



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY

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**CHINA'S NEO-TECHNO NATIONALISM AND
SECURITIZATION OF HUAWEI BY THE
TRUMP GOVERNMENT**

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ADVISOR: ASST PROF DR HÜSEYİN EMRAH KARAOĞUZ

MASTER'S THESIS

ISTANBUL, JULY, 2021

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Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master's in the Program of International Relations

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CHINA'S NEO-TECHNO NATIONALISM AND SECURITIZATION OF HUAWEI BY THE TRUMP GOVERNMENT

Abstract

The competition between China and the US that has dramatically increased in the Trump administration constitutes one of the main contested issues in international relations. The race has not only been limited in the economy but also in technology and other various fields. This study provides a critical look at the Sino- American relationship concerning technology which is seen as the backbone of the economy. The resounding success of China, especially in the fields of technology and science, in playing a prominent role in the world has been seen as the product of Chinese governmental ambitions. Owing to a Neo- Techno nationalist look of the Chinese leaders, Beijing seeks to leverage globalization to promote national interests in order to strengthen the nation by using technology as a tool rather than following solely protectionist policies. As a product of the Chinese government's technology policy to catch up with the developed countries, Huawei, one of the national champions, occupied an important place in the latest discussions. In this thesis, the question of how the Trump government securitized Huawei is problematized. Moreover, it is argued that even though Huawei is a private enterprise, thanks to the Trump administration's concerns over identity differences, technological risks, and economic threats, it is starting to be seen as a security matter. The detailed analysis of the discourse of the Trump administration by using the Critical Discourse Analysis method provides significant implications in terms of understanding the securitization of Huawei. This study contends that Huawei, which the dominant discourse of the hegemon power has excluded and suppressed, is discursively constructed and shown as a threat to security, to which extraordinary steps have been taken.

Keywords: China, Neo- Techno nationalism, Securitization, Sino- American relations, Huawei, Critical Discourse Analysis, Trump administration

ÇİN'İN TEKNO MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİ VE HUAWEI'İN TRUMP HÜKÜMETİ TARAFINDAN GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRİLMESİ

Özet

Trump döneminde önemli ölçüde artan Amerika ve Çin arasındaki rekabet uluslararası ilişkilerde en çok tartışılan konulardan birini oluşturmaktadır. Bu yarış, ekonomiyle sınırlı kalmayarak teknolojiyi ve diğer pek çok alanı da kapsamaktadır. Bu çalışma ekonominin belkemiği olarak görülen teknoloji açısından Çin Amerika ilişkilerine eleştirel bir perspektif sağlamaktadır. Çin'in dünyada önemli bir rol oynamak için özellikle teknoloji ve bilim alanlarında ses getiren yükselişi Çin hükümetinin hırslarının bir ürünü olarak görülmektedir. Çinli liderlerin teknolojiye neo- tekno milliyetçi bakışı sebebiyle, Pekin salt korumacı politikaları takip etmek yerine ulusu güçlendirmek amacıyla ulusal çıkarları artırmak için teknolojiyi bir araç olarak kullanarak küreselleşmeden çıkarı için faydalanmaya çabalamaktadır. Çin hükümetinin gelişmiş ülkelere yetişebilmek için takip ettiği teknoloji politikasının bir ürünü olan, ulusal şampiyonlardan biri, Huawei en son tartışmalarda önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. Bu tezde, Trump hükümetinin Huawei'i nasıl güvenlikleştirdiği sorunsallaştırılmaktadır. Ayrıca, Huawei'in özel bir girişim olmasına rağmen Trump hükümetinin kimlik farklılıkları, teknolojik riskler ve de ekonomik tehditler konularındaki endişeleri sebebiyle bir güvenlik sorunu olarak görülmeye başlandığını iddia etmektedir. Eleştirel söylem analizi metodunu kullanarak Trump hükümetinin söyleminin detaylı analizinin yapılması Huawei'in güvenlikleştirmesini anlamak açısından önemli çıkarımlar sağlamaktadır. Bu çalışma egemen gücün baskın söylemleriyle dışlanan ve baskılanan Huawei'in güvenliğe bir tehdit olarak gösterilmesinin söylem yoluyla inşaa edilip, olağanüstü adımların atıldığını ileri sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çin, Neo- Tekno Milliyetçilik, Güvenlikleştirme, Çin Amerikan ilişkileri, Huawei, Eleştirel Söylem Analizi, Trump Hükümeti

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To my parents

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ABBREVIATIONS

AI	ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
CDA	CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
CS	COPENHAGEN SCHOOL
DHA	DISCOURSE HISTORICAL APPROACH
FDI	FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
IP	INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IR	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
ICT	INFORMATION- TELECOMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
NTN	NEO-TECHNO NATIONALISM
R&D	RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
TN	TECHNO NATIONALISM
TG	TECHNO GLOBALISM
US	UNITED STATES
WTO	WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

1. INTRODUCTION

The competition between China and the US that has dramatically increased in the Trump administration constitutes one of the main contested issues in international relations. The race has not only been limited in the economy but also in technology and other various fields. The importance of technology for economic development has captured attention subject to vigorous debates. This study provides a critical look at the Sino- American relationship concerning technology which is seen as the backbone of the economy.

