



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

**TURKISH NAVY'S MOVE 'TOWARDS BLUE WATERS':
ITS ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION**

MESUT ÖZEL

ADVISOR: PROF. DR. SERHAT GÜVENÇ

PHD THESIS

İSTANBUL, JANUARY 2021

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-Access/Area Denial
AAAV	Amphibious Armored Assault Vehicles
AAW	Anti-Air Warfare
ADVENT	Network Supported Data Integrated Combat Management System
ARMERKOM	Research Center Command
ASuW	Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
BLACKSEAFOR/BSF	Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CVL	Aircraft Carrier, Light
DIDSA	Defense Industry Development and Support Administration
DISF/SSDF	Defense Industry Support Fund
DPO/MILPO	Design Project Office/MILGEM Project Office
EAI	European Amphibious Initiative
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
ESDP	European Defense and Security Policy
ESSM	Evolved Sea Sparrow System
FAC	Fast Attack Craft
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GENESIS	Integrated Ship Combat Management System
GOA	Gulf of Aden
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HOA	Horn of Africa
HRF(M)	High Readiness Force (Maritime)
JDA	Joint Defense Area
LACM	Land Attack Cruise Missile
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCT	Landing Craft Tank
LHD/LHA	Landing Helicopter Dock/Assault
LPD	Landing Platform Dock
LST	Landing Ship Tank
MCC	Maritime Component Command
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MILGEM	National Ship (Milli Gemi)

MND	Ministry of National Defense
MSA	Maritime Situational Awareness
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVOCFORMED	Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean
OAE	Operation Active Endeavor
OBSH	Operation Black Sea Harmony
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMS	Operation Mediterranean Shield
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OYTEP	Ten Yearly Procurement/Acquisition Program
PESCO	Permanent Established Cooperation
PESTEL	Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
ROKN	Republic of Korean Navy
SEEBRIG	Southern Eastern Europe Multinational Brigade
SHP	Strategic Goals Plan (Stratejik Hedef Planı)
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SNMCMG	Standing Mine Counter Measures Group
SNMG	Standing Maritime Group
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOVMEDRON	Soviet Mediterranean Squadron
SSB/SSM	Presidency/Undersecretariat of Defense Industry
STANAVFORMED	Standing Naval Force Mediterranean
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TAFC	Turkish Air Forces Command
TBWS	Towards Blue Waters Strategy
TCB	Turkish Republic's Navy
TCG	Turkish Republic's Ship
TGS	Turkish General Staff
TLFC	Turkish Land Forces Command
TNFC	Turkish Naval Forces Command
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
TSKGV	Turkish Armed Forces Support Foundation
TÜBİTAK	Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicles
UNISOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
USV	Unmanned Surface Vehicles
UUV	Unmanned Underwater Vehicles
VLS	Vertical Launcher System
WEU	West European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

ABSTRACT

ÖZEL, MESUT. *TURKISH NAVY'S MOVE 'TOWARDS BLUE WATERS': ITS ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION*. Ph.D. THESIS, İstanbul, 2021.

After the Cold War, the Turkish Navy faced a significant stimulus for change because of major alterations in strategic calculus, military planning, and means of waging war. To cope with pressing security challenges, the Navy charted itself a new course, 'Towards Blue Waters' in the 1990s. The Navy's growth and activism, and its role in the progress of defense industries attracted both commendation and criticism. Differences of opinion on the Navy's posture compel a thorough review of the main drivers of change. Focusing on the last three decades, this dissertation endeavors to uncover the geopolitical, strategic, historical, cultural, institutional, political, and economic factors behind this move. Taking this as an idiographic case, the toolbox of the sociological institutionalist model is utilized in explaining the Navy's attempt to redefine its strategy and role. Therefore, the process-tracing method is employed by interviewing naval elites/experts and value analysis of leaders' remarks to empirically verify the theoretical explanation. The naval elites who witnessed this process provided insightful explanations regarding the origins, development, and reactions to this shift in the Navy's orientation. The study analyzes the issue in five chapters. After discussing the historical, cultural, and geopolitical determinants in the first two chapters, the case is studied theoretically. Then, the performance of transformation is compared against its promised goals. This research concludes that the sociological institutionalist model provides solid explanations for the Navy's adoption of a worldwide norm: projecting security and force. By internalizing the notion of unimpaired access to the world as its organizational essence, the Navy's leaders, who are subscribed to the goal of Turkey's quest to become a sovereign, credible and legitimate member of the international community, figure as the engines for this transformation. In the process, the Navy relied on its skilled and educated manpower as the prime enabler.

Keywords: Towards Blue Waters, Turkish Navy, blue water navy, high seafaring capability, transformation, reformation, change, naval strategy, organizational essence, Blue Homeland, Republican Fleet.

ÖZET

ÖZEL, MESUT. TÜRK DENİZ KUVVETLERİNİN ‘AÇIK DENİZLERE DOĞRU’ HAMLESİ: DOĞUŞU, GELİŞMESİ VE UYGULANMASI. DOKTORA TEZİ, İstanbul, 2021.

Soğuk Savaş'tan sonra, Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri stratejik analiz, askeri planlama ve savaş araçlarındaki büyük değişiklikler nedeniyle değişim rüzgarlarına maruz kaldı. Deniz Kuvvetleri, acil güvenlik sınamalarıyla başa çıkmak için yeni rotasını ‘Açık Denizlere Doğru’ olarak belirledi. Ancak Deniz Kuvvetlerinin savunma sanayiinin ilerlemesindeki rolünün yanı sıra büyümesi ve harekât alanındaki eylemciliği hem övgü hem de eleştirilere konu oldu. Deniz Kuvvetleri’nin konumuyla ilgili bu tür farklı görüşler, alandaki sınırlı araştırma nedeniyle bu büyük değişimin irdelenmesi ihtiyacını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Son otuz yıla odaklanan bu tez, dönüşüm gereksiniminin ardındaki sistemik, tehdit temelli, politik ve ekonomik faktörlerin yanı sıra jeopolitik, stratejik, tarihi, kurumsal ve kültürel belirleyicileri keşfetmeye çalışmaktadır. Deniz Kuvvetleri’nin değişimini idiyografik bir vaka olarak ele alarak, değişim dinamiklerinin açıklanmasında sosyolojik kurumsalcı modelin araçlarından yararlanmaktadır. Daha sonra, teorik açıklamayı görgül olarak doğrulamak için denizci seçkin/uzmanlarla görüşme ve liderlerin görüşlerinin değer analizi yoluyla süreç izleme yöntemi kullanılmaktadır. Bu sürece tanıklık eden seçkinler, Deniz Kuvvetleri’nin dönüşümüne tepkilerin yanı sıra kökeni ve gelişimi hakkında aydınlatıcı açıklamalar yaptılar. Çalışma, konuyu beş bölümde analiz etmektedir. İlk iki bölümde tarihsel, kültürel ve jeopolitik belirleyiciler tartışıldıktan sonra diğer üç bölümde vaka teorik olarak irdelenmektedir. Ayrıca, deniz kuvvetlerinin değişim dinamiklerine tepkisindeki benzerlikleri ortaya çıkarmak için dünya çapındaki eğilimler incelenmektedir. Ardından, stratejik dönüşümün ne derece gerçekleştiği başta öngörülen hedeflerle karşılaştırmalı olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Araştırma, sosyolojik kurumsalcı modelin, Deniz Kuvvetlerinin dünya çapında norm olan uygulamayı, diğer bir deyişle güvenlik ve güç aktarımını benimsemesine yönelik kapsamlı açıklamalar sağladığı sonucuna varmaktadır. Türkiye’nin uluslararası toplumun egemen, güvenilir ve meşru bir üyesi olması için mücadele edilmesi amacını benimseyen Deniz Kuvvetleri liderleri, dünyaya engelsiz erişim kavramını örgütsel öz olarak içselleştirerek, bu dönüşümün lokomotifini olmuştur. Bu hedefe erişimde, Deniz Kuvvetlerinin nitelikli ve eğitilmiş insan gücü en önemli unsurdur.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Açık Denizlere Doğru, Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri, açık deniz yeteneği, dönüşüm, reformasyon, değişim, deniz stratejisi, örgütsel öz/kimlik, Mavi Vatan, Cumhuriyet Donanması.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. AIMS, MOTIVES, AND RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The end of the Cold War unleashed major military changes or transformations throughout the globe. One of the dynamics that forced the military organizations to change is the emerging security environment which substantially altered the prevailing strategic calculus, military planning, and relevant means of war-making structures. Another motive was the cuts in defense spending that compelled militaries to restructure, downsize or optimize. Ultimately, the technological leap, uniquely in cyber and information spheres, set in train a revolution in the conduct of military operations, as in all aspects of human life (Farrell & Terriff, 2002, p. 3).

What constitutes a change, transformation, reformation, and revolution in military affairs is a contending issue. Therefore, for coherency, consistency, and clarity throughout this study, military change is defined as “change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization¹” (Farrell, 1996). Military change appears in three forms: innovation, adaptation, and emulation, or a combination of them. Innovation incorporates creating new military technologies, strategies, tactics, and structures. Adaptation comprises fine-tuning of existing military means and ways that may eventually result in innovation when multiple alterations gradually bring about the evolutions of new ways and means. Lastly, emulation takes place by obtaining new tools and ways of fighting from other nations’ militaries via replicating their procedures, weaponry, and institutions. Ultimately, overall military change only occurs when the introduction of new ways and means result in new organizational objectives, strategies, and structures (Farrell, 2005, p. 7).

Alterations in perceived threat, systemic changes, technological breakthroughs, shifts in domestic politics, and/or economics are the main stimuli for transformation in military

¹ Military organization covers all aspects of force posture, including both force structure and military strategy.

organizations. Particularly after the systemic change induced by the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact along with NATO's revision of its mission spectrum, many Western countries were forced to transform their militaries both to benefit from the peace dividend and to cope with the emerging security challenges (Farrell & Terriff, 2002, p. 4)

This change had concomitantly affected the roles performed by navies. During the ongoing transformation process which started in 1992, the Turkish Naval Forces² publicized its strategy named 'Towards Blue Waters' in 1997, as an overarching framework document in aligning its mission profile and force structure, and also as the conceptualization and manifestation of the change of naval identity in the newly emerging world order (Gürdeniz, 2013, pp. 208-213). On its preamble signed by Admiral Güven Erkaya, the Commander of Turkish Naval Forces³ of the period underscored the need to adopt a strategy with a high sea dimension to better serve maritime interests and security of Turkey. This publicized strategy remained unprecedented in Turkey and was then superseded by its 2015 version. It was aimed to inform the Turkish public, academia, and other nations about Turkish naval intentions. Moreover, it was expected to have an appreciable impact on the defense decision making which defines Turkey's defense and maritime policy as Geoffrey Till noted (2018). The title of the strategy document was popularly accepted as a driving slogan to mark the new transformative orientation of the Navy. It also well reflected and manifested the new identity of the Navy. In other words, the 'Towards Blue Waters' was a clear declaration of the Republican Fleet's aspiration to operate in the high seas (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 191).

As an integral instrument of Turkey's foreign and security policy, the operational reach and tempo of the Navy along with its modernization plans have been both part of Turkey's strategic calculations in the context of the EU conundrum and its unilaterally imposed regional stabilization efforts (Yeşiltaş, 2020, p. 108). The current build-up and transformation of the Turkish Navy along with the advancement of supporting Turkish

² The official title of the Turkish Navy is 'Turkish Naval Forces'. For simplicity, the phrases 'Turkish Navy' or shortly 'Navy' is used in this dissertation.

³ The officer in the command of the Turkish Navy is called as 'the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces'. For simplicity, the phrase 'Navy Chief' is used in this dissertation.

defense industrial base is reported as part of ‘Turkey’s increasingly aggressive posturing in foreign affairs’ (Gingeras, 2019). It is linked to a grand strategy of “taking a more active role within the ‘sea basins’ in its near abroad” depicted in the *Strategic Depth* book (Davutoğlu, 2001), influencing Turkey’s current foreign policy. Often, Turkey’s military activism, particularly in the maritime domain was portrayed as part of revisionism or expansionism to exert influence in the former footprint of the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, the new strategic orientation of the Navy was assessed as “neither a reflection of Turkey’s foreign policy goals and nor of changes to its security environment”, rather as stimulated by the keen will of the elements in the Navy aspiring for projecting power despite a decreasing number of states identified in its national security as threats (Sanders, 2014). On the other hand, some pundits denoted that the initiation of the Turkish Navy’s endeavor of expanding its blue-water capabilities reflected “a coherent strategic orientation that began during the 1990s” and continued then on (Tanchum, 2020b). Many other analysts took the Navy’s modernization process in the scope of the ‘*Mavi Vatan (The Blue Homeland)*’ doctrine, positioning itself to be a more dominant actor in the region as part of Turkey’s militarized policy (Skafidas, 2020). Overall, the prime focus was on the ambitious expansion plans of the Navy. The construction of an amphibious assault platform (LHD), a light aircraft carrier modeled on *Juan Carlos I* design of the Spanish Navy, was denoted as an “emblematic of the Navy’s growth in pursuing the country’s assertive foreign policy goals” (Gingeras, 2019), disregarding its inclusion in the Navy’s strategic calculus early in the 1990s (Tanchum, 2020b). Such differing views on the Navy’s force posture necessitate reviewing its transformation in a longer historical perspective since the early 1990s.

Therefore, current Turkish naval assertiveness can be explained either as a manifestation of its imperial past or simply a timely adjustment to the emerging internationally oriented postmodern tasks which many contemporary navies aspire to perform. Granting that past experience may figure prominently in shaping a nation’s approach to naval strategy, this study seeks first to explore the Turkish Navy’s historical legacy. In this context, series of defeats the Ottomans suffered in the late 19th and early 20th centuries will be discussed in the context of the inefficiency of the Navy. The reformation efforts both in the Ottoman era and the early Republican era were instrumental in shaping the organizational structure

and identity of the Turkish Navy. In the process, Turkish naval traditions took shape under the influence of the British, German, and American naval missions to varying degrees. Ultimately, NATO membership in 1952 radically changed the organization of the Navy. The traces of foreign naval missions' and NATO's influence can be found in the naval education system which was redefined with each reform attempt. Additionally, the Navy's technological mindedness is analyzed to reflect its effect on the Navy's interaction with the defense industrial base.

Building on the existing literature, this study focuses on the process-tracing method by reviewing the speeches and interviews of the political and military leadership through employing value analysis to detect the signs of transformation in the discourses of the leadership. Moreover, in the context of process tracing, a group of elites, high ranking naval officers, experts, and academics, were interviewed to trace the trajectory of the recent historical change, the strategy implementation, and the role of the elites who "subscribe to the goal of state-led competitive progress" (Meyer, 1987, p. 59). The outcome of the interviews is also used to verify the content analysis of the primary and secondary material.

As part of this study, a PESTEL analysis⁴ is conducted to identify patterns of similarity patterns and differentiation among a selected group of small and medium-sized European, African, and South Asian navies. The analysis confirms that the prevailing practice of the era is projecting security in a linear evolution path, be it autonomously or in a coalition through interoperability and specialization (Germond, 2014, p. 45). Like most of its peers, the Turkish Navy has also followed a comparable path of evolution. What is startling is the fact that the 'course' charted by the Navy there decades ago survived the systemic change from bipolar to unipolar and then to a multipolar world, alterations in regional

⁴ A PESTEL analysis is a framework to analyse the key factors (Political, Economic, Sociological, Technological, Environmental and Legal) influencing an organisation from the outside. It offers people professionals insight into the external factors impacting their organisation. The analysis is flexible, so organisations can use it in a range of different scenarios. People professionals and senior managers can use the results to guide strategic decision-making (CIPD, 2020). In this study, the navies of selected countries are taken as organizations to be analyzed. The report of the PESTEL Analyses is attached as Annex-C to this dissertation.

threat perceptions, and ultimately the substantial reshuffling in civil-military relations in Turkey.

1.2. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

This dissertation hopes to make an original contribution to the field of international relations in several ways. First, it serves as an empirical study testing a theoretical paradigm using the transformation of the Turkish Navy as a test case. As elaborated in the literature review, such studies on medium- and small-sized navies are limited. Second, it provides an analysis of the Turkish Navy's transformation from international relations perspective. As Turkey's economic development and its coercive foreign policy attracted attention in the field, its naval build-up after the Cold war, particularly in the last decade with the materialization of programs like indigenous *Ada*-class corvettes (national ship-MİLGEM) and multipurpose amphibious assault ship (or light aircraft carrier), *TCG Anadolu* makes it an interesting case. What is most noteworthy is the capacity of the Turkish defense and shipbuilding industry to design and construct combat ships, and domestically develop related naval weaponry, combat systems, and sensors either indigenously or jointly. In this regard, Turkey joined the league of countries that could build their own naval ships, maintain a modern fleet with high seafaring ships and deploy it wherever and whenever needed for promoting and safeguarding its national rights and interests in the maritime domain. In other words, the Navy has become the demonstration vehicle of Turkey's pursuit of strategic autonomy at regional and probably at global levels. This study is one of the first in-depth analyses of Turkey's naval development using the sociological institutionalist theory of international relations and political science.

As for the sources used in this study, there is a growing body of secondary sources in the form of works by naval officers and academics based on thematic- and regionally focused facets of change. Moreover, some recently published memoirs and articles published in the Navy's periodicals also shed light on the various dynamics behind the Navy's transformation. Finally, it should be noted that naval archives in Turkey are not accessible

for researchers. Therefore, this dissertation, unfortunately, cannot rely on official documents with the notable exception of 1997 and 2015 naval strategy documents.

This study attempts to theorize the adoption of this strategy by applying the tools of the constructivist sociological institutionalist model. It ventures to seek its origins at the organizational essence and culture of the Navy aligned with the nation's interest and identity. Then, it explores its development by interviewing the naval leadership at the helm of the transformation move. It also aspires to compare the promise of the move 'Towards Blue Waters' with its materialization so far. Finally, it also discusses the similarities and differences between the substance of the 1997 and 2015 strategy documents.

The research question of this dissertation is to map out the origins, development, and implementation of the Turkish Navy's transformation move. In short, the inquiry is to analyze how the 'Towards Blue Waters' initiative of the Turkish Navy has come about, what its consequences have been, and what has made its momentum persevere for a period more than three decades and beyond.

1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW

In literature, scholarly studies, focusing on the Turkish Navy's transformation around its publicized strategies, are limited to some journal articles and book chapters. On the other hand, some commentaries, fact sheets, and editorials in newspapers, defense magazines, and naval service periodicals include abundant information on the transformation process. Lately, memoirs written by retired naval officers also present useful information and assessments about the Navy's transformation endeavor, including the intra- and inter-service dynamics. Moreover, the two strategy documents published by the Navy in the last three decades offer useful clues as primary sources. Despite the Navy could be deemed as the most transparent of the Turkish military services in sharing its vision, the scholarly research is mostly focused on its past rather than its current state, structure, operations, and transformation. In this regard, relevant literature was reviewed chronologically to provide the historical background to the transformation of the Navy.

The reformation of the Navy in the Ottoman period studied extensively in many history books and articles, such as Daniel Panzac's *La Marine Ottomane* covering the period of 1572 to 1923 (2018) with particular emphasis on its restructuring after major naval defeats. Ali İhsan Gencer (2001) (1986), Levent Düzcü (2009), Afif Büyüktuğrul (1967), and Fahri Çoker (1994) also researched the reformation efforts and its repercussions to the Turkish Navy. Emily Goldman analyzed the reform efforts of the Ottoman State through the lenses of realist and institutionalist paradigms in the aftermath of major military defeats. She asserted that although the political and military leadership espoused the need for the inevitable change in the military, even the most reform-minded ones were not committed to fully adopt the Western principles (2002).

Regarding the reformation efforts in the Republican period, Afif Büyüktuğrul also presented a comprehensive history of the Fleet in his book (1967) and his memoirs (2005). Figen Atabey (2002) also covered the development of the Republican Fleet in his book. Cem Gürdeniz's book (2013) *Hedefteki Donanma (Fleet on the Target)* offered a comprehensive panorama of Turkish naval development from a historical perspective, including the moves to hamper the advancement of the Navy. Furthermore, Admiral Özden Örnek covered the technological leap of the Navy by focusing on the story of the National Ship (MİLGEM) program (2016). Similarly, İskender Tunaboğlu (2008) analyzed in detail the system changes in the fields of personnel and training, education, logistics and technics, doctrines, and operations in the Navy under the influence of German, British and American schools.

Serhat Güvenç and Dilek Barlas (2003), focusing on the interwar period provided a comprehensive review and assessment of naval policy and subsequent fleet build-up. The political and military dynamics of the era revealed by the authors are also instrumental in understanding the projection of the military culture with repercussions even on the current transformation of the Navy. Moreover, Güvenç also elaborated on the enduring naval reformation efforts in the scope of his book chapter analyzing the impact of the American aid on the transformation of the Turkish Armed Forces in the 1942-1960 period (2010).

In his book chapter elaborating cross border and overseas operational capabilities, Güvenç reviewed the transformation of the Turkish military by pointing two contradicting

tenets of military priorities: actively partaking in multinational operations and developing an autonomous expeditionary military capability. He defined the Navy's 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy in the context of increasing the regional capacity of the Turkish Armed Forces to conduct overseas operations "alone or as part of coalitions". He particularly emphasized that the increasing significance of the Mediterranean in the scope of escalating Turkish-Greek rivalry in Cyprus and the prospective Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline route was reflected in the naval strategy with the inclusion of a light aircraft carrier as part of its future force posture (1998, p. 159). In tandem with Güvenç's first-ever citation of the Navy's new strategy, Metin Okçu (1998) provided insights and insider information on it for the first time. Interestingly, the theme that grabbed the academic and defense experts' attention in the new strategy most was the power projection capabilities envisioned, particularly the sea control ship, i.e., the light aircraft carrier, amphibious assault ship, and TF-2000 air defense frigates. Attention on such platforms is understandable as they were "the value-laden icons of a blue water navy" (O'Neill, 1999).

Güvenç (2004) broadened his analysis on the transformation of the Turkish military, including its naval arm by focusing on the use of Turkish military power as a tool of national foreign policy in the scope of its developing capabilities and field practices. In this regard, he also argued the development of naval policy and power in support of foreign policy objectives particularly addressing the proactive deployments of the fleet in the 1994 territorial water expansion, the 1996 Kardak (Imia), and the 1998 S-300 crises.

In a thorough analysis of Turkey's strategy and military modernization, Michael Hickok (2000) remarked on the potential rise of Turkey as a regional power with assertive foreign and security policy objectives centered on former Ottoman lands. He peculiarly pointed to the mismatch between its political ambitions and military capabilities. Considering the country's economic realities, he stressed the lack of public and political support to the modernization plans of the military depicted in the Ministry of National Defense's 1998 White Book. Moreover, he noted that the Navy was on the way of matching the acquisition programs to operational concepts and functional requirements, i.e., transforming itself from coastal defense to a high seafaring force capable of projecting security in the adjacent seas. In this era, the assertive foreign and security policies were reflected headlines as "Turks flex muscles abroad" (NYT, 1999).

More than a decade later, Deborah Sanders examined the Turkish Navy thoroughly in her case study of maritime power at the Black Sea. She covered both its “ambitious” force generation plans and the impediments to its materialization in the scope of the poor civil-military relations and the deteriorating relations with the US and Israel. She expressed a critical view of the Navy’s regeneration plans as “neither a reflection of Turkey’s foreign policy goals and nor of changes to its security environment”. In particular, Sanders pointed to “the elements within the Turkish Navy who were keen to develop a power projecting capability” despite the decreasing number of states identified in its national security as threats (2014, pp. 41-64).

Sıtkı Egeli and Serhat Güvenç (2016) presented an assessment of changing naval power hierarchy in the seas surrounding Turkey concerning the growing Russian naval strength and assertiveness. This essay also included the transforming naval strategy and force built-up of the Navy, compared to its rivals’ efforts, alongside alterations in the maritime security environment throughout the period. The authors particularly pointed to the welfare protection aspect of naval missions in the new strategy as one of the justifications for blue water missions. They also underlined the positive approach of the governing party to the development and use of the Navy.

In his analysis titled “Turkish Navy’s Vision 2033”, Metin Gürcan (2015) concluded that the transformation winds enabled the Navy to grasp the support of the political leadership. However, he stressed that the politicians tended to exploit the Navy’s empowerment as “an object for building self-confidence” and a tool to promote its standing in domestic and foreign political fora.

In his book (2018a) and subsequent article (2018b), Jeremy Stöhs devoted chapters to the comprehensive and chronological analysis of Turkish naval development vis-à-vis Greece. He pointed to the continuous modernization of the fleet intending to transform itself from a brown one to a blue water navy and the politicians’ will to finance it in times of austerity despite major delays in the materialization of the program. He also stressed the fact that “the political decision-makers in Ankara are running risk of losing sight of which means justify which ends” (2018a, p. 122).

Can Kasapoğlu (2018) analyzed the altering naval power dynamics and politico-military trends in the scope of an increasingly complex threat environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this context, he reviewed the modernization program of the Turkish Navy vis-à-vis its peers on the field. Additionally, in a more recent essay, Kasapoğlu (2020) listed the Navy's transformation toward a blue water capacity alongside the Blue Homeland concept as one of the pivots shaping the Turkish Armed Forces' massive change. He defined the blue-water navy as an asset of exercising geopolitical influence at the high seas and playing a decisive role in energy geopolitics competition and gunboat diplomacy with its reloaded outlook.

In a recent analysis, Murat Yeşiltaş (2020, p. 108) remarked that the operational reach and tempo of the Navy along with its modernization plans were both part of Turkey's strategic calculations in the context of EU conundrum and its unilaterally imposed regional stabilization efforts. By linking this to the leap of Turkish defense industries, Ryan Gingeras reported the developments as part of "Turkey's increasingly aggressive posturing in foreign affairs" (2019). Moreover, he also assigned them to a grand strategy of "taking a more active role within the 'sea basins' within its near abroad" as depicted in the book *Strategic Depth* by Ahmet Davutoğlu (2001). Additionally, Gingeras noted that the actions and statements of the Navy "suggest" a deviation from its current commitments to NATO and reveal its negligence in seeing the US as a friend and a partner, contrary to the letter of the 2105 strategy. On the other hand, Michael Tanchum (2020b) denoted Turkey's new expeditionary capacity, resting on strengthened naval capabilities as a "logical result of its strategic orientation" to become "an interregional power that will set the terms for a new pattern of connectivity between Europe, Africa and Asia' as the historical and political successor of Ottomans (Davutoğlu, 2001, pp. 37-41). Lastly, he underlined that the initiation of the Turkish Navy's endeavor of expanding its blue-water capabilities reflected "a coherent strategic orientation that began during the 1990s" and continued then on in the speeches of the commanders and the 2015 Strategy (Tanchum, 2020b).

Some other commentaries took the Navy's modernization process in the scope of the '*Mavi Vatan (The Blue Homeland)*' doctrine, positioning itself to be a more dominant actor in the region as part of Turkey's militarized policy (Skafidas, 2020). Despite some

brought about the coherent strategic orientation of the Navy towards blue waters that began in the 1990s (Tanchum, 2020b), the prime focus was the ambitious expansion plans of the last decade in the wake of the East Mediterranean energy impasse and Libyan civil war. The building of an LHD, a light aircraft carrier modeled on Spanish *Juan Carlos I* design, became emblematic of the Navy's growth in pursuing the country's assertive foreign policy goals (Gingeras, 2019) despite it had been included in the Navy's strategic calculus early in the 1990s (Tanchum, 2020b).

Considering the sociological institutionalist research on the navies' transformation, the dissertation by Sangyup Lee (2013) provided insightful explanations of South Korea's 'Blue Water Navy' initiative. Since the determinants that shaped the South Korean Navy's transformation were very similar to the factors affecting the Turkish Navy's change, its methodological approach is referred to throughout this study. However, despite the relative success of South Korea's drive, it was formally ceased due to the aggressive behaviors of North Korea. But the programs included in the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative have been materialized, or underway.

In retrospect to the early 1990s, the Turkish Navy aspired to recalibrate itself to the evolving security environment in support of the statecraft's vision of an enhanced standing in international affairs. The Navy, as "most of the small and medium navies", just has followed "a linear evolution path towards having more projection capabilities, be it autonomously, or in a coalition through interoperability and role specialization" (Germond, 2014). Furthermore, most navies' blue water components, such as South Korea, Singapore, Italy, Thailand have been justified on grounds of sea lane security because of their dependency upon international trade, which creates an imperative to protect its seaborne trade routes with significant naval capabilities (McDevitt, 2016). Since Turkey is vitally dependent on maritime trade, the very same strategic rationale for naval growth holds for Turkey. Sea lane security has historically been the prime task of the Navy (NAFO, 1997) that internalized 'accessing and reaching to the world' as its organizational essence.

1.4. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

1.4.1. Methodology

This dissertation is a single case study about Turkey's naval development, which may be viewed as an idiographic case study. As such it "aims to describe, explain, interpret, and/or understand a single case as an end in itself rather than as a vehicle for developing broader theoretical generalizations" (Levy, 2008, p. 4). The study also relies on qualitative analysis focusing on three levels: political level including the president, prime minister and minister of defense, general staff level, and naval command level. In this regard, the content analysis of speeches and interviews that were published in defense and naval magazines is undertaken to trace the meanings and values attached to the Turkish Navy by the political and military leaders.

As the main method of this research, process tracing is also employed focusing on the articles published by naval officers in defense periodicals and the service journals, and books based on the memoirs of naval officers. To this end, the elites who were involved in the process of conceiving and implementing the transformation drive, i.e., admirals and officers, are interviewed to uncover the origins of the idea as well as its materialization. Moreover, civilian experts who either witnessed or actively contributed to its implementation, are also interviewed for their assessments regarding the Navy's move. In sum, interviewed elites provided useful and important information about the development of the 'Towards Blue Waters' initiative as well as the responses and reactions to it from in and outside the Navy.

Broadly, the methodological approach used by Sangyup Lee (2013) in his dissertation focusing on the transformation of the Southern Korean Navy is adopted in this research as a starting point. Thereafter, the methodology is substantially modified by taking into account the different dynamics that have been peculiarly shaping the reformation of the Turkish Navy.

Additionally, a study of selected countries' navies is conducted via PESTEL analysis to trace their naval development patterns after the Cold War and attached as Annex-C.

1.4.2. Research method and data collection and processing

The qualitative analysis method is undertaken in five phases: the literature review, the value/content analyses of leadership speeches/interviews, the elite interviews, a theoretical analysis as well as a supplementary PESTEL analysis.

During the literature review, a phased approach is applied first to verify the fundamentals used in the strategic move under study such as the evolution of sea power, the impact of geography and geopolitics, and the transforming nature roles and tasks of navies in the changing security environment. To this aim, secondary sources are reviewed to set the theoretical framework. Later, the focus of the research shifted towards the histories of the Ottoman and Turkish Navies to investigate the origins of the strategic orientation of the Navy. Secondary sources consulted include journals, magazine and journal articles, and books whereas primary sources include the speeches and interviews of military and political leadership in service magazines of the navy and armed forces, national and international defense periodicals, newspaper articles. In this regard, diaries and memoirs of the leadership of the era were reviewed accordingly.

Second, the value analysis of the speeches and interviews of the politicians and military leaders was completed, explored graphically and statistically, and presented in a report (ANNEX A: Content Analysis of Leaders' Speeches and Interviews). In this regard, the speeches and interviews published in defense magazines and service periodicals in a time frame from 1987 to 2014 were reviewed thoroughly. The empirical results of the value analysis are used to verify the outcome of the Navy's transformation move.

Third, elite interviews were conducted with the naval leaders and civilian experts with a questionnaire tailored according to their professional experience and expertise. The interviews were recorded, translated to a draft English text which is attached as the ANNEX - B Synopsis of Elite Interviews, after the consent and approval of the elites interviewed. The content of the interviews was crosschecked with other interviews and the findings of the literature review to ensure objectivity and refrain from intra-service rivalry. The elite reviews are utilized as supporting material in theoretical analysis.

Fourth, the theoretical analysis of the research question is done by applying the tools of the constructivist sociological institutionalist model. The outcome of the theoretical analysis confirms the findings of content analyses and elite interviews via process tracing.

Fifth, the development of selected navies is analyzed to search and identify the similarity patterns in the modernization of these navies through the utilization of the PESTEL methodology (ANNEX C: Pestel Analysis of Selected Countries). The aim is to verify the tendency of possessing blue water capabilities for projecting security as the prevailing norm of the era.

In the selection of states analyzed, three broad criteria are taken into account. The first criterion is the membership to the G-20 (Group of Twenty) forum as an indication of economic development. The second one is the standing of their navies in the Lindberg-Todd Classification List (2012). The third one is to have an indicative regional representation of the countries' navies in line with the 'Pivot to Asia' narrative.

In the final stage of the study, a comparative analysis of the 1997 and 2015 strategies carried out to assess the implementation of strategies. This analysis is furthered by reviewing the period after 2015 up to date to portray the recent developments in the maritime security environment. Along with their recommendations for future study, the critiques of the elites are also included in the study.

The main method of this research is process tracing, that is, matching information from secondary material with evidence from primary sources. In that respect, the elite's views are very critical in verifying information taken from primary and secondary sources. In fact, the elites have provided valuable insights about events that occurred behind the scenes and not got covered in the media. Overall, by tracing the processes in the primary and secondary sources through the elite interviews, a better understanding of the dynamics leading to the transformation of the Navy is achieved.

1.4.3. Potential methodological barriers

In the naval historiography, the literature covering the strategic orientation of the Turkish Navy is very limited, particularly the theoretical explanations of its naval built-up. Due to the inaccessibility of primary sources in archives, this work is based on secondary material and elite interviews. The subjectivity of the data based on personal experience and expertise is a potential difficulty of the study. Therefore, process tracing is brought into the fold for cross-checking and verification.

Moreover, the fieldwork comprising the conduct of elite interviews and the literature review is geographically limited due to time and funding considerations ruled out archival research in other countries.

The focused time frame of this study is the period from the end of the Cold War to 2014. The Navy's leadership began to pronounce a new strategic transformation in the early 1990s which was published as a document in 1997. Later, the Navy revised and published a new strategy in 2015.

Despite the historical background also thoroughly reviewed to trace the roots of the change in the organizational essence of the Navy, the content of this research is confined to the strategic orientation of the Navy alone, not the other services and other state institutions. The material relied on this study is limited to open sources. Moreover, the content of elite interviews is used with the consent of the interviewees.

1.5. STRUCTURE OF STUDY

The organization of the dissertation is as follows. The first chapter is dedicated to the introduction of the research question and methodology as well as the literature review. In this regard, the relevant literature was reviewed to present a summary of alternative narratives on the rise of the Turkish Navy as a favored instrument in promoting national interest under the current government.

In the second chapter, the determinants of a naval strategy are studied. In this context, geopolitics, geography, and geographical significance of the seas are discussed to the extent to which they are relevant to crafting a strategy. Moreover, the terminology in the context of categorization of seas, typology of navies, and maritime interests and rights is included as a basis for common understanding in the debate on the Navy's strategic orientation. Then this dissertation focuses on the development of the Turkish Navy from the end of the eighteenth century up-to-1960s in order to draw attention to the ever-present need for reform and restructuring efforts and their impact on the current transformation. Additionally, NATO membership is also covered for it played a catalyst role in the Cold War transformation of the Navy. In this timeline, particular attention is devoted to the Navy's education system.

In the third chapter, after briefly discussing the various theoretical positions about the state's weaponry acquisition and military change, the case at hand is analyzed through the lenses of the sociological institutionalist model. To this end, the outcome of elite interviews is used for process tracing. Later, this theoretical explanation is verified by using the results of value analysis of leaderships' speeches and interviews. In the final analysis, the effect of cultural factors along with the desire for prestige and legitimacy are examined to show how the transformation initiative came about, what consequences it produced, and how and why the momentum of the naval build-up was sustained for three decades. Moreover, how the Navy's transformation overlapped (maybe momentarily) with the agenda of the current political elite in Turkey is ventured to be answered. The outcome of the PESTEL analysis on naval development trends of selected navies is also referred to in explaining the transformation move of the Navy.

In the fourth chapter, a comparative analysis of the 1997 and 2015 strategies of the Navy is carried out to measure the effectiveness of the 'Towards Blue Waters' move. Then, along with their recommendations for future study, the critiques of the elites are also included in this chapter. Furthermore, the development of the 'Blue Homeland' doctrine and Distant Horizon Integrated Maritime Surveillance System⁵ are also studied due to

⁵ Thereafter, the Distant Horizon Integrated Maritime Surveillance System is shortly referred as the 'Distant Horizon'.

their innate relationship to the 'Towards Blue Waters' move. Finally, the Navy's current undertakings in the context of the recent geoeconomics competition in the Eastern Mediterranean are brought into the picture due to their relevance for being the real-life practices of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy.

In the last chapter, the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the Navy's transformation move are explained with recommendations for future academic study. The need for the publication of a new naval strategy is also discussed due to the changes in the regional and global security dynamics as well as the developments in the technology domain.

Content analysis of leadership speeches/interviews, synopsis of elite interviews, and PESTEL analysis of selected navies are attached as annexes to the main body of the dissertation.

2. DETERMINANTS OF A NAVAL STRATEGY

This chapter is intended to set the groundwork for the discussion of varying perspectives in explaining the determinants of a high seafaring strategy for the Turkish Navy. The terminology used in the naval circles to study sea power and naval strategies may slightly differ depending upon the sources used and the ‘school’ leading the navy, and even the time frame under study. In this regard, the terminology used in the Turkish Naval War College for the indoctrination of naval staff officers as well as naval leadership is used in this study to provide a common understanding.

2.1. GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS

Throughout history, the Turkish Straits and Anatolian Peninsula have been a bridge due to their geographical position at the crossroads of cultural and communication lines stretching along the north-south and east-west axis. Turkey's geographical location and characteristics made it the subject of various geopolitical paradigms. Turkey is located at the intersection in the geopolitical rivalry between two superpowers according to the Rimland Theory of Nicholas J. Spykman (1944, p. 43), the US “Containment” policy (Kennan, 1969), and the Domino Theory of President Dwight Eisenhower (1954). In the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy document, a relatively contemporary geopolitical approach developed by Saul Cohen (1969, p. 178) and modified later is substantially elaborated to define the Post-Cold War world. Cohen based his theory on the balance and rivalry between two leading geographical regions, namely “The Trade Dependent Maritime and the Eurasian Continental Realms”. Between these regions, he identified “the shatter belts”-the Middle East and South Asia-occupied by several conflicting states which were caught between the clashing interests of the Great Powers. In his subsequent book, these three realms are shaped by the conditionality of “maritimity” and “continentality”, namely: the Atlantic and Pacific economically advanced realm, the Eurasian Continental Realm (Russian Heartland), and mixed “maritimity-continentality” East Asia. Moreover, Cohen discussed the geopolitical regions as mostly subdivisions of realms, where the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa are classified as the “shatter belts”, i.e., strategically oriented regions that are deeply divided internally and also designated as global destabilizers. Turkey, located in the vicinity of these shatter belts, is

listed on the second core of the world trading system as a second-order power. Due to its orientation and economic development, Cohen (2015, pp. 37-145) concluded that Turkey would probably take part in a future region of Euromediterranea with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. This developing geopolitical discourse conforms with the main contours of the geopolitical approach discussed in the Turkish Navy's 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy.

In another post-cold war theory, New Dominoes, it is argued that the US would manage the delicate relationships with other Great Powers, Europe, Japan, Russia, and China to sustain stability in the world. The pivotal states, with a substantial population and significant geographical location as emerging markets, would have the potential to influence regional and international stability. Turkey is labeled as one of these pivotal states which have noteworthy geographic prominence as a NATO ally and an EU candidate. Turkey is considered as an island of stability and economic confidence at the confluence of a very volatile region of the globe, enabling both opportunities to be exploited for its prosperity and also risks being deterred for its stability and security (Chase, et al., 1996).

In his book, *The Strategic Depth*, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2001, pp. 151-181) noted that the geopolitics of surrounding maritime areas profoundly transformed due to the emergence of new states and the change of political orientations from the static structure of the bipolar world. The adjacent seas and connecting river basins acquired new geopolitical significance with the enlarging and deepening regional interaction areas, namely the Persian Gulf, Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, the prominence of the Turkish Straits also increased due to the introduction of a Wider Black Sea regionalism.⁶ The consequent conceptual changes forced Turkey to set a comprehensive

⁶ The multinational regional cooperation initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)*, the GUAM** and the EU's Black Sea Synergy*** as well the Montreaux Convention include the states other than the riparian and neighbouring countries of the Black Sea. Today, the Black Sea still continues to be the subject of the processes of the EU enlargement, NATO expansion, and the US and Russian foreign policy that are driving forces behind the international politics of the Black Sea Zone. Moreover, the politics of energy have brought, and will bring more actors into the region. In fact, where exactly the Wider Black Sea region lies is still an open question (King, 2008).

maritime policy with a new strategic pivot rather than treating each maritime domain disparately as in the Cold War epoch. This transforming conjuncture also required Turkey to develop a holistic Eastern Mediterranean policy that cannot be treated separately from the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus issue from its standpoint. The core of the Aegean dispute is the contradiction between the geological and geopolitical realities and the current *status quo*, i.e., the Greek islands which are located on the continental shelf of the Anatolian Peninsula. The existence of the islands in the proximity of its continental mass and the maritime connectivity to the world markets creates a serious security dilemma for Turkey. In other words, first, the Greek islands are so close to the Anatolian landmass that they can be used as stepping stones in the military operations towards Turkey. Second, the Greek islands can control the narrow passages in the sea lanes connecting the Marmara Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean and hinder maritime transportation.

2.2. SIGNIFICANCE OF SEAS

As one of the main resources of life, seawater covers two-thirds of the world's surface and plays a vital and essential role in the prosperity and the security of humankind (Grove, 1990, p. 37). Humankind's relation to the sea stems from a multiplicity of causes that are attached to it, i.e., "the four attributes of the sea, namely, as a resource and a means of transportation, information and dominion"⁷ (Till, 2009, p. 23).

The significance of the sea as a mineral or food supplier increases as the continental sources degrade. The current problems manifest themselves as power struggles either in the delimitation of the maritime exclusive zones or the continental shelves as well as in

*The members of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) are Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, North Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine (BSEC, 2002).

**The members of the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development are Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM, 2021).

***The countries covered by the EU's Black Sea Synergy initiative are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Romania, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine (EC, 2019).

⁷ In the latest edition of this book, Geoffrey Till (2018, p. 6) depicts that "the four attributes are: the sea as a resource; the sea as medium of transportation and exchange; the sea as a medium of information and the spread of ideas; and the sea as medium for dominion."

the polar cone. The developments in extraction technologies, fishing equipment, and the opening of the Arctic sea route can potentially provoke conflicts on the global, regional, and local levels.

In the current age of globalization, whereas “over 80 percent of global trade by volume and more than 70 percent of its value is being carried on board ships and handled by seaports worldwide” and increasing historically (UNCTAD, 2017, p. x). Humanity gets more dependent on seaborne trade than other modes of transportation. This requires the utmost attention to safeguard the security of maritime trade.

In the course of history, seas are global conduits for the transfer of information and interconnectivity either through underwater cables and through the shipment of related material and people. Any disruption of connectivity in the worldwide web may cause the shutdown of the international financial system (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 37). Last but the least, being a seapower with global reach requires having substantial sea power to control the sea lanes of communication and the chokepoints of seaborne trade, and to project power wherever needed (Grove, 1990, pp. 46-56). Assertiveness in promoting the maritime interests of one nation in one of these interconnected domains may translate itself to cooperation or conflict with the ebb and flow in international relations. Consequently, the roles and the mission repertoire of the naval forces evolved in step with the requirements for being a seapower with global reach (Till, 2009, p. 23).

2.3. HIGH SEAS AND BLUE WATER⁸ NAVIES

The ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy document, as its label suggests, points out a direction or a path, towards the high seas or blue waters, or open seas which is the exact translation of the term in the Turkish language. It should note that the proposed force posture in the strategy was not explicitly categorized as a ‘blue water navy’.⁹ In fact, the Turkish Navy’s

⁸ Designed to operate on and range over the open sea; oceangoing; a blue water navy that can be dispatched throughout the world, far from its home base (dictionary.com, 2021).

⁹ For instance, it was used by the South Korean Navy to call its ‘Blue Water Navy’ initiative launched in 1995 (Kim, 1995).

force structure included some blue water type of platforms. The intent depicted in the strategy document could shed light on what was meant by pointing to an orientation towards the high seas, which would eventually result in the alignment of capabilities with the areas of influence and interest to Turkey.

The categorization of navies in terms of overall power and capability has been a demanding venture. In the classification of navies, many scholars used different criteria for their labeling which included the following, but not limited to the size and nature of the fleet, the geographic reach, the function and capability, the access to high-grade technology, and the reputation (Till, 2018, pp. 147-150).

2.3.1. Categorization of seas

The designation of sea areas has also been a contentious issue. There are a plethora of classifications drawing in various criteria in the literature. In their book, Lindberg and Todd set a framework in order to fully understand the impact of geography on naval warfare according to the physical properties of the marine environment in three specific areas: high seas, marginal seas, and littorals, and added also inland waterways to the analysis as a special environment. They designated the world's oceans as only one vast, interconnected body of water, where the continents separated the various ocean basins from each other. But neither did they prevent "the exchange of water from one area to another via surface and subsurface currents, nor did they prohibit the movement of marine life or shipping (except size limitations of vessels)" on a global basis. This was also valid for the access of vessels wherever this body of water extended, including the inland waterways (2002, p. 59). Such accessibility "has made the marine environment a major theater of military operations throughout the ages" by facilitating seaborne trade as much as the projection of forces onto the land. These specific physical geographic characteristics of the three-dimensional marine environment in surface¹⁰ and subsurface¹¹

¹⁰ Included among the surface characteristics are location, distance, physical configuration, surface conditions, tides, and currents.

¹¹ Depth, bottom topography, seawater properties, and marine life are those characteristics that pertain mainly to the subsurface area.

categories exert direct influence on naval strategy, tactics, logistics, weaponry, force structure, and ship design (Ibid, p. 60).

Historically, the seas have been deemed firstly as an essential means of trading on which the world's prosperity and peace depended. The notion of high seas, in general, reflects the views of Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in his *Mare Liberum* of 1609 (2019). Maritime powers have been insistent on the freedom of navigation at seas. Oceans which are seen as 'the common property of all' cover over 70 percent of the world's surface. Obviously, particular areas of the seas are owned by particular countries and available for their exclusive use under the 1982 UNCLOS III¹², such as maritime resources in the contiguous zone and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Due to the increasing concern for dwindling marine resources, some multinational and international rules and regulations are imposed in order to guarantee the legitimate and sustainable use of seas, as such in the suppression of piracy, the drugs trade, and international terrorism, and the protection of the marine environment. In that sense, the seas are regarded as a common property of entire humanity (or global commons) belonging to everyone including future generations. Oceans and high seas have turned out to be "a domain of shared sovereignty and agreed to regulation on current and future use, for the common interest of all mankind present and future". While the UNCLOS contemplating the concept of freedom of navigation, some practices like "imposing prior notification and consent regulations" are threatening this notion. Although some shifting of attitudes towards the understanding of global commons at stake, the notion of high seas is still valid in the relevant context of the UNCLOS (Till, 2018, pp. 28-31).

In order to further elaborate on the notion of high seas, the operational environment needs to be elaborated in terms of areas of influence and interest. In the 1997 strategy document, the Turkish Navy defined its areas of influence as surrounding seas, given utmost prominence to the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the whole Mediterranean. In the areas of influence, the Navy was tasked with ensuring the accessibility of seaborne trade routes by showing off the flag in order to safeguard the national interests. In a complementary

¹² United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN, 1982).

way, the areas of interest are designated as the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gibraltar Strait approach of the Atlantic Ocean. In the areas of interest, the Navy was tasked to monitor vigilantly the events and plan to actively partake in the prospective NATO or the UN-led initiatives. Moreover, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, which provide gateways towards oceans are included among the areas of interest to the Turkish Navy (Dz.K.K., 1997).

The areas of influence¹³ and interest¹⁴ were defined in the glossary of terms section, but not demarcated geographically instead referred to activities conducted beyond the near seas in the 2015 Strategy document (p. 46). Interestingly, the Turkish Navy has adopted a rather broad perspective by designating every littoral state as a neighbor of Turkey given the increased level of connectivity in the age of globalization. The term ‘blue water’ was not used in the text at all while the term ‘high sea’ was employed frequently and the phrase ‘open sea’ was referred to just once. The term “high sea”¹⁵ was also defined in the glossary section along with the phrase “freedom of high seas”.¹⁶ With this perspective, any instabilities in countries adjacent to the seas are assumed to pose direct and indirect potential risks to the security and economic interests of Turkey (p. 17).

At this point, it is worth elaborating how the notion of high seas was reflected in international law and how it was perceived by the international community and the practitioners, i.e., by the naval communities all around the world. The top official document, UNCLOS, devoted a complete part to the attributes and utilization of high seas

¹³ Area of influence: An area wherein a command is capable of engagement through its own weapons as well as other supporting weapons, and have its troops conduct maneuvers freely and keep them under control (The extends of this area depend on the organization, weapons, support systems and the mission of the force) (TNFC, 2016, p. 46).

¹⁴ Area of Operations: An area required for the execution of military operations in one or more operation zones and the administrative activities that belongs to them (TNFC, 2016).

¹⁵ High Seas: Maritime area that falls outside internal waters, territorial waters, archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State and exclusive economic zone and that neither is a part nor falls under the sovereignty of any State.

¹⁶ Freedom of High Seas: Benefitting on equal terms from the high seas whether countries are landlocked or not. Recognized freedom of high seas for both coastal and landlocked countries are freedom of navigation, freedom of flying in the airspace over the high seas, freedom of laying of underwater cable and pipeline, freedom of building artificial islands and other facilities as permitted by international law, freedom of fishing, freedom of hunting of living resources, freedom of scientific research.

out of which Ian Speller abstracted a definition, as “the high seas include all parts of the ocean to seaward of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). High seas are part of global commons which are “not subject to the sovereignty of any state”. Moreover, the exploitation and exploration of the resources within the high seas are held to be part ‘common heritage of mankind’ (2014, p. 22). Indeed, the EEZ gives a state sovereign rights to exploit and explore natural resources but not to restrict the freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other international legal uses of the sea related to these liberties (Robinson & Brink, 2004).

Here, it may be appropriate to ask if the Mediterranean Sea is an open (high) sea or not. In the interview, Admiral Kadir Sağdıç stated that although it was a (closed) internal sea, surrounded by three continents the Mediterranean Sea was indeed an open sea taking into account its being at the crossroads to oceans. Moreover, considering the limited capabilities of the naval platforms then, it was an open sea by the naval standards of the sixteenth century.

2.3.2. Typology of navies

In linking a state’s geography to the type of navy, the relationship between missions, capabilities, and operational environment each of which had a different level of geographical component, determine the type of naval forces. Based on mission orientation and capability, three primary types of navies are identified: “power projection, coastal or territorial defense, and constabulary” whereas each higher-ranked navy type to some degree covers the mission spectrum of its less capable peer. On the other hand, in relating the geographical criteria to the mission type, operational environment, and reach¹⁷ are used in categorization. The operational environment is divided into two broad subcategories of ‘blue water’¹⁸ and ‘non-blue water’ whereas the latter is divided further as ‘green water’¹⁹ and ‘brown water’. By definition, ‘blue water’ is associated with power

¹⁷ Reach could be defined as the distance from home that a navy can effectively operate.

¹⁸ Blue water denotes to the open ocean or what is frequently called the high seas.

¹⁹ Green water refers to offshore, coastal and territorial waters, ports and harbors while brown waters refer to navigable rivers, inland waterways and estuaries.

projection navies whereas ‘green and brown water’ is related to coastal and territorial defense navies, and ‘green water’ is linked to constabulary navies. The insertion of ‘reach’ adds a new dimension based on loss of power gradient, i.e., the mission capacity of a navy declines as it operates far away from its home base. Thus, according to the degree of reach, blue water navies are categorized as global reach, limited global reach, and regional power projection navies. Moreover, green water navies are listed as regional offshore and inshore coastal defense and constabulary navies. The final product is a tenfold ranking of navies based on the Lindberg-Todd classification system²⁰ which is used in Till’s recent book (2018, p. 148).

On the other hand, many experts have tried to describe and analyze the widespread notion of small, medium, and great navies. Currently, the most sophisticated and widely accepted of these various attempts at classifying navies was the ninefold hierarchy described by Eric Grove (1990, pp. 236-238), which was based on categorizations introduced by Morris (1987) on Third World Navies, as amended by later Haines (1988) starting from “Major Global Force Projection Navy-Complete” to “Token Navies”.²¹ Grove confirmed the usefulness of the overall model in his revision of the 1990 typology of navies with some changes in where navies stood within his grading (2016, p. 10).

²⁰ The Lindberg-Todd Classification System (1996, p. 196) lists the navies in a tenfold ranking system: (1) Global-reach power projection: US, (2) Limited global-reach power projection: France, Britain, (3) Multi-regional power projection: India, Russia, Italy, Spain, Italy (4) Regional power projection: China, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Germany, Canada (8 more) (5) Regional offshore coastal defense: Thailand, Malaysia, Norway, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore (12 more) (6) Inshore coastal defense: Oman, Finland, Vietnam, North Korea (21 in total) (7) Regional offshore constabulary: Mexico, Ireland, Uruguay, Iceland Coast Guard (8) Inshore constabulary: Philippines, Myanmar, Sri Lanka (10 more) (9) Inland waterway riverine: Bolivia, Paraguay, Azerbaijan, Laos (10 more)(10) Token navy riverine: Many examples. It should be noted that the first four rank denoted as blue water navies while the rest as non-blue water navies.

²¹ The ninefold hierarchy produced by Eric Grove (1990, pp. 236-238) is as follows: (1) one major global force projection navy – complete; 2 major global force projection navy – partial; 3 medium global force projection navy; 4 medium regional force projection navy; 5 adjacent force projection navies; 6 offshore territorial defense navies; 7 inshore territorial defense navies; 8 constabulary navies; 9 token navies.

Illustrations of these categories would include the US Navy (Rank 1), the Soviet Navy of 1990 (Rank 2), the French and British navies (Rank 3), the Indian, Chinese, and Japanese navies (Rank 4), Portugal, Israel, South Africa (Rank 5), Norway, Egypt (Rank 6), Oman, Singapore (Rank 7), Mexico, Sri Lanka (Rank 8), no examples as it sounds too insulting (Rank 9).

The main difference to Todd and Lindberg’s system consists of a further rank inserted between their Ranks 1 and 2, while their Ranks 7 and 8 are lumped together and their Rank 9 is left out completely.

The type of navy eventually transforms itself into the force structure of navies. For instance, blue water navies of all kinds are branded by the possession of varying numbers of larger combatants like “carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, as well as amphibious warfare vessels and afloat logistic capability” (2002, p. 196). Literally, blue water navy refers to maritime powers that can operate in the world’s oceans (Scholik, 2016). Meanwhile, the force posture of green water navies mostly comprises of smaller frigates, corvettes, fast attack craft, and underwater vessels whereas constabulary navies own varying size of patrol craft. Brown water navies field specifically designed platforms to cope with the requirements of inland waterways. Overall, the strategic and operational needs generally are the most prominent factor in deciding the number of ships in a navy’s inventory, whereas the size and class of ships are dictated by the operational environment (Lindberg & Daniel, 2002, p. 197). For instance, the current rise of constabulary tasks linked with the merging of new and old sources of risk at sea and from the sea, such as trafficking in humans, drugs, and arms, as well as piracy require navies to balance between capable blue water frigate size vessels²² and less capable littoral ships, such as corvettes which suit these tasks better (Diego, 2016). However, the logical relationship sometimes can be superseded by inexcusable and unexplainable decisions made by political and military leaders based on the vessel’s “prestige factor”. Apart from being inefficient and suboptimal, incompatibility of assets vis-à-vis operational environment might result in hindering a state from successfully utilizing its naval might to attain its goals, at worst, losing its assets and lives as well as the overall engagement (Lindberg & Todd, 2002, p. 198).

Turkey was ranked in the fifth category, namely ‘Adjacent Force Projection’²³, i.e., with “some ability to project force well ashore” in Grove’s 1990s listing (p. 280) and remained so as of 2016 (p. 18). Although the desired force structure was not defined explicitly in

²² Geography continues to play a prominent and direct role in design of ships despite the radical shrinkage in time-distance brought about by shipborne air vessels. Endurance and range factors led to the emergence of an informal workhorse of blue water operations, a typical frigate at least capable of 4000 nautical miles cruising at 18 knots (Lindberg & Todd, 2002, s. 216).

²³ Morris also included the criteria regarding “some licensed production and limited or no indigenously designed naval and naval aviation constructing considerable naval expansion program including imports” in designating “Adjacent Force Projection Navies” (1987, p. 32).

the 1997 strategy²⁴, the vision put forward by adopting a high seafaring strategy envisaged roles and functions that would require a naval force with power projection and strike capability. Additionally, this force could be sustained away from homeports in areas of influence and interest (p. 18).

In times of armed conflict, the strategy dictated that the Turkish Navy would conduct operations as a task force in the area of operations while carrying out activities as a task group, without prejudice to the requirements of the mission, in the zones of naval battle extending about 150 nautical miles in the area of operations (Ibid., p. 25). Emphasizing the attainment and maintenance of the effective force structure for the Turkish Navy, its blue water component was defined as consisting of frigates, destroyers, patrol craft, submarines, auxiliaries, and naval aviation platforms. Its blue-water tasks were to secure the sea lanes of communication on the high seas as well as to facilitate effective participation in allied and national sea control operations (NAFO, 1997).

In providing air defense of units operating at high seas, the TF-2000 air defense destroyer was singled out by Admiral Güven Erkaya as the core of the blue water component equipped with the command-and-control ability (S&H, 1995). In a series of articles authored to take stock of the developments in the Turkish Navy, Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu assessed that the Turkish Navy was on the way to transforming into “a blue water navy” from “green water, littoral one” given the operational efforts and capacity (2001c)²⁵. During this period, Lindberg (1998) listed the Turkish Navy among “regional power projection navies” in the “world naval type category membership” table in his

²⁴ In the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, the sole reference to such a typology is that the relatively developed capabilities of the Turkish Navy along with its sister services well accomplished its tasks in the Cyprus Operations of 1974 by conducting its ever first real wartime operation as a “Regional Force Projection Navy” (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 17). Moreover, it asserts that the Navy will transform to a ‘sea control’ navy with materialization of fast attack craft upgrade along with modern frigate and submarine procurement programs. As an end state, it underlines that the mission profile envisaged in the strategy requires a self-sufficient naval force with power projection and strike ability. Here, the self-sufficiency means to support and sustain a task group operating far from homeports; an organic fleet support ship takes part in the task group to this aim. Despite the end state was not explicitly categorized, the envisaged force structure corresponds to ‘Medium Regional Power Projection Capability’ of Grove’s typology, or ‘Regional Power Projection’ designation in the World Naval Hierarchy according to Todd&Linberg classification system.

²⁵ This is the first occasion that the term “blue water navy (high seafaring navy)” or “açık deniz bahriyesi” is used by a Navy Chief.

analysis of the geographical impact on coastal defense navies. Later, according to an analysis made by Kirchberger (2012) based on 2012 data, the Turkish Navy's standing on the list, in 'Rank 4' as 'regional power projection navy' per the Lindberg-Todd classification system, was confirmed.²⁶

The most recent strategy document publicized by the Turkish Navy in 2015 calls for advancing to the rank of 'Medium Global Power Projection Capability' from the current category of 'Medium Regional Power Projection Capability' according to Grove's typology. Commissioning of new combatants, expanding radius of operations beyond the adjacent seas and intensifying collaboration with the Allied and friendly navies as well as other multinational organizations, and possessing force projection capabilities are expected to contribute to the attainment of this goal (2016).

In sum, there have been numerous attempts to designate seas and categorize navies operating on them by linking the operational environment with the type of combatants in the hands of a navy. While the main body of water surrounding the southern flank of Turkey, namely the Mediterranean is geographically labeled as a semi-enclosed sea it has historically been considered high seas and a conduit to extend the Turkish Navy's reach to the oceans. Even though the Turkish Navy is ranked in the small navies category of 'adjacent force projection' in Grove's typology, it is included in the blue water navies category of 'regional power projection' in the Lindberg-Todd classification system. In fact, the common denominator in both listings is the power projection capabilities of the Turkish Navy. Considering the proposed force structure in both 1997 and 2015 strategy documents, the Navy has maintained its aspiration to become a 'Medium Global Power Projection Navy'. This may be a realistic aspiration provided that the multipurpose amphibious assault ship (LHD/LHA) and Air Defense Destroyers would be timely procured.

²⁶ The criteria differing from Rank 3 Navy is their lack of an at sea fleet air support capability (other than helicopters operating from destroyers and frigates) (Todd & Lindberg, 1996, p. 61).

2.3.3. Maritime rights and interests in the Turkish Navy's perception

In the preamble of 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy document, Admiral Erkaya underlined the new roles assumed by the Turkish Navy in contributing to the regional security in the framework of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and NATO Partnership for Peace initiatives. He also emphasized the growing significance of maritime interest and rights in the economic development of Turkey. Regarding its dependence on seaborne trade, he remarked the geostrategic location of Turkey at the intersection of the regional transport routes connecting three seas and three continents. In that respect, he underlined the symbiotic relationship between the survival of the country and the maintenance of maritime trade without disruptions, particularly the shipping of oil and byproducts in times of war and crises. His justification for developing a high seafaring capacity was to ensure the maritime interconnectivity of Turkey to the world economy under any circumstances. Therefore, considering the changes in the new security environment, he pronounced the requirement for adopting a new strategy of the Navy to better serve the maritime rights and interests of Turkey in a new domain, i.e., towards the high seas (Dz.K.K., 1997).

The fourth section of the strategy document is titled "the results that would orient the naval strategy in the light of external factors pertaining to Turkey". First, this section highlighted the present and prospective roles for Turkey in promoting regional stability. It also included the activities contributing to world peace beyond the region, such as Turkey's contribution to the multinational endeavors in Somalia, in the Gulf, and the Middle East peace processes. Second, the growing prominence of the seas as a means of transportation, communication, a source of food, and raw materials was emphasized in the age of globalization as a dynamic for ever closer social and economic integration among the nations. Ultimately, it was stated that the security of seaborne trade routes became more vital for Turkey. In this framework, the surrounding seas, given utmost prominence to the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the whole Mediterranean were designated as vital areas or in other words as the areas of influence for Turkey. In relation to the foregoing, the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gibraltar Strait approaches of the Atlantic Ocean were designated as areas of interest of the Turkish Navy.

That, in the strategic sense, marked the overall boundaries of the areas of interest and influence that were drawn in the 1997 strategy.

In the ‘Turkish Maritime Power Symposium’ held at the War Academies in June 1999, the Navy’s Operations Chief Admiral Lütfü Sancar presented a paper on ‘The Maritime Interests of Turkey and the Naval Force Requirement’ (Kutluhan, 1999). After setting the historical background, he defined the maritime rights and interests as:

- Uninterrupted sustainment of national seaborne trade by ensuring the openness of sea lanes of communication,
- Upholding maritime sovereignty rights in the surrounding seas under international law,
- Preserving and exercising full sovereignty rights on the Turkish Straits provided for the multinational conventions and improving navigational safety through the Straits to the international standards,
- Efficient conduct of search and rescue operations in the surrounding seas,
- Free exploitation of international waters in the seas which are in the area of interest of Turkey (HAK, 1999).

Concerning maritime interests, the 1997 strategy covered them in general without detail. On the other hand, the 2015 strategy dedicated a section to maritime objectives, including energy, maritime transportation, marine infrastructure, etc. within the scope of the aim of “Seafaring nation, Seafaring Country” by 2035.²⁷ Moreover, it also defined the Navy’s role in safeguarding the maritime interests in the world seas and its support in achieving them (TNFC, 2016).

²⁷ With this target set in the 11th Transport, Maritime and Communications Council conducted in 2013 (UDHB, 2013), other major maritime objectives are as follows: (1) to contribute to international maritime employment by achieving the number of 100 thousand officers, 350 thousand crew and 1 million amateur sailors, (2) To aim handling capacity to 32 million TEU, 500 million tons of dry cargo, 350 million tons of liquid cargo and 15 million passengers by 2023 (3) Mersin region to become the leader in transit container handling in terms of quantity in the South and Eastern Mediterranean Region, (4) Establishment of shipyards in the eastern Mediterranean to provide ship building, maintenance and repair services in the VLCC and ULCC capacity, (5) Integrating port and marine facilities in national transport and trans-European network, (6) Modernizing the fleet of commerce, (7) Constructing at least one of the world's top ten biggest ports.

2.4. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The determinants that are peculiarly affecting Turkey's maritime strategy, like in the case of most nations, are history, geography, and geopolitics as well as the principles of national security policy (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 6). In this regard, the history of the Navy merits attention, particularly its reformation efforts in three distinct periods: The Ottoman Navy era from 1770 to 1923, the Fleet of the Republic era from 1923 to 1949, and The Naval Force Forces era since 1949 onwards.

2.4.1. Reform and restructuring of Ottoman Navy

The annihilation of the Ottoman Fleet at Çeşme in 1770 and the subsequent territorial losses against Russia brought the idea of naval reform in the minds of politicians and military leadership. The loss of experienced seamen was the main concern. The Ottoman Sultans endeavored to restructure and modernize the navy with the help of Western experts. In this era, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Paşa, the Navy Chief, was influential in relative achievement in the navy's transformation. Firstly, the French and Swedish experts led the naval reforms that focused on three pillars: shipbuilding; modernization of shipyards; and naval education and training. The foundation of an engineering school (*Mekteb-i Riyazziye*) in 1773 was a farsighted effort that is regarded as a milestone in the establishment of a modern education system in the Ottoman State (Panzac, 2018).

After ascending to the throne, Sultan Selim III embarked on substantial reforms to set the groundwork for a 'New Order (*Nizam-ı Cedit*)'. In his reign, Küçük Hüseyin Paşa, the Chief of the Navy, led the reforms with the assistance of British and French advisors. He introduced several codes of conduct and practices to order the administrative, organizational, and personnel management of the navy.²⁸ As also noted by foreign experts, the reforms elevated the Ottoman Navy's standing and combat readiness in the

²⁸ Furthermore, Sultan Selim adopted a naval law (*1804 Bahriye Kanunnamesi*) (Gencer, 1985, pp. 63-70). Concurrently with the new law, the naval command was reorganized into two pillars. The Navy Chief (*Kaptan Paşalık*) was responsible for combat readiness and operations of the navy as well as determining strategic priorities. The Ministry of Navy (*Bahriye Nezareti*) was in charge of administrative, educational, logistical, and technical affairs along with the Naval Treasury.

international naval hierarchy just after Britain, France, and Spain (Ibid., pp. 216-266). However, the cultural gap between the foreign instructors and the Ottoman officers, the time needed for digesting newly adapted practices as well as the exodus of the Greek Orthodox naval personnel after the Greek independence negated the overall impact of the restructuring efforts.

During the Greek uprising in the 1820s, even though the Ottoman Navy achieved sea control in the Aegean and the Adriatic Sea, the allied fleet of British, French, and Russians destroyed the Ottoman and Egyptian fleet at Navarino in 1826. More importantly, the loss of experienced naval manpower had a substantial impact on the viability of the Ottoman Empire later. This disaster sharpened the Ottoman's resolve to build a high seafaring navy for preserving naval power balance vis-à-vis the Egyptians. A restructuring of the naval command organization and educational institutions materialized urgently in line with the abolition of the Janissary troops (Ibid., p. 292).²⁹

In the Reformation period (*Tanzimat*), to close the technological gap with the European navies, the Ottomans turned to European suppliers, primarily Britain for acquiring new steam-powered vessels which created dependence on foreign shipyards. In this regard, the acquisition policy was based on building the hull in-country and sending ships abroad for installation of the propulsion. Later it changed to ordering whole ships to foreign shipyards which resulted in total foreign dependency and inflated costs (Panzac, 2018, pp. 312-318). In this era, the first British advisory mission headed by Captain Baldwin Wake Walker (*Yaver Paşa*)³⁰ (1839-1843) focused its efforts on restructuring the Naval Academy and the Fleet. In fleet training, Walker emphasized exercises at sea as well as on gun and sail simulator drills (Çoker, 1994, p. 8). After signing a bilateral trade agreement with Britain, a group of 42 cadets and junior officers was sent for engineering training (Panzac, 2018, p. 350). In this period, the British influence grew in shaping the Ottoman Navy due to their unrivaled naval might and their industrial superiority.

²⁹ In this era, the private experts from the US were involved in the modernization of the Ottoman fleet. However, the American experts' involvement remained limited to avoid the wrath of European powers. (Gencer, 1986, p. 40).

³⁰ Customarily, the naval officers in the advisory missions were accorded an honorary rank one or two levels above their rank in their national services to strengthen their command authority (Lewis, 1987).

Politically, it was the consequence of their support to the Ottomans against Egypt and Russia. Concurrently, in an era, while French was the *lingua franca* of the world, the Ottoman naval academy preferred textbooks of the Royal navy due to their supremacy in maritime affairs (Saffet, 1326, p. 22). The establishment of the Naval Council, modeled after British Admiralty and the emphasis on restructuring the naval academy were instrumental in carrying out the institutional reforms more coherently and systematically.

The second British mission was led by Sir Adolphus Slade³¹ (1850-1866) (*Müşavir Paşa*). It focused on the rehabilitation of the naval academy and established a naval high school as a source of cadets. He introduced a four-year curriculum into the Academy with two years of theoretical in-class education and two years of hands-on training onboard training vessels (Panzac, 2018, p. 348).

In the 1860s, the visit of Sultan Abdülaziz to Europe had profoundly impacted the Ottoman elite's awareness of their country's underdevelopment. During this journey, the British government invited Sultan to London to impress him by demonstrating the British naval and technological might. This attempt bore fruit in the form of new combatant orders from British shipyards with loans from British banks (Ibid., p. 349). However, the British naval influence was not limited only to ship acquisition. It was also extended to the employment of British technical experts on board in operating the ship's power plant as well as manning repair facilities ashore to maintain the ships. The Naval Academy was also staffed and directed by British officers along with the Ottoman officers educated abroad. Admiral Slade was succeeded by Hobart Paşa (1867-1886), who also assumed the operational command of the fleet in the blockade of Crete in 1867 and was later assigned as the Black Sea Fleet commander in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War (Çoker, 1994). Another British officer, Henry F. Woods also, served in advisory and operational roles until 1909. Overall, during the reformation period, particularly in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, the Ottomans became almost fully dependent on the British

³¹ Admiral Slade, who also participated in the Crimean War, authored books about the political landscape of the region during his tenure. He criticized the British policy during the Greek uprising which had borne structural consequences on the overall balance of power in Europe. He argued it also provoked Russian aggression and influence in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and in the Mediterranean with the destruction of the Ottoman fleet (Çoker, 1994, p. 167).

naval missions for training, technical and operational functions. Moreover, they also served as interlocutors between the Ottoman navy and the British industrial base (Panzac, 2018, p. 342).

With its relatively increased naval power, the Ottomans endeavored to assert their sovereignty in their overseas territories, particularly in the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula. Similarly, they imposed a naval blockade around the island of Crete to tackle the uprising there (Ibid., p. 364). In the 1877-1878 Ottoman -Russian War, the Ottoman Navy enjoyed modest naval supremacy in the Black Sea over the Russian Navy but proved inefficient due to its substantial losses it sustained due to Russian torpedo boats and mines.³² Overall, it had been incompetently operated due to poorly trained crew on sophisticated weaponry and ships. Panzac concluded that the Ottoman naval build-up in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz was predicated solely on the show of power rather than serving a well-defined military or diplomatic objective (Ibid., p. 350).

Due to substantial losses of territory going hand in hand with the economic crisis, the Ottoman state had endured the pressure of European powers and internal conflicts. Such a security environment eventually placed the Navy in the secondary service after the Army. In this era, the prime function of the Navy was to ensure access to the overseas territories which were hard to reach via rail and land routes, i.e., to transport the troop reinforcements to Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Surely, the continentalist mindset of the German military advisory missions contributed to the Navy's relegation to an inferior status due mostly to its poor showing in the last war (Wallach, 1976) and its high-profile role in dethroning Sultan Abdülaziz.

In this era, the success of the Russian navy in littoral warfare with agile torpedo boats and mine warfare gave rise to *Jeune Ecole* promoted by French Admiral Theophile Aube. His conceptions were predicated on *course de Guerre*.³³ He also advocated coastal defense via distributed fleet elements instead of the concentration of naval forces. Consequently,

³² Ottoman Navy had faced evolving naval technologies at the battles, such as self-explosive artillery at Sinop and the torpedoes and mines in the Black Sea.

³³ Attacking the enemy's seaborne trade with agile combatants rather than a battle of fleets for sea dominance.

Ottomans ordered a variety of torpedo boats from the French and the German shipyards.³⁴ Moreover, Greece's naval buildup and its relentless efforts for *enosis* (union) with Crete compelled the Ottomans to rejuvenate their aging fleet with German technical aid (Panzac, 2018, pp. 377-389).

During his reign, Sultan Abdülhamid II began to change his attitude towards the Navy by prioritizing its modernization and restructuring of the Naval Academy, mainly due to his concerns about growing Greek irredentism (Ibid., p. 390). Upon this call, Lieutenant Commander Starke was assigned as deputy superintendent of the Naval Academy and inspector responsible for the reformation of the Navy in 1884 and succeeded by Lieutenant Commander Kalau von Hofe in 1892. Both advisors drafted comprehensive reports for the rehabilitation of the Naval Academy, the Naval Shipyard, and the Fleet. Despite the accurateness and appropriateness of their reports, they were not implemented by the naval leadership (Soydemir, 2007, p. 10).

During the 1897 War, the Ottoman Navy assembled in Çanakkale but failed a combat readiness inspection by the British and the German advisors, namely Woods and Von Hofe. The fleet was proved not to be combat-ready due to inadequate shipyard level maintenance and poor personnel training. Hence, Admiral Von Hofe recommended, in cooperation with some Ottoman officers, fleet modernization by urgently procuring three battleships, six protected (armored) cruisers, and two torpedo destroyers rather than repairing aging ships (Rahmi, 1324 (1908), pp. 35-57). Admiral Von Hofe objected to the procurement of a cruiser (*Mecidiye*) from the US by underpinning the urgency of coastal defense and the utility of armored combatants for this purpose. Upon his suggestion, three armored ships were modernized in Italy and Germany (Şehsuvaroğlu, 1952).

In the 19th century, four British and two German advisory missions were employed in Ottoman Navy for reformation (Düzcü, 2009). They carried out their functions under the supervision of their government and ambassadors in accordance with their national policy

³⁴ Another innovation brought about was a submerged torpedo boat or a submarine designed by a Swedish engineer, Nordenfelt. Ottoman followed the Greeks in acquiring two submarines which were mantled in Istanbul but proved to be inefficient, resulting in the loss of substantial funds.

objectives (Çoker, 1994). They took great strides in designing the Ottoman naval modernization in such a way that would benefit their home countries' shipbuilding industries and for personal profit and status. Foreign advisors, particularly the British served their national cause, i.e., keeping the British naval power be uncontested by containing the naval ambitions of others such as Russia, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire. It was a mechanism devised in 'managing over small and medium powers in the world naval system' (Waltz, 1979, p. 205). The British naval missions, either in their advisory roles or in the operational capacity had been able to limit modernization and combat readiness of navies that they had advised. They could even influence the mindset of naval leadership and shape the outcome of naval battles (Rooney, 1998). The employment of German advisory missions in the Navy in tandem with the policies of Sultan Abdülhamid II while the British missions were still in office resulted in dualism in the minds and practices of naval personnel which persisted until the 1960s (Gencer, 1999).

In the early 20th century, Ottoman naval leaders concentrated their efforts on the modernization of the navy commensurate with the development of naval technology. They had ordered 36 combatants of various types size despite the availability of limited funding. In addition to light cruisers, torpedo cruisers and gunboats were on the shop list along with the overhaul of the aging fleet. Between 1908 and 1914, the Ottomans asked for the formal assignment of British advisors, namely: Admiral Douglas Gamble (February 1909- February 1910), Admiral Hugh Williams (March 1910-April 1912), and Admiral Arthur Limpus (May 1912-September 1914). Although their main function was to oversee the modernization of the navy, they sought to increase British influence at the expense of the Germans and to secure the lion's share for the British naval industry. However, the Ottoman navy fared poorly yet again in the Tripolitanian and the Balkan wars in 1911 and 1912, respectively. The outcome of these defeats was the loss of Libya and the Dodecanese islands to Italians and the rest of the Aegean islands to Greece. The fleet was not even capable of providing escort for troop reinforcements earmarked for

Libya and the Balkans.³⁵ The raid of the Hamidiye cruiser commanded by Rauf Bey (later Orbay) stood as the only recorded achievement of the navy. The success of the Greek cruiser, *Averof*, in a way proved a point the Young Turks attempted to make with their rush to acquire dreadnoughts (Panzac, 2018, pp. 414-464) whereas the British naval mission insisted on a fleet for coastal defense.³⁶

The most notable activity in the Second Constitutional era (*İkinci Meşrutiyet*) was the preparation of naval programs to modernize the fleet either by British advisors or the Navy Council. The Ottoman Navy League (*Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) was established to manage fundraising via public donations for financially supporting naval programs. It also boosted ‘naval mindedness’ in the Ottoman public. The 1910 program called for a coastal defense navy with a maximum of 10,000 tons of armored combatants in its charge. The context of the program displeased naval circles due to its insufficiency to meet potential threats stemming from Greek and Russian naval expansion plans, and was, thus, not accepted. Naval leaders expressed their concerns about the content of the program criticizing that it took the British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the Greek naval supremacy in the Aegean Sea for granted. Such discontent of naval leaders triggered the early retirement of Admiral Gamble, who was succeeded by Admiral Williams. He, however, fully subscribed to his predecessors’ vision for the Ottoman Navy (Besbelli, 1962).

³⁵ After the success of the Ottoman army in the 1897 Ottoman-Greek war, a debate started in the Ottoman military circles between the proponents of rail and sea routes regarding their comparative utility in defense of the homeland as well as their efficiency in reinforcing the battlefield. Ultimately, the army failed in the Balkan wars since the reinforcing troops could not be transported via seaborne routes due to control of the Aegean Sea by the Greek navy (Büyüktuğrul, 2006, pp. 23-24).

³⁶ Büyüktuğrul pointed to two calamities that caused the loss of naval culture and experienced manpower: the Navarino Battle and the confinement of the fleet between 1878 and 1908 in the Golden Horn (1970). These losses caused a disruption of transfer of knowledge and experience (the Ottoman naval heritage) to the subsequent generations. He blamed the mismanagement of Sultan Abdülhamid II for keeping the Navy away from British advisors and for hindering its strategic and tactical development. The Navy could not create its own culture and standard operating procedures, routines, and norms. He also noted the paradox of relying on British naval officers, some of whom were involved in the annihilation of the Ottoman fleet in Çeşme and Navarino, to revitalize the same fleet. According to Büyüktuğrul, the British motivation was to keep away Germans. The British advisors mainly focused on limited training program entailing ship life, discipline, basic maneuvers instead of the live gun and torpedo firings and military planning practices. In such a case, the Ottoman naval cadres seriously lagged behind their contemporaries in other navies (Büyüktuğrul, 1967).

The second naval program crafted in 1912 was centered on six battleships along with 24 destroyers and six submarines and some auxiliary units. This program was implemented by ordering warships from France and Britain, including dreadnoughts. Ultimately, the Ottomans bought two old German armored battleships (former *SMS Brandenburg* class), *Barbaros Hayrettin* and *Turgut Reis*, and ordered three dreadnoughts to British shipyards: *Reşadiye*, *Sultan Osman-ı Evvel*, and *Fatih*. Before the War, an Army general, Cemal Paşa took over the Naval Ministry and restructured the Navy with the help and advice from British naval advisors. Naval personnel who were found inefficient in the Tripolitanian and Balkan wars was purged. In this era, there was a competition for the modernization of the Ottoman Navy between the British and German missions. Nevertheless, the British were still favored over German as many navy officers were sent to the Royal Navy for onboard training (Ibid., p. 78).

After the eruption of the First World War, the Admiralty seized all naval combatants under construction in British shipyards, including the dreadnoughts built for Ottomans. The British move caused anger and distrust in the Ottoman public. The Germans stepped in to substitute them with two cruisers, *SMS Goeben* and *SMS Breslau* which fled from British Mediterranean Fleet. In this era, the Ottoman political leaders which were also army generals were influenced by the German continentalist mindset. Since the *Entente* powers had not ensured its territorial integrity, the Ottoman politicians inclined to Germany and eventually decided to throw their lot with the Germans. Consequently, German admirals assumed the command of the Ottoman fleet. The German-led fleet endeavored for asserting sea control in the Black Sea. However, their contribution to the war effort was limited to supporting coastal defenses in the Çanakkale Strait (Panzac, 2018, pp. 480-90).

The third program of 1916 was predicated on the assumption that the Allied powers would win the First World War. It envisaged a force including six battlecruisers, six light cruisers, 24 destroyers, three submarines, and 50 naval aircraft along with logistics and training facilities. As for the education side, the German influence penetrated the whole schooling and training system (Besbelli, 1962, p. 81). Particularly, the annex to the 1916 program illustrated well the strategic justification for a high seafaring navy instead of a coastal defense one. Its wording reflected not only the farsightedness and prudence of its

drafters but also displayed a commitment to ‘sea control and seaborne trade protection’ as the maturing 'organizational essence' of naval circles. Such essence or identity was formed through experience and the lessons learned in combat along with cultural interaction with the world naval system. During the war, Admiral Hoffman of the German Naval Mission prepared another program that provided for a smaller coastal defense-type navy. His advice was rejected by the Minister of the Navy, Cemal Paşa, except for the parts in which he recommended the fortifications of the Straits (Ibid., p. 84).

Overall, the Ottoman politicians could be credited with trying hard to provide funds for the Navy whose combat performance was frustrating mostly due to inefficient and unskilled manpower. However, these issues paled in comparison to the overbearing effect of an ill-conceived strategy in disregard of technological advances, emerging weaponry, and tactics.³⁷

Emily Goldman (2002) studied the reform efforts of the Ottoman Empire which coincided with the aftermaths of major military defeats. She asserted that although the leadership admitted the inevitability of change, even the most reform-minded ones were not committed to fully adopting the Western principles.³⁸ Paradoxically, they endeavored to

³⁷ Büyüktuğrul (1967) drew attention to two serious obstacles to naval modernization efforts: The Ottoman Ministry of War and British naval missions. The latter was not in favor of warships over 10,000 tons, while the world naval system was racing for ‘castles of steel at sea’, i.e., dreadnoughts. The former naturally favored the Army in the allocation of limited budgetary funds. Büyüktuğrul published a classified report prepared by Ottoman naval officers that contradicted the views of the Ministry of War and the British Naval Mission. The report advocated a naval modernization program to build a high seafaring navy to exert sea control and safeguard seaborne trade rather than coastal defense of the long coastline and overseas territories in support of national foreign and security policy objectives.

³⁸ Goldman (2002) also attempted to account for the “half-hearted nature of reformation efforts” based on prestige and legitimacy. Since the desire was low, adoption was confined to the units involved and the type of reforms implemented. Instead of encompassing the whole body of the military, reforms influenced mostly technical branches and newly formed units (Shaw, 1971, pp. 6-7). The Ottoman military was more receptive to the adoption of modern technologies and the standardized training of units, but more resistant to “changes in the organization, administration, and training” or “reform in appointments, promotions, and secular education”. Though military leadership pushed hard for the adoption of the European military model due to strategic necessity, the politicians were “not strongly committed to reform because the assimilation of Western models would not enhance state legitimacy rather undermine the state’s traditionalist and religious roots”. The Western practices and norms clashed with the conservative and pious basis of Ottoman culture. Thus, the threat perceived from modernization to the Ottoman style of life resulted in “a partial and superficial diffusion from West to East” during a protracted process that spanned two centuries. After the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, foreign (i.e., Western) ideas and institutions were adopted by the young Republic of Turkey (Goldman, 2002).

preserve the extant medieval order while restoring the current traditional political system. Proponents of the reform advocated emulating the practices and structures of the ‘infidel’ enemy based on reciprocation, but opponents prevailed in curtailing the transformation (Levi, 1971).

2.4.2. Establishment of the Fleet of the Republic

The Republican fleet inherited the remnants of the Ottoman fleet after the War of Liberation, but not the Ministry of Navy. Initially, it was organized as a subordinate branch of the General Staff. The domestic and international factors affected the naval build-up and reformation efforts in the era. The emerging maritime security environment in the 1920s, particularly the challenges that stemmed from the Soviet Union in the Black Sea and Greece in the Aegean Sea impacted the structure of the navy that was in urgent need of maintenance and rejuvenation.

Reinforced by the inherited ‘naval mindedness’ of the Ottoman public, the Republican naval leadership intended to revive naval programs set in the previous era (Büyüktuğrul, 1967). However, the political climate even caused the shift of funds from the abolished Navy League to the build-up of airpower due to new priorities set by the General Staff. The domestic power struggles also influenced the revival of the Navy, which was considered as “an institution with questionable pro-republican credentials”. Furthermore, the apprehensions about the influence of Rauf Orbay in naval circles resulted in an army-dominated military. The purges to convert the navy to a republican institution hampered the institutional culture and human resources. The establishment of a naval ministry in 1924 brought new optimism for the revival of the navy. A modest modernization program was devised around the battlecruiser *Yavuz* and aging units aiming at a combat-ready fleet

through extensive training at sea. A German naval advisory mission³⁹ was also employed to supervise the restructuring and training (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003).

Between two competing naval strategies of the era, a high seafaring navy with battleships was advocated by the Republican naval circles. On the other hand, a coastal defense navy based on submarine and mine warfare along with the support of army operations was favored by the General Staff. Budgetary restraints along with an army-dominated General Staff preferring coastal defense determined the outcome. The eruption of the Mosul crisis and increasing Italian aggressiveness also worked in favor of submarine and airpower. Whereas aircraft and aviator rose as the symbols of progress and power for the newly forming republican identity of Turkey, only the battlecruiser *Yavuz* could compete ‘in capturing the hearts and minds of Turkish public’ (Besbelli, 1972).

Naval disarmament imposed by the Washington Treaty was another constraining factor in the fleet build-up on the Aegean Sea (Hatzivassiliou, 1998) which Turkey disregarded due to ongoing Soviet programs, despite the General Staff ‘confided’ to British Admiralty the other way around (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003). In such a conjuncture, Turkey refused a Greek proposal for a ‘naval holiday’ due to Soviet naval expansion in the north (Rimanelli, 1997, pp. 500-6).

In this era, Turkey’s government hired German advisors to oversee the revitalization of the Navy. However, the military was attentive to clearly defining the role and status of advisors due to previous experience with similar missions. The preference for German advisors also brought to the fore the split between the protagonists of ‘German School’ and ‘British School’ in the Navy. The head of the German advisory mission, Admiral Von Gager, hinted at his approach to naval revival via developing a coastal defense fleet that was in line with the General Staff’s conception of sea power. Eventually, the German advisors came up with a program consisting of a battleship squadron of eight units

³⁹ Büyüktuğrul (1970) praised the cultural activity initiated by German advisors who reported to the commander of the fleet, not autonomous like former British missions. Training at sea along with the improvement of standard procedures, routines, norms, and situation estimations developed the culture of the navy which was reflected in the Navy’s combat readiness. The reconditioning of the battlecruiser *Yavuz* along with the newly procured ships boosted the morale of naval personnel which reached a cultural peak with the inauguration of the Naval War College in 1930 to train naval staff officers.

supplemented by eight destroyers (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003). Meanwhile, the reconditioning of *Yavuz* did not proceed smoothly due to personal rivalries and interservice power struggles (Koçer, 2008).

