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**A REVIEW OF THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS ON
TERRORISM**

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MASTER'S THESIS

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ISTANBUL, MARCH, 2019

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMAL	<i>Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniyya</i> (The Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance)
ASALA	The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
Baath Party	The Arab Socialist <i>Baath</i> (Resurrection) Party
CTS	The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
EOKA	<i>Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston</i>
ETA	The Basque Nation and Liberty
FLN	The National Liberation Front
FNLC	The Corsican National Liberation Front
FTOs	Foreign Terrorist Organizations
G.C.C.	The Gulf Cooperation Council
IDF	The Israel Defence Forces
IRA	The Irish Republican Army
IRGC	The Iran Islamic Revolution Guard Corps – Pasdarans
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MNF	The Multinational Forces
<i>Narodnaya Volya</i>	The People’s Will
LAF	The Lebanese Armed Forces
LF	The Lebanese Force
LCP	The Lebanese Communist Party
LNМ	The Lebanese National Movement
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
OCLA	The Organization for Communist Labour Action
Open Letter	<i>Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbullah (Al-Maftuha) ila Al-Mustad‘afinin</i> (The Original Text in Full of Hezbollah’s Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed)
PLO	The Palestinian Liberation Organization
PSP	The Progressive Socialist Party
Phalange	The Lebanese Phalange Party (Kataeb Party)
SSNP	The Syrian Social Nationalist Party

SISC The Supreme Islamic Shiite Council

The Lebanese Union of Muslim Students *Itihad al-Lubnani lil Talaba al-Muslimin*

The Movement of the Deprived *Harakat Al-Mahrumin*

UN The United Nations

UNGA The United Nations General Assembly

UNIFIL The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Wilayat al-Faqih The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist

Wali al-Faqih The Jurist



ABSTRACT

AYKUT, MÜCAHİD. *A REVIEW OF THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM*, MASTER'S THESIS, Istanbul, 2019.

The question of whether terrorism is politically effective instrument is an ongoing and controversial debate in terrorism studies. Although pioneer scholars have examined this debate before, the September 11 Attacks have revived these discussions and the question “whether terrorism does work” has become central. Following the 9/11 Attacks, counterterrorism strategies more than ever need to understand when, how, and why terrorism does work. This thesis aims to analyze the political effectiveness of terrorism debate through the Hezbollah in Lebanon as a case study. The thesis examines how Hezbollah compelled to the withdrawal of Israel from South Lebanon and the MNF (the USA and France) military presence in Beirut, and how it survives through the examination of its historical evolution and organizational dynamics. For this reason, the examination of Hezbollah has been divided into two periods: *1982-2000* and *2000-onwards*. Ideology, type of objectives, regime type of the target country, target selection, organizational structure, competition, state sponsorship and popular support have been analyzed as independent variables. The results show that Hezbollah was instrumental in the first period of *1982-2000* with state sponsorship as a key factor. In the second period of *2000-onwards*, Hezbollah has shifted from instrumental to organizational perspective, and popular support was found to be a key factor.

Keywords: terror, terrorism, the political effectiveness of terrorism, Hezbollah, Hizballah, the Party of God

ÖZET

AYKUT, MÜCAHİD. *A REVIEW OF THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM*, YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İstanbul, 2019.

Terörizmin siyasal amaçlara ulaşmada etkili bir yöntem olup olmadığı sorusu terörizm çalışmalarında devam eden ve ihtilafli bir tartışmadır. Öncü bilim adamları bu tartışmayı daha önce incelendiyse de 11 Eylül Saldırıları tartışmaları yeniden canlandırdı ve “terörizm etkili bir yöntem midir?” sorusu tartışmaların merkezine geldi. 11 Eylül sonrası artan terörle mücadele stratejileri, terörizmin ne zaman, nasıl ve hangi koşullarda etkili olduğunu anlamayı her zamankinden daha fazla ihtiyaç duyuyor. Bu çalışma, terörizmin siyasal etkinliği teorik tartışmasını Hizbullah üzerinden analiz etmeyi ve terörizmin siyasi hedeflere hangi koşullarda, ne zaman ve nasıl ulaştığı sorularını yanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Hizbullah'ın, Güney Lübnan'daki İsrail İşgalini ve Çok Uluslu Güç (ABD ve Fransa) varlığını nasıl sona erdirdiğini ve organizasyonel devamlılığını nasıl sağladığı tarihsel evrimi ve organizasyonel dinamikleri üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bu nedenle Hizbullah'ın incelenmesi *1982-2000* ve *2000-sonrası* olarak iki periyoda ayrılmıştır. İdeoloji, amaçlarının türü, hedef devletin rejim türü, hedef seçimi, organizasyonel yapısı, rekabet unsuru, devlet sponsorluğu ve toplumsal destek bağımsız değişkenler olarak incelenmiştir. İlk periyotta, Hizbullah'ın enstrümantal hareket ettiği ve devlet sponsorluğunun en önemli faktör olduğu bulunmuştur. İkinci periyotta ise organizasyonel hareket ettiği ve toplumsal desteğin en önemli faktör olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: terör, terörizm, terörizmin siyasal etkinliği, Hizbullah

INTRODUCTION

The Subject Of The Research And Research Question

“The only way to make terrorists "lose" is to understand when, how, and why terrorism works.”
(Berry, 1987, p. 8)

Terrorism as an extreme form of political violence that has threatened humanity throughout history. Despite of its targeting of innocent civilians and ignoring the established norms and rules of armed clashes, it has not been accepted as a crime against humanity yet. However, it is considered a serious threat against international peace and prosperity by the international community. For instance, on 20 September 2006, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) unanimously adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CTS) to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism (UNGA, 2006, A/RES/60/288). Through its adoption, all member states affirmed the first time that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestation, and committed to take practical steps to prevent and combat terrorism. Prevention and counterterrorism strategies need to understand when, how, and why terrorism does work. However, there is currently no fully developed theory to explain causes, conduct and consequences of terrorism and its political effectiveness.

Terrorism has been used by various actors for different purposes. But the aim of terrorism first and foremost is to bring political changes. Throughout history, a few terrorists have been successful, and many have been recorded as failure stories. This has been seen as an interesting debate for terrorism scholars. Although pioneer scholars have examined the discussions, there are few sources related to this debate before the September 11 Attacks (Crenshaw, 1995; DeNardo, 1985; Laqueur, 1976; Schelling, 1991). The 9/11 Attacks have revived the discussions and “whether terrorism does work” has become the central question. In the coercion literature, there is no clear standard of measurement for success, rather it is measured as the adjustment of the target government’s behaviors according to the preferences of coercers (Byman and Waxman, 2002). This thesis defines effectiveness as the accomplishment of stated political objectives (Abrahms, 2006, p. 48).

The question of whether terrorism is politically effective instrument and the political effectiveness of terrorism is an ongoing and controversial debate in terrorism studies. This study aims to analyze the debate through Hezbollah in Lebanon as a case study, and try to find answers to the questions of under what conditions, when, and how terrorism is effective to reach its political goals. The political effectiveness of terrorism is a debate directly associated with conceptualize of definitions of terrorism and measure of effectiveness (Perl, 2005). Therefore, in the first part of this thesis, the concept of terrorism is examined, and characteristics are described. Subsequently, in the second part, some theoretical debates on the political effectiveness of terrorism are analyzed.

The purpose of this thesis is three-fold. The first purpose is to examine theories on the political effectiveness of terrorism and compare and contrast them to show divergences. The second purpose is to discuss the political effectiveness of terrorism and show that it is highly ineffective. This is supported with several empirical studies. But it also aims to understand under what conditions, when, and why terrorism is effective. The third purpose is to analyze the political effectiveness of Hezbollah since its establishment and in its historical evolution. Thus, it aims to explain the factors that have determined its political effectiveness and understand its changing goals.

The main reason Hezbollah was selected as a case study is that it is considered to be a rare success story of terrorism achieving its political goals. The study examines how Hezbollah compelled to the withdrawal of Israel and the Multinational Forces (the MNF) (the USA and France) from Lebanon and how it survives through examination of its historical evolution and organizational dynamics. For this aim, the examination of Hezbollah has been divided into two periods: *1982-2000* and *2000-onwards*.

The political effectiveness of terrorism is not a fully developed research area. There are many controversial arguments, and there is a distinct lack of case studies. One of the additional aims of this thesis is to fulfill the case study's need and inspire future studies. The motivation of choosing the research question was to understand what determines the political effectiveness of terrorism. The reason the selected case study was chosen is that there is no comprehensive and detailed longitudinal case study on the political

effectiveness of Hezbollah. In recent years, growing literature help students of terrorism to conduct longitudinal case studies in details. The increasing amount of literature being generated on Hezbollah has also helped to update existing literature about the organization. In addition to this, the lack of comprehensive studies on Hezbollah, and contested arguments on the political effectiveness of Hezbollah has led us to engage in this research question.

The aim of this study is not to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization but to analyze its operations and evaluate whether the use of terrorism as a tactic is politically effective. One should keep in mind that there is no such thing as a pure terrorist organization. Each organization has different tactics and techniques and a mixture of resistance, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. This thesis analyzes the political effectiveness of terrorism on Hezbollah as well as examining its historical evolution and organizational dynamics.

There are different arguments regarding the political effectiveness of Hezbollah. These different arguments are presented with their details and explanations in context. In the case of Hezbollah, scholars have mostly emphasized state sponsorship as a critical factor (Byman, 2005; Harik, 2004). They state that without Syria's and especially Iran's full support, Hezbollah could not have operated. However, although state sponsorship may be a necessary condition for terrorist organizations, it is insufficient as a sole factor that guarantees their effectiveness (DeVore and Stähli, 2015, p. 332). According to DeVore and Stähli (2015), rather than state sponsorship, Hezbollah's success can be attributed to internal dynamics such as organizational culture and leadership, and previous experiences from the Lebanese Civil War (tactics such as suicide terrorism, hostage taking, and kidnappings). In this thesis, Iran and Syria state sponsorship will be analyzed to understand whether external factors or internal factors drive success.

The literature on the political effectiveness of terrorism argues that terrorist organizations with limited objectives have a higher level of success (Abrahams, 2008; Jones and Libicki, 2008; Pape, 2003). The argument is that Hezbollah did not challenge the core interest of target states (Israel, the USA, and France) and Hezbollah has limited target selection (Abrahams, 2008; Hoffman, 2006). This thesis also examines the objectives of

Hezbollah and how Hezbollah has transformed its objectives over time. Also, it examines how adjusting its objectives has helped Hezbollah to maintain its survival.

Krause (2013) employs the structuralist theory on non-state violence to explain Hezbollah's success. The structuralist theory proposes that unipolarity drives success in insurgency movements. According to Krause (2013), Hezbollah's success is because of its competition with rival organizations such as AMAL and becoming top of the hierarchy in the Lebanese resistance movement against Israel and the Multinational Forces (the MNF). Rather than focusing on the use of terrorism as a tactic, Krause examines power struggles within social movements and the polarity in social movements as a general trend. However, taking the polarity as a lone variable may lead to confusion. It is also essential to examine what determines one to become the top of the hierarchy. For example, an organization might gain experiences from its previous actions, and its external support might increase, or international environment might change. While this study focusses on the use of terrorism and its effects, it also tries to understand the role of Krause's theory in explaining Hezbollah's success and find factors with the greatest explanatory power.

Although scholars examine the ideology, popular support, competition and regime type of the target country, there is no comprehensive study to investigate link between these factors and the political effectiveness of terrorism of Hezbollah. While Hezbollah has been included in large-N studies that investigated the role of these determinants, this study will apply these general assumptions on Hezbollah. Moreover, there is no study that analyzes organizational structure as a factor that can influence effectiveness. In this thesis, Hezbollah's organizational structure and *modus operandi* will be examined. The case study design allows us to elaborate on these factors in detail.

To avoid misunderstanding, this thesis does not aim to inform terrorist groups or advise them on how to achieve political goals. It aims to understand under what conditions, when, and how terrorist groups achieve success so as to prevent terrorism to be politically effective.

Research Design

This thesis is designed as a single case study to fill the gap the lack of case studies in the political effectiveness of terrorism debates. Hezbollah is regarded as a unique case, deviating from other organizations. It is considered to be an intrinsic case with this feature. The intrinsic case study is not aimed for the theory generation but to better understand causes, conduct, and consequences by providing very meticulous and thorough examination of the case (Stake, 1995). Notwithstanding, it can also be regarded as a longitudinal case study comparing transformation and changes of Hezbollah objectives from *1982-2000* to *2000-onwards*. In this way, it specifies how certain conditions and their underlying processes have changed over time.

However, it is exceedingly difficult to examine clandestine organizations due to organizational secrecy and lack of trusted sources. Some of the sections in the case study are not related to theoretical discussion and the research question but are important for the understanding of Hezbollah and for the updating of previous research.

This thesis is a qualitative study that focuses on primary sources from Hezbollah itself, and secondary sources on existing literature about Hezbollah. The research question is attempted to be answered by examining the literature on the political effectiveness of terrorism and Hezbollah. Thus, the works of prominent scholars are referred to such as Richard Norton (a UNIFIL observer), Naim Qassem (the deputy commander of Hezbollah), and Joseph Alagha. In addition to this, an interview from Turkish journalist Murat Erdin with Hezbollah's leader Hasan Nasrallah, and interviews of Timur Göksel who is known as "Mr. UNIFIL" are included. One should be noted that it also possible to read about Hezbollah from different perspectives and find different comments. Despite their controversy, these sources are essential to capture information about Hezbollah. This study tests hypotheses and analyzes existing alternative explanations and examines their explanatory powers.

This thesis is organized into five chapters including this introductory chapter. The first chapter begins with the problem of terrorism definition and briefly explores its history. It shows the problems with the universally accepted definition and tries to reach a consensus on the common characteristics of terrorism. Then, it examines its differences from other types of political violence and presents the unique features of terrorism. Lastly, it discusses how theoretical approaches handle terrorism.

The second chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. It starts with the problem of measuring the effectiveness of terrorism; how the aforementioned approaches handle objectives of terrorism and what level of analysis they use to measure are discussed. It then presents the literature on the political effectiveness of terrorism. It also investigates empirical studies on the strategic effectiveness of terrorism and longevity as a measurement of effectiveness. Lastly, it tries to find out which factors determines the political effectiveness of terrorism, and when does terrorism work.

The third chapter is the case study. It starts with a brief historical analysis of politicization and radicalization of Lebanese Shiites. It then examines the organizational dynamics of Hezbollah throughout its history. The significant sections are ideology, objectives, organizational structure, finance, and state sponsorships. Even if many sections under the case study are not related to theoretical discussion and research question of the thesis; they are essential points to better understand Hezbollah.

The last chapter, concludes and discusses the findings, combining theory and empirics. At the end of the thesis, prospects for future research are proposed.

CHAPTER 1

TERRORISM

1.1. INTRODUCTION

It is a well-known introductory sentence that terrorism has no universally accepted definition neither in academia nor in international law. The lack of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism has left a vacuum for states to define terrorism in terms of their own interests (Richards, 2015) and prevents the formulation of international agreements against terrorism (Ganor, 2002). Thus, the failure to reach an agreed definition causes several problems in legislation, punishment, and cooperation at the international level.

The failure to produce a universally accepted definition is not because terrorism is an undefinable concept, but because terrorism is a complex and subjective concept with political, legal, social, philosophical, and international dimensions (Schmid, 2011). Scholars state that a common definition cannot be made as a result of interests that differ from country to country, and their political, cultural and ideological perspectives as well as terrorist groups' different aims, tactics, and structures (Schmid, 2011; Hoffman, 2006). Furthermore, different departments in the same government may have different definitions such as the Department of State and Department of Defence, FBI, the Department of Homeland Security of the United States (Hoffman, 2006, p. 30-31).¹

¹ The U.S. State Department's definition:

“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

The U.S. Department of Defense' definition:

“the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.”

The FBI's definition:

“the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines terrorism as activity that involves following any act:

“is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and ... must also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”

In 1977, Laqueur (1977) argued that a common definition of terrorism is not possible and could not be found in the future. Three decades later, in 2002, he remarked the thirty years' lack of common definition problem and warned that it was impossible to categorize or define terrorism because there are "many terrorisms" (Laqueur, 2002). Furthermore, he emphasizes the peculiarities of various terrorist movements and their approaches. However, Laqueur (2002, p. 7) states that the definition of terrorism is not vital as we can diagnose acts of terrorism individually:

People reasonably familiar with the terrorist phenomenon will agree 90 percent of the time about what terrorism is ... in fact, terrorism is an unmistakable phenomenon ... the student of terrorism is not unlike a physician dealing with a disease the exact causes of which remain unknown ... but this will not prevent him from diagnosing the disease.

Another prominent scholar Jenkins (1980) also agreed that an ultimate and widely accepted definition of terrorism could not be possible. Yet, he pointed out that the debates should focus on which act is characterized as terrorism and which group is designated as a terrorist organization (Jenkins, 1980). However, there is also another problem, known as the "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" cliché. For example, Hezbollah is not designated as a terrorist organization by its own country Lebanon. On the other hand, it was designated by the USA in 1995 (by Department of the Treasury) and Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997 (by Department of State), and also by Israel in 1996. Yet, it was not designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union (EU) until 2013, but after Hezbollah's Burgas (Bulgaria) Bus Attacks in 2012 and involvement in the Syrian Civil War. In addition to this, Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) and the Arab League (except Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia) was not designate as terrorist organization until 2016 when it became involved in the Syrian Civil War since 2012 (Counter Extremism Project (CEP), 2019). Turkey has not considered Hezbollah as a terrorist organization yet.

The actual difficulty in finding a universal definition of terrorism is changes in the meaning and usage of the term over time (Hoffman, 2006). According to Rapoport (2002), the reason for the difficulty in defining terrorism lies in the fact that the meaning of the term has changed frequently over the last two hundred years. However, it should

be noted that this change is not only limited to its meaning, but also includes remarkable developments and changes in strategies, tactics, and techniques used in terrorism.

Although there are various forms, manifestations, and justifications in modern terrorism history, the increase in use of terrorism closely associated with the rise of democracy and nationalism (Hoffman, 2006). The rise of the modern nation-state after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia created the central state authority that modern terrorism attempts to influence (Laqueur, 2002, p. 11). The French Revolution triggered antimonarchical movements and nationalism across Europe. Those movements inspired by the revolution and its terror tactic led to the emergence of a new era of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006).

It is crucial to analyze briefly how the concept of modern terrorism has emerged and how it has evolved throughout history to understand definitional problems. Indeed, its meaning has been considerably transformed over time. Even so, this transformation brings about the larger debate over whether there is change or continuity in terrorism, also known as the “new” and “old terrorism” debate (Neumann, 2009)². The argumentation of the “new terrorism” would be though a narrow one when reviewing the history of terrorism. As Spencer (2006, p. 25) stated, “[T]he claim is not that terrorism has not changed. Terrorism has also evolved and changed over time. But these changes rather than revolution is evolution.”. In this study, rather than engaging the “old vs. new terrorism” debate, terrorism is handled in a broader perspective.

1.2. BACKGROUND

Etymologically, the word “terror” is derived from the Latin verb “*terrere*” which has meanings such as “to tremble, to frighten, to terrify, and to shake from fear or violence” (Wilkinson, 1974, p. 9). Adding the “-ism” suffix to the concept refers to the systematic use of terror (Schmid, 2011) as well as its political character (Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism was placed in a dictionary for the first time in the 1798 French Academy Dictionary as “a system or regime of terror” (Chaliand and Blin, 2007, p. 98).

² For further reading please see Neumann, P. R. 2009, *Old and New Terrorism*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

Although historically terror actions can be found throughout history to the beginning of humankind³, the word terror was popularized as a concept for the first time in the early years of the French Revolution, during revolutionary leader Maximilian Robespierre's March 1793–July 1794 “*Reign of Terror*” (Terror Era). The *regime de la terreur* was a policy instrument implemented by the newly established revolutionary state which described Jacobins' actions to consolidate and maintain revolution and to intimidate counterrevolutionaries (Laqueur, 2002). Unlike today's pejorative meaning, terrorism was used as a positive word with ironic hints at democracy during that period.

The counter-revolutionists that emerged during this “Terror Era” were judged, arrested, and sentenced to execution by courts with expanded powers (Hoffman, 2006). Robespierre believed that public order would be attained, and the revolution would mature only by acting in utter ruthlessness to the opponents whom he described as “the enemy of the people”. For this reason, the “traitors” were executed with the guillotine before the eyes of the people. The public executions of about 40,000 people before the eyes of the people had created fear, that is the terror, and it was thought that this was a way of sending a message to the opponents of the regime (Hoffman, 2006, p. 4).

During the French Revolution, terrorism was carried out against certain people in order to frighten or to terrorize a whole nation. Unlike modern terrorism, which is typically a tool of non-state actors, it was carried out then by government officials. In this form, it is

³ When looking at historical examples in terms of today's conjuncture, one of the earliest examples of the terrorist movement is the Sicarii sect of Jewish Zealots, against the Roman Empire in Palestine in the years B.C. 66-73. The name of the group comes from “sica” which is a short dagger that they used to assassinate their political opponents. The most important tactic of this highly organized religious cult is the assassination of crowd of people by daggers in Jerusalem during the daytime. Sicarii carried out assassination actions against the occupying Romans and the local Jews who cooperated with them (Laqueur, 2002).

Another terrorist movement in history that has been recorded is radical Shiite Hasan Sabbah's Organization or as is commonly known the Assassins. The word “assassin” is derived from Arabic meaning “poppy eater” or “poppy addict”. The Assassins was targeting the Sunni state administrators because they degenerated the religion and oppressed Shiites and the invader Christian leaders who fight against Islam. They chose the assassination as a method. The organization carried out assassinations to Seljuk governor, senior state administrators (Laqueur, 2002). According to Hoffman (2006), Hassan Sabbah, the leader of the Assassins, seems to have realized that it would nearly be impossible to confront the enemy with military means since his group is too small, then he carried out planned, systematic, long-term campaign of terror as an effective tactic. This is also why terrorism associated with “the weapon of weak”.

an example of “state terrorism” or “terrorism from above” (Jenkins, 1980). State terrorism refers to a type of terrorism which is used by governments against their own citizens. On the other hand, modern terrorism usually refers to asymmetric warfare as a type of non-state violence that non-state or sub-national groups are engaged with, which is very different from state terrorism. According to Hoffman (2006), terrorism during the French Revolution shared two features of modern terrorism. Firstly, it was neither random nor discriminate, but organized, deliberate and systematic. Secondly, its justification and goal were the creation of a new and better society to replace an unjust and corrupt one.

However, like many other revolutions, the French Revolution eventually began to consume itself. On July 26, 1794, Robespierre announced that he had a new list of traitors (Laqueur, 2002). Those who feared that their names might be on the list, joined forces with opponents to pre-empt Robespierre. As a result, Robespierre and his close inner circle were executed by guillotine. From this, terrorism became a term associated with the abuse of power and its positive connotations ended.

Modern terrorism has begun in the 1880s. David Rapoport (2002) periodized modern terrorism under four waves accordingly organizations with similar ideology, objectives, and tactics in the same era. Every one of the first three waves lasted roughly 40 years, and Rapoport (2002) expects the same lifespan for the fourth wave which has just completed its fourth decade.

The first wave was called “the Anarchic Wave” (Rapoport, 2002) and started with the Russian revolutionaries targeting a top-down revolution inspired by French Revolution tactics. In 1861, Tsar Alexander II freed the serfs (who at the time made up one-third of the Russian population) and promised funds for them to buy land. However, the Tsar could not provide sufficient funds, and unmet expectations led to widespread anger and disappointment. Terrorists sought to provoke the state to overreact and suppress people to eliminate terrorist elements but which very act of suppression leads to popular revolt aiming to eliminate the state which they saw as a source of inequality. The Russian *Narodnaya Volya* (People’s Will) organization was the first organization to employ terrorism in the first wave. The organization was very rigorous in its target selection,

focusing on symbolic targets such as the representatives of the tsarist regime, the nobilities and especially the Tsar and his family. Unlike later terrorist organizations, *Narodnaya Volya* avoided targeting civilians. Despite its short lifespan (1878-1881), it was involved in the assassination of high-ranking Russian officials including Tsar Alexander II (Laqueur, 2002, p. 12). Contrary to today's pejorative meaning, in this example, *Narodnaya Volya* did not hesitate to portray themselves as terrorists and their tactics as terrorism. Rapoport (2002, p. 3) states that “the rebels described themselves as terrorists, not guerrillas, tracing their lineage to the French Revolution”. Terrorism associated with Piscane’s “propaganda by deed” term emphasizes the didactic purposes of the violence to not only draw attention but also informs the masses (Hoffman, 2006). Practitioners expected that terrorism would be the quickest and the cheapest way to generate the polarization required to spark revolution (Rapoport, 2017). Anarchist Wave terrorism started in Russia and rapidly spread to Europe, America, and Asia in the last decade of the 19th century. Despite its prevalence, no organization has succeeded in this period, except for the tactical success and inspire future organizations in the next waves (Rapoport, 2002). In the following decades, terrorism had inspired separatist ethno-nationalist and anti-colonial movements. It is even argued that the spark of beginning the World War I which is the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 by Serbian nationalist separatist Gavrilo Princip was an act of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006).

