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CONTINENTAL POWERS AND QUEST FOR STATUS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ'S FLEET (1861-1876)

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SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. SERHAT GÜVENÇ

PHD THESIS

ISTANBUL, JUNE 2020

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PHD THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the Discipline Area of International Relations under the Program of International Relations.

ISTANBUL, JUNE, 2020

I, MEHMET ALİOĞLU;

Hereby declare that this PhD Thesis is my own original work and that due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources.

MEHMET ALİOĞLU

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JUNE 2020

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

This work entitled **CONTINENTAL POWERS AND QUEST FOR STATUS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZIZ'S FLEET (1861-1876)** prepared by **MEHMET ALİOĞLU** has been judged to be successful at the defense exam held on **... ... 2020** and accepted by our jury as **PHD THESIS**.

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ABSTRACT

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In this study, the Ottoman Fleet during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz is taken as a case that stands out as a Nineteenth Century precursor to subsequent efforts by continental powers, Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany and Stalin's USSR, to build sub-optimal fleets in the Twentieth Century. Therefore, these two cases are added in order to answer the following question: why do continental powers establish or try to acquire naval power beyond levels needed for the physical security of the state? In the first chapter, the purpose, the scope, and the methodology are presented. In the second chapter, the theoretical framework of the study is established and why a Constructivist theoretical framework is preferred over a Realist one is explained. The third chapter is devoted to the study of Ottoman sea power from historical and theoretical perspectives. As a result, the Ottoman Empire is identified as a continental power. In the fourth chapter, the strategic needs of the Ottoman Empire are studied to identify physical threats to the state from a historical perspective. The fifth chapter covers the fleet of Sultan Abdülaziz and its evaluation against potential threats. The inquiry made shows that Sultan Abdülaziz's Fleet was not commensurate with the threats it was supposed to counter. Therefore, it was an irrational arming decision. As a result, it is studied from a struggle for recognition perspective which fits in with the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. In the sixth and seventh chapters, the German and the Soviet naval expansions are evaluated against the threats these states faced. As a result, the German and Soviet fleets during the reigns of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Joseph Stalin are identified as inappropriate tools against the physical threats they were supposed to counter. They instead fit better in a struggle for recognition perspective. Then Ottoman, German, and Soviet naval expansions are comparatively evaluated to answer the question of why

continental powers establish or try to acquire naval power beyond levels needed for the physical security of the state. In this context this study concludes that all three states tried to acquire status through naval power. Hence, Constructivism offers a better explanation of continental states' over-investments in naval power.

Keywords: Constructivism, Status seeking, Ottoman Empire, Continental Power, Seapower State

ÖZET

ALİOĞLU, MEHMET. KARA DEVLETLERI VE STATÜ ARAYIŞI: ABDÜLAZİZ DONANMASINA AİT KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA (1861-1876), DOKTORA TEZİ, İstanbul, 2020.

Bu çalışmada neden karasal devletler fiziksel güvenlik gereklerinin ötesinde bahriye kurmaya çalışırlar sorusu Sultan Abdülaziz Donanması örneği üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bu çaba 20. yüzyılda Wilhelm Almanyası ile Stalin dönemi Sovyetler Birliği'nin giriştiği büyük donanma kurma çabalarının bir öncüsüdür. Dolayısıyla bu iki örnek karşılaştırma amacıyla teze dahil edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda 1. Bölümde tezin amaç, kapsam, ve yöntemi ayrıntılı olarak tanımlanmıştır. 2. Bölümde tezin kuramsal çerçevesi İnşaacı bir kuram tercih edilerek oluşturulmuş ve bunun gerekçeleri belirtilmiştir. 3. Bölümde Osmanlı deniz gücü tarihsel ve kuramsal bileşenler üzerinden incelenmiş ve Osmanlı Devleti'nin karasal bir devlet olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. 4. Bölümde Sultan Abdülaziz döneminde devletin karşı karşıya olduğu tehditler ve devletin stratejik ihtiyaçları tarihsel perspektiften değerlendirilmiştir. 5. Bölüm Sultan Abdülaziz'in donanması, bu donanmanın potansiyel tehditlerle kıyaslanması ve bu tehditlere karşı performansının incelenmesine ayrılmıştır. Bu bağlamda donanmanın devletin stratejik ihtiyaçlarına hitap etmediği sonucuna ulaşılmış ve bu silahlanmanın rasyonel olmadığı görülmüştür. Dolayısıyla donanmanın statü kazanmak amacı ile oluşturulduğu görülmüştür. 6. ve 7. Bölümlerde Alman ve Sovyetler Birliği donanma yatırımları incelenmiştir. Bu donanma atılımlarının da devletlerin fiziksel güvenlik ihtiyaçlarına ve tehditlere uygun olmadığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Bu hamlelerin de Osmanlı Devleti örneğinde olduğu gibi statü kazanmak amacıyla yapıldığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Sonrasında Osmanlı, Alman, ve Sovyet donanma hamleleri karşılaştırılarak neden karasal devletler fiziksel güvenlik ihtiyaçlarının ötesinde donanma gücü elde ederler sorusuna yanıt aranmıştır. Bu bağlamda üç devletin de büyük donanma kurmalarının arkasındaki amacın deniz gücü üzerinden uluslararası statü kazanmak olduğu saptanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnşaacılık, Statü arayışı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Karasal Devlet, Deniz Devleti

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DEDICATION

To my family

1. INTRODUCTION

Survival is considered as the most important objective of states in International Relations. Since in an anarchical international states system no higher authority than the state exists, states rely on their own capabilities for the attainment of this objective. Subsequently, all states try to accumulate power for their survival. Thus, power is used as a means to that end[1]. For the purposes of this dissertation, power is defined as material military capability. Therefore, states can acquire either land power, naval power, or air power for their physical protection. Their composition varies from state to state depending on strategic culture, geography, historical experiences, threats etc. The physical security of the state requires the protection of borders and the state sovereignty within, and most states share land borders. Therefore, land power is an important aspect of this objective. However, some states require it more than others, like most continental powers and states which are vulnerable to land-based threats; whereas states with smaller shared land borders or none may depend upon naval power, using the sea as a barrier against hostile power projection and a contributor to physical protection. While the acquisition of naval power by the latter may be considered natural, continental powers too acquire naval power. However, sometimes states in the first category try to acquire excessive naval power beyond levels required for the physical protection of the state. For example, why did Imperial Germany try to accumulate naval power second only to Britain prior to the First World War, and hence jeopardize its political position and physical security? Or why did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics invest in, and devote critical resources and finances to, large numbers of surface combatants prior to the Second World War, when Nazi Germany was clearly a land-based threat? Again, why did the Ottoman Empire, during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, acquire an armored battlefleet that was far more powerful than needed to counter immediate physical threats to its security and sovereignty? Therefore, this dissertation compares the German, the Soviet, and the Ottoman naval expansions because all three were continental powers which invested heavily in naval power. In each of the

[1] According to Mearsheimer, power is not "a means to an end (survival), but an end in itself" (Mearsheimer 2001, p.36).

cases there is a quest for naval power for acquiring status. Hence continental power strive to build large fleets for prestige and status rather than physical security is a proposition that stands across time and place. While the German and Soviet cases are addressed extensively in the literature, the Ottoman case has not merited a smiliar degree of attention. As such, this dissertation aims to contribute to the contemporary literature on status seeking through naval power by focusing on the fleet of Sultan Abdülaziz. To this end, this dissertation seeks to answering the question of whether the Ottoman Empire was a continental power or a seapower, thus by putting the Ottoman Empire in a context. After that, German and Soviet decisions to expand their navies are compared to the Ottoman decision. Finally, all three powers' arming decisions are studied from a struggle for recognition perspective.

1.1.The Purpose

How do we make sense of decisions that seem to defy rationality, which is an assumed attribute of states from a traditional Realist paradigm? This means, in the present case, building navies which are bigger than the requirements of security for continental powers. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the Ottoman naval expansion under Sultan Abdülaziz as one case of continental powers' attempts to acquire naval power beyond levels that are needed for their physical security. To answer this question requires further inquiry. The first is to answer the following question: Was the Ottoman Empire a continental power or a seapower? The reason why it is imperative to answer this question is to address the debate in the literature on the military character of the Ottoman Empire. It is described as either a seapower state, a sea empire, a seaborne empire, a continental empire, a continental power, or even as a hybrid power. To contribute to the debate, a definition of sea power is needed. Having surveyed various definitions of sea power, this dissertation suggests that the Ottoman Empire should be considered a continental power. In that case a further inquiry is required: Why did Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876) launch the expansion of Ottoman naval power in the third quarter of the Nineteenth Century? Previously, the Ottoman Empire had, on multiple occasions, embarked on expansions of naval power. What differs is the magnitude of this initiative. By the end of Sultan Abdülaziz's reign, the Ottoman Navy had acquired the third largest armored battlefleet in the world, after Britain and France. When threats against the state in his reign are

considered, Egypt, Greece, and Russia come to the fore. However, their naval threats do not rationalize a big armored battlefleet of this size. Therefore, the acquisition of such levels of naval power constitute an example of arming that goes beyond what is needed for the physical security of the state. Consequently, it is necessary to clarify whether this arming was sub-optimal and was meant to serve another purpose. This is the final question this dissertation addresses.

1.2.The Scope

In this context, sea power and its components are surveyed. Consequently, a debate on what a seapower state is emerges. Next, the Ottoman Navy and Ottoman naval power are studied. Then a historical background from the time of the Greek War of Independence to the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz is provided, to identify threats against the state during his reign. The Egyptian, Greek, and Russian threats are studied again with the same purpose. Finally, the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876), the German naval expansion between 1897-1912 during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918), and the Soviet naval expansion between 1937-1941 during the tenure of Joseph Stalin (1922-1953) are studied. This comparison is undertaken to understand why continental powers acquire or try to over-invest in naval power.

1.3.The Methodology

For the purposes of this dissertation, a Realist theoretical framework is deemed weaker in explanatory power relative than a Constructivist approach. Even though it focuses on power, Realism fails to explain why a state arms itself with excessive naval power for physical security purposes, by disregarding potential financial problems. On the other hand, Constructivism, with its focus on identity and its inclusion in security studies is chosen for its stronger explanatory power, to make sense of the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. The material used in this study is mostly secondary literature. The Ottoman part of the dissertation has three main foci: 1) Ottoman sea power and its historical analysis; 2) threats against the physical security of the state during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz; and 3) whether the state needed a naval expansion of this magnitude along with the motivation of the state in forming a competent naval power during his reign. Additionally, this dissertation discusses the aspects of Ottoman sea

power largely from a Mahanian perspective, with additions from other approaches. While this dissertation traces the evolutionary trajectory of Ottoman sea power back to 1494, the timeframe for the Ottoman naval expansion is limited to the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876), where the reasons for Ottoman naval expansion are evaluated. To answer the main question, Ottoman, German, and Soviet naval expansions are compared conceptually through the secondary literature. Quantitative data sets provided by Kennedy (1988, p.154, 171, 199, 200, 274), Modelski and Thompson (1988, p.67-76, 224, 230, 262, 266, 282, 289, 291-293, 309, 319, 328), and the Maddison Project (https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018) are used where necessary such as making comparisons between states to better understand the overall strategic situation.

1.4.Literature Review

An expansive survey of Ottoman naval history, focusing on Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz is made. The purpose of such a survey is twofold. One is to identify what the literature offers concerning the afore-mentioned naval expansion. The other is to determine what it does not.

So far, this survey has revealed that there are some common themes over which there seems to be a consensus. However, it should be noted that the study of Ottoman naval affairs is mostly dominated by historians, retired naval officers, or others with non-academic backgrounds in International Relations. In this sense, despite a plethora of works on the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, the literature is marked by the absence of analytical engagement grounded in International Relations theories.

Overall, there are five common themes that have emerged and been reproduced in the majority of the works on the Ottoman Navy concerning the naval expansion of Sultan Abdülaziz. The first and most important is that the armored fleet put together by Sultan Abdülaziz was the third largest in the world after Britain and France (Davison 1963, p.266; Yakıtal 1981, p.1334; Beşirli 2004, p.243; Erbaş 2016, p.139; Uyar and Erickson 2017, p.358; Panzac 2018, p.333; Erbaş 2019, p.84). Dal (2015, p.264) specifically notes that the Ottoman armored fleet was the third largest in Europe. On the other hand, Songur

(2017, p.1632-1633) notes that it was among the largest fleets in the world. Others even claim that the Ottoman armored fleet was the second largest or the second most powerful in the world. However, this is not an accurate assesment (Danışman 1966, p.179; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.63). With the exception of Dal (2015) and Panzac (2018), none gives a detailed explanation of ranking (i.e. tonnage numbers, inches of guns). They just remark that the Ottoman armored fleet was in third rank on paper. Some even omit the fact that the Ottoman armored fleet was strong only quantitatively and claim that the Ottoman Navy was the third *strongest* in the world, which was again false considering it failed against the Russian Black Sea forces during the 1877-1878 War. The only tangible data given by these works is on the armored ship numbers. However, even these figures vary between twenty and thirty depending on the work or on the date when the ships were counted (1876, 1877, 1878). Dal (2015, p.240-246) counts nineteen ships for the year 1878, whereas she notes that twenty-seven ships were launched overall. While Davison (1963, p.266) notes that the Ottoman Empire acquired more then twenty ironclads, Sondhaus (2001, p.123) counts twenty-two. However, Şehsuvaroğlu (2011, p.39), Bedirhan and Atabey (2013, p.131), and Hacipoğlu (2013, p.63) count twenty-five, while Gencer (1985, p.297), Büyüktuğrul (1983, p.63-64), Beşirli (2004, p.249), and Songur (2017, p.1633) are less precise in their assessments, and argue that the number varied between twenty and twenty-five. Finally Panzac (2018, p.333-338) counts twenty-eight ships, whereas Danışman (1966, p.219), Yakıtal (1981, p.1344), Gülen (1988, p.136), Akad (1995, p.245), Örenç (2013, p.142), Gençoğlu (2015, p.616), Gürdeniz (2015, p.302), Yüksel (2016, p.90), and Erbaş (2019, p.84) count thirty armored ships.

The second point agreed on by most of the researchers is that the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz was funded by extensive foreign debts (Yakıtal 1981, p.1,350, Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.62-65; Gencer 1985, p.297; Gülen 1988, p.137-138; Akad 1995, p.245; Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.3; Beşirli 2004, p.249-251; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.61; Örenç 2013, p.141; Dal 2015, p.255; Gürdeniz 2015, p.303; Yüksel 2016, p.87; Songur 2017, p.1,635; Panzac 2018, p.356-357; Erbaş 2019, p.84). However, what is important here is a secondary assumption concerning the Ottoman debt. According to some researchers, the Ottoman naval expansion caused a further Ottoman indebtedness, which is correct, and it led to the Ottoman bankruptcy, which is not (Örenç 2013, p.141; Gençoğlu 2015, p.625; Gürdeniz 2015, p.303; Dal 2015, p.267; Kurt 2015,

p.83; Songur 2017, p.1,635; Çelik 2018, p.79). From the inquiry made, it becomes obvious that the Ottoman naval expansion indeed led to further foreign indebtedness. However, no convincing evidence has been found that it led to the bankruptcy of the state. So, the literature on the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, while being correct on the first point, is incomplete and inaccurate on the second one.

The third consensus revolves around the ineffectiveness of the navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. Many researchers agree that the state could not effectively use the battlefleet during the two crises in which it had the potential to play an important role. These were the Cretan Rebellion (1866-1869) and the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878. They attribute this ineffectiveness to several factors. These include administrative failures, inadequate levels of training and education, budgetary constraints, insufficient local infrastructure and raw materials, along with manpower (Davison 1963, p.266; Yakıtal 1981, p.1,335-1,336, 1,345-1,357; Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.63-66, 125; Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.3; Akad 1995, p.245; Sondhaus 2001, p.90; Beşirli 2004, p.249; Örenç 2013, p.141; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.61-75; Dal 2015, p.3; Gürdeniz 2015, p.302-303; Yüksel 2016, p.91; Uyar and Erickson 2017, p.358; Songur 2017, p.1,638; Panzac 2018, p.351-370; Erbaş 2019, p.83-85). This point is the most accurate part of the literature on the Ottoman Navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz.

A fourth important conclusion reached by the researchers is the lack of a clearly determined strategic role, for the new battlefleet, by the state (Yakıtal 1981, p.1,347-1,348; Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.65; Akad 1995, p.245; Örenç 2013, p.141-145; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.61-63; Gürdeniz 2015, p.302; Panzac 2018, p.340; Çelik 2018, p.79). This is another accurate assessment of the naval expansion. However, the answer to the following question remains unclear: if the battlefleet had no strategic value, what was its purpose? This is not addressed sufficiently and substantively in the existing literature.

The last evaluation concerning the Ottoman Navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz is also the most important. A significant number of the researchers approach the matter from a physical security perspective. Some of them link the existence of a powerful Ottoman Navy to the physical security of the state (Bedirhan and Atabey 2013, p.127-131; Gürdeniz 2015, p.303; Panzac 2018, p.333). Another group link the naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz to the present threats of Russia or Greece and they

argue that Sultan Abdülaziz was motivated by the need to increase the physical security of the state (Shaw 1977, p.97; Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.47-54, 125; Gülen 1988, p.120-138; Gençoğlu 2015, p.615-616; Dal 2015, p.263-264; Erbaş 2019, p.85). It is true that Russia and Greece formed the bulk of the Ottoman problems related with the physical security of the state. However, Egypt too needs consideration. Additionally, if Russia and Greece were primary threats to the Ottoman Empire, why did the naval expansion of Sultan Abdülaziz by far surpass them in strength? Yakıtal is right on this point when he criticizes the naval expansion. He remarks that the Ottoman efforts should have been based on the present threats. He notes that thanks to the efforts of the pro-navy Sultan, the state obtained naval power beyond the levels needed for countering these threats and the physical security of the state (Yakıtal 1981, p.1335, 1,347-1,348). However, he too does not answer why this naval expansion took place.

This last attribute of the literature clearly shows that the researchers have approached the subject from a Realist International Relations perspective. However, none has clearly articulated such an approach beyond generalizations sustained by empirical research. Hence the literature is dominated by traditional historical approach and crude Realist explanations. This is understandable as the literature is populated by historians, naval officers and in some cases even enthusiasts without any scholarly formations. Therefore, this absence of articulation seems to have led to a lack of conceptualization. This thesis intends to fill this theoretical gap in the literature with a different theoretical approach than Realism.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The main question in this dissertation is why continental powers obtain or initiate the building of navies that are beyond the levels needed for their physical security. Accordingly, this dissertation tries to understand the Ottoman naval build-up during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876) as such a case. What is studied specifically is the maximization of Ottoman naval power relative to the Porte's rivals, with the hope of explaining the Ottoman decision to expand its navy in the third quarter of the Nineteenth Century. Power maximization is the attempt or the act of acquiring much more power than rivals, even if it is detrimental to the overall physical security of the state. It also means acquiring power beyond what is needed for the physical security of the state (Murray 2008, p.3-4). In order to establish a theoretical framework, it is first necessary to look into Realism and see if it is a good fit for the questions at hand.

2.1. Realism

To understand if Realism is the appropriate tool for this study, it is necessary to look at how Realism sees the acquisition of power. It is essential to answer the following questions: (1) what is power?, (2) how much power is necessary?, and (3) why do states acquire power?

According to Political Realism, borrowing from Hobbes, international politics is characterized by a state of nature and the lack of both a central authority and a world government. Even though there is a hierarchy of power within the system, there is not a hierarchy of authority, and no state recognizes a higher authority than its own. Thus, it is a system of self-help and states in this anarchy have nothing but their own power to fall back on in order to survive. Subsequently, they seek to maintain and increase their relative power (Waltz 1979, p.88-89; Mearsheimer 2001, p.19-32). For the Realist paradigm, the state is the main actor, with an emphasis on major powers which affect the workings of the international states system more than other states do. While the existence of other actors like international organizations, multinational corporations, terrorist organizations,

and others is acknowledged, their impact is accepted to be smaller (Waltz 1979, p.93-95). The state is considered as a unitary actor with one voice and one policy for any given issue at any given time. It is assumed that it acts as a rational actor, which determines its policies after the examination of all policies available from a cost-benefit analysis, at the end of which a choice is made to maximize utility by either minimizing cost or maximizing benefit. However, it must be kept in mind that the decision makers of the state may not have access to all the information available. It is assumed that they decide rationally on the basis of the information available to them (Waltz 1979, p.92; Mearsheimer 2001, p.31; Viotti and Kauppi 2012, p.12-40). Finally, the state prioritizes its political objectives. The protection of state sovereignty and its physical borders is the single most important objective (Mearsheimer 2001, p.19-46).

Power can be a "process, relationship, or a quantity" (Holsti 1964, p.193), or as Hart describes it, it can mean "control over resources" (Hart 1976, p.289-291). As an alternative, power can be "the ability of A to cause B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Baldwin 2013, p.273). Even within Political Realism there are several different definitions of power. It is "man's control over the minds and actions of other men" in Classical Realism (Morgenthau 1948, p.13). In this sense, Morgenthau describes political power as separate from force, which can be used to bend others to one's own will. Political power is a "psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised" (Morgenthau 1948, p.14). It also "gives control over certain actions of the latter through the influence which the former exert over the latter's minds" and that control may include the use of "orders, threats, persuasion, or a combination of any of these" (Morgenthau 1948, p.13-14). In the *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz says "an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him" (Waltz 1979, p.192). However, Waltz (1986, p.333) states that his definition of power is "insufficient". While he adds that "to define power in terms of who affects whom more strongly, is, I think, a move in the right direction", he stresses that "its proper definition remains a matter of controversy" (Waltz 1986, p.333). He additionally states that what matters is "the distinction between strong and weak states", therefore the distribution of capabilities (Waltz 1986, p.333). However, he does not explain how capabilities are defined, other that saying that "they are 'attributes of units'" (Baldwin 2016, p.132). Finally Waltz ranks states according to capabilities which "depends on how they score on

all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence" (Waltz 1979, p.131). Power is dependent upon tangible assets a state possesses in Offensive Realism. It is also divided into latent and military power. The former is based on population and wealth and is crucial in forming the latter, which is mainly made up of military assets. Hence power in Offensive Realism is largely military power (Mearsheimer 2001, p.55-57). Baldwin (2016) notes that there is not a "single all-purpose index of the power (of a state)" and that context matters when talking about power (Baldwin 2016, p.78). The most widely used definition is "the use of material resources to compel another state to do something it does not want to do" (Barnett and Duvall 2005, p.40). However, the purpose of this dissertation is not to debate the already controversial term of "power"[2]. It seeks to understand and explain the maximization of military power where it seems excessive, for the physical security of the state. That is why for the purposes of this dissertation, power will be treated as material military capability. States are interested in acquiring either relative or absolute power. Those who are interested in absolute power seek to maximize their absolute material and power gains. Whereas those who seek relative power try to accumulate more power than their actual or potential rivals. That is what will be inquired into in this work (Baldwin 2013, p.273, 274; Waltz 1979, p.105; Powell 1991, p.1,316; Grieco 1988, p.487)[3].

Power is required for the attainment of the afore-mentioned fundamental goal of survival of the state. It therefore is one of the primary objectives, if not the most crucial, to be realized. Subsequently, the reason why states acquire power and how much power is required according to different branches of Political Realism will be examined, starting with Classical Realim. According to Morgenthau (1948), man has an innate desire for

[2] For more on power see: Berenskoetter, Felix, and M. J. Williams, eds. *Power in World Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2007; Cederman, Lars-Erik. "Emerging Polarity: Analyzing State-Formation and Power Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 38, 4 (December 1994): 501–33; Mearsheimer, John. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001; Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Power in the Global Information Age*. New York: Routledge, 2004; Snyder, Glenn. "Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security." *International Security* 27, 1 (Summer 2002): 149–73.

[3] For more on absolute and relative gains see: Grieco, Joseph. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization 42,* no. 2, (1988); Mastanduno, Michael. "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," *International Security* 16 (1991); Powell, Robert. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 4 (1991).

power and dominating others. In accordance with this statement, he describes that international politics is about the struggle for power and that states, whatever their goal is, try to reach it by acquiring power. Consequently, according to Classical Realism, power is always the immediate aim (Morgenthau 1948, p.8-18). He stresses that policies can be pursued, even when they do not make sense from a financial point of view, if they are beneficial for the acquisition of power. However, he adds that such policies, if they cause a loss in national power[4] more than they provide political advantages, should not be pursued. In short, if policies weaken the nation more than they increase its power, they should be rejected (Morgenthau 1948, p.15).

Power in Structural Realism is a means to an end, that end being the physical security of the state. It has defensive and offensive variants, with Waltz and Mearsheimer being their leading proponents respectively. Their difference on the acquisition of power lies in their disagreement over how much power states want (Snyder 2002, p.152-155). It is assumed in Defensive Realism that states aim to survive and value security above all else (Waltz 1979, p.107). With this in mind, it is claimed that even though the international states system promotes expansionist policies from time to time, this may lead to a spiral of hostility, and in the end may be detrimental for the survival of the state. It is also noted that because the offense-defense balance of weapons systems mostly favors defense, conquest and aggressive expansion is difficult. Consequently, if states want security, it is relatively easily attainable through defensive and prudent policies (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, p.63-64). Therefore, Defensive Realism argues that the international states system promotes the preservation of power, defensive policies, and a prudent amount of power, that is enough power for the survival of the state (Snyder 2002, p.151-152; Baldwin 2016, p.135). Additionally, acquiring more than enough power, that is to defend territory or deter possible enemies from attacking, can be detrimental to the physical security of the state by triggering a counter coalition to balance the increasing power of the state in question (Waltz 1979, p.126). Waltz specifically notes that “states can seldom afford to

[4] National power is, according to Morgenthau, a combination of geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, and the quality of diplomacy (Morgenthau 1948, p.80-105).

make maximizing power their goal... International Politics is too serious a business for that" (Waltz 1979, p.127).

Offensive Realism, on the other hand, argues that anarchy favors offense and that states want to maximize relative power and become hegemons to improve their chances of survival (Mearsheimer 2001, p.21-32; Snyder 2002, p.151). According to Mearsheimer, five characteristics of the international states system are critical in imposing this state behavior; (1) anarchy, (2) the offensive capabilities of states, (3) the uncertainty of other states' intentions, (4) survival being the main goal, and (5) the state being a rational actor (Mearsheimer 2001, p.30-31). Consequently, states want to maximize power, not because it is a driving force of human beings, but because the anarchical structure of the system and the distribution of capabilities impose it, with the ultimate goal being hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001, p.2; Snyder 2001, p.151-152). This variant of Structural Realism argues, like Classical Realism, that states would want to maximize power in contrast to Defensive Realism. However, the reason for maximizing power, unlike in Classical Realism, is not the nature of man but the states system. Accordingly, a state is expected to acquire as much power as it can get (Baldwin 2016, p.135). There are however two constraints on the acquisition of power. First, spending must be limited where it would weaken the economy because it is "the foundation of military might", which in turn is part of state power according to Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer 2001, p.78). The second constraint is on the form of power. Mearsheimer specifically notes that armies, therefore land power, constitute the main element of state power, because they are critical in the conquest and control of land which is "the supreme political objective in a world of territorial states" (Mearsheimer 2001, p.86). Therefore, what matters for Offensive Realists is the maximization of land power above navies and air forces (Baldwin 2016, p.136).

Even though there is not a single all encompassing Neoclassical Realist theory but different variants, there are some generally accepted assumptions (Foulon 2015, p.646). This approach, like other Realist approaches, accepts that the international states system is anarchic and competitive. States act within this self-help structure. Additionally, security is "the most important national interest" in this anarchic system (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, p.28; Ripsman 2011, p.12; Foulon 2015, p.637). According

to this approach, this structure is the "prime mover" of states' foreign policy choices (Caverley 2010, p.612). It creates incentives and constraints on the conduct of foreign policy. Even though it imposes limits on foreign policy choices, it does not dictate state behavior (Ripsman 2011, p.1-3; Foulon 2015, p.636). These systemic incentives (i.e. the distribution of relative power, offense-defense balance, or geography) push states to seek security (Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, p.4). That is why states conduct their foreign policy "first and foremost with an eye" on structure (Ripsman 2011, p.12). However, sometimes states may act in defiance of it. This is where Neoclassical Realism enters the picture. It seeks to explain why states diverge from structural incentives. It tries to understand why states that exist in the same international structure behave differently instead of understanding why different states act similarly (Taliaferro 2006, p.480; Marsh 2014, p.121; Foulon 2015, p.636-637). Neoclassical Realism attempts this through the inclusion of unit-level variables.

According to Neoclassical Realism, the relative power of a state is crucial in determining its foreign policy. Additionally, the more relative power a state has, the more ambitious its foreign policy becomes, and vice-versa. However, the relative power of a state is not the only determinant of foreign policy. States respond to systemic incentives (i.e. relative power distribution) through a "foreign policy executive" (FPE) which is the main state instrument in the formation of foreign policy (Rose 1998, p.146-152; Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman 2009, p.33). However, domestic factors and ideas ("state-society relations", type of regime, "leader perceptions", and "strategic cultures") intervene and influence the FPE's decision-making. These influences may in turn cause illogical and irrational responses to systemic pressures (Rathbun 2008, p.314; Ripsman 2011, p.1-2). Therefore, the FPE and domestic actors shape the foreign policy course of the state together, in response to systemic pressures and incentives (Ripsman 2011, 11). According to Neoclassical Realism, that is why states within the same international system, states which are exposed to the same systemic influences, behave differently. Hence the structure, while limiting the foreign policy options of a state, is not influential in the choice of a particular policy (Rose 1998, p.147).

2.2. Problems with Realism

This survey on Realism reveals a few critical points as to why a Realist approach is not chosen as the main theoretical paradigm for this dissertation. Morgenthau (1948) argues that states, even though they pursue maximization of their power, should not do so if this pursuit makes the state weaker overall, for instance through the weakening of its economy. He specifically gives the example of the acquisition of loans, which may weaken the economy. However, he notes that these may be useful if they increase national power. Yet if their negative impact is greater than their contribution to the international position of the state, then the acquisition of power through debts is not advised (Morgenthau 1948, p.15). The Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz which was funded through loans is a case in point. This is an example of the detrimental use of loans for power maximization because the state, by continuing to acquire further loans, entered a cycle of indebtedness which led to insolvency at the end of Sultan Abdülaziz's reign. From this perspective, Classical Realism offers little explanatory power; therefore, it will not be used. Defensive Realism specifically argues that states do not acquire more power than what is necessary for the survival of the state. Accordingly, states would not maximize power but would acquire a prudent amount of it. However, the case studied in this dissertation includes a maximization of relative power to the point where it becomes excessive and beyond defensive purposes, therefore making a Defensive Realist approach unworkable. An Offensive Realist approach would not help either. Even though Offensive Realism anticipates the maximization of power, it does not explain the maximization of naval power. Instead it focuses on the maximization of land power, which makes this approach unfit for the exploration of the underlying reasons for Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. Finally, Neoclassical Realism specifically expresses that the ambitions of a state grow in proportion to its relative power, and they retract if a state loses relative power. However, the Ottoman naval expansion under Sultan Abdülaziz did not happen during a time of increasing relative Ottoman power. It happened during a time of stagnating if not decreasing relative Ottoman power. From this perspective, a Neoclassical Realist approach would expect a smaller expansion of Ottoman naval power. Therefore, it is not a fitting theoretical approach for the case at hand.

Another problem related with the Realist approach is the concept of survival. The survival of the state, according to Realism has the highest priority, because without it no other goal can be pursued. The survival of the state includes different aspects which are territory, sovereignty over territory, and autonomy over domestic politics (Waltz 1979, p.91-92; Mearsheimer 2001, p.31). Therefore, it is understood in material terms like "the physical protection of borders, the maintenance of territorial sovereignty, and the autonomy of the domestic political order", hence threats to the security can only be material (Murray 2008, p.18). Additionally, any other goal than the primary goal of survival is understood as irrational from the Realist perspective, if privileged above the physical security of the state because, as Mearsheimer notes, if a state is conquered it will not be able to pursue other policies (Mearsheimer 2001, p.31). This prioritization of security is present within Defensive Realism too. Waltz assumes that states value security above all else (Waltz 1979, p.107). The focus on security, along with the primacy of material aspects, makes a Realist approach weaker in terms of explanatory power relative to other international relations theories, namely constructivism for the case at hand.

The phenomenon studied here is the excessive investment by continental powers in naval power. According to the Realist approach, this is considered an irrational act, since continental powers need a prudent amount of naval power for the physical security of the state. As such, over-investment in naval power, by limiting the amount invested in land power, means jeopardizing the physical security of the state. However, Realism assumes that states are rational actors which value physical security above all else. An additional problem is the way the security and the threat are described in the Realist approach. They are understood in material terms, hence making it weaker in explanatory power for the phenomenon at hand. Classical Realism fails to explain the increase in state power through extensive foreign debts, as these actually undermine the economy and the very power that is being augmented. Defensive Realism, which focuses on a prudent amount of power for the survival of the state, cannot fully explain the excessive growth of the Ottoman Navy vis-a-vis potential threats, as it goes beyond defensive needs. Finally, while Offensive Realism can explain the maximization of power, it cannot explain the maximization of naval power, because according to Offensive Realism, what matters is land power, not naval power. Nor can it explain economically detrimental policies in the

pursuit of naval power. After having established that Realism is not a good choice of theory for the purposes of this dissertation, it is time to look for an alternative.

2.3. Constructivism

In the Realist paradigm, international politics is characterized by the lack of a higher authority. Hence, states exist and struggle for survival in a system of self-help "facing each other in a stance of fearful mistrust" (Honneth 1995, p.8). In such a world, they must acquire power which is essential for their physical security and self-preservation. Therefore, conflict in an anarchic world is based on self-centered states focused on self-preservation. In this state of anarchy which Hobbes describes, part of the reason individuals mistrust each other and acquire power for future contingencies is the lack of knowledge about others. However, in Hegel's terms, conflict is born out of the lack of knowledge of the self, which can only be acquired in action and by recognition (Markell 2003, p.13). Therefore, this knowledge of the self, or self-understanding, or identity becomes a reality inter-subjectively formed. The self-understanding is "one's sense of who one is, of one's social location, and of how, given the first two, one is prepared to act" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p.17). However, one does not act in isolation, thus it can only be acquired in combination with the significant other. It is dependent upon the "unpredictable sequences of action and response" of others (Markell 2003, p.13). These sequences in turn require the existence of an audience. As such, the formation of the identity is insecure because of its inter-subjective character. This conflict for acquiring knowledge of the self is described by Murray (2008, p.51-61) as the struggle for recognition in which all individuals struggle to secure their aspirant identities from an audience or a significant other.

In Realism, state survival depends on the protection of territory and sovereignty. Inspired by Murray (2008, p.65), this dissertation too argues that this description of state survival does not have to be understood in purely material terms. It is accepted however that territory is definitely the material part of what needs to be secured. Sovereignty on the other hand is not a material characteristic (Mitzen 2006, p.351). It is according to Waltz (1979) to be able to "decide for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments to them" (Waltz 1979, p.96). Even though from

Waltz's definition it is possible to deduce that sovereignty looks like a state attribute, it in fact needs to be accepted by other states (i.e. the audience). It is "a political entity's externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its affairs" (Biersteker and Weber 1996, p.2). The sovereignty of the state from this perspective is more of a right in international politics and therefore it is a social characteristic. Consequently, state survival, which depends upon territory and sovereignty, is not merely physical, but it is also social (Biersteker and Weber 1996, p.i-4). Therefore, statehood as a claim of a political community to state status, thus its survival as a state, requires international acceptance. As such it is an institution which requires inter-subjective recognition from other states in the international states system (Biersteker and Weber 1996, p.i-6, 278). Consequently, the identity of statehood and the status of sovereignty are social. Therefore, the quest for the material power that is necessary for survival, and central to the anarchic international system, is social at its core (Murray 2008, p.6).

The state itself has a self-understanding, as individuals do, based on its collective identity. However, this self-understanding too requires inter-subjective recognition. States represent those identities they aspire to through social interaction. Through this social process, if accepted by the audience (states in the system that are the target of recognition), the imagined identity of a state becomes real (Murray 2008, p.76-85). Since states, as social entities, interact with other states as their significant others, their identity is the result of a process of unknown sequences of action and reaction (Markell 2003, p.13). The identity is inter-subjectively formed, and is dependent upon the unknown and unpredictable response of others. The aspirant identity of a state is dependent upon that identity's acceptance by the others, as the state already sees itself to be (Mitzen 2006, p.358). However, the process of the inter-subjective formation of identity is insecure, because it is based on the perception and the acceptance of other states. The formation and acceptance of a state's identity does not preexist action, it is formed in the action and it is out of the actor's control (Markell 2003, p.13). That is why this process puts states' identities, or their aspirant identities, therefore their survival as social actors, in jeopardy, unless they are recognized by their significant others in the system (Mitzen 2006, p.358).

There are two possible reactions to this vulnerability. One is demanding recognition from other states. If successful, this would make the aspirant identity of the state a reality that

is inter-subjectively accepted, confirming what it already sees itself to be (Murray 2008, p.86-87). The other is taking the matter into its own hands. To bypass this recognition-based insecurity, states may try to ground their identities in material practices. They do this for two reasons. Engaging in a struggle for recognition, even before achieving the status, "restores some of the lost self-respect" caused by the misrecognition, and this action reflects back to itself an image already as a recognized entity (Honneth 1995, 164; Maclure 2003 p.8). Second states engage in this struggle because material properties give substance to the elusive concept of identity. Consequently states, by grounding their identities in material practices, experience their aspirant identities as if this preexists social interaction (Markell 2003, p.111-112). Therefore, they lessen the insecurity of the social interaction. This is most evident when a state aspires to the status of a great power because this specific identity is almost always equated with material capabilities of a military sort (Mearsheimer 2001, p.5). Thus, insecurity related to the great power identity can be bypassed through acquiring material military power.

The focus of this dissertation is status seeking through the maximization of relative naval power. It constitutes a behavior of relative power maximization through the acquisition of expensive cutting-edge weaponry with the purpose of obtaining a specific identity. The purchase of better weaponry is generally related with improved physical security. However, this may not be its sole purpose, according to the concept of Social Mobility where members of a society, by imitating the actions of those of higher status, can improve their inter-subjective standing within the group. A state too can do this by acquiring markers of status to influence the judgment of others to improve how the society perceives it, to gain recognition of a particular status, great power status for example, or to acquire admission into a specific club of states. Acquiring markers related with the status sought may result in an elevated status attached to that specific marker. This kind of behavior involving the acquisition of these specific markers of status has the aim of signalling the aspirant identity of the state, thus being granted mobility of rank within the society (Freedman 2016, p.800; Larson et al 2014, p.11; Frank 2005, p.137). However, Freedman (2016) argues that for the recognition to work, it requires that both parties must agree on "the signals that constitute recognition" (Freedman 2016, p.798). These signals are goods which grant its consumer or owner the status related with the object. These are what Frank (2005) calls "positional goods" and what Larson et al. (2014) call "markers

of status" (Frank 2005, p.137; Larson et al. 2014, p.11). For the purposes of this dissertation these markers are large ironclads with at least 6,000 tons of displacement and eight-inch guns in the Ottoman case. They are dreadnought class battleships in the German case. Finally, they are big surface warships including battleships of the largest tonnage and battlecruisers in the Soviet case.

2.4. Identity and Security

What is argued in this dissertation is that states, in anarchy, struggle for the recognition of their identities for survival. The main argument here is that the identity of the state requires protection and that it is part of what needs to be secured. Therefore, it is required for the survival of the state and now it has top priority along with the physical properties of the state. However, security, within the Realist paradigm, was seen as a narrow concept which mainly included physical security through the use of military force, especially until after the end of the Cold War. The study of security had been defined as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force" (Walt 1991, p.212; Buzan and Hansen 2009, p.16-17; Buzan 1983, p.3-9). With the end of the Cold War, a debate on the expansion of the security agenda ensues between different schools of thought[5] (Buzan 1997, p.5). Buzan and Hansen have argued whether to include issues other than the use of force in security studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009, p.12). The Copenhagen School comes to the fore when one intends to incorporate a larger number of issues into the concept of security (Mcsweeney 1996, p.81-82; Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, p.4). This school argues that the concept of security including mainly physical security is becoming less and less capable of addressing issues concerning security in the post Cold War era (Buzan et al. 1998, p.1-3; Murray 2008, p.21). The inclusion of identity in the security agenda[6] was argued mainly following the end of the Cold War (Buzan et al. 1998, p.1-7; 22-23; 25-26). This widening of the security concept makes identity a source of vulnerability and part of what needs to be secured. The usage of the term security in this dissertation will

[5] Traditionalists are arguing that security should be limited to military studies. On the other hand, "wideners" are wishing to expand the concept of security beyond the scope of the military (Buzan et al. 1998, p.2-5).

[6] The concept of security at the beginning of the Cold War did include a wider number of issues. These issues were related to the challenges mounted by the USSR. They were ideological, sociological, and economic. They were not limited to the military sector. Therefore, the inclusion of identity in the security agenda in the early days of the Cold War was quite probable (Buzan 1997, p.6)

include a larger number of issues, but the focus will mainly be on the inclusion of identity into the concept.

2.5. What is security?

Buzan (2016) argues that security can be understood as freedom from threat, which means in international relations "the ability of states to maintain their independent identity and functional integrity" (Buzan 2016, p.914/7368). Can anything become an item in the security agenda of states? To answer this question, one needs to look at the Copenhagen School as it introduces the process of securitization into the picture: publicly naming an issue as a security threat permits the elevation of that specific issue beyond normal politics. It is a successful speech act that securitizes the relevant issue and legitimizes the use of special means by the state to deal with that issue (Gad and Petersen 2011, p.316; Buzan et al. 1998, p.21). It is useful to add that through this act "an intersubjective understanding is construed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referrent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan and Waever 2003, p.491; Strizel 2007, p.358). This makes the referrent object of the security threat a subjective fact, open to manipulation or change through inter-subjective communication (Buzan et al. 1998, p.23-25). Therefore, the subject of security, the Copenhagen School argues, can become anything.

2.6. The Choice of Theory

There is a striking similarity between the cases to be compared in this dissertation. For instance, Germany at the turn of the Twentieth Century attempted to build up a powerful battlefleet, with the aim of securing recognition for its world power status from Britain (the audience). Just before the beginning of the Second World War, the USSR under Stalin initiated the building of an ocean-going fleet with big surface warships and attempted to secure recognition of its newly elevated status from the same audience as Germany, Britain. In both the German and Soviet cases, the significant other and the audience was Britain, which had stood at the top of the international naval hierarchy since the Battle of Trafalgar. This in turn led to the selection of a constructivist perspective to explain Sultan Abdülaziz's decision to obtain a powerful fleet of ironclads.

Constructivism has additional explanatory power with its greater focus on status seeking, and the formation of identity through inter-subjective acceptance. Consequently, it has the potential to offer an explanation of Sultan Abdülaziz's behavior. Additionally, the Copenhagen School's wider perspective on security studies by including issues other than "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force" and by including identity into the security concept, makes it a valuable choice for the purposes of this study (Walt 1991, p.212).

3. AN EVALUATION OF OTTOMAN SEA POWER

To evaluate the naval expansion of Sultan Abdülaziz, it is necessary to answer the following question: was the Ottoman Empire ever a seapower or not during its nearly 500 years of existence? However, answering this question first requires a thorough evaluation of the concept of sea power itself.

3.1 WHAT IS SEA POWER?

Throughout history, the successful use and implementation of sea power brought states additional power and wealth to those accumulated on land. Since 2000 BC, beginning with the Minoan Civilization of the Cretans, and continuing with Greece, Carthage's rise to power and its subsequent defeat at the hands of the Romans, the Muslims' rise in the Mediterranean and their failures to conquer İstanbul, the capital of Byzantium (modern day İstanbul), to the rise of the Venetian and Genoese trade empires, sea power had been influential in the ascendency of states to wealth and glory. Moreover, its influence only grew in the age of discovery and beyond from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century (Stevens and Westscott 1920, p.1-90, 441-443; Schmitt 1997, p.7).

According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, an early influential sea power theorist, sea power has six aspects. The first is Geographical Position, which is determined by the existence or the lack of land borders a state must defend or not. The second is Physical Conformation consisting of natural products, the climate, the coastline, having numerous and deep harbors. Additionally, it is necessary to know if the state is separated from others by a body of water and if the state is dependent upon foreign goods. The third aspect is the Extent of Territory, which includes the length of the coastline and the quality of its harbors. The fourth is the Population, which is a combination of the number of seamen, the reserve number of seamen, the number of people available for employment on the seas. The fifth aspect is the National Character which includes the tendency to engage in trade and enterprise in foreign lands. The final one is the Character of the Government,

with a continuous focus on the development of sea power and the institutions that are necessary for it, and the importance given by the state's leaders to the development of sea power (Mahan 1898, p.25-89). On the other hand, Sergei G. Gorshkov[7], who wrote about sea power in the USSR a century later than Mahan, notes that the sea power of a state encompasses the following: (1) the exploration of the oceans and harnessing of its wealth, (2) the merchant and fishing fleets, (3) the presence of a fleet that matches the needs of the state (Gorshkov 1979, p.1). Finally, Modelski and Thompson's classic definition of sea power is "the use and control of the sea and/or its denial to the opponent", which represents a narrowly focused military-centered perspective (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.3-4)

Speller (2014) defines sea power as a form of power that is obtained through the use of the sea. While he does not specify aspects that form the sea power of a state, he stresses the importance of sea-blindedness (or the opposite) as an important factor in the formation of sea power. Sea-blindedness means that states with a lack of understanding of the sea or its importance in international politics may fail to develop an efficient sea power. An important contribution of Speller to the study of sea power is his distinction between the terms of sea power. He remarks that while naval power is mainly a function of navies, maritime power is a function of military and civilian aspects which encompass naval power. He describes it as "military, political, economic power or influence exerted through an ability to use the sea" (Speller 2014, p.6, 8). Richmond (1946) describes sea power more akin to what Speller calls maritime power, albeit in a less all-encompassing form. According to him, sea power is a "form of national strength which enables its possessor to send his armies and commerce across those stretches of sea and ocean which lie between his country or the countries of his allies, and those territories to which he needs access in war; and to prevent his enemy from doing the same" (Richmond 1946, p.ix). Therefore, he sees sea power as a form of power that enables its possessor to control the sea both commercially (civilian aspect) and militarily (and deny it to the opponent). His contribution also includes the identification of six aspects of sea power. These comprise three material and three moral elements. The material elements include (1) the "fighting instruments" which enable the state, and deny the opponent, a power projection

[7] The commander in chief of the Soviet Navy (Herrick 1971, p.34, 47).

capability, and the establishment of commerce, and allow its possessor the seaborne movement of its troops, (2) "positions" or strategic bases, locations controlled by the state or its allies to help these "fighting instruments" for maintenance purposes, (3) the means of transport for armies and trade. While he did not go into further detail on the moral aspects of sea power, he briefly mentions them as (1) Aptitude, (2) Character, and (3) Courage (Richmond 1946, p.ix-x). Coutau-Bégarie (2006) uses a very similar description of sea power. For him, sea power is related with "the naval fleet, the command of the sea" (the military aspect), and also with "the merchant fleet, maritime hegemony" (the civilian aspect) which together grant the control of the sea and thereby deny it to the opponent (Coutau-Bégarie 2006, p.30). He further stresses the importance of the economic aspect of sea power by including "fisheries, maritime trade, agricultural surplus, a strong industrial base, and commercial structures" (Coutau-Bégarie 2006, p.31). Sea power is associated with the command of the sea, the presence of a naval fleet, and a merchant fleet. It does not solely mean warships. It also means a system of command, training, doctrine, logistical infrastructure, and shipyards (Coutau-Bégarie 2006, p.30-31).

A century ago, Stevens and Westscott (1920) used a general description of sea power. Writing in the same vein as Speller and Richmond, they link it to the description of power itself: it is "a nation's ability to enforce its will on the sea". They also offer a number of aspects for the formation of sea power: (1) a navy capable of overcoming enemy resistance, (2) strategic bases for supplies or protection when needed, (3) the protection of lines of communications, (4) a merchant fleet. However, according to Stevens and Westscott, the importance of the merchant fleet is diminishing with the progress of technological developments, as these advances increasingly prohibit (or make difficult) the use of merchant sailors aboard the ships of the navy. From this perspective, one can understand that they see sea power more as (a military) naval power than as maritime power (Stevens and Westscott 1920, p.443-444).

Harding (2001) offers an evaluation of the understanding of sea power through time. According to Harding, sea power was synonymous with battleships or ships-of-the-line and how much a state owned these weapons of war from the first half of the Seventeenth

Century[8]. It was also synonymous with state-owned navies which constituted naval power in the Nineteenth Century, with a battlefleet up until the mid-Twentieth Century, and with nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers from then on (Harding 2001, p.xix, 37, 281). He then gives a detailed description of sea power in which he associates it with (1) sea control and denial of it to others, (2) amphibious ability, (3) finance and administration, (4) material and shipyard capacity, (5) the quality and quantity of seamen, (6) privateers, (7) ship technology, (8) the quality and the quantity of the officer corps, (9) tactics and strategy. In short, he identifies sea power with finance, the capability of the central administration, the quality and the quantity of maritime resources, naval manpower which includes the seamen and the officers, maritime infrastructure, and the quality of political and naval decision-making (Harding 2001, p.38-40, 121-148).

Till (2009) on the other hand, notes that sea power, which he uses interchangebly with maritime power, is a combination of (1) population, (2) society, (3) the government, (4) the maritime geography, (5) the maritime economy, (6) technology, and (7) resources (Till 2009, p.84-102).

