



KADIR HAS ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
SOCIAL AND HUMANITIES DISCIPLINE AREA

**UNCERTAINTY AND ITS EFFECT ON FOREIGN
POLICY DECISIONS**

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MASTER'S THESIS

İSTANBUL, AUGUST, 2020

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Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in the Discipline Area of Social Sciences and Humanities and under the Department of International Relations.

İSTANBUL, AUGUST, 2020

I, BANU SEZER;

Hereby declare this Master's Thesis is my own original work and that due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources.

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ABSTRACT

In the international system which is inherently complex different environmental factors are decisive in individuals' decision making processes. Uncertainty is included these environmental factors which refer to the quality and quantity of information. Bounded Rationality as a theoretical framework of this research defends that people cannot act rationally when they have asymmetric and incomplete information. In this research, the questions of how people act under uncertainty in foreign policy decisions and how their differences such as decision-making strategies, age, and experience impact their responses are handled. In this regard, the data is collected via an experimental way and analyzed with the quantitative method.

Keywords: Uncertainty, Foreign Policy Decision Making, Bounded Rationality

ÖZET

SEZER, BANU, BELİRSİZLİĞİN DIŞ POLİTİKA KARARLARINA ETKİSİ,
İstanbul, 2020

Doğası gereği karmaşık olan uluslararası sistemde, farklı çevresel faktörler bireylerin karar alma süreçlerinde etkilidir. Belirsizlik bilginin niceliğini ve niteliğini belirleyen bir faktör olarak bu çevresel faktörlerin içindedir. Bilginin tam olmaması veya asimetrik olması durumlarında insanların rasyonellikten uzak kararlar alacağını savunan bir yaklaşım olan Sınırlı Rasyonellik bu araştırmanın teorik çerçevesini oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, bireylerin dış politika kararlarında belirsizlik faktöründen nasıl etkilendiği, kendi karar alma stillerinin ve yaş, deneyim, gibi kişisel farklılıkların bu süreçte nasıl rol aldığı ele alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda deneysel bir yol izlenerek veri toplanmış ve bu veriler nicel olarak analiz edilmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Belirsizlik, Dış Politikada Karar Alma, Sınırlı Rasyonellik

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
BDT	Behavioral Decision Theory
COPDAB	Conflict and Peace Data Bank
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FPDM	Foreign Policy Decision Making
IR	International Relations
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PDI	Power Distance Index
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences

1. INTRODUCTION

Decision-making is one of the indispensable parts of human life. It simply means choosing among the possible options. With a philosophical explanation, it expresses the move from the current situation to a future situation. The Decision-making process requires information processing which consists of actions of recognizing and attending interpreting information, assessing its relevance, evaluating its importance, and integrating it into its own knowledge base (Vertzberger, 1990).

In order to provide context for the following argumentations, a review of what decision making is a necessity. Decision making is a deliberative mental process whose ultimate purpose is to determine the choice. Formulation of decisions in foreign policy depends on the structure of decision-making units and the nature of internal and external factors.

The concept of “foreign” refers to the things that exist beyond territorial borders and “policy” refers to guidelines in order to achieve the determined objectives. In short, the decision-making approach in foreign policy tries to explain “what decisions made by whom under what constraints” (Tamaki, 2015). Foreign policy decision making is a part of foreign policy analysis (FPA) which is the study of relations between different actors in the international system. Within the FPA, foreign policy is studied by a diversity of methodological approaches including; organizational structure, human psychology, and rational choice (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 4).

The field of FPA offers a unique opportunity to conduct and integrate the analysis at different levels. In this regard, FPA studies can be conducted at the individual level, state level, or international level. FPA studies can handle an event at one particular level, or they can integrate different levels as well.

Hudson (2014) says that every social science field has a “ground”, and adds international relations (IR) field’s ground is human decision making. Individual-level analysis tries to understand how a human creates a difference in foreign policy. So, it begins with the fact that every human being is unique and so their decision-making

processes result in an impact on foreign policy. State-level analysis; on the other hand, emphasizes the effects of the internal context of states on their foreign policy decisions. Factors such as governmental structures, political cultures, and actors within the state apparatus are searched to explain foreign policy behavior (Hudson V. , *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2014). Lastly, the international system is the highest abstraction in foreign policy analysis. The system-level analysis focuses on the nature of the system in which all states act. The assumption of this analysis is states make decisions and take actions within the context of an international system, so that, they cannot be considered as definite free actors (Rourke & Boyer, 2007).

In its most general form, decision making studies in foreign policy is divided into two main domains: Rational Choice Theory (RCT) and Behavioral Decision Theory (BDT) (Redlawsk & Lau, 2013, p. 133). RCT is considered as a normative theory in decision making which basically interests with how decision-makers should act. It assumes people are omniscient calculators whose only interest is the maximization of his or her wellbeing. But would anyone really achieve this? As oppose to normative theories, descriptive theories seek to understand how people actually behave, and BDT is included in descriptive theories. The reflection of BDT into international relations fields is “Behavioral IR” which was introduced by Alex Mintz (2007). Studies in Behavioral IR can be made at the individual, group, or organizational level by examining situational factors such as risk, time pressure, and lack of information, contextual factors such as type of decision unit, or individual factors such as leadership style (Mintz, 2007). Behavioral IR views humans as limited information processors, with a better term humans are boundedly rational. The bounded rationality approach introduced by Herbert Simon (1957) argues that people violate the RCT model to some degree. They do not always modify their responses or update their beliefs due to new information, or they do not collect adequate information to make the best choices (Chong, 2013, p. 96).

Recognition of variety among decision-makers is important in the field of Behavioral IR, since all decisions depend on mental models of individuals. Decision-makers make decisions based on their knowledge, experiences, desires, and interests. Age is one of the important variables to assess abilities in decision making. Research on the

aging effect on everyday decision making has been focused on the development or decline of particular abilities in decision making (Finucane, ve diğerleri, 2002). Much research in the field of decision making is based on data from student subjects, most of them have neglected how decision making varies in older adult groups. In fact, most of the decisions that have an impact on our lives has made by older adults. It is especially important to understand and explain how older individuals actually make their decisions.

In order to make age analysis of people, one practical way is categorization in terms of generations. Generation is widely used to locate particular birth cohorts in a period of time, usually considered as 20-30 years (Biggs, 2007). Sociologist Karl Mannheim (1952) argues generations can only come up with specific historical events that lead different perceptions of the world by elders than youngsters. Howe and Strauss (1997) define several different generations in accordance with political, social, and economic turning points and the archetypes created by these points. For the millennium saeculum, they describe three different generations; baby boomers who were born from 1943 to 1960, Generation X who were born from 1961 to 1981, and Generation Y (Millennials) who born from 1982 to 2004, and Generation Z (Homeland Generation) who born after 2004. There is one more generation who are still exists in our society; Silent Generation. These people were born between 1925 and 1942 years and this generation belongs to the Great Power saeculum. Silents are children of the Great Depression and they faced World War II during their adulthood. They are labeled as silent because they work within the system by avoiding risks and following the rules. Baby boomers are born after World War II in the period of increasing birth rate. This generation had improved nutrition and educational facilities, thereby their intelligence and analytical thinking were higher than silents (Edward & Woodley of Menie, 2018). Generation X is described as first generation who grow up with adult presence because of high women involvement in labor life. And generation Y which is the final group that is used in this research is born during the global financial crisis and development of digital technology.

Less or much experience in a particular field has a considerable effect on decision making latitudes of people. Hafner-Burton and Hughes (2013) investigated the effect

of experience and found that experienced elites have more abilities in risk management, they are experts in using heuristics in complex conditions, and they are more cooperative.

Since age and experience are considered to influence which decision-making strategy will be held by individuals, it is also necessary to define what decision-making styles exist. Every action is a follower of a decision so decision-making is a never-ending activity in the human mind. People have habitual patterns in their decision-making process. These styles can be described as decision-making procedures specific to each decision-maker. There are different measures to define decision-making styles and most of their findings overlap with each other (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997; Scott, Scott, & Bruce, 1995). The present research uses the General Decision Making Style Scale (Scott, Scott, & Bruce, 1995) which categorizes five different styles: rational (systematic analysis of extensive information), intuitive (rely on feelings and hunches), dependent (rely on support and advice), avoidant (avoid to make a decision), and spontaneous (quick decision-making).

In the modern world, no nation-state can isolate itself from others. Traditionally, foreign policy analysis has interested in the maintenance of a country's security and power by interactions with the environment beyond its borders (Breuning, 2007, p. 5). Interactions can be formed as diplomacy, trade negotiations, intelligence, cultural exchange, war, and so on. However, the world has witnessed a growing number of nation-states since the treaty of Westphalia. The development of nation-states, globalization, and increasing interdependency creates a rise in interactions between the nation-states. For these reasons, new issue areas have been added between nation-states such as environmental issues, human rights problems, migration, food, energy policies, or foreign aid. Hence, every decision that was made by one state is quickly affecting the decision-making context of another state. The increase of networks and affairs among states creates complexity in the international environment.

In the nature of this environment, some of the interactions among states progress through conflicts, whereas another interaction appears in a cooperative way. There are certain factors to affect the direction of relationships among nation-states. Either

situational factors such as ambiguity, complexity, uncertainty, or instability, or personal factors such as knowledge, ability, and motivation play a crucial role in the outcome of the decision. (Beach & Mitchell, 1978). Uncertainty as a central concept of the research is defined in terms of completeness and accurateness of the information. Scholz (1983, p. 4) defines uncertainty as incomplete knowledge about the situation like lack of knowledge about possible alternatives, probability of their occurrence, or their outcomes.

Many scholars define the environment of the international system with the concept of uncertainty (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Renshon & Renshon, 2008). Sources of uncertainty in IR are seen as various from a different perspective. Rathbun (2007) states cognitivist and constructivists both see the reason for uncertainty as information ambiguity. Cognitivism argues uncertainty occurs because each individual filters the information via her belief system, identities, norms, or heuristics, and misperceptions and errors occur. Furthermore, constructivists also agree with information ambiguity, but the ambiguity is rooted in the malleability of norms and identity. On the other hand, rationalists and realists explain uncertainty as a lack of information about other's intentions; they discard agent error and say individual actors perceive the same stimuli similarly. Briefly, cognitivists and constructivists accept the source of uncertainty as for the ambiguity of information; however, rationalists and realists connect uncertainty with a lack of information about others' intentions (Rathbun, 2007).

Since the uncertainty is an inseparable characteristic of the nature of the international system, this research aims to investigate how uncertainty affects foreign policy decisions. While the theoretical literature about uncertainty in international relations is broad, empirical findings are not rich in this issue (Bas & Schub, 2017). In this regard, this research can contribute to the empirical literature on decision making studies under the context of uncertainty by taking the Bounded Rationality approach as a baseline.

1.1 METHODOLOGY

This study investigates mainly the following question: How does the uncertainty factor affect choices of foreign policy decision-makers? And its sub-questions on confidence level and strain level regarding the uncertainty variable, the effects of different decision-making styles, age, experience, and vocations.

In order to satisfy this research question, a quantitative method is held in this research. Quantitative research allows for objective measurement and statistical analysis of data which is collected via surveys, questionnaires, and polls. This research method follows the basic steps. In the first step, data is collected through structured research materials from a determined population. Then, data is arranged into tables, figures, or charts. Next, data is used to generalize concepts, to make predictions, and to examine causal relationships.

There are several advantages of using quantitative methodology. It allows for broader studies with a large number of samples and provides objectivity by decreasing personal bias. Additionally, it presents standardized measurements and this allows replicating the same research results across many sample groups.

Social scientists commonly use two empirical strategies in their researches; observational and experimental ways. In observational research, scientists observe ongoing behavior and make comparisons between people or groups who are subjected to different conditions. On the other hand, experimental research is in which people are randomly assigned to different treatments. The experiment is defined as any research design in which the researcher intervenes in the process deliberately by means of manipulating elements of the environment (Morton & Williams, 2012). Researchers are able to uncover processes that are normally difficult to observe thanks to the experiments. Kagel and Roth (1995) state three research goals of the experimental method: (i) searching for facts, (ii) speaking to theorists, and (iii) whispering in the ears of princes. "Princes" is here referring to businesspeople, policymakers, or bureaucrats

Many forms of experimental studies exist such as field studies, laboratory studies, or simulation studies. To test the research questions, experimental simulation methodology is employed in this research which is specifically called “paper-and-pencil experiments”. In this kind of study, the participant read an experimental scenario in which there are one or more embedded stimuli and answer follow up questions (Mintz, Rose , & Yang, 2011). Also, random assignment is used in this research in which participants that come from a particular population and have an equal chance to be part of a particular condition. In this research, the subjects are given two fictional scenarios and asked to choose one option from given nine policy alternatives. These alternatives are asked to rate in accordance with their conflict levels. They are also asked to 25 questions about their decision-making strategies. The procedure of the experiment will be deeply explained in chapter 5.

The experimental method is one of the most effective ways to identify the behavior under specific circumstances. On the contrary, it is very seldom used to understand international politics. Thanks to the science of psychology, the distinguished history of experimentation and behavioral economy studies have been merged (McDermott, 2002), and the experimental method is introduced in the mid-1990s in IR studies and still occupies a small place in the field. The use of experiments in IR, in particular, has not become more widespread because of major concerns of external validity and generalizability across time and space (Campbell, Cook , & Shadish, 2002). Despite these concerns, many scholars of IR continue to use the experimental methodology in issues like decision making, negotiation, cooperation, political culture (Hudson & Butler, 2010).

Despite the fact that there is a significant effort in the use of experimental methods in the world (Astorip-Courtois, 2000; Geva & Hanson, 1999; Mintz & Geva, 1993), there is a remarkable gap in experimental IR studies in Turkey. So, the present study can be a starting point for the experimental studies in Turkish foreign policy analyses.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

Actors in foreign policymaking are listed as political leaders, bureaucracy, institutions, and social actors. Kenneth Waltz (1959) argues that individual leaders sometimes play a definitive role in foreign policy, however, he adds that it is too complex and idiosyncratic to focus on an individual. There is increasing attention to individual-level analysis in recent years. However, the decisive role of a political leader is bounded to three conditions (Moric & Paquin, 2018, pp. 70,71); (1) political capability of leaders which is given by the state system, (2) leaders' willingness to be part of foreign policy, and (3) political opportunity which is determined by the situation (crisis or not, time pressure, uncertain and ambiguous). Bureaucracy is another actor in FPDM. Bureaucracy's responsibility is to present information to decision-makers and ensure governmental decisions are implemented. Therefore, it is based on expertise and bureaucrats remain politically neutral because they are not under threat of elections, unlike the political representatives. The most important studies on bureaucracy are based on group dynamics, organizational model, and the bureaucratic model. Groupthink was an important concept in group decision making which was invented by psychologist Irving Janis (1972). Groupthink defines the situations in which the members of groups feel oppressed by other group members and hesitated to state his or her ideas. Actually, it is a syndrome that diminishes the capacity to analyze events. The organizational model and Bureaucratic (Governmental) Model are developed by Allison Graham in his pioneering book "Essence of Decision" (Allison, 1971). Organizational model politics are developed by Graham Allison to explain foreign policy behaviors in the context of the organization. Allison argues organizations are divided into small parts when they are confronted with complex decisions, he calls this as decentralization. In addition, to cope with complexity organizations adopt standard operating procedures which are set of rules followed by organizations in a given situation. Bureaucratic Model is another model that Allison offers. Unlike the organizational model, this model proposes that the division of work is not functional. Instead, all separate parts defend their interests in a situation. Different ministries of government can have radically different views on the same issue.

The institutional framework shapes the actor's roles and preferences, consequently play role in decision making. It is important to understand who has a major role in foreign policymaking because it determines who will access the secret report or know the personal ideas of the head of state (Moric & Paquin, 2018, p. 127). In this sense, parliamentary and electoral systems, political coalitions, power of the state, and economic structure of the state are investigated. Social actors are listed as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), companies, unions, the media, cultural and ethnic groups (Moric & Paquin, 2018, p. 167). All these actors have some extent pressure on governments in their foreign policy decisions.

This research tries to understand individual behavior in decision making. Therefore, it is useful to extend individual level literature in foreign policymaking. Political psychology holds a gradually rising position in IR and foreign policy researches over the last half-century. Still, many leading researches and studies give little room for leadership. Many researchers hesitate to study the role of leaders because this perspective unable researches to construct parsimonious and generalizable explanations. However, many historical events are explained with considerable causal weight to the psychology of political leaders and researchers have begun to think that “who leads matter” (Hermann, Preston, & Korany , 2001)

The basic distinction between approaches in decision making studies comes from the level of analysis framework. The most convenient level for psychological studies in international politics is the individual level because political psychology basically emphasizes personality, emotions, information processing, perception, beliefs, and other factors.