The Second Wave called as “Anti-Colonial Wave” (Rapoport, 2002) was sparked by the Versailles Peace Treaty, and especially Wilsonian principle of self-determination. After the end of First World War and dissolution of empires, nationalist aspirations were becoming a focal point for rebellion by ethnic groups who were colonized under western powers or wanted their own independent nation state. Some of these groups chose terrorism as a method of their struggle and gaining international recognition. The first organization to emerge in that period was the IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Ireland against the British. Similarly, after the Second World War, the independence movements from the colonies such as the FLN (National Liberation Front) against France’s mandate in Algeria, the Jewish Irgun and Lehi against Britain in Palestine, the EOKA (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*) initially against Britain then against Turks in Cyprus are examples of this period’s organizations. The organizations of this period targeted mainly

police, military, and colonial government, aiming to eliminate them and have them replaced with their military units. Practitioners stopped to call themselves as “terrorists” and has started use of the “freedom fighters” which led to definition problems in the further (Rapoport, 2002). Terrorist organizations of the Anti-Colonial Wave were able to partly reach their aims through the use of terrorism. With the developments in the mass media, they made their “propaganda by deed” with terror and ensured that their political aims were announced to the international agenda (Rapoport, 2002). Thus, they succeeded in gaining external support from the international public.

The third wave, called as “New Left Wave” (Rapoport, 2002), began with influences of the Cuban Revolution and the Vietnam War. Vietcong’s “David defeats Goliath” motto encouraged leftist groups around the world. From the mid-1960s to the 1980s, terrorism had been recognized by the activities of the leftist groups that built on widespread anti-Westernism. These Anti-western political movements were also encouraged by the Soviet Union. During the Cold War period, the representatives of the bipolar equilibrium, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A, used terrorist organizations to fight against each other instead of direct war due to the increasing cost of the conventional war. In the third wave, radicalism was often combined with nationalism, such as in the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and the Corsican National Liberation Front (FNLC). Leftist organizations were selective in their target selection, choosing symbolic targets such as businessmen, politicians and NATO representatives, who were the representatives of the capitalist order, and directed towards the targets where they can generate the necessary message, avoiding mass civilian casualties so as not to lose support. New Left-Wave terrorist organizations were also influenced by the relative success of organizations such as the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization). PLO not only conducted terror campaigns in Palestinian territory but also across Europe. Organizations such as the German Red Army Faction and the Japanese Red Army have also carried out joint terrorist acts that have been regarded as the internationalization of terrorism. The third wave began to decrease in the early 1980s, especially after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 eliminated PLO, and international counterterrorism cooperation became increasingly effective (Rapoport, 2002).

The fourth wave, called the “Religious Wave” (Rapoport, 2002) has been started with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and is still ongoing. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist organizations has been seen in Shiites, then in Sunnis, and activities of these radical groups have been associated with terrorism. Iran-backed Islamic fundamentalist ideology has replaced Arab nationalism, which has weakened in the region. Like previous waves, religious and nationalism often overlap. But the formers aimed to create secular sovereign states, whereas in the fourth wave religion is only for justification and organization. Although Islamist groups were dominant in the last wave, there are also other religious groups such as the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult, Jewish fundamentalists and American Christian Identity. In addition to the previous tactics, suicide bombings have been the most striking innovation. Practitioners have made massive attacks against military and government installations, in particular the U.S which has become a frequent target. Hezbollah’s achievements in Lebanon have inspired other organizations to employ suicide terrorism (Rapoport, 2002). In this wave, the lethality of attacks and indiscriminate targets has increased. The September 11 Attacks were the deadliest suicide bombing attacks in history, with around 3000 dead and more than 6,000 wounded. The 9/11 Attacks led to a redefinition of terrorism, which was conceptualized as a phenomenon that would lead to open war against any person or group that threatened Americans (Rapoport, 2017). Thus, confusion of the meaning of terrorism has increased.

In summary, the meaning of terrorism has been subject to several changes since the late 19th century and it has gained different connotations depending on the context and political environment in which it has occurred. Due to development in doctrines, technology, and finance, it has transformed over time and turned into present form (Rapoport, 2002).

1.3. DEFINITION

To go back to the definitional debate, hundreds of different definitions of terrorism have been made until now. Yet so far, none of them have been able to gain consensus among scholars and policymakers. Jenkins (1980), in his work titled “*The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems*”, examined 76 definitions. He points out the most common

elements of terrorism that should be used to construct a definition: (1) the use of violence or the use the threat of violence (2) political motivation (ideology), and (3) actors that carried out attacks are members of an organized group.

The most comprehensive works until today are done by Schmid and Jongman (1988; 2005), whose works are also known as the “academic consensus definition”. Schmid and Jongman conducted their first research in 1988 and carried out and revised their findings in 2005. With the previous findings and the latest study, Schmid (2011) examined 109 definitions and pointed out frequency of common elements in the use of definition as follows: (1) violence and force 83.5 percent, (2) political 65 percent, (3) fear and terror emphasized 51 percent, (4) threat 47 percent, (5) psychological effects and anticipated reactions 41.5 percent, (6) victim-target differentiation 37.5 percent, (7) purposive, planned, systematic, and organized action 32 percent, (8) method of combat, strategy, and tactic 30.5 percent.⁴ They emphasized that the definition of terrorism varies but it always focuses on these specific elements. The results of both Jenkins (1980), and Schmid (2011) studies overlap and support each other. So at least scholars can agree on some major characteristics.

First, terrorism as an extreme form of political violence involving use of force or threat of use violence. Through violence, terrorists aim to create a climate of extreme fear and the concern with which they want to manipulate (Hoffman, 2006). Secondly, it is about the use of violence to achieve political change. It may be used for solid demands, to provoke an over-reaction so as to inspire followers for recruitment, for publicity, to for a thirst for revenge or to help undermine governments (Wilkinson, 2002). Thirdly, it involves attacks on symbolic targets which do not discriminate civilians. This is why terrorism is an unlawful act and out of the rule of war which clearly grants immunity of

⁴ Violence, force 83.5, Political 65, Fear, terror emphasized 51, Threat 47 (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions 41.5, Victim-target differentiation 37.5, Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action 32, Method of combat, strategy, tactic 30.5, Extra normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints 30, Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28, Publicity aspect 21.5, Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination 21, Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims 17.5, Intimidation 17, Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5, Group, movement, organization as perpetrator 14, Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others 13.5, Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence 9, Clandestine, covert nature 9, Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence 7, Criminal 6, Demands made on third parties 4 (Schmid, 2011, p. 3-5).

civilians. The Hague Conventions on Warfare grants not only civilians and non-combatants immunity and diplomatic inviolability, but also prohibits civilian hostage taking, regulates the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), and recognizes neutral territory and the rights of citizens of neutral states (Ganor, 2002). Fourth one is organizational element. Terrorism is conducted either by an organization which has structured chains of command or cells, by individuals directly inspired by the ideologies of existent organizations, or by its leaders (Hoffman, 2006). Another critical characteristic of terrorism is the repetition of terror. While individual acts of violence may meet definitional criteria, the systematic violence distinguishes terrorism from individual acts of violence. Terrorism is the repeated, systematic exploitation of emotional fear and terror (Badey, 1998). The last but not the most important element is that it is directed at a wider audience or target, rather than the immediate victims of the attacks. In other words, it is designed to strike fear into a broader group (Richard, 2015). As Jenkins (1975, p. 15) points out “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead”. The target audience and wider psychological impacts are key defining characteristics of terrorism.

There is also debate surrounding target selections. The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (National Counterterrorism Center, 2005, p. iii.). According to the U.S. Department of State (2005, p. iv), the term “combatant” means military, paramilitary, militia, and police under military command and control, in specific areas or regions where war zones or war-like settings exist. Therefore, non-combatant targets include civilians, police and military personnel (armed or unarmed, on or off duty outside of war a zone), diplomatic personnel, and diplomatic assets such as buildings and vehicles.

Although there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, scholars have agreed on its aims about bringing political change, which is the primary purpose of this thesis to discuss its political effectiveness. Thus, this thesis will use Hoffman’s (2006, p. 40) final definition which includes common key characteristics and emphasizes political aims:

... the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. ... Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience” ... Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.

1.4. DIFFERENCES FROM OTHER FORMS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Another problem with the term “terrorism” is that it is confusing and often used interchangeably with other forms of political violence such as “guerrilla warfare” and “insurgency”. It will be useful to discuss the similarities and differences and identify the characteristics that make terrorism a distinct phenomenon. It is not surprising that terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgents often employ the same tactics and tools, such as hit-and-run attacks, assassination, kidnapping, and hostage-taking for the same purposes (intimidation or coercion) (Hoffman, 2006). They are also similar in that terrorists as well as guerrillas and insurgents wear neither a uniform nor identifying insignia and thus are often indistinguishable among civilians.

However, despite their similarities, there are still fundamental differences among the three. Guerrillas are usually referring to larger groups than terrorists, and conduct military-style operations and are organized like military administration (Hoffman, 2006). They are generally better armed and trained as they have camps and bases. They can also occupy or control territory while exercising sovereignty over a population (Richardson, 2007). The critical distinction is that guerrillas can operate as a military unit and engage in force-on-force attacks (Hoffman, 2006). In other words, guerrillas aim to defeat or weaken the security forces in terms of military, whereas terrorists seek symbolic political effect (Tillema, 2002). Although it is difficult to make a clear distinction between guerrillas and terrorists in terms of target selection, to generalize, the guerrillas tend to target security forces and terrorists tend to deliberately target civilians (Richardson, 2007).

Theoretically, the fundamental aim of guerrilla warfare is to establish liberated areas and to set up small military units, which will gradually grow with the accumulation of military

assets, and fight against conventional armies in the final phase of the confrontation (Laqueur, 2002). For this aim, guerrillas follow Maoist and Leninist understandings, emphasizing the involvement of the masses through political organization. On the other hand, terrorism seeks to bypass both the mass agitation process and the conventional military elements of guerrilla warfare theory, believing that the use of symbolic violence alone will be sufficient as well as quick and cheap to achieve the desired political ends (Neumann, 2009).

Insurgents are very similar to guerrillas in terms of tactics, controlling territory and the way they exercise sovereignty over a population. They are often referred to as “revolutionary guerrilla warfare” or “people’s war” (Hoffman, 2006). In addition to their irregular military tactics, insurgents involve mass mobilization, and propaganda efforts to struggle against an authority such as government, imperialist power, or a foreign occupying force. Due to their engaging mass mobilization, they are in larger numbers comparing to guerrillas (Wilkinson, 2006). Although guerrilla warfare and insurgency terms usually refer to subnational groups’ asymmetric warfare against national armies, insurgency mostly referring to territorial separatist struggle, guerrilla warfare referring to tactical target selection (Abrahams, 2008).

However, due to terrorists’ limited numbers and logistics they generally cannot not operate as army units, and so they avoid fighting force-on-force, and do not attempt to occupy or control territory (Hoffman, 2006). Rather than military victory, they aim to bring overreaction and publicity, as well as using fear to influence their target audiences (Richardson, 2007).

The reason terrorists try to identify themselves as guerrilla or insurgency is to gain combatant status. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols No. I and II (1977), regulating laws on international and non-international armed conflicts, and the combatant status, is not granted terrorists to combatant status to enjoy of the rules of war (Saul, 2006). For this reason, terrorists have raised to use the concepts of guerrillas and insurgents to gain combatant status.

In conclusion, when comparing with other types of warfare which seek physical gains (such as acquiring territory or material harm to the adversaries), the primary intent of terrorism is to generate psychological impacts beyond the immediate victims. Although actors may use acts of terror in the short-term to terrorize victims, such as pointing a gun in the face of a bank clerk during a bank robbery, in the case of terrorism the primary intent is to spread fear beyond the immediate victims (Richard, 2015, p. 24). Unlike terrorism, the other types of violence are not designed to create psychological effects beyond the act itself. The unexpected nature of terrorism differentiates it from other forms of violence. Thus, it generates fear that it could happen anywhere and to anyone.

1.5. TWO MAJOR APPROACHES ON TERRORISM

As there is no universally accepted definition, there is also no full developed theory to understand and explain terrorism until now. Since terrorism is a political phenomenon, terrorism studies take attention from other disciplines such as economics, communication, and psychology. While each discipline has its own approach on terrorism, Crenshaw (1987) proposed two major approaches regarding terrorism. In her further studies in 1988, 2001 and 2011, Crenshaw revisited and developed these two approaches. This study benefits from Crenshaw's two approaches because they are closely associated with the aim of the research question that aims to understand the objectives and goals of terrorist organizations. These two approaches can also explain acts of terrorism and standards of measurement for success and failure.

1.5.1. The Instrumental Approach

The instrumental approach is derived from rational choice theory. It explains the act of terrorism as a deliberate strategic choice by actors to achieve their political aims (Crenshaw, 2011). Terrorism is seen as an intentional response to certain grievances. Actors are rational and they act on cost-benefit analysis. Radicals prefer terrorism because they think it is cost-effective compared to alternative strategies. As discussed above, other types of violence such as guerilla warfare is more time consuming and practitioners of terrorism want to quick result and by-pass some steps. In addition, they often claim that

they use terrorism as a last resort following the failure of other non-violent and violent methods (Crenshaw, 2011). Since the main aim of organizations is to achieve their political goals, targets are chosen logically and are related to organizations' ideology and their capability. Besides, targets are not constant but can be revised accordingly to changes in the political and strategic environment (Tucker, 2005).

Terrorist actions may occur for several reasons. For example, the costs of trying are low, the status quo is intolerable, or the probability of success is very high (Crenshaw, 2001). The organizations act as a unit and use terrorism as a tool to achieve political aims. The purpose of terrorism is not to destroy military targets but to influence a wider target audience and bring about change in the enemy's behavior. Organizations generally implement surprise attacks on symbolic targets (such as the presence of American Marines in Beirut, and the Israeli forces in South Lebanon) aiming to win quickly and cheaply (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 14).

According to the instrumental approach, success is defined in terms of reaching their stated political objectives. The instrumental approach assumes that when actors achieve their goals, they will stop the use of terrorism (Tucker, 2005). Terrorism fails when it cannot achieve its strategic aim. The reason why they sometimes continue operations when they cannot achieve their stated aims may be because of tactical objectives, such as to get publicity and recognition. Organizations also have short-term goals such as propaganda, overreaction for more participation or to expose the government's weakness (Crenshaw, 2001).

The instrumental approach is simpler and more comprehensible. This is because the purposes of organizations are inferred from their behaviors according to logical rules, regardless of identity or organizational dynamics (Crenshaw, 2001). However, it cannot explain how the preferences of the organizations are determined since it does not analyze the internal dynamics of organizations (Özdamar, 2008). So, it cannot explain why different organizations act differently.

1.5.2. The Organizational Approach

The organizational approach focuses on the internal dynamics of organizations and organizational continuity. In this approach, the acts of terrorism are outcomes of the internal organizational process rather than strategic action. It assumes that the primary goal of any political organization is survival in a competitive environment (Wilson, 1973 cited in Crenshaw, 2001). Organizations seek to maximize their power and maintain their survival. So, the act of terrorism is explained as a result of the struggle for survival regardless of its end stated political consequences.

Like instrumental approach, the organizational approach also assumes that actors are rational, and actions depend on cost-benefit. But the latter calculates how to achieve group survival in the best way, as well as individual or collective benefits (Oots, 1989; Crenshaw, 1985). The organizational approach explains not only why terrorism continues regardless of political results, but also explains why it starts (Crenshaw, 2011). It explains the existence of a terror group formed by entrepreneur leaders who use legitimizing ideas to mobilize resources, such as people and armaments. Leaders use of terrorism to provide individual and collective incentives such as financial (cash payment, housing for the families of “martyrs”) and social status related recognition (a collective identity with honor) for followers (Stern and Modi, 2008) or compete with rival organizations (Crenshaw, 2011).

According to the organizational approach, motivations for participation in terrorism include not only ideological but also organizational needs, such as individual or collective interests (Sandler, 1992). Unlike the instrumental approach, which presumes that ideology determines actions, the organizational approach regards ideology as an expression of the organization’s needs (Tucker, 2005). The reasons for joining a terrorist organization may also be intangible, such as to belong to a group, to achieve social status and reputation, or to gain material benefits (Crenshaw, 2011). It also suggests that organizations are more sensitive to their members than to enemies’ policy (Crenshaw, 2001). Leaders ensure organizational survival by offering various incentives to members which may not be related to the organization’s strategic purposes. Organizations are more

concerned with survivability than achieving political goals. Even achieving long-term goals may not be desirable, for if the organization succeeds there would not be enough incentives to maintain membership. Alternatively, even a terror group will not stop when it has achieved its original goals and turns into a self-sustaining organization. They can shift their objectives either from one stated objective to another one or from their stated objectives to organizational survival or individual and collective interests (Stern and Modi, 2008). Terrorism fails only when the organization is destroyed or cracked down (Crenshaw, 2001).

In summary, the organizational approach interprets the internal dynamics of organizations and how these dynamics influence terrorist acts. However, compared to the instrumental approach, it is more complex and less parsimonious; it does not allow us to get general inferences and assumptions or make predictions about the future due to *sui generis* characteristics of organizations. Since it is very difficult to collect data on the small clandestine organizations, the actions of terrorists are difficult to explain in this context. Nevertheless, most case studies focus on the details of the internal politics of the organizations (Özdamar, 2008).

However, neither instrumental nor organizational approach is fully satisfactory to explain terrorism as a single approach. Although these two approaches diverge on major points, they do not always contradict and can sometimes complement each other. For example, the organizational approach can be complete the instrumental approach “by determining what are the values of terrorists, how their preferences are determined, and how intensely they are held” (Crenshaw, 2001, p. 29). Additionally, organizations can begin with an instrumental view but over time transform themselves into clandestine organizations according to organizational dynamics (Tucker, 2005). Stern and Modi (2008, p. 35) argue that, with a Weberian perspective, organizations tend to shift their mission from achieving their objectives to promoting their own survival. This argument will be examined in regards to the Hezbollah case.

1.6. CONCLUSION

Until now, the definitional problem of terrorism has been examined, and its characteristics, historical evolution, and differences from other types of political violence have been presented. While discussing the definitional problem, the difficulties in reaching universal accepted definition have been presented. In addition to this, its common characteristics have been revealed and it has been emphasized that it is possible to reach a consensus from common characteristics. Subsequently, Crenshaw's two theoretical approaches on terrorism have been examined and it has been explained how they relate to the aim of this study. These two approaches will help to understand theoretical divergences among scholars on the political effectiveness of terrorism as well as to help understand and explain the objectives of Hezbollah and its transformation. In the discussion, these two approaches will be explained in two different periods of Hezbollah (*1982-2000* and *2000-onwards*).

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF TERRORISM?

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter starts with the meanings of effectiveness and success, and how the Crenshaw's two major approaches define and measure effectiveness. Then, level of analysis problem is discussed. Later, the literature on the political effectiveness of terrorism is presented, especially empirical studies, which show their findings on effectiveness. Lastly, based on empirical findings, how, when and what determines political effectiveness is elaborated upon. These determinants will be examined on Hezbollah in the discussion chapter.

Terrorism as an extreme form of political violence aims to bring political changes. Throughout history, various actors have used terrorism for different purposes, but one thing that is common is to achieve certain political goals. Scholars have argued many claims on its causes and aims, but there are a few works on its effectiveness. While the "success" of terrorism was seen as an interesting debate for terrorism scholars, the political effectiveness of terrorism is one of the ongoing controversial debates in terrorism studies. Although pioneer scholars have examined the debate, there are few sources that have discussed this debate before the September 11 Attacks (Crenshaw, 1995; DeNardo, 1985; Laqueur, 1976; Schelling, 1991). The 9/11 Attacks have revived the discussions and whether terrorism does work has become the central question. Since then, the focus of debate has evolved into the political effectiveness of terrorism.

In the coercion literature, there is no clear standard of measurement for success, rather it is measured as the adjustment of the target government's behaviors according to the preferences of coercers (Byman and Waxman, 2002). Effectiveness is understood in various meanings, but generally it is handled as the accomplishment of stated political objectives (Abrahms, 2006, p. 48). To measure effectiveness, it needs to consider the intended objectives and disregard the unintentional consequences (Krause, 2011).

Assessment of the political effectiveness of terrorism depends on how we define success⁵ (Perl, 2005). The instrumental approach defines success in terms of accomplishing the stated objectives, especially at the strategic level. For instance, for an ethno-separatist organization, success is achieving an independent state. There are also some short-term objectives such as propaganda, yet, as organizations do not achieve their strategic objectives, they are regarded as a failure (Crenshaw, 2001). On the other hand, in the organizational approach perspective, survival of the terrorist organization is enough for it to be considered successful. Nevertheless, the instrumental approach emphasizes that attaining the political ends are important and regards survival as an intermediary aim, even if the ultimate aims cannot be achieved. It suggests that terrorism continues because terrorist organizations achieve their tactical aims, such as publicity and recognition (Crenshaw, 2001).

In the following chapters, these two major approaches will be used to show theoretical differences in empiric studies and then on the Hezbollah case, which will be discussed in regards to its objectives. The instrumental approach will help to analyze strategic aims in a simpler manner. The organizational approach also helps to understand internal dynamics and explains the transformation of objectives, as well as survival can be regarded as solely strategic objective itself. In addition to this, these two approaches will help to understand the transformation of Hezbollah over time.

2.1.1. Level Of Analysis

As the instrumental and organizational approaches show theoretical differences in identifying success, another disagreement is the level of analysis. Most scholars measure the effectiveness of terrorism according to the stated objectives of organizations at the strategic level (Dershowitz, 2002; Pape, 2003; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Cronin, 2009). These can be things such as the changing of a regime, the

⁵Crenshaw (1995) underlines distinction between effectiveness and success. According to her, effectiveness is about producing the decisive effects in terms of outcome which may not require intent of the actor. On the other hand, success is about producing the effects which are related to the actor intended outcomes. So, she argued that terrorism can be effective without being successful (Crenshaw, 1995, p. 475). Yet, as growing literature on the debate, this study too regards effectiveness in terms of success.

withdrawal of colonial powers or secessionist campaigns to gain independence. Nevertheless, some of the terrorist organizations' objectives are complex to such an extent that these objectives to reduce a primary aim. Measuring the political effectiveness of terrorism in regards to stated objectives may cause oversimplification and disregarding of the process or organizational goals. The instrumental approach focuses on that level and disregards other levels.

While some scholars separated the aims of terrorist organizations into process goals and strategic goals, they define organizational objectives, with Abrahms wording, "process goals" that will contribute to strategic objectives (Abrahms, 2008; Cronin, 2009). Abrahms (2008) divided terrorists' goals into two: process goals (such as financial support, media attention, boosting membership, provoking for government overreaction) and outcome goals (such as the realization of a Kurdish homeland, removal of foreign bases or the establishing of Islamic Rule). He points out that the effectiveness of terrorism can be measured according to these two ways: process effectiveness (the level of damage indicted by the coercing power) and strategic effectiveness (the ability of the coercing power to achieve political objectives) (Abrahms, 2008).

There are also studies that examine strategic and organizational goals simultaneously (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2013; Krause, 2011; 2013). Krause (2011) put forward a two-level framework for examining the comparison of organizational goals and strategic goals. He considers organizational goals as complementary or contradictory to strategic goals depending on power distribution within social movements. As revealed before, the main organizational goals are to increase strength and maintain survival. The key audiences at the organizational level are the organization's popular base and its rival groups. Organizations may launch campaigns to retain their members or get new recruitment. From this point of view, the use of terrorism helps to mobilize support for the organization and deters rival armed groups (Krause, 2013).

The organizational approach uses a two-level and a multi-level of analysis. The two-level framework helps to better understand organizational dynamics. It also allows researchers to understand the effectiveness of terrorism from the perspective of those who employ it.

There are also studies on the multi-level framework. Marsden (2012) takes one more step and applies the multi-level approach in four categories: tactical, organizational, strategic goals and ultimate goals. In addition to the two-level framework, the multi-level framework also investigates tactical goals. Tactical goals are the tools that operationalize the threat and focus on carrying out an operation, such as to detonating bombs, taking hostages, hijacking planes or destroy infrastructure or to harm people. Successfully conducting an attack is labeled tactical effectiveness. Tactical effectiveness is regarded as military effectiveness rather than political effectiveness. Although there is a correlation between tactical and political effectiveness, military or tactical effectiveness may well be a necessary condition for strategic and organizational effectiveness (Johnson and Tierney, 2009, p. 11). To discuss the political effectiveness, the terror attack must be operationalized. It is not possible to discuss a tactically failed attack's effectiveness.

In these levels of analysis, this study follows a two-level framework. This is because the single level of analysis neglects organizational goals and multi-level analysis is too complex, has complex internal factors and is far away from being parsimonious. The single level framework disregards fundamental causes, mechanisms, effects, and perceptions of terrorism (Krause, 2011, p. 270). Also, a two-level is more appropriate for the case-study design. A two-level framework which analyzes organizational and strategic objectives simultaneously better explains the dependent variables and provides explanatory variables on political effectiveness of terrorism. For example, Hezbollah's attacks against MNF targets in the 1980s increased its recruitment and popular support among its base, and it is argued that this led to the achievement of its strategic goals in the next decade (Krause, 2013, p. 10).