As for the significance of technology for economic growth, it should be reiterated that technology is the knowledge that constitutes power, and sharing this knowledge does not diminish the owner's power (Mokyr, 2005). Tunzellman (1995) highlights that achieving knowledge concerning technologies and products has significant implications for supply and demand. Technology leads to the emergence of new demand structures, new taste patterns on the demand side. When one looks at the supply side, technological innovations contribute to the advances of basic knowledge, which might affect the national level creating spillovers from the technological breakthrough in other countries (Tunzellman, 1995:20).

The literature about innovation and technology comprises several empirical links: neo-classical theory, new growth theory, and evolutionary theory. They all agree that R&D contributes to output and might play different roles in different economies. Whereas R&D led to the rise of innovation in the large one, it facilitates the transfer of technology from abroad in smaller ones (Griffith et al., 1998). Also, the private rate of return of investment in R&D is high due to technology spillovers. Therefore, the invention of a new technology/ product brings significant economic benefits. For instance, the intellectual property protection (IPP) regime, especially the patent system, allows the innovator states to monopolize commercial exploitation for a specified period (Kumar, 2003:209). Naturally, it paves the way for the concentration of economic growth on the patent-taker states.

The close relationship between investment in technology at the firm level and productivity performance should be considered while analyzing the importance of technology in economic growth (OECD, 2000). Solow (1956) approached technological change as an exogenous variable that enormously affects long-run economic growth. Similarly, neo- Schumpatarian theories consider that technological development and economic growth are closely related.

They agree that the entrance of ICT to the economic supply as an input like capital brings the development of the production process.

Rosenberg (1963) focuses on the importance of the capital goods sector and its relationship with consumer goods sectors in which technological change occurs. Accordingly, all innovations entail that the capital goods sector shall produce new products/ machines to satisfy the need. Because it also contributes the deepening the capital through adding value at the firm and sectoral level, in the end, economic growth at the country level (Bahrini and Qaffas, 2019:2). Nevertheless, it is still too difficult to assess and quantify the precise contribution of technology and innovation to economic growth despite the various approaches, models aiming at analyzing this issue (OECD, 2000:27).

Economic history even demonstrates the dramatic changes in the record of economic growth given the enormous impact of Industrial and technological revolutions (Verspagen, 2006). The world's environment has been more interacted and provided the fluid flow of knowledge within and across the national boundaries. Therefore, innovation has been more market-driven, more linked to scientific progress and the economy, which has changed the balance in the world. As a significant result, technology has caused the centralization of power in various fields ranging from business to political society (Ball, 1957).

Thus, the policymakers have realized the significance of technological capability for economic development, power, and prestige in the international arena, even more so in the 21st century. Therefore, some states endeavor to manage this process by following a set of guidelines and plans. China proposes a significant example to a latecomer state but successfully catches up with the developed countries in technology and science. In order to provide a holistic and comprehensive analysis of the securitization of Huawei by the Trump administration, I aim at demonstrating the debate about the technology policy of the Chinese state. There is existing literature about the states following specific policies to protect domestic economic security and harness the advantages of the market at the same time. Neo-techno nationalism (NTN) is the perspective that this study has chosen to explain China's technology orientation.

NTN includes these characteristics that states consider technology a security concern since it is the primary determiner of the global status. However, they are aware that the interconnectedness of the world market necessitates them to follow the game's rules. Accordingly, states leverage globalization to national interests while opening borders in some circumstances rather than following restrictive and protective policies. Also, the governments

are active in investing in technology and acquiring know-how in the international market to apply it to the development of domestic industry (Feigenbaum, 2003). Also, state-led companies and private enterprises play an essential role in domestic innovation (Yamada, cited in Suttmeir and Yao, 2004). Therefore, the primary purpose of this kind of state is not to depend on other countries by providing domestic technology development. However, they do not reject to be in the market under the circumstances of globalization while doing this.

Attaining a rightful position globally and playing a prominent role using technology constitutes an integral part of Chinese governmental ambitions. Beijing has realized the importance of working under the established architecture and the significance of relative gains, not obsessively about absolute gains. In this vein, China emphasizes international norms and cooperation and tries to pursue economic-security interests by leveraging globalization's advantages (Suttmeir and Yao, 2004). Instead of a solely protectionist and interventionist China, Beijing now leverages globalization to promote national interests in technology (Segal, 2008). Playing the game pragmatically, China seeks to strengthen the nation by using technology to be a world leader by 2050 (Kennedy, 2013; Appelbaum et al., 2011).