The implementation of psychology methodology to foreign policy has evolved over the years. The dimensions focused by political psychology in foreign policy have evolved parallel to historical developments in the world. In the 1930s and 1940s, scholars studied the psychology of war such as aggression and attitudes to war. Following to development of psychoanalytic perspectives, emphasis on human nature as a cause of war has increased. Additionally, the number of psychobiographies increased to explain the political behaviors of individual reference with their

experiences in early childhood. Lange's study on Hitler (1943) and George and George's (1956) study on Woodrow Wilson, Volkan et al study on Richard Nixon (1999) are the fundamental works on that subfield. Psychobiography studies contribute to our ability to understand the impact of emotional and experiential factors on decision making (Hudson V. , Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014, p. 57). In recent years, the studies mostly focus on the categorization of leaders. Instead of analyzing one leader, scholars begin to compare them in accordance with their psychological assessments such as personality and timeline of their life. Barber (1972) classified many United States presidents due to their active-passive dimensions on making differences and negative-positive dimensions on their motivation. Barber suggests leaders' backgrounds, early failures, and successes provide insight into his or her type of leadership. Jerrold Post (2003) also tries to categorize the leaders with the method he called *anamnesis*. Post suggests that it is important to know the psychobiography of a leader to make assessments such as birth order, family wealthy, traumatic deaths in the family. Besides, leaders' personality is also concerned with anamnesis, his or her habits, bodily experiences, intellectual capacity, emotional stability, etc. Post adds substantive beliefs of leaders as third components of anamnesis. What the leader thinks about his country's power, national security, or what is this political ideology is concerned with beliefs. The last component of anamnesis is the leadership style. Here, leaders' communication ability with public or negotiation tactics, and their reactions to particular issues are examined.

Levy (2013, p. 304) posits that foreign policy analysis before the 1960s has been conducting more descriptive than theoretical, meaning that studies mostly try to explain sole issues rather than constructing general decision making theories. In these decades, generally single case studies were focused on time and space boundaries meaning that each country or situation is treated as unique and no recurrent case (Rosenau, 2006, p. 171). However, immediately after the Second World War, Synder, Sapin, and Bruck (1962) proposed the first systematic analysis of foreign policy. Synder and his colleagues reflected displeasure on the decision-making framework which makes apolitical and outcome-oriented foreign policy analysis. They argued state action should be considered as the behavior of its decision-makers, claiming that how decision-makers perceive the international system shaped the state action. They

come away from the traditional way of study foreign policy and defend that foreign policy studies should focus on political elites' behaviors with their definition of situation and conception of national interest. By the leading of Synder's and his colleagues' study, a growing number of studies started to emphasize psychological variables as central to foreign policy analysis. Wohlstetter (1962) for example studies intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor from the perspective of information processing in different bureaucratic agencies. George (1969) on the other hand, emphasized the political leaders' belief systems through the use of operational code analysis by focusing on cognitive dimensions.

By the 1970s scholars shifted to study on crisis decision making in response to American-Soviet disagreements about Berlin and the crisis over Cuba. Researchers have conducted studies in which high stakes, time constraints, and surprises take place.

Jervis (1976) with his classic work "Perception and Misperception" created a space for the cognitive paradigm in foreign policy analysis. He gave particular attention to cognitive and social psychological dimensions on perception in IR through deep analysis of many historical events. The cognitive paradigm in IR argues the world is an extremely complex place and its complexity is beyond human capability. Even people try to behave rationally, they are bounded with the complexity of the environment and cognitive limitations they have (Simon H. , 1957; Lebow, 1981). Rosati (2000) explains cognitive paradigm as a perspective which focuses on beliefs, process, and preferences. The cognitive paradigm assumes individuals view their environment differently than one another. With attention to cognition in decision making, the interest on cognitive assumptions has increased, these assumptions include; (1) seeking cognitive consistency: people tend to disfavor information which contradicts with the existing knowledge; (2) wishful thinking: people tend to think their choice will be successful, although there is no adequate evidence; (3) heuristics: mental shortcuts to filter inputs; (4) selective memory: people can remember certain information more than others; (5) cognitive stability: the core structure of beliefs stay stable once formed in the human mind (Cottam, 1977; Jervis, 1976; Lebow, 1981; Rosati J. , 2000).

On the other hand, emotions had begun focus point in the 1990s following the developments in neuroscience. The technological advances allow researchers to observe brain activities and the neural processes give the opportunity to a better understanding of emotions (Breder & Marcus, 2013). Much of the research has made an effect of emotions on decision making. For example, Brader and his colleagues (2008) have found that anxious citizens are more attentive to available information and less relies on convictions. Banks and Valentino (2012) have studied the effect of anger in decision making and they have found that angry people focus more on their predispositions such as political ideology.

Today, experimental behavioral research which focuses on measurable inputs and observable behaviors is spreading almost in almost all issues of international relations such as simulations on arms races (Pilisuk, 1984; Bonham, 1971), negotiation (Druckman, 1993) war simulations (Beer , Healy , & Bourne Jr., 2004; Healy, Hoffman, & Beer, 2002), and especially, there is an explosion of experimental studies on foreign policy decision making both in labs and the fields. Nehemia Geva, Alex Mintz, and Steven Redd are the main contributors to the experimental studies in foreign policy decision making. For example, Geva and Skorick (1999) examine how information inconsistencies affect foreign policy decisions. Geva and Hanson's (1999) study on how to do cultural similarity and regime perceptions affect the decisions in the international arena. Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carness (1997) seek to sort out the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision-making process. Beer et al. (1995) have studied on an experiment about the effect of conflictual and peaceful priming cues on decision making. 55 psychology students were attended the experiment and results showed that the existence of a peace treaty created a gender interaction effect. Women who take peace treaty priming and men who do not take peace treaty priming tend to act more cooperative way. Schafer (1997) designed an experimental study to investigate the importance of the policy maker's worldview on their preferences. He found that both historical relations whether cooperative or conflictual and cultural similarity with other countries affect the decision's degree of conflict. Mintz (2004) also conducted an experiment with 72 military officers in order to investigate decision-making strategies on familiar and unfamiliar cases. Their reliance on predispositions is greater for the familiar problem.

1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

In order to conduct the study of uncertainty in decision making both theoretical and empirical literature and argumentations are presented herein. In section 2, there is a broad explanation of what is foreign policy decision making, what factors affect the final choice, and what are the different approaches exist in the area. In section 3, the concept of uncertainty is explained with various definitions and its determinants and sources are explicated. Additionally, other factors –ambiguity and risk- are distinguished from the uncertainty. In section 4, the theoretical background is explained and hypotheses are exposed. Following this, Section 5 presents the research design and the methods to test hypotheses are highlighted.

Section 6 presents the results of the study. Specifically, the SPSS program is used to conduct statistical analyses. The experiment results show that the condition of uncertainty has a certain impact on an increase or decrease in the conflict of choices. Additionally, the confidence level scores are changed also as a function of uncertainty. However, it is found that strain-level scores are dependent on the conflict level of choice. This result contradicts our hypothesis. The findings also show the perception of the subjects predicts the level of conflict level of people’s choices. Finally, the decision making styles of the subjects do not demonstrate differences among different occupations, but they differ with regard to the experience and age level of the participants.

Section 7 concludes the implications of the findings, limitations of the research and finally, section 8 includes conclusions and recommendations for further researches.

2. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

An adult is making 35000 conscious decisions per day up to the experts (Hoomans, 2017). The improvement of cognitive facilities also refines the process. Decision making is deliberative mental processing whose major purpose is determining the result (Roy, 2016). It is always critical for the survival of human beings. Throughout history, humans tried to learn and predict all possibilities and to make a good decision. The wars, conflicts, and negotiations were built on this particular reality. Foreign policy is defined as a sum of official external relations that run by an independent actor in the international system (Hill, 2003). The actions in foreign policy come from the necessity of establishing, maintaining, or regulating relations between states (Synder, Bruck, & Burton, 2002, p. 55). The combination of these two concepts constitutes foreign policy decision making which refers to the choices of individuals, groups, or coalitions intending to influence the nation's preferences or actions in the international arena (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010).

In other words, foreign policy decisions can be defined as a dependent variable where the agents and environmental factors are independent variables. These

dynamics of foreign policy – decisions, agents, and environment- are handled from various points of view by different scholars. These approaches concern how a decision-maker resolves the puzzle of international events.

This chapter depicts, major approaches in FPDM which are rational and non-rational, levels of analysis in foreign policy analysis, decision types, processes and task characteristics, and finally, the different theories in FPDM.

2.1 Rational Approach

Foreign policy decisions have been dominantly explained by a rational model assuming governments and their leaders consider their power, wealth, and prestige and act rationally (Rosati J. A., 2001). This perspective also consisted of the realism approach and power politics tradition. According to a rational actor perspective, “decision-makers perceive the world accurately and that those misperceptions an only be treated as random accidents (Jervis, 1976, p. 3)”. The governments are treated as unitary actors so that all decision-makers are considered alike. Basically, the rational model assumes states are the key actors, they seek to achieve goals like power or wealth, and they can be thought relatively effective while they follow their interests (Snidal, 2002). In this model, rational actors make ends-means calculations by considering all possible courses of action and analyzing the pros and cons of each possibility (Verba, 1961). Evidently, it requires that actors have accurate knowledge about all possible options and preferences of other actors. However, this model is criticized to ignore deficiencies of human cognition and the effect of external in the international system (Zagare, 1990).

Why the people decision can be irrational in their decision? To answer this question we should explain what rationality is. Breuning (2007, p. 3) states that rationality is required a logical connection between means and ends. So, choices should be designed to achieve predetermined goals in decision-makers’ minds. Sahakian and Labuzetta (2013) listed four processes for rational decision; (1) discovery of information, (2) selection of relevant information, (3) combining this information

with the eventual decision, (3) receiving results and acquiring from outcomes. Rarely people gather optimal information before their final decision, consequently, most people can not achieve even the first step of best decision making (ibid). Also, cognitive biases inhibit the second process; choosing relevant information which is consistency seeking and selective and incomplete attention to information. Jervis (1976) explains the consistency in his pioneering book “Perception and Misperception” as the effort to assimilate incoming information according to pre-existing images. They strike a balance between their existing beliefs and their openness to new information. Jervis (1976) also mentions the effect of immediate concerns on perceptions. The decision-maker perceives incoming information following what his interest is at the time when the information comes. Evoked sets can lead to overestimation or underestimation of incoming information in terms of concerns of the time. How the information will be presented is also leads to different treatments to incoming information which is called the framing effect. Framing is crucial to a solution to a problem because it is the way of presentation of the problem. Slyvan and Voss (1998) argue when a situation emerged, decision-makers develop a definition for the problem in accordance with their knowledge and beliefs. Indeed, they construct an environment and problem representation (Simon & Newell, 1971).

Besides, the process of option selection can be seen as problematic also. Individuals end search as soon as they find a good enough alternative, instead of searching for all possible options because people do not have utility functions (Bendor, 2010). Simon (1957) called this a satisficing principle. In short, he argues humans do not generate a table that shows all available alternatives with their pros and cons, instead, they use sequential search in their examinations.

2.2 Non-Rational Approach

The criticisms against rational choice theory lead to the rise of a non-rational approach. The non-rational perspective assumes that individual response to an international event in a condition involves non-logical pressures and influences (Verba, 1961). Decision-makers can be unconsciously or consciously under the

influence of his personality, prejudgments, heuristics, or past experiences and environmental factors.

“Behavioral IR” has the same assumptions with a non-rational approach (Walker , Malici, & Schafer, 2011). It focuses on two components of the political world; (1) the external world of events, and (2) the internal world of beliefs. The external world of events refers to the characteristics of the international system. The international environment is usually described with words such as chaotic, complex, uncertain, or risky. On the other hand, the internal world includes the variables of human beings like beliefs, prejudgments, perceptions, or personal histories (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). The same distinguishes has been made by another scholar also. James Rosenau (1966) distinguishes between external internal factors. He categorizes external factors like intimidation, changes in cooperation, the process of integration or opposition, and much more. On the other hand, as internal factors, he refers to the personality, quality, and experience of the person who makes decisions. Domestic factors such as social values, economic development, dependency, geographic location, and governmental system are also included in internal factors by Rosenau.

Mintz and DeRouen (2010) make a more detailed distinction among factors influencing foreign policy decisions. They categorize the factors as psychological, international, domestic factors. In the systems in which the decisions are made by small groups or a person, psychological factors are decisive. These factors can be listed as cognitive consistency, evoked sets, personality, emotions, beliefs, prejudices. Behaviors of adversaries or allies are also affective on foreign policy decisions such as arms races, alliances, regime types of adversaries. These are included in international factors. Domestic factors like public opinion, economic interests, and electoral cycles are also important to determine the choices of decision-makers

To sum up, while people should be logical and orderly in the rational approach, the non-rational approach focuses on the factors that inhibit the rationality both internally and externally. This research is much closer to the non-rational approach because it questions how the lack of adequate information affects the decision-makers’ choices. In addition, this research focuses on how individual differences –experience, age, decision-making style- play a role in their preferences under the uncertainty condition.

2.3 LEVEL OF ANALYSIS AND FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Singer (1961) argued to focus on parts of phenomena or investigate it as a whole is a choice made by the researcher. Foreign policy analysis is not an exception; hereby scholars are divided in terms of their answers to the question of “Who the actors are a central one in international politics?” Kenneth Waltz (1959), in his book *Man, State, and War*, defines three different level analyses; the first image corresponds with individuals, the second image is states and the third image is the international system. Waltz argues these three images complement each other. Without first and second images, the third image cannot be determined; also without the third image, we cannot assess the importance of the other two. However, different scholars can focus on a different level of analysis. While rational perspective makes state-based analyses, non-rational models make individual-based searches. Each level has a different focus on foreign policy analysis (see Table 1). Individual and state-based analyses are process-oriented studies, while system-level analysis is outcome-oriented. On the individual level, researches seek to explain how leaders and decision-makers’ preferences shape foreign policy. On the other hand, the state-level analysis seeks to define the effect of internal factors of states on their foreign policy behaviors.

Table 1. Level of Analysis and Foreign Policy

Level of Analysis	Foreign Policy Focus
Individual	Decision
State	Behavior
System	Outcome

Each level has its pros and cons. Analysis at the international level enables us to make assumptions in a comprehensive size because research is conducted as a whole. However, this level of analysis can discount the effect of actors on the system while exaggerating the system effect on national actors. Analysis of the international level assumes that all statesmen think rational and they only care about their interest which in power in this context. The second level is national units which permit us more detailed examination than the international level but it can also lead ethnocentrism which results in biases in analysis. However, reducing international action to

individual behavior required a wide-range analysis because of the complex nature of human beings. Emotions, perceptions, predictions about the future are becoming the subject of foreign policy analysis. Some scholars argue IR cannot be understood from the point of individual attitudes (Verba, 1961). Also, some others claim the decisions at the state level are made by small groups or individuals (Walker , Malici, & Schafer, 2011), so they are worth studying.

2.3.1 Individual Level Analysis

Hudson (2005) says “All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers acting singly or in groups.” The individual level of analysis examines the individual as a decision-maker (leadership) in the nations. Specifically, it tries to understand how a human creates a difference in foreign policy. Containing human beings into IR theories provides a world picture more creative, more changeable, more accountable, and more persuasive (Hudson V. , Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014, p. 8). So, individual-level begins with the fact that every human being is unique and so their decision-making processes result impact on foreign policy. Decision-makers in this perspective centrally involve and takes an active role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. The ones who provide guidance (advisors) for the decision-makers locate in the periphery. In foreign policy, authority is usually highly concentrated so that individual differences can determine critical decisions. Although professionals in this like diplomats, bureaucrats, and soldiers claim that they make decisions purified from their beliefs and emotions, it is still questionable. The scholar in this approach defends that explanation of foreign policy behavior without examination of actors’ cognitive and perceptual conditions is ontologically disastrous (Singer, 1961).

Of course, the importance of analyzing decision-makers varies under different conditions. The first variable is the regime type. The leaders of dictatorial regimes and democratic regimes do not have the same amount of control of policy. The second variable is the interest level of a leader on foreign policy issues. Some leaders dominate their countries’ decision-making processes, however, some other disinterested leaders assign their duties to foreign ministers or bureaucratic groups.

