



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**THREAT PERCEPTION AND ALLIANCE
PREFERENCES IN THE PRO-GOVERNMENT TURKISH
PRESS BETWEEN MARCH 1945 AND JANUARY 1946:
PUBLICATIONS OF ULUS AND CUMHURIYET**

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SUPERVISOR: PROF. SERHAT GÜVENÇ

MASTER'S THESIS

ISTANBUL, SEPTEMBER, 2020

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ISTANBUL, SEPTEMBER, 2020

DECLARATION OF RESEARCH ETHICS AND METHODS OF DISSEMINATION

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This work entitled **THREAT PERCEPTION AND ALLIANCE PREFERENCES IN THE PRO-GOVERNMENT TURKISH PRESS BETWEEN MARCH 1945 AND JANUARY 1946: PUBLICATIONS OF ULUS AND CUMHURİYET** prepared by **YILDIRIM KAAN KARAKAYALI** has been judged to be successful at the defense exam held on **SEPTEMBER 4, 2020** and accepted by our jury as **MASTER'S THESIS**.

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September 4, 2020

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ABSTRACT

YILDIRIM KAAN KARAKAYALI, THREAT PERCEPTION AND ALLIANCE PREFERENCES IN THE PRO-GOVERNMENT TURKISH PRESS BETWEEN MARCH 1945 AND JANUARY 1946: PUBLICATIONS OF ULUS AND CUMHURIYET, ISTANBUL, MAY 2020

Considered one of the most critical milestones in the history of Turkish Foreign Policy after the Second World War, the termination of the Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship on March 19, 1945, and the subsequent events that are closely related to the Turkish – Soviet and Turkish – Anglo-Saxon relations until the first days of January 1946, particularly the Soviet demands of June 1945, constitute the main scope of this research.

In the research, firstly, it was aimed to establish the direct and indirect influence of the government on the press and publication agencies while shaping the threat perception and alliance preferences of the public by considering the relations between the central government, press, and journalists of the period. In conjunction with this, it was aimed to analyse if Turkey, who pursued a balance policy during the Second World War, would meet the characteristics of a “*middle power*” while re-constructing her alliance preferences after the termination of the Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, by looking at the publications of the two pro-government newspapers, which had the highest circulation rates.

The issues of *Ulus and Cumhuriyet* published between March 19, 1945, and January 7, 1946, were analysed in this research. By implementing the press scanning method, the articles of the distinguished authors of *Ulus and Cumhuriyet*, as well as the reports and articles retrieved from local and foreign press agencies and articles written by guest authors were focused. In this research, which has a descriptive nature, the prominent arguments in the literature were tested. As a result, it was concluded from the publications of *Ulus and Cumhuriyet* that the government had both direct and indirect influence on the process of shaping threat perception and alliance preferences. On the other hand, as

reflected in the publications of the newspapers, it was also observed that Turkey meets the middle power characteristics.

Keywords: alliance preferences, threat perception, Second World War, Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, Turkish – American relations, Turkish – British relations, Turkish – Soviet relations, Soviet demands, Ulus, Cumhuriyet



ÖZET

YILDIRIM KAAAN KARAKAYALI, MART 1945 VE OCAK 1946 ARASINDA HÜKÜMET YANLISI GAZETELERDE TEHDİT ALGISI VE İTTİFAK TERCİHLERİ: ULUS VE CUMHURİYET GAZETELERİNİN YAYINLARI, İSTANBUL, MAYIS 2020

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Türk Dış Politika tarihinin en önemli dönüm noktalarından biri sayılan, Türk – Sovyet Dostluk ve Saldırmazlık Antlaşması'nın 19 Mart 1945 tarihinde feshedilmesi ve başta Haziran 1945'te öne sürülen Sovyet teklifleri olmak üzere 1946 yılının ilk günlerine kadar geçen süreçte Türk – Sovyet, Türk – İngiliz ve Türk – Amerikan ilişkilerini yakından ilgilendiren olaylar bu çalışmanın temel kapsamını oluşturmaktadır.

Çalışmada ilk olarak dönemin merkezi hükümet ile basın ve gazeteciler arasındaki ilişkileri dikkate alınarak, kamuoyundaki tehdit algısı ve ittifak tercihlerinin şekillendirilmesi sürecinde hükümetin basın ve yayın kuruluşları üzerindeki doğrudan ve dolaylı etkilerinin incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır. Bununla bağlantılı olarak çalışmada, İkinci Dünya Savaşı esnasında denge politikası yürüten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin, Türk – Sovyet Dostluk ve Saldırmazlık Antlaşması'nın feshini takip eden dönemde ittifak tercihlerini yeniden inşa ederken “Orta Büyüklükte Devlet (OBD)” özelliklerini gösterip göstermediğinin, dönemin hükümete yakın ve en yüksek tirajlı iki gazetesi üzerinden incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır.

Çalışmada, Ulus ve Cumhuriyet gazetelerinin 19 Mart 1945 – 7 Ocak 1946 arasında yayınlanan sayıları incelenmiştir. Gazete taraması metodunun kullanıldığı bu çalışmada, Ulus ve Cumhuriyet gazetelerinin önde gelen yazarlarının konuya ilişkin makalelerinin yanı sıra, yerel ve yabancı basından alınan haberler ve konuk yazarlara ait makalelere odaklanılmıştır. Betimleyici bir mahiyette olan bu çalışmada literatürde öne çıkan argümanlar test edilmiş, Ulus ve Cumhuriyet gazetelerinin yayınlarından kamuoyundaki tehdit algısının ve ittifak tercihlerinin şekillendirilmesi sürecinde hükümetin bu iki gazete özelinde doğrudan ve dolaylı etkilerinin bulunduğu anlaşılmış ve yine bu süreçte Türkiye

Cumhuriyeti'nin gazete yayınlarına yansıdığı kadarıyla OBD özelliklerini karşıladığı görülmüştür.

Anahtar Sözcükler: ittifak tercihleri, tehdit algısı, İkinci Dünya Savaşı, Türk-Sovyet Dostluk ve Saldırmazlık Antlaşması, Türk – Amerikan ilişkileri, Türk – İngiliz ilişkileri, Türk – Sovyet ilişkileri, Sovyet teklifleri, Ulus Gazetesi, Cumhuriyet Gazetesi



ABBREVIATIONS LIST

B.Y.U.M.	Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü (Press and Publication General Directorate)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
U.K.	The United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
U.S.	The United States

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1. INTRODUCTION

The main component of this research relies on defining, explaining, and positioning the concept of the alliance and the threat perception in the post Second World War context. To understand the intrinsic features and possible implications of the alliance concept, we should first look deeper into its etymological roots. The word “*to ally*” -as a verb form- has its origins in the late 13th century France. The word has been used to denote “*joining a marriage*” or, in other words, “*bind to something or someone*”¹. To position the concept in the field of international relations, we might refer to Stephen M. Walt's definition that he preferred to use in his distinguished book *The Origins of Alliances*. In his words, the alliance could be defined “*as a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states,*” which requires a certain amount of commitment from both parties (Walt, 2013, p. 1). In light of this definition, to understand the main reasons for formulating alliances, first, the notions of cooperation and conflict should be scrutinized.

To understand the ongoing debate on the possibility of cooperation among states, we should look at certain classifications and explanations suggested by prominent figures from both realist and liberal schools.

As Robert Jervis has asserted in his article titled *Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate*, “*both neoliberalism and neorealism start from the assumption that absence of a sovereign authority that can enforce binding agreements and create opportunities for states to advance their interests unilaterally and makes it difficult for states to cooperate with one another*” (Jervis, 1999, p. 43). Indeed, this presupposition triggers different approaches to both neoliberalism and neorealism. In the simplest explanation, it could be said that neorealism sees international politics as more *conflictual* than neoliberal institutionalism does.

¹ ally. (n.d.). Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved December 10, 2017, from Dictionary.com website <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ally>

As Karen Mingst stated in her book *Essentials of International Relations*, both classical liberals and neoliberal institutionalists believed that cooperation among states is reachable. In her words, while classical liberals suggest that the cooperation emerges from man's establishing and reforming institutions that prevent violent actions and allow cooperative interactions, neoliberal institutionalists attach credence to the institutions that would enable states to cooperate for the collective good (Mingst, 2007, p. 65). Stephen M. Walt, on the other hand, reminded in his article that according to neoliberals, economic interdependence would also discourage states from taking coercive actions against each other (Walt, 1998, p. 32).

Contrary to core explanations of the classical liberals and neoliberals, Kenneth Waltz, one of the founders of the neorealism, argued in his book titled *Theory of International Politics* that there are two main limitations for states to cooperate derived from the structure of international politics. According to him, first, in a self-help world, a state intrinsically feels uneasy about such a division of possible gains that may favor other units more than herself. And secondly, he argued that under the same conditions, a state also worries about becoming dependent on other units while serving *cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services* (Waltz, 1979, p. 106).²

² The intrinsic reasons for this discrepancy could also be understood by looking at the basics. As Thomas Hobbes indicated in *Leviathan*, people inherently desire power to live secure and well. Therefore, the environment of insecurity and uncertainty eventually obliged people to live in a loop of “*continual fear and danger of violent death*” (Hobbes, 2001). In this Hobbesian world, in which state of nature is merely based on a view that each individual is selfish and power-seeking, one classic example regarding the state-level implications of this understanding could be mentioned, as Mingst underlined in her book. According to Karen Mingst, four essential assumptions of realism could be drawn from the Athenian historian and general Thucydides' *History of Peloponnesian War*. As a fourth assumption that Mingst pointed out in her book, she argued that Thucydides was mostly concerned with the issues related to the security of the state to protect it against internal and external threats. And added, a state in given conditions, augments its security by reinforcing its domestic capacities and economic prowess as well as forming alliances with other states which have similar interests (Mingst, 2007, p. 67-68). In contrary to Hobbes, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau based his understanding on the goodness of men who have not been poisoned yet by the pressures of society and state. As an outcome of this optimistic perception of human nature, Rousseau highlighted the importance of the concepts of *the general will* and *the common good* as

According to Robert Powell, three main issues are crucial to understanding the debate between realist and liberal schools. The first issue is the meaning and *implications of anarchy*. He asserted that to avoid confusion regarding its meaning and implications, it is necessary to begin with two separate formulations of anarchy. The first formulation acknowledged that anarchy purports a “*lack of common government.*” And the second argument attributes another feature to the anarchy that refers to “*the means available to the units.*” To avoid further misconceptions, Powell suggested that one should internalize the aforementioned arguments rather than accepting anarchy as a *lack of central authority* (Powell, 1994, p. 329-331).

The second issue that Powell mentioned was *the problem of absolute and relative gains*. In addition to the basics, Powell claimed that the key to understanding the debate is to distinguish between two main possibilities. According to one possibility, the degree of relative gain is a consequence of a strategic environment where the state is trying to sustain its status quo. And to the other, according to Powell, is the degree of desire for relative gain emerges regardless of the state's strategic environment but its own pleasures (Powell, 1994, p. 334-335). And the last issue pointed out by Powell was about *coordination and distribution*, which mainly focuses on the institutions. The essence of this issue mainly relies on the unequal distribution of the outcomes, which significantly affects the state not to cooperate anymore (Powell, 1994, p. 338-339).

At this very point, where the dispute on the possibility of cooperation remains prevalent in the field of international relations, we might take a more in-depth look at the determinants of the alliance perceptions in the field of IR. To create a concrete picture for states' alliance behavior in an anarchic international order, what deserves more elaboration is the system-level understanding of international relations. In addition to Powell's definition of anarchy, Waltz argued that anarchy means more than the absence

an essence of the social contract between the state and people (Rousseau, 2016). In brief, it could be deduced from the above-mentioned features that while realists are more concerned with human nature and international security, liberals are mostly concerned with enhancing the awareness of cooperation and economic prosperity through a set of international institutions.

of a government, according to him, it should also be perceived as the *presence of disorder and chaos* (Waltz, 1979, p. 114). He then suggested that, unlike classical realists, international power politics could be understood by focusing on the international structure rather than the characteristics of the units alone. In his famous three-part definition of structure, Waltz asserted that the structures are defined, first, according to the ordering principles, which is anarchy in the given context. Secondly, he claimed that structures are also defined by the principles of differentiation of units. And lastly, he argued that structures could be defined through the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979, p. 100-101). As it can be concluded from the suggestions that Waltz put forward, to define the international structure, as a founding father of neorealism, unlike his classical predecessors, he believed that the balance of power was particularly formed and determined by the international structure rather than the characteristic features of the units.³

In addition to Waltz's three-part definition of political structure, Stephen M. Walt, on the other hand, contributed to the field by suggesting the *balance of threat* concept to provide a more detailed explanation regarding the question of why states formulate alliances. According to constructivist Alexander Wendt, Walt's *balance of threat* argument is an important revision to Waltz's theory on the distribution of power, in his words, which supports the idea that states' actions and threat perceptions are socially constructed (Wendt, 1992, p. 396).

Within the context of this research, Walt's balance of threat theory carries great importance. In his book titled *The Origins of Alliances*, where he introduced the balance of threat theory, Walt structured his explanation upon Waltz's bandwagoning and balancing behaviors of states (Waltz, 1979, p. 126). According to Walt, in their simplest explanations, balancing can be defined as allying with other states to confront the prevailing threat, whereas the bandwagoning refers to allying with the source of danger (Walt, 2013, p. 17). Following these definitions, Walt then broadly explained the balancing and bandwagoning behaviors of states and finally concluded that although

³ According to Waltz, the balance of power starts with an assumption that states, at a minimum, seek their own security (in his words, preservation) in the self-help world and at a maximum drive for universal domination (Waltz, 1979, p. 118).

power remains as an essential component of the equation, in his words, it is more accurate to say that *states tend to formulate alliance with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat* (Walt, 2013, p. 21).

Following Walt's balance of threat theory, Alexander Wendt's emphasis on the *structure of identity and interest* come to the fore while searching for an additional explanation regarding the states' alliance preferences. According to Wendt, who argued that *self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy*, Walt's distribution of power might affect the states' calculations, yet he added that *distribution of knowledge* is the core theory that constitutes the conceptions of self and other (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). On the other hand, Wendt also argued that in order to bridge the gap between the structure and the action, the fourth dimension must be added to Walt's three-part definition of structure: *the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system* (Wendt, 1992, p. 401). With this suggestion, what might be concluded that Wendt tried to point out the logical explanation of the difference between states' actions towards her friends and foes.

By taking both Stephen M. Walt's and Alexander Wendt's criticisms and contributions to the structural analysis of the international politics and the alliance preferences of the states, the *construction of threat model* introduced by David Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero in their article titled ***Identity, Power and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experimental Study***, marked significant standpoint as it provided logical answers to *why* and *how* questions of threat perception as well. According to Rousseau and Retamero, construction of the threat model relies on the identity creation function between self and the other. Therefore, in their words, the model suggests that power has an influence over peoples' and also state's threat perceptions only after identity between *self* and the other has been constructed (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007, p. 749). From this point on, what they also suggest is, similar to Wendt's argument regarding the importance of the distribution of knowledge, the shared sense of identity will eventually decrease the belief that the other has an intention to harm the self, and encourage both parties to cooperate (Rousseau & Retamero, 2007, p. 750).

Subsequent to these aforementioned explanations that help us to understand the core theoretical principles of the alliance behaviors and threat perceptions of states in the international system, within the context of this study, one might raise a question that what kind of behaviors we might expect from a “*middle power*” in an international system which was dominated by two great powers after the Second World War.

To give a proper answer to these questions, I would like to start by referring to Raymond Aron’s well-known book titled “*Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations.*” Aron takes as his point of departure defining the international system as an ensemble constituted by political units that are initially responsible for maintaining the regular relations with each other even in the times of general war (Aron, 2009, p. 94). While stating the importance of *the policy of equilibrium* (Aron, 2009, p. 125), Aron then described the international system further and asserted its key characteristic as *the concept of a configuration of the relation of forces*. According to him, this concept, in its simplest form constituted by two contrasting typical components: the multipolar configuration and the bipolar configuration of the relation of forces (Aron, 2009, p. 98). Within the scope of my research, which is mainly dealing with the aftermath of the Second World War, I would like to focus on the bipolar configuration.

1.1. CLASSIFICATION OF STATES IN A BIPOLAR SYSTEM

In Aron’s words, in a bipolar system, we could say that there are two major powers that can sweep out all the rest, therefore the equilibrium could be reached solely through two main blocks (Aron, 2009, p. 98). According to Aron, in such a system, we could define three kinds of actors: two leaders of the coalitions and the states that are obliged to take part in one of those coalitions (Aron, 2009, p. 136).

Following Aron’s framework, William Hale carried out Aron’s theory one step further and asserted in his well-known book “*Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774*”, in a bipolar system, when middle powers – in other words, ones that are obliged to ally with one of those leading powers- receive a threat from one of the great powers, they would initially look after the solution outside. In his words, they cannot normally fight a successful war

against great power on their own. Therefore, Hale claimed that middle powers have two options to survive: “*whether by the exploitation of the balance of forces between two blocks or to joining an alliance*” (Hale, 2013, p. 2).

At this very point, what deserves more elaboration is the power and state classifications in terms of their capacities and capabilities in a given context. According to Edward Weisband, a *small power* could be understood by looking at Robert L. Rothstein’s definition. In Rothstein’s words, a small power can be determined as the one cannot obtain its security by its own capabilities and truly recognizes that it must rely upon the aid and support of other states or institutions (Weisband, 1973, p. 321).

Despite its significant contribution to the terminology, we might assert that Rothstein’s definition of a small state sounds broad to some extent. As a matter of fact, I would like to touch on Baskin Oran’s classification of states as an alternative set of definitions. Although states generally classified as *great* (which then described as *superpowers*⁴) and small in the international system, he suggested just as Hale did, we could indicate another one in between great (*hegemon*)⁵ and small (*pivotal*)⁶ states.

In Oran’s words, there are two main dimensions of middle power: Economic dimensions and Military & Strategic dimensions. He asserted that on the one hand, in order to define one state as a middle power, it must have at least a certain economic size and power as well as development in certain fields. On the other hand, in the case of turbulent economic circumstances, it should be able to demonstrate its military and strategic power to fill the gap (Oran, 2014, p. 30).

In addition to Oran’s definition of middle power, Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç mentioned four main approaches to define the concept of middle power in their book titled *Türkiye’nin Akdeniz Siyaseti (1923 – 1939)* but deduced that only the “*functional*”

4 According to William Fox, the category of a superpower can be formularized as “Great power plus great mobility of power”. Having said that he warns us that labels are (such as great powers or superpowers) are nothing but a matter of terminological convenience (Fox, 1980, p. 418).

5 According to Oran, hegemon states are the ones who have the ability to affect the regional and international equilibrium through their power elements. (Oran, 2014, p. 29)

6 According to Oran, in contrast to hegemon states, small states are the ones who have can easily be affected by regional and international disputes. (Oran, 2014, p. 29)

or “behavioral” approach could be relevant to Turkey during and aftermath of the Second World War (Barlas & Güvenç, 2014). According to Barlas and Güvenç, this approach mainly relies on the moral sentiments of a middle power within the international system (Barlas & Güvenç, 2014, p. 32). That is to say, in practice, this approach asserts that a middle power should act in favor of providing multilateral solutions to international conflicts and adopting the essence of “good international citizenship” in their foreign affairs (Barlas & Güvenç, 2014, p. 32-33). Within the period of my case study took place, despite her insufficient economic and military means, thanks to her geopolitical importance and prudent foreign policy, I believe it is wise to define Turkey as a middle power, just as Hale (2013, pg.1), Oran (2014, pg.30) and Barlas & Güvenç (2014, pg. 32) did earlier.

1.2. AIMS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

In the following chapters of this study, I will be trying to answer the question “*How were the alliance preferences and threat perception shaped in the pro-government Turkish press between March 19, 1945, and January 7, 1946?*” through researching the articles and editorial comments of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.

The reason that I have chosen *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* for this study is their high circulation rates in between 1943 and 1945. According to the research conducted by the *Royal Institute of International Relations*, and which has been highlighted by Edward Weisband in his book “*Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*”, during the period between 1943 and 1945, of the 11 newspapers published in Ankara and Istanbul, *Cumhuriyet* (16,000) and *Ulus* (12,000) were at the top of the list based on their circulation rates (Weisband, 1973, 74).

At this very point, I would like to touch on the importance of this study and the possible contribution to the field of international relations (IR). This study aims to contribute to the field of IR in two aspects. The first aim is to test the relevance of the aforementioned middle power characteristics of Turkey by analyzing the publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. Although there is an extensive literature on Turkey’s foreign policy

dynamics and state characteristics after the termination of the Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, none of them concentrated on the publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in the given time period.

It was observed that studies and researches on this particular subject mainly structured on the Soviet demands and diplomatic notes exchanged between Turkey and the Soviet Union (Ertem, 2010; Dokuyan, 2013; Ocak, 2016; İnce 2016) or the general reflections in the Turkish press and public after the Second World War (Kürümoğlu, 2011). For that reason, to contribute to the field, I have constituted my study on the basis of alliance preferences and threat perception of Turkey and how they were reflected in the press.

Therefore, the first hypothesis of this study mainly reflects the core theoretical argument that emphasized before. By taking William Hale’s interpretation on the abilities and capabilities of middle powers (see p. 6-7) and Barlas & Güvenç’s “*functional/behavioral*” approach (see p. 7-8) to the core, I will be testing the relevance of these arguments for Turkey in the given time period. In this regard, I am expecting to conclude that due to her fragile position at the end of the Second World War, Turkey was trying to exploit the *balance of forces* between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by pursuing cautious and smart public and foreign diplomacy from March 19, 1945, to January 7, 1946.

On the other hand, the second and the most salient aim of this study is to establish the direct and indirect influence of the Turkish government on the publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* while constructing the perception of threat and alliance preferences in the given time period. This aim is particularly supported by the findings, memoirs, and arguments of the prominent figures such as Feridun Cemal Erkin, *former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey*; Edward Weisband, *American political scientist*; Fahir Armaoğlu, *Turkish political scientist and historian*; Cemil Hasanlı, *Azerbaijani historian*; Baskın Oran, *Turkish political scientist*; Metin Toker, *Turkish journalist*; Nilgün Gürkan, *Turkish political scientist*; Nur Bilge Criss, *Turkish political scientist*; Behlül Özkan, *Turkish political scientist*; Cangül Örnek, *Turkish political scientist*.

Therefore, the second hypothesis of this research is completely in line with the first one. According to this hypothesis, it is claimed that to consolidate the U.S. support, the *perception of threat* in the pro-government Turkish press, specifically *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, gradually narrowed down on the Soviet danger as of the termination of the Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship dated March 19, 1945 by the direct and indirect influence of the Turkish government. Taking this argument into the core, by analyzing the related articles and editorial comments of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, in the given time period, I would like to establish the direct and indirect influence of the Turkish government to the publications of these newspapers while constructing the perception of threat and alliance preferences.

To support the argument which claims that the Turkish government had direct and indirect influences on the publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, I would like to refer Metin Toker and Nilgün Gürkan. As it was indicated by Metin Toker in his book “*Türkiye Üzerine 1945 Kâbusu*”, at the beginning of 1945, Turkish journalists and editors were instructed by the Turkish government on how to speak of the Turkish – Soviet relations (Toker, 1971, p. 9-10). On the other hand, Nilgün Gürkan also highlighted this issue in her book “*Türkiye’de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın 1945-1950*” and asserted that, in the early days of 1945, the Turkish press exhibited a relatively soft attitude towards Soviet publications and radio broadcasts which were targeting Turkey. However, this editorial attitude started to change subsequent to policy changes of the government towards the Soviet Union (Gürkan, 1998, p.107-108).

1.3. METHODOLOGY

This study mainly relies on the findings from the publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in the period between March 19, 1945, and January 7, 1946. I will be testing my hypotheses through the press scanning method, which helped me to gather in-depth insights about the subject. In the meantime, there were two main limitations that I have encountered during this research.

The first limitation was the accessibility of the sources. Due to the lack of available electronic copies of *Ulus*, I have searched state libraries of Istanbul and found hard copies. However, while being able to access the majority of the resources that I need through state libraries, I could not reach some of the issues of *Ulus* which were not essential but would be helpful to elaborate my research question further. On the other hand, the second limitation that I encountered was an outdated language. For some of the articles and reports that I found useful to support my research, I have spent extra time both to understand the inner meanings and to translate them into English.

In the research, I have mainly focused on editorial articles, reports retrieved from the international and local press agencies. Besides, to strengthen the content, I have also paid attention to the advertisements published in both newspapers. I have selected the works of the following authors and columnists for their relevance to this thesis.

1.3.1. Ulus

In *Ulus*, which was defined as the *official newspaper of the Republican People's Party (CHP)* by Edward Weisband (Weisband, 1973, p. 77), seven prominent authors came to the fore. Under the leadership of Falih Rifkî Atay, who was the chief editor of *Ulus* and the parliament member of the CHP at the time, of the six authors (excluding Atay), four of them were also parliament members of the CHP. In this respect, it could be stated that *Ulus* was the reflection of the CHP in the mainstream Turkish media to some extent.

For this research, 16 articles written by Falih Rifkî Atay were reviewed. It was observed that Atay, who attended the San Francisco Conference as the press advisor to the Turkish delegation in April 1945, particularly touched on the subjects related to the international disputes, peace conferences, and official Turkish stance towards certain issues in his editorials as of August 1945.

In the absence of Atay, during the period between April to August 1945, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, who was one of the non-politicians of the editorial board of the newspaper at the

time⁷, attracted attention with his editorials in *Ulus*. Of the eight articles reviewed in this research, written by Fenik, almost all of them were about the issues related to international disputes and their possible impacts on the Turkish cause.

On the other hand, Professor Nihat Erim, who was one of the prominent professors of the Law School of the Ankara University, came to the fore as another important figure for *Ulus* in this research. Professor Erim, who was a parliament member of the CHP at the time⁸, joined the editorial board of *Ulus* as of November 1945 and contributed to the editorials of the newspaper by focusing on strengthening Turkish-American and Turkish-British relations, commitment to the international principles, and international disputes that might have an impact on Turkey. Of the seven articles reviewed in this research, written by Erim, all of them were published after the first American diplomatic note regarding the status of the Straits was received by the Turkish government.

Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, in Weisband's words, "*a man who was close to the inner councils of foreign policy decision-making within the government*" (Weisband, 1973, p.77) also came to the fore in the editorial board of *Ulus*. As foreign editor of *Ulus*, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer⁹, who accompanied Falih Rıfkı Atay at the San Francisco Conference as an advisor to the Turkish delegation, mostly wrote articles regarding the international disputes in his column named "*Dış Politika.*" Of the five articles of Esmer that were reviewed in this research, all of them were about the importance and significance of the United States both in the international and regional conflicts.

In addition to the above-mentioned distinguished authors, the articles of Kemal Turan, Esat Tekeli, and Mehmet Nurettin Artam were also reviewed. It was observed that of the three articles reviewed in this research, written by Kemal Turan, who also served as a member of the parliament from CHP in between 1931 and 1950, mainly reflected the

7 Mümtaz Faik Fenik was elected as a member of parliament from the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950 and served two terms until 1957.

8 In his 18 years of an active political career, he served as Minister of Public Works of the Republic of Turkey between June 1948 and March 1949 under the Saka Government. After then, he served as Deputy Prime Minister between January 1949 and May 1950. And lastly, he served as Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey between March 1971 and May 1972, after March 12, 1971, Turkish military memorandum.

9 Ahmet Şükrü Esmer was elected as a member of parliament from CHP in 1939 and served until 1946. After that, in 1949, he was appointed as General Director of the Press and Publication Directorate.

Turkish standpoint in the face of certain milestones such as after the sudden death of the U.S. President F. Roosevelt and after the beginning of the Potsdam Conference. On the other hand, of the two articles reviewed in this research, written by Esat Tekeli¹⁰, who mostly contributed to the editorials of the newspaper with his articles regarding the economics and trade, one of them was about the priorities of the Turkish economy program. And lastly, two articles of Mehmet Nurettin Artam¹¹, who worked at the various departments of the General Directorate of the Press and Publication of Turkey during the Second World War, were also reviewed in this research.

1.3.2. Cumhuriyet

Contrary to *Ulus* and its editorial board composed of parliament members of the CHP, *Cumhuriyet*, which represented more nationalist and conservative outlook under the leadership of Nadir Nadi (Abalıoğlu)¹² who is the son of the founder of *Cumhuriyet*, Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu), was known with its pro-Axis tendencies in the Second World War. In this respect, within the context of this research, it could be expected that *Cumhuriyet* would represent a relatively more critical approach towards the Soviet threat than *Ulus*.

To establish the similarities and differences between *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in terms of editorial approaches pursued, different articles from five distinguished authors, in addition to the guest authors¹³, were reviewed for this research. In addition to 19 articles written by Nadir Nadi, which were mostly on the international and regional conflicts that had close links with the Turkish-Soviet relations, six articles written by Abidin Daver were also reviewed in this research. Abidin Daver, who nicknamed as “civilian admiral” for his interest in naval affairs (Weisband, 1973, p. 84), attracts attention due to his highly

10 Esat Tekeli served as Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Turkey between January 1942 and 1943.

11 The pen name *T.İ.* that Mehmet Nurettin Artam used in his column titled “*Yankılar*”, which are the initials of “*Toplu İğne*” can be translated as “*The Pin*.”

12 In Weisband’s words, Nadir Nadi who generally regarded as having favored the Axis forces during the Second World War, often tried to refute allegations regarding his pro-Axis tendency by justifying his editorials and on the grounds of political realism and Turkish national interests (Weisband, 1973, p. 77-78).

13 Professor İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Turkish academician, historian and Turkologist*, Süha Sakıp Taner, and Dr. M. Devecioğlu

critical and bold statements towards both the Soviet Union and the members of the Armenian National Committee. As pointed out in the following chapters, Abidin Daver was the first author who directly accused the Soviets being the instigator of the Armenian demands.

Along with Nadir Nadi and Abidin Daver, Ömer Rıza Doğrul¹⁴, who contributed to the editorials of *Cumhuriyet* with articles that he wrote in his column named “*Siyasi İcmal*”, came to the fore in the editorial board of the newspaper. Of the 7 articles reviewed in this research, written by Ömer Rıza Doğrul, 3 of them were published without the author’s name.

On the other hand, Professor Yavuz Abadan, who was a member of parliament from CHP at the time, also contributed to the editorials of *Cumhuriyet*. Of the six articles reviewed in this research, written by Professor Abadan, almost all of them were about the subjects related to the status of the Straits and the American stance towards Turkish-Soviet relations.

In addition to these distinguished authors, San Francisco correspondent of *Cumhuriyet* Doğan Nadi (Abalıoğlu)¹⁵, also came to the fore in *Cumhuriyet*. In his two articles that were reviewed in this research, Doğan Nadi focused on the reasons and developments of the Armenian demands which firstly announced at the San Francisco Conference.

14 Ömer Rıza Doğrul, who was a theologian and journalist at the time, was elected as a member of parliament from the Democrat Party (DP) in 1950 and served until 1954.

15 Doğan Nadi, who was a journalist at the time, also brothers with Nadir Nadi.

2. UNDERSTANDING THE PRE AND POST-SECOND WORLD WAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IMPACTS ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

2.1. TURKEY ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Starting with the 1929 Great Depression, the world entered a period of ominous developments that ends up with the total war in 1939. Through Japan's invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, then the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the credibility and prestige of the League of Nations took a major blow. Thereafter in 1936, following the resignation of Italy from the League of Nations, Rome – Berlin *Axis* announced.

In the meantime, the Republic of Turkey, which was mainly occupied with economic and military inadequacies in the early 1930s, obliged to implement prudent diplomacy for her own sake. As quoted by Selim Deringil in his book *“Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An “Active Neutrality”*, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, pointed out in his last days that a world war which was near would entirely destroy the international equilibrium. Having stated that, Atatürk also emphasized the indispensability of wisdom and prudence in policymaking in order not to *be faced with an even graver catastrophe than in the (Mondros) Armistice years (Deringil, 2004, p.1-3).*

According to Deringil, Turkish decision-makers formulated their foreign policy strategy based on six premises. First, the exceptionally strategic geopolitical location of Turkey strengthens her hand in the international arena and enables her to attract *powerful allies*. Second, although it gives such an advantage, her geopolitical location could also leave her in a difficult situation for being a point of attraction of major powers. Third, Deringil addressed, as a small country at the crossroads, Turkey had to avoid the formation of power blocks to maintain her maneuver flexibility. Fourth, Turkey must rely on the effective use of its own resources rather than counting on others'. Fifth, related to the previous premise, due to her inadequate resources, Turkey would step into war only in

defense. And lastly, smart and efficient use of bargaining stands out as a vital tool for Turkey's survival (Deringil, 2004, p. 3-4).

In light of these premises categorized by Deringil, the economic and military outlook of Turkey must also be pointed out. As underlined by Baskın Oran in his book *“Turkish Foreign Policy: Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt 1: 1919 – 1980”* despite the slight decrease in 1944, the cumulated inflation rate for the period between 1939 and 1944 reached 381.5% in Turkey (Oran, 2014, p. 390). In the meantime, debt payables of *Düyük-ü Umumiye (Ottoman Public Debt Administration)* as a percentage of exports increased tremendously to 64.2% (Oran, 2014, p. 391). On the other hand, when the country percentage breakdown of exports for the period between 1939 and 1944 was analysed, despite its significant decrease in 1940, Turkish exports were mostly dependent on Germany (Oran, 2014, p. 393).

In the late thirties, things were not heartwarming for Turkey in the military as well. As underlined by Deringil, in 1938, the Turkish Army consisted of 20,000 officers and 174,000 men forming 11 army corps, 23 divisions, one armored brigade, three cavalry brigades, and seven frontier commands which were primarily equipped with First World War weapons (Deringil, 2004, p. 33). Along with this outlook, Deringil also pointed out that the lack of *mobility* and *uniformity* constituted the Turkish Army's two-sided military inadequacy (Deringil, 2004, p.32).