Finally, any debate on sea power would be incomplete without at least mentioning Julian Stafford Corbett. His study of sea power focuses, however, on the command of the sea, the true purpose of naval warfare. Hence, it does not include a detailed study of aspects a seapower state should possess. Therefore, Corbett's study is not included in this sea power debate (Corbett 2019, p.1,131-1,449/4943).

To the debate above, it is crucial to add the different perspective on sea power advanced by Andrew Lambert. He separates "sea power" from "seapower states". According to Lambert (2018) sea power in Mahanian thinking can be pursued by "any state with a coast, money, and manpower" (Lambert 2018, p.4-6). In Mahanian thinking the true purpose of naval warfare is to obtain command of the sea (Crowl 1986, p.450, 455). This would be accomplished by the concentration of the fleet, a principle which he had borrowed from Jomini, against a fraction of the enemy fleet and by destroying it in a

[8] However, Mediterranean (France, Spain, the Ottoman Empire) and Baltic states (Denmark, Sweden, and Russia) are known to have had expensive fleets of galleys as important tools of naval warfare up until the Eighteenth and even Nineteenth Century (Modelski and Thompson 1998, p.232, 284, 319; Harding 2001, p.38; Coutau-Bégarie 2006, p.32; Phillips 2006, p.8-19; Bostan 2010, p.114-116)

decisive battle (Crowl 1986, p.457-458). Again, according to Mahanian principles, the attainment of this objective required that a fleet be "composed primarily of capital ships" (Crowl 1986, p.458).

According to Lambert, sea power is "a strategic tool that can be employed by continental powers" with the purpose of countering seapower states in the seas, hence its purpose "was to destroy sea power not acquire it" (Lambert 2018, p.14). Therefore, Lambert (2018) considers sea power to be similar to naval power. More critically, Lambert's (2018) contribution to the study of sea power is the way he describes what a seapower state is. To be a seapower, a state must be compelled to turn to the sea for economic and strategic benefits in "a politically driven" process (Lambert 2018, p.5-6). It is a state which has crucial ties to seaborne trade, with an indispensable dependency upon imported goods. Additionally, turning to sea power is "a confession of relative weakness", and it is a quest to acquire "an asymmetric advantage through a different approach to the world" (Lambert 2018, p.6). Therefore, states become seapowers not because they are powerful but on the contrary because they are weaker (Lambert 2018, p.8). A crucial requirement exists within the identity of the state, the sea. States with a "terrestrial and military" culture, "excluding merchants and financiers from political power", cannot become seapower states by simply acquiring a powerful navy or colonial possessions. Adding these do not make the state a seapower because they do not change their existing "strategic and cultural realities" (Lambert 2018, p.6). In line with his definition, Lambert (2018, p.6) counts historically only five "seapower great powers". These are Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic, and Britain.

In sum, sea power means a combination of factors that include the presence of a fleet which is a major element which however needs to be as efficient as it is numerous, modern, and well trained; the presence of strategic bases; the existence of a merchant fleet; a population that is occupied in maritime activity; a clarification of the needs of the state and the role of the fleet in realizing those needs[9]; and willpower on the part of the government to continuously develop a naval doctrine and the state's sea power (Stevens and Westscott 1920, p.443-447). It is possible to conclude the debate, for the purposes of

[9] "Because maritime strategy cannot be considered unless we first understand the national military strategy it is intended to implement" (Brooks 1986, p.61).

this dissertation, by the definition of Ian Speller that sea power is "the ability of navies to exert power at or from the sea for the purposes of national and/or multinational policy goals" (Speller 2014, p.5). However, this formulation is only half of a working framework. For its completion one needs to look at Lambert's (2018) definition of what a seapower state is. Therefore, based on his work, a seapower state can be summarized as a state with a maritime political, cultural, and economic identity at the heart of which lies the sea. This means heavy dependence upon seaborne trade, and trader influence in the highest echelons of political power, as opposed to weaker military and agricultural aspects. It is also a state with a relatively weaker land powerbase, which in turn imposes the formation of a seaborne powerbase. In contrast, seapowers are states that are mainly threatened from the sea. Their physical security concerns primarily rest on the advancement of their navies. Being a seapower is also related to a state's integration in international seaborne trade. Therefore, these powers' interests require the protection of that trade and their share in it. Unlike continental powers, these states either have short and easily defendable land borders or have none at all (Menon 1998, p.183; Montgomery 2013, p.80).

After having surveyed various definitions of sea power, it is now time to look at what continental power is and when a state can be called as a continental power. The description and the classification of a state as a continental power, seapower, (or hybrid power) is also based on any threat to it and from where that threat is perceived to exist. Continental powers have traditionally been states that are highly threatened by their land neighbors. This threat is generated and amplified by the existence of long land borders. Consequently, their security is primarily dependent upon the strength of their armies. As such, their primary physical security interests lies in the advancement of their armies. Therefore, the majority of their arms expenditure goes on the army or on land security investments (Menon 1998, p.183; Montgomery 2013, p.80-81). Mearsheimer (2001) agrees that the direction of the threat is important for a state to be called a continental power, which he calls a continental state. He expresses the view that such states can be attacked over land and water, considering they are not landlocked. However, he adds a further description: "a continental state... is a great power located on a large body of land that is also occupied by one or more other great powers" (Mearsheimer 2001, p.126). Therefore, it can be assumed that a continental power must be (1) vulnerable to physical

security threats over land and (2) if it is a great power, it must be present in a body of land within which another great power exists. The second condition is linked to the first, since only another great power can seriously threaten a great power. Mearsheimer counts France, Germany, and Russia as notable continental states (Mearsheimer 2001, p.126).

Finally, a hybrid power can be defined as a state which requires both armies and navies for its physical security. Even though most of the states with access to water may require navies for security purposes, in order to be called a hybrid power, the physical security needs based on land and sea need to be more or less balanced. That is, a state can be called hybrid if it cannot ignore either the naval or land aspect of its physical security needs (Menon 1998, p.183; Speller 2014, p.5). Menon (1998, p.183) counts the United States and Canada as such powers, due to their secure positions in the American Continent, which allow the relative importance of the sea to rise in military calculations.

In the context of this study, states as such as Austria-Hungary, Egypt, France, Spain, and Japan are not included for comparison for several reasons. First of all, Austria-Hungary did not even initiate a big naval expansion which went beyond physical security needs of the state. Egypt did try to acquire ironclads during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, but these ships were eventually taken over by the Ottoman Empire, leaving Egypt with only one ironclad. Therefore, the Egyptian naval expansion remained insignificant in scope for a comparative study. France had always possessed a considerable battlefleet. However, this state was also a colonial power. As such, French naval expansions cannot be considered as unnecessarily large when one considers its overseas possessions. Spain was a colonial power too. Additionally, it was more akin to a hybrid power than a continental power. Japan, on the other hand, was almost a seapower therefore could not be used as a case in a comparative study which focuses on continental powers.

3.2 WAS THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE A SEA POWER STATE?

When a comparison is made between the Ottoman ships, needs, and capacity and the conditions covered above, some patterns become evident. For the period under consideration, the Ottoman Empire needed naval power through geographical necessity

alone. It controlled an important sea lane between Asia and Europe. Furthermore, the majority of the Ottoman lands were situated on the coasts of the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean. As such, the Ottoman Empire was exposed to influence from the sea. Therefore, the physical security needs of the state required a considerable army and a navy. Even though it may be possible to label the state as a hybrid power, its leaders certainly did not see it that way as they considered the state as a continental power according to Erbaş (2019, p.78). Akad also stresses that the Ottoman Empire never developed a solely sea-centered strategic vision (1995, p.74-81). These sources point to a considerable lack of sea-mindedness on the part of the state's leaders. As a consequence, this alone rules out classification of the Ottoman Empire as a hybrid power, even though the state possessed aspects of sea power throughout its existence. The next part discusses the seapower credentials of the Ottoman Empire largely from a Mahanian perspective, modified by concepts borrowed from other approaches.

3.2.1 Presence of a Battlefleet[10]

As Harding (2001) indicates, the naval power of the state started to be equated increasingly with the ship-of-the-line (battleship after 1860) and the battlefleet starting from the Seventeenth Century up until the mid-Twentieth. Therefore, it is important to look for the existence of an Ottoman (battle)fleet and ships-of-the-line (and battleships after 1860) during the Empire's lifespan. There is a plethora of works on the Ottoman Navy and its (battle)fleet, including but not limited to Büyüktuğrul (1982, 1983), Gencer (1985), Brummett (1993, 1994, 2001), Langensiepen and Güleryüz (1995), Sondhaus 2001, Özbaran (2007), Bostan (2007, 2010, 2015), Zorlu (2008), Hacipoğlu (2013), Örenç (2013), Gürdeniz (2015), Dal (2015), Yüksel (2016), and Panzac (2018). They constitute a mass of compelling evidence for the continual presence of an Ottoman (battle)fleet. These works show that the Ottoman Empire was always in possession of a capable fleet, except in the aftermath of a few incidents at Çeşme in 1770, Navarino in 1827, and the defection of the Ottoman fleet to Mehmet Ali in 1839, for the entire lifespan

[10] The term "battlefleet" is chosen for the title, however, until the Seventeenth Century and until the formation of the ship-of-the-line tactics this term was not chosen to designate the naval power of states. Instead the term "fleet" was used.

of the Empire. Even before the conquest of Istanbul, the Ottoman state had a considerable number of ships, around sixty in the 1390s (Bostan 2010, p.4-5; Bostan 2015, p.33-34). The conquest of the future capital of the Empire, which required a powerful galley fleet to choke seaborne supplies, resulted in an increase of the fleet to 350 to 400 ships (Hess 1970, p.1,900; Bostan 2010, p.6-7; Bostan 2015, p.17)**.** The presence of Ottoman fleets is recorded during wars with Venice, Rhodes, Spain, Portugal and the Mamluks in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries. The fleet had around ninety galleys by the second half of the Fifteenth Century and the beginning of the Sixteenth. It possessed 122 oar-propelled ships at the battle of Preveza in 1538. During the attack on Malta, in 1565, it had 240 ships, of which 140 were galleys. While 161 ships were involved in the conquest of Cyprus in 1570-71, the fleet had risen to more than 200 ships, mostly galleys, at the battle of Lepanto again in 1571 (Gencer 1985, p.8; Brummet 1993, p.517-539; Brummett 1994, p.91-93; Özbaran 2007, p.48-49, 51; Bostan 2007, p.13-17; Bostan 2010, p.20-26; Gürdeniz 2015, p.222-239; Bostan 2015, p.18-40; Panzac 2018, p.xxiv).

The Seventeenth Century witnessed the transition from oar-propelled galleys to wind-propelled galleons in the Ottoman fleet. This transition started in mid-century and took around fifty years (Bostan 2010, p.41-50). Therefore, starting from the 1650s, galleons started to become the main fighting element of the fleet. In the second half of the century, the number of galleons fluctuated between six and thirty-six, and during the conquest of Crete (1645-1669) the Ottoman fleet possessed between twelve and thirty galleons (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.101-148, 183-206; Bostan 2010, p.46-49; Bostan 2015, p.190-197; Panzac 2018, p.136-172). In the Seventeenth Century, the Ottomans had two main naval theaters. In the Aegean and the Mediterranean, they had to deal with Venice and its allies Florence, Genova, the Knights of Malta, Naples, and the Papal States on the sea during the conquest of Crete (1644-1669). They fought with Venice on the sea again during the war of 1684-1699. On the Black Sea, they encountered growing Russian naval power prior to and after the conquest of Azov (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.85-207; Stone 2006, p.48-49).

The Anglo-Dutch wars in the second half of the Seventeenth Century led to the development of line of battle tactics and the subsequent establishment of the ship-of-the-line. Therefore, in this dissertation, from this point on, the Ottoman fleet will be called a

battlefleet and will be mainly evaluated by how many ships of this class it possessed. By the mid-Eighteenth Century the state had in its possession twenty-seven ships-of-the-line. In the mid-century this force was the greatest naval power in the Mediterranean, because both Britain and France, while owning a larger number of ships-of-the-line overall, had fewer ships-of-the-line deployed in that sea. The Ottoman Empire was a stronger naval power in the Mediterranean than Spain and Venice as well. The Spanish fleet was located in the Atlantic, therefore it lacked a sizeable presence in the Mediterranean. Lastly, the entire Venetian Navy was weaker than its Ottoman counterpart (Panzac 2018, p.185-187). During the Ottoman-Russian War of 1768-1774, a Russian fleet under the command of Aleksei Orlov entered the Aegean, by completing a journey from the Baltic with British support. After an indecisive first encounter, during which the opposing fleets had lost a galleon each, the Ottoman fleet retreated to Çeşme Harbor. The Russian fleet engaged the Ottoman fleet there once more and destroyed it in Çeşme Harbor by burning it while the fleet was at anchor. After this disaster at Çeşme in 1770, the Ottoman Navy strove to rebuild the fleet and increase its personnel. As a result of this effort, the battlefleet again grew in size. While owning twenty-three galleons, nineteen frigates, and seventeen smaller ships, it had thirteen[11] ships-of-the-line plus three in construction in 1784. The rest of the galleons were too weak to fight in the line of battle according to the criteria established by Modelski and Thompson (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.67; Aksan 2013, p.147; Panzac 2018, p.198-221).

By the first decade of the Nineteenth Century the battlefleet had ten to twenty-eight ships-of-the-line between 1804 and 1807 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.319; Sondhaus 2001, p.5; Zorlu 2008, p.119). In 1838, the Ottoman Navy owned ten ships-of-the-line, while in 1848 it had eleven ships-of-the-line. Right before the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1860, the Ottoman battlefleet had ten ships-of-the-line, seven being sailing, three being screw-propelled (Panzac 2018, p.318-332). In the Nineteenth Century the Ottoman Empire waged war on the sea against Britain between 1806 and 1809, Egypt between 1831 and 1833, 1839 and 1841, France between 1798 and 1801, Greece between 1821

[11] While Modelski and Thompson (1988) uses Shaw (1976) as a source material for Ottoman ships-of-the-line for the year 1784, Panzac (2018) is the choice as a source material in this work. This choice is made because Panzac's work gives details on gun numbers therefore makes it possible to classify Ottoman ships to see if they were fit for the line of battle or not according to the criteria of Modelski and Thompson (1988) (Shaw 1976, p.252; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.319; Panzac 2018, p.221).

and 1830, Britain, France, and Russia combined between 1827 and 1828 (as part of the Greek War of Independence), and finally against Russia between 1806 and 1812, 1828 and 1829, 1853 and 1856, 1877 and 1878 (Panzac 2018, p.212, 322-324).

Consequently, the Ottoman Empire was always in possession of a considerable battlefleet and a number of ships-of-the-line. It was also a regional power and the most powerful naval power in the Mediterranean until the second half of the Eighteenth Century. It even reached third place globally in the mid-Seventeenth Century. By the mid-Eighteenth Century it ranked fifth in terms of ships-of-the-line numbers, after Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Spain. However, it dropped behind Russia by the end of the century to sixth place, only to recover to fifth place by outranking the Netherlands in the first decade of the Nineteenth Century. It rose even higher to fourth rank after the Battle of Trafalgar, which eliminated the Spanish fleet and it kept this position until the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1861 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.67-72, 319).



Figure 3.1. Ottoman warships[12]

[12] After 1656 Ottoman ship numbers show Ottoman galleons. Before that date all the warships are counted including galleys (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.319).



Figure 3. 2. British, French, Russian, and Spanish warships[13]

3.2.2 Presence of a Merchant Fleet

The Ottomans had merchant fleets in the Aegean beginning at least from the Fifteenth Century. The basis of the Ottoman expansion was founded upon the strength of the army and its economy was independent of imported goods (Özbaran 2007, p.59; Gürdeniz 2015, p.277). Therefore, the need for overseas expansion was not felt as much as it was by other states of Western Europe. The focus was on getting tax revenues and controlling trade routes (Hess 1970, p.1916). Despite the lack of a focus on acquiring overseas possessions, the Ottomans had considerable interest in commercial activity and had significant merchant fleets in the Mediterranean (Brummett 1993, p.520; Brummett 1994, p.8, 11, 14, 176; Harlaftis and Laiou 2008, p.3-5). However, Tarakçı (2009) stresses that the Ottoman economic and military decline was generated by the Ottoman neglect of seaborne trade. Therefore, he points out the fact that, from the Sixteenth Century onward, the Ottoman Empire paid diminishing attention and care to its merchant fleet, which declined as a result (Tarakçı 2009, p.130-132).

[13] Ship numbers are taken from Modelski and Thompson (1988, p.213-292).

3.2.3 Population

There is also evidence of the existence of an Ottoman seafaring community dating at least from the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries (Hess 1970, p.1894). However, there were constant shortages of skilled sailors at the beginning of the Sixteenth Century, during Bayezid II's last years and Selim I's reign (Brummett 1994, 90, 96, 99). This shortage was felt again especially after the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, mostly for oarsmen. The situation above continued well into the Nineteenth Century. During the reign of Selim III, due to the shortage of naval personnel, some ships of the fleet could not sail (Panzac 2018, p.26, 243-245). This problem only became worse from the second decade of the century, because sailors were recruited mostly from non-Muslim subjects from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth centuries, until the Morea Revolt / The Greek War of Independence in 1821. However, when the Greek uprising began, most of the Greek sailors could no longer be employed in the Ottoman Navy. Either they had left the navy or they were let go by the Ottoman authorities (Gencer 1985, p.105; Phillips 1897, p.68; Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.349-350; Aksan 2013, p. 316; Gürdeniz 2015, p.240). To sum up, it is safe to assume that until at least 1821, the Ottoman Empire certainly possessed a population that was engaged in maritime activity.

Another part of the Ottoman maritime community was the corsairs. These were seamen, pillagers operating in the seas, targeting the ships and coasts of countries of alien religions or of their co-religionists. They were at times operating as part of the state navies. At others, rejecting the authority of the state, they acted independently by attacking the shipping or coasts of the very same state they served, or its enemies, friends, and neighbors. They were frequently used by states to supplement their fleets, especially in times of war. Some corsairs were hired by states as naval commanders for their expertise in naval warfare and to provide the state with experienced crews. Others were simply hired to prey on enemy shipping and coasts. Ottomans too used these seamen, starting from the last decades of the Fifteenth Century. Some notable examples were Kemal Reis during the reign of Bayezid II and, starting with his oath of loyalty in 1519 to Sultan Selim I, Hayreddin Pasha. In the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries they became an important part of Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean. Especially the Corsairs of the

Maghreb in Algiers, Tunisia, and Trablus accounted for a substantial part of Ottoman naval power as sailors and commanders (Brummett 1994, p.96-107; Bostan 2007, p.15; Arıkan 2007, p.80; Arı 2007, p.268-281; Bostan 2015, p.24-25; Gürdeniz 2015, p.228-229).

3.2.4 Strategic Needs of the State

By the early Fourteenth Century, the Ottoman Empire started to feel the need to acquire some kind of naval power, because of its increasing exposure to the sea, the expanding coastline of the state especially after the conquests in the Balkan peninsula, and the growing naval resistance from other powers including Venice, Spain, and Portugal (Hess 1970, p.1,898, 1,904; Fleet 2001, p.129-131). With the rising Russian power in the Black Sea, beginning with their short-lived conquest of Azov in 1700, a new naval challenge emerged (Ledonne 1997, p.90-92). The new threat only increased during the Eighteenth Century, reaching even higher levels in the Nineteenth. There was an inseparable naval aspect of this new threat. In all three naval disasters of the Ottoman Empire, in 1770 at Çeşme, in 1827 at Navarino, and in 1853 at Sinop, Russia was present, and was the main actor in two of them. Therefore, the need to counter the Russian naval power became an ever-present consideration. Additionally, as long as the Ottoman Empire controlled the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits, and its territory was divided between Europe and Asia, the state would always need powerful fleets to patrol this continental gap.

3.2.5 Sea-Mindedness of the State

Sea-mindedness is a combination of what Mahan (1899) calls National Character and Character of Government. National character means that there is a tendency to engage in trade and enterprise in foreign lands whereas Character of Government means that there is a continuous focus on the development of sea power and the institutions that are necessary for it. According to Till (2009) governments must actively invest in and develop their merchant fleets (Till 2009, p.105). That is because the sea must be at the center of economic and strategic calculations. However, in the Ottoman Empire this was

mostly left to non-Muslim Millets' initiative. Additionally, even though leaders' initiatives are important for the development of sea power, they "come and go" and their "achievements have often died with them" (Till 2009, p.86). This actually means that there is not a sea-mindedness. On the contrary, some leaders are aware of the importance of sea power, yet this awareness is not shared by the rest of the state's leaders or its bureaucracy. However, according to Lambert (2018) a state can be a seapower if there is a "politically driven" process for the development of sea power (Lambert 2018, p.6). This can be seen in the Ottoman example where individuals invest in naval power, but their enthusiasm is not shared by others. The navy of Sultan Selim III, the navy of Sultan Abdülaziz, the navy of Sultan Abdülhamit II are some well known examples. Especially the armored fleet put together by the efforts of Abdülaziz was left to rot in Haliç by his successor Sultan Abdülhamit II. Sea-mindedness of the Abdülaziz era was not shared by his successor or the state's bureaucracy. So, the existence of leaders who invest in naval power does not mean that there is sea-mindedness. On the contrary, it may be evidence to the lack of sea-mindedness because others did not follow their example due to the lack of a general political drive. Finally, Lambert (2018) specifically counts the Ottoman Empire as a "state too large and powerful to profit from a sea identity" (Lambert 2018, p.6-7). Therefore, he points out to the lack of sea-mindedness in the Ottoman Empire.

There is considerable evidence pointing to the existence of governmental will behind the development of the Ottoman naval power in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth centuries. This was a fact that was evident during the wars which were mainly naval conflicts with Venice, Spain, and the Papacy in the Mediterranean. One can add to these the Indian ventures against the Portuguese. However, the presence of Kapudan Pashas without a naval background, starting in the Sixteenth Century with Müezzinade Ali Pasha at the helm during the battle of Lepanto in 1571, prompts the question of the efficiency of the administration, if not the existence of its willingness (Brummett 1994, p.125; Gürdeniz 2015, p.234, 237, 244). However, it also indicates that sea and matters relating to sea were not at the center of Ottoman strategic calculations. The naval efforts of Sultan Selim III, Sultan Abdülaziz, and Sultan Abdülhamid II are all undeniable signs of governmental predilection for the development of Ottoman naval power. When studying Ottoman naval history, it is impossible to ignore the three naval tragedies that descended on the Ottoman fleets. At Çeşme in 1770, the Russian Baltic Fleet decimated the Ottoman

fleet that had sought shelter in Çeşme Harbor. At Navarino in 1827, the combined British, French, and Russia fleets destroyed the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet while it was at anchor inside Navarino Bay. Finally, at Sinop in 1853, Russian forces raided and completely destroyed an Ottoman squadron which had anchored inside Sinop Harbor. In all three cases, the Ottoman fleets were trapped in harbors (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.117-119, Panzac 2018, p.326-327). Even though this fact cannot be considered a sign of the lack of governmental predisposition for the development of naval power, it certainly indicates a significant lack of sea-mindedness. According to Özbaran (2007, p.56), the lack of a consistent and determined policy for the education of naval personnel prevented the Empire from becoming a true seapower, even though the state had no shortage of capable naval commanders and sailors. This is again a sign to the lack of sea-mindedness in the Ottoman Empire.

3.3 A HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF OTTOMAN NAVAL POWER

3.3.1 1494 – 1654 Pre Ship-of-the-Line Era

During this era, oar-propelled ships including the galley, which had hitherto been the main constituent of naval power and fleets right across the Mediterranean, started to lose its dominant position in naval warfare[14]. This decline was precipitated by the rise of sailing warships specialized in warfare, and long-distance travel over large bodies of water. This specialization in warfare came with the advent of smaller-sized cannons mounted on the broadsides of these sailing ships, a development which eliminated, or made difficult, seamen's ability, in smaller oar-propelled ships, to close in and board the enemy ship. Broadside armaments, sail-propulsion, and bigger ship designs led to the formation of galleon type ships. This new form of warship included many different

[14] Naval warfare in the Mediterranean in the Fifteenth Century was mainly a continuation of fighting on land. The tactics used were closing in with the enemy ship, ramming it, and boarding it with soldiers aboard one's own ship and taking the other ship over (Kennedy 1976, p.15-16)

types[15] until the standardization of an ocean-going type of galleon emerged in the Seventeenth Century (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.50-53; Kennedy 1976, 16).

The Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries witnessed breakthroughs in the naval technology of navigation, armaments, and gunnery. Another important naval innovation was at the tactical level. Before the rise of the galleon type ships, the battle at sea was in the form of a land fight on boats, with infantries trying to capture or sink the enemy ships. The introduction of the sail driven, stouter, floating castles, with higher sides and armed with broadside cannons changed the character of the fight at sea rapidly. Galleys could not close in or position themselves against the sailing warships, because of the superior firepower of the new warship. The Portuguese successes against the Mamluk, Ottoman, and Indian galleys of the early Sixteenth Century, or the British and Dutch successes against the Spanish Armada in 1588, are some of the examples of the changing tactical situation on the sea[16]. Nor could the galley endure in the open sea as long as these new types of ships. The transition from human energy (oar-propulsion) to wind energy (sail-driven) also meant that these new types of ships could make longer voyages (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.27-28, 36).

The Early Sixteenth Century (1520s) witnessed the use of the sailing warship and ocean-going vessels in the Mediterranean. Spain used caravels and galleons for ocean voyages. At the same time, it used large fleets of galleys and armed sailing ships in the Mediterranean. However, sailing warships were phased out in the 1540s in favor of the galley (Phillips 2006, p.12-14). Despite the performance of the *Great Galleon of* Venice, the Battle of Preveza in 1538 was a galley victory[17]. Hence in the first half of the Sixteenth

[15] This type included the Carrack (a northern trade ship), the Nau - the Great Ship (a Portuguese design for long distance operations), and according to some even the Venetian designed Galleass (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.155-160).

[16] What is learned from the Spanish Armada's defeat in 1588: (1) it showed the efficiency of sail and artillery against galley warfare, (2) broadside arming became much more important than bow and stern guns (which were useless except in pursuit or escape situations), (3) the formation of the line during the battle (Stevens and Westscott 1920, p.163-164).

[17] Even though the victory was on the side of the galleys, the performance of the *Great Galleon of Venice* was according to Stevens and Westscott (1920) a harbinger of future developments and a revolution in naval warfare. This broadside armed sailing ship stood alone against and inflicted serious damage upon numerous galleys of the Ottoman fleet. The deadly effects of the broadside armaments and their success against the galley was a precursor to the superiority of the sailing warship, the coming of the ship-of-the-line, future naval warfare, and maybe to the dawn of the ship-of-the-line era. However, its effects on the development of the galleon were to be felt only some fifty years later, because Venetian architects continued to favor the development of galleys, focusing on the fact that the galleon had becalmed, and not on the fact

Century, galleys were still the primary tools of naval warfare in the Mediterranean, and the galley retained its dominance in inland seas even until after the Battle of Lepanto (1571) (Kennedy 1976, p.18). However, in this battle, the galley, hitherto the backbone of Ottoman naval power, failed to deliver success. Like their Venetian counterparts, the Ottomans too had drawn the wrong lessons from the previous battle (Preveza). They still believed in the efficiency of the galley, hence they kept it as the primary tool in both battles. They subsequently missed the revolution in naval warfare, the transition from oar to sail, from boarding tactics to the primacy of gunnery. The presence of the sailing warship within the Mediterranean was not limited to Spain. France and Venice too had used them in the Sixteenth Century on that sea. Venice's use of the *Great Galleon of Venice* during the battle of Preveza in 1538 constitutes such an example (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.27-28; Phillips 2006, p.15-16, 22; Bostan 2010, p.20-21, 25; Gürdeniz 2015, p.243). By the 1600s, the armed sailing ship was, again, on the Mediterranean. Its use had become commonplace by the 1630s. Increases in the armament of the sailing ships had already started to diminish the effectiveness of the galleys. The superiority of the galleon was felt during the second half of the Seventeenth Century (Kennedy 1976, p.18). While large fleets were not maintained for long in the Sixteenth Century, they came to dominate the highseas and the Mediterranean from the late Seventeenth Century. It was a development that paved the way for the formation of the line of battle later in that century (Phillips 2006, p.15, 22-24)

From the Fifteenth Century, the Ottoman Empire always had a considerable fleet at its disposal. Hence, the Empire was always considered as a state with significant naval power (Hess 1970, p.1894; Brummett 1994, p.125). It had established its supremacy in the Aegean following the Aegean War of 1499-1503 (Brummett 1993, p.517). By the first decades of the Sixteenth Century it had also established its hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean (Brummett 1993, p.541; Brummett 1994, p.23). However, it never needed an ocean-going navy due to its lack of overseas aspirations, and thus was never considered as a global seapower (Saçlı 2007, p.8; Özbaran 2007, p.48-59). The farthest extent of the Ottoman naval reach in the East was the Indian Ocean, to challenge the Portuguese in the

that its firepower and thicker sides made it superior to galleys. According to Stevens and Westscott "They overlooked the great defensive and offensive capabilities of the galleon" (Stevens and Westscott 1920, p.96-98; Phillips 2006, p.16).

early Sixteenth Century. The Ottoman presence in the Indian Ocean was an enterprise which eventually failed due to the lack of an Ottoman ocean-going navy and supply problems (Brummett 2001, p.10-14). A naval frontier was established in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, in both of which the galleys of the Mediterranean dominated the seas. Another was established in the Indian Ocean, where the Atlantic sailing ship reigned supreme (Hess 1970, p.1917). In the West, the Ottoman naval presence reached as far as Algiers during its contest with Spain in the Sixteenth century (Bostan 2007, p.15-16). The Ottoman fleet controlled most of the Mediterranean during its heyday from the victory at the Battle of Preveza (1538) to the Battle of Lepanto (1571) and can be said to be the dominant naval power there until the conquest of Crete in 1669 (Bostan 2007, p.16-17; Bostan 2015, p.155). This was an endeavor which took twenty-four years because of insufficient naval preparation, Ottoman hesitation in the transition from galleys to galleons and heavy Venetian resistance on the seas (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.101, 116). This hesitation was, according to Hess (1970, p.1918), precipitated by the continuing success of the galley in the Mediterranean. Neither the Portuguese ocean-going sailing ships, although superior to the galley on the open seas, nor the Spanish galleons had challenged the Ottoman naval superiority in the Mediterranean until the Seventeenth Century. Additionally, even after the defeat at Lepanto, the Empire could still amass a matching fleet of galleys and continue its conquests in North Africa, by taking Tunisia. Another reason for the Ottoman hesitation was galleys' or oar-propelled warships' advantages in the Mediterranean due to long summers with calm weather, during which sail-propelled ships could become becalmed. Furthermore, galleys were advantageous in small bays and harbors. Additionally, Hayreddin Pasha, commander-in-chief or the Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman Navy in the Sixteenth Century and victor at the Battle of Preveza (1538), favored these warships, and his followers continued in his footsteps (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.2-5; Brummet 1994, p.9; Bostan 2015, p.27-28, 184-195; Gürdeniz 2015, p.43, 226-246). The final naval victory, and the following conquest of Crete, of the Ottoman Empire on the seas also corresponds to the end of the first naval era of Modelski and Thompson, who identify the year 1654 as the end of the pre-ship-of-the-line era. This era also characterizes the Ottoman hesitation until the final decades of the Seventeenth Century, as mentioned above, to adopt the sailing ship instead of the galley, which had proved,

hitherto, useful to the Ottoman expansion and physical protection (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.50).

3.3.2 1655-1860 Ship-of-the-Line Era

The end of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654) witnessed the emergence of the line-of-battle tactics and the subsequent development of the ship-of-the-line concept. A ship-of-the-line is defined as a warship strong enough to stand in a line against the enemy and withstand the firepower of the enemy ships in the opposing line of battle. It is also known as a sailing battleship. Between 1650 and 1690, the number of broadside guns in ships kept growing, due to the successive Anglo-Dutch Wars and the arms race this caused. By 1690, a consensus had emerged. The minimum number of guns a ship-of-the-line must have was determined to be 50[18]. These wars were also responsible for the establishment of the ship-of-the-line as the main warship and the establishment of the battlefleet as the main tool of naval power (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.61-66; Harding 2001, p.101-102)

Toward the Nineteenth Century, the ship-of-the-line gradually became the most potent weapon at sea. If unchallenged by similar vessels, it was unstoppable[19]: it could protect smaller vessels, help protect trade overseas, disrupt the enemy's commercial activity, protect large coastlines, and help military operations ashore. The ship-of-the-line had become indispensable for dealing with similar enemy fleets. It could defeat, but not eliminate, such groupings. By 1680, the role of the ship-of-the-line and that of the battlefleet formed by these ships was well established (Harding 2001, p.56-57, 108).

[18] Modelski and Thompson (1988) consider the ship-of-the-line to have possessed at least 30 guns for 1655-1670, 40 guns for 1671-1690, 50 guns for 1691-1756, and 60 guns for 1757-1860. The British had raised the minimum requirement of guns (for ships to be considered fit to be part of the line of battle) to be 60 after 1755 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.66-67). However, Polmar (1999) describes the ship-of-the-line to have had 100+ guns by late 1700s. Polmar also describes the frigates to have been limited to a maximum of 48 guns. Thus, he leaves a gap between 48-100 guns, and avoids describing them as either ship-of-the-line or as frigates (Polmar 1999, p.126).

[19] Despite its strengths, numerous weaknesses of the sailing battleship existed. It could not pursue or catch shallow-draughted, faster vessels like frigates and galleys. It was expensive and hard to maintain over long periods of time (Harding 2001, p.56)

However, even by the end of the Seventeenth Century, there was considerable doubt about whether or not to build such expensive weapons of war. This was so because in this century there was another aspect of sea power. The battlefleet alone was not enough for the control and denial of the sea. Privateering also played an important part[20]. Its importance increased until the Eighteenth Century. Thus, fleets in the Seventeenth Century were created in such a way that respected the balance between the battlefleet and the privateers. This was especially true during the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654), Anglo-Spanish War (1655-1660), and Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars (1664-1667, 1672-1674) (Harding 2001, p.57, 78, 104-105). Galleys, on the other hand, were still useful. Up until the 1810s, the galley survived in the Mediterranean due to lack of consistent winds, and the existence of few harbors large enough to contain larger ships. Additionally, they were used for towing ships in and out of action, especially when they were becalmed by the lack of sufficient wind (Harding 2001, p.111; Coutau-Bégarie 2006, p.32). In sum, by the second half of the Eighteenth Century, naval power was understood mainly in terms of the ship-of-the-line numbers a state possessed (Harding 2001, p.217).

During this era, there were no great leaps in shipbuilding technology besides the ever-increasing number of guns on the broadsides of ships, increasing maneuvrability, and durability. However, there were great changes in the size of the maritime economy and the volume of seaborne trade. This also led to the need for keeping the sealanes open for all those who engaged in seaborne commerce (Harding 2001, p.13-36). Related with this development, from the mid-Eighteenth Century, the importance of the blockade as a tool in naval warfare increased[21]. Although the concept of naval blockade was not new, with the first known instance of naval blockade during the Peloponnesian War in the Fifth

[20] The use of private naval power, by the state, to disrupt enemy shipping and commerce and reap benefits from it, began in the Sixteenth Century and developed into the Seventeenth Century during which it reached its zenith. It had been effective between 1690-1713, but after 1740 it started to lose its effectiveness. The reason for this was not because privateering could not impose high costs on the enemy trade and shipping. It was because it could not win a war the way the battlefleet could by destroying enemy battlefleets (Harding 2001, p.221, 253, 282).

[21] The importance of the blockade became crucial for both sides during the Anglo-Dutch Wars in the Seventeenth Century. The blockade of the French coast in 1759, 1792-1801, 1802-1815, and the blockade of German shipping during the First World War are all examples of the British use of naval blockade as a tool during wars (Harding 2001, p.51-52; Osborne 2004, p.1-9).

Century, it was the British who implemented its first systematic use during the Seven Years War (1756-1763) (Harding 2001, p.51-52; Osborne 2004, p.6).

The Ship-of-the-line era saw the decline of Ottoman naval power in the Mediterranean, which regressed into a more regional and defensive character in the Aegean and the Black Sea (Örenç 2013, p.122). This era was also marked by the rise of the Russian threat in the Black Sea and even its power projection into the Mediterranean during the 1768-1774 war, culminating in the Çeşme incident of 1770 (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.268-269). This era includes the three greatest naval tragedies that struck the Ottoman Empire. In all three, the Ottoman Navy was hit when it was anchored inside three different harbors in 1770, 1827, and 1853. All three disasters were caused by administrative failures, the Kapudan Pashas' lack of understanding or their misunderstanding of naval warfare, when they were the highest ranked naval commanders (commanders of the entire navy) (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.268-269, 364; Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.118-119; Gürdeniz 2015, p.290). This was a fact that can be attributed to their non-naval backgrounds, but not to a weaker fleet in terms of sheer numbers. The fact that the Ottoman fleets were caught and destroyed within harbors may reflect a defensive military mentality. It may also reflect the adoption of the strategy of "fleet in being" [22] against potential enemies. Another possible explanation is the lack of sea-mindedness of the Ottoman state. This might have caused the state to fail to develop or adopt a proper naval doctrine. It could also have prevented the establishment of the role of the fleet in realizing the strategic objectives of the state. The Çeşme Disaster of 1770 greatly reduced the number of trained sailors in the navy. The 1821 Greek revolt deprived the Ottoman Navy of the experienced Greek sailors and also led to the Navarino disaster in 1827, which dealt a further blow to the navy by killing most of the remaining experienced sailors (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.350-351; Watts 1990, p.11-12). The Sinop Raid in 1853 again killed many sailors (around 2,000), which further depleted the ranks of the Empire's experienced sailors (Watts 1990, p.13). Even though the destroyed ships could have been replaced, albeit at a financial cost, naval experience lost could not be recovered as easily. This lack of experience continued even

[22] A strategy that can be adopted by weaker fleets. It involves the avoidance of combat and/or staying within the relative safety of harbors.This serves to maintain the fleet (instead of risking its destruction by fighting the stronger enemy) so as to deny the opponent by its mere existence the freedom of action that could be derived from its destruction (Speller 2014, p.49).

until the end of the Abdülaziz era (Gencer 1985, p.54,150, 180-187, 273; Gürdeniz 2015, p.273).

3.3.3 1861-1945 Battleship Era

Before delving into the characteristics of this era a clarification is due. This dissertation uses the term ship-of-the-line as the main aspect of naval power until 1860, when the building of the *Gloire* and the HMS *Warrior* started. After that, the term battleship is used instead as the backbone of naval power. The significance of this era lay in the impact of industrialization upon naval power. After 1815, the pace of technological inventions created an era of change that was unprecedented since the mounting of cannons on the broadsides of sailing ships in the Fifteenth Century (Cable 1998, p.71). Until the mid-Nineteenth Century only incremental progress had been made (Stevens and Westscott 1920, p.146-147, 286-287; Lambert 1992, p.7-8). However, by 1860, the screw-propeller along with the steam engine, shell guns and armor had rendered all the wooden sailing ships obsolete (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.73). Chemical propellants and the development of the gunnery[23] extended the firing range of the battleship beyond that of any of its predecessors. The advent and improvements of the steam engine had made the installation of paddle-steamers in the 1850s[24] and screw-propellers[25], which continued to develop in the 1840s and 1850s, possible. This development freed the fleets from dependency upon the wind[26] and made them faster. The invention of the telegraph made long-distance communications possible. It therefore made communication between naval units dispersed across the oceans easier and much faster. According to Rose (2007) the most important impact of industrialization upon sea power was the hardening and the lightening of the armor. Between the 1840s and 1870s, the use of iron and steel in hulls, armor, and ship infrastructure made ships stronger. Additional important changes were the training instead of apprenticeship of sailors and officers, the terms of service for

[23] The improvements in naval ordnance continued until the 1890s (Conway's 1979, p.4)
[24] The last paddle-steamer frigate was launched in 1851 and the last sloop launched in 1858 (Conway's 1979, p.42).
[25] While the idea itself dated from Antiquity, it became possible only in the Nineteenth Century. However, it was not as efficient in speed or stability in paddle-steamers until 1840. By the 1850s, screw-propellers had doomed paddle-steamers into obsolescence (Sondhaus 2001, p.37, 42, 52).
[26] Until 1815, wind power was still the main source of power for fleets across the world (Cable 1998, p.71).

officers and men, and the introduction of shells[27] and torpedoes[28] (Conway's 1979, p.42; Cable 1998, p.71-72; Sondhaus 2001, p.38; Rose 2007, p.8-10; Crisher and Souva 2014, p.611)

The replacement of sail with steam, of oak with iron and steel in the hulls and the infrastructure of ships, of the cannonball with the shell, of the muzzle-loading gun with the breech-loading gun, and of the paddle with the screw-propeller began around the 1850s. Improvements in naval ordnance and armor in the 1870s made the ships built in the 1860s obsolete within a decade. The changes came so swiftly that an up-to-date ship of the succeeding decade could defeat several ships of the preceding decade. However, having ships that were built according to the latest technological innovations was not enough. That is because success on the seas depended also on the adaptability and the training of the ships' personnel. A new skill-set requirement had emerged, literacy and education of the naval personnel. So, accumulating "modern" ships at the expense of training and/or education was not as worthwhile as it was before these technological innovations took place (Stevens and Westscott 1920, p.286-287; Sondhaus 2001, p.108).

Crisher and Souva (2014) describe the period from 1865 to 1879 as "transitional" while Modelski and Thompson describe it[29] as a period of "trial and error". Crisher and Souva (2014) add that there were significant variations in ship design because of a lack of consensus in shipbuilding enabling the standardization of a single type of ironclad[30]. Such a stabilization in the designs of ships came only after the 1880s and a consensus emerged on what an ocean-going armored battleship should be like (Conway's 1979, p.2;

[27] Henry Joseph Paixhans had begun experimenting with shell guns in 1809. The development and the use of these guns started only in the 1830s and 1840s reaching its peak in the Battle of Sinop (1853) (Sondhaus 2001, p.22).

[28] The torpedo warfare began in the 1860s. The Frigate *Shah* was the first naval vessel to use a torpedo in action (no hit is recorded though). It gained efficiency between the 1870s and 1880s only to lose it in the 1890s (Conway's 1979, p.86).

[29] They also establish the period of confusion as spanning between 1859 and 1890 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.73).

[30] The design of the ship dates back to the 1850s. The use of armored floating batteries (in the bombardment of Kinburn in October 1855) during the Crimean War (1853-1856) influenced its development. While the Battle of Hampton Roads sealed the deal for the supremacy of this new ship. Even though Britain and France continued their building programs of wooden-hulled ships until the end of the 1850s, by the 1860s they had stopped all wooden-hulled shipbuilding. From then on, they started a program of conversion of the wooden-hulled ships to ironclads. The intensity of the ironclad development only increased in the 1860s along with a naval arms race between Britain and France (Conway's 1979, p.4, 41-42; Lambert 1992, p.9; Sondhaus 2001, p.77, 86).

Sondhaus 2001, p.73; Crisher and Souva 2014, p.610-611). Confusion about what type of ship to build was a general characteristic of the period. Even the British Admiralty was unsure of what type of ship to build. Additionally, no navy had a coherent naval strategy to guide their shipbuilding accordingly in the 1860s and 1870s. The focus was on getting as many ironclads as possible of all types, even those of the obsolete technology. Fleets of all states included broadside, casemate, and turret ironclads which formed a mixture of all types. Even the strongest navy had fleets formed of twenty-five different types of battleships. Nor was there any consensus on how to fight at sea; thus there was a lack of naval doctrine, because of the rapid technological advances which had brought confusion to the navies across the world (Conway's 1979, p.1; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.74; Sondhaus 2001, p.103, 109-110).

In sum, the age of steam introduced greater speeds for ships and technological developments in armor and armaments[31], that doomed wooden ships and ended the ship-of-the-line era. With the perceived success of the Paixhans guns in Sinop against wooden ships[32], iron and later steel armored ships started to be produced. The first ironclad launched was the *Gloire* of the French Navy in 1859, which was followed by the British with the launch of the *HMS Warrior* in 1860. The first phase of the ironclad development, which spanned from 1859 to the 1880s, is deeply connected to the purpose of this study. This phase is, as mentioned above, characterized by the fast pace of innovations in armament, armor, and speed of ships which caused concomittantly a rate of obsolescence in ships within a very short time. There was no universal ship design which could also have stabilized naval doctrines of the era (Papastratigakis 2011, p.14-15; Sondhaus 2001, p.103). In short, no state knew what to do with which ship, except to accumulate as much as possible of each new type. By the end of the 1880s, armored ships could hit much harder than they could endure and as such they were expensive but vulnerable weapons of war. As a result, the majority of states could not obtain or maintain them. The technological developments made ironclads ever more expensive, so they could be

[31] An important example was the explosive shells developed by French General Henri-Joseph Paixhans in the first half of the Nineteenth Century (Sondhaus 2001, p.22-23; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.285)

[32] Although there is considerable doubt concerning the effectiveness of the Paixhans gun because it took almost six hours for the Russian Navy which had six ships-of-the-line to destroy the Ottoman fleet in Sinop which had only frigates as the largest type of ship. Another argument is that the Russian fleet did not fight well. According to Badem, "a more efficient fleet, for example the British fleet, in the place of the Russians in such a situation could have won the battle in much less time" (Sondhaus 2001, p.57; Badem 1970, p.126)

afforded only by the states with a powerful industrial base. As such, only those states aspiring to preserve or reach great power status attempted to build such powerful and expensive naval units (Sondhaus 2001, p.27, 58, 74-75, 103, 108-109; Papastratigakis 2011, p.14-16; Gürdeniz 2015, p.117, 156; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.285; Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.65).

It is possible to conclude that the Ottoman Empire was always in possession of a battlefleet (or its equivalent for earlier periods), with the exception of a few instances, up until the end of its existence. It even competed with, and sometimes outranked other powers, with the exception of Britain and France. The second conclusion is that the Ottoman Empire fails to classify as a state focused on seaborne trade or its merchant fleet, maybe with the exception of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries. However, it certainly enjoyed a population that was actively engaged in maritime activity until the Nineteenth Century. Fourth, this inquiry has revealed that the Ottoman Empire needed naval power through geographical necessity alone. Despite this fact, it failed to formulate and adopt an appropriate naval doctrine after the Age of Discovery. From then on, every innovation in technology, therefore in tactics caused its naval power, doctrine, and infrastructure in terms of the maintenance of a modern navy to lag behind the European powers. Furthermore, it could not formulate a long-lasting, stable naval strategy to serve Ottoman interests in the long term. The Ottoman Empire seems to have had deficiencies in the last aspect of sea power as well. This was the sea-mindedness of the state. Despite the existence of numerous sultans who were interested in the development of Ottoman naval power, the state failed to create a consistent and a permanent system of education and training for the navy, because of the lack of a society and leaders embracing and promoting naval politics and interests. This caused a problem related to naval manpower through the poor education level of the general populace. The lack of a large number of major bases of operations, the Kapudan Pashas being chosen among the bureaucracy but not among naval leaders, a low dependence upon imported goods which led to a lack of commercial focus, were all problems pointing to a lack of sea-mindedness.

It is now possible to assume that; (1) the Ottoman Empire possessed a battlefleet (or its equivalent for earlier periods) during the entire lifespan of the state, which could not be used as effectively after the Seventeenth Century, (2) the naval manpower, seaborne trade,

and merchant fleets were mostly dependent upon non-Muslim Millets[33], (3) despite a clear need for naval power, the state failed to formulate an appropriate naval doctrine, (4) the sea was not at the center of Ottoman strategic, political, and economic calculations. The Ottoman Empire lacked multiple aspects of sea power, with the exceptions of the presence of a battlefleet and a population that is actively engaged in maritime activity. Futhermore, based on the definition of Lambert (2018), if a state is to be considered as a seapower state, it needs to possess at least two crucial aspects, a seaborne trade focus along with a merchant fleet and sea-mindedness. These are the aspects which the Ottoman Empire specifically lacked. From this perspective, the Ottoman Empire fails to qualify as a seapower state.

[33] The Ottoman Empire ruled over diverse ethnic and religious groups. Additionally, the Ottoman rulers had never attempted to assimilate peoples they conquered in the Balkans, Anatolia, or Middle East. They had not attempted a wholescale religious conversion of non-Muslims or Turkification of non-Turks. The Ottomans instead had ruled over these groups through a Millet system. The system itself dates back to the time of Sultan Mehmet II. It started with his acceptance that all the Orthodox peoples that lived under the Ottoman banner should be ruled, with full civil and religious authority, by the Orthodox Patriarch who resides in İstanbul, which had recently been conquered. Thus, the Millet system was born, and the Orthodox Community, which was ruled by its own religious leader, became one of the non-Muslim Millets by the Fifteenth century. A similar pattern was established with Armenians and Jews as well. Until the Nineteenth Century, Millets were established on religious terms. Orthodox, Gregorians, and Catholics all had their own Millets (Kent 2005, p.1; Ahmad 2005, p. 18).

4. OTTOMAN STRATEGIC NEEDS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

This chapter will provide a historical background of armed conflicts the Ottoman Empire was involved in prior to the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. It will additionally provide an analysis of those events. In turn, this exercise will help to assess the Ottoman strategic needs and situation before and during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. Furthermore, it will help to underscore the significance of the army as the most crucial element for Ottoman physical security.