Leader characteristics come into prominence when the situation is ambiguous and uncertain because in this type of condition advisers may not be able to read situations. Training in foreign policy is another element for the personality characters of leaders. Hermann (1984) argues that untrained leaders are more likely to decide based on their personalities, in contrast; trained leaders can be able to control their characteristics. The degree of crisis is also important. While high-level crises in which risk and stakes are relatively high are handled into top small decision making groups low-level risky decisions are made by organizational structures. To be an expert in a particular region makes leaders worth to examine. Leadership style and group interactions are also important decisive to understand the influence of the leaders.

The Decision-making process occurs in human cognition; therefore their perception of the world enables them to shape the system. People use their senses to contact with the world. During our relationship with the external world, we perceive too much information than our mental capacity can process. So, our cognitive mechanism utilizes many instruments to filter this abundant amount of information. Bounded Rationality concludes that that humans are unable to know and understand everything. Over time, humans developed some strategies to cope with external (missing information) and internal boundaries (limited mental capacity). The strategies are cognitive consistency, wishful thinking, and heuristics. People tend to disfavor information if it contradicts with the existing knowledge, it is called cognitive consistency. Also, their cognitive mechanism allows them to think that their choice will be successful, which is named as wishful thinking. Final instruments are called heuristics and they are defined by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky in their excellent work *Judgment under Uncertainty* (Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, *Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*, 1982). The heuristics are our mental shortcuts to filter inputs and they are useful because of the limited capacity of our short-term memory. Shortcuts led humans to organize their minds by developing rules and help to fill the blanks.

The effect of emotions on foreign policy behavior is beginning to be explored. Decision-makers' emotional condition whether he or she is sad, happy, depressed, or angry is usually ignored by IR theorists. However, researches show that emotion is

important to arouse people to take action (McDermott 2004, 153). Also, people trust more in their emotion-based decisions (Hudson V. , Foreign Policy Analysis, 2014, p. 49)

Studies on human behaviors suggest that physical drives have a role in the determination of human action. Its application to political issues is called biopolitics. The political behavior of humans is examined with two approaches. First is ethology which basically says innate characteristics of humans affect their behaviors. The second approach examines the influence of gender on political decisions. This approach defends that gender is behavior (Rourke & Boyer, 2007)

The situation context is examined both at the state level or individual level. Rourke and Boyer (2007) distinguished the situations whether it is a crisis or not. They argue that a crisis occurs when decision-makers are surprised by an event or perceive a threat or have a short time for their reaction. Such intense situations required top smaller groups to decide the policy. On the other hand, less intense events can be solved by the bureaucratic apparatus of the government.

Hudson (2014) adds groupthink, stakes, and social roles into the situational context. When stakes are high and time is a constraint, he argues, emotions become more decisive for policymaking.

Every human being has unique genetic codes through her or his experiences, beliefs, attitudes, or culture he or she is raised. Personality is also an important element of human composition. Psychologists who work on examinations of leaders study elements of their personalities. Specific elements of personality can determine human action in many ways. For instance, variables such as people's understanding of complexity around his world, level of loyalty or trust to others, or his or her ability to focus on an assignment might be independent of human personality.

2.3.2 State-Level Analysis

Foreign policy analysis can be handled with micro-level forces like psychological, cultural, or group factors. However, it can be examined at the macro level, as well. At this level, states are considered as the most important actors for the IR. Moving from

individual to state-level of analysis causes a change in the concepts. While the individual level of analysis requires analyzing FPDM, in-state level, the analysis is called as foreign policy (Hudson, 2014)

As was explained before, the governmental structure of a country is important to determine the level of analysis. In this regard, the division of structure as authoritarian and democratic helps us to understand whether leaders or states should be analyzed. Unlike the authoritarian governments where the leader holds the decision-maker positions, variables of decision making in democratic states are numerous such as executives, people, media, or parliament.

Hudson (2014) listed national attributes to run state-level analysis which is size, geography, demography, national sources, military capability, and economic capability. He argues large states by size have been more active in foreign policy because the population which had to be feed or natural sources that had to be controlled might be harder in those states. Small states, on the other hand, can be governed with relatively small bureaucracy and have few embassies.

Access to ports, sea, waterways, and/or have more borders with other states affect the foreign policy-making of a state. There is an inevitable difference between foreign policymaking for an island state and a land state. More borders mean more relations with others. In addition, possessing critical points in your territory like Kashmir and Golan Heights also requires more active foreign policy with others.

2.3.3 System-Level Analysis

Waltz's third image, system-level analysis, seeks to understand interstate and transnational phenomena. Waltz (1979) argues that "It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states". As a top-down approach, system-level analysis emphasizes on external constraints in foreign policy. It defends that states are not free on their foreign policy decisions and they adopt their choices to the context of the international system. Therefore, system-level focuses on the nature of the system in which foreign policy decision is made, rather than focusing on foreign policy (Hudson, 2014, p. 173). The main focus issues in this level are; the number of

actors in the system, the alliance mechanisms, the presence or absence of supranational organizations, the number of poles, economic relations, and norms.

Theories which born into a system-level approach suppose the structure of the international system is the regulatory body for the behaviors of states. Waltz's neorealism and Wallerstein's world-system theory are examples of structural theories. Neorealism has five assumptions about the structure of the international system; (1) states are unitary actors, (2) states try to maximize their utility on a rational manner, (3) the ultimate interest of states is maximized their chance of survival, (4) system is anarchic in nature, (5) states are in constant competition in the zero-sum game. World-system theory, on the other hand, assumes the global capitalist economy is explanatory of world structure. This theory divides the world as the core, periphery, and semi-periphery countries. Core countries are at the top and periphery countries locate at the bottom of the system. Periphery countries are exploited by core countries. Semi-periphery countries exist between them.

Even though theories in the system-level approach aim to explain the outcome of interactions, and do not focus on foreign policy alone, the structure is still important for foreign policy decision making: it determines the opportunities and constraints of actors in foreign policy (Moric & Paquin, 2018, p. 316).

2.4 DECISION TYPES IN FOREIGN POLICY

Decision types in foreign policy can be categorized in many ways, however, Mintz's categorization was the most common way to explain types. Mintz (2010, p. 15) categorizes four different decision types; single, interactive, sequential, and group decision making.

Single decisions are described as the one-shot, unilateral decision. They are rarely used in IR because most decisions are taken as a part of a sequence with other decisions or actors. However, the United States' decision to invade Iraq in 2003 can be a good example of this kind of decision.

Interactive decisions involved at least two players and they both influence each other's actions and decisions. For example, Yaser Arafat's decisions at Camp David in 2000 were affected by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.

In sequential decisions series of related decisions occur. For instance, after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, other decisions such as increased troops, attack, or withdrawal were part of the invasion decision, therefore these decisions are evaluated as sequential decisions.

Finally, group decisions are also part of foreign policymaking. Groups can be defined as advisory systems or/and bureaucracies that help governments to achieve national interests.

Besides these, there is one more classification on decision making styles built by Scott and Bruce (1995). These styles are concerned more with individual differences rather than decision task or environment. So, they described five decision-making styles;

- (1) Rational: this is a multistep decision-making model that requires logical, objective data processing rather than subjective and intuitive based. Steps are identified as (i) goal formulation, (ii) criteria identification, (iii) identification of alternatives, (iv) analysis of alternatives, and (v) final choice. In this style, people are expected to maximize benefits and minimize costs in their decision.
- (2) Intuitive: Intuition means a sense of feeling of the pattern (Sauter, 1999). The explanation for choices in this style is not based on conscious and logical thought but instincts and feelings.
- (3) Dependent: People who high in dependent decision-making style search for advice and guidance before they make a decision. Support from others is decisive for decisions.
- (4) Avoidant: This style is characterized by withdrawing, postponing, and negating the decisions. People in his style avoid making a decision whenever it is possible.
- (5) Spontaneous: In this style, people make quick and rapid decisions in accordance to spur of the moment.

2.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF DECISION TASKS

Foreign policy has witnessed a rapid rise in heterogeneity and pluralism in foreign policy in the 21st century. This increase is caused by; (1) technological developments and digitalization (2) an increase the number of actors consists of leaders, bureaucracies, militaries, lobbyists, think tanks, United Nations agencies, NGOs, terrorist and criminal organizations, citizens, (3) increase in sensitivity of public toward foreign policy (Stanzel, 2018). Therefore, heterogeneity and pluralism also rise in foreign policy areas. So, the demand for every decision becomes varied and different characteristics of decisions become more visible. These demands are basically listed as unfamiliarity, complexity, instability, and uncertainty.

(1)Unfamiliarity: refers to past experiences with similar tasks that influence the choices. While strategies that resulted in success can be easily preferred, strategies that end with failure can be neglected. If decision-makers have no experience with the situation, they need to consider more in approaching the issue. The terrorist attack on 9/11, for example, was a new and unfamiliar event for the United States. Or an opposite example can be Israel's experiences with suicide attacks. The Israeli government and people have become familiar with such attacks and developed standard operations in time.

(2) Complexity: refers to the number of components of decision problems that are taken into account by the individual such as numbers of alternatives, amount of information, or the number of criteria. Also, the future consequences of the decision determine the complexity of the problem. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world moved through to multipolar poles. An increase in the number of nation-states and networks among these states leads to a rise in complexity.


(3) Instability: means the degree to which components of the problem change during the decision. Instability makes it difficult to process because it decreases predictability. 2011 Arab uprisings and regime changes during the uprisings increased instability in the Middle region and made difficult policy selections towards countries in this region.

(4) Uncertainty: refers to the tasks in which a problem is unclear, goals, decision alternatives, constraints, etc. are ambiguous. Basically, it results from a lack of information about the problem.

2.6 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND ITS DYNAMICS

When decision-makers try to pick an alternative, they follow certain stages during the process. Foyle (1999, p. 23) visualizes decision making as four stages: (1) problem representation, (2) option generation, (3) option selection, (4) policy implementation. Decision-makers define stakes involved in policy in the problem representation stage. In stage two, decision-makers developed an options menu. Then, option selection refers where a decision is made. And, finally, policy implementation means the execution of the chosen option. Knetch and Weatheford (2006) add one more stage to Foyle's conceptualization: (5) Policy Review which refers to the evaluation of the chosen policy and decides whether continue, abandon or revise the policy.

Figure 1. The cycle of formulation of foreign policies



Simon (1960) also lists the stages of decision making. These are;(i) Intelligence where information is collected and the problem is identified, (ii) Design where the alternatives are listed and a criterion is selected, (iii), Choice in which alternatives are evaluated through the criteria and decision is made (iv) Implementation in which decision is put into effect and resources are allocated in accordance with the selected decision. As it is indicated in Simon's stages, information is the starting point of foreign policymaking.

Foreign policy bureaucracies can collect huge amounts of information via the help of their national intelligence services, report or cable traffics. However, too little information is a hindrance to deliver an ultimate decision; too much information can have the same effect as well (Ripley, 1993). So, FPDM studies mainly focus on how information is gathered, preceded, and recalled by the decision-maker. Sage (1990) listed three methods that decision-makers use while proceeding various information during the decision making process; (1) Holistic search means an examination of all alternatives, dimensions and, implications of decisions. The decision-maker is assumed to investigate all available information in this search type. (2) Wholistic search is an intuitive way to make a decision in which the decision-maker applies standard operational procedures or analogies. (3) Heuristic search in which decision-makers use his mental shortcuts to make interpretations.

2.7 MODELS OF FPDM

Foreign policy analysts seek to develop generalizable theories and concepts to explain nation-state actions, decision-making processes, the role of non-state actors in world politics, the impact of institutional and societal factors in shaping foreign policies (Alden & Aran, 2017). Nevertheless, a single holistic decision-making model still does not exist in foreign policy. Instead of this, there are many models and each can pay attention to different elements of FPDM.

2.7.1 Bureaucratic Politics

Weber mentions about the unavoidability of the bureaucratic process in the modern state where the power is exercised through routines of the administration (Pollitt, 2008). In all advanced political systems, there is a working bureaucratic structure that also shapes the public sphere and leaders' decisions. The bureaucratic politics approach argues that individuals are not sole in the decision-making process, indeed, they are part of a larger organization.

Dougherty (1971, p. 332) defines decision making as an incremental process that contains partial choices that arise from competition among organizations and bureaucratic pressure. In this model, decisions are the products of bargaining or struggle among groups who pursue their objectives. The president sits top on those organizations and manages those units (Halperin, Clapp, & Kanter, 2006). Accordingly, leaders and bureaucracy have different roles in decision making. Leaders decide what to do, and bureaucrats decide how to do. The role of bureaucrats in foreign policy as follows (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 46); (1) presentation of alternatives to governments to choose, (2) providing information about routine responses and standard operational procedures, (3) and they take a role on the implementation of the chosen policy by politicians.

Each organization has its own mission to complete and all actors seek to influence the decision-maker and decision-making process to accomplish their objectives. This variety of agencies leads a decentralized mechanism in the states which influence foreign policy decisions by creating competition. Allison (1971) explains government behavior as an output of several quasi-independent organizations. Fractionated power among organizations permits them to focus on particular facets of the problem more specifically.

There is no unitary actor in the bureaucratic model, rather, many actors focus on various conceptions of an issue. For example, the department of defense considers national security, the Ministry of Foreign affairs tends to focus on diplomatic consequences, while the treasury department considers budgetary implications.

Additionally, the bureaucratic way of decision making prevents mistakes that can arise from the rapid process of evaluation because it slows down the process (Rourke F. , 1984).

2.7.2 Prospect Theory

Prospect theory is developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky as a contribution to the behaviorist approach in FPA (1979). The theory provides comprehensive empirical proves of actual human behavior under risky conditions. According to prospect theory, the psychological pain of a loss is greater than the same amount of pleasure inflicted by a gain. Therefore, people are more risk seeker in the domain of losses, whereas they are risk avoidant in the domain of gains. In an experiment, people are told that they have 50% chances to lose 20 dollars and a 50% chance to gain 20 dollars. Most of the participants prefer not to play the game because their pleasure coming from gaining 20 dollars is lower than the pain of losing 20 dollars, although there is equivalency on the amount. Assessing losing or gaining is made according to the starting point, which is called a reference point in prospect theory (McDermott, 1998, p. 28). McDermott (2008) defines the reference point as the current state which a person has used to live.

Prospect theory explains the pattern of choice by dividing decision making into two parts; framing and evaluation phases. Framing means to simplify and clarify the acts, outcomes, and contingencies in the context of a particular choice. Decision-maker creates representation for a choice or option. Framing is crucial for the decision-making process because manipulations can be constructed for possible options. To show this an experiment was conducted and participants are told; if you impose policy A, 400 people will die but, if you choose policy B one-third change no one will die and two-third chance 600 people will die. 78% of people chose policy B. Although the amounts were the same in the two options, the way you told the thing creates the difference. The difference between options is inflicted by using exact outcome or nor. The second phase of the decision making process is called the evaluation phase. In this phase, each outcome is evaluated with a decision weigh. Decision weighs are

empirically arrived assessments. People made their final decisions in accordance with decision weights.

Prospect theory has explanations about the number of foreign policy behaviors of nation-states. For example; states mostly are more prepared to defend their territory than conquer new lands, they also invest more in their reputation if it slow down (Moric & Paquin, 2018, p. 238).

2.7.3 Poliheuristic Theory

The lexical meaning of poliheuristic is many shortcuts; poli means many and heuristic means shortcuts. It is designed to explain how decision-makers simplify complex decision tasks in their cognitive mechanisms. Poliheuristic theory merges the cognitive approach which focuses on identifying mental processes that involve decision making and rational approaches that examines the outcome of the decision (Mintz, 2004). The cognitive approach is focused on mental activities and processes and their role on shaping human behavior and decisions (McGraw, 2000).

It postulates two phases of decision making. In the first stage, possible alternatives are reduced via rejecting with non-compensatory principle. The non-compensatory principle means that when an alternative has a low score on a critical dimension, it is definitely rejected by the decision-maker (Mintz, 2003) According to this rule, the decision-maker directly rejects a certain alternative, if it is unacceptable on a key dimension. Even though this alternative has a high score in another dimension, this does not compensate. This stage is where cognitive rules are the determinants and decision-makers eliminate the complexity of the world herein. In the second stage, rational rules are utilized in order to evaluate the remaining alternatives.