Under these severe conditions, coupled with the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939, Turkey found herself on the edge of the Second World War. As Professor Fahir Armaoğlu underlined in his book *“Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi”*, following territorial guarantees been given to Greece and Romania after the Italian invasion of Albania, the U.K. offered the same to Turkey. Although having welcomed the British offer, as Armaoğlu stated, the Turkish government stressed the Italian threat towards the Mediterranean and therefore claimed that the aforementioned agreement should be conducted mutually (Armaoğlu, 2018, p. 109). As a result of heated negotiations, the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty was signed on October 19, 1939, which ensured British and French assistance in times of hostilities that Turkey being involved in. According to Deringil, for the Turks, the role of a *powerful friend* was filled by the Soviet Union from the early post – Lausanne days to

the late thirties. However, with the emergence of the Italian threat over the Mediterranean, the Turkish government strove to enhance the naval power of the U.K. (Deringil, 2004, p. 71).

After the Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939, another major source of surprise and apprehension for the Turkish government was the unexpected Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of August 23, 1939. In Deringil's words, with this ominous development, Turkish – Soviet relations took a major blow and isolated Turkey with the two Western democracies (Deringil, 2004, p. 78). Despite all, the Turkish government did not close the door to the Soviets and continued diplomatic efforts to secure her northern frontier.

Following the fall of Denmark in April and Norway in June 1940, the German offensive surpassed French defenses in June 1940 and forced them to surrender on June 22, 1940. The unexpected French collapse, which created a worldwide astonishment, also resonated with the Turkish governing elites. As underlined by Deringil, President İnönü believed that the war in the Maginot Line would last at least for four or five years. Despite all, as stated by Deringil, this catastrophe was also considered as an element of relief by the government officials, as they realized that their policy of caution had paid off (Deringil, 2004, p. 97).

As the German ascendancy skyrocketing in mainland Europe, Turkey did not lose time to sign a trade agreement with Germany on July 25, 1940. Although this move disappointed the British, as Deringil underlined, *Turkey's value as a friendly neutral at the crossroads* of the Middle East, India, and Europe were highly appreciated (Deringil, 2004, p. 108). On the other hand, Germans believed that keeping Turkey as a friendly neutral would be strategically wise because they were pretty sure that Turkey would gradually shift to their side by conclusive success in the upcoming Russian campaign (Deringil, 2004, p. 117).

Upon the successful German offensives in Eastern Europe in early 1941, on June 18, 1941, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Germany to secure its borders with Greece and Bulgaria. Only four days after the signing of this treaty, the unnatural German – Russian friendship came to an end, and Germany invades the Soviet

Union. According to Armaoğlu, the dispute regarding the partition of the world between Germany and the Soviets laid a foundation of break up. As he underlined that, one of the disputes was related to Turkish soils. According to him, Molotov's adamant attitude regarding the Soviet desires both in the Turkish Straits and the Aegean islands exasperated Hitler and caused an unsolvable dispute (Armaoğlu, 2018, p. 125).

The German attack on the Soviet Union also marked a significant milestone for the Anglo-Soviet rapprochement, which was not considered a heartwarming development by Turkey. As the German attacks intensified, London and Moscow agreed upon the invasion of Iran on August 25, 1941, to open up a supply route for the Soviet Union. In 1942, as the Allied support for the Soviets brought its successful results, Turkey began to fear the all-powerful Soviet Union. A valid interpretation of Turkish stance towards the German-Soviet war, as Deringil quoted, was made by the Italian Ambassador De-Poppo:

“The Turkish ideal is that the last German soldier should fall upon the last Russian corpse.”
(Cited in Deringil, 2014, p. 134-135)

As of late 1942, the Allied victory at El-Alamein and the Soviet counteroffensive of the German attack in Stalingrad opened a new scene in the war. Those developments were also important for Turkey, as they brought increased pressure from the Allies to convince Turkey to enter the war. Despite all efforts, Turkey preserved her position throughout 1943 and refused to enter the war due to a possible German strike towards the Straits¹⁶.

In 1944, two main events were tied Turkey's hands against the Allies. The first event was the sudden departure of the British military mission – also known as Linnel Mission – which arrived in Turkey in early 1944 to keep up with the arrangements made in the Cairo Summit. As underlined by Deringil, the reason behind the sudden departure of the Mission was the report prepared by S. Bennet on February 10, 1944, claiming that the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Numan Memencioğlu, *had given the Axis extensive information about Turkish – British military talks* (Deringil, 2004, p. 167). Following this

¹⁶ Starting with the Casablanca Conference on January 14, 1943, the Allied Powers held a series of meetings to ensure Turkey's entrance to the war. These gatherings could be listed in chronological order as; Adana Conference on January 30, 1943, Quebec Conference on August 11, 1943, Moscow Conference on October 19, 1943, Tehran Conference on November 28, 1943, and Cairo Summit on December 4, 1943.

turbulence in Turkish – British relations, the passage of German auxiliary vessels through the Straits caused an *uproar* between Ankara and London. As a result of this event, British Ambassador Hugesson vehemently accused Numan Menemencioğlu of letting Axis war vessels to pass through the Straits. In response to Hugesson’s accusation, Memencioğlu defended his standpoint by referring to the clause in Montreaux Convention, however, it did not help him to be unseated. In Deringil’s words, it was obvious to İnönü that the cause of rapprochement with Britain required a public sacrifice (Deringil, 2004, 171). Following these events, Turkey’s break from Germany and the shift towards the British standpoint gained momentum. On August 2, 1944, Turkey suspended diplomatic relations with Germany but did not declare war against her subsequently due to the possibility of *prestige attacks* that could be exercised by German forces.

Towards the end of the war, in early 1945, leaders of the Big Three (the U.S., the U.K., and the Soviet Union) decided to gather a meeting in Yalta to discuss the fundamentals of post-war Europe. During the meeting, which started on February 4, 1945, it was agreed upon that to be invited as a charter member to the United Nations Conference to be gathered in San Francisco in April 1945, states must have declared war against the Axis until March 1, 1945. As a result of this call, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945.

2.2. TURKEY AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

According to Professor Fahir Armaoğlu, to understand the characteristics of the post-war international relations, we should be aware of six related factors (Armaoğlu, 2015). Having started with the bipolarization of the world as a first factor, Armaoğlu mentioned that the notions of both ideology and doctrine were added to the fields of international relations and conflicts as the result of the rising influence of the Soviet Union. Then, he pointed out the establishment of the non-aligned movement created by the countries that refused to become satellites of neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union as a third factor. Moving on, the fourth factor that he mentioned was the expansion of the context of international relations. In his words, before 1945, only the issues within the territories of continental Europe were described as a subject of international relations. However, as a

result of the Second World War, it was understood that every single issue throughout the world would become the subject of international relations. Following the fourth factor, Armaoğlu stated the significance of the *space level international relations* by mentioning the importance of the technological developments that appeared during the Second World War in terms of results it should create. Lastly, he pointed out the prioritization of the economic concerns over such notions as the balance of power, international security, and peace after 1945 (Armaoğlu, 2015, p. 376-379).

In addition to Armaoğlu's characterization of international relations, I would like to scrutinize two factors that had an immense impact on the Turkish foreign policymaking. Firstly, in William Hale's words, the most crucial feature of the post-war period for the Turkish government was the bipolarity of the international system. According to him, due to the bipolarity of the newly emerged international system, Turkey did not have a chance to play one European country off against another at the time (Hale, 2013, p. 78). As a newly established country with insufficient economic and military means and resources at its disposal, Turkey was obliged to conduct very cautious diplomacy towards both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Within the given case, as Nur Bilge Crisis mentioned in her article titled "***Turkey's NATO Alliance: A Historical Perspective***", policymakers who confronted with political uncertainties decided on their alliance priorities by referring to the lessons that have been taken from distant or recent past experiences (Crisis, 2012, p. 3). To support this argument, we might look at Edward Weisband's book and refer to Daniel Lerner's survey results. As Weisband indicated, Daniel Lerner found out that although up to eighty percent of the Turkish population has been questioned about their thoughts about the Soviets, only two percent based their arguments on the post-Second World War information, whereas the rest mainly based their arguments on the "*traditional stock of Turkish folklore*" (Weisband, 1973, pg. 86).

2.3. ROOTS OF ANTI-COMMUNISM IN TURKEY

On the other hand, one might ask whether the historical facts and ideological perspectives played a role or not in the post-Second World War Turkish foreign policy, especially towards the Soviets. According to Cangül Örnek, even though the reason behind it varies from one to another, deep suspicion and hatred against communism were the only common ground amongst modernists, nationalists, and Islamists (Örnek, 2015, p. 59).

In her book *Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı: Antikomünizm ve Amerikan Etkisi*, Örnek offered two rationales to analyze further the reasons behind this traditional hatred and how it evolved throughout the history; ideological and historical dimensions. As she highlighted, the central ideological conflict was built upon the strict refusal of classes by the Kemalist ideology. According to her, Kemalist ideology in its mature form of the 1930s, in particular, denied the existence of classes while advocating a model of an organic society in which parts were becoming a whole by the principle of populism (Örnek, 2015, p. 59).

In addition to the ideological background, Örnek highlighted the importance of historical facts as well. As she mentioned in her book, to understand the main dispute between two countries, we should keep in mind that the Turkish struggle for independence, at the same time, should be considered as a struggle for power between the groups in which communists and socialists existed (Örnek, 2015, p. 61).

After admitting the exchange of support and gestures between the two countries during the Turkish War of Independence, she then pointed out the consequences of the increasing Soviet influence in the region and its impacts on interstate relations. According to her, due to Kemalist's tendency towards building trustworthy relations with the Western alliance and accordingly balancing the Soviet power in the region, Turkey gave signals of restoring its relations with both the Western allies and the Soviets (Örnek, 2015, p. 61).

Of course, these policy changes had an impact on both the internal and external affairs of Turkey. By taking national sovereignty as a core concern, Kemalists believed that in order to take advantage of the current power struggle and suppress the Soviet influence in

domestic affairs, the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) must be eliminated from the politics due to its close relations with the Soviets. Therefore, as Örnek summarized in her book, an official communist party was established in the early 1920s to replace the Soviet-backed communist parties (Örnek, 2015, p. 62).

By the end of the 1930s, the increasing tension in Europe eventually forced the Turkish government to implement more cautious diplomacy, especially to the countries considered as a potential threat to their territorial integrity. As Edward Weisband highlighted in his book, İnönü's foreign policy understanding was mostly laid upon the preservation of territorial integrity rather than gaining or losing ground (Weisband, 1973, p. 43). In line with this perception, in Weisband's words, due to his past experiences about Russian ambitions, İnönü wanted the Soviets never to feel too secure in the west because this would possibly be the best protection of Turkey's territorial integrity (Weisband, 1973, p. 44-45).

In short, as Cangül Örnek summarized in her book, despite the historical and ideological roots of it, the hatred of communism in Turkey was not a systematic "*anti-communist*" movement at all until the second half of the 1940s. Instead of defining this hatred as "*a systematic anti-communist movement*", Örnek prefers calling it a "*traditional hatred of communism*," fueled by the hostility towards class struggle and fears escalated by the anti-sovietism. On the other hand, according to Örnek, by 1945, due to associating communism with an external force, the struggle against communism transformed into a systematic national policy (Örnek, 2015, p. 64). In accordance with this interpretation, we might put forward that the Turkish government gradually evaluated Soviets as a sole threat to their territorial and constitutional integrity as of mid-1945.

2.4. THREAT PERCEPTION AND ALLIANCE PREFERENCES OF TURKEY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1945

On March 19, 1945, the first spark blew out when the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Vyacheslav Molotov invited Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper to his office and informed him about the termination of the Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and

Friendship and would not be subjected to renewal. As Cemil Hasanlı described in his book titled “*Tarafızılıktan Soğuk Savaş’a Doğru: Türk – Sovyet İlişkileri 1939 – 1953*”, right after the termination of the Turkish - Soviet Treaty of 1925, Turkey found herself in a state of uncertainty (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 141).

On the face of the increasing uneasiness caused by the Soviet interventionism, particularly in Poland, Trieste, Iran, and Greece, which accelerated after the end of the Second World War, Turkey initially invested her hope in the San Francisco Conference, as a continuation of her wartime foreign policy, expecting that the approaching uncertainty might be eliminated if the ongoing disputes between the wartime Allies would be solved.

However, three months after the termination of the treaty, in a private meeting on June 7, 1945, Molotov declared Soviet demands to Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper in return for the possible renewal of the Turkish - Soviet Treaty of 1925, which were completely not acceptable for the Turkish side: military bases in the Straits and retrocession of Kars and Ardahan provinces to the Soviets. According to Oran, these demands caused a collapse in the Turkish-Russian relations that would take a long time to repair, and their effects would last for decades (Oran, 2014, p. 501).

After a set of failures to find common ground for the ongoing disputes at the international peace conferences, coupled with the unacceptable claims put forward separately by the Armenian National Committee and the Georgian academicians, which were believed at the time that the Russians were the instigators of these approaches, the Soviet threat has gradually become more serious fact amongst the Turkish governing elites and public.

In the given circumstances, the question of whether Stalin was planning to march against Turkey or not remained unclear at the time. According to Behlül Özkan, the answer is simple. The aforementioned demands were nothing more than a *proposal*, and therefore they should not be considered as the list of *threats* (Özkan, 2017, p. 39-55). Contrary to Özkan’s interpretation, Baskın Oran highlighted that questioning whether Stalin had the potential to march against Turkey or not, does not make sense in the given context. To support his argument, he then emphasized the importance of the perception by stating

that, “*in the field of international relations, perception is the essence*” (Oran, 2014, p. 496).

In addition to Oran’s standpoint, if we depart from Waltz’s explanation of the state of nature, which suggests that states conduct their affairs in the *brooding shadow of violence* (Waltz, 1979, p. 102), it could be assumed that Turkey at the time prepared herself against any possible hostile action against her territorial integrity and sovereignty. On the other hand, Stephen M. Walt’s suggestions regarding the factors that affect the level of the threat perception might also enable us to interpret the Turkish stance towards the Russians. According to Walt, greater the aggregate power (e.g. industrial and military capabilities) and lesser the geographic proximity of a state, the greater threat that can pose to others (Walt, 2013, p. 22). In this regard, it could be stated that Turkey might have structured her threat perception upon the Soviet intentions in accordance with the aggregate power and the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union after the Second World War.

3. CASE STUDY: THREAT PERCEPTION AND ALLIANCE PREFERENCES IN ULUS AND CUMHURİYET BETWEEN MARCH 1945 AND JANUARY 1946

As Metin Toker, one of the well-known journalists and writers of his time, described in his book titled "*Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kâbusu*" in 1971, although there was a partial practice of freedom press in Turkey towards the end of the Second World War, news and articles related to foreign policy were subjected to strict control prior to their publication (Toker, 1971, p.10). In other words, by taking national interests into account, it can be said that the government limited the media to some extent through certain institutions¹⁷ as well as the laws and especially redefined the duties and responsibilities of journalists.

Moreover, having elaborated the interrelation between central authority and press through the common goal of *westernization* towards 1945, Nilgün Gürkan took it one step further in her book titled "*Türkiye’de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın 1945-1950*" and underlined the common tasks and responsibilities of the press that directly contribute to self-emancipation in Turkey:

“[...] With its mission of guardianship aimed at establishing a Western-style democracy, the single-party government did not consider the public mature enough to leave administration to them without completing the necessary revolutions. The history of the West is the history of the individual's struggle for emancipation against the state. In Turkey, the emancipation of the individual was aimed to be provided by the state. The press was also assigned the duty to raise the level of maturity that the public can rule themselves [...]" (Gürkan, 1998, p. 78).

“[...] The expectation of the Kemalist ideals as “developing the Turkish nation”, “reaching the level of contemporary civilizations” to be common to everyone in the process of establishing the Republic of Turkey, is also seen in the basic approaches and wordings of the journalists [...]" (Gürkan, 1998, p. 73).

From this point of view, it can be deduced that the attitudes of the newspapers that are close to the government in the period following the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship were shaped in consideration of these duties and

¹⁷ The Directorate of Press and Information (which was re-established under the name of the General Directorate of Press in 1933), established by the law enacted on June 7, 1920, was used as a tool of limiting and controlling the press by the political power. The institution, which was subjected to various regulations over the years, was affiliated to the Prime Ministry in 1940, and with the addition of the international promotion and propaganda of the country to the responsibility area of the institution, by the law enacted on July 16, 1943, was renamed as the General Director of Press and Publication Directorate (B.Y.U.M.). (Gürkan, 1998, p. 89)

responsibilities. In support of this argument, it will be appropriate to evaluate the changes in the approaches of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on Turkish-Russian relations, between March 20, 1945, and January 7, 1946, in three different periods.

3.1. PERIOD OF DENIAL (March 20, 1945 – June 22, 1945)

3.1.1. March 1945

Having declared symbolically that they were going to war alongside the allied forces towards the end of the Second World War, Turkey wanted to obtain a position in the new international order that is suitable for her national interests by playing an active role in the establishment of the peace and prosperity after the war. In such an environment, the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, dated March 19, 1945, that pushed the Turkish government *to think even though it did not surprise*, should have been conveyed to the Turkish public in the most careful manner (Toker, 1971, p. 8).

The very first news on the subject in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* was shared with the Turkish public on March 22, 1945. In the news titled “*Türkiye – Sovyet Rusya arasındaki dostluk ve tarafsızlık antlaşmasının feshi (Termination of Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship)*” published by *Ulus* on the front page, no individual comments and evaluations regarding the subject were seen, and attention was paid to convey the issue as it is. In addition to that, Russian newspaper *Izvestsia*’s explanations of the termination process were also shared in the same news. According to *Izvestsia*, the reason that the Soviets took early action to terminate the agreement was simply relies on the dissatisfaction of Turkey’s attitudes during the Second World War (*Ulus*, March 22, 1945).

On the same day, in his article titled “*Amerika ve Kurtarılmış Memleketler (America and liberated countries)*”, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer shared the priorities of the post-war activity of the U.S. in the mainland Europe based on the statements of the Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of State Mr. Dunn. Esmer stated that, according to Mr. Dunn, the U.S. could never remain indifferent to what was happening in Europe, and the democracy

regime was aimed to be established across the continent. On the other hand, based on the allegations regarding the partition of the mainland Europe between British and Soviet spheres of influence, the author emphasized that the current situation in the mainland Europe was in line with the decisions taken at the Yalta Conference, referring to the Undersecretary Dunn's statements. In the last paragraph of his article, Esmer pointed out the importance of the U.S., especially on liberated and satellite countries, by addressing to British Prime Minister W. Churchill's words stating that the U.S. entered the life of the old world *deeply and constructively* (Esmer, *Ulus*, March 22, 1945).

In addition to *Ulus*, *Cumhuriyet* also published the recent news about the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, including the full text on March 22, 1945. On the other hand, by sharing the Russian newspaper *Izvestia*'s article regarding the termination process in a different section, *Cumhuriyet* dealt with the issue in greater detail than *Ulus*.¹⁸

Following the publication of the first news regarding the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, as Toker stated that Turkish government, which pushed to think further on its attitudes towards the issue, was also influential in the publication policies of newspapers known for their affinity to the government such as *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. In this regard, it was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* avoided such comments that would put the Turkish government's policy priorities towards the Soviet Union at risk. On the other hand, it is a remarkable detail that the reports and articles chosen to be conveyed from the foreign press belongs primarily to Western democracies, such as the U.S. and the U.K., which the Turkish government strives to strengthen its relations in the international arena.

In fact, in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* dated March 23, 1945, the initial reactions of the Western states, specifically the U.K. and the U.S., were tried to be gauged by publishing the comments and reports of prestigious news agencies such as Daily Mail, Times, and Reuters.

¹⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, "Türk – Sovyet Muahedesi Uzatılmayacak", March 22, 1945

In this context, the speech given by the British member of the parliament Richard Law in the House of Commons regarding the intentions of the British government on the Straits was published in *Ulus* on March 23, 1945. However, due to a translation error in the published text, Anadolu Agency (AA)¹⁹ sent a correction note without wasting time to be published in the newspapers of the next day. In the first text that was published on March 23, 1945, it was emphasized that R. Law stated that “*the amendment of the Montreaux Straits Convention will require international negotiations*”.²⁰²¹ On the other hand, in the correction note that was sent by Anadolu Agency on March 24, 1945, it was stated that R. Law’s statements should be understood as “*the amendment of the Montreaux Straits Convention is an issue of international debate*”.²²²³ As it can be understood from this example, taking into account the sensitivity of the issue, the news and articles received from the foreign agencies were subjected to an extra control to avoid misunderstandings in the Turkish public opinion regarding the reactions and attitudes of the Western democracies and to prevent any harm to the prudent Turkish policy.

Again, in the first days, question marks were raised about the main motives of the Soviet Union, and predictions were made regarding the extent of the danger in some of the articles that were carefully selected from the foreign press. In fact, one of the articles published in the Swiss newspaper *Le Tribune de Geneve*, which emphasized that *the issue of the Straits was described as the most influential milestone to reveal the true intentions of the new Russia*, was addressed in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on March 25, 1945.²⁴ On the other hand, the article of the Greek newspaper *Acropolis*, which stated that perceiving the

¹⁹ An international news agency of the Republic of Turkey, which was founded on April 6, 1920 during the Turkish War of Independence.

²⁰ *Ulus*, “**Türk – Sovyet paktının Moskova tarafından feshine dair yankılar**”, March 23, 1945

²¹ Londra, 22 a.a. – Avam Kamarası işçi sayımlar[ın]dan İvor Thomas, İngiliz Hükümetinin politikası Türkiye’nin Boğazlardaki muhafızlık durumunu desteklemek olup olmadığını sormuştur. M. Richar Law şu cevabı vermiştir: “Halen İngiliz Hükümetinin Boğazlar hakkındaki politikası Montreaux’de imzalanan milletlerarası sözleşmeye uygundur. Bu milletlerarası mukavelelerin tadili, tabiidir ki, milletlerarası görüşmeleri gerektirecektir.”

²² *Ulus*, “**Son Rus kararının yeni yankıları**” March 24, 1945

²³ Dünkü sayımızda, beşinci sayfada çıkan “Sovyet-Türk paktının Moskova tarafından feshine dair yankılar” başlıklı yazının üçüncü paragrafı şöyle okunmak gerektiği Anadolu Ajansı tarafından bildirilmektedir: “Halen İngiltere Hükümetinin Boğazlar hakkındaki politikasını, Boğazlar rejimini tanzim eden ve Montreaux’de imzalanmış olan mukavele tayin etmektedir. Bu milletlerarası mukavelelerin tadili, tabiidir ki milletlerarası bir münakaşa konusu teşkil eder.”

²⁴ *Ulus*, “**Sovyet Rusya’nın son kararı ile ilgili çeşitli yorumlar**”, March 25, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “**Türkiye – Sovyetler**”, March 25, 1945

current disagreement in Turkish Soviet relations would cause new problems was nothing more than pessimism, also published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on March 26, 1945.²⁵

In addition to the news and articles selected from the foreign press about Turkish Soviet relations, another critical issue that stands out in both newspapers was the prioritization of the duties of the Turkish government and the society to adapt to the socio-economic dynamics of the new world and to increase the economic efficiency of the country.

In his article titled “*İhracatı artırma çalışmaları (Efforts to increase exports)*” published in *Ulus* on March 26, 1945, Esat Tekeli underlined the importance of the exports while giving examples from the countries that started taking a series of measures to protect their economic assets in the post-war period. Tekeli also emphasized that the post-war economic program should be based on the trade agreements aimed at increasing exports (*Ulus*, March 26, 1945).

On the other hand, in his article titled “*Çalışma gücümüzü artırmak (Increasing our working power)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on March 29, 1945, Nadir Nadi stated that the states would enter in a sharp development race in the post-war period, therefore in order not to be left behind in the race, Turkey must increase its national working power by using electric energy more efficiently (*Cumhuriyet*, March 29, 1945).

In the meantime, the articles of the Polish newspaper *Dziennik Polski* and the British journal *Time and Tide* on the Turkish Soviet relations and the Straits issue, published by *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on March 31, 1945, were remarkable due to providing a clear and complete outline of Turkey’s priorities in this dispute.²⁶

According to the article published in *Dziennik Polski*, two ominous developments raise concerns about the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship. The first development mentioned in the article was the date of denunciation chosen by the the Soviet Union, who increased its power enormously after the Second World War.

²⁵ *Ulus*, “Son Sovyet kararının yankıları”, March 26, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Türkiye – Rusya”, March 26, 1945

²⁶ *Ulus*, “Sovyetlerin fesih kararı hakkında yeni yorumlar”, March 31, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Türkiye ve Sovyetler”, March 31, 1945

Furthermore, the second ominous development mentioned in the article was the severe propaganda against Turkey, carried out by the Soviet press and radio. On the other hand, after the denunciation of the treaty, Turkey's stance was summarized by Time and Tide journal:

“Turkey is ready to engage in good relations with Russia and would desire it. Turkey is ready to negotiate only issues related to Turkish-Russian affairs. However, on the subjects of the Straits and the re-examination of the Montreaux Straits Convention, the Turks –rightfully- insists that the aforementioned subjects do not belong only to Turkish – Russian relations but rather an international matter” (Ulus & Cumhuriyet, March 31, 1945).

In addition to the above-stated expressions, it was also highlighted in the article that Turkey’s priority in the foreign policy could be stated as “*freedom of action*”, and therefore alliance with the United Kingdom should prevail.

3.1.2. April 1945

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, with the participation of the leaders of the U.S., the U.K., and the Soviet Union, it was decided to organize a conference in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, in order to establish international peace and security as well as eliminating the political, economic and social impacts of war by the sustainable cooperation of all peace-loving states (Erkin, 1968, p. 245).

Given the fact that, prior to the San Francisco Conference, in order to gain the sympathy of the Western democracies and to alleviate the black propaganda carried out by the Soviet press, it became vital to clearly explain Turkey’s commitment to democracy, proposals for the peace and prosperity, and foreign policy priorities which were mainly built on the idea of sustainable peace, to the international community.

Within this context, in his article titled “*Amerikan davası ve görüşü (American cause and opinion)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on April 1, 1945, Ömer Rıza Doğrul drew attention to the importance of the role that the U.S. would play in order to bring peace and prosperity to the new world by stating the following expressions about the main goals of the U.S. towards the end of the Second World War.

“[...] The target is above all the freedom and independence of America. Then, keeping the nations that are America's friends alive, enabling the revival of democracy, protecting South America from invasion and achieving what the old community failed by establishing a new League of Nations [...]” (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, April 1, 1945).

On the other hand, in his article titled **“Heyetimiz yola çıkarken (While our delegation is on the road)”** published in *Ulus* on April 6, 1945, Mümtaz Faik Fenik mentioned the Turkish delegation’s credence in international peace by praising their mission, responsibility, and motivation while they were on their way to attend San Francisco Conference. Also stating that the establishment of international peace should be carried in utmost care, Fenik then suggested the method of achieving it in his article:

“[...] There are arbitrary lines of peace, as there are arbitrary lines of war. Undoubtedly, the desires and works such as establishing happiness, prosperity, and peace of humanity take the greatest place at the top of these lines. If it is desired not to make a breach in the peace order, this line should be arbitrated first [...]” (Fenik, *Ulus*, April 6, 1945).

When the Turkish press and the public focused on the San Francisco Conference, the Turkish government's response to the Soviet Union regarding the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship was found a place both in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on April 7, 1945.

In both newspapers, the full text of the aforementioned Turkish response was shared with the reader without any editorial comment. In the first two paragraphs of the response, it was mentioned that the Turkish authorities were notified by their Soviet counterparts that they were willing to terminate the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, which was signed in 1925, on the grounds that the treaty was not compatible with the new conditions of the post-war era. Following that, in the last two paragraphs of the response, it was stated that the Turkish government was waiting for the proposals from their Soviet counterparts with great optimism in order to ensure the continuity of long-lasting friendly neighbourhood relations between the two countries. Also, in the last section, it was stated that the response was handed over to the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara M. Vinogradov by Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey Hasan Saka on April 4, 1945.²⁷

²⁷ *Ulus*, “Sovyetlere cevabımız”, April 7, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Sovyet Deklarasyonuna Cevabımız”, April 7, 1945

It was observed that the articles regarding the Turkish response to the Soviet Union, which were written by the prominent authors of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, particularly on April 8 and 9, 1945, found similar to some extent with the official response letter.

On April 8, 1945, in his article titled **“*Türkiye ve Sovyetler (Turkey and the Soviets)*”** published in *Ulus*, underlining that no agreement is eternal, Mümtaz Faik Fenik then pointed out that the Soviet Union, who demanded renewal of the friendship agreement according to the new conditions after the Nazi persecution was eliminated, was well received by the Turkish government. On the other hand, Fenik highlighted that the most important factor would be the *goodwill* of the states to successfully conclude the new negotiations.

“[...] Our government has welcomed the offer, which is undoubtedly inspired by the friendly relations between the Soviets and Turkey. [...]

Truly it is never possible to claim that an agreement is eternal, no matter how well-intentioned it is and well-served in the interests of the two parties. [...]

Is there anything that much obvious as the Soviet Union, who is fighting for humane purposes such as to eliminate Nazi persecution, constraint, and force and to determine the nation’s rights of life, wants to come to an agreement with the free and independent Turkey according to the new conditions? [...]

As goodwill prevails in the new negotiations, it is possible to see that the result will be achieved easily [...]” (Fenik, *Ulus*, April 8, 1945).

Again in the same day, in his article titled **“*Türk Sovyet dostluğu (Turkish-Soviet friendship)*”** published in *Cumhuriyet*, Ömer Rıza Doğrul expressed his hope that -just as Mümtaz Faik Fenik-, as a result of the strong neighbourly relations that been going for many years, this process would end in the fastest and best way.

“[...] The government of the Republic of Turkey accepts the suggestion to substitute the old agreement with the new one, which includes more appropriate and significant modifications to the current interests of the two sides. This is the most honest approach that confirms the Republic of Turkey’s policy of maintaining good neighbourly relations and forever friendship with the Soviet Union. Since only the conditions have changed, it is necessary to adapt these new conditions to the basis and do not delay in achieving this task. [...]” (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, April 8, 1945)

On the other hand, in his article titled **“*Türk – Sovyet dostluğunun yarını (Tomorrow of the Turkish – Soviet friendship)*”**, published on April 9, 1945, Nadir Nadi, emphasizing the depth and importance of the friendly relations between the two countries dating back

to a quarter-century ago, claimed that the pessimist anticipations about the future of the Turkish Soviet relations in the foreign press were not even close to the reality.

“[...] while the lights of a solid peace order appear on the horizon, some commentators who sense a smell of a depressing cloud in every wind, reach up to the occasional scepticism about the future of the Turkish-Soviet friendship. However, the essence of the events is far from showing a view that would justify these doubts [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, April 9, 1945).

Nadir Nadi also stated in his article that an ill intention should not be pursued in the termination of the agreements between states, and it should not be overstated.

“[...] What makes the friendship between nations and gives life and direction to that are not signed agreements and treaties, but a sense of unity and thought arising from the mutual interests of nations. What are the agreements and pacts if they are not the patterns of those emotions and the frame of those thoughts? If the 1925 Turkish - Soviet agreement had been successful for the two nations for twenty years, this was primarily due to the strength of the idealistic mentality that remained alive between the lines of the agreement [...]” (Nadi, N. *Cumhuriyet*, April 9, 1945).

As highlighted by the Turkish government in their response letter to the Soviet Union, the utmost determination to pursue this process with good intentions, as required by the friendly neighbourhood relations between the two countries, was also seen in the articles of Nadir Nadi, Ömer Rıza Doğrul and Mümtaz Faik Fenik.

In addition to carrying out the editorial policy that was in line with the Turkish foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, another issue that came to the fore in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* was the increasing American and British sympathy. The news published in *Ulus* on April 7 and 21, 1945, supports this argument.

On April 7, 1945, *Ulus* published an article titled “***Bu harbin zaferden zafere koşan komutanı: Montgomery Kimdir? (Victorious commander of the war: Who is Montgomery?)***” written by Joseph J. Thorndike Jr, on the third page. With this article, the heroism of General Montgomery -one of the most important figures of the Second World War- that changed the course of the war, was presented to the attention of the Turkish readers (*Ulus*, April 7, 1945).

On the same day, by sharing the advertisement titled “***Harp, Sulhun Temellerini Hazırlıyor! (War Lays the Foundation of Peace!)***” of the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation on the third page of *Ulus*, it was stated that the U.S. would have an important

position in the civil aviation that would develop rapidly after the war as a result of her air supremacy during the Second World War (*Ulus*, April 7, 1945).

Besides, the press release of the book “*Amerikalı (American)*” written by E. Rosen and translated to Turkish by H. Ataman, published in *Ulus* on April 21, 1945, came to the fore as an important detail. The selected sentences from the press release such as “*Work is an idol for the American!*”, “*American says: ‘If I fight, I’ll tear the enemy apart!’*” and “*The American man is helpful.*” revealed the increasing admiration to the Americans towards the opening of the San Francisco Conference.

While the doubts regarding the method and purpose of the conference disappeared towards the beginning of the San Francisco Conference, another issue that was discussed continuously by the international community was the question of in what conditions and privileges participating states would be represented. Within the framework of this issue, *the distinction of great and small powers*, which was put forward by some foreign statesmen and started to take place in the foreign press frequently, was criticized by the prominent editors of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on April 12, 1945.

On April 12, 1945, in his editorial titled “*Küçük devletlerin hakları (Rights of the small powers)*” published in *Ulus*, Mümtaz Faik Fenik criticized the U.S. Secretary of the State Edward Stettinius’ expressions about the rights and freedoms of small states, claiming that Stettinius’ words were contrary to the principle of equality.

Referring to the different meanings of the terms state and country in his article, Fenik pointed out that such a classification can only be made as a *small* or *large* homeland considering its soil and population density. Moving from this point, Fenik highlighted that it would be more appropriate to express the issue as *the rights of all free and independent states* instead of *the rights of great and small states*. In the last section of his article, he stated that the principle of equality would be established after the Allied victory of democracy.

“[...] Just as people are born free and equal to law, states live free and equal by law. Here, the Allied victory of democracy will put this ideal into practice after the war” (Fenik, *Ulus*, April 12, 1945)

On the other hand, in his article titled *“Büyük kim? Küçük kim? (Who is the Great one? Who is the Small one?)”* published in *Cumhuriyet* on April 12, 1945, unlike Mümtaz Faik Fenik, Nadir Nadi accepted that the classification of states as great or small according to their political, military, and economic abilities was a reality, but also underlined that it would be better to focus on the consensus among the states in order to establish peace and prosperity.