4.1 The Morea Revolt / The Greek War Of Independence, 1821-1832[34]

With the ideological legacy of the French Revolution, and inspired by nationalist ideas, the Greeks became the first non-Muslim millet to rise up against Ottoman rule in the Nineteenth Century (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.16). This nationalist revolt led to the independence of Greece, with the help of Britain, France, and Russia. The Great Powers' intervention took the form of a naval action, culminating in the battle of Navarino, during which the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet lost three ships-of-the-line, sixteen frigates, twenty corvettes, and thirteen smaller craft along with experienced naval personnel (Bostan 2010, p.61; Watts 1990, p.12). That was a naval disaster from which the Ottoman Navy never fully recovered, because the destruction of the Ottoman battlefleet caused the loss of 6,000-7,000 experienced seamen along with most of the Ottoman ships (Watts 1990, p.12; Aksan 2013, p.299; Gürdeniz 2015, p.273, 294). Additionally, the Greek sailors whom the Ottoman Navy had hitherto depended on to recruit able seamen were no longer available following the Greek uprising. Henceforth, the Ottoman Empire was forced to man its fleet with untrained fishermen and boatmen (Phillips 1897, p.68; Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.349-350).

[34] The end date of the Revolt/War of Independence is chosen as 1832 because it is the final date on which the question was finally settled with two separate treaties (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.27)

Up until the Greek uprising and the subsequent defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Greece had been under Ottoman rule since its conquest in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth centuries (Shaw 1976, p.12-63; İnalcık and Quataert 1994, p.11-13). By the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, the Ottoman Empire ruled over millions of Christian subjects, of which nearly three million were of Greek origin (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.25-26). The Greeks had been the most privileged ones among the non-Muslim subjects. The head of all the subjects that constituted the Orthodox Millet was the Ecumenical Patriarch who resided in Istanbul. The Patriarch was always a Greek (Clogg 1973, p.1-2). Even outside of continental Greece, powerful Greek lords had reigned over Wallachia and Moldavia as princes. A Greek nobility called the Phanariots enjoyed a near monopoly of some of the powerful bureaucratic positions within the Imperial Administration. These positions included the Principal Interpreter of the Porte (tercüman başı), the Principal Interpreter to the Kapudan Pasha of the Fleet, the Governorship of the islands of the Archipelago, and the post of Hospodar (prince) of Wallachia and Moldovia (Clogg 1973, p.9-10). However, these positions of power were considered by Greeks and their contemporaries as tools of oppression instead of equality in relation to the ruler and the subjects. Therefore, they were not useful in responding to the grievances of the Greek population living under Ottoman rule (Phillips 1897, p.14-15; Clogg 1973, p.10).

With the ideological legacy of the French Revolution, the grievance of the Greeks towards the Ottoman Sultan took the form of a national uprising. This movement was long in the making through a secret Society of Friends, the Philiki Hetaria. The aim of this society was the unification of all Hellenes in an armed resistance against the Ottoman Empire and to break free from Ottoman rule (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.16; Phillips 1897, p.20-21). The uprising started as isolated acts in March 1821, but quickly turned into a countrywide rebellion by April 1821. By the end of 1821, the majority of the towns and castles south of the Thessalian frontier were freed from Ottoman control. Subsequently the whole of Morea, along with Athens, Thebes, and Missolonghi fell to the insurgents in the summer of 1822 (Phillips 1897, p.47-65; Shaw 1977, p.18; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.19). Sultan Mahmud II responded with the dismissal and the public execution of the Ecumenical Patriarch Gregorios in 1821 (Phillips 1897, p.77-78; Armaoğlu 2016, p.184). This action aroused, or more likely strengthened, the Philhellenism across Europe, and it threatened to turn the Greek Question into a European one (Koliopoulos and

Veremis 2010, p.20; Armaoğlu 2016, p.184). However, Metternich[35], Lord Castlereagh[36], and Czar Alexander[37] still strongly held on to the Vienna Order, along with the idea of monarchical solidarity, to avoid the risk of another revolutionary war. Consequently, the Greeks were not recognised as belligerents in their struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, the Ottoman Empire was to be recognized as the legitimate suzerain of the Greeks. Czar Alexander even dismissed his foreign minister, Count Ioannes Capodistrias who was a Greek (Phillips 1897, p.113-114, 237). However, the death of Castlereagh in August 1822, and his replacement by Canning[38] as the Secretary of State, moved the British closer to the Greek cause. Subsequently, Britain recognised the Greeks as belligerents in their conflict with the Ottoman Empire on 25 March 1823. This action alone made the Greek uprising take a different tone than the popular movements in Spain and Naples had hitherto been given by the reactionary powers of Europe (Phillips 1897, p.115-116, 237).

In the meantime, the Ottoman Empire had difficulties dealing with the Greek rebellion. Successes on land and sea were temporary and much of the progress realized would be lost afterwards, like that of Dramali[39] on land (Phillips 1897, p.97-100; Brewer 2011, 1584-1761/8644; Armaoğlu 2016, p.187). The control of the Aegean Sea was in the hands of the Greeks until at least 1824, when Mehmet Ali, the Egyptian Governor, was tasked with the suppressing of the rebels (Fahmy 2002, p.55). The control of the Aegean by the Greeks was a direct consequence of their naval power. This power depended upon their merchant marine, their domination of the trade routes inside the Ottoman Empire[40], and the autonomous and partly independent standing of the Aegean islands. The Ottoman dependence upon Greek sailors too had left the Ottoman fleets at a disadvantage when it came to regain and retain the control of the seas. One can add to the Ottoman difficulties at sea, the ability of the Greek ships in avoding blockades and major naval confrontations,

[35] Klemens von Metternich, Chancellor of the Austrian Empire from 1821 until his dismissal during the 1848 revolutions (Aksan 2013, p.425-426)
[36] Robert Stewart, Viscount of Castlereagh, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Britain until 1822 (Phillips 1897, p.115-116).
[37] The Russian Emperor
[38] George Canning, Secretary of State after Castlereagh (Phillips 1897, p.115-116).
[39] Mahmud, Pasha of Drama. He was commonly called Dramali (Phillips 1897, p.98).
[40] This was also a result of Napoleon's continental blockade against the British. Greek merchants and the Greek merchant marine prospered as blockade runners. They eventually surpassed the French in the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, the Greek islands of Spetses, Psara, and Hydra developed large merchant fleets (Clogg 1973, p.12).

due to their skilled seamen, officers, and faster ships. These were part of a naval tradition sharpened by fighting the Barbary pirates and their blockade running experiences during the Napoleonic Wars. Had the Ottoman and the Greek fleets successfully engaged, this would have been an opportunity for the superior Ottoman firepower and bigger ships, a significant part of which were ships-of-the-line, to be useful. During the time of the uprising there was an asymmetry between the two fleets. The Ottoman fleet was designed for battle at sea. Their ships had higher caliber guns, greater tonnage, could deal and sustain greater punishment. Greek ships, on the other hand, were designed mostly as merchantmen and as blockade runners which could and were armed if the necessity arose. Their ability at sea was not to fight a line battle but to avoid one and strike blows when the opportunity presented itself (Phillips 1897, p.13-14; Gencer 1985, p.102-106; Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.349-350; Brewer 2011, 1768-1953/8644; Economou, Kyriazis, and Prassa 2016, p.4-5). The important islands of Spetses (on 7 April 1821), Psara (on 23 April), and Hydra (on 28 April) joined the Greek cause. This rendered shipping reinforcements and supplies from the western coasts of Anatolia to the Morea and to the rest of the Greek peninsula very difficult (Phillips 1897, p.65). These difficulties forced Sultan Mahmud II to seek help from Mehmet Ali who had managed to form a modern army and a powerful navy. The Egyptian Governor accepted his suzerain's plea for help against the Greeks in return for the governorship of Crete and the Pashalik of Morea for his son, İbrahim. The Egyptian forces successfully suppressed the Cretan uprising, and almost brought an end to the Greek rebellion in Morea. However, the successes of the Ottoman Empire against its rebellious Millet only strengthened the Philhellenic feeling across Europe (Phillips 1897, p.151-203).

The death of Castlereagh had already brought Britain closer to the Hellenic cause[41]. Britain was suspicious of Russian intentions concerning the Greeks. It also feared that

[41] The Creation of a Greek state (the Ionian Septinsular State) at the Congress of Vienna had given hope and inspiration for the creation of Greece. The Greeks were demanding their right to national self-determination. This demand was based on a few arguments: (1) the Greeks are a nation distinct and separate from the Turks, (2) The Greeks were subjects of masters who imposed obligations on their subjects but showed no respect for their rights, (3) The Greeks had been subjugated by force and had signed no treaty with their suzerain, (4) The Turks were foreign to the lands of Europe they lorded over and should be forced to abandon these European lands, (5) The Greeks had the right to rejoin the European family of nations. In sum the Greek Cause was the establishment of an independent Greek nation state on lands which the Greeks lived in (who were the Greeks and which were their lands was itself open to debate by then) (Dakin 1973, p.160; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.16, 17).

Russia would declare war on the Porte and singlehandedly solve the Greek issue. Consequently, a Greece grateful to Russia would increase Russian influence in the Morea, therefore in the Eastern Mediterranean, and threaten the British interests there. The French motives lay in the desire to regain their lost influence within the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Russian motives were similar to those of the British: inhibit British influence over a potentially independent Greece (Phillips 1897, p.237-238; Armaoğlu 2016, p.186, 188, 190). Therefore, British involvement also led to growing Russian advances.

By August 1825, Czar Alexander had announced that he was taking the matter into his own hands. However, he died in December that year. His successor Nicholas I was even more inclined to support the Greek cause. The result of increasing British and Russian support was the Protocol of St. Petersburg between Russia and Britain, which was signed on 4 April 1826. It was delivered to the Ottoman Grand Vizier in April 1827. The protocol (1) offered the mediation of the European Powers that signed the protocol, which were at that time Britain and Russia, however further contribution from other powers was induced by the protocol, (2) demanded that the Ottoman Empire should accept a fully autonomous Greece that would pay a yearly tribute to the Sublime Porte, (3) Turks who lived in the Greek lands would sell their immovables and emigrate out of those lands, (4) the border between the newly-formed Greek nation state and the Ottoman Empire would be determined by Britain and Russia, (5) the British and Russian governments would abstain from seeking any territorial, political and/or economic influence within Greece, (6) the Protocol would be open to Austria, France, and Prussia's participations (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.358; Brewer 2011, 5,875-6,018/8,644; Armaoğlu 2016, p.190-191).

Afterwards, a joint fleet was sent to Morea with the purpose of forcing İbrahim to return to Egypt and the Ottoman Empire to sign the protocol of St. Petersburg. This offer was refused by the Ottoman Empire on the grounds that accepting it would have meant a breach of Ottoman sovereignty on a matter which the Ottoman Empire considered an internal affair (Armaoğlu 2016, p.191). However, following its refusal, the Protocol was upgraded into the Treaty of London on 6 July 1827. The signatories, Britain, France, and Russia had committed themselves to the realization of the objectives of the St. Petersburg Protocol. On 16 August, a final note, along with the notification of the Treaty of London

was given to the Porte for an armistice to be signed with the Greek government. In the case of refusal, the Three Powers would take any measures for its enforcement (Armaoğlu 2016, p.192).

Meanwhile, Metternich, with the hope that the death of Canning on 8 August would make a change in British foreign policy, was trying to mediate the differences between the Porte and the British, French, and Russian governments. Before an agreement could be reached, the news of the Battle of Navarino, which took place on 20 October 1827 destroyed the prospects of a peaceful resolution (Phillips 1897, p.237-250; Armaoğlu 2016, p.193). The Allied armada of Britain, France, and Russia had twenty-eight sails with Britain having three ships-of-the-line, four frigates, and four smaller vessels, France having four[42] ships-of-the-line, one frigate, and two smaller vessels, Russia with four ships-of-the-line, four frigates, and two smaller vessels. This armada was blockading the joint Ottoman-Egyptian fleet of at least sixty-five ships with at least three[43] ships-of-the-line, according to Phillips (1897), fifteen frigates, twenty-six corvettes, and seventeen smaller craft for the enforcement of the Treaty of London. They decided to enter the Bay of Navarino for two reasons. First, a longer pacific blockade was about to become impossible due to the season changing with the coming of storms. Second, the Three Powers wanted to persuade the Porte with a brute show of force. Against at least three ships-of-the-line of the Ottomans, the Allied fleet had a total of at least eleven. Even though the Ottoman fleet had more guns, it had fewer large vessels. The battle itself was pure cannonade without manoeuvering, and the Allied fleets were better at gunnery, as they had managed to destroy the majority of the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet by the evening (Phillips 1897, p.262-267; Watts 1990, p.11-12; Sondhaus 2001, p.16-17; Brewer 2011, 1768-1953/8644).

The Battle of Navarino led the Ottoman Empire to declare the Treaty of Akkerman[44] null and void (Phillips 1897, p.276). Metternich, at this point, tried, for the last time, to keep

[42] While Phillips (1897) counts three French ships-of-the-line, this dissertation uses the number four which is given by Watts (1990) and Sondhaus (2001), because they are later works.
[43] While Phillips (1897), Jane (1899), Bostan (2010), and Panzac (2018) count three ships-of-the-line, Watts (1990) and Sondhaus (2001) count seven ships-of-the-line. However this dissertation takes into consideration the number three because it is stressed by two studies focused on the Ottoman Empire: Bostan (2010) and Panzac (2018) (Jane 1899, p.128; Watts 1990, p.12; Sondhaus 2001, p.16-17; Bostan 2010, p.61; Panzac 2018, p.280).
[44] The treaty was signed for peaceful relations with Russia. It was hoped that Russia would stay away from joining the conflict between the Porte and its rebellious millet (Phillips 1897, p.276; Armaoğlu 2016, p.189-191).

the peace between the Three Powers and the Porte. The Porte responded to Metternich's overture by declaring its willingness to negotitate the Treaty of London. However, the response came too late, as Russia had already declared war and its armies crossed the Pruth river on 6 May 1828. The direct result of Navarino and the Russian declaration of war was the renewal of hope for Greece (Phillips 1897, p.278-279). The great power involvement, besides the Battle of Navarino, with the Russian declaration of war upon the Ottoman Empire, brought the Greek War of Independence to an end. The Russo-Turkish War, which had been going on since May 1828, ended with the Treaty of Adrianople that was signed on 14 September 1829. The Treaty obtained, for Greece, the terms of the London Protocol of 22 March 1829 (Phillips 1897, p.326-328; Armaoğlu 2016, p. 196-197). Eventually, the Greek Question was settled in 1832 with two treaties[45]. The importance of the Greek War of Independence lay in its negative impact on the Congress system, that had supressed all revolutionary and anti-monarchical movements in Spain and Italy. It additionally left the Ottoman Empire without a fleet and experienced naval personnel, and thus vulnerable to naval threats, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 and beyond.

The creation of an independent Greece had multiple consequences. First, it meant that the 1815 order had taken a serious blow because Britain, France, and Russia had intervened on behalf of a subject against its legitimate suzerain. This constituted an example for future political developments in the Balkans, by showing that non-Muslim subjects of the Porte could expect help from European great powers, especially from Russia for the Orthodox cause, in their struggle against their imperial rulers. Another consequence was the establishment of a hostile state with irredentist ambitions against the Ottoman Empire, ready to join the cause of pushing the Turks out of Europe if the opportunity arose. An additional impact was the loss of a quarter of a million subjects, which caused a reduction in tax revenues which further eroded the Ottoman administrative capacity. From a naval perspective, this also meant that the Ottoman Navy lost one of its most important sources of capable seamen. Even if Greece had not become independent, the Battle of Navarino itself had already caused the loss of a huge reservoir of naval experience with the death

[45] One of the treaties concerned the establishment of a Wittelsbach Prince from Bavaria, Otto, chosen as the new King of Greece. The second was the Ottoman Empire's acceptance of Greece's independence and new borders. According to these treaties Britain, France, and Russia would be the three guarantor powers of the newly founded Greece (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.27).

of 6,000-7,000 sailors. In sum, Greek independence created potential new threats, and an additional enemy to the Porte, while crippling its war-making capability and severely curbing its naval power (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.363-364; Sondhaus 2001, p.17; Quataert 2005, p.55; Armaoğlu 2016, p.114-193).

Finally, when evaluated from a seamindedness perspective, another point becomes evident. The Ottoman Empire had to man its fleets with untrained fishermen and boatmen after Greek sailors became unavailable. How can a state with so many coastal provinces suffer from a shortage of sailors? This certainly points out to a lack of se-amindedness as the state did not focus on its sea power by establishing a reserve pool of sailors and instead relied only on non-Muslim initiative.

4.2 The Rebellion of Mehmet Ali, 1831-1841

The Egyptian governor Mehmet Ali's rebellion was a threat faced by the Ottoman Empire prior to the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. It is included in this study because it constituted a threat to the Ottoman Empire's physical security, albeit a secondary one.

Born in Kavala, a city in continental Greece, in the 1760s, Mehmet Ali was an Albanian general sent by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) to Egypt. His goal was to fight and dispel, as part of the Ottoman army of Egpyt, the invading armies of Napoleon (Ahmad 2003, p.24; Aksan 2013, p.306). His influence and power, already on the rise during his fighting with the French, increased further in the wake of the French retreat in 1801. A power vacuum had been created by this retreat in the province, because the French presence had weakened the existing structures of power, most importantly that of the Mamluks[46] (Fahmy 1998, p.140-144; Aksan 2013, p.306). By 1801, he was commanding the Kavala contingent in the army of Egypt. Two years later, he was the commander of his own Albanian army. In the chaos that followed the riots of 1803, among the Albanians, he consolidated his power inside Egypt. In 1805, he appointed himself the governor of

[46] They had been the military landlords of Egypt for centuries despite the Ottoman rule of Egypt since the Sixteenth Century (Fahmy 2002, p.9)

Egypt[47]. It was a fait accompli to which Sultan Selim III acquiesced. His reputation grew further when he defeated the British force that landed at Alexandria in 1807 (Aksan 2013, p.306-307; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.198).

He continued to consolidate his power by eliminating that of the Mamluks. He succeeded in eroding the Mamluk influence by killing many of their leaders in 1811[48] (Aksan 2013, p.307; Fahmy 2002, p. 82-84; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.198). He eventually became the uncontested ruler of Egypt, following the defeat of the Mamluks (Fahmy 1998, p.148-149). By 1818, he had defeated the Wahhabis[49] and was able to end their influence along with that of the Saud Family's, at least temporarily. For these achievements, he was rewarded with the provinces of Hejaz and Habesh by Sultan Mahmud II (Neumann 2006, p.59; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.198). In 1822, he invaded Sudan[50] in the name of Sultan Mahmud II (Fahmy 2002, p.86-89; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.198). However, what made Mehmet Ali successful and a challenge to the Sultan Mahmud II lay in the economic, military, and bureaucratic reforms he implemented in Egypt, as much as his conquests and military accomplishments. He managed to tap into the resources of Egypt, by making its economy more efficient than it had been under the Ottoman rule. This allowed him to build a conscripted army for himself (Fahmy 2002, p.10-11). Between 1811 and 1824, Mehmet Ali carried out ambitious reforms that changed the Egyptian economy and society. Under his rule, finance was centralized, conscription introduced, and monopolies on imported and exported goods, especially on grain, rice, sugar, and long staple cotton, were created. A nascent industry was formed with textile factories, sugar refineries, and rice mills.

[47] His rising influence and power inside Egypt helped him depose the existing governor Hüsrev Pasha (henceforth his rival) and forced Selim III to appoint him the governor of Egypt with the promise of defeating the Wahhabi revolt in Arabia (Kocaoğlu 1995, p.198).

[48]The Massacre of the Citadel: On 1st March 1811, in a festive ceremony to celebrate the appointment of his son (Tusun Pasha) to fight the Wahhabis, he ordered the killing of the Mamluk leaders gathered for the occasion (Fahmy 2002, p.83-84).

[49] The Rise of the Wahhabis was "a religious movement with the aim of abolishing all 'heretical' innovations introduced since the Prophet Muhammed's time" (Neumann 2006, p.59). This movement in the Arabian Peninsula had become a serious threat to the Ottoman legitimacy among Muslim populations. This was so because the Wahhabis had conquered Mecca and Medina in 1804 therefore threatened the title of the Ottoman Sultan as the Guardian of the Holy Cities and Protector of the Pilgrimage of Hacis (since the Wahhabis conquered Mecca and Medina in 1804) (Ibid., p.59; Aksan 2013, p.308-309). Mehmet Ali had been continuously ordered by Sultan Selim III, and by Sultan Mahmud II to deal with the Wahhabi revolt (Kocaoğlu 1995, p.198; Aksan 2013, p.309).

[50] Mehmet Ali had his own reasons for conquering Sudan. The most important reason was to acquire Sudanese manpower for his ever-growing army. However, he also wanted to extinguish the last remnant of the Mamluk power there (Fahmy 2002, p.86).

Finally, the taxation system was improved (Aksan 2013, p.307-308; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.198-199). Through these reforms, he was able to build and finance an army and establish institutions that helped the very same army to function (Fahmy 2002, p.12-13). However, the achievements of his own subject were only harmful to Sultan Mahmud II, because they only meant that a powerful vassal was growing more ambitious. This was especially true since the help of the vassal was not appropriately rewarded, according to Mehmet Ali. He had helped his master in dealing with the Wahhabis, in conquering Sudan in his name. He had fought for his suzerain during the Greek revolt in Morea. Thus, he believed that he was entitled to the governorship of Syria. However, under the influence of Koca Hüsrev Mehmet Pasha, the arch-enemy of Mehmet Ali, the Kapudan Pasha between 1811-1818 and 1822-1827, Serasker of the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (the commander-in-chief of the land forces) between 1827-1837 and the Grand Vizier between 1839-1840, his request was turned down by the Sultan (Shaw 1977, p.7-57; Fahmy 1998, p.158; Fahmy 2002, p.40-41, 285-290; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.1-2; İnalcık, H n.d.).

By the end of the 1820s, Mehmet Ali had the most powerful army in the Near East. Under his rule, Egypt had come to possess a bureaucracy that worked more efficiently than that of the Ottoman Empire. This bureaucracy in turn was supporting the army (Hanioğlu 2008, p.65). Based on this powerful army, he was able to act almost as an independent ruler (Neumann 2006, p.59). Already during the Greek War of Independence, he could dictate to the Porte on matters of war[51], and he was running out of patience with his master's approach (Fahmy 2002, p.55-60). In the summer of 1827, he was convinced that the European powers, in particular Britain and Russia, would not stay neutral on the issue of Greek independence (Fahmy 2002, p.58). When he learned that a joint European armada was assembled near Morea, he urged the Porte to accept the European demands and the Austrian offers of mediation. However, Sultan Mahmud and his advisors interpreted these events merely as bluffing. On 20 October 1827, the joint British-French-Russian fleet destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet. Having lost his fleet, and the battle for Greek Independence, the Sultan refused Mehmet Ali's requests of rewards which included the governorship of Syria, and instead gave him only Crete. It was a reward that

[51] Mehmet Ali threatened to stop military operations in Morea unless Hüsrev Pasha was removed from the command of the navy (Fahmy 2002, p.57).

fell short of Mehmet Ali's expectations[52]. From then on, Mehmet Ali decided that he would no longer respond to his sovereign's demands for help. This was a decision he stuck to during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829. He refused to help on the pretext that he lacked a fleet, that the front was too far away for supplying his army, and because of the presence of the outbreak of a contagious disease in Syria (Fahmy 1998, p.158-160; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.199-200; Aksan 2013, p.312).

Mehmet Ali's obsession with Syria was connected to the abundance of wood and the extra sources of manpower the region offered. These resources were crucial for the rebuilding of his fleet and army (Fahmy 1998, p.166). On 2 November 1831, under the pretext of recapturing the peasants who had fled from the Delta, he embarked on the invasion of the region (Fahmy 1998, p.166). Acre, Damascus, and Aleppo fell to the Egyptian forces, led by İbrahim Pasha, son of Mehmet Ali. In July 1832, his armies crossed the Taurus mountains and captured Tarsus and Adana (Fahmy 1998, p.166; Quataert 2005, p.58). Besides these victories and conquests, what forced Sultan Mahmud II to ask for help from the European Great Powers was the battle of Konya in 1832. This was an important success for Mehmet Ali, whose army had defeated that of the Sultan's which was three times its size (Fahmy 2002, p.160-162).

This victory opened the way to Istanbul, and even threatened the Ottoman dynasty itself. Then Sultan Mahmud II turned to Britain for help. However, Britain turned down this plea. Britain's refusal surprised the Porte because it was known that Mehmet Ali had close ties with France (Kocaoğlu 1995, p.201-202). Following Russian offers of help, the Sultan turned to Russia, the traditional enemy of the Porte[53]. The result was the treaty of Hünkar İskelesi in the summer of 1833. It was a treaty that represents, according to Hanioğlu (2008), Russian diplomacy at its best vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century. In the absence of British support, Russia intervened to prevent Mehmet Ali from capturing the Ottoman Capital. The treaty formed a mutual defensive alliance between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. However, its significance lay in a secret article it contained. In the event of war, Russia would offer military help to the Porte. The

[52] Crete was already in his possession and was in a constant state of turmoil (Fahmy 1998, p.160).
[53] The Russian fears of an empire (that of Mehmet Ali) replacing the weak Ottoman Empire was an important motivation for their intervention (Quataert 2005, p.58).

Ottomans, on the other hand, would, in the event of armed conflict or an attack upon Russia, close the Dardanelles to foreign vessels of war, thus preventing any naval pressure in the Black Sea against Russia, while enabling Russia to reach the Mediterranean without the fear of a naval retribution. Thus, the treaty dramatically altered the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean in favor of Russia. Another significant aspect of the treaty was that the Russian attitude towards the Porte was now almost friendly. Russian policy, for the next eight years, during which the treaty stood, had become the maintenance of Ottoman territorial integrity (Hanioğlu 2008, p.66; Aksan 2013, p.374-375). The embarkation of Russian troops on the shores of Asia forced Mehmet Ali to end hostilities and negotiate peace with his sovereign. According to the Treaty of Kütahya, signed in May 1833, Mehmet Ali and his sons were recognized as rulers of Egypt and Syria, which included the cities of Aleppo, Damascus, Tripoli, and Acre. Additionally, they would rule over Jeddah, Crete, Adana, and Sudan (Hanioğlu 2008, p.66-67). However, these terms were required to be renewed annually by the Sultan. Therefore, they left Mehmet Ali at the mercy of the Sultan, and susceptible to the intrigues of the courtiers in İstanbul. Sultan Mahmud II was not happy either to have been forced to comply with his subject's demands. Even Britain and Russia were dissatisfied[54]. Consequently, the peace only ceased hostilities, while not eliminating any possible future points of friction (Fahmy 2002, p.66-68).

Before the second phase of the conflict erupted, the position of the European powers concerning Mehmet Ali had remained the same except for that of Britain. France was still supporting Mehmet Ali as a means to influence Egypt and North Africa. Russia had the Porte under its influence and was in a dominant military position in the Straits. Russia was not willing to see conflict erupt again, because it was not sure if it could keep the level of influence it had enjoyed since the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi. Britain, unlike its previous stance, was determined to intervene this time. The British purpose was to undermine the Russo-Turkish alliance and the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi. They were also determined to support Ottoman territorial integrity. An additional purpose was to prevent French encroachment in the Eastern Mediterranean. What had influenced the British

[54] Russia desired its influence with the Porte to increase further. Britain was uncomfortable with Russia's increasing influence with the Porte. Especially the secret article in the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi disturbed Britain (Fahmy 2002, p.68).

calculations most by far was the threat posed by Russia, if it dominated a weakened Ottoman Empire, and the status of the Turkish Straits. Such a position would enable Russia to threaten British interests in Asia, and the British trade route in the Eastern Mediterranean (Shaw 1977, p.50; Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.386; Fahmy 1998, p.174-175; Aksan 2013, p.388; Armaoğlu 2016, p.222-224)

By 1838, Mehmet Ali had announced his intentions to declare Egypt's independence. While the Russians offered military support to Mahmud II, Britain reacted with the Treaty of Balta Limanı, in order to weaken Mehmet Ali's economic position and the Russian influence within the Ottoman Empire. This was a commercial treaty signed in 1838, that banned all monopolies across Ottoman territories. It was a lucrative treaty for Britain no doubt, but also a treaty that damaged Mehmet Ali's sources of income, namely the monopolies within his jurisdiction. Mahmud II accepted such a treaty unfavorable to the Ottoman economy because of political reasons. The Porte's reasoning was that this treaty would damage Mehmet Ali's income as well, and that Britain would be more willing to intervene on the Ottoman side if the conflict renewed. Mahmud II, vengeful because of his submission to his vassal's demands, was waiting for the opportunity to crush Mehmet Ali and take back the lands he had conquered from the Porte. Mehmet Ali and his son İbrahim were always wary of Sultan Mahmud II, because both men knew and expected that the Ottoman Sultan was waiting for an opportunity to strike. Additionally, they had intenions of independence and establishing a powerful state in the Middle East (Shaw 1977, p.50; Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.385-387; Fahmy 1998, p.172-175; Aksan 2013, p.388; Armaoğlu 2016, p.221-222).

Meanwhile, reforms had been taking place in the Ottoman army since the 1820s. The old Janissary Corps was abolished in 1826, and the Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammediye (The Mansure Army) was established in its stead. Several other reforms took place as well. These included the establishment of redif forces (reserve militia), the improvement of supply of the army, the status of the Serasker, and the salaries of the officer corps. Additionally, military and naval engineer education and training were improved. A medical corps was established. The organizations in the military command were improved, with brigades being established, the positions of brigade commander and the brigadier general being added (Shaw 1977, p.43-50; Aksan 2013, p.313-322, 375-

383). The Ottoman Navy too was improved. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, the Ottoman Navy had a total of six ships-of-the-line with one three-decker and five two-deckers, three frigates, five corvettes, and three brigs. By 1839, the Ottoman battlefleet had twenty-five pieces. However, because it would defect to Egypt, this fleet capable of standing against Egypt would not be available during the next phase of the conflict (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.366; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.1-2; Armaoğlu 2016, p.222).

In 1839, the conflict erupted again. Mehmet Ali's army defeated the army that Sultan Mahmud II sent against him at the Battle of Nizip in June 1839. This battle once again opened the way for Mehmet Ali to march on the Ottoman capital. The Ottoman fleet had defected[55] to Egypt, leaving the Empire with no army or fleet to stand against an unruly vassal (Fahmy 1998, p.172; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.204). However, this time Britain, having missed the opportunity nearly a decade ago, intervened so as not to let Egypt, an ally of France, control the Eastern Mediterranean further nor to let Russia gain further concessions, similar to those obtained by the treaty of Hünkar İskelesi. This privilege was of course the closure of the Straits by the Porte in the case of a Russian engagement in an armed conflict with a power other than the Ottoman Empire, as stressed in the secret article of the treaty. Another reason why Britain intervened was the Treaty of Balta Limanı (Fahmy 1998, p.174; Neumann 2006, p.61; Aksan 2006, p.113). However, Britain's intervention did not cause Mehmet Ali to back down or accept negotiation right away. This was because he was supported too by a Great Power, France. However, Britain was not alone. A coalition of Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia stood against Mehmet Ali. A joint force composed of the Ottoman[56], British, and Austrian naval contingents brought the fight to Syria and defeated his forces. By November 1840, Mehmet Ali was

[55] The fleet had defected because the Commander of the Ottoman fleet, Admiral Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, believed that the new Sultan, Abdülmecid, and his Grand Vizier, Hüsrev Pasha (enemy of Mehmet Ali) would hand the fleet over to the Russians for a joint operation against Mehmet Ali. As an alternative explanation Fahmy mentions that Mehmet Ali had bribed the Admiral so that he would hand over the fleet to him (Fahmy 1998, p.172; Aksan 2013, p.391)

[56] Hanioğlu (2008), Kocaoğlu (1995), or Faroqhi (2006) do not mention in detail the existing Ottoman fleet at that time. However, Sondhaus (2001) mentions the use of British, Austrian, and Ottoman marines taking part in the action. Additionally, Walker's *Mukaddeme-i Hayır* is mentioned as taking part in the naval action off the coast of Egypt (Sondhaus 2001, p.33-34). On the other hand, Panzac (2018) clearly states that an Ottoman fleet of one galleon, two frigates, and two corvettes joined the British in an amphibious operation off the coast of Beirut. He also adds that one Ottoman galleon joined forces with British and Austrian forces in the siege of Akka (Panzac 2018, p.313). Therefore in addition to a brig and a steamer which returned to İstanbul when Kapudan Pasha (Ahmet Fevzi Pasha) defected with the Ottoman fleet, the Ottoman Empire seems to have possessed some form of naval power, albeit a weak one (Hacipoğlu 2013, p.2).

forced to accept the European intervention (Aksan 2006, p.113; Hanioğlu 2008, p.67; Kocaoğlu 1995, p.206; Quataert 2005, p.58).

Subsequently, the Egyptian question ended with the Convention of London, signed in 1840, which reversed all of Mehmet Ali's gains, except for hereditary rule in Egypt for his male descendants. Finally, the last remnant of the Mehmet Ali uprising was eliminated with the Straits Convention of 1841. According to convention, in a war to which the Ottoman Empire was not a party, it would close the Turkish Straits to all belligerent warships. If the Empire was at war, it would decide whom to let through the Straits. Under this treaty, Russia lost its influence over Ottoman foreign policy, and the privileges which it had enjoyed since the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi (1833). However, Russia's Black Sea coasts were still protected unless it was at war with the Ottoman Empire (Seton-Watson 1965, p.94; Aksan 2006, p.113; Armaoğlu 2016, p.225-226).

The significance of Mehmet Ali's challenge was its military nature. This was mainly a land conflict and the victory on land had greater impact on the result. The naval action was made possible and successful only with British and Austrian participation, since the Porte did not have a fleet capable of standing up against Egyptian forces, because the majority of the Ottoman fleet had defected to Mehmet Ali in 1839. Despite all the military reforms of Mahmud II following the removal of the Janissary Corps in 1826, the Ottoman Army sent against Mehmet Ali was defeated. The main problem during the conflict of 1831-1841 was the poor performance of the Ottoman Army. In each phase of the conflict, Mehmet Ali managed to defeat the Porte and had the opportunity to march on the Ottoman Capital after the Battles of Konya (1832) and Nizip (1839). Had Mehmet Ali been defeated on land, the conflict could have ended sooner. The threat from Mehmet Ali was generated by his better army. It showed that the Ottoman Empire needed a stronger army before anything else for the physical security of the Empire (Kocaoğlu 1995, p.200-206; Fahmy 1998, p.172-175; Quataert 2005, p.58; Aksan 2013, p.313-342; Hanioğlu 2008, p.66-67).

4.3 The Crimean War, 1853-1856

The Crimean War was significant in various ways. First, it was the only great power conflict since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Second, in its aftermath the Ottoman Empire was accepted into the European States System, under the Treaty of Paris in 1856 (Clayton 1971, p.89; Hanioğlu 2008, p.82). It was also the only war in which the Porte stood victorious[57] in the Nineteenth Century against its historical rival, Russia. The war was also significant because it was the first war during which public opinion at home mattered (Sweetman 2001, p.14-15; Badem 1970, p.2). Another significant aspect of the conflict was the Porte's diplomatic success in aligning with the principal liberal powers of Europe against Russia (Hanioğlu 2008, p.82). Finally, it was also the first war that was documented and reported to the masses on a daily basis through the use of telegraph, photograph, and newspapers (Aksan 2013, p.449).

The seeds of the conflict were sown when Louis Napoleon III, nephew to Napoleon I, challenged[58] Russia's traditional role as the protector of the Christian shrines in the Holy Land (Sondhaus 2001, p.57). France demanded that the guardianship of the sites in and around Jerusalem be handed over to Latin monks. Napoleon III's policy became bolder in 1852 by sending the *Charlemagne,* a 90 gun (80 according to Conway's 1979), screw-driven two-decker to the Ottoman capital to influence the Porte into submitting to Napoleon III's demands concerning the Holy Places (Clayton 1971, p.104; Conway's 1979, p.284). This was an example of gunboat diplomacy[59]. Subsequently he renewed his demands, which forced the Ottoman government to work on a solution favoring the Roman Catholic Church (Hanioğlu 2008, p.78-79; Sondhaus 2001, p.57). In response to French pressure, Russia redoubled its efforts and forced the Porte to work on a solution favoring the Orthodox Christians. However, no solution satisfying both sides could be

[57] It was also the eighth time Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire yet for the first time Britain and France declared war on Russia on behalf of the Porte (Sondhaus 2001, p.57).

[58] Napoleon III was in search of prestige and victory for domestic and international political reasons. A victory on the issue would please his clerical supporters within France. Victory over Russia would mean that France would gain further influence on markets and financial investments within the Ottoman Empire. In sum, the new emperor was looking for a triumph that would improve France's power and the new Emperor's (Napoleon III) prestige internationally and domestically (Taylor 1954, p.49; Clayton 1971, p.103-104; Ledonne 1997, p.125; Sweetman 2001, p.19)

[59] "Gunboat diplomacy is the use or the threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state" (Cable 1998, p.115).

found. As a result, the demands and the pressure of both sides countinued to mount in 1852. With the crisis deepening, the stakes were getting higher for Russia, as it was expected to win the battle for influence in the Levant (Fairey 2015, p.125-126). In February 1853, emboldened by recent events[60], Czar Nicholas I sent Prince Aleksandr Sergeyevich Menshikov[61] as ambassador extraordinary to the Porte. On one hand, his mission was to conclude the Holy Places dispute in Russia's favor. On the other hand, the Russians were now also demanding a treaty. Prince Menshikov presented the Russian demands on March 22, 1853. It was a demand which would designate Russia as the protector of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte. This demand was based on the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 1774 (based on articles 7, 8, 14, and 16) (Hanioğlu 2008, p.79-80; Fairey 2015, p.2). While this demand seemed religious at first glance, it was according to Hanioğlu (2008, p.79-80) "a political demand with potentially far-reaching consequences". Menshikov's demands concerning the Holy Places were found negotiable by the Ottoman government. However, the subsequent demands were not (Badem 1970, p.74-77).

Earlier, in 1852, the Ottoman Governor of Bosnia had occupied Montenegro. Fearing the effects of this move on their South Slav subjects, Austria responded by sending Count Leiningen to Istanbul, with an ultimatum of ten days to end the conflict. The Austrian diplomatic mission was successful, and the Porte accepted a return to the status quo ante (Taylor 1954, p.51-52). After having solved the Montenegro Crisis, the Porte was, diplomatically, in a stronger position[62] to resist the additional demand of Menshikov. The acquiescence of the Porte during the Montenegro Crisis had eliminated any possibility of Austria supporting any Russian diplomatic move that would strengthen the latter's influence in the Balkans (Hanioğlu 2008, p.79-80). With the recommendations of

[60] The Ottoman acquiescence to the Austrian and French military pressures in Montenegro and the Holy Places disputes respectively had encouraged Russia. Czar Nicholas I, now believing that a forceful approach would induce the Porte to comply with the Russian demands, and willing to mimic Austria's Leiningen mission on a greater scale, decided to send a similar diplomatic mission to Istanbul. This was a fatal move because instead of scaring the Ottomans, it alarmed the British (Hanioğlu 2008, p.66, 79; Taylor 1954, p.51-52; Clayton 1971, p.105).

[61] The Governor General of Finland, General-Adjutant, Admiral and Marine Minister, was more of a military man than a diplomat. According to the Russian Foreign Minister, General Prince Aleksey Fyodorovich Orlov would be a better choice for the task at hand. He thought so because Orlov had had experience in the Treaty of Edirne (1829) and the Treaty of Hünkar Iskelesi (1833) (Badem 1970, p.71)

[62] This strength of position also stemmed from the reports of Ottoman ambassadors in London (Kostaki Musurus), Paris (Veli Pasha), and from the Ottoman chargé d'affaires in Berlin (Badem 1970, p.78-79).

Canning[63], the issue of Russian protective rights was kept separate from the Holy Places disagreement. By May 1853, the Holy Places disagreement was resolved. However, the core conflict still defied resolution. Additional Russian demands were rejected in May again with the recommendations of Canning and assurances from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Villiers. The Russian ultimatums of 5 and 11 May were rejected as well. On 15 May Menshikov cut off official relations with the Porte. Consequently, he left İstanbul on 21 May 1853 by declaring that his mission had ended in failure (Badem 1970, p.77-79; Clayton 1971, p.103, 106; Fairey 2015, p.136, 138-139; Hanioğlu 2008, p.80).

The French fleet, in a political move against Russia, had already sailed to Salamis (in Greece) in March 1853. The British fleet moved from Malta to Besika Bay (in the Dardanelles) in June 1853, as a warning to the Russians, although only after the Russian demands were rejected by the Porte. A final ultimatum, by the Russian Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode[64], was rejected in June. The subsequent declaration of an Imperial Firman reaffirming the rights of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire was not enough for Czar Nicholas I. In response, Russian troops crossed the Pruth River and invaded the Danubian Principalities in July 1853 (Badem 1970, p.80; Clayton 1971, p.106-107; Hanioğlu 2008, p.80-81; Sweetman 2001, p.7, 19-20; Taylor 1954, p.53-54). A final diplomatic effort was made in what is now known as the Vienna Note[65]. Even though it was accepted by the Russians, it was rejected by the Porte. The Ottoman government stressed that it could only accept the Note with some modifications. However, these modifications were rejected by Russia in September 1853. At the end of September (26-27), the Porte decided to declare war on Russia, and it was declared on 4 October 1853 (Badem 1970, p.82-83, 95-98; Taylor 1954, p.55).

The rationale behind the decision to go to war was that the Porte had tried to meet all of Russia's requests that it considered legitimate and reasonable. However, the Ottomans

[63] Stratford Canning, 1st Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe from 1852. He was the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1826 to 1832 and from 1842 to 1857 (Clayton 1971, p.93; Fairey 2015, p.25).
[64] Count Karl Robert Vasilyevich Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister (1822-1856) (Badem 1970, p.71).
[65] The note was demanding that the Porte "remain faithful to the letter and the spirit of the Treaties of Küçük Kaynarca and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion" and promise that any future gains of other Christian sects would also be gained by the Orthodox community inside the Ottoman Empire (Fairey 2015, p.142; Armaoğlu 2016, p.248).

considered that the Russian interpretation of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was intolerable, and it would cause a violation of the Sultan's sovereignty rights. This was unacceptable to the Porte. The Ottoman declaration of war was countered by the Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire on 20 October 1853 (Badem 1970, p.100; Fairey 2015, p.6; Hanioğlu 2008, p.81). By mid-November 1853, as they had stakes in the current Near Eastern crisis, the British and French fleets were moored in the Bosphorus (Clayton 1971, p.108; Sondhaus 2001, p.57). On 23 October, the Ottoman armies crossed the Danube and fired upon the Russians. Even though this was seen as an act of aggression that could have diminished the diplomatic support the Porte enjoyed from Britain and France, the Russian destruction of an Ottoman squadron in Sinop Harbor[66] on 30 November prompted the British and French interventions on the Ottoman side (Taylor 1954, p.58; Clayton 1971, p.108-109; Aksan 2013, p.444).

Russia, by attacking and destroying the Ottoman squadron, had defied the major powers of Western Europe, especially when their fleets were anchored in the Bosphorus with the purpose of supporting the Porte diplomatically, and physically if needed. Nonetheless, the British and French fleet movements taking place from March 1853 up to the Sinop raid could not deter Russian aggression. These diplomatic moves, while constituting an example of gunboat diplomacy, also illustrated the failure of the same diplomacy. To take a stronger stance, in December, the British and French fleets were ordered to enter the Black Sea, and in January 1854 they were in there to protect Ottoman troop transports and supply ships. Then, on 27 February 1854, an ultimatum by Britain, France, and Austria was sent to Russia demanding that it withdraw its troops from the Danubian

[66] The Battle of Sinop was the single most important naval engagement (from the Ottoman perspective) of the Crimean War. On one hand, it caused the loss of naval manpower and weakened the Ottoman battlefleet. On the other hand, it led to the British and French interventions on the Ottoman side leading to the Ottoman victory. The battle itself was between unequal squadrons. The Russian squadron was composed of six ships-of-the-line (84 gunned flag ship *Imperatritsa Mariya*, 120 gunned *Parizh*, 120 gunned *Tri Svyatitelya*, 120 gunned *Velikiy Knyaz Konstantin*, 84 gunned *Chesma*, 84 gunned *Rostislav*), two frigates (*Kagul* and *Kulevchi*), and three steamers (*Odessa*, *Krym*, and *Khersones*), against the Ottoman-Egyptian squadron of seven frigates (50 gunned flag ship *Avnillah*, 64 gunned *Nizamiye*, 48 gunned *Nesim-i Zafer*, 48 gunned *Fazlullah*, 42 gunned *Navek-i Bahri*, 42 gunned *Dimyat*, 22 gunned *Kaid-i Zafer*), three corvettes (22 gunned *Necm-i Evşan*, *Fevz-i Mabud*, *Gül-i Sefid*), two transports, and two steamers (*Taif* and *Ereğli*) (Badem 1970, p.117-120). The Russian forces had quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Ottoman squadron. While the largest Ottoman guns were 24-pounders, the Russians had 68-pounders. The Russian squadron also had thirty-eight explosive shell firing Paixhans guns which penetrated the wooden hull of ships, then exploded, setting the ships on fire from within. Thus, the Russian ships under the command of the Admiral Nakhimov destroyed the entire Ottoman squadron within six hours (Badem 1970, p.120-121; Watts 1990, p.12; Sondhaus 2001, p.57-58).

Principalities. This demand was rejected by Russia. By the end of February, diplomatic relations between Russia and Britain and France were severed. Britain and France signed a defensive treaty with the Ottoman Empire on 12 March 1854. Then, they declared war on Russia on 28 March 1854 (Taylor 1954, p.58-59; Badem 1970, p.180; Clayton 1971, p.108-109; Hanioğlu 2008, p.81).

Austria and Prussia were neutrals during the conflict. Therefore, they were barring the way to Russian lands and preventing the waging of war on the continent. That is why the Crimean War was mainly fought on the Crimean Peninsula, despite the Russian invasion of the Danubian Principalities. Besides, by 2 July 1854, the Russians had completely withdrawn from the Principalities which Austria had subsequently occupied. As a neutral in the war, it prevented the formation of a front there (Hanioğlu 2008, p.81; Sweetman 2001, p.31; Taylor 1954, p.67-68). The main war objectives of the allies were the capture of Sevastopol and the destruction of the Russian naval power in the Black Sea (Sondhaus 2001, p.59; Sweetman 2001, p.31-32). However, a better understanding of the Allied objectives in the war requires an evaluation of the 4 Points of August (1854). These were (1) the renunciation of Russian claims of protectorship of the Danubian Principalities which would, instead, be guaranteed by the Concert of Europe, (2) the freedom of navigation and trade for all nations along the Danube river, (3) the revision of the Straits Convention of 1841[67] to reflect the Balance of Power in Europe, and (4) that Russia give up its pretension of protectorship over the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte, which

[67] The London Straits Convention was signed on 13 July 1841 between Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. Its most important article was based on the traditional Ottoman policy of the closure of the Turkish Straits to all foreign vessels of war. A rule which Britain, by the Treaty of Dardanelles (1809), promised to adhere to as long as other states did. However, with the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi (1833) Russia, to the dismay of the British, had obtained privileges over the Straits which no other power had. By 1840 Britain had convinced, in principle, Austria, Prussia, and Russia that the Straits must remain closed to all foreign warships. France had rejected any discussion over the straits before the issue of Egypt was solved. With France's participation after the resolution of the conflict between the Porte and Mehmet Ali, The London Straits Convention was signed. It had evolved from the Treaty of Dardanelles. Its most important article was the closure of the Turkish Straits to all foreign vessels of war, as long as the Ottoman Empire was at peace. There are a few important details to add on the Convention of 1841: (1) The Porte could open the straits to any warship if it was in any armed conflict with another state. Additionally by binding other powers to the Straits Convention, Britain had put a limitation on future Russian ambitions and plans on the Turkish Straits, (2) the Straits had gained an international status and it was no longer within the Porte's sovereign rights to change the rules determined in the Convention which were hitherto within the Ottoman sovereignty, (3) the commitments taken, by Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia to uphold the Straits Convention was not only against the Ottoman Empire but also was against each other. So, any singlehanded attempt by one power would be to stand against other powers (Clayton 1971, p.84-86; Armaoğlu 2016, p.227-228).

would be under the protectorship of the European Great Powers (Fairey 2015, p.154-155; Taylor 1954, p.65-66). The first and second points were implicity accepted by Russia when it had retreated from the Principalities in the summer of 1854. The fourth point was agreed by the Russians when they had accepted the Vienna Note in August 1853. The only point of friction was the third point, which was in fact the elimination of Russian naval power in the Black Sea. According to Taylor, it was the sole standing reason for which the Crimean War was fought (Taylor 1954, p.66; Sweetman 2001, p.90; Fairey 2015, p.154). In October 1854, Sevastopol was besieged. In the summer of 1855, Russia was losing the war. Czar Nicholas I had died in February. Military defeats in the Crimea, during the battles of Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman, and the capture of Sevastopol on 8 September, broke the new Czar and his ministers' will to continue the war. France[68] had no more political aims to fulfill, either. Britain[69], although desiring a further erosion of Russian military power, could not continue the war alone (Badem 1970, p.286; Hanioğlu 2008, p.81; Fairey 2015, p.157-158). Following Austria's[70] threat to join the war on the Ottoman side in 1856, Russia conceded defeat in February 1856 (Hanioğlu 2008, p.81).

4.3.1 An Evaluation of the Ottoman Fighting Capabilities in the Crimean War

Such an evaluation is important in two ways. First it shows that the Russian threat towards the Porte was independent of naval power. This was seen in the Russian victories on land and advances in Eastern Anatolia, despite the Allied naval superiority in the Black Sea.