DeRouen (2003) explains President Eisenhower's decision not to use the force of help the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. French was requesting military aid for their last stand in their former colony, Vietnam. Eisenhower had three alternatives; (1) Invasion with ground troops, (2) Airstrike, and (3) No force. The president chose to option three, no use of force. According to Derouen (DeRouen, 2003), the president's

decision corresponded with the two steps of the poliheuristic theory. American population and Congress were against to use of force in Vietnam, so the first option was not appreciated in the domestic/political dimension. According to the non-compensatory principle, option one had to be rejected. The other two options remained for the second phase of evaluation. In this stage, politicians think more analytical with rationality rules- maximize gains and minimize the losses. The airstrike option has a good score in the military dimension, but still questionable for the political dimension because the success of airstrike, according to Eisenhower, depended on the participation of other allies namely Britain. But the coalition could not be established. In the end, President Eisenhower chose not to use force, the best alternative regarding political dimension.

This theory stresses the information processing and order sensitivity decision-makers. Redd (2003, p. 104) emphasize the importance of framing which means the way that alternatives or information are presented. In addition, the sequence of outcomes presented to decision-makers has a decisive effect on the decision making process. According to poliheuristic theory, people process incoming information with selective and nonholistic strategy. In this sense, it shared the assumptions of bounded rationality about the lack of computational ability of humans (Liu, 2003, p. 146).

2.7.4 Cybernetic Theory

The cybernetic theory provides an understanding of people's reach decisions in volatile and uncertain environments by manageable strategies (Ostrom & Job, 1986). It stresses the decision-makers' disability to determine the state of the environment, available alternative, and assess the results of these alternatives (Liu, 2003, p. 142). In this regard, cybernetic theory's assumptions are opposed to the rational choice approach in which decision-makers are capable to order all alternatives and evaluate the consequences of these alternatives. In fact, cybernetic theory is based on the bounded rationality approach of Herbert Simon where decision-makers' are considered as a cognitive miser who hasn't computational skills to process any information.

According to Steinbruner (1974), decision-makers try to minimize uncertainty through information feedback. Decision making in this theory is not considered comprehensive and systematic. People only seek a small set of variables, rather than consider all alternatives and outcomes.

Ostrom and Job (1986) examined presidents of the United States in the post-world war II period, and they concluded that the presidents developed simple decision-making rules for use of force decisions in this era. They argued all presidents concerned similar roles in the Oval Office which are; (1) rejection of isolationism, (2) prevention from communism and, (3) Containment of the Soviet Union. These shared goals lead to presidents reacts and evaluate their environment similarly.

2.7.5 Bounded Rationality Theory

Optimal decision making requires some preconditions such as extensive time for process information, cognitive effort, and high concentration and calculation skills. However, time pressure, rapidly changing environment, and limited cognitive capacity of humans are the facts that the real-world offers to decision-makers. Simon (1957) recommends the “Bounded Rationality” approach to emphasize human cognitive constraints in complex decision-making situations. Simon (1960) claims the cognitive and computational capacity of a human is not enough for complex problems that require rational thinking. Bendor (2010) listed the reasons why an individual is limitedly rational; (i) there is always more information in the environment than we can perceive, (ii) people process slowly even this limited information, and (iii) their memory is reconstructive which means people cannot remember all the things as it is. Therefore, people have to address their cognitive shortcuts and heuristics when they make choices.

Cognitive limits play role in every stage of the decision in which defining problems, generating alternatives, and choose the optimal option. Simon argues that cognitive limitations come from the complexity of the world. Inevitably, rationality in decision making is fairly limited. Simon critics “economic man” whom we suppose to act in a rational way (Simon, 1997, p. 68). He argues neither rational model nor game theory

interest in boundaries of decision maker's computational capacity and the quality or quantity of information that an individual has. Economic man is supposed to act in accordance with the maximizing principle that is, choosing to maximize the value of utility function. On the contrary, the bounded rationality model argues choices are made by the satisfying heuristic. Individuals end search as soon as they find a good enough alternative, instead of searching for all possible options because people do not have utility functions (Bendor, 2010, pp. 5,52). In short, he argues humans do not generate a table that shows all available alternatives with their pros and cons, instead, they use sequential search in their examinations.



3. UNCERTAINTY

Uncertainty is a fundamental element of the human condition which takes place when probabilities of outcomes are unknown. Even the simplest decision includes some amount of uncertainty. For instance, the decision of choosing a cup of coffee can contain uncertainties; the taste can be bad, or the usual pleasure cannot occur. Uncertainty can be reduced by gaining more information, but never be eliminated. Since we cannot think of any decision without uncertainty, we have to consider how uncertainty might affect the decision-making process.

According to Bland and Schaefer (2012) successful decision making is resulted from a stable representation of the S-R-O rule. Decision-makers learn from a specific association between stimulus (S) and response (R) which is linked with a negative or positive outcome (O). In order to make optimal choices, an agent should learn the association between S-R-O and the possibility to which they occur. Bland and Schaefer argue uncertainty is inflicted by unexpected changes in relationships S-R-O. For instance, you enter a cafe (R) and find your favorite meal (S) is available 8 out of 10 (O). However, a sudden change in the café such as the replacement of chefs can increase the uncertainty. Because the association between S-R-O that you established before is not the same anymore, the probabilities that you established have changed.

3.1 UNDERSTANDING DIMENSIONS OF UNCERTAINTY

Uncertainty is incomplete information as a general statement (McDermott & Cowden, 2001). However, the variety of ways in which uncertainty has been defined in social sciences. Best (2012) describes uncertainty as a lack of information or knowledge about the environment, actors, and possible outcomes which can be reduced by obtaining more information. Best also distinguish uncertainty in two kinds; (1) uncertainty about environment, and (2) uncertainty about others' intentions and preferences. Basically, it is about our inability to acquire accurate information. Several scholars define uncertainty with different terms. For example, variance of distribution over probabilities (Poast, Hardin, & Uzanyi, 2013), a situation where probabilities of outcomes are not known (Levy J. S., 1992), the situation when

probabilities of future events are absent (Luce & Raiffa, 1957) The shared assumption about the uncertainty is the existence of unknown information.

3.2 OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN DECISION MAKING

Scholars have tried to develop their understanding of decision making by identifying environmental factors. A foreign policy environment commonly is defined with adjectives such as high stress, risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Nevertheless, uncertainty and other environmental factors are misunderstood sometimes and confused with each other. Especially uncertainty, risk, and ambiguity are often used interchangeably. This situation has required clarification to better understand what uncertainty is.

Ambiguity is the word mostly used in the place of uncertainty in our daily life and also in academic articles. Unlike the scholars who substitute ambiguity with uncertainty (Heradstveit & Bonham, 1986), some scholars draw a line between those two concepts. Moore and Eckel (2006) explain ambiguity as a variation of uncertainty by arguing uncertain events can be classified as risky events and ambiguous events. In this context, risky events signify situations where the probability of outcomes is known. On the contrary, in ambiguous events, the decision-maker neither knows the outcome of the event nor the payoffs associated with this event. Shorty, ambiguity states a greater degree of uncertainty. It is defined as the uncertainty of uncertainty (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). A precise definition of ambiguity is also defined as ambiguity exists if a stimulus has more than one meaning (Levine, 1985). Similarly, Best (2012) distinguishes ambiguity from uncertainty by emphasizing the role of interpretation in ambiguity. According to him, ambiguity occurs when a text or policy open to interpretation because multiple meanings inherently exist in the languages and actions.

Risk is another conception of the decision environment. Knight (1921) defines risky events as measurable and uncertain events are immeasurable. Meanwhile, Milburn and Billings (1976) claim risk exists if the decision-maker has complete information

about the probable distribution of consequences. However, an uncertain situation exists when the decision-maker has no definite knowledge about the probabilities of the outcomes.

3.3 APPEARANCE OF UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Incomplete information is omnipresent and enduring in foreign policy issues. States always keep private information from other states or mispresent the information deliberately. In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense of the USA, explains to the reporters that "...as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know."¹ His words clearly present that uncertainty is acutely absolute for international relations scholars. Uncertainty arises from various factors. They can be categorized into three titles; (i) uncertainty over state intentions and preferences, (ii) uncertainty over states' resolve or material capabilities, cost of war (iii) uncertainty over war outcomes (Bas & Schub, 2016).

Uncertainty in world politics increased after the Cold War (Rosenau, 2006; Hudson, 2014). The Soviet-United States rivalry was providing some sense of stability through known enemies and continues tension among them. The contemporary world is much more unpredictable, not only because of the absence of superpower rivalry but also developments in technology, the proliferation of organizations, integration of regions, information revolution, and so on (Rosenau, 2006, p. 109)

Inevitably, uncertainty affects each level of analysis of IR. At the individual level, it influences decision-making processes. At the state level, the diplomatic, economic, or military relations of countries are tried to be maintained without surprises. Finally, at

¹ Donald Rumsfeld 'Department of Defense News Briefing' February 12, 2002
<https://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636> (Accessed on: DD.MM.YY)

the international level, the creation of multistate organizations again needs a certain environment where the actors communicate directly.

3.4 DECISION-MAKING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY

In everyday life, people often have to make decisions under uncertainty. Therefore, they developed some strategies to cope with it. There are two types of models to explain the decision making under uncertainty; normative and descriptive approaches. Normative approaches try to explain how people should make decisions. Expected utility theory is an example of the normative theories. The expected utility theory assumes that people make choice between two options by comparing them in accordance with their weighted sum of utility values. Normative theories assume people are perfectly informed and have high-level calculation abilities. On the other hand, descriptive theories explain how people actually make decisions. Prospect theory, poliheuristic theory, and bounded rationality theory can be included in descriptive theories.

Besides the theories, researches also study specific strategies that people use in the face of uncertainty. Kahneman, Tversky, and Slovic (Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982, p. 3) argue people are more prone to use heuristic-based judgments when they try to deal with uncertainty. Heuristics are generally defined as cognitive shortcuts to reduce the complexity of situations. In their book, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, they mention about three heuristics; (1) *Representativeness*, (2) *Availability*, (3) *Anchoring* (Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982). The Representativeness heuristic is a mental shortcut that refers to the situation where people estimate the probability of an event by contrasting it to existing categories in their minds. Availability is another shortcut and means people assess information in accordance with its frequency, vividness, and actuality. People tend to rely on information that eases to recall. Anchoring is very similar to the priming effect. People make estimates from an initial value and this value affects the judgment process.

Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) state three broad strategies that are utilized to handle uncertainty; (1) reducing uncertainty, (2) suppressing uncertainty, and (3) acknowledging uncertainty. There are two tactics for reducing uncertainty. First, an individual can gain more information, if it is possible. McDermott (2010) argues policymakers always strive to reduce uncertainty because they believe certain and confident information increases the quality of the decision. Similarly, Steinbruner (1974, p. 68) argues decision-makers act through their willingness and tendency to control uncertainty, thus they strive to reduce uncertainty as much as possible. Steinbruner (1974, p. 67) proposes that decision-makers do not prefer to be underexposed of all relevant information and do not assess non-preferred alternatives and finally. However, it can be not possible to collect additional information. In such situations, people move to the second tactic, which is extrapolating from existing information by using statistical methods or assumption-based reasoning. The second strategy is suppressing uncertainty which means ignoring uncertainty and undesirable information. Here, people employ intuition-based choices and adapt their preferences and beliefs to their decisions. The final strategy is an acknowledgment of uncertainty and taking it into account. Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) argue when people accept the uncertainty they prepare to avoid some possible risks by employing courses of action.

The strategies employed in the foreign policy decision under uncertainty show similarity with everyday life tactics. However, George (1985, p. 498) deeply classifies the strategies used to cope with a lack of knowledge in foreign policy decisions. The first strategy that he defined is *procrastination*. Leaders sometimes prefer to escape from stress induced by uncertainty. Therefore, they remain inactive until the problem goes away or boils down. The second strategy is *bolstering* which refers tendency to increase the attractiveness of preferred options and decrease the attractiveness of rejected alternatives. This strategy makes it easy to decide when decision-makers confront a situation clouded by uncertainty. The third tactic is the use of cognitive aids which are heuristics explained above and simple decision rules. Simple decision rules contain; *satisfying principle* of bounded rationality approach in which people choose the alternative which is good enough rather than calculating all possible alternatives; *incrementalism* which refers considering a narrow range of alternatives;

sequential decision making which means breaking up big problems into small-step decisions; consensus politics in which leaders do what enough people want; use of historical analogies in which policymakers use past historical cases to diagnose the present case and; use of ideology as guidance to solve complex problems by using generalized and deductive beliefs.

In a conclusion, uncertainty is central in our life. However, there are multiple ways in which uncertainty has been defined and studied. This chapter tried to provide a general review on the concept of uncertainty, its involvement in international relations, and strategies to strive with uncertainty.



4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In recent years there have been extensive explorations by psychologists in the international relations field as explained in the literature review. Increasing attention to international relations from behavioral sciences leads to the emergence of Behavioral IR. The main focuses of Behavioral IR consist of judgments and choices of individuals, groups, and organizations. These levels are analyzed under different situational factors, contextual factors, and individual factors. While traditional studies of decision making such as rational and expected utility theories are outcome-oriented, behavioral studies are process and outcome-oriented. Accordingly, behavioral decision science aims to understand the process through which actors adopt in constantly changing, transforming, and reordering the environment and make their choices.

Even though the expanse of behavioral approach in IR goes back to the 1950s, there no general theory exists which can provide a parsimonious, unified framework. However, Rosati (2000) argues that decision-makers are “cognitive actors” whose subjective preferences, heuristics, images, or schemata should be taken into account for comprehensive decision theory. Similarly, Mintz (2007) argues behavioral IR can be defined as the sum of its parts because it consists of studies on emotions, perceptions, personalities, cultural and societal factors, beliefs, and more

The behavioral IR approach is influenced by Simon’s ideas in decision making studies. In the 1950s, Herbert Alexander Simon who is American social scientist work on the behaviorist approach suggested a theory for this kind of situation and named his approach as “Bounded Rationality” (Simon H. , 1955). Although his ideas are constructed for economic behavior, he opened a discussion platform for international relations scholars and behavioral revolution in this field. Mintz (2007) defines the characteristics of Behavioral IR with a similar assumption of Simon’s Bounded Rationality. They both agree on the limited capability of humans to make a rational

decision because of boundaries came from both the internal worlds of the human and external world of decision.

This research which takes its theoretical framework from behavioral IR focuses on both environmental constraint –uncertainty- and individual psychology; how do they people be affected by uncertainty in their decisions, how do they perceive it, and how their conflict perceptions correlate with their behaviors under the condition of uncertainty. In this regard, research will try to seek out both the impact of uncertainty and personal variables on the decision making processes.

As stated in Chapter 2, traditional decision-making theories – rational model- postulate decision-makers as “economic man” who is assumed to have clear and comprehensive knowledge of his environment. Economic man is also assumed to have good skills in computation which enables him to evaluate all alternatives and all information available to him. Shortly, the economic man uses linear, logical, mathematical algorithms where the information is complete, the situation is well structured and time is enough to make a deep analysis. However, rationality essentials are not fully existed in many situations. Decision-makers have to decide in ambiguous conditions with incomplete information and under time pressure. The situations with incomplete information are characterized as where stable and defined preference structure does not exist; probability distributions are limitedly known or unknown; accurate evaluation of consequences is absent (Weber, 1987).

According to Dougherty (1971, p. 312), decision making is “... act of choosing among available alternatives, about which a certain amount of uncertainty exists.” Uncertainty is defined as the variability of the situation and/or character of information. The variability of the situation indicates the difficulty of anticipation about the consequences of alternative options. The character of information, on the other hand, refers quality and quantity of information that a decision-maker is being given. Uncertainty is n critical concept in here because of its potential to obstruct the decision-making process to output rational decisions. As Simon’s argumentation,

human's limited knowledge about the conditions surrounding bounds his decisions (Simon H. , 1990, p. 15).

Researches about information constraints demonstrated that how does it presented to decision-makers affect the choice (Redd, 2002). The way information is presented to decision-makers impacts their decisions and it is called the "framing effect" (Mintz, 2007). Since the information is considered as the principal source of decision making, the actors either individuals or governments state the problem and make assessments in accordance with incoming information.

In this regard, this brings the question of how does the uncertainty level of information at certain issues would shape the conflictual level of responses? In the context of framing, if a decision-maker who takes similar scenarios with different presentations due to their uncertainties, how does his decision-making process affected? Depending on this question, one asks the first three hypotheses of the present study as follows;

Hypothesis 1: Individuals will perceive a higher threat in the condition of high uncertainty and they will choose more conflict policies in high conflict conditions.