“[...] Yes, the great-small distinction is a reality. But it is a reality that changes according to the conditions like every reality and takes other forms from today to tomorrow. Those who will prepare the peace of tomorrow, if they do not disregard this point, will grasp the biggest truth of our era and lay the foundation of a progressive world” (Nadi, N. *Cumhuriyet*, April 12, 1945).

Undoubtedly, another shocking development that came to the fore in this period was the sudden death of U.S. President F. Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. It was observed that several concerns started to be aired in the Turkish newspapers, along with the dozens of articles expressing deep sorrow. During this period, particularly the question regarding to what extent the person who would take office after F. Roosevelt –who was referred as the father of the democracy- would continue his policies were frequently questioned by the Turkish statesmen and journalists.

Within the framework of these developments, news and articles on the deep sorrow felt by the death of F. Roosevelt, and the priorities of the new president Harry S. Truman were published systematically in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* between April 13 and April 17, 1945. In this regard, Kemal Turan’s editorial titled *“Büyük kayıptan sonar (After the great loss)”* published in *Ulus* on April 15, 1945, and Nadir Nadi’s editorial titled *“Truman’ın ödevi (Truman’s duty)”* published in *Cumhuriyet* on April 17, 1945, could be given as examples.

Indicating the humanity lost a great value after the death of F. Roosevelt, Kemal Turan also stated that Roosevelt had an important place in the history of humanity not only for his expertise in the military he had shown during the war but also with the efforts he made for the establishment of peace and prosperity.

“[...] Roosevelt has never been only a man of war; he has always repeated that defeating the enemies will not end the war. He was enthusiastic about the greater and undoubtedly tougher

victories of warfare. To bring security for the nations, to remove hunger, misery from the world, to provide an honourable and comfortable life for everyone... Roosevelt has devoted his heart and intelligence to all these beautiful things lying in the hearts and hopes of almost every person for centuries. He also made efforts to prepare everyone for the war of humanity, which would be won without arms but with the force of heart and mind! [...]" (Turan, *Ulus*, April 15, 1945).

After these statements in the last section of his article, underlining the important duties and responsibilities of all statesmen who had the opportunity to meet and work with Roosevelt, Turan emphasized that if these duties and responsibilities fulfilled completely, Roosevelt would serve the victory of the idea of humanity even after his death.

On the other hand, in his article published in *Cumhuriyet* on April 17, 1945, Nadir Nadi underlined the duties and responsibilities of the new president Truman in order to realize the democracy goal that did not mean a war victory but a victory of peace, represented by Roosevelt.

"[...] One of Truman's primary duties should be meeting personally with the Allied chiefs whom he will work with tomorrow, trying to represent Roosevelt next to them, trying to represent the American view on the world affairs in Roosevelt's words" (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, April 17, 1945).

As it has been understood from these above articles, during the time of the balance of power changed after the war and the new world order established, Turkey was trying to take advantage of the sustainable efficiency of the U.S. in the international arena, against the possible threat or a strategic move could be received from the Soviet Union. Therefore, it could be argued that Turkey had some concerns about possible changes in the U.S. foreign policy that would conflict with her foreign policy priorities. However, soon after Truman took office, his messages to the international community were welcomed by the Turkish intellectuals, and therefore the pessimism caused by the death of Roosevelt disappeared to a significant extent.

In his article titled "*Amerikan politikasının hedefleri (Objectives of the American policy)*" published in *Cumhuriyet* on April 22, 1945, Professor Yavuz Abadan underlined that the replacement in the U.S. Presidency did not cause any changes in the principles that the American policy was based on.

"[...] President Truman is an equal and worthy companion to his esteemed predecessor in humanitarian idealism. America, which has become "one of the greatest forces for goodness

on the world” and “gained the authority to guide the world,” defends the necessity of “helping the suffering humanity and taking them to the path of peaceful progression” with the faith and courage that Roosevelt had. So, it appears that the change in the Presidency has not caused any trouble to the principles on which American policy is based upon [...]” (Abadan, *Cumhuriyet*, April 22, 1945).

Shortly after the sudden death of Roosevelt and Truman’s inauguration, with the opening of the San Francisco Conference on April 25, 1945, the focus of the Turkish newspapers shifted on the conference and its possible outcomes.

Sharing his expectations regarding the San Francisco Conference on April 25, 1945, in his article titled “*San Francisco günü (San Francisco day)*” published in *Ulus*, Kemal Turan asserted that states could only succeed if they act within a *unity of wish and effort*. On the other hand, Turan also acknowledged that humanity placed great hope in this conference after the unprecedented troubles of the Second World War, however underlined that it was not logical to have exaggerated expectations (*Ulus*, April 25, 1945).

3.1.3. May 1945

In his article titled “*Görüş ayrılıklarından çıkan ahenk (Harmony from disagreement)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on May 2, 1945, Ömer Rıza Doğrul underlined that great significance attributed to the San Francisco Conference for the resolution of the ongoing disputes between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, especially on the issues of Poland, Austria, and Italy. In addition to Kemal Turan’s call for *unity of wish and effort*, Doğrul underlined the main expectations of the Turkish delegation from the conference by emphasizing the importance of the harmony that expected to emerge from different opinions and its logical use on the way to the resolution (*Cumhuriyet*, May 2, 1945).

In addition to these attitudes and expectations expressed by Kemal Turan and Ömer Rıza Doğrul, the statements made by the head of the Turkish committee, Hasan Saka, – Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey- on American radio on May 10, 1945, contain important clues regarding the principles of the Turkish government.

In the statement published in *Cumhuriyet* on May 11, 1945, it was stressed that the Turkish delegation found the *principle of establishing peace and security* insufficient,

and therefore they have made a proposal underlining the need to maintain the principle *following the principles of fairness and justice*. On the other hand, according to the statement, Saka underlined that the Security Council would have a significant role in the new organization to be established and that they proposed a provision requiring the council to inform the general assembly about the decisions it intended to take and implement.²⁸

From that point of view, it could be concluded that the hope of providing peace and security by adhering to the principles of rights and justice was compatible with the ideal of equal representation advocated by the Turkish government.

However, it should not be ignored that the memorandum published by the Armenian National Committee on May 8, 1945, concerning the Armenians in Turkey to be moved to Russia and the recent news about the Straits issue obliged the Turkish delegation to adopt a more defensive attitude against accusations directed to them.

In the news titled **“Konferansa yapılan acayip ve ahmakça müracaat (Weird and foolish application to the conference)”** published in *Cumhuriyet* on May 9, 1945, the memorandum distributed by the Armenian National Committee to the participating countries, which was demanding the Armenians in Turkey to be moved to the Soviet Union in order to rescue the Armenian race from the destruction, was strongly criticized. According to Doğan Nadi, San Francisco correspondent of *Cumhuriyet*, given the fact that the Armenians had the same rights and freedoms determined by law just like any other Turkish citizen, those accusations directed by the Armenian National Committee were unacceptable (Nadi, D., *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 1945).

On the other hand, in the news titled **“Boğazlar meselesi “United Press’in” uydurma haberi (Straits issue; False news of the United Press)”** published in *Cumhuriyet* on May 12, 1945, it was underlined that the allegations regarding Turkey’s readiness to modernize the Montreaux Straits Convention which allegedly shared with the officials of the four great powers by Hasan Saka, was spread by the United Press. It was also stated in the

²⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, “Hasan Saka dün Amerika radyosuna konuştu”, May 11, 1945

news that the allegations of the United Press were strongly refuted by the statement of Falih Rifkî Atay (*Cumhuriyet*, May 12, 1945).

Despite the positive atmosphere created by the victory in Europe following the German declaration of unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945, the absence of a reasonable resolution regarding the Polish issue, which dominated the agenda of the conference, also had great repercussions in the Turkish newspapers.

In this context, on May 13, 1945, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* referred to the British newspaper *The Tablet* and the *Economist's* very striking criticisms on the Polish issue.²⁹ As stated in *The Tablet's* article, Russians harmed both themselves and the international cooperation by acting arrogantly and impractically not only in the Polish issue but also at the San Francisco Conference regarding Austria, Yugoslavia, and Romania issues.

On the other hand, according to the article published in *The Economist* magazine, Britain's policy towards the Soviets was regarded as a *policy of concession and reconciliation*, since the British government's efforts and *sacrifices* to establish friendly cooperation with the Soviets do not provide any concrete results. Therefore, it was suggested in the article that the current British policy towards the Soviets needs to be revised (*Cumhuriyet*, May 13, 1945).

Based on these reports published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, it can be suggested that they refrained from directly targeting the Soviet Union by their editorials but preferred to relate their attitudes indirectly through highlighting this kind of news and articles from the foreign press.

On the other hand, the *Economist's* article on the hidden reasons for the dispute with Russia, which was published in both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on May 20, 1945, also was of great importance due to its intense and robust content.

²⁹ *Ulus*, "Sovyet Rusya'nın batı devletleri ile münasebetlerine dair", May 13, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, "Polonyalı liderlerin durumu", May 13, 1945

In the first part of the article retrieved from the Economist, it was stated that the Soviet Union established her foreign policy on the purpose of structuring a broad and forward security zone starting from the Baltic to the Adriatic, therefore the nationalist sentiments attracted in the small states which were seen as one the essential elements of this policy, in order to strengthen the front line. It was also stated in the article that there were two main reasons for this policy. While the first reason underlined as the fear of an anti-Russian alliance to be formed under the leadership of Germany, the second reason stated as the reckless attitude of Marshall Stalin after the war.³⁰

After the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, this article that contains strong accusations which were rarely published in the previously retrieved articles from the foreign press, was of great importance, especially considering the fact that it was published simultaneously by *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* when the repercussions of the memorandum prepared by the Armenian National Committee was still present at the time. As will be seen later in this study, these arguments stated by the Economist would be widely accepted among Turkish bureaucrats and intellectuals.

Another critical discussion in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* during this period was the definition of the concept of democracy, which the international community was also closely interested in. The foreign policy approach adopted by the Soviet Union, which was regarded as *antidemocratic* in the Western media, especially in the British newspapers and magazines, was also found a place in the Turkish newspapers.

In this regard, an article published by the Russian newspaper Pravda on May 22, 1945, primarily upon the increasing criticism in the British magazine the Economist, was shared with the Turkish readers in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on May 23, 1945.³¹ In this article, some of the British press and media organs were accused of *disseminating anti-democratic ideas under Europe's guise of democratization*. On the other hand, these media organs

³⁰ *Ulus*, “Economist dergisinde çıkan bir yazı”, May 20, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Rusya’nın emelleri”, May 20, 1945

³¹ *Ulus*, “Pravda’da çıkan bir makale”, May 23rd, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Demokrasi kelimesinin mânası”, May 23rd, 1945

were also strongly criticized for arbitrarily classifying countries as *democratic regimes* and *police regimes*.

In the last part of the article, which was shared without any editorial comment, it was underlined that when it comes to the democratization of continental Europe, contrary to the Western definition of democracy, the Soviet Union preferred defining the concept of the true democracy as *an ideal that emerged from the full and creative efforts of the masses of people*.

“[...] Despite what these short-sighted journalists say, which poses a threat to genuine democracy that emerges from the full and creative efforts of the masses of people, Europe's democratization cause will be realized” (Ulus & Cumhuriyet, May 23, 1945).

Apart from all these opposing views put forward by the British and the Soviet press, Mümtaz Faik Fenik's article titled *“İngiltere ve Sovyetler (Britain and the Soviets)”* in which he emphasized the priorities of the Turkish foreign policy of the period, published in *Ulus* on May 26, 1945, merits attention.

In his article, which was written on the third anniversary of the military and political alliance between the U.K. and the Soviet Union, Fenik referred to both countries' strong cooperation for the annihilation of Nazism under the London Agreement of May 26, 1942. He then reminded that, according to this agreement, both countries promised each other that they would be acting in the strong spirit of an alliance in order to bring peace and prosperity to continental Europe. Despite all of this, Fenik, who accepted that there were some controversial issues between the two countries, especially the Polish and Austrian issues, emphasized that the possibility that these problems would remain unsolved was an unfounded doubt.

“[...] It is not possible to say that these controversial issues cannot be addressed by looking at their development patterns. Both Britain and the Soviet Union knows that a peace that would be established rapidly in continental Europe is more suitable for their own interests and the humanitarian cause that they gave millions of lives rather than the continuation of the controversial issues between them. Because an armed peace never brings a tranquillity. Therefore, it is surely expected everywhere that all these issues will be dealt with within a short time [...]” (Fenik, *Ulus*, May 26, 1945).

As can be understood from the statements of Fenik, the idea that a strengthened British – Soviet alliance would bring peace and prosperity to the region –especially to Europe- was

pretty dominant. From this point on, it can be deduced that, particularly during the time of uncertainty caused by the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, the expectation of strong cooperation to be established between the U.K. and the Soviet Union would eventually be beneficial for Turkey, was generally accepted by the Turkish government and intellectuals.

3.1.4. June 1945 (between June 1, 1945 – June 22, 1945)

In addition to expressing optimistic expectations about a strengthened Anglo-Soviet alliance's prospective outcomes, the recent news regarding a Tripartite Meeting to be held immediately after the San Francisco Conference was also covered attentively both in the national and foreign press.

On June 1, 1945, in the report titled “*İngiltere-Amerika ve Rusya ittifakı (British – American and the Soviet alliance)*” published in *Cumhuriyet*, statements of the American commissioner Harry Hopkins, regarding the negotiations on a new military alliance between the U.K., the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to preserve peace and establish a brand new league of nations, was shared with the readers (*Cumhuriyet*, June 1, 1945).

On the other hand, on June 7, 1945, *Cumhuriyet* also published the transcript of the news of an Austrian Radio, which was under the Soviet control. Referring to the news retrieved from Moscow, it was stated in the broadcast that Marshall Stalin was also looking forward to a new Tripartite Meeting.³²

On June 9, 1945, comments of the New York Times on the importance of the Tripartite Meeting, which was planned to be held in the upcoming days, published in *Cumhuriyet*.³³ It was stated in the news that, according to the New York Times, this meeting would be the most important of all conferences and meetings ever held.

“[...] Elaborating on the Tripartite Conference that will be held soon, the New York Times indicated that since the previous meetings were only concerned about how to defeat the enemy, this one will be the most important of all conferences that have been convened so far. It was also

³² *Cumhuriyet*, “**Üçler Toplantısı**”, June 7, 1945

³³ *Cumhuriyet*, “**Amerikan siyaseti**”, June 9, 1945

stated that this meeting would be extremely crucial because it will not only determine the destiny of Europe but also of the world [...]” (Cumhuriyet, June 9, 1945).

In the lights of the positive developments that increased hope for the desired cooperation, in his article titled “*Anlaşma ve güven siyaseti (Agreement and trust policy)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on June 11, 1945, Ömer Rıza Doğrul underlined the need for mutual trust in order to achieve the international peace ideal.

Stating that he did not claim that all the problems would suddenly disappear with this need being met in his article, Doğrul expressed his belief that talking openly about all the suspicions and disagreements would strengthen the spirit of mutual trust. In the last part of his article, Doğrul, criticizing the approach of domination that states try to establish on each other as a way of resolving problems, underlined that the controversial issues between states could only be resolved peacefully through respecting rights and justice of all (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, June 11, 1945).

Five days after this article, referring to General Eisenhower’s words in his article title “*Üçler Konferansına doğru (Towards the Tripartite Conference)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on June 16, 1945, Doğrul stated that there was no reason for the deterioration of the strong harmony between the Western allies and the Soviet Union. He then added that the reasonable ground for this conference was found.

“[...] In short, there is no obstacle for the Three to gather in the best conditions and the most intimate atmosphere and decide on peace principles. Therefore, it is expected that the Tripartite Conference will provide successful results. In any case, Truman's role in this success will never be forgotten” (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, June 16, 1945).

It is seen that the expectation of establishing international peace and prosperity through strengthening the environment of trust in the international arena and taking peaceful steps supported by the rights and justice for the solution of the conflicts was prevailing at the time. In this context, the news and articles articulating the hope regarding resolving the ongoing disputes started to appear in the Turkish newspapers as of the first half of June.

On the other hand, at the time of plenty of news and articles on the San Francisco Conference and the Tripartite Conference being published, the article titled “*Basın hürriyeti ve gazetecilik üzerine (On freedom of the press and journalism)*” published in

Ulus on June 18, 1945, and written by Mehmet Nurettin Artam -who used T.İ. (the pin) as a pen name- was also deserves attention.

In the article, the author pointed out the importance of the freedom of the press by quoting from famous historical figures and prominent journalists. He also underlined the Turkish devotion to this matter by quoting from the President of the Turkish Republic İsmet İnönü. In the words that the author directly quoted from İnönü, it was emphasized that the people's will was directly proportionate to the freedom of the press, therefore if the freedom of the press were not used well, the countries would face severe problems. In addition to this, it was also stated that the freedom of the press was not under the responsibility of the state only but the entire public (T.İ., *Ulus*, June 18, 1945).

Two main reasons can be put forward to understand the increase in the articles on freedom of the press recently. The first reason can be attributed to the increasing importance of managing public perception in accordance with the foreign policy priorities. Therefore, it is seen that the articles related to the conscientious responsibilities of journalists -whose boundaries were set by the central government- become more prominent in the Turkish press. On the other hand, the second reason can be stated as the increasing need for an editorial defence mechanism against the accusations directed by the pro-Soviet elements in Turkey claiming the newspapers with wide circulation –including *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*- were adopting anti-democratic and partisan practices, while the 1946 democratic elections were approaching. As can be understood from these two reasons, the concern regarding the degradation of Turkey's image in the eyes of the Western allies was the determinant factor behind the curtain.

3.2. PERIOD OF RECOGNITION (June 22, 1945 – November 2, 1945)

After the bilateral talks between Turkey's Ambassador in Moscow Selim Sarper and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Vyacheslav Molotov on June 7, 1945, and June 18, 1945, the hopeful attitude and expectations of the Turkish press and especially the Turkish state officials, towards the future of the Turkish – Soviet relations had started to lose momentum. To explain the bitterness and the seriousness of the situation, Cemil Hasanlı

emphasized that the decisions were taken by the Soviet government regarding Turkey and Iran, especially between June 7, 1945 (Molotov – Sarper meeting) and July 6, 1945 (Resolution of the Politburo on Organizing Separatist Activities in South Azerbaijan and Other Northern Regions of Iran) could be counted as the beginning of the Cold War (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 140).

It was observed that, subsequent to the rejection of all the Russian demands (see p. 23) by the Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper, upon a clear instruction received from the Turkish government, Turkish policy that aims to maximize the support of both the U.S. and the U.K. in the international arena evolved into a more active and dynamic phase. In the light of these developments, as stated by Cemil Hasanlı, Turkish newspapers, which were informed about the bilateral meetings held on June 7, 1945, and June 18, 1945, through the telegram sent by Istanbul correspondent of the Times on June 22, 1945, carefully aligned with the attitudes of the central government towards the issue (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 164).

When the newspapers of the period are analysed, it is seen that the demands expressed by V. Molotov in Moscow meetings were also encountered with great anxiety in almost all Western democracies. Especially in the U.S. and the U.K.-based news, it was stated that it would be reasonable for Ankara and Moscow to settle these disputes among themselves, but the issues regarding the status of the Straits could not be resolved without being discussed by the signatories of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits.

Qualifying the Russian territorial claims as unrealistic, Russian scientist N. I. Yegorova asserted that these territorial claims were put forward *due to the desire to use it for blackmailing and political pressure* against Turkey during the ongoing debates on the status of the Straits (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 162). Supporting Yegorova's claim, Cemil Hasanlı also underlined that without any doubt, Soviet leaders meant to realize both demands at first, but in case of being obliged to choose between their demands, they would prefer the Straits because of its traditional significance (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 162). In addition to claims of both Yegorova and Hasanlı, Baskın Oran stated that Russians made a *tactical mistake* by bringing territorial claims forward, which eventually accelerated the process of Turkish-American rapprochement (Oran, 2014, p. 502).

On the other hand, Cemil Hasanlı explained the Turkish standpoint regarding the Soviet demands as a major existential threat, by pointing out the report titled “*The U.S. stand on expansionist aspirations of the Soviets*” published by the U.S. Army Command Forces in June 1945. Having stated that Turkey was at the greatest danger on the face of the Soviet demands, Hasanlı underlined that if Soviets successfully establish control over the Straits, it would eventually put the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean at risk, according to the report (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 163).

“[...] Rumours are afloat among soldiers and the civilian population of Turkey about an inevitable military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Some officers indicate that the war will be sacred for the Turks, for the return of territories captured by Bulgaria in Thrace, for the return of Batumi seized by the Soviet Union. Analysts allege that Britain will back Turkey in the future war. Pending the Soviets’ assault on Turkey, the country is engaged in reinforcing its fortifications” (Cited in Hasanlı, 2011, p. 163).

Also, these sentences quoted from a testimony of a Turkish soldier who was interrogated on June 13, 1945, as Cemil Hasanlı mentioned, provides a strong basis on to understand how the Turkish side interprets the Soviet demands. Likewise, as stated earlier, Weisband highlighted Daniel Lerner’s survey and stated that only two percent of the Turks based their opinions about the Soviet Union on the current information and developments, whereas the rest based their opinion on the “*traditional stock of Turkish folklore*” (Weisband, 1973, p. 86).

3.2.1. June 1945 (between June 22, 1945 – June 30, 1945)

Given these developments, in his article titled “*Milli birliğimiz (Our national unity)*” published in *Ulus* on June 17, 1945, referring to the National Solidarity and Soil Day, Kemal Turan emphasized that from the past to the present Turkish nation overcame the difficulties by the understanding of national unity and solidarity.

In the second part of his article, Turan pointed out that the Turkish nation was well-positioned at the beginning of the Second World War, among the community that recognized national rights and freedoms, and he underlined that, as of June 1945, Turkey was struggling fiercely on the Pacific coast to contribute to the improvement of the fortune of all humanity. Turan also underlined that the innovations that the Turkish state

put into practice for its farmers would have an important place in the history of the Turkish revolution and that the Turkish nation should make a great effort to prosper the country in a safe atmosphere and to fully prosper its citizens (Turan, *Ulus*, June 24, 1945).

Following Kemal Turan's statements on national unity and solidarity, Nadir Nadi's article titled "*Bizim vazifemiz (Our duty)*" published in *Cumhuriyet* on June 26, 1945, was of great importance in terms of messages included regarding international dynamics.

Having stated that there were two different views regarding Turkey's situation, Nadir Nadi underlined the importance of remaining vigilant by taking the most realistic one into account. According to the first evaluation, Nadi indicated that in this period, when Germany was defeated, and the European war ended, the ultimate peace would be achieved sooner or later, no matter how large the conflicts between the Allies. Again, according to the same evaluation, it was advocated that Turkey must well-position herself in the world of peace, the foundations of which laid at the San Francisco Conference and maintain its close relationships with the U.S. and the U.K. along with signing a new agreement with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, according to the second evaluation, Nadi mentioned that with the defeat of Germany, the disputes between the Allies that were date back to old times emerged again. Subsequent to the disappearance of Germany from the European equation, the suspicion voiced by the Anglo-Saxons lately regarding the Soviet desire to establish a new hegemony in Europe, becomes a serious concern considering the future of the libertarian nations in case of a possible Soviet dominance. According to the same evaluation, while stating that the Soviet Union has the same feelings towards Anglo-Saxons, it was emphasized that if this mutual sceptical attitude continues, the world could be dragged into a new war.

According to Nadir Nadi, the first evaluation was insufficient. Nadi stated that in order for the United Nations status signed at the San Francisco Conference to be successful, a permanent agreement should be reached between the three major states, otherwise he would not expect much from either the San Francisco Conference or its possible outcomes. Moreover, stating that it would not be easy to sign a new agreement with the

Soviet Union as it was suggested, Nadir Nadi emphasized that in order to make it happen, Turkey must analyse the new conditions set forth by Russians well.

Stating that the second evaluation includes the closest assumptions to reality, even if it was more pessimistic than the other, Nadi underlined that the disputes between Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet Union, which he claimed due to regime differences, can only be resolved with a policy of mutual sympathy and trust. Even with the most optimistic approach, Nadi stated that the relation between Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets needs time to recover. For that reason, considering the conditions of the day, Turkey must stay on alert as if everything would be worsening someday and, in the meantime, continue to work hard as if everything was getting better (Nadir, N., *Cumhuriyet*, June 26, 1945).

After Kemal Turan and Nadir Nadi's call for increasing the awareness of national unity and solidarity and preventing complacency against possible ominous developments in Turkish Soviet relations, the reflections of the Soviet demands were widely found a place in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on June 28, 1945.

In the news published in the front pages of both newspapers, it was stated that Hasan Saka, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, would visit London on his way back from San Francisco, to evaluate the latest Soviet demands on the Straits issue.

On the other hand, referring to the diplomatic note that was given by the Soviet government to their Turkish counterparts on June 18, 1945, it was also stated in the same news that the controversial issues between the two countries could be resolved through mutual dialogue, but the issue related to the status of the Straits needs to be discussed by the signatories of the Montreaux. It was also shared with the reader that the issue of the status of the Straits would be discussed at the Churchill, Truman, and Stalin meeting to be held in the coming days.³⁴

In the news titled "*Sovyet Genelkurmay Başkanı'nun raporu (The report of the Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces)*" published in *Cumhuriyet* in the same day,

³⁴ *Ulus*, "San Francisco'da bulunan Dış Bakanımız dönüşte Londra'yı ziyaret edecek", June 28, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, "Sovyet Taleplerinin Akisleri", June 28, 1945

sections from the report that includes evaluations of the Commander of the Soviet Arment Forces Antonov regarding the recent developments in Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, were presented to the attention of the readers. Using Antonov's words "*From now on, the flag of Slavic nations will be waved in Europe*" stated in the report, as a subheading of the news, attracts great attention due to pointing out the Soviet threat indirectly (*Cumhuriyet*, June 28, 1945).

On the other hand, *Ulus* also gave place to the comments published in the British press regarding the latest Soviet demands in its issue dated June 29, 1945. According to the information received from the Daily Express correspondent, it was reiterated in the news that the disagreements on the Soviet demands over the Straits would be discussed at the Tripartite Conference, which would be held in Berlin soon afterward. In the same news, Reuters' interpretations regarding the ultimate aims of the Soviet Union on the status of the Straits were also shared with the readers. Stating that territorial claims put forward by the Soviets raised less concern than the issue of the Straits, it was emphasized in the news that these demands must be considered tightly since this was just the beginning of the Soviet policies towards the establishment of a friendly Turkish government which was closer to the Soviet principles.

The recent developments in Northern Iran were indicated as another development that could affect the Straits issue in the news. In fact, it was stated that an Azerbaijan Liberation Committee was established in Northern Iran, under the Soviet occupation, and they wished to unite with Soviet Azerbaijan. It was also underlined that such a unification would result in disconnecting Turkey's border with Iran, and in this way the Soviet Union would possibly acquire a border in the Mosul region.³⁵

With the latest Soviet actions towards Northern Iran and the Iranian Foreign Minister E. Sepahbodi's call to the Allied states -as well as the Soviet Union- asking for the withdrawal of their troops in Iran on May 19, 1945, the dispute entered to a new phase. In the case of the military withdrawal, being afraid of harming her petroleum exploration activities in Iran and undermining its military and political superiority in the region, the

³⁵ *Ulus*, "Son Sovyet teklifleri etrafında İngiliz basınında geniş yorumlar göze çarpıyor", June 29, 1945

Soviets increased its propaganda activities on regional issues. On the contrary, it was started to be emphasized by the foreign press that the U.K. and the U.S. started to work on determining a common policy regarding this issue just before the Tripartite Conference to be held in Berlin. Besides, the number of news and articles related to this subject increased gradually as of August 1945, in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.

3.2.2. July 1945

Since the last weeks of June, it was observed that there was a significant increase in the news published in the international media, particularly in the Western newspapers, that shows support for Turkey's cause against the Soviet demands.

In the news that was retrieved from Reuters and published on *Cumhuriyet's* front page on July 1, 1945, the Turkish-Russian negotiation, which would be discussed in the forthcoming Tripartite Conference- was defined as the most delicate subject in Europe after the Polish issue.³⁶

On July 2, 1945, in the news titled "*Boğazlar meselesi (The Straits issue)*" published in *Cumhuriyet*, evaluations of the Sunday Times correspondent on the Soviet demands, emphasizing that Turkey does not even consider the possibility of establishing foreign military bases inside her territory, were shared with the readers. Besides that, the interpretations of the French newspaper Aurore on the subject, emphasizing that the aforementioned dispute was not only concerning Turkey or the Soviets but also concerning *the Big Three* as an issue of the Middle East, were also shared in the same news (*Cumhuriyet*, July 2, 1945).

On July 3, 1945, in the news titled "*Trakya topraklarında Sovyet istekleri (!) (Soviet demands in Thrace(!))*" published in *Cumhuriyet*, the criticisms made by Greek newspapers towards Soviet territorial claims in both Greece and Turkey were also shared with the readers. It was stated in the news that both Turkey and Greece had common political and military interests, and therefore they should act in the spirit of a strong

³⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, "Sovyet Talepleri", July 1, 1945

alliance against the common enemy. Also, in the same news, it was emphasized that Greek's have already rejected the demands concerning their territorial integrity, and they do not even want to believe the rumors related to Soviet territorial claims in Turkey (*Cumhuriyet*, July 3, 1945).

Besides the news mentioned above and articles published by the Western newspapers, it was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* also gave wide coverage to the Tripartite Conference in July 1945.

In the news published in *Ulus* on July 4, 1945, with the title “*Üçler Konferansı’na iştirak etmek üzere Mr. Truman yola çıkıyor (Truman is going to join the Tripartite Conference)*”, the evaluations of the Reuters regarding the goals of the conference were included. According to Reuters, this conference had two goals. While it was stated that the first goal was *to prepare the basis for a peace agreement*, it was also underlined that the developments in the Far East and the situation that occurred as a result of the defeat of Germany would be evaluated together as a prerequisite. In connection with this objective, it was underlined that *the leaders of the Big Three (Truman, Churchill, and Stalin)* would come together to create a reasonable basis for a new friendship treaty to be signed between the Soviet Union and Turkey, and in particular to evaluate issues regarding the status of the Straits. On the other hand, the conference's second objective was indicated as to resolve some administrative issues, especially the issue of Trieste that emerged after the European War (*Ulus*, July 4, 1945).

While the attitude of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* towards the Soviet demands getting stricter day by day, the explanation given by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Şükrü Saraçoğlu regarding the foreign policy activities of the government at the Parliamentary Group Meeting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) on July 10, 1945, was shared with readers in the front-pages of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on July 11, 1945.

The vote of confidence given to the government by the Parliamentary Group of the CHP regarding its foreign policy activities, which was affirmed that fully matches the interests

of the country, was considered as an important detail for the government to take a strong political stance in such a period.³⁷

Evaluating the statements of the Prime Minister Saraçoğlu on the foreign policy activities in his article titled “*Dış politikamızda devamlılık (Continuity in our foreign policy)*” published in *Ulus* on July 12, 1945, Mümtaz Faik Fenik underlined the main principle of the Turkish foreign policy by touching on the consensus regarding foreign policy activities in the country.

“[...] What is the main principle of our foreign policy? Let us repeat once again that our foreign policy is the most humane. Just as people are born equally by law, nations who are already born in this way live freely and equally. This is the real democracy in our opinion, and this is the outlook that we want the future world to take [...]” (Fenik, *Ulus*, July 12, 1945).

After reminding Turkey's foreign policy principle, which has been following since its foundation, Fenik then sniped at the attempts that were trying to degrade Turkey through unfounded allegations and emphasized that without any state domination over herself, Turkey would live freely and independently.

“[...] Living freely and independently in a world that knows how to respect mutual rights and seeing this manner of life is spread all over the world, no domination over nations, no superior person, no thousand years of future for a country! We have [always] defended a policy that human beings are above all else and always provides an eternal and comfortable future to the whole human community. The National Oath has inspired by this principle. Our national borders have been drawn. We will live free and independent in our own homeland [...]” (Fenik, *Ulus*, July 12, 1945).

Reminding that Turkey cooperated with the Western democracies against the forces that threaten the principles mentioned above in the Second World War, Fenik emphasized his support for the foreign policy activities that were still implemented in line with these principles and the government's effort on this cause, with strong words.

“[...] We fully believe that the government of Mr. Saraçoğlu will continue our foreign policy, which has been carried out in accordance with our national rights and interests, and with full accuracy. Because we stand behind him as a nation, and we have great confidence in ourselves, our unity and our power” (Fenik, *Ulus*, July 12, 1945).

³⁷ *Ulus*, “Başbakan’ın demeci alkışlarla karşıladı”, July 11, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Parti Grubunun Dün Verdiği Karar”, July 11, 1945

Referring to the strong messages voiced at the General Assembly Meeting of the Parliamentary Group of the CHP dated July 10, 1945, in his article titled “*Güvenimiz (Our trust)*” published in *Ulus*, Mehmet Nurettin Artam expressed his trust in the government’s foreign policy program. Stating that Prime Minister Saraçoğlu and the government were following a policy program that was fully in line with the national rights and interests, Artam evaluated this sensitivity in the context of national unity and solidarity.

“[...] If the national unity started talk nowadays and spoke about the indivisible integrity of the motherland, it would speak in this voice, and it would shed its feelings with these words [...]” (T.İ., *Ulus*, July 12, 1945).

Following these words, stating his inferences about the real intentions of those who intend to seize the rights and freedoms of the nation and who did not have good intentions towards one particular nation, Artam also contributed to the frequently voiced explanation *war of nerves* while defining the Turkish Soviet dispute.

“[...] Those who do not have good intentions towards one particular nation, wants to cause separations and contradictions in it, to disrupt its spiritual existence and erode its nerves made of steel [...]” (T.İ., *Ulus*, July 12, 1945).

Towards the end of his article, pointing out that all the citizens were aware of their duties and responsibilities and would maintain their power despite all attrition efforts, Artam stated that the environment of peace and prosperity dreamed of by foreign states already exists in the spiritual body and politics of the Turkish nation.

“[...] Our ties, our nerves are like steel on the anvil. Any suggestion that will target it will only serve to increase its strength.

We know our rights as well as our responsibilities and duties [...]” (T.İ., *Ulus*, July 12, 1945).

