variable of colonisation is also a categorical data, this thesis will also see how the relation of the variables changes when the circumstance of colonisation change. In other words, does the relation between the variables change depending on whether or not a country has been a colony. Due to the limited number of

Table 0.2 Regression Table Conscription#GDPperc.including religious fractionalisation

VARIABLES	(1) Coup	(2) inflation	(3) Coup	(4) inflation	(5) Coup	(6) inflation
ncons	4.675*** (1.204)	1.134 (0.980)	4.223*** (1.351)	1.237 (1.015)	4.282** (1.835)	0.0585 (1.527)
nGDPperc	-6.369*** (1.647)	2.655 (1.786)	-5.849*** (1.658)	2.280 (2.061)	-6.066*** (2.276)	4.049*** (1.712)
c.ncons#c.nGDPperc	5.952*** (1.692)		5.203*** (2.017)		5.873** (2.494)	
nrelfract	0.233 (0.194)	0.988* (0.510)	0.150 (0.327)	0.867 (0.743)	0.292 (0.226)	1.665** (0.696)
npolityIV			-0.247 (0.425)	-0.0960 (0.825)		
nfreesdom					-0.353 (0.235)	-2.153* (1.152)
Constant	-4.495*** (1.182)	0.498 (1.560)	-4.272*** (1.140)	0.188 (1.686)	-4.039** (1.659)	2.028 (1.831)
Observations	142	142	142	142	142	142

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

countries which have not been a former colony, the zero-inflated Poisson regression was unable to run any of the models. Therefore the regression runs on the countries who were a former colony shown in table F in the appendices will be compared to table 4.1.

Looking at the outcome of both analyses one can see that there are no significant changes in the relations the variables show to coup d'état. One can thus assume that whether a country has been a former colony or not has no significant relation to coup d'état.

When comparing the outcome of this analysis with the literature there shows to be a disagreement, although the opinion of the literature seems to be based on mere speculations. The relationship between coup d'état and colonisation in the literature is mentioned as a relevant relationship (Belkin and Schofer, 2003). Meaning, if a country has been colonised, the likelihood of them experiencing a coup d'état goes up. This analysis, however, shows that there is no significant relationship between the latter. A note has to be made though on the complexity of colonisation since its legacy is underspecified and might, in fact, include many different factors which might or might not be related to coup d'état (Ziltener et al., 2017). Because of the extent of this research and the level of its complexity, these factors have not been taken into consideration.

4.7 CONSCRIPTION AND COUP D'ÉTAT

According to table 4.1, there seems to be a relation between conscription and coup d'état. The relation shows through the inverted nonlinear relation between conscription and GDP per capita. The results show that up until a certain point the increase in GDP per capita, and the increase of conscripted years in a country, will also increase the number of coup d'état.

Compared to the literature the analyses seem to support the claim of Varol. He mentions that in countries who hold the army in high regard, through the means of conscription, for example, the likelihood of coup d'état is increasing (Varol, 2012). The data used in this thesis, however, does not take into consideration the popularity of the army and thus can only base a comparison on his claims made surrounding conscription. Because this is a dataset including a worldwide population, it might still be that on an individual country base there is more evidence of a relation between conscription and coup d'état, yet this thesis is too minimal to contribute to these possible findings.

4.8 HYPOTHESIS RESULTS

After having given the results, the answers to the hypothesis can be given, before answering the main question.

Sub-question 1 - How does democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalization and colonialism impact the risk of coup d'état?

The analysis within this thesis in combination with already existing literature shows that democracy, economy, military personnel per capita and linguistic fractionalization have a significant relation to the occurrence of coup d'état. In the case of democracy and economy, there appears to be a negative relation. If the level of democracy, or economy goes down, the occurrence of coup d'état will go up. Military personnel and religious fractionalisation have a positive relation with coup d'état, meaning if they were to increase, so will coup d'état.

Sub-question 2 - How does the presence of conscription influence the impact democracy, economy, military management, religion, fractionalization and colonialism impact the risk of coup d'état?

The analysis shows there to be an inverted nonlinear relation between GDP per capita, conscription and coup d'état. This means that up until a certain level the increase of conscription in combination with the increase in GDP per capita will show an increase in coup d'état. Under the presence of conscription, the impact GDP per capita has on coup d'état thus changes from a negative to a positive relation.

How does conscription correlate to coup d'état?

To answer the main question: conscription does correlate to coup d'état. The correlation is visible in the inverted nonlinear relation between GDP per capita, as earlier explained. One can thus conclude that there is, in fact, a relation between conscription and coup d'état.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This thesis has been able to analyse multiple facets which have not been researched before, either in general or not by the use of quantitative data. It also means that it has falsified and supported several pieces of literature, next to adding new information in order to fill up the holes in the literature.

The pieces which have been falsified are those who relate coup d'état to military expenditures, religious fractionalisation, colonialism and coup-proofing. There is no relation present as far as being analysed by this thesis, and thus the previous speculation can now be shown as nothing more than just speculation. Throughout the analysis, there has also been no proof that conscription will lower the risk of a coup d'état and so the claim that conscription is a successful way to coup-proof a country has been falsified.