Hypothesis 2: The order of condition of uncertainty given to an individual (low-high, high-low, and low-low) will affect their perceived threat. Individuals who take scenarios in high-low order will choose more conflict policies for the first scenario than individuals who take scenarios in low-high and low-low order.

Hypothesis 3: More experienced participants' policy preferences will change according to conditions of uncertainty. Highly experienced individuals will choose more conflict policies in high conflict conditions.

Hypothesis 4: Policy preferences of different age groups will vary in the face of uncertainty terms of their conflict levels. Older individuals will be less attentive to the amount of condition and their choices will not be affected by the condition of uncertainty.

Hypothesis 5: Subjects who have different decision-making styles will respond to different conflict levels under conditions of uncertainty.

Hypothesis 6: Soldiers are expected to be choosing policies whose conflict is higher than civil servants' choices.

Hypothesis 7: Individuals' level of confidence in their choices will be higher in the condition of low uncertainty and will be lower in high uncertainty conditions.

Hypothesis 8: The perceived difficulty of the decision making in scenarios will be different for scenarios involving different levels of uncertainty. Individuals will perceive high-uncertainty scenarios as more difficult compared to low-uncertainty scenarios.

Hafner-Burton and her colleagues (2017) argue that behavioral IR obtains information from focusing on the heterogeneity of choices and decision-making processes. Consequently, this approach interests with causes and consequences of differences across individuals because even similarly situated persons can behave differently. Today, the factors that lead heterogeneity are searched in emotional states, reasoning styles. Also, factors like career experiences, age, and gender are researched (Hafner-Burton, Haggard, Lake, & Victor, 2017). Experience is a widely studied individual factor in decision making and judgment domains. Hafner and her colleges (2011) specifically focus on the differences in decision-making styles between experienced elites and inexperienced people. According to their results, highly experienced elites are more skilled to use heuristics for complex and uncertain decisions; they can also choose well functioning heuristics and update their heuristics due to the requirements of the situation.

Perception is also included in the subtitles of behavioral IR because it affects the heterogeneity of preferences. Perception is utilized to describe the construction of reality in our minds (Herrmann, 1986). The massive amount of data and information circulates simultaneously in the complex world. However, this information is filtered

via the perception of the human mind. In order to understand decision making patterns, the behavioral approach claims that more attention is needed on how people perceive situations (Hermann, 2013). Howard (2012) argues that perception is the primary causative for clashes by arguing against the ideas of Huntington who says civilizations are the cause of clashes. In that regard, conflict is caused by something between the actual event and the way processed by the human mind (Howard, 2012).

Moreover, Spinoza divided the concept of perception into four subtypes: perception by the senses, perception by experience, perception by deductive reasoning, and perception by intuitive (Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007). Actually, he emphasizes the sources of perception. From this point of view, it can be argued that conflict perception of our sample will be affected by their experience, occupation, or decision making styles.

Hypothesis 9: Conflict perception will be higher for individuals who have higher intuitive decision-making style.

Hypothesis 10: Soldiers' conflict perception is expected to be higher than the civil servants'.

As stated before, one of the focal points of behavioral IR is individual personality. In this regard, individual differences in decision-making styles can be utilized in order to understand preference differences. Bruce and Scott (1995) developed a questionnaire in order to determine the decision-making style of a person. Decision-making style, by definition, is an individual's habitual pattern that a decision-maker uses when he decides (Driver, 1979). Bruce and Scott (1995) define five different decision making styles; rational, dependent, intuitive, avoidant, and spontaneous. These styles affect the way of gathering and processing information and the outcome as well. People, who have a rational decision-making style, tend to do a more logical search and thinking. Dependent decision-makers are in need of support from others. Intuitive decision-makers make quick decisions by depending on their foresight. Avoidant decision-makers attempt to postpone their decisions. Finally, spontaneous decision-makers' choices are dependent on the spur of the moment. It is possible to

learn how different decision-making styles can affect people's responses to uncertainty. With this regard the related hypotheses are as follows;

Hypothesis 11: Decision-making styles of subjects will vary as a function of the experience of subjects. More experienced individuals will have more intuitive and dependent decision making styles.

Hypothesis 12: Decision-making styles of subjects will differ across soldiers and civil servants.

5. THE EXPERIMENT

5.1 PARTICIPANTS OF THE EXPERIMENT

Thirty-three subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects are found via a snowball sampling method where the existing participants provide a referral to recruit other potential subjects. They all participate in the experiment voluntarily and they sign a disclosure form before the experiment. Table 4.1 presents the number of participants and their distribution to different occupations either soldier or civil servant.

Table 2. Descriptive for Variable of Occupations

	N	%
Civil Servant	18	54.5
Soldier	15	45.5
Total	33	100.0

As seen in Table 4.1, the subjects of the study are selected due to their occupations. The subjects under the civil servant category are composed of former ambassadors and former bureaucrats. On the other hand, the subjects who belong to the soldier category had worked as high-rank officers for the Turkish army for years and the


majority of them have taken responsibility in high-level positions. In this respect, it can be easily claimed that the sample of this study is composed of people who possess important roles in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy.

A 2x3 within and between factorial designs is employed in the experiment. The factors are as follows: (i) level of uncertainty (high vs. low), and (ii) order of the scenarios (High uncertainty-low uncertainty, low uncertainty-high uncertainty, low uncertainty-low uncertainty).

5.2 PROCEDURE OF THE EXPERIMENT

Each session is conducted with face to face meetings individually. Each session begins with each subject reading the general instruction about the experiment. As far as data collection tools were concerned, this research is conducted with a structured questionnaire. This questionnaire includes four different steps (See Figure 2). In the first step, subjects are asked about their personal information which is age, experience, occupation, and gender.

Figure 2. Stages of the experiment



In the second stage, subjects are asked to evaluate their decision making styles. The items in the initial set focus on the general decision making styles of the individuals.

The scale is developed by Bruce and Scott (1995) to identify the decision making styles of administrators (See Appendix C). They argue individuals employ five different styles in general when they face a decision-making process; (1) rational decision-making style in which subjects evaluate alternatives logically, (2) intuitive decision-making style is defined by relying on feelings, (3) dependent decision-making style is in which subjects search for advice and support from others, (4) avoidant decision-making style is described when decision-makers attempt to escape from making a decision, (5) spontaneous decision-making style in which subjects decide on spur of the moment. In this scale, subjects are presented 25 statements and they are demanded to indicate whether they agree or disagree via ranging items with 5 points scale. The scale is employed to explore decision making styles of the participant in our research.

In the third stage, people are asked to estimate nine different policy alternatives (see Appendix D). Specific political actions are considered and perceived by individuals very differently in terms of actions' conflict or cooperation level. The actions were taken from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) scale and refined for coding and measuring (Beer, Ringer, Sinclair, Healy, & Bourne Jr., 1992). Although COPDAB scale contains a number value of conflict level for each action, we take a subjective assessment of actions is in order to show perception differences across individuals. One test paged is constructed for this stage. The participants are instructed first to read 9 political actions and evaluate them with a number between 1 and 100. 1 refers to the action whose conflict level is the lowest and 100 refers to the action whose conflict level is the highest. The evaluation is used to make a rank order and measure the conflict level of the subject's choices in the main experiment. Additionally, the evaluations of subjects are used to determine the conflict perception of each person.

In the next stage, subjects read a background statement of the nature of the simulated conflict and instructions about their role play in the scenario. Participants receive the cases as an intelligence report which comes from military fever in the neighbor country. In these scenarios, participants are wanted to suppose themselves as an

advisor to a decision-maker and they are informed that their advice has great importance. The purpose here is to give the impression of a real international environment effect. When the subject knows that his advice is crucial than the stress factor will be effective. After reading the scenarios, they answer a few questions. Firstly, they are asked to choose one action from the presented nine alternatives that they ranged before. After this, the participants are asked to grade their confidence in their choice in terms of success possibility from 1 to 5. Then, they are asked to estimate their perceived difficulty in their decision process. Again, there are asked to score their feeling of difficulty between 1 and 5.

The story in both scenarios is about a threat possibility that comes from a neighbor country 18 (see Appendices E, F, G). In the first scenario, there are two fictitious countries named *Zindia* and *Samarta* who share a border. *Zindia* has begun some industrial instructions near to the shared border and those constructions threaten the *Samarta* economy indirectly. Also, some other suspicious constructions are attracted the attention by the *Samarta* government. In the second scenario, again there are two fiction countries whose names are *Igrid* and *Aldovia*. In this scenario, *Igrid* plans to construct a water treatment plant in an area where the *Aldovia*'s fishing industry is based. So, again an economic threat is on the place. Both scenarios are prepared as two versions; long and short. In the long versions of the scenarios, there is more information about the actions of another country. By doing this, uncertainty is kept on a low level. On the other hand, limited information is given in the short version of the scenarios, so the uncertainty level is increased relative to the long another version of the scenarios.

Each scenario is given to the subjects separately. After they complete the first scenarios, the case is taken and put in an envelope. The subjects are not allowed to see what they had done in the previous sections. The intention here is to eliminate them to make any comparison between their answers.

The independent variables in this experiment are the uncertainty level of scenarios and the sequence of scenarios. On the other hand, dependent variables are alternatives chosen by the subjects.

Besides, variables of age, experience, decision-making style, and conflict perception are also considered as independent variables.

5.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

To determine the impact of the uncertainty factor in foreign policy decision making, two factors are investigated. (a) manipulating the degree of uncertainty faced by decision-makers, (b) manipulating the order of scenarios. Also, the order of alternatives is manipulated to restrain order-induced effect on decision making strategy.

The uncertainty level of scenarios is ensured by the manipulation of the number of information that is given to the subjects. Context of uncertainty is defined in various way, however, the definition that is taken as a base here “lack information”. Uncertainty occurs when leaders do not have accurate information about the other side or do not have enough reliable information, or cannot estimate what the future will bring as a result of his choices (McDermott & Cowden, 2001). The number of information and uncertainty level is negatively correlated. Each participant has exposed two different scenarios.

The subjects are randomly assigned into three groups in accordance with the uncertainty level of scenarios. In order to see the impact of the order we prepared scenarios in three different sequences; low-high uncertainty, high-low uncertainty, and low-low uncertainty. Group A first read the scenario whose uncertainty level is low and then read the scenario whose uncertainty level high. Group B follows the opposite direction than Group A; they first take the scenario which contains high uncertain information and then read the second scenario which contains low uncertain

information. Finally, participants in Group C are given two scenarios and both scenarios include low uncertain information.

5.4 DATA ANALYSIS

In data analysis, Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) -25.0 was utilized to perform descriptive statistics, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and regression analyses.

Specifically, ANOVA was utilized to test the predictive power of uncertainty condition on the conflict level of responses. It was also benefited to demonstrate condition impact on subjects changed estimates on success and strain. In addition, regression analysis was utilized to test the predictive power of occupation, age, experience, and decision-making style on general conflict perception, and subjects changed strategies during the decision making process. Besides, group differences and correlations analyses are used to detect relational patterns among variables.

6. RESULTS OF THE STUDY

This chapter presents the results of the quantitative data. As it is presented in the analysis sections, four different statistical analyses are conducted to test the hypothesis. In order to test the thesis hypotheses, a repeated-measures ANOVA was utilized to explore whether (1) responses differed in terms of conflict, success, and strain levels in different uncertainty conditions (high-low), (2) the order of scenario presenting (low-high, high-low, low-low) influenced subject's estimations in terms of conflict, success, and strain. T-tests and one way ANOVA were conducted to test whether the occupations, decision making styles, age groups affected individuals' responses to scenarios. Finally, Pearson's correlation analysis was utilized to explicate whether (1) decision making styles are related to by age, (2) decision making styles are related to experience.

The dependent variables were conflict, success and strain estimations, and conflict perceptions of subjects, respectively. The within-subject variable was the degree of uncertainty (high-low) and between-subject variables were the order of scenarios, age, experience, occupation, decision making styles.

6.1 Analysis on Conflict Change

A two-way 2 (uncertainty: low or high) x 3 (order of uncertainty: low-high, high-low or low-low) mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of uncertainty level and order of scenarios on conflict ratings. There was a significant main effect of uncertainty, $F(1,30) = 10.32$, $MSE = 3476.37$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = .26$, suggesting that conflict level of responses changed across scenarios. The main effect of the order was not significant, $F(1,30) = 333.19$, $p = .746$. The interaction effect is significant, $F(2, 30) = 9.65$, $MSE = 3249.74$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .39$, indicating the effect of conflict level of responses over scenarios depend on the order that low and high uncertainty scenarios are presented. The results verify the hypothesis #1 which states high uncertainty will increase the conflict level of responses and hypothesis #2 which states the order of scenarios will affect the conflict level of responses.

Next, further pairwise analyses were conducted to examine the pattern of differences depending on the order of scenarios (low-high, high-low, low-low). Results showed that subjects who received scenarios in low-high order selected less conflictual responses to the first scenario ($M=18.45$, $SD=25.31$) than the second scenario ($M=44.01$, $SD=22.89$). The subject who received scenarios in low-low order followed the same pattern with the low-high order group. They chose less conflictual policies to the first scenario ($M=17$, $SD=12.83$) than the second scenario ($M=48.27$, $SD=36.42$). However, subjects who are given scenarios in high-low order chose high conflict policies to the first scenario ($M=32.00$, $SD=31.63$) than the second scenario ($M=18.63$, $SD=27.08$).

A mixed analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to assess if mean differences exist on change in conflict level of choices by uncertainty (high and low) after controlling for the role of occupational experience. The main effect of uncertainty was significant even when we control the effect of experience, $F(1,29)=5.822$, $MSE=1845.96$, $p=.022$, $\eta p^2=1.67$, suggesting the conflict level of responses changed across scenarios regardless to career experience in years of subjects. This data did not confirm the hypothesis #3

However, when we control the age, the main effect of uncertainty is disappeared, $F(1, 29)=2.193$, $MSE=744.118$, $p=.149$, $\eta p^2=.070$. In order to detect the age effect on response change, subjects are categorized into generations (see Table 3) and repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted with each generation by splitting. For Generation X, the main effect of uncertainty was significant, $F(1,8)=11.385$, $MSE=2738.0$, $p=.010$, $\eta p^2=.026$, suggesting that the conflict level of responses changed across scenarios. This was qualified by the interaction between the degree of uncertainty and the order of scenarios is presented. These results are showing that the effect of conflict level of responses depends on the order that low and high scenarios are presented in the group of Generation X. On the contrary, the main effect of uncertainty was not significant for a group of Baby Boomers, $F(1,11)=4.248$, $MSE=1689.429$, $p=.064$, $\eta p^2=.279$, but the interaction effect between change and condition was significant, $F(1,11)=6.126$, $MSE=2436.639$, $p=.016$, $\eta p^2=.527$. Finally, the same analysis for Silent Generation revealed no significant result neither for the main effect of

uncertainty nor interaction between condition and change. Results indicated that the way individuals respond to uncertainty is different across generations. While participants in Generation X determine their responses in accordance with the amount of incoming information and also be affected by the order of scenarios, Baby Boomers do not show a reaction to uncertainty, but they are affected by order of low and high uncertainty. Participants' responses in the Silent Generation do not show any reaction to the amount of information and /or order of low-high uncertainty scenarios. The results support the hypothesis #4 in which the age groups are expected to react differently in the conditions of uncertainty.

Table 3. Distribution of Generations

Generations	Age	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Generation X	40-54	11	33.3	33.3	33.3
Baby Boomers	55-74	14	42.4	42.4	75.8
Silent Generation	75-90	8	24.2	24.2	100.0
Total		33	100.0	100.0	

In addition, an ANCOVA was conducted to test whether conflict responses changed when the effect of decision-making styles was controlled. When we included each decision making styles separately as the covariate, the significance in the change of responses disappeared. In addition, conflict perceptions and occupation also revealed the same results. Although the interaction effect between change and covariate is not significant, covariates eliminated the significance of the change. The result supports the hypothesis of #5.