2.2. BACKGROUND AND DEBATES

There is no consensus and even a considerable disagreement in the existing literature on the question of whether terrorism works, as well as the political effectiveness of terrorism. Mostly, scholars have differentiated stances when selecting cases to classify terrorist groups and provide standards of measurement for assessing effectiveness. Some studies evaluate effectiveness at the strategic level and look at how campaigns or particular actions contribute to the achievement of primary goals (Abrahms, 2006). Others only analyze the efficacy of suicide terrorism (Pape, 2003; Atran, 2006; Moghadam, 2006) and some of them analyze overall terrorism as a strategy (Kydd and Walter, 2002). Organizational effectiveness examines organizational dynamics as well as their effects on strategic effectiveness (Carter, 2011; Jones and Libicki, 2008; Gaibullov and Sandler, 2013). Tactical level analyses focus on the details of specific operations and define effectiveness based on outcomes (Sharif, 1996; Berrebi and Klor, 2006). There are also case studies on terrorist groups that aim to identify factors related to data analysis (Homeland Security Institute, 2007; Krause, 2013). In addition, RAND researchers have examined different types of terrorist operations in search of factors that shape effectiveness (Jackson and Frelinger, 2009; Jones and Libnicki, 2008).

Although the preeminent scholars have discussed the effectiveness of terrorism in early terrorism studies (Crenshaw, 1995; DeNardo, 1985; Laqueur 1976; Schelling, 1991), the political effectiveness debate was triggered following the September 11 Attacks. Before the 9/11 Attacks, while there is no such broad debate on the political effectiveness of terrorism, the widespread opinion was that terrorism fails to achieve end state results (Schelling, 1991) and rarely induces bargaining to governments (Crenshaw, 1987; Wilkinson, 1986). David Rapoport (2001) also confirms in his study that terrorism has rarely succeeded in history.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks, Dershowitz's (2002) provocative book "*Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threats, Responding to Challenges*" argued that terrorism works as an effective coercive strategy. He has analyzed the 9/11 Attacks through terrorism since 1968 and links Palestinian terrorism with the 9/11 Attacks. His

main argument is that terrorism works because the international community had not punished but instead rewarded terrorism since 1968, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) benefited from their terrorist acts (Dershowitz, 2002, p. 85). Dershowitz claims that the 1972 Munich Olympics Attacks and airplane hijackings have made Palestinian conflict more popular on the international agenda. And then, Arafat's speech at the UN General and his visits to the Pope and the U.S. are examples of legitimization. Thus, these things make terrorism attractive. So, he asserts that the U.S. and European countries have contributed to the rise in terrorism by not punishing but seeking to understand root causes and legitimization (Dershowitz, 2002). Dershowitz's book was written under the shadow of the 9/11 Attacks and he focuses on the Palestinian case rather than global terrorism. He interprets the PLO case as a success story, but it is regarded as a failure at the strategic level (Abrahms, 2006).

2.2.1. Strategic Effectiveness of Terrorism

Following the September 11 Attacks, there have been increasing numbers of empirical studies on terrorism. Most of these empirical studies focus on the strategic level. Pape (2003) is the first terrorism scholar to conduct an empirical study on the effectiveness of terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism campaigns, and his findings support Dershowitz's argument. He analyses the outcomes of 11 suicide campaigns and claims that terrorism is a profitable political tactic because 6 of them succeeded. In his further study Pape (2005) found success rates to be 7 out of 13 campaigns, which makes suicide terrorism highly effective. According to Pape (2003, p. 350) "the main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works". But his explanation that terrorists are learning from each other is not intellectually satisfying and other key motivations and factors need to be investigated.

Kydd and Walter (2006) maintained Dershowitz's argument and asserted that terrorism often works. According to authors, "extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda, Hamas, and the Tamil Tigers engage in terrorism because it frequently delivers the desired response" (Kydd and Walter, 2006, p. 49). What is more, they claim that terrorism works

not simply because it instills fear in target populations, but because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that serve the terrorists' aims.

Max Abrahms (2006) with his "*Why Terrorism Does Not Work?*" article challenged the dominant wisdom at that time on the political effectiveness of terrorism, and claimed that terrorism was an ineffective coercive strategy. He argued that "terrorist groups rarely achieve their policy objectives, and the poor success rate is inherent to the tactic itself", because it targets civilians (Abrahms, 2006, p. 43-44). In his further study, Abrahms (2008) examined the campaigns of the 28 terrorist groups those are on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by U.S. Department of State to analyze the strategic effectiveness of terrorism. He assessed the outcomes of 42 political objectives of FTOs' campaigns and found that contrary to expectations, success rates were extremely low as 3 out of 42 (Abrahms, 2008). In another study, Abrahms (2012) assessed the effectiveness of terrorism in 125 violent campaigns waged by 54 groups in RAND's Terrorism Knowledge Base. Results showed that 38 out of 125 successful, 36 of the successful were military targeted, and one of them civilian targeted (which is 2004 Madrid train bomb).⁶

When looking at Pape (2003; 2005) and Abrahms' (2008; 2012) studies, there is a big contradiction on success rate, with the former studies claiming that terrorism works with a 50 percent success rate and the latter studies countering that it does not work with an only 7 percent success rate. This lays out the differences in standards of measurement and case selection. They disagree over which achievements qualify as a success or failure. Abrahms measures success by comparing terrorist organizations' stated objectives to policy outcomes. On the other hand, Pape measures success by comparing pre-terrorism status concessions. Therefore, Pape's success measurement standards are lower than Abrahms. For example, in the case of Hezbollah, the stated objective of Hezbollah's destruction of Israel is a success for Abrahms while the withdrawal of Israel from South Lebanon is enough to be a success for Pape (Krause, 2011).

Looking at more comprehensive large-N studies, Cronin (2006; 2009) analyzed 450 terrorist groups' campaigns. Her results found that 87.1 percent had achieved none of

⁶Khmer Rouge data is missing.

their strategic aims, 6.4 percent had achieved a limited result, 2 percent had achieved a substantial component of their aims, and only 4.4 percent had succeeded in the full achievement of the group's primary stated aims (Cronin, 2009). Furthermore, updated RAND data by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) showed a success rate as low as 4 percent.

Fortna (2015) also contributed to the debate by comparing the outcomes of 104 rebel groups involved in full-scale civil wars active between 1989 and 2004 to assess whether rebel groups who use terrorism are more successful than those who avoid this tactic. She argued that by targeting civilians, the political effectiveness of terrorism is undermined rather than enhanced. Thus, terrorist rebels tend to be far worse than non-terrorist rebels in terms of achieving their political goals. Furthermore, she argues that the use of terrorism contributes to organizational survival. According to her, rebel groups that use terrorism last longer than who avoid this tactic (Fortna, 2015).

2.2.2. Organizational Effectiveness of Terrorism

There are also studies on the organizational effectiveness of terrorism (Bloomberg, Engel and Sawyer, 2010; Carter, 2011; Jones and Libicki, 2008; 2012; Sandler and Gaibulloev, 2014). Most case studies focus on organizational dynamics. As revealed before, the organizational approach proposes that organizations aim to maximize their power and maintain their survival. Krause (2011) put forward a two-level framework for examining the comparison of organizational goals and strategic goals. He considers organizational goals as complementary or contradictory to strategic goals depending on power distribution within social movements. The key audiences at the organizational level are the organization's popular base and its rival groups. The use of terrorism can help retain and recruit new members, mobilize support for the organization from the base and compete with rivals.

Survival as a Measurement of Effectiveness

In the organizational level, there are also studies on the survival of terrorist groups as a measure of effectiveness. While survival is regarded as one of the dimensions of organizational effectiveness, it is also accepted as a degree of effectiveness (Phillips,

2014; Stern, 2016). The organizational approach indicates that “the minimum goal of any organization is survival” (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 18). It is an undeniable fact that terrorist organizations need to survive in order to operate and achieve their goals.

To measure survivability, scholars have examined the longevity of terrorist groups. Rapoport (2004) claimed that 90 percent of terrorist organizations survive less than one year. Philips (2017) updated Rapoport’s claim and found 52 percent of terrorist organizations survive less than one year. While Vittori (2009) found an average lifespan of four years when he examined 100 organizations, Cronin (2009) proposes between five and nine years. Cronin (2009) also found a strong correlation between group age and negotiations with the state and claims older organization are more successful. It is also argued that terrorism is effective for rebel organizations’ survival, and civil wars that involve terrorism last longer (Fortna, 2015).

In summary, while empirical studies show that terrorism is ineffective in attaining strategic goals, it is more likely to be effective for the survival of groups. Another question on terrorist organizations is what will they do if they achieve their goals? The instrumental approach assumes that when actors achieve their goals, they will stop the use of terrorism (Tucker, 2005). It will be examined on Hezbollah that it has reached its strategic objective but continues to operate. This will also answer the question of “what happens if an organization reached its objective but does not end?”

2.2.3. What Determines the Political Effectiveness of Terrorism?

While empirical studies, especially large-N studies, show that terrorism is ineffective both in terms of strategic goals and survival, a few organizations can be regarded as successful. It is essential to understand how successful terrorism reaches its aims by examining what the determinants and factors are.

RAND researchers Jones and Libicki (2008) analyzed 648 terrorist organizations that existed during 1968 and 2006 and examined how these groups ended. The purpose of their research was to find out the implications of countering al-Qaeda by examining

historical experiences. Researchers implemented quantitative methods to understand the primary reason for the end (or survivability) and effectiveness of organizations by characteristic variables, such as size, ideology, aims, tactics, and also the target country's features such economic conditions, and regime type. The study found that of the 648 groups that were active from 1968 to 2006, 268 of them ended in that period, 136 groups were splintered, and 244 groups remained active (Jones and Libicki, 2008). Looking at the results on ended groups shows that 43 percent of them reached a peaceful political accommodation with their government. Those who reached political solutions mostly ended because of seeking narrow policy goals. According to researchers, groups that followed narrower goals were more likely to achieve them through a political transition. Local police and intelligence agencies neutralized 40 percent of them. Security force eliminated 7 percent of terrorist groups. Only 10 percent of terrorist groups ended because they achieved victory (Jones and Libicki, 2008). The study also showed that when terrorist groups were involved in an insurgency, they lasted longer. Nearly 50 percent of the groups ended by negotiating a settlement with the government, 25 percent of them achieved victory, and 19 percent were defeated by military forces (Jones and Libicki, 2008).

Abrahms (2012) assessed the political effectiveness of terrorism in 125 violent campaigns waged by 54 groups in RAND's Terrorism Knowledge Base. The results showed that 38 out of 125 were successful. 36 of the successful were military targeted, one of them civilian targeted that was the 2004 Madrid train bomb (and Khmer Rouge data is missing.). Abrahms examined the following variables: target selection (civilian or military), the capability of FTOs (membership size, lifespan, external support), the capability of the target country (military power and economy, population, regime type), stated political objectives (narrow or wider). When he analyzed the groups that had achieved their objectives, he found target selection to be the key indicator (Abrahms, 2008). He claims that when the targets are primarily civilians, these groups almost never succeed. Thus, he found that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are less effective than those with military targets. Also, he argues that groups that have maximalist objectives are significantly less successful than those with limited objectives.

Sandler and Gaibullov (2014) examined 367 organizations active during the period of 1970–2007, in terms of their membership size, type of attacks, ideology, base of operation, and the characteristics of their target countries. According to their study, terrorist organizations are more successful if they have larger membership size, diverse attack types, religiosity rather than secularity, nationalist or left-right wings goals, and if they operate in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region (Sandler and Gaibullov, 2014).

In line with the above studies, the factors ideology, type of objectives, target selection, state-sponsorship, competition, and regime type of the target country will be discussed in regards to the Hezbollah case. However, some determinants have not been included due to the difficulty in measuring their effects on a single case study. In addition to these, organizational structure and *modus operandi* are also thought to be effective factors examined in regards to Hezbollah.

Ideology

Ideology is one of the key variables that also shapes other factors. Terrorist organizations are generally divided into four categories in terms of their ideological motivations: nationalist, religious, left-wing and right-wing. Nationalist organizations aim to gain independence, territorial control, or autonomy, and these challenges the core interests of the target countries. Religious organizations have more apocalyptic goals. Some studies have suggested that nationalist and religious terrorist groups last longer than other ideologies (Cronin, 2009). Nationalists tend to have more popular support among a population. It is also argued that religious organizations last longer due to spiritual or sacred affiliated motivations among members and loyalty to leadership (Cronin, 2006). However, it is also suggested that leftist and rightist organizations have shorter lifespans due to having trouble identifying concrete goals and retaining popular support. According to Jones and Libicki (2008), in 648 groups, those holding a religious ideology never achieved victory. (Jones and Libicki, 2008). This will be discussed in regards to Hezbollah and how its ideology has shaped its effectiveness.

Type of Objectives

Goals of terrorism range from narrower ones, such as coercing a government to change its policy on specific issues, to broader ones, such as overthrowing existing regimes. Scholars have mostly agreed that terrorism can achieve higher levels of success when groups have limited objectives that are not challenging the core interests of the target countries (Abrahms, 2006; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Jones and Libicki, 2008). At the same time, organizations who seek narrow goals can achieve concessions through their end stated objectives (Jones and Libicki, 2008).

Target Selection

Some studies reveal that military-centric terrorist groups are more successful than civilian-centric. Abrahms' (2012) study's results show that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are less effective than those that are against military targets.⁷ He claims that when the targets are primarily civilians, these groups almost never succeed. When he analyzed the groups that had achieved their objectives, he found target selection to be the key indicator (Abrahms, 2008). He tries to explain why terrorist groups are unable to achieve their political objectives by targeting civilians. He views terrorism as a bad communication strategy, because of its extremely high correspondence. Because target countries perceive terror attacks as means to destroy their society or direct threats people' living styles rather than focusing on perpetrators' political demands. And this perception finds response by target countries' public. This will be discussed in regards to Hezbollah's target selection and its role in its effectiveness.

State-sponsorship

Most scholars qualify state-sponsorship as a major factor in determining the political effectiveness of terrorism. Wilkinson (2006) claims that state-sponsored terrorism often works because the resources of the state are linked with the groups practicing the violence.

⁷ Abrahms' sample consisted of 42 outcome goals from the groups designated by the U.S. State Department as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs).

Some have suggested that terrorism only succeeds in exceptional circumstances, such as decolonization, where national liberation movements struggling for independence have greater support (internally and internationally) than other circumstances (Hoffman, 2006). On the other hand, sponsorship is not always good and may be a bad thing for terrorists. Organizations who rely on their sponsors for a safe haven are more likely to be eliminated. Sponsorship does not seem to significantly help groups to avoid forceful elimination (Carter, 2011). This will be discussed in the context of Hezbollah and its relations with the sponsorships of Syria and especially Iran.

Popular Support

Scholars have also emphasized popular support as a factor that determines political effectiveness. Terrorist groups cannot survive without either active support (such as joining the organization, hiding members, raising money) or passive support (such as ignoring terrorist group's activities, or denying cooperating with police force) (Cronin, 2009). Nationalist organizations typically have more popular support among a population, and broader popular support is usually the key to the greater average longevity of nationalist groups. It is argued that religious organizations last longer due to spiritual or religious motivations among members and loyalty to leaders (Cronin, 2006). Attacks by Hezbollah against western targets in the 1980s increased its strength and support dramatically, paving the way for the achievement of strategic goals in the future.

Regime Type of the Target Country

Scholars have argued that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism due to elections and public pressure (Abrahms, 2012; Sandler and Gaibullov, 2013). Terrorism researchers have also been examining the regime type of the target country as a factor that determines the political effectiveness of terrorism. Israel's decision to withdraw from South Lebanon and its relations with Israel's Elections will also be discussed in the context of the Hezbollah case.

Competition

Another factor that determines effectiveness are terrorist groups alliances and rivalries. Krause (2013) argues that competition among groups in the same movement for popular support or recruitment improves chances of success at the organizational level. While most of the studies measure rivalries in the same country (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013; Young and Dugan, 2014), there are also studies on cooperation and competition among terrorist groups internationally (Phillips, 2015). Empirical studies also confirm the correlation between cooperation and longevity (Phillips, 2015; Price, 2012).

Competition between terrorist organizations leads them to engage with each other, learn and innovate new tactics (Bloom 2004). Terrorist groups adapt to new circumstances and learn from each other. In addition to this, cooperation also helps an organization in terms of recruitment, training, financial sources, and information sharing (Phillips, 2015). This will be discussed in the context of AMAL-Hezbollah rivalry and how this competition shapes Hezbollah's effectiveness.

2.2.4. When Does Terrorism Work? Structuralist Theory of Non-State Violence

Krause (2011) claims that previous studies related to the political effectiveness of terrorism disregard the structure of power within social movements as an explanation for the greatest variation. In many cases, organizations are not a sole actor but are in competition with other actors in a social movement. Organizations in the same movement pursue common strategic goals characterized by collective actions. At the same time, they compete for organizational dominance and engage in zero-sum game. The distribution of power within a social movement, hierarchy, and polarity, determines whether strategic and organizational objectives are likely to be contradictory or complementary. Thus, the hierarchical polarity of social movements drives the actions of their armed groups (Krause, 2011).

The structuralist theory of non-state violence has two central claims (Krause, 2011). The first one is that a unipolar social movement is more politically effective than a multipolar

social movement. The second one is that the dominant organization in the hierarchy of a social movement is most likely to pursue its strategic goals, whereas weaker groups are more likely to pursue organizational goals regardless of age or ideology.

To test the structuralist theory, Krause examines insurgency movements, particularly national independence struggles, in general non-state violence rather than only focusing on terrorism. Perhaps he is avoiding the use of the term “terrorism”. In his Ph.D. dissertation, he analyses four cases in the two-level framework: Israel, Algeria, Palestine, and Ireland. In his further article, Krause (2013) compared single-level and two-level frameworks of eight campaigns of national movements: the Irish national movement (1969-2001), the Algerian national movement (1954-1962), the Zionist movement (1920-1948), Lebanese resistance to foreign occupation in the 1980s, the Vietnam War (1955–1975), the uprising of militant Islamists against the Mubarak regime in Egypt (1990s), and two campaigns of the Palestinian national movement -the struggle against Israel from within neighboring Arab states (1965-1987), and the Second Intifada within the West Bank and Gaza (2000–2006). Hezbollah is one of the organizations that Krause examined within the case of the Lebanese resistance movement to Israeli Occupation in the 1980s.

However, Krause’s structuralist theory of non-state violence provides an answer to question of when does terrorism work but does not elucidate the questions of how, and why terrorism does work. Furthermore, his argument does not provide implications for counterterrorism strategies. If the main aim of the political effectiveness of terrorism is to understand how terrorist groups achieve their goals to make terrorists organization to lose, the findings should include implications for governments to take measure to prevent terrorism. For this reason, this thesis will be focus on factors that determines one group to become top of the hierarchy in the movement.

2.3. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the political effectiveness of terrorism was examined. First, the meanings of effectiveness and success were examined. The level of analysis problem was then discussed. Later, the literature on the political effectiveness of terrorism was presented.

The literature shows that, as the number of studies on terrorism has increased since the 9/11 Attacks, it has also triggered studies on the effectiveness of terrorism. There is no consensus in the existing literature on either the question of whether terrorism works or the political effectiveness of terrorism. Studies have selected different data, cases, and methods for assessing success and failure, yet there is no common ground for the political effectiveness of terrorism as of yet.

Overall, large-N empirical studies show that terrorism rarely achieves its political objectives (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Cronin, 2009) and is significantly less effective than guerrilla campaigns (Abrahms, 2006; Fortna, 2015) and non-violent campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2008). The literature shows that although in some cases terrorism can be an effective tactic for achieving organizational goals especially for survival (Pape, 2005), the quantitative studies show that it is an ineffective tactic for achieving strategic objectives.

Later on, what determines the political effectiveness of terrorism is investigated in the remainder of the chapter. Thus, ideology, type of objectives, membership size, target selection, state sponsorship, competition, popular support, and regime type of the target country were found as key variables. After this, “when does terrorism work?” was answered and analyzed by Krause’s structuralist theory. In the following chapter, these factors and structural organizational will be examined in the Hezbollah case in detail. In the discussion section, will be provided some scholarly insights drawn from the findings.

CHAPTER 3

A CASE STUDY: HEZBOLLAH

3.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, in light of the political effectiveness debate, Hezbollah is examined as a case study. It is difficult to describe such a clandestine organization accurately due to organizational secrecy and a lack of transparency. It is also very hard to find reliable sources. In the case study part, although some of the sections are not related to theoretical debate and the research question, it is worth discussing these in order to understand Hezbollah. It will also be useful for updating previous research on Hezbollah.

Firstly, a brief history of Lebanon and the radicalization of the Shiites, the establishment of Hezbollah, its relations with AMAL, its role in the Lebanese Civil War, and its fight against to Israel Invasion will be presented. Then, Hezbollah's organizational structure, its objectives and the transformation of its objective, its *modus operandi*, finance and recruitment, and Syria and Iran's state-sponsorship will be examined. The reason why the historical part is kept long is to show the AMAL-Hezbollah split and to test Krause's structuralist theory on non-state violence to examine the distribution of power in the Lebanese resistance movements in its historical transformation.


3.2. HISTORY

Besides the Lebanese Shiites' historical grievances, four events led to the radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and the creation of Hezbollah (Smit, 2000). These events are the Lebanese Civil War, the Israel Invasions of 1978 and 1982, the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr in 1978, and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The Civil War caused Lebanese Shiites to feel insecure and start military organizations. The disappearance of Sadr provided the Shiites with a powerful mobilizing symbol. The Israel Invasions increased the cost of Palestinian presence for the population of the South. Lastly, the 1979 Iranian

Islamic Revolution was a tremendous source of inspiration and increased the self-confidence of the Lebanese Shiites.

3.2.1. Brief History and Radicalization of the Lebanese Shiites

Image 3.1. Jabal Amil Region and Its Environment



Source: Chalabi, 2006, p. ix

Image 3.2. Selected Cities of Jabal Amil



Source: Chalabi, 2006, p. x

To understand Hezbollah, it is essential to look at the politicization and radicalization of the Lebanese Shiite community. For this aim, the chapter starts with a brief history of Lebanon and the causes of the Lebanese Civil War. Lebanon has a multireligious and multisectarian mosaic structure. Although there are eighteen official sects and confessions in Lebanon today, Christians, Sunnis, and Shiites are the most notable ones. Shiite existence in Lebanon can be traced back to the ninth century and they have had grievances since they started their migration (Smit, 2000, p. 35). Shiites are mostly located in the Jabal Amil region, which is a mountainous part of southern Lebanon containing the cities of Saida, Jezzine, Nabatieh, Tyre, and Bint Jbail (Chalabi, 2006, p. 18).

During the four-century rule Ottoman (1527-1918) in Lebanon, Sunnis were the dominant power and Shiites were not recognized as a separate community in the Ottoman *millet* system (Alagha, 2006). After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 following World War I, there were the short-lived Shiite *zu'ama* (who are the powerful Shiite family political bosses, basically local feudalists) governments until the Sykes-Picot Agreement which gave the control of Lebanon and Syria to France under the League of Nations. On September 1, 1920, France created "*the Grand Liban*" (Greater Lebanon) (Alagha, 2006, p. 21).

The Sunni dominance in the Ottoman period was passed on Christian Maronite rule under the French mandate (Smit, 2000). During the mandate years, France aimed to create a Christian-dominated state in the Middle East. On May 23, 1926, the new constitution declared the Republic of Lebanon, and Charles Debbas of Christian origin was elected as the first president of the new republic. In 1932, the French Mandate authority conducted a census and found that 58.5% population was Christian and 41.5% non-Christian (Maktabi, 1999, p. 222). When France lifted the mandate, the political structure of Lebanon was designed by the unwritten National Pact, often referred to as the Gentlemen's Agreement between the Maronite Christian President Bishara al-Khoury and Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Riyadh al-Solh. As a result of this agreement, Lebanon political power was divided between the Christian and Muslim communities (Norton, 2014).

The redistribution of power was realized in line with the 1932 Census. According to the census, the largest community were the Christian Maronites with 33.5% of the population has taken the Presidency who had preeminent prerogatives and powers. The second largest community were the Sunnis 18.6% of the population has taken the Prime Ministry. And the third largest community were Shiites 15.9% of the population has taken the Parliament Speakership which is a considerably weaker but symbolic position (Norton, 2014, p. 6). This confessional sectarian system is known as “troika”. In addition to this, seats in the parliament were divided into 6/5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. Thus, Lebanon turned into a “democratic state” with parliamentary elections and the inclusion of all religious sects (Alagha, 2006). The Gentlemen’s Agreement also outlined the following understanding between parties: Firstly, Lebanon should be a neutral, sovereign, and independent entity in the Middle East, having an Arab character. Secondly, parties agreed that Lebanon would not seek unity with neighboring Syria nor the Arab world. Lebanon should also refrain from pursuing special ties with France or the West (Smit, 2000, p. 51).

The history of the modern state of Lebanon started with its independence from France in 1943. Although Lebanon declared its independence on November 22, 1943, the full independence was only acquired after the withdrawal of the French Army in 1946 (Alagha, 2006, p. 23). One could argue that Lebanon saw stability and relative peace in the following decades. It has often been criticized that the new distribution of power did not solve the deeper problems. Moreover, with the increased fertility rate among Shiites and migration from Iran and Iraq, the Shiite population was increasing. This increasing population did not reflect representation in the politics and this contradiction has caused political tension in the long run. Shiites remain one of the most marginalized and least developed communities in Lebanon (Norton, 2014).