1.1 Defining the Problem

The economic growth of China in the last two decades has been a resounding success. It is fair to say that Chinese competitiveness in the high-tech industry made the other developed countries uneasy. As argued, with the governmental industry policy to help Chinese firms catch up with the developed countries, most companies could fulfill these dreams (Ahrens, 2013). One of the striking examples in this regard is Huawei. Huawei has offices in more than 140 countries and became the second-largest telecommunications equipment supplier company and the second-largest smartphone.

Nevertheless, Chinese companies, such as Huawei, have undergone a rough period during the Trump government (Cheng, 2018). The Trump administration securitized Chinese activities in many domains, including technology policy. However, despite being alert to Chinese technological improvements since the Cold War, the US presidents have not securitized the Chinese rise in technology as Trump administration. The securitization made the relationship between China and the US contentious because it increased the likelihood of conflict with significant global implications and repercussions. Thus, this issue has attracted growing scholarly attention and has been examined from different angles. Previous research, for instance, has addressed China's rise and its impact on the free market economy (Morrison,

2013; Che, 2019). Also, the US strategy towards China, especially in economic terms, has been analyzed (Valli, 2018). Furthermore, China's threat discourse and how China's ambitious strategy can threaten the interests of the US are explained (Mearshimer, 2001). All these studies shed essential light on the novel dimensions of China-US relations.

However, the international political economy of the struggle concerning technology between China and the US is still understudied, as many scholars highlight. This study aims to contribute to the existing body of literature by proposing a novel explanation that explores the securitization of Huawei regarding China's neo-techno nationalist policy by the Trump administration. What are the reasons behind the securitization, and how the US sees the innovation policy of China? The thesis questions are how the Trump administration's discourse constituted the security threats to the neo-liberal-based economy, ideology, and technology. Last but not least, although there is literature arguing that the Trump administration securitizes Huawei, there is no analytical study using the resources I have focused on and the methodology I have followed. I aim at bringing two different but interrelated pieces of literature to provide a comprehensive perspective for figuring out the securitization of Huawei.

1.2 Research Question

As the following chapters will explain more in detail, the purpose of the thesis is to provide a comprehensive perspective to China's technology policy and its impact on the securitization of Huawei by the Trump government. I am working on the securitization of Huawei considering the Chinese technology policy. Because I want to find out how Chinese technology policy orientation affects the perception and approach of the Trump administration in the international arena towards China in the context of Huawei. In order to help my reader to understand better the factors behind the securitization process and considering technology as a kind of new battle, I endeavor to analyze the Sino-American relationship in technology terms during the Trump administration.

Therefore, to guide the study, I have formulated the following central research question: How does the Trump administration securitize Huawei regarding China's Neo Techno Nationalism? To this end, I have developed three additional research questions: How China's technology policy might be analyzed from Neo- Techno nationalism perspective? Secondly, why The Trump administration might securitize China's technology policy? Lastly, how the Trump government has securitized Huawei?

1.3 Research Design- Methodology

This study uses the method of Critical Discourse Analysis(CDA). CDA investigates the legitimization of discrimination, exclusion, and creating unequal power relations, focusing on language. This study argues that Huawei has been the one that is excluded by the dominant discourse. The discourse of the Trump administration as the dominant one affected the international arena. A threat discourse is constructed, and many states decided to exclude Huawei and its 5G infrastructure. The Trump government has taken extraordinary steps and barred Huawei from entering the US market as well.

As a sub-branch of CDA, Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), Wodak's analysis model, will be used to understand how Huawei has been securitized by the Trump administration, focusing on 32 Congressional Hearings from 2017 to 2020, the Security Strategy Report 2017, and Cybersecurity Report 2018. Congressional hearings are held annually and provide a comprehensive general perspective about the US government's perception of threats and interests. They are seen as the most formal version of the US government's securitization practices. DHA provides a better understanding of how "us" and "other" are shaped and constructed, presenting a multiple theoretical and multidimensional analytical model. Also, DHA is suitable for this kind of study, observing identity constructions while considering the discursive incidents with societal and historical factors (Aydın Duzgit, 2014). Therefore, DHA will contribute this study to demonstrate how Huawei is presented as an existential threat to US security regarding identity, economy, and technology.

The thesis argues that although Huawei is a private enterprise, it is discursively constructed and shown as a threat to security owing to the concerns of the Trump administration over identity, economy, and technology, to which extraordinary steps have been taken. Language plays a vital role in the securitization process of the political actors in a particular issue. Therefore, DHA will help us to figure out the securitization of Huawei. In fact, no issue is an essential threat; instead, they become a security issue through discursive politics. By saying security, the leader changes the understanding of an issue. Special rights are achieved thanks to the language which defines the issue as a security threat (Wæver, 1995: 55). Thus, an ordinary issue that is not a topic of politics turned into an extraordinary mode (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). In a nutshell, securitization is made to achieve substantial political power and effects in a particular issue, which is turned into a political and securitized issue through the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat (Hansen, 2006).