Together with Mehmet Nurettin Artam’s strong and decisive words on the belief and commitment to the national unity and solidarity, Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka’s interview with the foreign press, which was held right after Eden³⁸-Saka talks on the Straits issue, was also published in *Ulus* on July 12, 1945.

³⁸ British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden

In the news that was shared on both newspapers' front pages, Hasan Saka's answer to one of the questions "*Border changes or land concessions is not at stake for Turkey*" was highlighted and used as a subheading.³⁹ Highlighting that the Straits issue and disputes related to the Eastern provinces of Turkey need a separate evaluation in the interview, Saka then touched on Turkey's policy style towards the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy to state that, in the evaluations shared without any editorial comments, Saka preferred to express his criticisms regarding the Russian policy style indirectly, through some press commentaries.

"[...] In this regard, I would like to say that the maintenance and reinforcement of continuous, sincere, and friendly relations between the two countries is one of the main directives of Turkish foreign policy. Some press commentators implied that adapting these relations to the new conditions arising from the Second World War could neglect the fundamental principles recognized and defended by the two countries since their revolutions. These principles are the recognition of the unconditional rights of the nations to freely decide on their own destinies and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the nations [...]" (Ulus & Cumhuriyet, July 12, 1945).

While the reactions to the statements of Prime Minister Saraçoğlu and Foreign Minister Saka on Turkish Soviet relations and Turkish foreign policy continued among the Turkish public, the articles were written by Nadir Nadi, on July 13, 14, and 15, 1945 came to the fore due to their content and affinity to the theses put forward by the officials of the government. In particular, it was observed that the language used by Nadir Nadi in expressing his criticisms and concerns in these articles entirely coincides with the policy set by the government. In fact, in line with the statements made by the Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka, Nadi preferred to define the Soviet demands as an allegation instead of accepting them straightforwardly and refrained from harming a possible dialogue opportunity between the two countries with his words.

In his article titled "*Bir milletten toprak istemek (Asking for land from a nation)*" published in *Cumhuriyet* on July 13, 1945, touching on the statements of Foreign Minister Saka on the Turkish Soviet relations and Turkish foreign policy, Nadir Nadi expressed his criticisms and concerns about the issue in which uncertainty prevailed by referring to the news published in the foreign press.

³⁹ *Ulus*, "Hasan Saka görüşümüzü izah etti", July 12, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, "Hasan Saka – Eden Mülakati", July 12, 1945

“[...] Have these offers been made? If so, what is its essence? Although many articles have been written on this subject in the world for two or three weeks, we have not yet acquired extensive information. Many telegrams appeared in foreign newspapers about the fact that the Soviet Union wanted a base in the Straits and disposed of some territorial changes in Thrace and in our eastern provinces that are against us. [...]

If the Soviet government had officially made some proposals to us, the government of the Republic [of Turkey] would not delay its task to enlighten its people while sending the necessary answer to Moscow. However, if the rumours mentioned above were entirely made up, it would be necessary to read that these were so far denied by our Soviet neighbours” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1945).

After this unusual reproach, Nadir Nadi stated that as a Turkish citizen who witnessed the 25 years of Turkish Soviet friendship, he would be disappointed if the demands in question were real. In the following sections of his article, supporting vehemently Foreign Minister Saka’s statements on the territorial claims, Nadi emphasized that the state of negligence allegedly associated with the Soviet Union would devastate the country's image.

“[...] Turkish generations, who feel the consciousness of national freedom in their veins, created these boundaries with their blood at the expense of the dissolution of a huge empire. No matter where it comes from, whoever it is, nobody can pull away any land from us, either through request, threat, agreement, or discussion. [...] It will also be sad to learn that idealist Russia, which we know that they understood this truth before every nation, is going back towards the time of the old Tsars and has forgotten the intrinsic meaning of nationality after twenty years have passed [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1945).

Stating that he did not want to believe these claims, even if they have not been denied until now in the last part of his article, Nadi stated that no state could put another state under domination unless the idea of nationality disappears.

In his article titled “*Boğazlar meselesi (The Straits issue)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on July 14, 1945, which can be seen as a continuation of his previous evaluations, touching on the history of the Straits issue and its increasing importance in the international nations, Nadir Nadi explained how the Turkish thesis grounded on this subject.

Starting his article by reminding that there were no sovereignty problems related to the Straits due to the condition of the Black Sea, which was seen as a Turkish lake up until the 18th century, Nadir Nadi stated that the issue of the Straits emerged with the expansionist policies of Tsarist Russia while the Ottoman Empire was losing strength. Nadi also stated that the Straits issue gained different meanings as a result of the social, political, and economic changes in Europe since the 18th century, and with the

strengthening of the idea of freedom, the states that see the Straits *as a matter of national existence*, have become one of the parties of this issue.

Stating that the Straits' issue was first addressed in the Lausanne Treaty, which was signed after the First World War, Nadi reminded that the issue was evaluated most appropriately at the Montreaux Conference held in 1936. After reminding that, he questioned the necessity of reconsidering the Straits issue while there were lots of important issues that emerged after the Second World War.

“[...] It has been almost nine years since the Montreaux Conference conducted. In these nine years, an unprecedented war has turned Europe upside down and shook the foundations of everything in the name of order. Is it necessary to review the Straits issue once more under these conditions and link this international water corridor to a new order? [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, July 14, 1945).

Despite all, if there would be changes regarding the status of the Straits, referring to Turkish Foreign Minister Saka's words, Nadir Nadi emphasized that those possible changes should be made by considering the right of passage, the security of the Black Sea states, and the sovereignty rights of Turkey. And lastly, Nadi underlined the importance of considering the regime of the Straits as an international matter, with the following sentences.

“[...] This [the issue of the Straits] is neither related to Turkish-Russian relations nor Russian-British or Russian-American relations. The issue is a matter of international trust and mutual agreement directly [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, July 14, 1945).

Subsequent to criticisms and concerns that he expressed in the past days, in his article titled “*Rus dostluğuna verdiğimiz değer (The value that we attach to Russian friendship)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on July 15, 1945, Nadir Nadi touched on the mutual trust and friendship dimensions of the issue and tried to prove that Turkey could not be blamed for the dispute of today concerning historical events.

Starting his article by explaining the importance that Turkey has given to the Russian friendship through geopolitical realities and historical events with reference to Hasan Saka, Nadir Nadi underlined that both countries did not benefit from the expansionist policies they have carried out against each other in history. Also touching on the good relations between the Kemalist Turkey and the Leninist Russia, Nadir Nadi reminded in

his article that the Neutrality and Friendship Agreement signed between Turkey and Russia in 1921 laid the foundations of the strong trust and friendly relations between the two countries.

However, at the point reached after years, Nadi, who complained that the Turkish-Russian relations were deteriorating day by day after the end of the Europe War and the defeat of Germany, admitted that many allegations were put forward to understand this deterioration in bilateral relations, but he did not examine the reasons for this issue in his article. The statements that he made in the last paragraph, which could be assumed as a summary of his article, come to the fore as it reflects the perception that the Turkish government desires to create in public.

“[...] What I want to show is that we have no responsibility for the Turkish - Russian relations to take on the ambiguous and unpleasant situation of today. Let us hope that the dynamic swellings that stand out in the Soviet political body will reach a balance before the friendship between the two nations become irreparable. Because the strongest guarantee of the value that we attach to our friendship rights is the respect that our friends show to the Turkish independence [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, July 15, 1945).

Along with Nadir Nadi’s detailed evaluations published in *Cumhuriyet*, a Washington Star article titled “*Modern Türkiye (Modern Turkey)*” published in *Ulus* on July 14, 1945, was also attracted significant attention due to the wide acceptance of its suggestions in the Turkish public.

Touching on the increasing political pressure on Turkey, it was highlighted in the article that, if Turkey –a modern country- bows to pressure, it could be drawn into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.

In addition to this, addressing the peaceful and intelligent foreign policy practices of the Republic of Turkey, which was established in accordance with the Western principles, it was stated that along with being a member of the United Nations, Turkey strengthened its position in the international community.

At the same time, it was stated in the article that despite the aforementioned peaceful and intelligent foreign policy practices of Turkey, the unacceptable demands of the Soviets were described as the main reason for failing to reach a new agreement between the two

countries. Considering Turkey's post-war position, it was also stated that the ongoing dispute between Turkey and the Soviet Union, which was described as a first-degree political issue, would be discussed at the upcoming Tripartite Conference (*Ulus*, July 14, 1945).

Subsequent to the beginning of the Potsdam Conference on July 16, 1945, in which the issues related to the future of Southeast Europe, the Straits, Iran, Italy, and particularly the future situation of Germany -was- planned to be discussed, the recent updates regarding the conference being hidden from the press had created a sceptical approach that started to be adopted in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.

In his article titled "***Truman hakemlik mi yapacak? (Will Truman be a referee?)***" published in *Cumhuriyet* on July 18, 1945, expressing his hope that the U.S. President Truman would not remain neutral in critical issues, Nadir Nadi underlined that the U.S. President Truman had a great duty to defend American stance against hegemonic policies threatening the world peace (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, July 18, 1945).

On the other hand, in his article titled "***Üçler Toplantısı'nın Gizliliği (The secrecy of the Tripartite meeting)***" published in *Ulus* on July 19, 1945, criticizing that about 200 journalists who went to Berlin to follow the conference, having been not allowed to enter the Potsdam, Mümtaz Faik Fenik stated that, despite all there would be no changes in the subjects that the conference planned to discuss, considering the current international dynamics (Fenik, *Ulus*, July 19, 1945).

During the period of shortage of concrete information and updates regarding the conference, the claim made by Professor Yavuz Abadan in his article titled "***Üçler ve Dünya (Big Three and the World)***" published in *Cumhuriyet* on July 25, 1945, became more important due to the expectations regarding the conference were decreasing day by day. Sharing the leaked allegations that *the leaders of the Big Three* intended to deal with daily affairs at the conference but leave the main issues to a future conference, Abadan stated that the belief regarding the disputed issues between the three states could not reach a certain and long-reaching agreement would be strengthened if these allegations proven to be true (Abadan, *Cumhuriyet*, July 25, 1945).

In the meantime, it was observed that the undeniable role of the United States and the United Kingdom, repeatedly voiced by Turkish statesmen and journalists, continued to be covered by the foreign press.

The article of the Birmingham Post published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on July 30, 1945, is an example of such news.⁴⁰ In the Birmingham Post news, which was based on official sources, it was emphasized that the Straits issue would be handled at the Potsdam Conference, and the Turkish side would do their best to preserve their sovereignty. It was also stated in the news that the interests of the Anglo-Saxons in the Mediterranean would be the most crucial determinant in resolving the Straits issue.

“[...] The Big Three will encounter the issue of finding a satisfactory way that is in the advantage of the world peace in between the rights of Turkey and the security goals of Russia as a Black Sea state in the one hand, and the interests of the Anglo-Saxons in the other hand. The interests of the Anglo-Saxons may be the most important determinant in this matter” (Ulus & Cumhuriyet, July 30, 1945).

Another development that was strongly criticized by the Turkish press during the Potsdam Conference was the activities of the Armenian National Committee, just like at the San Francisco Conference.

In the news titled “*Kars, Ardahan ve Artvin hakkında münasebetsiz bazı Ermenilerin münasebetsiz gayretkeşlikleri (Impertinent efforts of some impertinent Armenians about Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin)*” published on the front page of *Ulus* on July 23, 1945, it was reported that the demands of the Progressive Armenian National Committee regarding Kars, Ardahan and Artvin were submitted to the leaders of the three major states by telegraph. It was mentioned in the news that, during the discussion being held regarding the new friendship agreement desired to be signed between Turkey and the Soviet Union at the conference, the suggestion of touching on the territorial claims also brought to the attention of the participants. Furthermore, it was also stated in the same news that, according to the general conviction in London, due to the inappropriate

⁴⁰ *Ulus*, “Üçler Konferansı’nda bazı meselelerin tehiri muhtemel”, July 30, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Boğazlar rejimi”, July 30, 1945

submission, the aforementioned Armenian requests would not be effective at all (*Ulus*, July 23, 1945).

Evaluating the issue thoroughly in his article titled “*Amerikadaki Ermeni meselesinin iç yüzü (Behind the Scenes of the Armenian Issue in America)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on July 31, 1945, Doğan Nadi indicated that the Armenians who recently applied to the Potsdam Conference actually belonged to the same community with the ones that distributed the memorandum during the San Francisco Conference. Stating that he did not believe these Armenians were acting on behalf of one particular group, Doğan Nadi also underlined that they did not find the expected interest and attention in both conferences. Furthermore, he also explained the emergence of these demands by associating them with the strange effects of the Second World War on social life.

“[...] But battles play strange roles in social life. As the war started in Europe in 1939 and then caused these latest developments that we all know, such as the desire for making a profit, gaining reputation, growing and taking advantage of the situation, it seems that the desire for playing a political role in this Armenian community has emerged as well. The application to the San Francisco Conference is a result of this harmful desire [...]” (Nadi, D., *Cumhuriyet*, July 31, 1945).

After this inference, criticizing the purpose of these Armenians by stating that “*They wanted, and still wanting to fish in murky waters*”, Nadi lastly underlined that in the past, the subjected issue was resolved between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia in response to the accusations made.

3.2.3. August 1945

Following the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference on August 2, 1945, it was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, which were focused on the final declaration of the conference and the parliamentary elections in the U.K., also covered news about the possible effects of the management change in the U.K., especially on the current British-Russian relations.

Touching on the parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom in his article titled “*Potsdam’ın sonu (End of the Potsdam)*” published in *Ulus* on August 3, 1945, Esat Tekeli emphasized that unlike other European examples, British socialism was not ideological but parliamentary by nature while defining the characteristics of the British

conservatives and socialists. For this reason, he emphasized that it would be wrong to read the election results as the superiority of socialism over the nationalists, and he reiterated that conservative and socialist understanding in the U.K. was far different from other examples in the world.

Stating that the issue that concerns the both international and the Turkish press was the foreign policy agenda of the Labour Party, Tekeli underlined the fact that this issue has been a crucial question during the Potsdam Conference. Pointing out that both political parties in the U.K. had very stormy discussions about foreign policy issues during the pre-election period, Tekeli articulated the feelings of the Turkish side by stressing that Churchill's understanding of cooperation with the U.S. to establish world peace and security should not be lost (Tekeli, *Ulus*, August 3, 1945).

On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet*, which was trying to understand the foreign policy approach of the new British government and its attitude against the ongoing disputes, focused on the news related to the subject published in the U.S. press. In the news titled **“Yeni İngiliz hükümeti ve Türk Rus münasebatı (New British government and Turkish Russian relationship)”** published in *Cumhuriyet* on August 4, 1945, it was emphasized that the British Foreign Minister Bevin left the concerns of Americans unfounded with the effective statement he gave at the Potsdam Conference, referring to the article in the American magazine the Cavalcade.

“[...] At the Berlin [Potsdam] Conference, the British Foreign Minister Mr. Bevin's explicit declaration has resolved the concerns of Americans who are afraid that the leftist government in Britain will divide the Big Three into two groups as socialists and capitalists. Bevin has made it clear that he will act honestly and will not confront his allies in the field of international politics by getting stuck some ideological thoughts [...]” (*Cumhuriyet*, August 4, 1945).

On the other hand, it was emphasized in the same news that the new Prime Minister of the British government, Clement Attlee asked the Soviet leaders to review their demands against Turkey and Greece during the conference, and it was also shared with the readers that, according to the general conviction in Washington, the Soviet Union would comply with the call and adjust their demands against Turkey.

One day after the conference ended, it was observed that the final declaration shared with the international community on August 3, 1945, was criticized by the editorial writers of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.

In this regard, complaining about the discrepancy between the predictions and the reality of the conference agenda, in his article titled “*Üçler Konferansı demeci (The declaration of the Tripartite Conference)*” published in *Ulus* on August 4, 1945, Mümtaz Faik Fenik indicated that as it was understood from the declaration, the conference seems only focused on the issues related to the administration, political and economic situation and compensation terms of Germany. In addition to this, pointing out that there might be discussions on the other issues apart from those related to the future of Germany have been made to some extent, Fenik emphasized that if so, these issues might have been addressed indirectly while discussing the issues related to the actual results of the war (Fenik, *Ulus*, August 4, 1945).

In addition to the statements of Mümtaz Faik Fenik, Nadir Nadi, who expressed his reproaches about the final declaration of the Potsdam Conference in his article titled “*Nihayet (Finally)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on August 4, 1945, also criticized the appointment of the controversial issues to different commissions, to be discussed in the future.

“[...] In short, it is not possible to have a positive opinion about the success of the conference by looking at these summaries. Even if we do not take into account some disturbances such as the British elections, Stalin's illness, the Allied chiefs gathered at least twelve, thirteen times, negotiating and discussing for hours each time, and eventually left all of the troubling issues related to the European and world peace to the Council of Foreign Ministers that is claimed to start working on September 1. They could not go beyond making some important decisions regarding the administration of occupied Germany [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, August 4, 1945).

While the reactions in the Turkish press have been continuing towards the final declaration of the Potsdam Conference due to the absence of any records related to the Straits, the report of the Reuters on the Turkish Russian relations published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on August 5, 1945. As it was stated in the related news, according to the

general belief in London, Turkish-Russian negotiations came to a deadlock, and it was underlined that no official proposal had been made since the Sarper – Molotov meetings.⁴¹

On the other hand, as stated in the same news that the Turkish-Russian negotiations were stopped for two reasons. According to Reuters, the first reason for the interruption was Turkey's undeterred attitude against the Soviet territorial claims. Moreover, the second reason stated as Turkey's refusal to the Soviet offer, which was suggested discussing the issues related to the status of the Straits in a private meeting. After mentioning the reasons for the deadlock of the Turkish-Russian negotiations, it was stated in the news that the solution could only be possible through if the major states came to terms about the Straits issue.

“[...] According to the opinion of the political circles in London, the rehabilitation of the Turkish-Soviet relations also depends to some extent on the major states' agreement on the Straits issue. [...]

[...] As far as no signs are showing that Turkey and the Soviet Union are keen to sacrifice from their point of view on this issue, no predictions can be made about new negotiations for now” (Ulus & Cumhuriyet, August 5, 1945).

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which published an article of the Observer magazine just a day after the Reuters' news, continued to cover the most popular interpretations of the Western press regarding the results of the Potsdam Conference.

In the article published in both newspapers on August 6, 1945, since the Turkish-Russian dispute did not arise from the war, it was stated that the issues related to the dispute were not discussed at the Potsdam Conference and most probably would not even be discussed at the Council of Foreign Ministers planned to be held in September.⁴² Reiterated that the Turkish-Russian negotiations were stopped due to the reasons also mentioned in the Reuters' article a day before, it was underlined that neither refusal nor confirmation was received from the London sources regarding the subject. The most assertive interpretation in the news can be highlighted as, although the Turkish-Russian dispute would not be discussed in the foreseeable future, a problem that would arise from this particular dispute

⁴¹ *Ulus*, “**Reuter’e göre; Üçler Konferansı’ndan sonra Türk – Rus münasebetleri**”, August 5, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “**Türkiye Rusya**”, August 5, 1945

⁴² *Ulus*, “**Halledilmeyen Meseleler**”, August 6, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “**Berlin Konferansı’nda Halledilemeyen İşler**”, August 6, 1945

would sooner or later turn into a major problem that involves all states, and at that point, the solution could only be possible through the United Nations Security Council.

“[...] Certainly, there has been no progress in Turkish-Russian talks for weeks. Relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey are not related directly to the European war. In this respect, they are not included in the field of investigation or judgment of the Allies and the foreign ministers of the five major states that will soon meet to line up the peace conference plans. If a crisis emerges at the end of the Turkish - Russian negotiations, it will be obvious that all the major states will get involved, but in such a case, the place where the matter will only be resolved is the United Nations Security Council [...]” (Ulus & Cumhuriyet, August 6, 1945).

At the time when the concerns and reproaches about the unresolved issues of the Potsdam Conference, especially the Straits issue being voiced in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, the attention of the Turkish and world public opinion immediately turned into the last phase of the war and the post-war developments as the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945.

Upon Japan’s declaration that they would surrender through the governments of Sweden and Switzerland on August 11, 1945, referring to the information obtained from New York sources, *Cumhuriyet* shared this development in the front page with the title of “*İkinci dünya harbi sona erdi (The second world war is over)*” and stated the allegation that Japan asserted protection of the sovereignty rights of Emperor Hirohito as a condition of surrender (*Cumhuriyet*, August 11, 1945).

On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet* shared the statement of the President of the U.S. Harry S. Truman, which he gave to the American radio on the issues discussed in the Potsdam Conference. In the news titled “*Truman’ın nutku (Truman’s speech)*”, it was emphasized that Truman pointed out the selfish use of waterways in Europe as one of the causes of the wars that lasted for the last two centuries, and offered free and unobstructed navigation for European waterways, including the Dardanelles and Istanbul Straits.

In his statement that he gave to the American radio, it was stated that in the news that Truman emphasized the necessity to prepare specific statuses for each of these waterways, and he suggested the representatives of the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union, and France, as well as representatives of the related countries, take place during the preparation of these statuses (*Cumhuriyet*, August 11, 1945).

On the other hand, Chief Editor of *Ulus* Falih Rifkî Atay, who had the opportunity to follow the Turkish delegation closely at the San Francisco Conference, made some points regarding the capability and capacity of the new international organization which was founded at the San Francisco Conference and drew attention to the actions that could threaten sustainable peace in his article titled “*Milletlerarası yeni teşkilatlanma (New international organization)*” published in *Ulus* on August 12, 1945.

Starting his article by describing the political success of the Turkish delegation at the San Francisco Conference as “*realist cooperation that took a prudent path between dreams and opportunities*”, Atay then raised two important questions that the international community was also looking for the answer.

“[...] Is the new organization more advanced and better than the old League of Nations? Can this organization protect small nations from being attacked? [...]” (Atay, *Ulus*, August 12, 1945).

Starting his evaluations by addressing the capacities and competencies of the former League of Nations, Atay stated that, unlike the recently founded one, the former did not have an army, a navy, or an air fleet that could prevent attacks on Europe, Asia, and Africa, and as a consequence, it could not prevent the Second World War.

However, even with these competencies in mind, he underlined that the new organization, which has given more confidence than the former one, could not prevent a new war if any of the major states act like Japan, Germany, or Italy as they did at the beginning of the Second World War. After this sceptical warning, Atay emphasized the important responsibilities of the great powers, as well as small powers, to establish a continuous and reliable environment of peace and prosperity.

“[...] In order for the new organization to maintain a continuous and reliable peace order, great powers, as well as small powers, should give up all kinds of hegemony, influence and intervention ambitions and should not make any difference between the rights of others and their rights. The great powers should be united not only in keeping the order of peace intact but in keeping this order with the will of everyone without compulsion [...]” (Atay, *Ulus*, August 12, 1945).

Indicating his warnings and suggestions by targeting the great states striving to create a zone of influence and expand their borders illegally after the war, Atay stated that it was too early to say that the goal of establishing a reliable peace order has been realized. In

the following sections of his article, he reiterated that the period in which the rights and freedoms of states were partially or wholly endangered, regardless of whether they were small or great, should be ended. Furthermore, he also noted that the danger was not only upon the small states but also upon the great powers.

“[...] The case was neither won nor lost; the case is evident. If there is a truth, it is those true democracies, and the candid masses of people who continue these democracies, are determined to prevent new wars. [...]

[...] The era of inventing excuses and abusing goodwill to deprive nations of all or part of their rights and liberties should be ended. The danger is not just for the small powers; if the war and assault methods do not disappear, even the great powers will not be able to escape from distrust. [...]” (Atay, *Ulus*, August 12, 1945).

Emphasizing that the consensus reached in San Francisco was the best possible result to be achieved under the conditions of the day, in the last section of his article, Atay stated that all these efforts would not be different from an incomplete dream if states failed to remain loyal to the ideal of peace in which millions of people lost their lives for.

As can be understood from the statements of Falih Rıfıkı Atay, the great powers, who have been striving to extend their borders regardless of the rights and freedoms of the smaller states, pose the biggest threat to the international peace order. On the other hand, to successfully carry out the process, a strong feeling of trust in real democracies and their supportive masses also came to the fore in Atay's words.

In addition to the warnings and suggestions indicated by Falih Rıfıkı Atay to reach the ideal of continuous and reliable international peace, in his article titled “***Kuvvetli ile Kazançlı (The Strong and the Profitable)***” published in *Cumhuriyet* on August 15, 1945, Nadir Nadi made evaluations regarding the process specific to the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Pointing out the U.S. as the strongest state and the Soviet Union as the most profitable of the post-war period, Nadi emphasized that being governed by different regimes did not create a problem between two countries in terms of cooperation during the Second World War.

Concerning this historical reality, Nadi stated that the environment of cooperation could be preserved in the post-war period as long as *the most profitable one* did not take actions to become stronger and *the strongest one* to maximize its profits, which would threaten international peace (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, August 15, 1945).

After touching on the need for true democracies to establish a continuous and reliable international peace in his article dated August 12, 1945, Falih Rıfki Atay also explained the role of the U.S. in the international community after the Second World War by comparing it with their role in the aftermath of the First World War, in his article titled **“Amerika için yeni devir (New era for America)”** published in *Ulus* on August 16, 1945.

Summarizing his comparisons in three important points, Atay first touched on the U.S. impact towards the direction of war and underlined that the U.S. played a more vital role in the European and Far East victories compared to the First World War. Secondly, he made comparisons about military capacity and stated that when compared to the aftermath of the First World War, the U.S. had military superiority at sea, on land, and in the air after the Second World War. And finally, Atay concluded his comparisons by touching on the responsibilities of the U.S. and stated that to maintain peace and security of the post-war period, the need for the presence of the U.S. became vital like never before (Atay, *Ulus*, August 16, 1945).

On the other hand, It was also observed that the news about the Iran issue, which stands out as another main topic of August, started to increase as of August 18, 1945, with the intensification of the events in the region. Touching on the civil rebellion in Azerbaijan and Tehran, in the news titled **“İran’da halk Ruslara ve solculara karşı ayaklanıyor (People in Iran are rising against Russians and leftists)”** published in *Cumhuriyet* on August 18, 1945, it was stated that people who took the city garrison under control, did not intend to step back unless the current government resigned and a new one was established (*Cumhuriyet*, August 18, 1945). An update on the issue that the rebellion has not been suppressed yet was also shared with the readers a week after in *Cumhuriyet* with the title **“İran’daki isyan hareketi Sovyet işgaline karşı! (The rebellion in Iran is against the Soviet occupation!)”** (*Cumhuriyet*, August 25, 1945).

It was observed that *Cumhuriyet*, which frequently covers the news related to the crisis originating from the Soviet Union in the neighbouring state Iran, started to adopt relatively bold editorial language against the Soviet threat, which could also be understood from the striking headlines that were chosen.

3.2.4. September 1945

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which have not been silent against the problems in the Balkan states as well as the events in Iran, also covered the evaluations related to the issues that were expected to be resolved in the Council of Foreign Ministers, which would be convened in London in the mid-September.

Emphasizing that the main discussion topics of the Council of Foreign Ministers would be the issues related to the Balkans and Central Europe, in his article titled “*Avrupa barışı ve Balkanlar (European Peace and the Balkans)*” published in *Ulus* on September 1, 1945, Mümtaz Faik Fenik stated that the establishment of the ultimate peace environment in Europe would be only possible through the resolution of these two issues.

Stating in his article that the Balkan states came to the brink of destruction by encountering with the power struggles of some interest groups instead of dealing with important economic, political, and social issues that emerged at the end of the war, Fenik underlined the importance of the American and British initiatives that were aiming to establish peace and prosperity in countries like Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece. On the other hand, mentioning that the foreign policy approach of the Soviet Union, which was formulated upon the desire for expanding their zone of influence over the Balkans, pushed the U.S. and the U.K. to take extra measures, Fenik pointed out that in line with the mutual interests of the three states the solution for these issues would be sought at the upcoming Council of Foreign Ministers (Fenik, *Ulus*, September 1, 1945).

When the Council of Foreign Ministers was approaching, another important subject pointed out by the editorial writers of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* were the expectations of the

Western democracies from the Turkish government, which was determined to continue to serve the Allied cause in the post-war period.

Touching on the problems that arose from regime conflicts and regional disputes accelerated right after the Second World War, in his article titled “*Amerikalılar Türklerden ne bekliyor? (What do the Americans expect from the Turks?)*” published in *Ulus* on September 11, 1945, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer expressed his belief that this chaotic situation resulted from the uncertainty that followed the great wars, and that peace and stability would be established over time.

Emphasizing that people could overcome these difficulties only by preserving their unity and solidarity at the time of uncertainty just as at wartimes, Esmer underlined that the Western allies wished Turkey to act with the same dignity and wisdom against any possible troubles that would emerge after the war, referring to his past experiences at the San Francisco Conference and following meetings. Summarizing feedbacks that he received during these meetings by an answer that he gave to a question about the expectations of the U.S. from Turkey, Esmer also stated that *a Turkey that preserves its stability* was desired by all Western allies and especially by the USA.

“[...] What are they waiting from us now? I can answer this question without hesitation: The only thought of our friends who love us is Turkey's stability. The world war gave birth to political anarchy in the countries around us. Turkey is a fortress of stability and tranquillity in the middle of this sea of anarchy [...]” (Esmer, *Ulus*, September 11, 1945).

Continuing his words by stating that having been seen as a center of stability and tranquillity by the Americans was a great privilege for Turkey, although there were some discrepancies between the American democracy and the Turkish democracy, Esmer stated the American faith in the Turkish democracy by quoting from the meeting that he had with the former U.S. Undersecretary of State Mr. Grew:

“[...] The Former U.S Undersecretary of the State Mr. Grew, who recently left the office, said in a speech when we visited America a few years ago:

“I saw that Turkish democracy has grown from a small sapling to a big tree.”

This expresses the sincere belief of millions of Americans in both politics and business. Furthermore, all Americans expect this tree, which is fed by the honourable efforts of an honourable nation, to grow and strengthen, according to Mr. Grew's statement” (Esmer, *Ulus*, September 11, 1945).

A few days before the conference starts, in his article titled “*Konferans açılırken... (The Conference is opening...)*” published in *Ulus* on September 12, 1945, pointing out that the conference having been seen as a milestone for the nations of the world, Falih Rıfki Atay underlined the responsibilities of the foreign ministers who would be attending to the conference with the following sentences:

“[...] Foreign ministers of the major states are not alone at the table of the recently opened London Conference: The hopes of all nations are also gathered around it.

Are we heading towards the establishment of a world of freedom and rights? Yes or no, this is one of the answers expected from those who came to London” (Atay, *Ulus*, September 12, 1945).

Undoubtedly, as can be understood from the statements of Falih Rıfki Atay, the issue of the Straits was one of the main issues that the Turkish side hoped it would be discussed at the conference. In this regard, the U.S. President Truman's statement dated September 12, 1945, shared with readers in *Ulus* on September 13, 1945, raised expectations that the issue in question would be discussed at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. According to information received from Washington sources, President Truman’ stance on the Straits issue has not changed since the Potsdam Conference, and he did not contact Turkey directly. On the other hand, it was emphasized that the issue in question would be discussed at the Council of the Foreign Ministers to be held in London.⁴³

In addition to the statements of the U.S. President Truman regarding the Straits issue, on September 14, 1945, *Cumhuriyet* shared a report from the Canadian radio dated September 13, 1945, which emphasized both the U.K. and the U.S. would pursue a joint action plan on the Straits issue and also relevant issues. Having mentioned that the Soviet Union frequently referred to the issue of the Suez Canal when discussing the Straits issue, in the related news, it was also stated that along with the Straits issue, the major waterways such as the Tuna, Danube, Rhin, Kiel, and Suez would be included in the conference agenda.⁴⁴

⁴³ *Ulus*, “Truman’ın Boğazlar için demeci”, September 13, 1945

⁴⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, “Boğazlar meselesi”, September 14th, 1945

Following the statements of the U.S. President Truman, the possibility of major waterways being subject to international negotiations that expressed by the foreign press frequently was welcomed by the editorial writers of *Ulus*.

Expressing his satisfaction about the issue in his article titled “*Amerikan mucizesi (The American miracle)*” published in *Ulus* on September 14, 1945, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer emphasized the vital importance of the U.S. in international issues by referring to the Falih Rıfkı Atay’s article published in *Ulus* on August 16, 1945 (see p. 68).

Reiterating that the U.S. came out of the Second World War as the most powerful state in his article, Esmer also described the transformation process of the U.S. as a great miracle by reminding that she was busy with her land until 1914 and even had to borrow from the United Kingdom to build railroads, established great army and armed her allies by mobilizing all her resources in a short time.

Underlining that the U.S. would undertake a great responsibility for establishing international peace and prosperity in the post-war period at every opportunity, Esmer also emphasized in this article that not considering the U.S. as the most important state when evaluating international dynamics would not match the reality.

“[...] Understanding the scope and meaning of their weight in international life, Americans are determined to undertake their duties and responsibilities. This is a significant event not only for themselves but also for the world. Henceforth, politics, which does not regard America as the most important state in international life, has nothing to do with reality” (Esmer, *Ulus*, September 14, 1945).

On the other hand, continuing to cover developments regarding the Iranian issue, which became one of the top subjects of the foreign press as of August 1945, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* started to publish evaluations made by the foreign press regarding the possible impacts of the Iranian turmoil on Turkey.

On September 18, 1945, in the news retrieved from the Manchester Guardian published in *Ulus* with the title “*Kuzey İran’da bir Azerbaycan partisi kuruluyormuş! (An Azerbaijani political party was being established in Northern Iran)*” it was stated that an Azerbaijani political party was planned to be established in Northern Iran and so that the possibility of separation in Iran was laid aside. Describing these developments as more

acceptable than a possible separation, the Manchester Guardian emphasized that, in the case of an Azerbaijani-Soviet Union unification, areas behind the eastern borders of Turkey would be controlled by the Russians, which eventually results in a full disappearance of the border between Iran and Turkey (*Ulus*, September 18, 1945).

Since there was no positive news coming from the Council of the Foreign Ministers, Falih Rıfki Atay touched on the reasons, solutions, and importance of the ongoing disputes between the victors of the war and also underlined the main reason for the deadlock as the inadequacy of the nation's willpower, in his article titled “*Gerçek barış kurulabilecek mi? (Will true peace be established?)*” published in *Ulus* on September 21, 1945.