Considering the emerging security perceptions, the government ordered two destroyers, two submarines, and several lighter units from Italy. Apprehensive of Turkish naval expansion, the Soviets responded by deploying one battleship and one cruiser from the Baltic Fleet to the Black Sea. Greece ordered two destroyers from Italy to preserve the regional naval equilibrium. The seas got calm after concluding protocols with Greeks and the Soviets in 1930 and 1931 respectively (Cable, 1994, p. 168). In the context of these developments, Turkish naval officers began to mature in commanding and upkeeping the fleet. Several officers were sent abroad. Overall, the Turkish Navy was aiming to increase its cultural interaction with the worldwide naval system⁴⁰ (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003).

Concurrently, the Naval War College was inaugurated in 1930 for staff training with a curriculum that was designed by German instructors. As such it consolidated German influence in the Turkish Navy's ranks until 1939 (Büyüktuğrul, 1970).⁴¹ After the finalization of naval contracts, Italy turned out to be a threat due to Mussolini's aggressive policies. Ankara decided to inaugurate a new naval program mainly to tackle the Italian threat. The defense of the Straits, particularly Çanakkale became the primary concern in Turkish defense circles. Although the submarine procurement was prioritized in the new program due to the coastal defense mindset in the naval strategy, both political and military leadership began to appreciate the utility of a major surface fleet. Such thinking was primarily for the protection of the seaborne trade and accepted by British counterparts in principle. The demilitarized status of the Straits was changed through the signing of the Montreux Convention, on July 20th, 1936. This move was considered a political triumph of Turkish diplomacy by exploiting the shifting winds of the security environment (Büyüktuğrul, 1967).

⁴⁰ Between 1928 and 1934, 19 junior officers were sent abroad for training in France, Italy, Britain, Germany and the US (Büyüktuğrul, 1967, p. 13)

⁴¹ As noted by Admiral Büyüktuğrul (1970), a new generation of naval officers began to voice more vocally their views on strategy and management of naval affairs.

After the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the naval program was expanded to include two battlecruisers over 10,000 tons and 12 destroyers, and 30 submarines of many sizes and shared with the British Admiralty. Since the British did not support urgent deliveries, the procurement of cruisers was planned for 1941 and 1945 successively while keeping the battle cruiser *Yavuz* operational in the period. However, this program would never be materialized since the suppliers gave priority to their national war-fighting capabilities (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003). The commonality in the procurement efforts of Turkey was its firm standing against the suppliers retaining political and military influence over the state. Moreover, the legacy of this ambitious naval program survived well into the early 1950s when Turkey became a NATO member (Özak, 1954, p. 28).

Overall, the naval strategy and modernization in this era were primarily crafted by the General Staff, which was controlled by continentalist-minded army generals of the ‘German School’. Nevertheless, the Italian threat brought to the fore the need to acquire major surface combatants. The fleet's deployment to Malta and Piraeus, supposedly to return the courtesy of King Edward of Britain, was a somewhat risky exercise of gunboat diplomacy against the Italian aggression. The Turkish Navy has never given up hope on acquiring a cruiser to replace the battlecruiser *Yavuz*. The Navy managed to enlist President Celal Bayar’s support for their cause. He asked for a cruiser from the US during his official visit in 1954. Cruiser acquisition was later brought up in the parliamentary debates on the defense budget in 1955 (Büyüktuğrul, 2005).

2.5.ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN CULTURAL ADAPTION

In her examination of the growth and development of the nation-state, Martha Finnemore (1993) concludes that institutional theory has brought to the fore the role of organizations as “teachers of norms”. In world military history, only NATO and the former Warsaw Pact (during the Cold War) have been considered such formal multinational organizations with a significant standardizing effect. DiMaggio suggests that institutional theory has underpinned the significant role of cultural processes in both the advent and the proliferation of organizational forms. These roles include but are not limited to, “the development of a unique professional identity, the development of a theorized body of

knowledge, the development of professional organizations, increases in the density of inter-organizational contacts between professionals, increases in the flow of the information, and the emergence of a collective definition of the field” (2012). Moreover, Eyre and Suchman attempt to explain the development of transnational linkages, rather than a national one, within the military profession. They identify two sets of connections between military professionals that transcend national boundaries. The practices in the first category embrace the exchange of military officers as attaches and observers, and the education of exchange officers in military schools which has been carried out between developed and developing nations for centuries (1996, p. 111). Indeed, the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey have not been an exception to this practice. In fact, this exercise picked up substantially in the post-Cold War Era.⁴² The Turkish Navy has also been sending officers to war and staff colleges in the US, Britain, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh based on the principle of reciprocity. Besides, the Turkish Navy has been sending officers to top universities abroad and particularly to the US Naval Postgraduate School for postgraduate education mainly in engineering fields. The second major set of connections refers to the development of international defense literature.⁴³ In sum, as Eyre and Suchman suggest that such mechanisms through which cultural models might be transmitted and the cultural interaction of a nation with this environment results “in assertion and

⁴² First international students from Tunisia and Iran admitted to the Naval Academy in 1967-68 academic year (Sayacı, 1997). Between 1970 and 1990, 173 officers of four different countries graduated from Turkish Naval Academy. All but three of them were from Libya. The end of the Cold War brought diversity to the Naval Academy’s student profile with 119 international students from eight different countries including Pakistan, Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Albania, Jordan, and Georgia until 2007. On the other hand, the Turkish Navy had only sent midshipmen to the US Naval Academy. The only exception was a cadet who was sent to South Korean Naval Academy in 2016 on the basis of reciprocity. The reluctance to send Turkish cadets abroad for education is largely due to differences in the curriculum and rather cumbersome bureaucracy of getting foreign diplomas recognized by the Higher Education Council (YÖK) of Turkey (Yücer, 2007).

⁴³ A case in point for this transnational connection, a simple count of the articles in the Turkish naval journal (*Donanma Dergisi*) from April 1948 (No.383) to January 1953 (No.402) shows that 88 of a total of 227 articles were translated from mostly the US and British naval magazines, particularly from the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. This journal continued to publish articles translated or compiled from foreign sources yet their numbers decline substantially. At any rate, their appearance in such high numbers in the overall content of the Turkish naval journal is an indicator of sheer volume of naval knowledge transferred from the leading allied navies which contributed to the development of a cultural environment, particularly during a period of transition that the Turkish Navy was restructured and reorganized by a US naval mission under the auspices of Marshall plan.

authentication of its sovereign status with the ultimate symbol of nationhood, a military” (1996, p. 113).

2.5.1. Entry into NATO and the Turkish Navy’s transformation

Turkey’s admission to NATO in 1952 added momentum to the transfer of surface and subsurface combatants to the Turkish Navy from the US and other NATO members. In parallel, reform was pursued in all aspects of the service, including organization, training, personnel, technics, and logistics in order to transform the Turkish Navy into a modern naval force by emulating and adopting the US model (Uslu, 2000, p. 100). The defense and control responsibility of the Turkish Straits was accorded to the Turkish Navy by the General Staff. After 1952, all war plans were reviewed and revised accordingly. And all norms, routines, and operating procedures were revised, rewritten, or directly translated from their US equivalents. Naval training directives were also modified to ensure the combat readiness of the fleet through a phased drill program covering unit-level all the way to task force (Tunaboğlu, 2008, pp. 70-71). Overall, with the American Military aid, the Turkish military education and training system was organized along with the American model either by adapting the extant institutions or by establishing new ones (Ibid., p. 215).⁴⁴

The Navy Chief became a dual-hatted NATO commander, ‘Commander, Northeast Mediterranean Area (COMEDNOREAST)’ and ‘Commander Submarine Northeast Mediterranean (COMSUBMEDNOREAST)’ in addition to his national capacity. Except for the units dedicated to the defense of the Straits, such as minelayers and minesweepers, fast attack, and patrol boats, the bulk of the Fleet were earmarked for or assigned to NATO (Ibid., p. 72). Moreover, NATO and bilateral exercises accelerated the process of adopting and espousing NATO procedures. Training provided by the

⁴⁴ To improve the combat readiness of the fleet, the Fleet Training Team Development Center (*Yıldızlar Süüstü Eğitim Merkezi Komutanlığı*) was established in Gölcük (Ibid., p. 74). In 1964, Petty Officer Preparation School was restructured from secondary to tertiary education institution level in order to provide basic education on the technological advancements in the Navy (TNFC, 2015). In Yassıada, a comprehensive training and school facility was established to meet the vocational training needs of the officers and the petty officers.

Americans either in-country or abroad (in the US) was also instrumental in this regard. However, the whole American aid reduced the function of the Turkish Navy to a highly specific mission in coastal defense to delay a potential Soviet attack until the arrival of the NATO reinforcements.

After the 1950s, the staff education system was aligned with the American staff and war college system. Also, the joint war college was introduced. The American instructors were employed along with the British instructors. The latter continued to serve in the Naval War College until 1956.⁴⁵ After the 1960s, the practice of employing foreign instructors in the college was abandoned (Ibid, pp. IV-E-2-3).

After 1953, the Naval Academy switched to a new curriculum based on the 'line' system of the US Navy. This system was meant to produce graduates who could be assigned to any shipborne or shore-based positions throughout their career without prejudice to their eligibility for ship command duties. A training flotilla was activated for the sea training of midshipmen at sea. After the 1950s, open sea training with school ships started for the graduating class, including foreign port visits. Interestingly, the Open Sea Exercise of 1952 planned to the Indian Ocean, including port visits to Karachi and Bombay (Tunaboğlu, 2008, p. 48).

In this early Cold War period, the Turkish Navy was equipped, advised, and organized by the US Mission in accordance with the primary tasking of the Alliance, i.e., the protection of the Turkish Straits, which were one of the vital choke points for NATO. In other words, it was tasked with the denial of Soviet Control over the Straits (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 3). Basically, the Turkish Navy was structured to delay a Soviet attack until the arrival of the reinforcements from the US/NATO (NARA, 1954, p. 1), whereas the Turkish Army was tasked to ensure continued resistance to Soviet pressure from the Balkans and the Caucasus. Mainly to wage coastal defense warfare, the force posture called for smaller destroyers, fast attack boats, minesweepers and minelayers,

⁴⁵ Following the inception of the Second World War, German instructors left the Naval War College (NWC) on December 25th, 1939 where they taught from 1880 onwards (Işın, 2006, p. 43). The curriculum of the Naval War College shifted from the German to the British School by employing British Instructors after 1942 (DHA, 1988, pp. V-E-2).

submarines, and coastal defense units along with the supporting logistic structure. Sea control-type tasks with the protection of sea lanes of communication were a shared responsibility to be undertaken by the US and Britain (Kaplan, 1980; Güvenç, 2015, p. 104). Such a division of labor within the Alliance meant that the Turkish Navy had to give up on its top priority mission since 1923 (NAFO, 1997). Inevitably, Turkey's demands to build an effective naval force had not been supported by the US which refused to transfer larger combatants, such as cruisers and destroyers. Moreover, the aging battlecruiser *Yavuz* was excluded from the scope of US military aid (NARA, 1953, p. 2). In view of the US's refusal to supply larger warships, Ankara turned to Britain to purchase four destroyers in 1959.⁴⁶

Throughout the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union had to make significant commitments to ensure the defense of their small power allies. Any hesitation or indecision by one side, due to any conceptual and doctrinal change affecting deterrence posture, would have signaled its weakness in resolve and capacity which would have been taken into consideration by the other side in subsequent de-aligning. These dynamics emerged mainly because of the structural characteristics of anarchy regardless of individual states' intentions (Jervis, 1976, pp. 58-67). During the 1962 Cuban crisis, the removal of Jupiter missiles by the US without prior consultation caused Turkey to question the reliability of the Alliance (Güvenç, 2004, p. 906).

In the early 1960s, the transformation of NATO's strategy from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" resulted in policy changes in the character of military aid to Turkey, from donations to foreign military sales (FMS) credits. Turkey was strained under the burden of procuring weapons and equipment dictated by this strategic shift. Nevertheless, it facilitated the creation and development of expeditionary capabilities in the form of marine, commando, and airborne units, airlift capability, and amphibious landing fleet. Such capabilities would be useful in national contingencies as well (Güvenç, 2015, p. 104).

⁴⁶ Four of *Paşa (Milne)*-class destroyer were transferred, namely *Alparslan*, *Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak*, *Kılıç Ali Paşa* and *Piyale Paşa* (TNFC, 2005).

In the late 1950s and early 1960, a series of events led to a re-consideration of Turkey's military and naval priorities. Included among them were the Cyprus problem, Greece's attendant assertiveness in the maritime domain, and finally the deployment of the SOVMEDRON⁴⁷ in the Mediterranean after the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958. At the height of the Greek Cypriot attacks on the Turkish Cypriots on the island in 1964, Ankara contemplated military intervention which was forestalled by a letter⁴⁸ from US President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu (1966). The Johnson letter marked a turning point in US-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey views of NATO, and finally Turkish threat perceptions in the age of Superpower *détente*. Against this background, Turkey's economy began to take off in the 1960s. The consequent growth in the volume of seaborne trade necessitated the accommodation of safeguarding of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the Eastern Mediterranean into the mission repertoire of the Turkish Navy. In the process, the center of gravity in Turkish naval calculations moved towards the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Navy significantly revised its command, force, and logistic structures and deployment plans.⁴⁹ It also embarked on a new naval expansion in pursuit of more nationally centered goals. It is argued that the Cyprus problem compromised Turkey's contribution to NATO in two ways. The first was the regional rivalry between the two allies which impeded the proper functioning of the Alliance. The second was Turkey's allocation of some of its forces to

⁴⁸ SLOCs: Sea Lines of Communication (or sea lanes of communication) are the routes used by the merchant ships for maritime shipping, and also known as maritime highways, seaborne trade routes, maritime trade routes.

⁴⁹ Güvenç (2004, p. 906) argues that the overlapping of the envisaged force structure of NATO's flexible response strategy, which required the acquisition of maneuvering elements based on operational capability, with the partial transformation need in Turkish military capacity to the same way which enforced by the emerging foreign policy dynamics of Turkey, i.e., the Cyprus Issue and the sovereignty disputes in the Aegean Sea. In this period, the Turkish Navy acquired 5 *Fletcher*- and 8 *Gearing*-class destroyers along with 3 LSTs, 6 LCTs, 4 LCUs from the US and the Britain, and built many LCTs/LCMs in naval/civilian shipyards, established an amphibious regiment and UDT/SEAL (SAS/SAT) which enabled an amphibious capacity. Its sisters, the Turkish Land Forces founded high maneuvering units like airborne and commando brigades which facilitated an airborne capacity along with transport aircraft and helicopters. Even, the transfer of a cruiser, *USS Springfield* was at stake in this era to accommodate instead of *Yavuz* battle cruiser at the first half of 1974 which was personally supported by Henry Kissinger.

national contingencies such as a prospective intervention in Cyprus away from NATO contingencies (DePorte, 1986: pp. 229-243).

In the late 1960 and the early 1970s, the regional security dynamics began to be shaped profoundly by the rivalry between Turkey and Greece. This rivalry prompted an arms race that could not be sustained solely with weapons and equipment supplied by the US.⁵⁰ Consequently, public campaigns were organized on both sides to raise funds from individual and collective donations to procure additional arms.⁵¹ Again on both sides, the press fanned the flames of enmity and politicians contributed to the tension with their bellicose rhetoric. In Turkey, the public campaign to fund new naval units was led by the press. The effort eventually culminated in the Republican reincarnation of “the Navy League”⁵² to support the Turkish Navy (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 120). Besides the efforts of the Turkish Navy League which focused on building landing vessels and escort destroyers, the transfer of more capable destroyer and landing ships from the US to facilitate more effective participation in NATO on-call forces⁵³ enhanced the operational effectiveness and the power projection capability of the Turkish Navy.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ In his extensive survey of literature focused on Greece-Turkey arms race, Jurgen Brauer (2002, p. 103) concludes that there may have been an arms race between the rivals, but it probably ceased in the mid-to-late 1980s.

⁵¹ A series of articles, prompted by naval leadership behind the curtains, appeared on the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* starting on May 5th, 1965 penned by Yılmaz Çetiner heralding the inauguration of a public campaign “*Başkalarının Vermediğini Millet Yapar (Nation Builds Whatever Undelivered by Others)*”. The articles elaborated on the lack of capabilities to project power to the island of Cyprus, the insufficiency of capacity to uphold national interests and the unbalance of power between Turkey and Greece (1965).

⁵² In 1972, the Turkish Navy League turned into a foundation to use donated funds more efficiently.

⁵³ Admiral Biren stated that Turkish eagerness but incapacity due to lack of high seafaring platforms was conveyed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US in a NATO meeting which later triggered the transfer of three *Fletcher*-class destroyers to the Turkish Navy. Interview with Admiral Işık Biren, January 31st, 2020, İstanbul, Annex B p. 107.

⁵⁴ The US had covertly impeded restrictions to ships transfers to Turkey, particularly refrained from the transfer of *Fletcher*-class frigates, six of which loaned to Greece well before between 1959 and 1962 when Turkey turned to Britain to procure four *Paşa (Milne)*-class destroyers. Turkey received two *Fletcher*-class in 1967 and later three in 1970. The imbalance of power against Greece, particularly the lack of amphibious capability, the inadequacy of surface and subsurface combatants, topped the agenda of the Turkish Navy League which launched a donation campaign, “*Atatürk Filotillası (the Flotilla of Atatürk)*” on November 15th, 1970, distinctively to improve offensive capabilities of the Fleet (Engin, 1970). A special law (The Decree dated June 6th, 1971 numbered 1417) was approved by the Parliament for authorizing the Ministry of National Defense to allocate a total of 500 million TL for procuring platforms, equipment, and weaponry from abroad up to 100 million TL on an annual basis.

Following the sinking of Israeli destroyer *Eliat* by a Styx guided missile fired from Egyptian *Komar*-class fast attack craft in October 1967, which was the first time that a much larger ship hit by a relatively surface small craft with a guided missile, many navies subscribed to efforts for procuring fast attack craft armed with guided missiles (West, 2010). Greece and Turkey followed the trend of the era, the guided missiles topped their procurement lists. Germany then figured prominently as a reliable alternative arms supplier to both countries. German companies were known to be more accommodating to customers' expectations for technology and know-how transfers through joint ventures.⁵⁵ Both countries, after 1974, diversified away from relying solely on the US as their major arms supplier (Brauer, 2002, p. 107) which implemented a seven-to-ten ratio in the supply of the American equipment to Greece and Turkey (Veremis, 1983, p. 137) due to legislation passed by the US Congress. Greece was the first country in the Mediterranean basin which ordered *Combattante-II* fast attack craft equipped with Exocet guided missiles from France. It later ordered Type 209 *Glafkos*-class diesel submarines from Germany.⁵⁶ In response, Turkey first armed *Kartal (Jaguar)*-class fast craft with Norwegian Penguin guided missiles, and then launched projects to build Type 148 *Doğan*-class guided-missile equipped fast attack boats and Type 209 *Ay*-class submarines with German shipbuilders.⁵⁷

An attempt by the Greek junta to topple down the government in Cyprus by its proxies forced Turkey to take unilateral action to protect the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community. The other guarantor, Britain, chose inaction in order not to be seen as taking

⁵⁵ Interview with Admiral Mustafa Özbey, September 10th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 18.

⁵⁶ A review of sources like *Jane's Fighting Ships* revealed that Greece was the first at the transfer of more modern and capable platforms and weaponry, be it the *La Combatante II* fast craft with Exocet guided missiles in 1971, the Type 209 class submarines in 1972, the *Elli (Kortenaar)*-class frigates and followed by Turkey after five years with Type 148 *Doğan* class fast craft fitted with Harpoon missiles in 1977-1980, Type 209 *Ay*-class submarines in 1976-1981 and the first MEKO-class frigate *Yavuz* in 1987 (Güvenç & Egelı, 2016).

⁵⁷ Jeremy Stöhs argues that Turkish procurement from Germany is not by chance considering the similar roles given both navies by NATO, to secure the exit of the Soviet Fleet to open waters, be it through Baltic straits or Turkish Straits. Resultantly, two naval forces developed similar strategies and capabilities. At late 1980s, the Turkish Fleet consisted of 6 German design Type-209 submarines, 4 MEKO 200 *Yavuz*-class frigates, 22 German design fast attack craft as well as smaller vessels solely designed for territorial defense (2018a, p. 111).

sides.⁵⁸ However, the American embargo imposed right after substantially hampered the modernization efforts of the Turkish Military which was at the threshold of a technological leap. Turkey tried to revise its security policy into a relatively more independent and national priority-based conception, one of the significant pillars of which was the foundation of the national defense industries (Güvenç, 2004, pp. 909-911). In the aftermath, the relations with Greece took precedence in Turkish foreign policy due to proliferation of disputes that required the use, or the threat of use, of force, given the foremost priority a potential expansion of Greek territorial waters at the Aegean Sea (which was considered *casus belli* (Elekdağ, 1994, p. 8)). Meanwhile, the Navy continued to take necessary measures against the increased aggressiveness of Greece, including some relocations of its command and force structure.

In the 1980s, based on substantial investment in advanced weaponry and systems, NATO put into effect its 'Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA)' doctrine following the US's 'air-land battle' conception in the Reagan era which the Soviet Union could not match economically, militarily, and technologically. Consequently, a milder and younger leader in Moscow made it easier for both sides to inaugurate talks on limitations of conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) and to sign an agreement on the reduction in Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) which annoyed political circles in Ankara (Güvenç, 2015, p. 109).

During this period, Turkey and Greece had been engaged in competition on sovereignty disputes in the Aegean Sea while the naval presence of the US enabled them to organize their forces against each other, not for an east-west conflict. This rivalry was reflected in their threat perceptions and inevitably triggered an arms race between the two. In the 1980s, while enhancing its 'littoral warfare capabilities' with *Doğan/Rüzgar-class* fast

⁵⁸ The Cyprus Crisis had also profound effects on the international level. Notably, the Soviet Union was in favor of an independent Cyprus and was supporting the Makarios government because his policies were in line with the Soviet's interest in the Mediterranean, given the geostrategic position of the island controlling the approaches of the Suez Canal and providing reach to the Middle East and other Eastern Mediterranean littorals which already deliver this capacity to the Britain via its sovereign bases on the island (Tunaboylu, 2008, p. 113). The Soviets objected to the 1974 Turkish intervention since Cyprus could become a NATO base due to the presence of the Turkish military. On the other hand, the leaving of Greece from NATO's integrated military structure had negative effects on the defense of the southern flank of the Alliance which had been eventually applauded by the Soviet Union.

attack boat projects, the Turkish Navy inaugurated MEKO Track I/IIA-class frigate and *Ay/Prevezze*-class submarine projects to enhance its posture to the ‘sea control’ level without substantial attention to force-multipliers. Although the US relatively increased its military sales in this era, the technological level of the platforms was far away from meeting the operational needs of the Turkish Navy in littoral warfare and ‘sea control’ roles. Consequently, Turkey sought to diversify its defense suppliers and to develop a domestic defense industry after the 1970s.

The escalating rivalry between Greece and Turkey in the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean after 1974 turned Greece into public enemy number one for Turkey. The Greek efforts, particularly modernization of its air force and navy were countered by reciprocal modernization efforts of Turkey, which eventually led to a regional power equilibrium in the late 1980s (Güvenç, 1998, p. 153).

The fall of the Berlin wall marked a breakthrough in the international order, from a bipolar world to a unipolar one, which had a fundamental impact on foreign policy behaviors of states. Such systemic breakup could be used in explaining the growing tendency of Turkey in resorting to the use of force for the attainment of its foreign policy goals. But both the altering domestic policy dynamics and also the influence of Turkey’s military establishment on the designing of foreign and domestic policy should be taken into account as well (Güvenç, 2004, p. 914).

2.5.2. NATO’s transformation and its influence on the Turkish Navy

NATO, as the winner of the Cold War, had felt compelled to change in order to cope with the challenges of the emerging security environment. Though the Alliance had been expected to “go out of business” in the aftermath of the Cold War, it emerged as “the primary security institution in Europe” (Terriff, 2002, p. 91), even in the globe. The transformation of NATO after the 1990s profoundly affected and stimulated change in other nations’ armed forces. As a long-time member of NATO, Turkey’s military adapted itself to the transformation wave in tandem with its national interest.

The Alliance reacted to the changes in the worldwide security environment in two broad stages. First, NATO revised and promulgated its new strategic concept, including its new aims and missions, particularly adding out-of-area operations to its range of responsibilities. In other words, collective security was added to its main function of collective defense. Second, the Alliance modified its command and force structure accordingly (Terriff, 2002, pp. 96-97). Terriff (pp. 100) asserts that the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept had been the cornerstone of changes in the Alliance's military structure. The CJTF concept is basically "a command-and-control mechanism designed to facilitate the generation of a deployable multinational task force" (MNTF) for specific contingency operations. It was intended to "permanently institutionalize the MNTF which has always been a temporary command and arrangement employed by ad-hoc coalitions" (Barry, 1996). NATO brought forward the need for capabilities of greater flexibility, versatility, and mobility to cope with "the new order of military risks and crises management tasks". In the new force structure, NATO emphasized: "being able to integrate the military contributions of smaller nations that could no longer field stand-alone forces" (Eide, 1992, pp. 8-10). The course of events following the 1992 Bosnian crisis dragged NATO into providing assets to the UN military mission in Bosnia. The CJTF concept was also instrumental to shift NATO's defense planning to a capability-based approach. It also allowed for variable national participation, including non-alliance states (Terriff, 2002, p. 106).

In the context of normative isomorphism, NATO, as a professional network that spans across military organizations, serves a platform for the development of common norms and procedures, and also a venue facilitating the transfer of new models. NATO's military structure provides a network for the intermixing of personnel from member states' militaries that were assigned to the posts in the peace establishment of the integrated military structure (Ibid., p. 107). Regardless of their nationality, personnel assigned to NATO positions interact with people from other member states in their working environment. Such a multinational milieu also enables acquaintance with different ways of thinking and alternative ways of practicing besides basically adjusting to NATO procedures and culture. As all military personnel seconded to the Alliance from their

national organizations for a certain period of assignment, “a high degree of cross-fertilization and socialization among military officers occurs” (Ibid., p. 108).

The same approach also holds for the personnel of military units who engages in the Alliance’s joint exercises. As regards, Terriff (2002, p. 108) relates the diffusion of the CJTF concept among the ranks and personnel of NATO to their interaction with their American counterparts. The US practice of adaptive force packages emulated by NATO in the form of the CJTF concept in the foggy aftermath of the Cold War, particularly partaking in out-of-area operations.

Since the adaptive force package concept evolved as the organizing principle in generating an intervention force, the other states have adopted it as well simply to impart legitimacy. Thus, in time middle powers such as Britain and France imitated the concept in the first place, while the smaller states lacking significant defense resources endeavored in adapting the concept to provide “a degree of international and domestic legitimacy, or because they are isomorphically forced to do so”. NATO applied the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept to its force structure in the form of the NATO Response Force (NRF), which means that sea, land, and air components from a multitude of countries are all united in the concept (Ibid., pp. 112-115).

In this regard, the 1997 ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy also emphasizes the profound need for “joint operations” with the participation of two or more services to cope with the emerging security risks (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 12). Furthermore, it envisaged exclusively to partake in regional and international stability operations under the auspices of the UN or within NATO in the context of cooperation objective and to develop a relevant force structure. Turkish military actively and eagerly participated in multinational stability operations under the auspices of the UN while developing cross-border and overseas operational capacity (Güvenç, 2015, p. 111). In line with the mechanisms above, the Alliance membership resulted in the fundamental revision of all concepts, doctrines, force postures, infrastructures, and educational philosophy and institutions of the Turkish Navy as well as the mindset of the Turkish Navy’s personnel.

Maritime operations are also instrumental in projecting security norms and enlisting regional allies. Moreover, projecting norms through confidence-building measures, capacity building, and the development of common procedures pave the way toward security communities. In this interaction (Germond, 2015, p. 58), NATO's well-established and globally diffused naval procedures, tactics, and signals facilitate interoperability as well as reinforce the Western model in the naval realm (Tangredi, 2002, p. 27). With many combined operations in the post-Cold war era, such as the ones in the Gulf and the Adriatic Sea, the common usage of NATO procedures along with the experiences and lessons learned from NATO's standing formations have provided the basis for the effective and successful management of the activities (Till, 2018, p. 283).

Although the defense budgets of European nations decreased, interestingly some larger European countries preserved carrier strike and amphibious capabilities as part of the European Amphibious Initiative (EAI).⁵⁹ Later on, middle-sized European navies of France, Britain, Spain, and Italy established maritime deployable headquarters which are designed to command and control assigned forces up to the NATO Task Force level in the context of the NATO Response Force (NATO, 2015). With an LHD in its inventory, Turkey might also join this club of middle powers with maritime deployable headquarters in extending the perspective of cooperation with other navies in the European Amphibious Initiative (TNFC, 2016).

In the post-Cold War era, many Western and some non-western navies, as observed in the PESTEL analysis in ANNEX-C, emphasized the power projection in their strategy documents. The acquisition of amphibious vessels, such as LHA/LHD/LPD heralds the growing interest in expeditionary capacities by a diverse range of countries such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Egypt. Surely, the degree of involvement in force projection is dependent on their political goals, financial constraints, technological base, and military capacity (Germond, 2015, p. 63). Germond categorizes

⁵⁹ The goal of this initiative was to develop "a European capability to project and sustain an embarked amphibious force. Besides, in the context of the European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP), the European navies endeavored to develop interoperable CJTF headquarters. In fact, the EU could have taken and still take the opportunity to develop an EU-led combined task force in the context of the Permanent Established Cooperation (PESCO).

the intensity of the maritime projection in three levels. The capacity of France and Britain corresponds to the comprehensive projection level, whereas Germany's competence is listed as limited projection. Moreover, despite limited resources and apparently fewer international commitments, many small and medium-sized navies also adopted in a way that "downloaded from NATO's strategic concept", the projection narrative particularly as part of multinational operations and multilateral frameworks. Role specialization has been another venue for smaller navies in contributing to larger coalition operations. In sum, all European states have generally focused on the prominence of exploiting seas to project power, in general, to attain security (p. 71). Although the extent of power projection varies with national priorities, the commonality, in all cases, has been the emergence of interoperability and multilateralism as the norm for power projection operations. That is, the prevailing practice in the Post-Cold War era for "most of all small and medium navies" is to follow "a linear evolution path towards having more projection potency, be it autonomously, or in a coalition through interoperability and specialization" Germond concludes that projecting security beyond their territorial waters has been the main discourse of the Western navies (2014, pp. 45-49).

The Turkish Navy has also emulated the emerging norm of projecting security to increase its contribution to multilateral stability and humanitarian operations by aspiring to have a force projection platform in its 1997 strategy (Dz.K.K., 1997). The lessons learned from recent evacuation operations, particularly in Libya in 2011, brought up an urgent need for an LHD/LPD, examples of which were operated effectively by Italy and France.

Since NATO is a maritime alliance, the Turkish Navy actively partakes in NATO activities, exercises, and standing maritime groups. At first, it adhered to translated NATO procedures and tactics. Later, it adapted and revised them for its national use. NATO contributed substantially to the tactical and doctrinal improvement of the Turkish Navy via socialization with other member's navies (Wendt, 1994). Commanding NATO groups enhanced the leadership traits of the Turkish flag officers. NATO missions were regarded as a testbed for measuring levels of training, combat and material readiness, interoperability, endurance, and logistic sustainment of participating combatants, including real war conditions. More importantly, participation in the Alliance activities has allowed the Turkish Navy to operate at high seas and learning advanced practices

related to operations other than coastal defense operations. Most NATO exercises have involved struggling for sea control and protection of sea lanes of communication at high seas which corresponded to the Turkish Navy's main roles and functions.⁶⁰ In sum, the emulation and adaption of NATO, as a relatively high-status organization, has been instructional and instrumental in setting a course to blue waters to protect and represent Turkey's national interests (Farrell & Terriff, 2002).



⁶⁰ As emphasized by the elites in the interviews (Annex B)

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 'TOWARDS BLUE WATERS'

In the course of this study, the applicability of traditional theories of maritime strategy for small and medium-sized navies is reviewed taking into consideration the move of the Turkish Navy to the high seas in the context of the revealed strategy document, 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy as the test case. Till (2003) suggests that such a definition regarding the size of the navy should take into account the size and nature of the fleet, geographic range, function and capability, access to cutting-edge technology, and reputation, but also points that what actually is determinative in sizing is "matching of limited means and aspirations." With the scarcity of resources in supporting the ambitions of maritime strategies, many small and medium-sized navies have taken innovative approaches to overcome the constraints such as multinational cooperation, role specialization, the development of niche capabilities, design compromises, and development of indigenous industrial base to provide the required potency (Mulqueen, et al., 2016, p. 8). At this juncture, Till (2003) warns that "all navies that cannot produce what they need themselves, have vulnerabilities that come with dependence and that dependence will get worse the more they need". In this regard, the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy also elaborates on the course of how the Turkish Navy would proceed in its transformation.

Basil Germond (2014, p. 45) claims that in a ranking system a "small or medium-sized navy" naturally follows a linear evolution path towards more projection capabilities, be it autonomously or in the coalition through interoperability and specialization. During the Cold War, framed with the realistic paradigm, the prevailing concept of security was centered on the state's survival, territorial defense, and national security. Like most Western navies, the Turkish Navy was also integrated with the Euro-Atlantic system of defense, and, in case of war, it could have contributed to the war efforts by securing the Turkish Straits and mainly performing coastal defense tasks. However, later due to deterioration in Turkish-Greek relations and also in Cyprus, the Turkish Navy adjusted its capabilities to balance the Greek Navy and then to sustain an edge in the rivalry. Last but not the least, it developed its amphibious capability to project power to Cyprus whenever needed (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 45).

After the perishing of the Soviet threat, the security agenda widened to include a variety of threats and risks, including non-military ones like economic threats, illegal migration, illegal trafficking, humanitarian assistance, transnational criminality, terrorism, and piracy. This trend eventually led to a transforming discourse that is the projection of security beyond one's boundaries, to tackle the risks and threats as far as possible, at the source, as soon as possible. This dominant discourse shifted the focus of naval missions to projection operations. In this regard, naval multilateralism is a sub-discourse within the course on power projection, which left two alternatives to navies either to develop their own projection capabilities or to take part in multilateral naval cooperation. This is the so-called "noble" role of today's navies, including the Turkish Navy. Overall, the tendency of small navies to get integrated into the multilateral frameworks and coalitions let them contribute to the general effort of projecting security and securing the liberal international order. That is, the emphasis put on the collective final cause rather than individual material considerations which dovetails well with the liberal conception of international relations (Germond, 2014, p. 46).

Turkey's trajectory to become a trading state⁶¹ after adopting liberal economic practices in the early 1980s also introduced an additional challenge to the traditional conception of national security by imposing a broader perspective in the protection of economic interests of Turkey beyond the borders (Kirişçi, 2009). This new paradigm also pronounced itself in building a blue-water navy to perform new tasks and roles in the new liberal international order. Consequently, evolving state culture matched and supported the organizational culture of the Navy aspiring to sail towards high seas with relevant competencies.

⁶¹ Mustafa Altınay claims that "substantial state capacity challenges undermine Turkey's trading state potential. On the external side, the new regional security environment including the civil war in Syria and failed states in the Middle East and North Africa pose enormous challenges to utilize trade and investment as a practical hand in Turkish foreign policy. On the domestic side, Turkey is approaching the middle-income trap that puts the sustainability of its growth and export performance into jeopardy" (2016).

3.1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES IN CRAFTING NAVAL STRATEGY

In the preparation of the 1997 'Towards Blue Waters Strategy', the main objectives of the maritime strategy were determined as cooperation and deterrence. In the light of the above discussions, the deterrence objective fits well with the realistic concept of security, that is, the assurance of state's survival, territorial defense, and national security, and corresponds to the roles and tasks related to national maritime security aimed to dissuade the adversary's will and resolution to wage war (Dz.K.K., 1997). The concept of security and the balance of power, as well as external threat perception of the realist paradigm, could provide insights for the development of a capable blue water navy to cope with such risks and tasks. On the other hand, the projection capability envisaged in the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy surely contributes to the security and cooperation objectives which envision taking part in multilateral missions under the United Nations and NATO mandates in stabilizing the international order.

Most of these new missions are to be executed in peacetime. Besides the realistic understanding of security beyond the borders, the contribution in promoting the international order and peace brings to the fore the introduction of other theoretical approaches. First is the bureaucratic/organizational model due to its relevance to weaponry acquisition. Second is constructivist sociological institutional perspectives due to the role of the Navy's organizational essence in the origination and continuation of the transformation in question.

The research question of this dissertation is to map out the origins, development, and implementation of the Turkish Navy's transformation move. In short, the inquiry is what brought about the 'Towards Blue Waters' initiative of the Turkish Navy and what made it persevere for a period more than three decades and beyond. To answer this query, it is found that the relevant work in literature that endeavored to provide clarifications for change in military strategy and arms procurement cumulated on three rationalist perspectives: the realist models, the bureaucratic politics/organizational behavior model, and the domestic politics model. Another group of research was focused on constructivist work predicated on the evolution and effect of norms in international politics (Wendt, 1999, p. 255).

The realist models would parsimoniously provide the most basic clarifications considering the widely accepted nature of the military as the main instrument of power politics. According to the realist paradigms, military policy and arms procurement could be best understood as states' efforts to secure and improve national interest founded on rational calculations and accessible assets in reaction to exterior inducements (Waltz, 1979). In contrast, the bureaucratic politics/organizational behavior and domestic politics models endeavor to understand choices on military strategy and arms procurement as consequences of competitive relations among different organizations or domestic groups who would endeavor to further the parochial interests of their own groups. That is, they look within states at how military and political actors manipulate state policy to maximize their own organizational autonomy and resource levels (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Halperin & Kanter, 1973). In these models established on a rational actor assumption—either explicitly or implicitly—the main aim of agents is the maximization of utility—either security⁶² or self-gain⁶³—narrowly described in terms of material and political power. While this rationalist assumption provides a foundation for the parsimonious analytical structure, it might hinder the social facts that stemmed from the human motives other than self-interest to be grasped. Furthermore, these models seldom include social perspectives in their analyses.⁶⁴ Most importantly, these rationalist perspectives are not well supported and evidenced in the preliminary work conducted in the context of this research for the case of the Turkish Navy's transformation move. A synopsis of explanations based on rationalist paradigms summarized as follows:

Through the lenses of realism, the threat and risks posed by Greece and the Greek Cypriots in dyadic relations and a quest for being a regional power provide plausible explanations for the Turkish Navy's strategic transformation and expansion. In the 1990s, its focus was the preservation of the *status quo* in the Aegean Sea (S&H, 1994, p. 14) and

⁶² Waltz provides the classic neorealist account of states as power balancers (Waltz, 1979). Explanation on states as power maximizers are found in the works of Randall L. Schweller (1997) and John J. Mearsheimer (2001).

⁶³ Self-gain corresponds to promoting the organizational standing and the organization's share from the resources dedicated to the defense spending (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Halperin, et al., 2006)

⁶⁴ In the literature, there are rationalist studies that venture to include social contexts. As such, O'Neill shows that the policies of rational actors in games are not only influenced by those of other actors, but also shaped by cultural elements such as institutions (1999).

the ensured access through the Aegean trade routes (S&H, 1995, p. 52), but the Eastern Mediterranean was also added to the area of focus in the new millennium. The Turkish Navy has taken many measures to improve its deterrent value vis-à-vis the Greek Navy over which it gained the upper hand after the 1990s. The littoral component of the fleet alongside versatile frigates could explain the maintenance of the balance of power and buildup efforts to a certain extent. However, the envisaged force projection capacity could not be justified only in the scope of the Greek threat. The employment of a (light aircraft carrier, actually an LHD) task group to open a second front against Greece in case of hostilities or to protect seaborne trade in the Central Mediterranean would fall short of justifying the strategic rationale, considering the undersea and airborne threats. Nevertheless, a self-sufficient task group could cut the connection between Greece and the Greek-Cypriot-controlled part of Cyprus which adhered to the ‘Joint Defense Area’ doctrine.⁶⁵

Furthermore, an expeditionary capacity with a multi-purpose amphibious landing platform (LHD) would enhance Turkey’s contribution to an intervention task force as well as a humanitarian one and promote its international standing and credibility (Dz.K.K., 1997; TNFC, 2016). In both strategies, the uninterrupted flow of maritime trade is underlined as vital to sustaining Turkey’s war-fighting capacity. However, the possibility of sustaining it via other modes of transportation, particularly in short-duration conflict, would compromise such a justification. Surely, the flexibility of using high seafaring platforms at low- and high-end tasks would also be plausible in an era in which the competitive high-end missions have been increasing (Stöhs, 2018a, p. xiii). In parallel, the strategic need for blue water platforms in the scope of recent geoeconomics competition is justifiable in the context of escorting Turkish survey and drill activities while deterring others. In sum, the realist paradigms predict the naval expansion and activism in the context of the combined threat posed by Greece and the Greek Cypriots to Turkey’s sovereign rights and maritime interests up to a certain extent. However, building an expeditionary capability backed by overseas bases goes beyond the realist

⁶⁵ In relevant literature, it is also referred as the Single Defense Space (SDS) or Common Defense Space. For the purposes of this thesis, the term “Joint Defense Area” will be used, since it is the one that this concept is described in the official booklet of Hellenic Ministry of Defense (MoD, 2000, p. 34)

predictions. Considering alliance groupings supported by external great powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey cannot stand alone by balancing solitarily with military activism. As such, building coalitions and making allies would be the prudent prediction of realistic paradigms for counterbalancing.

On the northern front, the power hierarchy at the maritime domain drastically changed after 2010 due to the Russian military build-up and its naval projection to the Eastern Mediterranean (Güvenç & Egeli, 2016). The realist discourse calls for external balancing via NATO's "enhanced forward presence" while Turkey persists in regional cooperation and limits NATO to "tailored forward presence" (Hodges, et al., 2020).

The Navy's move towards blue waters brought about in tandem with economic growth in the globalization era. Along with a pressing strategic need to safeguard the economic interests at seas and overseas, the metrics of Turkey's economic growth surely provided and prompted the financial, technological, and industrial basis for the building of more efficient and seaworthy platforms. However, such growth has not been proportionally translated into funds allocated to the Navy's modernization yet. Most of the major naval programs have been substantially delayed while in-country defense industries are maturing. Moreover, the advancement in economic and technological power enables the materialization of a high seafaring navy to safeguard Turkey's worldwide economic interests.

In the context of the bureaucratic/organizational behavior model, the Navy internalized the notion of maintaining capable combatants for sea control and maritime trade protection as its organizational essence and a norm for its regeneration. The Navy strove to promote its standing and budget share in materializing its move towards the blue waters. It relied upon the support of political and military leadership for its cause up to some extent but could not be sufficiently effective in the army-dominated defense decision-making circles until 2016. Lately, the Turkish Navy's 'Blue Homeland' doctrine has been embraced by the government as a foreign and security policy discourse. The incumbent president publicly expressed his support for the Turkish Navy's modernization programs and operational conduct, including force projection elements. To this date, this discursive support has not been translated into the promotion of its standing and budget

share in contrast to what the bureaucratic/organizational model would predict. The delays in major combatant construction and upgrade programs have the potential to hamper the Turkish Navy's combat and material readiness as well as its operational tempo.

In the domestic politics model, a *sui generis* form of the military-industrial complex, comprised of politicians, bureaucracy, military, industrialists who may benefit from a high level of defense spending, may have prompted the Turkish Navy's move. Indeed, Turkey's defense and shipbuilding sectors are relatively small compared to their Western peers with little, if any, direct influence on defense procurement programs, again in contrast to what the domestic political model would predict. Turkey has a centralized weapons procurement process dominated by the state. The modernization programs based on strategic requirements are implemented through the cyclic planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) running in the military side before 2016. Normally, the Ministry of National Defense and the Defense Procurement Agency (SSM) were involved in the process in the procurement phase. So, the system was technically immune to any intervention by the government or lobbying of the military-industrial complex until the decision finalization by the Defense Industries Executive Committee (SSİK).

In fact, the military was leading the budgeting and procurement system until 2013 based on its strategic needs while the Ministry of National Defense and SSM were managing the industrialization phase. As the Ministry of National Defense has become influential in leading the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the government has begun to exert influence in designing a defense industrial policy from 2013 onwards. In accord with the decisions taken in the SSİK, the politicians have favored granting contracts to the companies acting in line with their political leanings.

Due to these limitations of rationalist models, a constructivist sociological institutionalist approach is chosen to make sense of the Turkish Navy's 'Towards Blue Waters' move. In that respect, it is assumed that human behaviors are not basically prompted by the notion of self-interest; instead, they are driven by cultural elements such as institutions, identities, and norms. They are broadly seen and treated as meaning-making activities. Concurrently, the sociological institutionalist approach features the progression and diffusion of norms and institutional routines in transnational organizational areas and

their worldwide impact (Farrell, 2005, p. 450). In the model picked for this dissertation, agents are aware of conformity not only to the identities of the organization and nation to which they belong but also to what other states do in the worldwide community. This model does not reject the outcome of rationalist models that stress different aspects of human behaviors such as self-interest and organizational dynamics. However, as elaborated below, the explanations predicated on the sociological institutionalist model offer conditions in which these aspects play out. In other words, those aspects are effective throughout cultural components.

3.2. THE SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALIST MODEL

As one of the constructivist approaches, the sociological institutionalist model draws on the evolution of the norms in transnational organizational domains which are later diffused in transnational organizational networks and their worldwide effect (Farrell, 2005, p. 450). It tends to define institutionalism wider to contain not only formal rules, but also symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and the moral templates that offer the “meanings of frame” guiding human behavior (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). These kinds of institutions serve as significant cultural aspects that guide human behavior. Especially, the sociological institutionalist approach underpins the socially constructed meanings of practices and objects, such as weaponry, naval combatants, and high-tech navies which symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence. That is, states link high-tech navies and weaponry with their sovereignty, modernity, and social legitimacy (Eyre & Suchman, 1996).

The sociological institutionalist models approach the nature of human behavior sociologically rather than economically. In economic models, agents behave independently with independent goals while their main drive is self-interest for maximization of utility. On the other hand, their behaviors are guided by the social context, that is, “social norms, rules and obligations” (Coleman, 1988, pp. 95-96) in sociological models. The core principle of action in this model is based on the “logic of appropriateness”. March and Olsen (1984, p. 741) note that “political actors associate certain actions with certain situations by the rules of appropriateness” and outline the

appropriateness within the framework of a political and social system that is diffused through socialization. Thus, through the lenses of the sociological institutionalist model, social practices can be adopted since they are considered appropriate and legitimate rather than facilitating efficiency or interest.

Similarly, in the sociological institutionalist model, states are not taken as rational actors that maximize power, i.e., materially defined interests, and mainly pursue relative gains over other states. Surely, this does not mean that they are not concerned with national interests at all, rather their national interest is embedded in their identities and social contexts (Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 2-3). Identity surfaces as a significant variable that may cause alterations even in the national security interest and security policies, and the term identity here denotes “mutually constructed images self and the other” (Jepperson, et al., 1996, p. 59) which is recognized through social interaction in relation to others. Therefore, depending on how agents, particularly political leadership, see their states in relation to others, states’ security attitudes may alter. Moreover, the collective identity stipulates appropriate behaviors toward states that are believed as ‘us’ and ‘others’. The shared identity among democratic states facilitates the creating of a ‘pluralistic security community’ predicated on democratic culture and norms of mutual consultation and accommodation (Deutsch, et al., 1957, pp. 129-130). Risse-Kappen (1996) demonstrates an exemplary instance of an institutionalized pluralistic security community established on collective identity that perceived the Western allies and NATO as “us” and the Warsaw Pact as ‘other’.

In a cultural account of the US’s naval policy and force posture which materialized with the deployment of “The Great White Fleet”, Edward Rhodes (1996) remarks on the reasoning behind forming such a new navy. He argues that it is the reflection of changes in dominant “beliefs about the nature of the state and the state’s relationship to the outside world” during a period of social and political alteration which required the creation of a new state image and identity. Such traces of change could also be found in the deployment of the newly established fleet of the Turkish Republic to Malta and Greece in 1936. In this respect, the nation-building process of the young Turkish Republic bears similarities with one of the US in demonstrating the change of identity in the codes of the nation. Moreover, it indicates its capacity to show force before the Second World War to the

external others, in an era in which Turkey was concerned with the increasing Italian aggressiveness (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003, p. 25).

The sociological institutionalist approach also distinctively features the role of world culture and the way that contemporary states react to it. From this point of view, world culture provides a toolbox consisting of a spectrum of appropriate norms and attitudes for modern nation-states. McNeely (1995, p. 17) defines world culture as “a framework of definitions, rules, and principles that are institutionalized at the world level and, by implication, are held to be applicable throughout the world”. Therefore, once a model of social action is settled at the world cultural and organizational level, many states feel obliged to comply with it or adopt this institution to acquire legitimacy in a modernized and integrated world. Consequently, isomorphic structures and policies among nations come to the fore as an outcome of sociological institutionalist approaches. A prominent example of this phenomenon is the existence of “worldwide rule-like conventions” that stipulate the proper organizational form of the state. Thomas and Meyer (1987) call attention to the isomorphism in the states’ jurisdictional contents among various contemporary states.⁶⁶

The impacts of world culture could also be traced to military practices. Farrell (2005, pp. 448-462) demonstrates that world culture imposes templates, or widely accepted schemes for the development of the military organizations and the conduct of military operations through “professional norms of conventional warfare” and “norms of international law”⁶⁷ although some local variations may be seen depending on threat perceptions.

Grounded in the sociological institutionalist thought, the world is conceptualized as a political-cultural system in which “world-level cultural and organizational directives for development and program, press all countries toward common objectives, forms, and practices” (McNeely, 1995, p. 1). The directed orientation to isomorphic state structures,

⁶⁶ Furthermore, the universality and the uniformity of educational development (Ramirez & Boli, 1987), programs, including welfare programs including land reform were empirically evidenced through the study of relevant data (Thomas & Lauderdale, 1987).

⁶⁷ For instance, 160 states (out of 191 members of the United Nation) maintain standing military forces and 146 states have the Western style tri-service structure (Farrell, 2005, pp. 461-466).

including progress and development is founded on Weber's observation on rationalization and bureaucratization (1978, pp. 956-989). In the final analysis, when a society starts to be rationally organized through the bureaucracy, the transformation begins to proceed in accordance with the best-practiced institutions that are recognized worldwide.

Sociological institutionalist thought recognizes that the rise of the modern state as a centralized political authority to impose pressures on its citizens for various forms of cultural allegiance and participation is the fundamental structural change that instills the unitary character of nations. Moreover, states need to find collective goals and direct national efforts to achieve them for their citizens. In the contemporary world polity, collective purposes such as the growth of national income, educational expansion, technology development, and the social welfare system have been adopted across nations as national goals which are considered as the measure of "success" and "progress". (McNeely, 1995, p. 17). As state-led endeavors for progress at the world level create a competitive environment among various states, internal support from domestic actors to their states would also emerge, i.e. elites (political, military, and intellectual) also subscribe to that goal of competitive progress in the world, besides given external supports to the world nation system as aid, military support, protection, legitimation (Meyer, 1987, p. 59). As a matter of fact, elites and leaders in various fields look out to the other states for comparing the practices of their state with others as a measure of success and progress.

Nevertheless, it should note that the world cultural system is not taken as operating in a "single dominating dynamic" across various societal sectors. The sociological institutionalist approach in this dissertation is predicated on Giddens's model of the world system. It characterizes the current world system as comprised of a "global information system", a "nation-state system", a "world's capitalist economy" and a "world military order" which instrumentalizes a clearer panorama about the operation of the real world (1985, pp. 276-277). Such compartmentalization allows to formulate or exercise the relationships between "sectors" or "systems", so the professionals, be it, naval officers, in the context of this study, engage in the rationalization of different sectors in the society and experience the world cultural pressures in the realm of their own sector rather than overall society-wide progress (Eyre & Suchman, 1996, pp. 94-95). As such, naval

attaches and naval personnel in educational institutions abroad or multinational headquarters become indicators of the connection to the world naval system. Moreover, other interactions at the navy-to-navy level provide such connectivity. In sum, it is the personnel of the navy who experience the naval world order and the worldwide trend of high seafaring navies with advanced combatants if many countries have already them.

Such intersubjective relations among “systems” and “sectors” of the world cultural system with the “global spanning networks” of governmental and non-governmental institutions of the newly emerged world order are studied by Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997, p. 195). Professionals in various fields interact and share their concerns with their counterparts in other states. Besides involvement in cooperation for a common enterprise, they also benefit from the experiences and practices of their peers. Being part of a larger community enhances the legitimacy of their practices. Militaries, and surely navies, network with their counterparts (p. 197). Such professional networks serve as sources of isomorphic ways and norms that newer practices and models spread out (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 71).

The Neorealist thought also visualizes isomorphic tendency which is founded on socialization and imitation among the contending state actors. As such, the imitation of Bismarck’s victorious staff system by the central powers including the Ottomans and Japan are cases in point (Goldman, 2002). In this respect, Waltz points to the dependency of each state’s faith on its response to what other states do by “contending the military innovations contrived by the country of greatest capability and ingenuity” (1979, p. 127). Any fallback in imitating capability and ingenuity would pay the price with the loss of human lives and resources on the battlefield. For that very reason, the practices of the victorious state of the Second World War, namely the US Navy was taken as a model for the Turkish Navy. Nevertheless, although the sociological institutionalist thought acknowledges the competitive nature of states’ interaction, it highlights the normative isomorphic processes that result from the “diffusion and internationalization of cultural models that legitimate organization and action” (Farrell, 2005, p. 455). Such processes are mirrored in Eyre and Suchman’s (1992) arguments about the “sacred” symbolic meaning of advanced weaponry. They emphasize that as technologically sophisticated militaries become the value-laden icons of modernity, then this linkage emerges as the

stimulant of worldwide arms races. In this process, the primary concern is how peers act and whether the possessions of weaponry are meaningful according to international standards.

States strive to act in legitimate ways that are recognized and observed by the other states in the world society. Eyre and Suchman (1996, p. 96) argue the connection of the cultural ideas and images of a nation-state to a weapon's symbolic significance. High-tech, visible, unique weapons are accorded with more significance in symbolizing independence. From this perspective, the symbolic prominence of the navy has been widely acknowledged and institutionalized at the world cultural level. As Ken Booth notes the symbolism attributed to the naval ships, especially "those of biggest type", as "useful and visible signifiers and representatives of a country's intentions and commitments", in other words, their representation of national statuses such as sovereignty, national power and international prestige (2014, p. 35).

The magnificent appearances of warships impress both national and foreign audiences. Shulman relates the rise of navalism successfully in the 1892-93 era in America to society-wide preference to "bigness and heroism" that symbolized the American public (1995, p. 133). In Turkey, the symbolism attributed to battleships finds its meaning in the prominence ascribed to the battlecruiser *TCG Yavuz* (formerly *SMS Goeben*) which continued to capture the hearts and minds of the Turkish public for generations. This symbolism also manifested in the titles selected for journal articles on her: "*Yavuz: Tarih Yapan ve Tarih Açan Gemi (Yavuz: The ship that made history and opened history)*" (Besbelli, 1972). Consequently, she "became the symbol of the Turkish naval revival, a symbol around the Republican Fleet want to shape" (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003). The dispatch of the battleship *USS Missouri* to İstanbul in April 1946 to return the remains of Turkey's Ambassador Münir Ertegün who passed away in 1944 was intended as "diplomatic courtesy". However, the expedition turned out to be a well-documented practice of "gunboat diplomacy" and interpreted as a manifestation of the US's government decision to support Turkey against the Soviet Union on the eve of bipolar world order (İnanç & Yılmaz, 2012). James Cable also lists the deployment of *USS Missouri* in his chronology of gunboat diplomacy (1994, p. 178) and notes that "The US

Secretary of State thought this gesture persuaded the Soviet Union to relax their pressure on Turkey” (Hayes, 1969).

In fact, the pressure persisted and the threatening maneuvers by the Soviet Black Sea Fleet had to be retaliated by subsequent visits of US and British naval ships to Istanbul (Kirk, 1954). In this regard, Michael Howard observes that the battleships in the imperial age have been a symbol of national pride and power because they represented the technological edge of the nation, its worldwide reach with the immense destructive power (1979). After the Second World War, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines have taken the pride of place in navies whereas their symbolic values equaling or exceeding that of battleships (Eyre & Suchman, 1996, p. 96).

Notably, navies are institutions, physically and literally, linked to a specific world system of navies. World navies operate at volumes of water, physically connected at the global level, known as one of the global commons or *Mare Liberum* in Hugo Grotius’s terminology (2019). Indeed, there are no physical borders exist other than depth and breadth limitations in confined and shallow waters or internal waterways (Lindberg & Daniel, 2002, p. 59). While warships officially represent the state as a sovereign part of it, they are assumedly also part of the world naval community.⁶⁸ Due to the intensive interaction of the navies historically, there are many commonalities among the various navies, particularly design and symbols of navy uniforms show remarkable isomorphism (Eyre & Suchman, 1996, p. 98 Fn.47). A case in point is the Ottoman Navy’s adoption of a new uniform code based on the Royal Navy’s uniform code in 1909 (Çoker, 1972). Moreover, in an era when French was the prominent language in the world society, the Ottoman naval academy preferred using books of the Royal Navy due to their effectiveness and superiority in maritime affairs (Saffet, 1326, p. 22). Since navies are more liable to world culture than armies that have been dominantly influenced by the nearby cultures, it could also be considered that most of the world navies have taken the

⁶⁸ This understanding is well reflected in the letter of the 2015 Strategy as “In today’s world where globalization increases interdependency from day to day; we regard every coastal state as our neighbor.” and “Each asset of the Navy acts as an embassy which enjoys the freedom of navigation on the high seas. Hence, Naval Forces conduct a diplomatic mission capable of showing great activity around the world with its assets.” (TNFC, 2016, p. 16: 24)

Royal Navy as a role model to emulate. This fact lends further credence to the explanatory powers of the sociological institutionalist perspectives.

Up to this point, the nature of agent behavior and the role of world culture are presented in the sociological institutionalist theory. From this point on, these principles will be tested in the case of the Turkish Navy. Based on the discussions about how the world cultural system works within professional networks, it is likely that the naval leadership and officers are the ones who start the crafting of a high seafaring strategy. The naval organization, made up of officers as the leaders who commanded the ships and operated the sophisticated combat systems and weaponry, has felt the pressing needs for the transformation of the Navy. These professionals have been the ones who are closely linked to the world naval order and maintain many networks through various activities, such as combined exercises, conferences, personal exchanges besides attending graduate, staff, and war schools and colleges or in-service training courses and port calls.

Nevertheless, agents (naval officers) in the sociological institutionalist model are not the ones who passively absorb the influence of the world (naval) culture. Finnemore asserts that the sociological institutionalist thought tends to view world culture as “marching effortlessly and facelessly across the globe” and produce isomorphism that obfuscates the role of politics and power in world history and normative change (1996, p. 339). A reply to this critique could be through emphasizing the role of identity (Lee, 2013, p. 52). In the sociological institutionalist thought, agents are assumed to act in appropriate ways based on their identities. Naval leaders, like the elites in the society who belong to an organization and “subscribe to the goal of competitive progress” of their nation in the world (Meyer, 1987, p. 59), are most likely to be attentive to how their organization could contribute to their nation. Then, the convictions about what the Turkish Navy is or does and what kind of nation the Navy is serving are critical for naval leader’s decisions.

In Turkey, the acquisition/procurement of weaponry requires policy decisions of the Executive Committee of Defense Industry (Resmi Gazete, 2108).⁶⁹ Therefore, the Turkish Navy needs a certain level of consent, approval, and support of political and military leadership for the modernization programs to build a high seafaring navy in implementing its strategy, 'Towards Blue Waters'. Besides, the commitment of naval assets to operations, exercises, and deployments overseas, with the exception of NATO activities is possible only at the request of the government subject to the approval of the Turkish Parliament (Resmi Gazete, 1982). In some cases, politicians and the relevant bureaucratic circles in ministries and the General Staff may not share the vision and operational requirements of the Navy. In fact, they may not grasp the difficulties in the conduct of naval affairs as much as naval leaders owing to their expertise and experience in the field.

The defense planning system also requires that the procurement program should meet a certain spectrum of strategic and operational needs based on rationalization. The force planning system is cyclic from operational needs to resource planning which is scrutinized at each stage in the naval headquarters and then in the General Staff, and finally at the Ministry of National Defense. The Parliament is not involved until the approval process of the budget. Accordingly, it takes a lot of effort to persuade the political and military leadership to allocate resources for relatively expensive platforms rather than low-cost naval units. Hence, the political/military leadership should be convinced of the relationship between possession of a high seafaring navy and the nation's survival and prosperity. At this point, the argument is based on an understanding that the political and military leadership could appreciate the vitality of the navy for the nation. Supposedly, they are aware of worldwide tendencies in naval building and the employment of navies, particularly, their practices concerning procurement of naval systems and weaponry. The PESTEL analysis, which is conducted in the scope of this

⁶⁹ Up to 2016, the Committee was comprised of Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Chief of General Staff and Undersecretariat of Defense Industries. Currently, it consists of President, deputy President, Minister of Finance and Treasury, Ministry of National Defense, Minister of Interior, Chief of General Staff and Director of Defense Industry.

study provides useful insights into the common trends in developing a naval force based on political, economic, sociological, technological, environmental, and legal factors.

Although one could locate the origins of the idea for building a high seafaring navy so far back in the early republican era, even in the late Ottoman period, the need for a high seafaring navy has been pronounced more loudly and frequently after the 1980s. As the idea of a more capable navy gained the support of the political and military leadership, the Turkish Navy's transformation initiative gradually took root in public too. In such a process of gaining support from political circles, opinion leaders, and the public, the beliefs about the identity of their nation and associated meanings of an advanced navy might have played a profound role in keeping the momentum after a decision was taken. Such an identity-based explanation may have grounds considering the timing of promulgation of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy and the change in foreign policy to "a far active international player", particularly in the crises in the country's neighborhood (Rubin, 2001, p. 3).

Moreover, the reflection of its economic policy after the 1980s along with its quest in searching export markets and certain raw materials for its growing economy (Eder, 2001, p. 181) also needs to be considered. The quest for integration into the world both economically and politically was meant basically trading more with others. In this way, Turkey manifested its national will by declaring that, as a sovereign state, it would mobilize its national efforts to be more integrated, internationalized, and competitive in all domains, including economy, diplomacy, national security, and culture in its areas of influence and interest, as a regional power. Şule Kut argued that Turkey was promoted by different Turkish leaders and even by some Western statesman "as a model of a democratic, secular, free-market society to newly independent states of Central Europe and Central Asia" (2001, p. 8). The focus here is to put forward the effects of Turkey's recognition of an institutionalized object (navy) in the process of constructing a new national identity on the change in the naval policy. If the political leadership and public begin to perceive the emerging new role of the country in the changing world, and if these people relate the growth of the navy to the rise of the nation's standing in the world as the appropriate attitude based on the new identity of the nation, they are likely to support building a high seafaring navy. In this regard, the Turkish Navy's new naval strategy may

symbolize the national resolution of Turkey as a modern and sovereign state for becoming closely linked to the world system in the new world order of the post-Cold-War era. In other words, a high-tech capable navy may contribute to the construction of a new identity and extend this identity to the world.

In the light of these explanations, it could be hypothesized that the transformation of the Turkish Navy towards high seas was launched by the naval leadership in the process that the Navy redefined its identity in terms of how it would serve the nation given the newly forming identity of Turkey as a more sovereign, credible, and legitimate member of the worldwide community.

3.2.1. Explanations based on the sociological institutionalist model

This section offers a cultural explanation for the origin and implementation of the strategy 'Towards Blue Waters' to create a high seafaring navy. In this attempt, some conceptions of the organizational behavior model are borrowed to complement the constructivist perspectives (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 143-152). Compatible perspectives are observed in two approaches since they share some significant assumptions on human behavior. Both perspectives underpin that actor's attitudes trail the logic of appropriateness and are guided by cultural and institutional elements such as identities and norms. On the other hand, the two perspectives present different understandings in explaining the case in question, the transformation of the Turkish Navy.

The organizational behavior model predicts that the member of an organization (naval officers in the context of this study) makes decisions based on the account of the identity of the organization they stand for (March, 1994, p. 58). What matters at this point is how this organizational identity is formed and how it is defined. As depicted beforehand, in the sociological institutionalist perspectives, military officers as part of elites in the society tend to subscribe to the competitive and state-centered progress in the world polity (Meyer, 1987, p. 59) (which may not always coincide with organizational identity as the bureaucratic politics model would predict). Concurrently, they are inclined to be considerate of not only national interest, but also the standing, prestige, and roles of their nation in the world. Above all, naval officers think about what kind of nation they serve.

Hence, the process of defining the organizational identity might be affected by national identity, considering the “nation-in-arms”⁷⁰ character of the Turkish nation. The effect would be more significant, especially when the organizational identity of the Turkish Navy strengthens national identity in terms of what it does and what it stands for. In the meantime, the development of the Turkish Navy would also be affected by its international engagements and interaction that expedite the realization of self-identity as well as diffusion of norms and institutional practices among worldwide navies.

Depending on process tracing, this section endeavors how the strategic transformation started and what outcomes it has produced. Such an explanation of the strategic transformation requires understanding the changes in the Turkish Navy’s organizational essence and the meanings of the navy in relation to the national identity of Turkey by taking into account the *sui generis* position of the Turkish military (Özcan, 2001, p. 16). The manifestation of the changes that took place against the background that Turkey was progressively seen as “an emerging multi-regional power” (Rubin & Kirişçi, 2001). In this process, as the sociological institutionalist approach would portray, the Turkish Navy’s initiative for building high seafaring ships, i.e., a blue-water navy was reinforced by its involvements with advanced allied and friendly navies in which naval officers experienced strong pressure toward the development in their professional field. As claimed by Basil Germond, “most of all small and medium navies followed a linear evolution path towards having more projection potency, be it autonomously, or in a coalition” (2014, pp. 45-46). In this respect, the manifestation of ‘Towards Blue Waters’ may have also helped to spread the meaning of the high seafaring combatants connected with the emerging national identity of Turkey as well as economic growth which

⁷⁰ The history page in the Turkish General Staff website starts with a prelude “Turks, who been referred as the ‘army-nation’ throughout the history...” and goes on “the vigorous living conditions” of geographies that the Turks dwelled “compelled them to become a rigorous and a militarist nation” (TGS, 2019). Traditionally, the Army has always been one of the core organizations in the Turkish states and maintained its prominence. During the Ottoman era, the high-ranking officers were part of the local government in the provinces which gave the military a higher standing in the society. Most of the founders of the young Turkish Republic were officers of the Ottoman military (Güvenç & Barlas, 2003); the same influence of the military continued in the government hierarchy (Akkaya, 2006). One of the most distinct characteristics of the Turkish military is its land-force dominated structure. Besides the historical reasons elaborated above, the Land Forces maintain 402,000 active duty personnel while the navy and the air force have 53,000 and 63,000 personal, respectively (MND, 2000). Moreover, the conscription system links the society with the military since compulsory military service applies to all male citizens from twenty to forty-one years of age.

generated well-disposed impacts for the naval weaponry acquisition. To some extent, the move 'Towards Blue Waters' represented visions of those in and outside the navy that is linked with Turkey's move to integrate with the world. In this context, Özcan summarizes the assertive role played by the Turkish military in the foreign policy process in three pillars: increased power projection capabilities, enhanced role in NATO via participation in multinational stability operations, and elevated self-confidence as a security-providing country (2001, pp. 25-26). This observation of Özcan based on the statement of the other service commanders, but for the Navy, the 1997 strategy document was cited as a reference since it was the first-ever strategy document publicized by the Turkish armed services.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, "Turkey has transformed its foreign policy and self-image more thoroughly than any non-communist country" as Barry Rubin remarked (2001, p. 3). Amalgamated with factors of change, due to the stimulus of globalization, Turkey embarked on rigorous efforts via "active foreign policy" to promote its standing as a "regional power" influencing developments in its surroundings and as a "model" to the newly democratizing countries (Kut, 2001, pp. 9-12). As products of this multi-vector policy, the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as the first active policy initiative on June 25th 1992, Turkey's customs union with the European Union (EU) in 1996, the launch of Developing-8 in 1997, the rapprochement with Israel in the 1990s, active engagement with the newly independent states in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, becoming an EU candidate in 1999 could be counted among the important events in this respect (2001). This "active foreign policy" approach was reflected in the numbers and size of the national representations abroad. Turkey's foreign missions rose from 73 in 1990 to 91 in 2011, and finally to 142 in 2017 (Kavoğlu, 2018, p. 90). In this era, the Turkish military also had an increased role in shaping foreign and security policy (Özcan, 2001, p. 13).

Larson et. al. define status as "collective beliefs about a given state's ranking on the valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)". Status in international politics manifests itself in two ways: the membership in a defined organization of actors and the relative standing within such an organization. Actually, status perceived by a particular

state may differ from the one reflected in the collective beliefs. Furthermore, others' perceptions and beliefs for a given state matter more since a state is mainly concerned with its status recognized by others (2014, pp. 7-8). This status recognition is translated into "status markers" corresponding to standing symbolizing respect and esteem such as membership in elite clubs like Group of 20, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), leadership in multinational/regional organizations, hosting high-level meetings, etc. However, there is a potential gap between self-image status and widely approbated status.

This study focuses on "self-image" status on how Turkey perceives itself. More, such foreign active policy engagement mentioned above causes Turkey to see itself differently as a 'regional power' or a 'model' although others perceived it differently with reference to the status markers. As a matter of fact, the content analysis of leadership speeches and interviews only in defense-related occasions shows the usage of internationally oriented value-laden phrases, that is, status markers like 'being a world power', 'a model for the region', 'contributing to regional and global peace', including extended and deepened diplomatic relations and regional initiatives. As Abdelal et. al. justifiably remark speeches in various instances and interviews in the media are tools "designed to evoke a sense of collective self and are examples of the process of contestation" (2009, p. 29).

The radical shift in domestic politics after the 1980 military intervention was also influential in forming self-image in Turkey. Larson et. al. relate Turkey's current Renaissance to reforms of Prime Minister (later President) Turgut Özal who liberalized the economy and became the second civilian president of the country. They present Özal's conduct as a great achievement in the democratization of Turkey (2014, p. 53). As president, Özal worked hard to carve a role out for himself in foreign policy making and indeed championed an active foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War (Kut, 2001). Özal advocated enhancement of Turkey's power and standing, its influence, and its ability to play a decisive role in its region and world politics by making Turkey a 'great nation'. Özal's vision was a way of projecting and implementing a new Turkish national identity and role conception, moving away from and beyond regional confinement to the world community (Mufti, 2009, pp. 62-63). With these changes, the two successive presidents

Özal and Demirel reconciled on a common “Turkic World from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China” policy from 1980 through 2002 (Yükselen, 2020, p. 176).

Hikmet Sami Türk, the Minister of National Defense in 1999, related the foreign policy of the era to the geographical location of Turkey, surrounded by volatility and uncertainty in the post-Cold world. Moreover, He reflected on Turkey’s pivotal role in promoting regional peace, stability, and cooperation in contributing efforts to end human suffering and conflict (S&H, 1999). Although Yükselen denotes the strategy of this era is ambivalent due to the differences between what is stated and what is materialized, Turkey has been advancing its role in the international fora (2020, p. 234). In sum, a rising theme in Turkish society was Turkey’s ‘rise in the world’.

Although the Turkish Navy began to be more vocal about their new corporate identity in the early 1990s, the change of identity did not materialize immediately. It involved a gradual formation process since the 1980s, (even since the early 1960s). As inherited from the pre-war period, the primary mission of the Turkish Navy in NATO’s plans was to secure the Turkish Straits against the Soviet fleet’s move towards open seas (Watkins, 2007, p. 78). The Turkish Navy was organized and equipped with the Second World War-era US and British destroyers and submarines, the modern German-built fast attack craft, and mine warfare vessels acquired from various NATO countries. Although in the early 1960s the protection of the sea lanes of communication was a task delegated to NATO allies in the scope of a division of labor, the Turkish Navy endeavored to develop a limited force protection capability (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 3).

However, the lack of a force projection capability and US President Johnson’s infamous letter to stop Turkish intervention in Cyprus stimulated a reconsideration of Turkey’s military priorities. Consequently, it was realized that the Turkish Navy had to acquire power projection capabilities to add credibility to Turkey’s policy on Cyprus. The Navy took the lead in promoting a new naval mindedness with the help and advocacy of prominent journalists and columnists (Büyüktuğrul, 1970, p. 2). The support of the politicians such as Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü and his deputy Süleyman Demirel was secured through their involvement in the Navy League as founding members as well. Hence, the modernization of the Navy gathered momentum.

More specifically, the campaign organized by the Navy League bore fruit in the form of indigenously built landing craft as well as *Berk*-class escort destroyers by the early 1970s. In the meantime, the transfer of *Fletcher*- and *Gearing*-class destroyers and LST-type landing ships from the US met the growing operational needs for larger combatants in the context of NATO responsibilities. Even an attempt made by the Turkish Navy to replace the battlecruiser *TCG Yavuz* (Yavuzalp, 1996) (which was sold for scrapping in the early 1970s) as a showcase for organizational perseverance, determination, and ambition for bigger size combatants.⁷¹ Turkey turned to the European market, following Greece, to procure diesel submarines and guided missile fast attack boats. The domestic shipbuilding experience in this era taught a lot to shipyards and industry that later enabled the in-country design and construction of naval vessels. This period marked an exceptional era when the naval, political, and public identities were aligned for an ultimate national interest, framed as upholding sovereignty rights in the Aegean Sea and as protecting the Turkish Cypriot Community.

The naval combatants built and transferred in this era facilitated the Turkish Armed Forces to successfully undertake the 1974 Cyprus Operation. The capacity-building effort led by the Navy League (became a foundation after 1972) was very instrumental and effective in defining the Turkish Navy's identity and associating it with national identity and interest. The embargo imposed by the US forced Turkey to diversify its defense procurement and to develop its national defense industry as well as to sustain its current forces with domestic means. The joint ventures with German suppliers provided modern combatants along with the know-how and technology transfer, but Greece was ahead of Turkey in procuring such platforms. In the 1980s, the procurement of the MEKO-class frigates, the commissioning of the fleet oiler *TCG Akar*, the development of Aksaz Naval

⁷¹ In this era, five *Fletcher*- and 8 *Gearing/Alan M. Summer*-class destroyers along with three LSTs, six LCTs, four LCUs were transferred from the US and Britain. Local shipyards built many LCTs/LCMs. An amphibious regiment and UDT/SEAL teams were activated. Similarly, the Army activated expeditionary units like airborne and commando brigades. Airborne capacity was boosted with the arrival of transport aircraft from the US and Germany and utility helicopters from Italy. The Turkish Navy even contemplated commissioning the cruiser *USS Springfield* to replace the battlecruiser *TCG Yavuz* in the first half of 1974. Her transfer to the Turkish Navy was supported personally by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Yavuzalp, 1996, pp. 202-206).

Base were the steps of the gradual advancement for the Navy towards open seas, i.e., the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.

In this period, security priorities led to a drive to upgrade the military's capabilities and building a defense industry. This drive culminated in the reorganization of the Defense Industry Act of 1985 and the establishment of the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDSA)⁷² for managing the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF/SSDF) (Karaosmanoğlu & Kibaroglu, 2002).

In the Cold War era, the changes in naval strategy could mainly be traced from the speeches of naval leadership that appeared in the newspapers, the defense magazines, and the service periodicals due to the classified nature of the information. In that era, the interviews of the successive Navy Chiefs were confined to a very limited number of defense magazines (such as *Naval Forces* and *NATO's Nations* as well as service periodicals) which were sanitized and cleared by the General Staff before publishing. Although the military leadership also conveyed their views through anonymous media reports, views and opinions leaked in such a way could not be considered reliable without confirmation by other sources. On two occasions, information regarding naval strategy and modernization in the Cold War era were made available to the public: change of naval command ceremonies and ship commissioning ceremonies.⁷³

For instance, the Navy Chief, Admiral Celal Eyiceoğlu, outlined the naval strategy during a ceremony in 1972. It was based on the forward defense of the homeland. It was to be implemented by being present at high seas, having a say in the Mediterranean, strengthening, and modernizing the navy, protecting maritime trade routes and the Turkish Straits, upholding the maritime interests of the nation (Dz.K.K., 1972). This strategy and its attendant objectives were later confirmed during the commissioning ceremony of *TCG Berk* on July 12th, 1972. Even, in those years promoting national

⁷² In 1989, DIDSA became the Undersecretariat of Defense Industry (Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı) subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense.

⁷³ The first Change of Command ceremony was held in 1968, when Admiral Necdet Uran handed over to Admiral Celal Eyiceoğlu (Dz.K.K., 1968).

interest and national standing in international fora was among the core missions of the Turkish Navy.

Such events also provided an opportunity to link the Navy's meaning to the public with national identity and interest. This practice continued in the 1970s and the early 1980s. It should note that even in the 1970s, the protection of sea lanes of communication and safeguarding maritime trade, i.e., maintenance of the Turkish economy's connectivity, particularly sustaining the uninterrupted flow of oil were the roles constituting the organizational essence of the Navy. As such, they rendered naval presence at high seas, also to the protection of maritime rights and economic interests vital.

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, defense magazines began to provide a very well documented chronology of change in defense policy and military strategy. They covered the interviews with leadership and their speeches on various formal occasions, such as the keel laying, first welding, launching, and commissioning of naval combatants. Since most of the content of these interviews prepared beforehand based on given questions, they reflected a coordinated formal position of the defense and military establishment.⁷⁴ For instance, a defense magazine, which featured annual interviews in every year-end issue since 1987 with the top brass of the Turkish military advertised that due to the disapproval of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff the interviews with the military chiefs would not be published in the 1992 year-end issue. Actually, from 1988 (S&H, 1988) up to 1994, only the ministers of defense and the chiefs of general staff commented on defense policy and military strategy-related topics whereas the service commanders mostly covered the context related to modernization of services. This tradition continued until 1995. After that year, each service commander was interviewed

⁷⁴ Bora Kutluhan was a retired marine corps captain, who worked as editor in chief in *Savunma ve Havacılık* confirmed the close coordination for interviews and some articles written by the correspondents and, even some anonymous one. Telephone Call, September 30th, 2018, İstanbul.

In addition, Admiral Özbey confirmed that some articles prepared by the staff of Navy headquarters and given to the reporter of *Savunma ve Havacılık*, Metin Okçu for publication. Interview with Admiral Mustafa Özbey, September 10th, 2019

in a separate issue. The Navy Chiefs stood out as vocal advocates of their service regarding naval strategy and subsequent naval modernization efforts.

Later in the decade, another journal, *Savunma*⁷⁵ showed up with more dedicated content to defense policy and military strategy. The journal included the retired flag officers in its board of directors and published their articles covering topics along the lines of the formal interviews with incumbent service chiefs. The former service chiefs voiced almost the official position of the Turkish military, sometimes even more loudly, by touching on thorny issues that they could not pronounce officially in uniform. Meanwhile, the articles penned by Admiral Güven Erkaya, and Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu appeared in this magazine and provided information in unprecedented detail and analysis about the changing identity of the Navy and the dynamics behind the change.⁷⁶

From a broader perspective, the confinement of defense policy and military strategy affairs to the realm of the defense ministers and the chiefs of general staff until 1992 was in line with the traditions of the Turkish military inherited from the Cold War. However, later, the utilization of defense media to convey the views related to defense policy and military strategy by the top brass, including the service chiefs could be seen promoting the armed services in a way of linking their meanings of existence to national identity. This more vocal standing of the top brass coincided with the military's growing assertiveness in the making of the foreign and security policy in the 1990s (Özcan, 2001).

Starting in 1993, the Turkish Navy launched a series of ceremonies that became an annual tradition in the coming years to mark the keel-laying, first-welding, launching, and

⁷⁵ *Savunma (Defense)* changed its title to *Ulusal Strateji (National Strategy)* from the first issue of 1999 onwards since its former name caused confusion with another defense magazine *Savunma ve Havacılık (Defense and Aerospace)* (Ulusal Strateji, 1999).

⁷⁶ Admiral Güven Erkaya assumed responsibility on the board of editors of *Savunma*. The articles that he crafted for this periodical also veiled his priorities during his tenure as the Navy Chief. He wrote his views and opinions that he could not have voiced when he was in command and uniform. The first one was about the Turkish Straits and the "TÜRBO" system to improve navigational safety through the Turkish Straits (1998a). His other articles was focused on the significance of the Aegean Sea, titled "Can Peace Prevail in Aegean Sea?" (1998b) and "The Crucial Aegean" (2000). Later, Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu appeared in *Ulusal Strateji* with a series of articles titled "Turkish Navy Forces from yesterday to today" (2001a; 2001b;2001c) covering the chronological development of the Navy and another series titled "We are yet to be a maritime nation" elaborating on the maritimization of the Turkish nation (2001d; 2001e)

commissioning of naval combatants. These ceremonies are mostly attended by the high-level invitees including the President, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of National Defense, the Chief of General Staff, and the Commanders of other services. They became a platform to show off national prestige. In these events, the Navy Chiefs, implicitly, accounted for their conduct and achievements during the year via their address to the public, politicians, and military leadership. The speeches made also provided an opportunity for the top leaders to express their vision and strategic orientation about the development and conduct of the Navy.

From the late 1980s and the early 1990s onwards, the Navy started to make more rigorous efforts to make it clear in and outside the navy what kind of navy it should be. In terms of the shift in the Navy's identity, the year 1992 marked an important turning point. It was the time when the references to 'high seafaring naval capabilities' began to appear in the speeches and interviews of the naval leadership in their descriptions of the future shape of the Navy. More importantly, from this time on the naval leadership started more clearly to associate the Navy with the advancement of national interest and the prosperity of Turkey in the future.

During these developments, the Navy started to carry out new 'postmodern' roles in the evolving security environment such as participating in the NATO/WEU Operation Sharp Guard, the deployment as part of a Turkish task force to UNISOM-I⁷⁷, and operations in supporting constabulary agencies against illicit drug trafficking in seizing merchant ships *Kismetim I* and *Lucky-S*. In this regard, the expedition of *TCG Turgut Reis* to Japan in 1990, the Somalia deployment and longer assignments to NATO/West European Union task forces built confidence in logistic sustainment of ships successfully besides the conduct and nature of the Navy reflected in the creation of a newer organizational identity. These taskings promoted the Navy's standing in the political, military, and public circles.

⁷⁷ A task force comprised of *TCG Fatih*, *TCG Derya* and *TCG Ertuğrul* transported an infantry company of Turkish Army to Somalia for humanitarian assistance operations in 1993. Admiral Feyyaz Öğütçü was the commanding officer of *TCG Fatih* during this mission. Interview with Admiral Feyyaz Öğütçü, October 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 29-35.

Moreover, the Navy adapted its doctrines in accordance with the newly emerging tasks (Gürdeniz, 2013).

From around 1992 up to 1995, the Navy's newly forming identity and the orientation of force transformation had become progressively clearer. In a briefing, the J3 Operations Chief of General Staff Headquarters General Çevik Bir (1992) elaborated on 'NATO's New Strategy and Turkey' and detailed changing threat perception and operational concepts of the Turkish military in line with the emerging security environment. In this regard, he pointed to the employment of self-sufficient maritime task groups, including fleet logistics ships and naval air arm in the three-dimensional threat environment. This briefing could be considered one of the earliest references to high seafaring capabilities at the General Staff level.

An article appeared in *Savunma ve Havacılık* on "New Roles for Turkish Naval Forces in the Changing World Conditions" heralding new roles and functions -postmodern tasks- that the Navy prepared to assume in the emerging world order. Its author Metin Okçu⁷⁸ (1993) also underscored the significance of safeguarding maritime routes in the context of Turkey's increasing dependence on seaborne transportation along with upholding of maritime interests on the high seas. The requirement for acquiring naval combatants and logistics ships that could sail in the high seas for longer durations and operate in a multidimensional threat environment in severe sea states and the evolving need to participate in the stability and humanitarian operations under the auspices of the UN and NATO were the new undertakings by the Navy. In sum, the content of this article could be taken as a preliminary manifestation of a high seafaring navy.

Even before the promulgation of the strategy document 'Towards Blue Waters', Admiral Bayazıt confirmed the changing roles and functions of the Navy. He stressed that these changes would not alter the main operational concept based on the tenets of 'protection of maritime interest' and 'safeguarding of sea lanes of communication', particularly given

⁷⁸ Metin Okçu was a retired army general and a close friend of Admiral Bayazıt. The two worked together during their assignments to NATO headquarters in Naples. Admiral Özbey confirmed that the article in question was prepared by the staff of Navy headquarters and given to Okçu for publication. E-mail from Admiral Mustafa Özbey, November 27th, 2019 07:52 PM.

the growing importance of the seas as resources and the maritime routes that connect Turkey to the globalized world. This was as a re-affirmation of the invariable organizational essence of the Navy in 1994. He also underlined that participation in multinational operations that may be requested by the government would require the fleet to be in a high state of readiness to operate at high seas for long durations. He also pointed to the potential for cooperation between the littorals in the Black Sea. Furthermore, he emphasized the preservation of the *status quo* in the Aegean Sea and remarked on the emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean as a new area of operations due to its being an energy hub (S&H, 1994, p. 14). Besides ongoing modernization programs, Admiral Bayazıt underscored the prominence of the then-current efforts in domestically designing and building naval combatants with knowledge and expertise accumulated by the domestic defense industry (S&H, 1993).

During a ship-commissioning ceremony, Admiral Bayazıt underlined the importance of the transfer of four *Knox*-class frigates in attaining regional power balance and the savings made by taking over these frigates as hot-ships (Ariş, 1993). In July 1994 which was the most comprehensive ceremony related to seven new combatants, Admiral Bayazıt underlined the significance of Turkey in its region with its economy and democratic credentials. For him, Turkey needed a deterrent naval force as an essential instrument for national security and to maintain global and regional peace (Ariş, 1994). Besides, he praised the Navy under his command for becoming the best one in the Mediterranean in terms of size and operational tempo. Simply, the linkage between the organizational identity of the Navy and the national interest, identity, and standing had begun to be profoundly set.

Shortly, another anonymous article titled “Towards a Strong 21st Century Navy” was published in *Savunma ve Havacılık*. It announced the newly defined roles and function of the Turkish Navy in accordance with its new concept of operations prepared in the light of emerging security dynamics. The article put forward the need for a powerful, high seafaring navy. This anonymous article may be considered an informal precursor to the strategy document, ‘Towards Blue Waters’. It suggested:

... Given these demanding tasks, the Turkish Navy has to operate at longer distances for longer durations and to be in higher combat readiness in order to protect the homeland from the high seas as well as to perform emerging postmodern tasks and operations other than war (OOTW). These tasks require a naval force consisting of combatants and support ships that could endure longer at high seas and operate in extreme sea states in a diverse and multidimensional threat environment. Turkey's increasing dependence on seaborne trade necessitates safeguarding the availability of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and securing transportation from far distances. It is vital to deter and, if necessary, eliminate any threat to maritime shipping that could compromise the survival of the homeland and national interest. Only a strong capable navy could perform these tasks. The introduction of MEKO class along with *Knox*- and *Perry*-class frigates endowed the Turkish Navy with capabilities to defend the homeland from an overseas threat. Besides, the efficiency of the Navy was substantially increased to protect maritime interests on the high seas, more importantly, to uphold the security of the sea lanes of communication, the lifelines of the national economy. At the dawn of the 21st century, the Turkish Navy has gone through an important transformation process. In fact, the efforts undertaken in the 1970s have just begun to bear fruit. This ongoing process rendered itself more significant after the end of the Cold War and turned into an important requirement. Particularly, due to the growing strategic and politico-economic prominence of Turkey, the reconfiguration of the Turkish Navy as a high seafaring navy has become a vital requirement. The emergence of Turkey as an international political and economic power in its region is the most significant determinant and indicator of this necessity (S&H, 1995).

After becoming the Ministry of National Defense in 1995, Mehmet Gölhan also noted the increasing endurance of the self-sufficient maritime task groups with organic fleet logistics supports on the high seas, including the newly commissioned *TCG Yarbay Kudret Güngör*, the second oiler of the fleet. Gölhan made note of this new development in an interview specifically on the Turkish military to the preservation of peace at the regional and global levels (S&H, 1995). In fact, this was the first reference to high seafaring capabilities by a politician.