Furthermore, the rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s exacerbated the sectarian tensions in Lebanon (Boran, 2007). Sunni Muslims supported Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and his anti-western stances, and the Maronites refused to join the pro-Nasser camp and defended their neutral stance. The aforementioned Gentlemen’s Agreement

clearly indicated that Lebanon should be neutral in Middle Eastern politics. The establishment of the United Arab Republics between Egypt and Syria was fostered Nasserist Lebanese Arabs. In 1958, Lebanon was on the verge of civil war. Lebanese Maronite President Chamoun asked the U.S. President Eisenhower for help. The landing of the U.S. Marines in Beirut appeased the violence (Boran, 2007).

By the 1970s, the differences among communities had become more visible, and it coupled with the Palestinian problem following the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars. Palestinian refugees flowed into Southern Lebanon where a predominantly Shiite population live, but it actually ended up affecting the whole Lebanese society. There were nearly 400,000 Palestinians in the Lebanese camps. The Palestinian refugees and the existence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) *fi da'iyin* in South Lebanon radicalized the local population against Israel. While Muslim Sunnis and Shiites supported the Palestinian refugees, Christian-Maronites were uncomfortable with the changing population dynamics. Then, due to the militarization of the region and Israeli retaliation, the already impoverished Shiites were the most impacted. In addition to this, Palestinian refugees sought to share Lebanese Shiites' limited resources and introduced cheap labor (Alagha, 2006).

The Cairo Agreement, which was signed by the PLO and the Lebanese Army on 3 November 1969, had granted the PLO the right to use Lebanese land against Israel. PLO was settled in Jordan before. After the disruption of Jordan and the PLO following the Civil War in Jordan in 1970–71 (known as Black September) the PLO moved to Lebanon. In the 1970s and early 1980s, PLO had used southern Lebanon as a base of operation, and they established training camps which also trained Lebanese Shiites. In time, the PLO existence challenged the authority of the Beirut government. The Lebanese Army considered that the Palestinians had manipulated the Cairo Agreement in order to build a state within a state in Lebanon (Alagha, 2006). As a result, there was a clash between the PLO and the Lebanese Army. Israel took the opportunity to become involved in Lebanon's domestic politics and provided military aid to the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) (which consisted primarily of Maronite Christians) and also increased attacks on the Lebanese southern border where mostly Shiites were living (Cragin, 2005).

The Shiite community, who lived under the dominance of the *zu'ama*, had little representation or influence over politics. They were also becoming marginalized and remained underdeveloped. The *zu'ama* maintained their authority with client and patronage networks until the 1960s. Since the 1960s, the young Shiite population began to grasp new political movements and they organized themselves against the *zu'ama*. The oppositional voices came especially from leftist, socialist and Arab Nationalist parties such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), the Organization for Communist Labor Action (OCLA), and pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi factions of the Arab Socialist *Baath* (Resurrection) Party (Norton, 2014).

Under these circumstances, the Lebanese Shiites started to mobilize their political efforts. In addition to these domestic developments, external factors such as the increasing interaction between Lebanese and Iranian Shiites triggered the politicization and radicalization of the Shiites (Norton, 2014). Political organization of Shiites can date back to 1960s when the interaction between Lebanese Shiites and Iranian Shiites developed in the Shiite school center cities of Najaf (Iraq), Baalbek (Lebanon) and Qum (Iran). This was especially true in Najaf, where Ayatollah Khomeini, the future leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, was exiled between 1964 and 1978. Many Lebanese Shiites received instructions from him and influenced by him. For example, future Lebanese Shiite leaders such as Abbas Musawi and Suphi Tufayli were educated in those cities during his stay. Meanwhile, Lebanon had become a safe haven for those who fled from Iran and they were mobilizing against the Shah regime (Ranstorp, 2002). They also supported the Palestinian *fida'iyin* in Southern Lebanon to fight against Israel (Alagha, 2006).

3.2.2. Imam Musa Sadr

The increasing interaction between Lebanese and Iranian Shiites during the 1960s and 1970s had fostered Iranian migration to Lebanon. One of the Iranian immigrants was Imam Musa Sadr (of Lebanese descent), the son of a famous Islamic scholar from one of the most respected families among the Shiites (Smit, 2000, p. 61). He studied Law at the University of Tehran and also completed religious studies in Qum and Najaf. He was a religious modernist with political aspirations. He came to Lebanon by invitation of his

relative Abdel Hussein Sharafeddin, the Mufti of Tyre. He then moved to Lebanon in 1958, settled in Tyre, married a Lebanese woman in 1963 and became a Lebanese citizen. His Iranian citizenship was later revoked due to his criticisms against the Shah regime (Alagha, 2006, p. 26).

Imam Musa Sadr started to become actively involved in the Lebanese political arena. He started to mobilize the Shiite community and sought to improve their socioeconomic conditions by establishing the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council (SISC) in 1969 (of which he became its leader) (Alagha, 2006). He aimed to reduce *zu'ama* influence and increase the consciousness of the Lebanese Shiite community. In the beginning, he was inclusive and cooperative with other sects and religions. He formed the *Harakat Al-Mahrumin* (the Movement of the Deprived) in 1974 and cooperated with the Greek Catholic archbishop Gregoire Haddad. The organization was for all Lebanese people regardless of their sects or ethnic origins. However, this inter-community cooperation was short-lived, and the Movement of the Deprived turned into a Shiite based movement under the leadership of Imam Musa Sadr (Alagha, 2006, p. 27).

3.2.3. AMAL

Musa Sadr continued to challenge *zu'ama* dominance by changing the socioeconomic structure. In the beginning, he organized non-violent rallies and symbolic activities that attracted thousands. However, he came to realize that changing the political structure through peaceful means was nearly impossible, and he became more radicalized over time (Alagha, 2006). With the outbreak of Lebanese Civil War in 1975, he founded a militia group as named *Afwaj Al-Muqawama Al-Lubnaniyya* (The Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance) known as its acronym, AMAL, which also means “hope” in Arabic. Although AMAL had started as a military wing of the Movement of the Deprived, it absorbed the Movement of the Deprived and took over its role. This was because Musa Sadr thought that the Lebanon Army was not capable of defending southern Lebanon, and he also wanted to help the Palestinians fight and defend against Israel (Alagha, 2006).

According to the 1975 Charter, AMAL defines itself as a reformist movement that aimed to reform the social and political conditions of Lebanese Shiites. AMAL committed to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and the Lebanese multireligious multiethnic structure. AMAL did not demand the establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon. Lebanon was to be a democratic parliamentary republic but also anti-sectarian. In contrast to the Lebanese left movements, Imam Musa Sadr wanted reforms within the confessional sectarian system, rather than overthrowing the regime. Notwithstanding, the problematic relationship between the Palestinians and AMAL, the AMAL officially declared to support the Palestinian cause, and AMAL militias were trained by the PLO (Norton, 1988).

However, AMAL transformed its objectives over time. Before the Israel 1985 Invasion, Nabil Berri, the successor of Sadr, defined the objectives of AMAL in an interview: a unified Lebanon, the reconstruction of state authority, safeguarding the Arab identity of Lebanon, and the abolishment of sectarianism (*Monday Morning*, December 22-28, 1980 cited in Norton, 1988).

3.2.4. The Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990

In 1975, with the aforementioned domestic problems, along with the political imbalance among sects and changing social structure with migration, had increased tension in Lebanon. Shiites felt oppressed by a Christian dominated government and a Sunni dominated region (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). The spark that triggered the Civil War in Lebanon was the killing of four Christian Lebanese Phalange Party (as known as Phalange or Kataeb) members during an attempt to kill Bashir Gemayel (who is the leader of the Phalange Party). Phalangists thought the assassins were Palestinian and retaliated by attacking a bus in Ain-al Rummaneh in Beirut, and killing of 27 Palestinian passengers on April 1975 (Fisk, 1990). Just a few months later, known as “Black Saturday”, four Christians were found shot dead in east Beirut. Bashir Gemayel ordered retaliations resulting in around 40 Muslim men being stopped at Christian roadblocks and murdered. Muslim militias retaliated in a similar way, and by the end of the day, about 300 Muslims

and 300 Christians had been murdered, and the Lebanese Civil War had officially started (Taha, 2016, p. 23).

In the beginning of the civil war, there were two camps. Maronite Christians came together under the Lebanese Forces (LF), which was dominated by the Phalange Party. The LF stood for the continuation of the status quo and were against any reform in favor of Muslims and the end of Palestinians' extraterritorial rights. On the other hand, groups that demanded the end of the confessional system and sympathized with the Palestinians came together under the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The LNM included the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) led by the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, the AMAL led by the Shiite leader Musa Sadr, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Communists, the Arab nationalist Baath Party, and the Sunni al-Murabitun Militia. The LNM also had the support of the PLO (Norton, 2014).

In collaboration with their Palestinian allies, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) managed to win several key battles in the first couple of years of the Lebanese Civil War. However, the Syrian military intervention in 1976, which was conducted in order to support the Lebanese Front (LF), prevented a complete defeat of the LF forces. Syria brokered a settlement between parties which ended this phase of the Civil War and halted the LNM's plans. Their political influence declined with the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in 1977. After the settlement, South Lebanon where the Shiite population was dominant was becoming the main battlefield. Due to the clashes between Phalangist militias, the Shiites were forced to leave from Eastern Beirut. With the migration from East Beirut to South Lebanon, an area formed in the South with a mostly Shiite population. The Lebanese Civil War worsened the sectarian divides and caused to the radicalization of the Shiite community (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

In August 1978, Musa Sadr disappeared during his trip to Libya. He visited several Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Algeria in search of support. Although he did not plan to visit Libya, it was suggested to him by Algeria that he should include Libya as well. On 31 August 1978, Musa Sadr left his hotel to meet Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, where he was last seen in public. The Libyans stated that he had left

for Italy. However, the Italians denied that Musa Sadr had ever got the Al Italia flight. The disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr has never been clarified, but it is suspected that Gaddafi was behind his disappearance, as Gaddafi saw Musa Sadr as a threat or rival for him because of Libyan Shiites (Norton, 2014, p. 41). Sadr's disappearance unified not only Shiites but all Lebanese as well, and led to about 250,000 people gathering for a commemoration in Tyre. After Sadr, AMAL witnessed a leadership gap. Successors Hussain al-Husain and Nabil Berri could not fill the gap, and AMAL's popularity decreased (Siklawi, 2012).

3.2.5. The 1978 Israeli Invasion “the Operation Litani”

On March 14, 1978, Israel claimed that there were security concerns from the PLO located in South Lebanon, and launched a ground invasion named “the Operation Litani”. The aim of the operation was to eliminate the PLO, establish a security zone in southern Lebanon, and help the South Lebanese Army (SLA) to control the region. In 1978, Israel partially entered the Lebanese territory. However, due to the limited military action of Operation Litani, it could not prevent the PLO presence in South Lebanon and its attacks from borderline. Shiites supported the PLO during the 1978 Invasion. However, as a result of the destruction from the invasion, Shiites in southern Lebanon were badly affected and became even more radicalized. As a result of the invasion, 2,000 were dead and 250,000 people were displaced (Alagha, 2006, p. 31). Thus, discomfort between the Shiites and the PLO increased.

3.2.6. The 1982 Israeli Invasion “the Operation Peace for Galilee”

On June 3, 1982, with the claiming that armed attacks to Israeli Embassy in London by the PLO members, Israel launched a wide range of military operations from the sea, land, and air towards Lebanon, known as “the Operation Peace for Galilee”. Israeli forces reached a location near Beirut without much difficulty. Israel declared that the purpose of the occupation was to remove Palestinian militias from Lebanon. While this may be true, another aim of the Israeli administration was to establish a pro-Israel government and away from Syrian influences in Lebanon (Taflioglu, 2004).

At the beginning of the 1982 Invasion, the Israelis were welcomed with “rice and flowers” in many southern villages by Shiites who were uncomfortable with the Palestinian *fida'iyin* presence (Norton, 2014). Although AMAL was opposed to the Israeli invasion, AMAL tactically welcomed the invasion. This is because if the PLO were eliminated, they hoped to control the region and resources. Nevertheless, over time AMAL realized that Israel would not leave easily, and the invasion would continue and even increase (Norton, 2014). By occupying South Lebanon, Israel attempted to create a buffer zone at the southern Lebanon border. Ironically, the buffer zone became a source of tension between Lebanese militias and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and forced Israel into a defensive position (Ranstorp, 2002). The former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak later confessed: “When we entered Lebanon ... there was no Hezbollah. We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shia in the south. It was our presence there that created Hezbollah” (Newsweek, July 18, 2006 cited in Norton, 2014, p. 33).

Israel misinterpreted the AMAL's anti-PLO stance and so this did not translate into long-term support for Israel (Norton, 2014). The early resistance against the Israeli Invasion was mainly carried out by Lebanese leftist parties, which included many Christians and Shiites close to AMAL. The ideology of the resistance was nationalistic, rather than Islamic. Breaking point was reached when Phalangist militias under Israel control massacred the Palestinian Sabra and Satilla Camps in West Beirut on 18 September 1982. They murdered about a thousand of women and children, increasing tension and angering pro-Palestinian Lebanese (Boran, 2007). AMAL did not declare armed resistance until 1984, hoping that a political solution would be possible. In June 1984, AMAL officially announced it was joining the armed resistance against Israel, and became actively engaged. Resistance in the South Huma region (known as *dahiya*, where dominantly Shiites live) lasted over a month, and despite the bombing of air, land and sea, the Israeli army could not enter the area. The Shiite militias' resistance to the Israeli troops had made a substantial impact on the people. With thousands of civilian losses in this occupation, Israel fell into a very difficult situation both internationally and domestically (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Between 1982 and 1985, 654 Israelis were dead and 3,890 wounded. On the other side, approximately 19,000 Lebanese Shiites were dead and 32,000

wounded, as well as the destruction of most villages in southern Lebanon (Smit, 2000, p. 275).

Another reason for the Shiites' non-resistance to Israel during the 1978 invasion, but resistance to the 1982 invasion, was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The Shiites were influenced by the Iran Islamic Revolution, and thus reacted to the 1982 invasion (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

3.2.7. 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution and Iranian Role on the Establishment of Hezbollah

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran started to export revolution to other countries, especially those with large Shiite populations, such as Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon. There were already Shiite revolutionary parties in Iraq and Lebanon. In the 1970s, several Shiite clerics who received religious instructions from Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf formed the Lebanese Islamic Dawah Party, which modeled the Iraqi revolutionary Shiite Islamic Dawah Party. The Iranian revolutionist cadres had previous links with Lebanese Shiites in Najaf, Baalbek, and Qum. They also had developing relations with the AMAL. The activities of Lebanese Dawah Party in the early 1970s are unclear, but Khomeini directed the party to become a part of AMAL in 1975. They also had connections with the Iraqi Islamic Dawah Party. After the Iraqi regime started to suppress its members, they moved to Beirut where they became a co-religious ally with AMAL. Iran encouraged Dawah members to join and infiltrate AMAL in order to spread revolution and radicalize AMAL. One of the notable party members was Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, who became an AMAL officer and later, the leader of the Hezbollah (Alagha, 2006).

Although the real reason behind the confrontation between AMAL and Iran is still not clear, the major problem might have been that AMAL was becoming moderately secular after Musa Sadr's disappearance under the leadership of Berri. AMAL was a nationalist organization, and aimed to increase socioeconomic conditions of the Shiite community by working within the multiconfessional political system in Lebanon. In other words, it sought reforms, not a revolution. In contrast to Iran and Hezbollah, AMAL did not aim

to establish an Islamic State. In addition to this, AMAL was closer to Syria, and Iran wanted more aggressive revolutionary movement in Lebanon (Norton, 2014). Another disagreement between AMAL and Iran was about the PLO presence in South Lebanon. For Khomeini, the Palestinian cause had priority and the PLO should be supported against Israel (Smit, 2000). Thus, Iran started to support radical Shiites and the creation of Hezbollah.

After the Israeli 1982 Invasion, Iran sent between 1,000-1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen Corps (IRGC) (also known as Pasdaran to Baalbek) to Lebanon via Syria. The Pasdaran included Islamic instructors as well as military trainers. They brought financial assistance, provided military and weapon training and indoctrinated the concepts of the Iran Islamic Revolution (Blanford, 2011, p. 43-45).

3.2.8. Establishment of Hezbollah and AMAL-Hezbollah Split

Until the 1982 Israel invasion, pro-Iranian radicals worked inside AMAL. While the popularity of AMAL was decreasing, it faced a leadership gap because Imam Musa Sadr's clergy role could not be replaced by secular successors (Avon and Khatchadourian, 2012). The breaking point for radicals in AMAL was Nabil Berri's decision to cooperate with the Lebanese government and participation to negotiations between the Lebanese National Salvation Committee (LNSC), which was formed by the Lebanese president Elias Sarkis in June 1982. The radical AMAL members wanted AMAL to not attend these negotiations, and they issued a statement that Berri was deviating from organizations' goal of fighting against Israel, which the main objective of the AMAL. His participation in negotiations were even judged as un-Islamic (Tafloğlu, 2004; Alagha, 2006). Furthermore, Syria forced Berri to join the newly established Lebanese Cabinet of National Unity. Berri got the Ministry for South Lebanon position in the cabinet. He saw the position as an opportunity to reform the system and to use for the wellness of the Shiites. Berri considered himself the only representative of the Shiites as Minister for the South (later named as Minister of Resistance). Berri was also criticized in leaflets signed by AMAL in South Lebanon for getting involved in political games to obtain a cabinet seat (Smit, 2000).

Following the protests against Berri, some members of AMAL raised their voices under the leadership of Hussein Musawi. He led the radical wing, bound by the ideological and religious guidance of Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini. The Iranian ambassador to Syria and Lebanon declared that they supported Musawi. Then, Musawi quit AMAL and went to the town of Baalbek and established the Islamic AMAL (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

Iran exploited of Lebanese Shiite reactions to Phalangists' Sabra and Shatila Camps massacre. With the assistance of the IRCG members who were sent to Baalbek, the former AMAL members also joined, and they established the "Committee of Nine" also known as the Hezbollah's first *Shura Council* (the Supreme Decision-making Council). The committee consists of three ex-AMAL members, three Lebanese Shiite clerics, and three IRCG members (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Nasrallah, who is the current Secretary General of Hezbollah, was AMAL's district leader of the Beqaa. Thus, the divided Shiite elites led to a schism in AMAL, which eventually resulted in the creation of Hezbollah as an Islamic jihadi movement against the Israeli occupation, backed by Iran (Alagha, 2006). Later on, there were also other radicals who protested against Berri and joined to other Islamic Shiite groups such as the Islamic Dawah Party, *Itihad al-Lubnani lil Talaba al-Muslimin* (The Lebanese Union of Muslim Students), as well as independent active Islamic figures and clerics who joined Hezbollah (Alagha, 2006).

Training camps were established in the Beqaa Valley in the north of Lebanon because there was not under Israeli occupation. Baalbek, where the Shiite population is large, became the center. Other groups in Lebanon were also gathered in the Beqaa Valley because South Lebanon was under the occupation of Israel (Taflıođlu, 2004). On the occupied territories, the Lebanese state practically collapsed and the power vacuum that has been eagerly filled up by a newly formed resistance movement Hezbollah. So, under Iranian financial and logistical backing as well as ideological support, Hezbollah's institutions started to emerge (Alagha, 2006).

By 1983, Musawi's Islamic AMAL had started to cooperate with Hezbollah. By 1983, Hezbollah was joined by other Islamic groups such as Islamic AMAL, *Jund Allah* (Army

of God), Hussain Death Squad, the Revolutionary Justice Organization, and Islamic Jihad formed Islamic Resistance. There were also other secular groups were confronting Israel such as the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and OCLA (Organization for Communist Labour Action). Later on, they united and formed the Lebanese Resistance Front. However, after 1985, the Islamic Resistance was alone in fighting Israel and its ally, the SLA. It was also during that year that Israel unilaterally withdrew from South Lebanon to the security zone in the Israel-Lebanon border (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

In the early years of the Hezbollah's establishment, both AMAL and Hezbollah could operate simultaneously in Lebanon. Over time, Hezbollah focused on Beqaa Valley in Beirut while AMAL retained its popularity in south Lebanon. In this period, Hezbollah had emerged as a resistance movement, only participating in the fight against the Israeli occupation of several areas of Lebanon. Hezbollah refused to participate in the Lebanese Civil War with other Lebanese components, except against the Israeli proxies (Early, 2006). In February 1984, AMAL and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) under LF took over West Beirut. The take-over of West Beirut represented a significant step in the transition of the Shiites of Lebanon from political outsiders to players on the central stage (Norton, 1988, p. 134).

From 1985 to 1989, Hezbollah and AMAL engaged in many bloody clashes of over Hezbollah's anti-MNF stance, as well as AMAL's desire to keep Hezbollah from gaining further support in South Lebanon. This conflict was further exacerbated when Hezbollah kidnapped U.S. Marine Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins in February 1988. AMAL supported the UNIFIL in south Lebanon because they saw the UNIFIL as a neutral international force that could secure southern Lebanon. However, Hezbollah saw the UNIFIL as just another form of western intervention and occupation. Thus, Hezbollah objected to the UNIFIL's presence in Lebanon until 1991 (Schad, 1999).

3.2.9. Withdrawal of the MNF

After the 1982 Invasion, Israel besieged Beirut, but the tension and fighting had increased between both parties. Especially after the Sabra and Shatila Camps massacre,

international pressure had increased. The U.S. President Regan sent Philip Habib to ceasefire and conduct negotiations between the parties in August 1982. Regan Administration planned to withdraw Israel, Syria and the PLO from Lebanon and strengthen the Lebanese Army to control Beirut. Habib negotiated between parties and convinced them to the evacuation of the troops under control of an international peacekeeping force, the Multinational Force in Lebanon (the MNF). The MNF consisted of the U.S., France, the U.K, and Italy. In the initial phase, the MNF successfully operated the evacuation of the PLO and Syrian troops. Parties including AMAL supported the MNF missions. However, having recently established Hezbollah, the PSP and Islamic AMAL were opposed to the MNF presence and regarded it as a western influence over Lebanon. After the French paratroopers' air raids, which claimed mistakenly, against the Beqaa Valley and killing of 39 Lebanese caused criticism on the MNF. As a result, the PSP and Islamic AMAL no longer recognized its peacekeeping role (Norton, 2014).

The newly emerging Hezbollah and Islamic AMAL targeted the MNF bases. The U.S. Embassy in West Beirut was bombed, and 63 people were killed on April 18, 1983. Another devastating attack was twin suicide attacks by bomb loaded trucks against the U.S. Marines Barracks and the French paratroopers on October 23, 1983, which caused the death of 241 American and 58 French soldiers (Norton, 2014, p.70). It is argued that these attacks led to the withdrawal of the MNF (the USA and France) troops from Lebanon. Following the AMAL takeover of West Beirut, the U.S. Marines were decided to be redeployed and asked Berri for protection and the control of the region while they left. With the withdrawal of the American Marines, the U.S. influence was over on Lebanon, but the U.S. continued to support Bashir Gemayel against Syria. The French left on 25 March 1984. The withdrawal of the MNF was considered as a victory by Lebanese Shiite militias to end western influence on Lebanon (Göksel, 2007).

3.2.10. Israel's First Partial Withdrawal in 1985

In 1984, there was an election in Israel and the Israeli Labour Party promised to end Lebanon operations if it won. The Labour Party was victorious in the August 1984 election and formed a coalition with the Likud Party. Shimon Peres became Prime

Minister and Yitzhak Rabin became the Minister of Defense. While Israel decided to withdraw in 1984, it hoped to establish a security zone in the border and leave to control of South Lebanon to the South Lebanon Army (SLA). Thus, Israel supported the SLA to control South Lebanon and keep the Palestinians and left-wing Lebanese parties out of the South. But, when Israel partially withdrew from South Lebanon in 1985, the AMAL flag began to appear at checkpoints (Göksel, 2007).

AMAL avoided targeting Israel, especially after the 1985 withdrawal to the security zone. Israeli air strikes also avoided targeting AMAL and mostly focused on Hezbollah and leftist Palestinian groups, hoping to minimize hostility among moderate Shiites (CIA, 1987). When Israel withdrew, AMAL proved it was strong enough to control the areas evacuated by the IDF. AMAL portrayed itself as the central force in the Lebanese National Resistance (LNR), and was responsible for a great victory against Israel. However, AMAL gradually lost its control over to Hezbollah and within a year it became clear that it could not maintain its hegemony over the liberated area of the South (Göksel, 2007).