Literature which has been supported by this thesis are those on the relation between coup d'état and democracy, economy, military personnel, religion and linguistic fractionalisation. There does indeed seem to be a relation between these variables and coup d'état. The results which show there to be a relation between conscription and coup d'état are completely new to the literature and can thus be considered a great contribution to the existing cap related to the topics of coup d'état and conscription.

This thesis however must acknowledge the high complexity of coup d'état. The event is generally not caused by used a single variable, and the results given by this analysis should, therefore, be taken with care. It is the mere lack of literature in combination with the complexity of coup d'état which make that these findings are just a start in the quantitative research on coup d'état, and the effect of conscription on its occurrence.

The future recommendation would, therefore, be broken up several variables into smaller pieces, such as military management. By looking at the allocation of military expenditures, one would be able to see which characteristics would be more related to coup d'état than others.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVE DATA

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Coup	142	0.423	0.894	0	4
ncons	142	0.570	0.497	0	1
nGDPperc	142	5.33e-10	1.000	-0.794	5.878
nlingfract	138	-1.24e-10	1.000	-1.403	1.740
nrelfract	142	1.17e-09	1.000	-1.863	1.817
npolityIV	142	-1.25e-08	1.000	-1.976	1.155
nfreesom	142	6.39e-09	1.000	-1.467	1.768
ngini	135	8.93e-10	1.000	-2.124	2.451
nmilpers	142	2.56e-09	1.000	-0.879	7.031
nmilexp	141	8.45e-10	1.000	-0.520	5.267

**APPENDIX B. SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVE DATA BEFORE
STANDARDISATION**

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Coup	142	0.423	0.894	0	4
Conscription	142	0.556	0.466	0	1
GDPperc	142	11,315	13,673	459.9	91,680
LingFrac	138	0.413	0.293	0.00211	0.923
RelFract	142	0.437	0.233	0.00229	0.860
PolityIV	142	2.623	6.390	-10	10
Freedomindex	142	3.722	1.855	1	7
GINI	135	385.7	74.65	227.2	568.7
Militarypersonnelperc	142	0.00552	0.00603	0.000218	0.0479
Militaryexpendituresperc	141	173.6	333.1	0.269	1,928

APPENDIX C. DEMOCRACY REGRESSION

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation
ncons	5.588* (3.086)	-1.594 (2.007)	4.983** (2.484)	4.553 (3.660)	4.975 (4.761)	-106.1*** (4.095)	7.138* (4.009)	13.26 (9.424)	8.493** (3.538)	0.598 (2.831)
nGDPperc	-8.638** (4.143)	5.957** (2.941)	-3.307 (3.004)	8.573 (6.479)	-4.492 (5.414)	-69.20*** (2.920)	-8.271 (5.456)	6.648** (2.793)	-10.77** (4.573)	11.24** (4.831)
c.ncons#c.nGDPperc	8.820* (4.683)		4.609 (3.562)		4.581 (6.210)		9.262 (5.883)		12.56** (5.366)	
nlingfrac	0.296* (0.174)	0.467 (0.596)	-0.676* (0.384)	-1.051 (1.043)	-0.421 (0.276)	5.062*** (0.443)				
npolityIV			-3.384*** (0.827)	-0.662 (7.961)	-2.734*** (0.777)	314.9*** (12.69)				
nfreesdom							1.937*** (0.709)	0.107 (2.321)		
ngini					-0.599 (0.500)	-70.55*** (2.899)				
nmilpers					1.965** (0.946)	149.5*** (4.772)				
melfrac									0.461 (0.284)	2.427*** (0.888)
Constant	-5.683** (2.750)	3.564* (1.940)	-2.604 (2.211)	-2.076 (6.134)	-2.100 (3.664)	-57.59*** (2.297)	-6.425* (3.727)	-11.21 (9.243)	-7.220** (3.053)	4.953 (3.650)
Observations	75	75	75	75	75	75	76	76	76	76

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX D. DICTATORSHIP REGRESSION

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation
ncons	6.106*** (2.201)	17.45*** (1.221)	6.486*** (2.382)	17.69*** (1.348)	6.592*** (2.391)	17.07*** (1.361)	5.301*** (2.039)	2.423 (1.854)	6.518*** (2.250)	5.928*** (2.057)
nGDPperc	-9.040*** (2.793)	-1.225 (1.050)	-9.594*** (3.017)	-1.258 (0.992)	-9.691*** (3.085)	-1.172 (1.044)	-8.340*** (2.660)	1.703 (2.215)	-10.25*** (3.102)	8.034 (5.603)
c.ncons#c.nGDPperc	7.135** (3.005)		7.570** (3.227)		7.768** (3.226)		6.620** (2.912)		8.292*** (3.192)	
nlingfract	-0.477*** (0.157)	-0.633 (0.511)	-0.517*** (0.136)	-0.697 (0.593)	-0.483*** (0.147)	-0.631 (0.553)	-0.420** (0.184)	0.0204 (1.274)	-0.368* (0.213)	0.367 (1.834)
npolityIV			0.375 (0.347)	0.275 (0.869)			-0.784 (0.508)	-11.61* (6.551)	-0.685 (0.552)	-26.36 (21.22)
nfreesdom					-0.273 (0.410)	-0.169 (0.990)				
ngini							0.599* (0.317)	8.364* (4.995)	0.655** (0.302)	17.55 (16.00)
nmilpers									0.346 (0.219)	-2.917** (1.325)
Constant	-6.428*** (2.109)	-17.63*** (1.438)	-6.521*** (2.169)	-17.62*** (1.190)	-6.672*** (2.187)	-17.05*** (1.491)	-6.396*** (2.014)	-14.72** (7.492)	-7.640*** (2.232)	-30.73 (23.05)
Observations	63	63	63	63	63	63	57	57	57	57