Subsequently, in the aftermath of the 1994 Territorial Water Expansion Crisis with Greece⁷⁹ the incoming Chief of the General Staff General Hakkı Karadayı described

⁷⁹ Turkey took some proactive and precautionary measures against a Greek attempt to expand its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in accord with the entry into force of the UNCLOS III in November 16th, 1994, as an enactment of controlled tension policy. The Turkish fleet preemptively deployed, almost as a whole, to the Aegean Sea overtly for the *Denizkurdu*-1994 Exercise, actually planned as a show of force or deterrence. This deployment also backed through the tough statements by the Turkish politicians as well (Güvenç, 2004, pp. 918-920).

For the *Denizkurdu*-1994 Exercise, Admiral Özbey stated that the units were intentionally deployed in the vicinity of the West Aegean Islands for the first time and the islands were virtually blockaded in the drill scenario and the Fleet supported by air sorties. The message was a strong display of deterrence. Interview with Admiral Mustafa Özbey, September 10th, 2019, İstanbul.

Greece as the main and primary threat due to its hostile intentions and actions. He also explicitly pointed to the required capacity of the armed forces for controlling, safeguarding, and deterring any violations of national borders, airspace, territorial waters, and economic zones in peacetime. Then, the Navy Chief, Admiral Güven Erkaya, emphasized the function of naval forces in both defending homeland against potential crisis and regional conflict risks and protecting the increasing volume of seaborne trade due to globalization in the new world order. He summarized the roles of the Navy into four categories: contributing to eliminating current and future threats to the homeland, protecting maritime trade routes, safeguarding, and controlling the maritime economic zones, supporting global and regional peace by participating in international organizations. He highlighted the vitality of the Turkish interests in the Aegean Sea. The interviews with the incoming chiefs of staff were inevitably marked by an emphasis on threat perceptions in the aftermath of the 1994 crisis with Greece. This was the first record of mention of maritime (exclusive) economic zones. Naturally, the Greek threat was also explicitly brought up by both the Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief (S&H, 1995).

In assessing the surface capabilities of the Navy, *Savunma ve Havacılık* outlined the new roles in the evolving security environment along the lines put forth by Admiral Erkaya a year earlier. The author argued that the challenging new roles and rapidly developing technologies required navies to invest substantially in the state-of-the-art platforms. It noted that the Turkish Navy's ongoing frigate and submarine projects had to be supplemented with a regional air defense capable surface combatant, such as the TF-2000 project. The domestic defense and shipbuilding industry could easily be accommodated to this project thanks to their recently developed abilities (S&H, 1996).

In this era, the content of speeches by naval leadership emphasized the Navy's increasing role in promoting national interest and national standing. The naval leadership stressed

Admiral Bostanoğlu stated that he was also embarked on the flagship with other staff of the Fleet headquarters to coordinate shifting from exercise scenario to real war taskings in case of the crisis would have escalated to armed conflict. During this deployment, the Greek Navy was simultaneously conducting the *Niriis* 1994 Exercise at the Aegean Sea. He recollected the deployment of the cruiser *USS Philipian Sea* to prevent a potential confrontation between the Aegean littorals. Interview with Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul.

the newly emerged identity of the Navy which involved not only contributing to the national defense and security but also safeguarding and promoting Turkey's interests and standing internationally via various missions such as protecting seaborne trade routes and taking part in operations led by the UN and NATO. In other words, participation in international activities started to become part of the 'organizational essence' of the Navy in addition to safeguarding maritime trade routes. In fact, Admiral Bayazıt also reflected his views on the new roles for the navies by elaborating on their deployment in coalition operations for crisis management. He emphasized increasing combat readiness, ascending prominence of the Eastern Mediterranean, developing forces with a mix of highly capable platforms in a flexible command structure, training personnel in operating highly sophisticated onboard combat systems. He ultimately underpinned 'rightsizing' rather than 'downsizing' forces to cope with the increasing operational tempo, but last not least investing in the indigenous development of combat systems and platforms.⁸⁰ Overall, after 1992, the speeches of the naval leadership placed almost an equal emphasis on postmodern roles of the Navy, even in an era when two standoffs with Greece took place in the Aegean Sea, by shifting focus to a broader concern about the nation's prosperity.

The period before the onset of the new strategy included many efforts to change the posture and vision of the Navy towards the high seas. The force posture and the operational conduct began to change with the transfer of *Knox*-class frigates, the first *Prevez*-class submarine, *Yıldız*-class fast attack boats, and the initiation of construction for the second batch of MEKO Track IIA frigates and the second fleet oiler (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 203). The transfer of *Knox*-class frigates triggered successive waves in standardization and unity of doctrine led by Admiral Erkaya, the Fleet Commander of the era. The permanent deployment of surface and subsurface task groups at the Aksaz base altered the operational mentality of the Navy. The Navy's move towards the high seas in this era facilitated the transfer of new ideas, conceptions, and doctrines through increased interactions with the Allied navies in multinational operations besides additional training and vocational courses taken during ship transfers (p. 211). Starting with defining its needs in the joint venture shipbuilding projects, the Navy also initiated a project to

⁸⁰ A synopsis of the inputs by Admiral Vural Bayazıt to the Commanders Respond section in the *Proceedings* of the United States Naval Institute. (1993;1994; 1995;1996).

indigenously design and built a national ship. Additionally, it planted the seeds through sending engineers for abroad training toward developing in-country combat systems software⁸¹ (DHO, 2010).

The Turkish Navy continued to keep its course during the tenure of Admiral Erkaya, who prioritized institutionalism and standardization, particularly compiling routines into written standard operating procedures to promote the unity of doctrine. His priority program was surveillance of the surrounding seas to compile the recognized maritime picture⁸² through the realization of the Distant Horizon (*Uzun Ufuk*) project. Postmodern tasks such as hostage rescue operation for the *Avrasya* ferry, which was hijacked by the Chechen fighters, evacuation of Turkish citizens from Albania as well as competitive tasks like the management of the Kardak crisis were effectively conducted under this command. In this era, the evolution of the roles and functions of the Navy towards the high seas was reflected in the crafting of a strategy document *Açık Denizlere Doğru (Towards Blue Waters)*⁸³ (Dz.K.K., 1997). This was the conceptualization and manifestation of the change of Turkish naval identity in the newly emerging world order (Gürdeniz, 2013, pp. 208-213). In other words, this strategy was a clear declaration of the Republican Navy's possession of the capability to reach the high seas (Ibid., p. 191).

A better understanding of the strategy document 'Towards Blue Waters' requires the review of particularly the various remarks and speeches of Admiral Güven Erkaya made on different occasions. In one of the first interviews as the Navy Chief, Admiral Erkaya

⁸¹ Another dimension was based on a principle "One who cannot command the software cannot command the fleet". This phrase was pronounced by Admiral Özbey. At that point, seventh and eighth fast attack patrol craft were undergoing modernization, whereas the combat management software of the rest of the boats were updated by the Dutch firm, Signaal. The naval headquarters obliged the contractor to provide training on the software development. Otherwise, another contractor might be selected. This was an unorthodox approach, With the agreement of the contractor, eleven bright engineer officers were sent for training on software development. These officers later established the necessary institutional infrastructure in the Navy for software development aim. The pieces of the puzzle, that is, the software and hardware needed for in-country ship design and building were put in place with the supporting financial instruments as part of long-term approach of the Navy which began with the Distant Horizon project. Interview with Admiral Mustafa Özbey, September 10th, 2019, İstanbul. Annex B, p. 12-24.

⁸² Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP): Information created through compiling of efficient, continuous, and real-time/near real time detection and diagnosis of warships and every sea vessel that is required by operational needs that operate in our interest areas and the seas surrounding Turkey (TNFC, 2016, p. 48).

⁸³ See a detailed narrative about the crafting of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy in Annex B, p. 6-13. Interview with Admiral Kadir Sağdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul.

elaborated on how he perceived the security environment and how to cope with it (S&H, 1995, s. 52). After summing up the role and functions of the Navy⁸⁴, he underlined the vitality of safeguarding the maritime trade and keeping sea lanes of communication open for Turkey. His redline was drawn in the Aegean Sea where trade routes had to be protected at any cost and domination by any country could be tolerated because the bulk of Turkey's seaborne trade (about 65 %) was conducted through the Aegean route. Since the domestic industries depended on the imported oil as the primary source of energy, Turkey could not allow any change in the *status quo* there. Inaction was not a choice for Turkey in the case of Greece's extension of its territorial waters which would dramatically change the current regime from free passage to transit or innocent passage. He also highlighted the prominence of protection and control of the other areas of maritime jurisdiction due to the potential availability of resources at sea and undersea. Having reaffirmed Turkey's commitment to indivisibility of international security with reference to Atatürk's motto, "Peace at home, Peace in the World", Admiral Erkaya underscored the increasing participation of the Navy in regional crises by nature of its flexibility, deployability, mobility, sustainability, and durability in longer taskings. However, for him, the bottom line was that Turkey could not allow any unilateral attempt to change the *status quo* in the Aegean Sea.

After his retirement, Admiral Erkaya was honored with the title of 'Ambassador' and assigned Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister and a coordinator responsible for the safety of navigation through the Turkish Straits (Resmi Gazete, 1998). He also assumed responsibility on the board of editors of a defense magazine *Savunma*. The articles that he authored for this periodical also unveiled his true intentions during his tenure as the Navy Chief. He could air his views and ideas more freely than he was in active duty and uniform. The first one was about the Turkish Straits and the "TÜRBO" system for enhancing navigational safety through the Turkish Straits (1998a). The second one was titled "Can Peace Prevail in Aegean Sea?" (1998b) which appeared in addition to an anonymous article "Aegean Islands that Belong to Turkey" (Savunma, 1998). Both

⁸⁴These roles included he involvement in preventing threats to the homeland in present and future, the protection of national maritime trade, the safeguarding and monitoring of national maritime economic zone, the contribution to the world peace globally and regionally through participation in the international organizations.

articles were elaborating on the disputes involving sovereignty issues in the Aegean Sea and prospects for lasting peace between two littorals. This issue also included the ever first coverage of the 1997 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy document in a defense periodical almost a year after its promulgation (Okçu, 1998).

The requirement for a strong navy in the context of the increasing energy demand of economically growing Turkey was discussed in an anonymous article which reflected the letter and the spirit of the 1997 strategy document (Savunma, 1999). The permeability between the functions 'sea control' and 'protection of maritime trade' was elaborated as roles complementing and, in a way, overlapping with, each other, even as phrases expressing the same roles. It highlighted the sustainment of seaborne trade, particularly energy imports in times of war and crisis for the functioning of the Turkish economy and the preservation of war-fighting capacity. This very fact required the development of a strong and capable naval force that could primarily safeguard maritime shipping through the Aegean Sea, i.e., the lifeline of the Turkish economy. Such navy could also perform the same function in the areas of interest covering whole the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. A year later, Admiral Erkaya wrote an article about the vitality of the Aegean Sea for Turkey in which he described it as the center of gravity of Turkish maritime interests from the perspective of its significance in the total sea borne trade of Turkey, particularly the oil imports through the Aegean routes. In this context, he labeled the Aegean Sea as the main artery of the Turkish economy since it was the strategic route for energy imports and foreign trade. He stressed the inadmissibility of any change in the current navigation regime in the Aegean Sea for Turkey (Erkaya, 2000), that is, he reaffirmed his position more strongly than when he was in uniform.

In order to cope with these demanding tasks, he listed his priorities for the development of the naval force structure. As for the modernization of the force, he placed the procurement of the air defense frigates, i.e., the TF-2000 project, the naval assault helicopters, the offshore patrol vessels (OPVs-MİLGEM), and the modernization of the mine countermeasures and amphibious capabilities on top of the list of priorities. For force multipliers, he singled out the Distant Horizon and the command and surveillance (C4I) projects along with the establishment of a software development center and the investments in simulator training for training personnel (S&H, 1995).

In a special issue of a defense periodical published in English, *Naval Forces*, Admiral Erkaya detailed the decision for the procurement of a fixed-wing air arm for ASuW⁸⁵ and ASW roles in the longer term. In the medium term, the naval helicopter could serve as stopgap platforms. In his view, the *Perry*- and *Knox*-class frigates were to fill the frigate gap (1997, p. 12). Moreover, he also made a distinction between blue water and shallow water/littoral components of the naval force structure. It should note that this is the first-ever use of the ‘blue water’ phrase by the Turkish Navy instead of the expressions ‘high seas’ or ‘open seas’ which was the direct translation of the term.⁸⁶ He stated:

The blue water component of such a structure should consist of frigates, destroyers, patrol craft, submarines, auxiliaries, and naval aviation platforms, to secure the sea lanes of communication on the high seas as well as to permit effective participation in allied and national sea control operations. As for shallow water and littoral warfare requirements, the Navy should operate Mine Countermeasure Vessels (MCMV), guided-missile fast patrol boats and another type of patrol vessel (NAFO, 1997).

The TF-2000 air defense destroyer was designated by Admiral Erkaya as the core of the blue water component equipped with command-and-control capability while providing air defense of units operating on the high seas (S&H, 1995). In another section of this special issue, it was elaborated that the force structure related to littoral warfare had almost been in place except for procurement of new mine counter measures vessels and air defense system of the bases and ports in the last twenty years. Concerning the sea control-based open sea warfare, that is, the protection of sea lanes of communication, the force was slated to include multipurpose frigates, anti-air warfare frigates, modern submarines, off-shore patrol boats, logistic support ships, naval air assets, special forces, and associated force multipliers. He added that some platforms were under construction and some projects were in the bidding and contracting stages. The future force structure was defined as containing “force structures and force multipliers that operate both in the regional seas and in the specific areas of concern (interest), as well as on the open seas to promote national interests” (NAFO, 1997).

⁸⁵ C4I: Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence Systems, ASuW: Anti-Surface Warfare, ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare.

⁸⁶ In Turkish language, the term ‘*açık deniz*’ is used for translating the terms ‘high sea’, ‘blue water’ and ‘open sea’; the latter one corresponds to the direct translation of the Turkish term ‘*açık deniz*’.

In the “History of the Navy” section of this special issue, it was depicted that the basic force structure and development of the Navy were likely to continue unabated despite drastic changes in security perceptions in the post-Cold War era. It was also underscored that although there would be additional roles assumed by the Turkish Navy such as the contribution to peace support operations, the security of maritime trade routes which would stand as the top priority mission, as it had been since the Turkish Republic was established (NAFO, 1997)

In his farewell speech on August 29th, 1997 during the change of command ceremony, Admiral Güven Erkaya commended the Navy for attaining the level of “the most notable force”⁸⁷ in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and for its ability to conduct operations in the Atlantic Ocean. He also highlighted the contribution of the Navy to the nation’s economy by safeguarding maritime trade routes as far as from the high seas to the shores of the country (S&H, 1997). As a matter of fact, that constituted the main discourse or the crux of his blue water navy strategy.

So, the Navy’s vocal emphasis on defending and representing the nation as its essential role at and around at the end of the Cold War was part of its efforts to define the appropriate roles for the nation, specifically given the newly forming identity of Turkey: a nation whose leadership and public progressively see it as a sovereign state that aims to rise as a ‘regional power’ and a ‘model’ in the coming century (Kut, 2001, pp. 9-12). Although Turkey was strained under regional and national security challenges, it was expected to assume a bigger international role. For naval leaders who were familiar with how the navy could be employed for promoting the nation’s new international identity, it was high time to provide the Navy with the capabilities commensurate with the country’s new international identity and needed to perform prospective high-profile missions.

Halperin outlines the ‘organizational essence’ as “the view held by the dominant group in the organization of what the missions and capabilities should be” (2006). The essence

⁸⁷ In his farewell speech, Admiral Güven Erkaya stated that “...*Akdeniz ve Karadeniz’in en çok dikkate alınan kuvveti olduk. Atantik’te görev yapabilecek yeteneklere ulaştık...(... We have become the most notable power of the Mediterranean and Black Sea. We have reached the capabilities that can be employed in the Atlantic...)*”,

of an organization is established via practices, experiences, and lessons learned throughout its past and evolved by its interaction with the world naval system. Historical background and dynamics, educational and training system, role models that have been emulated, the impact of foreign advisory missions, and interactions within the alliance groupings are instrumental in its forming. As Halperin observes, such organizational essence is very difficult to change once it establishes itself in an organization. However, Halperin highlights the bureaucratic politics aspect in which actors can put their consideration of organizational essence even before that of national interest. In this regard, the position of this study in explaining the Turkish Navy's development deviates from Halperin's approach (1973) because it has been observed that the Turkish naval officers identified national interest with the organizational essence of the Navy.⁸⁸

Certainly, as Levy and Thompson argue, it is tough from time to time to identify an actor's preference based whether on his/her own concerns about organizational interests or on the genuine beliefs that it is "acting on the best interest of the country", i.e., "what is best for the organization is best for the country" (2010). Since naval carrier officers are professionals who become socialized in the worldview and organizational culture of the navy, it is not surprising that they might be strongly convinced that that the interests of the country are best served by having a robust naval force. In this context, the naval leaders wholeheartedly believed that a high sea-faring navy was a critical strategic need, but not just a component of its organizational essence. However, such capability would

⁸⁸ An analysis of 1997 and 2015 strategies shows that the Navy's organizational essence, in a general sense, is to "maintain combat ships whose primary mission is to control the seas against potential enemies" (Halperin, et al., 2006, pp. 27-30), i.e., 'being a sea control navy'. (In fact, this is the organizational essence of the US Navy, but it is valid for the Turkish Navy that strives for sea control in surrounding seas. In the 1997 Strategy, being a sea control navy is described as a level higher than adjacent force projection navy (p. 17)). This is consistent with the systemic relevance of navies based on "unimpaired access to, and use of, sea lanes of communication" (Stöhs, 2018). Indeed, the 'organizational essence' of the Navy has ever been voiced by every Chief particularly starting with Admiral Vural Bayazıt. The main theme was principally deploying self-sufficient task groups to undertake Turkey's international and national commitments at longer distances. In this sense, shipping of hydrocarbons and raw materials was vital for the functioning of the economy, and consequently for the sustainment of warfighting capacity. In accord with his predecessors, Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu also stressed the sustainment of "the uninterrupted flow of the ever-increasing maritime traffic" in the prologue of the 2015 strategy (p. i). This securitized link to the country's survival led to the justification of the need for a high seafaring fleet in wartime and crises; it also provided a rationale for its peacetime roles in welfare and peacekeeping.

also enable the Navy to perform the emerging and existing tasks dictated by the political leadership to promote the interest and standing of the nation in the new world order.

Through the lenses of the sociological institutionalist thought, the self-started or voluntary initiative from the Navy can be understood as internal support from the elites, i.e., naval officers, in society who subscribe to the goal of state-led competitive progress in the modern world (Meyer, 1987, p. 59). Many in the political and military leadership form their opinions for developing a high seafaring navy by referring to other countries' competitive efforts in the context of protecting maritime interest. Admiral Güven Erkaya noted the need for revising the naval strategy to better serve the security along with the maritime rights and interests of progressing and growing Turkey in the 21st century in the preamble of the strategy document (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. i). The need to rejuvenate the aging fleet with seaworthy platforms and enhancing its reach was an ever-present driver highlighted by all interviewees. Truly, many cognizant observers assess that the move for the transformation of the Turkish Navy's force posture towards high seafaring capacity has also had 'welfare protection' aspect along with Turkey's long-term visions for the connectivity to the world markets, i.e., the globalization (Gürdeniz, 2013, pp. 190-194; Güvenç & Egeli, 2016, p. 97; Özgen, 2018).

It may be argued that the move 'Towards Blue Waters' may simply represent a timely adjustment to harness the emerging internationally-oriented postmodern tasks of the period to the ones based on littoral warfare and sea control roles requiring high seafaring capacity. However, such an argument would look more plausible if the new tasks were directly given and approved by the government through the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Surely, the emerging new tasks required parliamentary approval due to constitutional necessity and directed by the government. However, most of the missions conducted by the Navy were ad hoc responses to emerging situations and devised on a case-by-case basis, by exploiting the inherent flexibility, mobility, and versatility of the Navy in line with the *zeitgeist* of the era. These tasks were performed mostly by the allied support under the auspices of the UN and NATO. In sum, the move 'Towards Blue Waters' was neither an outcome of a 'top-down' policy process initiated by the political authority to align the naval power with the national interest-driven policy as in modern

seapower states. Nor was it a ‘bottom-up’ endeavor ‘stimulated by trade and led by civilian community’ as in the case of classical ‘*thalassocracies*’.⁸⁹

Regarding the crafting and later for the approval of the 1997 strategy in the General Staff Headquarters, Admiral Sancar⁹⁰ referred to the personality and professional credentials of Admiral Erkaya in securing the consent for the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy. The force structure envisaged in the strategy was converted into the Navy’s strategic goal plans, with a minor change in the classification of the light aircraft carrier to sea control ship due to the resistance from the Air Force.⁹¹ After the consent of the political and military leadership, it was published as an annex to the service journal (Dz.K.K., 1997). As Admiral Sancar and Admiral Sağdıç emphasized, the missing step in the preparation of the 1997 strategy was its approval as an official document by the political authority, even by the Parliament. Even the slogan ‘Towards Blue Waters’ had not openly been pronounced by Admiral Güven Erkaya in his speeches and interviews (S&H, 1995, s. 52) although he referred to its strategic context explicitly (NAFO, 1997).

In this regard, from a critical point of view, Stöhs records an incongruity that “amphibious operations and power projection over great distances was not considered as

⁸⁹ Admiral Sancar summed the relationship between seaborne trade and birth of navies. In that respect, he emphasized that the first seaborne trading nation in the Mediterranean Basin was Phoenicians, as a *thalassocracy*, whose nautical acquis was later utilized by Egyptians and Romans as part of their fleet. A *thalassocracy* is listed as ‘maritime dominance’ in Merriam-Webster dictionary (2021) and “dominion over the seas, as in exploration, trade, or colonization” in WordReference.com (2021). Initially, *thalassocracies* were seaborne trading nations without a navy. Later, to protect their maritime trade and interests, the merchants armed their ships. Later, as trading expanded, the merchants financed the creation of the navies. Admiral Sancar, starting with Phoenicians, listed Athenians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch and British as maritime trading nations. What they have in common is that the initiative to build a navy is either a ‘bottom-up’ effort by civilian circles promoted by overseas trade links, or a ‘top-down’ approach of political leadership inspired by the support of foreign policy goals and national prestige. He pointed that the development of Turkish Navy did not conform to the historical model of becoming a sea power as detailed above. Partial support from political and business circles was based on the armed forces’ longstanding credibility and prestige but remained limited. This backing did not result in the allocation of necessary funds to create such a naval capacity. Therefore, the sustainability of this drive ‘Towards Blue Waters’ would be limited in time and resources due to a lack of firm political support and civic initiative. Interview with Admiral Lütfü Sancar, November 16th, 2019, İstanbul. Annex B, p. 27-36.

⁹⁰ Interview with Admiral Lütfü Sancar, November 18th, 2019, İstanbul. Annex B, p. 27-36. He was Plans Policy Chief, responsible from strategy development and force planning, in the time frame that the 1997 strategy was crafted.

⁹¹ Interview with Admiral Kadir Sağdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul. Annex B, p. 11. He was the Head of Strategy and Force Planning Branch in the same time frame and crafted the strategy document.

a primary concern” (2018a, pp. 110-111) in the National Defense White Book⁹² (MND, 2000, pp. 55-58) despite its prominence in the Navy’s strategy document (1997). On the contrary, such a ‘high seafaring vision’ was implicitly listed among future objectives of the Navy section as “... In the next ten years, the Turkish Naval Forces will be transformed from a force structure required for coastal operations to a structure that could have a say in the open seas” with “...Sea Control Ships, Air Defense War Frigates, Modern Submarines...” (p. 57). For the Navy, the move for a high seafaring capability could not be considered a justification for building more seaworthy naval ships from the scratch. However, it was a major commitment that required perseverance and stamina to fight oppositions in the military and defense bureaucracy as well as in the defense industrial circles. Most notably, there was no guarantee that the Navy’s endeavor for a high seafaring capability would be successful. The Turkish Navy would not have been able to make this commitment without a fundamental change in the way of understanding its organizational essence.

Indeed, forming and defining the identity of its organization has been vital for the Navy. The Navy has already had preliminary plans to build big-sized ships, namely the TF-2000 air defense frigates (later destroyers) and a light aircraft carrier, amphibious assault ships, before the promulgation of the 1997 strategy document. In the early 1990s, the Navy was in search of alternative suppliers for its new generation frigates, called Turkish Type Frigate also known as Track III or TF-2000 program, due to financial difficulties encountered in ongoing joint-venture programs with Germany. Besides involving in NATO Frigate Replacement for the 1990s (NFR-90), the Navy received informal proposals from some US and European shipbuilders. In the meantime, Turkey acquired eight *Knox*-class frigates to restore naval power in the early 1990s with Greece and later eight *Perry*-class frigates as stopgap platforms to rejuvenate the aging fleet (S&H, 1995).

⁹² Jeremy Stöhs also points to the tasks given in the national defense paper published in 2000, namely: “territorial defense (of the Turkish Straits), protecting the sea lanes of communication, participating in multinational operations, as well as humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue. He also remarks that also the envisaged force structure is comprised of platforms to perform “Above Water Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare and Air Defense Warfare” and to carry out duties as “reconnaissance, surveillance, and submarine warfare for preserving and protecting maritime transport in the surrounding seas” (2018a, pp. 110-111).

The modernization program of the early 1990s called for the procurement of 12 corvettes (MİLGEM) and six air defense frigates (TF-2000) with maximum possible local content and indigenous design.⁹³ The frigate program was referred to as the “mega-project of the Turkish Navy”. It also constituted the mainstay of the high seafaring capability and based on the rationale of providing air defense and command, control capacity to the self-sufficient task groups deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean which expected to become an energy hub (Anon., 1999). As Admiral Özbey noted, an exclusive finance model was devised and presented to Prime Minister Tansu Çiller in 1995. Upon her approval, the Treasury earmarked the necessary funds for the program (2019, p. 49). The proposal to include the light aircraft carrier in the Strategic Goals Plan was also drafted during the tenure of Admiral Bayazıt before the publishing of the 1997 strategy document.⁹⁴ These examples confirm that most of the capabilities envisaged in the 1997 strategy had already been included or proposed to be included in the Strategic Goals Plan. Even the political leadership was informed in the process to ensure the financing of the program. Actually, the Navy was going by the book, i.e., in accordance with the procedures set in the Planning Programming Budgeting Process (PPBS). Concurrently, it was also sharing its strategy and vision with the public on different occasions. The reasoning behind crafting a strategy document was to have an overall guide as the basis of modernization plans (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 213).

As noted by Admiral Sağdıç, the motives behind crafting such a strategy document were threefold: a guiding document in force and human resource development, transparency/accountability of naval spending in the context of democratic control of

⁹³ In an interview, Admiral Bayazıt remarked that the national ship projects were initiated with a letter addressed to Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. The letter was covering the reasons behind the excessive cost of naval shipbuilding and the remedies to alleviate the cost via developing in-country combat ship construction and design capacity. Besides, he pointed to the prominence of personnel qualified in contract management and domestic software development for combat system management. To this end, Admiral Bayazıt directed his staff to send officers abroad for contract management which later facilitated the reflection of national operational needs to joint venture ship construction programs with reasonable costs. Admiral Bayazıt also praised the personal support of General Doğan Güreş, the then Chief of Turkish General Staff along with Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (2009).

⁹⁴ Admiral Özbey pointed to the signing of the requirement notification form (*İhtiyaç Bildirim Formu (IBF)*) by Admiral Bayazıt on August 14th, 1995 during the last days of his tenure as the Navy Chief. The IBF, which explains the justification behind a strategic and operational need, is the first procedural stage in the Planning Programming Budgeting Process (PPBS) to include a capability need in the Strategic Goals Plan (2020).

armed forces, and a message of reassurance to friendly and allied nations and of deterrence to adversaries.⁹⁵ Overall, the strategy document is meant to fill a procedural stage in the force planning cycle as a guiding document in an effort to institutionalize the process.

At this point, a retrospective look at the personalities behind this endeavor may provide useful insights into the origin and evolution of the new strategic orientation. During the elite interviews, it transpired that Admiral Erkaya, Admiral Özbey, and Admiral Sağdıç had similar professional carrier patterns and background in plans and policy affairs, i.e., long-term force planning. They had worked simultaneously or successively in the same headquarters, NATO, or the General Staff, or the Navy headquarters.⁹⁶

A close look at the adoption of the PPBS by the Turkish military would be beneficial in understanding its relationship with the birth of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy. The PPBS was inaugurated to align budget allocations vis-a-vis force planning processes on March 1st, 1968 by adapting the US system (Özdoğanç, 1968). In the early 1970s, the national and NATO force planning was not in harmony. The national defense planning was devised to request and receive more aid and funds from NATO. In his assignment as a force planning officer in the General Staff headquarters, Admiral Erkaya was tasked to draft a guiding document to align national and NATO force planning processes, and also for the preparation of national force goals and plans, which was later named as ‘Strategic Goals Plan’ (Erkaya & Baytok, 2001, p. 17). In the late 1980s, this trio (Admiral Erkaya, Admiral Özbey, and Admiral Sağdıç) with the inclusion of Admiral Işık Biren crossed paths in the J5 Plans and Policy Department of the General Staff headquarters. They pioneered the work that led to the preparation of a ‘National Policy Document’ by the political authority, commonly known as ‘The Red Book’, and its follow-up ‘The Military Strategic Concept’ by the General Staff. These two constituted the core guiding

⁹⁵ Interview with Admiral Sağdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p.11.

⁹⁶ Interview with Admiral Kadir Sağdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 6-13 and Interview with Admiral Lütfü Sancar, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 27-26.

documents in crafting a Strategic Goals Plan as the backbone of the PPBS system (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 194).⁹⁷

Besides preparing a guiding document for bringing NATO and national force planning cycles in line, these naval officers endeavored to increase the coverage of the ten-yearly procurement/acquisition program (known as *OYTEP-On Yıllık Tedarik/Temin Programı*) by matching it with the targets envisioned in the Strategic Goals Plan. This streamlining enabled to alleviate the competition between the services for more informal budget allocations and to include some of the out-of-budget resources into the basket of defense finance.⁹⁸ The efforts of the trio indicate their rationalist and scientific methodological approach in building institutions through establishing routines, norms, and practices. This proactive and productive behavioral approach brought additional credibility to the Navy in promoting its organizational identity in leading its transformation.

Although the main contours of a high seafaring strategy were pronounced in the tenure of Admiral Bayazıt, its publication took place under Admiral Erkaya's command. The timing of its publication reflects his knowledge of defense strategy and planning along with his insistent approach to institutionalism and standardization.

With the release of the strategy document 'Towards Blue Waters', the ongoing orientation of the Navy towards the high seas gained a 'formal organizational identity' (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 213). That is, with this strategic manifestation, the Turkish Navy did not only set a new course for itself but also refined and defined its roles in relation to the Grand strategy of Turkey. Such a breakthrough in naval strategy making passed largely unnoticed with the exception of a very narrow circle of academics specialized in defense and security affairs. For instance, Serhat Güvenç reflects his observations on the Turkish military's cross border operational capability in the 1990s as:⁹⁹

... In parallel with the enlargement of Turkey's economic and political areas of interest, the Turkish Armed Forces evolved into power with regional reach capable of conducting overseas and

⁹⁷ Interview with Admiral Sağdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p.7-17.

⁹⁸ Interview with Admiral Özbey, September 10th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 19.

⁹⁹ This was the first-ever citation to the 1997 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy in an academic book chapter.

transborder operations alone or as part of multinational coalitions. Centered on the Turkish-Greek rivalry and by taking into consideration the growing significance of the Mediterranean as a new energy hub and Cyprus, the Turkish Navy outlined its new roles and force goals in the strategy document *Açık Denizlere Doğru* (1998).

The promulgation of such an unclassified strategy document coincided with another transparency effort, the sharing of ten-yearly procurement programs of the Turkish military. The aim was to get the defense industry to prepare itself and put in place the industrial and technical infrastructure to meet the expectations of the armed forces. This also marked a milestone in the new transparency policy of the Turkish military towards transforming itself to the evolving needs of the new world order. It was also a step towards establishing the Turkish military's accountability to the public for defense spending (S&H, 1996).

Such a deliberate timing could also be considered yet another evidence of the unprecedented degree of harmony between the Navy and the General Staff both at the staff and the leadership levels to promote the organizational identity of the Turkish Armed Forces. In this regard, it should be noted that such harmony was possible due to personal rapport between Admiral Erkaya and General Çevik Bir (the Deputy of Chief of the General Staff at that time) which facilitated the approval of the strategy document 'Towards Blue Waters' by the General Staff.¹⁰⁰

As envisaged in the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy document, the Turkish Navy tested its ability to project power on the high seas relying solely on its own assets in the annual naval exercise *Denizkurdu-1998*. A fleet of 40 surface and underwater combatants was deployed across the Mediterranean, including around the islands of Cyprus, Crete, and Malta. The wargaming scenario was based on the struggle for sea control between opposing task groups supported by tactical aircraft refueling from airborne tankers (Cıvaoğlu, 1998).¹⁰¹ The participating units visited Egyptian, Israeli, Tunisian, and Turkish Cypriot ports. Such a show of force and support capabilities by the Turkish Navy

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Admiral Sağdıç, November 15th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 8.

¹⁰¹ Admiral Mustafa Özbey noted that the shift of focus of *Denizkurdu* (*Sea Wolf*) exercise series to the East Mediterranean was meant to break the connection between the Greek duo via securing sea control. Interview with Admiral Mustafa Özbey, September, 10th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 56-67.

generated political and military repercussions at national, regional, and international levels (Gürdeniz, 2013).

Up to the 2019 *Mavi Vatan (The Blue Homeland)* and *Denizkurdu (Sea Wolf)* Exercises, the Navy confined its drills to the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently, the deployment of naval task groups for escorting the drill/survey vessels in the Eastern Mediterranean and for supporting the Libyan Military Aid Mission has been the real-life practice of ‘Towards Blue Waters’ capacity envisaged in the 1990s. Other cases in this regard are the expeditionary deployment of the Turkish Maritime Task Groups to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and around Africa in 2010, 2011, and 2014 activations, respectively (Özgen, 2017).¹⁰² Moreover, the assignment of naval combatants to NATO’s standing maritime groups and counterpiracy operations task forces in the Gulf of Arabia and the Horn of Africa has also had an added-value effect in increasing the high seafaring capabilities of the Navy.

Regarding the background of the shift of focus in *Denizkurdu (Sea Wolf)* series exercises, Admiral Özbey pointed out that the Kardak Crisis added a new aspect to the web of disputes between the Aegean littorals in 1996. Namely, the new issue was ‘the geographic formations (islands, islets and rock formations) in the Aegean Sea for which the sovereignty has not been transferred to Greece under agreements’. Moreover, Greece and the Greek Cypriots on the island attempted to enhance their ‘Joint Defense Area ‘doctrine (MoD, 2000). Turkey responded by shifting its focus from the Aegean Sea to the high seas to break out of a prospective Greek and Greek Cypriot attempt to encircle Turkey. The exercise scenarios were modified to practice exerting sea control at the high seas, in

¹⁰² In the first half of 1955, a Turkish Maritime Task Group was activated to deploy in Indian Ocean in the context of a naval diplomacy function to pressure participants for signing Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The task group consisted of two destroyers *TCG Gaziantep*, *TCG Demirhisar*, two submarines *TCG Cerbe*, *TCG Sakarya* and the training ship *TCG Savarona*. Concurrently, the then President Celal Bayar joined the group in Bahreyn and sailed to Karachi on board of *TCG Savarona* for an official visit to Pakistan. The President also held a cordial reception on board of *TCG Savarona*. After visit to Pakistan, the President sailed to Basra and visited the Iraqi King in Baghdad. This activity was the first-ever flying of the Turkish presidential seal in Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The mission once proved the navy as being an effective foreign policy tool (Yılmaz, 2016).

the Eastern Mediterranean, and to secure command of the sea (sea dominance) around Cyprus.¹⁰³

When the participating units were at the port visits, Greece made a blatant move by deploying two F-16 aircraft to the Baf (Paphos) airbase as per their ‘Joint Defense Area’ doctrine with the Greek Cypriots. However, Turkey upped the *ante* with a tough *demarche* of the Prime Minister and also by detaching a flight of F-16s at Geçitkale base. Greece withdrew F-16s on the same day and shelved the ‘Joint Defense Area’ doctrine, but Turkish aircraft stayed on the island there for a week and the base was even opened to the public (Milliyet, 1998a). However, the UN Security Council, which held an emergency meeting and issued a resolution (1178 (1998) extended the mandate of the Cyprus Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and urged parties to avoid actions increasing tension and resume direct talks (UNSC, 1998). The wording of the resolution was not favorable to the stance of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots in the dispute. In July 1998, President Süleyman Demirel visited the island, as the first-ever president going to the island and issued a joint declaration with the President of Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denктаş, assuring Turkish stance in support of Turkish Cypriots to the world community (Milliyet, 1998b).

In the interviews, Admiral Cora labeled this exercise as a crucial activity that widened the horizons of the Navy and accelerated its outlook towards the high seas.¹⁰⁴ In this regard, Admiral Bostanođlu¹⁰⁵ remarked on the dispersing of units in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean supported with air sorties that refueled at air while the Turkish Army was conducting cross-border operations in Northern Iraq. This show of force, overall, was in a way a display of the operational effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces in accordance with the “two and a half war strategy” articulated in the article of Ambassador Şükrü Elekdađ (1994).

¹⁰³ Interview with Admiral Mustafa Özbey, September 10th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 23.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Admiral Deniz Cora, October 9th, 2019, Annex B, p. 41-45.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Admiral Bülent Bostanođlu, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 75.

In the context of this study, one of the questions posed to the elite interviewees was the role of Alliance membership in adopting a high seafaring mindset through partaking in NATO exercises and adapting NATO standards and procedures along with assigning personnel to the billets in NATO headquarters. Due to its relevance to this study, one of the most important contributions of NATO experience was the adoption of NATO defense and strategic planning procedures as noted by Admiral Sağdıç and Admiral Özbey which led to the creation of national defense planning.

Another important factor lies in the essence of NATO as being a maritime alliance. Most NATO naval exercises were predicated on the operations at high seas such as striving for sea control and escorting logistic convoys that carry reinforcements to the European theater of operations. In the beginning, the Turkish Navy subscribed to NATO doctrines and tactics by just making good and efficient use of given platforms but did not develop national ones until the eruption of the 1963 Cyprus Crisis. However, Admiral Özbey commended the tactical and operational contribution of NATO to the advancement of the Turkish Navy, particularly through the adoption of the NATO *acquis* in developing national amphibious doctrine according to the national threat perceptions. He remarked that on the strategic level NATO membership had not contributed to the progress of the Turkish Navy.¹⁰⁶

Admiral Sancar also praised the contribution of NATO in the tactical and doctrinal evolution of the Navy and naval officers by allowing socialization with the allied navies. He was the commander of the last activation of NATO On-call Force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) and the first activation of Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) in Spring 1992, which was later assigned to partake in the Bosnian Crisis. Admiral Sancar underlined the prominence of NATO missions as a testbed for measuring the level of training and material acquired by the Navy. He added that NATO activities provided opportunities to enhance the leadership traits of Turkish flag officers in commanding multinational task groups.¹⁰⁷ As also underlined by Admiral Ögütçü, the participation in NATO operations helped the Navy gain experience in

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Admiral Mustafa Özbey, September 10th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 17.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Admiral Lütfü Sancar, November, 15th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 32.

sustaining ships in real war conditions and particularly in boarding practices during the Operation Sharp Guard.¹⁰⁸ Admiral Cora expressed similar views and underlined NATO's contribution to the standardization and institutionalization of the Navy in all aspects, including practicing new tactics, training, evolving technologies, interoperability, and combat readiness along with the development of national tactical publications.¹⁰⁹

Admiral Bostanođlu emphasized the prominence of NATO undertakings in developing the communication capabilities of the platforms, such as the installation of satellite systems, such as INMARSAT and SATNAV, on board. the use of NATO standards (STANAGs) gradually improved the operating culture of the Navy. Moreover, he concluded that the technical advancement along with the transformation of the tactical mindset triggered the orientation of the Navy towards the high seas.¹¹⁰ Admiral Biren also touched upon the transfer of *Fletcher*-class destroyers that enabled the Navy's participation in NAVOCFORMED. He mentioned that he commanded the force in the Spring 1972 activation when he was the commanding officer of *TCG Adatepe*. He also pointed to the value of taking part in NATO on-call task groups in promoting the interoperability and tactical skills of naval officers.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Admiral Feyyaz Öđütcü, October, 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 42.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Admiral Deniz Cora, October 9th, 2019, Annex B, p. 46.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Admiral Bülent Bostanođlu, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 78.

¹¹¹ Interview with Admiral Işık Biren, January 20th, 2020, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 107: Admiral Biren stated that Turkish eagerness but incapacity due to lack of high seafaring platforms was conveyed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US in a NATO meeting which later triggered the transfer of three *Fletcher*-class destroyers to the Turkish Navy.

In sum, all interviewees commended the contribution of NATO experience in developing the tactical and operational planning and conduct via the adoption of tactics, doctrines, and concepts, in fostering familiarity with new technologies, in promoting strategic and defense planning skills. Last, but not least, they pointed to the experience gained in operating at open seas and finally in developing a high seafaring strategy. Consequently, the most widely recognized benefits for the Navy from participation in NATO operations and exercises were learning advanced tactics and gaining knowledge related to more diverse operations other than coastal defense operations, particularly sea control and maritime transportation protection operations. As depicted in detail in Section 2.5, the NATO acquis has been a catalyst in terms of setting a course towards the high seas to defend and represent Turkey's national interest in the international waters and form the organizational identity of the navy. Such NATO exercises inevitably involve protecting seaborne trade routes at the open seas which matched perfectly with the Turkish Navy's main roles and functions.

Nevertheless, from the sociological institutionalist perspective that underpins the diffusion of norms and institutional practices in transnational fields, such a NATO exposure has been instrumental in the evolution of the Turkish Navy's identity. As Wendt (1994) argues, identity is recognized through social interaction in relation to others. By partaking in such multinational events and assigning to multinational headquarters, members of the Turkish Navy reflect on the status of own their own navy and the nation. This may involve mixed impressions either being humiliated due to relative backwardness or being motivated by the pride of advancement. In the interview, Admiral

Although Turkey asked for high seafaring platforms over 3000 tons from the US military assistance programs, the US side was reluctant and concerned for delivering such a capability to the Navy. The venture for building escort destroyers domestically in Turkey stimulated the US to transfer considerably more modern *Fletcher*-class destroyers to Turkey. The first batch included *TCG İstanbul* and *TCG İzmir* that were delivered in 1967 and followed by the transfer of three more, *TCG İzmit*, *TCG İskenderun* and *TCG İçel*. Later, the US continued with the handover of *Gearing*-class destroyers to Turkey. The ability introduced with *Fletcher*-class destroyers got appreciated by the Navy compared to the design and propulsion system deficiencies experienced in *Berk*-class escort destroyers. The US got what it wanted, i.e., loss of enthusiasm of the embryonic Turkish naval shipbuilding industry. The US attempted two decades later with the transfer of *Perry*-class frigates to impede the flourishing of MİLGEM project. Although the Navy continued to develop its domestic shipbuilding capability with joint ventures with Germany, the cancellation of *Berk*-class destroyer project derailed the national ambitions for domestic design and building warships for two decades (Gürdeniz, 2013). It should also be credited that without the ship transfers from the US, the Turkish Navy could not sustain the balance of power in the Aegean Sea. Nor could it conduct the landing operations in Cyprus in 1974.

Sancar recalled that he was onboard *TCG Gemlik* during the first activation of NAVOCFORMED as an acting communications officer in 1970. In an anti-aircraft live firing, the British frigate commander ordered the ships to fire on the target, starting with the Greek ship and followed by Turkish, Italian, US, and British combatants. This formation was based on his assumption and confidence that the four ships would miss the target and finally, his ship would shoot it down. As planned, the British ship did to proof of confidence. Since the Turkish ship had an obsolete fire control system, its crew got upset, conveyed their concerns about the limited capabilities of their ship compared to other allied navy ships, and expressed the necessity for modern high seafaring ships. Coincidentally, Admiral Sancar, during the anti-craft firing in the Spring 1992 activation of STANAVFORMED, gave the command of series to the Turkish frigate commander. He ordered his ship to be the last one on the formation. All ships missed the Learjet-towed target which was hit by *TCG Fatih* with the second shot. He underlined this incidence as a showcase of an exemplary level of training and material reached by the Turkish Navy in a quarter of a century. Also, he noted that NATO deployments for durations up to six-month provided opportunities for increasing the endurance of the crew along with the logistic and technical sustainment of the ships.¹¹²

By partaking in such multinational NATO activities, the Navy personnel eventually started to perceive themselves as the representatives of Turkey, an innate function of the naval ships, in the worldwide naval community. At the same time, such participation enabled the Navy to become a part of the international community and the crew of the ships got exposed to world naval culture. As noted by the interviewees, they got acquainted with common practices among international navies, including up-to-date naval tactics and equipment as well as social events. They shared current issues that international navies took seriously and exchanged different views. Particularly, for naval officers who are well aware of the fact that the popular theme in Turkey was ‘reaching the level of contemporary civilization’ (Atatürk, 1933), advanced high seafaring ships of allied navies that represented their own nations might have been seen as some kind of

¹¹² Admiral Sancar also shared this experience the then commander of *TCG Gemlik* (an Ex *Gleaves*-class destroyer) in 1970, Admiral Hasan Sarioğlu who listened to him in tears of pride and joy. Interview with Admiral Sancar, November 15th, 2019, Annex B, p. 3.

norms that were transnationally established. In this sense, those ships, equipment, weaponry, and practices of advanced navies are cultural resources that serve as a repertoire of actions for the Turkish Navy (Swidler, 1986). As noted by Admiral Sancar and other interviewees, both by feeling upset because of the relative obsolescence of the Turkish naval ships and later being encouraged and feeling proud by the fact that the Turkish Navy is becoming part of the international naval community with modern ships. In sum, international exposure has reinforced the process of identity formation of the Turkish Navy and the route of force transformation towards a high seafaring navy.

In a ship commissioning ceremony in 1998, President Süleyman Demirel pointed to Turkey's position as a world power by having its constituents, i.e., economic and military power along with loyalty to democratic principles. In the same event, the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense, and the Chief of General Staff touched on the importance of deterrence and contributions to regional and global peace as well the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces and the development of domestic defense industries. In the same ceremony, the Navy Chief Admiral Dervişoğlu detailed the emerging new roles of the navy and the modernization of the navy in line with the increasing operational tempo (S&H, 1998).

In the 1998 annual year-end interview of the top brass, the Chief of General Staff, General Kıvrıkoğlu remarked on the prominence of a self-sufficient maritime force to cope with demanding naval tasks such as sea control and protection of maritime trade along with the contribution to international peace and stability. Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu took this opportunity to explain his vision of the Navy as the incoming new commander. He stated that it was a versatile navy capable of operating both in littoral and also in high seas with power projection capabilities, including a light aircraft carrier and an amphibious component to protect extending national interests. He also underscored the vitality of seaborne trade and the prominence of Turkish Straits and the Aegean in connecting the Turkish economy to world markets, whereas 65 percent of seaborne trade passing through the Aegean Sea. He remarked that the policy in developing force posture should be based on quality, not on quantity, even enhanced quality apace with technical development, and in recruiting manpower accustomed to high technology. He defined his goal for the 2000s as developing a deterrent force in the region and the Mediterranean and using this force

in contributing to the uphold of regional and international peace. His remarks were totally in line with the new strategy with a further emphasis on the force projection capability, i.e., including a light aircraft carrier and the TF-2000 air defense frigates (S&H, 1998). The highlight in this interview was his stress on the Turkish Navy's being a 'powerful regional navy' of regional power.¹¹³

As mentioned in section 2.3.3., Admiral Sancar made a presentation titled "The Maritime Interests of Turkey and the Naval Force Requirement" in the 1999 "Turkish Maritime Power Symposium". Since he was the Plans and Policy Division Chief at the Navy headquarters during the crafting of the 1997 strategy and the Operations Chief at the time of presentation, it is worth thoroughly examining his remarks as an official manifestation of the strategy to an audience comprised of military leadership, academicians, and the attendants of War Colleges (HAK, 1999). After setting the historical background, Admiral Sancar defined the maritime interests of Turkey as the expectations of a nation from seas and all sectors related to maritime activities.¹¹⁴

Admiral Sancar also pointed out the exclusive significance of seaborne trade from economic as well as political and military perspectives in elaborating on the maritime interests of Turkey. The connectivity of Turkey to other states is provided by way of the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. The disruption of shipping from and to Turkey in the Aegean Sea would paralyze Turkish foreign trade and lead to exhaustion of the stocks. This would eventually result in decreasing the production of oil and byproducts and would trigger an energy crisis in the industry. This situation accentuated the significance of the maritime trade for Turkey's growing economy through the Aegean Sea. If the maritime trade through the Aegean Sea could not be sustained in case of a conflict with Greece, the diversion of the seaborne shipping to the ports at the Mediterranean coast of Turkey

¹¹³ This interview was also published in English on the sister magazine of *Savunma ve Havacılık, Naval Forces* with the title "Turkish Navy: A Regional Powerful Navy" (Dervişoğlu, 1999).

¹¹⁴ The roles listed were uninterrupted sustainment of national seaborne trade by ensuring the access to sea lanes of communication, upholding maritime sovereignty rights in the surrounding seas under international law, maintaining full sovereignty rights on the Turkish Straits provided for by the multinational conventions and enhancing navigational safety through the Straits to the international standards, competence in the conduct of search and rescue operations in the surrounding seas, and free exploitation of international waters in the seas which were in the area of interest of Turkey (HAK, 1999).

would be possible but would not be enough particularly considering the oil processing capacities of the refineries other than Tüpraş at İzmit Bay and Aliğa at Çandarlı Bay, İzmir. The scarcity of oil and byproducts would hamper the industry and the transportation sectors, and consequently would degrade military capabilities and disrupt the foreign trade significantly. Since Turkey could not endure such a situation for long periods, it would be compelled to give up or backtrack on its political goals. In this context, the sustainment of seaborne trade through the Aegean routes stood out as the most vital of Turkey's maritime interests.

As promulgated in the strategy under consideration here, Admiral Sancar outlined the desired capabilities of the proposed naval force as:

- To maintain superiority over other navies in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean,
- To provide an adequate deterrent over other navies in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean,
- To detect, identify, and track friendly, neutral, and adversary platforms in the surface, subsurface, and air operations environments around the clock,
- To deliver firepower enough to neutralize adversary combatants in any type of countermeasure environment,
- To incorporate organic aviation and afloat logistic capability in its organization,
- To conduct joint and combined operations,
- To possess power projection and strike capability,
- To maintain a well-balanced force posture and force multipliers,
- To observe western standards in its technical conduct and operations,
- To recruit and retain well-trained and well-educated human resources displaying great potential in operating and developing high-tech hardware, software, and weapons systems and dedication to the ideals of homeland defense and contribution to international peace with high morale (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 26; HAK, 1999).

The ship commissioning ceremonies arranged in July every year quickly turned into annually held maritime fests with an ever-growing number of naval vessels commissioned into the Navy. Each event marked a new phase in the rejuvenation of the fleet with the contribution of the domestic defense industry. In July 1999, the ceremony was organized for 15 various vessels, the largest ever in terms of sheer numbers, including five *Engin (Ex- Eridan)* class minehunters transferred from France. A common theme in

the leadership speeches was the protection of maritime interest with a powerful navy built and maintained with the help of a domestic industrial base (S&H, 1999).

So far, this dissertation addressed the conception behind crafting a high seafaring strategy, defining the ends, as objectives to pursue and the means, mainly force structure consisting of fleet and supporting infrastructure and the ways, operations, missions, and exercises conducted to reach the ends. As discussed, although it could be traced to the early 1960s even before, i.e., to the last period of the Ottoman Navy, a high seafaring navy discourse appeared more plausible after 1992, starting with the tenure of Admiral Vural Bayazıt and his immediate successor, Admiral Güven Erkaya. As seen, it was brought to the public attention via the speeches and interviews of the naval leadership, including some anonymous and ghost-authored articles covering the details which were not included in statements of the naval leadership. Admiral Bayazıt prepared the groundwork for reorienting the Navy by defining the required force structure and arranging the ways to attain it through the defense planning process. However, it was Admiral Güven Erkaya who directed his staff to craft the ongoing transformation of the Navy into a comprehensive strategy document, including the naval policy objectives. His role was crucial in sharing it with the public as an annex to the service journal. His objective, as stated in the preamble of the 1997 strategy document, was steering the Navy's strategic orientation towards the blue waters to better serve the security and maritime interests of Turkey in coping with the emerging opportunities and challenges of the coming century (Dz.K.K., 1997).

The 1997 strategy document included both traditional missions related to regional threats and protection of maritime rights and interest, and also the postmodern roles in contributing to regional and international peace, by envisaging a balanced force structure (NAFO, 1997). Nevertheless, the naval leaders never overlooked the threat-based roles and functions of the navy. Hence, they took stopgap measures to maintain the regional naval balance of power, as in the case of the transfer of the *Knox*- and *Perry*-class frigates, later the transfer of *Eridan*-class minehunters and *Aviso*-class corvettes while the modernization programs were underway.

Then, what made Admiral Erkaya take such a bold, even unorthodox action, which marked a significant departure from the established practices of the Turkish military? Several contributing factors created a condition conducive to such a decision. Firstly, Admiral Erkaya understood the organizational identity of the Navy in terms of its relationship to the nation and the dependency between the naval force posture required and the national interest that the Navy must defend. He was an ambitious but also down-to-earth individual. For him, the Turkish Navy cannot and should not aspire to develop a kind of naval force that great powers have had. As noted by the drafter of the strategy document, Admiral Sađdıç, “This strategy was not devised to deliver a seapower to serve imperialistic goals”.¹¹⁵ However, Admiral Erkaya also emphasized that the Turkish Navy should go beyond the previous status of the littoral or regional navy in order to protect its overseas maritime interests. He stressed that the Navy had also to ‘increase its effectiveness and influence in international politics, or to promote its national standing in a globalized world where Turkey should be cooperating and, at the same time, competing with other countries considering the indivisibility of the security. He praised the versatility and mobility of naval forces in providing crisis managers with the flexibility to generate and tailor forces needed to cope with the unique requirements of each situation (NAFO, 1997, p. 12).

Second, his personal traits and his career trajectory which included experience in long-term planning, the functioning of NATO as well as in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean sovereignty issue all contributed to the creation of the 1997 strategy. He served as Plans Policy Chief in both the Navy and the General Staff headquarters with responsibility for strategy and force development.¹¹⁶ Besides, as a man of principle, his prioritization of institutionalization and standardization, particularly compiling routines into structured operating procedures facilitated the conversion of ongoing practices and

¹¹⁵ Interview with Admiral Kadir Sađdıç, November 5th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 11.

¹¹⁶ In 1977, upon the return from Brussels, where he served as the naval plans officer in the Turkish Military Representative to NATO, Admiral Erkaya was assigned as the Head of Strategy Branch at the General Staff as a captain. During his tenure, he had opportunity to brief the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit on command and control responsibilities of NATO headquarters in the Mediterranean, which was a thorny issue between Greece and Turkey. After briefing, he was praised personally by Prime Minister Ecevit due to his extensive knowledge on the issue. Later, the Prime Minister asked him to accompany in a summit with Greek Prime Minister at Montreux (Erkaya & Baytok, 2001, p. 109).

discourses of the transformation into a coherent strategy document. He implemented the same principles in designing the national defense planning in line with NATO planning as elaborated above.

Third, his personal experiences and principles of conduct¹¹⁷ also reinforced his beliefs in the necessity of crafting a high seafaring strategy document. As the sociological institutionalist perspectives predict, naval officers are the ones who are exposed to strong pressures related to advancement in the vocational field, and those experiences often involve international contacts.

Last, Admiral Erkaya, like Admiral Bayazıt, had unwavering confidence in the Turkish Navy in terms of its ability to build and operate more sophisticated ships, as proved in the successful adoption of the MEKO and *Knox*-class frigates. He had also believed in the attainability of the ongoing modernization programs, including the TF-2000, MİLGEM, Distant Horizon, and even a light aircraft carrier with the embarked air wing. Although the industrial base was limited to building naval combatants in joint ventures, he had confidence in the capacity of the sector to increase the domestic content, including the design work, indigenous hardware, and software development (NAFO, 1997).

In sum, the Turkish Navy and defense industry has accumulated institutional and technological know-how for designing and building naval ships over the years. Moreover, it was of a time of major changes in the force posture of the Turkish Navy. The Navy launched two of its first guided-missile fitted *Preveze*-class submarines, two MEKO 200T Track IIA *Barbaros*-class frigates, two *Yıldız*-class fast attack boats, and the second fleet oiler along with eight *Knox*-class frigates when he was either the Fleet Commander or the Navy Chief. Thus, the Navy was being equipped with the so-called multi-dimensional capabilities. With the promulgation of the 1997 strategy, the Turkish Navy made public the force structure envisaged for the future, which until then was somewhat abstract.

¹¹⁷ Before his retirement ceremony, Admiral Erkaya distributed a booklet of 40 pages, titled “*Veda Ederken (While Farewell)*”, covering the principles that he followed throughout his professional carrier (1997).

According to the strategy document, it is the Navy to ‘defend the country against threats from the sea, and to protect maritime interests’, and to assume very important national, regional and international roles with inherent capabilities of mobility and force projection. More precisely, its peacetime missions were:

Provision and maintenance of deterrence through the development of the force structure, and adequate training and exercises; maintaining a naval presence at sea, as required by national interests; securing sea lanes of communication; as required, participating in Peace Support Operations, Humanitarian Assistance, Natural Disaster, and Refugee Relief, and Search and Rescue Operations; participating in joint operations with other national and Allied security forces against terrorism, drug trafficking, and smuggling; co-operating with the Coast Guard in the protection of interests, and environmental protection within the EEZ, and in times of crisis or war, these tasks expanded to include strategic deterrence, crisis response, sea control, and participation in allied operations, or, when necessary, coalition operations’ (NAFO, 1997, p. 6).

The desired capabilities to perform the envisioned tasks might suggest that the Turkish Navy embarked on building a bigger navy based on a specific or imminent threat, which is a prominent determinant in the realist paradigms. Rather, it seems that the Navy was trying to become a norm navy, in line with the *zeitgeist* of the era, that can protect the nation’s interest and sovereignty by projecting security. More significantly, it was defining the participation in multinational peacekeeping activities, i.e., postmodern roles, as core capabilities that the Turkish Navy should have. Actually, these kinds of missions were the ones that were emphasized by the political leadership more profoundly along with the policy of being a ‘regional power’ and a ‘model’.

As it can be inferred from the discourses of Admiral Bayazit and Admiral Erkaya as well as from the content of the 1997 strategy, the blue water component of such a structure was to consist of “frigates destroyers, patrol craft, submarines, and naval aviation assets”. It was envisioned to secure the sea lanes of communication on the high seas as well as to permit effective participation in allied and national sea control operations” (NAFO, 1997, p. 6). As confirmed by Admiral Bayazit earlier, the changing roles and functions of the Navy would not alter the main operational concept based on the tenets of “protection of maritime interests” and “safeguarding of the sea lanes of communication”. Indeed, only participation in crisis management operations to contribute to regional and global peace was added to the existing mission portfolio of the Turkish Navy. As discussed earlier, the justification of the operational need for acquiring TF-2000 frigates and a sea control ship was mainly based on the main operational concept of competitive roles. Collaborative

postmodern roles, i.e., operations other than war were seen as secondary roles. This demonstrates that part of the mechanisms behind the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ move in which naval officers were concerned about appropriate and balanced roles of the Turkish Navy based on national identity or image that they held. Concurrently, as the sociological institutionalist model predicts, international engagements influence the development in the naval professional field prominently.

The capabilities envisioned for high seafaring roles have been already included in the modernization programs, as in the case of the TF-2000 frigate program or proposed for inclusion in the Strategic Goals Plan as in the case of sea control ship and landing platforms. Particularly, a sea control ship with organic fixed-wing aviation (STOVL) component and landing platforms with fixed-wing (STOVL) or rotary-wing (VTOL) aircraft enhanced mission flexibility to support the operations other than war (OOTW) such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).¹¹⁸ Even such a platform could also be used as the headquarters of NATO Maritime Reactions Forces as noted by Admiral Sađdıç¹¹⁹ and also incorporated into the 2015 strategy (2016). These units would constitute the backbone of self-sufficient task groups operating at the high seas as envisioned in the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 25).

Then, what did the move ‘Towards Blue Waters’ achieve? In other words, what were the reflected consequences from the move ‘Towards Blue Waters’ into the force development or transformation of the Turkish Navy? One of the most prominent consequences was that the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ move established and made explicit the meanings of the

¹¹⁸ In February 2011 during the Libyan Crisis, Turkish nationals in Benghazi, Libya were evacuated by a task force comprising escort frigates and *TCG İskenderun*, *M/V Osman Gazi* and *M/V Orhan Gazi* ferries, whereas some other western navies used their amphibious capabilities (LHDs/LPDs) without docking in the chaos-ridden ports of that country. Upon the completion of the evacuation operation, the coordinating agency, the Directorate of Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD), subordinated to the Prime Ministry, sent a letter to the General Staff and the Navy headquarters, urging the procurement of such platforms (LPDs/LHDs) to be employed in evacuation and other humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. Author’s recollections as the Force Planning and Resource Management Department Head in the Navy Headquarters.

Devrim Yaylalı also underpinned that he did not see *TCG Anadolu* as an aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship. Instead he visualized it as a ‘Messenger of Good Will’ in emergencies, in HADR missions as in the case of 2011 Libyan evacuation, in Beirut port explosion etc. Zoom Interview with DevrimYaylalı, October 13th, 2020, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 100.

¹¹⁹ Interview with Admiral Kadir Sađdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 11.

naval forces that have been closely associated with Turkey's national interest and national standing in the emerging world order. By employing the 'towards blue waters' slogan, naval leadership was imposing special meanings to the high seafaring capabilities that the Navy was aiming to develop. Such meanings could easily be shared by the audience outside the Navy because they had robust consequences for the progress of the national standing. In other words, while the Turkish Navy's promulgation of the strategy was a manifestation of its organizational identity, it transpired to the political and military leadership and the public what the high seafaring navy meant to them. As the sociological institutionalist thought observes, the modern nation-state has become the sole legitimate authority that can officially summon a collective identity and cultural loyalty from the citizen (McNeely, 1995, p. 19). Once a connection between the nation and the navy is founded, the advancement of the Navy becomes part of the progress of Turkey as one of the essential elements. Specifically, the Navy's international missions, including naval diplomacy and multilateral cooperation were in perfect harmony with Turkey's national policy initiatives that underpinned international engagement and recognition.

The meanings, however, have not been necessarily created by the Navy. The meaning of big naval combatants associated with the status of the nation has been part of institutions formed at the world cultural level, as discussed before, particularly the loaded value to the battlecruiser *Yavuz*. A special meaning gets attributed to such big ships which are not the case for other types of weaponry, such as tanks, aircraft, etc. As Eyre and Schuman discuss, some weapons are highly institutionalized while others are not in the modern world system in which "sovereignty, modernity, and interdependence are the essence of our ideas about the nation-state" (1996, p. 96). Truly, port visits by naval combatants symbolize friendly diplomatic relations between states. On the contrary, the same effect as a diplomatic sign cannot be expected from the visit of a tank, an infantry battalion, or a fighter jet. Thus, with its promulgation, the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy document installed these well-recognized tools purposely and intentionally.

In a sense, the phrase 'towards blue waters' has gradually taken an institutional meaning which manifested the transformation to a high seafaring navy and also a symbolic meaning that represented Turkey's national standing and pride. The symbolic elements of the high seafaring strategy can be conceptualized as O'Neill denotes as 'value

symbols'. The value symbols are characterized by the effect and the multiplicity of the meaning. Its effect can be explained in the sense that the public has a strong behavior towards the values that it embodies, and the symbol gets itself respected and valued by the group. On the other hand, multiplicity of meaning, i.e. 'polysemy' can be described as its attractivity to unite differing ideas and values under one cognitive entity, and create synergy among the emotions to each of them, like a national flag which represents the nation in the geographic sense, as well as signifying its history, culture, and institutions, etc. (1999, p. 7).¹²⁰

In fact, the title given to the strategy document *Towards Blue Waters (Açık Denizlere Doğru)* had not made headlines in the media in the first place, since it had not been launched at an official event. Instead, it was published as an annex to the Navy periodical, *Deniz Kuvvetleri Dergisi* with limited distribution mostly in the military circles (Dz.K.K., 1997). However, politicians and military leadership publicly referred to the high sea missions and capabilities in their speeches and interviews, demonstrating the prominence that they attached to the ideas and views in the conception of a high seafaring navy, as discussed above.

From a theoretical perspective, publishing a strategy is a result of normative isomorphic processes by emulating internationalized models to attain legitimacy in the world naval society. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many western navies published their unclassified strategies following the release of ... *From the Sea* in 1992 and *Forward ...From the Sea* in 1994 by the US Navy¹²¹ (Pandolfe, 2016). The Turkish Navy was no exception to this trend; it also emulated the recent practices of Western navies to attain legitimacy in the

¹²⁰ In the current practice, the 'Blue Homeland' phrase has gained a more prominent meaning in the eyes and minds of the nation. It increased public awareness on maritime interests. Its attachment to the 'Towards Blue Waters' slogan has also enriched its context.

¹²¹ The US Navy published its first unclassified strategic blueprint as *The Maritime Strategy* as a supplement to *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (Watkins, 1986) as an unofficial document. Interestingly, after translation, the Turkish Navy published this strategy a supplement to its service periodical with comments (Göksan, 1986). Similarly, the *Towards Blue Waters* strategy pamphlet also published a supplement to the Turkish Navy's service journal *Deniz Kuvvetleri Dergisi* as an unofficial document. This is an exemplary isomorphic process via emulation.

navies' world, as stated in the preamble of the 1997 strategy, "... as practiced in developed and democratic countries" (Dz.K.K., 1997).

Concurrently with Güvenç's citation of the Navy's new strategy in his book chapter (1998), Okçu detailed its context in a defense periodical with the title "Towards the Open Seas (Açık Denizlere Doğru)" (1998). Interestingly, the most referenced theme in the strategy by academicians and defense experts was the power projection capabilities envisioned, particularly the sea control ship, i.e., the light aircraft carrier and TF-2000 air defense frigates due to loaded symbolic value in such ships (O'Neill, 1999, p. 7). In 2000, a prestige book was published by the Turkish Navy, bearing the title *Towards Blue Waters: A Portrait of Turkish Navy* depicting the history, the organization, and capabilities of the Navy (2000). Shortly afterward, the Navy Chief, Admiral İlhami Erdil gave an interview to a defense magazine, in which he detailed the Turkish Navy's roles and capabilities with a particular emphasis on the high seafaring ones, to ensure the sovereignty of Turkey on the high seas. The interview was published with the heading "Açık Denizlere Doğru (Sailing to Blue Water)" (Kutluhan, 2000). Another interview of Admiral Erdil, with the title "Towards Blue Waters" in a similar context, was also published in *Naval Forces Journal Special Issue* of "The Turkish Navy: Today and Tomorrow". He revealed that the new direction of the Turkish Navy in the new century is "towards blue waters" (NAFO, 2001, p. 9). In sum, the utilization of the slogan 'Açık Denizlere Doğru-Towards Blue Waters' by the defense experts and naval leadership, including the Navy Chief by himself signified the internalization and institutionalization of the high seafaring strategy by the Turkish Navy as an inseparable part of its organizational essence.

After the promulgation of the 1997 strategy, both academics and defense experts began to refer to the strategy document with its symbolic value-laden title "Towards Blue Waters", prominently on its power projection themes. But it took a couple of years for the document to be publicly known. Indeed, it was the Navy Chiefs who attached roles and capabilities with the symbolic value-laden title of the strategy. The political leadership, namely the Presidents, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Defense referred mostly to the high seafaring roles and capabilities in the context of internationally oriented images, that is, in roles contributing to regional and global peace rather than

protecting maritime trade and sea control roles. However, the Chief of the General Staff mentioned the high seafaring roles and capabilities more prominently besides internationally oriented images after the release of the strategy document. Overall, as the owner of the strategy, the Navy Chiefs frequently referred to the strategy in a gradually increasing trend, particularly in the ship commissioning ceremonies where they linked the meanings of naval development with the meanings of national interest and identity.

As depicted in its introduction, the main rationale for the adaption of a new strategy with a 'Towards Blue Waters' dimension was to serve better the security and the maritime rights and interests of Turkey in the 21st century. The political and military leadership commended its symbolic value-laden context and associated it with the national power and standing of Turkish in the world, as a regional power and a world state. It should be noted that the 'national identity/image' value category, which relates to the Navy's role regarding defense, deterrence, and survival, was also brought to the fore in the speeches, with almost equal emphasis on internationally oriented images demonstrating their insights on national security issues. O'Neill emphasizes the significance of symbolic politics in international politics (1999, p. 7). In that respect, the dispatching of the battleship *USS Missouri* to İstanbul in April 1946 to return Turkey's Ambassador Münir Ertegün's remains (İnanç & Yılmaz, 2012) or the utilization of *HMS Illustrious* for the reception during the visit of Queen Elizabeth's visit to İstanbul in 2007 could be considered as symbolic responses or actions related to motives of national honor (DW, 2008).

According to O'Neill's definition, honor encompasses several elements, including "readiness to defend one's home, and rights of oneself and one's group, and caring about one has a common reputation for honor" (1999, pp. 87-88). For instance, the Kardak Crisis in 1996 that brought two Aegean littorals, Greece and Turkey, on the brink of war for their contending sovereignty claims over the two islets, turned into a standoff for national honor and prestige. The crisis was prudently thawed by devising a solution based on 'honorable retreat' without compromising the rights and reputations of the parties involved (Şihmantepe, 2011).

Similarly, the significance attributed to national standing by the political and military leadership along with the public has been also a crucial consideration in foreign policy discussions. Lebow abstracts standing and honor as a related pair: standing referring to the position that an actor occupies in a hierarchy, which ideally also corresponds to the degree of honor. Since standing, like honor, is a relational concept that the drive to attain it can result in a competition. Honor and standing are the means to attain one of the most desired objectives of social actors: self-esteem. Lebow also demonstrates that insults to “honor, thus self-esteem have been at least as a great source of war as threats to material self-being and security” (2008, pp. 64-66). As Larson et. al. (2014, pp. 3-30) demonstrates, status-seeking attitudes of great power have important for peace and conflict in international relations. In fact, social actors’, be it leaders, elites (naval officers), and sometimes public, drive for self-esteem has consequences on international relations such as the drive for wealth and security (Lebow, 2008, p. 131).

As inspired at the beginning, the institutionalization of the ongoing transformation of the Navy in the letter and spirit of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy offered an overarching theme as a guiding document for different modernization programs. It also presented a basis for the conduct of operational activities, and cooperative engagements of the Navy over the tenures of different naval leaders, i.e., until the promulgation of a new one in 2015. It also provided a solid foundation both to ensure the continuity and consistency of modernization programs in the naval organization and to ensure the integrity of the capabilities to be achieved at the desired end. At the same time, it provided communication between the Navy and the political leadership and the General Staff, as their support and approval were required for the realization of the relevant modernization programs. Gray asserts that the weapons programs come mostly with slogans symbolizing the end state to be achieved, surely its contribution to the deterrence, which make easier them to be approved at the leadership level and to be accepted by the public. (1993, p. 73). In the past of the Turkish Navy, there were such public campaigns devoted to developing national amphibious landing capabilities in the aftermath of the 1963 Cyprus Crisis, and to procure naval combatants after the loss of *TCG Kocatepe* and to replace the scrapped battlecruiser *Yavuz* (Çetiner, 2006, pp. 598-600). These campaigns were motivated by ‘symbols of honor’. In the Turkish Navy’s case, as noted by Admiral Sağdıç,

the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy was intended to serve as a guiding document for force and human resources development and to facilitate transparency and accountability of defense spending. It was also a signal of intention and resolution to both friends and adversaries.¹²² However, it has also evolved as the symbol of honor and prestige with the capabilities envisaged for Turkey in the international fora.

The modernization of the naval force structure was only one dimension of the new strategy. It envisioned increasing the strength of the Turkish Navy in the immediate future through ‘cooperation’ and ‘deterrence’ concepts which support each other and reflect Atatürk’s ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World’ policy as a contemporary interpretation in the 21st century (NAFO, 1997). So, the strategy encompasses aims to achieve a balanced approach with the modernization of force structure, the improvement of unit capabilities, the revision of organizational structure, the advancement of logistic infrastructure, the investment in research and development. But above all, it prioritized the advancement of manpower aspects, including training, education, discipline, and morale. The reduction of foreign dependency on software and technology was one of the sub-concepts in the comprehensive perception of the strategy (Dz.K.K., 1997).

Although the strategy featured a forward-looking approach, deterrence has always been its core driver due to persisting external and internal threat perceptions. Turkish naval leaders have been attentive to maintain the naval power balance in the region. However, the promulgation of the strategy accelerated the pace of naval transformation due to the sharing of concerns and visions among the naval leadership and the rest of the naval personnel.¹²³

So far, the origins and preliminary maturation of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy was argued. The promulgation of an unclassified strategy, contrary to the traditions of the

¹²² Interview with Admiral Kadir Sağıdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 6-11

¹²³ In the introduction of the 1997 strategy paper, Admiral Erkaya underpins that one of target audiences of the strategy is the military personnel, including the Navy’s personnel (Dz.K.K., 1997). In fact, he was underlining its contribution in improving unity of doctrine in the Navy since the strategy paper was distributed as a supplement of the Navy’s periodical. Similarly, the introduction to the 2015 strategy also had a message from Admiral Bostanoğlu stating this aim (TNFC, 2016, p. 3).

Turkish Armed Forces, was an outcome of the Turkish Navy's peculiar effort to re-define its relevance for Turkey. In sum, the above discussions demonstrate that the maturation and implementation of the strategy persisted despite the lack of overt political will behind along with limited financial resources.

3.2.2. 'Towards Blue Waters' after the 2000s

Although the Navy recovered relatively quickly from the impact of the earthquake, the financial crisis right after braked down the naval build-up program. The rapprochement between the Aegean rivals in the aftermath working in tandem with Turkey's EU candidacy calmed down the seas well into the early 2010s (Güvenç & Egeli, 2016). In the 2000s, the Navy kept pace with its modernization with the transfer of *Perry*-class frigates from the US, the *Aviso*-class corvettes and the *Eridan*-class minehunters from France, the construction of *Gür*-class submarines, *Aydın*-class minehunters, and *Kılıç-III*-class fast attack boats in Turkish naval shipyards.

At the beginning of the new millennium, the Navy's top brass reaffirmed the Turkish Navy's new orientation as being 'towards blue waters' (Erdil, 2001, p. 9). The finalization of the BLACKSEAFOR agreement was a significant achievement of the Navy in the aftermath of the quake (TNFC, 2015) which was not sufficiently appreciated by the US. The return of the US to the Mediterranean after the 9/11 tragic event has altered the naval hierarchy in the region and "significantly restricted latitude for naval activism in the south" (Güvenç & Egeli, 2016, p. 100). In this period of change, the Turkish Navy Chief, Admiral Bülent Alpkaya stressed the shifting of the navy's focus to non-combatant activities (2003).¹²⁴ The Navy actively partook in operations in support of the global war on terror (GWOT) and the 2003 Iraqi Operation while dynamically adapting itself to the emerging security environment.

¹²⁴ Admiral Bülent Alpkaya noted in his article penned for *Naval Forces*: "Consequently when we look at the new tasks for the navies in the 21st century, we can clearly see the focus shifting from combatant activities to non-combatant ones" (2003, p. 41).

In the early 2000s, the vision of the incumbent government to promote national defense industries was reflected in the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (SSM)'s¹²⁵ strategic plan as a goal of increasing local content to 50 percent by 2010 (2007).¹²⁶ Besides licensed production, co-production, technology transfers, and direct imports, the investment in its defense industry began to bear fruit in the form of 'unique designs' after the 2000s; the Navy's MİLGEM (National Ship) project¹²⁷ stood out as the 'flagship' of this trend (Seren, 2020). With the MİLGEM program, Turkey demonstrated its industrial capacity and "join[ed] the small group of countries able to both design and construct their own ships" (Waters, 2009).¹²⁸ Nevertheless, the delays in major modernization programs degraded the Turkish Navy's standing in the regional naval hierarchy and restrained Turkey's unilateralism in the surrounding seas (Güvenç & Egeli, 2016).

During the tenure of Admiral Özden Örnek, MİLGEM Program was prioritized and put back on track again (2016). More importantly, the Navy commenced Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSh), a maritime security initiative, on March 1st, 2004 (TNFC, 2020) to complement the efforts for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which was affiliated with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor (OAE).¹²⁹ These initiatives in the context of the regional maritime security architecture were perceived as endeavors to constrain the US and NATO involvement in the Black Sea and to preserve the Turkish Navy's relative prevalence in that particular theater. Mainly, such regional cooperation activities were pretty much in concert with the incumbent government's 'zero problems with neighbors'

¹²⁵ SSM stands for Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı (the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries) which later renamed Savunma Sanayi Başkanlığı (SSB) (Presidency of Defense Industries) with transition to Presidential government system in 2018.

¹²⁶ Despite attained in 2011 and reached over 70 percent, some defense experts commented that such ambitious objective might have hampered the ongoing naval modernization programs (Sanders, 2014).

¹²⁷ MİLPO (MİLGEM Project Office), established on March 12th, 2003, supervised the program in close coordination with the SSM. The keel of the first corvette was laid down on July 26th, 2003 (Örnek, 2016).

¹²⁸ In the meantime, Turkey has begun to upgrade its *Perry*- and *Barbaros*-class frigates, the *Ay*- and *Preveze*-class submarines by using the indigenously developed equipment, and weaponry in the scope of MİLGEM program. It initially comprised of 12 corvettes, was modified to construct a batch of four *İstif*-class frigate (TF-100) with improved design. Besides the first batch of MİLGEM, the completed ship programs include two LSTs and 8 LCTs, three submarine rescue and salvage ships, 16 coastal patrol boats. A combat support ship and two fleet oilers are under construction along with the AIP submarines and the LHD, *TCG Anadolu*.

¹²⁹ Nationally launched OBSh later turned out to be a multilateral one with the joining of the Russian Federation (December 26th, 2006), Ukraine (January 17th, 2007) and Romania (December 6th, 2010).

policy and de-emphasizing prominence of military power in foreign policy (Güvenç & Egili, 2016). Although the naval programs included in the portfolio of the Navy have not much changed in years, Admiral Yener Karahanoğlu gathered the programs associated with advancing the Navy's sealift capacity into an 'Amphibious Road Map' (2007).¹³⁰ In his elaboration of new naval functions, he pointed to the rising significance of "maritime situational awareness (MSA)" and the navy's leading role in integrating MSA projects of military and governmental agencies in a single white picture¹³¹. As a maritime and energy security endeavor, the timely inauguration of Operation Mediterranean Shield (OMS) aimed at securing sea lanes of communication to and from Ceyhan oil terminal from maritime-related threats (Özgen, 2013), coordinated with NATO's Operation Active Endeavor and UNIFIL maritime operation off the coast of Lebanon. This timing coincided with the launch of activities to monitor, and if necessary, intervene in, unauthorized survey activities in the Turkish continental shelf (Karahanoğlu, 2007, p. 82) following the exclusive economic zone declaration of the Greek Cypriots and their signing delineation agreements with Egypt in 2003, and later with Lebanon in 2007 and Israel in 2011.¹³²

In the last decade, the reach and intensity of activities of the Turkish Navy substantially increased besides routine national and international commitments. These undertakings included mainly NATO and UN activities and exercises, including prevention of irregular immigration, escorting convoys removing chemical weapons from Syria and carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia and Yemen, evacuation of civilians from Libya in 2011 and

¹³⁰ The program covers the construction and the delivery of one LHD ship, two Landing Ship Tank (LST), eight modified fast four Landing Craft Mechanized (LCMs), two Landing Crafts Vehicle and Personnel (LCVPs), two Rubber Hulled Inflated Boat (RHIB) and a Command Boat along with 27 amphibious assault vehicles (AAV/AAAV).

¹³¹ White picture is used to denote the Commercial Maritime Picture obtained through various sources and composed of commercial contacts (TNFC, 2000, p. 48).

¹³² Upon the Greek interception of a Turkish contracted Norwegian survey ship, *R/V Malene Ostervold* in 2008, Turkey determined to acquire survey and drilling vessels of its own. In this regard, Turkey has based its recent practice on three pillars: chasing away survey and drill vessels from contested areas, carrying out survey/drilling activities in contested blocks, also licensed by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, and showing the flag via exercises covering potential licensed blocks for military activities.

Yemen in 2015.¹³³ This list also includes some other non-competitive tasks like assistance with search and rescue activities in internal waters, conducting ICCAT¹³⁴ inspections in support of the Coast Guard, participation in the ISAF¹³⁵ Operation Resolute Support, mainly with soft power means. The Turkish Navy also supported anti-terrorist operations both in Turkey and across the border such as the operations, Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch carried out by the Turkish military in Northern Syria with its marine corps and commando (SEAL/UDT) units. In the firing drills, naval combatants fired all sorts of missiles, including the maiden launch of Harpoon Block-II, Subharpoon, and DM2A4 heavyweight torpedoes with warheads from submarines, and integration of the UAVs into the fleet (DefenceTurkey, 2019).

As an ultimate case of testing its reach and endurance, depicted in its 1997 strategy, the Turkish Navy activated its maritime task group three times, which was deployed to the Mediterranean in 2010, to the Indian Ocean in 2011, and to a circumnavigation of Africa in 2014 in support of national foreign policy objectives (Özgen, 2017). Ultimately, the Navy tested its firepower at the Denel Overberg Test Range in South Africa (Dz.K.K., 2016).

3.2.3. Verification and continuation of ‘Towards Blue Waters’

In this section, the discourses of three different societal actors, including, the Navy, the Turkish General Staff, the political actors, including the President, the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of National Defense are examined based on the two arguments. First, the Navy maintained the move ‘Towards Blue Waters’ because a high seafaring navy has been established as its organizational essence. Second, the high seafaring capabilities and

¹³³ *TCG Büyükada* evacuated Turkish citizens from Aden, Yemen to Djibouti in April 2015. This was a first evacuation operation conducted by the Navy outside of the Mediterranean between two foreign ports (AA, 2015).

¹³⁴ International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas oversees the conservation and management of a variety of Atlantic marine species, including tunas, swordfish, marlin and sharks, and adopts measures to minimize bycatch of turtles and seabirds associated with these fisheries (Bekiashev et al., 1981).

¹³⁵ The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan, established by the United Nations in 2001. Its main purpose was to train the Afghan forces and assist in rebuilding government institutions.

roles depicted in the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy paper stroke a chord with the political and military leaders because they shared the image and the identity of their nation, and they associated with the meanings of the Navy’s transformation to a high seafaring navy.

3.2.3.1. Turkish Navy

The manifestation of the Turkish Navy’s transformation drive in the form of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy was considerably smooth, considering the consistency and relevance of its content vis-à-vis the emerging security dynamics.

Four peculiar capabilities had the potential to trigger concerns and criticism of sister services, as the subject of conflicting parochial interest. These included the light aircraft carrier (CVL) with an embarked wing of fighter aircraft, the long-range air defense missiles on board of TF-2000, the high/medium-altitude unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and the maritime surveillance/patrol aircraft as an organic component of the Distant Horizon (Örnek, 2016, pp. 56-58). The concerns of the Turkish Air Force mostly stemmed from the potential repercussions of the prospective naval aviation capabilities on the overall control and defense of the Turkish airspace due to the potential for duplication. Although both the light aircraft carrier and TF-2000 were envisaged to provide air defense to naval task groups operating out of reach of the Turkish Air Force, the light aircraft carrier was later named as a sea control ship due to the resistance from the Air Force.¹³⁶

At this point, a reference to some mechanisms that may be appraised in the context of organizational culture will be complementary to the main argument of this study. In this regard, the establishment of some boards to ensure the continuity and consistency of the transformation process has been instrumental.

As a matter of fact, the highly institutional structure of the force planning process was the main element in sustaining integrity and continuity in modernization plans, with minor modifications in the number of the units and systems due to changes in operational needs

¹³⁶ Interview with Admiral Kadir Sağdıç, November 5th, 2018, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 11.

and technology.¹³⁷ Another element of continuity in force planning has been the discussion of each phase of the projects at Weaponry and Equipment Group and Admirals Board.¹³⁸ The participation of the relevant division/department/branch heads of naval headquarters and the experts from the subordinate commands whenever needed has enhanced participation and hence the legitimacy of decision-making in the naval organization. Ultimately, the Naval Commanders Council, established in 1968, provided a platform for sharing decision-making capacity with prospective commanders of the Navy and taking important decisions regarding the future of the navy.¹³⁹ These meetings, which continued then onwards have been contributory in the upholding of organizational essence along with the institutional continuity of naval strategy and complementing modernization programs (Dz.K.K, 1968).

The sustained and strong support of naval leadership has also been instrumental. Despite the Navy Chiefs' short tenure in the office, their adherence to the vision of the navy with robust intra-service decision mechanisms has enabled the materialization of transformation programs. Moreover, their timely interventions either on the political side (Bayazıt, 2009) or in the bureaucratic and military circles (Örnek, 2016) have prevented such as MİLGEM and its follow-on TF-100 from being dismantled or delayed. Besides, the longer assignments of personnel with a technical background at the posts managing the programs have ensured continuity in force development.¹⁴⁰

In advanced navies, the acquisition programs involving new and sophisticated technologies are managed more effectively by setting up a unique, purpose-specific

¹³⁷ Interview with Admiral Deniz Cora, October 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 47.

¹³⁸ A board made up of department and branch heads including subject matter experts and end-users led by the Plans Policy Chief. This board analyzes the alternative systems which meet the operational need and offers the various options to the Admirals Board. Admirals Board include the admirals in the Navy Headquarters led by the Navy Chief or his Chief of Staff. The unit commanders, as well as subject matter experts, are invited to attend the sessions of the board depending on the agenda.

¹³⁹ Naval Commanders Council (*Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Konseyi*) consist of admirals commanding the main subordinates of the Navy (Fleet Command, Northern Area Command, Southern Command, Education/Training Command) plus other 3- and 4-stars at any other posts. The admirals in the Navy also attend the council meeting and brief the council on latest issues and projects. Any decision regarding the future of the Navy is discussed in the council in detail and the decisions are taken by majority vote to ensure the institutional continuity in the Navy after the command handover.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 61-72.

organization. Such new institutions have been beneficial in countering the technological and financial anxieties, and even the bureaucratic resistance (Till, 2018, p. 176). In this regard, the Turkish Navy adopted the same approach in its sophisticated naval programs. In the first place, Admiral Bayazıt prioritized indigenous software development, sent postgraduate engineers to train, and established a center, called YAZGEM (DHO, 2010).¹⁴¹ His successor, Admiral Erkaya, founded a new department, APGE¹⁴² to manage the Distant Horizon program and appointed Admiral Lütfü Sancar to oversee it. Later, YAZGEM was reorganized as a Research Center (ARMERKOM-*Araştırma Merkezi Komutanlığı*) in 1998 under the structure of APGE. This department along with a dedicated research center has been adaptive to new technologies and achieved the successful materialization of the Distant Horizon and the GENESIS Combat Management System programs. Moreover, some other weaponry and equipment development programs such as Akya heavyweight torpedo and Atmaca surface-to-surface guided missile programs have been managed by ARMERKOM.

Another attempt of the Navy was to take lead in-country build and design of a national ship, in size of a corvette, by assuming the overall performance responsibility of shipbuilding. Indeed, the national defense procurement system led by SSM has been hindering the shipbuilding programs due to the project management mentality and the financial model. To this end, the Navy established a unique design office fully dedicated to new ship design which is named as National Ship Project Office (MİLPO/DPO) (Örnek, 2016). This office has been working with naval and civilian shipyards, the defense procurement agency (SSM/B), and other defense industry stakeholders. The first product of this office was the construction of a national corvette built with approximately 65 percent local content. The self-confidence gained through the materialization of the *Ada*-class corvette project has incrementally paved the way for the design and construction of *İstif*-class frigates, fleet replenishment ship (DİMDEG), TF-2000 air

¹⁴¹ Software Development Center (YAZGEM-*Yazılım Geliştirme Merkezi*) was established during the tenure of Admiral Bayazıt in 1993 at Gölcük in the building currently used by the Fleet Commander.