3.2.11. The End of the Lebanese Civil War and the 1989 Taif Agreement

In order to end the Lebanese Civil War and draw a road map for political normalcy in Lebanon, warring parties and 58 members of the Lebanese parliament met in Taif (Saudi Arabia) on 29 September 1989. Iran was not invited to the negotiations. The Taif Agreement (officially, the Document of National Accord) was the document that provided the basis for the ending of the Lebanese Civil War, provided reforms in Lebanon confessional system. The Taif Agreement changed the Christian-Muslim ratio in the parliament from 6/5 to equal sharing and increased Shiite parliament representation from 19 seats to 27 out of total 128 seats that makes equal representation with Sunnis. It also outlined the procedures ending the state of war and dealt with the problem of dissolving the militias and transforming themselves into political parties. The Taif Agreement proposed the disarmament of all militias within 6 months and required them to surrender their weapons to the Lebanese Army (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

Nabil Beri, as the leader of AMAL and the Lebanese Parliament Speaker, welcomed the agreement and was the first to disband its militia forces. However, the only group that did not give up its weapons was the Hezbollah, claiming they were fighting against Israel in South Lebanon. Although it is not clear how Hezbollah persuaded the other parties, it is argued that they tolerated Hezbollah making them promise they would not fight in domestic Lebanese politics (Göksel, 2007). Thus, the Lebanese Civil War resulted nearly 150,000 lives that was about 5 percent of the Lebanon population (Norton, 2014), and a new chapter opened in the battle in South Lebanon and Lebanon politics. Hezbollah became a hegemon in the unipolar resistance against Israel with the disarmament of other militias. Then, by 1992, Hezbollah had started a secret and sudden mobilization against Israel.

3.2.12. The Operation Accountability 1993

On 25 July 1993, after Hezbollah killed seven Israeli soldiers in South Lebanon, Israel launched an operation called “the Operation Accountability”. The IDF carried out air raids, artillery strikes and limited ground operations against Hezbollah targets in Southern Lebanese villages. The aim of the operation was to eliminate the threat of Hezbollah and to force both the civilian population and the Lebanese Government to put pressure on Hezbollah. The operation lasted a week, resulting in 3 IDF soldiers and over 150 Lebanese including 102 civilians were killed (Alagha, 2006 p. 45). Israel and Hezbollah had made an unwritten agreement that both sides would not target civilians which refers to “rules of the game” (Sobelman, 2004).

3.2.13. The Operation Grapes of Wrath 1996

The aforementioned understanding could not prevent Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli civilians. Hezbollah continued to launch rocket attacks. In April 1996, Israeli launched another military operation called the “Operation Grapes of Wrath”. The aim of the operation was to neutralize Hezbollah’s attacks from southern Lebanon and wipe out Hezbollah from the region (Smit, 2000). On 18 April, the IDF shelled a U.N. base near the village of Qana, (which Israel claimed to be a mistake), killing over 100 civilians

(Alagha, 2006, p. 46). The U.N. Security Council called for an immediate ceasefire. The U.S. negotiated a formal understanding between the Israel and Lebanon, known as the “April 1996 Understanding”, leading to the de-escalation of the conflict, and both Israel and Hezbollah both accepted terms of ceasefire and agreed on not to target civilians, meaning back to “rules of the game” (Norton, 2014). Hezbollah, therefore, gained legitimacy as a resistance movement in the international community and recognized by Israel. Furthermore, the operation resulted in national solidarity with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

3.2.14. Israel’s Second Withdrawal in 2000

When Israel withdrew from South Lebanon, it established a security zone inside the northern border in order to prevent attacks from Lebanese militias. Since 1985, the security zone has witnessed frequent low intensity fighting between Hezbollah and the IDF. The cost of invasion increased to the death of over 640 Israeli soldiers (Smit, 2000, p. 184). Increasing casualties of Israel led to criticisms within Israeli society and paved the way to growing domestic opposition aiming to end of occupation by pressuring on the Israeli government. Following the 1999 Election, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised to withdraw from Lebanon by July 2000. There was a dilemma as to whether a withdrawal should be unilateral or in the context of a peace agreement. The unilateral withdrawal would mean Israel’s defeat and a victory for Hezbollah. Israeli PM Barak and Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Faruq al-Shara met in the United States to negotiate a peace agreement in January 2000. The negotiations did not result in an agreement, but Israel announced that it accepted Resolution 425 as the basis for a settlement. The unilateral withdrawal of Israeli military forces from southern Lebanon occurred in May 2000. The UN Security Council confirmed that Israel had completed its withdrawal according to Resolution 425 on 16 June 2000 (Norton, 2014).

Israel is not only failed to expand its occupation beyond the security zone after 1985, but also was forced into unilaterally withdrew in 2000. However, Israel retains control of the Shebaa Farms area which was a part of Syria before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Syria and Hezbollah considered Shebaa Farms as Lebanese territory. Although Hezbollah’s victory

over Israel was expected to decrease its military *raison d'être*, it was not over. Hezbollah justified its continuation by arguing that Israel still occupied the Shebaa Farms. Hezbollah persisted in its struggle against Israel until the Shebaa Farms were liberated, and the remaining 19 Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails were freed (Göksel, 2007).

3.2.15. From 2000-onwards

Hezbollah welcomed the withdrawal of Israel in 2000 and announced as a great victory over an undefeated adversary (Norton, 2014, p. 90). Hezbollah seemed to have reached its strategic aims. Indeed, it was expected, Hezbollah would lessen its resistance, but Hezbollah could continue to preserve its military wing. It has also reduced the numbers of massive attacks, and focusing on kidnapping Israeli soldiers so as to achieve release of prisoners held in Israel. It sought to liberate Shebaa Farms, still occupied Lebanese territory in South Lebanon. Hezbollah has legitimized its military through Israel threat and has focused on survival since 2000.

Hezbollah declared 2006 as “the year of retrieving the prisoners”. Then, they started to kidnap Israeli soldiers. Hezbollah hoped to exchange prisoners, but the Israeli response was war. While the immediate cause of the war appeared to be Hezbollah’s kidnapping three IDF soldiers, it is also argued that because of disarmament of Hezbollah through politics, and Israel attempted to disarm Hezbollah through use of force (Engeland and Rudolph, 2008). However, Israel’s intervention was perceived by most Lebanese as interference in Lebanese domestic affairs (Norton, 2014).

Israel launched a full-scale air and naval blockade operation, and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley. Hezbollah responded by firing rockets in northern Israel. When Hezbollah’s rockets hit Haifa city, Israel Prime Minister Olmert addressed Knesset, Israel Parliament, stated aims of the operation as return of the two captured soldiers and a complete cease-fire accordingly U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 which means to aiming to eliminate of Hezbollah’s military wing and the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the South Lebanon (Norton, 2014, p. 139).

The July 2006 War lasted thirty-four days and ended with a ceasefire mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The resolution was indicated that Israel withdrawal from Lebanese territory, reinforced the UNIFIL and the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the south as well as demanded disarmament of Hezbollah (UNSC, 2006, S/RES/1701). The war resulted in death of 116 IDF soldiers, 28 LAF soldiers, and 250 Hezbollah members (BBC, 31 August 2006). In addition, 43 Israeli and 1,109 Lebanese civilians lost their lives. The war largely affected both sides of the border, nearly half the northern Israel population and most of the southern Lebanon population were displaced. The material cost of war was estimated approximately \$500 million in Israel and about \$4 billion in Lebanon (BBC, 31 August 2006).

Israel completed its withdrawal in July 2007, yet, Hezbollah could keep continuing its armed wing (Engeland and Rudolph, 2008). Despite the fact that the war hit Hezbollah in organizational terms hardly, it could survive. Hezbollah announced the result of the war as a victory to its popular base (Norton, 2014). The July 2006 War showed that not only Hezbollah was the only force that can protect south Lebanese from Israel attacks, but also Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could not capable of protecting its area of responsibility. Although Hezbollah enjoyed solidarity among all Lebanese during the war, after the ceasefire, cross-confessional solidarity was turned into criticism about Hezbollah's role in provoking the war. Besides its human cost, its material cost was about \$4 billion in Lebanon. The war destroyed most of the infrastructure of South Lebanon including 900 factories and 15,000 homes (Norton, 2014, p. 142). Hezbollah denied allegation blaming for provoking the war. Nasrallah claimed that Israel had been preparing a war even months before the kidnap of the Israeli soldiers. However, Nasrallah confessed their miscalculations: "If any of us [the Supreme Council] had a 1 percent concern that Israel was going to reply in this savage manner we would not have captured those soldiers." (Norton, 2014, p. 154).

Hezbollah promised that they would not use terrorism in domestic politics, and except for the 2008 Crisis, it was mostly avoided. In 2008, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora banned Hezbollah's communication company and that triggered clashes between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army. The clashes lasted two weeks and resulted in 62

people dead across the country. With the mediation of Qatar, parties signed the Doha Agreement which established National Unity Government and granted veto power to Hezbollah in the government (Norton, 2014, p. 170). Furthermore, despite the fact that UN international tribunal, investigating the February 2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, that formally accused four Hezbollah members, Hezbollah leaders denied any involvement (Levitt, 2013, p. 358).

In recent years, Hezbollah has also been involved in the Syrian Civil War, and has collaborated with the Syrian Army since 2012, such as with the clash with Free Syrian Army (FSA), *Jabhat al-Nusra*, ISIS, *Ahrar al-Sham* in al-Qusayr and Aleppo (Blanford, 2017). Hezbollah's role was condemned in Europe, the United States, and in much of the Middle East, as well as in Lebanese domestic. European Union designated Hezbollah as terrorist organization and followed by Arab countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) and the Arab League (except Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia) as its involvement into Syrian Civil War since 2013. Hasan Nasrallah declared Hezbollah's victory on the side of Assad and announced that they would refocus its energies against Israel in December 2017 (euronews.com, 12 December 2017).

3.3. IDEOLOGY

Hezbollah's ideology is based on Shiite radicalism and has been inspired by the Iran Islamic Revolution and its leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The ideological stance of Hezbollah is mostly composed of religious and political aspects that are complement each other. Based on the Hezbollah's Open Letter and prominent scholars such as Joseph Alagha (2006, 2011), Richard Norton (2014) and the Deputy Commander (and regarded as the main ideologue) of Hezbollah Qassem (2012), Hezbollah's ideology will be presented. Although its ideology has changed and transformed over time, it is possible to get some general inferences.

3.3.1. Political Aspects

Hezbollah's spokesperson Ibrahim Amin called a press conference at the Shiite Uza'i Mosque in Beirut on 16 February 1985, and declared the Hezbollah's first manifesto, "The Open Letter"⁸, which outlines its identity, ideology, enemies and objectives, organizational strategy, organizational structure and its loyalty to the supreme leader of Iran. The Open Letter was also published in Hezbollah's weekly newspaper *al-Ahd* on February 22, 1985 (Alagha, 2011, p. 119).

The Open Letter is the first detailed official document of Hezbollah that is considered to be its political constitution or manifesto. It officially revealed the establishment of Hezbollah, its military wing, the Islamic Resistance, and also outlined its ideology, identity and objectives. It also declared its enemies, ties to the supreme leader of Iran, and its organizational strategy (Alagha, 2011). While its ideology has transformed over time, Hezbollah acts in accordance with the ideological stance of the Open Letter. The timing also matters it was exactly one year after the assassination of Shaikh Raghīb Harb who is a prominent figure in Hezbollah's Islamic Resistance who mobilized the masses to fight against the Israeli forces (Alagha, 2011).

The Open Letter starts with the following sentences (Alagha, 2011, p. 40):

We, the sons of Hizbullah's ummah, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world's central Islamic state, abide by the orders of a single, wise and just command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent (Wali al-faqih), currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini... who has detonated the Muslims' revolution, and who is bringing about the glorious Islamic renaissance.

Therefore, we in Lebanon are neither a closed organizational party nor a narrow political framework. Rather, we are an ummah tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a strong ideological-doctrinal and political bond, namely, Islam, whose message God completed at the hands of the last of His prophets, Muhammad ... From this perspective, we move to confront this out of a "religious duty" primarily and in light of a general political visualization decided by the leader: jurist (Wali al-faqih).

⁸ *Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbullah (Al-Maftuha) ila Al-Mustad'afinin* (The Original Text in Full of Hizbullah's Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed)

It is clearly understood from the letter that Hezbollah defines itself with Shiite ideology and its loyalty to Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Therefore, Hezbollah follows the principles of Khomeinism. The first is Shiite activism, which refers to the martyrdom of Imam Hussein (grandson of Prophet Muhammed) in Karbala and calls for action against unjustness. The second is the illegitimization of corrupt Muslim regimes who do not follow Sharia law, which legitimizes to overthrow them (Schad, 1999).

Hezbollah political ideology can be divided into two periods. In the first phase, 1982 to 1989, it is guided by the establishment of an Islamic Republic and completely rejection of the Lebanese un-Islamic government. On the other hand, in the second phase, from 1989 to present, it started with the Taif Agreement which ended the Lebanese Civil War and Hezbollah involvement in Lebanon elections with the endorsement of Ali Khamenei successor of Khomeini. This period also coincidences with the governmental change in Iran and moderate Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency. Hezbollah has followed a more pragmatic approach, becoming involved in the Lebanese multiconfessional political system with participation in the 1992 Lebanese Election. Thus, it become more moderate (Harik, 2005).

Oppressed versus Oppressor

Hezbollah had exclusive discourse, it basically classifies people as either “good” or “evil” according to the Qur’anic dichotomy of *Hizb’allah* (Hezbollah, the Party of God) and *Hizb al-Shaytan* (The Party of the Devil) (Alagha, 2011). The Open Letter emphasizes two concepts: the “oppressed” and the “oppressors”, which are key to the understanding of Hezbollah’s ideology. The oppressed refers to those who are unjustly treated, tyrannized regardless of their religious identity. Hezbollah portrays itself as a defender of the “oppressed”. Hezbollah argues that western powers support the Lebanese Christians, and Israel oppresses the Shiites as well as all Lebanese. Hezbollah opposes the imbalance in global and regional power in favor of Israel and the U.S. Thus, Hezbollah presents and justifies itself as protector of not only the Muslim Shiites but also all Lebanese interests.

Islamic Order

According to Hezbollah, the just and legitimate rule can only be possible under Islamic order. In the beginning, Hezbollah clearly rejected the secular Lebanese regime and classified itself as a social movement that called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon, modeled on the Iran Islamic Republic. But Hezbollah argued that it would not impose an Islamic rule in Lebanon by coercion (Alagha, 2011, p. 44):

We are committed to Islam, but we do not impose it by force.

We are an ummah that abides by the message of Islam. ... we do not want to impose Islam on anyone, like we do not want others to impose upon us their convictions and their political systems.

We do not want Islam to govern Lebanon by force, as political Maronism is governing now.

In other words, Hezbollah argued that it would avoid the use of violence in Lebanese domestic politics. Hezbollah ideology follows Khomeini's call for pan-Islamism, the unity of the Muslims. However, Hezbollah combines Islamism with Lebanese nationalism. In this sense, Hezbollah is not purely pan-Islamic (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

Anti-Israel, Anti-westernism, Relations with Lebanese Christians

Hezbollah's initial *raison d'être* was Israel's Invasion of South Lebanon and fight against Israel. Although the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon in 2000 was expected to decrease its military *raison d'être*, Hezbollah persisted in its struggle against Israel until the Shebaa Farms were liberated (Norton, 2014). Even if Hezbollah would achieve liberation Shebaa Farms, Hezbollah would have been still committed to the liberation of Palestine (Qassem, 2012). Hezbollah considers Israel as an illegitimate state and characterizes Israel as an "aggressive, racist, expansionist, cancerous entity" instated by Western colonial powers in the Muslim heartland. From Hezbollah's perspective, all Israeli Jews are equated with Zionists. They believe that the Jews should go back to wherever they came from and those who lived in Palestine before 1948 should be allowed to live as a minority under the Muslim guardianship (Alagha, 2006).

Hezbollah defines western powers as "oppressors" and the causers of imbalance of regional and domestic Lebanese politics. Hezbollah characterizes the U.S as causer of the polarization and domination of the nations in terms of political, cultural and financial.

Hezbollah's Anti-American stance is clearly understood from the Open Letter as following sentences: "Our populace could not bear any more treachery, so they decided to stand firm against the nations of infidelity: America, France, and Israel." (Alagha, 2011, p. 43).

Hezbollah portrays Israel and Phalangists as agents and collaborators of the U.S.A. Hezbollah's hostility towards the U.S. is not only cultural but also the direct result of the defensive response to the U.S. regional involvement and support of Israel. Hezbollah was against the MNF and opposed to the UNIFIL which it regarded as western intervention and forces until 1990 (Göksel, 2007).

Hezbollah is selective towards Lebanese Christians. Hezbollah claimed that it would treat Christians with tolerance and not forcibly impose Islam among them, so as long as they stayed non-aggressive. However, Hezbollah strongly opposes political Maronism and sees them as collaborators with Israel. Also, Hezbollah has avoided establishing high-level relations with Maronites (Alagha, 2006).

In the 1980s, Hezbollah regarded the Lebanese government as an infidel and accused it of being influenced by western politics (Norton, 2014). Thus, it did not recognize the legitimacy of the Lebanese Government. Moreover, Hezbollah accused the Lebanese Government of being a "puppet" controlled by foreign forces. But since the 1992 election, Hezbollah has been involved in Lebanese politics, and the "Lebanonization" process seems to more moderate towards to Lebanese state. The basic worldview of Hezbollah outlined in the Open Letter still continues to guide the organization, despite the fact that updated their positions to accordingly to changes in domestic and international politics (Norton, 2014).

3.3.2. The Juncture of Religion and Ideology

Hezbollah's ideology is mostly shaped by its religious understandings. Naim Qassem who is the current deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah and its main ideologue, described in his book *Hizbullah: The Story from within* (2012) the three pillars of Hezbollah as being

belief in Islam, *jihad* in the name of God, and the adoption and application of *the Wilayat al-faqih* (the guardianship of the jurispudent) principle.

Belief in Islam

Ideologically, Hezbollah is an Islamic Shiite organization. It articulates a universalistic view of the *ummah* (Islamic Community) that incorporates Arab and non-Arab Muslims. Hezbollah interprets itself as representing not only Shiites but also other sects (Qassem, 2012). Although Hezbollah has removed its advocacy for establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon in its 2009 Manifesto, as compared to the Open Letter, the movement is still committed to this goal ideologically but not in practically (Alagha, 2011). Over time, Hezbollah realized that Lebanon's multi-confessional sectarian system does not allow and there is not enough support for establishing Islamic Rule in Lebanon. According to Hezbollah's leaders, an Islamic system of government can only be created based on the "direct and free choice of the people, and not through forceful imposition" (Alagha, 2011, p. 44). Therefore, Islamization should only be pursued when the conditions allow it and when people are open to the idea.

Wilayat al-faqih

The *Wilayat al-faqih* principle refers to the rule of the jurispudent. According to the principle, religious scholars should run the Islamic state since they are the only ones that can interpret God's laws. This principle is associated with Shiite tradition and is strictly followed by Hezbollah. The authority of the jurist is furthermore seen as the continuation of the authority of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams (Qassem, 2012). The holder of the position of *Wali al-faqih* (the jurisconsult) is supposed to be the most learned in Sharia (Islamic Law) and it refers to the current Iranian Supreme Leadership (Qassem, 2012). According to Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), all major political decisions of Hezbollah were taken in Iran such as participation in the 1992 Election.

Jihad

The last but not the least important pillar of Hezbollah's ideology is *jihad*, which is derived from the Arabic verb *jahada*, which means "to struggle, to strive or to endeavor".

The Qur'anic concept of *jihad* refers to any activity which strives for the cause of God and Islam. Hezbollah also interprets *jihad* as “any act which exerts effort in God’s”. According to Qassem (2012), it does not only refer to physically fighting with the enemy (lesser *jihad*), but also to the struggle against one’s internal foes (greater *jihad*). The greater *jihad*, as its name reveals is the primary one. There is also a distinction within the lesser *jihad* between “offensive” and “defensive” *jihad*. Offensive *jihad* can only be practiced by the Prophet and the Twelve Imams. On the other hand, defensive *jihad* can be practiced by the *Wali al-Faqih* who is the supreme leader of Iran (Qassem, 2012).

According to Hezbollah, the only movement that requires *jihad* is the Palestinian resistance movement and the defense of southern Lebanon against the Israeli Invasion (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Thus, Hezbollah justifies its fight against Israel with *jihad* under the *Wilayat al-Faqih* supervision. In Khomeinism, *jihad* is closely related to martyrdom. Building on Khomeini’s justifications of martyrdom, Hezbollah explicitly identified the martyrs as being inspired by Imam Husain’s martyrdom in Karbala. Martyrdom does not only serve as a mobilization and motivational tool for Hezbollah, but also strengthens its military capabilities, as its members are willing to sacrifice their lives. Hezbollah also justifies its suicide bombers since it does not discriminate between dying on the battlefield and blowing up oneself (Alagha, 2006).

The ideological stance of Hezbollah has changed over time. Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989 and his moderate successor Khamenei and Rafsanjani presidency led to shifting in Iran's foreign relations to a more pragmatic one. Thus, Hezbollah became more autonomous. Furthermore, the Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, dictated disarmament all militias to convert into a political party. Although Hezbollah did not give up its weapons, it established political wing and participated in the 1992 Lebanese Election with the endorsement of Khamenei. With the participation in the 1992 election and the following the “Lebanonization” process, Hezbollah has started to integrate into Lebanese domestic politics (Benedetta, 2013).

Hezbollah leader Nasrallah indicated that if Iran’s and Lebanon’s interests came into conflict, Hezbollah would favor those of Lebanon (Byman, 2005, p. 105). The founding

of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon and fight against Zionism are not publicly announced anymore. Hezbollah has deliberately moderated its objectives and discourse to achieve domestic political goals in Lebanese multiconfessional political system to compete its political rivals (Wiegrand, 2009). Hezbollah has focused on leftist discourse such as social justice minorities' rights and has conducted inclusive election campaigns to toward Lebanese domestic elections (Engeland and Rudolph, 2008).

3.4. OBJECTIVES

Hezbollah declared its objectives in the Open Letter in 1985 (Alagha, 2011, p. 43-48):

Our Objectives in Lebanon

... Israel's final departure from Lebanon as a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons of occupation.

The final departure of America, France, and their allies from Lebanon and the termination of the influence of any imperialist power in the country,

Submission by the Phalange to just rule and their trial for the crimes they have committed against both Muslims and Christians with the encouragement of America and Israel.

Giving all our people the opportunity to determine their fate and to choose with full freedom the system of government they want, keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam and that we urge to choose the Islamic system that alone guarantees justice and dignity for all and prevents any new imperialist attempt to infiltrate our country.

Our Minimum Aspiration in Lebanon

...

On this basis, the bare minimum that we aspire to achieve in order to realize this religious-legal obligation is the following: saving Lebanon from following East and West; forcing the Zionist occupation to evict Lebanese land; and adopting a political system freely chosen by the sheer will and freedom of the populace.

Israel must be completely wiped out of existence

We consider Israel the spearhead of America in our Islamic world... Israel is a rapist enemy that we will continue to fight till the raped land is returned to its [Palestinian] rightful owners...

According to the Open Letter, the long-term objectives are summarized as follows:

- (1) to end Israel Occupation in Lebanon,
- (2) to expel of the USA and France (the MNF) and their allies,
- (3) to submit the Phalangists to just rule,
- (4) to destroy the "Zionist entity" (which refers to Israel),
- (5) to allow Lebanese people to the right of self-determination to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon.

Although some of its long-term objectives are based on ideological fervor (such as the destruction of Israel) and religious symbolism, Hezbollah has adapted its short-term objectives to changing conditions based on the *realpolitik* and organizational needs. Unlike long-term objectives, the short-term objectives and operational activities of Hezbollah were designed with pragmatism and the strategic use of sources.

In the initial phase, Hezbollah focused on the struggle against the Israeli Invasion and the expulsion of the MNF (the USA and France) in Lebanon. It also conducted numerous operations against Israeli forces as well as the U.S. and French presence in Lebanon. In this process, Hezbollah strategically used its resources and focused its activities towards ridding foreign forces from Lebanon. While dealing with strategic objectives, Hezbollah also addressed organizational needs by recruiting new members, generating publicity, and credibility as well as becoming popular among rival groups. For example, the 1983 attacks on the USA and France Forces in Beirut and the hostage-taking crises made Hezbollah more popular among Shiite groups (Ranstorp, 2002). Other examples can be given such as kidnapping Israeli soldiers and exchanging them with Lebanese prisoners.

While Hezbollah dealt with the foreign forces, it also tried to maintain the organization's survivability in the competitive Lebanese environment. To do this, Hezbollah invested in political and social capitals for its continuing resistance in south Lebanon. Then, it established various social services and networks to address local Lebanese problems, such as schools, hospitals, and financial aids to families (Norton, 2014). The Taif Agreement disarmed all Lebanese militias, Hezbollah was only militia that could keep its military wing.

Hezbollah seems to have realized the need to establish the legitimate political movement in order to survive and decided to participate in Lebanese politics in the 1992 Election. Hezbollah's decision to participate in Lebanese domestic politics has not undermined its "resistance", but it resulted in shifting priorities (Wiegand, 2009). However, resistance against Israel and the abolition of political sectarianism as its two fixed principles are cited by Hezbollah in its 1992 Electoral Programme (Alagha, 2006).

Turkish journalist Murat Erdin interviewed Hasan Nasrallah in 1997 in Beirut. The following conversation explains the transformation of Hezbollah objectives in the post-1990s with the participation in Lebanese elections (Erdin, 2002, pp. 22-25):

Erdin: -How you describe yourselves (Hezbollah)? An Insurgent, a resistance movement or a political party?

Nasrallah: -Hezbollah is an Islamic Resistance organization. We established the organization against to Israel Invasion. But we also have political side, we have memberships in the Lebanese Parliament. Our two primary objectives are to liberate Lebanon from Zionist Israel Invasion and to establish justice and equality among Lebanese people. And prioritize the principles of Islam.

...