6.2 Analysis on Success Scores Change

In order to test how the order of scenarios influenced subjects' confidence level on their choices, two-way mixed-ANOVA was conducted for every three groups. Success estimations were entered as within-subject factors and order of scenarios was

entered as between-subject factors. The main effect of uncertainty was not significant, $F(1, 30) = 3.53$, $MSE = .545$, $p = .070$, $\eta^2 = .105$. The main effect of the order was also not significant, $F(1, 30) = 1.15$, $p = .052$, $\eta^2 = .1882$. However, the interaction effect between the level of uncertainty and order of scenarios (low-high, high-low, low-low) was obtained significant, $F(2, 30) = 18.82$, $MSE = 2.909$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .557$. Examination of success level means indicated that subjects who received scenarios in the order of low-high uncertainty estimated higher success to the first response ($M = 3.09$, $SD = .30$) than the second response ($M = 2.54$, $SD = .68$). The second group who were given scenarios in the order of high-low show a similar pattern with the first group; they estimated lower success for their first response ($M = 2.36$, $SD = .50$) than the second response ($M = 3.27$, $SD = .46$). Finally, the third group who received scenarios in low-low sequence made comparable estimations for both responses, high success estimation for the first choice ($M = 3.18$, $SD = .60$). This result supports the hypothesis #7 which says confidence levels of people on their choices will be high in the condition of low uncertainty and will be low in the condition of high uncertainty.

Further mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted by splitting subjects into different age groups to see the pattern of differences across age groups. These results of analyses showed that generation X and baby boomers have the same behavioral pattern in their success estimations. The interaction effect between condition and change was significant for generation X, $F(1, 8) = 9.636$, $MSE = .803$, $p = .007$, $\eta^2 = .707$ and baby boomers $F(1, 11) = 9.119$, $MSE = 1.437$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .624$, indicating that the effect of success estimations over the scenarios depend on the order that high and low is presented. These participants who belong to Generation X and Baby Boomers estimated more success when they receive more information and estimate less success when the amount of information is decreased. However, the interaction effect between condition and change was not significant for the silent generation, $F(1, 5) = 1.518$, $MSE = .177$, $p = .305$, $\eta^2 = .378$. These subjects do not determine their success levels in accordance with the amount of incoming information.

6.3 Analysis on Difficulty Rate Change

In order to investigate hypothesis #3 of the study, two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test whether difficulty ratings changed across scenarios for different uncertainty groups. The results indicated a non-significant main effect of uncertainty in difficulty rates and the main effect of the condition was also non-significant. Furthermore, the interaction effect between condition and change was also non-significant. That is, difficulty scores were not significantly different from each other both in terms of condition and order of scenarios. The results contradict with hypothesis #8 in which perceived difficulty is expected to be high in the condition of high uncertainty.

Even when the experience, age, occupation, and five different decision-making styles were entered separately as a covariate, none of them revealed a significant interaction with the change in difficulty scores.

Then bivariate correlations were conducted to examine whether difficulty ratings were related to the conflict responses to given scenarios. Results showed that difficulty scores of subjects are strongly related to the conflict level of chosen policy, for the first responses Pearson's $r(33) = .672, p < .001$ and for the second response Pearson's $r(33) = .559, p < .001$. The results mean that participants' perceived difficulty is increasing when their responses are more conflictual, but it is easier to choose less conflictual responses.

6.4 Analysis on Conflict Perception

Conflict perception scores are calculated from the subject's conflict estimations on nine policy options (see Table 4). The average of conflict perception scores ranged from 32.44 to 66.77 ($M=46.28, SD=7.41$).

Table 4. Conflict Ranks Mean Level of Policy Alternatives

Policy Alternatives	Mean	Std. Deviation
1. Sending a special ambassador	13.03	13.03
2. No comment on the situation	13.27	14.76
3. Try to establish alliance	17.15	17.57
4. Engaging verbal warning	32.15	22.52
5. Demand mediation from an international org.	41.09	22.84
6. Threatening to impose sanctions	64.12	21.71
7. Breaking up diplomatic relations	66.51	21.26
8. Increasing its military capabilities	72.42	19.32
9. Military operation	96.81	10.44

Multiple linear regression was conducted to predict conflict perception scores based on decision-making styles. The regression model was significant and explained the .35 of the variance in conflict perception, $F(5, 27) = 2.848, p < .034$. However, among all the predictors only the intuitive decision-making style was found to be significant, $\beta = .49, t = 3.2, p < .01$. That is, a higher intuitive decision-making style is associated with higher conflict perception, which is in line the hypothesis #9.

In the next step, an independent sample t-test was conducted to compare conflict perceptions of soldiers and civil servants. There was not a significant difference in the scores between soldiers ($M = 46.74, SD = 8.69$) and civil servants ($M = 45.90, SD = 8.59$); $t(31) = -.317, p = .753$. This result did not verify hypothesis #10 in which soldiers are expected to have higher conflict perceptions than civil servants.

6.5 Analysis on Decision Making Styles

In the last step, rather than focusing on responses to scenarios, analyses addressed decision-making styles and tested how individual-level variables such as age and experience were related to different decision-making styles Table 6.3 displays the correlation coefficients for five decision-making style and age. Based on the Pearson correlation results, $r(33) = .164, p < .05$, indicating a positive correlation between rational decision-making style and age. Similarly, dependent decision making was positively related to age, $r(33) = .517, p < .01$. These results show that while people are getting older, their decisions become more rational and also, they consult more with

other people in their decision process. The findings also revealed a negative correlation among spontaneous decision making and rational decision making, $r(33) = -.606, p < .01$, supporting the hypothesis 5a. The meaning of this result is people who employ rational strategies on their decisions, avoid deciding spontaneously.

A similar pattern of relationship was found for decision making styles and experience. Experience was correlated with only rational decision making, $r(33) = .435, p = .011$ and, dependent decision making, $r(33) = .485, p = .004$, suggesting that older individuals were more likely to adopt rational and dependent decision making but for other decision-making styles are not related to age. In that sense, the results supported the hypothesis #11, partially. Hypothesis #11 states experience and intuitive decision-making style will be also correlated, however, our results could not find any correlation between experience and intuitive decision-making style.

Table 5. Pearson's Correlations for Decision Making Styles and Age

		Rational	Intuitive	Dependent	Avoidant	Spontaneous
Age	Pearson Correlation	.364*	-.030	.517**	.239	-.160
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.038	.866	.002	.181	.374
	N					
Rational	Pearson Correlation		-.153	.671**	-.210	-.606**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.395	.000	.240	.000
	N					
Intuitive	Pearson Correlation			-.065	.063	.268

	Sig. (2-tailed)	.720	.729	.132
	N			
Dependent	Pearson Correlation		-.087	-.281
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.630	.113
	N			
Avoidant	Pearson Correlation			.141
	Sig. (2-tailed)			.434
	N			

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare all five decision making scores for soldiers and civil servants. There was no significant difference in all scores, showing that the decision making styles that soldiers and civil servants frequently use do not differ significantly. Means and standard deviation of decision making styles by soldiers and civil servants are presented in Table 6. The results did not verify hypothesis #12 which argues two groups will hold different decision-making styles.

Table 6. Mean scores of decision making styles for soldiers and civil servants

		Rational	Intuitive	Dependent	Avoidant	Spontaneous
Civil	Mean	4.1889	3.1889	3.5667	2.2222	2.3222
Servants	SD	.45230	.64888	.59508	.76969	.57451
Soldiers	Mean	4.0533	3.0533	3.3867	1.9067	2.3600
	SD	.66961	.60222	.64793	.48324	.70183
Total	Mean	4.1273	3.1273	3.4848	2.0788	2.3394
	SD	.55637	.62213	.61650	.66509	.62547

7. IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS

This research examined the uncertainty as a factor of environmental issues and the role of psychological factors in foreign policy decision making. For this purpose, nine hypotheses were tested. First, it was hypothesized that the uncertainty levels of the scenario are expected to predict the conflict level of the response; more uncertain cases are expected to create more conflictual responses and less uncertain cases would create less conflictual responses. Second, we hypothesized the order of scenarios (low-high, high-low, and low-low) will affect the responses of the participants. The next four hypotheses were about how different individual variables affect the responses to conditions of uncertainty. The seventh and eighth hypotheses focused on the impact of uncertainty on the process. Confidence and strain levels of subjects are expected to vary as a function of uncertainty level. The ninth and tenth hypotheses are constructed on conflict perception argumentations. It was hypothesized there is a correlation between occupation and experience and conflict perception rate. The final hypotheses focused on how decision-making styles are varied in different groups (soldier-civil servant and high experienced -low experienced).

7.1 DISCUSSION REGARDING RESPONSE CHANGES

In this section, ANOVA results regarding the impact of uncertainty on decision making will be discussed.

As noted previously bounded rationality theory argues decision-makers have limited knowledge about conditions surrounding his decisions. Uncertainty always involves an independent variable to the decisions we made. As hypothesized, subjects' responses varied in terms of their conflict level as a function of uncertainty.

The conflict level perceived by the subject was dependent and uncertainty level was the independent variable in the present study. Results revealed a significant Uncertainty vs Conflict Level interaction. As it is shown in the tables, subjects tend to support escalation when they confront with high-level uncertainty. The significant difference between high-low and low-high rounds is intriguing. Uncertainty reveals more conflict actions from responders. One explanation for increasing level of conflict to uncertain situation can be *intolerance of uncertainty*. Intolerance of uncertainty is defined as mental characteristic which is stemmed from set of negative beliefs about uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas, 2009). Uncertainty creates the condition of threatened for individuals who are intolerant to uncertainty and they want to control it. Therefore, subjects' tendency to act more aggressively toward more uncertain situations can result from their feel of threatened. Hofstede (2001) uses a similar concept to explain the pattern, *uncertainty avoidance*. Since, uncertainty, as it is discussed in the previous sections, inherently exists in our life, so that individuals, societies, and organizations have to cope with it. In societies where the Uncertainty Avoidance score is high, people tend to think what is different is dangerous. Hofstede (2001) categorizes Turkish culture as high avoidant one. Turkish people have intolerant to uncertain and unknown. This research shows that subjects are more comfortable when they escalate their responses even though they have less information. In contrast, the conflict level of their selections to less uncertain situations is lower.

It is possible to explain this behavioral pattern – more uncertainty, more conflictual- with connection to the decision making styles of the participant, as well. As it is shown in the previous section, our sample has a high level of dependency in general. This finding indicates that the increase in accountability in decision making pushes people to act at the highest point of risk. At the end of the day, they are responsible for their managers so they have to estimate any threat from the highest point and make appropriate choices according to this perception level. So, people tend to escalate relations even though they see little threat in high-level uncertain scenarios.

Results showed that soldiers and participants perceive a different threat in accordance with the sequence of scenarios. For soldiers, the most threatening scenario is the second scenario in the low-low uncertainty sequence. Conflict levels of their responses' peaks when they are exposed to more and more information. However, civil servants show the same pattern for the sequence of low-high uncertainty. At the condition of low uncertainty, they are more prone to behave in a cooperative manner. They perceive the second scenario of the low-high sequence as the most threatening scenario and the conflict level of these responses picks for this scenario. On the other hand, both groups' behavior patterns show a similarity for the high-low sequence of uncertainty.

Plots of generation vs response change rates show also differences. Especially, baby boomers' responses create vertical lines; on the contrary, silent generations' responses compose more horizontal lines. This result shows that while baby boomers sharply change their reactions in accordance with the amount of incoming information, the silent generation prefers policies with similar amounts of conflict, even though incoming information is not the same. The difference between behavioral patterns of different generations might be connected with rapid changes that occurred in the 21st century. The increasing number of actors and digitalization in diplomacy leads to more and more information flows and results with complexity and uncertainty (Stanzel, 2018). Modern communication technology promotes rapid interactions but also destroyed existing structures of diplomatic communication. Social media became a platform for non-diplomatic information flows and the

opportunity to communicate with the public. However, all these developments multiply the quantity of information that decision-makers have to deal with. Therefore, it is possible that baby boomers and generation X more vigilant to the amount of information that they have, and they could perceive and compare the difference between scenarios because they are accustomed more to the realities of the 21st century.

However, the number of subjects for this analysis is relatively low. So, these implications can be more confidential, if the subject number increases.

7.2 A NEW OUTLOOK TO DECISION-MAKING STYLES

The literature on the relationship between experience and decision making style constitutes that experienced elites rely more on their heuristics and they can select the most convenient heuristics for sophisticated tasks (Hafner-Burton, Hughes, & Victor, 2011). Experience is expected to increase the automaticity in decision making (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Cooper, Kagel, Lo, & Li, 1999). However, our findings with regard to intuitive decision making do not fit with the literature. In our experiment, the experience is positively correlated with rational decision making. This research does not have enough findings of this issue and cannot explain this trend because of the small sample size and lack of variation between participants. Therefore, to understand this type of decision making, more researches have to be conducted in this area.

Hafner-Burton and his colleagues (2011) also talks about the increase in cooperation with experience. This is also supported by our finding which demonstrates a significant increase with dependent decision-making style.

In the Turkish governance system, there is a certain distinction between elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats. Politicians are seen as sovereign representatives of political values, whereas bureaucrats are seen as policy executors who have remarkable implicit knowledge on the functionality of the system. Hence,

both soldiers and civil servants in our sample argued that they are mostly executor of the decisions which are taken by politicians. The authority and responsibility in foreign policy decisions belong to politicians up to them. Even for their trivial decisions, they tend to get the approval of the higher authorities. This data is also consistent with the highness of their dependency value within the decision-making process.

Another reason for the rise of dependency on Turkish administrative culture can be found in cultural explanations again. Hofstede (2001) argues that one's mental program is based on the societal context in which one is raised and he compares the countries due to their several indexes. Power Distance Index (PDI) is one index that Hofstede uses in order to categorize cultures. PDI basically shows human inequality in management. In societies with high PDI scores, decisions are made in highly centralized structures, managers are defined as an autocrat and like a father figure, and hierarchy reflects inequality between highs and downs. Hofstede's approach and this research are presenting consistent results for high PDI scores of Turkish society. As it is expected, individuals in highly centralized hierarchical systems tend to make decisions by consulting their managers (or supervisors) which increases the dependency of the staff.

7.3 DISCUSSION REGARDING VOCATIONAL FINDINGS

When it comes to career background discussions, our research couldn't find any significant discrepancy across soldiers and civil servants in terms of conflict level and decision-making styles. There are two possible explanations for this lack of difference. Firstly, almost half of the participants in the soldier category currently work as a lecturer in the universities. So, their academic experience may get closed them think in a similar vein with the civil servants. So, while soldiers were expected to be more aggressive than civil servants when they have less information, our results show they have a similar pattern with civil servants.

Another explanation may be related to the consequences of Turkish military culture. According to Benedict Anderson (1983) creation of nation-states is not natural; however, they are socially constructed and imagined societies. Hence founders of the new states have to find common ideas, beliefs, and so on. For the Ottoman Empire in its last years and newly founded Turkish Republic, militarist values were the most dominant which had been feeling in all spheres of society (Cinar, 2014). Militarism basically means significant dominance of the army. It was utilized to protect the unity of the nation and territorial integrity. Accordingly, the emphasis on military characteristics of the nation has increased and the myth of the military nation was created. Carl Jung called this situation as collective unconscious which is defined as common to all individuals in the inherited structure of the brain (Jung, 1959, p. 4). The collective unconscious contains archetypes which are primitive mental images that come from the earliest ancestors. For years, militarism had infused to citizens of Turkey through various policies and discourses like “every Turks is born a soldier” (Sayılan, 2019). The findings of the study seemed to support the overall structure of Turkish society. People’s decisions are shaped regardless of their occupational background.

7.4 DISCUSSION REGARDING CONFLICT PERCEPTION

Conflict perceptions of a participant are calculated from their conflict estimation of given nine policy alternatives. Analyses showed that there is no difference between civil servants and soldiers in terms of their conflict perceptions. The reasons for the lack of difference are explained above. Interestingly, there is also no difference between age groups due to conflict perception rates.

The relationship between high conflict perception and intuitive decision making is also verified by the assumption of Spinoza who defends one of the sources our perceptions are our intuitions. Intuition means something is known or perceived by feelings and instincts instead of using conscious thought. These feelings and instincts might be based on a pattern of past experiences. So, the subjects who have high intuitive decision making might estimate the conflictual of given alternatives based

on their feelings rather than rational calculations. Everyone has different past experiences and that's why their perceived conflict is different than one another.

7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE EXPERIMENT

It should be noted that the sample size is a critical factor in the results. Given the width of the experimental design (2x3: uncertainty and order), the number of subjects used in this research is small. Hence, the results can indicate instabilities.