¹⁴² APGE: *Araştırma ve Proje Geliştirme Başkanlığı*-Research and Project Development Division. Interview with Admiral Lütfü Sancar, November 16th, 2019, Annex B, p. 23.

defense destroyer, and even a prospective design for a national submarine (*MİLDEN-Milli Denizaltı*).

The Navy's commitment to such programs has encouraged defense firms and domestic research agencies, including academia in working with the Naval Research Center to develop indigenous systems for domestically designed/build ships with export potential. It has also acted as an interface in orienting the research studies in academia towards the needs of the Navy. In sum, the Turkish Navy has developed a flexible "institutional and cultural predisposition to adopt, adapt and exploit change proactively" (Till, 2018, p. 175).

In this context, the 'asymmetrical' practices of the naval staff are worth mentioning to demonstrate their dedication to the 'organizational essence'. Typically, the coordination with defense procurement and finance bureaucracy in the management of the modernization programs was a prerogative of the General Staff by law. The services were only allowed to offer their input in technical matters in accordance with the PPBS directive. However, the Navy Chief let his staff directly coordinate with defense firms to get first-hand information on projects. This coordination was aimed to directly relay the operational needs of the Navy to their counterparts as well as to speed up the funding and the procurement of the modernization programs.¹⁴³ In this regard, the earmarking of funds by the Treasury for the TF-2000 project in 1995, posting naval officers to Signal for software training in 1993 (Özbey, 2019), and the materialization of MİLGEM corvette and GENESİS combat management system programs (Örnek, 2016) have already been

¹⁴³ Regarding the relations with the external stakeholders, Admiral Özbey recalled a directive of the General Staff interpreted in a narrow framework that limited the contacts with suppliers only at the Ministry of National Defense level for avoiding misconducts. He remarked about presenting the issue to Admiral Bayazit with two courses of action: to be contented with the indirect information through the Ministry of National Defense for decision making on critical procurement and acquisition projects or to contact the representatives of the suppliers for getting firsthand information. He got the order to directly contact with the suppliers. He underlined the significance of practice in having authority to directly contact with other defense stakeholders at the highest level in a transparent manner to reach the firsthand information for critical decision making. Interview with Admiral Özbey, September 10th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 22.

mentioned. Furthermore, the revival of the maritime patrol aircraft procurement¹⁴⁴ and the acquisition of two fast attack craft urgently needed to restore the balance of power in the Aegean Sea in 2003¹⁴⁵ could be added as results of individual efforts of naval staff, beyond their remit to keep the naval programs in the track.¹⁴⁶ Such efforts were very instrumental in persuading the need for transformation of the Navy in the circles of the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Undersecretariats of the Treasury and Defense Industry. Dr. Sıtkı Egeli remarked that most of the naval projects were submitted to the defense procurement agency staff with a detailed procurement model determined at the higher echelons of defense decision-making.¹⁴⁷ His

¹⁴⁴ During his term as the Head of Operations Training Department, Admiral Feyyaz Ögütçü became aware of the decrease in the combat readiness of naval aviation units. The contract for the procurement of CASA CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft had been signed but had not effectively managed due to lack of coordination between the procurement agency (SSM) and the project officers in the Navy Headquarters. He took over the management of the project and overcame the issues that were hampering the venture. A few days before leaving his post, a letter received from the representative of the CASA firm in Turkey was proposing the replacement of the CN-235 which had lower loading capacity with more capable CN-295 aircraft. This could have been a good chance to get more capable aircraft with better efficiency, but after his appointment as Surface Action Group Commander, the decision was made for getting ATR-72 aircraft in the second batch instead of CASA CN-235 aircraft. However, the change did not serve well to the operational requirements of the Navy and since then the project has still been continuing. Interview with Admiral Feyyaz Ögütçü, October 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 40.

¹⁴⁵ Admiral Engin Baykal commented that the implementation of naval procurement plan required drawing on resources such as treasury guaranteed state/firm credits or defense industry support funds, a scheme which was wisely devised by the Navy through firstly persuading the political leadership and the defense procurement agency. The Navy closely followed the availability of such funds for its projects and made timely inputs to the relevant stakeholders at all levels such as inviting the Undersecretary of Treasury to Navy headquarters for direct coordination. The realistic design of naval projects and the knowledge of technical personnel influenced and fostered respect in defense procurement circles along with advanced cooperation and collaboration. The Navy made best of use these funds due to nature of its procurement projects and good coordination with the stakeholders. As such, the Eximbank credits were utilized for the procurement of Seahawk helicopters. Interview with Admiral Engin Baykal, October 23rd, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 40.

¹⁴⁶ Admiral Ögütçü noted the significance of keeping good contacts with other defense stakeholders such as the Ministry of National defense (MND), the defense procurement agency (SSM) as well as the defense firms Aselsan, Havelsan, Roketsan etc. Interview with Admiral Feyyaz Ögütçü, October 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 43.

Concerning the interaction with other stakeholders in the context of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy, Admiral Deniz Cora admitted that such interaction was out of his area of responsibility in much of his assignments in the Navy Headquarters. However, he underlined the improved level of coordination and collaboration between the Navy and the defense procurement agency (SSM). He complained only about the allocation of inadequate funds for modernization projects during his one-year term as the Chief of Staff. Interview with Admiral Deniz Cora, October 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 47.

¹⁴⁷ Zoom Interview with Dr. Sıtkı Egeli, November 13th, 2020, Annex B, p. 95.

observations confirmed the high degree of coordination among the Navy and other stakeholders in the defense procurement circles.

These are selected unique examples, from many, to demonstrate the reflection of individual learnings to organizational learning via the setting of structured routines, standard operating procedures, and decision-making mechanisms to promote the continuity and consistency in the organizational identity of the Navy. One of the factors hampering organizational continuity in military institutions has been the limited tenure of the Commanders, mostly restricted to two years, in some extreme cases up to four years. Since all incoming commanders have their own agenda which they have envisioned to realize throughout their career and expected to materialize them during their tenure, they might have instilled their priorities into the system, such as the procurement of naval platforms or some infrastructure investments. Surely, they have had the ultimate authority to do so, but the system of checks and balances such as procedural defense planning system and advisory/decision sharing platforms aligned their priorities in accord with the priorities of the organization.

Nevertheless, the escalating nature of rivalry with Greece during the transformation process could present difficulties, if one focuses only on its high seafaring or power projection aspect of the move 'Towards Blue Waters'. Although the Turkish Navy stood firm in the crises that erupted in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean during this period, the transformation has been developed in a balanced way by combining both threat-based and capability-based approaches, even the same understanding reflected in the 2015 strategy, as Admiral Bostanoğlu remarked.¹⁴⁸ In fact, the transformation of the Navy has never intended to neglect the threat-based regional security dynamics, the survival of the state has been one of the main stimuli in defining the strategic needs as discussed previously. Based on historical experiences embedded 'traumatically' in the memories of the naval officers, as also all interviewees remarked in Annex B, the lessons

¹⁴⁸ About the 2015 strategy, Admiral Bostanoğlu recollected the discussions on the validity of threat-based general defense plans. Considering the validity of the plan and the occurrence of crises in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, he guided the staff to formulate the strategy, taking into account both threat and capability-based approaches. He underlined that blind adherence to NATO defense planning approaches, regardless of national needs, would not meet national operational requirements. Interview with Admiral Bostanoğlu, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 84.

learned from the past reflected the organizational learning which evolved into one of the core constituents of organizational identity of the Navy, ultimately proving the relevance of experience.

3.2.3.2. Analysis of speeches/interviews of leadership

The content analysis of speeches made, and the interviews were given by the Presidents, the Prime Ministers, the Ministers of National Defense, the Chiefs of General Staff, and the Navy Chief provide valuable input to trace the roots in the initiation, maturation, and implementation of the 'Towards Blue Waters' move. Among different content analysis methodologies, the value analysis technique provided by Ralph K. White (1944) is employed in this study as detailed in Annex B. The outcome of the analysis is elaborated on in the following sections.

Table 3-1 Adapted Template for Value Analysis

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Generalized Value Words/Phrases</i>		<i>Category Total</i>
<i>Internationally Oriented Images</i>	<i>Contribution to Regional Peace</i>	67	171
	<i>Contribution to World Peace</i>	66	
	<i>Symbol for regional/World Power</i>	16	
	<i>Collective Defense</i>	22	
<i>National Identity/Image</i>	<i>Defense of Homeland</i>	47	211
	<i>Threat Countries Related Images</i>	11	
	<i>Forward Defense</i>	10	
	<i>Combat Roles</i>	7	
	<i>Deterrence</i>	70	
	<i>Fight against Terrorism</i>	12	
	<i>Nationalization of Defense Industry</i>	54	
<i>Role/Identity of Navy</i>	<i>Protection of Maritime Interests</i>	45	361
	<i>Safeguarding of SLOCs</i>	28	
	<i>Upholding Maritime Trade</i>	19	
	<i>Struggling for Sea Control</i>	12	
	<i>Naval/Gunboat Diplomacy</i>	25	
	<i>OOTW/Support to Constabulary</i>	22	
	<i>Maritime Security</i>	9	
	<i>Energy Security</i>	10	
	<i>Best/Respected Navy</i>	28	
	<i>Maritimization</i>	25	
	<i>Blue Water Navy/Power Projection</i>	36	
	<i>Sovereignty Protection</i>	25	
	<i>Modernization</i>	77	
	Total		

3.2.3.3. General findings

In the context of analysis, 743 value phrases related to the Navy were found in the speeches and interviews of the political and military leadership in the period from 1987 to 2014 under scrutiny.

In the precedence list of the overall statements, ‘deterrence’ related value phrases have appeared as the most frequently expressed one (70 times), followed by ‘contribution to regional peace (67 times)’, ‘contribution to world peace (66 times)’, ‘protection of maritime interests and relations (54 times)’ and ‘homeland defense (47 times)’.

The value phrases in the ‘internationally-oriented images’ category totaled 171 times whereas the ones in the ‘national identity/image’ category amounted to 211 times and the ones in the ‘roles/identity of Navy’ counted 360 times.

From a different point of view, the value phrases in the ‘survival-related core themes’ aired 223 times whereas the ones in the ‘high seafaring navy-related core themes’ aired 310 times and the ones in the ‘transitive roles/themes’ counted 79 times.

A combined analysis based on categories and core themes indicates that there is a delicate balance between the national survival-related value phrases and the internationally related images. Overall, since survival is directly related to the very existence of the nation and state the political and military leadership put their preferences on survivability in their narratives but also maintain a firm discourse on contribution to regional and global peace as being a respected member of the international community with a permanent motto ‘Peace at home, Peace in the World’. The common feeling of the international community in the initial years of the post-Cold War was the maintenance of peace whenever and wherever needed under the auspices of the United Nations and its sister regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union. Turkey consequently moved in step with this trend, that is the *zeitgeist* of the era, and contributed substantially to peacekeeping endeavors.

3.2.3.4. Political leaders

The general approach of the political leaders, the presidents, the prime ministers, and ministers of national defense have been positive and supportive for the transformation of the Navy, considering the main determinants of the Turkish foreign policy and the Turkish military's "assertive role" in the making of foreign policy (Özcan, 2001). Stöhs observes the "concerted effort of" of the Turkish leadership to modernize and strengthen its military to become a regional power (2018a). Although the transformation of the Navy was not led or directed by the political authority, they lent support and encouragement to the transformation and modernization of the Navy 'towards blue waters. Admiral İzzet Artunç observes that up to last years the political leadership was not influential in directing the transformation and modernization of the military as well as the defense industry. Rather the defense and military bureaucracy was influential in decision making. The political leadership was supportive both in discourse and in finding funds for the modernization projects. In the last years, although the political leadership has increased its involvement in the modernization of the military, the pace of the Navy's modernization has not changed due to the relevance of its programs.¹⁴⁹ Concerning support from political leaders, it might be argued that the rationale for the Navy's strategic transformation towards the high seas resonated well with political leaders because the leaders associated the high seafaring navy with the national identity and the international standing of Turkey. Otherwise, they would not necessarily support the 'Towards Blue Waters' move. In this section, this argument is verified through the outcome of the content analysis on speeches and interviews of the political leadership on defense-related fora and media.

3.2.3.5. Analysis of the Presidential speeches

The content analysis covers the period from 1987 to 2014 to trace the change in the discourse of the speeches through value analysis methodology. During this period, five presidents were in office. The presidents' views about the nation are well reflected in the presidential speeches at the naval ship commissioning ceremonies. They could be

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Admiral İzzet Artunç, October 30th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 69.

considered valuable resources containing remarks about the image and role identities of the Turkish Armed Forces that are expected in the conduct of national defense and security policy by the political leaders. At the same time, since most of the speeches are prepared with close coordination with the relevant service by the Presidency staff, they could be treated as sources of identities of each service that contain both how the service views itself and how the leaders see the service. In addition, since the speeches are intended to convey a message to domestic and foreign audiences, they often contain explanations on key foreign, defense, and security policy issues and how leaders view their nations, as can be seen from Figure 3-6.




Figure 3-1 Images of the Navy in the Presidential Speeches (Author’s compilation)

At this point, it is noteworthy to detail the two exclusive inputs of President Demirel in the context of the security and defense industry. Right before the period of the capture of the head of the separatist terrorist organization, President Demirel firmly emphasized the elements of being a powerful and strong 'great' power: economic power, military strength, and commitment to democracy. He then pointed to the Turkish military's deterrent power in settling regional disputes via peaceful means in the ship commissioning ceremony on July 24th, 1998 (Kutluhan, 1998). In fact, he was the only president, who had an interview

with a defense magazine. It was given in the context of the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. In the interview, the President shared his views on the development phases of the national defense industry since the onset of the Turkish Republic, and on the prevailing relationship between the national economy and the effective defense industry due to the geographic location of Turkey. He put forward his vision about the advancement of the national defense industry in the future. Actually, the interview was titled with his motto: “Strong Democracy, Strong Economic Power and Strong Defense”, which he spelled out during a ship commissioning ceremony (Kutluhan, 1998).

The succeeding President Ahmet Sezer did not shy away from expressing his views in the first three years of his tenure (six times in 2001, six times in 2002, and six times in 2003). This could be assessed as a follow-up to his predecessor. Moreover, his attitude could also be considered a display of resilience after the economic crisis of 2001 to assure that the austerity measures did not affect the modernization program and the combat readiness of the armed forces. President Sezer’s remarks were supportive, congratulatory, and encouraging in a general sense, as reflected in the following statements: “the geographic location of Turkey dictates defense of the homeland from the sea which requires a powerful navy”, “I am proud to see the high-tech capabilities and operational capacity of the Navy” (Kutluhan, 2001), “Turkish public commends the contribution of the Navy to international operations as well as homeland defense” (Kutluhan, 2002), “the Navy’s substantial contribution to the widely recognized reputation of the Turkish Armed Forces in the international fora” and “the Navy’s personnel that we are proud of their patriotic identity and heroism are also the heirs to the victories of the glorious past” (Kutluhan, 2003).

President Abdullah Gül’s remarks were also noteworthy, which were stated on the occasion of the commissioning of the *TCG Heybeliada*, the first of MİLGEM corvettes, and included the Navy’s achievement in designing and building naval combatants by also leading the defense industry, along with the Navy’s contribution to deterrence (Kutluhan, 2011).




Figure 3-2 Core Naval Themes Reflected in the Presidential Speeches (Author’s compilation)

From a different perspective, Figure 3-7 shows that references to high seafaring core themes including internationally oriented roles of the Navy (16 times) figure a bit more frequently than that of survival-based core themes (12 times) and material-based ones (seven times). Such references substantiate that the presidents associated the Navy’s transformation with the internationally oriented high seafaring image of the Navy in line with promoting the national standing of Turkey rather than the survival of the country and the modernization of the Navy based on the domestic defense industry. The presidents also praised the operational efficiency of the Navy as a respected and notable navy in the Mediterranean.

Overall, the Presidents referred to national identity (15 times) and internationally oriented images (13 times), naval roles related images (four times), and modernization of the Navy (seven times). Considering the relatively fewer references to the Navy’s role (seven times), the presidents tended to view the Navy as a part of the Turkish Armed Forces in contributing to the overall national interest of the nation. This could be interpreted that the Presidency approached the development of the Navy as part of the development of the national defense and international standing. Their statements on the navy-related

occasions were firmly supportive. It could be assessed that the presidents viewed the operational conduct and modernization of the Navy in parallel with the foreign and security policy of the era. That is, Turkey, as a ‘regional power’, was to shape the security environment in the surroundings by both maintaining deterrence and contributing to regional and worldwide peace and stability. Indeed, their remarks had been in line with the national level foreign policy imperative to engage with the world more actively. Moreover, the image of the Navy based on its unique qualities served as a basis for a strong case for the necessity of the force transformation. In that sense, President Gül noted explicitly in his speech about the political determination in developing a national defense industrial base and transforming the Turkish Armed Forces into a domestically modernized high-tech force (Kutluhan, 2011). Surely, without the support of the politicians in the context of the newly emerging national identity, it would have not been possible to transform the Navy into a high seafaring force which also has had consequences in the international fora.

In sum, it could be suggested that the Presidents were supportive enough of the Navy's move for transformation to a high seafaring navy. But the Navy's move could not be seen as an outcome of a ‘top-down’ policy process initiated by the Presidency to align the naval power with the national interest-driven policy as in modern seapower states.¹⁵⁰ In sum, the presidents, neither initiated the transformation of the Navy nor did they take a proactive stand to promote it politically.

3.2.3.6. Analysis of the Prime Ministerial speeches

In the parliamentary democratic system in Turkey (before 2018), the Prime Minister was the head of the government which had the ultimate political responsibility to the parliament and the nation. The government had the authority to implement the defense and security policy as advised by the National Security Council and to prepare a budget proposal for the approval of the Parliament. Actually, besides his impact on the allocation of the defense budget, the prime minister also chaired the meetings of the Executive

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Admiral Lütfü Sancar, November 16th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 27. See also footnote 90.

Committee of Defense Industry¹⁵¹ where policy decisions were taken on the acquisition/procurement of weaponry and the allocation of the defense industrial support funds to specific programs.

For instance, even in times of financial austerity, the prime ministers had supported naval programs as exemplified in the following two cases. As Admiral Özbey noted, an exclusive finance model was devised and presented to the Prime Minister Tansu Çiller in 1995 for the realization of the TF-2000 frigate project, notably right in the aftermath of the 1994 financial crisis, and upon her approval, the Treasury earmarked the necessary funds for the project (2019, p. 49). Another case point was from distant past when Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was willing to divert funds from the strained national budget for the Navy to procure a light cruiser *USS Springfield* to replace the decommissioned battlecruiser *TCG Yavuz* in 1973 (Yavuzalp, 1996, p. 203). As also Admiral Artunç noted, “the government took great strides to fund the modernization programs of the military within the financial limits of the period”¹⁵².

Later, in two events, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan publicized his vision regarding sea power by interlinking it with the defense and shipbuilding industry. In the launching ceremony of the first MİLGEM ship, on September 27th, 2008, Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized the prominence of seapower in protecting maritime rights and interests at seas. He pointed to the need for backing the naval construction industry to have an effective say at seas and underlined the evident link between being a world power and being a maritime power (Kutluhan, 2008). In the 2011 commissioning ceremony, Erdoğan outlined his government’s policy of promoting defense industries and summarized the progress towards achieving self-sufficiency and increasing arms export. He underscored the significance of protecting economic and security interests particularly from the Suez Canal, the adjacent seas, to the Indian Ocean (Kutluhan, 2011). Notably, this speech was right after the start of drilling activity in the blocks licensed by Greek Cypriots. In a way, Erdoğan gave clues about his foreign and defense policy during the hot days of the Arab Spring. His support for the Navy's push for modernization was

¹⁵¹ Up to 2016, The Committee consisted of Prime Minister, Ministry of Defense, Chief of General Staff and Undersecretariat of Defense Industries. Now, it is comprised of President, Deputy President, Minister of Finance and Treasury, Ministry of National Defense, Minister of Interior, Chief of General Staff and President of Defense Industry.

¹⁵² Interview with Admiral İzzet Artunç, October 20th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 53-54.

regarded as a show of solidarity against the court cases brought against the admirals and naval officers based mostly on fabricated evidence.

However, after the 2010s, the government, i.e., the Prime Minister has begun to exert direct influence on defense procurement by awarding contracts in line with its political preferences. Two cases reflect his growing influence on defense procurement strategy. First, the contract, given to RMK Marine shipyard, for the handover of the MİLGEM project to civilian shipyards was canceled by the Prime Ministry on the grounds of an unfair bidding process raised by Sedef Shipyard. Secondly, the contract for the LHD was also awarded to Sedef Shipyard via a co-production model with Spanish Navantia based on a *Juan Carlos I* design, whereas the other bidder, RMK Marine offered an indigenous design (Ariş, 2013). Shortly afterward, the Undersecretary of Defense Industries, Murat Bayar was relieved from his post (Ariş, 2014). Even if such intervention was triggered by the ambitious quest of shipyards to take the lion's share from the contracts, it cannot be said that they have the power to influence the modernization program set by the Navy. Overall, such developments resulted in the distribution of contracts between more shipyards which might have adversely affected the development of a strong and resilient domestic naval shipbuilding industry in the future.

On the other hand, the Navy benefitted from the contract termination in changing *Ada* corvette design to *İstif*-class frigates after the fourth ship to meet its urging frigate needs. Furthermore, the construction of LHD on a proven design decreased performance risks compared to an indigenous design. A co-production model also minimized the challenging at-sea acceptance trials due to the experience of the partner, Navantia. Since the program currently includes one ship, with another on option, marketing potential for an indigenous design landing platform dock would be very low considering the competition from the more experienced peers in the field.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ Interview with Admiral Bostanoğlu, November 15th, 2020, Fenerbahçe/İstanbul.




Figure 3-3 Images of the Navy in the Prime Ministerial Speeches 1987-2014 (Author’s compilation).




Figure 3-4 Core Naval Themes Reflected in the Prime Ministerial Speeches 1987-2014 (Author’s compilation)

The Prime Ministers communicated on 13 of 24 value phrases 35 times as seen from Figure-3-8: internationally related images two times, national identity-related images ten times, naval identity-related images 13 times, and modernization-related images ten times.

To put it differently, Figure 3-9 shows that high seafaring core themes including internationally oriented roles of the Navy (nine times) aired a bit more frequently than that of survival-based core themes (eight times), transitive role themes (four times) but less than material-based ones (13 times).

When assessed together, these figures indicate that the prime ministers were more concerned with both national identity-related roles of the navy (nine times) than internationally oriented roles (two times). The prime ministers were supportive of a high seafaring image of the Navy for the protection of national interest by supporting the modernization of the Navy via the advancement of the domestic defense base.

As Presidents, the Prime Ministers also remarked on the importance of the modernization of the Navy (ten times) along with the nationalization/localization of defense industry supporting it (six times) and commended the operational efficiency of the Navy as a respected and notable Navy in the Mediterranean (two times). Interestingly, the prime ministers did not touch upon the internationally oriented images such as contribution to peacekeeping operations. Particularly, it should be noted that Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in a ship commissioning ceremony directly addressed aggressive policies of Greece in the Aegean Sea on the sovereignty disputes and called for dialogue (Kutluhan, 2000) in the aftermath of the devastating Marmara earthquake in 1999. Notably, the prime ministers were relatively silent in the periods from 1987 to 1997 and from 2004 to 2010. Their remarks regarding the Navy peaked after 1998 (two times in 1998, four times in 1999, three times in 2000, four times in 2002, five times in 2008, four times in 2010, nineteen times in 2011) with the very same reasons as articulated above. Later, particularly the prime ministers resorted to discourses strongly supportive of the Navy in 2011 when the court cases brought against the naval leadership based on fabricated evidence nearly concomitantly with the commissioning of *Ada*-class corvettes.

Güvenç and Egeli observed that the economic crisis in 2000/2001 caused substantial cuts in the defense budget, which adversely affected Turkey's military and naval activism as well as caused delays in platform procurement programs, namely TF-2000 and MİLGEM. The relatively low profile assumed by the political leadership (the President, the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of National Defense) in their first decade could stem from their policy preference of de-emphasizing military means in its foreign policy (2016). On the other hand, after the 2010s, the increased number of remarks in the ceremonial speeches could be viewed in the context of more influential involvement in directing the defense procurement process in order to consolidate their political gains as well as the benefits of the defense industry supporting the policy of the government, as Admiral Artunç noted.¹⁵⁴

In sum, it should note that the prime ministers, in a general sense, lent political support to the Navy's drive for transformation to a high seafaring navy by promoting the modernization of the Navy via the advancement of the domestic defense industrial base. Their support was mainly predicated on the national identity-related images both in survival and high seafaring role domains, rather than internationally oriented images. Ultimately, the high seafaring transformation could not be seen as the result of a top-down policy-driven initiative taken by the Prime Ministers.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Admiral İzzet Artunç, October 30th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 69.

3.2.3.7. Analysis of the Defense Ministerial speeches




Figure 3-5 Images of the Navy in the Defense Ministerial Speeches (Author's compilation).




Figure 3-6 Core Naval Themes Reflected in the Defense Ministerial Speeches 1987-2014 (Author's compilation).

Before assessing the defense ministerial speeches, a short retrospect to the division of labor, i.e., the sharing of tasks and responsibilities between the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense would be beneficial. The tasks and responsibilities of the Ministry were defined as to carry out the political, legal, social, financial, and budgetary affairs of the national defense and to carry out weapons acquisition programs in accordance with the priorities and principles determined by the General Staff within the framework of defense policy endorsed by the Council of Ministers. The law dictated close coordination with the General Staff in carrying out specified tasks in a consistent and coherent manner (Resmi Gazete, 1970). In sum, the Ministry was carrying out the acquisition/procurement programs determined and prioritized by the General Staff, that is, the General Staff was the prime authority in managing the main core of the defense planning procedures, and even the disbursement of the defense budget to the services. So, the Ministry's role should be considered more on the procurement part and in relation to the defense industry.

The Ministers of National Defense (MND) used 20 of 24 value phrases, 106 times more than the combined score of the presidents and the prime ministers. The Ministers stressed internationally oriented (37 times) and national identity-related images (43 times) more than the naval roles (11 times). In the area of their ministerial responsibility, they naturally expressed their whole-hearted ownership of the idea of the modernization of the Navy (14 times). The Ministers were more vocal in the years before and after the end of the Cold War and acted as the spokesperson for both the political authority and the Turkish military. From core themes perspective, the Ministers' prime focus was survival-related core themes totaling 43 times (10 of which homeland defense, nine of which deterrence), but they also did not disregard high seafaring core themes (34 times), particularly the contribution to global and regional peace consistent with the *zeitgeist*. The Ministers eventually emphasized the modernization of the navy along with the nationalization/localization of defense industries due to their apparent responsibility in defense procurement.

The Ministers were less vocal in the first period of the current governing party as articulated above. Then after the 2008 Economic Crisis, and also during the period that the court cases brought against the Navy personnel based on fabricated evidence were

intensified, the Ministers remarked frequently both to show the modernization of the armed services underway as planned without being affected by the austerity measures and also to convey the support of the government to the armed forces during the alleged judicial attacks, gradually reaching to a peak of 15 times in 2014. Besides the increasing number of naval ship commissioning ceremonies in this period, which provided the Ministers with more opportunity to convey their views, the desire of the political leadership to manage the defense procurement process in line with their political preferences as depicted above continued unabated.

In sum, considering their responsibility conferred by law, the Defense Ministers were more vocal than the Presidents and the Prime Ministers in articulating defense policy and military matters. They also emphasized the importance of the modernization of the Navy through promoting the domestic defense industrial base. They supported the Navy's orientation towards high seafaring in a delicately balanced focus on internationally- and national identity-oriented images without disregarding the survival-related themes. Ultimately, the high seafaring transformation could not be seen as the result of a top-down policy-driven initiative taken by the Ministers of National Defence.

3.2.3.8. Analysis of the speeches of the Chiefs of the General Staff




Figure 3-7 Images of the Navy in the Chiefs of the TGS's Speeches (Author's compilation)




Figure 3-8 Core Naval Themes Reflected in the Chiefs of the TGS's Speeches (Author's compilation)

The Chiefs of General Staff mentioned almost all value phrases, totaling 171 times except for energy security. They also displayed a tendency in favor of survival-related core themes totaling 71 times (19 of which were deterrence and 17 of which were homeland defense). Their narratives relevant to high seafaring navy core themes amounted to 66 times. If the transitive themes are taken into consideration: protection of maritime relations and interests (eight times), sea control (four times), and OOTW/Support to constabulary (two times), then the emphasis of the Chiefs could be deemed as rather evenly distributed. The Chiefs accorded more significance to both national identity-related images (63 times) and also to naval roles (52 times) than to internationally oriented images (43 times). The nationalization of defense industries was less pronounced (five times) than the modernization of the navy (15 times).

They put more stress on navy-specific values, particularly during the period from 1988 to 2005. Besides the *zeitgeist* of the era, the harmony and coordination between the Chiefs of General Staff and the Navy Chiefs were noticeable in their narratives. The Chiefs were almost mute in the 2006-2011 frame with the exception of 2008 when the first ship of the MILGEM program was launched. This silent period, as also observed in the politicians might have resulted from the relative tension in civil-military relations of the era. Moreover, the intensification of navy-specific value phrases after the 2000s indicated the support of the military and political leadership to the naval projects and operations after the devastating earthquake that hit the Gölçük Naval Base. Although most of the high seafaring navy-related value phrases concentrated on the internationally oriented roles such as contribution to regional and global peace, maintaining the maritime trade at the high seas, and power projection were also articulated by the Chiefs of General Staff. They also commended the achievements of the navy and the respect gained through operational effectiveness. Besides, the Chiefs underscored the requirement for the maritimization of Turkey.

In sum, considering their responsibility conferred by law, the Chiefs of General Staff were more vocal than the politicians in articulating their views on military strategy matters along with the modernization of the Navy via promoting the domestic defense industrial base. The Chiefs sounded supportive of the transformation of the Navy to a high seafaring profile, but with more focus on survival-related themes. This indicated that they were

more concerned with national identity-related images rather than internationally oriented roles of the Navy. In the final analysis, although the General Staff has the authority by law to determine the priorities and principles in overall operational and strategic planning of the Turkish Armed Forces, the content of input reflected in their speeches and interviews did not include a principled and consistent stand for the transformation of the Navy towards high seas, i.e., as part of a “top-down” policy-driven initiative of the Chiefs of the Turkish General Staff.

3.2.3.8. Analysis of the speeches of the Navy Chiefs




Figure 3-9 Images of the Navy in the Navy Chiefs’ Speeches (Author’s compilation)




Figure 3-10 Core Naval Themes Reflected in the Navy Chiefs’ Speeches 1987-2014 (Author’s compilation)

The Navy Chiefs as expected for being the custodian of the newly adopted strategy, made use of more than half of the value phrases expressed (403 times out of a total of 743 times) by remarking on all generalized value phrases.

As seen from Figure 3-14, the Navy Chiefs referred to the value phrases in the following categories in descending order, respectively: navy’s role/identity (205 times), national identity and image (91 times), internationally oriented images (77 times), and modernization (32 times).

From the perspective of the core theme categorization, the Navy Chiefs remarked on the core theme of high seafaring-related value phrases (190 times), survival core theme-related value phrases (95 times), material-related value phrases (63 times), and transitive role-related value phrases (57 times).

In a detailed analysis of high seafaring core theme (total 190 times), internationally oriented images (contribution to regional (32 times) and world peace (34 times), a symbol for regional/world power (seven times) were less than (safeguarding of sea lanes of

communication (19 times), maintaining maritime trade (16 times), naval/gunboat diplomacy (20 times), best/respected navy (seven times), maritimization (16 times), blue water navy/force projection (25 times). This relative weight of the Navy's role/identity-related images suggested that the Navy's move for transformation towards blue waters predicated on naval identity, or organizational essence stimulation, as such the sustainment of maritime trade by showing off the flag at the open seas and projecting power if needed, rather than internationally oriented ones.

In a focused analysis of individual value phrases, it could be seen that the Navy Chiefs' priority had always been on the deterrence role which accounted for 35 references out of a total of 60 statements with the inclusion of other defense and combat role value phrases (homeland defense (16 times), threat country related roles (three times), forward defense (one time), combat roles (two times), fight against terrorism (two times), and homeland defense (16 times). The protection of maritime interests and relations (31 times) and sustainment of maritime trade (19 times) were the second most frequently referred themes. Considered with value phrases in the category of naval roles and identity implicitly linked with the defense of the homeland, unless the regional threat perception would not change, the maintenance and show of deterrence have always been and, will remain one of the core themes that the Navy Chiefs most concerned.

The Navy Chiefs also brought to the fore the respect shown to the Navy that was accumulated through operational effectiveness and combat readiness, as part of organizational prestige (20 times) associated with national standing (seven times). They also took every opportunity to draw the attention of the political and military leadership as well the public audience to the maritimization (16 times) of the nation and the state.

Moreover, the annual change in value phrases could be taken as the indicators of the state of civil-military relations. Interestingly, the period during which the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy (1995-1997) had been prepared was a time of tension in civil-military relations in Turkey. Later the same trend was also apparent in the graphics for the periods 2005-2007 and 2000-2011 and 2013 either due to a strained relationship between the civil and military actors or the government's efforts to de-emphasize military means in its foreign policy.

Until 2014, the Navy Chiefs remarked mostly on the modernization of the navy (seven times). As they gradually picked up on the roles taken by the Navy in both survival and high seafaring core themes, they consistently expressed their views on a balanced force structure that could effectively operate on both littoral and high seas. The ascending frequency of high seafaring value phrases in the time frame under study was coherent with the capability needs to build a blue-water navy. The speeches and interviews of the Navy Chiefs, as well as the context of the 1997 strategy document, profoundly underpinned the crucial connection between the survival of the nation and the transformation of the Navy towards high seas, i.e., the uninterrupted sustainment of maritime trade by safeguarding and ensuring the availability of shipping routes at surrounding and high seas. What was prioritized as ‘vital’ was the continued flow of oil for the functioning of the economy and even, for preserving the warfighting capacity of the country. This ‘securitized’ connection which justified transformation to a high seafaring navy in the war and crises was also used as a rationale for peacetime roles of a blue water navy by linking it to the prosperity of the nation, or “welfare protection” as Güvenç and Egeli noted (2016). These critical linkages were used to justify the operational need to procure a TF-2000 frigate and a light aircraft carrier.

Although the procurement of the core components of a high seafaring navy, namely the TF-2000 frigate and the light aircraft carrier, encountered major delays, due to budget restrictions and technology transfer concerns. Meanwhile, the Navy upgraded its *Gabya*-class (ex-US *Perry*-class) frigates with a new indigenously developed GENESIS combat management system and a national fire control system and 32-pack VLS for ESSM and Smart S Mk-2 3D-radars to perform high seafaring tasks.

Particularly, after 2008 as reflected in the speeches of the Navy Chiefs, the Navy increased its engagement in out of area operations, in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean by partaking in NATO and multinational task forces since 2008. Firstly, it provided escorts to convoys carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia in the context of the UN’s “World Food Program”. Later, the presence in this region, the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the Horn of Africa (HOA), continued in the form of participation in counter-piracy operations in the auspices of either NATO standing naval groups (SNMG-I/II) or US-led

combined task force, which commanded by Turkish admirals five times since its onset.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, the Turkish humanitarian aid ships were also escorted in the region in the 2011-16 period (Dz.K.K., 2016). As ultimate proof of its extant blue water capacity, the Turkish Navy activated its first task group in Spring 2010 in the Mediterranean to conduct naval diplomacy functions and regional naval cooperation activities with the littorals. In 2011, the second activated task group was deployed to the Indian Ocean in support of counter-piracy operations along with naval diplomacy and regional cooperation activities to test its reach and sustainment capacity. In the third activation of 2014, the Barbaros Turkish Maritime Task Group was tasked in support of the Turkish foreign policy objectives in Africa besides contributing to counterpiracy operations in the Indian Ocean. More importantly, the Turkish warships circumnavigated Africa, hailing Cape Hope for the first time after 148 years. The Turkish Navy tested its combat systems and firing capacity at the Denel Overberg Test Range in South Africa besides port visits to 24 countries and maritime capacity-building activities (Dz.K.K., 2016).

3.2.3.9. Overall analysis of political and military leaderships' speeches

The discourses of the political leadership were surely carrying out messages related to the political input, i.e., from the National Policy Document as well as from the political preferences depicted in the party and government programs. In parallel, the narratives of the Chiefs of General Staff were meant to convey the strategic military input, i.e., from the Military Strategy Document. These inputs could be accepted as the guiding and driving principles for the development of the naval strategy according to the defense planning procedures. However, these inputs were stated in more a general sense particularly focusing on modernization of the Navy rather than reorienting the naval strategy and restructuring the naval force posture accordingly.

From the overall content and context of the narratives of the naval leadership, it could be inferred that the Navy had already been in the course of modernizing its force posture and reorienting its strategy to conduct its primary and priority tasks effectively by taking the

¹⁵⁵ In July 2009, the then Navy Chief Admiral Metin Ataç boarded *TCG Giresun* conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. He flew his pennant on the masthead of *TCG Giresun* to mark this unprecedented occasion.

lessons learned from the previous operations well before the period under study. Due to the inherent flexibility and versatility of its force structure, the Navy adapted itself to the demanding operational requirements of the era, i.e., contribution to multinational peacekeeping endeavors and operations other than war (OOTW) wisely and promptly.

In this context, the security dynamics of the era obliged the Navy to redefine its area of influence and interest in relation to the economically growing and globalizing Turkey. The sustained access to world markets, particularly the uninterrupted flow of oil imports through the Aegean Sea in times of crisis and war was securitized in the scope of sustainment of the seaborne trade and the maintenance of sea lanes of shipping in the Mediterranean. This vitalized mission was the driving and guiding determinant of the crafting of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy paper and the development of the relevant force structure along with the operational requirements for contributing the world and regional peace. In sum, the Navy exploited the emerging security dynamics of the new world order to re-energize its operational needs.

Overall, it is demonstrated that the naval leadership continued to pursue the objective in the transformation of the Navy towards blue waters, or high seas. The Navy is still sticking to its goals from 'The Towards Blue Waters' strategy which is currently eclipsed by a more popular concept '*Mavi Vatan* – The Blue Homeland'. In the meantime, the Navy has lost many admirals and bright officers due to the court cases based on faked evidence and later the purge of personnel involved in the 2016 failed coup attempt. The main rationale for continuity in orientation can be linked to the momentum built around the idea of 'towards the high seas' which has evolved into the core of the organizational essence within the Turkish Navy.

The content analysis verified that the politicians including the Presidents, the Prime Ministers, and the Ministers of National Defense extended sufficient support to the Navy's move for transformation into a high seafaring navy. But it could not be viewed as a completely 'top-down approach' by the politicians 'inspired by the support of foreign policy objectives and international prestige or protection of national rights and economic interests. In other words, the politicians neither initiated the transformation of the Navy nor did they take a proactive stand to promote it politically. Concurrently, although the

General Staff had the authority by law to determine the priorities and principles in overall operational and strategic planning of the Turkish Armed Forces, the content of input reflected on the Chiefs of General Staff's speeches and interviews did not include a principled 'top-down' stimulus for the transformation of the Navy towards the high seas. The rationale for the support was that the Navy's transformation was promoting the identity of the Navy and its reflections on the national standing.

It should note that the Turkish people view their nation in terms of broader international relations, participating in multinational activities, and even compete with advanced countries. In this respect, an advanced navy becomes one of the elements that constitute the kind of nation that the people desire and, at the same time, a conduit that projects the national identity into the world.

4. ‘TOWARDS BLUE WATERS’: PROMISE VS. PERFORMANCE

4.1.COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TURKISH NAVY’S STRATEGIES

In 2015, the Turkish Navy revised its existing strategy (mainly based on the 1997 ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy document) due to changes in the security environment and technological developments. The lessons learned and experience of the last two decades have been reflected in the wording of the new strategy. The commander's goal is stated in short as “[being] Strong at Sea, Safe at Home; Present at Sea, Influential at the World”. To this aim, the characteristics of the envisaged force structure are depicted briefly as [being] “dependable in cooperation, deterrent in crises, decisive in combat” (2016).

The 2015 strategy does not describe the areas of influence and interest explicitly, besides their definitions in the military context posted in the glossary section. The section dedicated to the regional security environment covers all neighboring seas in the context of areas of influence. The section devoted to the global security environment includes maritime areas beyond neighboring seas in the context of the area of interest which encompasses the approaches of the straits and canals linking the Mediterranean to the oceans and all over world seas. The boundaries between them are permeable depending on the scope of interests in a particular geographical space. Moreover, the 2015 strategy includes the objective of obtaining port facilities in critical areas of interest to support units operating in those regions (Ibid., p. 37). In sum, the new strategy has a wider geographical scope to the world seas than its predecessor as stated in its motto.

The new document has a detailed list and description of missions and activities with an emphasis on the upholding of seas lanes of communication and the protection of economic interests in maritime jurisdiction areas as well as at all seas. Besides, the defense of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus along with the protection of its vital interests at sea exclusively takes its place on the task spectrum (Ibid., p. 31). For capability-building activities, Africa is prioritized. It refers to the protection of the “the Lausanne balance” regarding Greek claims which limit Turkey’s reach to the high seas and abuse inherent sovereignty rights based on the Lausanne Treaty and international law.

Reference to domestic defense industrial base appears in the task list as “supporting our defense industry’s export/joint production” or “to support defense industry objectives”. Moreover, the Navy gives precedence to make use of indigenous resources to the maximum extent as long as standards and requirements are met in developing its capabilities (Ibid., p. 33). In parallel, the 1997 strategy was based on a procurement policy in meeting the Navy’s needs from the local industry which is less dependent on foreign technologies. What was important was not to sacrifice combat capacity for the sake of cost-efficiency.

Based on the fact that the seapower has other integral components other than the navy, the 2015 strategy denotes interagency cooperation as one of the main activities, i.e., as one of the means, required to attain its objectives along with “concept of the use of force” and “development of force structure” (Ibid., p. 28). As regards, it dedicates a chapter to cooperation and coordination with national actors,¹⁵⁶ and another chapter to cooperation and relations with international actors. In the preparation phase, it is coordinated with other national stakeholders.¹⁵⁷

In the overall document, the references to seminal works of prominent academics working on seapower and maritime strategy denote its basis of knowledge taken into consideration during the preparation stage.

Another peculiar aspect of the document is its harmony with foreign policy objectives, formally stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Notably, it emphasizes the utilization of the navy as an indispensable and vital foreign policy tool due to its inherent mobility, flexibility, and versatility (Ibid., p. 19).

¹⁵⁶ National actors are listed as the Turkish General Staff and other military services, the Coast Guard Command, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, the academia and the press and the public Relation. In the international context, bilateral military cooperation with friendly and allied countries, NATO, the UN, the EU and other multinational initiatives (TNFC, 2016, pp. 38-42).

¹⁵⁷ Interview with Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul.

Since warships represent the sovereignty of its country at high seas, the 2015 strategy treats assets of the Navy being as a mobile diplomatic mission in showing off the flag around the world. The sustainment of presence operations in the Indian Ocean and the African Continent is to be improved by acquiring logistic bases and local port facilities (Ibid., p. 24). On the other hand, the 1997 version took the foreign policy objectives into account in the scope of national security objectives. Also, the support to foreign policy objectives has not been defined as an explicit task rather included in the scope of diplomatic tasks of the Navy.

The 1997 strategy equated the category of the Turkish Navy as of 1974 Cyprus Operation to “a regional power projection navy” and envisaged to further the level to “sea control navy” (s. 17).¹⁵⁸ As an end state, it underlined that the mission profile envisaged in the strategy required a self-sufficient naval force with power projection and strike ability. Here, self-sufficiency means to support and sustain a task group operating far from homeports; an organic fleet support ship takes part in the task group to this aim. Despite the end state was not explicitly categorized, the envisaged force structure corresponded to ‘Medium Regional Power Projection Capability’ of Grove’s typology, or ‘Regional Power Projection’ designation in the World Naval Hierarchy according to Todd and Lindberg classification system. In the 2015 strategy, what is envisaged is to promote the Navy to the rank of “Medium Global Power Projection Capability” from the current category of “Medium Regional Power Projection Capability” with its present capabilities according to Grove’s typology (2016). The introduction of new platforms, the expanding radius of operations beyond the surrounding seas, and increasing collaboration with the Allied navies as well as other multinational organizations and having power projection capabilities will contribute to the achievement of this objective (p. 33).

While the main theme of the 1997 strategy was focused on access to the world through the Aegean Sea, the new strategy replaces its epicenter more southwards to the Eastern Mediterranean, regarding the Aegean Sea as its integral part, and endeavors to reach all

¹⁵⁸ Turkey was ranked in the fifth category namely Adjacent Force Projection, i.e., with “some ability to project force well ashore” in Grove’s pecking order of the 1990s (1990, p. 280) and kept its standing there as of 2016 (2016).

over world seas (Dz.K.K., 1997). Every state adjacent to seas, i.e., coastal states is regarded as Turkey's neighbor. As such their stability or instability will have a direct or indirect bearing on Turkey's economic and security interest. In practice, the Turkish Navy has been employing its assets on a solitary basis to various international exercises and operations, or just for nationally motivated show of the flag functions all over the world.

In the 2015 strategy, the modernization program laying out the road map from current to the prospective force structure consists of three phases: short term (0-5 years), medium-term (5-10 years), and long term (11-20 years). It does not specify any numbers for platforms, instead, it refers mainly to the programs which are already in the procurement plans, not the ones in the Strategic Goals Plan. For the long-term goals, it just notes an increase in the number of platforms for sea control, force protection, and power projection. In contrast, its 1997 version provides a complete picture of the force structure, including the size and composition of the envisaged force posture.

A comparison between two envisaged force postures in Table 4-1 shows what has been achieved so far in the past two decades. A light aircraft carrier/sea control ship with its embarked strike airwing is not explicitly listed in the 2015 strategy, instead elaborated in the relevant sections in the context of power projection. Surely, the unmanned air, surface and underwater vehicles have taken their places in the 2015 one as a procurement program rather than a technological development area referred to in the 1997 strategy. The emphasis on the upgrade/modernization of the extant platforms is also noticeable.

Regarding maritime interests, the 1997 strategy paper covered them in the general context of the document without listing them explicitly. The 2015 strategy dedicates a section to maritime objectives, including in the energy, maritime transportation, and marine

infrastructure realms to become a “Seafaring nation, Seafaring Country” by 2035.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, it also defines the Navy’s role in safeguarding the maritime interests in the world seas and its support in achieving them.

In the final analysis, it should be noted that what the 1997 strategy put forward was visionary and almost to the point both in forecasting the developments in the maritime domain and also in determining the capabilities to meet the objectives set out. The economic and bureaucratic impediments along with the lack of political probably account for the gap between its promise and its performance. The core component of the high seafaring navy, TF-2000 destroyers is still in the design and development phase, almost three decades behind the program. In this regard, the commissioning of the landing platform, *TCG Anadolu*, beyond the air defense coverage of the Turkish Air Force would be risky due to lack of organic air defense capability, i.e., TF-2000 air defense destroyers. In any case, it surely will introduce substantially improved power projection capabilities, both in national and international stability operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. Actually, delays in materializing the force plan consequently have bought the Turkish Defense Industry some time to develop indigenous subsystems, sensors, and weaponry in equipping new and upgraded platforms may be seen as a blessing in disguise.¹⁶⁰

The crafter of the 1997 strategy document, Admiral Kadir Sağdıç, highlighted that besides being a guiding document in force and human resources development, the strategy also provided transparency and accountability to the naval spending in the context of the democratic control of the military. It also conveyed a clear message of assurance to the friendly nations and of deterrence to potential adversaries by informing them about the

¹⁵⁹ With this target set in the 11th Transport, Maritime and Communications Council conducted in 2013 (UDHB, 2013), other major maritime objectives are as follows: (1) to contribute to international maritime employment by achieving the number of 100 thousand officers, 350 thousand crew and 1 million amateur sailors, (2) To aim handling capacity to 32 million TEU, 500 million tons of dry cargo, 350 million tons of liquid cargo and 15 million passengers by 2023 (3) Mersin region to become the leader in transit container handling in terms of quantity in the South and Eastern Mediterranean Region, (4) Establishment of shipyards in the eastern Mediterranean to provide ship building, maintenance and repair services in the VLCC and ULCC capacity, (5) Integrating port and marine facilities in national transport and trans-European network, (6) Modernizing the fleet of commerce, (7) Constructing at least one of the world's top ten biggest ports.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu, November 15th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 58-68.

future course of the Turkish Navy.¹⁶¹ In its preface, Admiral Güven Erkaya stated that this strategy document was prepared as an “open (unclassified)” document targeting the internal and external audiences besides the Turkish Navy’s personnel as practiced in other developed and democratic countries (Dz.K.K., 1997). Similarly, in the 2015 document, the motives behind crafting a strategy worded as 1) to ensure doctrinal unity of naval personnel, 2) to inform national decision-making and executive institutions defense, foreign policy, and economic affairs 3) inform third parties including public, academia and foreign audience as stated on its commander’s preface signed by Admiral Bülent Bostanoğlu. In sum, both strategy documents are crafted to serve the objectives of transparency and accountability (TNFC, 2016, p. 3).

Another common denominator in both strategy documents is human resources, which is described as the vital element beyond all capabilities, that constitutes the real strength of the Turkish Navy, i.e., as a force multiplier. Consequently, effective implementation of naval strategy depends on training such component that has the ability and capacity to fulfill all assigned tasks (Ibid, p. 35) (Dz.K.K., 1997, s. 27).

As for the development of nuclear-powered combatant capacity, neither strategy paper has not envisaged acquiring such capability. However, the 1997 strategy underpinned that the nuclear submarines have still been the mainstay of deterrence due to their efficiency, stealthiness, and undetectability. In the interviews, all naval elites underlined that strategic deterrence is possible with conventional submarines, to some degree, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. The commissioning of the submarines with air-independent-propulsion (AIP) systems would enhance Turkey’s posture in this field. Considering their inherent mobility, Dr. Egeli also remarked on the use of submarines armed with land-attack cruise missiles, as a deterrent in regions of interest to Turkey outside the Mediterranean. Despite remained beyond the remit of both strategies, the nuclear-powered vessels, particularly submarines and aircraft carriers have been in the strategic calculus of the naval elite in parallel with the advancement of Turkey’s economy and political power, if needed in the future. Additionally, the fitting of ballistic-defense-missile (BMD) capability in the TF-2000 destroyers could also rule out the operational

¹⁶¹ Interview with Admiral Admiral Kadir Sağdıç, November 5th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 6-18.

justification for NATO's deploying BMD-capable combatants (Gürdeniz, 2013, p. 392) besides its use for national ballistic missile defense.

As noted, the Turkish Navy followed the prevailing practice of the era by the worldwide navies, i.e., publishing an unclassified strategy. It was meant for attaining legitimacy in the navies' world, and surely first and foremost in the eyes of the Turkish nation, as stated in the prelude of the 1997 strategy, "... as practiced in developed and democratic countries" (1997).

In the 1997 strategy paper, the Turkish Navy envisions Turkey's place in the context of Western security and political structures by associating its interest to the decisions taken in these structures and also by technically adopting Western standards (pp. 21-26). However, while the 2015 version continues to define Turkey in the Western institutions with an emphasis on NATO, it also questions security mechanisms established after the Cold War by NATO and the EU. The translation of this look to the technical field is the adoption of international and NATO standards, rather than Western practices (p. 33). Implicitly, the 2015 Strategy foresees a more autonomous role for Turkey in contributing to the global resilience in the emerging multipolar world.¹⁶²

The naval elite continues to visualize the future security and operations environment to make suggestions for potential development in strategies. In a notable article published in the Navy's periodical, an admiral reviewed in detail overseas operations, or expeditionary capacity of the Turkish military within the scope of Turkey's economic development potential (Okyay, 2018). What is striking in his article is the taking the high sea task group concept envisaged in the 1997 and 2016 strategies a step further to a task force with the commissioning of the second LHD or preferably an aircraft carrier. Such a task force, a unit at the operational level, would be capable of carrying out high-density warfare by deploying armored corps and providing air sorties to support land action. In the final analysis, the author suggested the declaration of the task force capacity to NATO as a high readiness maritime component command (HRF(M)-MCC) whereas the 2015

¹⁶² Interview with Admiral Bostanoğlu, November 19th, 2020, Fenerbahçe/İstanbul.

Strategy contented with the attainment of one LHD as the core of task group for a declaration to NATO as an HRF(M).

In sum, the 2015 strategy predicts the future maritime security environment and puts forward the principles that drive the activities in the maritime domain in pursuit of national vital interests. Moreover, it envisages the force structure to materialize the goals depicted in the strategy in a broader geographical perspective and a more detailed list of objectives (aims) and activities (ways and means) than its predecessor. The vision is set as “to possess an effective naval force based on national defense industry and to employ this force around the world to protect Turkey's rights and interests” (TNFC, 2016, p. 41).

4.2. ELITE INTERVIEWEES’ CRITICISMS ON THE NAVY’S STRATEGIES¹⁶³

While most interviewees commended the achievements under the Towards Blue Waters strategy paper, they have been also critical of some aspects of the Navy’s build-up.

Three admirals, Özbey, Sancar, and Sağdıç, who contributed to the preparation and the materialization of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy suggested that the Parliament’s approval should have been pursued the Strategic Goals Plan instead of the annual budget. Because the preparation of the armed forces is a task conferred by the constitution to the Parliament. They highlighted that even the War of Liberation had been conducted under the supervision of the Parliament. The parliamentary approval could have ensured the continuity and adoption of military modernization as a national endeavor. Admiral Sancar emphasized that his preference for an institutional initiative in crafting a strategy instead of being an effort led by the personal charisma of Admiral Erkaya for its long-term sustainment. Such an institutional initiative should have been led by the political authority like in the case of other sea powers and approved by the Parliament at the final stage. Another missing step in the preparation of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy was the lack of coordination with other stakeholders.

¹⁶³ Detailed views of the elites interviewed are enclosed in Annex B.

As for the impact of NATO membership, Admiral Özbey commended the tactical and operational contribution of NATO to the advancement of the Navy. It was particularly through the adoption of the NATO acquis in developing national amphibious doctrine according to the national threat perceptions. However, on the strategic level, he underpinned that it did not contribute to the progress of the Navy. As such, variations in NATO's contribution at different levels are reminiscent of the Turkish historical experience with the foreign naval missions that had been employed to oversee the Navy's reformation in the late Ottoman and early republican periods.

Admiral Özbey remarked that the current force posture of the Navy could not be considered that of a high seafaring navy, instead, it could perform effectively the safeguarding of the Blue Homeland and the first line of defense of the country from the Mediterranean. He underlined the importance of overseas bases, such as the island of Suakin at the Red Sea, for the support of a high seafaring force deployed to the oceans. He went on to suggest that the Navy would need a high sea component to provide training to the potential customers in conjunction with exported combatants in the coming decade. Besides supplying naval hardware, Turkey should also deliver soft power of naval culture and training to make overseas friends, which would transform the Navy into a 'real' blue water force. He also underscored the prominence of designing and building an AIP-powered submarine indigenously (MILDEN-National Submarine Project) as part of the 'Towards Blue Waters' force structure.

Admiral Ögütçü stressed that the Israeli Navy should also be taken into account in the force and operational planning as a potential adversary in the Eastern Mediterranean. He pointed to the previous level of amity that facilitated defense cooperation in very classified projects such as the development of guided missiles.

Regarding the current status of the Navy, like other interviewees, Admiral Ögütçü stated that substituting a generation of experienced officers who were removed and honorably discharged from the Navy would take at least three decades. This unfortunate turn of the incident caused the deterioration of naval traditions and culture that had been accumulated through decades. The transitional measures such as recruitment of civilian university graduates on board are acceptable. However, the desired level of proficiency and

competence could be later attained with the commissioning of successive generations of four-year graduates from the Naval Academy. The impact of personnel losses on the morale of the Navy would take years to recover, its relatively intact operational edge notwithstanding. Another requirement was the reopening of the Naval High School, which was shut off after July 15th, 2016.

Along with Admiral Cora, Admiral Artunç exclusively pointed out that the progress in the Navy could not be attributed to any personalities and underscored its roots in institutionalized processes or basically in the traditional naval culture. Admiral Cora pointed directly to the significance of the institutionalization of the PPBS in this regard.

Most naval elites interviewed brought up the significance of establishing a governmental agency, namely a Ministry of Maritime Affairs to manage all activities in the maritime domain for Turkey to become a sea power state and for the maritimization of Turkey and the Turkish public.

In this regard, Dr. Egeli underlined the lack of sufficient coordination between the Navy, the Air Force, and the defense procurement agency, SSM/B with respect to a wider, national picture for air and missile defense requirements, including the ballistic missile defense dimension. As such, the air, sea, and land variants of air defense systems were mostly tailored to specific operational needs of respective services, and in a rather independent fashion. A joint procurement model could have met the needs of both services cost-efficiently as practiced by French and Italian navies and their air forces. In this sense, Dr. Egeli stressed the lack of a joint procurement approach and inter-service dialogue for meeting long-range air and missile defense needs of individual services. Moreover, Dr. Egeli emphasized that the degree of success attained by the Turkish military in joint operations (both planning and execution) was not mirrored in joint planning and management of defense procurement activities. This was arguably a result of inter-service competition, plus insufficient familiarity, and experience with such complex procurement planning before the post-Cold War period.

Dr. Egeli also underpinned his surprise that the Turkish Navy has not brought to the fore earlier an operational and strategic requirement for land-based anti-ship and coastal-

defense missiles. Paying tribute to Turkey's geographic and geostrategic circumstances, such missiles would prove highly practical and valuable in scenarios concerning the Aegean Sea, Black Sea, and the island of Cyprus, both with respect to deterrence and sea denial. He drew attention to the Russian's A2/AD capabilities denying the Black Sea theater and beyond to the Turkish Navy since the annexation of Crimea. Such a threat and capability could have been responded in kind. It is only through the land-based, truck-mounted variant of the indigenously developed Atmaca system that such capability would be acquired. Atmaca is basically an evolved version of the anti-ship missiles of the 1970s era (i.e., Harpoon, Exocet, or Otomat), yet with more advanced guidance, sensor, and possibly warhead features. In this sense, Atmaca could not be seen as the ultimate solution, but rather the way station for more advanced capabilities and technologies, i.e., supersonic and hypersonic anti-shipping missiles. Considering the increased usage in advanced navies, including the Russian navy in the immediate vicinity, Dr. Egeli stressed the benefits for the Navy (if it has not already done so) to define its prospective strategic needs to grow incrementally from subsonic towards supersonic and hypersonic missiles. He also cautioned of the technological limitations and stumbling blocks in front of hypersonic missiles in fulfilling such tactical roles, e.g., challenges with finding reliable means of guidance and navigation during hypersonic flight. Yet, he also noted the shortcomings in maritime patrol and surveillance capacity apparent in performance and much-delayed delivery of CN-235 and ATR-72 aircraft.

Looking to the future, Dr. Egeli underlined the difficulties in the sustainability and replacement of the current fleet of surface combatants, due to the aging of platforms in the midterm. He contends that the current focus appears on the practice of replacing obsolete surface platforms with similar ones incorporating more advanced technologies. However, innovative approaches factoring in operational, geostrategic, and technological circumstances of three or four decades from now on is a real intellectual and organizational challenge, and they may not indeed be incorporated in current thinking. Future combatants and doctrines shaped around stealth, all-electric ship, autonomous singular and swarms of undersea/surface/air vehicles, directed energy, quantum sensors, and hypersonic weapons are some examples in question. He noted, perhaps it is in existence and hidden from public eyes, but he has not so far observed a prospective visionary study like the one conducted during the 1990s. The 'Towards Blue Waters'

strategy paper put forward in the 1990s has catapulted the Navy to a higher level in the power hierarchy, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. Dr. Egeli suggested that it would be prudent to focus on new maritime approaches and strategies envisaging the maritime security environment in the surrounding seas for the long term, i.e., next twenty to forty years, so as to determine Turkish Navy's future strategic needs aligned with the country's financial realities and taking into consideration to its weaknesses and strengths in R&D and emerging technologies, its logistic infrastructure, and human resources and institutional postures.

Whilst acknowledging the contribution of engineering-based naval education, Devrim Yaylalı criticized the lack of social sciences, particularly international relations programs in the Naval Academy since the Navy has inherent part of diplomacy as a foreign policy tool in the practice of both naval and gunboat diplomacy.

Regarding the attainment of the 'Towards Blue Waters' objectives, Yaylalı pointed to his criteria for success, continuity, and repeatability in a system-based approach; the designed plan should include the desired destination, what to do there, and the added value of reaching the destination. Such a scheme corresponds to the operational concept for a ship/task group, a strategy for a navy, and a grand strategy for a state.

Yaylalı also commented on the building of LHD/LHA, *TCG Anadolu* which is generally mostly misperceived as an aircraft carrier. On the contrary, what he viewed was the lessons learned from the 2011 Libyan Evacuation Operation. The naval and civilian ships entering ports under potential threat were covered by air sorties refueled in flight and a naval task group. A platform like *TCG Anadolu* would be the right asset for the OOTW, including evacuation, as practiced by Italy in the Libyan case, and other HADR. He designated *TCG Anadolu* as a benign part of Turkey's soft power.

Regarding the TF-2000 project, Yaylalı commented that these capabilities should not be a hostage of technological determinism and insistence. As such, its main component, ÇAFRAD¹⁶⁴ has still been under development waiting for Gallium Nitrate technology

¹⁶⁴ ÇAFRAD: Multi-purpose Phased Array Radar (*Çok Maksatlı Faz Dizinli Radar*)

development. Instead, the program could have been incrementally started with the US (AN-SPY-1X-SM-2/SM-6) or its European (APAR/EMPAR/Sampson/Aster/PAAMS) variants on board while the indigenous radar, missile, and software design and development have been underway. As the Navy could have been gaining experience in using air defense destroyers, the indigenously developed technologies could be fitted in the later ships of the batch and the initially built ships could have been upgraded to the indigenous technologies later.

Concerning self-sufficiency in the defense industrial base, Yaylalı stated its contribution to the strategic autonomy of Turkey in using such weaponry without any foreign pressure as well as its export potential. However, he criticized the advertisement of the ‘unmatured’ prototypes as proven products to the internal audience. While such behavior alarms the suppliers of the critical foreign technologies used in them to limit their supply, they also disappoint the internal mass due to the long industrialization periods. Yaylalı also drew attention to the lack of development of propulsion systems for land, sea, and air platforms, which hinders the industrialization of main programs.

Regarding the current operational profile and tempo of the Navy, Yaylalı reminded the continuity and repeatability criteria. In this context, a standing question is how long the presence operations in the Eastern Mediterranean could be sustained considering the material and personnel fatigue. In the Clausewitzian world, war is the continuation of politics by other means. Resorting to hard power as a means of policy should not be the only option. Turkey does not have the luxury of making every neighboring country an adversary instead it should establish friendly groupings and alliances. The balanced utilization of military and diplomatic tools could ensure continuity and coherence of political conduct in the field. As a final comment, Yaylalı pointed out that the maritime strategy should be revised due to the changing security panorama and developing technologies, that is, a new route should be set for the Navy.

4.3. LINKING ‘DISTANT HORIZON’ TO ‘TOWARDS BLUE WATERS’

During the early years of the Cold War, the surveillance capabilities of the Turkish Navy were confined to the area of operations dictated by its NATO responsibilities. This system

consisted of radar sites covering the venues of approach to the Straits (Karadeniz Ereğli, Karaburun and Kefken, Anadolu Feneri, Kumkale, Karabiga, Zincirbozan, Sebülbahir etc.) and the bases and ports assigned to NATO (İskenderun/Uluçınar).¹⁶⁵ After pivoting of the Navy to the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean in the early 1960s, some other radar sites monitoring the approaches of the naval bases (Değirmentepe, Aksaz, Foça) were installed as part of the base and port defense. Later, a mobile system comprising a report control center and three radars were procured to employ wherever needed to compensate for the surveillance and reconnaissance deficiency in the field of operations, particularly in the Aegean Sea.

After the 1974 Cyprus Operation, the Turkish Navy grasped its surveillance and reconnaissance deficiencies, particularly in the Aegean Sea. Moreover, the introduction of the guided missiles into the inventory of both the Turkish and Greek navies fundamentally altered the concept of naval warfighting at sea. The insufficiency of the onboard detection and recognition sensors brought about the need for additional surface, air, land, and space assets for the over-the-horizon targeting of the onboard guided missiles. This conceptual shift in naval warfare turned a relatively self-contained combat ship into an asset of the overall integrated combat system. In sum, besides the basic needs for surveillance and reconnaissance in the area of operations, the developments in the information and weapons technologies furthered the requirement for the compiling of the real-time recognized picture in the maritime area of operations in the Aegean Sea.

In the late 1970s, Greece turned its strategic disadvantage of geographically scattered islands into an advantage by installing surveillance radars across the Aegean Sea. This network of surveillance radars was complemented with air and maritime patrol assets stationed on the islands. This integrated surveillance system provided an operational and tactical edge to the Greek Navy. By the targeting data transmitted to the fast attack boats dispersed at their hideouts and the shore-based missile batteries, this system could deny the Turkish Navy access to the Aegean Sea through the Çanakkale Strait or from the Foça

¹⁶⁵ In 1985, the radar systems at Karaburun, Kefken and Karadeniz Ereğlisi sites were replaced with systems supplied by Marconi Radar Systems (ORKO, 2021).

and Aksaz bases. To overcome this deficiency, a preliminary feasibility study to devise an integrated surveillance system in the Aegean Sea was initiated by the Navy in the early 1980s.¹⁶⁶ This study later served as a baseline for a project started by Admiral Erkaya in 1992 which was called the Distant Horizon (*Uzun Ufuk*) Integrated Maritime Surveillance System.¹⁶⁷

The project was initially managed by a team of İTÜV-SAM¹⁶⁸ led by Professor Nejat İnce but was later taken over by the Navy. The Navy established a dedicated department to managing the Distant Horizon project, namely the Department of Research and Development (APGE).¹⁶⁹ In fact, the Distant Horizon was aimed “to produce a complete recognized surface picture on a real-time basis to enable the political leaders and the commanders to assess the situation for an effective crisis management, and also enable the long-range guided missiles platforms to use their missiles effectively” (NAFO, 1997). To realize the program, a reconnaissance and information exchange system was to be set up, which would provide the tactical picture and targeting information to the guided-missile platforms and tactical commanders and the high-level decision-makers on a real-time basis. This task was designed to be achieved with around-the-clock monitoring of the operational area by maritime patrol/surveillance aircraft equipped with surface search radars with detection and classification capability, coastal surveillance radars supported by electronic support systems (ESM), UAVs, and high frequency (HF) radars and data fusion centers. This initiative with the introduction of LINK-11 data exchange systems extended the horizons of the Navy in the area operations as well as its strategic

¹⁶⁶ Interestingly, the ‘Aegean Surveillance Project’ was inaugurated by Admiral Vural Bayazıt (the then N3/Operations Head of the Navy), given to Admiral Özden Örnek (the then Operations Branch Chief) as a development project and supported by Admiral Güven Erkaya (the then N5/Plans Policy Head of the Navy) in the early 1980s. A comprehensive feasibility study with a detailed site survey was prepared and presented to the Admirals Board but not supported by the majority of the Board (Örnek, 2016, pp. 52-54).

¹⁶⁷ During their tenure in the General Staff Headquarters in the late 1980s, Admiral Erkaya and Admiral Özbey discussed the need of establishing a surveillance system in the Aegean Sea with also the inclusion of Prof. Dr. Nejat İnce. These discussions led to the instrumentalization of the Distant Horizon Project. Admiral Özbey underlined his contribution the preparation of the Distant Horizon project and its naming. Interview with Admiral Özbey, September 10th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 12-21.

¹⁶⁸ İstanbul Technical University Foundation Defense Research Center.

¹⁶⁹ Research and Project Development Department: *Araştırma ve Proje Geliştirme Başkanlığı* (APGE). Admiral Lütfü Sancar was appointed to the department head (the then N5/Plans Policy Department Head) of APGE. Interview with Admiral Lütfü Sancar, November 16th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 23.

thinking.¹⁷⁰ In the course of program development, the General Staff began to inquire about the operational requirement for the Distant Horizon to meet it in the context of the Turkish Air Forces' Airborne Warning and Control System program. However, the Distant Horizon began to burgeon its outcome by exchanging data between two task groups exercising in the Black Sea during the *Denizkurdu-2002* Exercise (Örnek, 2016, pp. 52-54).

In the beginning, the focus of the Distant Horizon was the Aegean Sea and the venues of approach to Cyprus. To this aim, three radar sites were installed in Baştape/Gökçeada, Bozdağ/Karaburun and Dayıoğlu/Kuşadası with the fourth one in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Due to the delay in the materialization of the program, the contractor founded another radar site in Kaş as a penalty (S&H, 2013). Over time, the Distant Horizon was extended to cover almost the entire potential maritime jurisdiction areas of Turkey. A fusion center, called Surveillance Coordination Center, collocated with the Southern Area Command in İzmir was founded for the overall management of surveillance and reconnaissance activities in the surrounding seas of Turkey. After fusing the data gathered from all assets of the Distant Horizon, the center shared the recognized maritime picture¹⁷¹ with relevant headquarters and naval units at sea, including NATO authorities.

After the 9/11 tragic events, maritime security and maritime situational awareness gained prominence globally in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In this regard, the Turkish Navy commenced a maritime security initiative, Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH), originally as a national venture which later evolved into a regional

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Admiral Feyyaz Ögütçü, October 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 32.

¹⁷¹ The Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) Services provide the means to create, manage and disseminate the Recognized Maritime Picture. These services will generate a de-conflicted and agreed picture of the maritime environment through the collection, aggregation, correlation and fusion of information from multiple sources. It also provides data on the current and historical information of object data, e.g. tracks, vessels, figures, ports and special points. The information related to both combatant and non-combatant vessels builds the Maritime Operational Picture (MOP), in the broadest sense, which consists of all kinds of maritime operational objects available. MOP is the overall collection of Military Picture (MP), which is the collection of all recognized combatant tracks, vessels and relevant reference objects, White Picture (WP), which is the collection of civilian maritime tracks and vessels from a non-combatant category (merchant, fishing, pleasure, research, government etc.) and relevant reference objects, and any unknown and pending tracks with any other available supportive information (NATO, 2020).

cooperation activity with the participation of the Black Sea riparian navies. In support of the OBSH, the old radar sites in the Black Sea alongside the ones covering approaches of the İstanbul Strait were upgraded and integrated to Distant Horizon system via Karadeniz Ereğli Surveillance Coordination Centre. The locally dispersed patrol boats and the assets assigned to the OBSH contributed to the generation of the tactical picture, mainly for the identification of the contacts. In a way, the sharing of the white picture was to assuage the security concerns of NATO and the American authorities who dubbed the Black Sea as a “Black Hole” (Weinberger, 2010).

Following the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2006, the Turkish Navy immediately launched a maritime and energy security mission, the Operation Mediterranean Shield (OMS) (Özgen, 2013). In support of the OMS, the Navy established a Surveillance Coordination Center in Mersin and installed radar sites in Mersin and Karataş/Adana while upgrading the one existing site in Uluçınar/Arsuz. After fusing the data gathered from all assets, the compiled picture has transmitted the units operating at sea. The OMS was also coordinated with NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor (later Operation Sea Guardian) and UNIFIL maritime operation off the coast of Lebanon. Indeed, the initiation of the OMS also coincided with the start of surveillance and interdiction of illegal survey activities on the Turkish continental shelf (Karahanoğlu, 2007, p. 82).

Furthermore, due to the increasing role of “Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)” after the 9/11 tragic events, the Navy assumed a leading role in integrating MSA projects of other military and governmental agencies in a single ‘white picture. Eventually, the Distant Horizon system architecture was re-designed to contain and handle the compilation and dissemination of the white picture. Other MSA-related projects included the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), the Automated Identification Systems (AIS), and the Long-Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT) of civilian maritime authority, the Fishing Vessel Tracking system of national agricultural ministry, and the Coastal Surveillance Systems of Coast Guard. Furthermore, the Turkish Navy also participated in the Italian Navy-led Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre and Trans-Regional Maritime Network (V-RMTC&TRMN) which aimed to share unclassified information related to merchant shipping. Through this V-RMTC&TRMN community, the Navy was

also linked to the similar existing projects of the Brazilian Navy Surveillance System (SISTRAM) and Singapore Navy Surveillance System (OASIS) (MDD, 2021). Besides, the Navy also participated in the US-led Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) to enhance global maritime domain awareness while sharing classified information with NATO allies and commands via Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) (TNFC, 2016).

Through such multilateral and domestic interagency cooperation in maritime situational awareness in and out of NATO, the Turkish Navy was able to extend its coverage of unclassified maritime situational awareness (compilation of white picture) capacity beyond its area of interest. Such collaboration also aided the compilation of real-time recognized maritime pictures (useful for targeting) in its area of influence, covering its potential maritime jurisdictions and the area of responsibility for search and rescue, and beyond. Recently, the inclusion of the maritime patrol aircraft along with UAVs further expanded the area monitored by the Navy's Surveillance Coordination Center. Over the satellite data linking, the compiled recognized maritime picture and the white picture could be relayed to the Turkish naval units operating anywhere in the world and their feedback could also get incorporated into the overall picture.

In fact, the Distant Horizon was listed as a force multiplier that would enable the naval units in the force structure to be commanded, controlled, and managed in times of peace, crisis, and conflict in the 1997 strategy document (p. 26). Moreover, the 2015 Strategy also included the effective use of the Distant Horizon while envisaging its development in line with the Ship Integrated Combat Management System (GENESIS) and the Force Network Communication Systems Project (ADVENT) (pp. 29-32).

In sum, considering that all naval platforms at sea are organic assets of the Distant Horizon, the extension of its coverage could be taken as an intertwined concept that progresses hand in hand with the Navy's operational reach, i.e., its strategic orientation of towards blue waters. Whilst initially focused on the Aegean Sea and the venues of approach to Cyprus, the Distant Horizon coverage was subsequently extended to cover the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean with the inauguration of OBSH and OMS. Along with Turkey's participation in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Arabia and

Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean was included in the Distant Horizon coverage. In parallel with the increasing reach of the Navy and the expansion of Turkey's areas of interest, from the Mediterranean to Indian and Atlantic Oceans, and finally to the Arctic Circle in the scope of NATO exercises (BALTOPS), the coverage area of the Distant Horizon has also expanded accordingly. Without a shred of doubt, such a feat was possible and achievable thanks to the relevant infrastructure, manpower, and experience that had been put in place over the years through the Distant Horizon, as well as the larger blue water and force projection vision set forth by the Turkish Navy in the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy. Basically, the extension of the Distant Horizon overlapped with the orientation of the Navy from the Blue Homeland towards the blue waters, i.e., from the maritime jurisdictions in the surrounding seas to the areas of interest on the high seas. The last but not least, the Distant Horizon did not only enable the surveillance of operational areas by the Navy but also broadened the strategic mindset of the Navy, as Admiral Ögütçü noted.¹⁷²

4.4. THE 'BLUE HOMELAND' DOCTRINE

“*Mavi Vatan* (The Blue Homeland)” is a term coined by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz to define the maritime jurisdiction areas of Turkey, including the internal and territorial waters along with the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The term was aimed to increase awareness on the protection of sovereign maritime rights and economic interests as much as safeguarding the rights and interests at homeland. It was first used by Admiral Gürdeniz in a symposium on 'Black Sea Maritime Security' on June 16th, 2006 (2013, p. 19). The term later was used by the Navy Chief, Admiral Yener Karahanoğlu, in an interview to define the declared and undeclared maritime jurisdiction areas of Turkey corresponding to half of its landmass surface area (S&H, 2006). The Turkish Coast Guard adopted the Blue Homeland concept by overlapping it with its functional area of responsibility (S&H, 2007).¹⁷³

¹⁷² Interview with Admiral Feyyaz Ögütçü, October 9th, 2019, İstanbul, Annex B, p. 32.

¹⁷³ In the interview, Admiral Can Erenoğlu defined *Mavi Vatan* as large as 377,000 square metres..

Over time, the concept has been widened to cover the safeguarding of maritime rights and economic interests, and, in a way, evolved as sovereignty protection which became one of the core missions of the Navy. It has been adopted and voiced by many naval leaders on many occasions. In a contract signing ceremony, the Minister of National Defence, İsmet Yılmaz linked the safeguarding of the Blue Homeland with naval build-up. He became the first civilian leader who has pronounced the term (Virahaber, 2011). In addition, the Blue Homeland concept was used by a former Chief of General Staff General Necdet Özel in a press statement after the *Beyaz Fırtına* Exercise-2014 on the grounds to protect maritime rights and interests of future generations (haberler.com, 2014), right before Turkey started drilling activities. The Navy continued to use the concept as part of its mission of protecting maritime rights and economic interests despite there was no explicit reference to it in the Turkish Navy's 2015 strategy. As a matter of fact, the 2015 strategy looked to the concept¹⁷⁴ with an interagency approach, including the development of survey/drill capabilities, the diplomacy pillar, and the academic efforts to promote it besides sovereignty protection at sea.

The official adoption of the concept as a sub-doctrine of the foreign and defense strategy took place with the naming of the biggest ever exercise by the Navy in March 2019. Then, President Erdoğan posed standing before a map labeled '*Mavi Vatan*' in the graduation ceremony of the War Academies in August 2019 (TCCB, 2019). Defense Minister Hulusi Akar used the term 'Blue Homeland' in his speech in the commissioning ceremony of *TCG Burgazada* in the context of protection of maritime rights and economic interests at maritime jurisdiction areas with an acreage of 462,000 square meters (Hürriyet, 2018). Then, President Erdoğan described 'Blue Homeland' as 23.2 million hectares of sea area (TCCB, 2020) for safeguarding maritime rights and interests (TCCB, 2020) and voiced the Blue Homeland as a doctrine against the aspirations and efforts to confine Turkey to the Anatolian peninsula, i.e., a resurrected version of Sevres Treaty (TCCB, 2020). In sum, the Presidency uttered the 'Blue Homeland' doctrine explicitly in the wake of the geoeconomic competition with Greece in August 2020.

¹⁷⁴ Turkey's prospective maritime jurisdiction areas equal to more than half of the country's land territory (TNFC, 2016, p. 9).

The Blue Homeland concept has been developed from a discourse of naval leadership to a full-fledged politico-military doctrine which became the cornerstone of Turkey's assertive foreign policy for a while. Its mastermind, Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, and other retired admirals and naval officers have been utilizing the doctrine in voicing their views regarding the current geoeconomic competition in the Eastern Mediterranean. Many academics, pundits, and politicians have preached the doctrine as well. Moreover, a wider meaning was loaded to the doctrine: modernizing Turkey via maritimization. The doctrine was formalized by the 'Blue Homeland 2019 Exercise'.

Despite its adoption as a doctrine in protecting maritime rights and interests in declared and undeclared maritime jurisdiction areas, i.e., defensive in nature and, foreign politicians, academics, and naval experts took it as 'expansionist naval doctrine' which became an integral part of Turkey's assertive policy. Interestingly, what they took as a reference to their assessments was the statements of some retired officers instead of formal speeches of military and political leadership. They based their criticism on the use of the term 'homeland' which is by definition "non-negotiable and sovereign in the territorial sense". Therefore, they criticized the supporters of the doctrine who opposed any exploratory attempt in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially with Greece for a diplomatic solution. Besides, they also slammed the goal of establishing Turkey's naval supremacy which might lead to the perpetual conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean (Çandar, 2020). Notably, the same concerns were raised for the Chinese phrase "blue soil".¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, although there is no equivalent in international law, terms, and patterns such as 'maritime estate', 'marine estate', 'maritime property', and 'ocean estate' have been used especially in Anglo-Saxon literature, to express maritime jurisdictions. This is a reflection of the mind of the society that the concept of property on land also has a dimension in the seas.

In sum, the incorporation of the Blue Homeland doctrine by the political elite and public of Turkey as part of its national identity has been serving many purposes. First of all, it increased public awareness of maritime rights and interests, as the Navy has aspired to

¹⁷⁵ In the 2010 *China's Ocean Development Report* from the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) the littoral waters were referred as China's "blue soil," with the implications that territorial claims to the waters are as fundamental as the claims to land territory (Cheng, 2013).

invoke for decades. Many civilians were recruited to advocating the maritime cause in addition to the naval community. Since it has been adopted as part of the government's foreign and security policy rhetoric, it could also be used as leverage in diplomatic negotiations. Its adoption by the civilian marine circles could also facilitate the developments in all fields constituting maritime power. In sum, the Blue Homeland doctrine is evolving as a path towards the maritimization of Turkey in the coming decades.

4.5. THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN CONUNDRUM AND THE TURKISH NAVY'S STRATEGY

Turkey's reactions, particularly its resort to the Navy's activism, to the energy impasse in the Eastern Mediterranean provides insightful examples to the implementation of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy in the field. In this regard, what should be considered is the employment of self-sufficient task groups in the operational arena for long periods.

In this context, after the September 2011 tragic events, the energy competition in the Eastern Mediterranean entered a new phase. In contrast to the survey and drilling activities conducted by oil companies on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, Turkey took a different course of action based on a mix of hard power and soft power by increasing its footprint in the contested areas.

Upon the Greek Cypriots' attempts for oil and gas exploration (ANKA, 2011), tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean gradually and dangerously increased. Firstly, Turkey responded by signing a continental shelf delimitation agreement with the Turkish Cypriots on September 21st, 2011 (MFA, 2011). As a persistent objector to the UNCLOS-III provisions and the proclamation of an exclusive economic zone by the Greek Cypriots, Turkey predicated its recent practice on the display of its assertiveness via the implementation of hard measures. The first tier of measures includes the advising of survey/drilling ships to stay out of the contested areas through navigational warning

messages,¹⁷⁶ if not conformed to then the naval ships are deployed to intercept and chase away them (Ateşoğlu, 2019) as detailed in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press release (MFA, 2012).¹⁷⁷ For such actions, the Turkish Navy usually relies on naval assets that are already available in the theater for Operation Mediterranean Shield.

For instance, in September 2014, the *Saipem-10000* drillship of the ENI-KOGAS consortium was deployed to Block 9 licensed by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Navy traced the voyage of the drillship and monitored its activities in the field. The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a press release warning on the consequences of unilateral drill activities. The Ministry then signaled possible retaliatory measures to be taken by Turkey in response. They included extending all kinds of support to the Turkish Cypriots' for future seismic research activities, acquiring a drilling platform, and dispatching it to an area to be determined (MFA, 2014). The Turkish Survey Ship *R/V Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa* was deployed in the southwest of Cyprus and began conducting surveys overlapping with Block 9 of the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish survey ship was protected by a Turkish warship partaking in Operation Mediterranean Shield. Indeed, this deployment was part of the second tier of hard measures taken by Turkey. By retaliating in kind, the Turkish

¹⁷⁶ The corresponding reactions, particularly exchange of navigational warning messages between the relevant Turkish and the Greek Cypriot authorities in the East Mediterranean and between the Turkish and the Greek authorities in the Aegean initiated a new field of friction what was called “Anti-NAVTEX Wars (wars of navigational warning)” by the media. Particularly, the navigational warnings issued to designate an area for a specific purpose, such as a fire drill or a survey/drilling activity by the relevant station are cancelled out by the corresponding station as a violation of the NAVTEX service area because of non-existence of agreement on the delineation of NAVTEX Service areas in the East Mediterranean and in the Aegean Seas that was approved by the IMO or the IHO. The corresponding station releases its own message for the safety of navigation or sends a warning message. This was the case during the survey activities of German Research Vessel *Maria S. Marian* in the Eastern Mediterranean on February 2018.

¹⁷⁷ In the 2002-2016 period, the Turkish Navy intercepted 14 survey vessels (Yaycı, 2019). In the 2017-2018 period, Turkish Navy intercepted seven survey ships, namely the Italian *Odin Finder* in December 2017, German *Maria S. Marian* in March 2018 (Smith, 2018), the French *Thetys II* on June 2018, the British *Song Of Whale* in August 2018 and Maltese *Nautical Geo* in December 2018. The Turkish Navy also chased away the drilling rig *Saipem 12000* operating for the Italian company ENI in the so-called Block 3 of the Greek Cypriots in February 2018 whereas it did not react the activity of *Homer Ferrington* drilling rig hired by the US oil company Noble Energy in September 2011 and also did not chase away *Stena Icemax* drilling ship operating for the US Oil company ExxonMobil in the Block 10 (Andreou, 2018) because Ankara “chose not to antagonize Washington by interfering with the U.S.-based energy giant.” (Tanchum, 2019) As a matter of fact, the Pentagon officials denied the allegations that the US Navy would protect EXXONMOBIL drilling activities in the East Mediterranean. (Allahverdi, 2018) and some security experts also noted that the EXXONMOBIL drilling area did not overlap with Turkish Cypriot's EEZ and licensed blocks. (YeniŞafak, 2018)

survey ships began to carry out activities in contested blocks, which were also licensed by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.

In parallel with these events, the Turkish Navy carried out its multilateral invitational exercise *Mavi Balina* (Blue Whale)-2014 in the Eastern Mediterranean, during November 2014. During the press conference, the Navy Chief told the reporters that the Navy was ordered to implement a new set of rules of engagement (ROE), the authority for the enactment of which was handed over to it by the Prime Ministry via the General Staff. He underlined that the Navy would act in line with a new set of rules of engagement in case of encounters with Greek, Egyptian and Israeli ships. Considering together with the deployments of the Turkish survey ships, the Navy Chief was, in fact, heralding a new stance in the Eastern Mediterranean. Some defense analysts assessed this stance as Turkey's declaration of its readiness to go war over the hydrocarbon claims in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sünnetçi, 2019). Shortly, the Navy's new strategy document was published in 2015 with a manifest pivot to the Eastern Mediterranean where the protection of maritime rights and economic interests at sea was identified as a priority (S&H, 2016).

Another phase of the second tier of measures was the start of drilling activities by Turkey. On May 31st, 2018 Turkey dispatched its first drillship *Fatih* to the Eastern Mediterranean. Escorted by the Navy's assets, the drillship *Fatih* and *Yavuz* and the seismic survey vessels, *R/V Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa* and *R/V Oruç Reis* have been conducting exploration activities in the continental shelves of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Moreover, the Turkish drilling activities, dubbed also as a third major incident, escalated the energy standoff to a new level and caused a range of reactions from various national and international actors and also exchange of diplomatic notes at the UN circles between competitors. A Turkish columnist reported the navigational warning promulgated on May 3rd, 2019¹⁷⁸ as "a milestone" and "planting Turkish flag to bottom of the Blue Homeland in the Eastern Mediterranean" (Gürdeniz, 2019).

¹⁷⁸ TURNHOS N/W: 0560/19 (Antalya NAVTEX Station) (Published Date: 03-05-2019 09:58)

The third tier of hard power measures implemented by Turkey, and in some cases by Greece and the Greek Cypriots, is to conduct exercises by displaying the presence of a combat fleet and supporting air force in the area. To this aim, potential licensed blocks were reserved for military drills and operations to exclude the survey/drilling activities of its counterpart. Moreover, the regular annual and biannual exercises were planned and conducted with a deterrence message and an intention to block the adversaries' survey and drilling activities. The naming of the exercises and even of the NAVTEXed areas demarcated for varying drills were exploited by all parties to convey a message.

In this regard, the Turkish Navy held two consecutive large-scale exercises in all three surrounding seas simultaneously first time ever in the Republic's history, namely *Mavi Vatan-2019* (DefenceTurkey, 2019) and *Denizkurdu-2019* (MSB, 2019) in the first half of 2019. These exercises were aiming to demonstrate "Turkey's resolution and capability in protecting the country's security as well as its interests and rights in the seas". Described as 'war rehearsal', the exercises were a counter-message against the military activities of the alliance groupings, and whoever disputes the maritime interests of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean (Shay, 2019).