Erdin: -Mr. Nasrallah, I have two questions related to each other. First, if Israel withdrawal tomorrow, do you remain fighting? Second, if everything will go on the way what would Hezbollah do?

Nasrallah: -We are in Lebanon and we will be effective on Lebanon's future. You will see what we will do when Israel withdrawal. I do not want to talk now. Just to say we will remain Islamic resistance.

Hezbollah prioritizes the resistance to Israel and the liberation South Lebanon, while the attainment of political power in Lebanon is secondary. It is even argued that at the height of Civil War, Nasrallah announced that “Hezbollah is ready to leave the domestic scene if it could be left to confront Israel” (Erdin, 2002, p. 26). However, Hezbollah's resistance against Israel is considered to be an “instrument” for the legitimization and to the party's goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 2002). It makes sense when looking at the actions and discourses of Hezbollah. Hezbollah's Deputy Commander Qassem said that: “Even if Israel withdraws from South Lebanon, it will remain an occupier in our eyes and the duty to liberate Palestine will remain incumbent upon us.” (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). After the withdrawal of Israel, which is Hezbollah's strategic objective, Hezbollah transformed its objectives to focus on survival. Resistance against Israel remains to legitimize its military wing. Hezbollah persisted with the resistance claiming the Shebaa Farms still under occupation of Israel and commitment to the Palestinian cause.

There is no evidence that Hezbollah aimed to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon by force, yet Hezbollah believed that success in resistance would bring to support Hezbollah's Islamic worldview (Erdin, 2002). For example, in 1996 Election campaign Hezbollah used slogans “They [“martyr”] resist with their blood, resist with your vote!” (Norton, 2014, p. 102).

In the 2005 election, Hezbollah declared it had three aims: (1) the adoption of Islam as a way of life with the enforcement of *Sharia*, (2) the struggle against corruption, and (3) to end of the occupation in Palestine and Western hegemony over the world. The establishment of an Islamic republic was not a priority anymore and so no one in Lebanon would be forced to adopt the Islamic way of life. It also focused on the struggle against political sectarianism and the reformation of the Lebanese political and social justice systems (Engeland and Rudolph, 2008). These elections also illustrate the pragmatic political bargains that Hezbollah has often made with ideological opposites, such as secular Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and even the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) (Alagha, 2011).

In 2009, Hezbollah updated its manifesto and renewed its commitment to resistance against Israel, to liberate Shebaa Farms where claimed under Israeli occupation and prisoners held in Israel. According to the 2009 manifesto, “*the Resistance role is a national necessity as long as the ‘Israeli’ threats and aspirations persist.*” (Alagha, 2011, p. 124). Thus, Hezbollah has legitimized its military wing by instrumentalizing Israel threat (Alagha, 2011, p. 125):

The Resistance must continue in its quest to enhance its own capabilities, especially in view of the successful confrontational experience it has demonstrated against the enemy and the shattering of all plots to annihilate it, entrap the “resistance” alternative, or disarm it altogether. On the other hand, persisting Israeli danger against Lebanon and the continued threats voiced by Israel make it imperative for the Resistance to continue its relentless pursuit of further capacity in order to fulfill its national duties of contributing to the liberation of remaining Lebanese land under Israeli occupation in the Shib’a Farms, Kfar Shuba Hills, and the Lebanese town of Ghajar. It is also the duty of the Resistance to liberate those prisoners of conflict, missing fighters and martyrs, and to continue participating in the function of national defense and protection of the land and the people.

3.5. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

It is very difficult to accurately describe the structure of a clandestine organization such as Hezbollah. It acts carefully and diligently in the internal security of the organization to disable Israel’s attempt to infiltrate its cadres (Levitt, 2013, p. 13). Secrecy and discipline have been two crucial elements of the organization since its inception. The organizational structure of Hezbollah has officially been kept a secret throughout the history of the

group. Nevertheless, there is enough literature on understanding its organizational structure (Ranstorp, 2002; Hamzeh, 2004)

In its earlier stages, Hezbollah had an amorphous and not well-established organizational structure. Hezbollah did not have a clear hierarchy and it was often regarded as an umbrella organization including many cells and subordinate groups (such as alienated AMAL members, Islamic AMAL, the Lebanese Islamic Dawah, the Association of Muslim Students and individual clerics) who joined the fight against the Israeli Invasion (Azani, 2013; Shapira, 2002). From its inception in Baalbek in the early 1980s, the shadowy organization had loosely organized networks of militia led by Shiite clerics. Hassan Nasrallah, who is the current Secretary General of Hezbollah, describes the early amorphous organization as being too small to confront the enemy, and so they tried to attract members, raise morale, instill the sense of animosity towards the enemy (Jaber, 1997). Hezbollah's unified structure started in 1984 when Iranian leadership directed establish unified central authority (Cragin, 2005).

Hezbollah had operated secretly since its founding until 1984. Hezbollah officially announced its existence and the creation of its military wing, the Islamic Resistance, with the Open Letter in 1985. During its first years, the Islamic Resistance was partly autonomous (Jaber, 1997). At this stage, decision-making in Hezbollah was decentralized. In the beginning, there was no official secretary or spokesperson. The spokesperson position officially occurred with the declaration of the Open Letter (Boran, 2007).

Later on, Hezbollah created a hierarchy with a top level of *ulama*, with clearly defined positions and responsibilities. The main decision-making organ of Hezbollah was the Consultative Council (*Majlis al-Shura*), which preferred a collective decision-making process. Hezbollah's decisions were made by consensus and when council failed to reach consensus on an issue, it deferred it to Iran's leadership. As stated, Hezbollah is influenced by *Wilayat al-faqih* principle and loyalty to Iran. Iran has had strong influences on the major decisions Hezbollah, such as its participation in the 1992 Parliamentary Election (Byman, 2005). In its beginnings, there is no clear information about the

membership and structure of the *Shura*. Hezbollah's *Shura* has passed through different stages, the number of members decreased seven for a two years term 1984. After 1989, the number of members of *Shura* was nine and for a one-year term. It supervised seven committees: religious, political, military, financial, information, social and legal, under three regions: South Lebanon, Beqaa and Beirut. *Shura* selects its secretary general from its members, and other authorities shared to *Shura* members according to internal regulations (Blanford, 2017).

While Hezbollah decision-making was decentralized in the beginning, it has since adapted itself to new challenges and developments. Then, it revised the structure and election system to accommodate organizational growth, so as to increase its effectiveness and internal security. With the enormous growth, it experienced, required better coordination and control of the organization. Over time, Hezbollah turned into a well-structured organization with a clear hierarchy. Having a central entity in the decision-making process allowed for a focus of effort. Although cells at lower levels of the chain of command executed tactical operations, the centrality of the council of leaders allowed for operations to be conducted in support of the organization's overall objectives. Furthermore, this centrality provided a body that coordinated with outside partners, thus increasing the effectiveness of the group in reaching its objectives (Cragin, 2005).

Following the Taif Agreement in 1991 and before the 1992 Election, Hezbollah restructured its organization and implemented some revisions to make it more open and transparent (Ranstorp, 2002). It added sub-executive branches comprised of the executive, the politburo, the parliamentary, judicial and jihad councils. In 1991, the number of *Shura* Council was reduced to seven and their service was extended to a three-year term. In May 1991, Musawi was elected as the Secretary General and the deputy secretary general position was created (Qassem, 2012). The separated political wing was also established, with the supervisor position, the Politburo, which has no administrative authority.

The military wing is directly subordinated to the Supreme Consultative Council. Hezbollah separated its combat organs, which in 1992 before the election, consisted of

the Islamic Resistance (*al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah*) and Islamic Jihad (Ranstorp, 2002). The Islamic Jihad is supposed to be the branch that carries out terrorist actions. Indeed, it has claimed responsibility of terror attacks (Engeland and Rudolph, 2008). It is even argued that “Islamic Jihad” was actually a cover name for the operation carried out by Hezbollah (Hoffman, 2006). The organization also includes the External Security Organization (*al-Amn al-Khariji* or Unit 910) which conducts operations abroad (Blanford, 2017).

In 1997, besides its military wing, Hezbollah established the separate volunteer force the Lebanese Resistance Brigades to fight the Israeli occupation (Smit, 2000). This force includes all Lebanese regardless of their religion or sect (Christian, Druze, Sunni, and Shia). It also shows the “Lebanonization” of Hezbollah (Alagha, 2006). While the organization was disbanded after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, it was reactivated in 2009 (Blanford, 2017).

According to Hamzeh (2004), Hezbollah's intelligence service is divided into two parts: external (*Amn al-Muddad*) and internal (*Amn al-Hizb*). The external part is responsible for counterintelligence and security, and the internal part protects the organization's integrity and its leaders. The external part has connections with Iran and other intelligence agencies (Wage, 2012).

Hezbollah's organizational strength also relies on two crucial pillars: media apparatus and social services (Benedetta, 2013, p. 39). Social services do not only attract Shiites but also other communities in Lebanon. In the beginning, Hezbollah displayed propaganda in mosques and their religious prayer centers. Later on, Hezbollah has started to effectively use media apparatus.

Hezbollah spreads its propaganda via all means of communication, including radio, TV, newspapers, journals, and the internet. Hezbollah's TV Channel *Al-Manar* has been broadcasting since 1991. *Al-Manar* is famous for broadcasting Hezbollah attacks against Israel. Hezbollah militias carry cameras and videotaped operations are broadcast on their TV Channel. It is believed that *al-Manar* has strong effects on the Israeli public as

psychological warfare. Thus, it does not only demoralize Israel but also moralizes its popular base. There are programs where Hezbollah officials and spokespersons give speeches. *Al-Manar* also serves to the Arab world and international media. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah emphasized the significance of propaganda apparatus by claiming that victory would not have been achieved without *Al-Manar* (Blanford, 2011, p. 129).

Hezbollah has a radio station named *Al-Nour* Radio. It publishes anthems, Khomeini and Hezbollah's leaders' speeches to stir up their members. It frequently refers to Israel attacks on Palestine and Lebanon. Hezbollah also publishes a newspaper former *Al-Ahd* later *Lahit* and a monthly journal called *El-Muqawama*. It publishes its military arsenal such as weapons, and features praise for fighters and martyrs. Hezbollah also has its own website.

Since the Open Letter emphasizes the goal to increase socio-economic conditions of the Lebanese Shiite community, Hezbollah has invested especially in education and health. Hezbollah has very active social services which provide many services such as medical care, education, schools, houses repairs, social development programs for farmers as well as financial aids. The *Jihad el-Bina* (the Holy Reconstruction) organ builds constructions and repairs houses. For example, after 1996 Israel Invasion (the Operation Grapes of Wrath), Hezbollah restored nearly 5,000 houses in 82 villages and paid compensation to about 2,000 farmers who suffered from Israel's attacks (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009, p. 125). The *El-Jarih* organization runs hospitals. They provide medical care to members and their families. They also help to rehabilitate of wounded militias. They send the heavily wounded abroad for surgery and operations. The *Al-Shahid Waqf* (the Martyr's Institute) help its "martyrdom" families. It guarantees the provision of living and education expenses for the families of fighters who die in battle. The *Emdad* association provides emergency help in case of natural disasters or war, as well as to poor and restricted people. These are accepted as the most important civil society organizations of Lebanon. In addition to this, these organizations have employed thousands of people thus helping their community's economic status (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009, p. 125).

These also promote the legitimization of Hezbollah and increase its public support. All these social services and political wing are regarded as “state within a state”.

3.6. LEADERSHIP

As the 1985 Open Letter clearly stated, Hezbollah is loyal to the “*Wilayat el-Faqih*” doctrine, which is the Iran Supreme Leadership Khomeini, today is Ali Khamenei (Alagha, 2011, p. 224):

We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and Faqih [jurist] who fulfils all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him!
By virtue of the above, we do not constitute an organized and closed party in Lebanon, nor are we a tight political cadre... Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (*Wilayat al-Faqih*).

The founding members in late 1984 are believed to be Suphi Tufayli, Ibrahim Amin, Hasan Nasrallah, Abbas Musawi and Raghieb Harb. Hezbollah has had three Secretary Generals since its establishment. The first known Secretary General, Suphi Tufayli, was elected for one year between 1984 and 1985. Suphi Tufayli was important in the initial leadership of Hezbollah. He was seen as a proponent of the radical wing, close to the Iranian Revolutionist cadre. He protested to participation in the 1992 election and left Hezbollah leadership. Later, he was dismissed from Hezbollah for leading factiousness in the organization in 1988. His expulsion led to criticism about Hezbollah’s leadership attempts to prioritize its political identity rather than militarily one. Abbas Musawi was the second leader from 1985 until his assassination in 1992. Because of the AMAL Hezbollah conflicts, Congress was not held on time and Musawi’s term was extended. He belonged to AMAL in the leadership cadre. After a dissidence with AMAL leader Berri, he left AMAL and formed Islamic AMAL. Then, he joined to Hezbollah. He was responsible for military operations and internal security (Schad, 1999).

After the assassination of Musawi, Hassan Nasrallah was selected as the Secretary-General, and he has run Hezbollah since 1992. Nasrallah was born in Bazuriya, South Lebanon in 1953. Like Musawi, he also belonged to AMAL, but left in 1982. Under the leadership of Musawi, he acted as Hezbollah’s liaison to Iran. It is argued that Iran played

a strong role over the council for Nasrallah's election. It is argued that Iran had influenced increased after his leadership. Since Nasrallah has held the position, the two consecutive terms restriction for secretary generals was extended to allow him life-long service (Schad, 1999). Nasrallah's son Sayyed Hadi was killed by Israel and his dead body was broadcast on Israel TV in September 1997. This led to increased sympathy and loyalty to Nasrallah (Boran, 2007).

In its internal organization, Hezbollah runs by a collective decision-making mechanism, with decisions made by consensus by a seven-member *Shura* panel. There are also other prominent names in Hezbollah's leadership cadre; Naim Qassem (1991-today) is the deputy chief of Hezbollah, Ibrahim Amin (1984-today, was spokesperson until 1997) is head of the Political Committee, and Hassem Safieddine (2008-today) is head of the Executive Committee (counterextremism.com, 2019). There is also another prominent name Imad Mughniyah, head of the Hezbollah military wing until 2008. It is believed that he had orchestrated the 1983 U.S. Marines Barracks bombing and masterminding foreign hostages in the 1980s such as 1985 skyjacking of TWA flight 847 (Norton, 2014). He was assassinated in his car by bomb in 2008, allegedly claimed to be conducted by Israel intelligence (Norton, 2014).

Hussain Fadlallah (1935-2010) is often referred to as the spiritual leader of Hezbollah. It is not clear what the role of Husain Fadlallah is in Hezbollah. He studied Islamic Studies. Fadlallah arrived in Lebanon in 1966 and settled in Beirut. Phalangists seized him in 1976 but he could flee. Fadlallah was a prominent Shiite cleric. Fadlallah was contradicted with Imam Musa Sadr and did not involve himself in AMAL, but he seems to have had an indirect role in the establishment of Hezbollah. After Sadr's disappearance in 1978, Fadlallah has become one of the most influential religious authority among the Lebanese Shiites (Norton, 2014). After the U.S. Marine Attacks in October 1983, his name was linked to the attacks and Fadlallah suddenly became an internationally known name. While Fadlallah was described as the leader of Hezbollah, he vehemently denied any role in the Hezbollah cadre. However, Fadlallah was an important source of inspiration for many followers of Hezbollah and many of them recognized Fadlallah as their religious

authority, followed Iranian Supreme Leadership (Alagha, 2006). Fadlallah died on July 4, 2010 (Norton, 2014, p. 191).

3.7. MODUS OPERANDI

Hezbollah's Operational Doctrine has changed and evolved over time, but its general principles have been coded by Ehud Ya'ari which he published as the "13 Principles of Warfare," in the Jerusalem Report on 21 March 1996 as the following (The Jerusalem Report, March 21, 1996 cited in Mulhern, 2012, p. 40):

- 1) Avoid the strong, attack the weak - attack and withdraw!
- 2) Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties!
- 3) Strike only when success is assured!
- 4) Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you have failed!
- 5) Do not get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his advantage!
- 6) Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy's weak points!
- 7) Keep moving; avoid formation of a front line!
- 8) Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear!
- 9) The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories!
- 10) Keep up the morale of the fighters, avoid notions of the enemy's superiority!
- 11) The media has innumerable guns whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle!
- 12) The population is a treasure - nurture it!
- 13) Hurt the enemy, and then stop before he abandons restraint!

When looking at the above principles, it is understood that Hezbollah follows Lawrence and Mao's warfare principles such as mobility, time, protection of fighters, and loyalty of the population. Hezbollah is also advanced in the use of the media as a weapon with the technological advancements (Byman, 2011). By following these principles as well as conducting unpredictable surprise attacks, Hezbollah has forced Israeli forces to be on high states of alert.

Secrecy and discipline are key elements for Hezbollah *modus operandi*. Hezbollah generally utilizes hit and run tactics by conducting sudden raids aiming to catch the enemy unawares while sustaining minimum losses. Time and place matters for operations. Hezbollah prefers small and camouflageable weapons and tools. Secret small cells allow eligibility in the field. Hezbollah frequently moves its small camps to protect them from Israeli air attacks (Blanford, 2017).

In addition, the concept of *taqiyya* is the key to understanding Hezbollah. *Taqiyya* translates to “expedient dissimulation”, which means to hide someone’s real intention, belief or convictions in times of need (Alagha, 2006). *Taqiyya* has enabled Shiites to hide their religious identity when their lives are under threat. Since the advent of the Shiite sect, Shiites have felt oppression under Sunni dominance. The *Taqiyya* practice, developed by Shiites, allow them to stand against repression and ensure their survival (Alagha, 2006). In its initial phase, Hezbollah used *taqiyya* to hide its name so as to grow in silence in the competitive Lebanese anarchist environment.

3.8. MILITARY STRENGTH

There is no clear data on Hezbollah’s military capabilities. It is estimated that Hezbollah had about 1,000 and 2,500 militants in its early establishment period of 1982-1985 (Cragin, 2005, p. 38). Hezbollah has been described as relatively small, but highly trained, motivated and dedicated (Göksel, 2007). Kramer (1990, p. 133) estimated that Hezbollah had around 4,000 fighters, of which 500 were in South Lebanon in 1987. With the resistance becoming popular, its membership went up to 5,000 in 2000 (Ranstorp, 2002, p. 67). According to Blanford (2017, p. 6) besides its active military about 20,000, Hezbollah also has high numbers of reserve members close to 10,000. Hezbollah’s military force has often been described as being more powerful than the Lebanese Army (Göksel, 2007).

Hezbollah’s armament mostly consists of Iranian and Russian weapons (Erdin, 2002). Its fighters are equipped with AK-47 assault rifles. Hezbollah has grown enormously in terms of weaponry and equipment, such as the obtainment of long-range rockets (such as Katyusha-122 had 20 km) and missiles (such as and Fajr-5 missiles had 40 km, and Zelzal-1 had 150 which can hit Tel Aviv), sub-ballistic guided missiles with warheads, as well as advanced air defense systems (SA-6 anti-aircraft), and anti-ship missiles (such as C-802) (High Level Military Group, 2017, p. 38). It has also been reported that Hezbollah had Scud missiles that were provided by Syria. Hezbollah also carrying out aerial warfare campaigns using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) against Israel in recent years (Blanford, 2017, p. 6).

3.9. RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

Hezbollah primarily relies on religion, but also uses Lebanese nationalist values and an anti-Israel stance as recruitment tools. In the initial phase, Hezbollah organized itself in local mosques. Hezbollah found its manpower among young Lebanese Shiites. It is also believed that Palestinian, Iraqi and Iranian Shiite fighters joined. Hezbollah recruits volunteer. Recruits can leave at any time during the training process. Hezbollah implements a security clearance before starting religious education and basic military training. The trainings were given by the IRCGs (*Pasdarans* and Iranian veterans of the Iraq-Iran War called as *Baseyc*. There are also special recruiting bodies for youth (the *Mahdi Scouts*) and women (Blanford, 2017, p. 4).

Hezbollah's basic recruitment process lasts approximately a year and is a combination of religious education and military training. In the first phase of recruitment: *tahdirat*, which means preparation, ideological foundations of Hezbollah and Shiite doctrines are teaches during a 30-90 days education. Candidates have to pass the *tahdirat* phase in order to take the second stage, *intizam*, which teaches basic military training. The basic military training is usually given in camps in the Beqaa Valley. The training ranges from the using basic light weapons to senior weapons such as rockets and missiles, as well as the teaching of guerrilla warfare tactics against the IDF. Graduates are named "Martyrdom Volunteers" and wear red banners on their foreheads. In addition, doctrinal education is given as urban warfare training. There are many warfare training facilities at camps in the Beqaa Valley, some even emulating Israeli-style streets. Hezbollah has also organized summer camps field trips, such as travel to Iran and Syria for specialized training (Blanford, 2017).

3.10. FINANCE

Hezbollah is one of the wealthiest organizations in the world with an estimated \$500 million annual budget (forbes.com, 2014). Hezbollah's financial sources can be categorized under following five sections; charitable fundraising, zakat, illegal organized

crime activities (such as weapons trafficking, money laundering, and drug trade) diaspora donations and state sponsorship (Levitt, 2013).

Hezbollah accepts donations which are allocated to various social services. A substantial portion of these donations comes from donation boxes in Shiite neighborhoods. Hezbollah even uses its website to collect donations. Hezbollah portrays itself as a religious organization that is able to collect *tithes* and *zakat*, which means one-fifth income taxes in Islamic *Sharia*. Hezbollah argues that it uses these funds only for the Palestinian struggle to buy weapons and help train Palestinians.

There are Shiite Lebanese diasporas, about, 400,000 live in the Arab Gulf countries, Europe and the USA. It is reported that \$2.5 billion of funding is provided by Shiite diaspora donations annually (Levitt, 2013, p. 254).

It has been reported that Hezbollah has been involved in narcoterrorism and cultivates poppy in Beqaa Valley. There is also evidence of a partnership between Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Other criminal activity includes human smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, trade in contraband, money-laundering, forging travel documents, and financial fraud. Hezbollah's illicit activities occur primarily in South America's Tri-Border Area (TBA) and it receives approximately \$20 million annually from the region (Levitt, 2013, p. 77). Hezbollah has its own black-market network to manage the drugs trade, weapons trafficking, and smuggling (Cragin, 2005, p. 50).

Most of the income of Hezbollah comes from Syria and Iran's sponsorship. Owing to Iran's generous financial aid to Hezbollah, it does not worry about money issues. Iran's monetary support was believed to be between \$50 million and \$200 million per annum in the 1980s (Harik, 1994, p. 41; Hamzeh, 2004, p. 88), estimated at \$100 million in a year later on (Norton, 2014, p. 110). In addition to direct money transfer, Iran also provided training, free arms and military equipment (Norton, 2014). However, due to the devastating effects of sanctions on the Iranian economy, Iran cut Hezbollah's budget by approximately 40 percent in 2009 (Levitt, 2013, p. 372).

It is estimated that Hezbollah's revenue from its own sources was about \$40 million (Blanford, 2017, p. 3). *Bayt al-Mal* branch is the organization that serves as a bank, creditor and investor for Hezbollah (Engeland and Rudolph, 2008). Although Hezbollah has not been able to be a self-sufficient organization, it diversified its revenue and reduced its dependence on Iran

3.11. STATE SPONSORSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND SYRIA

As explained in the history part, there is no doubt that Iran played a central role in the creation of Hezbollah. Iran wanted to export the Islamic Revolution and its revolutionary messages as well as balance Israel. Iran legitimizes its presence in Lebanon by fighting for the protection of the Shiites, to expel the Israeli Invasion, and give help to the Palestinian struggle. Iran has also continued to play a central role in the development of Hezbollah in terms of religious, financial, organizational, and military institutions. Iran provided organizational assistance and training to the newly established organization and shaped it ideologically with the implementation of the *Wilayat al-Faqih* principle. Iran also provided direct military aid of approximately \$100-200 million per year and provided training by IRGC members as well as intelligence for operations (Alagha, 2006).

Iran has provided not only financial support, but also ideological, organizational and intelligence support to Hezbollah. Owing to Iran's organizational and material support and generous financial help, Hezbollah could deal with secular rival AMAL and has become the dominant Shiite force in the area of South Lebanon, especially the Beqaa Valley, and on the suburbs of Beirut. The strong state sponsorship support provided Hezbollah the opportunity to become stronger in comparison with non-sponsored rivals. Kramer (2006, p. 106) argues that it would have taken an additional 50 years for the movement to score the same achievements in the absence of Iranian backing.

Besides financial resources, Iran also offered a safe haven in its territory and Syria to Hezbollah's high profiles. Moreover, compared to the relations of AMAL with its sponsors Syria, Hezbollah's relations with Iran much more stable (Byman, 2005, p. 115).

Syria has a complicated relationship with Hezbollah. After losing the Golan Heights to Israel in the 1967 Six Days War, it became a national pride matter for Syria to regain them. Although Syria has kept its relations with AMAL, it has also built ties with Hezbollah. In 1982, Syria allowed IRGC members to enter the Beqaa Valley through Syrian lands. Thus, supporting Hezbollah allowed Syria to maintain its alliance with Iran. In addition, Syria has used Hezbollah as an instrument for preserving its interests in Lebanon, to serve its interests in the negotiations with Israel and confront Israel indirectly (Blanford, 2017).