[68] The French Policy – France had no further desire, because Napoleon III had reached his war goals of destroying the anti-French coalition, and dissolving the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The French policy had become less hostile towards Russia because Napoleon III thought that he would need Russian support in the future for his revisionist goals in Europe (Taylor 1954, p.24-25; Badem 1970, p.285-287; Fairey 2015, p.119, 157).

[69] The British Policy – Britain was willing to prevent Russian access to the Mediterranean, therefore was supporting the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity against Russian power (Sweetman 2001, p.17; Hanioğlu 2008, p.78)

[70] The Austrian Policy – Austrian motives were based on its problems in the Balkans. They had no desire to disrupt the status quo in the Balkans, especially in favor of Russia. Another Austrian worry was the increasing Russian presence in the Danubian Principalities and its consequences on Danubian trade and the freedom of navigation upon that river. Austria was not willing to let the Russians control the Danube or the Turkish Straits (Taylor 1948, p.84-85, Clayton 1971, p.108; Hanioğlu 2008, p.78-79; Mitchell 2018, p.268-271).

Second, it demonstrates that the Ottoman army was still in urgent need of improvements for the physical security of the state.

Even though the Ottoman Army was no worse armed or trained[71] than its Russian counterpart, there were instances when its command was claimed to be corrupt[72] and when the soldiers' welfare was neglected by their commanding officers[73]. Perhaps the biggest difference between the two armies was the payments received by the soldiers[74]. Inadequate leadership and unskilled officers, who bought their way into commandership via bribery, prevented victories[75]. There are multiple instances when the Ottoman forces dared not pursue[76], due to the lack of commanding officers' decisions, retreating Russian forces which could have been routed had they been pursued and engaged once more. It is true that the Caucasian forces of the Porte were poorly equipped and supplied. However, the Ottoman high command was also to blame for the poor performance of the army on that front. The lack of maps of the region, even though the French had such maps, the lack of proper battle plans of the officers of the army stand out as some examples of details responsible for the dismal performance of the army. It is almost as if the Ottoman high command was not prepared for a war with Russia in the Caucasus. This was a strange

[71] The Rumelian army was not inferior to its Russian counterpart in terms of supplies, arms, ammunition, or training and discipline. The Ottoman artillery, in general, had signs of competitiveness. The Ottoman infantry had some training. The only incompetent part of the army was the cavalry (Badem 1970, p.103, 170-171, 230; Grant 2002, p.16).

[72] Dr Sandwith's (Humphry Sandwith), who was an English army physician who served with the Ottoman army in the Danube and Anatolia, report on Ahmed Pasha's command of the Anatolian army was: "...His whole faculties were bent upon making money. He had in the first place to recover the sums he had already expended in bribes in İstanbul, and he had, besides, to make his fortune. I could not exaggerate the horrors the poor men suffered under his command, for no chief can plunder without allowing a considerable license to his subordinates, so that the poor solider was fleeced by every officer higher than the major" (quoted in Badem 1970, p.171-172; Aksan 2013, p.471).

[73] Some of the Ottoman Officials were reportedly uninterested in the lack of supply and care of the Ottoman troops during the siege of Sevastopol (Aksan 2013, p.459).

[74] The Ottoman soldier was, in theory, better paid with higher salaries. However, payments were most of the time delayed, even by up to a year (Badem 1970, p.54-55).

[75] In the battle of Kürekdere the Ottoman army lost to a Russian army which was one third of its own size (Badem 1970, p.220-221).

[76] The Ottoman forces did not follow the retreating Russians after their unsuccessful attack on Oltenitsa in November 1853. Another Ottoman army did not follow the retreating Russian forces after the latters' defeat at the battle of Bayındır in November 1853. Again part of the Ottoman Rumelian army did not pursue when Russian forces raised the siege of Silistra in June 1854 and began to retreat (after Austria demanded that Russia should evacuate the Danubian Principalities) (Aksan 2013, p.466-467; Badem 1970, p.108, 159-160, 186). Additionally, in the aftermath of the battle of Citate in January 1854, the Ottoman army again "failed to follow up on the victory" it won (Aksan 2013, p.452).

phenomenon if one considers the existence of almost two centuries of hostilities between the two states (Aksan 2013, p.459-472; Badem 1970, p.156-232).

The Ottoman Navy, on the other hand, was no match for the Russian Black Sea fleet. The navy had never recovered its strength after the Battle of Navarino (1827). According to Adolphus Slade[77], the biggest problem of the navy was its lack of funding. Even though the fleet had considerable fighting power, and was the fourth or fifth most powerful in Europe in 1853 according to Badem (1970)[78], including Egyptian ships which constituted five ships-of-the-line, thirteen frigates, eighteen smaller sailing ships, and eight paddle-steamers, it lagged way behind the Russian Black Sea fleet because of the lack of training and firepower. Even the Kapudan Pasha[79], the highest-ranking naval officer of the Empire, had no naval background or training (Badem 1970, p.109-111; Sondhaus 2001, p.57-58). The lack of sea-mindedness on the part of the Ottoman Empire stands out once again. The navy had not enough funding, nor it was adequately trained. Finally, and most importantly, Kapudan Mahmud Pasha was not trained in naval affairs. Such an assignment does not conform with the prerogatives of a state that puts the sea at the center of its strategic calculations.

An overall assessment of the navies during the war leads to a number of conclusions. During the crisis over the Holy Places, naval power was used as a tool of diplomatic pressure, which seems to have worked in the French example. France had sent the ship-of-the-line *Charlemagne* to persuade the Porte into acquiescing to French demands. It was a successful practice of gunboat diplomacy. However, after the rejection of Menshikov's additional demands, the same tool did not work. The French and British fleet movements in the Mediterranean, and their entrance into the Sea of Marmara could not deter Russian aggression in the Danubian Principalities or the Sinop Raid respectively. The Crimean Peninsula was the major theater of war. As such, navies

[77] He was an advisor and an admiral in the Ottoman Navy. He started his service in the Ottoman Navy in 1849 and eventually rose to admiral rank. He continued his services of naval administration, and education until 1866 (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.415; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.10; Gürdeniz 2015, p.265).

[78] According Modelski and Thompson, the top three most powerful navies in terms of warship numbers in the world for 1853-1856 are Britain (1), France (2), and Russia (3) with seventy-six, forty-three, and thirty ships-of-the-line respectively for the year 1853. Twelve Ottoman ships-of-the-line for the year 1853 puts the empire indeed in fourth rank, however by a great margin vis-a-vis other powers (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.72, 319; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.15).

[79] Mahmud Pasha, a protégé of the Damad Mehmet Ali Pasha (Badem 1970, p.110-111).

became crucial for Allied (British, French, Ottoman) power projection capabilities. The Allied naval supremacy also allowed for the total control of the seas, with the Russian Black Sea Fleet trapped in Sevastopol Harbor. However, the Russians were still able to enter eastern Anatolia and even capture Kars. It therefore could have indicated to the Ottoman military and naval authorities that naval supremacy may be necessary but not sufficient alone to win a war against Russia (Clayton 1971, p.104-107; Sweetman 2001, p.7)

4.3.2 The Paris Peace Congress

The congress was a significant event, as it was the first great meeting[80] of the European Powers since the Congress of Verona (1822). The peace conference convened on 25 February 1856. On 28 February, the Ottoman Empire was accepted into the European family of nations. The European Powers also promised that they would respect the independence of the Ottoman Empire and would seek third party mediation before resorting to armed conflict. The conference ended on 30 March with the signing of the Treaty of Paris. On 27 April, the signatories ratified the treaty. According to the treaty, (1)[81] the Danubian Principalities and Serbia were put under the general supervision of the European Powers, (2) Southern Bessarabia was given to Moldava, (3) Kars returned to Ottoman suzerainty, (4) the Ottoman Empire was admitted into the Concert of Europe and its territorial integrity was guaranteed by the European Powers, and finally (5) the Black Sea was militarily neutralized. The most significant article[82] of the treaty is the neutralization of the Black Sea. It was significant in two ways: (1) it was the only disarmament (or arming limitation) hitherto forced upon a great power[83], (2) it is also considered an innovation in international law because previously disarmaments were

[80] All other meetings were for smaller, specific issues, and mostly conferences (Taylor 1954, p.83).
[81] The Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and Serbia was abolished. They were instead put under the collective guarantee of the European Powers with Ottoman Sovereignty over them (Badem 1970, p.287).
[82] This is the most significant article from a naval perspective. For the Ottoman Empire the most significant article of the Treaty was its acceptance into the Concert of Europe as it provided the Porte a legitimate sovereign standing equal to those of the Great Powers of Europe.
[83] The only other example is the disarmament forced upon Prussia by Napoleon I in 1807 (Taylor 1954, p.85).

limited to the land or armies of a state (Clayton 1971, p.114; Ledonne 1997, p.127; Fairey 2015, p.168-169; Sweetman 2001, p.86; Taylor 1954, p.83-85).

The Crimean War exposed the financial constraints on the Empire, as the first foreign debt was taken in its wake, even though the Empire was on the victorious side. It also significantly limited the Russians' ability to project naval power into the Black Sea, with the demilitarization of that sea and the total destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet. What is interesting is the way the Russian Black Sea fleet was destroyed. It had not dared to leave Sevastopol during the war, out of its fear of the Allied fleets. It only conducted sorties by individual ships that targeted vulnerable merchantmen, transport, or other smaller vessels. Five ships-of-the-line of the Russian Black Sea fleet were scuttled to bar the entrance to the harbor, therefore eliminating any possibility of naval action between the Russian and Allied fleets in the Black Sea. An additional six ships-of-the-line were scuttled, again by the Russians, when Sevastopol fell to the Allies. The only remaining ships of the Russian Black Sea fleet were two dismasted corvettes and nine steamers, which were all scuttled later (Sondhaus 2001, p.58-61). This thus left little reason for the Ottoman Empire to develop a large fleet for physical security purposes in the Black Sea. Additionally, even after the Sinop Raid, the Ottoman Navy was still a capable force that consisted of five ships-of-the-line, six frigates, and fifteen other smaller vessels, which was able to counter a possible Greek threat in the Aegean (Sondhaus 2001, p.58-59, 68; Badem 1970, p.295-300, 402). When one considers how the Crimean War was fought between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, it becomes clear that it was mainly a land conflict. However, it must be remembered that the Crimean War was mostly a land conflict because of the Allied naval supremacy. It may also be enlightening as a foretaste of how the European powers, especially Britain, were going to act in the future. In a possible conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Russia would not be allowed or may not dare to take part in a naval offensive against the Turkish Straits. Such an action was almost guaranteed, at least from the Russian perspective at the time, to bring about Britain's involvement in the conflict. The main physical security deficit against Russia, at the end of the Crimean War, seems to be mainly on land. Even though strengthening the Ottoman Navy against Russia would certainly improve the physical security of the Empire, it was not an urgent need at that time, since the Russian Black Sea fleet was non-existent. A possible response could have been a gradual improvement of the Ottoman

Navy, in parallel with that of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Therefore, at the end of the Crimean War, improving the physical security of the Empire required mainly the advancement of the army, and remedying the existing deficiencies which could have included battling corruption, improving the education of the officers, and improving the performance of the cavalry corps.

This chapter has included an evaluation of the historical developments taking place in between the Greek War of Independence and the end of the Crimean War. The study conducted here has revealed some findings. First, the loss of Greece, along with approximately 750,000 inhabitants, meant a loss of naval manpower and an important tax base. This also meant that a new state with hostile intentions was created next to the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, the 1815 Order took a serious blow with British, French, and Russian support for a subject against its legitimate suzerain, therefore meaning that the principle of monarchical solidarity and the status quo stressed by that order were undermined. Second, the rebellion of Mehmet Ali showed that the Ottoman Empire lacked the strength to deal with a rebellious vassal, and that the state needed the improvement of its land forces for the physical security of the state. Furthermore, it showed that the army was still the crucial element for the defense of the state. Third, the Crimean War revealed that the Ottoman war-making capability was hindered by its weak finances, unprepared Ottoman high command, and inefficient officers corps. It additionally showed that Russia was an important threat, whether it possessed naval power or not. This is a fact which underlines once again the importance of the army for the physical security of the state, because Russia continued to be an important, if not the most important, threat factor during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. It must also be remembered that the Ottoman Empire had been admitted into the Concert of Europe in the aftermath of the Crimean War and was accepted into the European family of nations under the Public Law System. However, even though these admissions hinted that the Ottoman Empire was accepted as a peer of equal status, they did not amount to a full recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a great power. It thus left the status of the state in question. It was part of the Concert along with the great powers, but it was not a great power itself (Holbraad 1971, p.88).

5. THE ERA OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ

5.1 THE NAVAL SITUATION BEFORE THE REIGN OF SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ

The 1768-1774 war with Russia had revealed the weaknesses of Ottoman naval officers. Especially after the Çeşme incident in 1770, Ottoman authorities had seen that there was a need for technical education of officers for the successful application of naval power. To remedy this, a school, with the purpose of training naval officers was found during the reign of Sultan Mustafa III. This was the Bahriye Mühendishanesi which started its program in 1773 as the first educational institution for the training of naval officers (Panzac 2018, p.228). After that, attempts at improving Ottoman naval power continued during the reign of Sultan Selim III. Before Sultan Abdülaziz, he was the Ottoman Sultan who previously invested significantly in the Ottoman Navy, the battlefleet, and its reorganization. These included the following: the shipmaking and repairing capacities of docks were improved. Salaries were increased[84] and steps were taken towards professionalization, to create a stable pool of available sailors and officers. To improve the quality of the naval officer corps and to lessen corruption, a system of merit-based promotion was established. Again, to reduce corruption, a ministry of the navy was instituted, and a minister of the navy was put in charge of naval admininistration, in cooperation with the Kapudan Pasha. Finally, a school of medicine was opened to train medical officers for the navy (Panzac 2018, p.222-237).

The battlefleet was improved, too. When Selim III had ascended to the throne in 1789, the Ottoman Navy had ninety ships. In 1790, it had a battlefleet of sixty ships with twenty-six galleons and thirty-four frigates. By the end of Selim III's reign, the Empire had built around seventy additional ships, of which at least twenty-five, seventeen being ships-of-the-line, were galleons and thirty-one were frigates and corvettes. The activity of the shipyards was not limited to shipbuilding. Numerous ships' repairs and upgrades were

[84] Even though it meant an absolute raise, this improvement was actually an effort to maintain the purchasing power of salaries which was in decay because of inflation (Panzac 2018, p.233).

made as well. It is evident that Sultan Abdülaziz was not the first Ottoman ruler who felt the need to improve Ottoman naval power and who launched an ambitious[85] naval buildup in the Nineteenth Century (Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.305; Zorlu 2008, p.133-166; Panzac 2018, p.238-239).

In 1848, the Ottoman Navy had at least seventy-one ships with a single sailing three-decker *Mesudiye*, five additional smaller sailing galleons, seven sailing frigates, three corvettes, twelve brigs, three schooners, and forty smaller vessels, of which eighteen were steamers. During the Crimean War, Russia had sixteen ships-of-the-line in the Black Sea against an Ottoman Navy of similar strength with eighty-seven pieces of the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet, including eighteen ships-of-the-line (twelve three-deckers, six two-deckers), eleven frigates, eight corvettes, thirteen brigs, five schooners, and thirty-two smaller vessels. However, the Ottoman naval personnel were poorly trained and equipped. At the end of Sultan Abdülmecid's reign, the Ottoman Navy had forty-eight vessels, of which seven were sailing ships-of-the-line and three were screw-propelled ships-of-the-line[86] compared to Russia's fifty-six vessels, of which seven were screw-propelled ships-of-the-line and twelve were sailing ships-of-the-line. However, all the sailing ships of the Russian Navy were obsolete. The entire Ottoman fleet was weaker overall, yet the Russian Navy had to disperse its fleets among four separate theaters in the Baltic Sea, the Pacific, the North Sea, and the Black Sea[87]. Therefore, Russia was unable to concentrate its full naval might into one theater (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.59; Gencer 1985,

[85] It can be assumed that this was a big naval buildup, because in terms of shipbuilding numbers between 1791 and 1800, the Ottoman Empire was third in line after Britain and France, which had built ninety and ninety-eight respectively (Panzac 2018, p.239).

[86] *Mahmudiye* was a sailing ship-of-the-line. The installment of a screw propeller and a steam engine in Britain was considered. However, it was cancelled due to technical difficulties. The sailing ship-of-the-line *Mahmudiye* should not be confused with the ironclad *Mahmudiye* which was launched in 1864 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.2, 133; Conway's 1979, p.389; Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.63; Dal 2015, p.240; Bulgurcuoğlu 2006, p.97-98). *Kosova* was also a sailing ship-of-the-line in 1860. The screw machinery was installed in 1864 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.142). *Fethiye* was a screw-propelled ship-of-the-line in 1860 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.142). *Şadiye* too was a screw-propelled ship-of-the-line in 1860 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.142). *Peyk-i Zafer* was a screw-propelled ship-of-the-line too in 1860 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.142). *Teşrifiye* was a sailing ship-of-the-line in 1860 (Hacipoğlu 2013, p.40; Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.416; Badem 1970, p.270). Finally, *Mukaddeme-i Hayır* too was a sailing ship-of-the-line. It should not be confused with the casemate ironclad of 2,000 tons of displacement that was launched in 1873 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz, p.138; Conway's 1979, p.390).

[87] The Russian Black Sea Fleet was scuttled during the Crimean War (Watts 1990, p.13)

p.177-178; Watts 1990, p.12, 14; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.15; Dal 2015, p.30, 238; Panzac 2018, p.332).

After the Crimean War, Russia had adopted a defensive naval strategy and the tactic known as the *guerre de course*[88]. Their battleships numbered around thirty, but none was deployed in the Black Sea because the demilitarization of that sea precluded Russia from rebuilding its Black Sea fleet which had been destroyed in the Crimean War (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.292; Lambert 1992, p.11). The Russian Navy, in 1862, possessed nine ships-of-the-line, seven frigates with two more being built and two completed, eighteen corvettes with one more being built and two more completed, and nine sloops with three more completed (all screw vessels). These vessels were distributed between the Baltic, where all the battleships were concentrated, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific. The Russian Black Sea fleet included only ten steamers of 800 tons or below, which could not present a clear threat to the physical security of the Porte there (Conway's 1979, p.171). Should not military investments be against immediate, rising or possible threats, to increase the physical security of the state? That being said, Russia could always be considered as a threat based on its intention and capability against the Ottoman Empire, because of its designs on the Turkish Straits and its desire to reach warm water ports. It could additionally influence the Balkan Nations (Ledonne 1997, p.139-143). However, these threats would always depend on Russian land power, therefore a powerful Ottoman Army could counter these.

In Greece, political instability, along with the weakness of King Otto's rule, produced administrative problems. His reign also went through a military coup in 1844 which aggravated the country's problems. His was an unstable reign, which ended in 1862 (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.34-40; Armaoğlu 2016, p.284). The year 1853 witnessed a rise of irredentism in Greece, as well as nationalistic and philorthodox feelings in the Greek press, because of the 400th anniversary of the fall of İstanbul. These

[88] This is a type of naval warfare, usually adopted by the weaker navy, which prioritizes the attack on enemy commerce and trade on the sea. It is a strategy of commerce raiding. The focus is to cripple the enemy economy by disrupting its trade. It is a relatively low budget strategy in terms of both finance and administration. Privateers, fast cruisers, and later on submarines were the main naval tools used in its execution. While effective until the Nineteenth Century, its effectiveness waxed and waned through the century, only to increase towards the Twentieth with the advent of submarines (Modelski and Thompson 1998, p.79-83, 248, 308; Menon 1998, p.51; Halpern 2006, p.79; Harding 2001, p.55-58).

feelings were fanned by Russia, in the hope of creating a fifth column inside the Ottoman Empire in the ensuing crisis concerning the Holy Places and the Orthodox Christian minorities of the Porte. However, the British and the French, allies of the Porte by March 1854, put pressure on Greece by naval blockade, which forced that country to pursue non-hostile relations with the Porte during the Crimean War (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.40; Armaoğlu 2016, p.284). Therefore, Greece, before and during the war (1853-1856) was not able to present a physical threat of any kind to the Ottoman Empire, due to the international political situation. Between the Greek War of Independence and the Cretan Rebellion of 1866-1869, Greece did not attempt to obtain an armored fleet that could challenge the Porte. Additionally, most of its ships were destroyed in 1831, by Russia, during a rebellion against Capodistrias, to which the Greek Admiral Miaoulis along with most of the Greek fleet had joined (Sondhaus 2001, p.28-29). Greece obtained its only ironclads (1,770 ton *Basileos Georgios* which was launched in 1867, and 2,030 ton *Basilissa Olga* which was launched in 1869) during the Cretan Rebellion (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.61; Sondhaus 2001, p.90-91). Before the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, Greece was only a partial threat. It had the intention but not the capability.

The separation between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire had entered a final phase in 1869, when Khedive Ismail presided over the opening ceremony of the Suez Canal and did not invite Sultan Abdülaziz (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.42, 83; Sondhaus 2001, p.90; Quataert 2005, p.58). The concession to build the canal was obtained by France in 1854, and it was opened in 1869 with the purpose of gaining influence in Egypt, in the Mediterranean, and the Middle East (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.83; Goodlad 2005, p.4; Armaoğlu 2016, p.274, 367). From 1854 onwards, Egypt had developed a vibrant economy which grew further during the American Civil War because of an increase in the demand for cotton. However, economic growth only meant increasing penetration of Egypt's politics and economy by European powers. This was a development which led to a foreign loan spiral beginning in the 1860s, which left Egypt with limited economic capacity to mount a formidable threat to the Porte during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. The end of the cotton boom in 1864 only deepened Egypt's financial woes. Despite these economic setbacks Egypt, under Ismail's rule, had obtained full independence[89] from the Porte in all but name by

[89] Two imperial edicts in 1866 (ratified in 1872) and 1867 (ratified in 1873) gave Ismail the rights to confer titles and increase the size of the Egyptian army. The law of succession also changed from seniority to

1873 (Hunter 1998, p.185-194). The Egyptian battlefleet, which possessed eleven ships-of-the-line in 1839, had sent three of them to help the Porte during the Crimean War (Panzac 2018, p.298, 325), although one must consider the Egyptian threat as not a military but a political threat. It was a threat to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The threat was in the form of independence which it acquired, de facto, in 1873, as mentioned above. In retrospect, with the growing European interest and investment in Egypt, especially that of Britain, it is doubtful whether a powerful Ottoman Navy could have stopped it.

5.2 SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ'S FLEET

In 1860, the Ottoman Navy had ten ships-of-the-line with seven sailing and three screw-propelled with another screw-propelled in construction. It had fifteen frigates, with six sailing and six screw-propelled, while three additional screw-propelled were in construction. There were eighteen corvettes, with four sailing and fourteen screw-propelled, seven of which were in construction. Finally, there were four screw-propelled gunboats. The Ottoman Navy possessed in total forty-eight naval units. By 1876, the Ottoman Navy under the leadership of Sultan Abdülaziz had acquired a total of thirty-nine additional ships, of which twenty were armored. With the exception of some which were built locally, these ironclads were mostly built by British, French, and Austrian shipyards. By 30 May 1876, the Ottoman Empire had thirteen sea-going[90] ironclads, the remaining seven being coastal defense ships. Five of the sea-going ships were first class[91] and eight were second class ships. By that time, the Ottoman armored fleet had a total tonnage of 62,360, ranking fourth in the world after Britain with 250,540, France with around 170,000, and Russia with 72,121 tons. However, it ranked as the third[92] largest

primogeniture allowing the eldest son of Ismail to succeed him, thus preventing succession disputes within the dynasty of Mehmet Ali. Ismail also obtained the right to raise loans and conclude treaties with other states. Finally, he obtained the title of Khedive (Hunter 1998, p.193).

[90] The term sea-going is used because all ironclads were not fit for missions on the open seas. Some were built for river use like river-monitors. Others were specifically designed for coastal defense operations.

[91] The classification is based on a combination of ship tonnage and the caliber of guns mounted on ships. Ships over 6,000 tons with a minimum gun caliber of eight inch are considered first class ships. Those which failed to meet either criteria were considered second class ships (Panzac 2018, p.359).

[92] By 30 May 1876, Britain had twenty-eight and France had twenty-six sea-going ironclads (Conway's 1979, p.1-333).

armored battlefleet in the world, with thirteen sea-going ironclads when coastal defense ships were excluded. It was by far stronger in terms of ironclads than its main rival Russia, which had four sea-going ironclads. Considered among the potential threats to the Ottoman Empire for the purposes of this dissertation, Greece had two second class ironclads, whereas Egypt had one. Even their combined strength was not a match for that of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek Navy had a total armored tonnage of 3,804, and the Egyptian Navy had a total armored tonnage of 1,760 (Conway's 1979, p.1-416; Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.135-140; Sondhaus 2001, p.103; Dal 2015, p.240-242; Panzac 2018, p.332).



Figure 5.1. Ironclads of the European Powers on 30 May 1876[93]

When one considers that Russia had four naval theaters to attend to in the Baltic, the Black Sea, the North Sea and the Pacific, the inadequacy of the Russian armored battlefleet for offensive operations and as a threat factor on the seas becomes more striking. Since its coastal defense ironclads were incapable of mounting offensive operations on the high seas, and Russia had only the coastal defense ironclad *Novgorod*, a cruiser, a gunboat, and a torpedo boat on the Black Sea, the Porte had no reason to fear

[93] Ship numbers are taken from Conway's 1979 (Conway's 1979, p.1-113, 170-215, 240-265, 283-359, 388-394).

a Russian naval offensive there. If Russia mounted a naval offensive through the Mediterranean, it could at most send four ironclads. Two of these had around 6,000 tons and the other two had around 5,000 tons of displacement. The Ottoman Navy could amass, against this force, thirteen ironclads, one of 9,120 tons, four of 6,400 tons, one of 4,687 tons, two of 2,806 tons, one of 2,266 tons, and four of 2,080 tons. However, such a scenario, even though accomplished once in 1770, was not much of a threat factor in Ottoman strategic calculations. The four Russian ironclads were more likely to be a threat against the British. Additionally, could Russia send an offensive armored fleet from the Baltic through the Mediterranean against the Porte? Especially if one considers that the Porte enjoyed British friendship after the Crimean War. In this case, the Ottoman purchase of ironclads in such numbers seems excessive. It must also be noted that Russia did not possess any large armored ship in the Black Sea until the 1880s. Therefore, smaller ironclads could have been equally useful in the event of a war.

What was the Ottoman strategic motivation in acquiring a battlefleet significantly more powerful that its main rival, which traditionally constituted a predominantly land-based threat? Did the Sultan want to pursue a fleet-in-being strategy? Did he aim at building an offensive battlefleet? Or did he simply want a naval deterrent?

Regarding the first question, a fleet-in-being strategy does not require superior forces. It is a strategy pursued by states with a weaker naval power against a stronger enemy (Speller 2014, p.49). Therefore, the Ottoman battlefleet was too strong for the adoption of such a strategy. If that was the case, then Sultan Abdülaziz made an excessive and even a sub-optimal investment, disproportional to the threats it was supposed to counter.

On the other hand, the battlefleet fitted well into an offensive grand strategy. However, if one considers that the Porte had been on the defensive against Russia for the past two centuries, an offensive posture did make little sense. Even if Russia had lost the Crimean War, this had much more to do with British and French efforts along with an Austrian ultimatum, than Ottoman strength vis-a-vis Russia. In fact, the Ottoman armies in the Caucasus had failed to stop the Russian advance there and the fall of Kars. Therefore, an offensive battlefleet made little sense in terms of grand strategy, and constituted a case of excessive spending.

The other option was to obtain a naval deterrent. While acquiring a deterrent is certainly a rational choice for the physical security of states, it must be appropriate against the threat confronted. The Russian threat was mostly a land-based one. Russian victories at sea, although significant, were never decisive for overall victory. Russia could project power over land because there was a common land border between the two countries. It could also determine the result of the war through land victories. So, a strong army, not a battlefleet, could be the appropriate form of deterrence in this case. The Ottoman naval deterrent did not work against Russia anyway, and war still broke out in 1877. If the Ottoman armored battlefleet made no sense from a military perspective, then what was its purpose?

Additional efforts for the development of Ottoman naval power were made. These revolved around the improvement of education, training, and the improvement of dockyard capacities. There were two existing dry docks inside the Golden Horn. One was built during the reign of Sultan Selim III in 1799-1800. The other was built between 1822 and 1826 during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. In addition to these, one dry and one floating dock were built during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (Gencer 1985, p.99; Hacipoğlu 2013, p.65; Gürdeniz 2015, p.286; Dal 2015, p.207-210). Armor and steam engine factories were built to match the needs of a modern navy. Even though the capacity of the dockyards for manufacturing mechanical equipment and maintaining ships was increased between 1861 and 1876, the dependence on Britain continued, which led to ever increasing levels of imported equipment. There was also a constant need for foreign technical experts, and dockyard workers, to remedy the inadequate level of training of the local personnel so as to keep up with the naval modernizations taking place. A total of 200 British technicians were employed in Ottoman shipyards between 1865 and 1875, which were much more costly compared to the locals[94] (Hacipoğlu 2013, p.65-66; Örenç 2013, p.144-145; Dal 2015, p.111-112, 211-212; Panzac 2018, p.350).

Especially the employment on the steamers was dependent upon British technical personnel specialized on the steam engines. Efforts to remedy this deficiency were made during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. However, even in 1878, up to 250 British personnel

[94] Gencer (1985) also mentions that British technical experts were being used before the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz for the maintenance and use of Ottoman steamers (Gencer 1985, p.180).

were still employed on Ottoman ships. This number rose to even higher levels at the outbreak of the war with Russia in 1878. It is clear that the Porte had failed to establish a viable system of education to solve the low level of qualified personnel in the navy. Although employing foreign experts was not a novel practice within the Empire, a new level of critical dependence had been reached, because of the technological innovations that came about in the Nineteenth Century. Even the commanding positions aboard the ships, and sometimes entire fleets were given over to the command of foreign naval personnel. The inadequate capacity of the naval arsenal became obvious when it failed to complete the construction of a 6,400 ton ironclad which had begun in 1864. It could finish the building of another of 2,762 tonner, *Mukaddeme-i Hayır*, which was initiated in 1868, only in 1874. Another problematic attempt was the construction of a 6,594 ton ironclad, *Nusretiye* (renamed *Hamidiye*). This ship had been launched in 1871, relaunched in 1885 and could enter into service only in 1894 (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.166; Gürdeniz 2015, p.302; Panzac 2018, p.334-335, 349-352).

Insufficiency of coal supply and lack of iron/steel production in the Empire also plagued the maintenance of the navy. The coal mines of Ereğli became insufficient, and additional coal had to be imported from Britain at higher prices. Instances of inadequate coal supply[95] had hindered operations of the fleet during the Cretan rebellion (1866-1869) as well (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.107, 125). The Ottoman Empire lacked a naval industry and trained naval personnel to properly maintain or operate the armored fleet which had become the fourth largest in the world in terms of displaced tonnage by 30 May 1876. Therefore, the lack of naval education within the Ottoman Empire was an issue. Additionally, constant changes in the naval administration paralyzed this institution, as ever-changing responsibilities and task descriptions prevented the formation of an efficient naval administrative cadre. An example is the re-removal of the office of Kapudan Pasha and the re-establishment of the Ministry of Marine in 1867 (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.53-166; Dal 2015, p.5-244; Gürdeniz 2015, p.286, 302; Yüksel 2016, p.87-98;

[95] The coal production of the Ereğli mines was not enough. Alternative supply from Malta, Corfu, and Siros could be obtained but this was problematic because Greek merchants were obstructing its fast delivery (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.107).

Panzac 2018, p.331-353). In sum, Sultan Abdülaziz had built an expensive fleet that the Empire could not man, maintain or use effectively (Sondhaus 2001, p.90).

5.3 FINANCIAL BURDEN OF A MODERN FLEET

The treasury of the Navy (Tersane-i Amire Hazinesi) was founded along with Sultan Selim III's naval reforms. Until 1829, the treasury had constant budget surpluses. However, from the 1830s, the budget balance began to deteriorate and resulted in deficits. The major reasons behind this budgetary problem were, according to Gencer (1985), the technological innovations taking place in the naval industry. The steam engines and the skilled personnel needed for running these engines created additional expenses for the naval treasury. Since the Imperial Naval Arsenal lacked the means and the technical expertise to produce engines, and train personnel at home, they needed to be imported, mainly from Britain (Gencer 1985, p.197, 201-202)

In addition to increasing naval costs, the Ottoman Empire had to endure additional budgetary problems during and after the Crimean War of 1853-56. An estimated 11 million pounds sterling was needed because of the extraordinary war expenses. The war led to the first foreign loan in 1854. The second loan of 1855 was given on condition that the loan must be spent on the war effort. Therefore, these loans could not be spent for the improvement of Ottoman finances or remedying the economic problems. Consequently, they ushered in a vicious cycle of loans being repaid with subsequent loans (Pamuk 2005, p.230-231; Birdal 2010, p.28; Dal 2015, p.247)

The borrowing continued during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. Between 1862 and 1874, ten additional foreign loans were taken. These amounted to 167,557,000 pounds sterling or 184,312,810[96] golden Ottoman lira. Out of this, the amount credited to the Ottoman Treasury was around 80 million pounds sterling or 88 million lira (Birdal 2010, p.28; Kıray 2015, p.209-215; Pamuk 2018, p.76). However, the majority of the funds obtained

[96] The exchange rate was fixed in 1844 at one sterling equalling 1.1 Ottoman golden lira (Pamuk 2005, p.229)

were spent on capital and interest[97] payments on debts, the removal of Kaimes from the economy, the building of palaces, covering budgetary deficits, and bureaucratic expenses. Only a small part was spent on investments. No funds were allocated to revitalize the economy, industry, or to increase government income (Pamuk 2005, p.230-231; Birdal 2010, p.28; Kıray 2015, p.211-215; Pamuk 2018, p.58-61). Dal (2015) stresses that the share of budget allocated to the Ottoman Navy increased[98] in comparison to the army and the gunnery (Tophane) (Dal 2015, p.250-251). In addition, Hacipoğlu (2013) mentions that the loans taken in 1862, 1863, and 1865 were funneled into the naval treasury (Hacipoğlu 2013, p.61-63).

At this point, it will be useful to look at the costs related with forming a modern fleet of ironclads, in order to understand the share of naval expenses in relation to general Ottoman debts. The expenses of the Ottoman Navy between the fiscal years of 1861-62 and 1876-77 totalled 12,534,328 pounds sterling, according to Dal (2015). This calculation is in line with Panzac's (2018) assessments. According to the latter, the costs of procurement, modernization, and renovation of ships along with personnel and shipyard expenses amounted to something between 11 and 13 million pounds sterling. While personnel payments cost around 4.5 million pounds sterling, ship procurements cost around 5.45 million pounds sterling (Dal 2015, p.250-251; Panzac 2018, p.353-355).

In the light of the evidence, it should be granted that a considerable part of the loans was used to fund naval procurement. Aside from the Cretan rebellion that lasted from 1866 to 1869, there were no wars in which the Ottoman Empire participated. Increasing indebtedness, despite a relatively peaceful period, brings up the question of the efficiency of the Ottoman financial administration. Additionally, when the total cost of ship procurements, 5.45 million pounds sterling, is compared to the total amount of funds available through foreign borrowing, 80 million pounds sterling, it is hard to claim that the acquisition of ironclads during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz led to the bankcruptcy

[97] The payment of interest was becoming increasingly difficult to muster in the course of the 1860s and 1870s. While in the early 1860s these payments equalled 10% of government revenues, by the early 1870s they were equal to 30%, and by the end of the 1870s they were around 50% of government revenues (Pamuk 2018, p.61).

[98] The budget allowance of the Navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid was 12.29%, during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II it was 7.71%, and during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz was 17.27%. The increase in the budget of the navy can also be seen in absolute numbers as 988,000 Lira between 1861-1875, compared to 340,000 Lira between 1842-1854 (Dal 2015, p.250-251; Panzac 2018, p.356).

of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the general assumption that the formation of a large Imperial Fleet during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz led to the financial downfall of the Empire may need a re-evaluation. In its stead, it may be more useful to examine if the entirety of the naval expenses, around 12.5 million pounds sterling, led to the bankruptcy of the Porte or not.

5.4 THREATS TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

According to Walt, the level of threat a state poses depends on four factors. These are (1) the aggregate power, (2) the proximity, (3) the offensive capability, and (4) the offensive intentions. The aggregate power is a combination of the total resources, the population, the industrial and military capacity, and the technological prowess a state possesses. The proximity is mainly dependent on their geography and how the two states are situated relative to each other on the map. The closer they are, the more they become threatening to each other because the ability of a state to project power diminishes with distance. The offensive power or capabilities of a state depends on geographic proximity and aggregate power. However, it also means the ability to threaten the territorial sovereignty and/or independence of another state at an acceptable cost to the aggressor. The offensive or aggressive intentions need not be related to aggregate power, although it is enhanced by it. A state being viewed or perceived as aggressive is accepted as having aggressive intentions. The aggressive intentions of a state can also be said to depend upon irredentism, separatism, and other designs upon the targeted state, that can be interpreted as damaging the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or the independence of the latter (Walt 1985, p.9-13; Walt 1987, p.vi, 5, 22-26).

However, there are other aspects that affect the level of threat a state is exposed to. These include asymmetries in aggregate power, which increases threat perception, and the shared identity which decreases threat perception. Asymmetries in power affect threat perception, because if a state has accumulated more power than another state, in the anarchical environment of international politics, there is nothing to prevent the more powerful state from forcing its will on the weaker. Shared identity decreases such perceptions because of the social categorizations which individuals and states create. The

creation of a “self” automatically triggers the creation of the “other”. This leads to a motivation to see one’s own group positively, which also leads to seeing the other group negatively. As a result, in-group members are favored over members of the out-group; thus, also leading to a suspicion over the motives of the other, which amplifies threat perceptions (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007, p.744-762).

If Sultan Abdülaziz had formed a fleet based on such a balance of threat perspective, he should have acquired naval power sufficient to counter these threats, instead of a much larger ironclad fleet than that which is required for this task.

Based on the concept of threat detailed above, Russia, Greece, and Egypt are chosen as they presented the threats that the Empire was confronted with during the Nineteenth Century until after the end of Sultan Abdülaziz’s reign. These threats manifested themselves in the context of the Morea Revolt/The Greek War of Independence (1821-1830), the Ottoman-Russian War (1828-1829), The Rebellion of Mehmet Ali (1831-1840), the Crimean War (1853-1856), the Cretan Rebellion (1866-1869), and the Ottoman-Russian War (1877-1878). The Ottoman Empire and Russia were direct enemies in three wars until and right after the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz and Russia was also present as an enemy of the Porte during the Greek War of Independence. Greece became an enemy after its independence and was a supporter of the Cretan Rebellion. Egypt too was part of the problem under its ambitious rulers. These potential enemies are studied based on their aggregate power, proximity, offensive intentions and offensive capabilities in the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean regions.

5.4.1 An Assessment of the Ottoman Power

Before elaborating on Russian, Greek, and Egyptian threats, it is useful to present the Ottoman aggregate power, to compare it to potential threats. This will be helpful to assess the offensive capabilities of Russia, Greece, and Egypt in comparison to the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman Aggregate Power

The population of the Ottoman Empire was around 30 to 40 million in the 1870s. In wartime, it could mobilize and sustain no more than a few hundred thousand men. However, of these, only the soldiers of the Nizamiye could fight well enough. These numbered around 170,000 by the end of Sultan Abdülaziz's reign. The rest of the army was formed of reserves and irregulars, the fighting capabilities of which were much worse. Additionally, the Ottoman GDP was only 10% of the Russian GDP. The Ottoman Empire had an army budget of 4.7 million pounds Sterling, with 3.6 million reserved for Nizamiye (Aksan 2013, p.477-478; Ünal 2008, p.48; Broadberry and Klein 2012, p.82; Carreras and Josephson 2010, p.33; Uyar and Erickson 2017, p.328). With these figures in mind, it is now time to move on to assess the aggregate power and the nature of the threats posed by the potential enemies of the Porte.

5.4.2 Russian Threat

Aggregate Power

By the mid-Nineteenth Century Russia had a population of 60 million. By 1860 this number had risen to 76 million, which was to rise even further by 1870 to 84 million and in 1897 to 115 million, according to the 1897 census (Seton-Watson 1965, p.5, 30-31, Kennedy 1988, p.170; Broadberry and Klein 2012, p.83). In 1860, the Russian economy was producing an iron output of 340,000 tons, and a coal output of 150,000 tons. In 1870, these figures were 400,000 tons of iron and 750,000 tons of coal. In 1880, coal production rose to 3.2 million tons while iron production remained at the same level. In 1870, it had a GDP of 95.4 billion dollars (at 1990 international prices) (Taylor 1954, p.xxix-xxx; Broadberry and Klein 2012, p.82). The standing Russian army was 860,000 strong in 1860. Yet most of the army was used in policing duties across the vast Russian Empire stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific (Kennedy 1988, p.172, 179). In 1870, Russian military expenditures were 18 million pounds sterling, and naval expenditures were 2.4 million pounds sterling. In 1880, these figures were 26 to 3.8 million pounds sterling respectively (Taylor 1954, p.xxvii).

Proximity

During the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, the borders between Russia and the Ottoman Empire remained unchanged. The Caucasus and the Danube were the zones of their interactions. Russia and the Ottoman Empire were direct neighbors in the Caucasus. Russia also bordered Moldava, which was under the nominal suzerainty of the Porte, in the Black Sea at the mouth of the Danube river. The distance of this border to the Ottoman capital was around 900 km by land and around 320 nautical miles (592 km) by sea (https://www.distancefromto.net/). However, it must be added that the lack of adequate railroad networks south of Moscow had created tremendous difficulties for Russia to send supplies and men to the Crimea during the Crimean War. While supplies from Britain and France reached the Crimea in three weeks, troops from Moscow reached there in about three months (Kennedy 1988, p.174). On the seas, the Black Sea was the border between the two empires. However, because of its demilitarization, it was inaccessible by either navy. Since they were neighbors, the Russian proximity to the Ottoman Empire was a strong aspect of the threat the former posed to the latter. The distance between Sevastopol[99] and Sinop was around 171 nautical miles (316 km), and the distance between Sevastopol and İstanbul was around 295 nautical miles (546 km) (https://www.distancefromto.net/).

Offensive Intentions

Until the mid-Nineteenth Century, Russia was involved, multiple times, in the Ottoman Empire's political affairs, both internal and international. According to Seton-Watson (1965), by the mid-Nineteenth Century, Russian designs upon the Ottoman lands in the Balkans and the Straits had become known by the governments of Europe. That argument is supported by the fact that during the Nineteenth Century, Russia had continuously meddled in Ottoman affairs. Russia demanded, during the talks with the French in St. Petersburg in 1808, the Danubian Principalities and Bulgaria from Napoleon. It had supported the Greeks during their conflict with the Porte in the 1820s. Conversations in

[99] Sevastopol is chosen as a potential point of naval power projection although its naval base had been destroyed during the Crimean War.

London, in 1844, between Russia and Britain pointed to the fact that Russia, while favoring a weak but stable Ottoman state, preferably susceptible to Russian influence, in the 1830s, had started to voice its desires for partition by the 1840s. In January 1853, Nicholas I had talked to the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, Sir Hamilton Seymour, about his ideas of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The Czar suggested that the Danubian Principalities should be under Russian control, İstanbul should be a free city, and the British, if so desired, could take Egypt and Crete. It is also possible to see signs of offensive Russian intentions during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. The Russian sympathy toward the insurgents during the Cretan Rebellion (1866-1869) was a case in point (Taylor 1954, p.50; Seton-Watson 1965, p.90; Ledonne 1997, p.114, 125, 138; Hanioğlu 2008, p.79).

The reasons for these offensive Russian intentions were numerous. The city of İstanbul was the spiritual center of Christian Orthodoxy. That is why the czars of Russia, in a crusading spirit, were aiming for the liberation, if not the conquest by Russia itself, of the city from Ottoman control. Russia had also had an interest, especially since the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, to protect or liberate all Christian Orthodox subjects under Ottoman rule. These included the Serbs, the Bulgars, the Roumanians, and the Greeks. Additionally, Russia was trying to protect all Slavs regardless of religion. This was a policy which was becoming influential, as the idea of Panslavism took root within Russia. Thus, the shared identity of the Orthodox religion and of the Slavic race of Russia with the Balkan subjects of the Ottoman Empire turned into a major source of threat to the Ottoman Empire. Another reason was strategic. As long as the Turkish Straits, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were controlled by the Ottoman Empire, the Porte could open or close them. It could open the Straits, granting Russia's enemies maritime and therefore military access to the Black Sea, making Russia vulnerable to naval pressure. It could also close the Straits to Russia, denying it access to the Mediterranean. Additionally, the Straits were becoming increasingly important for Russia's access to world trade. Rapid industrialization made Russia dependent upon the imported raw materials which were causing an external balance deficit. To balance this trade deficit, Russia needed revenues from its massive grain exports. An important part of this trade passed through the Straits. As the Nineteenth Century progressed, Russian finances became increasingly dependent upon these exports. Therefore, the conquest, control, or

influence over the Straits were important for Russia because of ideological, economic, and strategic reasons (Seton-Watson 1965, p.90-93; Ledonne 1997, p.139; Lieven 2000, p.152, 268-269).

Offensive Capability

Even though offensive capabilities are considered a separate aspect of threat, they are dependent upon aggregate power and proximity, because the power projection capability of a state diminishes with distance. Moreover, because offensive capability is enhanced by the ease with which a state transforms its aggregate power into offense, it is also affected by the relative power of the state to its rivals, therefore requiring one to compare the Ottoman and Russian aggregate power levels.

Although it fared better than the Ottomans in terms of manpower, size of the army, military budget, and industrial capacity, the Russian aggregate power was suffering from serious setbacks. These were noted during the Crimean War. The supply of material and troops from Moscow to the Crimea was an important problem due to the lack of a well-developed network of railroads south of Moscow. The railroad network, which was around 600 kms during the Crimean War, had been extended to 5,147 kms by 1866. It also had the disadvantage of having to operate on several fronts, all of which are quite far from each other. During the Crimean War, an estimated number of 200,000 men were pinned down in the North against a possible Swedish offensive. Additionally, Russia had to split its Crimean forces to counter the Austrian army deployed on the Galician and the Transylvanian fronts, tying another 200,000 men down. An additional 500,000 men were needed to garrison the Russian countryside. Similarly, its navy had to cover four different seas: the Baltic, The Black Sea, The Pacific, and the Arctic (Kennedy 1988, p.171, 173; Lieven 2000, p.269; Rath 2015, p.20; https://www.railstaff.co.uk/2015/09/25/history-of-russian-railways-part-1-the-tsars/; Mitchell 2018, p.270).

The Russian Navy in 1860 had forty-four screw-propelled ships, of which nine were ships-of-the-line, with four three-deckers and six two-deckers, nine frigates, eighteen

corvettes, and eight sloops. Additionally, the Russian sailing battlefleet had twelve ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, and seven corvettes. However, the whole Russian sailing fleet was obsolete. The Russian Black Sea fleet in 1862 consisted of ten steamers[100] and the entirety of the Russian fleet consisted of nine screw-propelled ships-of-the-line with three three-deckers and six two-deckers, seven frigates, eighteen corvettes, and nine sloops. Until the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856) in 1871, Russia could not build a Black Sea fleet. The rebuilding of that fleet only gained momentum in the 1880s, and it was further strengthened in the 1890s. By 1876, Russia had twenty-five ironclads, of which four were useful in the open seas, the rest being coastal defense ships. In 1878, the Russian Navy had twenty-nine ironclads, but twenty-two of them were coastal defense ships, therefore could not endure on the open seas. It was also the third largest navy in terms of tonnage, yet again the majority of the tonnage consisted of coastal defense ironclads (Watts 1990, p.14, 54 ; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.286; Conway's 1979, p.171-173; Dal 2015, p.246). Therefore, by the time Sultan Abdülaziz abdicated in May 1876, the Ottoman armored battlefleet was significantly larger than its Russian counterpart. This fact alone proves that the state of the Russian naval power of that time would normally not warrant such an expensive and expansive naval building by the Ottoman Empire.

By the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Russian offensive capacity seemed to have increased, since they reached the Ottoman Capital fairly easily, with the exception of the resistance shown at the fortress of Plevne. However, it is crucial to note that during the Crimean War, there was no possibility of Russia reaching İstanbul without naval assistance, since there was no front in the Principalities due to the Austrian invasion (Ledonne 1997, p.140). Therefore, one cannot know for sure if Russia could or could not have reached İstanbul with equal ease during the Crimean War.

[100] Six steamers of 800 tons max and four steamers of 200 tons max as limited by the Treaty of Paris (Watts 1990, p.14)

5.4.3 Greek Threat

Aggregate Power

When first formed, Greece had a population of around 750,000. By 1860, it had a population of 1.1 million, and by 1875 this had risen to 1.59 million. In 1869, Greece could raise a 40,000 strong army (Valaoras 1960, p.128; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, p.154; Ünal 2008, p.48; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.15-16, 25-26). In 1870, it had a GDP of 1.47 billion USD (at 1990 international prices). It had an agrarian economy, and industrial growth was very low during the Nineteenth Century. In terms of finances, the Greek state was in serious trouble. There were budgetary problems and the state was continuously indebted. Due to existing loans, its credit rating kept going down and it was unable to find new international loans until 1879 (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, p.165-169; Broadberry and Klein 2012, p.82). Additionally, Greece could not compete with the Ottoman Empire in terms of naval power. Its competitive edge stemmed from the quality of its sailors and a Greek form of naval warfare shaped by the blockade running experiences of Greek merchant ships**.** The bulk of the Greek navy was destroyed by the Russians during the rebellion[101] of Admiral Miaoulis against Capodistrias in 1831. In 1860, the Greek Navy had in total six screw-propelled gunboats, one side-wheeled steamer, and two sailing ships. It had only two ironclads[102], which they obtained during the Cretan rebellion and these remained as the only large-armored ships of the Greek Navy for the next two decades. Thus, the Greek state lacked the financial and industrial pillars of aggregate power, in addition to its weak population base and smaller naval power (Conway's 1979, p.387; Brewer 2011, 1843-1854/8644).