I will elaborate on the Trump era because the securitization reached its hill and Huawei was banned in the US with a law. Another reason for my time frame choice is that Huawei has risen dramatically, surpassing Apple and got the second rank in the phone industry in these years. Although technological developments bothered the Obama government, they tried to find a way to cooperate, refraining from zero-sum game policies (Foot and King, 2019). In contrast, the Trump government turned to apply strict uncoordinated policy towards China's ambitious challenges to the American economy. For instance, the US applied trade tariffs, restricted China's outward investment policies, and targeted Chinese technology companies like Huawei and ZTE. The US government's banishment of government companies to use Huawei with the law and pointing Huawei in the entity list as a security threat to America are extraordinary measurements.

When it comes to the choice of case selection, there exist extraordinary measurements against Huawei. Although many Chinese companies have been successful in the market, Huawei has been continuously blamed and has faced many warnings. I argue that the capacity of Huawei in 5G telecommunications and the incapability of the American firms to compete with Huawei accelerated the process of securitization. The US's so-called free market economy in the 21st century can bar a company into its market, creating a threat perception. The US and other countries like Canada and Australia joined this camp; hence, China's negative discourse strengthened with the COVID-19 virus. I want to show how discourse has played a significant role in the securitization process. In short, my expected contribution to the literature will be explaining America's securitization of China's Neo-techno nationalist policy through the discourse analysis method. I aim at demonstrating two different stories about an issue, bringing two different but interrelated pieces of literature together.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is organized as follows. The overall structure of the study takes the form of five chapters. The second chapter will discuss China's Technology Policy in Perspective: Neo-Techno Nationalism. It is necessary to discuss showing the perspectives about China's technology policy in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the securitization of Huawei regarding China's technology policy. Therefore, techno-nationalism, techno-globalism, and as a bridge, Neo-techno nationalism will be analyzed before detailing the Chinese case. NTN will provide us to see the main features of the Chinese technology policy.

The third chapter demonstrates why the US government may securitize the technology policy of China. This chapter proceeds with two main sections. Firstly, I discuss how identity differences between China and the US contributed to the securitization discourse. To this end, the impacts of the rivalry between authoritarianism and liberal democracy and the Chinese government's grand strategies challenging the superiority of the US will be discussed. Secondly, how technical and economic reasons strengthened the arguments of the securitization and extraordinary measurements that could be taken will be elaborated. Also, the section will try to show how the state-led economy model of China constitutes a threat to the US economic security. The impact of cybersecurity threats and intellectual property thefts, and espionage activities on discursively constructing the threat will be discussed.

The fourth chapter, which constitutes the core part of the study, will explore how the Trump administration securitized Huawei before applying Critical Discourse Analyses to the Congressional Hearings from 2017 to 2020 during the Trump administration and National Security Strategy report 2017 and Cybersecurity Strategy report 2018. To this end, I will first discuss the reasons behind the securitization process of Huawei by the US, closely linked with the Chinese Technology Policy, given the existing literature.

The findings will show three main reasons behind this process: identity differences (being a Chinese company and the story of Huawei), economic concerns, and infrastructural threats like monopolization of 5G technology and intellectual property thefts. In the second section of the fourth chapter, the thesis will do an empirical analysis. Then, I will elaborate on what Critical Discourse Analysis/ Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) is and my reasons for choosing this method in this study. In the last part, I will apply this method to the documents that I have chosen to explain the securitization of Huawei by the Trump government. Finally, the Conclusions chapter will reveal the broader implications of my findings and the limitations of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2. CHINA'S TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: NEO-TECHNO NATIONALISM

2.1 Introduction

The technological capability of a state is associated with its strength for a long time. Besides contributing to the prestige of the states, technological development constitutes a significant part of economic growth. Especially for developing countries, catching up with the developed nations in technology and science is considered essential. In the 21st century, the importance of leading in technology is well-realized if a country desires to attain national power and strengthen its economy. Mainly, developing countries aim at catching up with leading actors, reducing the gap in technology.

Freeman (1987) looks from national innovation system approach to economic development, and he argues that this approach brings two different, but interrelated approaches together: 1-institutionalism identifies institutions indispensable to the sustainable growth of the state (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012) and 2-Schumpeterian approach looks at the technology's role in the development and catching up the advanced economies (Lee and Kim, 2009). Accordingly, the national system approach attempts to express a state's development catching up with the innovative ones considering both technology and the institutions. Therefore, government leaders emphasize success in innovation technologies as necessary for development (Liu et al., 2017).

Although there is no conclusive relationship between domestic technological innovation and national growth (Edgerton, 2007), the states are more likely to see technology as crucial for development and wealth. In this vein, they carry out protectionist policies due to domestic economic security concerns, harnessing the advantages of the market's innovation, even using them as leverage, trump card. No discussion of the issues can proceed very far without understanding a latecomer but successful country, China's technology policy: neo-techno nationalism. For this reason, the chapter focuses on analyzing techno nationalism, techno globalism, and neo-techno nationalism to understand states' rotation in technology and politics.