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX E. ISLAM REGRESSION

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation
ncons	6.216** (2.516)	14.73*** (3.621)	7.226*** (2.177)	1.350 (2.118)	6.003* (3.539)	1.401 (2.216)	4.946 (3.133)	42.04*** (7.407)	5.384* (2.986)	32.33*** (1.776)
nGDPperc	-9.832*** (3.745)	-0.682 (1.448)	-11.92*** (3.235)	-0.649 (1.119)	-8.925 (5.796)	1.805 (2.055)	-7.514 (4.837)	111.6*** (36.38)	-10.04*** (4.775)	69.26*** (4.181)
c.ncons#c.nGDPperc	8.526** (3.859)		10.46*** (3.311)		8.323 (5.589)		6.700 (4.908)		7.196 (4.586)	
nlingfrac	-0.150 (0.174)	-0.756 (0.659)	0.0289 (0.248)	-0.197 (1.175)	-0.235 (0.284)	-1.205 (1.869)	-0.333 (0.309)	-44.22*** (5.490)	-0.324 (0.235)	-68.68*** (3.213)
npolityIV			-0.515 (0.413)	-1.023 (2.399)	-0.378 (0.516)	-1.427 (1.699)	0.192 (0.309)	-2.815 (1.807)	0.0396 (0.287)	-25.59*** (1.697)
ngini					0.907 (0.587)	5.373 (4.230)	1.326*** (0.444)	194.4*** (15.67)	1.317*** (0.416)	280.8*** (12.37)
nmilpers							0.695*** (0.233)	-20.29*** (1.751)		
nmilexp									10.03*** (3.416)	1.241 (3.093)
Constant	-6.340*** (2.451)	-15.09*** (3.979)	-7.982*** (2.327)	-2.884 (2.218)	-5.721 (4.039)	-1.101 (2.042)	-4.172 (3.240)	2.152 (30.56)	-1.447 (3.063)	-33.79*** (3.333)
Observations	42	42	42	42	39	39	39	39	39	39

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

APPENDIX F. COLONY REGRESSION

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation	Coup	inflation
ncons	5.512*** (1.468)	12.66 (10.31)	3.539*** (1.323)	0.772 (1.266)	3.444** (1.523)	2.794* (1.479)	3.782*** (1.414)	1.937 (2.761)	4.129*** (1.485)	5.427** (2.758)	3.010 (2.330)	0.700 (2.659)
nGDPperc	-8.349*** (2.034)	-0.203 (1.290)	-6.221*** (1.631)	-1.090 (1.108)	-6.331*** (1.974)	-4.698** (2.052)	-6.490*** (1.837)	0.739 (1.484)	-7.084*** (1.946)	6.881** (3.204)	-5.854*** (2.093)	-2.509 (6.079)
c.ncons#	6.658***	4.244**	4.244**		3.971*		4.534**		5.016**		3.548	
c.nGDPperc	(2.125)		(1.895)		(2.225)		(2.083)		(2.181)		(3.182)	
nlingfract	-0.240 (0.149)	-0.304 (0.456)	-0.210 (0.141)	0.0250 (0.633)	-0.306** (0.124)	-1.376* (0.834)	-0.252** (0.125)	0.173 (0.850)	-0.227* (0.131)	0.594 (1.142)	-0.238 (0.154)	0.309 (0.942)
npolityIV			-0.703*** (0.151)	-2.166* (1.179)			-0.932*** (0.214)	-9.256 (5.939)	-0.882*** (0.228)	-22.65*** (8.179)	-0.946*** (0.260)	-7.267 (4.707)
nfreedom					0.853*** (0.199)	5.969** (2.850)						
ngini							0.411** (0.201)	6.380 (4.436)	0.425** (0.200)	14.67*** (5.332)	0.401* (0.231)	4.976 (3.546)
nmilpers									0.139 (0.164)	-2.684** (1.175)		
nmilexp											1.313 (4.890)	11.88 (25.23)
Constant	-5.995*** (1.411)	-12.73 (10.61)	-4.658*** (1.144)	-3.615** (1.640)	-5.005*** (1.352)	-12.72** (5.199)	-5.077*** (1.301)	-11.88 (9.592)	-5.444*** (1.361)	-26.48*** (9.596)	-3.931 (3.143)	-5.211 (8.458)
Observations	102	102	102	102	102	102	98	98	98	98	98	98

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

9. CURRICULUM VITAE (CV)

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