Criticizing the dictatorships and foreign interventionism that he described as the regime types that constitute the biggest obstacle to an international organization in his article, Atay touched on the ongoing dispute between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet Union over the Balkan countries, particularly on their governments and regime types. Stating that no compromise would be long-lived unless the main problem solved in an environment where both groups accuse each other with interventionism, which ignores the will of the people, Atay summarized the possible consequences of the protracted political deadlock for the future of the world in the light of the news about the Council of Five which were far from optimism.

“[...] Unless this fundamental case is resolved, all reconciliations will be temporary and free from credibility. News from the London Conference of Ministers so far is not favourable in this respect. As today's occupations, today's interventions, today's biases continue, there will be no peace and comfort in any corner of the world [...]” (Atay, *Ulus*, September 21, 1945).

Following Falih Rıfki Atay's statements about the conference in London, which were relatively far from optimism, Abidin Daver turned readers' attention to Armenian demands in his article titled “*Ermeni istekleri diye ortaya atılan manasız tahrikler (The unfounded claims put forward as Armenian demands)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on September 22, 1945, criticized the news published by the Russian agency Tass on Armenian demands.

Tass's attempt to legitimize Armenian demands over accusing Turkey of having been remained neutral during the Second World War and even served the interests of Nazis,

just like they did upon the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship in March 1945, was the focal point of Abidin Daver's criticisms. Summarizing the Armenian demands in his article as the annexation of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet Armenia and the transfer of all the Armenians in the world, especially the ones have been living under the yoke of Turkey, to so-called Great Armenia, Daver then pointed the Soviet Union as a target for the first time while explaining the purpose of these demands.

“[...] Some Armenians, who spent their lives with politics, secret societies, and provocation on behalf of great powers, have been in operation again for a while. History witnesses this. [...]

[...] They are starting to do the same provocation today. In the past, Tsarist Russia would provoke and encourage these politicians to realize their imperial ambitions. Now, these men want to disturb the peace and comfort of Armenians all over the world by leaning their backs on Soviet Russia [...]" (Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, September 22, 1945).

Continued his article by stating that early publishing of Tass's article, especially before the American agencies, includes some clues about from where the Armenian demands came from, Daver, for the first time, targeted the Soviet Union as *an instigator*. With this approach, it was observed that Daver steered away from the argument that was stating Armenians in question did not represent anyone, made by Doğan Nadi in his article published in *Ulus* on July 31, 1945.

Referring again to the Armenians' *frivolous* demands in the last section of his article, Daver indicated that not a single Armenian citizen who lives in Turkey would even consider going to Soviet Armenia and also underlined that a peaceful settlement would not be founded through these *stale* propagandas.

On the other hand, while the environment in the Council of the Foreign Ministers had been worsening day by day, in its news titled "***Konferansta hava gergin (The mood is tense at the Conference)***", published on September 23, 1945, *Ulus* shared an update retrieved from the British sources that due to disputes emerged during the talks on the Bulgarian and Iranian issues, the Conference got stuck (*Ulus*, September 23, 1945).

On the same day, *Ulus* was also shared evaluations of the Reuters about the statements of British representative Marshal Maitland Wilson that he made to the American newspaper Baltimore Sun. In the news published on the front page of *Ulus*, Marshal Wilson's

statements regarding the Soviet expansionism and American presence in Europe were highlighted.⁴⁵

On September 24, 1945, *Ulus* also shared the rumours which were widely appeared in the American newspapers, regarding the increase in dissidence between the Soviet Union and the other three major states, in the news titled “*Konferans çok ağırlaştı (The Conference come to a deadlock)*” in which the latest developments and updates regarding the conference were shared with the readers (*Ulus*, September 24, 1945).

Combining the pessimistic picture in the news received from foreign press and the ongoing environment of uncertainty in his words, Falih Rıfkı Atay stated that the foreign ministers of five major states were becoming distant from the ideal of establishing a peace order that gives confidence to the nations by looking at the course of the conference, in his article title “*Ne harp, ne barış! (Neither war, nor peace!)*” published in *Ulus* on September 24, 1945.

Expressing that the Soviet demands, in particular, drove other states to despair, Atay underlined that the demands concerning the rights and territories of other nations should be withdrawn as soon as possible, and the ground for peace should be established. Reminding that no nation can establish dominance over the rights and lands of the others without the force of arms, Atay stated that political, economic, and social improvements would be nothing more than a dream in this environment, which he called “*neither war nor peace*” by taking into account the prediction that nobody would want to take responsibility for a new war (Atay, *Ulus*, September 24, 1945).

On the other hand, Abidin Daver, who clearly stated in his previous article (see p. 73-74) dated September 22, 1945, that the instigator of the Armenian demands was the Soviet Union, touched on the seriousness of the Soviet threat which had been felt more and more, by evaluating the demands they put forward towards various parts of the world until that

⁴⁵ *Ulus*, “**Mareşal Wilson’un Sovyetler hakkında demeci**”, September 23rd, 1945

day in his article titled “*Sovyet Rusya’nın cihangirlik emelleri (Domination ambitions of the Soviet Union)*” published on September 25, 1945.

Starting his article by stating that the current Russian demands had already surpassed the ambitions of Tsarist Russia, Daver then summarized the Soviet demands towards the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the Arctic, and the Far East, respectively, and then voiced the American and British criticisms regarding these demands. In the last section of his article, Daver, who carried the concerns about dominance ambitions of the Soviet Union one step further, stated that a new world war would be inevitable if the dispute could not be resolved peacefully.

“[...] The worldwide strategy of the Soviet Union, which aims to dominate the world, will face opposition from all world states, especially Britain and America. If this struggle cannot be overcome through peace and agreement today, the third world war cannot be prevented. The Allies did not sacrifice so many lives and property to replace communist and imperialist Soviet Russia with Germany and Japan. How will this political and economic, strategic, and ideological war be concluded?” (Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, September 25, 1945).

One of the remarkable statements in Daver's words is undoubtedly the emphasis of both *communist and imperialist Soviet Russia*. These statements, which could be regarded as one of the most important indicators of the changing attitude towards the Soviet threat, have been frequently aired in *Cumhuriyet* as of the second half of September.

In addition to Daver's statements, in his article titled “*Faydalı konferans (Useful conference)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on September 29, 1945, Nadir Nadi compared the Soviet Union with Hitler and Mussolini while criticizing the Soviet demands. In the same article, Nadir Nadi emphasized his hope and belief that if the disputes could not be resolved peacefully, Anglo-Saxons would take a clear stance against Soviet hegemony as they did against German hegemony six years ago.

“[...] There is no doubt that the Soviet demands overshadowed fascists such as Hitler and Mussolini. After so much sacrifice, it is inconceivable that Anglo-Saxons, who did not tolerate the danger of German hegemony in Europe six years ago, would allow a Soviet hegemony on the face of the earth today [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, September 29, 1945).

Upon the accusations made by the Western media towards the Soviet Union, claiming that the reason for the deadlock was the Soviet demands, *Cumhuriyet* started to target the Soviet Union with more daring expressions in its evaluations regarding the conference. It

was observed that, by doing so, *Cumhuriyet* began to separate from *Ulus* in terms of the language they adopted towards the Soviet demands.

3.2.5. October 1945

Within the framework of the latest developments, it was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* continued to cover the Straits issue, the Soviet threat, and the Turkish-American friendship in October 1945, in line with their editorial approaches. In this regard, the most striking point about October 1945 is the increase in the number of news and articles published simultaneously in both newspapers, which were generally related to the subjects that formed the main dynamics of Turkish foreign policy at the time. The article of the Economist magazine titled “*Türk hareket tarzı (Turkish policy style)*” and the comments of the Observer regarding the Straits issue, which were shared with the readers in both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on October 1, 1945, could be given as an example.⁴⁶

With this article, the Economist magazine, which stands out with the support that they had given to the Turkish cause since the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, described the Turkish policy style against the Soviet demands related to the Straits and the Eastern provinces of Turkey and then underlined the Turkish military power which consists of approximately one and a half million people at the time. One of the most striking statements in the article was about Turkey’s readiness to fight if her policy style would be ignored.

“[...] Turks will not surrender. Even if they can resist for a few days, they will fight if necessary. Turkish policy style should be understood by the Foreign Ministers gathered in Lancaster House” (*Ulus* & *Cumhuriyet*, October 1, 1945).

On the other hand, in the article retrieved from the Observer, broadcasts of the Moscow radio regarding the Armenian demands were strongly criticized. Again, in the same article, while criticizing the Russian policy of silence towards the issue, it was

⁴⁶ *Ulus*, “Economist diyor ki: Türkler gerekirse dövüşeceklerdir”, October 1, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Türkiye kendine güveniyor”, October 1, 1945

emphasized that this attitude might result from psychological warfare conducted against Turkey.

In addition to the Economist and the Observer articles, the article titled “*Boğazlarda son durum (Recent updates on the Straits)*” written by Professor Yavuz Abadan, also found a place in *Cumhuriyet* on October 1, 1945. While the criticisms having been made by many local and foreign intellectuals towards the Council of the Foreign Ministers' failure that supposed to discuss the Straits issue and the other crucial disputed issues, Abadan brought a different interpretation to the subject. Underlining that no resolution suggestions for the Straits issue would be accepted as long as they complied with the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity principles of Turkey, Abadan emphasized that no one would stand to see the Straits which regarded as the *lifeblood of the Turkish national existence*, as a matter of bargain in a meeting without the Turkish presence.

“[...] We cannot stand to see the Straits which is the lifeblood of our national existence as a matter of bargain in a conference where the Turkish representatives do not participate, and variety of disputed world issues being negotiated. Because our determination and decision to protect our indispensable rights and interests on the Straits with envy, today is stronger than ever [...]” (Abadan, *Cumhuriyet*, October 1, 1945).

The London Conference, which was closed under the shadows of the increasing dissatisfaction in the international community, on October 2, 1945, got severe reactions from Turkey, not only due to a failure of providing any solutions to the ongoing disputes but also be witnessed to problems during the preparation of the final declaration.

Referring to this issue in his article titled “*Ciddi ve güç Durum (Serious and difficult situation)*” published in *Ulus* on October 4, 1945, Falih Rıfkı Atay described the current international situation as “*serious and difficult*” by stating that no agreement was reached even on the final declaration of the conference.

Making important determinations about the current situation in his article, Atay underlined that while international security was on hold, the international economic relations continued in an atmosphere of uncertainty that resembles the conditions of war and blockade. Also pointing that the pessimistic situation that the world had been encountering at the time could be compared with the atmosphere of depression that

emerged after the First World War, Atay emphasized that under these circumstances, Turkey would have suffered a lot to fulfil her commitments regarding economic priorities (Atay, *Ulus*, October 4, 1945).

Under these international conditions, as described by Atay, fighting back against the challenges might occur in the economy program, came to the fore as one of the priorities of the Turkish government.

In the news titled “*Amerikalıların bize açacakları kredi (The loan to be provided by Americans)*” that published in *Cumhuriyet* on October 6, 1945, it was stated that the negotiations between the U.S. and the Turkish delegations regarding the terms and conditions of the loan to be provided had reached the final phase. It was also stated in the same news that the British also signed an agreement on purchasing 25,000 tons of grapes and figs from İzmir (*Cumhuriyet*, October 6, 1945).

Another striking news in *Cumhuriyet*'s October 6, 1945 dated issue, was the rumours about the Straits issue published by the New York Times on October 5, 1945. In the news, titled “*Boğazlar: Rusya kontrolüne alırsa Akdeniz'deki isteklerinden cayacakmış (The Straits: If Russia takes control, she will withdraw her demands over the Mediterranean)*”, the journalist Edwin James's comments on the disagreements between the Soviet Union, the U.K., and the U.S. in a meeting organized by the New York Times, were included. In the news that James' statements were quoted, it was stated that, according to the impressions elicited at the London Conference, the Soviet Union could make some concessions such as giving up her wishes in the Mediterranean after guaranteeing her control over the Straits (*Cumhuriyet*, October 6, 1945).

Instead of these rumours, which were not highlighted by the editorial writers of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in the following days, it was observed that the news titled “*Zorlukları önlemek için Amerikan teklifi Genel Barış Konferansı (American proposal for preventing difficulties: General Peace Conference)*” published in *Ulus* on October 7, 1945, attracted great attention and became one of the most discussed issues of both national and international agenda. In the related news, it was emphasized that the U.S. proposed a *General Peace Conference* in which all the allied states of the war would

participate to resolve the ongoing disputes urgently, and the Russian response to this proposal was impatiently awaited (*Ulus*, October 7, 1945).

Contrary to his pessimistic attitude towards the London Conference, Nadir Nadi, who displayed a more positive approach in his article titled **“Her şey düzelecek (Everything will get better)”** published in *Cumhuriyet* on October 7, 1945, expressed his confidence regarding the solution of the disputed issues, by claiming that the disputes derived from the method not from the content. In his article, Nadi, who described the *bogging down* of the disputed issues at the London Conference as a development for the benefit of the nations, underlined that instead of exchanging fancy and implicit words, being clear and open in intentions could be regarded as an important improvement. Furthermore, emphasizing that the Anglo-Saxons made a great effort to establish peace in Europe in the last part of his article, Nadi also summarized the main idea of the Anglo-Saxons' approach to peace that prioritizes nations rather than governments.

“[...] By hearing from the most authorized people, the world now knows that Anglo-Saxons attach vital importance to the establishment of peace in Europe. They do not intend to dictate the conditions of peace, but they want the peace to be among nations, not between governments [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, October 7, 1945).

Contrary to the statements of Nadir Nadi, Falih Rıfkı Atay preferred to evaluate the speech of U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes by using more cautious expressions than Nadi Nadi in his article titled **“Mr. Byrnes’in nutku (The speech of Mr. Byrnes)”** published in *Ulus* on October 9, 1945. In his article, unlike Nadir Nadi's statements, Atay noted that the failure of the representatives of the five major states to reach an agreement at the London Conference might be related to deeper problems beyond disputes in methods. Atay also evaluated J. Byrnes' statements regarding the American principles of peace and international organization and the accusations made against these American principles by the far-left newspapers, especially the Russian newspaper Pravda.

Atay stated that according to the far-left newspapers, and especially the Russian newspaper Pravda, the main dispute was derived from the conflict between the *reactionary movement* caused by the American principles, and the *popular democracies* established in the Central European and Balkan countries. Furthermore, he lastly made

an inference from the speech of J. Byrnes and stated that the situation at the time in the international arena was not underwhelming at all (Atay, *Ulus*, October 9, 1945).

While the repercussions of the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes' speech continue in the Turkish press, the article of Sha Sakb Taner titled "***Sovyetler Birliđi ve Dnya Denizleri (The Soviet Union and the World Seas)***" published in *Cumhuriyet* on October 8, 1945, came to the fore due to its content about the expansion policy of the Soviet Union.

Evaluating the main reasons behind *the goal of reaching the warm seas* -one of the most important pillars of the expansion policy of the Soviet Union- which had been frequently mentioned by the Western press recently, the author emphasized that the Soviet Union, as one of the victors of the world war, was acting with the desire of becoming a complete hegemon state by utilizing all opportunities.

Also mentioning the goals of the Soviet Union regarding the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean in his article, Taner underlined that as one of the victors of the war, the Soviet Union would make every effort to achieve these goals, but would eventually encounter with great resistance.

"[...] There is no doubt that the Soviet Union would want to exploit the opportunity emerged by winning the victory, to the maximum extent. However, it would not be correct to think that she will realize all her ambitions. [...]"

"[...] However, the fact that the Soviet policy was understood in advance also prepares the measures to be taken to prevent the violent facets of this policy [...]" (Taner, *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 1945).

Concluding his words by mentioning that the Russian cause of hegemony concerns the whole world, Taner made his concerns more visible in the eyes of the readers by referring to the coloured map -which retrieved from an American magazine- titled "***Byk denizlere ıkmak isteyen Rusya (Russia who wants to reach the great seas)***" shared on the last page of *Cumhuriyet*.

Following the important statements of the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes regarding the Straits, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* shared the information obtained by Reuters' policy writer from the British sources on October 12, 1945.⁴⁸

In the same news, it was stated that the speech given by the U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes about the Straits was welcomed by the British, but unlike the U.S., the U.K. has not yet prepared a diplomatic note to be sent to the Turkish government, but it fully supports the negotiations on the Straits issue.

On the other hand, it was also stated that the official British view towards the issue was mainly founded on the belief that the Montreaux Straits Convention was inadequate and outdated in response to the requirements of the day. In that regard, two important points were pointed out as reasons.

“[...] Official British sources believe that the resolutions made by the Montreaux Conference are obsolete. There are two reasons for this:

1. There are many old enemy states among those who signed this [Montreaux Straits Convention].
2. Except for old enemies, consultation with signatories of the Montreaux Straits Convention is necessary” (*Ulus & Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1945).

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which increased the frequency of sharing the reflections on the issue in the Western press with the positive response of the British side to the U.S. proposal of to begin the negotiations aimed at the internationalization of the Straits, made evaluations to explain the characteristics of the American policy style and the course of the Turkish-Russian relations, in the news that they published on October 13, 1945.

Including the comments made towards the statements of the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes regarding the status of the Straits, in the news titled “*Boğazlar Statüsü: Yeni bir Montraux için Türkiye ile görüşmelere başlanması bekleniyor (The status of the Straits: Starting to negotiate with Turkey for a new Montreaux, is expected)*” published in *Ulus* on October 13, 1945, it was underlined that the Turkish government had sent a comprehensive note to the U.S. government about the course of the negotiations. The

⁴⁸ *Ulus*, “Boğazlara dair görüşme”, October 12, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Boğazlar meselesi: Londra’da meselenin halli için ileri sürülen noktai nazar”, October 12, 1945

report also emphasized that the United States favoured the Straits to gain international status, however strongly opposed to the Soviet demands -to establish a military base in the Straits and the retrocession of the cities of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union- which were set as prerequisites for a news Turkish-Russian friendship treaty (*Ulus*, October 13, 1945).

On the other hand, underlining that the U.S. government opposed to the Soviet demands towards Turkey, as stated in *Ulus*, in the news titled “*Boğazlar ve Amerika (The Straits and America)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on the same day, it was emphasized that the Soviet Union rejected the U.S. proposal regarding the internationalization of the Straits and therefore no agreement has been registered yet (*Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1945).

Evaluating the Turkish-Russian relations under the context of the Straits issue along with the negotiation proposal regarding the status of the Straits and the comments on this proposal, in his article titled “*Türk Rus münasebetleri (Turkish-Russian relations)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on October 13, 1945, Nadir Nadi underlined that the future of the Straits issue which has international importance did not concerns only Turkey and the Soviet Union but also the whole world.

“[...] When Turkey and Russia lived friendly, the peace environment prevailed in Europe. However, when the relationship between these two countries deteriorated, it caused trouble in the policy atmosphere and endangered peace each time [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1945).

Underlining that European peace was somewhat proportionate to the Turkish-Russian relations with these words, Nadir Nadi stated in the following sections that Turkish-Russian relations started to deteriorate with the Montreaux Conference, which was gathered to improve the unfavourable order of the Straits after the First World War. Stating that despite the friendly approach that Turkey showed from the first day, the friendly relations between the two countries damaged due to the unchanging hostile attitude of the Soviet Union, Nadir Nadi also emphasized that Turkey would take a step to restore the bilateral relations unless her sovereignty rights put forward as a matter of negotiation.

“[...] Turkey has tried to revive the old feelings of closeness with Russia several times. She is ready today as well to awaken the same warm feelings as long as her liberty, territorial

integrity, and independence are not desired to be possessed [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1945).

Touching on the lack of good intentions that Turkey expected to see from the Soviet Union in exchange for her friendly attitudes and approaches pursued a while, Nadi then described the main reason behind this discrepancy as *a change in spirit and thought* that prevailed in the Russian side.

“[...] But the change of spirit and thought prevailing on the other side does not seem to allow this [improvement of relations] for now. There seems to be another way of working, another way of thinking in the Russian government mechanism, which has endured all sorrows during the war year. Under this spiritual change, it is hard to recognize our revolutionary friend, whom we once get along well [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1945).

In the last part of his article, noting that the resolution of the ongoing disputes depends on the Russians’ well-intentioned approach, whom he described as the old friend, Nadi underlined that the Turkish side would make all efforts to restore bilateral relations without any change of emotion or thought.

Following the inferences made by Nadir Nadi on Turkish-Russian relations, Abidin Daver reconsidered the subject under the Straits issue in his article titled **“Boğazlarda üs isteyen Rusya, Akdeniz’i istiyor demektir (Russia who wants a base in the Straits, actually wants the Mediterranean)”** published in *Cumhuriyet* on October 14, 1945, and questioned the purpose that Russian demands serve for just like Süha Sakıb Taner (see. p.81-82).

Responding to the rumours that the Russians would give up their desires in the Mediterranean after guaranteeing the control over the Straits, as quoted in the New York Times article published in *Cumhuriyet* on October 6, 1945, Abidin Daver emphasized in his article that Russian claims over the Dodecanese islands, the coast of Tripoli, the Red Sea, Tangier, Yugoslavia and especially the Straits, were basically serving for the purpose of absolute control over the Mediterranean.

Drawing attention to the aspects of Russian claims towards each region mentioned above that could be associated with the domination over the Mediterranean in his article, Abidin Daver stated that given the critical role of the Mediterranean and Africa during the Second

World War due to their strategic location, neither the Mediterranean states nor the United Kingdom and the U.S. would allow such requests (Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, October 14, 1945).

In addition to the inferences made by Nadir Nadi and Abidin Daver regarding the threatening and irreconcilable manner of the Soviet Union, another news that came to the fore in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on October 14, 1945, was the article of the New York Times regarding the content of the diplomatic note of the U.S. which has not been sent to Turkey yet.

In the report published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, it was stated that the U.S. point of view regarding the revision of the Montreaux Convention mainly structured on ensuring free pass to the commercial vessels and warships of the Black Sea states from the Straits in times of peace and linking this privilege directly to a mutual agreement to decide its validity in times of war.⁴⁹

The sharpest refusal issued by Russian agency Tass against the aforementioned American proposal, which was essentially aimed at the internationalization of the Straits, shared with the international community on October 14, 1945.

In the news titled “*Boğazlar mukavelesi (The Straits convention)*” published in *Ulus* on October 15, 1945, it was emphasized that, according to the Tass agency, the Three Leaders did not reach an agreement for the internationalization of the Straits at the Potsdam Conference, but instead decided to advance the process by contacting the Turkish government directly since the agreement could not meet the conditions of the day (*Ulus*, October 15, 1945).

Upon the rejection of the American claims regarding the course of the status of the Straits by the Soviet Union, as of the second half of October, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* structured their editorial priorities on the increasing importance of the U.S. in the world politics and

⁴⁹ *Ulus*, “Amerika’nın Montreaux’ye dair görüşü”, October 14th, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Boğazlar meselesi, Amerika’nın nokta-i nazarı”, October 14th, 1945

Turkey's service to the Allied cause while continuing to emphasize the Soviet threat over the regional disputes.

In this context, with the report titled "*Sovyetler idaresindeki Avusturya'nın hali (The state of Austria under the Soviet administration)*", the severe conditions that almost half a million refugees, mostly women and children, encountered with were shared with the readers in *Cumhuriyet* on October 16, 1945. In the report that also draws attention to the state of misery under Soviet rule, the destruction and turmoil caused by the Soviet Union were shared with the reader, stating that the Red Cross, which took action to help the refugees, were not allowed by the Russian authorities (*Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1945).

On the other hand, October 19, 1945 dated *Ulus* touched on the internal turmoil both in Hungary and Greece, while Falih Rıfkı Atay drew attention to the disputes in Turkey's neighbouring countries with his article titled "*Çetin buhranlar ortasında (In the middle of the difficult depressions)*".

Mentioning the troubled election processes in Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia respectively in his article, Atay then touched on the unclear situation of the Balkan countries, where the most brutal examples of international interventionism were experienced, as well as the ongoing rebellion and turmoil in Iran, Syria, and Iraq. Also stating that Turkey, which came to the forefront with her determination amongst the countries that Soviet interventionism shows its effects in different ways, was an inspiration at the time for the establishment of peace and tranquillity in the region. Furthermore, Atay also underlined that, in the meantime, the disputes in the neighbouring countries had an impact on Turkey's political and economic order (Atay, *Ulus*, October 19, 1945).

As can be understood from the statements of Atay, maintaining determination against the Soviet threat that surrounds Turkey and establishing solidarity ties with the countries that considered as victims of the Soviet interventionism, stands out as the key elements of Turkish foreign policy at the time.

In this regard, another news that can be put forward as an example of solidarity was the article of Greek newspaper Kathimerini, titled “*Orta Doğu Harbi sırasında Türkiye’nin Müttefik davasına hizmeti (Turkey’s service to the Allied cause during the Middle East War)*” published in *Ulus* on October 22, 1945. Stating that Turkey and Greece had developed a sincere spirit of an alliance through the Balkan Entente of 1934 after solving their problems arose from the First World War, in the article, it was also underlined that even though the Balkan Entente was not in function at the time, Turkey and Greece could contribute to the restoration of peace and prosperity of the Balkans where the chaos prevalent (*Ulus*, October 22, 1945).

In addition to the news and articles related to services that Turkey provided to the Allied cause, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, which also highlighted the U.S. goals towards the world politics as well as the European politics published the statements of the U.S. President Truman which he had given on the occasion of Navy Day on October 28, 1945.

Evaluating the statements of the U.S. President Truman in his article titled “*Amerikan dış politikasının hedefleri (The goals of American foreign policy)*” published in *Ulus* on October 30, 1945, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer interpreted the priorities of the U.S. foreign policy by comparing the policy styles of the U.S. President Truman after the Second World War and the former U.S. President Wilson after the First World War.

In the first part of his article, Esmer compared the policy style adopted by the “*idealist*” former U.S. President Wilson after the First World War and the principles he proposed, with Truman’s policy style, which prioritized the armament and consolidation of the U.S. for the establishment of sustainable peace. In the following sections, Esmer also touched on the main objectives and the methods of Truman’s policy style.

“[...] Mr. Truman summarized what this force was targeting in the following words: First, to apply peace agreements. Secondly, as a member of the United Nations organization, to fulfil the duties of America. The third is to protect the territorial integrity of the states in the western hemisphere and finally to defend the United States against all kinds of attacks and aggressions [...]” (Esmer, *Ulus*, October 30, 1945).

Touching on the twelve foreign policy principles proposed by Truman, who shaped his government's action plan with the responsibility of being the advocate and protector of

democracy principles both on a national and international scale, Esmer also stated his hope for the future of international relations, primarily upon the promises made to respect the rights and freedoms of small powers.

“[...] These new principles are the main objectives of American foreign policy: Truman has stated that forced annexation of land will first be prevented. Freedoms taken away from them will be returned to all nations. Each nation will establish its own regime and choose its government without foreign intervention. Governments forcibly imposed on nations by foreigners, will not be recognized [...]” (Esmer, *Ulus*, October 30, 1945).

Underlining that the words directly heard from the President of the United States which has given confidence to each stakeholder who strives for international peace, especially the small powers, in the last section of his article Esmer also stated that these foreign policy principles which had heard from the world’s most powerful person, would eventually have vital importance on the future of the international relations.

However, Nadir Nadi, who did not find the principle satisfactory which suggests not to recognize governments that were forcibly imposed on other nations by foreign states, stated his criticisms in his article titled “*Krizin en şiddetli safhası (The most severe phase of the crisis)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on October 31, 1945.

Criticizing the U.S. President Truman for using contradictory expressions such as stating that it might not be possible to prevent such tyrant actions under some circumstances, Nadir Nadi raised the question of what kind of penalty system against states that endangering world peace would be applied.

“[...] By saying, “America will not recognize a government which imposed by another foreign state by force on another nation,” President Truman does not hide that “under certain circumstances, this cannot be prevented.”

So, what if it cannot be prevented? What punishment will be given to the states that do evil and prevent world peace? [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, October 31, 1945).

Complaining that there was no clear answer to this question in Truman's statement, Nadi drew attention to the destructive impact of this contradictory situation on the people of the victim countries.

It can be inferred that Nadir Nadi, who evaluated Truman’s statements inquisitively compared to Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, wanted the United States to take more concrete and

sharp actions against the expansionist policies of such companies which had an impact on various regions of the world, as well as the neighbouring countries of Turkey. Hence, it is also understood that the Turkish elites attached great importance to the United States' attitude against the violations of these rights and freedoms, especially in terms of struggle against the Soviet threat.

3.3. PERIOD OF INTERNATIONALIZATION (November 2, 1945 – January 7, 1946)

3.3.1. November 1945

In November 1945, it was observed that the diplomatic notes expected to be submitted to the Turkish government by the United States and the United Kingdom within the context of the negotiations on the future of the Straits were intensely discussed in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. About this matter which Turkish public was following with intense attention, as Feridun Cemal Erkin, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, stated in his book titled “*Türk – Sovyet ilişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi (Turkish – Soviet relations and the Straits issue)*”, it was aimed to withdraw the Soviet proposals deemed *unacceptable*, primarily through the diplomacy activities carried out by the Turkish government after the Potsdam Conference to consolidate American support for the status of the Straits (Erkin, 1968, p. 270).

For this purpose, in August 1945, Erkin stated that a letter containing the explicit expectations of the Turkish Republic was sent to the United States by the Turkish Government during the negotiations on the status of the Straits and summarized these expectations in two articles.

a) Not to constitute an obstacle to the sovereignty and security of Turkey, both in its meaning and in its implementation,

b) The proposed state of affair is to guide for a softening and improvement which does not leave a room for controversy in Turkish - Russian relations, and to put a certain end to the period of unrest caused by the Russian demands” (Erkin, 1968, p. 270).

Within the framework of these expectations, the first U.S. diplomatic note was issued on November 2, 1945, to the Turkish government, which was trying to revise the solution formula for the internationalization of the Straits adopted by the United States in such a way as to protect Turkey's national security and interests.

A day before the U.S. note was received by the Turkish government, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* shared the speech of the President of the Republic of Turkey, Ismet İnönü, which he made in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, on their front pages. In the speech, which was published in both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* with a comment that this speech would create great reactions not only within the Turkish public but also in the international community, İnönü's remarks regarding relations with foreign countries, the support has given to the Allied cause during the Second World War, unfair accusations directed to Turkey, internal politics, and freedom of the press were widely addressed. Especially at this point, against the unfair accusations and territorial claims against Turkey, İnönü's statement “*We have no debt to be given to anyone from Turkish lands and rights. We will live with honour and die with honour*” was used as sub-titles in both newspapers.⁵⁰

Following strong statements of the President İnönü, stating that Turkey would never compromise its rights and freedoms and its faith in the cause of democracy, regardless of the results, it was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* started to publish news and articles about the Soviet threat and increasing the U.S. support more frequently in the coming days. In this period, it was observed that *Cumhuriyet*, led by Nadir Nadi, criticised the Soviet threat in bolder terms, while *Ulus*, with Professor Nihat Erim joining its staff, focused on the news aimed at strengthening relations with the Western allies.

Following the diplomatic note of the U.S. regarding the Straits having been delivered to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hasan Saka by the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Edwin C. Wilson on November 2, 1945, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* reported the developments

⁵⁰ *Ulus*, “**Cumhurbaşkanımızın tarihi nutku**” November 2, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “**Milli Şefin Tarihi Nutku**”, November 2, 1945

on the content of the note to the internal and external press and made the first comprehensive report on the issue in their newspapers dated November 8, 1945.

Although no official announcement had yet been made, on November 5, 1945, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* shared the report received from the New York Times dated November 4, 1945, in which the clues about the content of the U.S. diplomatic note on the Straits were mentioned. The report stated that the United States wanted only technical changes to the Montreaux Convention, and the control was in favour of remaining in Turkey.⁵¹

The reports dated November 5, 1945 of the Washington Times and the Paris radio also shared in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on November 6, 1945 as part of the news received from the foreign press on the subject. The Washington Times reported that the proposal to keep the Dardanelles under Turkish control was included in the American note and that the United States had distanced itself from the decisions taken in the scope of internationalization of European waterways at the Potsdam Conference. On the other hand, radio Paris reported that the U.S. President Truman and Marshal Stalin had reached an agreement on the outline of the waterways and the Straits issue, along with the statements of the U.S. including that Turkey's independence and territorial integrity would not be harmed.⁵²

In the shadow of the question of whether the secret of the atomic bomb would be shared at the United Nations, which has long occupied the agenda of the international public, after the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes' announcement of the American diplomatic note regarding the Straits on November 7, 1945, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* shared the American proposals with their readers in 4 articles on November 8, 1945.

- “1) The Straits to be opened to the commercial vessels of all nations at all times
- 2) The Straits to be opened to the transit of the warships of the Black Sea powers (Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria, and Romania) at all times
- 3) The Straits should be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea powers

⁵¹*Ulus*, “Boğazlar Türkiye kontrolü altında kalacaktır”, November 5, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Amerika Boğazlarda değişiklik istemiyor”, November 5, 1945

⁵² *Ulus*, “Boğazlar daima Türklerin elinde kalacaktır”, November 6, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “İngiltere de Boğazlar için fikrini bildirdi”, November 6, 1945

4) The Montreux Convention must be revised the new treaty, with the exclusion of Japan alone from those who signed the old convention, must be approved by the United Nations” (Ulus & Cumhuriyet, November 8, 1945).

Abidin Daver, who made the first comprehensive assessment consisting of the four-articles of American note, in his article titled “*Boğazlar hakkındaki Amerikan teklifi (The American proposal on the Straits)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on November 9, 1945, shared his views by evaluating each proposal separately. Expressing his great pleasure that the United States had renounced the ideal of internationalization of the Straits in terms of both verbally and politically before beginning his evaluations, Daver then considered the fact that the United States had met with Turkey in this regard as an important and appreciable development.

Daver, who considered the first American proposal suggesting the free passage for all states' commercial vessels through the Straits at all times as acceptable but insufficient, argued that an additional regulation should be added stating that, as stated in the Montreux Convention, in the case that Turkey being belligerent of a war, commercial vessels belonging to the neutral countries may transit from the Straits on a condition that they do not, in any way, assist Turkey's enemy, only during daylight hours.

Daver abstained from the second American proposal that suggests a free passage to the warships of the Black Sea states (Turkey, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria) in the time of war, and he underlined the possible military security problems that this suggestion might cause.