The chapter brings two different but interrelated research fields and links them in the thesis's central argument: The US securitization of China's neo-techno nationalism. In order to understand what neo-techno nationalism is, it is necessary to figure out the distinctions of perspectives, techno nationalism, and techno globalism. Table 2.1 above clearly shows the main differences between them. In the first section of the chapter, I demonstrate my reasons for

selecting the neo-techno nationalism perspective but neither techno-nationalism nor technoglobalism to my research in explaining China’s technology policy. It is necessary to evaluate how these perspectives have been discussed in the literature by the researchers to understand thesis arguments. Secondly, I will discuss how China’s technology policy has been analyzed in the literature in given sectors ranging from telecommunication to aviation.

TECHNO NATIONALISM	NEO-TECHNO NATIONALISM	TECHNO GLOBALISM
Preventing globalization to protect national interests	Leveraging globalization to national interests	Protecting global interests by leverage globalization
Closing borders to the foreigner	Opening borders (some circumstances)	Opening borders
Government’s leading role in innovation	Private enterprises+ state-led companies play a role in innovation	The global market runs the innovation

Table 2.1: Differences of three perspectives, Source: The table is adapted from Atushi Yamada’s article, “Neo- Techno Nationalism how and why it grows?” (2000): 23

2.2 Techno Nationalism

Techno nationalism (TN) is a perspective primarily used to explain states’ policy to protect their domestic economic security using technology. It provides a better understanding of states’ innovation policy, which considers technological innovation a means to their power in the international arena. TN is the restrictive policy of governments towards technology innovation (Banet, 2018). TN is applied to explain the US and Japan’s policy and technological competitiveness due to the rapid rise of Japanese industry, narrowing the leading US role since the 1960s (Ostry and Nelson, 1995). Over time, thanks to expanding the literature, the Asian states, especially China, are explained concerning techno nationalism (Kim, 2003; Lee and Oh, 2008; Suttmeier and Yao, 2004).

Although not a new phenomenon, Capri (2019) argues that a growing trend of “techno nationalism” is a new kind of mercantilism to change geopolitics and the global market. TN

reiterates the necessity to advance in technology to protect national security and economic prosperity. Attaining a competitive advantage in the market under the state's guardianship, jeopardizing the laissez-faire model are seen as the result of ideological competitions accelerated by techno nationalism (Capri 2019). Similarly, the rise of techno nationalist tendencies is seen as the most severe symptom of anti-globalization blowback destroying interconnectedness. It is argued that the COVID-19 virus may have even aggravated this growing trend (Sudreau, Gahlaut, Kuehn, and Zhong, 2020).

Feigenbaum (2003) states that when military-associated view takes economic development in technology as a security concern, needless to say, there is techno nationalism. Coined by a political economist, Robert Reich, in 1987, techno nationalism refers to solid ties between the state's position in the global order and technology acquisition. Techno nationalism was first used to indicate the US's ambitions to preserve Americans' future in the technology sector from foreigners, mainly from Japan. The US, a dominant power, attempted to protect its national interests from Japan's technological development, achievements, and breakthrough in high-tech products.

Under globalization circumstances, how states can follow such policy is another point to figure out techno nationalism. Governments remain the same in nationalizing their technology policy than the private companies' strategy with globalization (Ostry and Nelson, 2013). For TN, the competitive market is seen as a threat to the domestic economy. Despite the transnationalism of business and technology, the governments attempt to nationalize them, which is the main reason for conflicts (Ostry and Nelson, 2013). Samuel and Keller (2003) point out that states embracing techno nationalism seem to have less desire to open their market to foreign direct investment (FDI). There is a faith that financial protection can only be guaranteed by substantial control over the generation of knowledge and standards. As a result, domestic markets are more likely to face foreign investors' challenges and the competitive environment dominated by foreign technology.

Stevens (1990) highlights that TN, a territorial view, is the primary constraint of the interconnected market; it considers technology a strategic asset that must be preserved and nurtured at home rather than in the market. For this reason, it is fair to say that TN paved the way for the emergence of a world in which the competition of national companies turned into the competition of the national governments (Stevens, 1990: 44). As shown in the following table 2.2, increasing concerns over the technology gaps with the other countries led to such measures.