Proximity

Greece and the Porte had a common land border in Europe. Additionally, the Greek and Ottoman Islands in the Aegean were 80 to 100 km away from each other, making power

[101] Admiral Andreas Miaoulis was the nominal commander of the Greek fleets during the War of Greek Independence, until Thomas Cochrane, a veteran British naval officer, took over the command in March 1827. He joined the rebellion against Ioannis Capodistrias, whom the Russians supported in 1831. The Greek Navy too joined the rebellion under his leadership. However, there was a Russian Mediterranean squadron present nearby which stayed after Navarino in that sea. This squadron helped Capodistrias quell the rebellion but in the meantime destroyed most of the Greek fleet (Sondhaus 2001, p.9, 15-16, 28-29).
[102] 1,774 ton *Basileos Georgios* (launched 1867) and 2,030 ton *Basilissa Olga* (launched 1869) (Conway's 1979, p.387)

projection over the sea a very viable option. Thus, meaning it had to be factored into Ottoman threat calculations. Additionally, the distance between the ports of Athens and İzmir was 300 km (162 nautical miles) by sea. Finally, the distance over land from the Greco-Ottoman border to the capital, İstanbul, was around 850 km. Since they shared a common land border and both possessed islands very close to each other, their proximity contributed to their potential threat to each other (https://www.distancefromto.net/).

Offensive Intentions

The Megali Idea formed the core of the Greek irredentism. It was the lynchpin of Greek foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire, with the purpose of conquering all Greek-populated lands of the Ottoman Empire. It dictated that all these Greek-populated lands should be united under a Greater Greece. It had irredentist claims over Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, Western Anatolia, Trabizond, the Aegean Islands, and Cyprus (Clogg 1992, p.47-48; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002, p.277; Pınar 2012, p.134).

Offensive Capability

Greek aggregate power was smaller than its Ottoman counterpart in every way. It had smaller manpower, a smaller economy, and a smaller battlefleet with only two ironclads. Its only advantage was in capable seamen and naval commanders. However, the fate of a war between the two states would still have to be decided on land. The only exception would be a separatist Greek rebellion on an Ottoman island. In which case the capability on the seas would make a difference, as happened in the Cretan Rebellion. Even then the Porte was able to keep the island in its grasp (Sondhaus 2001, p.90; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.47)**.** In sum, the newly-founded Greek state was in no condition to mount a formidable threat on its own. Even though it had the will, it lacked appropriate capability because of deep financial problems and the inability of the government to secure foreign debts due to low credibility. At times, even that will seemed fractured and wavering, because of unstable majorities in the parliament and worries over King Otto's rule. (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2010, p.28-62; Sondhaus 2001, p.28-29, 90-91).

5.4.4 Egyptian Threat

Aggregate Power

In 1870, Egypt had a population of 7 million. Its army was limited to 18,000 men, its GDP was 4.5 billion dollars (at 1990 international prices). The economy was dependent until the mid-1860s upon cotton sales, the prices of which dropped after the conclusion of the American Civil War. This added to the existing problem of indebtedness, and a loan cycle had begun. Subsequently, Egypt's credit rating suffered, which led to serious financial problems (Hunter 1998, p.186-194; Aksan 2013, p.406-407; https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018).

Proximity

Egypt and the Ottoman Empire shared a common land border in the Sinai Peninsula, south of Jerusalem. They also possessed coasts on the Eastern Mediterranean, making power projection over sea a possibility and a factor in the threat perceptions. The distance between İstanbul and Alexandria by sea was 1,337 km (722 nautical miles), whereas the distance over land between İstanbul and Cairo was around 2,200 km. Finally, the distance from the Egyptian-Ottoman border to the capital, İstanbul, was around 1,800 km (https://www.freemaptools.com**;** https://www.distancefromto.net/). Since they shared a common border, the proximity between the two states contributed positively to the threat calculation.

Offensive Intentions

Until the mid-1850s, the viceroys of Egypt were still after the legitimization of their dynasty. They additionally wanted to change the inheritance law from seniority to primogeniture, which would allow the rulers' sons to become viceroys. Finally, they desired independence. The reigns of Said (1854-1863) and Ismail (1863-1879) witnessed an era of economic growth thanks to the rise in cotton prices because of the American Civil War. Thus Ismail, based on the growing power of the state, was now in the pursuit of independence from the Porte, which he achieved in the form of two firmans in 1866 and 1867, ratified in 1872 and 1873 respectively. These allowed him to grant titles,

increase the size of the army, obtain loans, make treaties with other states, and change the inheritance law to primogeniture. He also gained the title of Khedive, a status over the standard viceroys of the Porte. Thus, Egypt had become independent in all but name by 1873 (Hunter 1998, p.183-187, 193).

Offensive Capability

An assessment of the Egyptian population, overall GDP, and its proximity points out that it may have been considered a potential threat for the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, during the reign of Ismail (1863-1879), 1,200 miles of railroad were constructed, thus increasing the offensive capabilities of the state. However, the size of its armed forces including the army and the number of ironclads, which was one, seriously constrained Egyptian offensive capabilities against the Porte. Furthermore, the Egyptian state might not have been able to bear the monetary burden of a war considering its own financial troubles (Hunter 1998, p.181-186).

To summarize, Russia stood out among the three states covered, as the only one that proved a serious threat to Ottoman physical security. However, that threat was mainly by land. The Ottoman Empire still needed allies to keep Russia in check. Among possible allies, Britain was the best great power candidate. France was to be dealt with in such a way as to prevent it from joining the enemy camp. Austria, because of its relative decline, was not as important. Britain was willing to support the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean (Hanioğlu 2008, p.77-78). Therefore, Ottoman foreign policy during the Tanzimat Era turned increasingly towards Britain to acquire physical protection against Russia.

5.4.5 The Question of British Friendship

Additional focus will be given to Britain, as it was the guardian protector of the Ottoman Empire against creeping Russian power towards the Mediterranean. Britain remained content with this role for a number of reasons.

One British intention during the premierships of Lord Palmerston (1855-1858 and 1859-1865) was to guarantee the security of the Ottoman Straits and İstanbul. It should be noted that the main rationale of British support was to stop the Russian encrochment toward the Mediterranean. Therefore, as long as Russia constituted a threat to British interests, the friendship of Britain would remain (Hanioğlu 2008, p.78). This support was given in the form of diplomatic and financial assistance, such as help in the acquisition of foreign debts. Additional support was given in the form of British advisors, with the purpose of modernizing the Ottoman Navy. The ultimate goal was to transform the Ottoman Empire into a power that was capable of standing on its own against Russia[103] (Kasaba 1993, p.221; Clayton 1971, p.24; Goodlad 2005, p.2-3). However, the modernization of the Ottoman fleet was beyond the capacity of the Ottoman shipyards in terms of maintenance, technical equipment, and skilled workforce, which needed to be imported from Britain (Dal 2015, p.80-81)

There was a shift in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire, starting with the death of Lord Palmerston and his replacement by Lord Gladstone in 1868. Lord Gladstone and his followers were frustrated with the Ottoman Empire's failure to deliver satisfactory political reforms. However, despite these feelings Britain chose to support Ottoman territorial integrity one more time during the Cretan rebellion and the following international conference (Armaoğlu 2016, p.290; Saab 1977, p.1,383-1,387). This support was caused by British fears of a Russian influenced Greece, had the latter expanded through Russian help. A grateful Greece could very well enter the Russian sphere of influence, which would let Russia project power into the Mediterranean[104] and threaten Britain's Indian trade route (Bourne 1956, p.81; Büyüktuğrul 1982, p.92, 400, 402).

5.5 SULTAN ABDÜLAZİZ'S FLEET IN ACTION

The following section offers an evaluation of the fleet of Sultan Abdülaziz in action during the Cretan rebellion (1866-1869) and the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, to

[103] The British Foreign Office did heavily mistrust Russia and it was willing to support the Ottoman Empire (or any other polity) for the encirclement of the latter (Otte 2011, p.12-13, 42-43)
[104] Following the future opening of the Suez Canal, the Eastern Mediterranean was about to become crucial for British commerce (Bourne 1956, p.81)

understand if Sultan Abdülaziz's decision to increase the naval power of the state matched the strategic needs of the Ottoman Empire.

5.5.1 The Cretan Rebellion

During the Cretan Rebellion, the Ottoman Navy showed an inability to deal with a force much smaller than its own. There were major problems which were not related to the number of ships. They were instead related to the Ottoman inability to wage war on the sea in the age of steam. The Ottoman fleet could not stop the flow of supplies and men to the island from mainland Greece, due to their lack of fast ships, problems in the maintenance of the fleet, and Ottoman naval officers' fear of violating international law when blockade-runners retreated to neutral harbors[105]. One of the major naval victories for the Ottoman side was accomplished due to Hobart Pasha's tactful application of international law in 1868. His action had led to the interception and the following chase of the *Enosis*, which ended in the capture of two more blockade-runners, the *Panhellenion* and the *Crete*. The lack of coal to supply the entire Ottoman Navy was another problem. The Ottoman Empire also lacked fast ships that could have been useful in the execution of a blockade (Büyüktuğrul 1983, 102-107; Dal 2015, p.87-94; Pasha 1887, p.192-193; Pınar 2012, p.135-136; Langensiepen and Güleryüz 1995, p.5). None of the ironclads in the navy were employed during the rebellion, and the Greek threat on the sea was countered with wooden steamships, which weakens the rationale behind acquiring so many ironclads (Sondhaus 2001, p.90-91).

5.5.2 The War of 1877-1878

When war broke out in 1877, Russia had twenty-nine ironclads built or being built, of which twenty-two were coastal ironclads that were fit only for coastal operations. It had

[105] Pursuit of blockade-runners more than ten miles off the coast was forbidden by international law. Upon his arrival in Crete, Hobart Pasha observed the "Ottoman naval officers' over-cautious approach towards blockade runners and their reluctance to break the international law" (Dal 2015, p.88)

only seven ironclads capable of fighting at sea. It had no sea-going ironclads in the Black Sea. To counter this force, the Ottoman Navy had thirteen ironclads, two coastal ironclads, and seven small river monitors. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed a degree of naval superiority similar to the one enjoyed by Britain and France in the Crimean War in the Black Sea. However, this naval superiority did not translate into a decisive victory in the war. Most of the Ottoman fleet stayed in port because of the ships' vulnerabilites to torpedoes. For instance, the largest ironclad of the Ottoman Navy *Mesudiye*, the largest casemate ever built, with 9,120 tons of displacement, remained in port during the whole campaign. Even though the Russian naval operations were confined to small naval raids to launch torpedoes and place mines, this offensive forced the far superior Ottoman Navy to stay on the defensive similar to a fleet-in-being strategy. However, a fleet-in-being strategy works best against an opponent with a stronger fleet. Against a weaker opponent, one must seek engagement and destroy enemy naval presence altogether. Staying in port with a stronger fleet can at best be described as a defensive posture, at worst a waste of resources. It also indicates a lack of naval doctrine, the lack of clear strategic objectives and the lack of a well-defined role for the fleet in realizing those objectives. The operations of the Ottoman Navy on the sea were limited to the supply of troops and defensive operations. Additionally, no blockade could be executed because of lack of funds for operations of a larger number of ships, in addition to the torpedo offensive of Russia, despite the quantitative naval superiority. Even though a naval blockade could be executed, Russia was invulnerable to such a strategy due to its supply of food and raw materials produced locally. Therefore, it had to be defeated on land with armies. In retrospect, the Ottoman Navy, despite being numerous, was ineffective during times of war, even with naval superiority. Another problem of the Ottoman Navy was the hindrance caused by the confusion at Ottoman high command. The naval high command was filled with commanders who were oblivious to naval affairs, and did not know the capabilities of the ships in the fleet (Conway's 1979, p.170-186; Sondhaus 2001, p.89, 122-125; Örenç 2013, p.140-141; Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.147-204; Kennedy 1976, p.174).

To sum up, when one considers geography, it becomes clear that the Ottoman Empire needed a powerful fleet. However, the Ottoman Navy never acquired the characteristics of an ocean-going global power, because there was little incentive to build such a navy,

due to a lack of overseas interests and possessions beyond the Mediterranean. However, Sultan Abdülaziz, by imitating the navies of Britain and France, strove to build such a navy (Gürdeniz 2015, p.36; Özbaran 2007, p.59).

The fast pace of innovations in the 1860s and 1870s rendered newly procured and expensive ironclads obsolete very rapidly. Purchasing these ships in large numbers was an ineffective use of the Empire's limited resources in the long run (Sondhaus 2001, p.103, 108-109; Papastratigakis 2011, p.14-16). This is confirmed in an official memorandum dated 9 May 1889. It is stated in the memorandum that "the reforms made fifteen to twenty years ago to modernize the Ottoman Navy have lost their significance when recent progress made upon the guns and ammunition is taken into consideration" (quoted in Dal 2015, p.259). So, the Ottoman ironclad fleet that was put together with extensive foreign debts had become nearly obsolete within approximately two decades. The costs of the modernization endured longer than its benefits.

The Ottoman Empire was in no great need of a powerful ironclad fleet. It certainly did not have to stretch the state finances to this end. Even after the Sinop Raid of 1853, the Ottoman Navy still had a capable battlefleet of five ships-of-the-line, six frigates, and fifteen other smaller vessels. Four of the remaining Ottoman ships-of-the-line acquired their steam engines and screw-propellers from British shipyards. Six screw corvettes were built in British shipyards between 1858-60, additionally eight screw-propelled corvettes were constructed**.** Consequently, the Ottoman Navy before Sultan Abdülaziz, was powerful enough to counter the Greek Navy in the Aegean up until the Greek purchase of two small ironclads in the second half of the 1860s. Additionally, the Russian naval power projection into the Aegean from the Baltic was at best a difficult, and in normal circumstances a very unlikely scenario. There had been no naval threats in the Black Sea since it was neutralized (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.61-62). However, the naval buildup proceeded with the procurement of additional ships, namely ironclads, even though the Treaty of Paris eliminated any possibility of Russia forming a Black Sea fleet in the near future. This development, along with the extensive foreign debts starting during the Crimean War, had left little reason for maintaining such a strong Ottoman Navy in the short term. Still the Ottoman Empire kept ordering expensive ironclads during the 1860s (Sondhaus 2001, p.68).

When threats against the empire are considered, it can be stated that the Russian naval capacity in the Black Sea never recovered to pre-Crimean War levels. The Russian Navy had to be divided between several fronts, leaving it incapable of successfully projecting power into the Black Sea or the Mediterranean. The only exceptions were the fast torpedo boats that were acquired before the war of 1877-1878, and armed merchant ships when that war broke out. Greece had severe economic and political problems that hindered the development of a powerful fleet. It had only two ironclads until the 1880s, which were obtained during the Cretan Revolt. Consequently, Greece could not compete with the Ottoman Empire in terms of naval power. Therefore, even though obtaining ships to counter Greek or Russian naval power made sense, it should have taken the form of a coastal defensive fleet, consisting of fast and heavily armed vessels and fewer large armored ships. Such a fleet would have been effective in capturing blockade-runners during the Cretan rebellion, or helping the army defend the Danubian border during the war with Russia. A report from the British Admiralty confirms this. In response to the British ambassador in İstanbul (1858-1865) Henry Bulwer's report in 1861 on Sultan Abdülaziz's desire to purchase frigates and corvettes, the Admiralty responded with a report. It was stated in this report that the Ottoman Empire should focus on obtaining fast vessels with higher caliber guns instead of acquiring larger armored ships (Dal 2015, p.237, 265). An additional need of the Ottoman Navy, especially against Greece, was training. Greece could support the rebellion in Crete not because it had more powerful armored ships, but because it had better sailors. One cannot remedy such a gap merely with more vessels. Therefore, instead of obtaining vessels which could be operated with foreign personnel, the Porte should have given priority to the training of the officers and seamen of the navy. The Cretan Rebellion showed that the Greek threat, either in the shape of a Greco-Turkish War or an irredentist rebellion, did not need to be tackled with expensive ironclads. What was necessary was faster blockade ships and success on land operations. The failure of the Ottoman fleet against the weakest naval power in Europe, Greece, during the Cretan rebellion brought up questions about the effectiveness of a large fleet consisting of big armored ships, instead of a faster coastal defense oriented fleet, and the level of training in the navy (Dal 2015, p.264).

The performance of the navy in the War of 1877-1878 further undermines the reasoning behind getting large armored ships, as they could not perform well in the war. The lack

of funds for naval operations during the war clearly indicates that the finances of the Empire were not used efficiently, by forming a navy that could not be used due to financial constraints. Having thirteen ironclads against the Russian Black Sea fleet, which had no sea-going ironclads there was not only excessive but also detrimental to the purpose of physical security, by spending the finite financial and material resources of the Empire. If precautions needed to be taken against the entire Russian ironclad battlefleet, which had only four sea-going ironclads in 1876 and seven sea-going ironclads in 1878, thirteen does not seem very excessive at first, especially for the year 1878. However, Russia's main fleet was guarding the Baltic, therefore could not be present in the Mediterranean for extended periods of time. Therefore, a coastal defense fleet with a few ironclads should have been enough against Russian ironclads. In the Black Sea again, a defensive fast fleet with coastal ironclads and fast ships with heavy guns would have been much more helpful when one considers that the majority of naval operations of the Ottoman Empire consisted of troops and supply transport operations during the war. His successor Abdülhamid II's efforts revolved around the formation of a coastal defense fleet which cost much less. Maybe Sultan Abdülaziz should have followed a similar policy (Dal 2015, p.259, 265).

The three naval tragedies that struck the Empire in Çeşme (1770), Navarino (1827), and in Sinop (1853) precluded the development of a permanent Ottoman naval tradition and resulted in the deaths of many experienced sailors. Therefore, if the purpose was the improvement of the physical security of the state, then the focus of Sultan Abdülaziz's naval expansion should have been the training of adequate naval personnel as well. This need is also stressed in the reports of the naval advisors to the Ottoman Navy, including Woods Pasha's report to the British Admiralty on 14 June 1872. This report stated that the main modernization should focus on training, with the purpose of manning the warships with skilled personnel (Dal 2015, p.31, 100). When one considers that the majority of the naval budget in the fiscal year of 1873, the highest between 1859-1878, was dedicated to the salaries of the naval personnel, their provisions, coal, and iron/steel needs of the navy, it becomes clear that the large number of ships became a liability rather than an advantage. Had the navy been kept smaller, more funds could have been spared for the training of the naval personnel, thereby increasing the efficiency of the fleet (Dal 2015, p.252-253). Büyüktuğrul (1983) states that if the financial situation had been taken

into consideration, then Sultan Abdülaziz should not have obtained such a huge navy (Büyüktuğrul 1983, p.54). This was a decision that placed a further financial burden on the treasury which was straining under an astronomical foreign debt of 213 million pounds sterling by the end of Sultan Abdülaziz's reign (Dal 2015, p.226, 247-249).

According to Dal (2015, p.239), Sultan Abdülaziz was aware that Ottoman shipyards lacked proper technical infrastructure necessary for building, repairing, and maintaining armored warships. He knew that the Ottoman naval power had sustainability problems. Yet he insisted on continuing with the procurement of expensive ironclads which further made the Ottoman Empire dependent upon the imported machinery, material, and personnel (Dal 2015, p.239, 266). The Sultan formed a navy to resemble that of the European powers, mainly Britain's and France's. However, this decision seems to have been taken without taking into consideration these states' global requirements of maintaining a colonial empire. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire ended up with a navy that did not respond to its specific strategic requirements (Dal 2015, p.266). If these requirements had been taken into consideration, the training of the naval personnel and the forming of a navy based on the limited financial capacity of the Empire should have been the focus of modernization. In sum, the Ottoman Empire seemed to have acquired a fleet that it could not man or use effectively (Sondhaus 2001, p.90).

The fact that Sultan Abdülaziz was aware of these problems (finances, insufficient naval industry, incapacity of the Imperial Naval Arsenal) indicates that he had in mind something different than improving the physical security of the state.

A Struggle for Recognition with Battleships

The beginning of the Ottoman military problems in the Seventeenth Century was accompanied by a process of modernization which began to slowly take shape. The Ottomans started to look to the west as a role model, especially in military affairs. The modernization was not limited to military affairs, however. It manifested itself in every aspect of Ottoman life, from education to diplomacy, including ideas and ways of thinking with concepts such as nationalism, liberalism, rationalism, and patriotism. Turkish political movements too were inspired by Europe, such as the Young Turks and Young Ottomans (Berkes 2012, p.41-253, 277, 285, 291-293; Hanioğlu 2008, p.101). The

Tanzimat era was another example of such efforts, starting with the Rose Chamber Edict in 1839. This edict, while promising domestic reforms, was designed with a different audience in mind, the European Great Powers. With it, the Ottoman decision makers intended to gain recognition as a state worthy of admittance into the Concert of Europe. According to Hanioğlu the purpose was "acquiring the international respectability required for membership in the European Concert" (2008, p.72-77). Again, according to Hanioğlu, the Tanzimat reforms "owed much of their existence to the encouragement of liberal Europe, and especially Britain" with which an "informal alliance" was the focus of the Tanzimat foreign policy (2008, p.77, 84). These efforts were rewarded in the aftermath of the Crimean War. The link between "the need for international recognition and domestic reform was most evident at the conclusion of the Crimean War" and the banning of slavery in 1855 constitutes an example (Ibid., p.85, 107). In the end, the Ottoman Empire was included into the Concert of Europe, and its territorial integrity was guaranteed by the great powers of Europe.

Sultan Abdülaziz ascended to the throne in 1861, following these developments and in an era when the Porte looked to the West, but especially to Britain as a provider for recognition and security. As a result, following his ascension, he made it clear that he was personally interested in the development of the Ottoman Navy and the continuation of reforms which had been pursued by his father and brother. In his Hatt-ı Hümayun on 2 July 1861, he made it known that he would be interested in the development of the army and the navy along with domestic reforms (Gencer 1985, p.294-295). He was specifically interested in battleships and navies (Gencer (1985, p.295; Beşirli 2004, p.248; Songur 2017, p.1,634). However, he was not solely interested in naval power. He contemplated a world class navy on a par with the major European powers (Gencer 1985, p.295; Gençoğlu 2015, p.615). He was so focused on expanding the naval power of the state that he ignored the financial costs of obtaining, building, and maintaining ironclads. When reminded of this aspect, he would even fire government officials such as sadrazam Kıbrıslı Mehmet Paşa, who objected to the Sultan's demand for the allocation of funds for the navy (Gencer 1985, p.295; Beşirli 2004, p.248). His interest in Europe was not limited to ships and navies. He also followed Europe in the arts and architecture. Many palaces built and repaired during his reign resembled European palaces more than they resembled traditional Ottoman palaces. According to Renda (2006), these buildings were

seen as symbols of westernization by the Ottoman Sultans (Renda 2006, p.17). Some link this interest in Europe to preceding developments like the Crimean War or Sultan Abdülaziz's – he was the first sultan to visit Europe - tour of Europe in 1867. According to Songur (2017, p.1634), the future sultan was impressed by the European fleets during the Crimean War. There is almost a consensus in the existing literature that the Sultan was highly impressed by the European navies during his visit. Abdülaziz had become more interested in naval power and was convinced that he had to invest further in the Ottoman armored fleet, which had only four armored ships (*Aziziye, Mahmudiye, Orhaniye, Osmaniye*) at the time of his visit (Palmer 1992, p.138; Gürdeniz 2015, p.302-303; Yüksel 2016, p.97; Panzac 2018, p.349). In sum, Abdülaziz was unique as a sultan who traveled outside the Empire, and as a sultan who geniunely embraced the Europeanization of the state.

The uniqueness of Sultan Abdülaziz and his embracement of European ideals is witnessed in his other actions as well. As noted, he was the first sultan to have ever visited Europe. The importance of this visit is better understood if one remembers that the Ottoman Empire had no permanent embassies until the reign of Sultan Selim III (Karaer 2003, p.7-8). This was an act which showed a change of mentality. The Ottoman Empire no longer considered itself as a superior polity but its ruler started to act like other European monarchs who visited foreign countries. The timing of the visit is noteworthy as well. It happened right after the admittance of the state into the Concert of Europe. Another remarkable aspect of the visit is the entourage which traveled with the sultan. Abdülaziz brought with him his own son şehzade Yusuf İzzeddin, the sons of his late brother (Abdülmecid) Murad Efendi and Abdülhamid Efendi (Karaer 2003, p.52-53). Sultan Abdülaziz, instead of killing the sons of his brother as allowed in Ottoman Law, had let them live and brought them along during his visit to Europe! This act alone shows that Abdülaziz could no longer act like an Ottoman Sultan but had to act like a European monarch. He could not act in a way that would be considered barbarous by Europeans, such as killing the sons of his brother.

It must additionally be remembered that the armored fleet which was put together on the initiative of Sultan Abdülaziz was an example of sub-optimal arming. It did not match the security environment of the state nor it did match the threats present. It was by far

stronger than the threats it faced combined. Russia had no significant naval power in the Black Sea. Its only ironclads were in the Baltic. It was doubtful if these ironclads could be used in an offensive into the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Greece was in no position to mount a formidable threat on its own because of domestic problems and British support for the Ottoman Empire. The Greek Navy had no ironclads until the Cretan Rebellion. It obtained two at the time, but they could pose no threat to the Ottoman ironclads, at least on paper. Egypt too had serious economic problems, especially after the conclusion of the American Civil War, and had only one ironclad, which was insignificant as a threat. Even the combined naval power of Russia, Greece, and Egypt was weaker than the Ottoman naval power in terms of armored warships. Another problem was the lack of a clearly defined Ottoman strategy and the role of the navy within it. Furthermore, the Ottoman armored battlefleet had no clear naval doctrine. Finally, due to technical differences, this fleet was not standardized and its command and coordination in naval warfare could pose serious challenges (Akad 1995, p.245-250; Gürdeniz 2015, p.302).

From the evidence, it becomes clear that the choice of expanding the Ottoman armored fleet was not made to improve the physical security of the state. Sultan Abdülaziz, despite deep financial problems, insisted on purchasing and even building ships that the state could not man, use, or maintain due to the lack of a sufficient naval industry including coal and iron production, local technical expertise, shipyard capacity, and trained naval personnel. The state obtained ships which had no clearly defined role in the Ottoman defensive strategy. According to Gencer (1985), the Sultan was determined to elevate the capacity of the Ottoman shipyards to equal those of Britain and France, two great powers of Europe. He further adds that the Ottoman Empire initiated the development of modern shipyards and military factories, which required significant financial costs which only great powers could sustain (Gencer 1985, p.296-297; Beşirli 2004, p.248). Kurt (2015) clearly states that a specific importance was given to the local production of ironclads, through the education of local engineers and other personnel (Kurt 2015, p.85). What is equally or more important is the Ottoman efforts at building ironclads at home. The Porte had ordered the building of *Hizber* and *Seyfi,* two river monitors of 404 tons each. Both were completed in 1876. It had ordered additionally the building of *Mukaddeme-i Hayır,* a 2,806 ton ironclad, which was completed in 1874. However, the most important construction was that of *Nusretiye* (later *Hamidiye*), a 6,594 ton ironclad, which was

started in 1871 and entered service in 1894 (Hacipoğlu 2013, p.64; Dal 2015, p.242). This shipbuilding was significant for, according to Sondhaus (2001), building or attempting to build ironclads locally was something only great powers, or states aspiring to that status, would do (Sondhaus 2001, p.108). A critical remark on the matter comes from Erbaş (2019). He points out the fact that starting from the Eighteenth Century, Britain, France, and Russia became primary actors in the international states system. Whereas The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the Ottoman Empire were starting to lose their status. With the exception of the Ottoman Empire, all of these states had accepted their loss of status and the superiority of Britain, France, and Russia in technology and shipbuilding. Subsequently, they went through smaller projects of development for their naval power while reducing their naval expenses. However, the Ottoman Empire had initiated bigger projects, including the development of shipyards, naval education, the purchase of ships, both sailing and armored, reacting as if it was still a great power (Erbaş 2019, p.83-84).

Naval power with a powerful battlefleet was the symbol of great power status in the Nineteenth Century. Britain was the leading example of the link between naval power and the status of a great power. The Royal Navy was the symbol of that status (Gray 2007, p.69). Sultan Abdülaziz initiated the expansion of Ottoman naval power through ironclads which could not be used effectively due to the afore-mentioned setbacks. His main desire was not the improvement of the physical security of the state. He wanted a navy as powerful as those of the European powers, Britain and France. This ambition seems to have been magnified after his visit to Europe. It seems that he wanted to imitate Britain and use ironclads as markers for the recognition of Ottoman great power status. A status he wanted to acquire like its peers in the Concert of Europe, into which the Ottoman Empire had been accepted in the aftermath of the Crimean War. The Ottoman Empire did not randomly desire an equal status to Britain or France. This was a status which the state saw itself to possess as an accepted member of the Concert of Europe. This was a possible act, according to Freedman (2016), who argues that a group with lower standing can increase its standing therefore status by imitiating the behavior of higher status groups by acquiring *visible*[106] markers of the aspired status (Freedman 2016, p.800). In this case,

[106] Emphasis mine.

the Ottoman Empire is a lower ranked member of the international states system and a late addition to the Concert of Europe. Britain is at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, therefore is imitated. The aspired status is that of a great power. The imitated act is military spending, which is an important part of that status. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire engaged in obtaining naval power because the formation or the recognition of identity is dependent upon the unpredictable responses of others, hence it makes the process insecure. However, it is possible to bypass this insecurity by grounding identity in material practices (Markell 2003, p.13, 112; Mitzen 2006, p.358; Murray 2008, p.8-9). This is especially possible regarding the formation or recognition of the great power identity because this specific identity is mostly equated with material military capabilities (Mearsheimer 2001, p.5). Therefore, the Ottoman Empire tried to ground its aspirant identity in material practices. Hitherto, the Ottoman army and its modernization had been equated with the physical survival of the state. Now, the navy became paramount for survival. However, its expansion and modernization were not used for physical survival. Instead it became a tool for the preservation and recognition of the great power identity of the state by Britain in the second half of the Nineteenth Century.

6. GERMANY AND THE HIGH SEAS FLEET

6.1. GERMANY'S RISING POWER IN THE NINETEENTH AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURIES

The Nineteenth Century witnessed major balance of power changes within Europe. The previously politically fragmented German and Italian regions were unified. These unifications changed world political power considerations within a decade. However, the former had the greatest impact of the two. Germany was founded in the aftermath of three successful wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and finally against France (1870-71) (Geiss 1984, p.47-48). During these wars, naval power had a marginal role. Following its foundation, Germany went through two periods of astonishing economic and population growth. Its population grew from forty-one million in 1871 to fifty million in 1888, and to over sixty-six million in 1914 (Retallack 1996, p.16; Henig 2005, p.6; Kelly 2011, p.103; Herwig 2014, p.2). Its industrial production skyrocketed. By 1900, German industrial power was equal to Britain's. Coal output had risen from 38 million tons in 1871 to 179 million tons in 1913. Steel production reached 13 million tons in 1910, second only to the United States, and 5 million tons more than that of Britain. In 1910, Germany produced three times as much iron, four times as much steel, and seven times as much coal as France. By 1912, Russia could only produce 13% of the coal, 23% of the pig iron, and 26% of the steel that Germany produced. In the same period, Germany accounted for 2/3 of total European steel production. Consequently, it dominated Europe economically (Henig 2005, p.6-7; Kelly 2011, p.103; Herwig 2014, p.2). In line with these developments, Germany's share of worldwide trade rose. Its trade expanded overseas and started to compete with Britain's. The German share of world trade reached 10% by 1910, second only to Britain. Its merchant fleet expanded from 82,000 tons in 1871 to over 5 million tons in 1914 (Geiss 1984, p.49; Retallack 1996, p.21; Kelly 2011, p.146; Herwig 2014, p.2, 35). This was the Germany to whose throne Wilhelm II ascended on 15 June 1888 and ruled for thirty years until 9 November 1918.

6.2.IDEOLOGY AND WELTPOLITIK

In line with the German economic domination of Continental Europe, there was a desire among Pan-Germans, in Liberal Imperialists, in Kaiser Wilhelm II himself (who wanted to create a world empire just as William I[107] and Bismarck[108] had created Germany), in Lord Georg Alexander von Müller[109], in Bernhard von Bülow[110], and in Alfred von Tirpitz, to convert this economic power into global influence. It was based on the "consciousness of growing power" (Geiss 1984, p.54). However, Weltpolitik was also pursued in response to growing domestic problems. It was thought that focusing on foreign policy and political success abroad would distract Germans from the domestic social and political problems (Geiss 1984, p.50-54; Massie 1991, p.135-144; Rüger 2017, p.159)

The idea of Weltpolitik was expressed for the first time persuasively by Max Weber in 1895. During his inaugural lecture at Freiburg University, he delineated a policy with the aim of achieving world power status for Germany. Weltpolitik was first promoted within government circles in July 1897 by Johannes von Miquel, the National Liberal Prussian Minister of Finance. It was also expressed by Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow in his speech in the Reichstag as "the days when the German happily surrendered the land to one of his neighbours, to another the sea... Those days are over... In a word, we don't want to put anyone in the shade, but we too demand our place in the sun" (quoted in Steinberg 1992, p.59-60). Simply put, Germany was now willing to establish its own world empire, replicating the France of Louis XIV and the British Empire on which the sun never set. This place in the sun would be achieved through the formation of a powerful battlefleet, with a focus on big-gunned warships, later with dreadnought class battleships aimed at politically bending Britain to acquiesce to German claims. According to Tirpitz, the German battlefleet, renamed the German High Seas Fleet in 1907, needed to defeat the Royal Navy in its home waters, for Germany to acquire freedom in world politics. So

[107] German Emperor between 1871-1888 (Rüger 2017, p.71-81)
[108] Chancellor of Germany between 1871-1890 (Abrams 2006, p.25-49).
[109] Chief of the Imperial Naval Cabinet between 1906-1918 (Herwig 1991, p.281; Herwig 2014, p.21).
[110] Chancellor of Germany between 1900-1909 (Massie 1991, p.143-144, 694).

the aim was the acquisition of world power status, the policy was Weltpolitik, the instrument was naval power in the form of a battlefleet (Geiss 1984, p.50-54; Fischer 1984, p.128; Epkenhans 2004, p.22; Holmes 2004, p.28, 37, 46; Kely 2011, p.318).

6.3.THE IMPERIAL NAVY UNTIL 1897

In the years prior to the appointment of Alfred von Tirpitz, and before the reorganization of the German naval command, the Imperial Navy of Germany was of secondary importance in the strategic military calculations of the state. This was partly due to the navy's marginal role in the unification of Germany. During the Austro-Prussian War, Prussian monitors had captured Hannover's fortifications on the Elbe and the Weser Rivers, but this action had hardly influenced the outcome of the war. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, it was almost inactive. In fact, French seamen, due to the lack of action on the sea, were eventually used to assist the French Army in the defense of Paris. From 1872 until 1888, the High Command of the *Kaiserliche Marine* (the Imperial German Navy) was given to army officers, General von Stosch and General Leo Graf von Caprivi, an act which represented the subordinate and the secondary status of the Imperial Navy within the armed forces of Germany (Herwig 2014, p.13-14; Wolz 2015, p.18). Bismarck himself desired that Germany should remain a "sea power of the second rank"[111] (Herwig 2014, p.15-16). However, the Imperial Navy's secondary status within Germany was about to change in the 1890s, with a new course during these years. There was an increasing public awareness and perception of the importance of naval power, the formation of a capable German fleet, and its need to improve and maintain

[111] Bismarck did not pursue an expansionist naval policy. He desired Germany to be a naval power of the secondary rank because he was not interested in pursuing a World policy. Nor he was, despite acquiring some colonial possessions for Germany, interested in Africa. He had responded to Eugen Wolf, an explorer of Africa, when he showed Bismarck his map of Africa with the following line: "Your map of Africa is very nice, indeed, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here lies Russia and here lies France, and we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa". He was focused on security in Europe. He had advocated, after the Unification, a foreign policy of moderation, which focused on keeping France isolated and busy, possibly in Africa. He was encouraging France toward colonial ventures there. This policy would have helped France accept its loss of status in Europe by having a colonial empire in Africa. His main concerns were Germany's physical security and dominance in Europe. Therefore, he must have considered German naval expansion as expensive, disadvantageous, and of little use to his foreign policy. Additionally, his ideas might have been reinforced by the inferior German maritime geography, the lack of naval tradition in Germany, and the navy's insignificant contributions to the Wars of German Unification (Henig 2005, p.4-5; Abrams 2006, p.52; Herwig 2014, p.3-13, 97).

increasing German political, economic, and military might. Tirpitz himself stressed that the naval power or the naval presence as he put it, was a prerequisite for the growing German economy, colonies, trade, and industry. According to him, Germany would inevitably decline to a pre-industrial agricultural state if these were not protected. There were also governmental hopes that the increasing industry, commerce, and colonies would solve domestic social and political problems. It was argued that the increase in these realms required that Germany should acquire all the traits of a great power, a powerful fleet included (Lambelet 1974, p.7; Epkenhans 2004, p.21-23). Another factor promoting the growth of German naval power was that of Weltpolitik. This required a powerful fleet as its most important instrument. Only a powerful fleet, it was thought, would enable Germany to pursue Weltpolitik and achieve success in foreign policy (Geiss 1984, p.52-53). Consequently, the priority given to the Imperial Navy within the German armed forces continued until it reached its peak in the 1910s.



Figure 6.1. British, French, German, and Russian battleships[112]

[112] Ship numbers are taken from Modelski and Thompson (1988) (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.230, 266, 293, 309).

6.4.THE TIRPITZ PLAN AND THE RISK THEORY

On 15 June 1897, Alfred von Tirpitz was appointed as the State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, a position which he kept until his resignation in 1916. Following his appointment, he started to work on the formation of the German battlefleet which would form the core of the rising German naval power. The Tirpitz Plan, as it is now called, was formulated with the specific purpose of establishing the political and strategic rationale for this new fleet. In his memorandum dated June 1897, he outlined the new German naval program of shipbuilding and the strategic rationale behind it. Major aspects of the future German naval policy were established. First, Britain was defined as the most dangerous enemy against which Germany needed a political power factor in the form of a powerful battlefleet. Second, cruiser warfare against commerce was excluded due to the lack of overseas bases on the part of Germany and due to the abundance of them on the part of Britain. Third, following this logic Tirpitz expressed the opinion that the fleet to be formed must be able to "unfold its greatest military potential between Heligoland and the Thames" (Herwig 2014, p.36). According to Tirpitz, a fleet formed with this aim would also work against the French and Russian Navies from Brest or Cherbourg up to Kronstadt. Tirpitz's reasoning followed that Germany needed "as great a number of battleships as possible" against the British (Kennedy 1973, p.608; Herwig 1988, p.76-78; Steinberg 1992, p.127; Retallack 1996, p.79; Maurer 1997, p.287).

The eventual strength of the German fleet was established in two squadrons with eight battleships in each, with one flagship and two reserve ships, making a total of nineteen battleships. An additional twelve large cruisers and thirty light cruisers would be built. This fleet would be completed by 1905. This memorandum was called "General Considerations on the Constitution of our Fleet according to Ship Classes and Designs" (Steinberg 1992, p.126-128; 208-221). It was endorsed by the Kaiser and consequently formed the basis of the first Navy Bill of 10 April 1898. The Navy Bill was followed by another in 1900, establishing the number of battleships to be built at thirty-eight, with twenty armored cruisers, and thirty-eight light cruisers doubling the number of battleships. While the first bill had no impact on the British, the second, according to Herwig, did start to cause initial alarm. These laws set Germany on a foreign policy course

that directly confronted Britain's (Kennedy 1973, p.608; Herwig 1988, p.76-78; Holmes 2004, p.47; Herwig 2014, p.3, 42; Seligmann, Nagler, and Epkenhans 2015, p.1, 42-47). The Navy Bills of 1898 and 1900 were supplemented by 1906, 1908, and 1912 amendments. Together, they gave the German High Seas Fleet its final form. Fortified by law in 1912, the German fleet would by 1920 consist of forty-one battleships, twenty battlecruisers, forty light cruisers, 144 torpedo boats, and seventy-two submarines, with capital ships[113] being replaced after twenty years of service (Steinberg 1971, p.25-27; Epkenhans 2004, p.14; Herwig 2014, p.1, 63; Seligmann, Nagler, and Epkenhans 2015, p.277-287).

The military-strategic and political rationale behind the new German shipbuilding program was explained by Tirpitz in the form of the Risk Theory. With the establishment of a powerful battlefleet, stationed in the North Sea at all times, Germany could apply political pressure upon Britain, with it as a political lever. From the beginning, Tirpitz never intended to achieve naval superiority. The plan revolved around forming a naval deterrent and a risk to Britain. This fleet, if large enough, would endanger the naval supremacy Britain had enjoyed. Also, Tirpitz, based on history, expected the Royal Navy to rush into the Heligoland Bight and destroy the German battlefleet during a war. So, he reasoned that a ratio of 2:3 in capital ships would be enough because, according to Mahan, an offensive fleet would need at least a 1/3 superiority in ship numbers. Even after a decisive naval engagement in which Britain was victorious, the Royal Navy would be so weakened that Britain would be vulnerable to other states' battlefleets, especially France and Russia. Concurrently it was argued, by Tirpitz, that Britain, instead of risking the

[113] The term capital ship, while it was first used during the Anglo-Dutch War in 1652, was re-introduced by Britain during the Naval Scare of 1909 and it was adopted by the Royal Navy by 1912. It was a term used to include all dreadnought class battleships (excluding pre-dreadnoughts) and battlecruisers (aka armored, large, or heavy cruisers – cruisers with high speed, heavy armament but light protection). Before the advent of steam and steel in shipbuilding technology in the 1850s, ships-of-the-line, and in general ships big enough to stand in the line of battle, were called capital ships. Later on, ironclads took prominence with the *Gloire* and HMS *Warrior* and in the 1890s with HMS *Royal Sovereign* as the first modern capital ship, eventually leading up to the development of the battleship HMS *Dreadnought*. By the Second World War the aircraft carrier had become the capital ship of fleets. While which ship was called a capital ship changed during the course of history, what it meant did not. A capital ship can be described as a naval platform (1) armed with the most powerful weaponry technologically available, (2) with great endurance for prolonged operations, (3) possessing great strategic mobility with highest readiness for fastest deployment, and (4) greatest toughness during combat protected by either armor and/or other defensive abilities (Sandler 1970, p.576-578, 594; Sumida 1979, p.206; Vlahos 1979, p.47, 51-52, ; Allen 1988, p.337; Herwig 2014, p.57; Wolz 2015, p.20-24).

possibility of losing its global naval supremacy, would submit to Germany a place in the sun through territorial and colonial compensations around the globe. As a result, Britain would accept Germany's status as a world power. This was the deterrent element of the Tirpitz Plan (Herwig 1988, p.77-78; Holmes 2004, p.47-48; Kelly 2011, p.5; Herwig 2014, p.36; Rüger 2017, p.111).

However, Germany was, until the 1890s, a state that focused on its land security. The physical security of the state used to depend upon the strength of the Imperial German Army. The need for a powerful fleet, and the crucially needed financing, required arguments that could sway public opinion and unite the political parties in the Reichstag. These additionally needed to convince Kaiser Wilhelm II, his entourage, and the Bundesrat toward the naval cause (Kelly 2011, p.130). In line with this, Tirpitz argued that Germany's growing overseas trade required the establishment of a powerful fleet. Interestingly, Tirpitz promoted the building of battleships instead of traditional commerce protecting vessels such as cruisers, due to the insufficient number of coaling stations Germany possessed. Dismissal of a cruiser-based fleet also stemmed from the futility of cruiser warfare against British commerce due to the inferior geographical position and again to a lack of oveseas bases for coaling. He additionally stated that if Germany could "threaten Britain militarily... It could impress her politically with German claims to be a world power" (quoted in Wolz 2015, p.20). One other factor behind the focus on battleships was surely the impact of Mahanian thinking on Tirpitz, with its focus on the battleship, the decisive battle, and the consequent control of the seas (Kennedy 1973, p.608; Holmes 2004, p.28, 52; Kelly 2011, p.133; Wolz 2015, p.20). Without such a powerful battlefleet against it, Britain would be free to attack, disrupt, and block Germany's growing share of world trade and strike at the heart of the German economy. That is why a naval deterrent, a battlefleet, would enable Germany to be free from such a fear (Lambelet 1974, p.7-8). An additional rationale was the fleet's Alliance Value. The powerful German battlefleet would also function as an Alliance Value. Naval powers of secondary rank and powers with which Britain had quarrels would be willing to ally with Germany, because the Imperial German Navy would function as a deterrent against British aggression against those powers as well (Herwig 1988, p.77; Herwig 1991, p.275; Kelly 2011, p.5; Herwig 2014, p.36). The generally accepted idea was that forming a battlefleet as powerful as Britain's was beyond Germany's industrial capacity. So,

another basic tenet of the Tirpitz Plan was that Britain could not concentrate its fleets in Home Waters, because of its far-flung possessions around the globe and Britain's security commitments. The underlying assumption was that Britain would not be able or willing to meet the German challenge to its naval supremacy in the North Sea (Holmes 2004, p.48; Kelly 2011, p.196).

The only expected problem was the Danger Zone. Germany had to pass through it, during which the nascent German battlefleet would be vulnerable to a preemptive strike. Britain, in 1807, under the command of Admiral James Gambier, had seized the Danish Navy to prevent its use by Napoleonic France against Britain. This action had created a Copenhagen complex in Germany. This was the fear that Britain, at one stroke, in a similar fashion to what they did in 1807, could easily prevent German aspirations and attempts at establishing its identity as a world power, by destroying the vulnerable German battlefleet before it became stronger. There were no counter-measures, as the action solely depended upon British decision-makers. Tirpitz's depiction of Britain as a hostile power against a rising Germany only strengthened German expectations at being preemptively struck. This feeling of vulnerability and insecurity related to the German identity was an ever-present aspect of the German naval buildup and foreign policy. The only remedy was to build ships and to build them fast, while convincing Britain of German friendliness towards it. So according to Tirpitz, to clear the Danger Zone, which he expected to come around the mid-1910s at the earliest, Britain needed to be assured that the German naval buildup was not against it. Additionally, Germany needed to "silently" build ships, and when Britain was finally aware of the danger, it would not be able to "risk" a naval war with Germany (Steinberg 1966, p.23-30; Herwig 1988, p.78; Holmes 2004, p.47-48; Kelly 2011, p.5-6, 196; Rüger 2017, p.111).

6.5.UNSUSTAINABILITY OF THE RISK THEORY

Tirpitz's Risk Theory was an elaborate "rationale" for the formation of a German battlefleet. It established an aim which was the pursuit of Weltpolitik, deterrence and the persuasion of Britain to accept Germany's status as a world power. It also established the tools, namely battleships, and it explained why the whole theory would work with

concepts such as the Alliance Value, the Risk Fleet, and the Danger Zone. Tirpitz also explained why the then current (1890s) political situation would favor Germany. Britain was isolated, and it could not concentrate its worldwide fleets in the North Sea because of existing security commitments, thus allowing a relatively small German battlefleet to work as a political lever. He also formulated the role of the German battlefleet based on his expectation of how the British would act during a war with Germany. According to Tirpitz, the Royal Navy would rush into German Waters, seeking a second Trafalgar. After having beaten the German battlefleet, it then would establish a close blockade. However, all these assumptions and rationalizations seem to conflict with reality.

The Alliance Value

The term Alliance Value in relation to Tirpitz's Risk Theory was coined at a time (the 1890s) when Britain was politically isolated in the world. Relations with France and Russia were unfriendly (Murray 2008, p.116-117). It had problems in Egypt and Sudan with France, and in Persia, Afghanistan, and Northern India with Russia. Therefore, at the time of its inception the idea that a powerful German battlefleet would draw allies against Britain looked as if it would work. Until at least 1904 it made some sense. However, in 1904, Britain and France settled their differences over Egypt and Morocco, in addition to other overseas areas of conflict. They signed the Entente Cordiale, which was not an alliance in the conventional sense, yet by eliminating possible points of friction between Britain and France, it undermined the rationale of the Alliance Value (Taylor 1954, p.413-417); though it mostly damaged the Risk Theory itself because the German naval buildup could never induce France to sign an alliance with Germany after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871. Another nail in the coffin of the Alliance Value was the British-Russian entente of 1907. With it the powers solved their problems arising from the disputed areas of Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Hence ententes between Britain and France, Britain and Russia, along with the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 formed what is now known as the Triple Entente. This was the death blow to the Alliance Value (Taylor 1954, p.442-445; Geiss 1984, p.55; Kennedy 1988, p.249-256; Kelly 2011, p.262-279; Armaoğlu 2016, p.442-444).

What made the validity of the Alliance Value further complicated was Tirpitz's reaction to a possible German-Russian alliance in 1904-1905. He actively objected to such an

alliance, arguing that it would provoke a British preemptive attack on the German battlefleet. Tirpitz did not regard the US as a possible ally for the Alliance Value, France would not ally with Germany, and Italy and Austria[114] (whose battlefleets and naval industries were not strong enough to help against Britain) had already been in the Triple Alliance since 1882. Japan had already been an ally of Britain since 1902. Therefore, the only candidate left as a possible ally was Russia, as a state strong enough in terms of naval power[115]. Therefore, Tirpitz's objection to this alliance is perplexing because the Risk Theory itself required the existence of other states with naval power ready to strike at Britain, if the Royal Navy was weakened after a naval armageddon between Germany and Britain in the North Sea. Consequently, Tirpitz, under the guidance of his own assumptions should have accepted an alliance with Russia (Conway's 1979, p.266-267; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.328; Kennedy 1988, p.198-206, Henig 2005, p.xix; Kelly 2011, p.197-201, 449).