Besides the show of force with large-scale exercises, the Navy has established a robust and strong presence to counter any challenges in contested sea areas and to prevent any *fait accompli*. From April 2018, the Navy deployed a plethora of combatants (about 14 surface and subsurface platforms along with maritime patrol aircraft and UAVs) and beefed up its presence in Aksaz, Mersin, and Famagusta depending on the intensity of tension.

In this era, a cursory glance at the news on the Navy's official webpage illustrates the high operational tempo (TNFC, 2020). In the scope of multinational and NATO commitments, the Navy deployed assets to UNIFIL, NATO standing maritime groups (SNMG/SNMCMG), and CTF-151 for counterpiracy operations. Currently, a Turkish captain (with the rank of honorary rear admiral (LH)) has taken command of the task force for the sixth time since the onset of counterpiracy operations. The Turkish ships assigned to NATO standing maritime groups have been partaking in the exercises in the Northern Atlantic, the High North, and the Baltic Sea since 2018 while Turkey applied

for membership in the Arctic Council (Depledge, et al., 2020).¹⁷⁹ The Navy is supporting the participation of the Turkish scientists in polar missions as depicted in its 2015 Strategy (TNFC, 2016). In line with its regular schedule, the Navy has been holding its annual and biannual multinational exercises, *Doğu Akdeniz*, *Mavi Balina*, *Nusret*, *Ay-yıldız*, and Dynamic Guard. Besides its mobile teams providing training to Maltese Special Forces and the Libyan Armed Forces.

Basically, the Navy's operational activities in the Eastern Mediterranean focused on two pillars: the escorting and monitoring activities in the scope of the Operation Mediterranean Shield and the deployment of the Turkish Maritime Task Group (TDGG) in the Central Mediterranean in support of the Turkish Military Mission in Libya. The ships deployed in the Mediterranean took every opportunity to conduct passing exercises with naval combatants sailing through their area of operations.¹⁸⁰ Besides being a drill opportunity, the Turkish units, particularly the TDGG, showed their presence in the theater of operations. In fact, the Turkish Navy deployed naval assets that might be equivalent to two, or more self-sufficient task groups, comprising the bulk of its overall combat fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As mentioned before,¹⁸¹ these deployments of the TDGG as a self-sufficient task group have been real practices of the core mission profile envisaged in the 1997 Strategy, which was played as a wargame in the *Denizkurdu-1998* Exercise. Additionally, in this context, the Navy and the Air Force conducted joint open sea exercises in the Central Mediterranean practicing support for long-distance tasks. Basically, the Air Force support was for the air defense of the deployed maritime task group which lacked organic medium-to-long range air defense capabilities. Another notable training was a combined assault exercise of the fast attack craft and the Army attack helicopters in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean since the Kardak Crisis of 1995/6. In fact, the Turkish

¹⁷⁹ Experts from the Navy participated to the Turkish Antarctica Scientific Mission.

¹⁸⁰ The Navy conducted passing exercises with the warships of Britain, Italy, the US, France, Spain, Germany, Indonesia.

¹⁸¹ Other examples in this regard are the expeditionary deployment of Turkish Maritime Task Groups to the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean and around Africa in the 2010, 2011 and 2014 activations, respectively (Özgen, 2017).

military was signaling its readiness for a potential simultaneous sovereignty crisis in the Aegean Sea. Another noteworthy activity was the *Kararlılık* (Deterrence) Exercise 2019 in which improved surface warfare tactics experimented with the integration of UAVs into the fleet. During this period, a Turkish warship, *TCG Giresun*, broke a record for the longest ever deployment by remaining at sea for 182 days without any port calls.

On the other hand, regional naval growth eventually got converted to the increased naval activity, i.e., naval exercises and operations as the regional tension escalated. Indeed, a comprehensive study of the context and scope of naval exercises and maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past decade reveals the changing patterns of regional and interregional alliance formation and cooperation in the fields of defense and energy. They have been a mirror image of stakeholders' global and regional policies, and especially defense cooperation.

In this regard, the discovery of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean stimulated some of the littoral states to set up a variety of frameworks to attract multinational companies in investing in the region. To secure the energy at the source and in transportation, basically, a set of maritime security initiatives leading to triangles of quasi-alliances have been eventually initiated to counteract and contain Turkey. In a nutshell, the Eastern Mediterranean has turned out to be the eye of a tropical storm. As of today, due to the transforming nature of regional alliances, Turkey promotes its policy by hard power as a 'Lone Wolf', lacking any reliable allies and partners. Regarding the maintenance of the regional balance of power *vis-à-vis* alliance groupings in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey could not keep up its deterrence by only 'internal balancing' based on its military activism and domestic defense industry. Considering the current and prospective naval and air force regeneration plans of its rivals, such as Greece, Egypt, and Israel, Turkey could still inflict considerable losses on any adversary with its current and emerging capabilities. However, external balancing via building coalitions against these counterbalancing moves would be the prudent option for the way ahead.

5. CONCLUSION

The recent energy stalemate in the Eastern Mediterranean alongside the spillover of Syrian and Libyan Crises at sea resulted in the activism of the Turkish Navy in pursuit of the national foreign policy objectives. The synergies created by burgeoning defense industries in maintaining a sizable naval task force for longer durations and in regenerating the fleet have been looked up with skepticism. Furthermore, the developing force projection capacity of the Navy, particularly the construction of an LHD was emblematic of the Navy's growth in pursuing the country's assertive foreign policy objectives, or of expansionism. Eventually, the growth of a potential hegemon in the region has triggered acts of internal and external counterbalancing. The rivals in the Mediterranean basin have initiated new naval arms procurement and upgrade programs, and concluded new alliance deals with regional and global powers.

Considering the changing security landscape in the vicinity of Turkey, such differing views on the Turkish Navy's force posture necessitated reviewing its transformation on a wider framework in retrospect to the fall of the Berlin Wall. In this dissertation, the transformation of the Turkish Navy in the last three decades, taken as an idiographic case, is analyzed through the lenses of the sociological institutionalist model. The study relies on qualitative analysis focusing on political, military (General Staff), and navy level. The speeches and interviews of politicians and military leadership particularly were scanned to find the meanings and values attached to the Turkish Navy. Indeed, as the main methodological tool of this research, process tracing is employed particularly by concentrating on defense and service periodicals, memoirs, and elite interviews. This approach helped unpack the origins, development, and materialization of the Navy's transformation since the 1990s.

In contrast to its sister services, the Turkish Navy remains to this day the only service that publicized open, or unclassified, strategy paper twice in two decades. In addition to the primary and secondary material mentioned above, the availability of two strategy papers has made it possible to survey the altering perceptions in ends, means, and ways across time. Publishing an open strategy paper was also an emulation of the practices of "developed and democratic countries" as depicted in its introduction (Dz.K.K., 1997),

towards institutionalization and standardization of force planning and regeneration process.

As the main theoretical approach of this thesis, the sociological institutionalist paradigm provides a broader and comprehensive basis to account for a plethora of factors influencing the Navy's transformation.

Indeed, the organizational identity or essence of the Navy was built through experiences and lessons learned from the distant past and evolved in constant interaction with the world naval system. Historical background, role models emulated, education system, foreign advisors, and alliance membership have all been influential in the forming of organizational essence. In the meantime, its international engagements and interactions have also affected its transformation by enabling the realization of self-identity as well as the adoption of norms and institutional practices of the other navies of the world. Considering the last seven decades, the Anglo-Saxon, i.e., the Royal Navy and the US Navy served as the prime role models for the Turkish Navy. More importantly, the reformation of the Navy's educational system modeled on the US system was very instrumental in raising the 'educated manpower' as the engine of transformation. Particularly, its prioritization of graduate education has promoted innovations in the Navy.

The socialization of the Navy's officers with their peers in NATO and other Western educational institutions broadened their horizons. Besides its direct influence, NATO became a source of reference for downloading institutionalized norms, practices, and procedures. The Turkish Navy adapted its tactical and operational procedures from NATO, which focused on sea control and protection of sea lanes of communication. Moreover, projecting security or power, the core of a high seafaring capacity, was also downloaded from NATO's doctrine. In short, the NATO experience was instrumental in shaping the Navy's organizational essence and identity. Modifying it to the national strategic needs, the Navy has followed "a linear evolution path towards having more projection capabilities, be it autonomously, or in a coalition through interoperability and role specialization" (Germond, 2014, pp. 63-71). In other words, the Turkish Navy has been attempting to be a norm navy in line with the trend of the era. In attaining

international and domestic legitimacy alongside isomorphic coercion, Turkey, aspiring to be a regional power, actively has partaken in regional and multinational stability operations under the auspices of NATO and UN in tandem with its improving cross-border and overseas operational capacity (Güvenç, 1998).

In line with sociological institutionalist thought, the naval leaders' role was very strong in aligning the Navy's new strategy to the emerging global security environment and Turkey's new position in it. The Navy's leadership has been attentive to the changes in the mission spectrum of world navies. They have subscribed to the goal of state-led competitive progress in the modern world. In fact, the letter and spirit of the 1997 strategy paper remain largely valid even in the current security environment. In addition, the force posture envisaged then has substantially corresponded to the strategic needs of the Navy's current mission profile. Hence, the Navy has eventually become an integral part of state-led efforts for securing a seat for the nation in the high council of the world. In parallel, the Navy's organizational identity or essence has been re-aligned with the national identity and standing. The Navy's leaders have endeavored to convince the politicians and military leadership for their discursive and financial support, even included the defense industry in the process, towards the Navy's future goals. When the Navy's modernization has lagged or been interrupted, they stepped in to correct the course of the transformation to the objectives pursued.

In its journey towards the blue waters, the peculiar decision-making mechanisms in the Navy's organization have ensured sustainment and coherence of force modernization process in line with the institutionalized planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS) regardless of frequent changes of commanders. As well, the Navy's leaders have also prudently and timely directed educated manpower to critical areas, such as in-country ship design and combat management system development through unique, special-to-purpose organizations like a design project office (MILPO/DPO) and a research center (ARMERKOM). If needed, the Navy's leaders have courageously taken substantial risks due to inadequacies of shipbuilding and defense industries. A case in point was the MILGEM program, for which the Navy assumed overall performance responsibility.

The Navy has also led regional cooperation initiatives in the maritime domain, such as BLACKSEAFOR and Operation Black Sea Harmony. In the case of maritime domain awareness, it coordinated surveillance efforts of varying government agencies into a common direction. In energy security, the Navy has proactively inaugurated Operation Mediterranean Shield, which is effectively functioning as of today and in the course of multi-lateralization.¹⁸² In a nutshell, the Navy's leaders and unique decision-making mechanisms have enabled the seamless maintenance of force regeneration and operational conduct for the last three decades. Its strategic conduct and modernization serving Turkey's survival and prosperity are totally in conformity with institutionalized norms in the transnational networks of world naval culture.

In linking the Navy's Distant Horizon system to its strategic orientation, the coverage area of the system could be correlated to the areas of influence and interest defined in the 1997 and 2015 strategy papers. Indeed, the Distant Horizon was listed as a force multiplier that would enable the naval units on strength to be commanded, controlled, and managed in times of peace, crisis, and conflict in the 1997 strategy paper (p. 26). Considering that all naval platforms at sea are an organic component of the Distant Horizon system, the extension of its coverage has contributed to increasing the Navy's operational reach, i.e., its strategic orientation of 'Towards Blue Waters'.

Considering that all services of the Turkish military have been endeavoring for the materialization of their main combat platforms, their realization could be taken as a basic criterion for the achievement. For the Land Forces, it is the main battle tank, the *Altay* program. For the Navy, it is the national ship (MİLGEM) program. For the Air Force, it is the national fighter aircraft, MMU/TF-X¹⁸³ program. The programs of the Land and Air Forces are at industrialization or initial phase yet while the Navy is proceeding with

¹⁸² In November 2019, a Pakistani frigate, *PNS Alamgir*, and a Pakistani maritime patrol aircraft partook in the Operation Mediterranean Shield after joining the *Doğu Akdeniz* Invitex alongside two Jordanian observers on board of *TCG Barbaros*. This was a major step towards the multi-lateralization of the OMS. Thereafter, the white picture compiled by the Turkish Navy has begun to be shared with the Pakistan, reciprocally. In furthering this move, the Navy continues to carry out consultations with Albania, Azerbaijan, Algiers, Georgia, Libya and Tunisia for the partaking of these countries to the OMS (Gürdeniz, 2020).

¹⁸³ MMU/TF-X: National Combat Aircraft (*Milli Muharebe Uçağı*)/Turkish Fighter-Experimental Program.

the second stage of the MILGEM program, namely *İstif*-class TF-100 frigates. In sum, the Navy's move towards blue waters has borne fruit on the technological edge which has also been enhancing its strategic posture as well as its operational efficiency. The achievement of the MILGEM venture is proof of the Navy's dedication to its organizational essence alongside its consistent adherence to the goals set in its strategies.¹⁸⁴

As remarked by Semmel, the navies have been more farsighted, more progressive, and more contemporary than other services since their interaction with the commercial and industrial interests of the nation as part of seapower (1986, p. 8). In this respect, the Turkish Navy also has been well aware of the need for capital and technology for its development, therefore it stood with the progressive and modern forces of life. The Navy has adopted the national interest of being a developed, sovereign, and legitimate nation into its organizational essence and subscribed to the goal of progressive statewide efforts in this venue. Moreover, these characteristics are reflected in its strategic culture, by recognizing the primacy of the emerging security context, maintaining a systems approach, performing in an expeditionary manner: offensive, forward, mobile, and joint, ensuring adaptability and accounting for inherent uncertainty and risk (Barnett, 2007).

In that respect, the coherent strategic orientation of the Turkish Navy has been part and parcel of Turkey's Grand Strategy besides its innate congruence with national security policy and military strategy documents. It has been in support of national foreign policy objectives as the Navy being an instrument of diplomacy.

While internal factors cover changes of governments, dramatic alterations in civil-military relations, domestic economic situations, the external factors include, but are not limited, to systemic changes, threat perceptions, and regional security dynamics. As elaborated throughout this dissertation, the external factors have been influential in determining the courses for the Navy's force modernization and operational capacity, but not the ultimate destination of its strategic orientation. As for internal factors, the government's support working in tandem with a favorable economic environment has

¹⁸⁴ Interview with Admiral Bostanoğlu, November 12th, 2020, Fenerbahçe, İstanbul.

accelerated the improvement of the Navy's force posture. On the other hand, the organizational essence of the Navy, which matured in the course of history, has been decisive in setting the ultimate destination for its orientation. The ultimate destination has been so resilient to change and responded to the impacts of the external and internal factors by the slight route and speed adjustments. In sum, the Turkish Navy's steering 'Towards Blue Waters' has never gotten off course.

Though moving ahead totally in accord with contemporary and normative naval development trends, the Navy's move towards blue waters has not been immune from criticism. While some scholars were attentive to the 'broadly defined regional perspectives' (Özcan, 2001) in the 1997 strategy, some remarked on a mismatch between the Navy's strategic need versus foreign policy goals and threat perceptions. Even the keen will of the elements in the Navy was referred to as the advocates of blue water move (Sanders, 2014). A decline in naval operation tempo has been expected due to morale and human resources depletion in the last decade, on the contrary, as elaborated, a firm and intense presence observed in the field via operations and exercises, including NATO and multilateral commitments.

Again, the Navy's activism and modernization, particularly the improvement of its force projection capabilities have been assessed as being part and parcel of Turkey's "increasingly aggressive posturing in foreign affairs", more profoundly relating it to expansionist and revisionist approaches (Gingeras, 2019). Interestingly, some commentaries, in accord with the main argument of this dissertation, identified that the Navy's initiation of improving its blue water capabilities reflected a coherent strategic orientation that began during the 1990s towards maintaining Turkey's regional interconnectivity (Tanchum, 2020b).

As noted, several other navies aspired to have blue water capacity in the prevailing practice of security in the era; a notable one is the South Korean Navy in the scope of its 'Blue Water Navy' initiative. A cursory glance reveals that the South Korean Navy has

attained blue water competency, including modern KDX program¹⁸⁵ destroyers fitted with ballistic missile and regional air defense capabilities, an LHD, and AIP-submarines. Although the South Korean Navy started modernization of both navies at the same time, it can be considered that it is ten to fifteen years ahead of the Turkish Navy's modernization program. Considering the delays in major programs and limitedly tested platforms alongside technology, experts still classify the Turkish Navy as "an essentially littoral force" (Gingeras, 2019) lacking main components of force projection, namely the TF-2000 air defense destroyers. Currently, the Presidential government supports defense industries and particularly the Navy, in the scope of the Blue Homeland doctrine. This support to the Navy's regeneration from the highest political authority in the country has yet to turn into substantial increases in budget allocation and elevated institutional standing.

In conclusion, the Turkish Navy's move towards the blue waters is prudently and proactively initiated by the Navy's leadership on grounds of the Navy's organizational essence to cope with emerging security dynamics. The Navy has emulated the Western navies' practices and followed an evolution path, towards projecting security, the organizing principle of the era, downloaded from NATO. Without neglecting threat-based planning, the Navy has been developing strategies to generate a force posture capable of conducting both low- and high-end tasks in littoral and at high seas as well as in the scope of deterrence and cooperation objectives. Many factors, from financial and technological development, political support, historical heritage, to alliance membership have enabled its move towards blue waters. However, the main engine of transformation was the dedication of the Navy's leaders and educated human resources to reform and their subscription to the goal of state-led competitive progress for promoting Turkey's interests and standing in the world councils. Taking into account the materialization of its modernization program, the Navy still has a long way to cover in possessing a full blue-water capacity. Nevertheless, the Navy set its route to the ultimate destination right at the

¹⁸⁵ KDX (Korean Destroyer eXperimental) is a substantial shipbuilding program embarked on by the Republic of Korea Navy. It is a three-phased program consisting of three individual classes of ships: KDX-I (3,800 tons), KDX-II (5,500 tons), Aegis-equipped KDX-III (11,000 tons) and KDX-IIA, planned derivative of KDX-II with Aegis combat system (5,500 ~ 7,500 tons).

inception by investing in the education and training of manpower, as the prime enablers of its transformation.

As stated at the onset, the methodology of this dissertation is based on the study of a single case to reveal the pattern and stimuli of the Turkish Navy's lasting transformation, by applying the tools of sociological institutionalism and by verifying via process-tracing. The findings of this research suggest that a further comparative case study of navies in the same league, with declared or undeclared blue water ambitions, probably among the navies of G-20 countries, would be beneficial in verifying the general naval trends referred to in this analysis. A preliminary PESTEL analysis beforehand would bring forward the factors in each PESTEL element in the form of a matrix. Such a basis might enable a comprehensive study of subject navies in revealing their development patterns that could be used as generalizations in future scholarly work on world navies.

Regarding the need to redraft the Navy's strategy, Dr. Egeli brought forward such a need due to the shifting security environment and evolving technologies. In this regard, the 2015 strategy has not amply covered the assertive Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in the Black Sea, the coupling of the Libyan Civil War to the Eastern Mediterranean debacle, growing strength of alliances against Turkey, the consolidation of opposing actors to Turkey's claims such as the Gulf States and Egypt, the EU, and the US. Turkey's position in NATO also needs to be politically clarified. On the technology side, what would need to be considered are the ballistic missile defense, the super/hypersonic missiles, and evolving drone technologies besides the development of nuclear-powered combatants.

Another point of revising is at what level to operate on the high seas, i.e., employing a task group or a task force. In case the level of ambition would be designated as a task force level the force posture would need to be re-designed accordingly, surely in line with the national objectives. In the light of these points, the revisiting of the current strategy would be a prudent approach to streamline the strategic discourses with real-life conduct in the field. Such an attempt would ensure the transparency, accountability envisaged in the publication of the 1997 and 2015 strategies.

Moreover, a better practice would be the adaption of the Navy's unclassified strategy publication by other governmental agencies. In this regard, a joint military strategy, a foreign policy vision, a national security policy, a maritime strategy, and above all a grand strategy, could be drafted. This would ensure overall transparency and accountability of Turkey's state practices to the internal and external audience as a modern, democratic state and a legitimate member of the international community.



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ANNEX A

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1. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES/INTERVIEWS

This section supplements this study on how the content analysis of speeches made by the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense, the Chief of General Staff, and the Commanders of Navy along with the interviews made with them on various occasions by reporters of defense periodicals. Among different content analysis methodologies, the value analysis technique provided by Ralph K. White is employed in this study. According to White, value analysis is the “classification and counting of recurrent value judgments” (1944). Sangup Lee adapted the value analysis technique for the study of South Korea’s Naval Build-up (2013). The analysis technique used by Lee in his thesis was also adapted to this study, focusing on the strategic orientation of the Turkish Navy, as the political and military dynamics differ qualitatively from those that led South Korea to the high seas. In particular, the involvement of political leadership and the members of the Turkish Parliament have remained fairly limited until almost the end of 2014. Statements made by political leaders on various occasions, such as military ceremonies, were generally well-coordinated with the Turkish General Staff and the relevant service to ensure a coherent context. As the analysis of the statements made by the political leadership does not provide sufficient input to determine the direction of the naval strategy, the statements made by the Chief of General Staff and the Commanders of the Navy are also analyzed for a comprehensive understanding.

This technique of value analysis served the purpose of the study very well, because ultimately what was being studied is how leadership values the Navy. Due to the volume of materials, it will be laborious and unnecessary to show the whole process, including the analysis of all speeches and interviews. Therefore, few examples are used to briefly illustrate the analysis process.

First, the leadership's speeches, interviews, and articles are collected with a comprehensive review of defense journals and service periodicals. *Savunma ve Havacılık*, along with *Deniz Kuvvetleri Dergisi* are selected due to their coverage of the relevant material such as the speeches, the interviews, and the articles of the leadership and the availability to the researcher. The work focuses on the period from 1987 to 2014 to trace

the process from the Navy's Cold War and the subsequent September 11th terrorist attacks to the launch of the 2015 strategy by the Navy.

The analysis process is basically as follows. Firstly, all the speeches are reviewed sentence by sentence. Each sentence is categorized according to the 'value' embedded in it, which constitutes a 'category'. The examples of categories include the role of the navy, national identity, national security posture in general, etc. Within a sentence, the value-laden words or phrases are underlined. These value words are categorized as they are in parentheses at the end of the sentence. Then, the frequency of the value words or phrases in each speech, interview, or article is counted. In calculating scores, the total score of each value word/phrase is equal to its frequency as one point is equally given to each count without weighting.

There may be different kinds of value words that belong to the same category. For example, in one speech, a sentence describing the role of the navy may include value words related to sovereignty protection. In another speech, the statement about the role of the navy may contain value words associated with other missions such as the protection of trade routes. This way, one can observe variations of value words or phrases within the same category over time. In conducting analyses, the sentences that only contain routine ceremonial remarks such as greetings and acknowledgments are excluded by focusing on the narrative about the roles and functions of the navy. Some examples of the value analysis are presented below.

1.1. SAMPLE ANALYSIS

The speeches made by political and military leaders during the ship commissioning ceremony in the Gölcük Shipyard on July 24th, 1998 (Kutluhan, 1998) are selected for sample analysis:

President Süleyman Demirel:

Türkiye, **dünya devleti olmasını** Büyük Atatürk'ün gösterdiği 'Yurtta Sulh Cihanda Sulh' ilkesine bağlılığından ve gücünden alır. (**Internationally oriented Images**) Türkiye barışçıdır. Türk askeri, gücünü barış için kullanır. Eğer askeri gücü varsa **caydırıcılık** meydana gelecek demektir.

(Defending Territory) Bulduğumuz bölgede bunu herkese, her zaman söylüyoruz. **Herkes sorunlarını barışçı yollarla** çözmeye çalışmalıdır. **(Contributing to Regional Peace)**

Turkey owes its **being a world state (Internationally oriented Images)** from its commitment to Great Atatürk's guiding principle "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" and its power. Turkey is peaceful. The Turkish military uses its power for peace. If it has military power, it means that **deterrence** will occur. **(Defending Territory)** We always tell everyone in our area. Everyone should try to solve their problems peacefully **(Contributing to Regional Peace)**.

Chief of General Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu

Üç tarafı denizlerle çevrili yurdumuzun, **denizlerdeki hak ve menfaatlerinin korunması ve idamesi** için vazgeçilmez bir unsur olan Deniz Kuvvetlerimizin güçlendirilmesi, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin temel hedeflerinden biridir. **(Contributions to National Prosperity)** Söz konusu gemilerimizin Donanmamıza katılması ile, **Deniz Kuvvetlerimizin her türlü hava ve deniz koşullarında harekât icra edebilecek vurucu suüstü ve sualtı unsurlarının gücü, bir kat daha artmış olacak (Modernized, High Tech)** ve **Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin barış dönemindeki en önemli görevi olan caydırıcılık** sağlanmış olacaktır. **(Defending Territory)**

The strengthening of our Naval Forces, which is an indispensable element for the **protection and maintenance of the rights and interests** of our country, which is surrounded by the sea on three sides, is one of the main goals of the Turkish Armed Forces. **(Contributions to National Prosperity)** With the addition of these ships to our Navy, **the strength of the striking surface and subsurface elements of our Naval Forces that can operate in all kinds of weather and sea conditions will be increased (Modernized, High Tech)** and the Turkish Armed Forces' **most important task in peacetime, i.e., deterrence will be achieved (Defending Territory)**.

Commander of Naval Forces Admiral Salim Dervişoğlu

Deniz Kuvvetleri, **üç tarafı denizlerle çevrili ülkemizin güvenliği için hedeflenen askeri gücün en önemli vurucu ve caydırıcı** unsurudur. **(Defending Territory)** **(Contributions to National Sovereignty)** NATO ittifak üyelerini birbirine bağlayan esas ortam da denizlerdir. Müşterek savunmanın ana ihtiyacı, **bu denizlerin müessir bir şekilde kontrolü ile barış zamanından itibaren tesis edilen ulaştırma yollarının sürekli açık tutulmasıdır.** **(Contributions to National Sovereignty)** (Blue Water Navy) Tüm dünya ülkelerinin denizlerden giderek artan oranlarda hak ve menfaatler sağlama çabaları **(Internationally Oriented Images)** ve **ülkemizin jeostratejik ve jeopolitik önemi göz önüne alındığında, her zaman göreve hazır, modern, vurucu gücü ve eğitim seviyesi yüksek bir deniz kuvvetini idame etmek, asıl hedefimizi teşkil etmektedir.** Güçlü bir deniz kuvvetine sahip olmakla ulaşabiliriz. **(Modernized Scientific, High Tech)**

The Naval Forces are the **most important striking and deterrent element of the military power aimed for the security of our country,** which is surrounded by seas on three sides. **(Defending Territory)** **(Contributions to National Sovereignty)**. The main medium that connects NATO alliance members is the seas. The main need of the collective defense is the **effective control of these seas and the continuous upkeeping of the transportation routes** established since peacetime. **(Contributions to National Sovereignty)** (Blue Water Navy). **Given the efforts of all countries of the world to provide rights and benefits from the sea at increasing rates** **(Internationally oriented images)** and the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of our country, our main goal is **maintaining a mission-ready, modern naval force with high striking power and training level.** We can achieve it by **having a strong naval force.** **(modernized, high tech)**

The sentences in the Turkish language above are excerpts from the original speeches in the same ceremony and translated to English for the sake of international interpretation.

The sample analysis is done in both Turkish and English. At the end of each sentence, the category is written in *italic* within a parenthesis. As explained, the value words or phrases in each sentence are underlined. Value words/phrases are almost equal to keywords/phrases in a sentence. As one can easily notice, it is not that there are always many value words or phrases in one sentence as in sentences (3). Often, one sentence may contain a single value word/phrase as in the cases of some sentences (1). The results of the analysis could be organized into a table as follows:

Table A-1 Sample analysis of selected leadership remarks

Categories	Generalized Value Words/Phrases	Value Words/Phrases	President	CGS	CNO
National Identity/Image	International standing	Being World Power	1		
	Contribution to Regional Peace	Peaceful resolution of problems	1		
The Role/Identity of Navy	Defending Territory	Striking/Deterrent Force	1	1	1
		Sea Control			1
	Contributions to National Sovereignty	Protection of Maritime Interests/Rights		1	1
		Homeland Security			1
		Exploitation of Seas			1
		Maritime Security			
	Blue Water Navy	Safeguarding seaborne routes			1
	Modernized Scientific, High Tech	Highly Educated			1
		Operating at all-weather/sea states		1	1
Modern				1	

Table A-2 Four of the Most Used Value Words/Phrases in Various Remarks

Value Words/phrases	Different expressions
Internationally oriented images of the navy	Show of the flag/presence, Participation to multinational operations under UN mandates, contribution to global/peace, maneuvering in world seas, High seas/ Oceans as the venue for our (economic) activities, congruence with international standards, best in the world, demonstrated regional supremacy, attracted the world's attention, advanced navy, superb performances in multinational combined exercises
Threat Country related images of the navy	Fend off sovereignty (EEZ/CS) violations, defeat existing threats, adversary's capabilities, coastal defense, deterrence,
Contributions to national prosperity	Prosperity of our nation/state, mentioning navy's supporting nation's future, growth, and glory, a leading force for our prosperity, a force protecting our prosperity in the Globalization Era, the navy that helps the nation rise as a maritime country, a leading role in the Globalization Era, protecting sea lanes of trade, safeguarding maritime interests,
Contributions to sovereignty	Maritime sovereignty protection, defending maritime rights and interests, Providing maritime security, naval and gunboat diplomacy

As Table A.1 demonstrates, there can be various kinds of value words/phrases under the same category. For instance, there are four kinds of value phrases under the category 'the role/identity of Navy. As more results of analysis from different years are added, new kinds of value words/phrases may appear, although many of them emerge repeatedly over time. This way, what kinds of value words/phrases and how frequently they have appeared in association with certain categories over an extended period can be observed. The four value phrases represent the four most frequently appeared phrases out of the fourteen kinds of value phrases that have been identified by Snagyup Lee.

It should note that a value word/phrase may come in different expressions while they represent similar meanings. For example, in describing the role/identity of the navy,

whether it is ‘safeguarding of maritime rights and interests’ or ‘benefitting from the seas (maritime resources)’, they represent the same recognition about the navy: contribution to national prosperity. For this reason, such similar expressions are incorporated into one value word/phrase. In Table A.2, different expressions that each of the four value words/phrases represent are laid out.

A preliminary value analysis of leadership speeches and interviews was done to ensure the applicability of Sangyup Lee’s model to the study of the Turkish Navy. Some “value words/phrases” were needed to be modified within the process of the analysis.

Table A-3 Total Appearance of Value Words/phrases in the Preliminary Analysis(Author’s compilation)

<i>Value Words/phrases</i>	<i>Total Appearances in the period 1987-2014</i>
Internationally Oriented Images	41
Threat Country Related Images	10
Defending Territory	64
Contributions to National Prosperity	53
Blue Water Navy	39
Contributions to sovereignty	39
Modernized Scientific, High Tech	44
Contributing to regional peace	40
Preparing for the future security environment	17
Symbol for regional power	26
Important role in conducting war	6
Total Number	397

The table including the preliminary analysis of the speeches made by the leadership in the naval ceremonies and their interviews in Savunma ve Havacılık Magazine are presented in Table A-3

1.2. INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE VALUE ANALYSIS AT THE FIRST RUN

The total number of value words/phrases determined in the analysis of the ceremonial speeches/interviews are 397 from 1987 through 2014.

The number of value words aired by the Presidents is 26 in total and seven of which are about the contribution of the navy to global peace. Six of the value phrases are about the contribution to the navy regional peace (four times) and its being a regional power (two times) whereas being deterrence is used four times.

The Prime Ministers communicated on eight of the twelve categories (19 times) by emphasizing deterrence (four times) and contribution of the navy to the protection of national sovereignty (four times) and by touching the contribution of the navy to national prosperity through safeguarding the seaborne trade (three times) and showing the flag in the high seas (one time).

The Ministers of National Defense remarked on eight categories (20 times) by underlining the deterrence provided by the navy (five times).

The Chiefs of General Staff communicated on all categories of value phrases 83 times amounting to one-fourth of usages in the analysis. The Chief articulated the preeminence of having a modern and a high-tech navy (14 times) and its vitality in being a deterrent force (11 times) and in safeguarding maritime interests (10 times) as well as the protection of maritime jurisdiction zones (6 times).

The adoption of a high seafaring naval strategy was also emphasized by the leadership in the context of its contribution to multinational operations under the auspices of NATO and the UN and by showing the flag in the world's oceans in support of foreign policy as well as for projecting power if needed.

As the custodian of the naval strategy, the Navy Chief eventually took the opportunity to convey his narrative to the subject audience, be it the political leadership and the public or be it a message to the friendly and adversary countries. The Navy Chiefs aired almost all the value phrase categories where deterrence (33 times) being first among equals followed by a contribution to national prosperity (30 times), having blue water navy ability (28 times), and involvement in improving in global (28 times) and regional peace (27 times) as well as the protection of sovereignty at sea (25 times).

A naval strategy is supposed to be predicated upon the political input from the government i.e., the National Policy Document, and the military input from the General Staff, i.e., National Military Strategy Paper according to the defense planning procedures, basically a top-down approach. The initial findings of the preliminary analysis hinted that the naval leadership has been leading the development of the naval policy by promulgating its strategy and by structuring itself accordingly, even by technically steering the domestic defense and shipbuilding industry in this course.

1.3. MODIFIED ANALYSIS THROUGH ITERATIVE PROCESSING

The preliminary value analysis provided useful and meaningful output in the period under scrutiny. During the analysis, it was noticed that the value phrases adopted by Sangup Lee for the South Korean Navy were not sufficient to cover all “categories” and “values” used by the Turkish leadership to express their opinions and views about the development of the Navy. After two more iterative value analyses, a more comprehensive template revealed itself and contemplated a new form. In generating this template, the strategy document crafted by the Navy in 1997 was reviewed thoroughly, by particularly focusing on the preamble signed by the then Navy Chief, Admiral Güven Erkaya, and the section covering the external and internal factors.

In the preamble of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy document, Admiral Erkaya underlined the new roles assumed by the Navy in contributing to the regional security in the framework of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiatives. He also emphasized the ascending significance of maritime interest and rights in the flourishing economic development of Turkey. Regarding its dependence on this seaborne trade, he remarked on the geostrategic location of Turkey at the intersection of the regional transport routes connecting three seas and three continents. In this context, this requirement for the protection of maritime trade was based not only on improving the welfare of the country but also on linking survival to prosperity in the context of the symbiotic relationship between the survival of the country and the uninterrupted continuity of sea trade. In the context of seaborne trade, what was particularly vital was the shipping of oil and byproducts in case of war and crises. He

related these changes to the requirement for adopting a new strategy of the Navy in order to better serve the maritime rights and interests of Turkey towards a new domain, i.e., towards the high seas (Dz.K.K., 1997).

The fourth section of the strategy document is titled “the results that would orient the naval strategy in the light of external factors pertaining to Turkey”. First, this section highlighted the present and prospective roles for Turkey in promoting regional stability. It also included the activities contributing to world peace beyond the region, such as Turkey’s contribution to the multinational endeavors in Somalia, in the Gulf, and in the Middle East peace processes. Second, the growing prominence of the seas as a means of transportation, communication, a source of food, and raw materials was emphasized in the age of globalization as a dynamic for ever closer social and economic integration among the nations. Ultimately, it was stated that the security of seaborne trade routes became more vital for Turkey. In this framework, the surrounding seas, given utmost prominence to the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea, and the whole Mediterranean were designated as vital areas or in other words as the areas of influence for Turkey. In relation to the foregoing, the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gibraltar Strait approaches of the Atlantic Ocean were designated as areas of interest of the Turkish Navy. That, in the strategic sense, marked the overall boundaries of the areas of interest and influence that were drawn in the 1997 strategy.

The roles/functions that should be taken by the Navy were listed as

- To ensure the availability of seaborne trade routes by showing of the flag (being present) at the areas of influence in order to safeguard the vital interests of Turkey,

- To monitor vigilantly the events in the areas of interest and planning to actively partake in the prospective initiatives led by NATO or the UN.

These roles would require a naval force-fitted with power projection and strike capability that could be sustained away from home ports. As a result, Turkey was getting more dependent on the seaborne trade routes on the high seas and besides the prime role of defending the homeland from the sea, Turkey was in a position of regaining its historical nautical traits due to the requirements induced by its developing economy and its contribution to the regional and global security. As an eventual consequence of these developments, a new strategy ‘Towards Blue Waters’ was crafted in pursuit of the above-mentioned goals along with an effective “Sea Power” as a toolbox in implementing it (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 17).

The analysis of the tasks causally related to the need for a high seafaring navy could be deducted as follows:

- To show off the presence and maintenance of deterrence,
- To safeguard maritime shipping,
- To strive for sea control in war times at surrounding seas and beyond,
- To project power (amphibious operations) and strike ability in the areas of interest and influence.
- To participate in NATO and multinational operations in line with national security policy,
- To support and collaborate with constabulary agencies in search and rescue, against terrorism and organized crime, the sovereignty protection and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
- To show off the flag or conduct presence operations in areas of influence in support of national policy goals (Dz.K.K., 1997, p. 20).

At the initial analysis, it could be inferred that the rationale for a high seafaring navy was explicitly based on the 'construction' of the strategic requirement for the sustainability of maritime trade by safeguarding it and also ensuring the availability of the shipping routes. seas. The continuity of maritime trade, particularly the import of oil and byproducts, 65 percent of which were transported through the Aegean Sea was securitized as 'vital' for the functioning of the national economy, particularly for the sustainment of warfighting capacity in times of war and crises. Although Admiral Erkaya hinted at the relation of this new strategy to the 'prosperity' of the nation in the era of globalization and the new world order, the prominent determinant in the overall strategy was the upkeep of the global connectivity. It was particularly the uninterrupted flow of oil imports to the refineries in times of war and crisis for the sustainment of war-making capacity which was related to the survivability of the state. This 'constructed' vital connection between the sustainment of seaborne oil shipping and the survival of the nation was used as a rationale in justifying the strategic need for high seafaring platforms such as TF-2000 air defense destroyers, multipurpose landing platforms (LHD/LPD), and a light aircraft carrier (later designated as a sea control platform). To this aim, this strategic requirement was used to convince and get the support of the top brass at the General Staff and the political leadership.

After the analysis of this section, three main categories were determined: ‘internationally-oriented images’, ‘national identity/image’, and ‘role/identity of the navy’. The boundaries between categories are permeable rather than rigid due to transitivity of the values stemming from their occurrence both in national identity and also in internationally oriented image categories as such in case of the value phrase ‘operations other than war (OOTW)/support to constabulary forces’. The same analogy also applies to the value phrase ‘protection of maritime interests’ which was the primary and priority tasking for the Navy, that could be exercised geographically both in littoral and also in the high seas as well as categorically both nationally and internationally oriented images.

In the third iteration, the template was optimized for covering almost all value phrases, totaling 24, in three categories to include the remarks of the actors. The value phrases were grouped under three categories in this table. Furthermore, another approach was also applied to group the value phrases related to the roles and functions taken by the Navy according to the ‘core themes’ to which the roles and functions were contributing, such as involvement to multinational endeavors for peacekeeping, that is inherently internationally related images, participation in the survival of the homeland against any threats and risks, that is, the defense of the homeland, the deterrence, etc. Some roles and functions that could be conducted both nationally and internationally were defined as transitive roles such as ‘protection of maritime interests, strive for sea control, support of constabulary forces/ involvement in operations other than war (humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, evacuation of refugees/nationals, etc.)’ were listed in the transitive theme. The discourses related to the modernization of the naval forces and the endeavor to increase the capacity of domestic defense-related industries, i.e., the nationalization and localization of domestic defense industries are earmarked in another core theme. In sum, this four-core theme approach was also used and found guiding in the value analysis, particularly the insight that is provided to differentiate between the determinants that were driving the orientation of the Navy.

Categories	Generalized Value Words/Phrases		Category Total	
Internationally Oriented Images	Contribution to Regional Peace	67	171	
	Contribution to World Peace	66		
	Symbol for regional/World Power	16		
	Collective Defense	22		
National Identity/Image	Defense of Homeland	47	211	
	Threat Countries Related Images	11		
	Forward Defense	10		
	Combat Roles	7		
	Deterrence	70		
	Fight against Terrorism	12		
	Nationalization of Defense Industry	54		
	Protection of Maritime Interests	45		
Role/Identity of Navy	Safeguarding of SLOCs	28	361	
	Upholding Maritime Trade	19		
	Struggling for Sea Control	12		
	Naval/Gunboat Diplomacy	25		
	OOTW/Support to Constabulary	22		
	Maritime Security	9		
	Energy Security	10		
	Best/Respected Navy	28		
	Maritimization	25		
	Blue Water Navy/Power Projection	36		
	Sovereignty Protection	25		
	Modernization	77		
	Total	743		743

Table A- 4 Adapted Template for Value Analysis (Author’s compilation)

1.3.1. General Findings

In the context of analysis, 743 value phrases related to the Navy were found in the speeches and interviews of the political and military leadership in the period from 1987 to 2014 under study.

In the precedence list of the overall statements, ‘deterrence’ related value phrases have appeared as the most frequently expressed one (70 times), followed by ‘contribution to regional peace (67 times)’, ‘contribution to world peace (66 times)’, ‘protection of maritime interests and relations (54 times)’ and ‘homeland defense (47 times)’.

Value phrases in the 'internationally focused visuals' category were counted 171 times, those in the 'national identity/image' category 211 times, and the phrases in the 'Navy's roles/identity' category 360 times.

From a different point of view, the value phrases in the ‘survival-related core themes’ aired 223 times whereas the ones in the ‘high seafaring navy-related core themes’ amounted to 310 times, the ones in the ‘transitive roles/themes’ counted as 79 times.

A combined analysis based on categories and core themes indicated that there was a delicate balance between the national survival-related value phrases and the internationally related images. Overall, since survival is causally related to the very existence of the nation and state the political and military leadership put their preferences on survivability in their narratives but also maintained a firm discourse on contribution to regional and global peace as being a respected member of the international community with a permanent motto ‘Peace at home, Peace in the World. The common feeling of the international community in the early post-Cold War years was to achieve peace whenever and wherever needed, under the auspices of the United Nations and its sister regional organizations such as the OSCE and the African Union. Therefore, Turkey moved in step with this trend, that is the *zeitgeist* of the era, and contributed to peacekeeping efforts.

Core Themes	Generalized Value Words/Phrases		Theme Total
Survival Related Themes	Collective Defense	22	223
	Defense of Homeland	47	
	Threat Countries Related Images	11	
	Forward Defense	10	
	Combat Roles	7	
	Deterrence	70	
	Fight against Terrorism	12	
	Sovereignty Protection	25	
	Maritime Security	9	
	Energy Security	10	
High Seafaring Navy Oriented Themes	Safeguarding of SLOCs	28	310
	Upholding Maritime Trade	19	
	Naval/Gunboat Diplomacy	25	
	Best/Respected Navy	28	
	Maritimization	25	
	Blue Water Navy/Power Projection	36	
	Contribution to Regional Peace	67	
	Contribution to World Peace	66	
	Symbol for regional/World Power	16	
Transitive Roles/Images	Struggling for Sea Control	12	79
	OOTW/Support to Constabulary	22	
	Protection of Maritime Interests/Relations	45	
Material Related Themes	Modernization	76	126
	Nationalization of Defense Industry	54	

Table A-5 Adapted Template for Core Themes (Author's compilation)

1.4. VALUE ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS

Table A-6 Value Analysis: Period 1987-1991(Author's compilation)

Year	1987					1988					1989					1990					1991					
Leadership	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO ¹⁸⁶	
Internationally Oriented Images				1											1					1			1	1		5
Threat Rel. Images			1												1								1	1		4
Deterrence									2																	2
Contribution to National Prosperity																										
Blue Water Navy									1																	1
Contributions to sovereignty																										
Mod.Scientific, High Tech				1										1					1							3
Contributing to reg. peace					1																					1
Prep for future sec. envi.																										
Symbol for regional power																										
Important role in war																										
		1		2	1				3					1	2				1	1			2	2		
Yearly Total	4					3					3					2					4					16

¹⁸⁶ PR : President of Turkish Republic, PM : Prime Minister, MD : Minister of National Defence, CHD : Chief of General Staff, CNO : Commander of Turkish Navy

Table A-7 Value Analysis: Period 1992-1996 (Author's compilation)

Year	1992					1993					1994					1995					1996					
Leadership	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	
Internationally Oriented Images										2										3					2	7
Threat Rel. Images																			1	1						2
Deterrence			1							2					1				1	3				1	2	11
Contribution to National Prosperity																										
Blue Water Navy					1					2								1		2				1	1	8
Contributions to sovereignty														1						1					1	3
Mod.Scientific, High Tech					1			1	1	1					1					2						7
Contributing to reg. peace										1					2					1					1	5
Prep for future sec. envi.																				2						2
Symbol for regional power																										
Important role in war																										
		1			2			1	1	8					5			1	2	15				2	7	
	3					10					5					18					9					45

Table A-8 Value Analysis: Period 1997-2001(Author's compilation)

Year	1997					1998					1999					2000					2001										
	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO						
Leadership																															
Internationally Oriented Images					2	1				1	1					1					1	1				1	2			13	
Threat Rel. Images											1						1													2	
Deterrence					2	1				3	1				1					1	2	1					2			14	
Contribution to National Prosperity					2					3	2				1	1				1	3	1				1	2			18	
Blue Water Navy					2					2	2				1											1	2			12	
Contributions to sovereignty					1						2															1				4	
Mod.Scientific, High Tech					1					2	2	1			2	1										2	1			12	
Contributing to reg. peace						1				2	1	1			2	1	1									2		2		13	
Prep for future sec. envi.																										1			1	2	
Symbol for regional power					1							1			1					1	1					1				6	
Important role in war															2															2	
					11	3				13	11	4	2		7	5	3	1		4	14	4	1			4	11				
	11					27					18					22					20					98					

Table A-9 Value Analysis: Period 2002-2006(Author's compilation)

Year	2002					2003					2004					2005					2006					
Leadership	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	
Internationally Oriented Images	1			1	1	1			1	2				1	1				1	1					1	12
Threat Rel. Images	1																									1
Deterrence	1	1		1	2	1	1		1	2			1		2					2						15
Contribution to National Prosperity		1		1	2		1		1	2			1		2					1					1	13
Blue Water Navy					1				1	1				1						2					1	7
Contributions to sovereignty		1		1	2		1		1	1				1						1		1		1	2	13
Mod.Scientific, High Tech				1	1	1				1			1						1	1				1	1	9
Contributing to reg. peace				1	2	1			1	1				1					1	1					1	9
Prep for future sec. envi.				1	1																					2
Symbol for regional power				1	1			1	1										1	2					1	8
Important role in war					1									1												1
	3	3		8	14	4	3	1	7	10			2	1	9	1			4	11		1		2	8	90
	28					25					22					16					13					

Table A-10 Value Analysis: Period 2007-2011(Author’s compilation)

Year	2007					2008					2009					2010					2011					
Leadership	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	
Internationally Oriented Images		1			1				1	1					1					2		1			1	9
Threat Rel. Images																										
Deterrence		1		1	2				2	2			1		1					2	1	1	1			15
Contribution to National Prosperity		1		1	2				1	2			1		1					2			1	1	2	15
Blue Water Navy					1					1					1					2		1				6
Contributions to sovereignty		1			2				2	2					1					2		1	1		1	13
Mod.Scientific, High Tech				1						1					2					2	1	1	1		1	10
Contributing to reg. peace					1				1	1					1					2				1	1	8
Prep for future sec. envi.					1					2					1					2		1			1	8
Symbol for regional power				1	1								1		2					2				1	1	9
Important role in war																				1						1
		4		4	11				7	12			3		11					19	2	6	4	3	8	94
	19					19					14					19					21					

Table A-11 Value Analysis: Period 2012-2014(Author's compilation)

Year	2012					2013					2014																				
	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO	PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO		PR	PM	MD	CHD	CNO					
Leadership																															
Int.Oriented Images				1	1									1	2																5
Threat Rel. Images														1																	1
Deterrence				1	1					1			1	1	2																7
Contribution to National Prosperity				1	1					1			1	1	2																7
Blue Water Navy					1					1				1	2																5
Contributions to sovereignty				1						1			1	1	2																6
Mod.Scientific, High Tech					1									1	1																3
Contributing to reg. peace				1	1										2																4
Prep for future sec. envi.				1	1										1																3
Symbol for reg.power					1										2																3
Important role in war					1										1																2
	15					4					27										46										

ANNEX B

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1. ANALYSIS OF THE ELITE INTERVIEWS

In this study, elite interviewees are expected to provide data on the inquiry of recent historical change in the Turkish Navy. They also used it to verify the process tracing of the strategy's implementation and the role of the elite in the development and implementation of the strategies, as well as the content analysis of primary and secondary materials.

The criteria in the selection of elites to be interviewed were their involvement in the preparation and implementation of the transformation drive. In the case of civilian experts, the benchmark was their position on the bureaucratic side of naval modernization and their knowledge and expertise in naval affairs. In programming of the interviews, the naval leadership of the era, such as the Navy Chiefs, the Chiefs of Staff in the Navy headquarters, the division heads of Plans Policy, Operations, Research and Development, and the other department heads in these divisions were chosen. Also, some officers assigned to relevant command posts were selected starting with the crafter of the strategy. As directed by the Thesis Monitoring Committee, an academician and an expert on naval affairs interviewed additionally. In total, sixteen interviews were conducted throughout the study.

Elite interviews were conducted through a series of questionnaires tailored to the assigned role, tenure, and professional experience and expertise of the subject elite. The questionnaires were principally structured in parallel with the research question and also the chapter outline of this dissertation. Some open-ended questions have been added to the interview questionnaire to examine the subject in detail. The questionnaires were posted to the target elite interviewees in the advance notice; an appointment was scheduled accordingly for the interview. The interviews were recorded in Turkish and then translated and summarized in English. Later, the interview texts were sent to the interviewees for their approval and corrected with their input. Finally, in order to maintain the academic objectivity of the study and prevent in-service competition, the content of the interviews was cross-checked with the findings of other interviews and a literature review.

In fact, the elite interviews provided information about the backstage events that could not be directly reflected in ceremonial speeches and comments made to defense magazines. Although they are subjective in nature as personal memories and views, the context of the interviews

made it easy for the researcher to fill in the missing details in the overall picture when double-checked with primary sources.

The list of elites interviewed was as follows:

Table B-1 List of Elite Interviewees

No.	Rank (Retired)	Name	Tenure
1	Vice Admiral	Kadir Sağdıç	1995-1997 Force Planning Branch Chief 2000-2002 Plans Policy Division Head (Crafter of the Strategy)
2	Rear Admiral	Mustafa Özbey	1992-1995 Plans Policy Division Head
3	Vice Admiral	Lütfü Sancar	1995-1996 Plans Policy Division Head 1996-1997 R&D Division Head 1997-1999 Operations Division Head
4	Vice Admiral	Feyyaz Ögütçü	2001-2003 Operations Division Head 2003-2005 Commander Surface Action Group 2005-2007 Chief of Staff in TNHQ
5	Vice Admiral	Deniz Cora	2002-2004 Operations Training Department 2005-2007 Commander of Surface Group 2010-2011 Chief of Staff in TNHQ
6	Rear Admiral	Engin Baykal	2002-2004 Plans Policy Division Head
7	Vice Admiral	Erdal Bucak	2001-2003 Commander Surface Action Group 1999-2001 Operations Division Head 1995-1996 Operations Training Department
8	Rear Admiral	İzzet Artunç	2001-2004 R&D Division Head
9	Admiral	Bülent Bostanoğlu	2005-2007 Operations Division Head 2013-2017 Commander of Turkish Navy
10	Captain	Sağdur Ekitmen	Commodore of Fast Attack Boats
11	Captain	Gökhan Kamil Yapan	Commodore of Surface Flotilla
12	Rear Admiral	Ali Yüksel Önel	1990-1992 Plans Policy Division Head
13	Vice Admiral	Işık Biren	1986-1988 TGS Plans Policy Division Head
14	Captain	Yılmaz Dalkanat	Coast Guard Chief of Staff
15	Dr.	Sıtkı Egeli	Professor at İzmir Economy Üniversitesi
16		Cem Devrim Yaylalı	Author/Expert on Naval Forces

2. QUESTIONS POSED TO THE ELITES INTERVIEWED

- What are the factors that inspired the Turkish Navy to adopt a high seafaring strategy? Which resources and academics are particularly effective in shaping the strategic mindset of naval officers?

In this context, what is the historical role of Turks' acquaintance with sea and maritime after conquering the Anatolian peninsula? How do you evaluate the influence of the Ottoman maritime tradition in guiding the Republic Navy to open seas?

- What are the roles of the faculty (such as Mert Bayat and Afif Büyüktuğrul) and the academic curriculum in driving the mentality and leadership of naval officers to blue waters or instilling a Mahanist strategy?

-What are the roles of foreign naval advisory delegations/missions since the Ottoman era in the modernization of the Navy, such as the British, German, and American naval missions to Turkey before and after the foundation of the Turkish Republic?

- What is the role of naval professional/postgraduate education including abroad institutions such as Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War/Staff College, NATO Staff College, etc.?

- What is the role of NATO in adopting a high seafaring mindset by partaking in NATO exercises, adapting NATO standards and procedures, and assigning naval personnel to NATO Headquarters?

- What are the global and regional determinants behind the enactment of a strategy by the navy that has already been directing itself towards blue waters since the early 1980s? In this context, what are the effects of the Aegean Sea and Cyprus conflicts, the post-Cold War maritime roles and trends, the embargoes imposed by the USA and Western countries, and the diversification of arms supply?

- What changes did the new 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy bring to the Navy's force development at that time? What are the mechanisms that ensure continuity and consistency in naval modernization and force planning? What are the roles of staff and command group

committees, such as the Naval Commanders Council, the Admiral's Board, and the Weaponry and Equipment Group Meetings?

- What do you think about the impact of the Navy's organizational culture, namely Naval Culture, Naval Strategic Culture, on the institutional essence, identity, and continuity of the Navy?

- What were the successes achieved in the implementation of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy by comparing the envisaged force structure with the existing power structure and ongoing modernization projects?

-What triggered the need to prepare a new strategy document in 2015? Evolving maritime security environment? Changing roles and functions of the Navy? What are the main differences between the two strategy documents?

3. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS

3.1. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL KADİR SAĞDIÇ

This interview was conducted on November 15th, 2018 in İstanbul.

Admiral Sağdıç was a surface warfare officer who received a master's degree in Operations Research/Systems Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School. During his carrier, he had the opportunity to work with Admiral Erkaya three times. The first was as the branch head of Operations Research when Admiral Erkaya was the Plans and Policy Chief. He had a chance to reflect his operations research knowledge to force planning. Strategic Goals Plan based on numerical analysis was prepared during his tenure. His interest in strategy, geopolitics, and maritime policies was consolidated during the Naval War College education. Later, he was assigned to the General Staff Plans and Policy (J5) division and studied the development of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) with Admiral Işık Biren and later with Admiral Erkaya. They tried to develop a systematic procedure for force planning. They pioneered the work that led to the preparation of a 'National Policy Document' by the political authority commonly known as 'The Red Book', and its follow-up 'The Military Strategic Concept by the General Staff. These two constituted the core guiding documents in crafting a 'Strategics Goal Plan'. Ultimately, the planning cycle was to be completed by the approval of the budget of the National Defense Ministry by the Parliament (TBMM) per the principles for the democratic control of the armed forces as was the case in developed democratic countries.

Later, Admiral Sağdıç was appointed to the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) as the Strategy and Force Planning project officer. This position gave him the chance to broaden his knowledge of strategic planning and contribute to the documents that guided NATO's transformation after the end of the Cold War. After returning to Turkey, he was appointed as Head of Strategy and Force Planning Branch in the Navy Headquarters. He had the opportunity to work closely with Admiral Erkaya who was the Navy Chief. During this period, Admiral Sağdıç was in a staff position preparing information notes and speaking points for international events that Admiral Erkaya attended. He also accompanied the Chief during these activities. Their exchange of views on strategy and force development gave rise to the understanding of crafting a distinct naval strategy to guide naval force development. In addition, it was to inform

the public about defense expenditures as a requirement of the democratic control of the armed forces, and at the same time to convey a deterrent message to the enemies, a message of assurance to friends in terms of transparency. The timing of the publication of an open strategy document was not a coincidence, given that at the same time, the Turkish General Staff launched an initiative to share the projects included in the Ten-Year Procurement Plan with stakeholders in the defense industry on the need-to-know principle. The purpose of this information sharing was to enable the industry to make the necessary preparations for defense contracts that would increase the local content of defense tenders in the future.

This background knowledge of Admiral Sağdıç is intended to reflect the importance of professional training and mission model as well as working with visionary leaders. Overall, this can trigger the productivity of the officers and improve the performance of the staff, as observed in the personal carrier model mentioned above.

In the interview, Admiral Sağdıç expressed the importance of the exploitation of the seas, primarily as a means of transportation, as a source of food and raw materials, and that these sea routes came to the fore during the growth and stagnation periods of the empires. The rest of his points could be summarized as follows:

During the period of Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, when the Ottoman navy and its proxies controlled the sea in the Mediterranean, the maritime consciousness and power of the Ottomans reached their peak in the 16th century. The effort to create a modern navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz failed due to the lack of training and the institutionalization of the navy that prevented the construction and operation of the national navy. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman Navy was locked on the Golden Horn which eroded the combat, material, and personnel readiness. This fatal mistake caused the loss of overseas lands and islands in the wars with the Balkan states in 1911 and Italy in 1912, and the *Entente* powers in 1914-1918, due to the Ottomans' inability to carry troops with ships. Besides, the Fleet could not get out of the Turkish Straits to gain sea control.

The only successful attempt was the raid operations of the *Hamidiye* cruiser under the command of Rauf Bey (later Orbay) to relieve the Greek Navy's pressure on the Turkish Straits. During the First World War, the *Entente Armada* attacked the Çanakkale but failed due to the effective

fire of coastal batteries and the mines laid by *Nusrat*. The largest amphibious attacks to date were fended off by the Ottoman Army. The unsustainable sea transportation in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean resulted in troop reinforcements not being made by sea. This ultimately resulted in defeats on the Syria, Palestine, Canal, Hejaz, and Yemen fronts due to the limited support by rail and roadways. The Ottoman navy and German ships *Goeben (Yavuz)* and *Breslau (Midilli)* carrying the Ottoman flag were also unable to provide effective escorts in the Black Sea. In fact, these events created an unforgettable psychological trauma in the minds of the seafarers, and almost all the elites interviewed were reminded. The result from this historical prelude was that an efficient naval force was needed to maintain logistical transport and exercise sea control to prevent an invasion from the sea.

Atatürk put forward his vision in the first period of the Republic and tried to build a navy from its ashes. In fact, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs was established for the modernization of the Navy and especially for the drydocking and repair of *Yavuz*. The Republican Navy was actively used in naval and gunboat diplomacy to support the foreign policy objectives. A task force sailed to Malta and Greece to show the flag as a precedent for the blue water navy. The will of the naval elite, which strive to develop a high seafaring capacity, did not find support during US foreign aid missions, and after joining the Transatlantic Alliance; the Navy was tasked with protecting the Turkish Straits. The outbreak of the Cyprus crisis in 1963 and the Cyprus Operation in 1974 began to shift the mentality of the political and naval elite towards national priority operations and defense planning. Moreover, it also triggered the diversification of foreign defense procurement and the inauguration of the domestic defense industry. The procurement of *Ay*-class submarines and *Doğan*-class fast attack boats coincided with the spirit of this era. However, the procurement of MEKO-class frigates set an exemplary milestone in the modernization of the Navy and its orientation towards the high seas.

On the other hand, the national defense planning process adapted from NATO and Western countries required a systematic approach based on the political directive, and consequently military and naval strategies. Although the Armed Forces had a classified military strategy, it was never shared with the public and the stakeholders in the defense industry. Admiral Erkaya, who also took a role in devising a national defense planning system during his tenure as J5 Head in General Staff Headquarters, pioneered the promulgation of a classified National Policy Document and a Turkish Military Strategy Concept by relevant authorities. After being

assigned as the Navy Chief, he and the then Deputy Chief of General Staff General Çevik Bir led the initiative to open the ten-year defense procurement programs to inform the defense industry. So, the industry can be prepared in advance for the future procurements of the armed forces. For the same reasons, the Navy prepared and published the 'Towards Blue Waters Strategy'. This publicized strategy, along with its variant released in 2015, has remained unprecedented in the Turkish military to this day. This document can be thought of as a manifestation of the strategic knowledge and experience accumulated in the Navy over the years. It should note that although the title of the strategy refers to the high seafaring navy, in essence, it envisages a balanced naval structure that will be effective in both coastal and offshore operations.

Admiral Erkaya's experience and knowledge of NATO and national defense planning, and his respected charismatic personality in government and military circles, were a leading factor in the preparation of a naval strategy without an explicit political directive. Due to his systemic and procedural approach to naval operations and defense planning, this initiative was simultaneously launched with the opening of the defense procurement plan by the General Staff. Admiral Lütfü Sancar also referred to Admiral Erkaya's farsightedness on crisis management, force planning, and naval affairs. He also underlined how the presentation of this strategy was praised in the General Staff and government circles. Both Admirals affirmed the importance of mechanisms that promote organizational continuity in defense and operational planning stemming from the traits instilled by naval culture and education. The interaction of naval personnel with other navies during exercises and port visits gave them the chance to follow the latest developments in the naval world. The knowledge gained through socializing with other navies and lessons learned from the past were synthesized for the advancement of the Navy. The Navy, as a small community with traditions, established mechanisms for the sharing of knowledge and decisions for the development of knowledge. In this sense, the Naval Commanders Council, which is held once or twice a year, with the participation of all commanders and admirals, can be considered as one of the mechanisms that enhance the organizational culture and institutional continuity.

In addition to being a guiding document in the development of force and manpower, the strategy also provided transparency and accountability for naval expenditures in the context of the democratic control of the army. It also gave a clear message of confidence and deterrence,

informing friendly and potential enemy countries about the future course of the Navy. Basically, adopting a high maritime strategy meant having the ability to protect the homeland by being on the high seas, ensuring the free flow of maritime trade, protecting maritime sovereign areas, and contributing to global peace by taking part in international efforts to this goal. This strategy was not devised to deliver a seapower to serve imperialistic goals. The blue water strategy was to strategically defend the homeland by being on the high seas, that is, by showing the flag in the Mediterranean and the approaches of the Indian Ocean.

In defense circles, the Turkish Air Force objected to the Navy acquiring such an air attack capability, and therefore the platform's name was changed to sea control ship. Such a platform could also be used as the headquarters of the maritime component of NATO Reaction Forces. Turkish flag officers have gained the ability to command NATO naval task groups with their experience over the years. The current command and control capabilities of the Turkish platforms, furthered by the development of the indigenous GENESIS Combat Management System (CMS), were effective in performing such command assignments. For example, a US Admiral who commands the NATO Permanent Maritime Group (SNMG) was appointed to NATO's Kosovo operations in 1999. Admiral Sađdıç, then a flotilla commodore, was appointed to take over the command duties in the NATO Cooperative Partner Exercise. He effectively performed this task from a Turkish frigate. The blue water component of a navy can facilitate a country's contribution to peacekeeping operations and increase a state's prestige and visibility in international circles. It would also enhance Turkey's deterrence through the demonstration of capabilities and operational efficiency that could be deployed to safeguard its national interests whenever and wherever needed.

The Navy implemented this strategy in a comprehensive scenario by deploying its forces across the Eastern and Central Mediterranean during *Denizkurdu* Exercise-1998. The wargaming scenario was based on the struggle for sea control between opposing task groups supported by tactical aircraft refueling from airborne tankers. This remarkable show of force was commended by friendly countries, but some felt anxious. In the coming years, the same exercise scenario was not done in order not to disrupt foreign relations. This practice proved that such an exercise could be carried out more effectively with a sea control ship such as *TCG Anadolu*. That is, conforming to the conventional triangle of strategy, a strategic vision (goals) could be

transformed to hardware to use (means-force structure) and then to a deterrence power in the hands of skilled leadership (ways-operations-exercises).

Admiral Sađdıç described NATO as a maritime alliance run by maritime states to control continental power in the heart of Eurasia, which owns most of its raw materials and energy resources. Being a member of this alliance, the Turkish naval intelligentsia was accustomed to the very same strategies, doctrines, and procedures focusing on the exploitation of high seas and oceans. Turkish Naval Academy instructors have used the same approach in the training of naval staff officers dynamically adapting to Turkey's security. One should be remembered in this respect was Captain Mert Bayat who lectured about the national strategy by processing it with current global strategies, lessons learned throughout Turkish history, and their current implementation. The writings of Admiral Afif Büyüktuđrul and Rauf Orbay were also enlightening in learning the historical facts about the Navy in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the first period of the Republic.

In sum, Turkey can only defend its national interests in the Blue Homeland and Cyprus with a naval force that has a high seafaring component. Such a high seafaring navy can show off the flag in the areas of interest and influence of Turkey. The Navy has proven its blue water capability in the last two decades and will do so at an increasing operational pace in the future. A defense and shipbuilding industry that can provide a high seafaring navy will provide added value to the national economy with its export potential. Currently, joint ventures with Pakistan to build a logistics support ship and MİLGEM-class corvettes are promising and inspiring examples of this goal. A capable defense industry will also minimize the impact of potential weapons and technology embargoes. Ultimately, this kind of sanctions, which may arise in the event of a sovereignty crisis will not prevent the implementation of Turkey's national policy.

3.2. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL MUSTAFA ÖZBEY

The answers of Admiral Özbey to the interview questions could be summarized as follows:

By allocating only part of the continental Anatolia to the Turks, the Treaty of Sèvres cut off their access to the open seas, namely the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean, and the Turkic world in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The principles of President Wilson's, which have been

the basis of the long-term strategy of the United States to date, dictated the same approach to the sharing of Anatolia. In practice, the Turkish mentality focuses on short-term success, whereas the imperialist mentality always focuses on long-term universal goals. Therefore, Turkish society remembers only the short-term goals of the Westerners but ignores the long-term goals of the universal doctrine set by the founder of the Republic.

During the victorious period, the Ottoman Navy took control of the sea in the Mediterranean and conquered overseas territories. While the Ottoman army conquered the interior of Central Europe, it also ensured the security of the southern flank. An imperialist designer could have benefited from the Ottoman vulnerability. First, the Ottomans could not catch the technological breakthrough in the maritime age, i.e., from rowing to sailing, and could not follow the technological developments afterward. Second, the privileges granted to minorities triggered uprisings and caused an international crisis that led to the intervention of the Great Powers. Due to the weakness of its army and navy as well as its government, these events resulted in the disintegration of the Empire with the involvement of the Great Powers. At this point, a constant research question is why the Ottoman dynasty perceived its navy as a threat to its existence. Sultan Abdülhamid II shackled the Navy to the Golden Horn. This not only destroyed maritime culture and continuity of personnel, but also the erosion of the navy's supplies and readiness for war. In fact, it was the Army that prepared and staged a coup to overthrow the sultan and establish a constitutional monarchy.¹⁸⁷

First of all, it should be noted that Atatürk is a strategy genius in implementing effective policies at the right time and in the right place. He determined a strategy based on the National Act (*Misak-ı Milli*), which includes Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hatay (Sanjak) provinces. He assessed that the Entente Powers could not afford to fight in Anatolia due to their war-fatigued economy and people. He inaugurated the War of Liberation, which resulted in the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. He also cautiously assessed the balance of power in the pre-WWII security environment and initiated a multinational conference that resulted in the signing of the Montreux Convention in 1936. His last act was to pave the way for the annexation of Hatay province to the homeland.

¹⁸⁷ This stands as a research question that should be further studied.

He would probably have a strategy for the annexation of Mosul and Kirkuk, but he passed away untimely.

In this respect, his prominent directive ‘Armies, your first goal is the Mediterranean. Forward!’ could be interpreted as a farsighted vision of reaching high seas and restoring connectivity to global commons instead of sweeping the adversary invaders from the Anatolian peninsula and reaching the shores of İzmir.¹⁸⁸ Such a visionary man who always thought about the next step would not have been expected to give such a simple order.¹⁸⁹ After the foundation of the Republic, Atatürk attached importance to the Naval Forces and established the Ministry of Navy. After the repair of the battlecruiser *Yavuz* was completed, the Republican Fleet set sail to sea and conducted gunboat diplomacy functions. The Navy, with its deterrent effect, contributed to regional stability while working on the open and surrounding seas. After Atatürk’s era, a land force-dominated doctrine was dominant in defending Turkey against a foreign invasion from seaward or land.

After joining NATO, the Navy has been equipped with newer platforms to fulfill a role that NATO has defined and restricted in the Black Sea, Turkish Straits, and territorial waters. With this narrow mindset, Turkey had not volunteered for any area of sea and air responsibility in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean from the Alliance. Turkey even left the responsibility of Flight Information Region (FIR) to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus due to technical reasons, in fact, lack of farsightedness. On the other hand, NATO membership presented novel indoctrination in modern naval tactics and procedures contributing to the organizational culture of the Navy, but within the very defined limits. Turkey has ignored the exploitation of the demilitarized status of the Aegean Islands by Greece. Moreover, during the 1947 Treaty of Paris, Turkey stayed unvocal to Greece’s taking over of the Menteşe Islands (Dodecanese) and Meis (Kastellorizo) island, that had been provisionally ceded to Italy by Ottomans in 1912. During the Cold War, Turkey did not develop any national concepts and

¹⁸⁸ Even in the era of Atatürk, Naval Officers attempted to make the analysis of this mission order in such a farsighted approach where the mission of the Army ended on the shores of the Aegean Sea but the mission dictated to the Navy entailed reaching oceans and reinstating connectivity to the global commons. (Heper, 1937)

¹⁸⁹ Admiral Özbey dubbed that he also talked about this motto with Admiral Erkaya and stated that Admiral Erkaya might have reflected such a visionary approach to the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy. As of today, this vision turned out to be “Blue Homeland” doctrine, even known by layman at the street, crafted by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz.

doctrines and just made good and efficient use of the given platforms within the NATO-defined tasks.

The blunt movements of Greece and the Greek Cypriots towards unification and President Johnson's harsh warning were a wake-up call for the Turkish military. However, from then on, an army dominated by the military realized that a naval force was needed as a national requirement due to the requirement to conduct an amphibious operation. Subsequently, the Turkish Armed Forces revised its national force planning to a threat-oriented basis and developed its amphibious capacity by building landing vessels and founding a marine force regiment. Surface and subsurface capability and firepower were also rejuvenated with secondhand combatant transfers and ships built in the country.

The Cyprus Operation¹⁹⁰ can be regarded as a breaking point in this age. It was an amphibious operation that required intra- and inter-service coordination between partaking services, headquarters, and units. Although the bulk of the Fleet was in the Aegean Sea for the annual *Denizkurdu*-1974 Exercise, a substantial part of the military personnel was on summer leave or on their way to their newly appointed positions. After receiving the mobilization orders, all naval units were quickly deployed to designated areas and held there. Due to the failure of diplomatic efforts, the operation was launched fairly quickly and was successful. This rapid response and subsequent sustainability gave the Navy confidence that it could do better if needed. The naval units used in this operation were mainly the national amphibious force and the platforms that were donated by the US but not assigned to NATO. This was a limited power projection experience and high maritime capability combined with logistical support but could not be considered sufficient for a national blue water capacity.

Immediately after the Cyprus Operation, the appointment of officers to war colleges fundamentally changed the perception of joint operations teaching, overcoming in-service competition and intolerance with the confidence gained in solidarity on the ground. This generation of personnel officers changed planning paradigms that had ossified in military circles as they climbed up the hierarchy. The lessons learned from the Cyprus Operations and

¹⁹⁰ Admiral Özbey was the Operations Officer of the Destroyer Flotilla Commodore on board of *TCG İskenderun* during the *Denizkurdu* Exercise.

the experience gained through the combat advanced threat-based operational planning and perception of force development perception.¹⁹¹ The knowledge gained in the NATO Force Planning Process was gradually reflected in the progress of a parallel national force development process. Particularly, a force structure which is to be used in case of a crisis with Greece began to be developed, that is, a force projection capability comprised of a high seafaring fleet and an amphibious force.

During this period, Germany emerged as an arms exporter and became an alternative market to the US, without strict restrictions on the transfer of know-how and technology and limitations on the use of transferred weapons. Turkey took a very critical decision to diversify its arms suppliers then. Although Turkey had ongoing contracts of a joint venture with German firms to build submarines and fast patrol boats, this novel approach gave three improved options: a flexible framework for the use of platforms in operations, the know-how and technology transfer in shipbuilding, and the opportunity to reflect the nationally preferred abilities and systems to the design package. The Navy used this opportunity to reflect its high seafaring requirements into the MEKO 200T multipurpose frigate project, which elevated itself to the league of the contemporary navies. This project can also be considered as a milestone in structuring a navy for priority needs at the national level.

In the late 1980s, modernization budget management in the General Staff was not coherent to support long-term force development and procurement projects. After the service shares were allocated, a 35 percent lion's share could only be used with the approval of the Chief of General Staff, who could distribute it according to his preferences. This had the potential to trigger competition between services. During this period, this budget management system was disciplined and restructured in a way to increase the coverage rate of 10-year procurement programs in accordance with the strategic goals plan by increasing the service shares. This

¹⁹¹ After graduation, these classes comprehensively changed the military planning basics. Admiral Özbey was assigned to the General Staff in the wake of *MTA Sismik-I* crisis when the General Staff was ordered to escort the research vessel. During Admiral Özbey's assignment to the General Staff, Admiral Erkaya was also a chief in the Force Planning Branch. Admiral Özbey worked in this position for four years and build his knowledge on the Turkish-Greek Disputes. Later, this duo worked in the General Staff again as Admiral Erkaya being the the J5 Head and Admiral Özbey being his Force Planning Branch Chief. During this period, the nucleus of the Distant Horizon project and the Towards Blue Waters strategy were the topics discussed by them. The commonality of the duo was their knowledge and experience on NATO Force Planning Cycle and their will to adapt it to the national planning without NATO limitations and indoctrinations.

disciplinary effort placed some extra-budgetary resources such as defense industry support funds (SSDF) and treasury guaranteed government / firm loans in the financing basket.¹⁹² This financial transparency allowed services to plan for long-term procurement projects and fund initiatives in the strategic plan by increasing the scope of the procurement plan. It was the period when the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System of the Turkish Armed Forces was realistically designed, restructured, and implemented both in the financial part between objectives and resources and in the conceptual part between political guidance and military concepts. Thus, the force planning cycle has been carried out systematically and this should be seen as a historic milestone for the future of the Turkish military.¹⁹³

In the years that they worked together, Admiral Erkaya and Admiral Özbey discussed the need to establish a surveillance system in the Aegean Sea, including Professor Nejat Ince, which is later to be materialized as the Distant Horizon project.¹⁹⁴ Admiral Özbey, the Plans Policy Chief of Admiral Vural Bayazıt, pointed to the harmony between the visions of Admiral Bayazıt and Admiral Erkaya (the then-Commander of the Fleet) in the initiation of challenging and leading projects for the progress of Navy.¹⁹⁵ Admiral Bayazıt's priority was to enhance deterrence in the Aegean Sea before UNCLOS III came into effect and develop a national ship project. In this regard, the decision to transfer eight Knox-class frigates was taken as a stopgap remedy to gain time to initiate an endeavor to build and design an indigenous naval combatant, with its national industrial property rights. The then NATO-2000 frigate was excluded during the staff work. The main problem was determined as the funding of the project, which can be handled with a model like in the case of the other foreign ship projects that were financed with the treasury assured state/firm credits in the auspices of Hermes financial assurance system.

¹⁹² Admiral Biren was the Chief of Plans and Policy (J5) the first year (1987-1989) of Admiral Özbey and replaced by Admiral Erkaya for the next two years (1988-1990). Admiral Sağdıç was also a project officer in the Force Planning Branch in this period. Admiral Özbey applauded the performance of General Necdet Torumtay as a commander and a statesman for keeping Turkey away from in the Iraqi crises in the 1990s.

¹⁹³ Admiral Özbey dubbed the working style of Admiral Erkaya as follows: “Mustafa, call your wife to prepare dinner for tonight. We will work in your house.” After tedious working until four o'clock in the morning, Admiral Erkaya said: “We're done for tonight. Please prepare the outcome of tonight's discussions as a report for tomorrow morning.” This anecdote was just given to reflect Admiral Erkaya's tempo and performance in a standard working day.

¹⁹⁴ Admiral Özbey underlined his contribution the preparation of the Distant Horizon project and its naming.

¹⁹⁵ Admiral Özbey remarked that Admiral İrfan Tınaz was focused on the procurement of combat ready platforms instead of capability development projects. In this regard, he was in the favor of transfer of *Perry*-class frigates, not the *Knox*-class steam-powered combatants.

Following the approval of the General Staff, the relevant staff work was presented to Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Once approved, she gave instructions for the allocation of the necessary funds by the Treasury.¹⁹⁶ This support paved the way for working on frigate development projects with other Western countries.

Another dimension was based on the principle “One who cannot command the software cannot command the fleet”. At that point, the seventh and eighth fast-attack patrol boats were undergoing modernization, whereas the combat management software of the rest of the boats was updated by the Dutch firm, Signaal. The naval headquarters obliged the contractor to provide training on software development. Otherwise, another contractor might be selected. This was an unorthodox approach. With the agreement of the contractor, eleven bright engineer officers were sent for training on software development. These officers later established the necessary institutional infrastructure in the Navy for software development aim. The pieces of the puzzle, that is, the software and hardware needed for in-country ship design and building were put in place with the supporting financial instruments as part of the long-term approach of the Navy which began with the Distant Horizon project.

While the support of the Navy leadership was resolute, the initiative did not go smoothly due to the difficulties arising from the defense procurement bureaucracy's inexperience in development projects, complex government contract management procedures, and pressure from foreign defense industry giants. MİLGEM's project was revived and put on the track again during Admiral Özden Örnek's tenure. On a note, it can be said that the interrupted transfer of *Perry*-class frigates was accelerated even with the secret intention of slowing the national ship project. The success of the MİLGEM project depended on the courageous effort of the Naval Forces to take full responsibility for performance in program management. It should also be noted that the funds allocated for MİLGEM at that time were later allocated to the financing of some other programs such as naval attack helicopters.

Admiral Özbey underlined that he made the most use of Captain Mert Bayat's knowledge during his staff training. He stated that Captain Bayat instilled a more visionary perspective to the

¹⁹⁶ The Undersecretary of Treasury, Ayfer Çıray earmarked a fund of around two and half billion US dollars for the realization of the project.

participants, like a version of the Distant Horizon that does not only focus on the Aegean Sea. He said that Captain Bayat insisted that the Navy is not just a profession of commanding ships, but a culture of looking beyond the horizon, that is, a culture of strategic thinking.

As for Mahan, Admiral Özbey said that the US, as an island nation, took command of the oceans from Britain, inevitably becoming a naval power and implementing a Mahanist worldview. At this point, it can be said that the USA cannot maintain its Mahanist approach as a naval power due to the difficulties created by its peers.

Regarding the impact of foreign consultation missions, Admiral Özbey pointed out that first of all, homeland defense should be a national issue. For this reason, the period when the command ranks of the Ottoman army were occupied by German officers would be remembered as an embarrassing period on the wall of history. He said it would be unwise to expect foreign delegations to propose adequate military planning for national needs.

Relating to the contributions of abroad training, Admiral Özbey uttered the prominence of target-oriented education instead of success-oriented one. In this regard, he referred to the directive telegram of Atatürk to the selected students for abroad education saying “I send you abroad as a spark. You should come back as a volcano”¹⁹⁷ (Şarman, 2006). He emphasized that, as in the example of sending engineers for software development training, education planning in foreign institutions was not designed with a set of goals aimed at developing the navy at the national level by putting the knowledge of graduates into practice.

As for the impact of NATO membership, Admiral Özbey commended the tactical and operational contribution of it to the advancement of the Navy, particularly through the adaption of NATO aquis in developing national amphibious doctrine according to the national threat perceptions. But he underlined that at the strategic level, it did not contribute to the progress of the Navy.

Admiral Özbey stated that although he exchanged views on the need for a high maritime strategy, Admiral Erkaya has the intellectual property rights regarding the naming and

¹⁹⁷ The directive telegram in Turkish says: “Sizi birer kıvılcım olarak gönderiyorum. Volkan olarak dönmelisiniz.”

processing of this strategy. Admiral Özbey referred to the directive of the General Staff to prevent misconduct in relations with external stakeholders, which was interpreted in a narrow framework and limited contacts with suppliers only at the Ministry of National Defense level. He stated that he presented the issue to Admiral Bayazıt with two courses of action, either to be contented with the indirect information through the Ministry of National Defense for decision making on critical procurement and acquisition projects or to contact directly the representatives of the suppliers to get firsthand information. He got the order to directly contact the suppliers.

As for the parliamentary approval, Admiral Özbey suggested that the National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*) was to approve the Strategic Goals Plan instead of the annual defense budget to assume its constitutionally given mission for the preparation of the armed forces. For the completion of the defense planning cycle, he recalled his efforts in the General Staff to ask the political authority to prepare a national policy document. And its follow-up, a military strategic concept was prepared by the General Staff. He reminded that Atatürk led the War of Independence on behalf of the National Assembly and that he was accountable to the Assembly for his actions even during the conflict. In other words, the basic principle is that the defense of the homeland should be conducted by the representatives of national will.

Concerning his last conduct as the Plans Policy Chief of the Navy, he noted the signing of the notification form of requirement for the procurement of a light aircraft carrier, as a proposal. He also remarked that the inclusion of such a requirement in the force planning cycle symbolically reflects the ambition level for a high seafaring navy.

In his assessment for the present level of the Navy, Admiral Özbey applauded the level attained in compiling recognized surface and aerial pictures. He also praised the readiness of surface combat ships for battle in partly deterring potential attacks and attacking a potential enemy, but he underscored the importance of AIP submarines as a deterrent force, especially in the Mediterranean. He praised the government's three strategic decisions to defend the country: the supply of S-400 air defense missiles, the creation of exploration and drilling capability, and support for the realization of naval projects that triggered a quantum leap at sea. In this context, he emphasized the importance of developing national weapon and sensor systems such as the

domestic production of Atmaca guided missiles, development of national sonar, progress of GENESIS, ADVENT command management systems.

Admiral Özbey pointed out that the Kardak Crisis added a new dimension, the geographic formations (islands, islets, and rock formations) in the Aegean Sea for which the sovereignty has not been transferred to Greece with Agreements, to the bundle of disputes between the Aegean littorals in 1996. Followingly, Greece and the Southern Greek Cypriots (SGC)¹⁹⁸ attempted to enhance their “joint defense area”. Turkey replied by shifting its focus from the Aegean Sea to the high seas to break this chain between the duos. The format of exercises was altered to a scenario based on exerting sea control at high seas, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and securing sea control around the island of Cyprus. Admiral Özbey also stressed two incidences as worth mentioning in this period. First, the landing of two Greek F-16 aircraft at the Baf (Paphos) airbase was immediately retaliated by Turkey with a tough demarche of the Prime Minister and by the landing of a half squadron of F-16s at Geçitkale base. Greece drew back F-16s on the very same day and shelved the joint defense area, but Turkish aircraft stayed there for a week and was even opened for public visit. The second was the attempt of Greek Cypriots to import and deploy the S-300 air defense missiles from Russia to the island. Turkey declared that this attempt would be considered as a breach of the demilitarized status of the island cited in the founding constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and also as an existential threat to its security. Turkey immediately informed the NATO and the UN authorities if the missiles would have been deployed to the island, then they would have been annihilated. The Greek duo drew back again, and the S-300 missiles were shelved to a depot in the island of Crete. Admiral Özbey also underlined that these two incidences set the background for the deployment of the Navy in the context of *Denizkurdu* 1998 Exercise into the Mediterranean as an implementation of the newly ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy.

Admiral Özbey applauded the logistical support of the platforms deployed in Somalia in 1992 as a test example of blue water capability and expressed the improvement of the Aksaz naval base as a historic step towards the open seas. He stated that on the efficient use of allocated modernization funds, a basic comparison will show the level of success between the completion

¹⁹⁸ Admiral ÖZBEY called the Southern Cyprus Cypriots as Southern Cyprus “Bandit” State.

of main combat initiatives, such as the *Altay* main battle tank for the Land Forces, the F-35 Joint Strike Aircraft for the Air Force, and the national ship (MİLGEM) for the Navy. He continued by stressing the prominent role of the MİLGEM and ARMERKOM-led projects initiated by the Navy in extending the vision of the SSM, i.e., transmuting it from procurement to a development agency, and also in earning competencies to the domestic defense industry. Resultantly, Aselsan, Havelsan, and Roketsan marketed their products to the world.

For the *Denizkurdu* Exercise-1994, Admiral Özbey stated that the units were intentionally deployed in the vicinity of the West Aegean Islands for the first time, and therefore, the islands were virtually blockaded in the exercise scenario. The intention was a strong display of deterrence message right before the UNCLOS III entered into force on November 16th, 1994.

Admiral Özbey remarked that the current force posture of the Navy could not be considered as a high seafaring navy, instead, it could effectively perform the safeguarding of the Blue Homeland and the defense of the country as a first-line by being present at the Mediterranean. He underlined the importance of overseas bases, such as the island of Suakin at the Red Sea, for the support of a high seafaring force deployed to the oceans. He added that the Navy would need a high sea component to distribute training to the potential countries in conjunction with exported combatants in the coming decade. Besides nautical hardware, Turkey should also import soft power of naval culture and training to make overseas friendly countries. That would eventually transform the Navy into a ‘real’ blue water force. He also underscored the prominence of designing and building an AIP-powered submarine indigenously (MİLDEN-National Submarine Project) as part of the high seafaring force structure.

3.3. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL LÜTFÜ SANCAR¹⁹⁹

Admiral Sancar²⁰⁰ first began setting the scene with maritime history. He underlined that trading at sea and nautical interests had been recorded before naval history. In A.D. 1500, Phoenicians were the first seaborne trading nation, or a *thalassocracy*, without a navy. When maritime trade had to be protected, merchant ships were armed and had guarded for self-defense. The inadequacy of this practice led to the emergence of guard fleets, namely navies, near the homeland and later on the high seas. Phoenicians were the prime marine nation in the Mediterranean Basin whose nautical acquis was later utilized by Egyptians and Romans as part of their fleet. During the Persian invasion, the backbone of the fleets consisted of Phoenician ships and was supported by the Carian fleet under the command of Queen Artemis (the first female admiral in history) who fought against the Greeks.

In the fifteenth century, Spaniards and Portuguese mariners showed up in maritime history. The advancement of Portuguese sailors was based on marine research institutionalized by Henry the Navigator, which encouraged expeditions to explore the seas and new lands. This venture resulted in reaching India by way of Cape Hope. It would be worth noting that all these initiatives were civilian-led and stimulated by trade. Entrepreneurs tried to reach resources without a navy. To maintain the maritime and land trade posts, navies were later established with the revenues obtained from the maritime trade. Following the Portuguese, the Spaniards entered the maritime scene with stronger elements of national power. Later, the Pope divided the unclaimed world between these powers with the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1493. Civic initiatives for wealth have resulted in many geographic discoveries; the most prominent was the continent of America. All valuable supplies from America were sent to Spain and invested in the navy to protect it.

¹⁹⁹ Admiral Sancar was the Plans Policy Chief between August 1995-January 1997, then the Head of Research and Project Development Department between January 1997-August 1997. Later after promoting to the rank of Admiral (UH) he served as the Operations Chief between August 1997-August 1999 and later assigned as the Commander of Landing Fleet between August 1999-August 2000

²⁰⁰ After his retirement, Admiral Sancar taught nautical history in the maritime faculty of the *Dokuz Eylül* University in İzmir. He is still in the organizing committee of Maritime History Symposium Series twelfth of which that be held this year in Antalya.