Measures	Purpose
R&D Subsidies	Finance research and technology development in strategic sectors
Non-tariff Barriers	Preserve scale of production and technology base through standards or public procurement
Grey- Area Measures	Protect technologically lagging sectors from import competition
Trade-Related Investment Measures	Limit imports and promote exports through local content rules and export performance requirements
Antidumping Measures	Limit imports and promote investment through allegations of predatory pricing or avoidance
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Measures	Stimulate technology transfer through patent and copyright systems
Export Financing	Subsidize exports to expand markets and recoup R&D costs

Table 2.2: Trends in Technonationalism, Source: The content of the table is directly taken from Stevens (1990: 45)

Considering the case of Japan and the US, even though collaboration and interconnectedness existed in the relationship between two actors, it already started to be puzzling and complicated owing to the rise of TN in Japanese leaders' minds (Kohno, 1995). Kohno (1995) highlights that TN is an ideological orientation to protect national security by minimizing its technological dependency on foreign actors. Elaborating the Fijutsu case and FSX, Kohno demonstrates the remaining nationalistic desires in Japan's technology policy (Kohno, 1995). In addition, the US followed a techno nationalist policy, but Japan has done the same since the 1960s. In response, it was confronting American enforcement itself to cooperate with American companies and continue the trade. The United States' growing concerns because Japan acquired great strength in technology led to carrying out such policies and programs to contribute to American firms' power (Ostry and Nelson, 2013: 37).

To be clear about Japan's case, since the Meiji restoration process in 1868, the government has played a crucial role in enabling Japan to modernize, gaining mastery in the world. Japanese has given technology priority to guarantee national strength; hence it constituted a significant part of national security (Samuels, 1996). Moreover, in Japan's context, for techno nationalist states, the willingness to international cooperate only stemmed from their ambition to solidify the economy. Autonomy over the dependence on foreign technology is essential to nurture the domestic economy with new technology opportunities in the free diffusion of knowledge. Knowledge acquisition equals power in political leaders' eyes following techno nationalism's mindset (Keller, 2003).

In order to figure out the development in Japan and the rise of techno nationalism, it is necessary to consider the historical triggering points. As known, the defeat of the Japanese in the second world war with the atomic bomb ceased to an ambitious nationalism. Nevertheless, it reemerged in the form of technology, a softer version (Low, 2003). Low (2003) asserts that the new motto of Japan accounted for strong Japan without an army. Japan has harnessed technology as a tool for national identity construction. To overcome its inferiority, Japan sought to strengthen its economy, military production through Second World War. Although the government has played an essential role in the economy in the first years, many firms and enterprises have entered the market in response to market forces over time. Indeed, Japanese firms have started to constitute an important place in the range from electronic devices to automobile production (Ostry and Nelson, 2013: 40).

Japan poses a successful development strategy (*kokusanka*) consisting of import-substituting indigenization, acquiring knowledge, imitating, learning to manufacture, supporting local development, and disseminating know-how (Feigenbaum, 2003). Indeed, Japan is expressed as a paradigmatic case driven by technological and security ambitions. As known, it was accepting to import first, but eventually, the main motive was imitating and doing more original and Japanese ones. In a nutshell, Japan is portrayed as an exemplar of successful TN in the post-war period, in which it harnessed civilian industrial strengths to promote indigenous defense productions (Hughes, 2011). Nakayama (2012) argues that other Asian states like Korea and China took Japan as an excellent development model.

In a nutshell, TN generates the emergency to develop the nation by using technology as a tool. Most importantly, the techno nationalist policymakers pursue increasing the state's power in the international arena through applying protective and restrictive policies. The literature mainly comprises the US, Asian states like Japan and China. However, discussions about TN

remain, some scholars argue that the 21st century is becoming the age of techno nationalism (Rajan, 2018). Many scholars have discussed the acquisition of power through technology while damaging the post-1945 Western-led world order under America's leadership (Rajan, 2018).

Interestingly, China and the US adopt techno nationalist policies, and other states also join this trend (Sudreau and Zhong, 2020). Thus, TN is not merely about Sino-Chinese competition like a new cold technological war. Instead, the multipolarity of the world contributes to the emergence of various states following these strategies like India (Rajan, 2018). That is, this seems like a security dilemma of the Realist approach has demonstrated. States' approach towards technology as a security matter in TN led to the diffusion of policies like imitating this protectionism to preserve the interests.

2.3 Techno Globalism

As already mentioned, how states might carry out techno nationalist policies is a critical point to discuss. Accordingly, is it possible to follow this rotation under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Do the conditions of the world that gradually bind states' economies allow the emergence of such situations? Those are the questions that led this study to investigate the technology under the circumstances of globalization. Techno globalism(TG) presents an excellent perspective to analyze the states which endeavor to protect global interests with a mind of the free-market economic model, which runs the technological innovation. In contrast to TN, TG sees global innovation as a key for growth instead of national innovation (Edgerton, 2007).

To explain the usage of technology in the Asian states for economic and political purposes, Kang and Segal (2006) contend that globalization undermines the abilities of Asian states to implement techno nationalism. Although the Asian states strived to promote local alternatives, the world's atmosphere necessarily affected by globalization entails strong networks, collaboration, and cooperation (Kang and Segal, 2006). However, TG refers to a more optimistic perspective of the states to the global interests rather than national interests in technological innovation.