The Danger Zone

The only problem Tirpitz expected was the Danger Zone during which the Royal Navy could preemptively strike at the German battlefleet and thus destroy Tirpitz's work. He reasoned that relations with Britain should be kept on friendly terms. However, to promote his navy bills, Tirpitz himself had fanned the flames of anglophobia in public. These popular movements, which could not be turned on and off as circumstances changed, made a British friendly foreign policy all the more complicated. Additionally, Tirpitz's underlying assumption was that Britain would not respond in kind to the German naval buildup, so that eventually Germany would reach a sufficiently large fleet level for the Risk Theory to work. However, Tirpitz seemed to forget or chose to ignore the basic tenets of British foreign policy during the past two centuries. Britain had never let a continental challenger gain the supremacy of the seas, let alone the North Sea. He also chose to ignore or forget the recent Naval Defence Act of 1889, which established the

[114] However, their own rivalry diminished the effectiveness of Austria and Italy as allies against Britain. By 1910s British Liberals were thinking that Austrian and Italian fleets were negligible because they were cancelling each other out since they were rivals (Massie 1991, p.623).

[115] Battleship numbers of the European powers in 1904 according to the criterion established by Modelski and Thompson (1988) are given for a clearer understanding of the balance of power on the seas. While Britain (thirty-eight) and France (eleven) had a total of forty-nine, Germany (fourteen), Austria-Hungary (three), and Italy (four) had a total of twenty-one. Russia's ten battleships would have made a significant contribution to the Triple Alliance (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.230-328).

Two Power Standard[116] that required the Royal Navy to be as strong as the next two largest powers' (read France and Russia) combined battlefleets (Padfield 1974, p.78; Murray 2008, p.116; Kelly 2011, p.198).

Tirpitz hoped or reasoned that such a country would simply ignore or let a hostile power across the Channel slowly build up its battlefleet until it became a threat to the Royal Navy and the survival of Britain as an independent state. If Britain accepted the German naval challenge and started its own naval buildup, then every additional capital ship built by Britain would mean the prolonging of the danger zone further into the future, risking a never ending naval arms race (Murray 2008, p.148).

Consequently, Tirpitz's plan would be shattered. Whether Britain would respond or not, Tirpitz's plan was contradictory in itself. The German battlefleet was formed or publicly promoted as a defensive fleet against what Britain might do to German trade or the slowly growing battlefleet. Thus, it depicted Britain as a hostile power to Germany. However, Tirpitz also reasoned that the Danger Zone could be easily crossed because Britain was a status-quo seeking pacific power, that made its calculations from the standpoint of a businessman[117]. Here is the paradox in Tirpitz's reasoning. If Britain was friendly or not an aggressive power bent on destroying the growing German fleet and German world trade, then the defensive purpose of the fleet was unnecessary. Yet if Britain was an aggressive power, then the Danger Zone could never be passed because it would definitely respond to the German naval challenge (Kennedy 1970, p.47; Padfield 1974, p.65, 78; Murray 2008, p.116-117, 148-151; Kelly 2011, p.198; Wolz 2015, p.19).

[116] An act that established, by law, that the Royal Navy needed to be as strong as the next two naval powers' combined fleets. At the time of its establishment, these two powers were France and Russia (Wolz 2015, p.19).

[117] This analogy is used by multiple authors, Kennedy (1970), Padfield (1974), and Murray (2008), possibly for pointing out that Britain was making its political decisions in the way a businessman would. Such a businessman would calculate the possible risks versus the gains of possible actions and then would decide its policy. In this example the risk was obtaining a pyrrhic victory against a powerful German High Seas Fleet and the subsequent loss of its global naval superiority along with the loss of good trade relations with Germany. The gain, on the other hand was keeping its global naval supremacy and keeping good trade relations with Germany.

The British Blockade

Tirpitz's plan rested on another assumption: that in time of war the Royal Navy would rush into the Heligoland Bight and attempt a close blockade of the German coasts. Tirpitz's expectation was that the Royal Navy would be reduced to an engageable size with mines, torpedoes, and submarines during such a close blockade (Kelly 2011, p.320). Then the German High Seas Fleet would engage with and win a decisive battle against it. His reasoning was based on historical precedent.

During wars with France and Spain, Britain had always opted for a close blockade of the French and Spanish coasts. This expectation was very much alive in German thinking until at least 1912. Therefore, the engagement plans were made accordingly (Kelly 2011, p.362-363; Seligmann, Nagler, Epkenhans 2015, p.13). While such a strategy might have worked against France and Spain in the age of sail, it would not work against German coasts in the age of steam. France and Spain had access to the ocean, while Germany did not. Additionally, wind-powered ships did not need to be resupplied with fuel, while ships in the age of steam needed recoaling. An additional disadvantage of a close blockade during the age of steam was the existence of torpedoes, submarines, and mines which made the attempt of close blockade a very dangereous task for the ships and the personnel engaged (Kelly 2011, p.364). Following this line, there was considerable concern in German naval thinking that the British might not attempt a close blockade.

From 1902 onwards, the German naval planners were aware of the possibility of a distant blockade. Chief of the Admiral Staff from 1902 to 1908, Vice Admiral Wilhelm von Büchsel brought up the possibility of such an action in a memo dated 1902 and in plans dated 1904. Tirpitz too mentioned, in 1909, the possibility of a British distant blockade, by remarking that the close blockade of the Napoleonic era was a thing of the past. However, he found the possibility of a distant blockade not to be realistic because of international treaties and a possible US reaction to such an action. His remarks over the years seem to be completely in contrast to this (Kelly 2011, p.237-368).

However, the problem of the above-mentioned assumption is its main logic. Why would the Royal Navy attempt a close blockade and risk losing its quantitative superiority by exposing itself to the dangers of such an action? Additionally, the Royal Navy did not

need to engage the German High Seas Fleet to obtain control of the seas. It could simply invoke a distant blockade and wait safely at a distance (Padfield 1974, p.210; Kelly 2011, p.198). In sum, Tirpitz's logic expected that the Royal Navy would rush into German waters and seek for the glorious decisive engagement. Concurrently, Germany never developed plans against a possible distant blockade. In 1914, when Tirpitz asked the Chief of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, "what will you do if they do not come?", neither men could answer the burning question (Herwig 1988, p.81).

Mahan's Theory

Influenced by Mahan's theories, including the supremacy of the battleship and the importance of the decisive naval engagement, Tirpitz reasoned that Germany did not need a fleet as strong as the British. He advocated that a ratio of 2:3 in capital ships would suffice to induce Britain to concede Germany a place in the sun. According to the Risk Theory, the British would be the attacker so they would need, based on Mahan, a 1/3 superiority in fleet size. However, an inferior German battlefleet would only work if the Royal Navy did attack. Otherwise, the German High Seas Fleet would need to attack to obtain naval supremacy, a case which would completely reverse the Tirpitz plan based on an inferior fleet. In such a case, Tirpitz's plan would not work, because taking the offensive with inferior forces would require great care, again according to Mahanian principles. Even expensive victories carried the risk of completely crippling the rest of the inferior side's fleet (Padfield 1974, p.209; Herwig 1988, p.69-77; Kelly 2011, p.200).

While influenced by Mahan, Tirpitz continued to overlook his principles on naval power. The first and foremost of these was the impossibility for a nation to be both a great continental power and seapower. It was impossible, Mahan claimed, for a nation with even the smallest continental border to compete with a nation having none, in a naval arms race and win (Herwig 1988, p.74-75, 80). An additional problem was Germany's geographical position. It had no access to the open seas except through the English Channel or the Norwegian Sea, which were at best contested or at worst controlled by Britain. So, a decisive naval engagement, even after a German victory, would not change Germany's inferior geographical position. Therefore, focusing on a battlefleet construction program with the decisive engagement as the ultimate purpose, made little sense in Mahanian terms of obtaining control of the seas (Herwig 1988, p.70, 81).

A controversial comment on the subject was that of the Chief of the Admiral Staff (1909-1911), Admiral Max von Fischel. He remarked that "we are fighting for access to the ocean, whose entrances on that side of the North Sea are in England's hands. We are therefore basically the attacker, who is disputing the enemy's possessions" (quoted in Herwig 1988, p.79-80). If true, such a strategic position required the High Seas Fleet to be used offensively, which required at least quantitative parity with Britain. In no case could an inferior battlefleet have won control of the seas. This meant that there was a strategic situation that undermined the Tirpitz plan further (Murray 2008, p.115; Kelly 2011, p.467).

Another Mahanian aspect which Tirpitz ignored was the British national character. Historically, Britain had never shied away from a maritime challenger from the continent. Naval power and naval supremacy were always vital for Britain. How could German decision makers have made the mistaken assumption that Britain, "the richest country in Europe, could not man a fleet in a life-and-death matter of national security" (Herwig 1988, p.79, Kelly 2011, p.246)? Finally, Tirpitz ignored an important tenet of both Mahan and Clausewitz. Both men stressed the need to continuously criticize and improve accepted beliefs and strategies. Tirpitz did the exact opposite of that. He never let ideas other than his own influence the naval program. Those who were silenced by Tirpitz included two Chiefs of the Admiral Staff (Friedrich von Baudissin, Wilhelm Büchsel), several admirals (Hollmann, von Koester, Oldekop), vice admirals (Valois, Karl Galster, von Schleinitz), all of them either supporting submarine warfare or cruiser warfare (Kelly 2011, p.6, 289; Herwig 2014, p.38-39).

The Question of British Enmity

German political decision makers believed that Britain was hostile toward Germany. These included Kaiser Wilhelm II, starting at the earliest from his uncle King Edward VII's visit to Paris in 1904, Tirpitz, from the 1897 Memorandum in which he identified Britain as Germany's most dangerous naval enemy, Bülow, in his speech to the Reichstag in November 1906, during which he warned Britain, France, and Russia of the dangers of trying to encircle Germany, and others in the Court. This belief was also supported by newspapers in Germany, before the acceptance of the Second Navy Bill in 1900. The general belief was that only when Germany possessed a powerful fleet would Britain start

to play fair (Padfield 1974, p.159; Holmes 2004, p.47). This enmity, according to them but especially according to Tirpitz[118], was based on rising German world trade share. Therefore, Britain would attack, if the opportunity arose, the German colonies, choke German seaborne trade, blockade German coasts, and would cause a German economic downturn (Padfield 1974, p.208; Herwig 1988, p.77; Murray 2008, p.114-115; Kelly 2011, p.5-9).

However, the German and British economies and trade interests were more complementary to each other than rivalling. At least until 1904, such an enmity or a possible British aggression towards German colonies or German trade seemed irrational from the British standpoint. Britain was politically isolated, except for the Japanese alliance of 1902. Therefore, Britain would not seek to alienate another European power to which British economic welfare was linked. This was believed by Bülow whose visit to London in 1899 convinced him, though he seemed to change his mind in 1906, and Count Metternich, who would soon be appointed to London as the German ambassador (Padfield 1974, p.79-92; Rüger 2011, p.607). Furthermore, there are even some instances of Anglo-German cooperation, as happened during the Boxer Rebellion[119] or the Venezuelan Debt Crisis of 1902[120]. Such instances constitute proofs against the existence of a steadily rising and permanent rivalry between Britain and Germany. An additional but crucial problem with Tirpitz's reasoning was the very question of British enmity towards Germany itself. If Britain was, as claimed, hostile, why would it let the Germans build a mighty battlefleet that may endanger British physical security in the North Sea?

[118] While he advocated the formation of a powerful German battlefleet based on this argument, he did know, at least in 1908, that the reason for the deteriorating relations with Britain was not German trade but his own shipbuilding program and its increasing building tempo (Padfield 1974, p.208).

[119] By 1900 it had become evident that the Manchu Government could not stand up, due to corruption, lack of will, power, and resources, against the continuing dismemberment and scrambling over of China by the Colonial Powers along with increasing missionary activity which had been going on for over six decades. In the Spring and Summer of 1900, Chinese peasants rebelled against this state of affairs, which their government seemed powerless to stop. These powers, including Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States joined against the rebels to defend the lives and property of their nationals along with their colonial and trade interests in the region. A time of international cooperation in a stance of West against East (although Japan was a participant), although short lived, ensued (Massie 1991, p.275-287; Mombauer 2004, p.91-94).

[120] Venezuela, by the beginning of the Twentieth Century was in continuous trouble paying its debts. Under the pretext that, as a result of domestic problems, European property and interests were at stake, a joint Anglo-German-Italian blockade was established as a classic example of gunboat diplomacy. A settlement was reached in February 1903 through an American offer of arbitration, demanded by Venezuela, leading to reparatory and debt payments to the blockaders (Mitchell 1996, p.186-205).

(Kelly 2011, p.9). That was the paradox of the Risk Theory itself. According to Murray, it should have collapsed "under the weight of its own contradictions" (Murray 2008, p.148-149).

The Redistribution Plan of the Royal Navy

Another basic tenet of the Tirpitz Plan was that the British could not concentrate their full naval might into one theater (read the North Sea), so Germany, with a relatively lower budget, could use its smaller battlefleet to apply political pressure on Britain. This was his thinking in the 1890s. The appointment of Sir John Fisher is generally taken as a moment of change concerning the British redistribution scheme. However, redistribution schemes for the Royal Navy went back to 1902, that is before Fisher. Still, these schemes were implemented later, on 12 December 1904 when Fisher was in charge. While it is said that until 1904 France and Russia dominated British naval thinking, later on it is argued that Germany started to take prominence. By 1906, it was the main actor on which the Admiralty focused its attention. The Entente Cordiale with France and the destruction of the Russian battlefleet at Tsushima also had a great impact upon British naval thinking. Subsequently, Britain decided to redistribute its fleets to control five important chokepoints[121] across the globe, to counter the increasing German naval threat in the North Sea (Padfield 1974, p.115-117; Murray 2008, p.148, 155; Rüger 2011, p.610-611; Seligmann, Nagler, and Epkenhans 2015, p.104-107).

The British redistribution scheme for the entire British Navy made the strengthening of the Home Fleet possible, thus completely undermining Tirpitz's assumption. On the matter of British focus on the defense of the North Sea, Tirpitz failed to appreciate the impact of his own plans. A growing German battlefleet meant an increasing risk to the Royal Navy and thus British independence. So how a state, alleged by Tirpitz to be hostile to Germany, would not respond to the growing size of the German fleet is puzzling.

[121] These points were Singapore, the Cape of Good Hope, Alexandria, the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Straits of Dover (Padfield 1974, p.117).

6.6.THE FAILURE OF THE RISK THEORY

In sum, the Risk Theory would work if several conditions were met. However, before 1910[122] the Risk Theory had become irrelevant. Britain had allies and no foes that could have taken advantage of the weakening of the Royal Navy after a decisive naval engagement in the North Sea. By 1906, Britain had accepted the German challenge by responding to the German naval buildup. By 1909, Tirpitz himself had admitted that, if the British continued further with their dreadnought building program, his strategy would fail. Only a few months later, the British Parliament endorsed the building of eight additional battleships. Consequently, and even according to Tirpitz, Germany was engaged in a naval arms race that it could not win, both due to rising financial costs following the dreadnought revolution of 1906 and the continental security commitments that required a strong army against France and Russia. Additionally, Britain had been able to concentrate its fleets in the North Sea after 1904 (Kaiser 1983, p.454-455; Herwig 1991, p.280-281; Murray 2008, p.117-118, 157-161; Seligmann, Nagler, and Epkenhans 2015, p.277-279; Rüger 2017, p.122).

Politically too, the Risk Theory was unfolding. German efforts at Weltpolitik were countered in successive Moroccan Crises. The First Moroccan Crisis had started with the kidnapping of an American resident in Tangier on 18 May 1904. This event led to European intervention, with the pretext of providing peace, stability, and security in the region. The main powers who had an interest in Morocco were Britain, France, and Spain. Britain, because it possessed Gibraltar, France with the aim of uniting its North African possessions of Algeria, acquired in the 1830-1840s, and Tunisia, acquired in 1881, and Spain with its possessions in the North of Morocco on the Mediterranean. Morocco had

[122] While Tirpitz's Plan had already been in great difficulty before 1906 due to the British redistribution of fleets around the globe, with a renewed focus on the defense of the Home Waters and the Entente Cordiale, the dreadnought revolution gave renewed hope to German naval ambitions. That is because building dreadnoughts meant that all powers could start afresh the naval race which enabled them to aspire to quantitative parity with Britain, unlike in older warship classes, although the impact of the dreadnought revolution did not directly translate into German ability to build dreadnoughts as fast as Britain. It soon became evident that Britain would not let anyone gain quantitative superiority, even in dreadnought class battleships. Additionally, the staggering increases in dreadnought class ship costs only increased existing German financial problems related with shipbuilding. It eventually led to German acceptance of defeat in the naval arms race before the First World War began (Lambelet 1974, p.4-6; Herwig 1991, p.277-279; Murray 2008, p.157-158; Seligmann, Nagler, and Epkenhans 2015, p.278-279; Rüger 2017, p.121-122).

been marked down as a state free from the Scramble of Africa[123] and a policy of open door for trade for all European powers was established at the Treaty of Madrid (1880). However, the Entente Cordiale permitted French preeminence in Morocco, and France started by offering Morocco help to reorganize its army, an offer which the Sultan declined (Massie 1991, p.351-353; Armaoğlu 2016, p.453-454).

Germany intervened both to test the Entente Cordiale and to break the alleged encirclement of the Triple Alliance by the Entente powers. There was no objection, in Germany, for a French dominated Morocco during the signing of the Entente. However, ten months later, the German stance had changed, quite possibly due to the weakening of Russian power at the hands of the Japanese earlier in 1905. The German objection was that France had not consulted Germany as a signatory of the Treaty of Madrid, which entitled the latter to such a consultation concerning any change in the status quo. The German pretext was that it was intervening to preserve the open-door policy for all European powers (Massie 1991, p.354-355).

The crisis started with Kaiser Wilhelm II's embarkment in Tangier on 31 March 1905. Then an invitation was sent to the signatories of the Treaty of Madrid for a settlement, to which France refused to accede. Britain, Italy, and Spain rejected the invitation to join if France did not do so as well. Under increasing German pressure, Théophile Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, resigned in June 1905. It was a diplomatic success for Germany. Berlin did not stop there, and went ahead with attempts to undermine the Entente further and even destroy it. Following Delcassé's resignation, France agreed to join the conference which convened on 16 January 1906, and on 7 April the Act of Algeciras was signed. German diplomacy fared poorly at the conference. French authority near the Algerian border was accepted. The Police force would be supervised by France and Spain, with Swiss participation for inspection. While it seemed that Germany had prevented French domination of Morocco, France had acquired something much more valuable, active British diplomatic support against increasing German aggressiveness. Hence,

[123] This was a period during which the continent of Africa was speedily colonised by European powers in the last two decades of the Nineteenth Century (Brooke-Smith 1987, p.1).

Germany achieved the opposite of what it was intending: the strengthening of the Entente (Massie 1991, p.351-367; Armaoğlu 2016, p.453-458).

When German efforts at breaking the Entente Cordiale failed during the First Moroccan Crisis, the Risk Theory took another impact. Following the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, the Risk Theory was in its death throes. Due to the German agressiveness in foreign policy, the Triple Entente was only strengthened at the expense of the overall German political position in Europe by the 1910s. Following the civil war in Morocco and in its aftermath, the chaos and the threat to European lives and property provoked another European intervention which led to the Agadir Crisis, also known as The Second Moroccan Crisis. An intervention was the signatories' right according to the Act of Algeciras (Massie 1991, p.720-722; Armaoğlu 2016, p.469-473).

In the spring of 1911, France informed the other signatories that it intended to send soldiers to Fez to deal with the situation. However, if the French troops entered Fez, it would have multiple consequences, the first of which was de facto French domination of Morocco. The second was the result of the first: the defiance of the Act of Algeciras. Since Germany could not prevent France from sending in troops, it tried to do the same in southern Morocco. It claimed that German lives and property were in danger, even though there were not many German citizens or any commercial interests in the southern part of the country. Germany intended either a redistribution of rights concerning France and Germany in Morocco, or to acquire compensation from France. This compensation was determined to be a part of the French Congo near the German colony of Kamerun. The German action included the deployment of SMS *Panther* and later SMS *Berlin*, to show the French that it was not willing to accept a fait accompli by France in making Morocco a full French colony. If Britain had not supported France or if France had yielded, this action would have humiliated the latter, weakened the Entente, and would have meant German domination of European politics. However, Britain stood determined to support its Entente partner if it chose to resist German demands (Massie 1991, p.720-738; Armaoğlu 2016, p.470-471).

On 4 November 1911, an agreement was reached between France and Germany. A French protectorate over Morocco was accepted, and France promised to keep the policy of open door intact. Germany was given a slice of the French Congo to be added to its colony of

Kamerun. This crisis too ended in German defeat. It could not get anything in Morocco, accepted the French domination of the country, and acquired less than half of the amount of the territory it had determined as a minimum concession in the French Congo. Consequently, French prestige rose. Britain had stood by France, and therefore the Entente remained strong (Massie 1991, p.720-741; Armaoğlu 2016, p.469-473).

The Agadir Crisis not only confirmed the German political isolation, but was also a blow to German aspirations to world power status. The German naval buildup seemed to isolate Germany more than it did Britain. Chancellor von Bülow had already admitted, in 1906, that trying to match the Royal Navy was "sheer madness" and von Holstein[124], from the German Foreign Office, was notifying von Bülow that there were "no allies in sight", pointing to the failure of the Tirpitz Plan and the Alliance Value (Herwig 1991, p.280-281). In fact, the German naval buildup had emancipated British foreign policy. Britain was able to give colonial concessions to France and Russia, and could defend this change in its foreign policy in public because of the aggressive German foreign policy. Ironically, the German naval buildup hindered German foreign policy by alienating Britain and strengthening the Triple Entente. The exact opposite of what Tirpitz had promised the Kaiser when they met in the Summer of 1897 (Taylor 1954, p.408-409; Padfield 1974, p.208; Kaiser 1983, p.454-455; Murray 2008, p.116-117, 135, 157-162; Seligmann, Nagler, and Epkenhans 2015, p.277-281).

6.7.A STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION WITH BATTLESHIPS

Given the situation depicted above, the German naval buildup illustrates an example of sub-optimal arming. The German naval buildup, instead of increasing the physical security of the state, had weakened it by causing German international isolation. It also meant that resources spent on the expansion of the German naval power could have been used on a defensive coastal fleet, a cruiser warfare focused fleet, a global colonial fleet, a submarine fleet, or on the army. The lack of funds for the Imperial German army is a case in point. Until 1912, it could not get enough funds because, after the adoption of

[124] An influential figure in the German Foreign Office (Kelly 2011, p.104, 234).

Weltpolitik, it was no longer seen as the sole source of German prestige and power. By 1911, as opposed to 1.59% of the French population only 0.99% of the German population was under arms (Mombauer 2001, p.56-57; Herwig 2014, p.75, 92).

However, the army was essential for the physical survival of the state during a very possible two-front war against the Dual Alliance, which required mass mobilization and conscription. The most striking case is that of the Schlieffen Plan,[125] the successful application of which required troops to be acquired through the reserves and the squeezing of more troops out of the replacement corps. Additionally, the lack of sufficient troops jeopardized and eventually contributed to the failure of the envelopment of the French forces through the plan (Heyman 1997, p.12-13; Mombauer 2001, p.56-57; Murray 2008, p.177; Holmes 2009, p.114; Herwig 2014, p.68, 75, 92). The possible choices of a defensive fleet, commercial warfare, a colonial fleet, a submarine fleet, or investment in the Imperial German army would have reflected reasonable strategic goals, given the German desire and/or need to obtain new or protect existing colonies, protect seaborne trade, or for increased physical security on the continent. In contrast, Germany kept on investing in a battlefleet without a clear strategic military purpose, even after the failure of the Risk Theory due to changing global political circumstances (Murray 2008, p.119-120, 158).

In building a powerful battlefleet, Germany tried to establish itself as a state with potent naval power, second only to Britain. The pursuit of Weltpolitik along with the establishment of a powerful battlefleet was an attempt at reaching and keeping its identity as a world power, with three different audiences in mind. One was the foreign audience of which Britain was the primary target from which the recognition would be sought. The second part of the foreign audience was other states with naval power, which were the targets of the Alliance Value. The other audience was the domestic one, which included

[125] The Schlieffen Plan was part of the German land strategy with the purpose of transforming the two-front war into a single front war by speedily eliminating France with an enormous decisive battle. This was to be realized through positioning most of the German army against France. While 1/8 of this force (the left wing) would hold Alsace-Lorraine and accept temporary defeat there by retreating into Germany, the remaining troops (the right wing) would strike through Luxembourg and Belgium. The right wing would first swing westwards and then south thus enveloping the French army facing the German left wing. This action would annihilate an important part of the French army by surrounding it. This strategy was hoped to lead to the surrender of France and was estimated to take about six weeks. Subsequently, the German army would be transferred to the east to face Russia (Mombauer 2001, p.75-77; Zuber 2002, p.1).

all the political aspects of the Wilhelmine Germany with differing levels of importance. These included the Reichstag, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the German Chancellor, the German Princes, and the German People, which all needed to be convinced that the building of the German High Seas Fleet was necessary, either for protecting the German economy, for keeping Germany as an advanced industrial state, for protecting the German colonies, or for reaching world power status. While the High Seas Fleet was intended to be used as the tool to establish Germany as a world power, it was also the mark of that status (Murray 2008, p.120).

Another aspect of the German naval buildup is the impact of the lack of German national identity. Until the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the Twentieth Century, there was not a strong sense of such an identity. Until 1871, the fragmented political power within Germany prevented the formation of such a shared identity. This was the case even after the formation of Germany in 1871, because in essence this new Germany was a merger of a number of smaller political units. As a newly established nation state, it lacked a sense of national unity. Local traditions and identities were a part of the German national identity. Even the divisional structure of the army reflected this. There were Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon and smaller local divisions within the army. There was a need for the establishment of a shared identity if Germany was to survive as a nation state. This was also necessary for defining the role of the newly founded state in world politics (Steinberg 1964, p.105; Murray 2008, p.120-123).

In this sense, the establishment of an Imperial or a German Navy was a national undertaking. That is because the German coasts of the North Sea and the Baltic were, until the unification, divided between several German states, therefore preventing the formation of a single strong state with considerable naval power that was German. There was no German Navy before 1871 so the fate of the German fleet was in a sense tied to the fate of Germany. The Navy was an imperial prerogative, unlike the Army. Furthermore, unlike the Army which had federal contingents, there was only one navy and it was German. It was also supported by popular movements like that of the Navy League, founded in 1898, with only a few thousand members. However, by 1899 its membership had grown to 130,000, to 250,000 six months later, and to nearly a million by 1906. It represented a national will, with almost all parts of the nation joining, to

acquire sea power and to become a state with considerable naval power. Thus, the Imperial Navy was a source of national unity, helping the creation of a sense of nationhood, also reflecting a struggle for national identity. The naval expansion and an ocean-going navy, by 1900, was inevitably linked to German nationhood, and the survival of the German nation state (Steinberg 1992, p.31; Murray 2008, p.123-127; Kelly 2011, p.166-168).

It is also important to note that in the Nineteenth and the Twentieth centuries navalism was on the rise in the international political arena. It started to connote further and further with great power status and international prestige, along with colonial ambition. Being able to build a powerful fleet with one's own resources, almost in an autarchic way, became a "hallmark of international respectability" (Steinberg 1964, p.102). Thus, towards the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the Twentieth Century, most great powers (France, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the US) had engaged in an effort for the establishment of powerful navies. These navies would in turn be used for overseas power projection and the acquisition of colonies and prestige (Murray 2010, p.672, 675; Rüger 2017, p.110). This tendency was pronounced by the link established by Mahan. He used Britain as the embodiment of the successful use of naval power. According to him, the British Empire proved that naval power was inevitably linked to the acquisition and protection of a global empire which made Britain a world power. Therefore, naval power meant world power status. The naval power itself was shaped around the battleship as the primary weapon with which decisive battles were won. Those victories in turn led to the control of the seas, which in turn led to the acquisition of colonies and the establishment of a world empire. So, according to Mahan, naval power was a sine qua non of world power status. The battleship and the ability to build one with one's own resources and manpower, because it was the major constituent of naval power, meant that such states were world powers (Mahan 1898, p.510; Padfield 1974, p.40; Sondhaus 2001, p.228; Holmes 2004, p.28-34; Murray 2008, p.128-131). It also represented how much a state's word carried "weight in the councils of the world" (quoted in Murray 2008, p.131).

Along the same lines, decision makers reasoned that Germany could establish its own world empire through naval expansion and thus acquire world power status. They linked naval power and the battlefleet to German claims of that status. Mahan's writings helped

Tirpitz to focus the direction of the naval expansion towards building battleships, not cruisers or submarines as some reasoned. However, at the turn of the century Germany, even though it was the greatest power in economic and military terms in continental Europe, lacked naval power. Therefore, it did not possess what endowed states the status of world power. Without naval power, any German claim to be a world empire lacked substance. First, it required naval expansion to transform its aspirant identity into reality, by imitating Britain. Then it required recognition, and that had to come from Britain as well, since Britain was Germany's alter ego. Tirpitz's memorandum of 1897 to Kaiser Wilhelm II is important in this way. It singled out Britain, instead of traditional enemies like France and Russia, as the most likely enemy. Therefore, the German naval expansion and the future battlefleet, which would be formed around battleships, would target Britain. However, there were no strategic objectives, besides the fact that the battlefleet would present a risk to British naval supremacy. The target was not British commerce but the Royal Navy itself, which was thought to be the symbol of British world power status. The focused theater would be the North Sea, between Heligoland and the Thames. The goal of the fleet was not acquiring or protecting colonies or trade. There was only a political objective. The battlefleet would be stationed in the North Sea. It would work as a political lever that would force Britain to acknowledge Germany's ascending position in world affairs, and recognize the latter's status as a world power on an equal footing (Herwig 1988, p.77; Murray 2008, p.133-141; Seligmann, Nagler, and Epkenhans 2015, p.42).

Bülow's speech to the Reichstag in December 1897 approves the drive for Germany to acquire a place of its own in the sun, which intends to replicate the British Empire upon which the sun never set and Louis XIV, the Sun King's, French Empire. The emphasis was on the achievement of world power status of those states. The German battlefleet was an indispensable tool in this quest, and would be built with the single aim of acquiring that status. The plans for the Second Navy Bill of 1900 were presented to the Kaiser on 28 September 1899. It was determined then that the eventual size of the fleet would include forty-five battleships, yet the bill only said that there would be thirty-eight, for now. The Second Navy Bill established the size of the new fleet. It needed to be strong enough to inflict sufficient damage to risk the British naval supremacy. A size of 2/3 that of the Royal Navy in capital ships would be needed. The bill also gave the battlefleet a

rationale: Germany's world power status would be assured with a battlefleet which would be second only to Britain's (Murray 2008, p.141-147).

To conclude it possible to make the following statement. The German efforts at acquiring a formidable naval power and initiating the Tirpitz shipbuilding program were not mistakes. According to Padfield (1974, p.343), they were correct and inevitable military-strategic choices. Again, according to him, the problem was that they continued and were retained despite continuous political, diplomatic, and financial setbacks encountered along the way. That is the puzzling question.

The answer does not lie in military strategy. Germany did not aim to produce military results even though it used military devices. It aimed to reach political and ideational results like the acceptance of its world power status or "a sort of Napoleonic supremacy... in the peaceful sense", as Kaiser Wilhelm II explained it to his friend Count Eulenburg in 1892 (quoted in Geiss 1984, p.50-51; Epkenhans 2004, p.15). Thus, the German naval expansion aimed for something else than military results. It was a product of the inter-subjective formation of state identity in the international political arena. It continued despite the afore-mentioned difficulties, contradictions, and changing political circumstances which undermined most, if not all, of Tirpitz's assumptions. That is because the growing German battlefleet aimed at establishing an identity, therefore military, financial, or other setbacks did not matter. As long as arming "reflected back to Germany an image of itself as a world power" independent of others' reactions, because the act of arming is an attribute of world power, it had worked (Murray 2008, p.149).

Additionally, the German reasoning was that German naval armament was a response to Britain. It was forced upon the Germans, so it had to continue, or else Germany would collapse economically and militarily. This line of thinking allowed Germany to continue its naval program. Weltpolitik, with its priority on having a battlefleet second only to Britain, was focused on achieving recognition from Britain of its world power status, which Germany already considered itself to have. Bülow's speech to the Reichstag during the introduction of the Second Navy Bill in December 1899 only underscored this. He stressed that Germany needed a strong German Navy reflecting its status. He also pointed out that a strong battlefleet represented Germany's transformation into a world power. German refusals of naval armament limitation talks in 1913 should be viewed in this light.

By that time, it had become obvious that the naval arms race with Britain was lost. The necessary funds were being transferred to the army due to Germany's precarious military position against France and Russia. Accepting a naval agreement would produce positive results from a military perspective. Yet it was refused. Murray argues that Germany acted in that way because that would mean an acceptance of inferiority vis-a-vis Britain. It would also mean that Weltpolitik and the Tirpitz Plan, along with German pretentions to be a world power had failed. It becomes evident that, even by 1900, a naval arms race against Britain was unwinnable. Finances alone prevented the realization of the German naval ambitions. Germany needed to devote most of its resources to the army to prepare for a very possible two-front war against France and Russia, instead of challenging Britain on the sea and making it an additional enemy of Germany (Murray 2008, p.149-164).

Consequently, Murray argues that Germany pursued Weltpolitik for the recognition of its identity as a world power because of two reasons. First, it was clear from the beginning that Britain, the greatest seapower state, was the primary target for recognition. The focus of the shipbuilding program was the battleship, a mark of world power status. A German battlefleet, stationed in the North Sea, would force Britain to recognize Germany as a factor in world politics, thus accepting its status as a world power. Second, there was no military rationale. The Risk Theory itself was based upon contradictory assumptions about British identity. It depicted Britain as an aggressive power bent on destroying German overseas trade, choking German commerce, and causing German economic ruin. This assumption required the presence of a powerful naval deterrent which would risk British naval supremacy even after a decisive naval victory. At the same time, Tirpitz reasoned that Britain was a status quo power, which calculated its actions from the standpoint of a businessman. Therefore, Britain would not strike down the nascent German fleet, allowing it to pass through the Danger Zone without risk. According to Murray this contradictory characterization of Britain let Germany continue with its shipbuilding program despite the impossibility of achieving established objectives by "shifting the burden of responsability" to the British. Since arming practices are a "constitutive feature of world power status", even engaging in an arms race despite its obvious failure reflected back to Germany "an image of itself already as a world power". Murray stresses that in this sense German naval rearmament was part of its identity and thus essential to its survival socially, if not militarily (2008, p.164-165).

7. THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE OCEAN-GOING FLEET

The Soviet naval expansion under the leadership of Stalin is the second case that is studied. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is selected because it was also a continental power which attempted to build a costly Ocean-Going Fleet, like Germany at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The purpose is to compare the rationale for its shipbuilding plan to those of the German and Ottoman naval expansions under the leaderships of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Sultan Abdülaziz respectively. It is imperative to look at Russian history to understand the Russian naval needs. Then one may be able to understand Stalin's big ship plan, and assess whether it responded to the physical security needs of the state or not. Subsequently, it will be possible to understand the purpose of this naval expansion.

7.1. RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS AND THE NAVY

Russian naval power and the Russian involvement with the sea, apart from river craft, can be claimed to have started at the end of the Seventeenth and the beginning of the Eighteenth centuries. From then on, the development of Russian naval power was dependent upon the ruler, who determined whether Russia invested or not in its navy. This is, according to Olkhovsky (1992), a reflection of rulers being autocrats until the end of the Stalin era. While Peter the Great (1682-1725), Catherine the Great (1762-1796), Paul I (1796-1801), Alexander I (1801-1825), Nicholas I (1825-1855), Alexander II (1855-1881), Alexander III (1881-1894), Nicholas II (1894-1917), and Stalin (1924-1953) were interested in the development of the Russian Navy, Catherine I, Peter II, Anne, Ivan IV, Elizabeth, Peter III (who all ruled in succession between 1725-1762), and Lenin (1917-1924) were less interested (Courtney 1954, p.14-15; Olkhovsky 1992, p.2-24). Consequently, the reigns of Catherine I, Peter II, Anne, Ivan IV, Elizabeth, and Peter III will be excluded from this study. The Lenin era, on the other hand, will not because Stalin succeeded him. So, any naval development under Lenin, or its omittance, and the

reasons for either choice might have been influential on Stalin's decisions regarding the development of the Soviet Navy.

Peter the Great, who ruled between 1682-1725, deserves greater attention because he was the one who started the development of Russian naval power. He is seen as the father of the Russian Navy, because he was the first Czar who initiated shipbuilding with the aim of fighting at sea. During his reign, a shipbuilding industry was created, and Russia had come into possession of no less than thirty-four ships-of-the-line with at least fifty guns by 1725. The first successful uses of Russian warships were against the Ottoman Empire and Sweden. In 1696, with the help of the newly formed Russian Black Sea Fleet, the Russian Army was able to capture Azov, which was returned to the Ottoman Empire following the Russian defeat at Prut in 1711. Between 1703-1721, during the Northern War with Sweden (1700-1721), Russia was victorious and able to capture Sweden's Baltic possessions, which contained important maritime resources and population, again with the help of its navy. Within twenty-five years, the Russian Navy had acquired a dominant position in the Baltic. Peter used Russian naval power against the Persian Empire too. He conducted joint operations in the Caspian Sea and was able to capture Resht and Baku on its coasts. Subsequently, these achievements, especially those against Sweden, established Russia as a Great Power (Ranft and Till 1983, p.6-7; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.289; Olkhovsky 1992, p.2-3; Ledonne 1997, p.89-94; Stone 2006, p.57-59). The need to establish Russian naval power in Peter's reign stemmed from the fact that Russia now faced two rivals which possessed some degree of naval power. Sweden in the north controlled the northern Baltic. Therefore, the expansion into the Baltic regions required Russia to possess some level of naval power even though victory on land was still decisive. Peter's focus in the south was Ottoman held Azov, which could be besieged by armies but needed a fleet to force its surrender by cutting off its seaborne supplies. As in the case of Sweden, a successful campaign against the Ottoman Empire which practically controlled the entire Black Sea required the establishment of a fleet there (Jane 1899, p.44-70).

The reigns of Catherine the Great (1762-1796) and Paul I (1796-1801) were marked by continued interest in the development of Russian naval power. The first long distance Russian naval operation was undertaken in 1769, and Russia was able to project power

through its Baltic Fleet against the Ottoman Empire in the Aegean, resulting in the victory at Çeşme (1770). Even though the Russian Baltic Fleet won a great victory at Çeşme, the Russian hesitation to force the passage through the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara prevented the exploitation of the naval superiority that ensued. Besides dividing attention and resources towards the Eastern Mediterranean, it achieved little else. Hence, the outcome of the war was decided on land. The impact of Russian naval power in the 1787-1792 war was even less than in the previous war, with the exception of the relief[126] of the siege of Kinburn. Catherine also initiated the building of the Sevastopol naval base, the city of Kherson, and the establishment of a capable Russian Black Sea Fleet. Perhaps the greatest naval challenge to Russia in her reign was that of Sweden, with its potential to reach St. Petersburg via its navy. This challenge reached its peak during the Russo-Swedish War of 1788-1790, in which the naval power of Sweden was decisively defeated at the battle of Vyborg in 1790. Olkhovsky (1992) notes that after the defeat of Sweden in 1790, Russia had become the second largest naval power in the world[127]. Additionally, Jane (1899) claims that Russia possessed eighty-two ships-of-the-line in 1801. However, Modelski and Thompson (1988) argue that Russia possessed seventy-five ships-of-the-line in 1790, which puts Russia in third place in contrast to Olkhovsky (1992). They furthermore add that in 1801, Russian ships-of-the-line numbered around fifty-eight,[128] which puts Russia in fourth place, not second as claimed by Jane (1899) (Jane 1899, p.78-109; Courtney 1954, p.16-18; Olkhovsky 1992, p.4-5; Ledonne 1997, p.104-113; Stone 2006, p.78-88).

During the reign of Paul I, a Russian fleet joined the British in their fight against the Napoleonic France in the Mediterranean. Their assistance, along with that of Ottoman ships, led to the capture of the Ionian Islands, which constitutes another example of

[126] During the war of 1787-1792, an Ottoman army and a force consisting mainly of galleys and gunboats had laid siege to Kinburn. The Russian Black Sea Fleet responded and a squadron, again formed by gunboats managed to destroy the besieging party on the seas, while a Russian army managed to break the siege on land (Jane 1899, p.88-89).

[127] Jane (1899) and Olkhovsky (1992) who uses the reference of Jane (1983) argue that in 1790, after the Battle of Vyborg against Sweden, Russia had become the second naval power in the World. Yet Modelski and Thompson (1988) argue that in 1790 while Russia had seventy-five warships, Britain had 137, France had ninety, and Spain had seventy-four which puts Russia in third place in terms of warships and the size of its total battlefleet (Jane 1899, p.109; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.224, 262, 291; Olkhovsky 1992, p.5).

[128] The difference in estimation probably originates from gun numbers. Modelski and Thompson (1988) counts ships-of-the-line with at least sixty guns while possibly Jane (1899) and Olkhovsky (1992) counted ships with fewer guns as well (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.67-70).

Russian power projection through the use of its navy. This had been possible thanks to the French hostility towards the Ottoman Empire in Egypt after the former's invasion of Egypt in the summer of 1798. In its wake, Russia and the Porte signed the Treaty of Alliance in 1799, which allowed Russia, as long as the conflict with France continued or at the request of the Ottoman Sultan, to move warships through the Turkish Straits into the Aegean and the Mediterranean. It also forbade entry of any warship of other powers into the Black Sea. This treaty was especially significant for the future, because it set a precedent for the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi in 1833 (Jane 1899, p.110-111; Courtney 1954, p.18; Ranft and Till 1983, p.7; Olkhovsky 1992, p.5-6; Ledonne 1997, p.113-114).

The advancement of Russian naval power continued to be driven by increasing rivalry with the Ottoman Empire and hostile relations with Sweden, interrupted by the coalition wars against France. Efforts at building a Black Sea Fleet gained momentum, especially in the course of two wars (1768-1774 and 1787-1792) with the Ottoman Empire, in the aftermath of which Russia had obtained the majority of the Black Sea's northern coastline including Kherson, Kinburn, and the Crimea. Another drive for naval power was caused by the enmity of Sweden in the Baltic, which reached its decisive point in naval affairs in 1790 in the battle of Vyborg, when Russia became the dominant naval power in that sea with the defeat of Sweden. However, Russian naval power was never the decisive factor in either theater of expansion.

During the reign of Alexander I (1801-1825), while it helped Britain defeat Napoleon, Russia was mostly involved in land warfare. Especially after the Battle of Trafalgar[129] on 21 October 1805, Napoleonic France's threat had become a continental one only. Therefore, after that point, the Russian contribution on land was enough to defeat Napoleon. Apart from its involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian involvement with matters relating to the sea was the first Russian Circumnavigation of the world, and the discovery of the Antarctic by a Russian expedition. Another instance of naval involvement could have been Russian assistance to Spain. Russian ships were sent to assist Ferdinand VII against a colonial uprising. Had these ships been in good condition

[129] During the War of the Third Coalition, the Royal Navy under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson engaged the combined Franco-Spanish Fleet and won a devastating victory, establishing near absolute British naval superiority for the remainder of the conflict with France (Kennedy 1976, p.124; Harding 2001, p.273).

for such a long voyage, Russia might have projected power through the use of its navy a third time. The opportunity for power projection came after Trafalgar. Even though the naval power of France had been beaten, war against the Ottoman Empire, now an ally of France, required Russian naval participation (Courtney 1954, p.19; Olkhovsky 1992, p.6; Stone 2006, p.95-109).

In February 1807, a British squadron tried to force its way into the Dardanelles. However, the Russian Mediterranean Fleet[130] refused to take part in it. Whether because of the lack of Russian support or Ottoman resistance, the British squadron failed. After the British failure, Russian ships stayed in the Aegean nonetheless, and fought with the Ottoman fleets until the Peace of Tilsit in July 1807. In Tilsit, France took the Ionian Islands from Russia, thereby making the deployment of the Russian Mediterranean Fleet problematic. Additionally, the peace treaty made France and Russia allies, and therefore put the Russians in a difficult position in the Mediterranean as an enemy of Britain. Since hostilities against the Porte eliminated the possibility of the Russian Mediterranean Fleet joining the Russian Black Sea Fleet, most of it sailed towards the Baltic. However, on its voyage, due to adverse weather conditions, it stopped in Lisbon, where the commander surrendered the fleet to the British. Those remaining in the Mediterranean were given to France. Subsequently, the existence of the short-lived Russian Mediterranean Fleet ended for the time being. For the rest of the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Baltic Fleet had minor engagements against the British and the Swedes in the Baltic. As far as participation is concerned, Russian sailors from Kronstadt joined the land warfare against Napoleon's invasion of Russia with the Grande Armée. While this is not considered as naval participation, it may point to the primacy of land warfare for the physical security of Russia, as well as to the lack of naval threat from France (Jane 1899, p.118-126; Courtney 1954, p.18-19; Olkhovsy 1992, p.6-7; Ledonne 1997, p.114-115).

[130] After the French naval defeat at the Battle of the Nile in 1798, Russian ships passed through the Turkish Straits and a joint force of Russian and Ottoman ships took part in the capture of Corfu and the Ionian Islands from France. This had been made possible because the Porte had asked for Russian support against France, which it acquired with the Treaty of Alliance in 1799. When Czar Paul I ordered the return of the Russian ships after the capture of Corfu and the islands, admiral Count Voinovitch stayed in Corfu with his squadron. By 1806, this squadron was still in Corfu and was conducting operations against France there. It was this squadron which refused to support the British in 1807 in attacking the Dardanelles (Courtney 1954, p.18-19; Ledonne 1997, p.114).

Following the defeat of Napoleon, Russia had become the greatest military power on the European Continent, with its 800,000 strong army. It was the power which had contributed most to the land campaigns in the defeat of France. However, it felt that it had not acquired enough compensation commensurate with its war efforts. It had acquired Poland east of Posen and Finland. Britain, on the other hand, had become the greatest commercial and seapower. Its maritime hegemony was unchallenged. Britain had succeeded in preserving its rights to search neutral shipping. It had acquired territorial and commercial concessions as well: the purchase of the Cape of Good Hope from the Dutch, acquisition of Malta, the island of Mauritius, some islands in the West Indies from France, commercial rights in South America from Spain. The British naval and commercial power and the Russian land power placed them at the pinnacle of the great powers' hierarchy. France, even though defeated and forced to pay a war indemnity of 700 million francs, still had great potential as a European power, but was contained and checked by four allies and buffer states in Italy and The Netherlands. Austria, while having established its influence in Germany and northern Italy, was growing weaker and held on to its great power status through the help[131] of other great powers. It had an agrarian society, lacking material resources, industrial and economic power vis-a-vis Britain and France. It had lower manpower than Russia, therefore was weaker in terms of military power. It was a great power, but lacked the necessary factors to keep its position as one. Its multi-ethnic empire was especially susceptible to nationalism in the Balkans. It was also fearful of a Russian advance into the Balkans, mainly against the Ottoman Empire. Germany was divided among several dozen states. Prussia was given territory on the Rhine to check French aggression, and northern Saxony. However, it was weaker than Austria in the German Confederation. The Italian region was divided into several states, and one was enlarged as a balancer against France, Sardinia-Piedmont. Most of the other states were within the Austrian sphere of influence (Kennedy 1988, p.153-164; Ledonne 1997, p.78; Bridge and Bullen 2005, p.5-7, 22-41; Stone 2006, p.111; Armaoğlu 2016, p.114-124). By 1822, Austria had reasserted its primacy in Germany through the Karlsbad Decrees in 1819, with the support of Prussia and Russia (through Alexander), along with

[131] This had become evident when Austria needed to convince other great powers to intervene in an area which it considered within its sphere of influence. In contrast, Britain, France, or Russia would not feel such a need when they intervened in Portugal, Spain, or Poland respectively (Bridge and Bullen 2005, p.48-49).

the tacit approval of Britain. These decrees which became part of German Federal Law by 1820, enabled Austria to inhibit intellectual activity and establish its control within Germany. It had also managed to convince France, Prussia, and Russia (three members of the Quintuple Alliance[132]) to use military force against revolutionaries to topple them in favor of a regime that would stay within Vienna's orbit in Naples through the congresses of Troppau (1820) and Laibach (1821). Even though these congresses may be taken as representing a united stance against revolutionary and nationalist movements, they also bore witness to the emergence of the first cracks[133] in the 1815 Order (Kennedy 1989, p.163; Bridge and Bullen 2005, p.42-49; Armaoğlu 2016, p.123-127).