The participation rate in this study remains relatively low because of the ongoing political situation in Turkey. Since the constitutional change in 2017, the presidential system of government gives expanded rights to the president. Besides, reforms in the legal system of Turkey lead to rewriting criminal codes and the president has gained more say in judicial appointments and more impact on the constitutional court, consequently, violations to rule of law have occurred (Rodrik, 2011). Kirişçi and Sloat (2019) argue that the elastic definition of “terrorism” in Turkey, leads to erosion of civil liberties leads to less and fewer people talk about governmental issues in the media scene. *Ergenekon* and *Balyoz* cases also are considered as a curtailment to freedom of expression (Düzgit & Keyman, 2013, p. 114). Hundreds of active and retired military officers were arrested and trialed as a part of these cases. So, one of the reasons behind the low level of participation is people's unwillingness to make comment on current political issues. Although, participants were told that their names will be confidential and study is not about a fact, some of them do not want to attend the experiment.

In addition, this kind of study in which high-degree officers are the subjects requires well-developed connections within the institutions. Some of the experienced elites are mostly busy, or suspicious about the experiment questions and withdrawn about revealing their decision making processes. Consequently, the results can be analyzed deeper, if we have more participants in this study.

In addition, the small size of the sample, lack of women participation is another limitation for the current study. The participant list of this research demonstrates the gap between men and women in Turkish politics. According to the Global Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum, Turkey ranks only 109st among 152 countries from the aspect of political empowerment. According to the Women Count in Turkey report (2018), there is poor representation in parliamentary committees that deal with foreign relations. No women hold the position in the national defense committee, and only 3 women involve in external affairs. Diplomatic corps show the same trend in terms of women's involvement. 18.3% of ambassador position is held by women diplomats in 2018. In addition, only 11% of civil servants in senior decision-making positions are women in Turkey. The numbers demonstrate the absolute gender gap in decision making positions. As a reflection of these numbers, this present research did not include women participants.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Bu araştırma, Kadir Has Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü'nde yürütülmekte olan, dış politikada karar verme eğilimleri konulu yüksek lisans tez çalışması için, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Psikoloji bölümleriyle iş birliği içinde yapılmaktadır.

Çalışmaya katılım tamimiyle gönüllülük temelinde olmalıdır. Ankette, sizden kimlik belirleyici hiçbir bilgi istenmemektedir. Cevaplarınız tamimiyle gizli tutulacak, istatistiksel ortamda ve toplu olarak sadece araştırmacılar tarafından değerlendirilecektir; elde edilecek bilgiler bilimsel yayımlarda kullanılacaktır. Cevapların doğru-yanlış olarak bir değeri yoktur; tamamen kişisel değerlendirmenize göre cevaplamanızı rica ederiz.

Anket, genel olarak kişisel rahatsızlık verecek soruları içermemektedir. Ancak, katılım sırasında sorulardan ya da herhangi başka bir nedenden ötürü kendinizi rahatsız hissederseniz cevaplama işini yarıda bırakıp çıkmakta serbestsiniz. Böyle bir durumda anketi uygulayan kişiye, anketi tamamlamadığınızı söylemek yeterli olacaktır. Anket sonunda, bu çalışmayla ilgili sorularınız cevaplanacaktır.

Katkılarınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman yarıda kesip çıkabileceğimi biliyorum. Verdiğim bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı yayımlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum.

Katılımcının adı, soyadı ve imzası

.....

Araştırmacının adı, soyadı ve imzası

.....

Tarih

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

Lütfen uygun seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Cinsiyetiniz: () Kadın () Erkek

2. Yaşınız: () 20 – 25 () 26 – 30 () 31 – 35 () 36 – 40 () 41 – 45 () 46 ve Üstü

3. Çalıştığınız iş sektörü:

4. İş Deneyiminiz (Yıl): () 0 – 5 () 6 – 10 () 11 – 15 () 16 – 20 () 21 – 25 () 26 ve Üstü

APPENDIX C

QUESTIONNAIRE OF GENERAL DECISION-MAKING STYLES

	(1) Hiç Katılmıyorum	(2) Katılmıyorum,	(3) Kararsızım	(4) Katılıyorum	(5) Tamamen Katılıyorum
(1) Hiç Katılmıyorum (2) Katılmıyorum, (3) Kararsızım (4) Katılıyorum (5) Tamamen Katılıyorum					
Karar vermeden önce emin olmak için bilgi kaynaklarımı iki kere kontrol ederim.					
Karar vermeden önce doğru gerekçelerim vardır.					
Mantıklı ve sistematik bir yolla karar veririm.					
Karar vermem dikkatli düşünmemi gerektirir					
Karar verirken belirli bir amaca yönelik değişik seçenekleri göz önünde bulundururum.					
Kararlarımı verirken içgüdülerime güvenirim.					
Bir karar verirken sezgilerime güvenme eğilimindeyimdir.					
Genellikle doğruluğunu hissettiğim kararlar veririm.					
Kararlarımı verirken benim için akılcı bir nedenden daha çok, verdiğim kararın doğruluğunu hissetmem daha önemlidir.					
Karar verirken içimden gelen duygu ve tepkilere güvenirim.					
Önemli kararlar alırken başkalarının yardımına sık sık ihtiyaç duyarım.					
Eğer başkalarının desteğine sahipsem önemli kararları almak benim için daha kolaydır.					
Önemli kararlarımı alırken başkalarının tavsiyelerinden yararlanırım.					
Önemli kararlar ile yüzleştiğim zaman birinin bana doğru yolu göstermesi hoşuma gider.					
Önemli kararlarımı başka insanlara danışmadan verdiğim nadirdir					
Üzerimde baskı hissetmediğim sürece önemli kararlarımı almaktan kaçınırım.					
Mümkün olduğunca kararlarımı ertelerim.					
Önemli kararları alma aşamasına gelinceye kadar karar vermeyi sık sık ertelerim.					
Önemli kararlarımı, genellikle son dakikada veririm.					
Üzerinde düşünmek beni rahatsız ettiği için pek çok kararı ertelerim.					
Genellikle ani kararlar veririm					
Kararlarımı, çoğunlukla o anda veririm.					
Çabuk karar veririm.					
Kararlarımı, sıklıkla düşünmeden veririm.					
Kararlarımı verirken, o anda doğal olan ne ise onu yaparım.					

APPENDIX D

QUESTIONNAIRE OF CONFLICT PERCEPTION

Bir devletin, belli amaçlara ulaşmak için uluslararası sistemdeki diğer devlet ya da kurumlarla kurduğu siyasi, ekonomik, diplomatik ve hukuki ilişkiler o devletin dış politikasını oluşturur. Devletlerin uyum içinde, müşterek faydayı gözeterek, pozitif etkileşimleri amaçladıkları davranışları işbirlikçi dış politikalar olarak tanımlanırken; bunun tersine çatışmacı dış politikalarda devletler sıfır-toplamlı stratejiler gözeterek tek taraflı kazanımları amaçlar.

Lütfen aşağıda bulunan seçenekleri kendinize göre çatışmacılık düzeylerini göz önünde bulundurarak 1 ile 100 arasında bir sayı ile değerlendiriniz. (1=çatışmacılık oranı en düşük, 100= çatışmacılık oranı en yüksek)

1. Karşı ülkeye özel bir elçi göndererek konuşmalar yürütmek (...)
2. Karşı ülke ile ekonomik, askeri veya siyasi alanda ikili ittifakları kurmaya çalışmak (...)
3. Karşı ülke ile diplomatik ilişkileri düşürmek veya kesmek (...)
4. Karşı ülkenin yaptığı çeşitli hamlelere karşılık olarak kendi askeri ve/veya ekonomik gücünüzü arttırmak (...)
5. Karşı ülkenin hamlelerine karşılık uluslararası bir organizasyona başvurmak (...)
6. Karşı ülkeye askeri saldırıda bulunmak (...)
7. Karşı ülkeye zaman sınırı koyarak yaptırım tehditlerinde bulunmak (...)
8. Karşı ülkenin eylemleri üzerine herhangi bir yorumda bulunmamak (...)
9. Karşı ülkeye eylemlerinden dolayı duyulan rahatsızlıkları içeren resmi bir uyarıda bulunmak (...)

APPENDIX E

SCENARIOS OF GROUP A

Samarta ve Zindia sınır komşusu iki ülkedir. Tarıma dayalı bir ekonomisi olan Samarta'nın tarım alanlarının %75'i bu müşterek hududa yakın bir konumda bulunmaktadır. Tarım alanlarının sulaması Gordon Irmağından gelen su ile yapılmaktadır. Zindia ise son zamanlarda yaptığı sanayi atılımlarıyla kendini göstermeye çalışan bir ülkedir.

Siz Samarta devlet başkanının en önemli danışmanısınız. Başkan kararlarını almadan önce mutlaka size danışır ve yüksek ihtimalle sizin vereceğiniz tavsiye doğrultusunda hareket eder. Başkan, size yakın zamanda kendisine teslim edilen bir raporu inceleyip, en kısa zamanda bir tavsiyede bulunmanızı istiyor. Raporda aşağıda bulunan bilgiler yer alıyor.

Ülke: Zindia

Konu: Kuzeydoğu sınırında bir sanayi inşaatı

Not: Rapor Zindia'daki askeri ateşe tarafından hazırlanmıştır

Ekonomisi son yıllarda büyük darbeler alan Zindia, yüksek işsizlikle karşı karşıya gelmiş, ekonomik olarak zayıflamaya başlamıştır. Zindia bu durumdan çıkış yolu olarak çözümü sanayi atılımları yapmakta bulmuştur. Bu amaçla Samarta ile müşterek hududuna 3 km yakında, Gordon Irmağı'nın yanında bir sanayi tesisi inşaatına başlamıştır. Fakat birçok tarım mühendisi bu sanayi tesisinin Gordon Irmağı'nın suyunu kirleteceğinden sizin ekinlerinize büyük zarar vereceğini, bu durumdan küçük hane halklarının yanında ülke ekonomisinin de büyük zarar göreceğini belirtmekte. Bütün bunların yanında, havadan çekilen görüntülerde bu sanayi tesisinin yakınlarında daha birçok bina inşaatları da görülmektedir. Sanayi tesisinin inşaatında görevli olan ve birkaç hafta önce Samarta'ya iltica eden iki mühendis, bu yapıların temellerinin bir sanayi tesisine gerekli olduğundan daha geniş tutulduğunu bildiren ifadeler vermişlerdir. Zindia'da bulunan bir askeri casusunuzun ele geçirdiği bilgilere göre, çok yakında sanayi tesisinin bulunduğu bölgeye özel askeri birliklerin sevk edilecektir ve bu birliklerin kendini kanıtlamış, tecrübeli askerlerden oluşmaktadır. Konuyla ilgili devam eden açık kaynak incelemelerinde, Zindia hükümet başkanının sosyal medya hesaplarında bu tesisin milli bir mesele olduğu ve her şey göze alınarak yapımının tamamlanması gerektiğini içeren mesajlar görülmüştür. Yapılan araştırmalarda, Zindia'nın çok namlulu roketatar sistemlerinin geliştirilmesi için yabancı uzmanlardan yararlandığı ve askeri envantere 300 yeni insansız hava aracı eklediği öğrenilmiştir. Havadan çekilen görüntülerde buradaki inşaatın ortasında penceresiz beton bir yapı olduğu ve burada sürekli devriyelerin dolaştığı görülmektedir.

SORULAR

1. ***Bu senaryo bağlamında siz Samarta'nın önemli bir karar vericisi olarak aşağıdaki seçeneklerden hangisini uyguladınız?***
 - a. Zindia'ya özel bir elçi göndererek konuşmalar yürütmek
 - b. Zindia ile ekonomik, askeri veya siyasi alanda ikili ittifakları kurmaya çalışmak
 - c. Zindia ile diplomatik ilişkileri kesmek
 - d. Zindia'nın yaptığı çeşitli hamlelere karşılık olarak kendi askeri ve/veya ekonomik gücünüzü arttırmak
 - e. Zindia'nın hamlelerine karşılık uluslararası bir organizasyona başvurmak
 - f. Zindia'ya askeri saldırıda bulunmak
 - g. Zindia'ya karşı zaman sınırı koyarak yaptırım tehditlerinde bulunmak
 - h. Zindia'nın eylemleri üzerine herhangi bir yorumda bulunmamak
 - i. Zindia'ya eylemlerinden dolayı duyulan rahatsızlıkları içeren resmi bir uyarıda bulunmak
2. ***Verdiğiniz bu kararın başarılı olacağına ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)***
3. ***Bu kararı verirken ne kadar zorlandınız? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)***

GROUP A – SECOND SCENARIO AND QUESTIONS

Lütfen aşağıdaki senaryoyu okuyunuz, ardından soruları cevaplayınız.

İgrid ve Aldovia komşu iki ülkedir. Berda bu iki ülkenin tam arasında kalan ve zengin balık rezervleri barındıran bir bölgedir. Aldovia nüfusunun %45'i geçimini balıkçılık faaliyetleri ile sağlamaktadır. İgrid ekonomisinin yaklaşık %60'ı ise tarım endüstrisine dayanmaktadır

Siz Aldovia devlet başkanının en önemli danışmanısınız. Başkan kararlarını almadan önce mutlaka size danışır ve büyük ihtimalle sizin vereceğiniz tavsiye doğrultusunda hareket eder. Başkan, size yakın zamanda kendisine teslim edilen bir raporu inceleyip, bir tavsiyede bulunmanızı istiyor. Raporda aşağıda bulunan bilgiler yer alıyor.

Ülke: İgrid

Konu: Berda yakınlarında bir arıtma tesisi inşaatı

Not: Rapor İgrid'de bulunan askeri ateşe tarafından hazırlanmıştır.

İgrid son birkaç yıldır artan kuraklık ve yağış oranlarındaki azalma sebebiyle ciddi bir kuraklık çekmektedir. Ekonomisi tarıma dayanan İgrid bu sebeple ciddi bir ekonomik kriz tehdidiyle karşı karşıyadır. Bu sebeple de Berda bölgesi yakınlarında bir arıtma tesisi inşasına başlamıştır. Uzmanlar bu bölgede kurulacak bir arıtma tesisinin, Berda'daki balık miktarında azalmaya sebep olacağından, sizin ekonominizde ani bir düşüş yaratabileceğini, büyük sanayi kuruluşlarının iflasının yanı sıra küçük ölçekli balıkçılık yapan ailelerin yoksulluk ve hatta açlık ile karşı karşıya kalabileceğini belirtiyorlar. Bütün bu bilgilerin yanında, bu arıtma tesisi ile ilgili yapılan araştırmalarda, tesisin inşaatının sürekli bir askeri koruma altında olduğu görülmektedir. Yapılan casusluk faaliyetlerinden öğrenilen bilgilerde yakın zamanda bir askerî harekât hazırlığı olabileceği öğrenilmiş.

SORULAR

1. Bu senaryo bağlamında siz Aldovia'nın önemli bir karar vericisi olarak aşağıdaki seçeneklerden hangisini uyguladınız?

- a. İdrid'e özel bir elçi göndererek konuşmalar yürütmek
- b. İgrid ile ekonomik, askeri veya siyasi alanda ikili ittifakları kurmaya çalışmak
- c. İgrid ile diplomatik ilişkileri düşürmek veya kesmek
- d. İgrid'in yaptığı çeşitli hamlelere karşılık olarak kendi askeri ve/veya ekonomik gücünüzü arttırmak
- e. İgrid'in hamlelerine karşılık uluslararası bir organizasyona başvurmak
- f. İgrid ile askeri saldırıda bulunmak
- g. Karşı ülkeye zaman sınırı koyarak ekonomik yaptırım tehditlerinde bulunmak
- h. Karşı ülkenin eylemleri üzerine herhangi bir yorumda bulunmamak
- i. Karşı ülkeye eylemlerinden dolayı duyulan rahatsızlıkları içeren resmi bir uyarıda bulunmak

2. Verdiğiniz bu kararın başarılı olacağına ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz.) (...)

3. Bu kararı verirken ne kadar zorlandınız. (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

APPENDIX F

SCENARIOS OF GROUP B

Samarta ve Zindia sınır komşusu iki ülkedir. Tarıma dayalı bir ekonomisi olan Samarta'nın tarım alanlarının %75'i bu müşterek hududa yakın bir konumda bulunmaktadır. Tarım alanlarının sulaması Gordon Irmağından gelen su ile yapılmaktadır. Zindia ise son zamanlarda yaptığı sanayi atılımlarıyla kendini göstermeye çalışan bir ülkedir.