Stevens (1990) asserts three main components of TG: global markets, global competition, and global companies. Accordingly, "technology has prompted the emergence of global markets for goods and services by contributing to greater homogeneity in consumer tastes worldwide, by causing firms to seek wider markets in order to recoup R&D costs, and by making it easier for firms to produce and market products globally" (Stevens, 1990: 43). Indeed, TG provided

the emergence of highly interconnected global companies because technology altered the spirit and the very basis of competition. The following table 2.3 illustrates the trends in TG states which believe the power the technological innovation leading by the global market.

Measures	Purpose
International Trade	To expand markets and increase returns to R&D To increase access to markets and localize production
Foreign Direct Investment	To allow specialization in core components and increase flexibility
International Subcontracting	To broaden markets and increase returns from R&D expenditures
International Licencing	To increase market access and R&D scale economies
International Joint Ventures	To share high R&D costs and spread risks
International R&D Corporation	

Table 2.3 Trends in Technoglobalism, Source: The content of the table is directly taken from Stevens(1990:43).

TG characterized the world economy, especially after the 1980s (Ostry and Nelson, 2013). Mothe and Dufour (1995) argue that international trade has been one of the main determiners of economic development in the postwar period; world trade flows have dramatically risen. Most importantly, the flows of international investment in technology and production have been witnessed. As a result, international technology transfer, especially among the most developed nations since the 1970s, has increased. Also, the diffusion of knowledge to the developing countries strengthened the idea of a more interconnected world. Accordingly, knowledge has no border; science and technology cross the borders thanks to patents, technical alliances, multinational firms (Mothe and Dufour, 1995:228). Mothe and Dufour (1995) highlight that the states benefit from strengthening the ties in technology and trade; however, as this process continues, the disputes over technology protection will increase.

Globalization has provided tightening of links in trade, economy, and technology between states. Also, the rise of states in high tech like Europe, Japan has continued thanks to the flow of technological knowledge. Concerns of America because of losing control of this high-tech trade is another side of the story. Because it might be regarded as techno nationalist, whereas the US wants to diffuse the know-how, it does not want to be surpassed by any other country. However, the interdependence in the financial market has dramatically increased with globalization. As a result, the competitive market has witnessed real rivalry with the acquisition of new technologies of other actors.

In short, techno globalist states are more likely to accept a liberal, individualistic way of thinking and harshly criticize TN's attitude towards seeing the opening market as the economy's collusion. States' interference in the economy should be at a limited level; firms are the main actors. Decreasing the trade barriers is one of the main concerns of the policy actors. Hong Kong and Singapore are seen as the most prosperous states following the techno-globalist strategy (Keller, 2003). Edgerton (2007) asserts that the nations' wealth from technology does not stem from its national innovation but mainly from the sharing across the national boundaries. Therefore TG sees global innovation as a key for growth (Edgerton, 2007). For this reason, TG sees keeping behind techno nationalism and promoting and thinking globally as necessary.

2.4 Neo- Techno Nationalism

To find a fine line between techno-globalism and techno nationalism, Yamada coined neo-techno nationalism (NTN). As discussed before, techno nationalism refers to intense government interference and technological innovations to protect the domestic economy despite encountering conflict and exclusion from the partners. In contrast, techno-globalism necessitates continuous cooperation with foreign partners to mutual gains in technological breakthroughs. Therefore, Yamada asserts that in neo techno nationalism, private-public partners leading actors in the relatively open market seek to preserve the national concerns by leveraging globalization and cooperating with foreign actors (Yamada, cited in Suttmeir and Yao, 2004). NTN argues that the state's interference in investment and planning needed in the key industries to upgrade. Nevertheless, this must not impede following the international norms and rules while the state plays a key role in the international market (Shim and Shin, 2016:199). In short, TG highlights the importance of being a bridge between supporting technological innovations for national economic and security interests besides benefiting from globalization.

Before analyzing Chinese Technology Policy, it is essential to present a feature list for neo-techno nationalism. Firstly, the state looks at technology from the security perspective strategically since it provides a good position in the global world. Secondly, the government plays a crucial role in investing in technology, acquiring knowledge of knowledge firstly thanks to importing and nurturing domestic capacity. Lastly, the diffusion of know-how in the international and foreign markets is essential to success (Feigenbaum, 2003). Therefore, the indispensable role of the government in catching up the technology can not be ignored. In this vein, private enterprises and state-led companies play a role in innovation. Thus, the state is leveraging globalization for national interests. The following table 2.4 clearly shows the main features of Neo- Techno Nationalism.




Table 2.4: Main features of Neo-Techno Nationalism, Source: The author’s compilation

When it comes to the other conceptualization of the NTN, Open techno nationalism can be accepted as another name, expresses the situation according to Naughton and Segal (2017). The desire to achieve self-reliance and independence should not be considered an abandonment of the open-door policy neither closing. Like interconnectedness in the trade and economy, the conditions of the world force states to alter and translate their harsh and ambitious styles of

techno nationalism. Therefore, the leaders are more likely to follow collaboration and cooperation rather than closing their markets and producing local products.