"[...] If the Naval Forces of the Black Sea states are allowed to pass through the Straits unconditionally, there is a possibility that a navy larger than the Turkish Fleet will enter the straits with many aircraft carriers and arrives in front of Istanbul, giving us an ultimatum for a very short period of time that does not allow us to take defensive measures, or without doing that, they might attempt to occupy İstanbul under the threat of their guns and planes [...]" (Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, November 9, 1945).

Stating that an adjustment that would not allow this possibility, which essentially points to the Soviet threat, was the first condition for accepting the American proposals, Daver also drew attention to the contradictory situation in the American note with his interpretation of the third American proposal.

Objecting the third American proposal that prohibits the passage and navigation of the non-Black Sea powers through the Straits in the time of war, due to possible consequences that could pose a threat to Turkey's national security, Daver emphasized that with this proposal, Turkey's right of choosing whom to enter the Straits, in the case of Turkey being belligerent or should consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, which granted to Turkey in Montreaux Convention, was eliminated.

Pointing out that this proposal may put forward by the United States to compensate concerns of the Soviet Union about any possible threat could come from the Mediterranean, Daver also stated that the United States thought if this proposal been accepted, the Soviet Union, which established its security in the Black Sea, would stop seeking a military base in The Straits. However, as a result of the evaluation of this proposal together with the second American proposal, Daver stated that a possible war between the Black Sea states and the Mediterranean states would cause a significant conflict, and pointed out that the Mediterranean states would object to this proposal in the face of such a conflict.

“[...] However, if the second article of the American amendment proposal allows the warships of the Black Sea states to pass through the Straits and to go directly to the Mediterranean during a war between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean states, all Mediterranean states will object to this amendment for their own safety. Because then the Black Sea states can hit the Mediterranean states with their navies that will pass through the Straits, but the Mediterranean states can do nothing against the military bases of the states coming from the Black Sea [...]” (Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, November 9, 1945).

Stating that new regulations should be added to the proposal which would bring different practices in times of peace and war, to avoid the contradiction that would arise from the third American proposal, Daver also emphasized that the proposal could have consequences that would lead Turkey to war by force, even in wars which Turkey wants to remain neutral.

Finally, he described the fourth American proposal, which suggested removal of Japan, one of the signatories of the Montreaux Convention, from this contract due to being one of the defeated states of the war, and substitution of the United Nations Organization for the League of Nations, as an acceptable proposal without need for evaluation. In the last

section of his article, Daver then stated that the American proposal could be accepted after the adjustments been made considering the concerns that he expressed.

Contrary to Abidin Daver's extensive reviews in *Cumhuriyet*, no evaluation of the American diplomatic note was made in *Ulus*, but instead, U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes's statement regarding the essence of the proposal was shared with the readers in a report titled “*Yeni Boğazlar statüsü (New status of the Straits)*” on November 9, 1945 (*Ulus*, November 9, 1945).

In addition to this news, a report titled “*Boğazlar meselesi; son tefsirlere dair bir İngiliz görüşü (The Straits Issue; a British opinion on recent comments)*” from Reuters on the U.S. note regarding the Straits was shared with readers in *Ulus* on November 10, 1945. While the latest American proposals on the Straits were mentioned in the report, the abstaining attitude of the British political circles towards the second and third articles of the proposal which determine the right of passage of the Black Sea states and non-Black Sea states, in times of peace and war, also expressed.

“[...] Some British circles believe that all forms of passage through the Straits during the time of war would be necessary to remain theoretical [...]” (*Ulus*, November 10, 1945).

As Abidin Daver underlined in his article dated November 9, 1945, it was stated in Reuters' report that the British political circles wished to take a more theoretical approach to this subject, given the contradictory situations that the second and third articles of the American note might have caused problems in the vicinity of the Straits.

On the other hand, Yavuz Abadan, who shared his assessment regarding American proposals in his article titled “*Boğazlar rejimi ve ABD (Regime of the Straits and the U.S.)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on November 12, 1945, in addition to the Abidin Daver's concerns, expressed his belief that the British, who had not yet expressed their official opinion, would not adopt the same view as the U.S. in this particular issue.

“[...] Contrary to public opinion and predictions, we do not believe that the British Government will support the American proposals in the same way. Therefore, we look forward to receiving the official opinion of Britain and especially of Soviet Russia on this issue openly [...]” (Abadan, *Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1945).

In addition to the evaluations of the U.S. diplomatic note regarding the Straits, news about whether the secret of the atomic bomb, one of the most important items on the agenda of the international community since August 1945, should be shared with the United Nations member states, widely covered in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.

In his article titled “*Atom bombasını ne yapmalı? (What should do with the atomic bomb?)*” published in *Ulus* on November 8, 1945, Falih Rıfki Atay, who evaluated the dispute in the international arena caused by the atomic bomb that suddenly eliminated Japan and brought the end of the Second World War, also stated that this secret should serve the international peace organization and therefore that peace should be established first.

"[...] The atomic bomb must be in the service of the international peace organization. However, first of all, peace must be established. If this order establishes and everyone accepts the constitution which based on national freedoms, that weapon can be a true assurance in his hands [...]" (Atay, *Ulus*, November 8, 1945).

After Falih Rıfki Atay's statements underlining the need for the atomic bomb to serve international peace, in his article titled “*Ya anlaşamazsanız? (What if you cannot reach an agreement?)*” published in *Ulus* on November 11, 1945, Professor Nihat Erim, evaluated the decision-making and solution skills of the new United Nations organization around the current discussions.

Referring to the recently escalating disputes among wartime allies in his article, Erim drew attention to the problems that the new security system could create by relying on the consensus of the five major states, quoting an event from the San Francisco Conference.

Sharing the British representative Sir Alexander Cadogan's response to the criticisms posed during the San Francisco Conference regarding the UN Security Council's new decision-making style, in the article, by referring to Cadogan's answer “ – *if we stuck, the United Nations will be crashed...* ” Erim underlined that under the circumstances of the

day, the United Nations' structure was so fragile. In his article, Erim also stated that it was necessary to maintain optimism for the establishment of international peace and prosperity, provided that, despite all this, not to stray from reality and not to give up paying attention under no circumstances (Erim, *Ulus*, November 11, 1945).

U.S. President Truman, British Prime Minister Attlee, and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who gathered in Washington to discuss the issue of the atomic bomb, announced that the secret would not be shared with the international community due to the international security concerns, through the memorandum⁵³ published on November 15, 1945.

Evaluating this development in his article titled “*Atomun sırrı (The secret of the Atom)*” published in *Ulus* on November 17, 1945, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer argued that the Soviet Union who asserted that the secret of the atomic bomb should be shared to ensure her security against the Western allies, dragged the international system into a new paradox, as they did in the 1930s on the issue of disarmament.

Reminding that the debates on the disarmament led to the start of the Second World War at the end of the day in his article, Esmer emphasized that the fine line between sharing the secret of the atomic bomb and providing security must be carefully observed by considering the experiences of the past and efforts must be made to use atomic energy for the benefit of humanity through an international commission to be established (Esmer, *Ulus*, November 17, 1945).

In addition to the statements of Esmer, referring to the Washington declaration in his article titled “*Yeni bir ümit (A new hope)*” published in *Ulus* on November 18, 1945, Professor Nihat Erim stated that it was important to settle the issue to a certain conclusion to eliminate hesitations emerged by the frequently updated information about the destructiveness of the atomic bomb.

⁵³ Declaration on Atomic Bomb by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/post-war/451115b.html>

Stating that *the fears of those strove for secret ambitions* constitute the source of these hesitations contrary to the concerns of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, which he described as *sincere believers of the United Nations ideal*, for the prosperity and happiness of the world, Professor Erim also mentioned that all states with good intentions would be pleased with the Washington declaration which announced that the secret would not be shared.

"[...] Since the most powerful invention of the history kept under the command of the United Nations Security Council today, the wish of the intellectuals can now be realized: the war must be -and will be- removed from the face of the world [...]" (Erim, *Ulus*, November 18, 1945).

Stating that there was a growing belief that international peace and prosperity could be established since the atomic bomb would be kept under the assurance of the United Nations in the last part of his article, Erim also argued that peace was the only chance in the face of the possibility that a new war might end the world given the devastating effect of the atomic bomb.

Contrary to Nihat Erim's implicit approach, targeting the Soviet Union explicitly in his article titled "***Sırrı vermiyorlar (They do not share the secret)***" published in *Cumhuriyet* on November 19, 1945, Nadir Nadi underlined that keeping the secret of the atomic bomb under the sole control of the Western allies would have a deterrent effect on Russian's expansionary policies.

"[...] In the face of the Soviet claims, which could not be attributed to any substantive thinking, the British and Americans were deeply in sorrow for their own safety and the security of the world. It can be said that the atomic bomb was an aid that came to their rescue just in time. If this weapon had been delayed, it would have been more challenging to resist Russian demands, and perhaps impossible to defend a peace mentality based on rights and justice on earth. [...]"

"[...] On account of democracies, the atomic bomb is a weapon of immeasurable value even further in this respect. As long as the secret of this weapon is in their hands, it will not be easy for any rowdy to engage in Hitler-like acts or attempt a Duce-like Invasion [...]" (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, November 19, 1945).

Emphasizing that the atomic bomb hit a very critical period in terms of timing, with these words, Nadi then reiterated that this bomb could be used as a trump card against all kinds of bullying that could destroy the feelings of rights and justice of the international

community, however, being mainly a precautionary measure against threats, this resolution would not be sufficient alone for the establishment of international peace.

While the impacts of the Washington declaration on the international community were continuing, it was noted that with the acceleration of the Iranian issue, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* stressed two main issues. Both newspapers, which aimed to draw attention to Soviet aggression by bringing forward an issue of national sovereignty in which the Soviet Union was directly responsible for, as seen from August 1945, also shared editorials about the friendly Turkish-American relations during the same period.

One of the most prominent examples of this approach was recorded on November 20, 1945. On November 20, 1945, in the reports that were shared simultaneously in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, it was stated that the rebellion in Iran grew day by day and that the Russian-backed Azerbaijani rebels had seized the administration in several cities and started to march on Tehran.⁵⁴

On the other hand, in addition to these reports reflecting the situation in Iran, Falih Rıfki Atay's article titled "*Hakikati arayan Amerika (America seeking the truth)*" published in *Ulus* and Nadir Nadi's article titled "*Bizi Dinleyenler (Those who listen to us)*" published in *Cumhuriyet* were shared with the readers, on the same day.

Touching on the meeting of the members of the Foreign Policy Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives Mr. Mund and Ms. During with President İnönü during their visit to Ankara, in his article, Falih Rıfki Atay also addressed the inferences of the committee members regarding Turkey, after their visit.

"[...] As also seen in this speech, two American colleagues acquired the following ideas from their visit to Turkey: 1-President İnönü and the whole Turkish nation have a feeling of genuine friendship towards America. 2- The Turks wish to cooperate with the other United Nations members in establishing world peace and spreading the cause of democracy [...]" (Atay, *Ulus*, November 20, 1945).

⁵⁴ *Ulus*, "*İran'daki kargaşalık*", November 20, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, "*İran'daki İsyân Büyüdü*", November 20, 1945

Concluding that Americans want to access real and intimate information about Turkey, from these positive comments made by the U.S. commissioners regarding Turkey, Atay then underlined that Turkey had no purpose other than the realities to be understood by everyone by noting the importance of communicating Turkey's priorities in the most effective and accurate way in the international arena.

In addition to Falih Rıfıkı Atay's sentences, referring to the well-intentioned and malicious articles published in the foreign press about Turkey's role in the Second World War in his article, Nadir Nadi complained that Turkey had become vulnerable to the systematic propaganda carried out against her since she had not concentrated on the publicity activities for a long time.

"[...] In Britain, America, France, and other democratic countries, countless articles were written, speeches were given and statements were made that showed us as we are. However, the malicious propaganda, which was systematically initiated and carried on for a long time, of course would left more or less a trace in the places where it crawled. A large part of the world was already very little known about Turkey. The fact that we had been lax about introducing ourselves to the outside world for years, that we could not comprehend the importance of gaining love and friends within the family of nations, and that we had rather let this go, made the task of the propaganda against us much easier [...]" (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, November 20, 1945).

After all these criticisms he made towards the inadequate communication activities of Turkey, drawing attention to the impact of the President İnönü's speech dated November 1, 1945, in the United States, Nadi emphasized that the Americans reaffirmed their friendly approach towards Turkey with the gesture of publishing President İnönü's speech with their citizens, as it is.

"[...] Our President's speech was published with its full text in the association printing the United States congressional proceedings. This means that this opportunity is provided in the best way to everyone who wants to learn about the politics we have successfully carried out during the war, in a friendly country where we know the strongest representative of the love of freedom and truth on earth. [...]"

"[...] The United States, which conveys our President's words to her people as it is, shows again that it has good intentions in this regard [...]" (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, November 20, 1945).

Stressing on the importance of the development of effective communication and public diplomacy strategy to strengthen Turkey's position in the Allied cause and to effectively manage the perception that formed in the international community against her, in his

article, Nadir Nadi also admitted that all the Western democracies, especially the United States, have demonstrated a constructive approach towards Turkey in this process.

Along with the articles of Falih Rıfkı Atay and Nadir Nadi, who stressed Turkey's image in the American public, Professor Nihat Erim was also addressed the need for the U.S. support in the settlement of the problems that Turkey encountered in the international arena in his article titled “*Amerika ve Boğazlar (America and the Straits)*” published in *Ulus* on November 22, 1945.

Sharing his assessments of the diplomatic note given by the United States to the Turkish government regarding the situation of the Straits in his article, Erim stated that the United States, which he described as *the just [rightful] state of the New World*, reaffirmed that with this note she would do her part in the Straits issue with great courage. On the other hand, reminding that Turkey has not yet received a note from both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom stating their views on the issue, Erim underlined that despite all, even including the United States in this issue was a great gain for Turkey.

"[...] Whatever these views [views of Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom], a very significant gain has already been achieved. The fact that the United States is involved in the case is a factor that strengthens the hope that future negotiations will end successfully [...]" (Erim, *Ulus*, November 22, 1945).

With these words, Erim underlined that Turkey attached vital importance to be supported by a great power to strengthen her hand in matters that threaten her national security, especially in the ongoing dispute with the Soviet Union.

It was observed that as of the last week of November, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* focused on the Iranian issue, which remained unclear at the time. Although *Ulus* shared the issue with its readers through news from the foreign press, *Cumhuriyet*, which shared its reviews and criticisms in a bold and clear manner, published Nadir Nadi's article titled “*Bağımsızlık stratejisi (Strategy of independence)*” on the front page on November 23, 1945.

Stating that the Iranian issue started to evolve into a major uncertainty in his article, Nadir Nadi underlined that the Tehran government was trying to explain that the events were

mainly an intervention of a foreign state and therefore asked for help from Western democracies.

Later in his article, referring to the Tehran sources, emphasizing that the rebels had carried out their actions with weapons originated from the Soviet Union, Nadir Nadi underlined that the Soviet Union might have started to operate a broad-scale strategy with “*Independence movements*” supported mainly in Europe and Asia. Pointing out that the *Independent Azerbaijan* plan in the north of Iran poses a threat to the integrity of the United Kingdom, Nadi criticized the United States and the United Kingdom for not carrying out clear and concrete action towards the issue in given circumstances and therefore, he also underlined that the prevailing uncertainty was endangering world peace.

"[...] The reason for these delays and slow actions must be derived from the great importance of the various development opportunities hidden behind the incident. If so, we should expect serious political undertakings to be attempted by the Anglo - Saxons in these coming days. Otherwise, if there is only hesitation and indecision at stake, there is no doubt in believing that we are becoming distant from world peace. [...]" (Nadir, N., *Cumhuriyet*, November 23, 1945).

Ulus, which also shared similar comments made by Nadir Nadi in his article that the issues in Northern Iran would endanger the integrity of the United Kingdom with the headline “*Kuzey İran meselesi Rusya’ya karşı gerginliği artırdı (The Northern Iran issue has increased tensions against Russia)*” on November 24, 1945, underlined that action by the Soviet Union in and around the Persian Gulf, which had great importance on the way to India, would be considered as a clear coup attempt against the Security of British Empire by political circles of London (*Ulus*, November 24, 1945).

In light of recent developments in Iran, *Cumhuriyet* continued to express the Soviet threat more clearly than *Ulus*, and with its stories that shared with its readers on November 25, 1945, it evaluated the size of the Soviet threat from a different perspective.

Nadir Nadi, who vehemently criticised the Anglo-Saxon policy against the Soviet Union by referring to British Foreign Minister Bevin's speech in the House of Commons in his article “*Söz değil iş gerek (Not words, the action is needed)*”, emphasized that this style of action, which he described as a policy of *softening and sweetening*, made the Russians more daring.

In the last part of his article, Nadi stated that a new policy should be adopted against the threats of daring Russia, and underlined that eliminating the threat could be achieved through a full-fledged program, not by expressing good intentions.

“[...] The question of focus is not to reveal good intentions, but to give a direction to the policy to be followed against Russia. Presumably, this shall not be realized with speeches dictated from parliament stand by referring to the epigrammatism method.” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1945)

In addition to these severe criticisms of Nadir Nadi's policy towards the Soviet Union by the United States and the United Kingdom, Ömer Rıza Doğrul's article titled “*İngiltere İran'ın yutulmasına razı olmayacaktır (Britain will not comply with swallowing of Iran)*”⁵⁵, shared under the column *Siyasi İcmal* of *Cumhuriyet* on the same day, also attracts attention due to its bold statements.

In the article which the Anglo-Saxon policy held against Russia evaluated over the Iranian issue, first the emergence of the problem mentioned, then the attitudes and approaches that were expected to be implemented by the Western democracies, especially the British government, against the Soviet Union who defined as an *intruder*, was stated.

Stating that the foundations of the occupation of Iran were laid when American arms and material support sent to the Soviet Union to be used against the German attacks via the Persian Gulf through Iran, in the article, it was also emphasized that, contrary to the previous pledges, the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran after the war, lead to arising of uneasiness.

The author then underlined that the imperialist desires of the Soviet Union were escalated like its predecessor after the subsequent victories achieved at Europe and the Far East, and as a result of these desires, he emphasized that this invasion attempt in Northern Iran should not be accepted by the British government and by Western democracies.

“[...] The Soviet imperialism, whose desires towards more lands have arisen after the victories achieved in Europe and the Far East, set its eyes towards Iran's Azerbaijan and towards all of Iran if a chance and an opportunity could be found. [...]”

⁵⁵ Unlike his previous articles shared under the column *Siyasi İcmal* of *Cumhuriyet*, Ömer Rıza Doğrul did not indicate his name after this article.

[...] But Iran is located on the way to India. Britain will not allow this country to be swallowed up by the Russians in one way or another.

Indeed, it seems that this classic Russian drama has sparked excitement and concern in the United Kingdom” (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1945).

While the great geopolitical importance of Iran to the United Kingdom and the British determination to not to allow Russian expansionism in any cases were expressed with these sentences, it was also mentioned that on the contrary, unpleasant reactions might be emerged at neighbouring Arabic countries and particularly at Turkey against Anglo-Saxon's unresponsiveness towards this issue.

In the last part of the article, it was stated that the policy of the Anglo-Saxons towards the Soviet Union, which Nadir Nadi interpreted as *the policy of softening and smoothing over*, could no longer be maintained. On the other hand, by stating, “*it is time for the Anglo-Saxons to pull the bridle of the raging passions*” attention was drawn to the policy style that should be adopted.

In addition to the extensive reports on the Iran issue, the British note to the Turkish government on the status of The Straits, which has not yet been officially announced, was shared with the public in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on November 25, 1945. In the news shared at both of the newspapers by referencing the speech that British Minister M. Noel-Baker made at House of Commons, the statements of Baker used while explaining the British point of view regarding the Straits, provided a resource for concluding that the British offers mostly coincided with American offers.⁵⁶

"[...] Minister of State M. Noel-Baker has stated that there are two clear points in the politics of the British government, in his article regarding the Straits: Britain always welcomes the amendment of the Straits Convention. However, it does not consider this amendment to be intended for the implementation of bases” (*Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1945).

On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet* also reviewed British Minister of State M. Noel Baker's remarks through an article titled “*Boğazlar meselesinde İngiliz görüşü (British opinion on the Straits issue)*” published anonymously on November 26, 1945. Regarding Baker’s statements, stating in the news that although it has not yet officially disclosed, the British

⁵⁶ *Ulus*, “İngiltere Türkiye’ye bir muhtıra verdi”, November 25, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Boğazlar rejimi; İngiliz hükümeti de kendi görüşünü bize bildirdi”, November 25, 1945

diplomatic note was welcomed as a positive development, it was also mentioned that the U.S. and the U.K. were opposed to the idea of providing military bases that could put the Mediterranean and especially Turkey's security at risk.

"[...] This means that Britain, like America, rejects Soviet Russia's request to establish bases in the Straits. Essentially, it was clear that Britain would not accept this Russian request. Because the Soviet Union settlement in the Straits means that, in the mildest definition, landing in the Mediterranean. Once the Reds settled in the Straits, it is not difficult to predict what will happen next, what political consequences, and even what disasters will happen in the Near and the Middle East" (*Cumhuriyet*, November 26, 1945).

Stating in the news that as agreed at the Potsdam Conference, the eyes turned on the Soviet Union after the U.S. and the U.K. diplomatic notes regarding their point of views regarding the Straits conveyed to Turkey, it was also emphasized that except for the report published in Russian agency Tass on October 14, 1945 (see p. 86) no developments reported from Russian official sources. On the other hand, stating that the silence of the Soviet Union on this issue *mainly stemmed from learning the thoughts of other states and looking for opportunities*, it was also emphasized in the report that this style of diplomacy was a major obstacle to international cooperation.

On the other hand, in the report that the views of Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom on the status of the Straits were summarized in three articles, it was also stated that although the Soviet Union preferred to remain silent, the issue was largely clarified.

"[...] 1- Turkey agreed for the amendment of the Treaty of Montreaux, but only if it does not harm Turkey's independence, sovereignty, and security. Turkey cannot accept an international administration in the Straits, nor can it accept giving bases to Soviet Russia.

2- Even America favors amendments in the Straits' present regime, but there is no reference to an international regime in the American opinion. This state also refuses to give bases in the Straits, to others. She wants the amendments to be in line with Turkey's sovereignty and security.

3- The United Kingdom is contented with saying that it would participate if a conference convened to amend the Montreaux Treaty and that she does not consent to the amendment that would encourage the granting of bases to others in the Straits [...]" (*Cumhuriyet*, November 26, 1945).

In the news stating that the asserted opinions of the three states who were related sides of the issue were covering the sovereignty rights, security, and future of Turkey, in exchange of these opinions, it was underlined that it has not known if the Soviet Union would be insistent about their base requests in the Straits. On the other hand, underlining that

according to the general opinion, the Soviet Union would keep her silence to save time and look for opportunities in the face of this uncertainty, lastly, it was emphasized in the report that, under the given conditions of the Straits, being supported by the Anglo-Saxons could be seen as a significant political victory for Turkey.

“[...] Today's outlook of the Straits issue is this: the Anglo-Americans accepted Turkey's cause, which is a hundred percent rightful. It would be a political victory for Turkey to ensure the support of America and Britain” (Cumhuriyet, November 26, 1945).

As this report shows, satisfaction with the realizing foreign policy priorities aimed to give the Straits issue an international character and consolidating the support of the United States and the United Kingdom against Soviet demands began to appear in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* by the end of November.

Following the British opinion regarding the Straits, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* shared the developments in Iran with their readers along with their assessment of the long-awaited American move against Soviet interventionism in Iran, on November 27, 1945. In the report published simultaneously in both newspapers, it was stated that the American note, which suggested the withdrawal of the Soviet and British troops from Iran to be realized on January 1, 1946, instead of March 2, 1946, since the war ended earlier than expected, forwarded to both states. In the same note, the Soviet Union was asked to explain her Iranian politics on the rebellion in Northern Iran.⁵⁷

Evaluating the American note regarding the recent developments in Iran in his article titled “*İran olayları (Iranian events)*” published in *Ulus* on November 30, 1945, Professor Nihat Erim expressed his pleasure for the proactivity of the Western allies towards the ominous developments in *neighbouring and friendly* Iran.

“[...] But the careful attention and determination of the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to give a diplomatic note, have eased the clouds of suspicion and anxiety that are about to aggravate. Seeing the two Anglo-Saxon states marching towards the United Nations ideal gives strength and light to hearths” (Erim, *Ulus*, November 30, 1945).

Underlining that the great responsibility falls on the shoulders of the great powers for the realization and observance of the ideals of the United Nations in the last part of his article,

⁵⁷ *Ulus*, “Amerika, İran'daki İngiliz – Rus kıtalarının çekilmesini istedi”, November 27, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Anglo-Saksonlar İran işinde harekete geçtiler”, November 27, 1945

Erim then pointed out that it would be appropriate to believe that the three great states (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union), which have been in dispute for some time, would eventually act in accordance.

In the last days of November, another news that drew attention that was published simultaneously in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on November 29, 1945, was the interview of Ambassador of Turkey to London Cevat Açıkalın with British journalists.⁵⁸

In the news which Ambassador Açıkalın's answers to the questions of British journalists before the United Nations meeting in London were quoted, the statements of the Ambassador on the duties agreed at the United Nations meeting for the establishment of international peace and security were also included.

"[...] To establish security strictly, to lay one of the perfect foundations in order not to challenge the evil-hearted and malevolent people to resort again to the actions that led humanity to this recent bloody war.

We can be sure that the faith that the whole world attaches to the United Nations is as great as the desire for peace and happiness [...]" (*Ulus & Cumhuriyet*, November 29, 1945).

In addition to his statements indicating Turkey's faithful commitment to the United Nations organization like all peace-loving states, his confident answer to the question about the Straits issue was also shared in the same news.

"[...] I do not think Turkey has any concerns about this issue. This is an international issue, and there is no doubt that Turkey will be happy to take part in settlement of this matter when the time comes [...]" (*Ulus & Cumhuriyet*, November 29, 1945).

Following his statements, which underlines that the Straits must be handled as an international issue, Ambassador Açıkalın's comments about the promising future of Turkish – British trade relations and response to the Armenian demands expressed by the Soviet press were also shared with the readers.

"[...] This [Armenian demands] is not an issue that to be considered or acted upon. Considering that Turkey is one of the few countries that has never pursued a hostile policy against the Soviet Union, it is more or less strange to carry out these radio attacks. In practice,

⁵⁸ *Ulus*, "Açıkalın'ın demeci", November 29, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, "Londra Büyük Elçimizin İngiliz basınına demeci", November 29, 1945

it is more or less difficult to understand what is being asked of us” (*Ulus & Cumhuriyet*, November 29, 1945).

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which published the interview of the prominent Turkish diplomat M. Cevat Açıkalın in which he reflected the general framework of the official Turkish opinion towards the Straits issue and Armenian demands, with his answers to the related questions, with their readers on their front pages, continued to shape their editorial framework in accordance with the priorities that were recently indicated by Açıkalın.

3.3.2. December 1945

In December 1945, it was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* were more frequently referring to the seriousness of the Soviet threat than in previous months, as the Soviet propaganda grew at home and abroad. Moreover, the events in Iran became even more serious.

Cumhuriyet, which shared the concerns of Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, on the diplomatic note of the Soviet Union to the Iranian government, in the news titled “*İran Şahı Amerika’den yardım talep etti (The Shah of Iran requested help from America)*” on December 1, 1945, asserted that Moscow asked Iran to recognize the autonomy of Azerbaijan (*Cumhuriyet*, December 1, 1945).

Addressing these developments, which were followed with great attention by the Turkish government and the public, in their report titled “*Rusya’nın İran’dan istekleri anlaşıldı! (Russian ambitions in Iran were understood!)*” published again in the headline on the next day, *Cumhuriyet* also included the prediction in their report that the Soviet government would be satisfied if the Soviets were granted a proper oil concession or if the Iranian government changed completely (*Cumhuriyet*, December 2, 1945).

On December 2, 1945, the Soviet resolutions on the migration of the Armenians living abroad to Soviet Armenia, and the opening of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan in Northern Iran dated November 21, 1945, were shared by the Soviet radio. In line with these resolutions, *Cumhuriyet* continued to share the extent of the Soviet threat that reached before the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, with its readers.

The authors of *Cumhuriyet*, who criticized the policy style of the Soviet Union with the anonymously published article titled “*Bariş yaklaşıyor mu? Yoksa uzaklaşıyor mu? (Is the peace approaching? Or is it going away?)*” on December 3, 1945, accused the Soviet Union of being the reason for the failure of the establishment of international peace for almost seven months.

Reminding that peace was delayed after the end of the First World War due to Germany's unwillingness to sign the peace treaty, it was emphasized in the article that, after the Second World War, peace was delayed again because of the conflict between the victors of the war. Furthermore, the policy style of the Soviet Union again addressed as the main reason for the conflict.

"[...] Everyone except Soviet Russia is no understood that the prime suspect of this situation is Moscow. Otherwise, all the Axis powers, especially Italy, who surrendered first, are thirsty for peace. There is no doubt that the nations that constituted the Soviet Union also missed and wanted peace. However, the comrades in Moscow think otherwise, and each day they extend the issue by creating a new conflict [...]" (*Cumhuriyet*, December 3, 1945).

In the same article, it was concluded that the United States and the United Kingdom made great efforts to avoid causing a new world war, whereas the Soviet Union tried to adopt their demands by taking advantage of this situation.

Based on this reality, addressing that the Council of the Foreign Ministers in London also failed due to the same reasons, the desperate feelings of the U.S. President Truman regarding the upcoming Tripartite Conference was also pointed out in the article. In this regard, it was also stated that to expect positive results from this conference was unwarranted.

Another ominous development that escalated tensions in the context of recent developments has been the Tan Printing House Demonstrations, which occurred upon the publication of an article titled “*Freedom in chains*” written by Sabiha Sertel -one of the well-known leftist writers of the period in Turkey- in the magazine named “*Görüşler*”. Undoubtedly, shortly after its publication, this article was subjected to harsh criticisms made by newspapers known for their affinity to the government, such as *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.

With the article written by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın -one of the prominent authors of *Tanin-* titled “*Kalkın Ey Ehli Vatan! (Get up lovers of the motherland!)*”, the total struggle against the leftist and communist propaganda, which was allegedly pointed out in Sabiha Sertel’s article, was started. Following that, on December 4, 1945, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* expressed their stances towards the issue.

Falih Rıfık Atay, who targeted the statements of Sabiha Sertel in his article titled “*Çirkin bir ‘taktika’ (An ugly tactic)*” published in *Ulus* on December 4, 1945, refuted the heavy criticism directed at the state, its institutions, and bureaucrats and accused Sabiha Sertel and her husband Zekeriya Sertel of *incitement to red anarchy*.

Atay defined the article of Sertel stating alleged corruption accusations that were intervened by government members and close bureaucratic circles in 1938 and 1939 as *corny and vulgar tactics* and underlined that these unwarranted claims that incriminate state's institutions and bureaucrats would not be unreturned.

Atay also drew attention to the importance of the total fight against slanders that would lead the country into anarchy as a requirement of the struggle for democracy in the last part of his article.

“[...] One of the most important points that we will pay the utmost attention in the development of democracy, is to prevent this country from being drowned into anarchy by a horrible period, in which those who attack honour and dignity are free and while these notions are unprotected” (Atay, *Ulus*, December 4, 1945).

Unlike Falih Rıfık Atay's statements in *Ulus*, *Cumhuriyet* targeted the ideological foundations behind these accusations instead of answering them one by one, with the news titled “*Bizim yoldaşlar nihayet maskelerini attılar (Finally our comrades threw their masks)*” published anonymously, the harassments directed against *independent and self-contained Turkey's democracy understanding* was criticized with severe words (*Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1945).

Concerning articles published in magazines *Yeni Dünya* and *Görüşler*, it was stated that the real intention of people who criticized democracy and freedom environment was making *communist democracy* and *red independence* dominant over Turkey, and it was

underlined that people who were defined as *worshippers of hammer and sickle* were trying to push Turkey under to *Moscow-like regime*.

“[...] They do not like democracy and freedom in the independent and self-contained Turkish homeland. They want democracy and freedom to make this country and nation a prisoner of a Moscow-like regime. What they want is even not communism, which is a social movement that has never held on anywhere other than Soviet Russia; but it is imperialist Russian Bolshevism [...]” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1945).

As Cangül Örnek emphasized in her book, the threat and the danger posed by *Soviet imperialism*, rather than *simply anti-communism* (Örnek, 2015, p.64), was emphasized in the report. It was also stated that even in the Soviet Union, which was depicted as the paradise of communism, the masses of the people lived hell, and the welfare disparity between the leaders of the party and the people was tremendous.

Stating that this *cruel* regime was intended to be adapted to Turkey in the last part of the article, it was also emphasized that the Turkish nation's common sense would not allow it.

“[...] Here are our comrades who want to burn the Turkish nation in the hell of such a cruel regime. But the common sense of this nation is too strong to be fooled by the false democracy and false freedom of those who want to drag themselves into the red hell.” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 4, 1945).

On December 5, 1945, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* published the demonstrations (*Tan Printing House Demonstrations*) occurred on December 4, 1945, resulted in the rifling through *Tan*, *Yeni Dünya*, *la Turquie* newspapers and magazines and also *Berrak Bookstore* where the books of Soviet literature was sold, by reflecting the approach of the Turkish government regarding the matter while considering the possible impacts of events on foreign policy.

In the news titled “*Dünkü nümayiş; İki gazete idarehanesi harap oldu (Yesterday's demonstration; executive offices of two newspapers were devastated)*” shared on the front page of *Ulus* on December 5, 1945, the demonstration organized in front of the Tan printing house by nearly two thousand university and graduate students *with the Turkish Flag, Atatürk and İnönü posters at their hands*, were mentioned.

Details of how the events unfolded were shared, and slogans written on the banners carried by the university youth who participated in the demonstration were noted.

"[...] Young people carrying pictures of Atatürk and İnönü with Turkish flags in their hands, took part in front of the group. Besides, the banners attached to the sticks read "We are democrats", "Curse you Sertel's", "Long Live Turkish Democracy", "Long Live Kemalist Turkey", "We are neither fascist nor communist", "Long Live Great Atatürk and İnönü" [...]" (*Ulus*, December 5, 1945).