Since Hezbollah cooperated with Syria, Hezbollah has evolved into a more autonomous movement over time. After the assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri in 2005, Syria was regarded as responsible for it. Despite Hezbollah's objections, Syria was forced to withdraw from Lebanon. Thus, Syrian influence over Lebanon ended. Despite substantial changes in Hezbollah-Syria relations, Syria keeps ties with the Hezbollah, even if not client-proxy level anymore, they still cooperate with each other (Blanford, 2017). Hezbollah involved into the Syrian Civil War in within pro-Assad stance since 2012. Also, Hezbollah could develop its relationship with Iran from proxy position to evolved into a more autonomous organization.

On the other hand, sponsorship from Syria and Iran has also constrained Hezbollah in some manners. Hezbollah cannot conduct major attacks in Israel without Iran's and Syria's approval. They might also have asked Hezbollah not to provoke Israel. In terms of regional realpolitik, Syria could not let Hezbollah get too powerful in Lebanon. And Iran was hesitant to disrupt the relationship with Syria. However, these constraints do not mean that the Hezbollah could not perform effectively on a tactical level (Cragin, 2005).

Following the 9/11 Attacks, the U.S. "war on terror" to restrict financial sources of terrorist organization, increased pressure on Hezbollah as well. In addition, due to break down of nuclear deal, Iran's economy and currency was in decline under the pressure from U.S. and UN mandated economic sanctions. By the EU and the GCC designation as terrorist organization as well as sanctions imposed by the U.S., Iran has reduced funds to

Hezbollah. That is why Iranian financial support to Hezbollah has decreased (Blanford, 2017).

3.12. MAJOR TERROR ATTACKS

Hezbollah was responsible for 36 suicide attacks against Israel and the MNF (the USA and France) forces during 1982-2000 (start.umd.edu/GTD, 2018). Hezbollah has denied responsibility for some attacks. Hezbollah launched its first attack on November 11, 1982 against the Israeli headquarters in Tyre, killing 76 Israel military personnel and wounding 20. It was a suicide attack by a detonated bomb-loaded truck. It is argued that former Hezbollah deputy commander Imad Mughniyah orchestrated the attacks. After the suicide attack's efficacy, which caused the largest loss for Israeli in Lebanon at that time, Hezbollah planned to use the suicide car bomb attacks more in further attacks (Norton, 2014).

Hezbollah has taken responsibility for two attacks in the Open Letter: "The first punishment against these forces was carried out on April 18, and the second on October 29, 1983. By that time, a real war had started against the Israeli occupation forces, rising to the level of destroying two main centers of the enemy's military rulers." (Alagha, 2011, p. 41).

Another well-known attack was against the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut on April 18, 1983, which killed 63. The most striking one was the twin suicide attacks against the U.S. Marines barracks and French paratroopers, on October 23, 1983, which caused the death of 241 American and 58 French soldiers. It is argued that these attacks lead to the withdrawal of the MNF (the USA and France) troops from Lebanon (Norton, 2014, p. 80).

Figure 3.1. Hezbollah's Attacks over time



Source: start.umd.edu/GTD, 2019


In addition to these suicide bombing campaigns, Hezbollah has also engaged in kidnappings and hostage-taking. Hezbollah has kidnapped western journalists, diplomats, and professors at the American University in Beirut. Although Hezbollah officially denied any responsibility for the kidnappings, it is reportedly involved in the kidnappings of such prominent hostages as William Francis, who is Beirut's CIA station chief, Buckley Terry Waite, who is the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, Jonathan Wright, from Reuters news agency, and Malcolm Kerr, who is the President of the American University of Beirut, (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Some of them were executed (William Francis and Malcolm Kerr) and some of them used for the exchange of Hezbollah prisoners in Israel (Smit, 2000, p. 113).

Hezbollah has also conducted operations overseas, such as the hijacked TWA flight 847 and hostage-taking of passengers in June 1985 Athens with 139 passengers and eight crew. It has targeted airports such as Kuwait International Airport in 1983, Israeli Airlines office in Turkey in 1985. It has also targeted diplomatic assets such as Israeli embassy attack in Buenos Aires in 1992 (29 dead), Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association center in Argentina in 1994 (100 dead) (Norton, 2014, p. 79). In recent years, Hezbollah conducted suicide bomb attacks to Israeli tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria resulted in 6 dead, 36 wounded on July 19, 2012. (Norton, 2014, p. 201).

Furthermore, despite the fact that UN international tribunal investigating the February 2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri that formally accused four Hezbollah members, Hezbollah leaders deny any involvement (Levitt, 2013, p. 358).

In recent years, Hezbollah has also been involved in the Syrian Civil War. Hezbollah has collaborated with the Syrian Army since 2012 and clashed with *Jabhat al-Nusra*, ISIS, *Ahrar al-Sham* in al-Qusayr and Aleppo (Blanford, 2017).

Figure 3.2. Hezbollah's Attacks targets




Source: start.umd.edu/GTD, 2019

According to the Global Terrorism Database, Hezbollah mostly targets military and chooses symbolic targets such as government and diplomatic personnel and avoids mass civilian casualties (start.umd.edu/GTD, 2019). In the early years, major attacks increased its visibility, which in turn helped in finding recruits and funds. Hezbollah used systematic suicide campaigns in that period (Alagha, 2006). Hezbollah's suicide attack campaigns compelled the MNF (the USA and France) to withdraw, demonstrating its success. Although Hezbollah spent most of its resources and energy towards a power struggle with AMAL during 1985 to 1989, after the Taif Agreement which ended the Lebanese Civil War and imposed the disarming of all Lebanese militias, Hezbollah refused to dissolve its military wing. Since 1992, when Hezbollah decided to participate in the Lebanese

political system, suicide bombings lessened. Since the 1966 Understanding with Israel, known as “rules of the game”, Hezbollah has generally avoided targeting civilians. Also, after achieving its strategic objective of forcing Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah changed its *modus operandi* and campaigns. Hezbollah has reduced the number of massive attacks and has focused on the release of prisoners held in Israel kidnapping Israeli soldiers, and liberating Shebaa Farms where claims is still occupied Lebanese territory and shooting at Israel aircraft which penetrated Lebanese airspace.

Figure 3.3. Hezbollah’s Attacks type



Source: start.umd.edu/GTD, 2019

The Graph 3 reveals that Hezbollah has diversified its tactics. When looking at Hezbollah’s early years’ attacks, most of them were suicide car bomb attacks, which are argued to be Hezbollah own invented tactic (Devore and Stähli, 2015). Although suicide attacks may be of Hezbollah own invention, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini’s justification of “martyrdom” has to have had role. The frequency of kidnappings also shows that Hezbollah has had strong intelligence on the Lebanese fields. This is because they require field intelligence, networks and local collaborators. Hezbollah used hostages for extort ransoms, prisoner exchange and bargaining. However, considering international attacks and hostage-takings, it is highly likely that have been connected with Iran’s help and supplying information serving for Iran interests (Devore and Stähli, 2015).

Hezbollah has employed kidnappings and hostage-takings in order to release of Shiite militants held in Israel prisons. For example, the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 resulted in the release of 766 Lebanese Shiite prisoners held in Israel's prisons (Norton, 2014, p. 46). In addition to this, hostage takings also led to the U.S. State Department prohibiting American citizens from travelling to Lebanon in 1987, therefore this decision consistent with Hezbollah's declared goal of decreasing America influence over Lebanon (Hamzeh, 2004). Kidnappings and hostage takings were often served the interests of Hezbollah's sponsor, Iran. For instance, the Iran Contra Affair of 1986, the scandalous case revealed that Iran bought weapons from the U.S. in exchange for the release of Americans being held by Hezbollah (Norton, 2014, p.74).

3.13. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, Hezbollah was examined as a case study. Firstly, it began with the brief history and radicalization of Lebanese Shiites. Then, the establishment of Hezbollah, Iran's role in the establishment, Hezbollah's relations with AMAL, and Hezbollah's role in the Lebanese Civil War were investigated. Later, its campaigns against Israel Invasions were elaborated upon in detail. The reason why the historical part kept long is to show AMAL-Hezbollah split, and to test Krause's structural organizational theory as examining the distribution of power in the Lebanese resistance movement over time. Lastly, its organizational dynamics such as organizational structure, leadership, objectives and transformation of objectives, funding, and state sponsorship were examined. Although some of the sections are not related to theoretical debate and research question, it is worth discussing them in order to better understand Hezbollah.

In the third chapter, ideology, types of objectives, target selection, regime type of the target country, competition, state sponsorship, and popular support were found to be key variables. In the discussion chapter, these factors and the structural organizational theory will be examined in regards to the Hezbollah case through analysis of the instrumental and organizational approaches. Then, the findings will be analyzed. Lastly, future research prospects will be presented.

DISCUSSION

Terrorism as an extreme form of political violence aims to bring political changes. Throughout history, many actors have used terrorism for different purposes. However, they all have had in common is the aim to achieve certain political goals. Scholars have often argued about terrorism's causes and aims but there are few works on its effectiveness. While the "success" of terrorism has been seen as an interesting debate for scholars, the political effectiveness of terrorism is one of the ongoing and controversial debate in the terrorism studies. Although pioneer scholars have examined this debate, there are few sources that discussed this dispute before the September 11 Attacks (Crenshaw, 1990; DeNardo, 1985; Laqueur, 1976; Schelling, 1991). The 9/11 Attacks have revived the discussions and "whether terrorism works" has become the central question. Then, the debate has evolved into the political effectiveness of terrorism.

The existing literature shows that there is no consensus on whether terrorism works, as well as the political effectiveness of terrorism. Studies have selected different data, cases, and methods for assessing success or failure, but the empirical records are obscure, and there is a lack of common logic for the political effectiveness of terrorism. Some studies have evaluated effectiveness at the strategic level, and have looked at how campaigns or particular actions have contributed to achieving terrorists' goals (Abrahms, 2006), and some of them have analyzed overall terrorism as a strategy (Kydd and Walter, 2002). The tactical level analyses have focused on the details of specific operations and defines effectiveness based on outcomes (Sharif, 1996; Berrebi and Klor, 2006). Overall, empirical studies show that terrorism rarely achieves its political objectives (Jones and Libicki, 2008; Cronin, 2009). The literature shows that although in some cases terrorism can be an effective tactic for achieving process goals, the quantitative studies show that it is a highly ineffective tactic at the strategic level.

The political effectiveness of terrorism is a debate directly associated with conceptualizing of definitions of terrorism as well as the standards of measurement for effectiveness (success) (Perl, 2005). For this reason, this study starts with the definition of terrorism. The challenges for an agreed-upon definition of terrorism were presented.

Then, while it is difficult to reach a common definition, scholars at least agree on some major characteristics. Furthermore, two major approaches, instrumental and organizational, were examined to understand terrorism and the acts of terror groups as well as to specify their objectives. Therefore, how instrumental and organizational approaches handle terrorism and effectiveness (success) were discussed. In the third chapter, the political effectiveness of terrorism was analyzed. The literature is also required to engage in the level of analysis problem. Moreover, empirical studies were examined, and their results were presented. What determines the political effectiveness of terrorism, and the question of “when does terrorism work?” were both answered. Ideology, objectives, target selection, regime type of the target country, competition, state-sponsorship, and popular support were found as key determinants. These determinants will be examined on the Hezbollah case in this discussion chapter.

While the literature on the political effectiveness of terrorism proves that terrorism is highly ineffective in achieving strategic goals, Hezbollah can be regarded as an exceptional case. There is no comprehensive longitudinal case study on the political effectiveness of Hezbollah, but scholars have different arguments in regards to it.

Hezbollah has thrived in Lebanon where there is a lack of state capacity, and it has grown up benefitting from Lebanese Shiites’ historical grievances. The Lebanese Civil War which ranged from 1975 to 1990, worsened the sectarian divides and caused the radicalization of the Shiite community (Norton, 2014). Besides the Lebanese Shiites’ historical grievances, four events led to the radicalization of Lebanese Shiites and the creation of Hezbollah. These events were the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the Israel Invasions in 1978 and 1982, the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr in 1978, and the Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Lebanese Civil War caused Lebanese Shiites to feel insecure and start military organizations. The disappearance of Sadr provided the Shiites a powerful mobilizing symbol. The Israel Invasions increased the cost of Palestinian presence for the population of the South. Lastly, the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution was a tremendous source of inspiration and increased the self-confidence of the Lebanese Shiites (Smit, 2000). Thus, Hezbollah would be defined as an organization surfing on,

with Rapoport (2002) wording, the “Religious Wave” in the early 1980s and shares basic characteristics of the period.

It is essential to specify Hezbollah’s objectives before discussing its political effectiveness of terrorism. In the fourth chapter, Hezbollah’s objectives were examined through its first manifesto, the Open Letter, the second manifesto in 2009, its leader’s statements, and its political party’s election manifestos. Although some of its long-term goals are based on ideological fervor (such as the destruction of Israel) and religious symbolism, Hezbollah has adapted its short-term goals to changing conditions based on the *realpolitik* and organizational needs. Unlike long-term goals, the short-term goals and operational activities of Hezbollah were designed with pragmatism and the strategic use of sources.

In 1985, Hezbollah declared its first manifesto, the Open Letter, and stated its objectives: to end Israeli Occupation in Lebanon, to expel the USA and France (the MNF) and their allies, to submit the Phalangists to just rule, to destroy the “Zionist entity” (which refers to Israel), and to allow Lebanese people to the right of self-determination to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s initial *raison d’être* was the Israeli Invasion of South Lebanon and fight against Israel. In the inception phase, *taqiyya* helped Hezbollah to keep its name secret and hide organization. In the initial phase, Hezbollah focused on the struggle against the Israeli Invasion and expelling of the MNF (the USA and France) from Lebanon. It has also conducted numerous operations against the Israeli forces as well as the U.S. and France military and diplomatic presences in Lebanon. In this process, Hezbollah strategically used its resources and focused its activities towards ridding foreign forces from Lebanon. While dealing with strategic objectives, Hezbollah also increased its organizational strengths such as recruiting new members, publicity, and credibility as well as becoming popular among rival groups. For example, the 1983 attacks on the USA and French Forces in Beirut, and the hostage-taking crises made Hezbollah more popular among Shiite groups (Ranstorp, 2002).

Hezbollah expelled the U.S and French forces (the MNF) in 1984, and then focused on its struggle against Israel. In 1985, Israel partly withdrew from South Lebanon but maintained its security zone along the border. While Hezbollah dealt with the IDF, it also tried to maintain the organization's survivability in the competitive Lebanese environment. To do this, Hezbollah invested in political and social capitals for its continuing resistance in south Lebanon. Moreover, it established various social services and networks to address local Lebanese problems, such as schools, hospitals, and financial aids to families (Norton, 2014).

From 1985-1989, Hezbollah engaged in the Lebanese Civil War, especially in the fight against Phalangists and AMAL. After the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ordered the disarmament of all Lebanese militia, Hezbollah was the only militias that did not give up their arms. While establishing its political wing, Hezbollah has kept its military wing, legitimizing itself as a resistance movement against Israel. Hezbollah seemed to have realized the need to establish a political party in order to survive, and decided to participate in the 1992 Lebanese Elections. Hezbollah's decision to participate in the Lebanese political system has not undermined its agency for "resistance" against Israel, yet it resulted in shifting its priorities (Wiegrand, 2009). However, resistance against Israel and the abolition of political sectarianism as its two fixed principles are cited by Hezbollah in its 1992 Electoral Programme.

While Hezbollah has been engaging in Lebanon domestic political system since the 1992 elections, it has increased its resistance against Israel. Israel aiming to crack down on Hezbollah, conducted the "Operation Accountability" in 1993 and the "Operation Grapes of Wrath" in 1996. While Israel could reach Beirut without much difficulty in the 1996 Invasion, it could not bear the occupation and destruction of Hezbollah attacks. In 2000, Israel decided to unilaterally withdraw from South Lebanon, with the exception of Shebaa Farms. When the Israeli forces withdrew, Hezbollah achieved its strategic objective and continued to follow more realistic approaches and focused on its survivability. Hezbollah reduced the number of large-scale attacks in order to concentrate on the release of prisoners held in Israel by attempting to kidnap Israeli soldiers, and liberating Shebaa Farms where it is still claimed to be occupied Lebanese territory. Hezbollah has

legitimized itself by instrumentalizing Israeli threat to justify continuing its military wing. Hezbollah could also defend itself in the 2006 July War. Despite the fact that U.N. Resolutions of 1559 (UN Security Council, 2004, S/RES/1559) and 1701 (UN Security Council, 2006, S/RES/1701) demanded the disarmament of Hezbollah, the organization was able to survive.

Hezbollah promised that they would not use terrorism in domestic politics, and it mostly avoided with the exception of the 2008 Crisis. In 2008, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora banned Hezbollah's communication company, this triggered clash between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The clashes between parties lasted two weeks, with the mediation of Qatar, parties signed the Doha Agreement which established the National Unity Government and granted veto power to Hezbollah in the government (Norton, 2014). Ultimately, Hezbollah has increased its political power in domestic politics by the use of violence. Furthermore, even though the UN international tribunal investigating the February 2005 murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri that formally accused four Hezbollah's members, its leadership cadres denied any involvement (Levitt, 2013, p. 358).

As a result, the political effectiveness of Hezbollah can be divided into two periods: *1982-2000* and *2000-onwards*. However, these two periods were not strictly divided. Indeed, the transformation of Hezbollah began with the 1989 Taif Agreement, yet, the critical juncture is the 2000 when Israel unilaterally withdrew from South Lebanon. Alternatively, Morrissey (2014) argued that Hezbollah's participation in the 1992 Lebanese Election is the turning point for the organization. However, he employed organizational approach as a singular approach to explain the Hezbollah case. Further, he argued that instrumental approach is insufficient to fully capture the transformation of Hezbollah (Morrissey, 2014). Yet, he missed the point that one organization can start with instrumental approach and shift into organizational perspective in due course. For this reason, to employ longitudinal case help to capture both the emergence and the evolution of Hezbollah. The reason why year of 2000 is a critical juncture, after is that although the transformation of Hezbollah has started in 1989, the real challenges appeared when the organization achieved its strategic objective of compelling the withdrawal of Israel in

2000. Since 2000, critics and pressures have been aroused for the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the number of questions related to why it continues to keep its weapons if Israel withdrew from South Lebanon.

In the first period of *1982-2000*, Hezbollah acted ideologically driven, based on Shiite Radicalism and Khomeinism. In this period, Hezbollah focused on its strategic aim: to expel Israel and the MNF from Lebanon. Hezbollah mobilized its resources according to this aim. So, in this period, Hezbollah acted accordingly to instrumental approach which basically presumes actors are ideologically driven and they follow stated objectives. While the instrumental approach presumes that an organization will end when it has reached its strategic objectives (thus ending the terrorism), but Hezbollah did not.

In the second period of *2000-onwards*, after the achieving its main objective of forcing Israel to withdraw from South Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah has changed its *modus operandi* and campaigns as well as its objectives, and within specific focus, concentrated on survival. Furthermore, Hezbollah has moderated its ideology, and has combined Islamism with Lebanese nationalism and in order to integrate Lebanese domestic politics and enjoy broader popular support. Thus, Hezbollah has shifted from instrumental approach to organizational perspective. Even the Taif Agreement ordered disarmament of all militias, and U.N. Resolutions of 1559 (UN Security Council, 2004, S/RES/1559) and 1701 (UN Security Council, 2006, S/RES/1701) demanded disarmament of Hezbollah, the organization was able to survive. Cronin (2009) found the average lifespan to be eight years for terrorist organizations which Hezbollah had already surpassed the threshold since 1982 with reaching four decades of lifespan.

Organizational approach presumes that, rather than stated objectives, organizations seek for organizational objectives such care for their own members. Kidnappings Israeli soldiers in exchange for Lebanese prisoners held in Israel, would be good example of means of achieving to its organizational objectives. In addition to this, Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian Civil War since 2012 would be another good example demonstrating explanatory power of organizational approach presuming that incentives were given by leaders to fight for their organizational goals.

There are different arguments in regards to the political effectiveness of Hezbollah. Krause (2013) explains this with the structuralist theory on non-state violence focusing on the power distribution within the Lebanese resistance movement. According to theory, unipolarity and hegemony drives success in non-state violence movements. Thus, Krause (2013) attributes Hezbollah's success by placing on the top of the hierarchy amidst the competition with rival organizations such as AMAL.

Krause's structuralist organization theory mostly explain the Hezbollah case. For example, between 1982-1985 the newly emerging Hezbollah and Islamic AMAL targeted the MNF (the U.S and France) bases. They could get rid of the MNF. However, when the U.S. withdrew, the control of the region was given to AMAL. So, AMAL as a hegemon mostly benefitted. On the other hand, Hezbollah as a non-hegemon enjoyed organizational goals such as massive attacks (twin suicide attacks against the U.S. Marines barracks and French paratroopers in 1983) increased its popularity and attract new recruitments.

Hezbollah started to challenge *status quo* in 1985. AMAL was dominant until the War of the Camps 1985-1988. Many in AMAL left the movement to join Hezbollah. Numerically AMAL was larger than Hezbollah with the ratio of 5/1 in that time (Göksel, 2007, p. 70). Until 1987 Hezbollah did not participate in the Lebanese Civil War, but instead focused on fighting against Israel. The Israeli Invasion was weakened AMAL, and strengthened the radicals such as Hezbollah. In 1986, Hezbollah started to expand its influence on the southern villages, AMAL became uncomfortable. In 1987, Hezbollah started to change tactics using more sophisticated and large-scale campaigns (Göksel, 2007). Syria and Iran intervened in the AMAL-Hezbollah fights in 1991. Despite the 1989 Taif Agreement dictating to disarm all militias, Hezbollah was the only militia force that could keep its weapons. Thus, Hezbollah became the hegemon on solely unipolar movement since 1991 when the Civil War was over. Hezbollah has enjoyed hegemony in the unipolar Lebanese resistance movement since then. As Table 4.1. shows, there is consistency between hegemon in the unipolar movement and Hezbollah's achievements. While Table 4.1. confirms structuralist theory and answers "when does terrorism works", it does not explore what determined for becoming top of the hierarchy or answer the "how" question.

Table 4.1. Summary of Campaigns in the Lebanese Resistance, 1982-Present⁹

Time Period	Movement Structure	Hierarchy of Organizations at Start of Campaign	Hierarchy of Organizations at End of Campaign	Strategic Outcome of Campaigns	Outcome
1982-1985	Fragmented	1) PLO 2) AMAL 3) LNFR (OCLA, SSNP) 4) I-AMAL (IR) 5) Hezbollah (IR) 6) PSP	1) AMAL 2) LNFR (OCLA, SSNP) 3) PLO 4) Hezbollah (IR) 5) PSP 6) I-AMAL (IR)	Limited Success	Withdrawal of the MNF, Withdrawal of Israel 1985
1985-1988 (the War of Camps)	Fragmented	1) AMAL (LF) 2) PLO 3) Hezbollah 4) Al-Murabitun 5) LNFR (OCLA, SSNP) 6) PSP (LF) 7) LCP (LF)	1) Hezbollah 2) AMAL(LF) 3) PLO 4) PSP(LF) 5) LNFR (OCLA, SSNP) 6) LCP (LF)	Limited Organizational Success	Becoming top of hierarchy
1988-1990 (the War of Brothers)	Fragmented	1) Hezbollah (IR) 2) AMAL (LNR)	Hezbollah	Limited Organizational Success	The 1989 Taif Agreement (Seats allocation in parliament revised from 6-5 to 5-5.) Disarmament of other militia forces, Survival
1990-1993 (the Operation Accountability)	Hegemonic	Hezbollah	Hezbollah	Limited Success	Survival
1993-1996 (the Operation Grapes of Wrath)	Hegemonic	Hezbollah	Hezbollah	No gains, Limited Success	Survival
1996-2000	Hegemonic	Hezbollah	Hezbollah	Success	Israel Second Withdrawal, Victory
2000-2006 (the 2006 July War)	Hegemonic	1) Hezbollah 2) AMAL 3) LCP 4) PLFP 5) LAF	1) Hezbollah 2) AMAL 3) LCP 4) PLFP 5) LAF	Limited Success	Survival
2008 Crisis	Fragmented	1) Hezbollah 2) AMAL 3) LDP 4) SSNP	1) Hezbollah 2) AMAL 3) LDP 4) SSNP	Success	Survival, The Doha Agreement (gaining veto power)

⁹ This table filled by the author's himself accordingly to Krause (2011)'s table structure.

In the third chapter, ideology, type of objectives, target selection, regime type of the target country, competition, state sponsorship, and popular support were found to be key factors. These factors will be examined in regards to Hezbollah.

Ideology

Hezbollah's ideology is based on Shiite radicalism and has been inspired by the Iran Islamic Revolution and its leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Based on Khomeinism principles, such as Shiite activism, it has helped mobilize masses. In addition to this, Khomeini's justifications for the use of violence and "martyrdom" legitimized the use of terrorism and suicide attacks against the MNF and Israel.