After gaining independence from the Spanish kingdom, the Dutch East Indian Company (DEIC) was founded in 1602 as the largest of the firms. Then the *Wisselbank* was founded in 1609, the precursor to, if not the first, a modern central bank and provided cheap credits for state and entrepreneurs. From its establishment until its closing in 1794, DEIC provided an average annual interest rate of 18 percent to its investors. The obligation to preserve this prosperous exchange gave birth to the Dutch Navy. The necessity to preserve this prosperous exchange gave birth to the Dutch Navy. At the same time, the British began to show interest in maritime trade and established the British East Indian Company (BEIC) in 1600 before the Dutch. However, the difficulty of dealing with the Netherlands forced the British to cooperate with them as a practice of traditional policy. In Britain, the aristocracy, supported by merchants in England, revolted against King Charles II. This event was recorded on the wall of history as the "Glorious Revolution of 1688". The marriage of the king's daughter, Queen Mary, to the Dutch King William, resulted in the unification of these two countries as part of the civil initiative. Dutch entrepreneurs began to become business partners of BEIC. The British financial system was revised accordingly by establishing the British Central Bank. Then, in 1707, the parliaments of these countries united. British maritime trade began to flourish without any threat from the Dutch. However, the threat of France, the continental power of the period, forced the British to develop their navy. A British politician, William Pitt The Elder persuaded parliament to approve recruiting fifty thousand sailors and building a 105-ship navy compared to the 70-ship navy of France at that time. During the seven-year war of 1756-1763, most of the French navy was destroyed by the Royal navy. All these events were led by a civilian government.

During Admiral Güven Erkaya's tenure as the Chief of Plans Policy, Admiral Sancar emphasized that the two issues he proposed did not progress as he had predicted. One of the issues to be discussed in the National Security Council was the conditions under which the agreement with Armenia would continue. Admiral Sancar proposed to encourage free and direct trade with Armenia by reopening border gates instead of insisting to remove certain symbols such as *Mount Ağrı (Ararat)* on the national flag or blocking the flow of Turkish goods through Georgia. Such a movement could strengthen the civilian government in Armenia and increase Turkish influence in power circles by excluding the Armenian diaspora. But this proposal was not accepted by the council.

Another issue where Admiral Sancar's views were not reflected was related to the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy. He stated that the navy's vision was not directly backed by political will. The initiative was mainly fostered by the professional qualities of naval officers instilled by their postgraduate educational backgrounds and enriched by careerism and naval (organizational) culture. This naval culture instilled in naval officers the virtues of questioning, self-improvement, and breaking the stereotypes of tradition. The high seafaring strategy crafted by the naval leadership and staff was presented to the General Staff for approval. With the support of the General Staff, the political leadership was convinced of the strategic need to develop a high seafaring navy. But it was not a bottom-up effort by civic circles promoted by overseas trade connectivity, or a top-down approach of political leadership inspired by the support of foreign policy goals and international prestige. Therefore, the development of the Navy did not follow the historical model of nations becoming the naval power detailed above. Partial support from politicians and business was based on the armed forces' longstanding credibility and prestige but remained limited. This backing did not result in the allocation of necessary funds to create such an ability. The sustainability of this venture would be limited in time and resources due to a lack of staunch political support and civic initiative.

The rationale for the strategic need for a high maritime capacity is built on the necessity of protecting maritime transport from the entrances of the Mediterranean, namely Gibraltar and the Suez Canal to the homeland ports. A vital part of this trade was the continuation of imports of oil and by-products across the Aegean Sea during times of crisis and war. The symbiotic dependence of the Turkish economy on energy produced by oil imports was 'securitized' to maintain its ability to wage wars. However, the civilian leadership believed that war was less likely to break out. Even if they assumed that war would break out, it would be a short-lived war. So, they could find other sources to import oil. Therefore, they did not express their views and concerns but instead appeared to support the blue water move.

Admiral Sancar emphasized that he focused on maritime history from both western and national sources. However, the literature on the Turkish merchant marine was extremely limited. Most academic work has focused on Navy-led history. Aware of this knowledge gap, Admiral Sancar focused on developing his academic studies in the history of maritime trade with a series of international symposiums, 12 of which were held in Antalya in 2020. He also edited a maritime

history book with three other academics with the support of the Naval Forces (Arıkan & Sancar, 2009; Bostan & Özbaran, 2009).

The Ottoman Empire's maritime understanding was different from other maritime nations. In fact, it would be more correct to say that the Ottomans were never a sea power or a maritime nation. The Ottomans were continentally minded like the Romans and their conquest strategy was based on enlargement in uninterrupted borders, that is, in upholding continuity and integrity of land seized. The only exception to this strategy was Algeria, which Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa presented to Sultan Suleyman. The Ottomans then extended their borders in North Africa, ensuring the continuity of their lands.

Atatürk knew the importance of the Navy very well for two reasons. First, the Entente States' attempt to invade Gallipoli from the sea, which could not be prevented by a skilled navy and cost the lives of half a million soldiers. The second was the importance of sea logistics transportation between Anatolia and Russia during the War of Independence.

Admiral Sancar remarked that he was most influenced by his instructor, Captain Mert Bayat, during staff college training. He described Captain Bayat as a person who reads naval and world affairs by questioning their content, sharing his distilled and digested knowledge with officers. Admiral Sancar also mentioned Captain Bayat as a strategy genius with theoretical knowledge comparable to Mahan. He stated that his list of the most valuable Admirals in maritime history will be Turgut Reis, Admiral Nelson, and Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa, respectively.

Admiral Sancar said that joining NATO can be considered a breaking point when it comes to the impact of foreign naval missions. Later, the Navy was developed under the auspices of US missions. NATO and the United States provided invaluable training opportunities for Turkish naval personnel and exercise opportunities for naval units and leadership. He stated that he attended destroyer school and staff college training in the USA and benefited from interaction in a multinational environment.

Admiral Sancar said he was at *TCG Gemlik* as an acting communications officer during the first activation of NAVOCFORMED in 1970, regarding NATO exercises. Later, he cited one of his memories about this exercise. In anti-aircraft live firing, the British frigate commander ordered

the ships to start from the Greek ship and fire at the target followed by the Turkish, Italian, US, and British frigates. This formation was based on his assumption and confidence that the four ships would miss the target and eventually his ship would hit him. As planned, the British ship hit the target. Twenty years later, Admiral Sancar directed the final activation of NAVOCFORMED, which became STANAVFORMED in 1992. In this activation, he gave the command of the serial to the Turkish frigate commander during the anti-aircraft fire and ordered it to be the last ship in the formation. All ships missed the Learjet-towed target. *TCG Fatih* hit the target in the second shot. He underlined this incidence as a showcase of a commendable level of training and material that the Navy has achieved in a quarter of a century.²⁰¹

In the preparation of the 1997 strategy, Admiral Sancar drew attention to the personal and professional characteristics of Admiral Güven Erkaya, the load-bearing pillar of this initiative. Admiral Erkaya was a naval intellectual who read and digested the relevant literature and blended it with his professional knowledge and experience. He was almost comparable to Captain Mert Bayat. His personal and professional qualities were the leading factor in this transformation. With his charismatic personality, he was respected both in Turkish General Staff circles and at the political level. Leveraging the appropriate political conjuncture and knowledge, he persuaded the political and military ranks to create a high seafaring navy. The trust and respect of Chief of Staff General İhsan Karadayı and Deputy Gen. Cevik Bir to Admiral Erkaya was instrumental in affirming the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, rather than the validity of such an operational requirement. For long-term sustainability, Admiral Sancar once again emphasized that he preferred a corporate initiative rather than an effort led by Admiral Erkaya's personal charisma. Such a corporate initiative should have been led by the political authority as in the case of other naval powers. He also noted that the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy was not coordinated with other ministries during preparation.

As for the impact of Turkish-Greek relations on the development of the navy, Admiral Sancar noted that the seeds of hostility between them were based on a strategy 'constructed' by the British. During the Atatürk-Venizelos peace period, the Greek side's demand to evacuate the

²⁰¹ Admiral Sancar also shared this experience the then commander of *TCG Gemlik* in 1970, Admiral Hasan Sarioğlu who listened him in tears of pride and joy.

British sovereign bases on the Island of Cyprus disturbed Britain, as these bases still needed influence in the Middle East. Therefore, Britain designed a policy to seed hatred between the Greek-Turkish duo. Fifty years later, British archive documents shed light on the British involvement in events that triggered this hostility, such as the bombing of Atatürk's house in Selanik and the organized attack on the Greek minority in Istanbul in September 1955. They saved their possessions in Cyprus, but the enmity that was cultivated continued until today. Moreover, the US also took advantage of this hostility economically by exporting its obsolete military equipment to the region.

After the 1974 Cyprus Operation, political pressure and embargo imposed stimulated Turkey to develop a national defense industry that was not anticipated by the superpowers. They never desired Turkey to improve an amphibious force in its military aid programs to exert its potential 'imperial' wills. In this regard, even public campaigns to build a national naval force were implicitly carried out by the Navy and not motivated by a civilian instinct.

As for the realization of MEKO projects, Admiral Sancar appreciated the contribution of Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS)²⁰² graduates experienced in fast patrol boats in effectively integrating these state-of-the-art frigates into the Navy's inventory. He pointed to the commanding officer of the first ship, *TCG Yavuz*²⁰³, who was also a graduate of the NPGS. Successful integration has increased the training and technological level of the fleet, and this can be seen as a breaking point in the transition from a classical to a contemporary navy. Despite the introduction of this technology in *Doğan*-class fast patrol boats and *Ay*-class submarines, its spread to a wider surface warfare community has instrumentalized this technological breakthrough.

Regarding his experience as the Plans Policy Chief, he stated that the austerity measures after the 1994 economic crisis prevented the MİLGEM project from being realized. Admiral Erkaya's priority was the implementation of the Distant Horizon project, which he introduced and supported in civilian and military circles. A research and project development (APGE²⁰⁴)

²⁰² NPGS: Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, US.

²⁰³ Captain Ahmet Tüfekçioğlu was the first commanding officer of *TCG Yavuz*.

²⁰⁴ Research and Project Development Department: Araştırma ve Proje Geliştirme Başkanlığı

department was established at the Naval Headquarters to oversee programs related to the Distant Horizon. The software development center established in Gölcük (YAZGEM²⁰⁵) became subject to APGE. Later, YAZGEM was reorganized as Research Center (ARMERKOM-Research Center Command) in 1998. Admiral Sancar has been appointed as APGE's head of department. Later, Admiral Dervişoğlu (Naval Forces Commander) and Admiral Örnek (Chief of General Staff) shifted their focus to the national ship (MİLGEM) project instead of the Distant Horizon Project. In that era, the graduate education program was reviewed and revised accordingly to meet the demanding needs of technological advancements in coordination with the Personnel Plans Division.

In the context of the Kardak crisis, Admiral Sancar stressed the command responsibility of task groups at sea. The lessons learned from this operation proved that a task force assigned to a politically sensitive crisis must be led directly by the Navy headquarters, the Navy Chief himself. During the Kardak crisis, Admiral Erkaya contacted the task group commander, Admiral Aydın Gürül, directly over secure lines, sometimes even by mobile phone, in order to convey his orders. The result was that the fleet commander was to be responsible for the combat and operational readiness of the task groups, and the units deployed had to be directly managed by the Navy headquarters due to the sensitive political dimension of the crisis. Another memoir recollected by Admiral Sancar was a midnight request to present the Kardak issue at the National Security Council (NSC) in the morning. He and his team made the necessary preparations, but there was no time to coordinate with Admiral Erkaya. All political and military leadership, particularly the then-President Süleyman Demirel, were informed about the facts of the issue at stake. Such an incident demonstrated the capacity of naval personnel to reflect similar approaches shaped by common organizational culture and identity. Another point to note is that no other government agency is ready for such a crisis, so the Navy's views have been decisive in decision-making circles. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' approach was to freeze the problem and turn to the *status quo ante*, which was not a defined situation.

During this period, Admiral Sancar stated that the aggressive efforts of the US Navy to deploy more frequently to the Black Sea caused controversy as their gates were already under the

²⁰⁵ Software Development Center (*YAZGEM-Yazılım Geliştirme Merkezi*) was established during the tenure of Admiral Bayazit in 1993 at Gölcük in the building currently used by the Fleet Commander.

control of a NATO ally. There were no insecurities to justify the strategic need for US presence operations which were based on showing the flag.

As for his transition from Plans Policy to Operations Department, Admiral Sancar commented that his background was contributory in coordinating affairs relevant to both departments. During this period, the national corvette project was given priority again, with the transfer of *Aviso (Burak)*-class corvettes and *Eridan (Engin)*-class mine hunters from France as a transition measure that increased the operational capacity of the navy. All these transformation efforts and the inclusion of these platforms in the inventory contributed greatly to the training level of the Navy and its personnel.

Admiral Sancar stated that, regarding his tenure at the Southern Field Command, he conveyed the increasing importance of the Foça Base Command and the need to appoint a flag officer to lead the base development works to the Navy headquarters. Another priority issue was the modernization of the equipment of the amphibious brigade, the strategic reserve of the General Staff, and the renewal of the landing craft fleet.

As for the implementation of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, he applauded the current level of force structure as a more realistic approach. Finally, he drew attention to the negative impact of judicial cases on staff training and morale.

3.4. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL FEYYAZ ÖĞÜTCÜ

Admiral Feyyaz Öğütcü began by emphasizing the importance of the eruption of the Cyprus Problem in 1963 and its role in raising awareness of national operation planning and force development. His comments are briefly presented below.

The pressing demand for landing vessels and craft was met by the construction of landing craft and vessels (LCM/LCT) which were fitted with tank diesel engines in domestic shipyards.

TCG Koçhisar (P-116), which was the last one of a six-pack PC-1638 US-design patrol ship, was the first combatant constructed in Gölcük Shipyard. The concept of shipbuilding with foreign designs and material packages has provided military shipyards with knowledge and

experience. *TCG Berk* (D-358) and *TCG Peyk* (D-359) were constructed in line with this model, but some domestic content was used. The concept of shipbuilding with foreign designs and material packages has provided naval shipyards with knowledge and experience. Germany became a new supplier.

When Admiral Ögütcü was onboard *TCG Yavuz* (F-240) as the executive officer, the chief of electronics brought him a fault report message in the fire control system. The message would be procedurally transmitted via the command levels to the manufacturer in Germany and then sent to the repair team to fix the fault. The expert came, fixed the breakdown, and made a fortune in minutes. The reason for needing the manufacturer's support was because the software of the ship's combat management system was not covered by the contract. The lesson was learned well and costly. The contract of the second batch of MEKO 200T frigates was further improved compared to the first and included the transfer of know-how and, in particular, the source code of the software on board. Subsequently, the Navy ordered all core software to be developed by ARMERKOM, supported by Milsoft and Havelsan. This effort particularly troubled the US side.

The education and training system of the Navy had very solid foundations. Especially sending officers to civil and military institutions for postgraduate education abroad has been very effective in increasing the quality of human resources. The result of the investment made in qualified manpower has been the effective management of modernization projects, which are appreciated by other services. The biggest changes in the education system were that the curriculum of the navy academy changed from three to four years. On the other hand, removing international relations from the curriculum was not a wise choice. Although the MEKO 200T project was very costly, about 450 million USD per ship, courses, and training in Germany and the Netherlands proved very useful and effective in training professional staff for frigates. During this period, naval culture progressed from a coastal one to a high seafaring navy. Navy personnel also adapted themselves to the innovations of the digital age, but organizational commitment began to decline relatively among the younger generation of officers. This stemmed from the assignment of officers who have been completed sea duties especially with subsurface and fast attack boat engineering background in the command cadres of the Naval Academy and Naval High School. Such officers, also lacking pedagogic education might have

tried their ego on the cadets, particularly in the Naval High School, causing them to regard the Navy with disfavor.

In the 1990s, the enforcement of UNCLOS III in 1994 was a vital consideration for Admiral Bayazıt the then-Fleet Commander to upkeep deterrence in the Aegean Sea. He was in favor of transferring *Knox*-class frigates as a transitional measure while Admiral Tınaz was for the procurement of newer platforms. Admiral Bayazıt initiated the transfer of the *Knox*-class frigates when he took over the command. The transfer of these frigates was very instrumental in improving the training level of the navy. In addition to providing deterrence in the Aegean Sea, they were used effectively without any major accidents and deficiencies. In the *Denizkurdu*-1998 Exercise, the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy was effectively implemented by deploying the fleet to the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, conducting air support (ASFAO/TASMO)²⁰⁶ operations in the west of Crete, and visiting foreign and local ports, including Egypt, Tunisia, Israel, and Northern Cyprus. The content and context of this exercise caused uneasiness in some foreign political and military circles, particularly Greece.

Admiral Öğütçü joined the Somali Task Unit consisting of *TCG Fatih*, *TCG Derya*, and *TCG Ertuğrul* in 1992 to provide logistical support to the Turkish Forces participating in peace enforcement operations under the auspices of the UN. The Somalian mission can be considered as the first overseas deployment of a Turkish naval mission unit in the Indian Ocean for a stabilization operation.²⁰⁷

While serving as the Commander of the Southern Task Group, Admiral Öğütçü designed and implemented exercises in a multi-threat environment. He included the SEAL/EOD teams in these drills. Alas, the 1999 Gölcük disaster shelved the progress of these exercises as the Surface Action Group moved to Aksaz.

The gradual domestic development in shipbuilding and related software, led by the Navy, later resulted in court cases brought against the Navy personnel based on fabricated evidence. The

²⁰⁶ ASFAO: Anti-Surface Air Force Operations. TASMO: Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations.

²⁰⁷ In the first half of 1955, a Turkish Maritime Task Group was activated to deploy in the Indian Ocean in the context of a naval diplomacy function to pressure participants for signing Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The mission once proved the navy as being an effective foreign policy tool (Yılmaz, 2016).

initiation of the national ship project was in the tenure of Admiral Bayazit. The Navy informed domestic shipbuilders about the feasibility of building an in-country naval combat ship with a foreign design. Due to the lack of experience and expertise in shipbuilding, the industry did not accept this initiative well. Transtürk, a Turkish company, asked about 100 million USD just to develop the necessary infrastructure. The project was suspended and shelved due to the lack of excitement among industry stakeholders.

Admiral Ögütçü drew attention to the visionary and charismatic personality of Admiral Erkaya, his good relations with the upper echelons of the political and bureaucratic circles, and his readiness to develop the navy.

His primary project was the establishment of the Distant Horizon with X-Band radar technology, which he started as the Fleet Commander. This initiative broadened the horizons of the Navy with the launch of LINK 11.

Admiral Ögütçü also partook in Operation Shape Guard in the Adriatic Sea as the commanding officer of *TCG Fatih*. This participation gained experience in sustaining the ship in real war conditions as well as in boarding practices.

During the Kardak crisis, all commanders remained at the headquarters. Admiral Erkaya was guiding both the political and military leadership with his advice. In coordination with the General Staff, the operation was conducted by landing the SEAL teams on the unoccupied islet. It was a timely response to Greek aggression in the Aegean Sea. Later, the Naval Headquarters determined the geographical formations, whose sovereignty was not transferred to Greece by treaties, through a detailed archive study.

The Navy made a quantum leap by creating its strategy in the 2000s, designed and applied its operations and exercises accordingly, and reflected it on the development of force by providing resources for long-term projects.

During his term as the Head of Operations Training Department, Admiral Ögütçü became cognizant of the decrease in the combat readiness of the naval aviation units. The Casa CN-235 naval patrol aircraft supply contract was signed but could not be managed effectively due to a

lack of coordination. Admiral Ögütçü took over the management of the project and overcame the problems that prevented the initiative. A few days before leaving his post as Chief of Naval Operations, a letter received from the representative of the Casa firm in Turkey was proposing the replacement of the CN-235 which had lower loading capacity, with more capable CN-295 aircraft. This could have been a good chance to get more capable aircraft with better efficiency. However, the Navy headquarters decided to buy ATR-72 aircraft as a second batch instead of replacing the Casa CN-235 aircraft.

During the Iraq War, the Navy started to make preparations as of December 2002, upon instructions such as the use of the Ağalar and İskenderun ports for the logistics transportation of the coalition forces. However, on March 1st, 2003 the refusal of the government decree in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey disrupted the planning of the coalition forces.

During his assignment as the Commander of the Surface Action Group, Admiral Ögütçü conducted firings for all types of guided missiles in the Navy's inventory, including the annihilation of Penguin missiles. The deficiency of the search radars on board to detect and track the missiles resulted in upgrading them to Smart-S²⁰⁸ radars.

Regarding his tenure as the Chief of Staff in the Navy headquarters, Admiral Ögütçü remarked that in line with lessons learned any major changes in ongoing projects ought to be avoided. After taking command, Admiral Karahanoğlu, the then-Navy Chief, ordered that all modernization programs continue without any intervention, as any changes could potentially prolong their completion. In addition, Admiral Ögütçü underlined that he became aware of the increasing attacks based on some alleged and false accusations through unsigned letters and materials published on some illegal websites. Their targets were Naval High School, Naval Academy, Petty Officer Vocational School, and selected naval personnel. Contrary to the main directive of the General Staff, the Navy Chief chose to investigate rather than ignore every case.

²⁰⁸ Smart-S (Signaal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Tracking S band) is a naval medium to long-range air and surface surveillance multibeam passive electronically scanned array 3D radar designed by Thales Nederland, formerly Hollandse Signaalapparaten (Signaal). Smart-S Mk2 is very successful. Only six years after its introduction, 30 systems were sold to navies all over the world. The radar transmitter/receiver (T/R) modules for the MK-2 are purchased by Thales from Aselsan of Turkey.

Investigations encouraged the attackers and destroyed the morale and motivation of the personnel in question, causing organizational discipline to be disrupted.

Regarding postgraduate education, a fiscal policy error caused by the Navy's allocation of inadequate salaries to officers, unfortunately, forced them to seek the support of some of the sects organized in the United States, namely *Fetullah Gülen* (which was designated as Fetullah's Terror Organization (FETÖ) after the July 15th coup attempt).

About the staff college education in the USA Admiral Ögütçü said that the college that attended in 1984 provided an ecosystem for the exchange of views and experiences in a multinational environment. It broadened the horizons of the participants by instilling a broader perspective. The close relationships and friendships established at the college continued in an alumni network and a newsletter informing alumni about the college's developments and the new assignments of the graduate class. Mostly, the Navy appointed the graduates of US Naval War and Staff Colleges to the Turkish Naval War College as instructors to benefit from their knowledge. But because of the sea duty obligation, he was appointed to *TCG Anittepe*, as the Executive Officer.

Regarding NATO, Admiral Ögütçü underlined the important contribution of NATO membership. The Navy has benefited greatly from NATO exercises and operations in developing national tactics and learning new procedures that improve the training level of the organization. He also pointed to newly designed exercises such as the damage control exercises (DAMCONEX) applied during the command mission as COMSTANAVFORMED.²⁰⁹ He also stressed that Turkey should concentrate on taking advantage of NATO to improve its military procedures and political standing instead of exiting.

Admiral Ögütçü also commented on changes in the mission spectrum of navies during his naval career from the combat roles to operations other than war (Somalia Mission, the evacuation of Turkish nationals from Albania by *TCG Adatepe*) and maritime security, and now back to the

²⁰⁹ Admiral Ögütçü took over the command of STANAVFORMED composed of frigates of eight NATO nations in September 1999 for a term of one year.

combat roles again. He also remarked on the relative primacy of the Navy in the Black Sea in the aftermath of the Cold War which was reversed by Russian naval buildup after the 2010s.

Admiral Ögütçü stressed that the Israelian Navy should also be taken into account in the force and operational planning as a potential adversary in the Eastern Mediterranean. He also recalled that the previous level of amity was turned into defense cooperation in very classified projects such as the development of guided missiles. He also commended the level attained by the Israeli Defense Industry which he observed during a visit to their facilities.

Regarding the current situation of the Navy, Admiral Ögütçü stated that it would take at least thirty years to substitute a generation of experienced officers who were removed and retired from the Navy. This unfortunate event led to the breakdown of naval traditions and culture that had accumulated throughout decades. The transitional measures such as recruitment of civilian university graduates on board have been acceptable. But the desired level could be later attained by the four-year graduates from the Naval Academy. He applauded the current operational tempo sustained by the sacrifices of the personnel in the Navy. He also noted the durability of the core leaders in the Navy against existing attacks by the Fethullah's terrorist organization.

Admiral Ögütçü underlined the importance of relations between successive commanders regarding the continuity of modernization of the Naval Forces, especially in the exchange of views, knowledge, and experience. He also drew attention to the importance of good contact with other defense stakeholders such as the Ministry of National Defense (MND), defense procurement agency (SSM), and defense firms Aselsan, Havelsan, Roketsan.

3.5. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL DENİZ CORA

Regarding the theoretical background of ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, Admiral Cora commented that it was formed by a synthesis of smaller parts in a process. Therefore, it might not be right to try to understand facts by putting some resources at the center and accepting them as the starting point. It would be more appropriate to examine and evaluate parts according to the conditions of that time and to determine their input to the formation of this background. He uttered: “The past shows us ‘what should not do’ instead ‘what to do’”.

Concerning the impact of Ottoman naval tradition, Admiral Cora dubbed that strength of a navy could have been gauged by the training level of its personnel and their adherence to customs and traditions. The Navy had traces of the past today since the Ottoman naval heritage eventually had made a significant contribution.

Regarding the impact of personalities in ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, Admiral Cora concluded that extremely limited numbers of people have made important contributions. This move was a procedural development driven by strategic needs: “If you train staff with core values, such a development would be the expected result”. He also noted the impressive personality of Admiral Erkaya, who he had two encounters in his professional career²¹⁰, as a leading, educational, calm, and knowledgeable leader. He underlined the efforts of Admiral Erkaya to initiate institutionalization and accelerate development.

Concerning the impact of foreign missions and education, Admiral Cora reiterated that the strength of a naval force had always been its educated manpower. It was especially important for officers with core values to receive training in abroad educational institutions. They had chances to get to know the world, transfer knowledge, see innovations, observe good examples, develop an analytical thinking style, stimulate the desire for research, and see the developments in the world. It has been and will be a good practice to assign these officers to national institutions to spread the gained knowledge all over the navy. The graduates of the NPGS contributed to the development of the Navy significantly contrary to the expectations of the

²¹⁰ Admiral Cora dubbed that he served as a branch officer in one of ships in Admiral Erkaya’s flotilla and later assumed the commanding officer posts of *TCG Kılıç Ali Paşa* and *TCG Akdeniz* when Admiral Erkaya was the fleet commander.

education provider²¹¹, the US, such as designing in-country platforms, advancing indigenous software, and crafting native strategies towards national goals. The Navy cultivated the necessary manpower with the technological background to move forward by benefitting from abroad training. Admiral Cora applauded the exemplary endeavor of Japan towards industrialization and reformation by observing, analyzing, and adapting the Western Model to its national characteristics. He suggested that Turkey could and should take Japan as a role model.

Concerning the contribution of NATO, Admiral Cora designated it as significantly important by noting his intense and long-winded involvement in operational training activities. In a general sense, the assignments of naval personnel to NATO Headquarters along with the participation in NATO exercises/operations contributed prominently to the standardization and institutionalization of the Navy in all aspects. The Navy adapted the improvements in tactics, training, and evolving technologies to its organization. These were in areas such as dealing with potential threats to future national interests, identifying future roles and functions of the navy, and developing a force structure to meet the operational needs that arose along with the required platforms and weapon systems on board. The training system along with necessary tactical publications was advanced accordingly on robust foundations. As the number of NATO's training and exercises dwindled, he pointed to a preoccupying question, how to improve combat training and how to monitor progress in the naval ecosystem. The design of such institutions by Western powers serves the purpose of improving standardization for the interoperability of allied forces and deploying them in multinational operations instead of their units to save money on resources dedicated to their defense. However, the Navy took advantage of NATO activities to prepare its forces to achieve its national goals.

As for global and regional determinants that triggered the orientation of the Navy towards high seas, Admiral Cora listed his views as follows: the disputes with Greece, the overt and covert weapons and defense technology embargos imposed by the West, the enlargement of NATO, the alteration of NATO's area of responsibility and operations as well as mission spectrum, the

²¹¹ The implicit purpose of graduate education in the US institutions is to get the foreign officers donned with knowledge and skills to operate the US donated ships and weaponry rather than indigenously design and build combatants and weaponry.

gradual reduction of natural resources and the economic and technologically rational feasibility of the extraction and exploitation of the resources in and under the seabed. Moreover, he added: The rise of China, the shift of economic activity center to South Asia, the increase of natural disasters, the problems and resources that emerged due to global warming, terrorism, ascending public awareness to advancements due to digital communication epoch, the cuts in defense budgets and military expenditures, growing importance of seas in the future due to steady shifting use of oceanic resources.

Concerning the interaction with other stakeholders in the context of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy, Admiral Cora admitted that such interaction was out of his area of responsibility during his assignments in the Navy headquarters. However, he underlined the improved level of coordination between the Navy and the SSM. He complained of insufficient funding allocated for modernization projects during his tenure as Chief of Staff at the Navy headquarters.

About the continuity of force development towards the high seafaring navy, Admiral Cora stressed that in this context, core force planning activities were carried out in integrity and continuity with minor changes in the number of units and systems. The main driver of sustainability in modernization efforts has been and will be the systematic institutional structure of the force planning process.

Concerning procurement and research related to the 'Towards Blue Waters', Admiral Cora touched upon the relevance of some major projects as follows: The MEKO 200T project made a significant contribution to the introduction of new generation technologies to the Navy and changed its perspective. However, it prevented and delayed the materialization of the national ship program. The procurement of *Knox*-class frigates was made on time and useful in increasing deterrence in the region and showing the flag. They also rejuvenated the naval forces and contributed significantly to the improvement of individual ship training. As for the *Denizkurdu*-1998 Exercise, Admiral Cora described it as an exercise that broadened the horizons of the Navy. This exercise took the strategic perspective of the high seas further and gave naval personnel a new viewpoint on maritime activities. Besides, the exercise bore a message to the littorals and the western world.

In his last comment, Admiral Cora noted that finding solutions to earthly problems through linear methods is impractical due to the incredible numbers of input and related parameters whereas they could be unraveled by the nonlinear equation. With its natural competence in mobility and flexibility, the navy has been and will be the primary means of solving problems in the national interest. Turkey could not survive turning into its own. It needs to take care of the surrounding seas, so it is vital to set its course towards the open seas due to the pressure of the earth's physical structure.

About his peculiar experiences in various command tasks, Admiral Cora mentioned the tasking of his ship, *TCG Akdeniz* (with the Surface Action Group Commander on board) to stop the Turkish ferry *M/V Avrasya*, which was captured by terrorists who took hostage passengers. *TCG Akdeniz* set sail to the scene and took the SEAL/EOD teams on board. The mission was to prevent the ferry from entering the Istanbul Strait and capture it without any casualties. He also participated in Operation Sharp Guard. He mentioned getting an order to evacuate Turkish nationals from Lebanon when he was attending as a task group commander to the July 20th ceremony in Girne, Cyprus. The task group consisting of *Gabya*-class frigates, *Burak*-class corvettes, and SEAL/EOD teams as well as the logistic ship *TCG Iskenderun*, was replenished in Mersin and set course to Beirut to conduct the evacuation mission. Also, he commented on the conduct of the evacuation mission in Libya in 2011 when he was the Chief of Staff in the Navy headquarters.

3.6. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL ENGİN BAYKAL

Admiral Engin Baykal recollected the salutation of the fleet his tomb on the Victory Day Parade along with the maxim of Barbaros Hayrettin Paşa: “Whoever rules the seas, rules the world”. He also underlined the efforts of Sultan Abdülaziz to build a navy and the shackling of that fleet in the Golden Horn due to the suspicions of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Continuing with the resultant defeats and the loses of land due to lack of a capable navy, Admiral Baykal applauded the strategic vision of Atatürk recorded in the logbook of *Hamidiye* cruiser towards building a navy from the leashes of inherited ships to defend the homeland against a seaward attack. Atatürk reflected his vision to practice within the limits of the budget and preferred the procurement of submarines and destroyers. Atatürk’s preference for the procurement of

submarines from Italy and the Netherlands, which he named some vessels personally, was based on his experience in the Çanakkale campaign where the *Entente Armada* forced and tried to invade the region to get through to Istanbul. This also facilitated the transfer of submarine technology and tactics along with the know-how handover to the Turkish shipyards which was elaborated in the writings of Afif Büyüktuğrul. The presence of a German training mission particularly along with the submariners, including Karl Dönitz who had not a training opportunity due to arms limitations of the Versailles Treaty, contributed substantially to the operational readiness of the Navy. Although the efforts for the regeneration of the Navy in the Atatürk's era were underway, the limited funds along with the continentalist mindset in defense ministerial and general staff circles, planning to use the fleet only for the support of land operations, restricted the scope. Literally, the Navy was confined to the Marmara Sea.

The same understanding still hinders the efforts of the Navy to regenerate. During his tenure in the Financial Resources Branch of the General Staff, Admiral Baykal experienced the very same mindset and struggled to increase the funds allocated to the Navy which were around 16.1 percent of the Ministry of National Defense budget. He commented that these funds essentially were for operations, maintenance, and current expenses. When he took over the Plans Policy Division of Navy, the then-Chief of General Staff General Özkök was briefed about the inadequacy of resources required to carry out the planned activities. It was underlined with the necessity of making the payments of two newly built fast attack craft from the national budget instead of treasury funds. The procurement of these crafts was urgent for maintaining the balance of power in the Aegean Sea.

After reviewing the steps and inputs of the PPBS cycle, Admiral Baykal applauded the relevance of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy. The derived force structure based on a threat-oriented scenario was very assertive and expensive. The implementation of such a procurement plan required drawing on resources such as the treasury-guaranteed state/firm loan or from the Defense Industry Support Fund, which were cleverly devised by the Navy primarily by convincing the political leadership and defense procurement agency. The Navy closely monitored the availability of such funds for its projects and provided timely input to relevant stakeholders at all levels, such as inviting the Undersecretary of Treasury directly to the Navy headquarters for coordination. The realistic design of naval projects and the knowledge of technical personnel influenced and created respect in defense procurement circles along with

advanced collaboration. It is particularly worth noting the utilization of Eximbank²¹² credits for the procurement of Seahawk helicopters.

Admiral Baykal recollected with appreciation the contribution of Captain Mert Bayat in building his knowledge of strategy in the Naval War College. He also commended the knowledge of Admiral Afif Büyüktuğrul on naval affairs and his efforts to relay it to the naval community via his essays. Admiral Büyüktuğrul advised the Naval Commanders of the era and the President Korutürk towards maritimization of the state and the public by determining the organizational deficiencies and the measures to overcome them. He emphasized the prominence of increasing public awareness in nautical affairs as a very first inception point. Admiral Büyüktuğrul was also insisted on the assignment of the Naval Commanders for longer durations in the office to promote organizational continuity.

Admiral Baykal continued with the success of the Navy Chiefs, such as Admiral Sadık Altıncan, who prioritized the establishment of coastal logistics and training infrastructure for the support of the fleet and developed Gölçük as the main base. He also referred to Admiral Vural Bayazıt, who started the MİLGEM project and established good relations with political leaders to get their support in financing procurement programs. Admiral Baykal underlined the determinants for a high seafaring navy, such as showing off the flag and force as part of state policy, contributing to international activities, promoting the prestige of the country, improving the training level along with knowledge and experience. He stated that Admiral Erkaya's diplomatic qualities, besides the respect shown to his knowledge, were very effective in persuading the political leadership. Admiral Baykal pointed out the revival of MİLGEM and GENESİS projects in the tenure of Admiral Özden Örnek while the politicians were only observing the endeavors in silence. The politicians began to show interest after the successful implementation of the programs.

²¹² Export Import Bank (Exim Banks) are government or semi government agencies that ensure the safety and growth of a country's foreign trade. They provide customized financial instruments to safeguard the interests of exporters against default/nonpayment from the importers. Facilitating easier finances for foreign trade, trade rules and conditions are some of the functionality of an Eximbank. Turk Eximbank was established in 1987 as Turkey's official export credit agency and began to implement its programs at the beginning of 1988.

Admiral Baykal praised the current successful public relations policy of the Navy to inform the nation about the Navy's achievements and activities. This policy was instrumental in promoting awareness in nautical affairs such as the advertisement of *Mavi Vatan* and *Denizkurdu* exercises, the maritime jurisdiction dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, technological achievements such as Atmaca missile and Akya heavyweight torpedo firings, the introduction of ADVENT combat management system, and the LPD project, etc. The confidence induced on the public and the politicians by the Navy facilitated the allocation of necessary funds to sustain such a remarkable operational tempo along with an ambitious modernization program.

By referring to Admiral Büyüktuğrul's essays, Admiral Baykal spoke of the Navy's efforts to exit the Sea of Marmara, such as the deployment of the *Hamidiye* cruiser in 1924 to make port visits on the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean coasts, and a training cruise to the Black Sea with midshipmen on board. He drew attention to the outcome of the naval war games in 1948, which brought to the fore the need to develop an operational base especially in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, namely Aksaz. This type of base development was planned due to concerns over a lack of logistical support, as there was no road and industry in the area. Then the Navy discussed activating two regional commands which were objected to by Admiral Büyüktuğrul due to a potential bifurcation of command and training. The establishment of the Aksaz base was colossal in orienting the fleet towards the high seas. Admiral Baykal drew particular attention to the deployment of a permanent submarine squadron²¹³ to Aksaz with the initial instruction of Navy Chief Admiral Dervişoğlu, despite the submariners being hesitant and resistant due to the lack of logistics and maintenance infrastructure at the base. He applauded his timely and courageous order in accelerating the base development with the permanent deployment of the units. Admiral Baykal praised that the permanent basing of flotillas from diverse groups enhanced the interaction among them and promoted common understanding, joint planning, training, and assessments. Admiral Baykal spoke of the NATO maritime community's appreciative feedback on the quality of Aksaz base services provided to visiting units.

²¹³ Admiral Baykal was the commodore of the third submarine flotilla and later served as the Commander of Aksaz base.

Concerning education abroad, Admiral Baykal commended the substantial contribution of graduate officers to the Navy's improvement. He also mentioned a briefing to General Kıvrıkoğlu, the Chief of General Staff, in 1997 who admired the number of graduate officers and their thrust to the Navy's project management and technological improvement.²¹⁴ In his tenure at the General Staff Headquarters, a staff study initiated to use Foreign Military Sales (FMS)²¹⁵ cases to send army officers for abroad graduate education in the US which was substantially exploited by the Air Force. The Navy effectively managed FMS cases to meet the operational and maintenance costs. For instance, the hull-mounted sonar dome of *TCG Yavuz*, after grounding in the Aegean Sea, was replaced by using FMS cases. Admiral Baykal stressed that abroad training provided chances to interact with the international naval community and culture and expanded the visions of officers, which later spilled over the Navy and prompted transformation.

During his tenure in NAVSOUTH Headquarters as Operations Chief,²¹⁶ Admiral Baykal witnessed the 9/11 tragic events and prepared a plan of operations, namely the Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) to conduct counterterrorism operations in the Mediterranean by utilizing NATO's standing maritime groups. He commended the substantial involvement of the Navy in assigning ships to the standing groups as a prudent and right course of action. Participation in NATO's missions and operations was a motivation for naval personnel, as well as promoting interoperability and recognition of NATO procedures and expanding naval culture and perception. Aside from joining NATO groups, Turkey voluntarily assigned national assets to the OAE whenever needed, be it submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. The submarines proved efficient in surveillance and reconnaissance roles by providing intelligence and pictures. The inclusion of submarines into counterterrorism roles also provided a rationale for national force requirements. Operations-other-than-war (OOTW) type roles such as disaster relief,

²¹⁴ The Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu encouraged the other services, particularly army, to send officers abroad for graduate education and awarded the graduates with a year of promotion.

²¹⁵ The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended [22 U.S.C. 2751, et. seq.] and a fundamental tool of US foreign policy. Under Section 3, of the AECA, the US may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace.

²¹⁶ Admiral Baykal served in NAVSOUTH headquarters, Naples from August 2000 to August 2002. After promoting to the rank of Admiral (UH) he was assigned as Plans Policy Chief at the Navy headquarters.

humanitarian assistance, and evacuation of civilians justified the power projection capabilities of some nations, i.e., Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, etc. Admiral Baykal also underlined the prominence of afloat logistic ability to sustain a high seafaring force and praised the support delivered by Turkish replenishment ships²¹⁷ to standing naval forces and OAE units.

Regarding the *Denizkurdu-1998* Exercise, Admiral Baykal stated that he took part in the drill on a frigate with the Commander of Surface Action Group, Admiral Karahanoğlu, and paid a port visit to Tunisia. He designated it as a comprehensive drill whereas surface units spread all over the Eastern and Central Mediterranean with air support and the submarines deployed to patrol zones. Both the context and size of the exercise and also the subsequent port visits made a remarkable impact on both littorals and global players. He also referred to a major exercise in 2000 mostly concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Admiral Baykal stressed the austerity measures during his tenure as Plans Policy Chief due to the 2001 economic crisis that hampered the modernization program and operational activities. Funding priority was given to projects in progress without any major delay. It was also worth noting that the reconstruction and relocation of some ashore and standing units were yet placed an additional burden on scarce resources. The Fleet resisted being relocated to İzmir. The Navy headquarters discussed the MİLGEM project based on foreign designs, but no tangible advance was attained. The mechanisms such as Commanders' Council, Weapon and Equipment Group, and Admirals' Board held meetings to determine the systems onboard of new platform projects. The development of Dalaman as a naval air base was instrumental in orienting the navy towards the high seas. He remarked that the visionary force structure of the Navy was reflected on the Strategic Goals Plan (SHP) whereas the Ten Yearly Procurement Program (OYTEP) was comprised of a prioritized listing within the financial limits and the budget was the realization of the program. The light aircraft carrier, or the sea control ship, has consistently existed in the Strategic Goals Plan as power projection ability and a part of the high seafaring navy.

Regarding the overall modernization program, Admiral Baykal commented that currently, the Navy became a notable force in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. By particularly referring to the details for know-how and technology transfer in the contract of *Atılay*, which was built in

²¹⁷ *TCG Akar* and *TCG Şehit Yarbay Kudret Güngör* have replenishment-at-sea-capability.

Haliç Shipyard in 1939, he underlined that the level of domestic content was always well planned. Admiral Baykal stressed the significance of naval shipbuilding in civilian shipyards and its role in assisting the sector to get through the fiscal crisis. In this regard, the civilian shipbuilders pressurized the political leadership to sustain the naval construction program which eventually increased public awareness on this matter. The strategic plan of the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (*Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı*) was well designed to promote the naval shipbuilding capacity in private shipyards. However, it was an undeniable fact that the Navy was instrumental in motivating the domestic industrial stakeholders.

After recovering from the devastating effects of the Gölcük earthquake during the tenure of Admiral Alpkaya, Admiral Örnek who was well prepared for the command post since his inception to the ranks of the Navy directed all staff to review the plans related to ongoing and future projects with an innovative approach. They were discussed in detail at relevant boards. The MİLGEM project was revitalized with a special focus. Admiral Baykal recalled the comprehensive briefing given to attract the attention of all defense and academic circles regarding the MİLGEM project and to increase its local content.

Concerning previous endeavors, Admiral Baykal applauded the efforts to devise a domestic fire control system for *Oerlikon* air defense guns in destroyers and another one for torpedo firing at *Reis*-class submarines. He related these attempts to postgraduate education. He stated that his generation was incredibly fortunate to witness, encourage and pioneer the transformation of the Navy from old technologies to contemporary ones during the ‘Golden Age of the Navy’.

About the current period, Admiral Baykal commended the efforts of the Navy’s leaders in getting the support of the politicians towards naval operations and modernization, and in advancing public awareness in maritimization. He emphasized that the General Staff circles are also convinced to support this aim. He praised the current level of operational tempo and procurement program as highly successful and unstoppable.

As for the submarine modernization, Admiral Baykal remarked that the completion of the AIP-equipped submarine project was vital to maintain the balance of power at the subsurface of the Eastern Mediterranean. At least the delaying of the project gave the Turkish Navy chances to avoid the bad experiences of the Greek navy; the design of the submarine was corrected

accordingly. He underlined his firm expectation for the realization of the national submarine project (MILDEN). Ultimately, Admiral Baykal remarked on the matching development of merchant fleet along with the Navy, by referring to a letter written by Admiral Büyüktuğrul (2005) to the then-President Admiral Korutürk in which he cited a sentence from Mahan: “No state could develop a traditional navy or merchant fleet without a public sensitive to maritime issues”.

3.7. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL ERDAL BUCAK

Having an operations background, Admiral Bucak started by emphasizing the importance of C4ISR²¹⁸ for the successful execution of naval operations and commented on the change of components that make up it throughout his career. As an ensign on board, he noted that there was only a “communications” component and that it was only possible to communicate with ships within a range of five miles. When command and control (C2) was added to communication, the domain name became C3, which gradually evolved into C4ISR with the addition of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and computers. He uttered that the Navy ever focused on the Aegean Sea during his assignments. The Aegean geography made it easier for the Greeks to follow all Turkish naval ships that sailed out of the Çanakkale Strait with a surveillance system located in the Aegean Islands. The Navy was like “a blind boxer in the ring against someone who sees well”. The main rationale for establishing a surveillance system in the Aegean Sea was to overcome this vital shortcoming. Admiral Güven Erkaya initiated the Distant Horizon in 1993. However, it was not possible to convince the continentally minded General Staff circles when it was presented by Admiral Bucak.²¹⁹ However, when the project was realized later in the years to come, he was able to monitor air operations in İskenderun Bay,

²¹⁸ C4ISR stands for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. It is a phrase used mainly within the military and armed forces sector. When referring to C4ISR, military personnel know that the subject matter is to do with any one of the 'Cs' - Command, Communications, Control, Computers - hence the term C4, and ISR simply stands for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

²¹⁹ Admiral Erdal Bucak was served as the Head of Operational Planning Department at the Navy headquarters in the 1993-1994 period

which is a thousand miles away from his desktop computer at the Surveillance Coordination Center.²²⁰

Admiral Bucak recollected the urgent need for the recognized maritime picture while managing the Kardak Crisis at the Navy's Operation Center in 1996 without knowing the order of battle of the Greek Navy. But the adversary had a complete compiled picture of the operations area. Yet the Navy managed the operations effectively.

Regarding the orientation of the Navy towards the high seas, Admiral Bucak pointed out that the then- Plans Policy Chief Admiral Özbey prepared an operational requirement document for the light aircraft carrier, and it will now be carried out with the construction of *TCG Anadolu*. He set the rationale for such a ship as neutralizing the Greek Navy with a carrier strike group encircling the Greek Navy from the west and south in order to alleviate the lack of surveillance in the Aegean Sea.

After the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the roles of navies were shifted into operations other than war (OOTW), such as humanitarian assistance, evacuation of refugees, disaster relief, etc. In this context, the Navy evacuated its nationals from Albania, Lebanon, Libya, and Yemen while carrying out logistic transportation to the island of Cyprus. Admiral Bucak pointed to his experience as the task group commander, consisting of two frigates, a destroyer, and two ferries. The group was tasked to transport the Turkish Peacekeeping units from Turkey to Croatia in 1994 during the last phase of the *Denizkurdu-1994* Exercise. After safely sailing the convoy through the Aegean Sea, one of the frigates in the task group got a sonar contact from a submarine. The task group conducted anti-submarine warfare tactics to steer it away. During this action, the location of adversary submarines was tried to be confirmed from the NATO units in the area and through NATO Headquarters, which commanded the Operation Sharp Guard.

²²⁰ The Surveillance Coordination Center co-located in the premises of Southern Area Command is the fusion center that all data gathered from the components of the Distant Horizon system comprised of naval and air vessels and shore-based radars and compiled to recognized maritime picture (RMP). Then, the RMP got relayed to the relevant headquarters and naval units at sea.

Admiral Bucak was the first commander of the task group comprising of frigates, submarines, fast attack boats, a salvage ship, and SEAL/UDT teams, which deployed in Aksaz. He described this positioning as part of the encirclement of the Greek Navy from the South and West to alleviate the relative situational blindness of the Navy and force them to divide their naval assets. As a counter action, the Greek Navy deployed some naval units to Rhodes to monitor Turkish naval activities and violated the demilitarized status of the island established by the 1947 Treaty of Paris.

Concerning the deployment of the Fleet in the Aegean Sea during the November 1994 crisis, Admiral Bucak confirmed that his flotilla had been diverted to Uzunada. With the arrival of Fleet Commander Admiral Erkaya and other ships, the Fleet spread all over the Aegean Sea and showed its strength as a deterrent.

Regarding the leadership traits of Admiral Erkaya, Admiral Bucak described him as a commander who believed in the prominence of C4ISR for success in combat. Moreover, he qualified him as an expert at NATO matters as well as a master of command at sea.

As for the procurement of *Knox*-class frigates, Admiral Bucak told that Admiral Bayazit was insistent on the transfer and got the support of the General Staff. The shooting of *TCG Muavenet* by *USS Saratoga* accelerated the transfer process in which Admiral Bucak was assigned to the ship inspection team. He designated *Knox*-class frigates as high sea anti-submarine warfare assets with a tall board and high seaworthiness but weak air defense competence. Their timely procurement has bridged the power gap between the Aegean rivals. The engineering staff gained self-confidence by safely operating 1200 psi steam boilers. The ships' crew got accustomed to sailing in severe weather and sea states due to the seaworthiness of frigates while the Greek peers preferred to stay in shelters. The introduction of the training team concept for ship command, combat management, damage control, and engineering drills has improved the quality of onboard training. Due to the higher sonar performance of the *Knox*-class frigates in winter conditions, the Fleet's anti-submarine combat efficiency has increased, especially in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

About his experience in the Navy headquarters as a flag officer, Admiral Bucak noted that he was assigned as the head of the department particularly established to manage relocation and

reorganization activities after the devastating Gölçük earthquake. One of the thorny issues was the relocation of the Fleet Headquarters to İzmir based on the mission and threat perception analysis. The outcome of this analysis was that the Fleet was to be at a central location instead of being behind the Çanakkale Strait that could be barred by the adversary. This course of action was advocated by the Chief of General Staff General Kırıkkoğlu and the Navy Chief Admiral Erdil but challenged by the Fleet Commander Admiral Alpkaya, the Northern Area Commander Admiral Örnek, and retired Admiral Nejat Tümer. The Fleet Headquarters remained in Gölçük and the Southern Area Command moved to the newly constructed building. At present, Admiral Bucak still defends this displacement proposal, as the threat perception from the former Russian Navy has decreased in the Black Sea and the real potential threat is in the Aegean Sea. Such relocation could have minimized the risk of a sudden attack by the adversary and gave the fleet the ability to respond from a central location. For example, at the beginning of the 1987 crisis, Admiral Bucak stated that the Fleet was in the Black Sea for the *Denizkurdu-1987* Exercise. For this reason, if the crisis turned into an armed conflict, it would have been difficult to sail from the Çanakkale Strait.

About his posting as the Armed Forces and Naval *Attaché* in Moscow, Admiral Bucak commented that Russian technology was based on their knowledge of mechanics, astronomy, and mathematics. Their disharmony with the digital age resulted in their collapse as assessed by many western experts. Most of their naval and air platforms were constructed through reverse engineering of the older western models. He conveyed his impressions for his tour in the flagship of the Russian Northern Fleet, the battlecruiser *Peter the Great* in 1998: The ship did not have any combat information center only a dead reckoning table (DRT) and a big sonar console in a compartment. All weapons on board had stand-alone fire control systems. Onboard fire control radars were outdated which could not differentiate between distance and bearing resulting in poor hits. His ultimate deduction was that most Russian warring machines were mostly polished during the Cold War as state of the art but, they were obsolete. The same approach may apply to the efficiency of Air Defense Systems such as the S-300 and S-400, which have powerful radars that can detect targets from long distances. Since it could not recognize and identify the targets the unit might have used 'Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)' tracking equipment. Their lagging behind in high-frequency radar technologies weakened their

ability to compile a real-time operational picture. However, the microwave radars used in the Turkish Navy's Distant Horizon system overcame this deficiency.

With regard to the supply of MEKO class frigates, Admiral Bucak identified this as a quantum leap from analog to digital, which, in addition to recognition and identification, gave a well-known tactical picture. MEKOs also provided air defense capacity with Sea Sparrow missiles and close-in defense competence with Sea Zenith gun systems. But their LINK 10 systems were not effective. Admiral Bucak described the current LINK systems in the navy as a confusing plethora with the introduction of LINK11, LINK 16, and LINK 22. The lack of standardization among units in a group led to operational deficiencies in the recognition and identification of adversary units during target allocation and firing of guided missiles.

Concerning abroad training and NATO assignment, Admiral Bucak commented that abroad education increased his awareness about the Navy's backwardness in technological and tactical affairs. For instance, the Turkish Navy was dealing with short-range air defense, while the western navies were discussing the defense against long-range missiles. During his tenure in NATO Defense College, he was assigned as the Secretary of the International Committee. He defined that period as a dark age for the Turkish Navy, which was embedded in local affairs, while the westerners were conversing on the Strategic Defense Initiative (officially known as Star Wars).

Pertaining to staff training, Admiral Bucak commended its input to his strategic and geopolitical knowledge, but not to his tactical skills. He applauded Captain Mert Bayat's contribution to his geopolitical and geostrategic thinking.

Regarding logistic capacity in the Eastern Mediterranean, Admiral Bucak underlined that the infrastructure was limited to sustaining units deployed in the region, such as inadequate drydocking and minor repair capacity.

On the importance of the island of Cyprus, Admiral Bucak underlined the strategic importance of Cyprus, which must be completely seized in order to control energy resources and limit the British and American presence in the region.

Admiral Bucak affirmed Admiral Erkaya's mentality of directing the Navy to the high seas in an operational capacity.

About the management of the Kardak Crisis, Admiral Bucak also mentioned the well-known remark of the then Prime Minister Çiller: “That [Greek] flag will be down, that [Greek] soldier will leave the island”. He stressed that it was Admiral Erkaya who advised Prime Minister, not Ambassador Onur Öymen. Upon a question by Minister of Foreign Affairs Deniz Baykal why the Turks would not be landing on the islet occupied by the Greek units, Admiral Erkaya responded to Prime Minister Çiller by asking whether Turkey was prepared for war with Greece. In that case, Admiral Erkaya added that the Navy was ready to land on the occupied islet. A new question answered differently by the officials around the table was about the sovereignty of the Kardak islets. The official reply of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a query about the possession of the subject islands was that they were belonged to Turkey according to the national cadastral registry. The government made a new reassessment and directed the SEAL units to land on the unoccupied one. Later, Prime Minister Çiller briefed the reporters about the crisis and made that famous statement. Admiral Bucak went back to the General Staff Operations Center to coordinate the conduct of the operations, but neither the General Staff nor the Air Force and the Land Force was ready to respond to the crisis. The occupation of other Kardak Islet by the SEAL unit was directed from the Navy’s Operations Center by direct cell phone communication between Admiral Erkaya and the commander on the scene, Admiral Aydın Gürül. Upon completion of the operations, the final report was given personally by Admiral Erkaya to President Demirel and Prime Minister Çiller. Later, the General Staff was informed the next morning.

Another issue during the management of the Kardak Crisis was the Navy’s request for the release of certain rules of engagement that would come into effect in the event of an armed conflict. Although the message was sent via the command hierarchy, no response was received. Admiral Bucak recalled that he had rushed to the prime ministerial office and contacted the official responsible for the matter. Surprisingly, the official said that they had received the message, but that the document in question was not in their inventory, so they archived it. The truth of the issue was that the General Staff had never sent the rules of engagement (ROE) document to the prime ministerial for approval, even though all powers regarding the armed conflict were given to the government through the parliament.

While he was serving as the Head of Operations Training Department, Admiral Bucak remarked that the Fleet Commander Admiral Dervişoğlu, acting as the Navy Chief because Admiral Erkaya was abroad, gave the order to the fleet to return to its bases right after the Kardak Crises. But, upon his homecoming, Admiral Erkaya annulled the order and directed the Fleet back to the Aegean Sea for deterrence. At that time, Admiral Bucak recalled that he had received a phone call from an Admiral in Pentagon asking why the Turkish Fleet was deployed in the Çanakkale Strait. Admiral Bucak replied to the US Admiral that the question should be asked to the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As for his memoirs about the *Avrasya* ferry crisis, Admiral Bucak remarked that the Police Headquarters established a crisis management board. The ferry, *M/V Avrasya* highjacked by a terrorist organization with some hostages held on board, was heading to the İstanbul Strait. Admiral Bucak was assigned to coordinate the crisis with the police if the intervention of the Navy was requested. After ordering the deployment of a task force consisting of a frigate and destroyer with the onboard SEAL/EOD units, Admiral Bucak informed the crisis board that the Navy should be officially authorized by the government to carry out an operation. Upon the reception of an intelligence report about a possible Russian intervention, Admiral Bucak proposed the board led by Prime Minister three courses of action: conducting a combined operation with Russians, letting a Russian operation, or conducting a national operation.

3.8. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL İZZET ARTUNÇ

Admiral Izzet Artunç began the obvious development of the Navy, in particular by highlighting the number and quality of these platforms. He stated that a navy, which was operationally confined to the Marmara Sea and the Black Sea due to lack of capabilities and resources, shifted its focus to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean by performing exercises and showing the flag after the 1970s and 1980s. After the 2000s, the Navy participated in multinational operations under the auspices of the UN and NATO. Advances in communications and information technologies, the diversity of technical resources to build better platforms, and continued logistical support over long distances have enabled the Navy to operate in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. The Navy showed the flag even around the Arctic Circle and Antarctica either in multinational ventures or in a national capacity. Emphasizing that the

progress in the Navy cannot be attributed to any personality, Admiral Artunç added that its roots are in institutionalized processes or mainly in traditional naval culture.

Admiral Artunç linked the history of the institutionalization of the Navy to the construction of the relevant infrastructure and the reformation of the education and training system in the 1950s, especially during the period of Navy Chief Admiral Sadık Altınca. Admiral Altınca changed the classical master-apprentice training with formal education. The establishment of the Yassıada training facilities and the change of the naval academy program to a four-year curriculum taught as a two-year student and a two-year officer can be counted as the first changes to this goal after NATO entry.

As a second factor influencing this change, Admiral Artunç pointed to the personnel's perception and internalization of the reform. This initiated a diversity in the creation of outward-looking ideas and a better understanding of advances in the world with the commencement of postgraduate education in the USA. In the 1980s, investment in manpower training began to bear fruit on the Navy's path to modernization. He emphasized that in the general development period of the Navy, a period of forty years should be considered reasonable to prepare for change. In summary, the change observed in the last two decades was precisely the result of this process of permanent transformation and institutionalization, not just the characteristics of reformist naval leadership.

The embargo imposed after the 1974 Cyprus Operation substantially hampered the development of all services of the Turkish military. Since the Navy had been the most prepared one with its cultivated and well-educated personnel to adapt itself to the changing security dynamics, the knowledge of naval personnel due to institutionalized training easily paved the way for the transformation from being a smart user to being a smart buyer. So, the Navy started defining its requirements. According to observations during his career, Admiral Artunç defined the Navy as a smart buyer that accomplished its mental transformation and guided the defense industry. Building confidence in research and development due to their investment in manpower, navy personnel began developing some ship systems as success stories.

Admiral Artunç praised the role of Admiral Erkaya in this transformation, especially for his contribution to the administrative institutionalization of the Navy. However, he highlighted

Admiral Örnek's efforts to direct technological institutionalization and trigger the leap towards the target. Admiral Artunç touched upon the renewal effort during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, when the platforms with the latest technology were purchased but were not operated effectively by skilled personnel. The lesson learned was that the leadership guidance towards transformation could only be effective with cultivated manpower.

Admiral Artunç commented that the recent purge of trained personnel from the Navy eventually led to a loss of morale, but not lack of motivation. Although the current leaders and staff are brave and wholehearted to reach a par with the world's advanced navies, keeping the Navy's transformation in the course would take several years due to the loss of the *acquis*. The Navy will move forward with certainty, free of malignant elements, as currently observed from its operational pace and technological leap.

Regarding the influence of the politicians, Admiral Artunç underlined their interest, especially in the financial and foreign affairs section. However, he stated that he did not think that political leadership was effective in directing the defense industry to this level of success. Until recent years, they were only following the processes, approving them, attending ceremonial events, whereas the decisions were mostly made by the bureaucracy. Overall, the government tried its best to finance the modernization projects of the Turkish military within the financial limits of the period. In recent years, politicians have tended to increase their participation in the process in order to consolidate their political gains and the interests of their supporters. However, their involvement did not change the course of the Navy's modernization as they realized the properness of naval projects. The government policy for the increasing participation of the private sector in defense procurement was a responsible endeavor due to the lack of manpower in naval shipyards. Government policy towards increased private participation in defense procurement was a responsible initiative due to the lack of manpower in naval shipyards. However, a role model where the military as a user defines needs and all production and purchasing are done by the private sector will not be a sustainable course of action. Such practice has failed in many western countries in the digital age. The withdrawal of the military from maintenance, repair, and shipbuilding activities caused the knowledge and experience of the smart user/buyer, who could define its operational needs, to deteriorate resulting in a buyer that contented itself with what the industry marketed. Military core personnel and facilities have

been a means of interacting with and guiding the industry in developing and manufacturing systems for the military's operational needs.

Regarding the Distant Horizon project, Admiral Artunç drew attention to the personal involvement and efforts of Admiral Erkaya at the beginning of the system design to compile the recognized maritime picture in the Aegean Sea to overcome the geographical advantage granted to Greece. The main fragility of the system was its design based on the use of foreign technologies, as the R&D activities of that period were in the training phase both in the Navy and in the domestic defense industry. However, such a capability significantly increased the mental transformation of naval personnel and organization. The Distant Horizon system facilitated the compilation and sharing of the real-time tactical picture with the command echelon and the headquarters and the transmission of relevant orders to the units. On the other hand, it also increased the headquarters' involvement and interference in the ongoing operations. At this moment, it can be argued that with the rapid technological leap, the capability could have been achieved with fewer resources and better technology. Although the system initially included the use of UAVs, they are now being used more effectively and intensively.

About the GENESIS system, Admiral Artunç mentioned that the mental change stimulated by trained personnel abroad is also reflected in the improvement of the system. Given the prominent necessity of owning national software, an initiative was launched with a simpler K5 system that evolved into a sophisticated combat management system that facilitates more effective hardware-independent solutions through software. The foreign software that was partially used in some layers was gradually replaced by local software in later versions. Although this model was criticized initially for not being an indigenous product, its timely implementation encouraged developers for more local content and gave naval platforms a more contemporary flair. Admiral Artunç applauded the visionary leaders' role in the success of the system. He also underlined the motivation and incentives of the civil defense industry partners in the project to improve combat management systems in the later stages. This achievement should be seen as a milestone in promoting domestic software development.

Admiral Artunç underlined that the priority in the implementation of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy should be to provide deterrence, to show the flag in the surrounding seas, and to

participate in multinational operations in other areas of interest. A goal of projecting force in oceans with a task group comprised of amphibious assault ships, frigates, and fleet oilers would be illusionary compared to the economic development of Turkey in the near future. Such capability also would require continuous logistic support and a chain of bases or bilateral agreements for use of bases/ports in regional countries. It could have been used to safeguard sea lanes of communication (as other sea power states practiced) and to improve bilateral political, military, and economic relations with regional countries as the international trade of Turkey would have elevated to higher levels.

Concerning the MİLGEM Project, Admiral Artunç described the MİLGEM initiative as the ultimate product of a process that started nearly thirty years ago. He also stressed that the overall process also includes the institutionalization of the naval education system. To this aim, he further added the cultivation of manpower and their mental transformation along with self-confidence, know-how, and experience gained in shipbuilding throughout the years with joint venture models. However, the MİLGEM project was transformed into an indigenous and independent model by Admiral Örnek. It was quite different from its onset model. The Navy's sought to convince the defense industry and bureaucracy by assuming the responsibility of overall performance in the endeavor.

About the AIP and MİLDEN submarine projects, Admiral Artunç remarked on the more sophisticated edge of technologies that are required for the national design and building of submarines. He pointed to the need for investment and knowledge in basic technology areas such as the chemical and metallurgy industries, as well as research in basic sciences such as physics, chemistry, and materials sciences that support the defense industry. Otherwise, it would only be possible to build an in-country design submarine with imported materials such as steel for hull, optics for periscopes, and fuel cells for submarine propulsion. Such an investment cannot be cost-effective, as the submarine market will be limited. Advances in fuel cell technologies were very rapid, as was the case with automobile propulsion systems. The Navy should closely follow these technologies to avoid lagging regional adversaries. The current phased model employed in the MİLGEM project could also be used in the MİLDEN program without delaying the technological leap of the submarine fleet. So, the acquis of the MİLGEM project in the Navy and the defense sector could be benefitted.

Finally, Admiral Artunç made a final comment on the importance of institutionalization of naval education as the ultimate stimulating factor in the mental transformation of the naval organization, which resulted in the technological leap and operational efficiency of the navy.

3.9. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL BÜLENT BOSTANOĞLU

Regarding the development of the Navy, Admiral Bostanoğlu stated that it was possible to examine it in three phases. The first phase covers the period from the foundation of the Republic to membership in the Alliance. At this phase, the Navy was limited to operating in the Marmara and Black Sea due to the lack of capability. The second phase started after the Second World War with the transfer of newer platforms in the context of the development of Turkish-US relations. But the focus area of the Navy overlapped with the area of responsibility of its NATO hat (COMEDNOREAST), i.e., the Turkish Straits and the Black Sea. Admiral Bostanoğlu, referring to the words of Navy Chief Admiral Fahri Korutürk, dated 1959, which pointed to the future vision of the Navy: “Currently, our force is a fleet of the Marmara Sea. We could transform it into a fleet of the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. For instance, now we could deploy our destroyers to Iskenderun for exercises. The submarines could operate in the Ereğli at the Black Sea.” (Büyüktuğrul, 2005, p. 922). The sending of destroyers and submarines to the United States for overhaul can also be considered as a factor in improving navigational and endurance skills for naval personnel to gain confidence on the high seas. It should be noted that while the Portuguese searched for new routes to India in the sixteenth century, they accidentally discovered Brazil; the corvettes of the Ottoman Navy, namely *İzmir* and *Bursa*, reached Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, three centuries later, in 1865 by chance.

Admiral Bostanoğlu underlined that the deployment of the fleet to Mersin in response to the 1963 Cyprus Crisis constituted a milestone in the transformation from the Marmara Sea Fleet, which was repeated with the deployments in 1967 and 1974 for the same purpose. As a result of the lessons learned from these crises, the Navy League was re-established to improve the Navy, with the creation of landing fleet and marine corps as the core of an amphibious capacity. These efforts were followed by the construction of US design ships in Turkish Shipyards, namely *TCG Koçhisar*, *TCG Berk*, and *TCG Peyk*. The assignment of the Turkish destroyer to NAVOCFORMED, founded in 1969, introduced the concept of deploying units without home

base support for more than a month. The Navy also got acquainted with NATO procedures and interoperability with other allies. According to the historical background, the Cyprus Operation and subsequent crises stemmed from sovereignty disputes in the Aegean Sea shifted the operational focus of the Navy. Resultantly, plans to establish naval bases at Foça and Aksaz were initiated. In summary, it can be said that the Navy gradually completed its expansion towards the Eastern Mediterranean with a special focus on the Aegean Sea until the end of the Cold War. At this point, Admiral Bostanoğlu referred to a message sent by the Naval Forces to the General Staff requesting air support in the Eastern Mediterranean, and later the clause referring to the request for air support was canceled by the General Staff in 1983. The rationale of the General Staff for cancellation was the prominence and priority of the Aegean Sea for Turkey.

After the end of the Cold War, Admiral Bostanoğlu pointed to the events that changed the roles and abilities of the navy. A milestone was the acquisition of refueling capability at sea with the commissioning of *TCG Akar*. The transformation of NAVOCFORMED to STANAVFORMED to ensure the continued presence of NATO units in the maritime field resulted in deployments of up to six months due to the outbreak of the Bosnian crisis and the commencement of Sharp Guard Operations. The first operations-other-than-war (OOTW) of the Navy were also conducted in support of law enforcement during this period: the attempt to capture of *M/V Kısmetim-I*²²¹, the seizing of *M/V Lucky S*, and the hostage crisis on board of *M/V Avrasya*. Next was the initial deployment of an overseas task force to transfer Turkish peacekeeping units to Somalia.

As for the theoretical background of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, Admiral Bostanoğlu drew attention to the importance of Aegean issues for the Navy during this period. He pointed to the knowledge and leadership of Admiral Erkaya on Aegean issues. As mentioned in the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, Admiral Erkaya directed staff studies on the sufficiency of petroleum stocks in case of war at the Aegean Sea. The result was a vital need for convoy operations to supply oil to refineries in the Aegean Sea and the Marmara Sea should the conflict last longer. Currently, China has the same need to sustain oil imports in case its sea routes are

²²¹ Admiral Bostanoğlu was the commanding officer of *TCG Savaştepe* which tasked in the task group to seize *Kısmetim-I* loaded with drugs.

blocked by the US Navy. Therefore, China has developed highways and pipelines, along with the relevant infrastructure, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar to China. India also declared the Strait of Malacca as the trachea of imports to its homeland and invested in developing Iran's Chabar port facilities to control Pakistan.

Admiral Bostanoğlu also talked about Turkey's growing foreign trade after the economic model change after the 1980s. Increasing Turkish investments and supporting the workforce in foreign countries, especially in the construction sectors, can be considered as the driving force of building a high seafaring navy. In this context, he exemplified four operations conducted for the evacuation of Turkish nationals from crisis areas: from Albania by *TCG Adatepe* in 1996, from Lebanon by *TCG İskenderun* in 2006, from Libya by *TCG İskenderun* and the civilian ferries. He also added the evacuation of civilians from Yemen by *TCG Büyükkada* in 2015, as a first operation out of the Mediterranean.

These evacuation operations indicated the expansion of Turkish business and trade in all parts of the world and Turkey's ability to protect its citizens wherever and whenever if needed. Most of these operations were carried out with the support of friendly and local forces, such as the evacuation from Lebanon. In that respect, Admiral Bostanoğlu underlined the operational necessity of having multi-purpose landing platforms with vertical take-off and landing aircraft for use in evacuation operations under enemy threat. He also applauded the inscription of such a strategy during the tenure of Admiral Erkaya who had the principle of "Let's write what we do; Let's do what we write" that is, going by the book. He transformed practices into standard operating procedures to achieve doctrinal unity. As a common practice, a navy should publish a transparent unclassified strategy document for a demonstration of intent and a classified one for its implementation.

Regarding the instructors who influenced his strategic knowledge, Admiral Bostanoğlu commended the teachings of Captain Mert Bayat on Mahan's doctrine and his lessons on the elements of national power along with Atatürk's perception of maritime affairs.²²² He also

²²² Admiral Bostanoğlu stated that Captain Bayat, who was his instructor at the college from 1980 to 1982, visited him during his tenure as the Commander of the Naval War College and gave a lecture to the student officers in 2004-2005.

underlined Bayat's clarifications on the undefined boundaries between maritime power, sea power, and naval power which were confused due to permeable meanings among their definitions.

As for the Ottoman maritime tradition, Admiral Bostanoğlu cited a map showing the naval battles and expeditions of the Ottoman Navy in the November 1987 issue of *National Geographic*. Accordingly, he denoted the expansion of the Ottoman Empire at sea by way of controlling the choke points that were later controlled by the British. The stimuli to control the high seas were to safeguard the spice trade and to protect pilgrimage routes. The Ottoman Navy was mostly operating during the summer season due to its dependence on rowing labor on warships which was provided by the Greek minority on the sail age. The missing part of Ottoman sea power was to get its share of profit from the other merchant states instead of developing a merchant fleet of its own; they did not go with the maxim "flag follows the trade" as practiced by other imperialist sea powers.

Reformation efforts to cope with the renaissance, the enlightenment, and the industrial revolutions of the Western Powers did not suffice to put the Ottoman Empire in the league of developed nations of the era. The magnificent navy of the Sultan Abdülaziz era entrusted the operation and maintenance of the engineering systems to the foreign crew. Admiral Bostanoğlu cited Palmira Brummet's seminal book, which said that after the 18th century (1994) the Ottoman Navy assumed the role of supporting land operations rather than sea control functions. Lack of an effective navy was accepted as the main factor in the losses of overseas territories and the Aegean islands during the Italian and Balkan Wars. The Navy has been directly tasked against the Entente Fleet forcing the Çanakkale Strait during the first World War. Admiral Bostanoğlu also referred to a telegram in which Atatürk, then the Military *Attaché* at Sophia, donated all his salary to the operation to build a navy and demanded additional funding. He also mentioned that the two dreadnoughts ordered from Britain were equipped with weapons of lower quality than their sisters in the Royal Navy and were therefore taken out of service in 1923.

When it comes to technology transfer, Admiral Bostanoğlu stated that the US navy has a list of devices and systems that should be deprived of its classified capabilities, such as some filters

of the AN / SLQ-25 *Nixie* fanfare and the target library of electronic warfare equipment as well as the propeller hub of *Knox*-class frigates.

Admiral Bostanoğlu underlined that the Maritime Chamber of Commerce and the Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs were established during the military government period in 1982 as a prudent and proactive move towards the maritimization of Turkey.

Concerning the impact of foreign advisory missions, Admiral Bostanoğlu mentioned that the advisors for technology were dated back to the era of Fatih Sultan Mehmet which recruited Hungarian craftsmen to build the guns used in the siege of Istanbul. Although French consultants played a role in initiating formal training in the Navy, it was the British advisory missions that were more effective in organizing the Ottoman Navy, with procedural and institutional inputs. Later US missions had an impact on technological issues. The consultants shaped the Ottoman Navy towards specialization in coastal defense in line with their national interests. It could also be seen the establishment of a naval ministry well before a ministry of war affairs as a mockup of the British Admiralty as well as a college for staff training of naval officers. He commented that the German missions imbued the continentalist mindset into the ranks of the Ottoman military. After the tasking of German Missions in the Ottoman Navy, they took the operational command of the Ottoman Navy, prioritized the countermining and coastal artillery for the defense of Çanakkale Strait. They deployed the naval units to prevent a Russian landing operation to İstanbul while the Entente Powers were attacking the Çanakkale Strait. In fact, the Germans 'concealed agenda was to avoid the destruction of their ships, *SMS Goeben* and *SMS Breslau* by the British naval might.

Regarding staff college training abroad, Admiral Bostanoğlu referred to his experience in the US Naval Staff College where they instilled Mahan's teachings to the audience based on being a maritime nation. The first sentence of the keynote speaker to the participants was about Mahan's doctrine. As a high seafaring nation, the US always advocated the freedom of navigation at seas to reach its citizens wherever needed, all over the world, including the Black Sea. The US thesis at the time of the Montreux Convention negotiations was in favor of the free passage of all civilian and military ships in all conditions, which is consistent with the Russian thesis. The Soviet pressure to change the convention was initially supported by the United States, which was later persuaded by British Prime Minister Churchill's visionary maneuver.

As for NATO exercises, Admiral Bostanođlu stressed that the Navy's participation in NATO exercises was initially limited to the Aegean and Ionian Seas. But later the Navy took part in invitational exercises in the West Mediterranean. Moreover, Admiral Bostanođlu emphasized the prominence of NAVOCFORMED in developing the communication capabilities of the platforms, such as the installation of INMARSAT and SATNAV on board. Admiral Bostanođlu pointed out that the Navy took part in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean to advance its high seafaring capability and endurance. The NATO standards (STANAGs) surely and gradually improved the operating culture of the Navy. Overall, technological advancement, along with the transformation of the tactical mindset, started the strategic orientation towards the high seas.

Admiral Bostanođlu reiterated the importance of security concerns arising from the Aegean and Cyprus problems regarding the global and regional drivers of high maritime strategy. With the development of Aksaz and Foça bases, which support the deployment of the Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of the Southern Task Group Command with rotationally assigned units further advanced the naval presence in the high seas. This presence was later strengthened by the permanent deployment of the assigned units at Aksaz base in the 1990s, and further enhanced with the taskings in the Indian Ocean. As a result of these advances in technological and logistical capacity or tactical capability, it could be said that the Navy's orientation followed the same expansion patterns in the victorious 16th century of Ottomans as *National Geographic*'s November 1987 map.

Admiral Bostanođlu talked about the technological breakthrough of the Navy, and the introduction of modern technology and tactics by supplying Ay (TYPE 209)-class submarines, *Dođan* (TYPE 148)-class fast attack ship and MEKO-class frigates. The mine warfare fleet made the same leap forward with the acquisition of mine hunters and its involvement in NATO's permanent mine countermeasure groups since 1999. Admiral Bostanođlu applauded the supply of *Knox*- and *Perry*-class frigates, *Burak* (*Aviso*)-class corvettes, and *Eridan*-class minehunters as a stopgap to maintain the regional balance of power. He also said that the Navy achieved the procedural and training revolution through the *Knox*-class frigates, while the MEKO-class frigates achieved the technological leap forward. Navy's competence in managing the transition from the Second World War vintage technologies (of *Gearing*-class destroyers, *Tang/Guppy*-class submarines) to the contemporary edge (MEKO-class, *Dođan/Yıldız/Kılıç*-

class fast attack boats, *Ay/Preveze/Gür*-class submarines) was questioned with resentment and surprise by the Western peers.

Regarding his observations as the Armed Forces and Naval *Attaché* in Athens, Admiral Bostanoğlu said that the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy did not attract the attention of Greek peers and that its sister version in 2015 found a considerable audience in the Greek media.

Concerning the *Denizkurdu*-1998 Exercise, Admiral Bostanoğlu stated that the task groups deployed in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean were supported with air sorties that refueled in flight by tankers. Simultaneously, the Army was conducting transboundary operations in Northern Iraq. Overall, the Turkish Armed Forces were operationally implementing the two-and-a-half war strategy outlined in Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ’s seminal article. After two F-16 warplanes were sent to the Baf (Paphos) on the Greek island of Cyprus, Turkish ships were directed to the region, while the Air Force retaliated by sending an F-16 fleet to the Geçitkale air base.

Regarding his experience as the Chief of the Plans Organization Branch in the Fleet headquarters, Admiral Bostanoğlu mentioned the execution of the *Denizkurdu*-1994 Exercise simultaneously with the entry into force of UNCLOS III on November 16th, 1994. The fleet was deployed to the Aegean Sea for exerting deterrence. Admiral Bostanoğlu also embarked on the flagship with other personnel of the Fleet Headquarters to coordinate the exercise scenario shift for real war taskings in case the crisis would have been to the extent of armed conflict. The Greek Navy was simultaneously conducting the *Niriis* 1994 Exercise in the Aegean Sea. He recalled the deployment of the cruiser *USS Philipian Sea* to avoid a possible conflict between the Aegean rivals.

Admiral Bostanoğlu said that he was assigned as the task group commander in the exercise, which was planned simultaneously with the escalation of the crisis after the Land Forces Chief General Atilla Ateş forced Syria to deport the terrorist Abdullah Öcalan. The show of deterrence affected the expulsion of the terrorist without any conduct of the exercise. He also recollected the launch of the *Deniz Yıldızı* exercise series to encourage collaboration between the riparian of the Black Sea and the continuation of the *Denizkurdu* series in the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean with greater attendance as in 1998 and longer. After the devastating Gölçük

earthquake that occurred in 1999, the mine warfare group was permanently deployed at the Erdek base, while the main body of the Surface Action Group (*Harp Filosu Komutanlığı*) was deployed to the Aksaz base with the *TCG Akar* supply ship. This could be considered as a strategic move that changed the balance of power in the Aegean Sea and an attempt to split the Greek Fleet. While the damage to infrastructure and personnel was significant, the Navy insisted on continuing its post-earthquake operations program, including the amphibious exercise with the British Navy, as a demonstration of determination. Admiral Bostanoğlu stressed the significance of show of unity, solidarity, and force to the world during harsh times when the Navy faced difficulties in manpower, resources, and technology, such as in the aftermath of the earthquake, during the court cases brought against the Navy personnel based on fabricated evidence, and in the aftershocks of the July 15th, 2016 coup attempt.

Regarding his assignment at the Greece-Cyprus Department of the General Staff, Admiral Bostanoğlu revealed that he had a chance to raise issues related to maritime jurisdiction areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. They were in the content of proceedings of two symposia: one was talking about the use of the equidistant methodology in determining the continental shelf of the island Meis (Kastellorizo) (Foreign Policy Institute, 1995) and the other was stating that Egyptians was avoiding talks on EEZ delimitation with Greeks, for not displeasing Turks. Upon these inputs, Admiral Bostanoğlu inaugurated a staff study to determine the Turkish position on the subject. The result was to request a Turkish continental shelf in December 2000 limiting the impact of Meis, which corresponds to an area three times larger than the Turkish continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. Then he asked his staff to monitor any survey/drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean by way of NAVTEX messages and a US official website. In that time, the survey activity of the *Northern Access* research ship was detected and began to be tracked. After starting research activities, the ship was informed about the boundaries of the Turkish continental shelf. Thereafter, it was warned by the Turkish warships for violating the boundaries and asked to leave the area. In addition, Admiral Bostanoğlu stated that in the 2000s, President Rauf Denктаş was informed by a private oil company about the existence of rich oil and natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean. This could be one of the motivations to speed up the voting of the Annan plan and subsequently accelerate the illegal participation of Greek Cypriots in the EU as representatives of the whole island, even though they voted against the Annan peace plan. Another achievement was the removal of sea boundaries claimed by Greece at the

Aegean Sea from an electronic map prepared by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) of the US through the General Directorate of Mapping.

Admiral Bostanođlu proudly emphasized that he commanded the escort and patrol fleet (*Refakat ve Karakol Filotillası Komodorluđu*) to be transformed into a group under the command of the Admiral. The Group was later permanently stationed at Foça and renamed Western Task Group affiliated to the Fleet Command in 2002. This should be seen as a breakthrough symbolizing prominence given to the Aegean Sea.

Admiral Bostanođlu recalled that the frigates were sent to NATO Electromagnetic Testing and Evaluation activities to keep the navy informed of the latest developments in this field, while he was serving as the Operations Chief in the Navy headquarters. *Akdeniz Kalkanı Harekatı* (Operation Mediterranean Shield) started on April 1st, 2006 in order to carry out energy and maritime security activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Distant Horizon monitoring area was expanded to cover all surrounding seas with the establishment of new radar fields such as Kaş, Mersin, Karataş, and Cyprus, as well as the establishment of Surveillance Coordination Centers in Karadeniz Eređli and Mersin. The existing radar sites were upgraded by effective equipment. The establishment of the Naval Surveillance Command, which coordinates all activities related to detection, recognition, and identification in the surrounding seas, has led to a change in the mentality of naval leaders and personnel at sea and on the shore. Sharing the white picture²²³ alleviated the security concerns of NATO and US officials, who called the Black Sea the “Black Hole”. The deployment of maritime task groups to the high seas after 2010 should also be seen as a revolutionary effort towards a blue water navy. Admiral Bostanođlu drew attention to the guided missile firing in the South African range in testing the overall effectiveness of sensors, systems, and missiles against complex targets. This deployment around Africa was also the performance and endurance test of MİLGEM corvette, *TCG Heybeliada*.

²²³ White Picture is the term used to denote the recognized civilian maritime traffic at sea.

During his period, the first firings of a homing DM2A4 torpedo with war load, and Sub-Harpoon²²⁴ from submarines along with the one of a Harpoon Block II²²⁵ missile to land targets were successfully conducted. The next step may be to deploy a task force in the oceans depending on the expansion of maritime relations and interests.

Concerning the force posture of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy, Admiral Bostanoğlu went through the procurement of used US combatants, the in-country building of *TCG Koçhisar*, *TCG Berk*, and *TCG Peyk*, the building/procurement of German design *Ay-*, *Doğan-*, and MEKO-class frigates, the establishment of maritime air command. All were generally in line with the force structure envisaged in the Strategic Goals Plan, and there were some delays in the planned dates. The breakthrough in the modernization of the Navy has been the success of the GENESIS/ADVENT and MİLGEM projects, which were also appreciated by SSM. The implementation of the delayed TF-2000 project was associated with the development of a progressive array radar system that successfully passed factory and field tests. The TF-2000 destroyer will be built in the coming years, upon completion of the design. The capabilities of the sea control ship and the LPD in the plan were combined into a unique ship, LHD, i.e., *TCG Anadolu*. Almost all the assets in the force posture of the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy were completed or underway except for the acquisition of a squadron of strike fighters.

Admiral Bostanoğlu pointed out the importance and priority given to the institutional structure of the Navy and the training of manpower (four-year naval academy program, postgraduate education abroad), regarding other issues in the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy. It also added features of advanced technological infrastructure and institutions, as well as the ability of naval officers to be open-minded, have a history of changing the world, and the flexibility to adapt to technological changes.

²²⁴ UGM-84: model for submarine usage. It is also referred as Sub-Harpoon. This missile, too, has a rocket booster and is longer and heavier than the AGM-84. Until it reaches the surface, the UGM-84 is sealed in a container.

²²⁵ The key improvements of the Harpoon Block II are obtained by incorporating the inertial measurement unit from the Joint Direct Attack Munition program, and the software, computer, Global Positioning System (GPS)/inertial navigation system and GPS antenna/receiver from the SLAM Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), an upgrade to the SLAM..

In the preparation of the second strategy document, Admiral Bostanoğlu reminded the hierarchy of inputs, namely the National Policy Document, the National Military Strategy Document, which are classified documents. Admiral Bostanoğlu, who appreciated Admiral Erkaya's approach based on principles, led the Plans Policy team to revise its 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy and to prepare a new strategy document. Following internal coordination in the Naval Forces Command, the draft document was first sent to the subordinates of the Naval Forces and then to external stakeholders for their views and inputs.: sister services (including the Coast Guard and Gendarmerie), ministries, undersecretaries, and directly affiliated institutions to the prime ministry. But only the Coast Guard Command provided substantial input. The maturing strategy document was published after the approval of the General Staff.

About the 2015 strategy, Admiral Bostanoğlu recollected the discussions on the validity of threat-based general defense plans. Considering the validity of the plan and the occurrence of crises in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, he guided the staff to formulate the strategy, taking into account both threat and capability-based approaches. He underlined that blind adherence to NATO defense planning approaches, regardless of national needs, would not meet national operational requirements. Another dimension of the new strategy was to give maximum priority to the domestic development and purchase of platforms and systems that were not emphasized in the previous strategy. Considering the validity and continuity of the main threat to Turkey, defense of homeland and control of surrounding seas were registered at the top of the mission list. This priority mission is followed by safeguarding maritime trade routes, support to the foreign policy and defense industry goals of Turkey and contributing to global and regional peace. The goal of the strategy was to attain 'Medium Regional Force Projection Capability'. The utilization of unmanned air, submerged, and surface vehicles were also considered to the maximum extent.

Continuity in force planning arose from a discussion of each phase of the projects on the Weapon and Equipment Group and the Admirals Board, with the participation of the relevant units of the headquarters. Also, experts from the subordinate commands called for when needed. Ultimately, he emphasized the sharing of decision-making capacity in the Naval Commanders Council, which included all four and three-star Admirals in the Navy (the future commanders of the Navy). Surely, long assignments of staff with a technological background in the posts managing the projects were instrumental in ensuring continuity in force development.

3.10. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL ALİ YÜKSEL ÖNEL²²⁶

Admiral Önel started with the Distant Horizon project which came to the fore to fuse all data received from afloat and shore assets into a recognized maritime picture. The Project was initially confined to the Aegean Sea. He commented that the ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy did not foresee projecting force in the oceans, but rather an effective presence in surrounding seas, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean along with the defense of Cyprus. At that time, the General Staff input, which was expressed as the preservation and modernization of existing force levels in the national strategy concept document, was effective in defense planning. Admiral Önel said that the TF-2000 project was launched as an alternative to the Turkish-German joint production of MEKO class frigates. In this venue, the Newport News Shipbuilding Co. brought some proposal package to build frigates of modified *Oliver Hazard Perry*-class design for the Navy in Turkish shipyards. Admiral Önel recollected presenting an information booklet to President Turgut Özal before he visited the US. The booklet included a request for the transfers of *Perry*-class frigates and P3C maritime patrol aircraft. He also recalled the proposal by the then Fleet Commander Admiral Vural Bayazıt for the procurement of an air defense frigate which he was not personally in favor of getting a platform designed solely for a specific warfare type.