On the same day, in the news about the Parliamentary Group Meeting of the CHP held on December 4, 1945, which was published in *Ulus*, the remarks of the government regarding the recent demonstrations in Istanbul were included. In the meantime, the insults of these newspapers were stated as most significant incitement in these demonstrations by the Parliamentary Group of the CHP. On the other hand, in the same news, Prime Minister Saraçoğlu's statements stating that the government was following the issue with patience and calm *to en-root the concept of democracy* and that legal actions would be initiated against those found guilty under the law.⁵⁹

Cumhuriyet, which shares the developments related to the events in Istanbul with the news titled "*Üniversite gençlerinin dünkü nümayişi (Yesterday's demonstration of the university youth)*", included the evaluations expressed in the Parliamentary Group Meeting of the CHP on the subject such as *Ulus* (*Cumhuriyet*, December 5, 1945).

On the other hand, in the report titled "*Hadisenin tafsilatı (Details of the event)*", the development process of the events in Istanbul and the flow of events in Izmir were shared with the readers. In the news, it was stated that the people of İzmir who learned from the evening newspapers that the "*red publishing houses*" in Istanbul were destroyed, had written "*these are communists, do not read!*" on posters of *Görüşler* and *Yeni Dünya*. It was also underlined in the news that the young people who were *faithful to nationality and democracy*, indicated their support to the events in Istanbul.

"[...] The young people of Izmir, who are strongly committed to nationality and democracy, say that if they were in Istanbul, the action they would take would be just like the university students has made [...]" (*Cumhuriyet*, December 5, 1945).

⁵⁹ *Ulus*, "Parti grubu toplantısında tahrikçi yayınlara karşı duyulan infial belirtildi", December 5, 1945

In addition to these reports, the statement given to foreign press members by Nedim Veysel İlkin, General Director of Press and Publication Directorate (B.Y.U.M.) regarding the events in Istanbul, on December 4, 1945, was also published simultaneously in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. The report stated that upon receiving information that the Tass agency Ankara reporter was preparing to expose the events in Istanbul as an *anti-Russian action*, with the statement of Nedim Veysel İlkin gave to the foreign press, it was remarked that events did not have a fascist or anti-Russian nature as it was reflected.⁶⁰

As can be seen from the reports published on the day after the events, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* evaluated the events with an approach within the framework determined by the Turkish government. In this context, articles from magazines and newspapers were determined as the cause of the events, and the attitude shown by university students who attended to demonstrations were tried to be laid on the legitimate ground by defining them as Kemalist, nationalist, and democrat young people. On the other hand, considering that a misunderstanding in the international community regarding the cause of events could put Turkey in a difficult position, publishing the announcement made by the General Director of Press and Publication Directorate (B.Y.U.M.) by *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* was also a remarkable detail.

Subsequent to the decisions of the Parliamentary Group Meeting of the CHP and the comments made by the General Directorate of Press and Publication (B.Y.U.M.) regarding the evaluations made by the Tass reporter, Falih Rıfkı Atay, who shared his new assessments regarding the events in his article dated December 6, 1945, underlined three basic points to eliminate misunderstandings about the events.

Atay stated that these events occurred due to the *incitement of corrupt newspapers* without any prior preparation and that these incitements, which *extend to the honour and integrity of individuals and institutions*, led to Turkey becoming more vulnerable to external danger.

⁶⁰ *Ulus*, “Nümayiş hakkında Tass muhabiri tarafından çekilen telgraf”, December 5, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Tass ajansı, tezvire hazırlanıyor”, December 5, 1945

Secondly, mentioning that the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government would not let any unjust *even-though the reason was right*, together with this Atay also stated that *a senseless youth without any response* was also worrisome as well as ones trying to solve every problem against the law during the development of democracy.

Finally, Atay mentioned that, contrary to the claims of the Tass agency Ankara reporter, referring to any of these events did not happen against the foreign state, emphasized that event were realized as *a result of direct attack against national emotions* and underlined that fake news should not be shared for the sake of the wellbeing of relations between states.⁶¹

On the other hand, in his article titled **“Bir hakikat ve bir üzüntü (A truth and a sorrow)”** published in *Cumhuriyet*, Nadir Nadi evaluated the events in terms of freedom of expression and national freedom and pointed out that it was unacceptable to engage in actions and discourses that contradict the values of the society in which they live and even serve foreign ideologies.

“One should pay attention to the great difference between freedom of thought and national freedom. National freedom is essential for a society that understands its own self. Freedom of thought must be in the service of national freedom. Only then, it will have a value. We should be able to write without hesitation what we hear and think for the sake of the rise of our nation, our people’s prosperity, and the protection of our country. No force should prevent us from adopting what we find appropriate to our intellectual structure within policy regimes. However, since we are members of a particular society, it means not recognizing the laws of nature to be connected to the opinions contrary to the existence of that society, knowingly or unknowingly to be an instrument for foreign ideologies at the expense of national freedom [...]” (Nadi, N., *Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 1945).

Reminding again the limits of freedom of expression within the framework of the duties and responsibilities imposed on journalists by the central authority, which Nilgün Gürkan underlined before (see p. 25), Nadi then stated that as long as the thoughts remained on the *individual area*, they would not be faced with any reactions from the public. However, he also asserted that in the opposite case, these thoughts could prepare the ground for conflict within the society by various reflections.

⁶¹ Atay, *Ulus*, “İstanbul’daki nümayiş”, December 6, 1945

In addition to this fact, expressing his regret regarding the level that the demonstrations in Istanbul have reached in the last part of his article, Nadi expressed his wishes towards the enlightened Turkish youth to control their nerves in all circumstances instead of responding with brute force, which he stressed he did not approve this behaviour, even if it was diametrically opposed with the national sentiments.

In addition to the Atay and Nadi's articles, Prime Minister Saraçoğlu's interview with foreign journalists published in both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* also attracts attention.

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which shared with their readers the interview of Prime Minister Saraçoğlu with members of the press on December 5, 1945, regarding the latest developments, gave separate explanations made by the prime minister regarding the recent American and British proposals on the status of the Straits.⁶²

First, Prime Minister Saraçoğlu's statements on the continuation of efforts to increase friendly relations with neighbouring and friendly countries without any change in foreign affairs were given in the related news, and then his statements on how the latest American proposals regarding the Straits evaluated by the Turkish government were quoted.

"[...] There is no doubt that the American view is worth considering as a ground for debate and negotiation, to find the proper and timely examination of the forms and records of the exercise. Of course, we are considering America's participation in the future conference as both an ardent desire of our government and a necessity. [...]" (*Ulus & Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 1945)

As Abidin Daver underlined in his article dated November 9, 1945, in which he evaluated the American proposals regarding the Straits (see p. 93-94), Saraçoğlu made statements supporting the call for the review of articles that could pose a threat to Turkey's security and after taking both three country's offers he stated that exhaustive evaluation might be much more relieving.

By December 7, 1945, Falih Rıfkı Atay's article "*Boğazlar meselesine dair (On the Straits issue)*" in *Ulus* about the statement given by Prime Minister Saraçoğlu to the press

⁶² *Ulus*, "Boğazlar hakkındaki Amerikan ve İngiliz teklifleri karşısında Başbakan, görüşümüzü bildirdi", December 6, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, "Başbakan'ın gazeteciler ile dünkü görüşmesi: Boğazlar meselesi", December 6, 1945

was also remarkable. Atay, who started his article by reminding American proposals were first learned by the words of the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes, moving through the words of Prime Minister Saraçođlu, he underlined that the government was ready to participate in an international conference on condition that Turkey's security and sovereignty would not be harmed.

Pointing out that the position of the United States, which prioritizes freedom, security, and sovereignty in international affairs, reinforced the sense of trust in friendly countries in his article, Atay stated that the Turkish government was very pleased that the United States would attend this conference and emphasized that the issue now evolved into an international subject.

“[...] For us, it is no longer a question of the Straits, because this has been buried in the grave of the issue of condition, now we have a task of determining the conditions for the international use of the two waterways according to the situation. Just as the Straits are an integral part of the Turkish territory, Turkish security is also an integral part of the cause of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits [...]” (Atay, *Ulus*, December 7, 1945).

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which published evaluations regarding comments of Prime Minister Saraçođlu on the latest developments and mainly the Straits issue, from both editorial writers and prominent international newspapers, started to give priority for news regarding the developments in Iran and the new Tripartite Meeting, which would be held in Moscow on December 8, 1945.⁶³

In the report titled “*Üçler arasında yeni bir konferansa doğru (Towards a new conference between the Big Three)*” received from the British United Press and published in *Cumhuriyet* on December 8, 1945, it was stated that the American and British foreign ministers would meet in Moscow on December 15, 1945, with the proposal of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, stating that the situation in Iran was getting worse with each passing day in the report titled “*İran’da durum (The situation in Iran)*”, reviews of the foreign agencies were included (*Cumhuriyet*, December 8, 1945).

⁶³ *Ulus*, “Boğazlar; Başbakan’ın demecine dair İngiliz yorumu”, December 8, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Boğazlar meselesi”, December 8, 1945

On the other hand, Professor Nihat Erim, who made a situation evaluation over the news recently published in Anglo-Saxon media in his article titled **“Heyecanlı yayınlar arkasında (Behind the exciting publications)”** published in *Ulus* on December 8, 1945, stated that *the world was in severe political depression due to insecurity*.

“[...] In our opinion, the dispute arises from a lack of mutual trust. The real reason for the amazing events we face today is the desire to defend. Any state, who does not feel secure, tries to raise the walls to create medieval solitude inside and outside the borders in a manner that seems safe to ensure its security [...]” (Erim, *Ulus*, December 8, 1945).

When the rebellion in Iran, the Chinese civil war, and the depression in Balkan states evaluated all together, Erim, who stated that these problems were derived from the same source, underlined that to achieve the solution, first of all, the reasons that create distrust should be get rid of, and after that, the base of consensus should be established between two views. Erim complained that world *could not be able to show the same success in the field of spirituality and morality that shown in the technical field*, he warned that political approaches based on defense or offense would eventually drag the world into an even more devastating war than before, and to prevent this pessimistic possibility, he called to unite under the ideals of the United Nations.

Following these statements of Professor Nihat Erim, *Ulus*, which shared⁶⁴ the information that the foreign ministers of the three great powers would meet in Moscow on December 9, 1945, displayed a sceptical approach to the new meeting, with a pessimism that was given by old experience. Falih Rıfki Atay, the voice of this sceptical attitude in *Ulus*, underlined in his article titled **“Büyük bir şey umdurmayan toplantı (The meeting that does not make us hope for anything great)”** that it would be baseless to attach great hopes to the conference of foreign ministers to be convened in Moscow, which he wrote on December 10, 1945.

Reminding the latest speech of the U.S. President Truman in which he said that issues should not be discussed between three or five states but instead should be handled under the umbrella of the United Nations, in his article, Atay then stated that despite these words, the decision regarding the gathering of the foreign ministers of three major states

⁶⁴ *Ulus*, “Üç dış bakanı Moskova’da toplanıyor”, December 9, 1945

in Moscow was surprising. From this point on, Atay questioned the reason why the three would be meeting in Moscow and concluded that this conference, as the previous ones, would not go further than investigating whether there was a possibility of an agreement between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet Union.

Atay stated that Iran, Eastern Europe, Balkan, and Far East issues would be on the agenda of the conference in line with foreign media reports, and emphasized that *mutual distrust and conflict in the principles of peace*, which constitute the common point of all these issues, would determine the direction of the conference. Thus, emphasizing that these contradictions would determine if the independent nations' regime or some of the great powers' domination regimes would prevail, Atay then underlined that the principle of prevention of dominance by one nation over another, which was accepted by all parties, surprisingly shows differences in practice.

In the last stage, according to the author, it was claimed that the Anglo-Saxons would share the secret of the atomic bomb with the Soviet Union at the meeting in Moscow and ask them to withdraw their attempts allegedly pursued their own security concerns, and thus concluded that the main purpose of the conference was to invite the Soviet Union to common sense.

“[...] So, the point is to voluntarily discourage Russia from pursuing desires that are only for its own security, and to ensure that they have an equal place like everyone else within the United Nations [...]” (Atay, *Ulus*, December 10, 1945).

Atay acknowledged that the normalization could be achieved if this goal was to be realized, but argued that the Moscow Conference could not provide a consensus which was comprehensive enough to allow for achieving this goal.

Nadir Nadi, who accompanied Falih Rıfkı Atay's sceptical and hopeless attitude with his article titled “*Yeni Moskova toplantısı (New Moscow meeting)*”, published in *Cumhuriyet* on the same day. Underlining that the hesitation and ambivalence were still prevailing in world politics, criticized the Anglo-Saxon policy towards Russia in light of the recent developments.

Stating his astonishment like Atay, regarding the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes' statements indicating a new conference would be convened in Moscow, contrary to the words of the U.S. President Truman in this article, Nadi then described the changing decision of the U.S. in a very short time as a weakness in policy style followed against Russia.

Nadi acknowledged that the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet Union might have some expectations from this conference *that came out from nowhere* but stressed that the outcome would not change unless a comprehensive agreement were reached on the basis of the problems, no matter how and where they were discussed.

The author pointed out that the sides were explicitly clear at the point reached, and argued that the solution could only be reached through two ways:

“[...] 1. To convince Russia that her security constitutes an indivisible whole with the security of the world.

2. To retreat step-by-step in front of the demands which were put forward by Russia with security claims [...]” (Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 1945).

Nadi systematically stated that Anglo-Saxons followed the second path when considered within the frame of the latest developments, and this path would lead the world to desperation and peace of balance.

On the other hand, in his article titled “*Açık kartlar konferansı (Open cards conference)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on the same day, Ömer Rıza Doğrul stated that, as Atay and Nadi expressed before, it would be baseless to expect better results from Moscow conference than previous meetings. In the meantime, he also underlined that focusing on clearing the fog between three great powers should be the most important goal (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, December 10, 1945).

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which were agreed on that it was too optimistic to expect good results from the Tripartite Conference to be convened in Moscow, in addition to this matter, which the international community was awaiting impatiently, also these newspapers continued to share reports from the foreign press regarding the Tan Printing House demonstrations occurred on December 4, 1945, with their readers.

In this context, it was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, which shared the assessments of the France Presse and Tribune de Geneve regarding the events in Istanbul on December 9, 1945, tried to create an international legitimacy ground against the statements that recently appeared in the Soviet media, and fascism accusations directed to Turkey through these reports.

The Tribune de Geneve reported that the Russian demands on the Straits had a major effect on the emergence of the demonstrations. And it was stated that the situation was out of control with the emergence of other territorial claims as well as the Straits. France Presse reported that the Russian side considered the demonstrations in Istanbul as a fascist and anti-Russian action while the British indicated a concern that the Russian interventionism in Northern Iran might spread to Turkey as the reason for the events.⁶⁵

In addition to the reports of the Tribune de Geneve and France Presse, the reviews of the Greek newspaper Akropolis on the subject were shared in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on December 10 and 11, December 1945.

In the report of the Akropolis, published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on December 10, 1945, it was stated that upon the libellous accusations and insults put forward by some newspapers, *the nationalist Turkey who has a democratic regime that bears the mark of the reformist Atatürk*, non-surprisingly witnessed a set of social demonstrations. Again, in the same report, demonstrations in Istanbul were described as *an expression of national rage*.⁶⁶

On the other hand, in another report of the Akropolis, published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on December 11, 1945, it was emphasized that Turkey had a complete democratic identity, as a response to a question whether fascism exists in Turkey or not. The Greek

⁶⁵ *Ulus*, “İstanbul’daki son nümayiş”, December 9, 1945, *Cumhuriyet*, “Talebe nümayişine verilen manalar”, December 9, 1945

⁶⁶ *Ulus*, “Yunanistan’da İstanbul’daki nümayişlere dair yorumlar”, December 10, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Milli hiddetin bir ifadesi”, December 10, 1945

newspaper also indicated that the most significant proof for the forestated argument was the radical revolutions realized during the early republican period of Turkey.⁶⁷

It was observed that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, which shared the reports of the Greek newspaper Akropolis in which they were reaffirming their reliance in Turkey, upon the severe allegations of Russian newspaper Pravda claiming that the demonstrations in Istanbul *had fascist and anti-Russian roots*⁶⁸, took a tougher stance against those accusations as of December 11, 1945.

In this context, Falih Rıfkı Atay, who vehemently denied the accusations of fascism claims against Turkey, in his article titled **“Türkiye’ye iftira edilemez (Turkey cannot be accused)”** written in *Ulus* on December 11, 1945, underlined how Turkey was fighting against fascism by referencing a document sent by the *Tanin*’s Nurnberg reporter outlining the Nazi activities between 1933 and 1939.

“Nurnberg reporter of Tanin sent a newly found document of the Nazi Party’s foreign policy office, revealing activities between 1933 and 1939. According to this document, the Nazis found a solid foothold in Romania. In Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan, the Nazi organization has worked. In the document, it says: “Our work in Turkey has not provided a success.” [...]” (Atay, *Ulus*, December 11, 1945)

Even though Atay accepted that financial relations between the years 1933 – 1939 made Turkey and Germany come close to each other, he also mentioned that with the treaty of 1939, Turkey showed the clearest attitude against the German threat in a period when Germany concuered the Middle Europe. Atay pointed out that Turkey directed its military and political strategies such as the states positioned against Nazi imperialism during the war, and emphasized that the events in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan during the most intense periods of the war did not reach critical dimensions thanks to the resistance of the Great Wall of Turkey.

In light of these historical realities, Atay argued that no false accusations could be made against Turkey, whose allegiance to the United Nations cause better understood in each

⁶⁷ *Ulus*, “Türkiye hakkında bir Yunan gazetesinin makalesi”, December 11, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Türkiye’de faşizm var mıdır?”, December 11, 1945

⁶⁸ *Ulus*, “Pravda’nın yazdıkları”, December 10, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “Rus gazetelerinin saçmaları”, December 10, 1945

day passes, also stated that even these accusations were meant to continue, there would be no doubt that these accusations served some secret purposes.

On the other hand, Abidin Daver, in his article published in *Cumhuriyet* on December 12, 1945, expressed how freedom of expression was suppressed in the Soviet Union, based on the evaluations of the editorial writer of *Tanin*, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, regarding the demonstrations occurred in Istanbul.

Indicating that a library managed by Soviet citizen in Istanbul-Beyoğlu, which described as *a communist propaganda center* by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, was destroyed by university youth due to its open propaganda activities, Daver also included Yalçın's question in his article asking that if any anti-regime journals were being published in the Soviet Union as published in Turkey. Answering Yalçın's question through his own experience, Daver described the Soviet Union, where radio was connected to a central system and the free circulation of any anti-regime articles or cartoons never allowed, as a closed box with *no foreign ideas could ever enter inside*.

Emphasizing that the Turkish people lived in such an environment during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid, Daver then mentioned that the Soviet people, who were unaware of the outer world, convinced that their rights were much better than other countries.⁶⁹

Following the criticism expressed by Atay and Daver against Russian propaganda accusing Turkey of being a fascist and oppressive towards the freedom of expression, the statements of a Greek magazine supporting the Turkish cause regarding the latest Istanbul demonstrations were also published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on December 13, 1945.

In the statements given in the article of the Greek weekly magazine *Promahas*, it was stated that there was no suitable environment for the development of communism in Turkey and that Turkish youth, who were *committed to the ideals of taking the country*

⁶⁹ Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, "Hem Nalına Hem Mihına", "Kapalı kutu!", December 12, 1945

forward and realizing its historical destiny, would never tolerate foreign movements hostile to nationalism in their countries.⁷⁰

Greece, which entered the restoration process with the end of the Second World War, has been one of the most critical Balkan countries experiencing strategic disputes between Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet Union. When evaluated in this respect, it could be put forward that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* might want to highlight the international nature of the problem by focusing on the support messages emerging from a country that suffers from Soviet intervention against systematically implemented anti-Turkey propaganda of Russian media after December 4, 1945 dated Tan Printing House demonstrations.

Just days before the Moscow Conference, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* began to express their expectations about the conference again, attracts attention. In his article titled “**Üçlerden beklediğimiz (What we expect from the Big Three)**” published in *Ulus* on December 14, 1945, Professor Nihat Erim stated the expectation of the Turkish Government from the Moscow Conference and the pessimistic atmosphere in the first days of the conference was beginning to cast away after the last news.

Stating that it was believed that the Moscow Conference, which was announced by taking the chance of late beginning of the UN General Assembly, scheduled to be convened in London in the second half of December, would eliminate the instability that has been going on for six months, Erim also mentioned that Turkish government was also supporting these good-wishes for the peace and safety of the whole world.⁷¹

On the other hand, in his article titled “**Moskova Konferansı (Moscow Conference)**”, shared under the column **Siyasi İcmal** of *Cumhuriyet* on December 15, 1945, Ömer Rıza Doğrul pointed out that a new peace conference could be convened if disagreements over some issues were solved. In the meantime, he also stated that it would be wise not to

⁷⁰ *Ulus*, “**Son İstanbul nümayişlerine dair bir yorum**”, December 13, 1945; *Cumhuriyet*, “**Türkiye bir mucize yaratacaktır**”, December 13, 1945

⁷¹ Erim, *Ulus*, “**Üçlerden Beklediğimiz**”, December 14th, 1945

attach great expectations to this conference upon the statements of the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes.

The article also listed the topics to be discussed at the Moscow Conference in the light of the information received from London, while the expectations of different foreign sources related to the conference were shared.

“[...] According to the reports from London, among the main issues to be discussed at the conference are:

1. The Straits issue and relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey,
2. Iran issue,
3. Palestinian issue,
4. The question of controlling the atomic energy,
5. Far Eastern affairs,
6. The question of the administration of Germany,
7. Eastern Europe affairs,
8. Southeast Europe, in other words, the question of the Balkans [...]” (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, December 15, 1945).

Doğrul then mentioned in his article that in the case of the above-stated issues to be discussed, there would be no important issues left. On the other hand, he also mentioned the opinion of the Times regarding the Straits issue.

"[...] The Times, after noting the difficulty of reaching an agreement on the Straits regime, writes that “Britain and America cannot allow any change that would harm Turkey's independence.” [...]” (Doğrul, *Cumhuriyet*, December 15, 1945).

In this article, where the expectations of the conference shared, it was pointed out that the policy style of the Anglo-Saxons towards the Soviet Union would have a direct impact on the outcome of the conference, and it was warned that the conference would be unsuccessful if the soft policy style pursued against the Soviet Union until this day was continued. In fact, this warning was taken one step further, and it was emphasized that if the conflict could not be resolved, the Soviet Union could lead the world into a new war, as Germany did once.

In addition to these warnings, Falih Rıfıkı Atay, who pointed out that the U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes and the U.K. Secretary of State Bevin were facing a *fait accompli* before the conference, in his article titled “*Moskova Konferansı (Moscow Conference)*”

published in *Ulus* on December 16, 1945, and he mentioned the important roles undertaken by these two statesmen.

In his article, Atay also pointed out that the outcome of the conference would determine the peace system in the world, and stated that two kinds of peace systems could be mentioned under the current conditions.

"[...] There are two peace systems: one is the separation of the world into zones of sovereignty called security among the great powers, which we think has vanished with the Nazi and fascist dictatorships. The second is the order of freedom and equality, which is based on the unconditional possession of all nations' own land and rights, and we wish that a new step has been taken in Moscow towards the elimination of the actions that prevented the latter from happening. This is the only good news we expect from Moscow [...]" (Atay, *Ulus*, December 16, 1945).

Stating that two kinds of freedom and two kinds of democracy would drag the world into a permanent war environment if the world were divided into sovereignty regions between the great powers, as stated in the first option, Atay then emphasized that to eliminate this possibility, the ongoing disputes between the countries that based on distrust should be resolved.

"[...] One voice reaches to Moscow from all nations of the world: Agree to end the unique tragedy for the sake of the freedom of nations with a peace that gives nations their freedom and ensures its continuity [...]" (Atay, *Ulus*, December 16, 1945).

In this period, when the world closely followed the results of the Moscow Conference, news about the conference, as well as news about three related issues that would affect the course of Turkish-Russian relations, began to appear in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. The first of these issues was the transfer of Armenians abroad to Soviet Armenia, which was become apparent with the initiatives of the Armenian National Committee at the San Francisco Conference.

Although November 21, 1945 dated Soviet government decision on the migration of Armenians living abroad to Soviet Armenia was learned through Soviet radio broadcasts on December 2, 1945, the invitation was not immediately shared with the Turkish public. *Cumhuriyet*, which addressed the issue in accordance with the communiqué (Erkin, 1968, p.274-275) prepared by Prime Minister Saraçoğlu to be published in the Istanbul

newspapers, as referred by Feridun Cemal Erkin, shared the first report regarding this issue on December 14, 1945.

In this report, which was shared with the title **“Rusya’ya gitmek isteyen Ermeni vatandaşlar (Armenian citizens who want to go to Russia)”** in *Cumhuriyet* on December 14, 1945, it was stated that upon the invitation of the Soviet Union, about 200 Turkish citizens of Armenian descent, who wanted to go to Armenia, had registered in the Soviet Consulates (*Cumhuriyet*, December 14, 1945).

In the news titled **“Rusya’ya gitmek isteyen İstanbullu Ermeniler (Istanbulite Armenians who want to go to Russia)”**, which was shared in *Cumhuriyet* on the next day, it was stated that 60 to 70 people applied to the Soviet Consulate, and it was emphasized that most of these people were *badly dressed, shabby and vagabond*. The report also included the words of respected Armenian citizens praising Turkey, in return for the *unqualified and useless Armenians* who applied to the Soviet Consulate to go to Soviet Armenia, *stating that their home country was Turkey*.

“[...] By the way, Dr. Nazaretyan said: “- This is the home of mine and many of my esteemed Armenian friends I know. In this free country, anyone can go anywhere. As for me, I will not move from my place because I know that I will not find the freedom that I have here anywhere.” [...]” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 15, 1945)

After Dr. Nazaretyan, the statements of the headmaster of the Bezezyan Armenian High School and the attitude taken by the Armenian Catholic Patriarchate regarding the issue were also mentioned in the report. Finally, it was stated that those who applied to leave the country in a manner contrary to the procedures without recourse to the Turkish authorities would be denationalized from Turkish citizenship.

In the report titled **“Türkiye’den Rusya’ya gitmek isteyen Ermeniler (Armenians who want to go to Russia from Turkey)”** published in *Cumhuriyet* on December 17, 1945, it was stated that the Turkish government would make several political attempts against the irregularities mentioned in the report dated December 15, 1945, in the meantime, it was also specified that these attempts would not be aimed at keeping those who wanted to go (*Cumhuriyet*, December 17, 1945).

After the informative news on December 14, 15, and 17 of 1945, about the Armenians who wanted to go to Soviet Armenia, the first comprehensive review of the issue was published in *Cumhuriyet* on December 19, 1945. Abidin Daver, who evaluated the issue in his column titled “*Hem Nalına Hem Mihna*”, drew attention to the two fronts of the issue in his article and detailed them.⁷²

“[...] There are two fronts to this issue:

1. The Soviet Union, like Tsarist Russia, wanted to use the Armenians as a political instrument by playing the role of patron of the Armenians;
2. The Invitation and registration of the Armenians in Turkey as if they were Russian citizens by the Soviet Consulate, without feeling a necessity for a meeting and agreement with the Turkish government [...]” (Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, December 19, 1945).

Daver, who first evaluated the issue through Soviet imperialism, as he mentioned in his article dated September 22, 1945, emphasized that the Soviet Union, just like Tsarist Russia, was taking the role of patron of Armenians and using them as leverage against Turkey (see p. 77-78). From this point on, Daver claimed that the Soviet Union intended to take back the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin, which had been left to Turkey under the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the 1921 Treaty of Kars.

Secondly, Daver mentioned the political and diplomatic problems caused by the issue in practice and underlined that the fact that those who want to go to Soviet Armenia registered directly through the Soviet Consulate without recourse to the Turkish authorities *damages the law and courtesy between the two countries*.

After focusing the two fronts of the issue mentioned above, Daver called on the prominent persons and press organizations of the Armenian community to enlighten Armenian citizens, referring to the words of the Moscow correspondent of Reuters.

“[...] As our friend wrote, it is important to remember the following important point: There is a way to go there, but no way to return. Because those who live in the communist heaven are not allowed to leave.

The task of enlightening his descendants in this matter will be relied upon by the Armenian press and its dignitaries” (Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, December 19, 1945).

⁷² Daver, *Cumhuriyet*, “**Ermenistan’a gitmek isteyenler**”, December 19, 1945

As can be understood from the statements of Abidin Daver, the policy of ignoring adopted in *Cumhuriyet* was gradually replaced with a more offensive policy. Because in the early days, while emphasizing that the majority of the Armenians who applied to Soviet Armenia consisted of unqualified and useless people, it was emphasized that *there was nothing lost*, and the statements of Abidin Daver who stated that the living standard in the Soviet Union was worse than that described. As it can be understood from his call to the Armenian community leaders, it was observed that this attitude started to change recently.

The second of the topics frequently featured in *Cumhuriyet* during the Moscow Conference was the development process of the events in Iran. After the decision was announced about the opening of The National Assembly of Azerbaijan in Northern Iran in through the Soviet radios on December 2, 1945, the Iran issue, which was become one of the subjects that the international community closely follows, especially the Moscow Conference, entered a new phase with the establishment of the Azerbaijan government on December 15, 1945.

Cumhuriyet, which brought this development to its pages with the title of “*Azerbaycan’da bir hükümet kuruldu (A government was formed in Azerbaijan)*” on December 16, 1945, according to sources in Tehran, a cabinet of 10 people was established in Northern Iran, and expressed that all ministries, except for the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were covered by this cabinet. On the other hand, the same report stated that the rebels wanted to be recognized as the *local government* of Azerbaijan, and underlined that the rebels who stated that they would recognize the Iranian flag and the Shah, wanted to collect their own taxes (*Cumhuriyet*, December 16, 1945).

The report, which was shared with the title “*İran parçalanıyor (Iran is falling apart)*” on December 19, 1945, emphasized that the growing Kurdish rebellion in Iran's Gilan province reached a more dangerous level than the issue in Northern Iran. It was reported that the guerrilla party that supported Russian occupation forces 29 years ago was back in action. It was also commented that the Iranian government, which could not even

capture a parliamentary majority in such an environment, was facing a possible revolution.

On the other hand, according to the information received from Tehran, although the newly formed Azerbaijan government did not establish the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and stated that even they would adhere to the Iranian constitution in these two fields, it was mentioned that they sent representatives to Moscow from day one.

It was also reported in the news, while the statements of the American officials related to the subject were also included, it was stated that the U.S. Secretary of State J. Byrnes and the British Foreign Minister Bevin faced a new “*fait accompli*” at the Moscow Conference (*Cumhuriyet*, December 19, 1945).

Besides the fact that Armenians living abroad were invited to Soviet Armenia and the Iranian events became more and more alarming, the developments that marked the Moscow Conference were undoubtedly led by the Georgian academics S. Canaşıya and N. Berdzenişvili's article titled “*Türkiye’ye karşı yasal taleplerimiz hakkında (About our legal demands against Turkey)*” published on December 14, 1945 (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 238).

The first reactions from the Turkish government to this article, published in the most prominent Soviet newspapers such as Pravda and Izvetsia on December 20, 1945, came from General Kazım Karabekir, a veteran of the Turkish War of Independence, and Foreign Minister Hasan Saka. On December 21, 1945, *Cumhuriyet* shared the statements made by Karabekir and Saka in the Turkish Grand National Assembly with its readers with the title “*Mecliste Rus istekleri meselesi görüşüldü (The issue of Russian demands was discussed in the Assembly)*”, and again on the same day, in the report titled “*Soğuk bir şaka! (A cold joke!)*” summary of the article of the Georgian academics in question was shared with the Turkish public.

Especially in the shadow of the Turkish-Russian relations, which have been tensed a lot after the Tan Printing House demonstration in Istanbul, it was underlined in the news that General Kazım Karabekir's decisive reproaches towards the Soviet demands, which were

getting increasingly serious and threatening, were met with great enthusiasm by the MPs in the parliament.

“[...] ”If the information we received from foreign press and agencies is true, our neighbour in the north has some requests from us. The whole world should know that the Straits are the throat of the Turkish nation, and Kars plateau is the backbone. It is in the interests of both states to become friends and to remain friends.” [...]” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1945).

After General Kazım Karabekir's statements underlining that Turkey's future and territorial integrity cannot be considered separately, the same news also stated that Foreign Minister Hasan Saka emphasized that Turkey was always ready for the reconstruction of Turkish – Russian friendship by drawing attention to Turkey's foreign policy approach that prioritizes international peace.

“[...] ”We want to be friendly with all states, and we work for that. Our goal is, as our great commander said, “*Peace at home, peace in the world*”. From now on, we will pursue our national policy of not wanting anything from anyone and not giving anything to anyone, as we have pursued so far. Even the Soviets' failure to renew the existing friendship and non-aggression agreement between us has not reduced our friendship desires and ambitions. We are always ready to renew and strengthen this friendship.” [...]” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1945).

In addition to the speeches of General Kazım Karabekir and Hasan Saka regarding the official view of Turkey in the face of recent developments, on the same day, *Cumhuriyet* shared the report titled “*Soğuk bir şaka! (A cold joke!)*” with its readers, in which the important parts of the article published by the Georgian academicians underlined (*Cumhuriyet*, December 21, 1945).

In the section quoted from the article, it was claimed that the Turks and Iranians, who were accused of assimilating the Georgians, shared the territory of Georgia through an agreement signed between them, so it was stated that *all the Lazistan, including the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, Artvin and Oltu, Tortum, Ispir, Bayburt, Gümüşhane, and Giresun*, which were allegedly within the borders of the Kingdom of Georgia in 987, were wanted back. On the other hand, the same section argued that the rights of the Georgians who fought for international interests on the contrary to Turkey, which was accused of supporting fascist Germany in the Second World War, should be given back.

The report also stated that this article, in which accusations targeting Turkey were frequently mentioned, was shared with the American and British foreign ministers who were in Moscow for the Tripartite Conference.

Following the publication of the article written by Georgian academicians with the Turkish public, *Cumhuriyet* began to carry the reactions and criticisms of Western press agencies regarding the issue on its pages as of December 22, 1945, and in this context, it published a report titled “*Konferans Türk Rus meselesini görüşüyor (Conference discusses the Turkish Russian issue)*”, which included the assessments made in the American and British press on the possible effects of the Georgian claims (*Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 1945).