The Russia of Nicholas I (1825-1855) was involved in some of the most important naval affairs of the Nineteenth Century. First among these is the Battle of Navarino, in which Britain, France, and Russia intervened, on behalf of the Greeks, against their suzerain the Ottoman Empire, and destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in 1827. Russian ships engaged an Ottoman squadron once again in 1853, at the battle of Sinop, and came out victorious. However, Nicholas's success in naval affairs came to an end in the Crimean War. Following the Russian victory at Sinop, Britain and France declared war on Russia as well. In the face of British, French, and Ottoman naval superiority, the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet had to retreat to the Sevastopol naval base. Subsequently, it was destroyed when Sevastopol was captured by the British, French, and Ottoman troops. However, Russia and the Porte were not always enemies during his reign. Nicholas I chose to assist Sultan Mahmud II against his rebellious subject Mehmet Ali. In the Summer of 1833, Russian involvement led to the peace of Kütayha (1833) and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi, which technically made Russia and the Porte allies for the

[132] The Quintuple Alliance was formed by the admission of France into the controlling powers of the European states system at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. The Quadruple Alliance, which had been formed against Revolutionary France in November 1815 by Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia with the single purpose of preventing a "Bonapartist restoration" or an attack from France upon the Vienna System and containing France within the 1815 settlement, continued to operate separately as a check against the French. It would also work to control Russian ambitions to thwart the Anglo-Austrian domination of the international system (Bridge and Bullen 2005, p.34, 41).

[133] Britain, as expressed in foreign secretary Castlereagh's state paper of 1820, advocated that intervention in the affairs of another state is not within the jurisdiction of the Quintuple Alliance. However, intervention in another state's internal affairs was within the rights of a state if its interests were threatened. According to Britain the Alliance was "never intended as an organization for the government of the world" (Bridge and Bullen 2005, p.44). While Britain endorsed single-handed Austrian action in Naples, France and Russia had favored congresses, thus were willing to make the problem in Italy a matter for the Alliance (Bridge and Bullen 2005, p.42, 45).

next eight years (Courtney 1954, p.18-20; Olkhovsky 1992, p.7-9). Olkhovsky credits the Russia of Nicholas I with around fifty ships-of-the-line against ninety belonging to Britain for the year 1838[134]. When one adds Modelski and Thompson's calculations for the French ships-of-the-line (named as warships in Modelski and Thompson 1988), which were twenty, Russia can be said to have owned the second most ships-of-the-line for the year 1838. Olkhovsky (1992) adds that due to insufficient funds, the Russian Navy declined[135] in the 1840s. Yet by 1854 the Russian Navy still owned the second most ships-of-the-line, with forty-four, coming after Britain's seventy-eight and standing above France's thirty-two, according to Modelski and Thompson (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.71-72; Olkhovsky 1992, p.7-9). Nicholas's reign witnessed naval power's potential impact upon Russian physical security, perhaps for the first time in its history. A natural reaction could have been to restore and improve Russian naval power, especially in the Black Sea. However, Nicholas's death before the end of the Crimean War and the demilitarization of the Black Sea prevented those. Their execution was left to his son and successor, Alexander II who made considerable efforts on this matter.

Even though Nicholas I's reign was full of naval endeavors and two successful naval engagements against the Ottoman Empire, the loss of the Russian Black Sea Fleet stigmatized his naval record, and his successor Alexander II (1855-1881) fared much better in this regard and in terms of naval development. He is known as the Father of the Modern Russian Navy. Following the humiliating defeat in the Crimean War, Alexander II focused on the modernization of the Navy, with the introduction of steam and armor. Subsequently, the number of screw-propelled ships increased between 1856-1860. Screw-propelled ships-of-the-line had increased from one to nine, frigates from one to seven, and corvettes from none to nineteen by 1860. Additionally, the number of smaller

[134] Modelski and Thompson (1988) estimate that in 1838 Russia had forty-one warships against Britain's seventy-six. The difference in estimation may originate from Modelski and Thompson's criteria for counting warships and ships-of-the-line. For the years 1757-1860, they classify warships (and ships-of-the-line) as ships having at least sixty guns, leaving ships having fewer guns out of their calculations (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.67, 71).

[135] If one looks again at Modelski and Thompson's estimates, it is noticeable that Russian warships in the 1840s and even in the 1850s, up until the Crimean War, kept rising in numbers. However, Olkhovsky stresses that the Russian Navy declined. It necessarily brings one to question whether Olkhovsky added second rate ships-of-the-line (with fewer guns) to his calculations and as a result equated their diminishing number with that of the Russian Navy's power because the total number of ships-of-the-line (including the second rate ships) declined even though the number of first rate ships-of-the-line increased (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.71-72; Olkhovsky 1992, p.7).

screw-propelled vessels had increased by eighty-three during the same period. (Jane 1899, p.151; Watts 1990, p.14; Olkhovsky 1992, p.9). Another important part of the modernization was the introduction of armor following the British, French, and American examples (Jane 1899, p.154-170; Watts 1990, p.14). The last important modernization was the introduction of the torpedo into the Russian Navy, which had some success against the Ottoman ships, sinking *Seyfi* on 25 May 1877, which was the first successful sinking of a ship in conflict through use of the torpedo in history, and sinking *İntibah* on the night of 25-26 January 1878 (Watts 1990, p.15-16). The show of force through the Russian Navy against the Chinese to secure the Ussuri region around Vladivostok, and the unilateral annexation[136] of Tsushima in 1861 by the Russian Navy coincided with a Russian realization of the use of naval power as an active instrument of foreign policy (Jane 1899, p.186-188; Ledonne 1997, p.198; Olkhovsky 1992, p.10-12). While the Russian Army suffered budget cuts, Russian naval expenditures remained stable, and due to the army budget cuts its relative share of the defense budget increased. Overall, the reign of Alexander II saw an increased importance and investment in the navy (Olkhovsky 1992, p.12). Another important naval development took place in the Black Sea. Taking advantage of the Franco-Prussian War, Russia managed to revoke the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856), and the demilitarization of the Black Sea, at the London Conference in 1871, with the confirmation of Britain, France, and Prussia. Therefore, within fifteen years, it acquired the right to build and maintain warships without tonnage or gun limitations in that sea. However, no units other than small vessels were put to sea there until 1883, due to lack of funds. Consequently, during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, Russian naval power was almost nonexistent in the Black Sea, except for a few armed merchant ships and torpedo boats. As a result, the Ottomans enjoyed total naval superiority in the Black Sea. However, the Russian use of the torpedo at sea prevented the Ottomans from taking advantage of their naval superiority. Jane (1899) adds that the Ottoman naval inactivity was most probably based on the lack of ammunition, materiel problems, circumstances and the Russian method of using the torpedo than the Ottoman high command's mere fear of the torpedo. All in all, Russia

[136] Russia had to give the island back due to British and French responses. However, it managed to reach an agreement that all European fleets should keep away from the area. This was another example of what navies, without recurring to war, could achieve. Had Russia not possessed a navy, the afore-mentioned treaty which kept all other powers' fleets away would never have come to pass (Ledonne 1997, p.198; Olkhovsky 1992, p.10).

managed to deny the Ottoman Empire control of the sea by waging somewhat successful guerrilla warfare on the sea with very limited resources. As a result, despite the lack of naval power, thanks to successes on land, it defeated the Ottoman Empire decisively. According to Jane (1899), had Russia possessed a comparable naval power to the Porte, the war would not have lasted more than a few weeks. This war was the last important Russian naval endeavor during the reign of Alexander II (Jane 1899, p.180-201; Ledonne 1997, p.138-142; Bridge and Bullen 2005, p.172-173; Stone 2006, p.130-135). His reign had started with defeat in the Crimean War. Subsequently, the poor performance of the Russian army and navy convinced the Russian decision makers that reforms were direly needed for Russia to survive in every sense of the word. As a result, Russia initiated the modernization of not only the navy[137] but of the army[138] as well, stretching from conscription laws, to equipment, and to the education of soldiers and officers alike. Most importantly the navy, along with the army, started to be accepted as a tool for preserving Russian great power status. These modernizations are a direct result of the sobering effect of the Crimean War. The success in the 1877-1878 war, at least on land, seemed to justify the reforms made, although further problems lay ahead (Jane 1899, p.151; Courtney 1954, p.20; Riasanovsky 1993, p.376-379; Kipp 2002, p.153; Stone 2006, p.127-130).

During the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894) naval expenditure kept rising. Towards the end of the 1870s and the beginning of 1880s, Russia felt the need to build a substantial fleet, especially in the Black Sea. This was a direct result of the war with the Ottoman Empire in 1877-1878, during which the Porte had enjoyed a clear naval superiority, which it failed to take advantage of. Additionally, the frontier disputes with China in the Far East, along with the news of Chinese and Japanese plans to expand their fleets, engendered the need to strengthen the forces in the Pacific. The need to expand the Baltic

[137] The brother of the Czar, Grand Duke Constantine initiated and supported the development of the Russian Navy including the modernization of the Baltic forces and the formation of the Pacific forces. Most importantly his reforms included the improvement of the Naval Digest (a naval bulletin) from a "dull official bulletin into a lively journal of discussions" (Kipp 2002, p.153). Additionally, the development of the navy was promoted as similar to its western counterparts with its own industry along with the professionalization of the officers and the introduction of a system of promotion through merit not seniority (Ibid., p.153).

[138] Dmitrii Alekseevich Miliutin was an artillery officer. He started his reforms right after his appointment as War Minister in 1861. These reforms included the improvement of the administration of the field armies, the centralization of the control of the ministry, the decentralization of the administration of the armies, the improvement of equipment, the introduction of universal military service, the improvement of literacy among the soldiers, the expansion of the number of officers by including non-nobles, and the introduction of theoretical debate into the Nikolaev General Staff Academy (Stone 2006, p.127-130).

Fleet was felt too, to counter the expanding German Navy and the combined strengths of the German, Swedish, and Danish fleets. In addition to the potential conflicts with the afore-mentioned states, the director of the Navy Ministry also toyed with the idea of waging a *guerre de course* against British, French, and German commerce, in a potential global conflict, even though the existence of a single supporting port, Vladivostok, made its prospects shaky. In May 1882, a new shipbuilding program was ratified by Alexander III. The priority of the new program was the Black Sea, with the purpose of occupying both sides of the Bosphorus. The objective of the naval expansion there was to establish a Black Sea Fleet equal to the entire Ottoman Fleet in strength. The Black Sea Fleet would include eight ocean-going battleships, three cruisers, and twenty torpedo boats. On the other hand, the war time objective of the Baltic Fleet would be the defense of the coastline against enemy blockade in the case of a war against states with superior fleets. Against states with weaker fleets, the Baltic Fleet was expected to achieve command of the sea with a planned strength of eighteen battleships, twenty coastal defense battleships, twenty gunboats, and 100 torpedo boats. The purpose of the Far Eastern Fleet was to defend critical possessions on the Pacific Coast. This was to be achieved with coastal artilleries, mining, and a fleet of eight gunboats, twelve torpedo boats, and two transport ships. Another focus of the program was the construction of thirty cruisers, with the specific purpose of global commerce raiding. The program was to be completed in twenty years due to a lack of funds. The strategy that guided the program was still mostly based on *jeune école*, with an additional emphasis on establishing a high seas fleet centered around battleships (Jane 1899, p.180-181, 202; Papastratigakis 2011, p.60-77). Therefore, the commerce raiding (especially against Britain), which had started to influence the Russian naval strategy during the reign of Alexander II, kept its pivotal position in Russian naval thinking. This naval expansion envisioned the formation of a navy with no less then twenty battleships, twenty-four cruisers, and eleven gunboats. The planned fleet would have a substantial number of battleships as its backbone, because it was thought to be crucial to obtain a certain number of capital ships. However, its real focus was the building of fast and powerful cruisers with the aim of destroying the enemy seaborne commerce. That being said, until the war with Japan in 1904, there was no official doctrine adopted by the Russian Navy. Tactics mostly favored those promoted by Vice Admiral Stephen Ossipovitch Makarov, the principal ship designer of Russia in the late

Nineteenth Century and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Squadron from March 1904, who attributed great importance to the torpedo craft and the fast cruiser with powerful guns, without ignoring the functions of battleships. He thought that torpedoes had undermined the prospects of blockades and decisive battles, although he never discarded the decisive battle as a part of naval warfare (Watts 1990, p.20; Lovett 2002, p.170; Papastratigakis 2011, p.50-53). The first Russian submarine (built by the British based on a Swedish design) was acquired, although it sank on its way to Russia in 1887. The modernization of the navy continued, along with the increasing pace of the industrialization of Russia. Development focused on armor piercing shells and armor. Even though Russian industrialization seemed to advance Russian shipbuilding capabilities, the *Rurik*[139] example showed that the case might not be so (Watts 1990, p.16; Olkhovsky 1992, p.11-15; Papastratigakis 2011, p.66-69). Souring relations with Germany, the Reinsurance Treaty[140] had not been renewed in 1890, continuing rivalry with Britain, expansion in the Far East and the increasing Japanese resistance there, along with the need to establish a presence in the Turkish Straits, had all contributed to a Russian perception that naval expansion was a necessity. Overall, Russia formulated offensive policies against weaker adversaries in the Baltic and the Black Seas, in the shape of achieving command of the seas and amphibious operations. Against stronger opponents, the Russian fleets would stay on the defensive. The only exception was the planned commercial warfare against Britain, with thirty or so cruisers. On one hand, the wartime objectives of the Russian fleets were somewhat realistic. On the other hand, the fact that Russia, with a GNP equal to Britain, with 1/3 the industrial power, and 1/10 the steel production of Britain in 1880, aimed at obtaining at least twenty battleships of pre-dreadnought class, of which Britain at that time had only ten[141], is curious (Kennedy 1988, p.171-200; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.76). It may even form a precursor to Stalin's

[139] The British, fearing the alleged specifications of this new ship, responded with their own designs that were meant to be superior to *Rurik's*. However, these fears proved to be unfounded when the ship made its first appearance in Kiel Week in 1893. The design of the *Rurik* was obsolete by some twenty years, with its sailing masts (Olkhovsky 1992, p.15).

[140] The Treaty of Reinsurance was a secret agreement between Germany and Russia when the Dreikaiserbund, also known as the three Emperors' Alliance or the League of Three Emperors, ended in 1887. According to the treaty, in the case of war, with the exceptions of a German attack upon France or a Russian attack upon Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia promised each other neutrality (Riasanovsky 1993, p.399; Abrams 2006, p.45).

[141] While Britain had only ten pre-dreadnought class battleships, it had numerous other armored warships (Conway's 1979, p.2-113; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.76).

Ocean-Going Fleet, in the sense that both constitute an ambitious naval expansion with a purpose other than the physical security of the state and that is not in line with the economic realities of the state. Especially if one considers the existence of a pamphlet published by Alexander Mikhailovich, brother of Nicholas II, which argued that the need to "enhance Russia's prestige and dignity as a great power" against enemies in the Far East required the establishment of a capable fleet there. Interestingly, this pamphlet was supported by many important naval officers (Papastratigakis 2011, p.132). Hence, it entails further study so as to understand its origin and purpose, but it is out of the scope of this work.

The reign of Nicholas II (1894-1917) witnessed one of the lowest points in Russian naval history. The expansion of the fleet undertaken since 1882 was wasted away during the war with Japan. Russia had been more or less successful against the Swedish and the Ottoman Navies in the Baltic and the Black Seas respectively. However, it was never put to the test against a state which used naval power so efficiently until 1904 (Courtney 1954, p.21). In the face of Britain's superior naval power, it had backed down more than once and avoided direct naval confrontation in 1726 in the Baltic and in 1861 in Tsushima. Until its defeat at the hands of the Japanese, the Russian decision makers, least of all Czar Nicholas II had not expected Japan to have a formidable naval power, nor considered it as a potential rival prior to the war with Japan (Stone 2006, p.138). This attitude had not changed, even though the Russian naval attaché in Japan had reported in 1895 that Japan was expanding its navy, that it had purchased two battleships from Britain, and it was becoming a formidable naval opponent. Russia had reached the Pacific in the Seventeenth Century and by the end of the Nineteenth Century was in possession of the mouth of the Amur River, Kamchatka, the entire continental coast of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Island of Sakhalin[142]. After the surrender of the entirety of the Kuril Archipelago to Japan in 1875, the Sea of Okhotsk had become a closed sea for Russia and, as a result, Vladivostok was denied access to the open sea. Subsequently, Russia had no option for access to open sea with ice-free ports, but to expand southwards into Korea and Manchuria. However, Japan too was coveting Korea up to the Yalu River, for

[142] Until 1875 Russia was in control of the northern half of the island. They also possessed some of the Kuril Islands. In a treaty with Japan in 1875, Russia abandoned all the Kuril Islands it possessed in exchange for the annexation of the southern part of Sakhalin Island (Ledonne 1997, p.196-197).

expansion, overseas markets, and against the Russian expansion through Manchuria towards the Yalu River. Hence, a conflict between the two powers was becoming increasingly likely. Japan had finally managed to separate Korea from China, when it defeated the latter in the 1894-1895 war. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) won Korean independence, which was in fact a preliminary stage for Japanese dominance of the peninsula. It additionally conquered Taiwan, and more importantly claimed the Liaodong Peninsula, which is part of southern Manchuria. However, the Japanese advance into Korea was not acceptable to Russia. Japanese control of the peninsula would mean the bottling up of the Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk, just as the enemy control of the Turkish Straits would in the Black Sea, since Japan already controlled the Kuril Islands, the other possible exit from that sea to the Pacific Ocean. Subsequently, Russian pressure, with the support of France and Germany, forced Japan to cede back the Liaodung Peninsula to the Chinese. In the aftermath of its "help" against the Japanese, Russia managed to lease[143] Port Arthur in 1898 in that same peninsula. It was already able to convince China in 1895 to allow it to extend the Trans-Siberian railroad, which would now pass through Manchuria to link Moscow with Vladivostok. Another concession was extracted in 1898, along with the lease of Port Arthur, to link it with the Trans-Siberian Railroad. These acts were a direct and open challenge to Japan according to Ledonne (1997). Since Korea had become independent, Russian and Japanese competition then revolved around it. The Russian efforts to increase its influence in Korea intensified. It helped to strengthen Korea militarily against Japan, while Japan initiated a military build-up against Russia. Further Russian encroachments[144] into the Chinese core area toward Peking, and its rejection of allowing Japan to do the same in Korea had started to convince Japan that the issue might not be solved through negotiations. The British-Japanese Alliance of 1902, along with French and German support for China during the 1901 negotiations, forced the Russians to stop their efforts at incorporating southern Manchuria

[143] As a matter of fact, the price China had to pay for Russian support was Russian intervention in Chinese finances and a military alliance. It was able to lease Port Arthur following Germany's lease of Kiaochow in the Shantung Peninsula, just south of Liaodong Peninsula, and thanks to additional Chinese financial problems. These problems also allowed Russia to extract railroad and industrial building concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia (Ledonne 1997, p.200-203).

[144] In addition to their efforts to incorporate the whole of Manchuria, in 1901 another concession was demanded. Instead of reparations for the damage done to Russian property during the Boxer Rebellion, Russia would be allowed to extend the Manchurian railroad web toward the Great Wall "in the direction of Peking" (Ledonne 1997, p.210-211). However, these negotiations were broken off because of British, French, and German support of China (Ledonne 1997, p.212).

and extending the Trans-Siberian Railroad toward Peking. However, the Russo-Japanese conflict over Korea could not be solved. Japan's proposals[145] of establishing spheres of influence for both powers went nowhere, and until 1904 negotiations failed to produce a stable border (Ledonne 1997, p.31-213; Riasanovsky 1993, p.402-403; Sondhaus 2001, p.187; Papastratigakis 2011, p.93-245).

The Russian naval requirements during the reign of Czar Nicholas II were greater than the state could meet, and their strategic calculations had stayed the same since 1882, with the exception of the Far East. In the Baltic, the fleet needed to be ready either against Germany or Britain, both of which were stronger. Russia could not win a naval arms race against Germany due to the lack of funds, and standing up against the Royal Navy was out of the question. However, it could still support the army by protecting its flanks and help defend the coastline, especially near the capital. Interestingly, it was argued by Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, Nicholas II's uncle and the General Admiral, P.S Vannovskii, the Minister of War in 1895, A. B. Lobanov-Rostovskii, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1895, N. M. Chikhachev, the Director of the Navy Ministry in 1895, General N. N. Obruchev, and Vice Admiral O. K. Kremer that Russia still needed to obtain a battlefleet in the Baltic. They argued that this would increase Russia's alliance value in the French minds, because it would distract the powerful German Navy from concentrating its might toward the French Navy alone. While the Black Sea Fleet was stronger than its Ottoman counterpart, the possibility of British intervention there required Russia to seize both sides of the Bosphorus. Additionally, this possibility required the Russian Black Sea Fleet to be able to blockade it against such an incursion. The rise of Japan in the Far East added a third to the potential naval enemies of Russia. It also required the Russian Pacific forces to be equal to Japan's, at least in terms of battlefleet capability, which was in 1895 inferior. Additionally, Russia needed an ice-free port for supplying its fleets, which fueled the Russian drive southward. Some argued, including a report on the war games conducted by the Nicholas Naval Academy, the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, brother of Nicholas II, and Chikhachev, that Russia needed to conduct a commerce warfare with cruisers. In opposition to this view others, including Vice Admiral S. O. Makarov deemed it difficult due to the lack of sufficient bases and

[145] Japan had proposed or was inclined to an agreement which would leave Korea to Japan and Manchuria to Russia (Ledonne 1997, p.208, 213).

cruisers. Even though the program that had been ratified in 1882 envisioned some thirty cruisers for such operations, in 1895 Russia possessed only two such vessels. An additional problem was that only the naval base of Vladivostok could offer support to such operations. One interesting view was that of S. Iu. Witte, the Minister of Finance since 1892. He argued that Russia was a continental power and should not imitate Japan's naval build-up. He advocated that Russia should prop up its army in the Far East and focus on the development of the Trans-Siberian Railroad for the quick deployment of further troops and supplies in the case of a war. Toward the end of 1895, the Czar had ratified such a program which would fortify Vladivostok and increase Russian land power there; however, not as a result of such thinking but as a direct result of Japanese armaments increases in its army (Papastratigakis 2011, p.36-184).

In 1895, the Czar ratified a shipbuilding program with the final purpose of enhancing the Russian Navy against German battleships in the Baltic, and against British and Japanese battleships in the Far East, and in order to conduct *guerre de course* against both. The Black Sea Fleet would receive improvements, to make it ready for the eventual capture of the Bosphorus. Accordingly, the Russian Baltic Fleet would be reinforced by five battleships, four coastal defense battleships, six protected cruisers of 6,000 tons, one smaller cruiser of 4,000 tons, three gunboats, five destroyers, and further smaller torpedo vessels. The Black Sea Fleet would receive an additional battleship, two protected cruisers, two minelayers, and some transports. The forces in the Far East would be strengthened by two gunboats and would receive additional battleships in the case of an emergency. The program had not focused on the Far East because of two reasons. Russia had not possessed sufficient funds for expanding in both the Baltic and the Far East. Second, the Russian authorities had given priority to the Baltic, because they considered Germany as a more immediate threat to Russian physical security. Additionally, they were not yet aware of the major Japanese naval expansion apart from two battleships. However, Japan was already on its way to forming a navy centered around battleships. After the lease of Port Arthur in 1898, reinforcing the Russian Pacific forces received priority, since now Russia had an ice-free port in that theater and was aware of the scope of Japanese naval expansion. Subsequently, a new shipbuilding program was ratified in February 1898. The program included, by 1899, five battleships, four protected cruisers of 6000 tons, four light cruisers of 3000 tons, twenty destroyers, ten torpedo boats, and

two minelayers. In 1904, a final shipbuilding program was ratified by Nicholas II. At the time of its completion in 1914, the Black Sea Fleet would be bolstered by seven battleships, two medium cruisers, and twenty-eight destroyers. The Baltic Fleet would receive nine battleships, two armored cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and ten submarines. Since the 1898 program would make the Far East Fleet equal to the Japanese, it would only get gunboats, torpedo craft, and submarines in the 1904 shipbuilding program (Papastratigakis 2011, p.111-234).

In order to grasp the fundamentals of the war with Japan, one must also understand the Russian geopolitical situation in the Far East. Russian territories there were at a great distance from its core area. They were connected to its center only through the Trans-Siberian Railroad upon which supplies, and communications depended. Additionally, the Russian army there was quantitatively inferior to the Japanese, and would certainly require further deployments in wartime. While the latter could be supplied and reinforced through the sea via multiple nearby naval bases situated in and around Japan, the former needed supplies and troops to be brought by railroad over vast distances. Hence, Japan could deploy its troops anywhere, as long as it had command of the seas. Another problem was added to these. The Russian Army needed to defend Port Arthur as well, which was situated nearly 1,000 miles away from Vladivostok. Defending Port Arthur could be accomplished either over land or over sea which would require a Russian command of the seas. A final problem lay in the vast distances separating the Russian fleets. By 1904, Russian decision makers had come to the conclusion that they had strengthened the Far East Fleet enough, and they started focusing on the Black Sea due to financial constraints. Furthermore, a significant part of the Far East Fleet would be incorporated into the Baltic Fleet. Therefore, they additionally reasoned that in time of war, the Baltic Fleet would support a war in the Far East. Papastratigakis (2011), while evaluating that this was a dangerous strategy, comments that it was the only viable one (2011, p.171-172, 234).

When war broke out in January 1904, the Russian Pacific Fleet had seven old battleships, with an additional one coming from the Mediterranean, four armored and seven protected cruisers, six gunboats, twenty-seven destroyers, ten torpedo boats, and two minelayers. The Japanese Fleet, on the other hand, had six modern battleships, plus the ex-Chinese battleship *Chin Yen*, eight armored and twelve protected cruisers, eight gunboats, twenty-

seven destroyers, and nineteen torpedo boats. An overall assessment of capital ships, which included battleships and armored cruisers, reveal that Japan had a qualitative advantage. The Russian ports in Vladivostok and Port Arthur were also in need of further defensive and infrastructure upgrades. The Trans-Siberian Railroad, although nearing completion, was still unfinished. Diplomatic relations, which had been deteriorating since summer 1903, were severed between Japan and Russia for some time (from 5 February) when ten Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur on the night of 8 February 1904, damaging and putting two battleships out of action temporarily. The first naval battle[146] on 9 February was indecisive. Another battle in south Korea cost the Russians one protected cruiser and one gunboat. The Russians lost Commander Makarov when his flagship struck a mine on 13 April, leaving Russia with six battleships. By now, Port Arthur was blockaded. Hence, the Russian Far East Fleet was unable to interrupt Japanese landings on the Korean Peninsula. On 10 August, the Russian fleet made another attempt at breaking the blockade to join with the forces of the Vladivostok squadron which had four cruisers. The Port Arthur squadron had six battleships, four cruisers, and fourteen destroyers against the Japanese fleet of four battleships, two armored cruisers, eight smaller cruisers, and forty-eight destroyers and torpedo boats. The Japanese won the engagement, forcing the Port Arthur squadron to return to port with only five battleships, a cruiser, and nine destroyers. The rest of the squadron, one battleship, two cruisers, and four destroyers were interned in foreign ports. One cruiser was forced aground off Sakhalin on its way to Vladivostok. Meanwhile, four cruisers of the Vladivostok squadron had been waging a successful war against Japanese commerce and troop transports around Japan. However, when they tried to link up with the Port Arthur squadron, they failed and lost one cruiser, and the rest returned to harbor never to leave again during the war. The rest of the ships in Port Arthur were destroyed or scuttled during the siege of the port. In the meantime, the Russian Baltic Fleet with a force of five[147]

[146] The Russian fleet of five battleships and six cruisers (one armored, three protected, and two light cruisers) engaged the Japanese fleet consisting of six battleships and nine cruisers (five armored and four protected) (Watts 1990, p.20).

[147] The number of modern battleships is indicated as five because the battleship *Osliabia* was a relatively new ship when the war broke out. However, there is a difference in modern battleships between Grove (1998) who counts four and Lovett (2002) who counts five. That is because while Grove (1998) only counted the four newest battleships of Borodino Class and classified the rest as "older" while Lovett (2002) includes *Osliabia*, laid down in 1895 and commissioned in 1901, as part of the modern battleships. This difference is however not very crucial because in the following pages of his work Grove counted *Osliabia*

modern battleships, two older battleships, four cruisers and eight destroyers, along with at least seven auxiliaries had sailed to assist the Pacific Fleet. However, sending the Black Sea Fleet had not been possible. Before the arrival of the relief force, after a five months siege, Port Arthur fell on 2 January 1905. The Baltic Fleet continued nevertheless and was joined in May by another squadron comprising three coastal defense ships, an old ironclad, and an older armored cruiser that had sailed from the Baltic through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. Subsequently, the entire fleet reached Korean waters at the end of May 1905. The Russians had at their disposal twelve capital ships. Five of these were modern battleships, pre-dreadnoughts, four of 13,500 tons and one with 12,683 tons displacement. Four others were obsolete battleships, one of 10,400 tons, another of 10,200 tons, a third amounting to 9,672 tons, and a last one which was more of an armored cruiser with 8,500 tons displacement. Again, as part of their capital ships, they had three coastal defense battleships with displacements of 5,000 tons. They also had five cruisers, of which three[148] (all protected cruisers) were modern, two lighter cruisers[149] with scout properties, several destroyers, an armed yacht, five armed merchantmen, and eight smaller vessels. The Japanese, on the other hand, had four modern battleships[150], two of 15,200 tons, one of 14,850 tons, another with 12,500 tons of displacement. Eight modern armored cruisers were added to this force. Two of these were of 9,750 tons, a couple of 9,700 tons, one other of 9,646 tons, with one more of 9,370 tons, and two more with around 7,500 tons displacements. To supplement this force, the Japanese had eight protected cruisers[151], nineteen destroyers or torpedo-boat destroyers as they were called at the time[152]. Besides this main fighting force, the Japanese had three cruisers of 4,217 tons, the former Chinese battleship *Chin Yen*, twenty-seven gunboats, eight older ships (one armored, three protected, two unprotected cruisers, and two twenty-five year old gunboats), and ten additional vessels of various types, including support and scouting

as part of the modern battleships of the Russian forces (Watts 1990, p.47; Grove 1998, p.11-14; Lovett 2002, p.176).

[148] One of the modern cruisers had 6,645 tons of displacement while the other had 3,727 tons. The last one was the cruiser *Aurora* with 6,823 tons of displacement (Watts 1990, p.92; Grove 1998, p.16).

[149] They had 3,100 tons of displacement (Grove 1998, p.16).

[150] For more information on the Japanese battleships, look at Conway's 1979 (Conway's 1979, p.221).

[151] A couple of these protected cruisers had 5,000 tons, two had 3,650 tons, one more had 3,366 tons, another pair amounted to 3,000 tons, and a final one had 2,756 tons of displacement (Conway's 1979, p.226-230; Grove 1998, p.19)

[152] These ships were designed specifically to destroy torpedo boats hence they were named torpedo-boat destroyers (Panzac 2018, p.410-411).

ships. While Russia had a quantitative advantage in battleships, Japan had a qualitative advantage. The Russian fleet was a patchwork of modern and obsolete ships, which led to organizational and tactical problems. It even had coastal defense battleships, as if the Russian leadership had thrown everything they had got into the fight without thinking much about naval doctrine. Japan, on the other hand, had a homogeneous fleet with a clear purpose. This characteristic, along with better leadership, organization, tactics, equipment, communication, ammunition, gunnery, and training, led to a more efficient fleet. The Battle of Tsushima started on 27 May. Within a day and a half, most of the Russian fleet, including all the battleships, four[153] surrendering to the Japanese, were lost. Only three smaller vessels[154] were able to reach Vladivostok, while most of the surviving vessels were either captured by Japan or interned in neutral ports (Watts 1990, p.19-23, 33, 42; Grove 1998, p.10-45; Sondhaus 2001, p.188-191; Lovett 2002, p.172-177; Stone 2006, p.138-140, 147-148; Papastratigakis 2011, p.259-266).

Mahan was proven right. A state which had continental borders to defend could not compete, in terms of naval power, with a state which had no or negligible continental borders. Russia had vast continental borders, it was a pure continental power, the elephant. Whereas Japan was more akin to a seapower, the whale. The sea was the natural domain of the whale; hence, Russia was defeated at sea, and the defeat of the Russian fleet was decisive. Subsequently, Russia was forced to sue for peace. With the mediation of the United States, the engaging parties signed the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Russia ceded the Liaodong Peninsula including Port Arthur and the southern part of Sakhalin Island to Japan. It also retreated from southern Manchuria, including the railroad linking the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Japan also gained a free hand in Korea (Grove 1998, p.45-46; Sondhaus 2001, p.191-192; Lovett 2002, p.177; Stone 2006, p.148). Even though the Japanese victory at sea was decisive, the war on land was not, since Russia was still a formidable opponent on land, even after losing most of its naval power. In addition, Japan had neared exhaustion and could not sustain its offensive over land much longer. Had the Russian political situation at home been more stable, ever

[153] Stone (2006) indicates that two Russian battleships surrendered, while Watts (1990) counts four battleships. The difference in number is caused by the method of counting battleships. Stone (2006) very likely did not include the two coastal defense battleships *Admiral Seniavin* and *Admiral Graf Apraxin* while Watts (1990) included them (Watts 1990, p.23; Stone 2006, p.148).
[154] The armed yacht *Almaz* of 3,285 tons and two destroyers (Watts 1990, p.23; Lovett 2002, p.177).

increasing Russian troop numbers in Siberia, through the recently completed Trans-Siberian Railroad, reaching a million by the end of the war, could have enabled them to obtain better peace terms (Grove 1998, p.46; Stone 2006 p.148). While it looked as if Russian physical security was threatened once more by naval power, in fact disturbances at home had brought Russia down, not the defeat at sea. Furthermore, considering the increasing troop numbers it is very doubtful that Japan could have continued its successful campaign on land, hence both governments were eager to make peace. Russian physical security seemed set to continue to depend upon the strength of its army, and its loyalty to the regime.

Following defeat at the hands of Japan, the Russian Navy embarked on a few different shipbuilding programs in 1909 and 1912, yet by 1914 it had recovered neither materially nor morally, nor were the programs anywhere near completion (Courtney 1954, p.21; Hudson 1976, p.43; Watts 1990, p.23-25; Olkhovsky 1992, p.16). After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Russian naval power had sunk to its lowest point in history to that date, and Russian prestige and status took a severe blow with defeat at the hands of an Asian power. It plummeted even lower with the Potemkin Mutiny later in 1905.

During the First World War, when compared to its army, the Imperial Russian Navy contributed less to the Entente war effort. This was mostly true, with one very important exception. The grounding of the German light cruiser SMS *Magdeburg* led to the capture of German naval codebooks, which helped the British naval war effort against the Imperial German Navy. Besides this, the Russian Baltic Fleet stayed on the defensive, focusing on minelaying and submarine operations (Watts 1990, p.25-27). The Russian Black Sea Fleet of five pre-dreadnoughts, three cruisers, seventeen destroyers, and four submarines had two enemies. One was Germany, which had the German battlecruiser SMS *Goeben* and the German light cruiser SMS *Breslau* in the Black Sea, against which the Russian ships were slower (Watts 1990, p.27-29). Overall, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was used much more offensively than its Baltic counterpart. The Russian Pacific Fleet could not have recovered from its devastation in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. However, the Russian Navy's contribution to the First World War was only marginal, and did not affect the outcome of the war (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.286). Yet it must be remembered that one of the characteristics of the First World War

was the relatively small impact of naval power (Cable 1998, p.99). In this sense, the Russian Navy was no exception in its insufficient contribution to the war effort.

The war showed once again the importance of the Russian Army for the physical security of the state. Russia was able to push into Germany and Austria-Hungary, defend its western border, pin down crucial German divisions on the Eastern Front and relieve France and Britain on the western front, all thanks to its army. The Russian Navy, although used somewhat effectively, especially defensively in the Baltic and the Black Seas, contributed little to the main Russian war effort. The existence of four distant theaters also hindered the effectiveness of the Imperial Navy. The only arena in which Russian naval power could have been partly important for the physical security of the state was the Black Sea. Had the Russians achieved naval superiority there and established a capable Black Sea Fleet for amphibious operations, they could have tried to occupy the Turkish Straits, therefore enabling Britain and France to send vital supplies to Russia; although this is completely hypothetical, since even though the naval superiority of the Entente Powers enabled them to initiate a landing in Gallipoli, it failed miserably. There is no telling that the same thing would not have happened to a Russian landing attempt as well.

In the aftermath of the October Revolution, the Imperial Russian Army rapidly collapsed, and the Bolsheviks could not stop the German advance. Therefore, they had to sign one of the most severe peace treaties ever enforced. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March 1918. The Bolsheviks gave up Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and Ukraine, and had to cede Ardahan, Batum, and Kars to the Ottoman Empire. At one stroke, Russia had returned to its Eighteenth-century frontiers in eastern Europe. It lost nearly 26% of its population, in addition to 73% of its iron and 89% of its coal production. It lost 1.3 million square miles, nearly a third of its arable land, a third of its factories, a quarter of its railroad network. Following the signing of the treaty, the Allies, now Britain, France, Japan, and the United States, landed troops from all quarters to establish a front against the Central Powers. After the defeat of Germany, these landings became part of the Civil War as they supported, most importantly with supplies, the enemy of the Bolsheviks, the White Russians, or Whites. In 1919, the Whites were in control of the North Caucasus, from the Urals to the Pacific, and a small territory in the Baltic. However, their lack of

coordination and the Bolshevik control of central Russia, along with its industrial base, the railroad network, and intact interior lines of communication allowed the Bolsheviks to crush their enemies by 1920, even though significant regional resistance, peasant and separatist, in Central Asia, The Caucasus, and Siberia to Bolshevik rule continued until 1922 (Tucker 2001, p.157; Riasanovsky 1993, p.477-478, 483-487; Stone 2006, p.177-183).

Even though the Civil War confirmed the importance of the army and its loyalty to the ruling regime, some have pointed out that if the state had owned fleets capable of defending the coastline, enemy landings in the Soviet territory might never have taken place. Therefore, the Civil War would have been won at a lower cost and in a shorter time (Ranft and Till 1983, p.152-153).

Under Lenin, Russian naval power reached an even lower point. The most significant act of the Soviet Navy in the period was also its first. The cruiser *Aurora* of the Baltic Fleet entered into Leningrad on 7 November, 1917, through the Neva river, and fired at the Winter Palace, where the then head of the Russian Provisional Government, Aleksandr Kerensky was staying, an act which signalled the Bolshevik takeover of the state (Klare 1975-76, p.89; Ranft and Till 1983, p.60). Despite its contribution to the Bolshevik seizure of power, the navy was neglected under Lenin's leadership. Olkhovsky (1992) argues that the reason for this neglect was Lenin's view that the fleet was a "manifestation of imperialist nations" (Olkhovsky 1992, p.18). Whereas Klare (1975-1976) argues that, even though Lenin was interested in the development of Soviet naval power, the state of the economy did not permit its development (Klare 1975-76, p.89-90). Whatever the real reason was, after 1921, following the Kronstadt Mutiny, the Soviet Navy was no longer seen as politically reliable, and thus it was further downgraded[155] and put under the Commissariat of Defense, which was mostly controlled by the Army. Due to neglect, its tonnage fell from 548,000 to 82,000 tons. This was the lowest point in Russian/Soviet naval power in nearly three centuries (Olkhovsky 1992, p.18-19).

[155] According to Olkhovsky, had Trotsky, then the Defense Commissar, not intervened, Lenin would have disbanded the Soviet Navy (Ranft and Till 1983, p.86; Olkhovsky 1992, p.19).

Even though Russian naval power fluctuated, its navy was, for the most part of the last 200 years, the third or fourth most powerful in terms of warships with the exception of the years 1729-1770 and the decade leading up to the First World War. It even ranked second between 1832 and 1855 (MccGwire 1971, p.93; MccGwire 1979, p.135; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.68-76). It must also be remembered that the expansion of the fleet depended upon individual leaders' dedication, whereas the driver of Russian naval strategy should have been geography. Moreover, while the geography required a defensive fleet, individual leaders sometimes favored an offensive fleet, contrary to the dictates of geography. However, Russia/USSR was and is a continental power whose physical security needs rest on the improvement of the army. Threats to its physical security have mostly emanated from the land, and thus the army was and is the main source of physical security. It acquired, defended, or held onto its territory through its armies (Baldwin 1955, p.600; MccGwire 1979, p.136). Even the strength of the ruling regime depended upon the loyalty of the army, as proven in the 1905 revolution, in the removal of the Czar in 1917, or in the enforced industrialization and collectivization of agriculture during the Bolshevik rule. Besides defending themselves from naval threats, Russian fleets were of secondary importance for vital security needs, with the notable exceptions of the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. However, even in those wars, the weaknesses of the regime, weak/non-existent internal supply lines, and inadequate training, along with under-equipment of the army, inability to concentrate forces overwhelmingly in one theater due to geographical considerations, structural, strategic, domestic and foreign threats, and international isolation contributed more to the defeat. During the Crimean War, Russia could not deploy troops rapidly or in sufficient numbers, nor could it supply its forces in the main theater of the war faster than Britain or France could deploy soldiers or supply their own via the sea from their own bases in Britain and France. Russia had to accept defeat in 1905, despite having amassed enough troops in the Far East against Japan and despite Japanese exhaustion, not only because the Russian battlefleet was annihilated at the battle of Tsushima but also because of the brewing domestic trouble and the weakness of the regime (Ranft and Till 1983, p.59-61; Kennedy 1988, p.173-174; Riasanovsky 1993, p.344-347; Rath 2015, p.20-23; Mitchell 2018, p.270).

Additionally, the navy was understood as and mostly used as a supportive and a defensive element. Even the seemingly aggressive Russian foreign policy of acquiring warm water ports was ultimately a defensive one. In wartime, the fleets were the supporters of the army and they were not independent actors. This was the case in the Russo-Ottoman Wars, Russo-Swedish Wars and the First World War. Against the Ottomans, while Russian naval power helped in achieving victory in the Azov Campaigns in the Seventeenth Century, in Çeşme during the 1768-1774 war, and in Navarino in 1827, the lack of it did not hinder victory in the 1877-1878 war. Russian armies were able to achieve victory without naval support. On the other hand, Russian fleets contributed significantly to victory against Sweeden, since it had considerable naval power. However, without victories on land, naval power would not have been able to weaken and defeat Sweden on its own. The bases on the shores of the Baltic had been conquered and held onto by Russian armies in the first place, so that Russia could create its own naval power. Additionally, Russian naval power certainly did not contribute to conquests in Poland and Central Asia. Nor was it instrumental in keeping those territories in Russian hands. The navy never was the primary instrument of conquest or foreign policy, with maybe the exceptions of securing the Ussuri region, the annexation of Tsushima which was given back following international pressure, and the cession of Port Arthur, after Russia had notified Japan that it was sending a modern battleship squadron to the Pacific. Overall, Russian naval power was always secondary and supplementary in terms of Russian physical security, foreign policy, and conquests. This was possibly due to the geographical characteristics of the state, which made Russia a continental power with vast land borders. This in turn required a strong army for protection. The geography and favorable internal lines of communication had also facilitated Russian expansion over land until it reached its maritime borders and political resistance from Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. From then on, geography and the slow pace of Russian industrial development started to hinder the Russian expansion, just as it hindered the development of Russian naval power. Because of geography, the Russian borders in 1914 required the Russian Navy to cover four separate seas with vast distances in between. Its fleets were further obstructed by political obstacles from supporting each other. These difficulties prevented the concentration of the entire naval might of the state into one overwhelming force. Mahan argued against the division of the fleet. Instead he

advocated concentrating the entire strength of the fleet upon a fraction of the enemy fleet; however, Russia could not do that. In fact, it had to do the opposite. The Soviet Navy inherited this geopolitical challenge from its predecessor (Mahan 1898, p.29; Baldwin 1955, p.600-601; Ledonne 1997, p.198; Lieven 2000, p.268, 273; Lovett 2002, p.169).

7.2.DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE AND NAVAL PLANS IN THE USSR

The State of the Navy in The Aftermath of the Civil War and the Early Soviet Era

In the early 1920s, the Red Navy was more of a liability than an asset. It could still be considered as a champion of the Revolution, however. Even before *Aurora* participated in the Bolshevik takeover, the Russian Navy, at least part of it, had taken part in revolutionary activity during the 1905 Revolution. Since January 1905, a widespread series of strikes along with a general peasant's revolt had broken out across the country. In June, the Russian prospects of winning the war with Japan were dim, Port Arthur had been lost along with the Pacific Fleet there. The Baltic Fleet, or the so-called Second and Third Pacific Squadrons, sent for the relief of the port had been destroyed in the battle of Tsushima in May. Furthermore, the Black Sea Fleet could not take part in the war to fight alongside them. Most of the experienced officers and ratings were sent to the Pacific for the war effort. Subsequently, the command of the ships was in less capable hands and as a consequence the morale of the fleet was low. Sparked by refusal to eat bad food, the sailors of the ship *Potemkin*, the fastest and the most powerful ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, rebelled and took over the command. It then sailed to Odessa, a city troubled with revolutionary fervor. The *Potemkin*'s arrival fueled the unrest into an open uprising, although *Potemkin* contributed little to the action beyond firing a few rounds of six-inch shells. As a response, part of the Russian Black Sea Fleet including battleships were sent to quell the mutiny. Even though the arrival of the Russian ships threatened the safety of *Potemkin*, the refusal of sailors in other ships to engage their fellow sailors in armed conflict allowed *Potemkin* and its sailors' mutiny to continue. It was even joined by one of the battleships, at which point the squadron sent against *Potemkin* returned to Sevastopol. By now the mutineers had in their possession five ships including two battleships. However, the other battleship eventually decided to abandon the mutiny and

ran aground in the Odessa harbor, leaving *Potemkin* the sole battleship in mutiny. By now government authority within Odessa had been reestablished and providing provisions for the ship's needs, especially coal, was getting increasingly difficult. Following the discouragement of the loss of their fellow revolutionary battleship, *Potemkin* was forced to leave Odessa due to their lack of supplies and went to Constanza, where it was again refused any supplies or coal. It then left for Feodosia where it was allowed to get supplies but no coal. It sailed for the last time back to Odessa and surrendered. Even though the incident did not last long, it became an important part of revolutionary history in Russia and a signal of the dreadful state of the Russian Navy (Bennett 1959, p.415-422; Seton-Watson 1965, p.221; Hough 1975, p.11-20, 36-83, 102-147; Watts 1990, p.23-24).

The First World War and the subsequent Civil War too eroded the status of the Russian Navy, both in terms of physical and political reliability. The Baltic Fleet lost many ships during its Ice Cruise of 1918 to avoid capture by Germany during the peace talks of Brest-Litovsk. Important maritime resources and population were lost under the same treaty following the liberation of the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The entire Black Sea and Northern Sea Fleets were captured by the enemies of the Bolsheviks during the Civil War. The Soviet Navy's total displacement in 1921 was 16.2% of the Russian Imperial Fleet of 1917. The entire Soviet Navy had to drawn on this 16.2% residue. Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, most of these ships were in need of repair or modernization, which was not possible due to the lack of funds. Subsequently, most of the Baltic Fleet had to be sold to Germany for scrap materials, in exchange for foreign currency. Even if all the Soviet ships were to be repaired, its fleets were too weak[156] for a state like the USSR. The naval industry of the state was in ruins as well. In 1921, the Soviet shipyards could only produce 8% of their 1913 capacity. The almost nonexistent naval industry until the late 1920s made the revival of Soviet naval power all the more difficult (Herrick 1971, p.4, 8; the US Dept of the Navy 1991, p.7; Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.837-838; Hauner 2004, p.98; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.8-9).

[156] Olkhovsky claims that the Red Navy's tonnage fell from 548,000 to 82,000. It must be remembered that the Soviets had demanded, at the Rome Naval Conference in 1924, that their limit for capital ship tonnage should be 490,000 tons. In the light of this evidence 82,000 tons total tonnage was way below what a state like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expected to have even in the early 1920s (Olkhovsky 1992, p.19; Silverlock 2003, p.200).

The actions of the Baltic Fleet ship *Aurora* in toppling the Russian Provisional government had made the fleet a politically reliable tool in the eyes of the Soviet Party Officials. However, this feeling was soon erased by the Kronstadt Mutiny in 1921. On 1 March 1921, the sailors in the Kronstadt naval base, along with the workers there, joined together in a revolt against the Communist Party. More specifically, the mutineers were demanding the Party relinquish its tight control over the government and to share it with non-communist parties. They were also demanding wide-ranging reforms concerning the economy and politics including freedom of speech, assembly, and the press. They were additionally demanding that the voting system be rearranged into a secret ballot system. However, these demands were refused, and the Red Army was sent to suppress the mutiny which succeeded after three unsuccessful attempts. The navy had a reputation as a reliable agent of the revolution due to its assistance in the capture of the Winter Palace and the downfall of the Provisional Government in 1917. In a few days, this reputation was tarnished for years to come. From then on, the fleet began to be viewed with suspicion by the Soviet Government (Herrick 1971, p.4-8). Consequently, it was put under the command of the Commissariat of Defense, which was mostly controlled by the Army. The officers of the navy constituted another problem. Even though some Czarist Officers were removed from their posts, a significant number, almost 80% at the beginning of the 1920s, held onto their positions, which added to the political unreliability of the navy. Even a significant number of the newly appointed communist officers, who were inexperienced, were watched suspiciously by the Communist Party. In sum, the economic problems of the USSR, the political and economic devastation of the First World War and the Civil War, and the prioritizing of the army over the navy made the revival of Soviet naval power very unlikely until the mid-late 1920s (Herrick 1971, p. 11-12, 16-17; Hudson 1976, p.43; Kokoshin 1998, p.77; Hauner 2004, p.98-99; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.7-10).