Admiral Önel mentioned that he requested Admiral Afif Büyüktuğrul to tell the *Dumlupınar* incident. Admiral Büyüktuğrul firstly dubbed that the main cause was the commander of the submarine not being at the bridge. The Navy then issued a policy order to ensure that commanders were on the bridge when crossing narrow waters. While the watch officer ordered full starboard to prevent a collision by risking grounding, the commander jumped onto the bridge and first turned it back to the port, then gave an emergency full astern command, but could not prevent the collision. Admiral Önel commended the inputs of Admiral İrfan Tınaz (who favored imbuing of the unity of doctrines and principles, British School) and Admiral Necmettin Keski (who preferred going by the tactical documents, the American School) as instructors during his tenure in the war college.

²²⁶ Admiral (LH) Ali Yüksel Önel was the Plans Policy Chief when Admiral İrfan Tınaz was the Navy Chief during the August 1990-August 1992 period.

Admiral Önel attended the Department Head Course at the US Navy Destroyer School and subscribed to the *Naval Proceedings*. He dubbed that the US blue water naval strategy could not be taken as a preference by the Turkish Navy which was a littoral navy. He stressed that Turkey should focus on homeland defense in line with the maxim of Atatürk, “Peace at home, Peace in the World”, which guided the national foreign policy principles.

During his tenure at NATO Headquarters²²⁷, Admiral Önel stated that explaining the main reasons for the 1980 military intervention to the allied countries, and Greece's re-entry into NATO's Military Structure were the main issues of that period. As a Naval Planning officer, he took the initiative to meet with his Greek counterpart, Captain Mantadakis, to compartmentalize the bilateral disputes in the Aegean Sea. The aim was to achieve a fair compromise on the possibility of resolving problems to gain bilateral benefits, but his counterpart did not accept this proposal, fearing the inflexible government in Greece. He recalled being on board a British frigate during their participation in the fall activation of NAVOCFORMED in 1973 onboard *TCG Kocatepe*.²²⁸ He took the offer to fly over Mount Etna with an embarked chopper but made an emergency landing due to the loss of power on the torque meter. Later, Admiral Önel assumed the command of NAVOCFORMED in its fall activation of 1987 which he highly recommended for a Turkish naval officer as a professional goal to reach in his career. At this activation, he took his chances to fly over Mount Etna with the commanders in the force which he was not able to do in 1974.

Regarding the foreign consultation missions in the Ottoman Navy and later the Turkish Navy, Admiral Önel stated that, given the inadequacy of Turkish culture in institutional and system development, their contributions could be considered beneficial. The disciplined navy, with the contributions of foreign missions, has led to many innovations and introduced many modern technologies to the country. In this regard, Admiral Önel expressed his admiration for Rauf

²²⁷ Admiral Önel was assigned as Naval Planning Officer at the Turkish Military Representative Office in the NATO, Brussels during the August 1979-1982 period. Admiral Sabahattin Ergin was the Turkish Military Representative at the period.

²²⁸ Admiral Önel was the executive officer at *TCG Kocatepe* whereas the commanding officer was Admiral Güven Erkaya. *TCG Kocatepe* subsequently partook in the Fall 1973 and Spring 1974 activations of NAVOCFORMED. On the way back to Turkey, *TCG Kocatepe* was directed to Mersin as the Cyprus Crisis got escalated. During operations, *TCG Kocatepe* sank by friendly fire of Turkish Air Force (Erkaya & Baytok, 2001, p. 113).

Orbay, whose memoirs and biography he studied, and had the chance to see him during Orbay's Naval Academy visit.

Admiral Önel recalled Admiral Zahit Atakan ordered the staff to examine the operational need for pocket submarines after he visited Pakistan. Admiral Önel learned that a similar directive was given by Admiral Celal Eyiceoğlu after his tour to Pakistan, but the directive had not evolved into a procurement project. The periodical repetition of similar directives triggered the need to devise a procedural mechanism on how to transform an operational requirement into a project and to manage it if transformed. The aim was to ensure the permanence of staff/corporate memory in project management and to prevent disconnection, duplication, and resource loss. The mechanism needed was translated into a Project Management Directive during his tenure as the Plans Policy Chief. Another mechanism in this context was the Commanders' Council, where secretarial support was provided by the Plans Policy Division. Although the commanders were expected to voice their opposite or alternative views, they were cautious not to speak against the Navy Chief or retained visionary ideas for their potential tenure on the post. Admiral Önel stated that during his tenure, the commanders generally came to these meetings with a preliminary decision on the issues and that they directed the discussions to this aim in a way that prevented an efficient articulation on the subject. Admiral Önel pointed to the studies of his project officer specialized in operations research in risk analysis based on operational components comparing existing threats with the assets available. The outcome was a comparative chart of deficiencies and abundancies in operational types. Resultantly, the capability areas that would need to be strengthened are displayed.

Concerning relations with governmental institutions, Admiral Önel dubbed that all interaction was conducted through the General Staff according to the PPBS directive. He pointed to the view that the Distant Horizon project is a joint intelligence initiative that should be planned, financed, and executed under the auspices of the General Staff, not under the responsibility of the Navy.

At this point, Admiral Önel shared one of his visions for the privatization of the shipbuilding part of Gölcük Shipyard. He took the phased ship procurement process of the US as precedence, namely, the project description went first to the tender, second to the construction of the prototype, and finally to the building of the first batch of fighters. This approach did not find

support in naval circles. After his retirement, acting as the General Coordinator of the Turkish Shipbuilders' Association (GİSBİR), he led the way for the establishment of a joint firm of all private shipyards, namely GİSAŞ (Shipbuilding Co.), to make job sharing in big contracts between the members to optimize the capabilities of shipyards. GİSAŞ submitted a bid for the Pendik Shipyard privatization tender. The envisaged model was to be focused on specific types of ships to be marketed off the shelf to the shipping markets, based on accurate cost analysis and reducing overhead costs by eliminating remakes and overheads.

Regarding the current material capability of the Navy, Admiral Önel successfully applauded the level achieved, especially considering the power projection capability he had never seen before. He commented on the concept of force multipliers imposed by Admiral Güven Erkaya, that is, the components of soft power, intelligence, morale, discipline, and education. Moreover, he stressed his regret at the current lack of these multipliers versus the outstanding material adequacy generally gained. The naval culture based on traditions could only be furthered by the permanence of manpower over generations. For the advancement of the Navy, the vulnerabilities in the manpower and traditions should be taken care of by the current leadership.

3.11. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN SAĞDUR EKİTMEN

Regarding the public campaigns to improve naval capabilities, a private shipbuilding company owned by a businessman, Hayri Baran financed the building of the first landing vessel (LCU²²⁹ 205) and donated it to the Navy which was later commanded by Captain Sağdur Ekitmen. After his graduation, he was assigned to a landing craft (LCU 205) stationed in Mersin due to the escalation of the Cyprus issue. He was on board the fast attack craft *TCG Denizkuşu*, which was deployed to the Aegean Sea during the Cyprus Operation of 1974.

About naval traditions and heritage, Captain Ekitmen expressed his bitterness of not keeping our symbol ships as a museum such as the legendary battle cruiser *Yavuz*, whose father served as damage control officer. He also recalled the will and enthusiasm of the Turkish workers in

²²⁹ LCU: Landing Craft Utility. Four vessels of this class were transferred from the US and later twelve of them were constructed in Gölcük Shipyard.

Germany to donate for the construction of a fast attack craft of *TCG Gurbet* via the Navy League for whose President he had prepared an introductory speech.

Captain Ekitmen appreciated the views of Captain Mert Bayat and Captain Hakkı Baykiran, who influenced him with his teachings on leadership, strategy, geopolitics, and national power elements regarding strategic culture. He also referred particularly to the seminal book of Admiral Gorchov, *The Sea Power of the State*. Later, he had taught estimate of the situation and surface warfare courses in the Naval War College. Captain Ekitmen explained that he was assigned as Commanding Officer of *TCG Yıldırım*, a gunboat transferred from the US which was not used effectively by the Navy due to lack of right fuel specification.

Concerning the optimum force compositions to operate in the surrounding ships, Captain Ekitmen put his preference in using a task force of *Ada*-class corvettes and *Kılıç*-class fast craft complementing each other in the Aegean Sea. He remarked on operating with a task force of frigates in the Black Sea since fast attack craft activity was limited due to severe sea states. Ultimately, a task force of frigates with the political deterrent effect of LHD, *TCG Anadolu*, and its embarked air wing could be employed at the Mediterranean.

About the cultural change in the Fast Attack Craft Fleet, Captain Ekitmen commented that the technological leap triggered with the introduction of the concept of the combat management system. However, since the relevant courses given to the first fast boat crew could not be continued in the following years, they were converted to apprentice-master type training. Officers and crew adapted themselves to new skills over time through self-training. The reflection of these technological innovations in tactics was hardly adopted by the flag officers familiar with the old systems. Graduate officers were invaluable in adapting to new abilities on board.

Captain Ekitmen reminded that after refueling in Çanakkale, he was assigned as the group commander of the two fast attack craft moving to Çanakkale to cover the *Sismik-I* survey ship. But the mission was postponed due to severe sea and weather conditions. Concerning the deployment of the fleet in November 1994, the fast boat fleet was deployed to waiting/hiding locations in the Aegean Sea. During the Kardak Crisis, he was ordered to deploy SEAL teams

to the Bodrum area as soon as possible by aircraft. Although the directive was received after working hours, the mission was accomplished by deploying them to the operational theatre.

Captain Ekitmen summarized his insights for the maritimization of Turkey as a sea power state on three tenets as follows. First, the flexible use of the Navy to support national foreign policy should be considered in the formulation of national defense policy in peacetime, so resources must be allocated to develop a competent navy. Second, a government agency, namely a Ministry of Maritime Affairs should be established to manage all activities in the nautical domain towards a sea power state. Third, the decommissioned naval ships should be converted to naval museums to promote marine awareness in the public, as well as port visits of ships and academic/introductory activities at all fora. Overall, the upkeep of naval traditions in the institutional structure is essential to its survival. The eminence of qualified manpower has always been paramount in a navy's combat effectiveness. The radical transformation in the military education system should be closely regulated by the short and long-term need for qualified manpower of the Navy, without hindering long-term traditions and institutional permanence. The needs of services in the operational field should be decisive in the design of the relevant curriculum for war colleges. The final goal should be to supplement the loss of qualified personnel due to the alleged judicial cases and the failed coup attempt along with the purge of students in the military schools.

Captain Ekitmen recalled his task of preparing task inventories, an attempt to design the general organization and training curriculum of the Navy according to the tasks performed by the units at the force level.

3.12. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN GÖKHAN KAMİL YAPAN

Concerning the theoretical background, Captain Yapan referred to the evaluation of the old strategies of the Ottoman period and the early Republic period, taking into account the expanding power struggle in global areas in the preparation of future naval strategies. Turkey should not confine its presence to the surrounding seas rather extend its naval reach in congruence with its economic sphere. The maintenance of the domestic merchant fleet along with representation in relevant maritime organizations is a prudent move towards this goal. The ultimate naval strategy needs to be developed by assessing conjunctural political developments.

Regarding the historical past, Captain Yapan emphasized the inadequacy of naval history courses and research in the naval academy and college curriculum, which he considers important to instill naval traditions in graduates. He also emphasized that the stimuli to orient to the high seas is due to the defense of the homeland from the sea in the current global and regional volatile security environment, as well as developing maritime technologies and communication capabilities.

About the factors that make up the strategic culture of naval officers, Captain Yapan stated that the Ottomans first spread to the continents and then turned to sea domination with the introduction of North African pirates into their service. The shackled fleet into the Golden Horn was revived, but not efficiently used during the Italian and Balkan Wars as well as the First World War. After the 1970s, the Navy began to be regenerated in line with procedural force planning. The weight of strategy lessons in naval schools should be improved and increased by the inclusion of retired maritime leadership at the faculty and joint activities with civic experts. Captain Yapan appreciated the valuable contributions of Captain Mert Bayat and Captain Şamil Hızal, who are his teachers at the Naval War College.

When it came to the influence of foreign consultants, Captain Yapan drew attention to the recruitment of foreign sailors in the Ottoman navy throughout history. In particular, foreign advisory missions were instrumental in the formation and institutionalization of a relatively modern navy during the recession. However, the German missions that were dominant in the military circles caused the Ottomans to enter the First World War and eventually disappear.

With regard to postgraduate education, Kaptan Yapan stated that the purpose of graduate education abroad should be to train manpower that devotes itself to the advancement of national interests and goals. In this regard, Captain Yapan praised the input of graduate officers in leading the technological leap of the Navy.

Captain Yapan drew attention to NATO missions and tasks, their valuable influence on learning procedures and standards, and the establishment of a naval culture. The core of the issue was to reflect the knowledge and experience gained through NATO into setting national standards, tactics, procedures, processes, and strategies.

An important reason for its high seafaring capability is the protection of maritime transport by deploying patrol vessels or boarding security teams in key risk areas such as the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.

The collaboration with other marine stakeholders such as merchant fleet and nautical educational institutions would be a paramount endeavor to this aim. The Navy should lead and motivate activities towards the maritimization of Turkey.

Captain Yapan pointed to the changing dynamics of the balance of power following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as the power rivalry that emerged between the great powers in the age of globalization and the digital age. Turkey should take its stakes from the Chinese endeavor to revitalize the “Maritime Silk Road” of the comprehensive “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” along with exercising its naval presence at the gates of it.

About the continuity and coherence in force modernization, Captain Yapan underlined its importance by touching its revision according to the strategic, economic, and political changes. The Navy has always been and has been a pioneering service in getting acquainted with modern technologies compared to its sisters. The naval strategy should be prepared in line with the national policy objectives, considering the emerging political and economic factors and covering the areas of interest in the world beyond the spheres of influence in the surrounding seas.

The modernization of the Navy should be planned within the limits of allocated resources by making the most of the national defense industry's capacity. To facilitate communication and exchange of information, a global common platform should be established with all relevant stakeholders, from industry to academia, from finance to business. Finally, he emphasized that the protection and exploitation of marine wealth is the basis of rights and interests, as the future of the young generation is closely linked to resources at sea and below the seabed. In summary, this requires the preparation of a national grand maritime strategy to promote it, with the involvement of all stakeholders in the maritime field.

3.13. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL IŞIK BİREN

Admiral Işık Biren began by interpreting the human drive to seek valuable commodities and to seize power. Christopher Colombo, for example, set sail to the West to reach India and reached a new continent, America, based on a global understanding of the world. The sea powers were after two of the time's precious goods: spices and manpower, that is, slaves. Surely, one of the main motives was to christianize for the name of the Pope who had divided the undiscovered lands between the Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal with the *1493 Tordesillas Agreement*. On the contrary, the Ottomans found these goods available at their ports by silk routes passing through their lands, so it was not a vital commercial incentive for shipping. The Dutch emerged as a sea power in the seventeenth-century due to its Spanish colonial past. Later the British took control of maritime trade from the eighteenth century onwards. The British were like the Phoenicians who, except the Carthaginians, did not want to colonize the land, but rather, like the Genoese, they controlled the chokepoints of the sea trade routes.

The southern and central parts of the newly discovered continent were fertile and prosperous and mostly inhabited by agricultural civilizations destroyed and naturalized by the Latin *Conquistadors*. Its northern part was rocky, arid, and harsh, and it was where nomadic tribes lived. In the north, the land was unclaimed, so new settlers of mostly Anglo-Saxon, German, Frankish, and Viking descent had the chance to own land. The need for manpower in new colonies triggered the slave trade from Africa as a motive for developing maritime shipping.

After pointing out the strategy triangle, Admiral Biren underlined that the main cause of the First World War was resource competition. The world was reigned by three ruling elite groups: palace, church, and army in the West whereas chiefs, clergy, and army in the Eastern world. The emergence of steam power in the first industrial revolution resulted in the birth of a new class, the proletariat, in addition to the bourgeoisie of mercantilism. The coal became a valuable commodity that was mined by the labor force. The coal later was replaced by hydrocarbon fuels for power production. The great powers of the period deployed some agents under the guise of archaeologists (Gertrude Bell, Lawrence of Arabia) in possible geographies such as the Middle East and the Caspian Basin to explore oil fields during the Ottoman reign. They did a plan to share the Middle East where the British got the oil fields and the French got more nostalgic lands of Syria and Lebanon. This plan was recorded on the historical wall as the Sykes-Picot

agreement that shaped the definition of the border in the Middle East after the First World War. The Russians revealed this agreement after the revolution, of which their old government was a part. The Turkish Straits and Marmara region were left to the Russians. Admiral Biren commented that a unilateral region was established around the Straits because the Russians had a share in the Treaty of Lausanne.

Admiral Biren talked about the visit of US General Mac Arthur to Atatürk in 1932. General Arthur asked Atatürk about his opinion on the developing security panorama in Europe. Atatürk said: The Paris Agreements should not be considered as an agreement but as a ceasefire. The allied forces could not restrain a nation like Germany under these conditions, which would soon be transformed by a leader into a great power to control Europe outside of Britain and Russia. With US intervention, the Germans will lose a future war, but the Bolsheviks will benefit more in Europe. However, Bolshevism was not consistent with human nature, so it was doomed to extinction.

An Austrian corporal, who claimed to be socialist as well as nationalist, emerged as Germany's "Führer" and led his nation to war without knowing its borders. Technologies developed by the German but not used effectively were mostly taken over by the Russians and partly by the Americans, which made it easier to move them into space later on. The use of the atomic bomb on the Pacific Front resulted in the unconditional surrender of Japan and ended the war earlier than expected. Battles took place between carrier task groups. The US imposed an economic blockade on Japan through unconditional submarine warfare. The Soviet Empire expanded its sphere of influence to deal with the threat of US containment. Through the Marshall Plan, the US provided economic and military support to Europe from the surplus of its inventory. Two of these excess materials were important in shaping the geography around Turkey. One was ammonium nitrate, which was used to manufacture explosives but was also used as a fertilizer in agriculture. The US led the establishment of the chemical fertilizer industry in Turkey. The other was the fleet of *Liberty*-class ships which were extensively used in transportation during the war. An ex-Ottoman Greek, Onassis, and Niarchos from İzmir bought the ships and transported excess military material from the US to China. As a result, an entrepreneur transformed Greece into a wealthy seafaring nation.

NATO used an “all-out nuclear war” strategy to prevent the spread of communism until the Russians produced an atomic bomb. A “balance of horror” was established between two pacts through second-strike capability. NATO’s strategy was based on determination, deterrence, and defense (3D). This understanding is reflected in the naming of the exercises such as Display Determination of which all allies contributed to kind. Established in Britain during the war, the Joint Headquarters was transformed into NATO Headquarters by Eisenhower in Paris but later moved to Brussels as France left the Alliance's military structure. During the Cold War, some local wars took place but not an all-out war between the superpowers. NATO adopted a flexible defense strategy while the arms race continued. After taking over, President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) known as “Star Wars” in 1985, aimed at destroying ballistic missiles with laser weapons found on satellites.

During his visit to Turkey in 1987, Marshall Akhromeyev, the General Staff Chief of the Soviet Union, confessed to Admiral Biren, who was his honor escort, that the Soviets could not have coped with the SDI due to their economic situation and their technological underdevelopment. Although the Soviets had all types of energy resources on their land their technology was too obsolete to exploit them competitively with the world market. Marshall also commented during his visit to Topkapı Palace that Turks kept their historical heritage whereas the Bolsheviks destroyed the Almighty Russian past. He was also surprised to learn that the Pension Fund had some real estate to operate to ensure the future of its government officials after retirement the contrary to what they had taught of capitalism. Along with the suffering of the public, this was a clear indication that the Soviet Empire was coming to an end. Admiral Biren reported his impressions to NATO authorities, who were astonished by the assessment on a potential demise of the Soviet Union. A couple of months later the US and the USSR initiated strategic arm limitation talks (SALT).

Admiral Biren also pointed to the unwavering goal of Russian geopolitics to reach the warm seas independently of the leaders. This was the main driving force of current Russian policy in Syria. Throughout history, Russians aspired to show presence in the Mediterranean since 1770. Peter the Great, the Czar spent significant efforts to reform its country and to transform it into a European state. They first conquered the Baltic Sea shores, then the Crimea, and then the Black Sea coast. Admiral Biren personally praised Gorbachev’s leadership for enabling an empire with vast territory and diverse ethnicities to overthrow in a controlled manner without

concrete death, like its predecessors. Gorbachev's initiatives, *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* facilitated this smooth transition. Its successor, the Russian Federation, regenerated its influence in its former backyard.

Admiral Biren cited his memoirs of the Greek destroyer *HS Velos*'s departure from NAVOCFORMED during his command due to the military coup in Athens in 1972. The commanding officer of *HS Velos*, Commander Papas took refuge in England with some of its crew. Then, the ship manned with some Greek personnel at the NATO Headquarters re-participated in the force but continued the exercise in hardship with the assistance of the Turkish ship. Admiral Biren built an everlasting friendship with Commander Papas, who later became the Chief of the Greek Navy.

Admiral Biren recalled his assignment at the communications department of NATO Headquarters (CINCAFMED) in Malta. In this capacity, he managed the reimbursement of long-line costs for the last five years which was mistakenly charged less between Ankara-Larissa instead of Ankara-Laskaris²³⁰, Malta from the resources that became available due to the cancellation of exercises during the Cuban missile crisis.

Admiral Biren interpreted Admiral Büyüktuğrul, his teacher at the military college, as a man who witnessed by going through history and observing some important events. He stated that underdeveloped societies are very vulnerable to perception operations because they believe in whatever they want without question.

Regarding his assignment in the Southern Area Command, he recalled manufacturing a hovercraft capable of carrying fifteen personnel. He also introduced computers to prepare presentations in the Headquarters.

About his experience as the Chief of the General Staff Plans Policy Division, he pointed to his enforcement for using analytic methods in force planning, bilateral foreign relations, and R&D departments. The participation of Aselsan and Roketsan in the Stinger MANPAD venture as

²³⁰ The NATO Headquarters in Malta was called after Laskaris, or (Mir) Ali Bey who was a Greek convert assigned in the ranks of Ottoman army during the siege of Malta and defected to Maltese in the later stages of combat.

one of the main contractors was a bold initiative²³¹ of Admiral Biren without the prior consent of the command echelon which gained the rocket technologies to the Turkish defense industry. Another experience was about the talks for the renewal of the Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement with the US. The transfer of forty F4/E aircraft reserved in Arizona was demanded by Turkey in flyaway condition. In the talks, Admiral Biren managed to get the aircraft in flyaway condition without any other additional burden to Turkey by compromising over permission to the US aircraft for using the Karapınar range during firing drills at nighttime. Admiral Biren also convinced the US side to import all spare parts including ammunition used by the US forces in Europe if they were manufactured in Turkey. Admiral Biren categorized the available weapons systems and platforms in the US at four generations: decommissioned ones, ones about to be decommissioned, ones currently in service, and ones about getting into service along with the weapons under research and development. The US only let transfer of platforms either decommissioned or about to be decommissioned under foreign military sales. The US industry did not support spare parts of decommissioned systems. Admiral Biren managed to get the privilege of providing parts to third countries such as tracks for M-60 tanks transferred to countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. The provision is included in the Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Turkey. Turkey benefitted from exporting spare parts to third countries through FMS cases.²³² He also recalled the reports relayed by the then Defense *Attaché* Captain Reyhan Destan which triggered the foundation of the American Friends of Turkey (AFOT).²³³ The AFOT later amalgamated with the Turkish American Businessmen Council (TAİK) led by Mustafa KOÇ and transformed into the American Turkish Council (ATC) of which the founder chairman of the management board was Admiral Biren. The ATC prevented the approval of the “alleged” genocide resolution of Armenians in the US

²³¹ Stinger was a joint venture managed by NATO Armaments Group. After a report by Colonel Cemal Alagöz, Admiral Biren allocated 20 million USD to the project and sent the participation request to NATO with no command approval. The then-Chief of General Staff General Necip Toruntay was aboard for a visit to Canada but he approved the project after return to Turkey. Admiral Biren was of the opinion that it would be possible to draw the application for participation after sending on contrary it would not be possible to join after the due date.

²³² Admiral Biren and Captain Seyhan later established a firm called “Turkish Defense Industries” to facilitate the implementation of this MOU after retirement.

²³³ A group of American nationals who had sympathy for Turkey joined in a hearing in Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate. They managed to convey their voices of support to Turkey for being a staunch ally of the US and the unrightful arms embargo imposed on Turkey. When the President asked about their identity they replied in concert “We are the Friends of Turkey, although we do not have an institutional identity, yet we will form one after getting out.”

Senate. Later, many prominent US defense firms were included in the Council. Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ was also very instrumental in developing these types of relations.

Admiral Biren dubbed that an engineering and technology firm called *STM Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş.* to overcome the difficulties in getting export licenses and technology handover for the F-16 project. Some highly qualified engineers working for the US defense firms (P&W) were transferred to this company.

Admiral Biren recollected his being assigned as honor escort to the Chief of General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Navy. Although included in his schedule, the Saudi Chief did not want to pay a visit to the Mausoleum of Atatürk, Anıtkabir due to their Wahabi faith which forbade visiting the tombs. Admiral Biren knocked on the door of the Saudi Chief and asked him to visit the Mausoleum and the adjacent Museum. After the visit, the Saudi Chief expressed his admiration of the Atatürk and told Turks should have a movie of him, like *The Message*²³⁴ to introduce him to the world public. Admiral Biren replied that the Turks were hesitant on conveying Atatürk's message incorrectly.

Admiral Biren mentioned that he and Admiral Erkaya thought of building merchant ships that could be convertible to warships with the containerized weapons and equipment technology of the MEKO project. He praised the contribution of Admiral Örnek to the realization of the MİLGEM project by emphasizing the prominence of teamwork and institutional acquis through the advancement of the venture.

Admiral Biren stressed that the area of responsibility given to Turkey by NATO, which was mainly the Black Sea, and the Turkish Straits was not dictated by NATO instead it was the preference of Turkey due to lack of capabilities.

Admiral Uran established or reformed many naval education and training institutions such as the preparatory school for petty officers, the petty officer's vocational school. The sending of naval officers to the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) was also inaugurated and

²³⁴ *The Message* (originally known as *Mohammad, Messenger of God*) is a 1976 epic historical drama film directed and produced by Moustapha Akkad, chronicling the life and times of the Islamic prophet Muhammad through the perspective of his uncle Hamza ibn Abdul-Muttalib and adopted son Zayd ibn Harithah.

institutionalized during the tenure of Admiral Uran.²³⁵ After graduation from the NPGS, Admiral Biren was posted as adjutant/liason officer of the US Admiral in JUSMATT. He admitted that Turkey highly benefitted from the US military aid to Turkey. Followingly, Admiral Biren was assigned to the NATO Headquarters in Malta for two years but left earlier to enroll in the war college training. His assignment as escort officer to Admiral Uran visit to Malta resulted in his posting as flag secretary of Admiral Uran in the period from August 1967 to August 1968. Admiral Biren stated that he was assigned as the flag secretary of Admiral Necdet Uran²³⁶ who he designated as honest, the man of his word. In that period, the submarines were begun to be overhauled in the Gölcük Shipyard which should be considered as a breakthrough, that led to domestic submarine construction. Besides in-country submarine overhauling, the rejuvenation of the Navy League, and the initiation of domestic shipbuilding, firstly with *TCG Koçhisar* later with *TCG Berk* and *TCG Peyk* as the predecessors of national ship venture. The modernization of naval shipyards was critical decisions made for the future of the Navy during Admiral Uran's tenure. A naval gazette, *Poyraz* was published in this period. The first session of the “Naval Commanders Council” was held on February 9th, 1968 where the commanders (3- and 4-star Admirals commanding the subordinate commands) were briefed about the latest issues and projects and took important decisions regarding the future of the Navy²³⁷ (Deniz Kuvvetleri, 1968).

The General Staff ordered the enforcement of PPBS as of March 1st, 1968 (Özdoğan, 1968). Admiral Biren recalled his astonishment when Admiral Uran has applied for his retirement his Admirals who were visiting him daily for a tea break did not show up anymore. Admiral Biren managed to arrange the first command handover ceremony between the commanders of the Navy which later became a custom in the General Staff and the Navy Headquarters (Dz.K.K., 1968). Admiral Biren packed all personnel correspondence and belongings of Admiral URAN

²³⁵ Admiral Biren and Admiral Fuat Uğur were the first officers sent to the Naval Postgraduate School for the General Line Curriculum (Naval Science). Admiral Biren graduated with excellent degree on May 26th, 1960.

²³⁶ Admiral Necdet Uran was the fifth commander of the Navy from June 20th, 1961 to August 16th, 1968 for a period of seven years.

²³⁷ Naval Commanders Council (*Deniz Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı Konseyi*) was comprised of Admirals commanding the main subordinates of the Navy (Fleet Command, Northern Area Command, Southern Command, Education/Training Command) plus other 3- and 4-stars at any other posts. The Admirals at the Navy also attend the council meeting and brief the council on latest issues and projects. Any decision regarding the future of the Navy get discussed on the council in detail and the decisions is taken by majority vote to ensure the institutional continuity in the Navy after the command handover.

and got him moved to an apartment in the basement of a building since his adjutant had left him.

Admiral Biren also praised the role of Admiral Kemal Kayacan in founding the naval air force, the marine corps regiment, and the maritime component of Gendarmerie (later Coast Guard). He also pointed out that the operational requirement for construction and transfer of various landing vessels after 1965 was based on the rationale of supporting the logistic transport of the First Army in the Marmara Sea. Admiral Biren also praised Admiral Kemal Kayacan's role in the establishment of the naval air force, the marine corps regiment, and the naval element of the Gendarmerie (later the Coast Guard). He also pointed out that the operational requirement for construction and transfer of various landing vessels after 1965 was based on the rationale to support the logistic transport of the First Army in the Marmara Sea. Admiral Biren also reiterated the reactive nature of the Turkish community in preparation for a possible landing in Cyprus and commended the participation of NPGS graduates and the University of Michigan in the domestic construction of various landing ships and escort destroyers.²³⁸

He recollected sailing to the US with *TCG Giresun* for overhauling in 1955. During the overhaul, the ship was fitted with electronic warfare equipment and 3/50 guns were also mounted. Admiral Biren attended the system course for electronic warfare equipment. As repair coordination officer, he got the torpedo tubes replaced from the reserves instead of purchasing new ones and managed to get two emergency diesel generators installed with the funds saved from the torpedo tube replacement. Later Admiral Biren was assigned as the commander of Barbaros Transmitter Station at Elmadağ and taught in the electronic warfare course. During this time, he had the chance to visit the remarkable facilities of Hasanoğlan Village Institutes and its contribution to the local economy and people which was later abolished due to some political concerns.

During his tenure in the Turkish Military Representative Office²³⁹, Admiral Biren conveyed one of his memories as follows: NATO would like to form a naval on-call force

²³⁸ Admiral Biren remarked the peculiar input of Captain Namık Oruç in construction of *TCG Berk* which he also named his newborn son after the ship.

²³⁹ Admiral Biren was assigned to the office of Turkish Military Representative at NATO Headquarters from August 1968 to 1970 as Naval Planning Officer.

(NAVOCFORMED) at the Mediterranean to balance the Soviet naval presence. The US has attached importance to the consent and contribution of the Mediterranean riparian including Turkey. However, contrary to the expectations of the USA and NATO, the instruction of the General Staff was negative, as the Navy was engaged in tasks related to the security of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits. Admiral Biren proposed a different wording with a positive approach: “Turkey would like to join the NAVOCFORMED provided that the platforms needed this task are to be transferred.” What he had in mind was to provide a rationale for overcoming the US Senate hurdle over the handover of *Fletcher*-class destroyers and to use this input as an argument in the sphere of responsibility debate in the Mediterranean. Although the Chief of General Staff, General Cemal Tural opposed the proposal considering it as a violation of the widespread practice, i.e., not to obey a coordinated directive sent by the capital, he later got convinced by General Uruğ and General Sunalp. General Tural ordered Admiral Biren to explain the topic. Admiral Biren told that the Navy needed *Fletcher*-class destroyers to partake in NAVOCFORMED. To the question on the number of destroyers required, Admiral Biren wisely replied at least three platforms would be required to sustain the mission: one in the activated force, one in the training, and one in the overhauling. After overcoming the obstruction in the US Senate, the destroyers, namely *TCG İzmit*, *TCG İçel*, and *TCG İskenderun* was transferred to Turkey before the end of the year from the FMS case, 110.000 USD per ship²⁴⁰. Admiral Biren underlined that this kind of approach in NATO was called “Wording Engineering”. The operational control of the force was also an issue of concern for Turkey which was settled by giving the operational control to NAVSOUTH. Admiral Biren also criticized that many issues raised in NATO related to sovereignty issues were due to lack of

²⁴⁰ Although Turkey asked for high seafaring platforms over 3000 tons from the US Military Assistance programs, the US side was reluctant and concerned for delivering such a capability to the Navy. The venture for building escort destroyers domestically in Turkey stimulated the US to transfer considerably more modern *Fletcher* class destroyers to Turkey. The first batch included *TCG İstanbul* and *TCG İzmir* that were delivered in 1967 and followed by the transfer of three more, *TCG İzmit*, *TCG İskenderun* and *TCG İçel*. Later, the US continued with the handover of *Gearing* class destroyers to Turkey. The ability introduced with *Fletcher* class destroyers got appreciated by the Navy compared to the design and propulsion system deficiencies experienced in *Berk* class escort destroyers. The US got what it wanted, i.e., to hamper the motivation of embryonic Turkish naval shipbuilding industry which it tried again two decades later with the transfer of *Perry*-class frigates to impede the flourishing of MİLGEM project. Although the Navy continued to develop its domestic capability shipbuilding capability with joint ventures with Germany, the cancellation of *Berk*-class destroyer project costed it to postpone the national ambitions for domestic design and building warships for two decades. (Gürdeniz, 2013) It should also be credited that without the ship transfers from the US Navy could not sustain the balance of power in the Aegean Sea and not conduct the landing operations to Cyprus in 1974.

knowledge and indifference such as the expansion of territorial waters to twelve miles in NATO which was stopped at the Turkish Military Representative level.

Admiral Biren stressed that he first read a ship's manual when assigned on board. He chose to follow the book. He told that after the devastation of the US fleet and qualified crew at Pearl Harbor the US Navy tasked the universities to prepare ship handling manuals for inexperienced officers to con the ships. The US Navy won the battle with these officers that followed the book. Admiral Biren valued and preferred this style of commanding ships.

3.14. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN YILMAZ DALKANAT

Captain Yılmaz Dalkanat started by emphasizing the traditions, doctrines, educational institutions, and infrastructure of the Navy, and its transformation from being an imperial one to a Republican Navy. He continued as follows: In the early republican era, the Navy also set its goals to recover from the war period in line with the directives given by the politicians. The naval department of the General Staff had published very valuable books on the history of the Navy. NATO was established and improved by the British alongside the Americans. Mostly their documentation was adapted to NATO standards. When Turkey entered the Alliance, there was a big gap between Turkey and other allies. Over time, the NATO acquis has gradually evolved, with contributions from all allied countries.

Captain Dalkanat was assigned to the handover crew of *TCG Adatepe*, the first destroyer of *Gearing* FRAM MK1 GROUP B modification transferred by Turkey, as Subsurface Weapons Officer. In his posting as Operations Training Officer in the Navy Headquarters, Captain Dalkanat was responsible for the planning of NATO and national exercises as well as NATO documentation and attending the various meetings of NATO. As he got acquainted with NATO events Captain Dalkanat started to transfer his knowledge to national procedures, documents, and activities. For instance, Captain Dalkanat took the initiative to adopt NADREX²⁴¹ to relevant national documents.

²⁴¹ The major NATO Commanders Exercise Directive (NADREX) is a classified document providing NATO exercise doctrine.

The area of responsibility given to COMNORMEDEAST (the NATO hat of the Navy) was limited to the Turkish Straits and the Black Sea due to a lack of capabilities and farsightedness in determining the area of Search and Rescue (SAR) responsibilities. The force structure and logistic infrastructure of the Navy were designed along with the regional responsibility. To get rid of this regional limitation, Turkey advocated the task force concept at NATO fora whereas Greece and Britain were not in favor of it. In this regard, escorting a logistic convoy was carried out by a task force commanded by a Turkish commodore which was later supported by the US.

The Cyprus crisis forced the Navy to show off the flag in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. However, the limited logistic support was restraining these operations. As Exercise Planning Officer, Captain Dalkanat added the operational requirement for afloat logistic ships into the conclusion and proposal section of post-exercise reports. The strategic need provided a rationale to initiate a project for such a ship. Another issue at stake was the establishment of a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean. Coincidentally, the thesis of Captain Dalkanat at Naval War College was on the whereabouts of alternative bases. Within that time, the top brass of the Navy decided to develop a base at Aksaz and proposed NATO to finance the project. But this project was not supported due to the proximity of the Suda Base in the region. Later, Turkey started to develop the base gradually with national funds over time.

In national drill planning, Captain Dalkanat was focused on the use of the South Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean along with the port visits by the units partaking in the exercises to get acquainted with the region. Later, the Navy determined the hide-outs for fast attack craft to effectively operate in the region. He recalled an approach of Admiral Hilmi Firat, the then-Navy Chief, that forbade the deployment of fast craft southwards of İzmir to prevent them get worn off. The fast craft was the only platform fitted with guided missiles in that period.²⁴² As so, their combat readiness including any technical faults was closely and personally monitored by the Navy Chief. NATO experience taught Captain Dalkanat the national rights and interests from which later he deducted national maritime relations and interests and how to uphold and promote them. Captain Dalkanat recalled the promulgation of a strategy document by the General Staff without informing the political leadership on contrary to widespread practice. A

²⁴² *Kartal (Jaguar)*-class fast attack craft (FAC) were transferred from Germany and fitted with Penguin guided missiles bought from Norway starting from 1971 and ending at 1978.

military strategy document should be based on a political directive which was the case also in promulgating rules of engagement (ROE) directives that were inherently under the responsibility of the government. NATO usually tasked some Turkish platforms to tattletale Soviet ships with the gradual release of some ROE. Since the ROEs included the use of force in some cases, their release had to be authorized by the national political authorities. To fill such a gap, Captain Dalkanat crafted a national ROE document.

The stimulus driving the Navy towards the high seas was to cope with the challenges in the surrounding seas raised through the course of events, i.e., the Navy was reacted to the initiatives taken by adversaries or neighbors. Captain Dalkanat recollected the promulgation of an intra-college weekly magazine to discuss the current issues of the Navy and to enhance the writing skills of the attendants. Then he referred to one of his articles posted in *Deniz Kuvvetleri Dergisi* about progress in amphibious platforms (Dalkanat, 2000). He stressed his preference for acquiring a light aircraft carrier and an amphibious assault platform by the Navy. He explained his confidence in-country shipbuilding of national combatants.

Captain Dalkanat conveyed his venture after retirement for building a frigate for the Navy, TF-2000. In a private firm with Ekber Onuk, Captain Dalkanat and his friends were monitoring international contracts for naval shipbuilding. They got interested in a tender for Bangladesh Navy. They prepared for the bidding but withdrew the proposal due to the requirement to hand over the ship in Bangladesh.

Regarding the definition of high seas, Captain Dalkanat described blue waters as the sea zones beyond territorial waters. He mentioned his curiosity about how the other Coast Guards were operating. As such, Captain Dalkanat applied the use of shiny material for keeping away the dolphins from fishnets which he watched in a movie. He also stressed the need for a ship commander to be cognizant of vessels around him which was the main stimulus of the Distant Horizon project. Captain Dalkanat also underlined the inclusion of Coast Guard in sovereignty protection, i.e., the defense of Blue Homeland since it was the agency authorized by law to enforce relevant regulations at the maritime jurisdiction areas. During discussions about the transformation of the term “maritime security” in the last two decades, he recollected a memento presented to him by the Pakistani Maritime Security Forces in 1987.

About the naval culture and institutions, Captain Dalkanat emphasized that the establishment and management of naval institutions were most affected by the foreign advisory missions in the Navy. The lack of historical background based on archives and personal memories made Navy research difficult. Captain Dalkanat admitted that his first encounter with ‘strategic culture’ was at the Naval War College, but later on, he gained depth thanks to his professional career with the lessons and experiences he learned. He stated that the normative training at the Naval War College was designed to instill a culture of strategy in an extremely rigorous format that narrows the horizons of the participants, rather than just teaching the basics of strategy and then allowing officers to explore its breadth and depth.

Regarding the historical past, Captain Dalkanat said that the Ottoman Navy and the regions under its responsibility were initially ruled by the highly skilled *Kaptan-ı Derya* (fleet commander), who cultivated in the ranks of the navy. *Kaptan-ı Derya* had the authority to impose taxes on the regions to finance the fleet. Because these lands were rich and prosperous, the income was admired by the decision-maker, other high-level officials, and ruling elites in the palace circles who had better relations with the Sultan and his grand vizier (*Vezir-i Azam*). When the navy was commanded by the continental-minded ruling elite, it suffered great disasters such as Lepanto, Çeşme, Navarin, Sinop. It was not only the ships that were destroyed but the corporate culture and traditions that were destroyed by the manpower lost in the wars. The yearly expeditions of the Ottoman fleet were not part of an imperial Grand Strategy but aimed at raids for booty when weather and sea conditions permit. The continentalist-minded military leadership saw the Navy as a supportive unit of army corps during the foundation period of the Republic and onwards.

Regarding interaction with other stakeholders, Captain Dalkanat reiterated that the coordination should be done by the General Staff, which plays a role above the civilian leadership and institutions. The General Staff tried to maintain full control of all services, including resource allocation, inspections, training, and operations, as well as oversight of other government agencies. He referred to an interview with the former Chief of General Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu (TESUD, 2019) mentioning the significance of postgraduate education for officers to get themselves prepared for life after retirement. However, thesis topics for postgraduate officers should serve the main goals and interests of the services, that is, be goal oriented. The

attendants also avoided selecting research topics injected by the services as they were unrelated to the research areas of their thesis advisors.

3.15. SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH DR. SITKI EGELİ²⁴³

Dr. Sitki Egeli started with an overview of his professional carrier in the scope of its relevance to defense planning and procurement. During his tenure in the SSM's Directorate for International Affairs, Dr. Egeli had a responsibility to contact the General Staff Headquarters and its services in the context of the PPBS process, as an interface between the General Staff and SSM during the preparations of the SHP and OYTEP. He particularly noted that SSM was not involved in the determination of the procurement model of respective defense projects before the mid-1990s. The General Staff had the sole responsibility for determining the procurement model internally. Later the selected model was transmitted to procurement agencies, be it the Ministry of National Defense, SSM, or the services itself. In this sense, SSM was commonly involved in co-production, unique design, and R&D programs. Starting from the mid-1990s, the SSM was incorporated in the PPBS process, particularly in the staff work aimed at determining the procurement model, and particularly in conjunction with those programs involving in-country industrialization and R&D. Firstly, the joint meetings were held in the General Staff premises, but later the experts from the project groups of the services were also invited to the SSM.

Dr. Egeli particularly noted that the Navy had a visionary look at the force regeneration programs. He recollected more cautious, at times even inquiring attitude of other services when presented with Navy programs involving at force projection assets and platforms, be it in the form of a sea control ship, or an LHD/LHA, or a light aircraft carrier in the context of parochial competition. One of the strategic justifications for defining requirements for the LHD/LHA platform at the time was closely related to the lessons learned from the Bosnian Crisis and the

²⁴³ Sitki Egeli holds degrees from Bosphorus University (BA, Political Science), University of Chicago (MA, Security Studies), and Bilkent University (PhD, International Relations). Beginning his professional career in US, in 1991 he has joined Turkey's Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) where he eventually became the Director for International Affairs. Between 2000 and 2015, he held senior executive position in an international consulting firm. Since 2015, he has been teaching international relations and international security courses at Izmir University of Economics. He has published several books, articles and papers on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, air and missile defense, nuclear deterrence, air power, space security, international arms trade, and export controls.

Somalia expedition where Turkey's involvement and contributions were limited due to the lack of relevant force projection capabilities.

Most of the naval projects were transmitted to the SSM staff with a ready, detailed procurement model. Probably, this signified procurement model being determined at higher echelons, between high-level decision-makers from both SSM and Navy. Also, it should be remembered that at the time, most of the naval platform projects (submarines, frigates, missile boats, patrol boats) were materialized in naval shipyards via the Ministry of National Defense's procurement branch, and not SSM.

One of the most prominent naval programs of the era was the Distant Horizon, which was conveyed to SSM in circa 1994. It was perceived as a solitary surface/subsurface surveillance system of systems, focusing primarily on the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, and without necessarily a blue water component. The underwater and surface surveillance (radar and ESM) components of the Distant Horizon were partly materialized over the years.

Also devised in close conjunction with the Distant Horizon scheme was the National Ship (MİLGEM) - a corvette equipped with surveillance sensors, such as search radars alongside electronic support measures for detection, basically conducting patrolling and reconnaissance, as well as the display of flag tasks in the scope of Distant Horizon. Along with the eventual shift in the procurement model from in-country construction with a foreign design towards indigenous design and construction, the MİLGEM program turned out to be the mainstay of regeneration of the surface combatants with its follow-on TF-100 and TF-2000 variants. In the 1990s, the TF-2000 frigate procurement was seen as a long-term program. It did appear in the SHP, but its design included weaponry and sensors at the technological edge, and the timeline of the program has been stretched through time.

At this point, Dr. Egeli underlined the lack of sufficient coordination between the Navy, the Air Force, and the SSM for a wider, national picture for air and missile defense requirements, including the ballistic missile defense dimension. As such, the air, sea, and land variants of air defense systems were mostly tailored to specific operational needs of respective services, and in a rather independent fashion. A joint procurement model could have met the needs of both services cost-efficiently as practiced by French and Italian navies and their air forces. In this sense, Dr. Egeli stressed the lack of a joint procurement approach and inter-service dialogue for meeting long-range air and missile defense needs of individual services. Moreover, Dr. Egeli

emphasized that the degree of success attained by the Turkish Armed Forces in joint operations (both planning and execution) was not mirrored by joint planning and management of defense procurement activities. This was arguably a result of inter-service competition, plus insufficient familiarity, and experience with such complex procurement planning prior to the post-Cold War period.

Eventually, there appeared more successful examples of such inter-service dialogue, cooperation, and coordination; for instance, the Gezgin National (Cruise) Missile (LACM) project initiated probably during the late-1990s as an exemplary case of “strategic” joint procurement programs, combining similar but distinct requirements of three services, namely land, navy and air force. Such capability held the potential of being used as a part of both coercive and deterrence might at extended distances, when and if required. Naval combatants equipped with Gezgin LACM missiles, particularly submarines would become strategic assets to project force and firepower due to their flexibility and mobility. Furthermore, unlike ballistic missiles that are subjected to strict export, technology, and political constraints, the LACM is bound to create less concern and adverse reactions at the international level. In this regard, the development and deployment of ballistic missiles do not make much operational or cost-efficiency sense unless matched to weapons-of-mass-destruction payloads. The LACM’s mobile, vehicle-mounted land version could be used effectively by the Turkish military if needed, as effectively practiced by Russia, Iran, and even Syria.

All the while, Dr. Egeli underlined his surprise that the Turkish Navy has not brought to the fore earlier an operational and strategic requirement for land-based anti-ship and coastal-defense missiles. Paying tribute to Turkey’s geographic and geostrategic circumstances, such missiles would prove highly practical and valuable in scenarios concerning the Aegean Sea, Black Sea, and the island of Cyprus, both with respect to deterrence and sea denial. He pointed to the Russian’s A2/AD capabilities denying the Black Sea theater and beyond to the Turkish Navy since the annexation of Crimea. Such a threat and capability could have been responded to in kind. It is only through the land-based, truck-mounted variant of the indigenously developed Atmaca system that such capability would be acquired. Atmaca is basically an evolved version of the anti-ship missiles of the 1970s era (i.e., Harpoon, Exocet, or Otomat), yet with more advanced guidance, sensor, and possibly warhead features. In this sense, Atmaca could not be seen as an ultimate solution, but rather the springboard for more advanced capabilities and technologies, i.e., supersonic, and hypersonic anti-shipping missiles.

Considering the increased usage in advanced navies, including the Russian navy in the immediate vicinity, Dr. Egeli stressed the benefits for the Navy (if it has not already done so) to define its prospective strategic needs to grow incrementally from subsonic towards supersonic and hypersonic missiles. He also cautioned of the technological limitations and stumbling blocks in front of hypersonic missiles in fulfilling such tactical roles, e.g., challenges with finding reliable means of guidance and navigation during hypersonic flight.

Another component of the Distant Horizon system was the maritime patrol (MPA) and surveillance aircraft (MSA) procurement program. Despite the MPA component being materialized during the early-2000s through CN-235 aircraft, the MSA surveillance component shaped around ATR-72 aircraft lagged by almost two decades. Dr. Egeli has shared his observation that the Navy's initial perspective for maritime surveillance aircraft has over time transitioned to display similarities with the requirements more relevant for the classical role of MPA. Accordingly, MPA's focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) necessitated certain types of performance parameters and types of propulsion (turboprop). Conversely, requirements of MSA maritime surveillance called for such performance characteristics as long endurance, altitude flight, and crew comfort, which are in fact better served by turbojet propulsion. This point was subsequently validated by several navies' selection in subsequent years of turbojet-powered maritime aircraft to satisfy their needs – e.g., P-8A Poseidon and several Gulfstream variants. Hence, the Turkish Navy's eventual insistence on turbojet propulsion for its MSA surveillance aircraft is probably indicative of a shift in its cadres' perspective, away from the original objectives of the Distant Horizon program and blue water, and in favor of more traditional, conservative, brown-water strategic thinking pertaining to maritime aviation. Indeed, had a turbojet-powered, long-endurance maritime surveillance aircraft be available now, there is little doubt it would have served perfectly in the context of the current contingencies and operations involving the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. Hence, MSA is probably one dimension in which Distant Horizon vision has diverged significantly from its original blue water goals, fell short in catching up with evolving contingencies.

Regarding the coverage area of the Distant Horizon System, Dr. Egeli pointed to its extension in parallel with the reach of the Navy and the expansion of Turkey's areas of interest, from the Mediterranean to Indian and Atlantic Oceans, and lately reaching up to the Arctic Circle in the scope of NATO exercises. Dr. Egeli remarked that such extension of the Distant Horizon towards far-off blue waters went farther beyond its initial scope and objectives. Without a shred

of doubt, such a feat was possible and achievable thanks to the relevant infrastructure, manpower, and experience that was triggered and acquired over the years via Distant Horizon, as well as the larger blue water and force projection vision set forth by the Turkish Navy during the 1990s.

In a final analysis regarding the achievement of the Navy's 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy set in the 1990s, Dr. Egeli pointed out the regeneration of the fleet both in size and capabilities, as well as its sustainment at longer distances for longer durations with afloat logistic capacity. Yet, he also noted the shortcomings in maritime patrol and surveillance capacity apparent in performance and much-delayed delivery of CN-235 and ATR-72 aircraft.

Looking to the future, Dr. Egeli underlined the difficulties in the sustainability and replacement of the current fleet of surface combatants, due to the aging of platforms in the midterm. He contends that the current focus appears to concentrate on the practice of replacing obsolete surface platforms with similar ones encompassing more advanced technologies. But innovative approaches factoring in operational, geostrategic, and technological circumstances of three or four decades from now on is a real intellectual and organizational challenge, and they may not indeed be incorporated in current thinking. Future combatants and doctrines shaped around stealth, all-electric ship, autonomous singular and swarms of undersea/surface/air vehicles, directed energy, quantum sensors, and hypersonic weapons are some examples at stake. He noted perhaps it is in existence and hidden from public eyes, but he has not so far observed a prospective visionary study like the one conducted during the 1990s. The 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy put forward in the 1990s has enabled the Navy to be on a higher level of power hierarchy, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. Dr. Egeli suggested that it would be prudent to focus on new maritime approaches and strategies envisaging the maritime security environment in the surrounding seas for the long term, i.e., next twenty to forty years, so as to determine Turkish Navy's future strategic needs aligned with the country's financial realities and paying due tribute to its weak and strong spots in R&D and emerging technologies, its logistic infrastructure, and human resources and institutional postures.

3.16 SYNOPSIS OF THE INTERVIEW WITH CEM YAYLALI

Devrim Yaylalı started the interview with the stimulants initiated his interest in combat ships, particularly the history of wars. He noted taking pictures of the ships of the US Sixth Fleet

visiting İstanbul, comprising of a *Ticonderoga*-class destroyer, *USS Belknap*, and *USS Iowa*. He sent photos to *Jane's* magazine, subscribed to it.

As for the historical past, he has highlighted what the navy has taken from the Barbaros era to today's practices and traditions. The corsairs of northwest Africa were mostly adventurers and later subordinated to the Ottoman navy. The annual spring deployments of the Ottoman navy can be considered as an example.

He linked the strategy in the context of defining the course of a warship for navigation and considered the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy as an analogy to the course of the Navy. Although Russia's aggressive policy has been outlined and implemented, he has questioned the validity of the 2015 strategy in today's changing security environment. However, Russia's increasing presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria, the Libyan civil war, and the energy enigma in the Eastern Mediterranean were out of the question at the time the 2015 strategy was designed.

Regarding the period after the ending of the Cold War, Turkey benefited from the US military aid in building up a navy. Every grant has payback as in the case of Johnson's letter of 1964. The Navy woke up earlier from the relaxation of the Cold War due to its intense involvement in technologies onboard. One of the reasons for this early awakening was the shorter, in a way somewhat informal, chain of command in warships compared to its sister services. The tactical (in some cases operational) commander is mostly in one of the units at the theatre of operations and subjected to the same sea and weather conditions as well as 'living at the same boat'. He recollected seeing an indigenously built fire control device '*Vatos*' on board a museum submarine in Gölcük. He related such a device to the Navy's investment in graduate education in science and technology. The educated human resources of the Navy enabled incremental indigenous designs such as K5, GENESİS, and ADVENT. Such consciousness amalgamated with strategic vision triggered the Navy's orienting to in-country shipbuilding with joint ventures like *Ay/Preveze/Gür*-class submarine, *Doğan/Kılıç* class fast attack craft, and MEKO-class frigates. Through these endeavors, the Navy had the experience to reflect its system and weaponry needs within the confines of political objectives and financial means. The technological dependence on the supplier in maintaining and upgrading the ship's systems besides overt and covert embargos imposed was hampering the Navy's combat and material

readiness. Along with the confidence and experience accumulated, the Navy changed its route towards in-country combat ship and building (MILGEM) as well as indigenous ship system and weaponry development for promoting its self-sufficiency.

Whilst acknowledging the contribution of engineering-based naval education, Devrim Yaylalı criticized the lack of social sciences particularly international relations programs in the Naval Academy since the Navy has inherent part of diplomacy as a foreign policy tool both in naval and gunboat diplomacy.

Yaylalı pointed out the success, continuity, and repeatability criteria with a system-based approach regarding the achievement of 'Towards Blue Waters' targets; the designed plan should include the desired destination, what to do there, and the added value of reaching the destination. Such a scheme corresponds to the operational concept for a ship/task group, a strategy for a navy, and a grand strategy for a state.

Yaylalı also commented on the construction of the multi-purpose landing platform *TCG Anadolu*, which is mostly seen as an aircraft carrier. Rather, he saw it as lessons learned from the 2011 Libya Evacuation Operation. The naval and civilian ships entering ports under potential threat were covered by air sorties refueling in-flight and a naval task group. A platform like *TCG Anadolu* would be the right platform for the operations-other-than-war (OOTW), including evacuations as implemented by Italy in the Libyan case, and other humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. He designated *TCG Anadolu* as a benign part of Turkey's soft power.

Regarding the inclusion of this capacity in the strategies of 1997 and 2015, Yaylalı drew attention to the deployment of the French *Mistral*-class LHA in Beirut with fully loaded aid materials within nine days immediately after President Macron's visit immediately after the Beirut explosion on August 4th, 2020. Although the Egyptian navy had two *Mistral*-class ships that could be found in Beirut before France, Egypt did not attempt a similar mission, as it was neither in the operational concept of the ship nor the strategy of the Navy. The inclusion of these taskings makes a navy more effective and visible, which eventually translated to the nation's reputation and prestige.

In this regard, Yaylalı pointed to the prominence of a tall ship as a school ship. In addition to crowning the maritime and command qualities of a naval officer, a tall ship will have a striking effect, representing the standing and reputation of an advanced maritime nation during port visits. Additionally, Yaylalı attached great prominence to the building of salvage and submarine rescue ships, *TCG Işın*, *TCG Akın* and *TCG Alemdar* which had export potential as much as MİLGEM.

Regarding the TF-2000 project, Yaylalı commented that these capabilities should not be a hostage of technological determinism and insistence. Therefore, ÇAFRAD, its main component, is still under development, awaiting the development of Gallium Nitrate technology. Instead, the program could have been incrementally started with the US (AN-SPY-1X-SM-2/SM-6) or its European (APAR/EMPAR/Sampson-Aster/PAAMS) variants on board while the indigenous radar, missile, and software design and development would have been underway. While the Navy could gain experience in using air defense destroyers, indigenously developed technologies could be fitted to later ships of the party, and ships originally built could later be upgraded to indigenous technologies.

Regarding technology development, Yaylalı stated that the success of the Navy in national design and shipbuilding enabled it to cope with technology transfer constraints. Regarding technology development, Yaylalı asserted that the success of the Navy in national design and shipbuilding enabled it to cope with technology transfer constraints. Considering the risks and effects in the public and political sphere, he pointed to the Navy's cautious decision with a relatively small ship, such as a corvette, rather than an ambitious ship such as air defense destroyers.

While remarking on the strategic significance of the submarine program, Yaylalı applauded the Navy's involvement in the design of the *Reis*-class which corrected the problems encountered by the Greek navy despite the substantial delay in its materialization.

Concerning self-sufficiency in the defense industrial base, Yaylalı stated its contribution to the strategic autonomy of Turkey in using such weaponry without any foreign pressure as well as its export potential. However, he criticized the advertisement of 'immature' prototypes as proven products to the domestic audience. While such behavior awakens the suppliers of the

critical foreign technologies used in them to limit their supply, they also disappoint the internal audience due to the long industrialization periods. Yaylalı also drew attention to the lack of development of propulsion systems for land, sea, and air platforms, which hinders the industrialization of main programs.

As for the achievement of the envisaged force posture in the 1997 strategy, Yaylalı remarked that the current level could be considered relatively successful considering the procurement model mainly predicated on self-sufficiency. In comparison to the Republic of Korea, Yaylalı brought to fore the improved level of satellite technologies of the South Koreans compared to the level of the Turkish peers despite both countries started in the same era. The same assessment holds for the technological level of the Navy and air force but the South Korean's choice of strategic dependence on the US is the main driver of their advancement whereas Turkey prefers self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy.

Regarding the current operational profile and tempo of the Navy, Yaylalı reminded the continuity and repeatability criteria and added: In this regard, a standing question is how long the presence operations in the Eastern Mediterranean could be sustained considering the material and personnel fatigue. In the Clausewitzian world, war is the continuation of politics by other means. Resorting to hard power as a policy tool should not be the only option. Turkey does not have the luxury of making enemies of all neighboring countries but instead should establish friendly groups and alliances. The balanced use of military and diplomatic tools can ensure the continuity and consistency of political behavior on the ground. As a final comment, Yaylalı pointed out that the maritime strategy should be revised due to the changing security panorama and developing technologies, that is, a new route should be drawn for the Navy.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL INTERVIEWS

The interviews provided valuable inputs to understand the origins, development, and implementation from a comprehensive perspective. The interviews were also used to crosscheck the material available in the literature. An overall analysis of the interviews is as follows:

The coincidence of the crafting of the 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy with the liberalization of the Turkish economy reflects the changing worldview of the Turkish political and military elite, particularly after the fall of the Wall. The emerging security dynamics forced Turkey to review its national security and defense policies including the restructuring of the military organization. Emerging both in low- and high-end, new tasks began to change the conduct of military operations, as well as combating domestic terrorism and dealing with the Greek threat.

Traditionally adopting the Mahanist School, the Navy responded to reform incentives earlier than its sister services, due to its inherent flexibility and mobility covering a wider range of new missions. The Navy participated in stabilization operations, either as part of the NATO-led multilateral task groups or as part of the coalition forces. Since NATO is a maritime alliance, it has been instrumental in turning the Navy towards blue waters.

Many interviews pointed out the lack of maritime vision and awareness in the Turkish states and the public. Being an autarchic state limited the economic interests of the Turks from the exploitation of the seas, especially maritime trade. The Turks have never become a maritime nation or a seapower. Their interest in the maritime domain was mostly limited to the security of seaborne trade and haj routes as well as the maintenance of the connectivity to its overseas provinces. The Navy mostly operated in tandem with the Army for safeguarding the maritime flank while the Army was attacking.

The Ottoman failure to capture the Renaissance and Enlightenment ultimately reflected their inability to follow developments in the industrial revolution. Foreign advisory missions were instrumental in shaping the mentality of the Ottoman and Turkish naval elite. However, their influence remained limited at the tactical and training level, as their main idea was to keep the Ottoman navy at a controllable level without disturbing the regional balance of power. Many

of the Ottoman naval institutions were created by imitating the Royal Navy, including the education and training organization. Resultantly, the Ottoman naval intelligentsia developed a Mahanist culture.

Ottoman naval heritage has also been instrumental in the Navy's look to the prospective security environment. While the naval elite was proud of the victorious era of the Ottoman navy, they were mindful of naval disasters and land losses. The lessons learned from the fleet of Sultan Abdülaziz's era were that if the fleet consisted of ships built in various countries, it could not be sustained and operated without technological infrastructure and manpower. Despite its poor combat power, Sultan Abdülhamid II kept the fleet inoperative and detained it in the Golden Horn due to its involvement in the overthrow of his elder brother. The Sultan did not heed the fleet commanders and the foreign consultants' call for restructuring. As a result, the Navy proved inefficient against the Greek and Italian navies in-field testing, resulting in the loss of overseas territories and Aegean islands. The national campaign to build a fleet under the auspices of the Ottoman Naval Society failed to achieve its goals due to the outbreak of the First World War. Again, the Navy could not be effective against the Entente Armada in the naval defense of the homeland. These experiences "traumatically" inscribed to the memories of the naval officers as territorial and prestige losses. The inefficiency of the Navy in the late Ottoman Empire, combined with its relatively modest contribution to the War of Independence, made it difficult to regain its position within the military and political leadership of the Land Forces, despite the support of its founder, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In the light of this understanding, the Navy has been restructured as a littoral combat force mainly seen as a supporting unit for the land forces.

In fact, the Navy's role stayed as it had been after the accession of Turkey to NATO. What was changed was the newer platforms transferred and the new training and exercise opportunities in line with NATO taskings. The socialization of naval personnel with NATO counterparts in exercises and joint headquarters to NATO standards and operational procedures has radically changed the Navy's strategic calculations and operational behavior. The Navy adopted its NATO acquis to its national force and operational planning. The organizational identity of the navy has developed in parallel with NATO's maritime perspective, that is, sea control and protection of maritime trade.

Important input from NATO procedures was the adoption of the NATO defense planning process. While the Army and the Air force preferring the operations and infrastructure development posts in NATO edifices, the Navy assigned its officers to plans policy posts in NATO. Interestingly, all three admirals that form the basis of the Navy's strategic orientation were posted at NATO Headquarters and then at the General Staff Headquarters. They were also influential in establishing the national PPBS and the promulgation of its guiding documents, namely, the National Policy Document and the Military Strategic Concept. All interviewees commended the contribution of the NATO experience to the Navy's transformation in all fields. However, Admiral Özbey underlined that NATO and US contributions were influential in a technical, tactical, and operational context, but not in strategy development. He also stated that NATO and the United States reformed the Turkish military to make the best use of its weapons on the ground, so as not to advance strategic planning towards its goals, as in foreign advisory missions. The Navy's transformation towards blue waters has been "an untoward consequence" for the US and NATO. The interviewees (with naval background) also stressed the assignment of graduate officers in the Naval Academy and Staff College to transmit their knowledge to the cadets and attendants.

The participation of the navy in NATO standing groups has increased its high maritime capacity and logistical support for longer periods over longer distances. NATO also gave the Navy flag officers a chance to command multinational task groups. NATO activities were a test setting for assessing the combat and material readiness of the participating Turkish troops. Nowadays, the Turkish warships are partaking in NATO exercises in the High North while Turkey has applied for membership in the Arctic Council.

All interviews agreed on the role of the eruption of the Cyprus Crises in the Navy's pivoting to the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Navy endeavored to build an amphibious capacity, including landing vehicles and naval infantry. Strategic calculus and operational planning altered accordingly to this aim. In this era, Turkey changed its defense procurement model by diversifying its suppliers, in-country naval shipbuilding via joint ventures, and establishing a domestic industrial base. The Navy's basing and organization changed in accord with its pivoting to the high seas.

With regard to the Navy's education system, the interviewees appreciated the adoption of the US education system, which corresponds to a universal undergraduate degree curriculum, based not only on vocational training but on engineering and science. Besides, the Navy sent its best abroad for postgraduate education and staff courses. Postgraduates have broadened the Navy's strategic perspective and technological level. The educated manpower was influential in developing the technological base of the Navy in accord with universal practices. The Navy was more adaptive to imitate modern technologies and tactical developments. Here, the Navy's achievement was stemmed from sending its best Naval Academy graduates after a certain ship duty to graduate education on engineering and science. But its sister services relied on civilian university graduates employed in their technological edifice without a tactical background in operations. The blending of scientific and technological knowledge with tactical experience enabled the Navy to establish an R&D base for their needs, from ship design to software and weapon development. The product of this approach has borne fruit in the design and construction of MİLGEM and the development of combat software and hardware. In summary, the Navy's science and engineering-based education has been the trigger of its innovative, adaptable, and visionary approach to reformation, along with its investment in graduate manpower.

As for the creation of the strategic mentality of naval officers, all interviewees acknowledged the input by Captain Mert Bayat who was their instructor in the Naval Academy and Naval War College. Captain Mert Bayat's teachings set 'a nationalized and Turkified Mahanist strategic mindset' in maturing the organizational essence of the Navy towards blue waters. Admiral Afif Büyüktuğrul writings and teachings were instrumental in transferring past experiences to the present in a course that went to the open seas.

All Admirals also shared the political impact of the *Denizkurdu*-1998 Exercise when the Navy implemented its blue water strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean for its wargaming with the support of the air forces and made port visits in Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Northern Cyprus. They also commended the deployment of the Turkish Maritime Task Group in 2010, 2011, and 2014. Also, they remarked that the real-life exemplars of 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy have been the deployment of the Fleet for *Mavi Vatan*-2019 and *Denizkurdu*-2019 Exercises. Moreover, its current naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean can be seen in this context. In summary, what was envisioned twenty years ago is now being implemented.

Admiral Feyyaz Ögütçü underlined the importance of the 1992 Somali mission, which can be considered as the first power projection in the Indian Ocean after the Korean War. He also pointed out the importance of the Distant Horizon project in opening their eyes, making it easier for the Navy to head towards the high seas. Admiral Deniz Cora, emphasizing the old *Perry*-class frigates' contribution to blue water missions due to their durability in open seas, commented on the *M/V Avrasya* incident, which can be considered the first counter-terrorism operation of its kind when he was the commander of the *TCG Akdeniz*.

Like all his colleagues, Admiral Engin Baykal stressed the importance of naval leadership's improved relationship and interaction with other civilian institutions: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in case of maritime affairs and foreign contacts and with the Defense Procurement Agency (SSM) in management of modernization ventures, and Treasury Undersecretariat in case of financing the long-term ship procurement projects.

While acknowledging the role of visionary maritime leaders, all interviewees emphasized that the main drivers of the resilience and consistency of change are the Navy's commitment to trained manpower, investment in R&D, as well as institutionalized defense planning. They also drew attention to the importance of coherent mechanisms in decision-making that facilitate the involvement of experts such as the Council of Commanders, the Admirals' Board, and the Weapons and Equipment Group.

All interviewees applauded the current operational conduct of the Navy, but they also expressed their concerns about material and personnel fatigue. Considering the loss of experienced manpower due to the judicial attacks and the subsequent coup attempt, they assessed the combat and material readiness reflected operations sea operations and sizable exercises as “remarkable”. The navy's determination to clear malignant elements while maintaining its operational pace was also appreciated. They were considerate about the cultivation of the Navy's personnel after the close-up of naval schools, particularly an admission and education system led by the civilian officials of the Ministry of National Defense under strict political supervision.

Regarding the force structure achieved as of today in the context of the relevant strategies, the interviewees acknowledged that the level reached so far was “successful” in achieving the

envisaged force targets. While appreciating the interim measures to maintain the regional naval balance (*Knox, Perry, Aviso, Eridan*-class ship transfers) and the realization of newer projects MİLGEM, GENESIS/ADVENT/Atmaca/Akya, LCT/LST/LHD, they expressed concerns about delays in major programs such as TF-2000, TF-100, and Meltem MPA/MSA. Such delays run the risk of hampering the Navy's combat and material preparation in the medium and long term, given the naval build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Devrim Yaylalı criticized the Navy's technological insistence on indigenous design for ÇAFRAD, which is the main component of the TF-2000 destroyer. He suggested that a hybrid procurement model based on a foreign system in the first phase could facilitate the earlier implementation of regional air defense capacity, while local designs fit the next ships of the program. Dr. Sıtkı Egeli pointed to the extension of the Distant Horizon's coverage in parallel with the Navy's operational reach. As a flaw from the Distant Horizon vision, he criticized the Navy's MPA/MSA supply for choosing better aircraft for patrolling rather than surveillance for both missions. Dr. Egeli emphasized that the success of jointness on the operations side (planning and conduct) has not mirrored in scale to joint defense planning and procurement (due to inter-service competition). He pointed to the utilization of the Gezgin and Atmaca's portable land version could also be used effectively by the Turkish Armed Forces if needed, as practiced by Russia and Greece. Considering the increased usage in advanced navies, including the Russian navy in the immediate vicinity, Dr. Egeli stressed the urgency for the Navy to define its prospective strategic need incrementally from supersonic towards hypersonic missiles.

The 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy put forward in the 1990s has enabled the Navy to be on a higher level of power hierarchy, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean. Dr. Egeli suggested that the Navy should work on a new strategy envisaging the maritime security environment in the surrounding seas for the long term, i.e., next twenty years to determine its future strategic needs within potential financial limits, including R&D in emerging technologies, logistic infrastructure, organizational posture.

In summary, without political momentum, the visionary leadership of the Navy, supported by talented Admirals and staff, has adapted a versatile education and training system to obtain the human resources needed, developing a right-sized force structure, to be a blue water navy. Moreover, the Navy promoted its standing and effectiveness by partaking in international endeavors for global peace, by improving its operational and readiness to meet the demanding

tempo of the era, by improving bases and relevant logistic infrastructure to support the fleet, and by investing in research for preparation to emerging technologies. Undoubtedly, the findings of the research to date are credited with the visionary and important contributions of Admiral Vural Bayazit, Admiral Güven Erkaya, and Admiral Özden Örnek during their mission to guide the Navy towards the blue waters. The Commander's commitment to this goal, along with other admirals, officers, and personnel, should also be considered. As a result, the Navy sought to translate its acquis into a 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy, without a clear political mandate from the government or order from higher levels of command.



ANNEX C

NAVAL DEVELOPMENT TRENDS VIA PESTEL ANALYSIS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the world sea power, particularly its naval element, has undergone a drastic change. The sudden disappearance of the Soviet Union prompted many governments to reassess their perceptions of threat and risk. Many governments assumed that the epoch of great-power rivalry and major-power wars finally came to an end and cut the previous levels of military spending. They diverted their funds to other areas, such as housing, education, and health care by exploiting the ‘peace dividend’. However, the crises that emerged in the post-Cold War era turned out the security environment to something, but not peaceful. NATO also recalibrated its main mission from “collective defense” to “collective security”. (Xhambazi, 2017). Many of the western states and their allies around the globe took part in the low-intensity warfare or fought adversaries that posed a relatively limited threat. They engaged in activities such as combined-arms warfare, effects-based operations, and coercive airstrikes against a series of state and non-state actors in the disguise of peace enforcement, building or keeping operations as well as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance (Stöhs, 2018b).

During the post-Cold War era, many countries reviewed their military posture and redesigned their force structures in accordance with the evolving security perception. As for the navies, two approaches emerged at both ends of the spectrum. On the one end, rather than on the upholding of the “international system”, modern navies have been restructured taking into account a set of assumptions about the required capabilities and roles in which national concerns prevail over the collaborative goal and focus on the defense and immediate interests of the country. Postmodern navies, on the other hand, have been reorganized to secure globalization by protecting trade and preserving the conditions on land that make trade possible. Indeed, these roles also require strategic reach and a range of skills covering the full spectrum of conflict. (Till, 2018, pp. 45-49).

Due to prevailing circumstances, most navies exhibit a mixture of both approaches by placing themselves in the continuum of possibility between modern (competitive) at one end and post-modern (collaborative) at the other end. In fact, their status on the scale is decided “by their doctrinal and other policy declarations (in what they say), by the structure and nature of their fleet (in what they’ve got) and by the nature of their operations (in what they do)”. The balance in these approaches can change as the security context alters in a given time for a state (Ibid, p. 57).

Following the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the security agenda expanded to encompass a variety of threats and risks, including non-military ones, such as economic threats, illegal smuggling, humanitarian aid, international crime, terrorism, piracy. This trend eventually became the transformative discourse, that is, the projection of security beyond one's own borders, to tackle risks and threats as far as possible, at the source, as soon as possible. In his analysis, Basil Germond argues that this dominant discourse shifted the focus of naval missions to projection operations and that most small and medium-sized navies naturally, whether independent or in a coalition, follow a linear evolutionary path to have greater projection potential (2014, pp. 45-46). Overall, small- and medium-sized navies have tended to integrate into the multilateral frameworks and coalitions of a kind, and to contribute to the general effort, consisting of projecting security and securing the liberal order.

Accordingly, Jeremy Stöhs (2018b) confirms this strategic change in power projection, stabilization operations, expedition capabilities, and out-of-area deployments in his analysis of post-Cold War naval development trends.

This analysis specifically focuses on the time frame in which the paradigm shift in defense and security perception took place from the end of the Cold War to the September 11 attacks, that is, the period 1990-2000. During this period, the Turkish Navy manifested its shift of orientation towards high seas which had already been underway since the mid-1980s (Dz.K.K., 1997). As summarized above, the same trend may also apply to many of the small- and medium-sized European, African, and South Asian navies as well. In this study, it is argued that the tendency to have blue-water capabilities, which include power projection, stability operations, expeditionary capabilities, and out-of-area deployments, is the main discourse of the period. Therefore, the development of selected navies is analyzed to search and reveal the similarity patterns in the naval modernization using the PESTEL methodology.

In the selection of analyzed states, three broad criteria were considered. The first criterium is the membership to the G-20 (Group of Twenty) forum as an indication of economic development (Spain is a permanent invitee of the G-20 whereas Pakistan and Thailand not). The second one is the ranking of the navies in the Lindberg-Todd Classification List (Kirchberger, 2012) as a blue-water navy in ranks designated as either 'regional power projection ability (Germany, the Netherlands, South Korea, South Africa, Australia, Pakistan, Turkey, Canada)' or 'multi-regional power projection ability (Italy and Spain)' as well as their

declared ambitions to be one (Thailand which has had a light aircraft carrier in its inventory), as a sign of naval might. The third one is to have an indicative regional representation of the countries' navies in line with the 'Pivot to Asia' policy, which is the shift of the economic and military center of gravity from the North West to South East.



2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN NAVY

2.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

2.1.1. Government Policy and Political Support for Naval Build-up

After the Second World War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) remained in the US sphere of influence and adopted a state-led capitalist economy. The government was controlled by the army through a series of quasi-military dictatorships until the early 1990s. After the election of the first civilian leader and the reduction of the army's influence in the government circles, South Korea has had a better appreciation of the integrated conventional and maritime security due to the strategic realities of the post-Cold War maritime environment and its economic growth. In this context, a conscious decision was made to pursue more naval power in the 1990s due to the increasing importance of the sea, the changing political landscape in East Asia, and the desire to take a firmer stance in the regional security architecture. (Bowers, 2014).

The defense paper released by the government suggested a more encompassing security posture, from 'conventional deterrence' towards a policy of 'comprehensive security' policy. It formed the basis of the *Sunshine* policy of following administrations, aiming to be "a responsible regional and global stakeholder, be capable of acting independently on the world stage"²⁴⁴. South Korean Navy was framed as "a necessary element of being a globalized nation". Despite the opposition of the army-dominated Ministry of Defense, political support was given by the Presidency. President Kim, Young-sam, approved a plan for the creation of a navy with greater capabilities and new responsibilities such as protecting the regional maritime trade routes and contributing to multinational humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts. His successor, Roh, Moo-hyun, placed the navy at the center of his plan to promote regional cooperation while at the same time shielding the country from possible regional controversy. Later, President Kim Dae-jung announced a plan to build a "Strategic Mobile Fleet" for "the

²⁴⁴ The content of this policy resembles the Turkish Navy's pursuit of enhanced ability to contribute to peacekeeping/stability operations.

protection of the national interests in the five oceans in the world and the contribution to the world peace (Ibid., 2014).

However, President Lee, Myung-bak, a more conservative politician prioritized deterrence and sovereignty protection against North Korea in the 2012 Defense Paper after the sinking of Cheonan and the shelling of Yeopyeong.

2.1.2. Threat Perception and military considerations

Traditionally, South Korean Navy was given a supporting role for the Army against North Korea and concentrated on the protection of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). It was mainly tasked with denying national maritime jurisdictions against a numerically superior North Korean Navy. By focusing on the littoral, the South Korean Navy was relied on the US Navy to protect its maritime interests on the high seas.

Currently, potential causes of conflict in the region, such as long-standing historical tensions, territorial disputes, and resource competition, pose significant challenges to South Korea's maritime interests. South Korea has considered a more assertive China with growing regional aspirations and an increasingly 'normalized' Japan with the uncertain military role-historical relationship in the context of its defense strategy. In this context, alongside the traditional security threat posed by North Korea, the Navy considered unconventional risks and threats in a regional context, such as the establishment of EEZs and the protection of sovereignty. Its maritime sovereignty disputes included the delimitation of EEZs as well as the continental shelves, and disputes on the status of Dok-do island with Japan, and Ieo-do submerged rocks with China. With the historical fear of domination and its relatively smaller size compared to its neighbors, the Navy aspired to develop a powerful force to match at least with Japan for protecting its own interests within its own territory and conduct sea area defense and sea lane protection with submarines. (Lee, 2013).

In this context, the Mobile Fleet concept forms the basis of the Navy's ocean-going goals. It is an autonomous force that can protect South Korea's shipping and also respond to crises around the peninsula. Three KDX-III Aegis and six KDX-II destroyers are the first Navy components that can provide true, multi-functional, multi-mission capability in this regard. (Ibid., 2014).

For South Korea, the symbolic nature of naval power means that the development of naval forces is seen as essential to its development and existence as an Asian power and a globalized nation, promoting its international standing and prestige.

In the scope of collaborative maritime security, the relatively small size of the Navy's modern blue water capable fleet has limited its commitment. Even a ship used for multinational operations can reduce the amount of firepower that can be used in a peninsula or regional emergency by a significant margin. Due to its traditional sensitivity to deploying forces abroad, South Korea only contributed to the UN peacekeeping operations or made non-kinetic contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bowers, 2014).

2.1.3. Maritime Claims

South Korea is a signatory of the 1982 UNCLOS III. The maritime border between North and South Korea is a matter of concern due to the peninsula's divided status. The ROK also should settle the boundary delimitations in the South China Sea with China and Japan.

2.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

2.2.1. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

Statistics showed that the South Korean economy grew by more than ten percent per year from 1980 to 1990, as of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and increased almost five times from 65 billion to 279 billion USD, respectively. Then it gradually slowed down to 6 percent annually by doubling to 562 billion USD in 2000 due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Merchandise trade remained between 50 to 60 percent over the same period. Economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military spending. As a percentage of GDP, military spending fell from 6.0 percent in 1980 and 4.0 percent in 1990 to 2.5 percent in 2000. However, military spending in USD rose from 4.0 billion in 1980 to 10.1 billion in 1990 and then to 13.8 billion in 2000. In sum, South Korea also benefitted from the export-driven economy of the globalization era and relatively enjoyed the peace dividend of the post-Cold War era due to the requirement of watching over the capacity of North Korea by allocating more funds to the military modernization. (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

In the same period, South Korea's maritime activity began to grow exponentially, coupled with the high growth rate of foreign trade, the scarcity of natural resources needed to feed a thriving manufacturing economy, and the growing demand for seafood among the population.

2.2.2. Maritime Interests

South Korea's maritime interests can be broadly divided into shipbuilding (22.6 million gross tons as of 2017), 81,000 tons of merchant fleet in 2016, resource procurement, exploration and exploitation of subsea energy resources, and marine life stocks. But fishing only accounts for about one percent of the country's GDP.

99.7 percent of the country's imports and exports by volume and 76 percent by value are carried out by sea, accounting for about 85 percent of GDP. South Korea is the world's fifth-largest crude oil importer and the third-largest importer of coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) due to a lack of energy resources. All hydrocarbon imports are mostly by sea from the Middle East. South Korea imports all its crude oil, 90 percent of raw materials, and 73 percent of the food.

The ratio of South Korea's coastal length to its total area is around 128 meters per square meter.

2.3. SOCIAL FACTORS

2.3.1. Historical Background

The Korean naval history dates to the wars during the unification of the mainland, which were recorded in the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms of Korea-Baekje, Goguryeo, and Silla. At that time, the Korean fleet protected the homeland from Japanese pirate attacks. Later, a combined fleet of Korean and Chinese ships sunk a large Japanese fleet and ended a seven-year war in the Korean homeland. Heavy steel-clad Korean 'turtle' warriors were very effective in combat. (Koda, 2010).

2.3.2. Population growth and Age distribution

The growth rate of the population diminished gradually from 1.6 in 1980 and 1.0 in 1990 to 0.8 percent in 2000, resulting in higher percentages in the working force of South Korea from 62.0 in 1980 and 70 in 1990 and to 72.3 in 2000. The percentage of men eligible for the industry and the military has increased positively, although it also indicates that the population is aging. (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

2.3.3. Cultural trends

The benefits of sea power did not find a basis in Korean culture, and the attitudes and orientations of the policy elite and the wider population were fundamentally continentalist.

The people of South Korea are somehow not concerned with the improvement of certain defense issues to some extent, but they do not apply electoral pressure in making defense decisions. The presidency is imperial in nature and sets the agenda for military reform and operational posture.

2.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

2.4.1. Increased training to use innovation.

The trademark applications have been sky-rocketed in these two decades, tripling from 13500 in 1980 to 46800 in 1990 and then rising to 110000 in 2000.

The growth of high-tech exports increased from 11 billion USD in 1990 to 54 billion USD in 2000; this was linked with investment in education and research (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

2.4.2. Emerging Technologies

The shipbuilding industry competes with China. South Korea, a member of the G20, has become one of the world's largest exporters.

2.4.3. Maturity of technologies

During the 1970s, South Korea developed a national defense strategy to build a self-sufficient national defense capacity. According to this plan, South Korea started to build its fleet of 2,000-ton *Ulsan*-class frigates and 1,000-ton *Pohang*-class corvettes domestically, using domestic technology and industrial capacity.

In the late 1980s, naval modernization started with the introduction of new weaponry, high technology, and in-country shipbuilding. As its first-generation submarine, the Navy favored the German Type 209 submarines. In a licensed production model, the first boat was built in Germany and the remaining three boats were constructed in South Korea. As for submarine rescue capability, the Navy transferred two ships from the US and built one domestically. As for destroyers, the Navy replaced six of eleven US-built destroyers with three KDX-I units equipped with improved combat systems and *Lynx* helicopter. Moreover, it replaced the legacy fleet of fast attack bots by building multiple locally designed *Sea Dolphin* classes and *Wildcat*-class fast attack boats. The Navy also developed new doctrines and training systems to keep its fleet combat ready. Mine countermeasures and amphibious capabilities also improved accordingly. In sum, the Navy modernized its fleet both in quality and quantity before the end of the 1990s. Ultimately, the then Chief of Naval Operations declared the goal of becoming a blue-water navy (Koda, 2010).

2.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

2.5.1. Climate and weather

The marine environment of the Korean peninsula is one of the most hostile regions in the world, with severe winters, monsoon summer storms, rising summer heat, and cold and snow in the

winter. All ships should be built to withstand these standards and to cooperate on safety issues throughout the year (Jacobs, 2005, s. 38).

2.5.2. Geographical location (and accessibility)

South Korea, a geostrategic peninsula, has a coastline of 2,413 kilometers and relies on the ocean as both a provider of essential materials and a facilitator of its export-driven economy (Bowers, 2014). Stuck between China and Japan and surrounded on three sides by the sea, Korea and later South Korea have a surprisingly ambiguous relationship with the East Asian maritime area. With the Sea of Japan to the east, the Yellow Sea to the west, and the East China Sea to the south, it is reasonable to assume that Korea should be an important naval power in whatever form.

2.6. ASSESSMENT

The Navy launched an initiative for a high seafaring navy by pronouncing it in the speeches of the top brass on various occasions and projecting it into naval modernization plans. The ‘Blue Water Navy (BWN)’ was first defined in 1995 and was included in the letter of the Defense Paper 1995.

Although the initiative did not find support from the defense ministry and joint staff circles, it was appreciated and adopted by the then-president of the time as an indicator of a developing nation and a tool of foreign policy doctrine against Japan. That is, top politicians were instrumental in steering the process. The threat perception stemming from either North Korea or China and Japan did not satisfactorily justify the blue water naval build-up. It was not also justified as a sign of aggressive foreign policy or as an internal balancing act resulting from the declining US commitment to South Korea.

Economic growth and technological progress may be supportive, but not driving factors unrelated to any positive relationship between economic growth and defense spending of the period under review. Policymakers and defense industry contractors did not have incentives for lobbying due to the closed nature of the defense acquisition process. In general, the organizational culture of the navy that evolved through socialization with the world navies revealed a blue water initiative to define, protect and promote the navy's identity and essence.

The reinforcement of support for the initiative resulted in the fulfillment of the Navy vision, as political leaders and people associate South Korea's national identity and international position with the blue water navy. (Lee, 2013, s. 144-146).

At the turn of the millennium, the Navy had 3 KDX-I frigates, nine *Ulsan*-class corvettes, nine Type 209 submarines, four LSTs, and a fleet support ship as part of its blue water component. As of 2018, the Navy has three KDX-I, six KDX-II, and three KDX-III frigates, eight *Ulsan*- and six *Incheon*-class corvettes, an LPH, eight LSTs, 16 Type 209/214 submarines, and three fleet support ships. They were part of the blue water capacity achieved by the South Korean Navy's ongoing ambitious modernization program.



3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROYAL THAI NAVY

3.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

3.1.1. Government Policy and Political Support for Naval Build-up

Throughout its history, Thailand had not been colonized. Being wary of any situation, domestic and foreign, that has been conceived as a threat to its foreign policy, Thailand has always kept itself in line with the strongest hand in the region (Naidu, 2001).

During the Cold War, Thailand was a front-line state in fear of immediate aggression and occupation, but that threat perception was later deemed distant. However, there is a growing concern about maritime resources and claims.

Due to strategic and political considerations, the Thai military remains an army-dominated institution relegating its navy to a second priority. Reportedly, the Royal Thai Navy is the least politicized of the three services, but the navy is developing a blue-water capability that may elevate its political prominence. However, the increased interest in maritime claims and maritime shipping lines has resulted from both the relative decline of land-based threat perceptions and the economy's dependence on maritime trade. In the age of globalization, 95 percent of Thailand's commodity trade was done by sea. In summary, changing threat perceptions, with increased connectivity due to globalization and increased international trade, can be considered a common impulse for blue water navies.

3.1.2. Political stability or instability overseas

Due to the absence of territorial conflicts in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, Thailand has a relatively calm strategic marine environment. Despite being a traditional US ally, Thailand has maintained constant friendly relations with rising powers in the region, namely China.

3.1.3. Threat Perception and Maritime Interests

The Navy faces a maritime delimitation dispute with Cambodia. Its main tasks are to protect the fishing fleet and offshore energy resources, fight piracy, respond to natural disasters as well as irregular migration/human trafficking and smuggling at sea. It is also vigilant against Chinese naval aggression and expansion in the region.