Siz Samarta devlet başkanının en önemli danışmanısınız. Başkan kararlarını almadan önce mutlaka size danışır ve yüksek ihtimalle sizin vereceğiniz tavsiye doğrultusunda hareket eder. Başkan, size yakın zamanda kendisine teslim edilen bir raporu inceleyip, en kısa zamanda bir tavsiyede bulunmanızı istiyor. Raporda aşağıda bulunan bilgiler yer alıyor.

Ülke: Zindia

Konu: Kuzeydoğu sınırında bir sanayi inşaatı

Not: Rapor Zindia'daki askeri ateşe tarafından hazırlanmıştır

Ekonomisi son yıllarda büyük darbeler alan Zindia, yüksek işsizlikle karşı karşıya gelmiş, ekonomik olarak zayıflamaya başlamıştır. Zindia bu durumdan çıkış yolu olarak çözümü sanayi atılımları yapmakta bulmuştur. Bu amaçla Samarta ile müşterek hududundan 3 km içeride, Gordon Irmağı'nın yanında bir sanayi tesisi inşaatına başlamıştır. Fakat birçok tarım mühendisi bu sanayi tesisinin Gordon Irmağı'nın suyunu kirleteceğinden sizin ekinlerinize büyük zarar vereceğini, bu durumdan küçük hane halklarının yanında ülke ekonomisinin de büyük zarar göreceğini belirtmekte. Bütün bunların yanında, havadan çekilen görüntülerde bu sanayi tesisinin yakınlarında daha birçok bina inşaatları da görülmektedir. Sanayi tesisinin inşaatında görevli olan ve birkaç hafta önce Samarta'ya iltica eden iki mühendis, bu yapıların temellerinin bir sanayi tesisine gerekli olduğundan daha geniş tutulduğunu bildiren ifadeler vermişlerdir. Zindia'da bulunan bir askeri casusunuzun ele geçirdiği bilgilere göre, çok yakında sanayi tesisinin bulunduğu bölgeye özel askeri birliklerin sevk edilecektir ve bu birliklerin kendini kanıtlamış, tecrübeli askerlerden oluşmaktadır.

SORULAR

a. Bu senaryo bağlamında siz Samarta'nın önemli bir karar vericisi olarak aşağıdaki seçeneklerden hangisini uyguladınız?

- a. Zindia'ya özel bir elçi göndererek konuşmalar yürütmek
- b. Zindia ile ekonomik, askeri veya siyasi alanda ikili ittifakları kurmaya çalışmak
- c. Zindia ile diplomatik ilişkileri düşürmek veya kesmek
- d. Zindia'nın yaptığı çeşitli hamlelere karşılık olarak kendi askeri ve/veya ekonomik gücünüzü arttırmak
- e. Zindia'nın hamlelerine karşılık uluslararası bir organizasyona başvurmak
- f. Zindia'ya askeri saldırıda bulunmak
- g. Zindia'ya karşı zaman sınırı koyarak yaptırım tehditlerinde bulunmak
- h. Zindia'nın eylemleri üzerine herhangi bir yorumda bulunmamak
- i. Zindia'ya eylemlerinden dolayı duyulan rahatsızlıkları içeren resmi bir uyarıda bulunmak

b. Verdiğiniz bu kararın başarılı olacağına ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz.) (...)

c. Bu kararı verirken ne kadar zorlandınız? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

İgrid ve Aldovia komşu iki ülkedir. Berda bu iki ülkenin tam arasında kalan ve zengin balık rezervleri barındıran bir bölgedir. Aldovia nüfusunun %45'i geçimini balıkçılık faaliyetleri ile sağlamaktadır. İgrid ekonomisinin yaklaşık %60'ı ise tarım endüstrisine dayanmaktadır

Siz Aldovia devlet başkanının en önemli danışmanısınız. Başkan kararlarını almadan önce mutlaka size danışır ve büyük ihtimalle sizin vereceğiniz tavsiye doğrultusunda hareket eder. Başkan, size yakın zamanda kendisine teslim edilen bir raporu inceleyip, bir tavsiyede bulunmanızı istiyor. Raporunda aşağıda bulunan bilgiler yer alıyor.

Ülke: İgrid

Konu: Berda yakınlarında bir arıtma tesisi inşaatı

Not: Rapor İgrid'de bulunan askeri ateşe tarafından hazırlanmıştır.

İgrid son birkaç yıldır artan kuraklık ve yağış oranlarındaki azalma sebebiyle ciddi bir kuraklık çekmektedir. Ekonomisi tarıma dayanan İgrid bu sebeple ciddi bir ekonomik kriz tehdidiyle karşı karşıyadır. Bu sebeple de Berda bölgesi yakınlarında bir arıtma tesisi inşasına başlamıştır. Uzmanlar bu bölgede kurulacak bir arıtma tesisinin, Berda'daki balık miktarında azalmaya sebep olacağından, sizin ekonominizde ani bir düşüş yaratabileceğini, büyük sanayi kuruluşlarının iflasının yanı sıra küçük ölçekli balıkçılık yapan ailelerin yoksulluk ve hatta açlık ile karşı karşıya kalabileceğini belirtiyorlar. Bütün bu bilgilerin yanında, bu arıtma tesisi ile ilgili yapılan araştırmalarda, tesisin inşaatının sürekli bir askeri koruma altında olduğu görülmektedir. Yapılan casusluk faaliyetlerinden öğrenilen bilgilerde yakın zamanda bir askerî harekât hazırlığı olabileceği öğrenilmiştir. Zindia basınında çıkan haberlere göre hükümet bu tesisi milli bir mesele olarak görmekte, inşaatın tamamlanmasını hayati olarak tanımlamaktadır. Dost bir ülkenin aracılığıyla ele geçirilen bazı belgelerde, İgrid'in donanmasına üç yeni hafif savaş gemisi aldığı, bazı büyük silah satıcı ülkelerle taarruz uçakları almak için pazarlıklar yaptığına dair bilgiler bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca son zamanlarda, İgrid deniz kuvvetlerinin rutin devriyelerini arttırdığı dikkati çekmektedir.

SORULAR

1. Bu senaryo bağlamında siz Aldovia'nın önemli bir karar vericisi olarak aşağıdaki seçeneklerden hangisini uyguladınız?

- a. İdrid'e özel bir elçi göndererek konuşmalar yürütmek
- b. İgrid ile ekonomik, askeri veya siyasi alanda ikili ittifakları kurmaya çalışmak
- c. İgrid ile diplomatik ilişkileri düşürmek veya kesmek
- d. İgrid'in yaptığı çeşitli hamlelere karşılık olarak kendi askeri ve/veya ekonomik gücünüzü arttırmak
- e. İgrid'in hamlelerine karşılık uluslararası bir organizasyona başvurmak
- f. İgrid ile askeri saldırıda bulunmak
- g. Karşı ülkeye zaman sınırı koyarak ekonomik yaptırım tehditlerinde bulunmak
- h. Karşı ülkenin eylemleri üzerine herhangi bir yorumda bulunmamak
- i. Karşı ülkeye eylemlerinden dolayı duyulan rahatsızlıkları içeren resmi bir uyarıda bulunmak

2. Verdiğiniz bu kararın başarılı olacağına ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

3. Bu kararı verirken ne kadar zorlandınız. (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

APPENDIX G

SCENARIOS OF GROUP C

Samarta ve Zindia sınır komşusu iki ülkedir. Tarıma dayalı bir ekonomisi olan Samarta'nın tarım alanlarının %75'i bu müşterek hududa yakın bir konumda bulunmaktadır. Tarım alanlarının sulaması Gordon Irmağından gelen su ile yapılmaktadır. Zindia ise son zamanlarda yaptığı sanayi atılımlarıyla kendini göstermeye çalışan bir ülkedir.

Siz Samarta devlet başkanının en önemli danışmanısınız. Başkan kararlarını almadan önce mutlaka size danışır ve yüksek ihtimalle sizin vereceğiniz tavsiye doğrultusunda hareket eder. Başkan, size yakın zamanda kendisine teslim edilen bir raporu inceleyip, en kısa zamanda bir tavsiyede bulunmanızı istiyor. Raporunda aşağıda bulunan bilgiler yer alıyor.

Ülke: Zindia

Konu: Kuzeydoğu sınırında bir sanayi inşaatı

Not: Rapor Zindia'daki askeri ateşe tarafından hazırlanmıştır

Ekonomisi son yıllarda büyük darbeler alan Zindia, yüksek işsizlikle karşı karşıya gelmiş, ekonomik olarak zayıflamaya başlamıştır. Zindia bu durumdan çıkış yolu olarak çözümü sanayi atılımları yapmakta bulmuştur. Bu amaçla Samarta ile müşterek hududuna 3 km yakında, Gordon Irmağı'nın yanında bir sanayi tesisi inşaatına başlamıştır. Fakat birçok tarım mühendisi bu sanayi tesisinin Gordon Irmağı'nın suyunu kirleteceğinden sizin ekinlerinize büyük zarar vereceğini, bu durumdan küçük hane halklarının yanında ülke ekonomisinin de büyük zarar göreceğini belirtmekte. Bütün bunların yanında, havadan çekilen görüntülerde bu sanayi tesisinin yakınlarında daha birçok bina inşaatları da görülmektedir. Sanayi tesisinin inşaatında görevli olan ve birkaç hafta önce Samarta'ya iltica eden iki mühendis, bu yapıların temellerinin bir sanayi tesisine gerekli olduğundan daha geniş tutulduğunu bildiren ifadeler vermişlerdir. Zindia'da bulunan bir askeri casusunuzun ele geçirdiği bilgilere göre, çok yakında sanayi tesisinin bulunduğu bölgeye özel askeri birliklerin sevk edilecektir ve bu birliklerin kendini kanıtlamış, tecrübeli askerlerden oluşmaktadır. Konuyla ilgili devam eden açık kaynak incelemelerinde, Zindia hükümet başkanının sosyal medya hesaplarında bu tesisin milli bir mesele olduğu ve her şey göze alınarak yapımının tamamlanması gerektiğini içeren mesajlar görülmüştür. Yapılan araştırmalarda, Zindia'nın çok namlulu roketatar sistemlerinin geliştirilmesi için yabancı uzmanlardan yararlandığı ve askeri envantere 300 yeni insansız hava aracı eklediği öğrenilmiştir. Havadan çekilen görüntülerde buradaki inşaatın

ortasında penceresiz beton bir yapı olduđu ve burada sürekli devriyelerin dolaştığı görölmektedir.

SORULAR

1. Bu senaryo bağlamında siz Samarta'nın önemli bir karar vericisi olarak aşağıdaki seçeneklerden hangisini uygulardınız?

- a. Zindia'ya özel bir elçi göndererek konuşmalar yürütmek
- b. Zindia ile ekonomik, askeri veya siyasal alanda ikili ittifakları kurmaya çalışmak
- c. Zindia ile diplomatik ilişkileri düşürmek veya kesmek
- d. Zindia'nın yaptığı çeşitli hamlelere karşılık olarak kendi askeri ve/veya ekonomik gücünüzü arttırmak
- e. Zindia'nın hamlelerine karşılık uluslararası bir organizasyona başvurmak
- f. Zindia'ya askeri saldırıda bulunmak
- g. Zindia'ya karşı zaman sınırı koyarak yaptırım tehditlerinde bulunmak
- h. Zindia'nın eylemleri üzerine herhangi bir yorumda bulunmamak
- i. Zindia'ya eylemlerinden dolayı duyulan rahatsızlıkları içeren resmi bir uyarıda bulunmak

2. Verdiğiniz bu kararın başarılı olacağına ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

3. Bu kararı verirken ne kadar zorlandınız? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 0-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

GROUP C SECOND SCENARIO AND QUESTIONS

İgrid ve Aldovia komşu iki ülkedir. Berda bu iki ülkenin tam arasında kalan ve zengin balık rezervleri barındıran bir bölgedir. Aldovia nüfusunun %45'i geçimini balıkçılık faaliyetleri ile sağlamaktadır. İgrid ekonomisinin yaklaşık %60'ı ise tarım endüstrisine dayanmaktadır

Siz Aldovia devlet başkanının en önemli danışmanısınız. Başkan kararlarını almadan önce mutlaka size danışır ve büyük ihtimalle sizin vereceğiniz tavsiye doğrultusunda hareket eder. Başkan, size yakın zamanda kendisine teslim edilen bir raporu inceleyip, bir tavsiyede bulunmanızı istiyor. Raporunda aşağıda bulunan bilgiler yer alıyor.

Ülke: İgrid

Konu: Berda yakınlarında bir arıtma tesisi inşaatı

Not: Rapor İgrid'de bulunan askeri ateşe tarafından hazırlanmıştır.

İgrid son birkaç yıldır artan kuraklık ve yağış oranlarındaki azalma sebebiyle ciddi bir kuraklık çekmektedir. Ekonomisi tarıma dayanan İgrid bu sebeple ciddi bir ekonomik kriz tehdidiyle karşı karşıyadır. Bu sebeple de Berda bölgesi yakınlarında bir arıtma tesisi inşasına başlamıştır. Uzmanlar bu bölgede kurulacak bir arıtma tesisinin, Berda'daki balık miktarında azalmaya sebep olacağından, sizin ekonominizde ani bir düşüş yaratabileceğini, büyük sanayi kuruluşlarının iflasının yanı sıra küçük ölçekli balıkçılık yapan ailelerin yoksulluk ve hatta açlık ile karşı karşıya kalabileceğini belirtiyorlar. Bütün bu bilgilerin yanında, bu arıtma tesisi ile ilgili yapılan araştırmalarda, tesisin inşaatının sürekli bir askeri koruma altında olduğu görülmektedir. Yapılan casusluk faaliyetlerinden öğrenilen bilgilerde yakın zamanda bir askerî harekât hazırlığı olabileceği öğrenilmiş. Zindia basınında çıkan haberlere göre hükümet bu tesisi milli bir mesele olarak görmekte, inşaatın tamamlanmasını hayati olarak tanımlamaktadır. Dost bir ülkenin aracılığıyla ele geçirilen bazı belgelerde, İgrid'in donanmasına üç yeni hafif savaş gemisi aldığı, bazı büyük silah satıcı ülkelerle taarruz uçakları almak için pazarlıklar yaptığına dair bilgiler bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca son zamanlarda, İgrid deniz kuvvetlerinin rutin devriyelerini arttırdığı dikkati çekmektedir

SORULAR

1. Bu senaryo bağlamında siz Aldovia'nın önemli bir karar vericisi olarak aşağıdaki seçeneklerden hangisini uyguladınız?

- a. İdrid'e özel bir elçi göndererek konuşmalar yürütmek
- b. İgrid ile ekonomik, askeri veya siyasi alanda ikili ittifakları kurmaya çalışmak
- c. İgrid ile diplomatik ilişkileri düşürmek veya kesmek
- d. İgrid'in yaptığı çeşitli hamlelere karşılık olarak kendi askeri ve/veya ekonomik gücünüzü arttırmak
- e. İgrid'in hamlelerine karşılık uluslararası bir organizasyona başvurmak
- f. İgrid ile askeri saldırıda bulunmak
- g. Karşı ülkeye zaman sınırı koyarak ekonomik yaptırım tehditlerinde bulunmak
- h. Karşı ülkenin eylemleri üzerine herhangi bir yorumda bulunmamak
- i. Karşı ülkeye eylemlerinden dolayı duyulan rahatsızlıkları içeren resmi bir uyarıda bulunmak

2. Verdiğiniz bu kararın başarılı olacağına ne kadar güveniyorsunuz? (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

3. Bu kararı verirken ne kadar zorlandınız. (1 en az, 5 en çok olacak şekilde 1-5 arası bir rakamla değerlendiriniz) (...)

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Kişisel Bilgiler

Adı Soyadı : Banu Sezer

Eğitim Durumu

Lisans Öğrenimi : Kadir Has Üniversitesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi, (2012-2017)

Yüksek Lisans Öğrenimi : Kadir Has Üniversitesi, Psikoloji (2015-2018)

Yüksek Lisans Öğrenimi : Kadir Has Üniversitesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler (2018-2020)

Bildiği Yabancı Diller : İngilizce

İş Deneyimi

Çalıştığı Kurumlar ve Tarihleri:

(Şubat 2018- Haziran 2020) Kadir Has Üniversitesi – Uluslararası İlişkiler bölümü- Burslu Lisansüstü Asistan

(Eylül 2020- Halen) Kadir Has Üniversitesi – Yabancı Diller Yüksekokulu İdari İşler Görevlisi