First, The Times reported that these demands put forward by Georgian academics could put the Soviet Union in a difficult position in the matter of amending the Montreaux Convention, which was scheduled to be discussed at the Moscow Conference. In the same assessment, it was noted that these demands coincided with the criticisms directed against Turkey in the Soviet press, and it was underlined that they were heavier than all the demands that had been forwarded to Turkey so far.

Then the well-known commentator of The Daily Herald, William N. Ewer's assessment, stated that although the Soviet government did not explicitly support the article of Georgian academicians, the fact that two official Moscow newspapers devoted four columns to this article was a remarkable detail.

Finally, in the same report, a United Press article including remarkable reviews of M. Karl Mundt, one of the members of the U.S. Foreign Affairs Commission, who visited Turkey and Russia in the summer of 1945, was shared. In the article, M. Karl Mundt's statements which the effectiveness of the United Nations would be questioned if the Soviet Union made an official attempt on these demands were quoted, and his impressions that he gained from a meeting with President İsmet İnönü during his visit to Turkey regarding the Turkish – Soviet relations, were also given.

“[...] “Mundt said that when he visited Turkey in the summer, President İnönü told him ambiguously about some Russian wishes and that Turkey, while knowing that a victory

against Russia could not be hoped for, would prefer to fight than to bow down.” [...]” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 1945).

Besides these statements, according to the information stated in the same article from an unnamed source, it was stated that the Turkish General Staff has for some time been afraid of a possible Russian intervention in the port of Trabzon and its surroundings, and as evidence for this, it was stated that the Turkish army was still kept in the order of warfare, even though the war was over.

In addition to the reviews made by the American and British press regarding the Georgian demands and increasingly strained Turkish – Russian relations, on the same day, the editorial titled “*Türk – Rus dostluğunu tekrar kurmanın yolu (The way to rebuild Turkish – Russian friendship)*” published anonymously in *Cumhuriyet*, stands out as offering comprehensive and critical evaluations on Turkish – Russian relations.

In the article, it was stated that, after the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship in March 1945, despite all the friendly attempts of Turkey, the Soviet Union took a hostile approach. However, it was also emphasized that the subsequent Soviet moves brought the relations between the two countries to a stalemate.

In this context, firstly, it was stated that the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union for the renewal of the Turkish-Russian Friendship Treaty damaged Turkey's faith in Russian friendship. In April 1945, the Soviet Union began to incite the separatist Armenians and then sent a note to the Turkish government regarding the Tan Printing House incident in December 1945 to inflame the tension between the two countries, and the fact that the Soviet Union now supported the Georgian demands has been criticised with allusive statements.

“[...] [the Soviet Union] now wants Georgia to be given the Turkish territory that extends all the way to Giresun by provoking the Georgians. At this rate, it should be no wonder that the people who live along the Angara River in Siberia are also provoking Ankara to ask them to do so [...]” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 1945).

In the course of these events, the article shows as a reason of the breakdown of the friendship between the two countries that the Soviet Union, which emerged strongly from

the wars in Asia and Europe, began to act with imperialist ambitions just like its predecessor, Tsarist Russia, and thus Turkey became an obstacle to these imperialist aims.

“[...] The Soviet Union, in the east of Europe and in the Balkans, after establishing governments subject to its orders based on the Red Army, has deviated to realize its ambition to land in the Mediterranean and wants to demolish the Turkish Great Wall, which is the only obstacle to its landing in the Mediterranean [...]” (No name, *Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 1945).

After these evaluations, at the end of the article, the constructive and friendly approach of the General Kazım Karabekir and Foreign Affairs Minister Hasan Saka towards the Turkish – Russian relations under the shadows of the *ludicrous* claims of Georgian professors were mentioned. After all, it was also emphasized that the only condition for the re-establishment of the Turkish-Russian friendship was the withdrawal of the Soviet demands.

“[...] If we consider the solution of the matter from our front, when Moscow gives up its desire to ask for a base in the Straits, that is, having an eye on Istanbul, and to take over the Turkish territories starting from Kars, Ardahan, Artvin to Giresun, there will be no obstacle left to the return the friendly relations. As long as Soviet Russia continues to follow its path today, it will never gain Turkey's friendship. Because we do not want anything from anyone, and we are determined not to give anything to anyone” (*Cumhuriyet*, December 22, 1945).

3.3.3. January 1946

It was observed that the developments of December 1945, which constitute an important turning point for Turkish-Russian relations, especially the issue of Georgian demands, continued to appear in the newspapers of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in the first month of 1946 with the same seriousness and concern. From this point on, it is seen that until the United Nations General Assembly, which was to be convened in London on January 10, 1946, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* frequently shared reports on three closely related topics. These reports can be listed as reports on the Moscow Conference results, national and foreign press reports on Georgian demands, and expectations from the UN General Assembly meeting to be held in London.

The first comprehensive evaluations of the results of the Moscow Conference, which was closely followed by the Turkish public with the hopes of a peaceful resolution of the issues in Northern Iran and the immediate elimination of disputes over demands of the

Soviet Union from Turkey, began to be shared in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in the first days of the new year.

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet* published assessments of Britanova and Reuters regarding the talks between Cevat Açıkalın, Turkey's Ambassador to London, and the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Bevin on the return of the Moscow Conference, with the readers on January 1, 1946.⁷³

According to the Britanova agency's news that both newspapers shared on their front pages, British Foreign Minister Bevin's meeting with Ambassador Açıkalın as soon as he arrived the country and consulted on ongoing issues were considered as an evidence of the urgency and concern of the situation in the Turkish – Russian relations. On the other hand, the same report emphasized that although the governments of Ankara and Moscow intend to maintain tranquillity, the propagandists of the two countries pose an obstacle to this intention, and therefore the process reached a complete stalemate. The report also expressed concern over statements about the Turkish nation's readiness to fight against Russian demands, which became a more significant problem along with the claims of Georgian academicians.

"[...] For today, the Russian – Turkish issue is in a complete stalemate. The Russian press is indeed asserting unacceptable demands, and Turkish newspapers are not hesitant to say that if Russia insists on their demands, the war cannot be prevented [...]" (*Ulus & Cumhuriyet*, January 1, 1946).

In the report, which included the evaluations of the Reuters besides the Britanova, regarding the results of the Moscow Conference, it was stated that many issues such as Iran, the Near East, and the Middle East, especially the Turkish issue, could not be resolved at the conference. In addition to these, the Reuters report, which provided detailed observations on issues of primary concern to Turkey, emphasized that the issue of the amendment of the Montreaux Convention, as well as the demands for Kars and Ardahan provinces, were not negotiated at the Tripartite Meeting.

⁷³ *Ulus*, “**Arazi istekleri; Mr. Bevin dün Londra’da Büyükelçimizle görüştü**”, January 1, 1946; *Cumhuriyet*, “**Rus istekleri için Londra’da endişe**”, January 1, 1946

On January 2, 1946, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* shared with their readers the statements of Ambassador Açıkalın, who answered the questions of the British newspaper *New Chronicle* and expressing sorrow over the results of the conference, following his meeting with the U.K. Foreign Minister Bevin, without adding any comment.⁷⁴

In an interview published on the front pages of both newspapers, it was stated that Ambassador Açıkalın shared the deep sorrow of the Turkish government for the lack of any improvement in the Iranian issue at the conference, and pointed out the importance of a constructive solution of the Iranian issue for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, especially Turkey. In the news, it was underlined that Ambassador Açıkalın, who answered to the question raised by the reporter of *The New Chronicle* about the repercussions of the Turkish-Russian affairs in the conference by stating that the issues discussed at the conference were not directly related to the future of the relations between the two countries. Furthermore, it was also stated that despite his regret that important issues were not discussed, the partial agreement reached by the major states could be beneficial for everyone.

Statements of the Ambassador Açıkalın, who gave explanations regarding the present situation of the Turkish-Russian relations, indicating that the deteriorated relations between the two countries did not derive from Turkey's policy style, in fact, Turkey never denied supporting the Soviet Union as well as Allied states, when the historical realities examined, were also included.

It was also stated that, in the last phase of the interview, Ambassador Açıkalın also mentioned the principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and stated that Turkish foreign policy was based on the principles of establishing sustainable friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, which were of great importance for the security of Turkey and the Near East.

⁷⁴ *Ulus*, “Londra Büyükelçimiz diyor ki: Türkiye olmaksızın Türk meselelerini münakaşa etmek beyhude olacaktır”, January 2, 1946; *Cumhuriyet*, “Rus talepleri davasının halli için tasavvurlar”, January 2, 1946

In addition to the statements made by Ambassador Açıkalın to the British press, *Cumhuriyet* also covered the developments in the U.K. on the same day, with a report titled “*Moskova’da Üçler bizim için neler konuştular? (What did the Big Three talk about us in Moscow?)*”. In this report, the explanation given by British Foreign Minister Bevin about the Moscow Conference at the Cabinet meeting chaired by Prime Minister Attlee was mentioned. The report stated that Bevin shared with Cabinet members his deep regret on the interruption of the negotiations on the Iran issue and that after the consultation on the Turkish – Russian issue, British Cabinet members began to be concerned about the severe reactions that had already started to appear in the Turkish press in response to the Russian demands (*Cumhuriyet*, January 2, 1946).

The reports include severe reactions, which were also brought to the British cabinet's attention, began to appear in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* since the last days of December. The Soviet demands, which were set forth firstly at the Molotov-Sarper talks in June 1945, after the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship in March 1945, caused a severe reaction in the Turkish public with the allegations put forward by the Georgian academicians. In fact, reports in which regional and local newspapers affirmed their support and confidence in the central government and expressed their anger and criticisms against these demands were shared in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, uncommonly in between June 1945 and December 1945.

In the report which was shared with the title “*Rus istekleri Trabzon’da büyük bir asabiyetle karşılandı (Russian demands were met with great anger in Trabzon)*” in *Ulus* on December 27, 1945, the reaction of the people of the region against the Georgian demands which were referred in the local newspaper named *Halk* in Trabzon province, was included. In this report, which was shared on the front page of *Ulus*, it was emphasized that Turkey was an indivisible whole within the borders of national oath and that the Turks would defend their homeland till the end, as the inheritors of Atatürk. On the other hand, a point in the way the news is transmitted comes to the fore; the report of local newspaper *Halk* was shared in *Ulus* with an image from Trabzon province, with the note “*a view from Trabzon, which is Turk to the bone, and whose ancestries were Turk, history is Turk, and the future will be Turk*” (*Ulus*, December 27, 1945).

In addition to this example from December 1945, it was observed that suchlike news were frequently published in the early days of January 1946 in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*. On January 1, 1946, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* published reports retrieved from foreign sources, regarding the results of the Moscow Conference, as well as the protests against recent Georgian demands in Zonguldak and Ordu provinces.

In the report shared in *Ulus* on January 1, 1946, with the title “*Gülünç iddialara cevap: Türkiye'nin kimseye bir karış toprak borcu yoktur (Answer to the ridiculous claims: Turkey owes no one a single piece of land)*”, it was stated that many workers, tradesmen and professional groups in Zonguldak province, especially members of the party organization of the CHP and the administrative board of people's houses, reaffirmed their loyalty to the statesmen with a telegram they sent. The contents of this telegram were also shared in the news that the people of Zonguldak were ready to fight till the end to protect the homeland and independence, if necessary, under the command of their *great leaders and the glorious Turkish flag* against the territorial claims over the Turkish lands (*Ulus*, January 1, 1946).

On the other hand, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* also shared the article of Ali Rıza Gürsoy, who served as mayor of Ordu province for a period. In the article, which firstly published in the local newspaper *Gürses*, Gürsoy reflected the reaction and determination of the people of Ordu province against these territorial claims. In his article, for whatever reason or motivation, Gürsoy emphasized that even a single span would not be given to anyone unless the land of the homeland from the eastern borders to the Straits *was covered with the body of twenty million Turks*, and emphasized that they *considered dying with honor for this purpose as the beginning of eternal life*.⁷⁵

Following the simultaneous publication of the criticism and reactions expressed in the local press against Georgian demands in Trabzon, Zonguldak, and Ordu provinces in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, *Cumhuriyet* continued to cover the ongoing protests in Çanakkale,

⁷⁵ *Ulus*, “*Gülünç iddialara cevap: Türkiye'nin kimseye bir karış toprak borcu yoktur*”, January 1, 1946; *Cumhuriyet*, “*Gürcü iddiaları Ordu'da da derin infial uyandırdı*”, January 1, 1946

Hatay, and Aydın provinces as well as in Sürmene and Çıldır districts in the following days.

In the report titled “*Yurtta asabiyet ve heyecan devam ediyor (Anger and excitement continue at home)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on January 2, 1946, it was stated that during the protests held against Georgian demands; people reminded the victory of Çanakkale to those who claimed rights over Turkish lands. On the other hand, it was also underlined that the people of Çanakkale stated their readiness to make all kinds of sacrifices on the path to independence that initiated by Atatürk and İnönü. In the same news, developments regarding the protests that took place in Hatay, which joined the homeland on July 23, 1939, were also shared, and it was stated that the people of Hatay chanted that the whole *Turkish nation was ready to be set on fire for a single span of Turkish soil* in the rally that held (*Cumhuriyet*, January 2, 1946).

On the next day, sharing the news regarding the protests organized by the peoples of Sürmene and Çıldır districts with the title “*Yurtta infial ve asabiyet (Indignation and anger at home)*” *Cumhuriyet* touched that on January 2, about 5,000 people in Sürmene district held a public demonstration to protest against foreign demands on Turkish lands, on the other hand, stated that 4,572 people from Çıldır district sent a telegram that emphasizes their unwavering commitment to the President İnönü (*Cumhuriyet*, January 3, 1946).

On January 4, 1946, *Cumhuriyet*, which carried the protests in Aydın province to its pages with the news titled “*Yurtta infial (Indignation at home)*”, featured an article written by Raif Aydoğdu, the mayor of Aydın province, in a local newspaper *Aydın*. In addition to the words of Aydoğdu, who stated that the territorial claims “*at most, put forward to prepare the ground for an Eastern-style negotiation*”, the article written by journalist Hikmet Şölen in the local newspaper *Doğan*, was shared in the same report. In his article, he emphasized that Turkey was no longer a country open to external effects like the last days of the Ottoman Empire and that the noble children who unite under Atatürk's flag and idea, were the sole owners of the land of the homeland (*Cumhuriyet*, January 4, 1946).

Cumhuriyet, which expressed the reactions and protests of the people of Aydin regarding the Georgian demands through the articles of Raif Aydođdu and Hikmet řölen, shared the article of Professor Yavuz Abadan titled “**Hak ve řeref yolu (The path of truth and honour)**” on the same day. Abadan, who drew attention to the sacrifice and determination shown by the Turkish nation in the War of Independence, emphasized that this nation, which *never left the path of truth and honour*, would stand against all kinds of an imperialist threat as an *indivisible and invincible force* just like it did 25 years ago (Abadan, *Cumhuriyet*, January 4, 1946).

In addition to these reports published in *Cumhuriyet*, a program dated January 3, 1946, broadcasted by Ankara Radio in several foreign languages, including English related to Georgian demands, shared by *Ulus* on January 4, 1946, is also notable.⁷⁶ As stated in the telegram sent by U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Edwin C. Wilson to his superiors on January 4, 1946, the radio broadcast emphasized that the Georgian demands consisted of *a fairy tale* (FRUS, vol. VII, 1946, p. 806) and that the audience could confirm the allegations from any sources.

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which carried the rising reactions and criticisms from all over Turkey against the Soviet pressure increased recently and the territorial claims put forward by Georgian academicians, also featured the articles of respected Turkish historians during the same period. This news and articles, which were closely related to recent developments such as motherland awareness in the Turkish history and the inconsistency of the Georgian demands, which were claimed to be based on historical realities, were published in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* on January 3, and 4, 1946.

The first example to be given to the articles published in this context was the article titled “**Türk tarihinde “Mukaddes yurt” telakkisi (Conception of “Sacred motherland” in Turkish history)**” written by Turkish historian and Turkologist Ibrahim Kafesođlu in *Cumhuriyet* on January 3, 1946.

⁷⁶ *Ulus*, “**Tarihi hakikat: Gürcü masalının esası nedir?**”, January 4th, 1946

Explaining the Turks' devotion to their motherland for centuries through symbols and beliefs in his article, Professor Kafesoğlu emphasized that to understand the unique characteristics of the Turks, one should look at the two thousand years of the Turkish history and sociological structure.

“[...] We are also witnessing this love of motherland in the belief of “Blessed Mountain”, which our ancestors raised the greatness to the religious level. According to them, the motherland was considered a divine being, or rather a part of the “Turkish God”.

The unity of faith here and hundreds of others like that are enough to show how practical the concepts of their ancestors are in the formation of the Turkish national structure [...]” (Kafesoğlu, *Cumhuriyet*, January 3, 1946).

Following Ibrahim Kafesoğlu's remarks about how the Turkish society mobilized against the territorial claims targeted their motherland, Dr. M. Devecioğlu's article titled “*Gürcü tarihinin iç yüzü nedir? (What is the inside story of the Georgian history?)*” published in *Cumhuriyet* on January 5, 1946, was also notable due to including statements to rebut the claims of Georgian academicians.

Started his article by questioning the Georgian history whether it was as stated or not, Devecioğlu then began to examine the demographic structure of Georgia after drawing attention to the importance of the Caucasus, the museum of peoples and languages, one of the two passages that played a major role in connecting Europe and Asia (the others were Istanbul and the Straits).

The author, who claimed that Georgians were not even aware that they were called “Georgian”, stated that the people called themselves “Kartvelian” were essentially consist of seven communities, shared the latest population distribution of these seven communities according to recent research, with readers.

“[...] According to the latest statistics, the distribution ratios are as follows:

Population	Community name
480,000	Georgians
500,000	Imeretians
100,000	Guris
70.000	Chechens
11.000	Pshavis
7.000	Khevsuratis [...]” (Devecioğlu, <i>Cumhuriyet</i> , January 5, 1946)

In light of this data, Devocioğlu emphasized that Georgians were far from representing unity in a racial sense, and then questioned whether the Georgian territory, which Georgian scholars claimed that based on historical realities, was true. Reminding that the coasts of the Black Sea had invaded by the IV. David (expressed as II. David in the article), who ruled the Kingdom of Georgia -founded in 920- in between 1089 and 1125, Devocioğlu emphasized that domination over the coasts of the Black Sea, which was a complete invasion, would not support the claim that the lands in question belonged to the Georgians.

Ulus and *Cumhuriyet*, which covered the news and articles from the national and local press agencies against the increasing Soviet pressure and the recent Georgian demands, also closely followed the publications made in favour of Turkey in the international arena when the United Nations General Assembly meeting was approaching. In this context, the articles of the British magazine Tribune and the Greek newspaper Kathimerini, which were shared in the early days of January, stands out as important examples.

In the article of the Tribune magazine, one of the major media organs of the British Labour Party, which shared in *Ulus* on January 2, 1946, it was highlighted that the eastern provinces of Turkey, which were subjected to the Georgian demands, were unquestionably belonged to Turkey, and stated that there was no such a thing as Georgian issue in Turkey or anywhere else in the world. On the other hand, in the same article, it was pointed out that *the developments in Azerbaijan brought Russia to the center of the Middle Eastern stage* and emphasized that the Soviet Union was now actually becoming a neighbour of Iraq.⁷⁷

Following the publication of the article of the Tribune magazine, which expressed its support for the Turkish cause and concern for Russian expansionism, *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* shared the article of the Greek newspaper Kathimerini with its readers on January 3, 1946.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ *Ulus*, “Gürcü meselesi diye bir mesele yoktur”, January 2, 1946

⁷⁸ *Ulus*, “Sovyetlerle ihtilaf: Bir Yunan gazetesinin yazdığına göre Türk – Rus meselesi de Londra’da konuşulacak”, January 3rd, 1946; *Cumhuriyet*, “Türkiye’nin yapacağı imtihan”, January 3rd, 1946

In the article that pointed out that the Turkish - Russian relations, which have been tensed a lot with the Georgian demands and started to closely followed by the international community, would be one of the most important agenda items of the UN General Assembly to be held in London, claimed that the structure of the UN agency would be destroyed, if the General Assembly fails to resolve this conflict.

To base this claim, the article reminded in detail how Turkish-Russian relations reached their current status, and it was stated that Turkish-Russian relations had been dragged into a new dilemma, together with the anger created by the Georgian demands in Turkish society.

“[...] Ankara agrees to review the Montreaux Convention, and the Turks received British and American proposals for such a review. However, the Georgian demands and territorial claims over Kars and Ardahan provinces are separate issues. All the news received from Ankara clearly shows that the Turks would rather fight with the Soviet Union than giving land [...]”
(Ulus & Cumhuriyet, January 3, 1946)

Stating that the way the Russians supported the Georgian demands and their plans regarding the Kars and Ardahan provinces were increasingly worrying the Turkish people, in the article, it was also underlined that this policy style pursued by the Russians began to be described as *Hitler-like attitudes* by many Turks.

In light of these facts, the article emphasized that the issue of one UN member state requesting land from another would become one of the most vital issues of the UN General Assembly, and stated that if the problem could not be solved, the entire organizational structure would collapse and small powers would encounter with immense security problems.

The last part of the article stated that the United States and the United Kingdom, who aware of this danger, would defend Turkey as a friendly country against the Soviet Union at the upcoming UN General Assembly, and noted that Greece would be of great benefit if the Turkish – Russian issue were to be resolved.

In addition to articles by British and Greek newspapers stating that the issues which consider Turkey directly would be of vital importance at the upcoming UN General Assembly, Professor Nihat Erim's article published in *Ulus* on January 6, 1946, was also

attracting attention for describing the general perspective on Turkey's expectations from the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting.⁷⁹

Erim, who started his article by drawing attention to the fact that humanity was going through very important days for their future, emphasized that the distress and anxiety caused by the failure to build peace and security after the war, unfortunately, attracts more attention than the social, political and economic problems caused by the war. Erim stated that the UN General Assembly, which would be opened soon under these circumstances, would be the stage for decisions of great importance for the future of humanity, and emphasized that member states must learn from the mistakes of the past and strive for the interests of the international community; otherwise the world would face unimaginable destruction.

In the last part of his article, stating that these feelings were shared by the people from all over the world, as well as statesmen who would represent the fifty nations in London, Erim underlined the fact that the UN General Assembly which would take place in London, *the winner of the war, the brave and heroic city*, would have a positive impact on all participants.

On the day of the publication of these statements by Professor Nihat Erim in *Ulus*, two important developments that closely concern Turkish foreign policy took place before the UN General Assembly. The first of these was that the Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka and the accompanying Turkish delegation went to London immediately before the UN General Assembly to discuss Turkish – Russian relations with their British and American counterparts and to explain Turkey's strict stance on this issue. *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* reported to their readers that Hasan Saka and the accompanying Turkish delegation went to London earlier due to the reasons mentioned on January 6, 1946, with news both newspapers published on their front pages.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ *Ulus*, “Bir dönüm noktasındayız”, January 6, 1946

⁸⁰ *Ulus*, “Konferans'ta Türkiye; Hasan Saka Londra'da İngiliz ve Amerikan şefleriyle görüşecek”, January 6, 1946; *Cumhuriyet*, “Türkiye'nin kararı”, January 6, 1946

Another important development took place in Ankara on the same day. At a time when the tension in the country escalated with increasing Soviet pressure and subsequent Georgian demands, Turkish Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu held a press conference on January 6, 1946, and made extensive statements on these issues that had been the agenda of the Turkish public for a while. Prime Minister Saraçoğlu's extensive assessments regarding the subjects of Turkish foreign policy, increasing Soviet pressure, Armenian and Georgian demands, as well as his call for common sense for Turkish journalists, were shared with readers on January 7, 1946 issue of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.⁸¹

In this statement, which was shared in *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*'s front pages, Saraçoğlu emphasized two important issues that Turkey has been suffering from for a while, and then made some wishes and calls. In his statements, Saraçoğlu, who evaluated the issue of giving the Kars and Ardahan provinces as a homeland to the Armenians living abroad, stated his firm belief that the majority of the Armenian citizens living in Istanbul would remain loyal to their states by not being concerned with external provocations. Then, stating that the provinces subjected to the demands were left to Russia, pursuant to the San Stefano Peace Treaty, which was signed after the last Turkish - Russian war on March 3, 1878, corresponding to the 1,410 million roubles of compensation, Saraçoğlu expressed that this decision was also included in the subsequently signed Treaty of Berlin dated July 13, 1878. Saraçoğlu continued by reminding that Turkey and Russia, which came out of the First World War with great losses, agreed to determine the future of these two provinces by plebiscite, and underlined that Kars and Ardahan *were returned* to Turkey according to the results of the plebiscite (85,124 of 87,048 voters voted in favour of Turkey). Saraçoğlu then refuted the claims that shared in some newspapers about Kars and Ardahan were taken back by exploiting Russia's weakness and stated that *Turkey was almost non-existent at the time*.

Secondly, in evaluating the claims of Georgian academicians and their publication in the Soviet press, Saraçoğlu emphasized that the citizens living in the provinces where the allegations directed were the refugees who fled from the persecution of the Tsar and his

⁸¹ *Ulus*, “**Başbakanımız dün mühim bir demeçte bulundu; Toprak isteklerine cevabımız**”, January 7, 1946; *Cumhuriyet*, “**Başbakanın mühim demeci**”, January 7, 1946

armies. Based on the statistical data of 1935, Saraçoğlu stated that the number of citizens speaking the Georgian language in Turkey and how many of them lived in the provinces where the allegations directed, and he accused the Georgian professors of not knowing the history of yesterday and today because of their inconsistent claims.

After these two important issues, Saraçoğlu conveyed his appreciation on behalf of the Turkish nation to the press organizations of the U.S., Greece, Switzerland, India, Arab countries, France, Sweden, and particularly the U.K., for their strong support to Turkey against the allegations directed by Georgian academicians. Stating that *the reason for this interest mainly derived from the policy of Turkey that never goes astray, as it has never been*, Saraçoğlu then stated that the Republic of Turkey, who fights for the prosperity of the international community, aimed to strengthen her friendly relations with her neighbours, strongly committed to the principles of the San Francisco.

In the last part of the press conference, Saraçoğlu drew attention to the recently appeared severe criticisms and comments in the Turkish press and called for dignity and calmness to be adopted by the Turkish youth and Turkish journalists, especially until the troubled waters settle down, considering the conditions of the day.

While the British and American governments were particularly concerned about the recent news and articles targeting the Soviet Union, which were mainly published in the local and national newspapers of Turkey, on the way to the UN General Assembly, it was possible to infer that Prime Minister Saraçoğlu wanted to prevent publications that could harm Turkey's national interests in the international arena, with these statements. In this context, the telegrams that the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson telegrams sent to his country's Foreign Ministry on January 3, 1946, and January 15, 1946, supports inferences regarding the sensitivity of the Turkish government in this regard.

The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Edwin C. Wilson, who summarized his conversation with Feridun Cemal Erkin, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, in his telegram sent to his superiors on January 3, 1946, stated that according to Erkin, patriotic protests would continue in addition to reactionary articles in the Turkish press if the Soviet pressure continued. However, in the same telegram, Wilson

stated that Erkin assured him that these possible reactionary articles and patriotic protests would not have hostile or provocative characteristics as before (FRUS, vol. VII, 1946, p. 806).

Upon the Soviet diplomatic note dated January 12, 1946, regarding the articles that contain heavy accusations against the Soviet leaders, Stalin and Molotov, published in *Vatan* and *Tanin* (Hasanlı, 2011, p. 257), Ambassador Wilson met with Secretary-General Erkin to discuss the issue. In the telegram that he sent to his superiors to inform them of the latest developments, Wilson stated that Erkin informed him about the measures taken by the Turkish government to reduce the tension. Mentioning that Erkin told him that a few days before the Soviet note was received, Prime Minister Saracoğlu sent a letter to the Turkish press that asking from them to refrain from giving offense to the Soviet Union, Wilson then mentioned that these statements were also included in the answer note sent by the Turks to Russia. In addition to that, Wilson stated that with this initiative, the Turkish government expected their Soviet counterparts to adopt the same approach and eliminate such injurious press and radio articles and comments against Turkey. In the last part of his telegram, Wilson stated that he had confirmed Prime Minister Saraçoğlu's initiative to limit the anti-Soviet news coverages from the other sources and that there had indeed been very few reports in the Turkish press that could be described as strongly critical criticism of the Soviet Union since then (FRUS, vol. VII, 1946, p.808-809).

When evaluated in scope *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, it was noted that, as Ambassador Wilson stated in his telegram, there was a noticeable decrease in news and articles with heavy criticism and accusations against the Soviet Union until the early days of February 1946.

4. CONCLUSION

In this research, which conducted to understand the threat perception and the alliance preferences of Turkey in the period between March 19, 1945, and January 7, 1946, by looking at the related publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, two hypotheses were tested.

As it was stated in the “*Aims and the Importance of the Study*” section of this thesis, the first aim was to test the relevance of the *middle power* characteristics of Turkey, which were pointed out by the several authors, by analyzing the related publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in the given period. On the other hand, the second aim, which was also related to the first one, was to establish the direct and indirect influence of the Turkish government over the publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* while constructing the perception of threat and alliance preferences in the given time period.

To properly test these hypotheses, publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* separated into three subsequent sections. In the first section, entitled *Period of Denial (March 20, 1945 – June 22, 1945)*, which indicates the time scale between March 20, 1945, the day after the termination of the Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, and June 22, 1945, when the Turkish press informed about the Soviet demands, three main conclusions made.

Firstly, it was observed that, after the termination of the Turkish Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* denied the deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and the Soviet Union and avoided such editorial comments that might harm Turkish diplomacy dynamics towards the Soviet Union and the Western allies. On the other hand, both newspapers have given wide coverage to the reports and articles retrieved by the foreign press agencies -particularly from the British and American- to understand the general stance towards the issue.

Secondly, emphasis on the necessity of the strengthened international cooperation despite different opinions, in order to settle the ongoing conflicts and to establish desired international peace and prosperity stands out as another important discourse of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in this period.

And thirdly, it was observed that both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* attached significant importance to the role that the Anglo-Saxons -particularly the U.S.- would play in the post-war period.

In the following section, entitled ***Period of Recognition (June 22, 1945 – November 2, 1945)***, which refers the time scale starting on June 22, 1945, the day when the Turkish press informed about the Soviet demands, and ending on November 2, 1945, when the first American diplomatic note regarding the Straits received by the Turkish government, three conclusions made.

Firstly, it was observed that neither *Ulus* nor *Cumhuriyet* explicitly mentioned the Soviet demands until the speeches of Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu on July 10, 1945, and Foreign Minister Hasan Saka on July 12, 1945. However, it was also seen that, as of the last week of June 1945, after receiving the information regarding the Soviet demands, both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* started to publish articles and reports, which were mainly addressing the necessity of the national unity and responsibilities.

Secondly, it was observed that both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* attached great importance to the agendas and the possible consequences of international conferences such as the Potsdam Conference, which convened in July 1945, and the Council of Foreign Ministers held in September 1945. In this regard, it could also be stated that the failures of both the Potsdam Conference and the Council of Foreign Ministers marked significant turning points in both foreign policy priorities of Turkey and the editorial policies of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*.

Thirdly, it was also seen that, despite the widening gap between *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in terms of the editorial language they used towards the Soviet demands by the end of September 1945, the amount of simultaneously published news and articles in both newspapers, which were mostly related to the subjects that formed the main dynamics of Turkish foreign policy at the time, increased significantly.

And finally, in the last section, entitled ***Period of Internationalization (November 2, 1945 – January 7, 1946)*** which indicates the time scale starting on November 2, 1945,

when the first American diplomatic note regarding the Straits received by the Turkish government, and ending on December 7, 1945, the day after the speech made by Turkish Prime Minister Saraçoğlu regarding the recent developments that increased the tension with the Soviet Union, three main conclusions could be made.

First of all, it was observed that both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* gained confidence in the face of the ongoing uncertainties that emerged after the Potsdam Conference, with the receipt of first American and British diplomatic notes regarding the Straits in the early days of November 1945.

However, in December 1945, it was seen that *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* started to address the seriousness of the Soviet threat more frequently than in previous months, as Soviet propaganda grew at home and abroad also the events in Northern Iran became more complicated. In addition to these developments, along with the Tan Printing House demonstrations in Istanbul and the unfounded claims of the Georgian academicians led both newspapers to demonstrate a strict attitude towards the Soviet threat. In this regard, it was also seen that both *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* gave wide coverage to the reports and articles retrieved from both local and Western press agencies, which indicated support to the Turkish cause in the face of increasing Soviet propaganda.

On the other hand, it was also observed that, first, the speech of the General Director of the Press and Publication Directorate (B.Y.U.M.) Nedim Veysel İlkin after the demonstrations in Istanbul, then speeches of General Kazım Karabekir and Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka regarding the Georgian demands, and lastly, the press conference of the Turkish Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu on the back of increasing anti-Soviet propaganda in the country, come to the fore in this period as attempts to limit and control the publications of the Turkish press to prevent any harm to the Turkish foreign policy at the time.

In brief, when analyzed within the context and the scope of the research, it could be stated that despite her insufficient economic and military resources at its disposal, Turkey, who pursued a balance policy during the Second World War, adopted the essence of “*good international citizenship*” in her foreign policy in the given time period. In addition to

this, as shown in this research, after the termination of the Turkish – Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship, Turkey first tried to exploit the balance between the U.S and the Soviet Union to find a way to prevent such a chronic dispute. But then after, as it can be seen in the related articles of the distinguished authors of the period, particularly after the Soviet demands and the failure of the Potsdam Conference, Turkey turned her face to the Western allies and made significant effort to consolidate their support to alleviate the Soviet threat. Therefore, it could be concluded that both arguments of William Hale and Barlas & Güvenç regarding the middle power characteristics of Turkey proved in this study.

On the other hand, in line with the alliance preferences of Turkey in the given period, despite such differences between *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* in terms of the intensity of their editorial languages specifically towards the Soviet Union, both newspapers and their authors remained loyal to their framework which was set by the central government. In this regard, it could also be stated that the direct and indirect influence of the government in the publications of *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet* particularly on threat perception and alliance preferences, were also proved.

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