The Royal Thai Navy deals with the issue of fish/seafood slavery, that is, forced labor and exploitation on illegal fishing vessels. At present, the Thai government has prioritized Navy renewal and combat readiness due to concerns over the country's maritime interests. The maritime rights and economic interests include 80 seaward oil rigs, huge fishing armada (the third largest in the world). The Thai Navy's prime missions include protecting and monitoring the disputed maritime borders and sea lanes of communication (Hollingsbee, 2019).

3.1.4. Modernization of the Navy

After the promulgation of the 1992 National Defense Strategy, the modernization of the armed forces took precedence, particularly the Thai Navy due to the increasing focus on the maritime domain. The Navy's modernization program was the most ambitious, emphasizing increased capability to protect territorial waters, maritime natural resources, industrial energy resources, and sea lanes of communication. The Navy gave priority to the acquisition of more modern surface warships and a small fleet of diesel-powered submarines. The Navy procured two Chinese-built revised Type 53 frigates and the ex-US *Knox* class frigates which were equipped with more efficient missile and air defense systems (Harpoon, ESSM, torpedo, *Sea Lynx* helicopters). The transformation of the Navy from a littoral navy to a high seafaring one was initiated in the 1990s. In this regard, the fleet was modernized with new Chinese-built frigates and a light aircraft carrier with an embarked air wing. On the other hand, the Thai Navy has not yet acquired submarine capability. In a nutshell, a modest fleet of naval combatants would be sufficient to carry out these tasks in the neighboring seas of the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand/Gulf of South China, given its main duties, such as protecting sovereignty and maritime rights. (Global Security, 2019).

3.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

3.2.1. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

Due to industrialization, the demand for energy and raw materials from abroad, especially from the Middle East, has increased its dependence on maritime trade. Consequently, the focus of military modernization has shifted towards improving naval capacities.

Statistics showed that Thailand's economy grew more than five percent annually relative to GDP from 1980 to 1988 and nearly doubled from 35 billion USD to 85 billion USD respectively. Later, due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it increased to 104 billion USD in 2000, gradually declining to 5 percent annually. Commodity trade as a percentage of GDP doubled over the same period.

Economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military spending, as the percent fell from 4.1 percent in 1980 and 2.6 in 1990 to 1.5 in 1998.

Subsequently, military spending increased from 1.4 billion USD in 1980 to 2.6 billion USD in 1990 and then dropped to 1.5 billion USD in 1998 due to the 1997 financial crisis. Overall, Thailand also benefited from the export-oriented economy of the globalization era and the relative peace dividend of the post-Cold War era (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

Although Thailand is no longer seen as an economic miracle, it has recovered relatively quickly from the financial crisis. It still has a strong economy based on agriculture and industry exports and tourism. The financial crises of 1997 and 2008 exacerbated the conflicts between domestic power circles that favor and oppose external influence. Currently, the internal political balance continues to promote free trade and regional and international economic ties. As long as foreign influences create intolerable social divisions and do not undermine Thailand's traditional power, this balance will remain (STRATFOR, 2019).

3.2.2. Maritime Interests

The maritime interests of Thailand can be broadly divided into shipbuilding (742 million gross tones as of 2017), merchant fleet of 5402 thousand DWT in 2016, 80 offshore oil platforms, as well as the country's vast fishing fleet (the third largest in the world). While Thailand's economy

was dependent on international trade in the age of globalization, 95 percent was carried out by sea (UNCTADSTAT, 2019).

The ratio of Thailand's coastal length to its total area is about 14 meters per square meter.

3.3. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

3.3.1. Increased Training to Use Innovation

Trademark applications have more than doubled in these two decades, from 5300 in 1980 to 12800 in 1990 and then 27000 in 2000. High technology exports rose from 3 billion in 1990 to 17.3 billion USD in 2000, linked to investment in education and research (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

3.3.2. Maturity of Naval Technologies

Thailand also had indigenous and licensed shipbuilding capability on which landing ships were built, as well as patrol and fast attack boats for the Thai Navy.

3.4. SOCIAL FACTORS

3.4.1. Population growth and Age distribution

The growth rate of the population diminished gradually from 2.1 percent in 1980 and 1.4 in 1990 to 1.0 in 2000, resulting in higher percentages in the working force of Thailand from 56.6 in 1980 and 64.9 in 1990 to 69.2 in 2000. Although it also indicated the aging of the population for the future, the percentage of eligible males for the industry and the military ascended favorably in two decades (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

3.4.2. Historical Background

In the 15th century, Thailand sought to control of the Malay Peninsula and the Strait of Malacca, a crucial chokepoint for maritime trade located at the southwestern tip of the Malay Peninsula.

This could enable the Thai to develop still more rice paddy fields, fisheries, and trading posts on the extended coastline. The Chinese, then the dominant military and naval trading power, supported the Malay sultans not to compete over the Malacca Strait, which was an important part of their trading empire. Siam, therefore, could not gain control over the straits. However, they retained their own narrow section of the peninsula and maintain strategic access from the west coast of the peninsula to the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean, where they can fish and trade.

Throughout history, Thailand did not have a merchant fleet or fleet to protect itself and remained a sedentary society dependent on foreign merchants to export their goods. It sought to attract foreigners to benefit economically and acquire advanced technology. Siam has been linked with Chinese merchants since the 14th century, and with the Portuguese who brought cannons and rifles since the mid-1500s. Later, Japanese, Persian, Dutch, British, and French merchants joined the bustle of ships entering and leaving the Gulf of Siam (STRATFOR, 2019).

3.4.3. Demographics

Central Thailand struggles to control the southernmost parts of the Malay Peninsula, where the population is mostly Malay-speaking and Muslim, unlike the Thai majority of the country.

3.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

3.5.1. Climate and weather

High humidity - Bangkok is one of the most humid cities in the world - is suitable for both agriculture and a sedentary lifestyle. The tropical climate is characterized by an alternating warm, rainy monsoon from the southwest and a dry, cool monsoon from the northeast (STRATFOR, 2019).

3.5.2. Geographical location (and accessibility)

Thailand is located in the center of the Indochina and Malay peninsulas that form the core of the Southeast Asian peninsula and overlook the Gulf of Thailand. The Malacca Strait, a crucial chokepoint for maritime trade that lies at the south-western tip of the Malay Peninsula Siam's

strategic location near the delta and gulf gave Thailand several advantages. These advantages, such as being a receiving point for rice grown upriver and a point of contact for foreign maritime traders willing to pay for surplus rice production, made Siam the preeminent Thai power (STRATFOR, 2019).

3.6. ASSESSMENT

Since the 1990s, the Thai Navy has endeavored to shift from purely coastal defense to limited blue-water capabilities following the dominant fashion of the era as well as defending its sea lanes of communication. This was reflected in the focus on bolstering the surface fleet, including new Chinese-built frigates and a Spanish-built light aircraft carrier. However, the persisting effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis limit the procurements for high seafaring capabilities including the protracted submarine acquisition process. Indeed, the growing importance of maritime interests and popular support for the advancement of the navy, as well as the development of the navy, eventually increased its position in government circles (Global Security, 2019).

At the turn of the millennium, the Thai Navy had one light aircraft carrier with an air wing of *Sea Harriers*, eight frigates, seven corvettes, two LSTs, and one fleet support ship as part of its blue-water fleet. As of 2018, the Thai Navy has one light aircraft carrier, seven frigates, seven corvettes, one LDP, two LST, and a fleet support ship. Currently, one submarine is constructed in China and a stealth cruiser is under construction in South Korea.

4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTANI NAVY

4.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

4.1.1. Government Policy

Its boundaries, which do not coincide with the edges of its geographic location, pose an ever-present challenge for Pakistan. The country was artificially designed in 1947 to hold the Muslim-majority in the northern parts of India during its liberation. Due to border disputes, India and Pakistan strained relations and fought three wars, mainly due to conflicting claims in Kashmir territory.

While Pakistan is vitally linked to the world economy via maritime transport, the navy has not been seen as important in the country's defense strategy. As a result, the Navy did not see interest among the continental-minded ruling elite in Pakistan, and budget allocations remained low.

Pakistan perceived India as the main threat to its existence. Since its inception, the main challenge for Pakistan has been to deal with the supremacy of the Indian Navy. To this end, the Pakistani navy is trying to develop the use of innovative tactical weapons to disrupt the regional sea balance. An offensive naval denial strategy focused on submarines and seaplanes against India enabled it to emerge as a proactive force.

Furthermore, the Pakistani navy is trying to take a nuclear role for the defense of the country, i.e., a possible second-strike capability. Pakistan went into three wars with India and faced the US arms embargo, which forced it to seek alternatives for resource diversification, such as Britain, France, and China. The US tightened its arms embargo and ended its military and economic aid program due to the proliferation problem, and even reclaimed its frigates (Sakhuja, 2002).

4.1.2. Threat Perception and Maritime Strategy

Pakistan's naval strategy was based on 'offensive defense' as part of the national military strategy. Accordingly, the force structure is optimized for offensive attacks on enemy forces at

their bases using its strong fleet of submarines equipped with Harpoon missiles. Centering around frigates and missile boats, the navy maintains a defensive strategy based on layered defense along the coast. The offensive component of the strategy aimed at attacking high-value enemy naval platforms and destroying key transport and military facilities, thus turning the enemy into defense. This strategy had been tested in the past during the 1965 and 1971 wars when Pakistani submarines were deployed in offensive roles outside of Bombay and Vishakhapatnam (Sakhuja, 2002, s. 448).

According to the Pakistan Navy's assessment, the main Indian objective during a war would be to enforce a complete blockade of East Pakistan and to cut off its sea lines of communication. Therefore, Pakistani strategic planners planned to develop alternative ports on the Baluchistan coast. By 1997, the Pakistan Navy concluded that the capabilities gained through new hunters relatively diminished the mine threat to its main ports. Moreover, the developed force structure may prevent the Indian navy from blockading or quarantining these ports. Pakistan's submarine forces gained the ability to fire surface-to-surface missiles, which was unprecedented in South Asia at the time. The fleet air arm had also superior antisubmarine and anti-surface warfare capability (Atlantic fitted with Exocet and P-3C Orion fitted with Harpoon) and about twelve Mirage-V fighter aircraft with Exocet and Sea King helicopters with air-to-sea Exocet missiles against enemy surface ships (Sakhuja, 2002, s. 456).

4.2.1. Modernization of the Fleet

Pakistan navy acquired Six Type 21 (*Amazon*) class frigates of British origin and modernized them after retrofitting several new types of equipment, including LY 60 (N) surface to air missiles, and equipped it *Ex-Gearing* class destroyer with Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles. From 1992 to 1999, the Pakistan Navy emerged as the major beneficiary of the funds allocated for military procurement totaling 1,800 million USD.

The Pakistan Navy continued to rely on the primacy of submarines in its force structure. In the 1990s. It signed a contract for the construction of three Agosto 90B class submarines and three *Eridan*-class minehunters. Although French arms imports were relatively costly, Pakistan preferred French equipment due to the lower potential for sanctions and embargoes.

After the 1990s, China emerged as Pakistan's main partner in defense cooperation. Pakistan Navy supplied *Hola*-and *Hegu*-class fast attack boats and *Fuqing*-class tankers from China. Its *Jalalat*-class fast patrol boats were also equipped with modern Chinese-made surface and air defense missiles. Four *Zoulfiqar (Jiangwei-II)* class frigates purchased from China reinforced the surface element of the Navy (Sakhuja, 2004).

Pakistani Navy recently acquired two corvettes constructed in Constanza shipyard with Dutch Damien company. A fleet support ship built in-country with a Turkish-led joint venture. Currently, another corvette program based on the Turkish *Ada*-class has been underway.

4.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

4.2.1. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

The statistics showed that the economy of Pakistan, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew annually over 7.6 percent in 1985 amounting to 31 billion USD and slowed down to 4.5 percent in 1990 amounting to 40 billion USD. Although badly affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it got recovered back to the GDP growth rate of 4.3 percent in 2000 almost doubling to 74 billion USD. In this period, the merchandise trade as a percent of GDP floated on the 30 percent.

The economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military expenditures as the percentage dropping from 6.9 in 1985 corresponding to 2.14 billion USD and 6.5 in 1990 amounting to 2.8 billion USD and later to 4.8 percent of GDP totaling to 3.0 billion USD (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

Although the statistical data did not support explicitly, the Pakistan navy got the lion's share of the funds allocated to military procurement totaling 1,800 million USD. In his analysis, Rodney W. Jones discussed that the divergence between the defense spending and defense budget of Pakistan pointed out either the allocation of out-of-budget funds or covert foreign aid (2001).

4.2.2. Maritime Interests

Pakistan's maritime interests can be summed up as the overall dependence on maritime trade, namely a 752,000 DWT merchant fleet in 2016 and the country's vast fishing fleet. Pakistan's maritime interests can be summed up as the general dependence on maritime trade, namely the 752,000 DWT merchant fleet and the country's vast fishing fleet in 2016 (UNCTADSTAT, 2019).

Pakistan's fisheries industry is worth about 1.2 billion USD a year of which exports are worth about 200 million USD.

The ratio of the coastal length of Pakistan to its overall area is around 3 meters per square meter.

4.3. SOCIAL FACTORS

4.3.1. Population Growth and Age distribution

Although the growth rate of the population diminished gradually from 3.3 percent in 1985 and 2.9 in 1990 to 2.3 in 2000, it stayed well above the world average, keeping stable percentages in the working force of Pakistan from 54.7 in 1985 and 53.3 in 1990 to 53.8 in 2000. Although it also indicated the aging of the population for the future, the percentage of eligible males for the industry and the military ascended favorably in the two decades (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

4.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

4.4.1. Increased Training to Use Innovation

During this period, Pakistan concentrated on research efforts on the development of nuclear capabilities and related missile technology to achieve nuclear deterrence.

Trademark applications soared, from 2900 in 1985 to 3170 in 1990 and then to 8320 in 2000. High-tech exports remained around 3 billion USD due to the consistently low state budget devoted to education and research.

The Pakistani Navy has traditionally been more comfortable with western technology, especially US technology. However, the lack of western equipment forced Pakistan to turn to China for naval supplies, despite the burden of replacing some equipment that did not meet Pakistan's military standards.

4.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

4.5.1. Geographical Location

Pakistan, lying in South Asia, is bordered by Iran, Afghanistan, China, and India. The Himalayan Mountains set its northern border. The huge Baluchistan Plateau on the southwest is deserted and sparsely inhabited. The Thar desert and the Arabian sea coastline set its southern border. The Punjab region, fed by the Indus River, is the economic and political center of Pakistan (STRATFOR, 2019). Gwadar, the terminal port of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, is an alternative to Karachi to diversify maritime trade and Central Asia's access to the Arabian Sea.

4.5.2. Climate

Pakistan has four seasons. A Monsoon season extends from June to December which is followed by a cool, dry winter from December to February, a hot, dry spring from March to May. The southern part of the country more humid than the northern part despite it gets less rain. Although the summer temperatures do not get as high as those in Punjab, the high humidity poses the residents a great deal of discomfort.

4.6. ASSESSMENT

Once part of the Royal Navy, the Pakistani Navy follows its traditions and education system. This fact also affected the blue water ambitions of the Pakistan Navy. During the Cold War, the Pakistani Navy benefited from US military and economic assistance by purchasing former US warships and weapon systems. However, the wars with India and the nuclear program resulted

in US embargoes, which crippled its combat power and forced the Navy to turn to other resources for the modernization of its fleet.

During the period under review, the Pakistan Navy adopted an "attack defense" strategy to keep and destroy the enemy fleet at its bases by deploying anti-surface missile-equipped submarines at their approach points. In addition, anti-surface missile-equipped maritime patrol aircraft and strike fighters, as well as anti-surface and anti-air missiles mounted frigates, fast attack boats, and coastal missiles/artillery.

In summary, focusing on its existential rival the Indian Navy, the Pakistan Navy has developed limited blue-water capabilities based on the 'offensive defense' concept to overcome its vulnerability to the blockade, to deny its rival sea control under all circumstances. Besides developing alternative ports to her main hub and industrial base, Karachi, Pakistan relied on fighting unconventional naval warfare by utilizing anti-surface missile-equipped submerged, surface, and air platforms as well as the marine platoons and SEAL units. For the future, achieving second-strike nuclear deterrence is not a requirement in Pakistan's announced 'first strike' policy, but it is the main goal for the Navy to both increase its stance in government circles and achieve a technological balance against the Indian Navy.

At the turn of the millennium, the Pakistani navy operated only six frigates, four submarines, and a fleet support ship as part of its limited blue water capacity, as well as naval aviation due to the effects of embargoes and the severe economic situation. Pakistan operates 11 frigates, five submarines, and two fleet support vessels as of 2018. An ambitious modernization and upgrade program is underway, including submarine construction and modernization, new corvettes, a fleet support ship.

5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY

5.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

5.1.1. Government Policy

In the Cold War era, Australia's defense policy was based on the concept of 'forward defense' to keep the communist threat as far away as from the continent. Australia has relied on powerful allies, initially Britain and now the United States, to defend its homeland. Based on the publicly disclosed variant of the *Australian Territorial Security* defense strategy presented in December 1989. The main features of his strategy were self-sufficiency in-country security within the structure of alliances and regional groups. In this regard, its objectives are to set a layered in-depth defense to keep challengers away from its area of interest, to build naval and air forces to deter and beat opponents beyond the sea-air gap, and to carry out activities to promote regional security with neighboring countries neighbors. Its ultimate end is to prevent threats and risks from escalating, including operations by the military arm (Australia, 1989).

5.1.2. THREAT PERCEPTION AND MARITIME INTERESTS

In line with the revealed maritime strategy, Australia planned to initiate major weaponry programs, such as the *Anzac*-class frigates and *Collins*-class submarines, the delivery of maritime air surveillance and strike capabilities for its Air Force. In addition to that, it was planned to develop bases on the west side of the continent and increase maritime surveillance capacity with the acquisition of long-range radars. For an island nation, maritime domain awareness was a top priority, requiring all intelligence-gathering assets, even if it required the mobilization of naval and air units. Due to the potential of regional maritime delimitation disputes, Australia endeavored to develop its maritime security capability. The protection of sovereignty emerged as the main mission of the Royal Australian Navy, as it claimed nearly 10 million square kilometers of EEZ guaranteed by UNCLOS III.

After the 1990s, Australia participated in the Gulf War by deploying a naval task group in the region, demonstrating the flexibility and effectiveness of its naval forces. This is perceived as

the first call for possible roles such as peacekeeping, maritime policing, and humanitarian aid under UN mandates.

Strategic thinking also began to focus on maintaining good order at sea, including maritime security, combating piracy, preserving sovereignty, protecting waterways, and maintaining freedom of navigation. Chinese naval modernization has also been under investigation for its effects on the planning of Australian military power (Bateman & Sherwood, 1993).

Its security policy and strategy have dwelled on the aim of keeping the US strategically engaged in South East Asia to reinforce Australia's strategic position. Strategic planning has been expanded with the recognition that Australia's defense has been extended beyond the protection of Australian territory to include issues that directly affect security interests (e.g., offshore resources, and critical sea lanes of communication) (Australia, 1989).

The Australian Navy, as a postmodern navy, emphasized making reliable friends during the Cold War. Thereafter, the Navy assumed responsibilities in the Gulf for sanction monitoring operations during the Afghanistan campaign. Dictated by its unique geographic location, the Navy implements “a policy of regional engagement” (Till, 2018).

The Naval Forces operate all over the world with the slogan borrowed from the great soldier Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whom they respect, and ‘Peace at Sea, Peace at Home’ was changed in maritime style. The Navy had blue water and limited force projection capability at the end of the millennium. Along with the air arm, there was also a modernization plan to replace aging destroyers and amphibious ships. The Australian Navy envisaged operating in multinational coalitions to maintain world order and stable good order at sea. It also had leadership roles in the UN mission to the crisis in East Timor.

5.1.3. NAVAL DEVELOPMENT

In concert with the promulgated defense and maritime strategies, the perceived force structure of the Australian Navy in the 1990s had blue-water capabilities, such as advanced surface combatants, in number and incapacity such as 3 guided missile destroyers (all modernized), 6 guided missile frigates (*Perry*-class), 8 *Anzac*-class frigates (entering service from mid-1990s) and new 6 Type 471 submarines, and also 6 inshore minehunters, 2 fleet supply, and support vessels, one amphibious heavy lift ship, 15 *Fremantle*-class patrol boats, seven Sea King

helicopters 16 Seahawk helicopters (Australia, 1989). Later in the decade, the procurement plans included the replacement of obsolete air defense destroyers and amphibious platforms to retain the cutting blue water and strike capability (MOD, 2010).

5.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

5.2.1. Economic Growth and Defense Budget

The statistics showed that the economy of Australia, as of GDP grew constantly between a range of 3.0 to 5.0 percent except in the years of financial crises 1983, 1991 and 2000 by doubling from 150 billion to 311 billion USD in 1990 and then reaching 415 billion USD at the end of the millennium. The merchandise trade was around 30 percent of GDP at the period, showing the autarky of the country.

The economic growth was not proportionally reflected military expenditures since the percentage range lingered around 2.1-2.5 until 1980 to 1995 and then dropping below 1.9 percent in 1995 and onwards, corresponding to 3.66 billion USD in 1980, 6.7 billion USD in 1990, and 7.3 billion USD in 2000. (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

After the Cold War, with the government opting for a 'peace dividend', the Australian Armed Forces were under real pressure to cope with the emerging mission requirements, with financial limits that remained relatively stable over two decades. The Australian Government began to worry that a mismatch emerged between strategic goals, defense capabilities, and defense funding levels. The government estimated that defense spending should increase at an average of three percent per year in real terms within a decade and prompted the Ministry of Defense to plan within this budget (MOD, 2010).

5.2.2. Maritime Interests

Australia's maritime interests include its offshore territories and EEZ marine resources, both in and underneath the sea, maritime trade, marine industries, and its claim of transit rights. Due to its increasing reliance on offshore oil and gas, the protection of maritime interests has gained more strategic prominence.

Being an island country, uninterrupted maritime transport is its main national interest as a maritime country. 99 percent of its exports are by sea routes and its merchant fleet is 98,000 DWT with a container port business volume of 285,900 TEU.

Considering the rough continental terrain, coastal shipping is of paramount strategic importance in transportation between industrial and raw material centers as well as deployment of the military. Coastal transportation has been considered vulnerable to potential interruption by adversaries.

Due to the long coastline as well as the vast sea ownership, the hidden passions of other regional states need to be taken into account.

5.3. Social Factors

5.3.1. Population growth and Age distribution

The growth rate of the population remained relatively constant in the range of 1.1 and 1.6 percent annually by resulting in stable percentages in the working force of Australia around 67.5 percent. (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019)

5.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

The trademark applications elevated in the era by increasing from 13,567 in 1980 to 20,000 in 1990 and then by more than doubling to 43,000 in 2000. The high-tech exports increased from 0.4 to 2.8 billion USD whereas 1.7 percent of the GDP was allocated to research and development. Australia is one of the countries with high standards and attracting qualified students for university and graduate education.

In the development of naval capabilities, a balanced and hybrid approach was applied due to the high cost of domestic production between overseas procurement, joint ventures, and domestic shipbuilding. An industrial base of local defense companies was supported to provide confidence in the maintenance and operation of state-of-the-art systems and platforms. This capacity was also encouraged to adapt and modify the systems and platforms by ensuring their operational reliability and efficiency.

5.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

5.5.1. Geographical Factors

Australia is a bridge between two important but different strategic areas. To its north and north-west is archipelagic and mainland southeast Asia, which is politically, ethnically, and culturally varied. Southeast Asia, including Burma (Myanmar) and Indochina, is also densely populated (435 million). To its north-east and east are large expanses of open ocean, broken only by the dispersed and small island states of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.

The population of the Southern Pacific - excluding New Zealand - is very small (5 million). Australia is an important economic and communication center for the South Pacific and provides important educational and technological services. Australia's dominance in the South Pacific is matched by its long-standing participation with Southeast Asian countries. For Australia, the task will be to remain strategically engaged with New Zealand while remaining sensitive to New Zealand's self-interest.

5.5.2. Climate

Due to the vast size of the country, Australia naturally has several different climate zones. The frequent tropical typhoons that occur in the northern coastal areas along with extratropical storms require high sea-keeping capabilities for naval ships (WeatherOnline, 2019).

5.6. ASSESSMENT

The Royal Australian Navy has always been the first line of defense for a continental country and a means for the projection of force abroad. After the Navy was formed in the 1910s, it traditionally had blue water and limited strike capability. It had participated in two world wars with the Alliance and exercised her muscles. However, Australia traditionally ensured its defense through the alliances led by major powers, Britain, and the US due to power limitations and vast maritime borders. An alliance of Australia, New Zealand, and the US, namely ANZUS, currently performs these tasks. In addition to maintaining the regional balance of power with

its immediate maritime neighbors, the Navy actively participated in non-traditional maritime missions after the Cold War. Each defense white paper has emphasized the significance of retaining blue water capabilities, based on surface combatants and submarines and long-range strike capabilities by an amphibious assault ship and air arm.

At the turn of the millennium, the Royal Australian Navy had in its inventory three guided-missile destroyers, six guided-missile frigates, three submarines, three landing platforms, and one fleet support ship. As of 2018, the Navy operates two amphibious assault ships and a landing platform, two air defense destroyers, ten frigates, six submarines, and two fleet support ships which correspond to a very versatile blue water fleet with force protection and limited strike capability.



6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY

6.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

6.1.1. Government Policy and Naval Development

South Africa's critical geographic location, which controls the maritime trade route connecting the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean, gave the country strategic importance to the control of world trade and the maintenance of world hegemony. Before the breakup, the master role had played by the British Navy. South Africa could be thought of as a sea blind nation, not fully aware of how dependent they are on the sea. Therefore, South Africa neglected the navy and its aviation arm.

After the cancellation of the Simon Town Agreement, which ended the Royal Navy's presence in the Cape, the South African Navy was born and raised as the daughter of the Royal Navy. With the introduction of arms embargoes due to the apartheid policies of the South African Government, the Navy turned to other countries for naval procurement. In the early 1970s, The Navy acquired three *Daphne*-class submarines from France, but the project of buying six corvettes failed due to political and financial developments in Portugal (Heitman, 2013, s. 8). However, the Navy procured nine *Reshef*-class missile strike craft from Israel in a joint venture project which replaced the obsolete fleet of destroyers and corvettes.

Due to international restrictions and the ensuing arms embargo, the domestic defense industrial base of South Africa got developed (T.D.Potgieter, 2000, s. 179). Consequently, the Navy acquired light amphibious lift capability with the domestic construction of two supply ships. Major cuts to its defense budget forced the Navy to reduce its manpower by almost one-fourth and to cancel the domestic submarine building program during the transition period to democracy (Heitman, 2013). Later, the government of the African National Congress (ANC) initiated a new Strategic Defense Procurement (SDP) package in September 1999. This program focused on procuring new platforms for the navy and air force. Through this venture, the Navy commissioned four MEKO-class frigates, three Type 209/1400 submarines, and four Sea Lynx helicopters (Baker, 2012).

By the realization of the subject projects, the Navy had a limited blue water capability focused on the maritime security tasks in its and neighboring countries' maritime jurisdictions, particularly against piracy and armed robbery at sea. Traditionally assuming the role of "Guardian of the Cape Sea Route," the Navy is structured as a "counter navy" force capable of fighting an "as-yet-undefined adversary" (Baker, 2012, s. 8).

6.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

6.2.1. Maritime Interests

Besides its economic dependence on maritime trade, its blue economy totals to some 70 percent of the GDP with the inclusion of the fishing industry, offshore gas fields, and offshore diamond mining.

The overall contribution of its Fishing Industry to the national GDP is about one percent.

The maritime interests of South Africa can be broadly summarized as its dependence on seaborne trade, a merchant fleet of 1300 thousand DWT in 2016, and shipbuilding industry of 2,516 GT annually as well as the country's vast fishing fleet. The dependence of South Africa's economy on international trade in the globalization era whereas the container port throughput is 4,634,900 TEU (UNCTADSTAT, 2019).

South Africa has a 2,798 km coastline and 1,54 million square kilometers of an EEZ, which includes Marion and the Prince Edward Islands, located at 1,000 km south-east of the mainland. The ratio of coastline length to the area is three meters per square kilometers.

In fact, the future development of South Africa's economy is inevitably interlinked with the improvement of southern or even sub-equatorial Africa. Like South Africa, all countries in this region are reliant on the exploitation of maritime resources (Heitman, 2013).

6.2.2. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

The statistics showed that the economy of South Africa, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), showed a lingering and contracting tendency in the 1980s stemming from the international sanctions against its apartheid policy and also the worldwide economic crises. The GDP

increased from 83 billion USD in 1980 to 115 billion USD in 1990 and later to 136.4 USD in 2000.

The economic crises also proportionally reflected on military expenditures as cuts, that is, the percentage increasing from 3.3. in 1980 and 3.9 in 1990 but later to 1.4 in 2000 but the military spending escalated from 2.7 billion USD in 1980 to 4.4 billion USD in 1990 and later dipped to 1.9 billion USD in 2000. In a nutshell, the Navy was badly affected by due effects of the transition period to democracy and following economic crises. However, the government allocated funds after 1999 for the modernization of the South African Navy that kept its limited blue water and force projection capabilities in the coming decade.

6.3. SOCIAL FACTORS

6.3.1. Population growth and Age distribution

The growth rate of the population diminished gradually from 2.5 percent in 1980 and 2.2 in 1990 to 1.5 in 2000, resulting in higher percentages in the working force of South Africa from 55.60 in 1980 and 57.3 in 1990 to 62.2 in 2000. Although it also indicated the aging of the population, the percentage of eligible males for the industry and the military ascended favorably (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

6.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

International pressure and subsequent sanctions triggered the burgeoning of the SA's defense industrial base.

The trademark applications kept a linear ascending path in these two decades by increasing from 8,582 in 1980 to 10,378 in 1990 and then by elevating to 25678 in 2000. The growth of high-tech exports ascended from 0.42 billion USD in 1992 to 0.7 billion USD. in 2000 (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

6.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

6.5.1. Geographic Location

Due to its strategic location, South Africa has played a critical role in the control of the sea lanes connecting East and West Africa. Therefore, Britain kept its presence in the Cape for a long time. Being responsible for South Africa's defense, the Royal Navy had close links with its naval establishment.

6.6. ASSESSMENT

The decade before the turn of the millennium was very difficult for the Navy due to the transition to democracy. It lost a quarter of qualified personnel and almost all the potential procurement projects. The modernization process reinitiated in 1999 to procure new frigates, submarines, and helicopters which would gain the Navy a limited blue water capability which focused on the maritime security tasks in its and neighboring countries' maritime jurisdiction areas, particularly against piracy and armed robbery at sea but not off the coast of Somalia.

At the turn of the millennium, the South African Navy had in its inventory three submarines, one fleet support ship, and seven fast attack crafts due to embargo and financial constraints. However, due to the modernization process that started in 1999, the Navy operates three submarines, four MEKO-class frigates, three offshore patrol ships, and a fleet support ship as of 2018.

7. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY

7.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

7.1.1. Government policy and Support to Naval Build-Up

The elected political leadership wants to control the direction of the Canadian Armed Forces. Placing close cooperation with the United States and Britain, the government developed Canada's First Defense Strategy, which guided the navy's defense planning (Huebert, 2014). However, policy failures to provide the navy with the necessary funds prevented the replenishment of its main combatants (Till, 2018, p. 419). Despite their fast learning, Canadian politicians are sea blind at the beginning.

The peacetime missions of the Canadian navy mostly include the protection of the maritime jurisdictions and the enforcement of Canadian laws and regulations on a constabulary basis. Moreover, as a modern blue-water navy, the government has tasked it with collaborative roles in promoting global security (H.Gimblett, 2018).

7.1.2. Political stability or instability overseas

The declining importance of NATO after the Cold War changed Canada's view of the emerging world crises, using the fleet's global reach. Canada's so-called 'New World Order Navy' has stepped up its operational pace to keep up with real-world crises. With its technological know-how reflected in new frigates and modified destroyers, the Navy quickly adapted itself to new functions doctrinally and tactically. With its technological know-how reflected in new frigates and modified destroyers, the Navy quickly adapted itself to new functions doctrinally and tactically (H.Gimblett, 2018).

However, the use of naval power beyond national maritime jurisdiction has become the concern of the Canadian Navy and has been recorded as a unique event in world maritime history. That is, in the Turbot War between Canada and Spain in 1995, the Navy seized a Spanish trawler beyond national jurisdiction due to concerns over maritime protection (Till, 2018, pp. 311-312).

7.1.3. Threat Perception and Naval Modernization

The Canadian Navy was designed to perform anti-submarine warfare tasks in North Atlantic during the Cold War. It consisted of an aging fleet in need of renewal and major midlife updates, under pressure to rescale to capitalize on the peace dividend. In the First Gulf War, a task group consisting of a destroyer, a frigate, and a fleet oiler was quickly deployed, equipped with upgraded command, control, and communication systems and modular weapons such as close-in-weapon systems and Harpoon missiles. It was mostly integrated into the naval effort of the US Navy (Till, 2018, p. 153). Normally optimized for open-ocean antisubmarine warfare in the sub-Arctic waters of the North Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Navy suddenly found itself facing a primarily airborne threat in confined tropical waters.

Following the prevailing naval trend, the Navy had participated in stability operations as part of multinational task groups. Many basics were sound such as the immense flexibility of general-purpose ship designs; the basic competence of well-trained sailors and practiced staff officers; and the immense benefits of investing in standardizing major systems, especially communications, with the United States Navy (H.Gimblett, 2018).

In the mid-1990s, newly commissioned, versatile *Halifax*-class frigates facilitated the Navy to participate effectively in multinational stabilization operations while introducing Canadian technology to states located near the area of operations. Indeed, Canadian assets were not only “attached”, but operated as a fully “integrated” unit of a carrier task group, due to exclusive access to high-level communication codes and equipment that would allow full use of the new Canadian frigate (Ibid.).

In the 1990s, 12 *Halifax*-class patrol frigates and *Iroquois*-class ships replaced steam-powered destroyers. In addition, 12 *Kingston*-class (PB-700) maritime coastal defense vessels (MCDVs) replaced the vintage *Bay* class minesweepers. Three *Oberon*-class submarines were replaced by the *Victoria (Ex-Upholder)*-class of four diesel submarines acquired from the Royal Navy (Ibid.).

The successful transformation of the 1990s delivered just a capable and versatile navy when Canada needed to respond decisively to a range of domestic and international crises. But the aging of the fleet speaks to the urgency of getting on with renewal.

7.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

7.2.1. Economy and Defense Expenditures

Canada is an industrialized country with the seventh biggest economy in the world. It shifted from being an agrarian economy to manufacturing and services. Faith bequest to Canada, the country produces and exports many raw materials, including asbestos, nickel, silver, zinc, uranium, cadmium, cobalt, magnesium, gypsum, molybdenum, potash, aluminum, gold, iron ore, copper, fluorspar, and lead.

Tightened monetary policies and the recession caused the Canadian economy to contract in the second quarter of 1990. The economy, which suffered high unemployment rates and domestic spending, displayed an average growth rate of 3 percent in GDP (Nations Encyclopedia, 2019). Statistics show that the Canadian economy grew by 2.2 percent in 1980 to 273.8 billion USD, followed by 365 billion USD in 1985.

But it slowed to 0.2 percent in 1990 totaling 594 billion USD. It shrank in the early 1990s due to the financial crisis, and reached 2.7 percent in 1995, 604 billion USD, and then 5.2 percent in 2000, rising to 742 billion USD. During this period, commodity trade followed an increasing trend, from 47 percent in 1980 to 70 percent in 2000, and 40 percent in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the economic crisis.

Economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military spending, as the percentage rose from 1.8 in 1980 to 4.0 in 1990, fell to 1.6 percent in 1995, and 1.0 in 2000. Economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military spending, as the percentage rose from 1.8 in 1980 to 4.0 in 1990, fell to 1.6 percent in 1995, and 1.0 in 2000. The allocations reflected that the military budget was the first to be cut at the time of austerity and that the government kept military spending to a minimum to cope with the international commitments of the Canadian Armed Forces (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

7.2.2. Maritime Interests

A compiled list of Canadian maritime rights and economic interests at sea includes maintaining Canada's sovereignty over its maritime jurisdictions and protecting against maritime attacks. The long coastline (more than 244,000 kilometers) and the broad sea zone (about 7.1 million square kilometers), which equates to about 70 percent of its landmass, are Canada's most important maritime strategic interests. Furthermore, the opening of the northern passage and the struggle for delimitation in the Arctic Ocean will complicate Canada's maritime strategic interests (Lombardi & Ansell, 2018).

Canada's maritime interests are based on its dependence on maritime trade. These include but are not limited to a merchant fleet of 9,273 thousand DWT and the shipbuilding industry of 148 GT in 2016, as well as a sizable fishing fleet. Since 38 percent of it in value has been seaborne, the Canadian economy's dependence on international trade is relatively considerable in the globalization era whereas the container port throughput is 6,298,590 TEU (UNCTADSTAT, 2019). The ratio of its coastal length to the total area is 29 meters per square meter.

7.3. SOCIAL FACTORS

7.3.1. Population growth and Age distribution

The population growth rate remained around 1.3 percent in 1980 and around 1.5 in 1990, decreasing to 0.9 in 2000. However, selective immigration policies stemming from the country's attractiveness resulted in higher percentages of Canada's workforce from 68.4 in 1980 and 69.1 in 1990 to 69.3 in 2000. The percentage of men eligible for the industry and the military has increased positively, although it also indicates that the population is aging (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

7.3.2. Cultural trends

Although Canada is a maritime nation, Canada and its political elite have a landlocked mindset, while most of the major cities are far from the ocean shores. Cultural differences and mandates separated the navy and coast guard to develop a separate maritime strategy (Huebert, 2014).

7.3.3. Demographics

Canada has been the homeland of diverse national and cultural groups. Currently, Canadians of British and French descent make up only half of the population, as more immigrants come from other countries in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019).

7.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

Trademark applications have increased exponentially over these two decades, almost doubling from 15,200 in 1980 to 25,700 in 1990, and 46,500 in 2000. The growth of high-tech exports ascended from 10 billion USD in 1990 to 30 billion USD in 2000, linked to investment in education and research (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

7.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

7.5.1. Climate and weather

Neighboring three oceans on its shores, with differences in topography, Canada has many different climate and weather patterns. Moreover, due to its northernmost location, it is one of the coldest countries in the world (SpainExchange, 2019). These weather conditions, combined with harsh sea conditions, require special designs of fighters optimized to deal with this harsh operating environment.

7.5.2. Geographical location (and accessibility)

Permanently frozen land in the north poses a serious obstacle to the development of the world's second-largest country. Therefore, 80 percent of Canada's population is concentrated within 160 km of the US border. Due to its strategic location, Canada could exercise control over the north polar route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, namely, between Russia, China, and the US. In this respect, besides being prominent for the economic security of Canada, the oceans still constitute an essential defensive shield that needed to be retained even in the post-Cold War security environment.

7.6. ASSESSMENT

The Canadian Navy was designed to perform anti-submarine warfare missions in the North Atlantic, mostly during the Cold War. The Navy consisted of an aging fleet in need of regeneration and upgrading. It was under pressure to downsize to benefit from the peace dividend. However, it reacted responsibly to the emerging operational needs of the Cold War era. Despite budget cuts that prevented the modernization of the fleet in a planned way, the Canadian Navy was actively involved in multinational operations under the command of the UN and NATO.

At the turn of the millennium, the Canadian Navy had in its inventory four guided-missile destroyers, 12 guided-missile frigates and three submarines, and a fleet support ship. The Canadian Navy operates 12 frigates, two submarines, and two fleet support vessels, corresponding to a versatile blue water fleet as of 2018.

8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROYAL NETHERLANDS' NAVY

8.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

8.1.1. Government Policy and Support to Naval Development

The Netherlands had been a maritime trading nation and naval sea power, particularly in the seventeenth century. It was an exclusive exemplar of a naturally 'bottom-up' developed sea power, based on commercial incentives. The confinement at the land had forced the Dutch to seek their fortune at sea. Although it has been vitally dependent on seaborne supplies and exports for the function of its economy, historically the protection of maritime shipping has not been part of Dutch maritime doctrine (Till, 2018, pp. 110-116).

After the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands benefited from the peace dividend like many other NATO countries by reducing defense spending and at the same time downsizing and restructuring its military power. Instead, the Dutch chose to allocate substantial resources to domestic welfare and healthcare.

The Netherlands has been an active participant in both kinetic and non-kinetic stability and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. However, Dutch forces also faced heavy criticism for failing to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from the June 1995 massacre of Srebrenica. The Netherlands was involved more in the kinetics side of the operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi crises, especially in peace enforcement, support, and keeping operations in the wake of Balkan conflicts and Somalia in the 1990s. At the end of the millennium, it devised a plan to restructure its armed forces to meet the growing needs of the post-Cold War security environment. The renovation programs aimed to increase the overall combat capacity and improve the force projection capability of the Dutch Navy (Hernandez, 2013).

8.1.2. Naval Modernization Plans

After the fall of the Wall, the Dutch navy was substantially downsized by selling the decommissioned combatants in its inventory (NL, 2005). The new plan implemented by the Dutch navy so far has resulted in a blue water navy with limited force projection capability that includes four LCFs and two *Karel Doorman*-class frigates, four submarines, four OPVs, two

amphibious ships (LHD/LPD), and a joint support ship. Another joint support ship is to be commissioned in 2025.

8.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

8.2.1. Maritime Interests

The Netherlands is a maritime nation heavily dependent on maritime shipping and ports, offshore oil/gas platforms, fishing and also has overseas territories, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. The maritime interests of the Netherlands include its shipbuilding capacity corresponding to 106,000 GT as of 2017, a merchant fleet of 18,000 DWT in 2016. Shipping totals 27 percent of its merchandise trade-in value and the container port throughput is 13,951 thousand TEU. Rotterdam is the busiest port in the world.

The ratio of the coastal length of the Netherlands to its overall area is around 57 meters per square meter.

8.2.2. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

Statistics show that the Dutch economy grew by 1.3 percent in 1980 to 193 billion USD, followed by 4.2 percent to 314 billion USD in 1990, but reached 4.2 percent at 412 billion USD in 2000. However, economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military spending; It increased from 1.8 percent in 1980 to 4.0 in 1990, then dropped to 1.6 percent in 1995 and 1.4 in 2000.

The Netherlands, the 17th largest economy by gross domestic product (GDP), ranks fourth in terms of GDP per capita globally. In addition, it is the eighth largest exporter state in the world and ranks fifth in foreign direct investment. On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, Dutch defense spending as a percentage of GDP has declined significantly to 1.40 percent in 2000. These percentages were reflected in the budget as 5.27, 7.4 and 6 billion USD in 1980, 1990 and 2000, respectively. The allocations showed that the military budget was the first to be cut at the time of austerity and that the government kept military spending to a minimum in order to cope with the international commitments of the Dutch Armed Forces. The platforms in

the maritime inventory have been sold to various countries to raise funds for modernization and operations and maintenance expenditures. (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

8.3. SOCIAL FACTORS

8.3.1. Population growth and Age distribution

The population growth rate remained between 0.8 and 0.5 percent in the period 1980-2000, and the percentage of men eligible for industry and military was 3 percent in 1980, 1.5 in 1990, and 0.9 in 2000. The attractiveness of the country resulted in higher percentages in the Dutch workforce from 68.4 in 1980 and 69.1 in 1990 to 69.3 in 2000, but it also showed that around 70 percent of the total population is aging (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

The Netherlands is a highly educated country with high-quality universities recognized around the world and attracts highly qualified students and graduates from all over the world, as well as highly trained engineers and scientists specifically for the aerospace and defense industries.

8.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

The Netherlands is an industrialized and developed country and has a very advanced defense and shipbuilding industry with indigenous designs, especially in combat systems used as an alternative to US systems. Its high-tech exports gradually increased to 45 billion USD (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

During this period, the Dutch navy encouraged defense cooperation with Belgium and Britain and invested in local designs and combat systems rather than buying foreign designs. The defense industry has remained competitive in naval systems such as APAR radars and also in constructing naval platforms for various navies and coast guards (Stöhs, 2018).

8.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

8.5.1. Maritime Climate

Influenced by the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, particularly from the Gulf Stream, the Netherlands has a temperate maritime climate with cool summers and moderate winters. Daytime temperatures range between 2 ° C-6 ° C in winter and 17 ° C-20 ° C in summer.

Strong Atlantic low-pressure systems can cause storms and uncomfortable weather conditions, especially in the autumn and winter months. The Netherlands is threatened by a flood due to sea level that has occurred in the past but is vulnerable to sea-level rise due to climate change.

8.5.2. Geographic Location

Geographically, The Netherlands is positioned to dominate some of Europe's most economic centers as Flanders, Brabant, and the Rhineland. It also had fertile fisheries gifted by the Gulf Stream. Its limited land area stimulated the urge to seek their fortunes at sea. As a result, it was dependent on maritime trade for the export of agricultural and finished goods, as well as the import of raw materials. The Netherlands, in particular, is the world's second-largest agricultural exporter, despite its limited landmass.

8.6. ASSESSMENT

Despite being greatly downsized in terms of personnel and equipment, the Dutch Navy actively fulfilled its international commitments in multinational coalitions after the Cold War. In general, the Dutch government reshaped its military to meet the emerging needs of the Post-Cold War era in order to increase combat readiness and improve the ability of Dutch forces to conduct power projection operations. One of the reasons for its downsizing is to have a versatile and mobile capacity to operate in coalitions of a kind in the event of a crisis. The Netherlands does not perceive an immediate threat to its national and business interests in the near future due to the relatively stable and resilient environment created by the European Union. On the

other hand, it enjoys the comfortability provided by the US's leading role in ensuring the freedom of navigation in the world's oceans (Stöhs, 2018a).

At the turn of the millennium, the Royal Netherlands Navy had eight frigates, four submarines, and an LPD due to downsizing. As of 2018, the Dutch navy has a blue water navy with limited force projection capability, including four *De Zeven Provinciën*-class frigates and two *Karel Doorman*-class frigates, four submarines, four offshore patrol vessels, two amphibious ships (LHD/LPD), and a joint support vessel.



9. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPANISH NAVY

9.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

9.1.1. Government policy and Support to Naval Build-up

Spain could be considered an empire on mastery of seas in the sixteen century and enjoyed the advantages of interaction between the naval and commercial aspects of maritime power. As an absolute monarchy which is a system of mobilization of manpower rather than the financial capital, the Spanish navy did not receive the support of the public, seafaring traders, merchants, and financiers. Consequently, it failed the “maritime mindedness” test, that is, the administrative efficiency raising money and other resources and the chances of spending it wisely (Till, 2018, p. 113).

9.1.2. Threat Perception and Maritime Considerations

As part of Spain's sovereignty disputes, Spain challenges British sovereignty over all Gibraltar. As a result, it does not acknowledge that Gibraltar has any right to territorial waters. In addition, Spain competes with Morocco on the sovereignty of Ceuta, Melilla, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas, and Chafarinas Islands (O'Reilly, 1999). Spain also does not recognize the French's unilateral claim to the EEZ in the Mediterranean.

Due to its geographical location and coastal maritime borders, the Spanish navy has difficulties in protecting three separate beaches and overseas cities and islands.

Spain's goals were a bit more limited. The country often calls itself a “middle power” in its official statements, with its sphere of influence stretching from the Western Mediterranean to the Atlantic waters between the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary Islands. Spain mostly relied on US military assistance. After the transition to democracy, Spain built ships and developed combat systems under US licensed designs. It has a robust naval shipbuilding base with competent defense industries. By the early 1990s, *Armada Española* evolved into a small but modern multipurpose fleet designed around a small STOVL aircraft carrier (based on the U.S. vision of a sea-control ship), nineteen other large surface combatants, and a flotilla of eight submarines. Like other Western states, Spain experienced significant economic prosperity

during the 1990s and benefitted from the "peace dividend". At the same time, it also steadily reduced defense spending to 1.2 percent of GDP in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While the booming economy could make up for dwindling defense budgets, several large-scale shipbuilding programs consumed a large chunk of the Navy budget.

In the post-Cold War security environment, force projection capability including amphibious forces was prioritized in the supply list as a general trend in most European navies. In line with this paradigmatic shift in the country's naval strategy, two *Galicia*-class amphibious assault ships were constructed, together with a pair of tank landing ships, and a replenishment oiler. Funding was provided for five new escort ships in 1997. This air defense frigate, unlike some of its foreign counterparts, benefitted from the incorporation of the American-designed Aegis combat system and SM-2 air defense missiles. This design was later chosen by Australia and Norway for its economical price tag compared to the more capable but more expensive American *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyer. (Stöhs, 2018, s. 19). Its exclusive amphibious assault ship has also been selected by Australia and Turkey for their force projection needs as well by Thailand in the past.

9.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

9.2.1. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

The Spanish economy was also seriously affected by the crisis, and consequently, its defense forces were also affected. As a result, the Spanish navy has faced severe financial pressure in recent years. Lack of funding harmed training and readiness. The number of military personnel continued to decline throughout the post-Cold War period.

During the 1990s, the Spanish economy recovered with a decline in unemployment. Alongside government-induced austerity measures, integration into the single European market was instrumental in this economic recovery. In the early 21st century, Spain has developed into one of the EU's strongest economies. Foreign direct investment in the country tripled from 1990 to 2000. Moreover, since 2000, a large number of people have immigrated to Spain to work in the construction industry, which contributes about one-tenth of GDP (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019).

The statistics showed that the economy of Spain, as of GDP grew 2.2 percent in 1980 to 232 billion USD, and then 3.8 percent in 1990 amounting to 535 billion USD but reached 5.3 percent in 2000 totaling to 595 billion USD. The growth declined due to the economic and financial crises in 1992-93. The trade increased from 23.6 percent of GDP in 1980 to 45.6 percent of GDP in 2000 (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

Economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military spending, its percentage declined from 3.0 in 1985 to 2.3 in 1990 and fell to 1.7 percent in 2000 amounting to 10.2 billion USD in 2000. The Spanish Navy had difficulties continuing the modernization of aging platforms and keeping up with the increasing operational pace of the post-Cold War era. However, the Spanish Navy was more fortunate than its other European counterparts, with an earlier start to modernization with the state-owned industrial complex by building licensed US frigates and amphibious assault ships and exporting them to other countries.

9.2.2. Maritime Interests

As for Spain's maritime interests, it includes 47,000 GT shipbuilding capacity, 3,990,000 DWT merchant fleet, and 17 million TEU container port business volume as of 2017. The ratio of the coastal length of Spain to its overall area is around 128 meters per square meter. Although it has the largest fishing industry in the EU, the country has access points to both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea and offers good conditions for marine and freshwater aquaculture. Spain annually produces just under 1.2 million tons of fishery products, more than any other EU country. It consists of 9,146 ships, the EU's third-largest fishing fleet. (Eurofish, 2019).

9.3. SOCIAL FACTORS

The growth rate of the population remained around 0.5 percent in the period between 1980 to 2000 and the percentage of eligible males for the industry and the military from 63.6 percent to 70.2 percent in 2000. However, the boom in the economy and the prosperity associated with EU accession have made Spain an emigration country, formerly a country of immigration (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

9.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

Spain relied mostly on US military assistance. After the transition to democracy, Spain built ships under US licensed ship designs and combat systems and retained its military-industrial capabilities. Naval industrial complex, due to the economic price tag Aegis destroyer design of Australia and Norway, LHA/LHD designs can export to Australia and Turkey and competition.

Spain has become a relatively industrialized and developed nation and has a very advanced defense and shipbuilding industry with indigenous designs, especially in combat systems based on US systems. High technology exports rose from 0.8 billion USD in 1988 to 7.0 billion USD in 2000, while brand applications tripled in two decades, which can be considered as a result of R&D investments and innovative industrialization. (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

9.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

9.5.1. Maritime Climate

Spain faces significant major climate divisions due to the size of its peninsula-shaped terrain. In addition to its location affected by the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean, and Sub-Saharan African regimes, it faces continental climatic risks as well as rains in mountainous regions (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019).

9.5.2. Geographic Location

Besides occupying most of the Iberian Peninsula, it also has territory in Morocco along with the Canary Islands in the Atlantic and the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean Sea. It also has coastlines neighboring the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019).

9.6. ASSESSMENT

Spain created comparably a better-balanced fleet with a blue water and force projection capability as well as a supporting defense and shipbuilding industry with export capacity on its indigenous and licensed designs than its European peers. Its blue water fleet is recently comprised of an amphibious assault (light aircraft carrier) ship, air defense destroyers, and frigates, 2 LPDs.

At the turn of the millennium, the Spanish Navy had one light aircraft carrier, eleven frigates, five submarines, and two fleet support ships. As of 2018, the Spanish navy has one amphibious assault ship and two LPDs, five Aegis destroyers and six frigates, three submarines, and two fleet support ships along with a capable fleet of offshore patrol vessels, mine countermeasures capability, and fast attack crafts.

10. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

10.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

10.1.1. Government Policy and Support to Naval Build-up

The Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean during the late 1970s and early 1980s required the Italian Navy to establish a greater presence in NATO's southern flank. Many new warships were built during this period while existing platforms underwent modernization and refit. At the end of the Cold War, Italy operated a well-balanced fleet of ships and submarines, most of which were built domestically (Stöhs, 2018).

At the same time, the country's military strategy shifted from sea control and static defense against Soviet forces to projecting power from main ports to areas farther away. The strategy had been translated into practice in Italy's military engagements in Iraq (1991), Yugoslavia (1993–97), Mozambique (1993), Somalia (1991–95), and Eritrea (1998) and against Serbia (1999). At the same time, the country's military strategy shifted from naval control and static defense against Soviet forces to projecting power from main ports to areas farther away. Although the percentage of military spending decreased slightly between 1990 and 2000, the defense budget remained relatively stable due to Italy's economic growth (Stöhs, 2018).

The Italian Navy remained a powerful instrument of Italian foreign policy throughout the 21st century. In fact, the country's strategic goals have remained largely unchanged since their publicization in the late 1970s. Per Italy's strategic interests, the Navy continued to enhance its expeditionary capabilities (the goal was to be able to deploy a brigade-level force), strengthen its naval airpower, acquire multirole platforms for countering all forms of threat, and promote the national defense, maritime awareness, and maritime security (Waters, 2013).

10.1.2. Threat Perception and Naval Activities

Over the last decade, the Italian Navy has maintained a very high operational tempo and conducted a variety of naval tasks. In doing so, it relied on a capable and well-balanced fleet and highly trained crew. The domestically built aircraft carrier *Cavour* was brought into service in 2008 and will be able to deploy the Lockheed Martin F-35B STOVL fighter.

Its predecessor, *Giuseppe Garibaldi*, meanwhile, works as a helicopter carrier. The demand for an Italian aircraft carrier air wing stems from the shrinking footprint of the US Navy in the Mediterranean over the past two decades.

The escort fleet consists of two destroyers *Horizon* or *Andrea Doria* class and an increasing number of new FREMM²⁴⁵ frigates. Contrary to France's throttling policies, the Italian Defence Ministry decided to supply all ten frigates it had originally planned. Italy's submarine fleet benefited from close collaboration with Thyssen Krupp Naval Systems in Germany and received four Type 212A submarines with air-independent propulsion.

Most importantly, both Italy's navy and coast guard have been actively involved in combating human trafficking as well as providing humanitarian assistance to large areas of the Mediterranean basin. Accordingly, the Italian Navy had a large contingent of offshore patrol ships better suited for policing tasks than their heavily armed sisters.

Current conflicts, combined with Italy's numerous other military commitments, left fewer platforms dealing with a greater number of missions. With dwindling resources and fewer platforms, the Italian Navy hardly maintains its deployment speed in many regions without the risk of fatigue and accidents. Perhaps more importantly, since the transition to a fully voluntary force, personnel costs have placed a significant burden on the defense budget and thus limited maintenance and procurement funds. Italian naval leaders remain steadfast that the Italian Navy can "fulfill its national and international commitments" (Stöhs, 2018b). But despite these assertions, the country may have to limit its ambitions: "For the navy, the longer-term consequence will likely be some re-orientation towards regional intervention capabilities at the expense of its current enthusiasm for extra-regional expeditionary deployments" (Waters, 2013).

Meanwhile, based on their experience on their joint *Horizon* project, France and Italy set out to build a new multipurpose frigate, known as the FREMM. Both navies intended the class to replace their existing assortments of older surface combatants; the French navy hoped to procure nineteen units.

²⁴⁵ The FREMM ("European multi-purpose frigate"; French: *Frégate européenne multi-mission*; Italian: *Fregata europea multi-missione*) is a class of multi-purpose frigates designed by Fincantieri and Naval Group.

The main goals of the Italian navy remain: to enhance the fleet's expeditionary role, to use naval airpower effectively, to achieve the ability to conduct brigade-level amphibious operations, to acquire multi-role platforms, and to strengthen national defense and to promote maritime security (Branciforte, 2012).

In sum, the Italian Navy kept an expeditionary capability in projecting a brigade with a well-balanced blue water fleet consisting of two CV/LHA, three LPD 12 *Horizon*/FREMM frigates, offshore patrol vessels, eight Type 212A submarines, and fleet logistic support ships.

10.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

10.2.1. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

Statistical data show that the Italian economy grew by 3.4 percent in 1980 to 476 billion USD, followed by an increase of 2.8 percent in 1990 to 1.2 trillion USD compared to GDP, but in 2000 it reached 3.7 percent for a total of 1.14 trillion USD. Growth declined due to economic and financial crises in 1992-93. Trade grew from 37.5 percent in 1980 to 42.0 percent of GDP in 2000 (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

The percentage of GDP devoted to military spending decreased slightly during this period. However, the defense budget in the current USD remained relatively constant owing to Italy's economic growth. That is, the booming economy made up for the percentage drop in military spending by relatively keeping defense budgets almost constant. Economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military spending, as its percentage in terms of GDP remained almost unchanged at around 2.0, but the funds allocated increased from 9 billion USD in 1980 to 25 USD billion in 1990. However, the effects of the financial and economic crises were also reflected in the decline of defense budgets to less than 2.0 percent of GDP in 1995 and then stabilization at 2.0 percent in 2000 to 22 billion USD in 2000 (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

10.2.2. Maritime Interests

The ratio of Italy's coastal length to its total area is about 31 meters per square kilometer and its coastline is 9,136 km. The surface area of the coastal regions comprises almost 60 percent of the national territory. Despite the limited contribution to the overall GDP, the fishing sector constitutes a significant economic activity in the south. Italy has 12,250 registered fishing vessels in connection with declining catches (Eurofish, 2019).

Italy's maritime interests can be broadly divided into 470,000 gross tonnage shipbuilding capacity as of 2017, 21 million DWT merchant fleet, 1 million TEU container port throughput in 2016. The overall seaborne trade in Italy corresponds to thirty percent of its merchandise trade-in value (UNCTADSTAT, 2019).

10.3. SOCIAL FACTORS AND POPULATION GROWTH

The population of Italy almost remained constant with corresponding the percentage of eligible males for the industry and the military stayed around 70 percent (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019). Being a transit country as well as a settlement destiny for immigrants, Italy has vehemently influenced the flow of migrants from Africa.

10.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

Italy has relied on its own designs and weapon systems to develop relevant shipbuilding capabilities and maintain defense industry competence. The Navy's platforms are supported by an industrial base that establishes a leading position in naval equipment and weaponry, particularly in the anti-surface and electronic warfare domains (Stöhs, 2018).

Italy has become a relatively industrialized and developed nation and has a very advanced defense and shipbuilding industry, especially with indigenous designs in combat systems. Its high-tech exports gradually increased from 88 in 1988 to 20 billion USD in 2000 whereas the trademark applications tripled in two decades which could be considered a result of investment in R&D and innovative industrialization (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

10.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

10.5.1. Geographical Location

With the Italian Peninsula occupying a critical geographic position along Europe's southern shores, Italy's sphere of interest largely was confined to two main lines stretching across the Mediterranean Sea: starting from Gibraltar, "one reaching the Black Sea and the Middle East through the Balkans and the Aegean Sea; the [other] moving southward through the Red Sea down to the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, and including the Horn of Africa" (Waters, 2013).

10.5.2. Climate

Italy has a typical Mediterranean climate. However, particularly Mistral can induce snow and gales, even reaching the southern regions of Italy (WeatherOnline, 2019).

10.6. ASSESSMENT

Italy operated a balanced fleet of ships and submarines throughout the period, most of which were built domestically at the end of the Cold War, in a way the Italian Navy had a versatile force structure capable of dealing with the emerging roles and operational tempo (Stöhs, 2018).

At the same time, the country's military strategy shifted from sea control and static defense against Soviet forces to projecting power into regions farther from home. Italy's military engagement in the coalition operations under the UN mandate and its commitments to NATO underscore the Italian Navy's multi-role and multi-mission skill set, as well as its political will, to act within the sphere of influence and interest of the country.

In summary, the Italian Navy could project a brigade with a well-balanced blue water fleet consisting of versatile platforms, while developing the domestic military-industrial complex in collaboration with its European peers in joint development projects such as FREMM and *Horizon*-class.

At the turn of the millennium, the Italian navy had one light aircraft carrier, six guided-missile destroyers, 16 guided-missile frigates, eight submarines, three amphibious platforms (LPD),

and two fleet support ships as part of its blue-water fleet. As of 2018, the Italian Navy has one light aircraft carrier/amphibious assault ship, four air defense destroyers, ten FREMM, and seven other class frigates, eight submarines, three amphibious platforms (LPD), and two fleet support ships.



11.THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN NAVY

11.1. POLITICAL FACTORS

11.1.1. Government Policy and Support to Naval Build-Up

During the Cold War, the Navy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) undertook coastal defense missions to protect West Germany's coasts from amphibious attacks. Together with the Danish navy, it was tasked with preventing the Red Baltic Fleet from leaving the Danish straits. Hence, the German Navy was intended mainly to conduct anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare in the confined and shallow waters of the Baltic Sea, acting as a secondary escort along the sea lanes of communication in the North Sea and the ones towards the English Channel.

But by the end of the Cold War, the German Navy had already begun to switch from a brown-water force operating on its littoral waters to a blue water fleet that could be deployed permanently on the high seas. Like most of its NATO partners, in the 1990s, taking advantage of the peace dividend, Germany cut defense spending and diverted funds for social welfare and health care. The defense budget eventually dropped to 50 billion USD. Simultaneously, the Navy decommissioned many platforms of its aging fleet.

The German Navy avoided obtaining any platform specifically designed for amphibious operations, for both doctrinal and political reasons. Instead, several new surface combatants, namely the K-130 corvettes and F-123 anti-submarine warfare frigates, were put into service (Stöhs, 2018).

In the post-Cold War period, Germany limited its military deployments with its commitments to the Alliance, except participation in the Persian Gulf mine-clearing operations and facilitation of the Federal Constitutional Court ruling on Adriatic embargo operations.

11.1.2. Threat Perception and Naval Deployments

The German Navy continues to evolve from a largely littoral-focused regional force to a more globally deployable, flexible configuration, in line with declining defense spending and its increased participation in international stabilization missions.

Currently, surface forces are increased by the continuation class of Type 125 *Baden-Württemberg*-class frigates. All remaining fast attack ships will be retired over the next few years, while the mine warfare fleet will likely be reduced to ten boats supported by mine countermeasure modules deployed on other ships. In addition, the total number of naval helicopters in the current forty-three strong Sea King and Lynx fleet will be reduced to thirty.

The focus on international deployments resulted in the construction of three combat support ships. Meanwhile, the German navy replaced the aging Type 206 submarines with the fuel cell Type 212A submarine. Overall, the German Navy after released from its constitutional restrictions transformed from a regional force to a more globally deployable blue water navy except for force projection and strike capability (Waters, 2013).

11.2. ECONOMIC FACTORS

11.2.1. Maritime Interests

Germany has the fourth-largest merchant fleet by ownership of around 100,000 DWT and container carriers. It is also on the list of global leaders at the connectivity level. The German economy has been vitally dependent on maritime trade for the import of raw materials and the export of finished goods. Germany has settled its claims for maritime jurisdiction areas and fishery zones with the neighboring states. Half of the German merchandise trade was carried by maritime shipping. Hamburg and Bremerhaven are on the list of ten busiest ports of Europe.

Germany's maritime interests can be broadly listed as 470,000 gross tonnage shipbuilding capacity as of 2017, 111.3 million DWT merchant fleet in 2016, container throughput of 19.5 million TEU. The seaborne trade corresponds to 37 percent of the total merchandise trade-in value. The ratio of the coastal length of Germany to its overall area is around 10 meters per square meter (UNCTADSTAT, 2019).

11.2.2. Economic Growth and Defense Expenditures

Although Germany bears the cost of uniting with East Germany, including the transport of the Red Army, it has become Europe's largest and locomotive economy. Statistics showed that the

German economy grew by 14 percent in 1980 to 947 billion USD, followed by an increase of 5.3 percent in 1990 to 1.765 billion USD, but in 2000 it rose 3.0 percent to 1.950 billion USD. Growth declined due to economic and financial crises in 1992-93. Merchandise trade increased from 40.2 percent of GDP in 1980 to 54 percent of GDP in 2000. (WorldBank, GDP, 2019).

The economic growth was not proportionally reflected in military expenditures, a percentage of which, in terms of GDP, kept descending from 3.1 percent corresponding to 26.7 billion USD to 2.7 percent in 1990 totaling 42.3 billion USD. Subsequently, it decreased to 1.4 with 28.1 billion USD in 2000 (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

11.3.SOCIAL FACTORS

11.3.1. Historical Factors

Nominally having the fifth-largest navy in Europe, Germany remained a land power, only occasionally showing greater naval aspirations. Given the geographic as well as historical realities (access merely to the Baltic and North Seas, and under constant suspicion of militarist tendencies from its own population), the country has found it difficult to take a leading role in European defense and security matters. With the disintegration of large parts of the former East German Navy after German reunification in 1989, the underlying strategic goals and needs of the country had to be reconsidered (Stöhs, 2018)

11.3.2. Social Factors and Population Growth

Although it has been an attractive destination for immigrants from all over the world, the population of Germany almost remained constant. The percentage of eligible males for industry and military stayed around the 1970s (WorldBank, Population Indicators, 2019).

11.4. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS

Historically, due to its reliance on seaborne trade, Germany has always had a shipbuilding industry and relevant marine infrastructure. While comprising a small chunk of its commercial

ship construction, While Germany accounts for a small fraction of merchant shipbuilding, it is a major warship exporter, reaching around 51,000 equivalent gross tones in 1984 and 2006.

On the military side, German designed MEKO modular frigates, fast attack boats, corvettes, and Type 209/214 submarines are popular in the world market due to their price tag and adaptability to the customer's system requirements. Germany also has a defense industry that supports naval shipbuilding, is competitive and highly preferred for the quality of its products, as well as supporting financial models and insurance guarantees (GlobalSecurity.org, 2019).

Germany has become a highly industrialized and developed nation and has a very cutting-edge defense and shipbuilding industry with indigenous designs. High technology exports rose from 34 billion USD in 1988 to 86 billion USD in 2000, while trademark applications increased fivefold in twenty years, which can be considered as a result of R&D investment and innovative industrialization, amounting to 2.2 percent of total GDP annually (WorldBank, Trademark App and High Tech Exports, 2019).

11.5. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

11.5.1. Climate

Germany enjoys a moderate climate. In the northern regions, the marine-influenced climate introduces “warm summers and mild cloudy winters”. However, this regime also brings storms and displeasing weather conditions as well (WeatherOnline, 2019).

11.5.2. Geography

Germany has difficult strategic geography due to its central position among rival states while offering a bare natural defense. Its shipping routes are limited by the English Channel and the gap between the British Isles and Norway, in transmission to the broad Atlantic, historically controlled by Great Britain. On the other hand, Germany can control access to the Baltic Sea, that is, an important exit point for the Russian Fleet to the oceans (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019). Its geostrategic position dictates the development of a littoral warfare capacity in the Baltic Sea while having a blue water component to safeguard its seaborne trade.

11.6. LEGAL FACTORS

11.6.1. Out of Area Operations

Since the Second World War, Germany has refrained from participating in operations outside Europe due to ‘supposed’ constitutional restrictions. The case was taken to the constitutional court. The verdict of the court was the requirement for parliamentary approval to partake in operations out of Europe. From then on, German troops are allowed to participate in military missions “approved by collective security agreements”, that is, under the auspices of the UN, NATO, and the EU. After that, in 1995, for the first time since the Second World War, Germany sent military forces to a war zone (GlobalSecurity.org, 2019).

11.7. ASSESSMENT

By the end of the Cold War, the German Navy already had begun transitioning from a brown-water force that operated within its littorals to a blue-water fleet that was capable of sustained deployments at high seas. The German Navy continues its transformation from a regional force focused largely on the littorals to a more globally deployable, flexible configuration in line with its increased participation in international stabilization missions with shrinking defense spending. However, the German Navy does not have the expeditionary capacity, that is, force projection, for political and constitutional reasons.

At the turn of the millennium, as part of the German Navy’s blue water fleet, there were three guided-missile hunters, 12 guided missile frigates, 18 submarines, and six fleet oilers. As of 2018, the German Navy has nine guided-missile frigates, six corvettes, six submarines, and three fleet support ships as part of its blue-water capacity achieved through the ongoing ambitious modernization program.

12. AN OVERALL ANALYSIS OF NAVAL DEVELOPMENT TRENDS

The panorama of the countries studied by the PESTEL analysis revealed many similarity patterns common to most of them, with differences arising from geography and threat perceptions of the state under investigation.

Politically, the sudden disappearance of the Soviet Empire and the subsequent crises in the Gulf and the Balkans fundamentally shifted from a bipolar world order to a unipolar one, then to a multipolar world after the 2010s, dramatically changing the global threat perception. Ultimately, differences in the depiction of the security environment were reflected in national defense policy and governments' strategy. The most common trend was the demobilization of Cold War structures and the downsizing of naval command and force structures.

In the early 1990s, many economies grew significantly and although there was a worldwide trade boom due to the winds of globalization, increases in budgets were not reflected in the defense part in proportion to the increase in economic growth. The first action of governments common to all countries was to make significant cuts in naval allocations of various scales. Most of the coastal defense forces, fast attack ships, convoy escorts, anti-submarine, and mine countermeasures combat platforms were immediately demobilized. The functional focus of navies shifted from sea control to out-of-area operations.

Another common aspect of the period was the entry into force of the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Delimitation of maritime jurisdictions such as territorial waters, continental shelves, and exclusive economic zones were matters of concern and controversy for many countries to streamline their naval muscles, namely navies accordingly. In addition to force projection and embargo operations, naval forces were given new roles and functions in upkeeping sovereignty and maintaining good order at sea. The new roles and functions required multi-role and multi-functional vessels with embarked air components rather than warfare-specific platforms of the Cold War. Most of the existing platforms have been upgraded to the levels that met the emerging needs of the evolving maritime security environment.

The Dutch government decommissioned almost half of its naval fleet by selling ships to other countries and canceling most of the revisions and updates planned for the modernization of platforms in inventory. Later, the Royal Netherlands Navy transformed its force structure into a versatile fleet with limited force projection capability with embarked expeditionary units to

protect maritime interests and defend its overseas territories. The Dutch defense and shipbuilding industry kept its place in the market with indigenously designed systems and the Dutch navy was its advertising envoy. Positioning itself close to the postmodern part of the naval spectrum, the Royal Netherlands Navy actively participated in non-traditional missions of the post-Cold War era.

The German government decommissioned the East German Navy and downsized its Navy. By establishing a versatile and mobile war fleet, it continued its transformation into the blue water navy that it had initiated earlier. For political and constitutional reasons, Germany initially hesitated in out-of-area deployments, but later joined non-kinetic parts of operations accordingly. The German Navy did not plan to develop an amphibious capability for historical reasons but flexed its muscles by deploying annual task groups around the world as a showcase of its versatile blue-water capability.

Italy and Spain opted to consolidate their naval forces by shrinking and streamlining their structures by shifting from sea control and static defense to projection of power farther away from the homeland. Both navies had limited power projection and strike capability for stabilization operations and out-of-area deployments.

In Europe, a fashion trend has been the creation of a bilateral and multilateral mechanism for establishing a unified capability through cooperation, such as combined amphibious forces, surface duty groups, mine countermeasure groups, etc.

Canadian Navy also transmuted itself from an open ocean anti-submarine warfare in the sub-Arctic ocean to a part of a stabilizing force in the tropical waters in the shadow of harsh defense cuts. The successful transformation of the 1990s provided the blue-water capability needed to respond to local and global crises on time.

In the down under, the Royal Australian Navy adapted itself to the emerging security environment with increased regional vigilance due to the growing tiger, China in the neighborhood. Despite the defense cuts, the Australian Navy improved its existent blue water capabilities with advanced platforms and retained its limited expeditionary capabilities.

The South African Navy was also reborn from the ashes during the transition to democracy following the perishing of the global feud. Despite facing difficult economic conditions, the government provided the necessary funds to build a core blue water capacity in one of the most strategic locations on sea routes.

Thailand enjoyed the position of being a Rimland country in the Cold War era. Then it developed a force by shifting its focus from coastal defense to limited projection capability, that could not be justified with the threat perception other than out-of-area operations. The Royal Thai Navy is still strengthening its blue water capabilities by keeping a close eye on the balance of naval power in the region and participating in international operations such as combating piracy.

For the Pakistan Navy, the development of naval capabilities was threat-based as part of the layered defense against its existential rival, the Indian Navy, rather than acquiring a blue water navy capability. Due to the arms embargo and economic hardship, the Pakistan Navy diversified its supplies to improve its stance against the growing Indian naval power. However, it had also deployed its frigates effectively by taking part in counter-piracy operations to display its standing and combat readiness.

The rise of the South Korean Navy deserves a careful analysis because it includes the optimum merging of threat-based capabilities and blue-water capacity. Ministerial circles dominated by the Army prioritized a threat-based approach to naval development against North Korean Navy's excursions. The South Korean Navy was tasked for particularly concentrating on littoral and anti-submarine warfare and on patrolling the territorial waters with a force comprised of patrol vessels, anti-submarine warfare corvettes, and destroyers, fast attack crafts, mine countermeasures platforms. Protection of maritime routes delegated to the US Navy. Historical rivalry with Japan and growing China in the maritime domain were also other challenges for South Korea's naval capability development. Prepared by the maritime leadership to pursue more maritime power-driven by the growing importance of the sea, the blue water naval strategy matched the presidential policy of being a responsible regional and global stakeholder and a capable independent actor on the world stage.

With this synergy, the South Korean Navy developed a blue-water capability bolstered by the country's economic growth and the technological leap of its shipbuilding industry. Surely, US support was instrumental as a strategic partner. Within two decades, the South Korean Navy has evolved from a coastal defense and sea control navy to a blue-water navy and then a regional force projection navy. In this context, the South Korean Navy was the main driving force in taking this initiative, which was adopted by politicians and the public. In the final analysis, the

South Korean maritime initiative has resulted in the collective desired outcome to raise the prestige and reputation of the nation with its economic standing in the international arena.

The level of political support for the development of blue-water capacity varied across European Navies. Spain and Italy benefited from relatively strong/moderate support to transform and modernize their navies into medium regional force projection navy category while operating in a national capacity, and also entered to medium global force protection navy category while exercising this capability in multinational coalition forces.

Based on their geographical position and threat perception, Canadian, Dutch and German Navies also developed blue water capabilities corresponding to medium regional force projection navy category while operating in the multinational coalition task forces due to the limited capacity of amphibious forces and naval aviation.

The unique position of the Royal Thai Navy with its light air carrier, which has recently been re-designated as an amphibious assault ship, deserves to be categorized as a medium regional force protection navy. However, the Thai Navy can be listed as an adjacent force protection navy because of its true combat readiness and operational efficiency.

Concentrating on layered defense, the Pakistan Navy can be categorized as an offshore territorial defense navy with very limited adjacent force projection capability.

With the modernization program at the end of the millennium, the South African Navy reached the category of adjacent force projection navy, although it struggled to maintain its operational readiness and effectiveness due to limited budget allocation.

Traditionally capable of projecting power, the Australian Navy has upgraded its naval stance from an adjacent force projection navy to the level of a medium regional force projection navy at the end of the millennium. With the introduction of two amphibious assault ships (literally light aircraft carriers with F35-B fighters) and Aegis-equipped air defense destroyers, it paves the way to a higher category, namely medium global force projection navy. By 2020, the Australian Navy has reached operational capability, such as the Spanish and Italian navies.

With its ambitious modernization program, the South Korean Navy was transformed from an offshore/inshore territorial defense navy, while maintaining and prioritizing this capacity as well, to an adjacent force projection navy at the end of the millennium. As of 2020, it is listed

as a medium regional force projection navy, with the procurement of amphibious assault ships and Aegis-equipped air defense destroyers and frigates.

The Turkish Navy was tasked with the coastal defense of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits during the Cold War Era and basically had an offshore/inshore territorial defense navy capacity. However, developments in the Aegean and the Cyprus crisis eventually required the Navy to focus on locally developing the limited force projection capabilities that it successfully used in the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. Shifting its center of gravity to the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Navy started to develop its blue water and power projection capability with the purchase of MEKO class frigates and the construction of two fleet support ships after the 1980s. The vintage ex-US *Gearing*-class destroyers were replaced by the transfer of ex-US *Knox*- and *Perry*-class frigates. The permanent basing of a task group at the newly developed Aksaz naval base was a move to this aim. For Turkey, the entry into force of UNCLOS III has complicated the issues that stemmed from the alleged sovereignty claims of Greece in the Aegean Sea. Priority was given to threat-based defense planning, naval superiority, or at least balance, against the Greek Navy while developing the high seafaring navy.

In this era, the Turkish Navy also promulgated its 'Towards Blue Waters' strategy as a manifestation of its future force structure and functional profile. The 1997 strategy focused on the development of a versatile blue water capability navy that could be categorized as a medium global force projection navy while keeping offshore/coastal defense capacity against the Greek Navy and Greek Cypriot's maritime forces. The envisaged naval posture in the strategy included a light aircraft carrier with a strike air arm, an amphibious assault ship, 22-24 guided-missile frigates, 15-18 submarines, an amphibious brigade, multi-purpose helicopters, and two or three fleet support ships. The strategy also envisioned the development of indigenous ship design/construction and combat management systems, as well as in-country improved weapons such as artillery, guided/cruise missiles, and heavy/lightweight torpedoes (Dz.K.K., 1997).

Although this initiative, launched by the Navy, received limited support from the defense ministry and general staff circles, the budget allocation to the Navy was not increased in order to achieve the desired goals of the strategy in the foreseen schedule. The economic growth of the period was not reflected in the naval budget due to the prioritization of domestic counter-terrorism operations that diverted funds to the urgent needs of the Land and Air Force's

operational capacity. The lack of funds consequently forced the naval leadership to convince the government to utilize foreign finance packages guaranteed by the Treasury, which only allowed under license procurement and building of warships instead of domestic design and construction.

In a nutshell, the vision of the Turkish Navy to develop blue-water capability completely matches with the trend of the era, namely ‘projecting security’. In fact, this capability can be used in multinational coalitions for out-of-area operations, as practiced by many European, South American, and South Asian navies.

The ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy focused on maintaining and developing coastal/offshore defense and adjacent force protection, as implemented by the Pakistan and South Korean Navy.

In summary, the force development strategy of the Turkish Navy mostly follows similar patterns to that of the South Korean Navy. For example, they had convergences in some aspects, such as their threat-based capability development, their initiation by the Navies based on their cultural and organizational development, and the Navies’ adaptability to the emerging security environment. Their constraints were almost similar as well, such as restricted allocation of funds as well as limited support (sometimes hindrance) from army-dominated/continentally minded ministerial circles. However, the South Korean Navy, unlike the Turkish Navy, makes use of US technology transfer more easily and flexibly as a strategic partner. In addition, South Korea supports financial mechanisms for promoting the industry, as well as having a more developed shipbuilding and defense industry. For these reasons, it can be said that the South Korean Navy is 20 years ahead of the Turkish Navy, although both began the same strategic journey in the early 1980s and set out in the early 1990s. Due to the problems mentioned above, the Turkish Navy may be listed in the adjacent force projection category at the beginning of the millennium. However, the increase in the capabilities of existing platforms with locally designed combat management systems and the commissioning of domestically designed and built corvettes and landing ships raised the Turkish Navy to the category of medium regional force projection navy as of December 2020.

13. THE WAY FORWARD

In the strategy document published in 2015, the Navy confirmed the force stance envisaged in the previous ‘Towards Blue Waters’ strategy and claimed that it would try to become a ‘medium global force projection navy’ with the commissioning of the amphibious assault ship(s), the TF-2000 air defense destroyers, the *Istif*-class frigates and the fleet support ship. This envisaged capacity will expand the area of operation beyond the surrounding seas and increase cooperation with Allied naval forces and other multinational organizations (TNFC, 2016).



Table C-1 Naval Development Trends of Selected States in the Aftermath of Cold War-1990 to 2000

Factors/Countries	South Korea	Thailand	Pakistan	Australia	South Africa	Canada	Netherlands	Italy	Germany	Spain	Turkey	
Political	Gov. Support	Strong/President	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Weak	Strong	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	
	MOD Support	Weak/Army Dom.	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Strong	Weak-Army D.	
	ICS Support	Weak/Army	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	Strong	Weak	Strong	Weak	
	Naval Culture	Very Strong	Strong	Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Strong	Strong	Very Strong	
	Conventional Threat	N/Korea	Moderate	Very	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	V Strong-Greece/SCGA	
	Maritime Threat	Strong-Japan/China	Moderate	Strong/India	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Very Strong-Greece/SCGA	
	Sup/Global Ord	Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Strong	Weak	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Very Strong	Strong	
	Growth (GDP USD)	Strong-% 6-562	Strong-%5-104	Moderate-%4-74	Strong-%5-415	Moderate-4.2%-136.4	Strong-5.2%-742	Strong-4.2%-412	Strong-3.7%-1.14	Strong-3.0%-1.95	Very Strong-5.3%-595	Strong-6.6%-273
	Defence Exp. (GDP-USD)	Strong-%2.5-13.8	Moderate-%1.5-1.5	Strong-4.8%-3.0	Moderate-1.9%-7.3	Weak-1.4%-1.9	Moderate-1.0%-8.3	Moderate-1.4%-6	Moderate-2.0%-22	Moderate-1.4%-28	Mod-1.7%-10.2	Moderate-3.7%-10
	Seaborn	Very Strong-% 60-81	Weak-7038 T-DWT	Weak-%30-752 T-DWT	Strong-%99-98 T-DWT	Strong-50%-2516	Strong-38%-9.2	Strong-2.7%-18	Strong-30%-20.7	Very Strong-111.3	Strong-2.35 M-DWT	Strong-%50-24
Trade/Mer.Fleet	Very Strong-90301/14 TEU	Moderate/31787/79 TEU	Weak/8789/72 TEU	Moderate/3542/802 TEU	Weak/1846944 TEU	Moderate/2927942 TEU	Strong/6407162 TEU	Strong/6918588 TEU	Strong/7695688 TEU	Strong-3789695 TEU	Weak-1591/739 TEU	
Container Port Throughput	Very Strong/North Korea-China-Japan	Moderate/Cambodia	Strong/India	Moderate	Very Weak	Moderate/Arctic	Very Weak	Weak	Weak	Strong	Very Strong-Greece/SCGA	
Maritime Claims	128 m/m2	14 m/m2	3 m/km2	7.8. m/km2	3 m/km2	29 m/km2	57 m/km2	29 m/km2	10 m/km2	15 m/km2	11 m/km2	
Coastal Length/Area	0.2 % of GDP/96000	1.15% of GDP/58119	0.1% of GDP/34000	2.27% of GDP/2400	0.2% of GDP/-	1.42 of GDP/23000	1.86 of GDP/9400	0.5 of GDP/12250	0.63 of GDP/1500	2.59 of GDP/18936	0.4 of GDP/18936	
Fishing GDP/boats	Weak	Weak/Army dom.	Weak/Army	Strong	Strong	Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	
Maritime Hts.	Weak/Continentalist	Weak/Army dom.	Weak/Army	Strong	Strong	Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Strong	Strong	Moderate	
Maritime Char.	0.8 %-72.3%	1.0 %-69.2%	2.3%-53.8%	1.2%-67.5%	1.5%-62.2%	0.9%-69.3%	0.7%-69.7%	0.0%-70%	0.0%-70%	0.5%-70.2 %	1.5%-63%	
Population Gr.	Very strong/110000	Moderate/27000	Weak/8320	Strong/43000	Moderate/25678	Strong/46500	N/A	Strong/45000	Strong/73000	Strong/98981	Moderate/29500	
Applications	Strong/1860 MUSD	N/A	N/A	Weak/394 MUSD	Weak/930 MUSD	Strong/21	Strong/-	Mod./5	Str/19.7	Mod/1.8	Weak/-	
Defence In d.Ex.	V. Strong/22.6 M-GT	Weak/724 GT	Weak/-	Mod/11000 GT	Weak/2516 GT	Weak/148 GT	Str/106 K-GT	Strong/470	Strong/470	Mod/23923	Mod-192 KGT	
Shipbuilding	Strong/54 BUSD	Mod/17.3 BUSD	Weak/3 BUSD	Weak/2.8 BUSD	Weak/0.7 BUSD	Strong/30 BUSD	Strong/45 BUSD	Strong/86 BUSD	Strong/86 BUSD	Mod/7	Weak/1.1	
High Tech Ex	Strong	Strong	Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Very Strong	Strong	Moderate	Very Strong	Strong	
Geography	Very Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	Very Strong	Moderate	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	
Climate	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Moderate	Strong	Moderate	
Legal	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Restricted	N/A	N/A	
Naval Posture	3 FFG, 9 FL, 9 SS, 4 LST, 1AOR	1 CL (SeaHarrier), 8 FFG, 7FL, 2 LST, 1 AOR	6 FFG, 4 SSG, 1 AOR	3 DDG, 6 FFG, 3 SS, 2 LST, 1 LSH, 1 AOR	7 FAC, 3 SS, 1 A	4 DDG, 12 FFG, 3 SS, 1 AOR	1 LPD, 8 FFG, 4 SS, 1 AOR	1 CVL, 3 LPD, 6 DDG, 16 FFG, 8 SS, 2 AOR	3 DDG, 12 FFG, 18 SS, 6 AOR	1 CVL, 11 FFG, 5 SS, 2 AOR	20 FFG, 4 SSG, 4 SS, 4 LST, 4 NL, 2 AOR	
Capacity	1 LPH/1HA, 3 DDG, 6 FFG, 14 FL, 8 LST, 16 SSK/SSG, 3 AOR	1 LPH, 7 FFG, 7 FL, 1 LPD, 2 LST, 1 AOR	11 FFG, 5 SSG, 2AOR	2 LHA, 1 LSD, 2 DDG/AD, 10 FFG, 6 SSG, 2 AOR	4 FFG, 3 OPV, 1 AOR	12 FFG, 2 SS, 2 AOR	2 LPD/LHD 4 DDG/LCF, 2 FFG, 4 SS, 4 OPV, 1 AOR	1 LHA, 3 LPD, 4 DDG/AAW, 17 FFG, 8 SS, 2 AOR	9 FFG, 6 FLG, 6 SS, 3 AOR	1 CVL/HA, 2 LPD, 5 DDG, 6 FFG, 3 SS, 2 AOR	16 FFG, 3 FLG, 6 FL, 8 SSG, 4 SSK, 6 LST, 2 AOR	

1 The nine-fold hierarchy produced by Eric Grove is as follows: 1 major global force projection navy – complete; 2 major global force projection navy – partial; 3 medium global force projection navy; 4 medium regional force projection navy; 5 adjacent force projection navy; 6 offshore territorial defence navies; 7 inshore territorial defence navies; 8 constabulary navies; 9 token navies. Illustrations of these categories would include the US Navy (Rank 1), the Soviet Navy of 1990 (Rank 2), the French and British navies (Rank 3), the Indian, Chinese and Japanese navies (Rank 4), Portugal, Israel, South Africa (Rank 5), Norway, Egypt (Rank 6), Oman, Singapore (Rank 7), Mexico, Sri Lanka (Rank 8), no examples as it sounds too insulting (Rank 9).

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