The Debate

Russia was never a seapower in the sense that Britain was. Its geography did not allow Russia, by preventing the concentration of Russian fleets into one theater, to use naval power in the way seapowers could. Nor did it require Russia to possess vast fleets for physical security. Despite this fact, Russia always had the third or fourth largest navy

among Britain, France, Spain, and The Netherlands with the most warships, for the past 200 years. This was a fact, even though its naval power fluctuated, which had been a characteristic for continental powers or for states whose interests of expansion or physical security lay on land. This drive for naval power emanated mostly from individual leaders whose interests fueled the naval expansion. Additionally, Russia had its fair share of innovative activity concerning warfare at sea. The experimental uses of high explosive shells, the torpedo, and the mine were part of the Russian history of naval innovation. Continuous historical ranking among the most powerful navies and the importance of individual leadership in naval expansion were important legacies for the USSR. However, the development of Soviet naval power took a somewhat different form in the years preceding Stalin. When it recovered from the Civil War and an economic recovery had been achieved[157], its leaders' will to revive Soviet naval power renewed, especially after the mid-1920s. However, the form this renewal took, although influenced by ideology and a party perspective, was not the dictate of a single leader. Consequently, it eventually took the form of a defensive fleet, which potentially reflected actual Soviet naval needs, in striking contrast to Stalin's shipbuilding plans (MccGwire 1971, p.93-94; Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.69-76, 283-286; Ringmar 2002, p.125).

The Old School

The question was, what kind of a navy would the USSR have? Until 1928, Soviet naval thinking was dominated by the Old/Traditional School. This was similar to the 1890s when it was under the guidance of Professor Major-General Nikolai L. Klado, a follower of Mahanian naval thought. The Soviet Naval Doctrine in the 1920s followed this line, with Professor Boris B. Gervais of the Naval War College and Mikhail A. Petrov, author of the Naval Tactical Manual and the first draft of the Naval Battle Instructions, who were themselves followers of Klado's teachings and Mahanian thought. They advocated that the Soviet Navy needed a high seas fleet with battleships[158] as the primary weapon. The main purpose of this fleet was to achieve a Mahanian command of the adjacent seas through decisive battles and to defend its coastlines against any possible enemy landings

[157] Agricultural recovery happened in 1928 when land productivity reached its 1914 levels (Lovett 2002, p.186).
[158] Even though the battleship was emphasized, aircraft carriers, battlecruisers, and submarines were also needed according to the Old School (Hudson 1976, p.53).

from afar (Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.838-839; Hauner 2004, p.99). While accepting that submarines should be a part of the fleet, Gervais contended that an over-emphasis on submarines would be dangerous. He reasoned that even if submarines could cut enemy communications, they could not protect friendly ones. According to Gervais, they could not keep supply and trade routes open either, or help with the transport of troops over water (Herrick 1971, p.9-10). According to the Traditionalists, this fleet should be able to act independently of the army and be its equal, not a subordinate, in terms of funds and decision-making processes. They additionally stressed that the Baltic and the Black Sea fleets should be immediately built using economic resources at hand, with the fleets of other theaters following later on when further economic recovery would be made. The Old School, with its emphasis on the command of the seas and the primacy of the battleship heavily influenced teachings at the Naval Academy, at the Naval War College and Soviet naval thinking in general until 1927-28. However, no corresponding naval capability could have been achieved due to the lack of funds and the limits of Soviet industrial capacity. While most of the Traditionalists ignored this, only a few, Mikhail A. Petrov, an ex-Czarist officer and Chief of the Training and Exercise Department of the Soviet Navy in 1928, and professor at the Voroshilov Naval War College, among them, seem to have stood out to stress the fact that the USSR first needed to improve its economy, industry, and agriculture. In the 1920s it looked as if there was a discrepancy between the economic and maritime realities of the USSR and its Traditionalist naval thinking cadre (Hudson 1976, p.45-47, 53; Ranft and Till 1983, p.85, 142; Whitten 1998, p.51-52; Lovett 2002, p.169, 178, 186; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.7-8, 14).

The Young School

The preminence of the old school continued until it was challenged by a different school of thought concerning shipbuilding and the Soviet naval doctrine. This was the new Young[159]/Modernist School which offered a solution to the incompatibility between a naval doctrine focused on gaining command of the seas and the economic realities of the

[159] The name Young School was derived from the French Jeune Ecole. However, it should not be confused with it because the French School was an aggressive naval doctrine based on commerce raiding, an economic warfare, with the aim of overcoming the enemy (Britain) by starving the British Isles since they were dependent upon seaborne supplies. Whereas the Soviet Young School was a defensive naval doctrine with the purpose of defending coastlines with submarines, destroyers, mines, and shore-based aircraft. (Ranft and Till 1983, p.85-86).

USSR. Among them were V. L. Orlov, the Deputy Commander of the Naval Administration in the early 1920s, M. V. Frunze, the People's Commissar for the Army and the Navy from 26 January 1925, R. Muklevich, Head of the Soviet Navy after 1927, and I. M. Ludri, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy between 1931-1937. According to them, the state simply lacked, in the 1920s, the industrial capacity, the naval industry, and the funding necessary to build a large surface fleet pursuing a command of the seas doctrine (Ranft and Till 1983, p.85). Another rationale behind the Young School was that Communist principles should guide Soviet Naval thought, and that the Mahanian thinking of the Traditionalists reflected capitalist/imperialist thinking, therefore they needed to be rejected (Ranft and Till 1983, p.86). Another impetus of the Young School was the naval trend in the international system. During the 1920s and 1930s, up until 1933[160], there were successful efforts at limiting naval armaments at the Washington (1921-22) and London Conferences (1930). Additionally, the utility of the battleship and that of the battlefleet was increasingly questioned by the naval cadres and the politicans of states in the 1920s (Ranft and Till 1983, p.87). Some argued that large armored ships were becoming increasingly vulnerable to submarine and aircraft (Klare 1975-76, p.90). Hence, what the Young School advocated was a partial reflection of the international naval trend. Another argument used was the deplorable performance of the battlefleets in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. However, during the same war, two Japanese battleships were lost to Russian mines. The Young School advocates also stressed that the cruiser warfare against Japan had proved successful by disrupting communications and transport between the Japanese mainland and troops at the front (Hauner 2004, p.92). The last but certainly not the least important factor was the experience of the Civil War. It had been fought mainly on land, with Britain, France, Japan, and the US helping the counter-revolutionaries with amphibious landings and seaborne supplies (Higham and Kagan 2002, p.3). Subsequently, it was deduced that: (1) a future war would be decided by large infantry offensives, with the navy in a defensive and a supportive role, (2) the Soviet Navy must be highly mobile, with light surface ships and submarines, (3) it should not aim for

[160] Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933, the following failure of the 1935 London Naval Conference, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in the same year, and the subsequent rise of the naval armaments race started to prevent the naval armament limitations by 1935 (Ranft and Till 1983, p.87; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.60-61).

command of the seas and should be a minor branch of the army, (4) speed[161] not armor should dominate the future of Soviet naval development. It was stated by Ludri[162] that the Soviet Navy should not have an independent mission except for the defense of the homeland, which was the prerogative of the army, and thus the former must be subordinate to the latter in this objective with defensive and supportive missions (Herrick 1971, p.21-25; Hudson 1976, p.47-53; Kokoshin 1998, p.79-80; Stone 2002, p.17; Lovett 2002, p.174-175; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.20, 60-61).

The End of the Debate?

The conflict between the two schools started in the 1920s. By 1932, the Young School had gained the upper hand. It retained its influential position until around the start of the Spanish Civil War (1936) (Klare 1975-76, p.90; Lovett 2002, p.187). Since Russia and the USSR were weakened by the First World War and the Civil War respectively, a defensive doctrine which would entail a lesser economic burden was more compelling. Also, the funds available were needed for the speedy economic development of the state rather than for shipbuilding. The feeling of being the only socialist power in the world and surrounded by hostile capitalist powers also added credibility to the Modernist case for a defensive doctrine. An additional factor which resonated with the ruling cadre of the USSR was the need to control the navy politically after the Kronstadt mutiny of 1921. Hence, the Modernist call for greater Party control over the navy was much more in line with the mindset of the Soviet leadership. Subsequently, the Young School naval doctrine was accepted by the end of the First Five Year Plan of 1928-1932. The battle instructions of *VMS RKKA*[163] (the Naval Forces[164] of the Red Workers' and Peasants' Army) of 1930 were dominated by Young School thinking. Even Stalin himself was favoring Young School thinking in the early 1930s (Hudson 1976, p.53-55; Mastny 1996, p.11; Hauner 2004, p.99, 107; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.11, 23, 29).

[161] Besides the experience of the Civil War, the First World War too had shown the inefficiency of large armored vessels (Hudson 1976, p.49).
[162] However, modernists were not advocating a complete subjugation of the navy to the army. Especially Muklevich and Ludri were stressing this point (Hudson 1976, p.52).
[163] The Soviet Navy had lost its independent position on 26 July 1926 when it became officially subordinate to the army (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.23).
[164] Rohwer and Monakov's translation (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.xvi).

7.3.STALIN'S BIG SHIP PROGRAM

Stalin had risen to preeminence and consolidated his power between 1924-1929. He enjoyed absolute power within the USSR by 1938. Subsequently, in the 1930s, he started to be increasingly interested in the development of the Soviet Navy. By 1934, in a speech at the XVIIth Party Congress, it was noted that Stalin would now personally manage the shipbuilding plans of the state, although this did not happen until 1936 (Herrick 1971, p.29; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.19-20, 42-43). Hence, Soviet naval development started to return to its Czarist roots in the sense that again individual decision making became influential in steering the development of the naval power of the state.

Stalin had his own vision for the Soviet Navy. According to him, the USSR needed the most powerful navy in the world to achieve its full potential. A new shipbuilding program was initiated, focusing on battleships, aircraft carriers, and battlecruisers, along with light cruisers and submarines. This vision included an independent naval command, which was realized on 30 December 1937, when the Naval Commissariat was reestablished, having been abolished in 1918. This was an act which gave the Soviet Navy its autonomy back which had been lost in 1926 when it had become subordinate to the Soviet Army with the formation of the Naval Forces of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (*VMS RKKA*). Another part of the Stalinist vision was the renegotiation of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, which would enable the construction and purchase of battleships (the US Dept of the Navy 1991, p.9; Aselius 2000, p.84; Lovett 2002, p.188).

The Second Five Year Plan, the naval part of which was influenced by the Young School, had been developed in 1932 and was to be in effect until 1937. Yet the Soviet naval planning was about to change even before it ended (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.44, 58). An important meeting took place on 23 December 1935. At this meeting, Stalin, petty officers of the Pacific Fleet, the *Narkom* of Defense (Minister of Defense) K. E. Voroshilov, the Chief of the Army General Staff A. I. Yegorov, and the Chief of the Navy V. M. Orlov were present. According to Rohwer and Monakov (2006, p.58), by the end of this meeting, Stalin had ordered the afore-mentioned shipbuilding program focusing on big surface combatants for the USSR. On 24 December, an article by its chief editor was published in *Pravda*, the Communist Party's official newspaper. The article talked about the new shipbuilding plan. It also stressed that the strengthening of the Soviet Navy

would soon be realized, which would in turn place the state among the great seapowers (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.58).

However, according to Lambert (2018, p.5-11) this was not possible by simply acquiring a battlefleet. On 16 January 1936, Yegorov wrote to Orlov, proposing a different shipbuilding program than the USSR had had until then. Orlov then passed on this proposal to Voroshilov, with citation to Yegorov's proposal, demanding a shift of focus toward big surface ships for the new program. The fact that such an article was published in the Communist Party's official newspaper, that the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the Soviet Navy, all high ranking Soviet Officials, now supported a shipbuilding program focused on big surface vessels, strongly hints that this was Stalin's wish. This becomes all the more evident if one considers that all three were once supporters of the Young School (Herrick 1971, p.19-21; Olkhovsky 1992, p.36, Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.850-851; Lovett 2002, p.187; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.24-25, 58, 64).

In February 1936, two different plans were drafted. One plan was drafted by the Staff of the Chief of the Navy, with a total of 1,727,000 tons. The other had been drafted by the Army General Staff, with a planned tonnage of 1,868,000 tons. Both plans included battleships, aircraft carriers, and battlecruisers. On 27 May, a shipbuilding program with a total displacement of 1,300,000 tons was chosen by the Council of Labor and Defense. This plan, which included at least fifteen battleships and twenty-two battlecruisers, was estimated to be completed in 1947. However, at the time of its presentation to the Politburo and the Defense Committee on 26 June, it included twenty-four battleships. Additional modifications were made to the plan from its inception until 1941. By 1939, it had reached a total planned tonnage of 2,500,000. However, in 1936, some still objected to forming a navy centered around battleships and battlecruisers. Especially Ludri, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, argued that battleships proved to be vulnerable to submarines, and that they were not as useful as they had been before the First World War. Orlov, the Chief of the Navy, on the other hand, was arguing that the changing international situation required the USSR to acquire a "really big fleet" (Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.853-854; Hauner 2004, p.107-108; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.63-64).

The situation, before the approval of the plan, required a clarifying decision from Stalin. Therefore, a conference for solving the differences between both schools and settling the doctrinal confusion was convened at the end of the 1936. This conference witnessed the final debate between the Young and Old School supporters until the end of the Second World War. While the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, I. K. Kozhanov, supported the building of light surface craft and motor boats , the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, M. V. Viktorov, supported big surface ships, arguing that smaller vessels were of little use on the open seas. Their divide reflected a wider one within the navy concerning the future of the Soviet Navy. The debate aside, Stalin had already made his decision. The fact that the Chief of the General Staff of Army Yegorov and the Chief of the Navy Orlov now supported a shipbuilding plan focusing on big ships were clear indicators of this (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.64). That is according to Lovett (2002) because Stalin could not accept that big surface ships were no longer practical and that "he liked big things, often the bigger the better" (Lovett 2002, p.187-188). Hauner (2004) mentions a Russian historian, Kasatanov according to whom "the international situation, the naval armaments race, and Stalin's megalomania demonstrated in his fondness for big things" along with Stalin's desire to obtain battleships as the ultimate symbols of military power, were the main reasons (Hauner 2004, p.106-107, 114). The important fact here is that Stalin decided to have a big surface fleet before the events in Spain. The Spanish Civil War seems only to have strengthened his resolve (Ibid., p.109).

The Third Five Year Plan, announced in 1937, now included the new shipbuilding program. The pursuit of this program was made possible with the increasing industrial capacity of the state. Although building aircraft carriers was postponed due to technical and economic reasons, the building of three battleships, along with the modernization of three older ones, and the building of battlecruisers began. Out of the 533 ships that were laid down between 1927-1941, only 312 vessels, including submarines, were commissioned, with a total tonnage of 243,200. The fact that the total commissioned tonnage remained far below that of the total planned tonnage reaching millions proves how unrealistic the Soviet shipbuilding plans were. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War on 22 June 1941, the Soviet Navy had a total of three old battleships (two in the Baltic, one in the Black Sea), no completed modern battleships, and no completed modern battlecruisers. It was as if the USSR had not started the shipbuilding plan focused

on big surface vessels (Herrick 1971, p.31; Ranft and Till 1983, p.87; Hauner 2004, p.88; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.135-139).



Figure 7.1. British, American, and Soviet battleships[165]

[165] Ship numbers are taken from Modelski and Thompson (1988) (Modelski and Thompson 1988, p.230, 238, 293).



Figure 7.2. British, American, and Soviet navies total tonnages in 1937[166]

Understanding the Soviet Naval Expansion

When one examines the Soviet naval expansion prior to the Second World War, it is not puzzling that the Soviet leadership decided to expand their fleets in the four Soviet naval theaters. This is all the more evident, especially if one considers the deplorable situation of the ships inherited from Czarist Russia, the increasing international tension, and the naval arms race that was going on in the 1920s and 1930s. What requires explanation is the form this expansion took or was planned to take. Under Stalin's guidance, an ambitious shipbuilding plan was adopted in 1936, which was revised repeatedly until 1941. These plans envisioned the building of battleships in numbers ranging from ten in the 1940 plan to twenty-four in the 1936 plan. They also aimed at building battlecruisers in numbers changing between ten in the 1937 plan and sixteen in the 1939 plan. Additionally, two aircraft carriers were included in the 1937 and 1939 drafts. However, by 1941, none of the modern big vessels could be completed (Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.858; Aselius 2000, p.84; Hauner 2004, p.103-106, 113; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.61-103). What had driven Stalin to build an ocean-going navy, with an emphasis on big

[166] Tonnages are taken from James, Alfaro-Zaforteza, and Murfett (2019) (James, Alfaro-Zaforteza, and Murfett 2019, figure 0.2).

surface craft such as battleships and battlecruisers? Was it to strengthen Soviet physical security, or was it aimed at achieving some other objective?

The objectives of the Soviet Navy were established in February 1921. They were: the defense of the maritime borders, communications at sea, and the support of the army, with the Baltic as the main theater. The purpose of the Black Sea Fleet was defensive as well in the early 1920s. The Second Five Year Plan too, which was developed in 1932 and approved in 1933, delineated the purpose of the Soviet Navy as the defense of the Soviet maritime borders. V. M. Orlov, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, in a speech on 28 November 1936, stressed that the USSR needed a big fleet for the defense of the state. Even in 1939, a different ten-year shipbuilding program was being drafted, with the declared purpose of coastal defense (Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.845; Hauner 2004, p.106; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.12-13; Yegorova 2005, p.158). Orlov, in his speech, announced publicly that the USSR needed this naval buildup because of the increasing aggression of Italy, Germany, and Japan, which were signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact[167]. He stressed the need to defend the maritime borders of the state against such potential aggressors. Thus, he linked the current shipbuilding plan, which included a significant number of battleships and battlecruisers, with the defensive needs of the USSR. However, according to Hauner (2004), Russian/Soviet naval experts[168] stressed

[167] The Anti-Komintern was an agency founded in 1933 by Joseph Goebbels, the Reich's Minister of Propaganda (1933-1945). While being a private organization officially, it was funded and directed by the Nazi regime. It was working to promote anti-Bolshevism, and warn other nations of the dangers of Communism, with the purpose of isolating and casting out the USSR from the international political arena. Its ultimate purpose was to create a global anti-Bolshevik movement, which would be led by Nazi Germany. Its efforts and propaganda were supplemented by the highest-ranking members of the Nazi regime during rallies, speeches, and in diplomatic endeavors. The eventual product of the entirety of these efforts led to the creation of the Anti-Comintern Pact itself. It was signed on 25 November 1936 between Germany and Japan, to which Italy joined on 6 November 1937. Hungary and Spain joined it in 1939 while Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Nationalist China, Romania, and Slovakia joined in 1941. Its signatories pledged themselves to help the global fight against Communism. A secret protocol indicated that the signatories promised their benevolent neutrality in the case of a Soviet attack against any of the signatories (Waddington 2007, 573-577; Stackelberg 2007, p.13, 200, 255).

[168] While Hauner did not specify who, three such examples can be that of Nikolai O. von Essen, who was in command of the cruiser *Rurik* in the Russo-Japanese War and took part in the successful cruiser warfare against Japan and commander of the Baltic Fleet in 1908, that of Aleksander Nemits, the Naval Commander in 1921 and that of Kozhanov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet in 1936. Essen had advised offensive and defensive mine warfare against the superior German High Seas Fleet in the First World War. Kozhanov too followed a similar line of thought when he had advised against big surface vessels for the Black Sea for naval operations. Nemits, on the other hand, while willing to build a fleet including battleships in the Black Sea, advised, until more resources would be available, the conduct of a defensive naval strategy focusing on mines and coastal defenses (Aselius 2000, p.79; Hauner 2004, p.92, 108; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.64).

that big ships, especially battleships were not suited to the shallow and narrow waters of the Baltic and the Black Sea, which were designated as the main naval theaters during the inter-war period. Additionally, the length of the Soviet coastline and the lack of access to open seas in the Baltic and the Black Seas meant that a defensive fleet, along with mine warfare, suited Soviet naval needs more than a battlefleet did. It must be added that some of these considerations were made in the early 1920s, when Germany had no threatening naval strength in the Baltic. However, even by the beginning of the Second World War, the German Baltic Fleet was far less powerful than its Soviet counterpart. It could therefore not seriously threaten Soviet physical security through naval power by that time either (Hudson 1976, p.46; Aselius 2000, p.68-70, 79; Fieldhouse and Taoka 1989, p.19; Hauner 2004, p.92, 106, 108, 114; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.12, 25, 54). Furthermore, even Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, then the *Narkom* of navy (the navy minister) starting from 28 April 1939, had remarked that the waters of the Baltic could have been easily mined at a much lower cost for defensive purposes. A remark which Stalin parried with his own: "We shall build them (big ships) even if we had to scramble the last penny!" (Hauner 2014, p.114). Again, according to Kuznetsov, Stalin had rejected the need for increasing the anti-air capabilities of ships. Allegedly the argument was that the USSR would not fight off the coasts of the United States. Stalin expected the naval struggle to happen near Soviet shores so he reasoned that Soviet shore-based aircraft would deal with the enemy air forces. Therefore, as he was not planning to take on the offensive overseas, his naval doctrine envisioned a defensive naval stance (Herrick 1971, p.34; MccGwire 1979, p.138; Hauner 2004, p.114; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.79).

If true, building battleships was unnecessary to increase the physical security of the state. This was especially true at a time when resources were limited, and international tension was growing. What is more striking is that the expected enemies of the state were Germany and Japan, while the former was considered to be the greater threat. The German threat, specifically, required the augmentation of the army for the defense of Soviet territory. Therefore, if defense, thus increasing the physical security of the state had been the aim, battleships may not have been the optimal instruments of defense against Germany, a conflict with which would be mainly decided on land. Nor they were optimal in the defense of the Baltic or the Black Sea. Then the evidence at hand suggests that Stalin's shipbuilding must have been aimed at some other purpose.

As pointed out earlier, Russian/Soviet physical security depended until after the Second World War, first and foremost, upon the strength of the army (MccGwire 1979, p.136). The Russian/Soviet interior lines of communication had helped the state expand and defend itself through the strength of its army for the past 300 years. Especially during the Civil War, Soviet control of the railroads of the state and interior lines of communication allowed the Reds to prevail in the ensuing struggle (Riasanovsky 1993, p.486). The navy had little purpose besides defending the coastline, disrupting enemy amphibious operations, disrupting the reach of enemy supplies to the enemy troops nearby, or operating within friendly territory, or supporting Russian/Soviet land operations. Its main theaters were the Baltic and the Black Seas. Hence forming a navy with capabilities going beyond the ones cited above may hint at a different purpose. Battleships and battlecruisers were useful, up to a point, for acquiring a Mahanian command of the sea or projecting power overseas. On the other hand, they were not necessary for defending coastlines or other supportive actions which were established as the purpose of the Soviet Navy. Destroyers, shore-based aircraft, submarines, torpedo boats, and mines would serve the same purpose at much lower costs. Additionally, the geography of the state prevented the state from concentrating its forces in an overwhelming fashion. That is why the Russian/Soviet fleets often fell prey to the enemy who could concentrate its fleets in any one theater it chose to strike Russia/USSR. Therefore, the geography was only a hindrance to the development of naval power. In these circumstances, obtaining the command of the sea with battleships was an elusive goal, while the defense of the coastline was a much more attainable one (Lieven 2000, p.205-225, 269; Aselius 2000, p.68; Stone 2006, p.177-180; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.12).

Linked with the above is the classic trade off problem. Tremendous material resources were needed for a battleship and battlecruiser focused shipbuilding plan. This meant that a significant part of the limited resources was allocated away from the army toward the navy. A significant part of the defense budget, 18.5% in 1939, had been allocated to naval expenses, as opposed to around 4% up until 1933 and 9% after that year. For a state whose physical security depended mainly on its army, allocating increasing amounts of resources towards the navy in a time of increasing international tension, along with the increasing revisionism of states like Italy, Germany, and Japan is puzzling. Especially if one considers that Stalin was fearful of a German attack, and that he was feeling the need

to improve the USSR's chances in a possible war with Germany (Hudson 1976, p.58; Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.846, 865-867; Hauner 2004, p.103-106; Grenville 2005, p.180).

If Stalin had in mind the purpose of increasing Soviet physical security through naval expansion, his actions may be interpreted as conflicting. While he was enhancing the material quality of the navy at the same time, he was diminishing its personnel quality through purges. Among the victims of the purges were Admiral Orlov, then the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and his followers, who were executed by July 1938. I. M. Ludri, the former chief of staff of the navy, R. A. Muklevich, the former chief of the navy, and I. K. Kozhanov, the chief of the Black Sea Fleet were also executed between 1937-1938. They were followed by the arrest and execution of the commanders of the Pacific Fleet, G. I. Kireev, the Baltic Fleet, A. K. Sivkov, the Black Sea Fleet, P. I. Smirnov-Svetlovski, the Northern Fleet, K. I. Dushenov, and the Amur Flotilla, I. N. Kadatski-Rudnev. Viktorov, who had become chief of the navy after Orlov in July 1937, was arrested on 22 April and executed on 1 August 1938 (the US Dept of the Navy 1991, p.9; Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.853-855; Lovett 2002, p.187; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.34). Equally wide-ranging purges also took place within the army. The elimination of such high-level commanders of the navy and the army surely diminished the effectiveness of both the services, therefore impairing their ability to defend the state. This fact was proven by the actions of the Baltic Fleet. In the early months of the war, it could not take any offensive action despite its quantitative superiority against the German Baltic Fleet, due to the lack of training and effective command. Subsequently, it had to retreat to the Gulf of Finland, where it was bottled up (Rice 1986, p.668; Fieldhouse and Taoka 1990, p.19; Kokoshin 1998, p.40-43).

Another baffling aspect of the purge is its targets. Stalin cared little for eliminating valuable naval theorists who could have been useful for establishing a fitting naval strategy and an appropriate shipbuilding plan for the USSR's physical security needs. Both Young and Old School proponents were purged. The elimination of Young School proponents meant valuable theorists would not be able to criticize, and improve if needed, the chosen shipbuilding plan. Whereas the execution of the Old School theorists, who were supporters of a navy focused on big surface vessels, meant that Stalin would not be

able to draw on their expertise for his shipbuilding plans focused on battleships and battlecruisers. Either way, it is hard to justify Stalin's actions if he had in mind the enhancement of Soviet physical security through naval expansion. Maybe he just wanted to possess big ships no matter the cost. It is as if he felt that their contributions did not matter. Stalin's neglect of professional opinion is also seen during the drafting of programs and the designing of ships. These were prepared in the presence of Stalin and the top party officials. Naval specialists or theoreticians were not present during these plannings. Even fleet commanders were at times left in the dark concerning the specifics of ships being built in the shipyards under their control (Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.855; Hauner 2004, p.108).

The plans did not make sense from a financial point of view either. By 1939, the naval budget had reached 18.5% of the total defense budget and 5% of the total Soviet GDP of 153.1 billion rubles. The building of four *Sovetskii Soyuz* class battleships accounted for 1/3 of the defense budget alone for the year 1940. The 1939 shipbuilding plan, which laid out the fleet disposition for the year 1947, included fifteen Project 23 type battleships. This was the project number of the *Sovetskii Soyuz* class. The Soviets planned to build eleven additional *Sovetskii Soyuz* class battleships, even though the building of only four had already placed a heavy burden on the defense budget. When one considers that the initial four could never be completed[169], this shipbuilding plan seems excessive for the available Soviet resources and shipyard capacities. These numbers are way too high for a state, the defensive priorities of which lay on its army. Rohwer and Monakov (1996) and Hudson (1976) too agree that the Soviet shipbuilding plans after 1936 went far beyond what was needed for defensive purposes in the four Soviet naval theaters (Herrick 1971, p.30, 40; Fieldhouse and Taoka 1990, p.19; Rohwer and Monakov 1996, p.858, 867; Hauner 2004, p.106; Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.229). Furthermore, MccGwire (1979) notes that the Soviet small war doctrine of the early 1930s was a fitting naval strategy and a healthy response to Soviet strategic needs, when one considers available Soviet resources (MccGwire 1979, p.137-138).

[169] All four ships had been ordered on 21 January 1938. They were laid down between July 1938 and July 1940. By 22 June 1941 none was completed, nor near completion, and their progress of building were between 21% and 4% (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.229).

A final contradiction lay in the ideology embraced by the Soviet leadership after the mid-1920s, and especially after Stalin had defeated his opponents following Lenin's death in 1924. Prominent political figures like Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev argued that without a world revolution, Socialism in the USSR could not stand. Subsequently, they reasoned that the state needed to promote and support revolutionary movements abroad. Stalin argued, on the contrary, that Socialism in one country was possible despite the failure of revolution to materialize in the rest of the world. Therefore, he promoted the idea of protecting the one state in which Socialism existed and he disfavored its export until further notice (Riasanovsky 1993, p.490-491; Aselius 2000, p.76; Ringmar 2002, p.125). An additional contradiction related with the above was the Soviet diplomatic stance, and its pursuit of collective security. Until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the USSR tried to protect the status quo by alliances with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. The Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War was again part of Soviet efforts at protecting the status quo against Fascist powers. Even during the months prior to the 1939 pact, the Soviets were trying to ally with Britain and France. However, the two powers failed to take the Soviets seriously enough as an important power by sending a "weak and low-ranking mission" (Riasanovsky 1993, p.514-516; Ringmar 2002, p.125). The ideological and diplomatic defensive posture of the USSR was not in line with an ocean-going offensive fleet with big battleships at its core**.** If the state was not going to export its ideology, what good would an offensive fleet do?

The shipbuilding plans initiated prior to the Second World War, focusing on battleships and battlecruisers, exceeded reasonable expansion of naval power. They indicate a discrepancy between the strategic requirements of a state and its armament practices. Therefore, they form an example of sub-optimal arming. Thus, it is safe to assume that the information provided so far suggests that the Soviet naval expansion had been initiated not for the enhancement of Soviet physical security. Therefore, The Soviet naval efforts are worth consideration from a struggle for recognition perspective.

A Struggle for Recognition with Battleships

Bolshevik Russia and the USSR that followed had legitimacy issues, starting from the October Revolution in 1917. In the 1920s, it sought to be recognized as a legitimate state, in the 1930s as a great power. For a state like the USSR, this was especially important, since the Bolsheviks, like their Czarist counterparts were "heirs to a great tradition of Russian great power status", and they had now taken over the control of a state which had been known for the last 200 years as a great power (Riasanovsky 1993, p.511; Ringmar 2002, p.125; Lovell 2009, p.104).

The 1917 Revolution was a minority action based on the support of the major urban centers and military units but not on that of the countrywide population of rural peasantry. It was not based on the popular will[170]. It had no international legitimacy either. During the Civil War, in which the Bolsheviks were victorious, Britain, France, Japan, and the US had supported the enemies of the Bolsheviks. However, even victory in the civil war did not bring recognition. In its aftermath, the USSR still had no diplomatic ties to the Allies, hence had no recognition as a legitimate state. In the 1920s, it was seen by the Allies as an inconsequential state (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.9). Consequently, it was not invited to talks on the limitation of naval armaments in Washington (1921-1922) (Hauner 2004, p.111). However, another state was excluded too, Germany. Subsequently, these two powers had their own relations restored, and Soviet recognition started with the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany in 1922. The allied powers, again, did not feel the need to heed the Soviet demands at the Lausanne Conference in 1922 (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.10). Britain and Italy recognized the USSR as a legitimate state only after Lenin's death in 1924 (Hudson 1976, p.54). By the end of that year, Austria, China, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Norway, and Sweden had followed suit. By 1930, it had gained widespread recognition in the international political arena and it joined the League of Nations in 1934 (Riasanovsky 1993, p.512). That being said, it was still not recognized as a great power. That is because, before the 1930s, the USSR was a second-rate power with a devastated economy due to the First World War, the Revolution, and the Civil War (Mastny 1996, p.13). However, by the 1930s, it had achieved a significant degree of

[170] The Bolsheviks had only 25% of seats in the Russian Consitutent Assembly, which was disbanded after its first and only session on 5 January 1918 (Stone 2002, p.14-15).

industrial and agricultural development. Its war industry had produced, between 1931-1935, around 14,000 tanks and 10 to 13,000 aircrafts, larger than the entire world arsenal in both tanks and airplanes. Subsequently, it now felt that it was entitled to great power status equal to that of Britain and France. However, even by 1938, the USSR's recognition as a great power was at best uncertain. As mentioned above, Britain and France had sent even in 1939 a low-key diplomatic mission not in line with what Stalin perceived the USSR to be, a power that should be taken seriously. It was not invited to the Munich Conference in 1938 settling the German demands for Sudetenland. It considered itself, but most importantly Stalin considered the USSR, as a great power. However, it still required inter-subjective recognition for its status to become accepted thus real (Mastny 1996, p.11-12; Riasanovsky 1993, p.511-516; Whitten 1998, p.52; Ringmar 2002, p.122-125; Hauner 2004, p.88, 111; Yegorova 2005, p.158). One must add to the reasons for the Soviet desire for status the feeling of isolation the state endured. The USSR was the only Socialist state, maybe with the exception of Republican Spain, in an intrinsically hostile world full of powerful capitalist states. Thus, it felt that it was, by being the sole representative of the revolution and the proletariat, entitled to a greater status (Mastny 1996, p.11; Hauner 2004, p.104).

Rohwer and Monakov avoid giving a concrete answer, by saying that it cannot be answered for sure whether the Soviet decision to form a big ship navy had the aim of increasing Soviet physical security, or ensuring that the USSR would become one of the great powers by 1947. However, they also assume that Stalin, in the late 1930s, thought of battleships as "historical predecessors to the atomic bomb", which represented "the highest grade of power, a most powerful and mobile instrument of power politics" (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.223). They further argue that a state needed these symbols of highest political power to be recognized as a full member of the international political scene. Subsequently, they assert that Stalin might have aimed for this, by pursuing a big ship program (Ibid., p.223). Hauner's (2004) argument supplements this view. According to him, none of the Russian naval historians could understand or explain why a state so disadvantaged by the character of its maritime geography would engage in such an ambitious naval expansion and join the naval arms race that ensued in the inter-war years. He continues with Commander R. W. Herrick's explanation. According to Hauner (2004), Herrick made an accurate assessment by linking Stalin's decision to build a big

ship navy to the Soviet diplomatic experience during the inter-war years. Soviet delegations were not invited to three naval conferences in 1921-22, 1930, and 1936. Nor could they influence the Lausanne conference concerning the decisions over the Turkish Straits to their advantage. Additionally, at the Rome Naval Conference (1924), Soviet proposals for establishing their capital ship tonnage at 490,000 tons were not accepted[171] and it was treated like a secondary power. According to Herrick (1971), Stalin was convinced that, during the 1936 London Naval Conference, to which the Soviets were not invited, Soviet naval power in the form of submarines was totally unimpressive in the eyes of the Western Powers of Britain, France, and the United States. He additionally claims that Stalin had reached the conclusion that Soviet diplomacy needed to be reinforced by a balanced fleet including big surface vessels, and that Soviet diplomats were not taken seriously because they had "no big naval guns" supporting them (Herrick 1971, p.43; Akgün 1994, p.62-63; Hauner 2004, p.106-111; Grenville 2005, p.141). Dallin (1945, p.88) agrees on the matter by noting that "it was clear to Moscow that the Soviet voice in the London Conferences of the powers was feeble because of her utter weakness as a sea power". Yegorova (2005, p.158) follows the same argument and claims that the Soviet attempt at forming a big ship navy was based on the desire to attain great power status which the USSR saw itself as already having. This dissertation follows their line and argues that Stalin had initiated the Soviet shipbuilding program with the intention of gaining recognition for the great power status which the USSR already saw in itself, based on its industrial achievement, its capacity to arm itself on a great scale, by being the sole Socialist state in the world, and its historical claim to great power status as the successor state of Czarist Russia.

To conclude it is possible to say that the USSR in the 1920s was a shadow of its Czarist predecessor, in terms of economic and military capabilities. Furthermore, it was unrecognized diplomatically. It was not considered as a state with naval power worthy of invitation to naval armaments talks in Washington and London. By the 1930s, it had gained recognition as a legitimate state, and had recovered economically from the devastating wars of the previous two decades. Soviet land and naval rearmament had

[171] The USSR was expected to limit its tonnage of capital ships to 175,000 tons, similar to France and Italy, whereas Japan was limited to 300,000 tons. However, the USSR considered itself worthy of 490,000 tons, similar to Britain and the United States with 500,000 tons allowances each (Silverlock 2003, p.192, 200).

begun in the late 1920s, which accompanied the increasing industrial capacity of the state. Following this, it started to see itself as a great power, though it was still not accepted as one. It was not even accepted as a naval power by Britain until the Anglo-Soviet Naval Agreement of 17 July 1937. The experiences of Soviet diplomats in the interwar years are supportive of the neglect of Soviet great power status. The negotiations with France and with Britain and France collectively in the 1930s had proved to Stalin an important fact: that these powers from whom the USSR was seeking recognition were not ready to recognize the USSR as a power with its own sphere of influence in eastern Europe. Ringmar (2002) clearly argues that the USSR engaged in such alliance talks for the sake of gaining recognition of great power status, although the term is used mostly for the specific era between 1815-1914. He argues further that had the USSR been seeking physical security, it should have accepted alliances with France and Britain prior to the Second World War. However, according to Ringmar, Stalin was not only seeking physical security, but recognition as well (Ringmar 2002, p.125-126). Reasoning that he and his diplomats would be respected if the USSR had a big ship navy, Stalin ordered the building of such a navy comprising battleships and battlecruisers. Thus, the Soviet shipbuilding program, hitherto influenced by the Young School, turned toward forming a more Mahanian navy. However, forming a battlefleet with battleships and battlecruisers as its backbone made little sense from a physical security perspective, due to several reasons. First of all, battleships were not suited to the shallow and narrow waters of the Baltic or the Black Sea, which were designated as the main naval theaters during the inter-war years. These waters could have been defended with smaller surface vessels along with submarines and mines, at a lower cost. Second, the limited shipbuilding capacity of the state lacked the proper industrial capacity for building these vessels, which was proved when multiple projects were cancelled or scrapped mid-way through construction. Third, the ever-increasing danger of war required the USSR to strengthen its army first and foremost, which so far in Russian and Soviet history had been the decisive factor for the physical security of the state. Fourth, the Soviet Navy, as seen from the experiences of the First World War and the Civil War, was needed mainly for defensive operations, which was stressed multiple times. However, the shipbuilding programs after 1936 are characterized as going beyond the defensive needs of the state. Even though a state can pursue an offensive naval build-up and an appropriate offensive strategy, if these are

pursued at the cost of physical security then they may become cases of sub-optimal arming. Thus, they may lead researchers to look into the motives for the arming decision. The enormous financial burden of Stalin's big ship program begs one to question its motives. The budget share of the navy had reached almost 20% of total defense expenses in 1939. The naval budget reached even higher levels in 1940, with the cost of the four *Sovetskii Soyuz* class super-battleships, laid down between 1938-1940, which were never completed. The cost of these ships alone amounted to 1/3 of the entire defense budget. Such naval expenses can hardly be justified for obtaining physical security for a continental power like the USSR. Had these resources been allocated to the army, would they not have contributed more to the physical security of the state? (Rohwer and Monakov 2006, p.76, 95, 229). From the evidence present, it looks as if Stalin had ordered the building of big surface vessels not for the sake of obtaining physical security but in order to gain recognition and status for a state which already considered itself to be a great power due to its economy, armament production capacity, and to being the successor state of a great power for the previous 200 years.

8. CONCLUSION

The study conducted in this dissertation revealed some findings. The first is that the Ottoman Empire was a continental power. The studies on sea power show that there are some criteria for a state to be considered as a seapower. These are the presence of a battlefleet, the focus on seaborne trade and the presence of a merchant fleet, a population that is actively engaged in maritime activity, which also formed the basis of naval power until the mid-Nineteenth Century, the strategic and commercial requirement for the acquisition of naval power for the wellbeing of the state, and the seamindedness of the state. When evaluated by these criteria, the Ottoman Empire fails to qualify as a seapower state, even though it possesses some of the above criteria: (1) the Ottoman Empire possessed a somewhat capable battlefleet at all times, the efficient use of which was doubtful beyond the Seventeenth Century, (2) their naval manpower, seaborne trade, and merchant fleets were mostly dependent upon non-Muslims, (3) despite a clear need for naval power, the state failed to formulate an appropriate naval doctrine, (4) the sea was not at the center of Ottoman strategic, political, and economic calculations. This was a state which possessed some elements of sea power, like a battlefleet and a maritime population. However, it lacked in others. Even though the classification of a state as a seapower is altogether more complex than simply possessing these aspects of sea power, they are indicators signalling how much a state is on its way toward becoming a seapower. Futhermore a seapower state, based on the definition of Lambert (2018) would certainly at least possess two of the afore-mentioned aspects. These are a trade focus with a merchant fleet and sea-mindedness. These are the aspects which the Ottoman Empire specifically lacked. From this perspective, the Ottoman Empire fails to qualify as a seapower state by a large margin.

The threats against the Ottoman Empire before and during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz were evaluated based on the criteria of Stephen Walt (1985 and 1987). According to these criteria, the level of threat a state poses to another state is formed of four variables. These are aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions. These are added to by two more variables, according to Roussea and Garcia-Retamero (2007). These are asymmetry in aggregate power and the shared/unshared identity between states. Based on these criteria, the Egyptian, Greek, and Russian threats against the Ottoman

Empire during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz are evaluated. From the inquiry made, it is clear that Egypt and Greece could not pose a threat on their own, let alone forming a naval threat for the physical security of the state. Russia, on the other hand, posed a threat based on its land power. Therefore, the threats to Ottoman physical security during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz were predominantly land based.

Another finding of the study is the peculiar character of the technological developments in naval warfare after the mid-Nineteenth Century. The fast-paced technological developments in armor, steam, guns, and torpedoes made naval warfare a less precise practice than it had been. The most important result of this was the fast rate of obsolescence of new armored warships, namely ironclads. Following on from this, the Ottoman investment in naval power, at enormous cost, quickly became inefficient, and the Ottoman armored battlefleet lost its competitiveness within decades. Furthermore, the Ottoman naval industry, which had been competitive up to a point, started to become insufficient for supplying and repairing a modern armored battlefleet. Additionally, the Ottoman Navy could not train enough personnel to use this armored force. The budget for the education and training of the navy was 1.37% of the total budget in 1873-74 fiscal year. This is a clear indication of the lack of focus on this aspect of naval power. Therefore, the focus of the Ottoman naval expansion should have been more on training and less on acquiring armored ships that the empire could not maintain, man, or use for improving the physical security of the state.

A related fact is the acquisition cost of this armored battlefleet. Between 1862-1874, the Ottoman Empire acquired a total foreign debt of 167,557,000 pounds sterling. The amount credited to the Ottoman Treasury was around 80,000,000 pounds sterling. 15% of this amount was dedicated to the Ottoman Navy, whereas 7%, nearly half of the Ottoman Naval budget, was dedicated to the acquisition of new armored warships. Therefore, the Ottoman naval expansion was funded through extensive foreign debts.

During the Nineteenth Century, navalism was on the rise. Hence, the battleship, the most visible object of naval power, had become the most coveted weapon of navies. The desire for its acquisition was not only linked to naval power though. It was also linked to what it signified. The battleship, the ironclad in the Ottoman example, in the Nineteenth Century, was a symbol of great power status. Consequently, only states which aspired to

or wanted to maintain that status would even try to build and acquire them. The Ottoman naval expansion focusing on ironclads is evaluated from this perspective in this study.

By 30 May 1876, the armored fleet put together by the sultan was, after Britain, France, and Russia, the fourth largest armored fleet in terms of displaced tonnage. When compared with its most dangereous rival, Russia, this does not strike one as an excessive force. However, when armored battlefleets without coastal defense ships were compared, the Ottoman battlefleet suddenly jumped to third rank, way above Russia. The Ottoman battlefleet had thirteen sea-going ironclads, whereas Russia had only four, Greece two, and Egypt only one! Additionally, a battlefleet of such proportions did not fit into any reasonable Ottoman military or naval strategy. It was too strong for a defensive fleet or a fleet in being strategy. While it could be used offensively, the Ottoman Empire was on the defensive against Russia for nearly the past 150 years. Nor could it be used as a deterrent against Russia, because it was a purely continental power against which land forces would be a more fitting deterrent. Therefore, the Ottoman naval expansion during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz constituted an example of sub-optimal and excessive arming.

During the Tanzimat Era, the focus of Ottoman foreign policy was admittance into the Concert of Europe and an informal alliance with Britain. When Sultan Abdülaziz ascended to the throne, the Ottoman Empire was looking to the West, especially Britain, for physical security and recognition. The policy of recognition was successful, and at the end of the Crimean War the Ottoman Empire was admitted into the Concert of Europe, which was itself a great power club. The highest-ranking member of the group was Britain and its status was linked to naval power. Furthermore, obtaining battleships, or ironclads in this example, and building them domestically was a sign of great power status in the Nineteenth Century. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire, by obtaining them by building them at home, imitated and targeted Britain for recognition. The Ottoman Empire, which was not a great power by the second half of the Nineteenth Century, was in a great power club and wanted to be recognized as one. However, this required an inter-subjective recognition by other great powers, but especially Britain. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire tried to bypass this insecurity by grounding its aspired status in material practices, namely

ironclads. Hence, the state obtained these visible markers of status for recognition of its great power status by Britain.

At the turn of the Nineteenth Century, Germany initiated a big naval buildup, without a clear military rationale. It tried to acquire naval power second only to Britain. The foreign audience of this buildup was Britain from whom a recognition was sought. This buildup was fueled by navalism and the link between naval power and world power status. Britain had a powerful navy and colonies, which made it a world power. Therefore, naval power was linked to world power status. Hence, building and obtaining a powerful fleet was a sign of world power status. The heart of that naval power was the battleship, which the German naval buildup focused on. It additionally served the formation of a German national identity, which further supported naval expansion. The German decision makers linked the German High Seas Fleet, thus naval power, to the German claim of world power status. So, Germany sought the recognition of its world power status by Britain through naval power.

The USSR had legitimacy and recognition issues from its inception in 1917. It was not diplomatically recognized until Rapallo in 1922. It gained some recognition after Lenin's death in 1924. By 1930, it had widespread recognition, and by 1934 it had joined the League of Nations. However, it was still not recognized as a great power by either Britain or France, because it was still a secondary power with a devastated economy until the 1930s. By 1930, its economy had developed and between 1931-1935, as a result, Soviet industry produced more tanks and airplanes than any power in the world. Yet by 1939, it was still not recognized as a great power. Britain and France had even sent a low-ranking diplomatic envoy for alliance negotiations prior to the Second World War; thus, the USSR lacked their inter-subjective recognition for its great power status. This was not in line with how Stalin and the USSR saw themselves. The Soviet diplomatic experience in the decades up to the Second World War too was not consistent with how the Soviet leadership saw the state. The USSR had not been invited to naval talks in 1921-22. It could not influence the Lausanne Conference in 1922-23, concerning the status of the Turkish Straits. It was treated like a secondary power at the Rome Naval Conference in 1924. It was not invited to 1930 and 1936 naval conferences. It was not even accepted as a naval power by Britain until 1937. So, Stalin reasoned that Soviet diplomacy needed to

be strengthened by a balanced fleet with big surface combatants, especially battleships, which he considered as the highest grade of military power, similar to nuclear weapons during the Cold War. However, before and during the Second World War, the threat against the physical security of the USSR mainly emanated from Germany in the form of land power. Therefore, obtaining a fleet with expensive battleships made little sense for the USSR. It also made little sense from a geographical perspective, as the shallow waters of the Baltic and the Black Seas, which were designated as the main theaters, favored a defensive mosquito fleet. Nor did it make sense from an economic perspective, as the building of four *Sovetskii Soyuz* class battleships alone cost 1/3 of the defense budget for the year 1940. Therefore, the Soviet naval buildup prior to the Second World War was initiated to attain recognition of Soviet great power status from Britain, which the state already saw itself to be, based on the Russian great power tradition, being the sole representative of Socialism, and with their industrial achievements in producing arms. The results of alliance talks with Britain and France supports this view. These negotiations went nowhere, because the USSR was not seeking physical security but recognition from Britain and France for its own sphere of influence in eastern Europe as a great power. Yet this demand had been rejected. As a result, a treaty with Germany was signed, which gave the Soviets what they wanted, a sphere of influence, and maybe recognition for its desired status.

Continental powers with sea power pretentions

This dissertation had been started with the purpose of answering why continental powers try to acquire naval power beyond levels that are needed for their physical security. The Ottoman naval expansion under the leadership of Sultan Abdülaziz, the German naval expansion during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the Soviet naval expansion led by Joseph Stalin were chosen to answer this question. First, it was necessary to answer the question of whether the Ottoman Empire was a continental power or a seapower, because the USSR and Germany were already accepted as continental powers in their eras. From the inquiry made on sea power, this study has reached the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire failed to qualify as a seapower, thus was accepted as a continental power. Additionally, each naval expansion was studied separately, to ensure that these were sub-optimal armings. This study has reached the conclusion that they indeed were cases of

sub-optimal arming, where funds diverted to naval expansion could have been used more efficiently for the physical security of the state elsewhere. Finally, the comparison made showed that each of the three cases of naval power acquisition were made not for increasing physical security but for acquiring the recognition of a specific status. The Ottoman Empire acquired naval power to gain recognition of its great power status from Britain. Germany acquired naval power to gain recognition of its world power status from Britain. The USSR too acquired naval power to gain recognition of its great power status from Britain. Therefore, German, Soviet, and Ottoman naval expansions were part of a quest for acquiring status. This quest for status seems to expand across time and valid in three different eras for these three continental powers which invested in naval power. The status provider was Britain, because it was at the pinnacle of the naval power hierarchy and was the top great power. In all three cases, the objective was to gain inter-subjective recognition for a specific identity, which the state already saw itself to hold. In all three cases, the tool was naval power. This made sense since in all three cases the party from whom the recognition was sought was Britain, the great seapower and the state at the pinnacle of the great power hierarchy.

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