Hezbollah's political ideology can be divided into two periods. In the first phase, from 1982 to 1992, it is guided by the establishment of an Islamic Republic and completely rejection of the Lebanese secular government. In addition, *taqiyya* helped Hezbollah to hide its organization from 1982 to 1984 to gain strength and prevent early disintegration. According to Philips (2017), 52 percent of terrorist organizations survive less than a year. On the other hand, the second phase, from 1992 to present, it started with the 1989 Taif Agreement which ended the Lebanese Civil War and Hezbollah's participation in the 1992 Lebanon Election with the endorsement of the Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, successor of Ayatollah Khomeini. This period also coincided with the governmental change in Iran and the presidency of moderate Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Hezbollah has followed a more pragmatic approach, becoming involved in the Lebanese multiconfessional political system with the participation in the 1992 Lebanese Election (Harik, 2005). With the participation in the 1992 election and the following "Lebanonization" process, Hezbollah has started to become integrated with Lebanese domestic politics and become more moderate. So, it is not a pure pan-Islamic movement (Norton, 2014). Hezbollah has combined Lebanese nationalism with Islamism in the second period of *2000-onwards*, and it has instrumentalized ideology for organizational objectives.

The role of Hezbollah's ideology on its political effectiveness of terrorism cannot be deniable. Compared to its secular ideology AMAL, Hezbollah's religious ideology

attracted young Shiite radicals, and benefited from Iran's state sponsorship. However, analyzing ideology as a part of state-sponsorship will be more explanatory. Iran's role in the establishment of Hezbollah and its ideological and political support will be examined under state sponsorship. Ideology is also strongly connected with popular support, that is to be discussed under the section of popular support.

Type of Objectives

Scholars have mostly agreed that terrorism can achieve higher levels of success when groups have limited objectives that are not challenging the core interests of the target countries (Abrahms, 2006; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Jones and Libicki, 2008). At the same time, organizations that seek narrow goals are able to gain concessions from adversaries in the way of their end stated objectives (Jones and Libicki, 2008).

Although some of Hezbollah's long-term objectives are based on ideological fervor (such as the destruction of Israel) and religious symbolism, Hezbollah has adapted its short-term objectives to changing conditions based on the *realpolitik* and organizational needs. Unlike long-term objectives, the short-term objectives and operational activities of Hezbollah were designed with pragmatism and the strategic use of sources.

In the first period of 1982-2000, Hezbollah focused on its strategic aims, to expel Israeli forces from Lebanese land and the MNF (the USA and France) presence in Lebanon. Hezbollah mobilized its resources according to this aim. When Hezbollah accomplished to do it, in the second period of 2000-onwards, Hezbollah has transformed its objectives, and it has followed more realistic tactics and has focused on survivability. Hezbollah has tried to legitimize itself after the Israeli withdrawal to maintain its military wing with persisting to release of prisoners held in Israel and to liberate Shebaa Farm where it claims as a still occupied Lebanese territory.

Moreover, since the 1992 Election, Hezbollah has participated in Lebanon domestic politics. Hezbollah's decision to participate in Lebanon's domestic politics has not undermined its capacity for resistance and its activities accordingly, but it resulted in shifting priorities. Hezbollah has deliberately moderated its objectives, rhetoric, and

actions to achieve domestic political legitimacy, but they did so in a unique environment in which their group had leverage over rivals in the government (Wiegrand, 2009).

Although Hezbollah aims to establish Islamic rule in Lebanon, there is no evidence that Hezbollah has used force to achieve that objective. Yet, Hezbollah believed that success in resistance would bring support to Hezbollah's Islamic worldview (Erdin, 2002). It is unlikely to suggest that Hezbollah has employed political violence for the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Lebanon. Thus, Hezbollah, with a realist vision, seems not dreaming of a wider, and thus unrealistic goal that are unlikely to obtain. So, Hezbollah's objectives were limited and had not directly challenged the core interests of the target countries. In this sense, it is likely to say the role of limited objectives is crucial to understand the political effectiveness of terrorism of Hezbollah, but, it is worth mentioning that the type of objective has limited explanatory power on elucidating question starting with "how".

Target Selection

Empirical studies reveal that military-centric terrorist groups are more successful than civilian-centric groups (Hoffman, 2006; Abrahms, 2012). The results of Abrahms' study (2012) show that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are less effective than those with military targets.

According to Graph 4.12.2, Hezbollah mostly targets military and chooses symbolic targets such as government and diplomatic personnel and avoids mass civilian casualties (start.umd.edu/GTD, 2019). In the early years, major attacks with mass casualties increased its visibility, which in turn helped in finding recruits and funds. Hezbollah used systematic suicide campaigns in the period of 1982-1987 (Alagha, 2006). Since 1992, when Hezbollah decided to participate in Lebanese domestic politics, reduced the number of suicide bombings. Since the 1996 Understanding with Israel, known as "rules of the game", Hezbollah has generally avoided targeting civilians. To demonstrate the importance of the accepted "rules of the game", Hezbollah apologized for Katyusha rocket firings that targeted Israeli civilians in November 1998 (Norton, 2014, p. 86). However, Hezbollah's avoidance of civilian targets was not always the case. The Burgas

Bus Attacks in 2012, portrayed that from time to time, it deliberately targeted Israeli tourists. The Graph 4.12.2. also demonstrates that Hezbollah's terrorism is military-centric. As a result, as limited type of objectives, target selection has significant role in Hezbollah's political effectiveness of terrorism, but it has also limited explanatory power on when it comes to elucidating question starting with "how".

Regime Type of the Target Country

Scholars argued that democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism due to elections and public pressure (Abrahms, 2012; Pape, 2011). Looking at Israel's decisions to withdraw, the first time in 1985 was after the election, and the second time in 2000 was also after the election in Israel. However, it is not a reliable factor because, despite Israel's partly withdrawal in 1985, Israel conducted further operations in 1993 and 1996 aiming to fully eliminate Hezbollah. Then, Israel initiated another full-scale war in 2006. In addition, the U.S. and France (the MNF)'s decision of withdrawal from Lebanon, rather than election or domestic politics, the cost and burden of military presence for the U.S. and France is more explanatory. So, the regime type of the target country has limited explanatory power.

Organizational Structure

Another element that has contributed to the effectiveness of Hezbollah is its organizational structure. The evolution of the organizational structure has contributed to its longevity and effectiveness against Israel. The organizational design and hierarchy of Hezbollah has not only provided flexibility but also effectiveness (Cragin, 2005). As discussed in the case study, Hezbollah layered its leadership and preferred collective decision making in the beginning. Thus, ensuring its organizational integrity, and preventing the destruction of the entire organization from the Israel's decapitation attempt (Cragin and Dally, 2004, p. 70). For example, although Israel forces killed Abbas Musawi (the leader of Hezbollah at that time) in 1992, they could not crack down the organization. Nevertheless, Hezbollah could survive and sustained its campaigns against Israel. Then, Hezbollah's organizational structure was able to produce new leaderships, and Musawi's successors maintained its organizational integrity. However, while its decision-making

has centralized over time, Hezbollah delegated tactical operational execution to cells at the lower echelon of the chain of command. Having a central decision-making process has allowed for effort to be focused towards coordination with external partners, especially Iran and Syria. Thus, helping and increasing the effectiveness of the group in reaching its objectives.

Hezbollah's organizational strength has also relied on two crucial pillars: its media apparatus and its social services (Benedetta, 2013, p. 39). Initially, Hezbollah explicitly propagated in the local mosques and religious prayer centers. Later on, Hezbollah cemented media apparatus and broadened the reach of the cause by effectively using all means of media, such as *Al-Ahd* newspaper, *Al-Nour* Radio, and *Al-Manar* TV-station, to be win "the hearts and minds of the population". It is believed that *al-Manar* played a large role on the psychological warfare against the Israeli public. In addition, not only demoralizing the Israeli public, but also strengthening its popular base. *Al-Manar* TV often displays Israeli destruction of Lebanese homes followed with pictures of Hezbollah rebuilding the very same homes. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah emphasized the importance of propaganda apparatus claiming that victory would not have been achieved without *Al-Manar* (Blanford, 2011, p. 129).

Hezbollah has also invested in social services and provide various services such as medical care, education, schools, repair houses from Israeli attacks damages, social development programs for farmers as well as financial aids. *Jihad el-Bina* (the Holy Reconstruction) organization builds constructions and repairs houses. For example, after the 1996 Israeli Invasion (the Operation Grapes of Wrath), Hezbollah had restored about 5,000 houses in 82 villages and paid compensation to about 2,000 farmers who suffered from Israel's attacks (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009, p. 125). The *El-Jarih* organization runs hospitals. They provide medical care to Hezbollah's members and their families. They also help rehabilitate wounded militias. They send the heavily wounded abroad for surgery and operations. *Al-Shahid Waqf* (the Martyr's Institute) helps the "martyrdom" families. Hezbollah guarantees the provision of living and education expenses for the families of fighters who die in battle. The *Emdad* association provides emergency help in case of natural disasters or wars as well as to poor and restricted

people. These are accepted as the most important civil society organizations of Lebanon. In addition to this, these organizations have employed thousands of people thus helping its community's economic status (Hamzeh, 2005). These also promote the legitimization of Hezbollah and increase its public support. These social services not only attract Shiites but also other communities in Lebanon. For this reason, Hezbollah's media apparatus and social services that will be also discussed under the section of popular support.

Competition

Another factor that determines the political effectiveness of terrorism are terrorist groups' alliances and rivalries. Competition between terrorist organizations leads to engage and learn with one and other (Bloom, 2004; Phillips, 2015). Thus, they look for innovate new tactics in the field of recruitment, training, financials sources as well as information sharing. Krause (2013) argues that competition among groups in the same movement for popular support or recruitment help them to succeed at the organizational level. The AMAL-Hezbollah rivalry and their competition has shaped the political effectiveness of Hezbollah. In addition, Hezbollah has been innovative by providing social services for local populations to gain leverage from rival organizations.

While Hezbollah dealt with the foreign forces, it has also tried to maintain the organization's survivability in the competitive Lebanese environment. To do this, Hezbollah has invested in political and social capitals for its continuing resistance in south Lebanon. Then, it established various social services and networks to address local Lebanese problems, such as schools, hospitals, and financial aids to families. Hezbollah seemed to have realized the need to establish legitimate political party in order to survive and decided to participate in Lebanese domestic politics in the 1992 Election. Since the 1992 election, Hezbollah has increased its votes and the number of memberships in parliament. Hezbollah has moderated its objectives and actions to achieve domestic political goals in the competitive Lebanese political environment (Wiegrand, 2009). Despite the call of the 1989 Taif Agreement for disarming all militias, Hezbollah was the only militia force that could keep its weapons. After the 1989 Taif Agreement, while establishing a political wing, it has kept its military wing intact, legitimizing itself as the sole resistance movement against Israel. The competition element can explain the

political effectiveness during the Lebanese Civil War but, it seems unlikely to explain since in 1989 other militia forces were demilitarized. Competition has also helped increasing Hezbollah's popular support, and it will be discussed under the section of popular support.

State-sponsorship

Most scholars qualify state-sponsorship as a major factor in determining the political effectiveness of terrorism. Wilkinson (2006) claims state-sponsored terrorism often works because the resources of the state are linked with the groups practicing the violence. Some have suggested that terrorism only succeeds in special circumstances, such as decolonization, where national liberation movements struggling for independence have greater support (internally and internationally) than other circumstances (Hoffman, 2006).

Although state sponsorship may be a necessary condition for terrorist organizations, it is not sufficient as the sole factor that guaranteeing their effectiveness (DeVore and Stähli, 2015, p. 332). DeVore and Stähli (2015) examined the first decade of Hezbollah, and argued that Hezbollah's success can be attributed to internal dynamics such as organizational culture and leadership. In addition to this, they claimed previous experiences from the Lebanese Civil War (tactics such as suicide terrorism, hostage taking, kidnappings, and intelligence web on the ground) have played a more significant role than state sponsorship. DeVore and Stähli (2015)'s main argument is that the organizational culture of the recipient shapes the effectiveness of benefit from aids. For example, Hezbollah is known as an incorrupt organization. Göksel (2007) emphasized how Hezbollah effectively allocated its resources and procured weapons and equipment. DeVore and Stähli (2015) claimed that despite the fact that Iran supports groups in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, only Hezbollah became a successful non-state actor. On the IRGC's role of advisory on Hezbollah, DeVore and Stähli (2015) assert that IRGC was established in 1979 and it lacked experience to provide assistance to Hezbollah. Yet, Cragin and Sally (2004) argued that IRGC's support helped Hezbollah to skip numbers of steps in terms of organizational development and transformed into a significant threat against Israel in a short time. However, DeVore and

Stähli (2015) concentrated on offensive side and they inclined to disregard its defensive operation in order to survive. When looking at the weapon inventory of Hezbollah, one can see most of them are from Iran supply such as Katyusha rockets that can target northern Israeli villages that promote strong deterrence to Hezbollah (Sobelman, 2004).

When looking at the dynamics of Hezbollah, strong state sponsorship has been a major element in driving Hezbollah's success and in competing with its rivals such as AMAL in the early period. With Iran's organizational, material support and generous financial help, Hezbollah could cope with secular rival AMAL and become the dominant Shiite force in the fight against Israel. The strong state sponsorship provided Hezbollah the opportunity to become stronger compared to the non-sponsored rivals. For example, while AMAL could not offer salary, Hezbollah paid regular wages to its members \$150-200 per month in the early period (Harik, 2004, p. 25), and pay \$600 per month in the recent years (Blanford, 2017, p. 18). While Iranian funds appealed Shiite recruits Hezbollah's combat wing, rapidly expanded to 7,000 combatants, Iran's ideological and political support played a more decisive role (DeVore and Stähli, 2015). Besides financial resources, Iran offered safe havens in its territory and in Syria to the Hezbollah's leadership cadres. Moreover, compared to the relations of AMAL with its sponsors in Syria, Hezbollah's relations with Iran has always seemed much more stable (Byman, 2005, p. 115). Kramer (2006, p. 106) argues that it would have taken an additional 50 years for Hezbollah to achieve the same level of success without Iranian backing.

However, sponsorship of Syria and Iran constrained Hezbollah in some manners in the second period. Hezbollah could not conduct major attacks in Israel without Iran and Syria approval. They might have asked Hezbollah to not to provoke Israel. In terms of regional *realpolitik*, Syria could not let Hezbollah get too powerful in Lebanon. And Iran might not disrupt the relationship with Syria (Cragin, 2005).

Although Iranian support is crucial for Hezbollah, with the death of Khomeini, his successor Khamenei and presidency of moderate Ali Akbar Rafsanjani attempts to reoriented Iranian foreign policy towards Lebanon. Iran lessened its financial support Hezbollah at least for a couple of years (Norton 1990, p. 132). When look at this period

of 1987-1989, as Figure 3.1. shows, there is a sharp decrease in Hezbollah attacks. So, it demonstrates the links between state-sponsorship and terrorism.

Furthermore, Hezbollah became more autonomous and became less dependent on Iran over time. Following the 9/11 Attacks, the U.S. waged “war on terror” to restrict financial sources of terrorist organizations and this increased pressures on Hezbollah as well. In addition to this, due to the breakdown of the nuclear deal, Iran’s economy and currency was in decline under the pressure from U.S. and UN-mandated economic sanctions, Iranian support to Hezbollah has decreased. By the EU and the GCC designation as terrorist organization as well as sanctions imposed by the U.S., Iran has reduced funds to Hezbollah up to 40 percent (Levitt, 2013, p. 258).

The evolution of Hezbollah reveals its transformation to the self-sufficient organization due to diversifying its financial sources and opportunity for international collaborations. However, as discussed above under ideology, and organizational structure, it is more reasonable to consider competition as an intermediate variable that influence popular support. Thus, its role on Hezbollah’s popular support discussed will be also discussed under the section of popular support.

Popular Support

Scholars also emphasized popular support as a crucial factor that determines the political effectiveness of terrorism (Cronin, 2009; Davis et al., 2012). Terrorist groups cannot survive without either active (such as joining the organization, hiding members, raising money) or passive support (such as ignoring terrorist group activities, denying cooperating with police force) (Cronin, 2009). At the inception period, Hezbollah’s religious stance and Khomeinism attracted young Shiite radicals. Hezbollah has no difficulty in recruitment since its establishment, even can select among recruits. Hezbollah’s massive attacks against Israeli and the MNF targets in the 1980s dramatically increased its popularity and paved the way for more popular support. Although ethnic and religious heterogeneity of Lebanon limits public support to Hezbollah, it enjoys broad popular support among not only Shiites but also supported by other sects as well in Lebanon.

As discussed above, Hezbollah's ideological stances have a role in its popular support. Nationalist organizations typically have more popular support among a population, and broader popular support is usually the key to the greater average longevity of nationalists. It is argued that religious organization lasts longer due to spiritual or religious motivations among members and loyalty to leaders (Cronin, 2006). Since the participation in the 1992 Election and following the "Lebanonization" process, Hezbollah combined Lebanese nationalism with Islamism. In this regard, Hezbollah has combined religious and nationalist ideology. Whereas AMAL was hostile to PLO presence in Lebanon, Hezbollah supported them against Israel. The respected Shiite religious authority Hussein Fadlallah backed Hezbollah's position and condemned the AMAL campaigns. Because of this crucial clerical approval, Hezbollah won increasing support among the local Shiites (Norton, 2014). Furthermore, Hezbollah portrays itself as a religious organization that enables to collect *tithes* and *zakat* which means one-fifth income taxes in Islamic Sharia. In addition to this, there are Shiite Lebanese diasporas about 400,000 live in the Arab Gulf countries, Europe and the USA. It is reported that \$2.5 billion amounts of funding provided by Shiite diaspora donations annually (Levitt, 2011, p. 258). And this has helped to diversify its financial resources and reduces dependency on Iran's money supply.

In addition to ideology, competition, and organizational structure have also discussed associated with popular support. However, Lebanese Shiites' support for Hezbollah is not conditional. The destructions of Israel's 1993 and 1996 Operations on southern Lebanon villages caused decreased support to Hezbollah. Then, Hezbollah seemed to have realized the role of public support and has invested social service facilities and recover damages to "win the hearts and minds" of people. The organization has gained a much broader political base in Lebanon due to effective delivery of social welfare services. As discussed in the organizational structure, Hezbollah's media apparatus helped both propaganda and social services for public support.


Lebanese community has welcomed the withdrawal of Israel in 2000 as a great victory over an undefeated adversary. Hezbollah presented itself as a national hero and increased its popularity in the eyes of all Lebanese. The July 2006 War showed that not only

Hezbollah was the only force that can protect south Lebanese from Israeli attacks, but also Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were not capable of protecting its area of responsibility. Hezbollah announced the result of the war as a victory in its popular base. Although Hezbollah enjoyed solidarity among all Lebanese during the war, after the ceasefire, cross-confessional solidarity was turned into criticism about Hezbollah's role in provoking the war (Norton, 2014). Besides its human cost, its material cost was about \$4 billion in Lebanon. The war destroyed most of the infrastructure of South Lebanon including 900 factories and 15,000 homes (Norton, 2014, p. 142). Then again Hezbollah has focused on relieving the damages of the war and helped victims. It also claimed that Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian Civil War criticized by its popular base. While many Shiites share the leadership's appraisal of the high stakes in Syria, especially Sunnis do not approve Hezbollah's intervention in Syria (Norton, 2014).

Hezbollah has been contesting Lebanese parliamentary elections since 1992. In the 1992 election, Hezbollah won 12 of 128 seats and in the 1996 election won 9 seats. Hezbollah was pressured by Syria into an electoral alliance with AMAL. In 2005, Hezbollah won 14 seats, claiming a massive victory in southern Lebanon (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Hezbollah's political party has played a major role in Lebanon's governing coalitions since 2008. In the 2009 election, Hezbollah won 13 seats, but its allies were defeated by the U.S.-supported "March 14" alliance. Following the election of Hezbollah ally Michel Aoun became president in October 2016, and two Hezbollah parliamentarians and 15 Hezbollah political allies were appointed in the Lebanon's 30-minister government. In 2018, Lebanon's first parliamentary elections since 2009, Hezbollah won 13 seats and its allies won 68 seats in Lebanon's 128-seat parliament. Nasrallah calls the results a "political and moral victory" for Hezbollah that would guarantee the protection of "the resistance." (Al Jazeera, 10 May 2018). The election results clearly demonstrate Hezbollah's popular support. Since the 1992 Election Hezbollah has increased its votes and membership in the parliament. In addition, Hezbollah has also ensured survival its military wing due to both public support and its political wing in the Lebanon parliament. Hezbollah prevents the parliament taking a decision to disarmament its military wing.

In addition to election results, poll results also confirm its wide popular support. According to Beirut Center for Research and Information, 87% of Lebanese supported Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon War, compared to February's poll rise 29% (The Christian Science Monitor, 28 July 2006). The support for Hezbollah's resistance comes from non-Shiite communities as 80% of Christians, 80% of Druze, and 89% of Sunnis. Only 6% of Lebanese say Hezbollah should be disarmed (The Christian Science Monitor, 28 July 2006). The updated poll by PEW Research Center (2014) also demonstrate popular support by Shiite population, at the same time fluctuation with the involving the Syrian Civil War since 2012:

Figure 4.2. Lebanese Views of Hezbollah



		Q15o Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of: o. Hezbollah					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Lebanon	Spring, 2014	33	8	6	53	1	100
	Spring, 2013	32	9	7	52	1	100
	Spring, 2012	29	11	8	52	0	100
	Spring, 2011	28	10	10	50	1	100
	Spring, 2010	31	9	7	51	2	100
	Spring, 2009	28	7	8	56	1	100
	Spring, 2008	24	9	8	57	2	100
	Spring, 2007	25	10	9	55	1	100

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2014

Each of these variables discussed above have necessary impacts on the political effectiveness of Hezbollah, yet none of them solely explain to the full story. When compared these variables, state-sponsorship would be stated as the key factor with the highest explanatory power to determine the political effectiveness of terrorism of Hezbollah in the first period of *1982-2000*. Iran has not only helped ideological, military or financial but also politically such as the decision to participate in Lebanon politics taken by Iran which promote Hezbollah's survival. Although state sponsorship is the major factor in the initial phase, Hezbollah has been able to develop its resources and has become less dependent on its sponsors. In the second period of *2000-onwards*, popular support has been found as a key factor determines its survival. Hezbollah has legitimized its military wing by its political wing. Also, Hezbollah's political wing in the parliament prevents to pass and to implement bills that can order to disarm its military wing.

It is expected that Hezbollah will continue to operate in organizational perspective focusing on survival with benefitting wide popular support. Due to the Israeli threat and Lebanon Armed Forces' (LAF) incapability to protect South Lebanon, Hezbollah will continue to legitimize itself and maintain its popular support among the Lebanese. While engaging in the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah seemed to reject the transformation to a fully legal political party in Lebanon in the near future. Moreover, using violence as a coercive strategy, as it happened in the cases of the 2006 July War and the 2008 Crises, will be a useful instrument for Hezbollah until its disarmament.

Table 4.2. Summary of the Discussion

	1982-2000	2000-onwards
Aims	Strategic Objectives Open Letter (1985): (1) to end Israel Occupation in Lebanon, (2) to expel of the USA and France (the MNF) and their allies, (3) to submit the Phalangists to just rule, (4) to destroy the “Zionist entity” (which refers to Israel), (5) to allow Lebanese people to the right of self-determination to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon.	Survival Second Manifesto (2009) (1) to the liberation of remaining Lebanese land under Israeli occupation in the Shebaa Farms (2) to release prisoners (3) to enhance its own capabilities
Role of ideology	Ideology driven; -Shiite radicalism, and Khomeinism	ideology as an expression of the organizational needs; -Combining nationalism “Lebanonization” with Islamism
Methods	Surprise attacks on symbolic targets (such as the presence of American Marines in Beirut, Israeli forces in South Lebanon) aiming to win quickly and cheaply, Massive attacks,	Reduced the number of massive attacks, Kidnapping Israeli soldiers, Shooting IDF Aircraft that penetrating Lebanese air space, Incentives by leaders to fight, - involvement in the Syrian Civil War
Expectation	Pursue strategic objectives, Will stop use of terrorism when achieved its strategic objectives	Even if achieved its objectives, would not ending terrorism, Organizations are more sensitive to their members than to enemies’ policy; - Kidnapping Israeli soldiers in exchange with Shiite prisoner held in Israel, Leaders ensure organizational survival by offering various incentives to members which may not be related to the organization’s strategic purposes.
Key factor	State sponsorship	Popular support
Approach	Instrumental	Organizational

Prospects for future research

Because of the fact that the findings of the study, a single case that examining the only case of Hezbollah, cannot be generalized, there is need more case studies to make a comparatively scholar insight. This thesis may have some setbacks because of its limited focus on the intricate relationship between political effectiveness and the use of terrorism to achieve it. The lack of case studies about the political effectiveness of terrorism has also hardened the conduct of this research. This thesis has not examined the success of Hezbollah's transition from a terrorist group to a semi-legal political party and coalition partner in the government. However, the thesis has concentrated on Hezbollah's employment terrorism and its influence over the political effectiveness. Some presume that terrorism is not only the instrument that Hezbollah employed to expel Israel and the MNF (the USA and France), and so future research may also investigate what other factors may have played role in Hezbollah's achievement of some successful outcomes. Future studies of scholars would also investigate other determinants such as membership size, territorial control, the target countries' capabilities, and leadership as a factor influencing the political effectiveness of Hezbollah. In addition to this, despite the fact that this thesis analyzed popular support, it could not elucidate the root causes of popular support. So, researchers can explore in their future studies the sources of Hezbollah's popular support. The findings of the thesis can serve well for future large-N researches to make more comparative analyses.

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