Techno hybridism can be seen as similar to neo techno nationalism since it refers to such states embracing both techno globalism and techno nationalism. Techno hybrids embrace techno globalism on a limited level, using it as an opportunity to be a global player. In order to reach national goals, they can easily import ideas, technology. Thus, substantial foreign control over domestic technology is more likely to emerge. Techno hybrids can be considered the mediate way to open markets to foreign direct investment (FDI), send the brightest students abroad, and retake them. However, while techno nationalism tries to restrict it, techno globalists are indifferent to controlling these ideas. Not quite liberal, and at the same time, they are not quite mercantilists (Keller and Samuel, 2003).

This section analyzed the perspectives of techno nationalism, techno globalism, and neo techno nationalism. The thesis shows how and why the Trump administration has securitized Huawei regarding China's neo-techno nationalism. I support the literature seeing China as a neo-techno nationalist state because of the reasons that I will explain in the following section. In order to understand the main reasons behind the securitization process, it is necessary to look at how China carries out such policies concerning Huawei and threatens American interests. To this end, how scholars have discussed China's technology policy will be elaborated in the following part.

2.5 CHINESE TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND NEO-TECHNO NATIONALIST LOOK

Despite being a latecomer, China remains the second-largest economy globally, outspeed Germany in 2009 and Japan in 2010. Over the past few years, the growth has dramatically increased. The following figure 2.1 compares China and the USA's annual GDP growth rates from 1961 to 2019. As of 2021, the Chinese GDP growth rate in 2021 is 8.44% is higher than the US's 6.39%. Chinese growth is continuing and changes the balance in the international arena.




Figure 2.1: The comparison of GDP growth of China and the US from 1961 to 2019, Source: World Bank

With a historical look at the significance of technology to Beijing, while China has continued to rise in the world economy, this section attempts to explain China's view towards technology. Has China fully liberalized its economy after the entrance of WTO? How Beijing competes with standard setter, developed states as being a latecomer to the technology industry? What are the strategies of China to strengthen domestic producers in a competitive market? Finally, can China be assessed as a truly techno nationalist state? Those are the questions that need to be answered considering the existing literature.

Before evaluating the discussions, it is necessary to highlight that China's techno nationalism-neo techno nationalism studies are mainly explained from one perspective and look from China's view. Indeed, there is no abundant literature about how China's technology policy has shaped other states' strategies. Also, the researches encompass standard-setting races in the technology sector. Another important point about the literature discussions is that China's

techno nationalism is accounted for mainly by standardization and China's innovation policy. Thus, on the one hand, a group of scholars claims that China's policies should be discussed under techno nationalism (Feigenbaum, 2003; Naughton and Segal, 2003; Suttmeir et al., 2005) because the Chinese states' interference into the economy, closing borders to the foreign companies, seeing technological development as a national security concern. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the others maintain that China has not followed it anymore and turned to neo-techno nationalism (Serger and Breidne, 2007; Kennedy, 2013; Stewart *et al.*, 2011). In essence, China pragmatically harnesses the conditions of the free market to domestic development through using technology.

It is a known fact that a density of military-led techno nationalism has existed during Mao's term (Zhao, 2007). Since the establishment time of the PRC in 1949, the military's role in modernizing China is another factor in this approach's existence. The look of China to science and technology reminds warfare spirit during that time. For Feigenbaum (2003), the unique ideological view of the military has enormously affected the policies putting into practice. The tensions with the USA, refusing the USSR to develop the Chinese nuclear submarine fleet, strengthened the belief that national power is associated with technological developments. Indeed, technology is accepted as essential to security and the economy; therefore, it is argued, it can be accepted as a techno nationalist view. Segal (2018) points out that one satellite's Maoist policy to achieve two bombs exemplifies the desire to acquire technological freedom.

As discussed in the section on techno-nationalism, Feigenbaum (2003) argues that the Mao period demonstrates the traces of techno nationalist look of the government. Because during that time, a persistent interference of state to technological development can be noticed and the view of state to technology from a security perspective, which is the global position and prestige determiner. Similarly, Liu et al. (2017) point out that the Chinese central authority realized the necessity to overcome the large gap in these years. In the first stage, like Japan and Korea, the authority turned to import technology from abroad since it was cheaper than investing in domestic knowledge. However, importing rather than nurturing the economy was not the solution to the backwardness, as they have realized. Therefore, the interventionist state strategy to control the economy has gradually changed (Liu et al., 2017: 658).

Starting in the late 1970s, China has undergone a substantial change with more-market orientation (Liu et al., 2017). Aiming to create a positive image globally, Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992), post-Mao period, has sought to refrain from the ideology clashes between socialism and capitalism. It is true to say he dramatically changed ideological rotation and turned more

pragmatic policy (Kluver, 2005). China imported Western consumer goods and products and turned itself into a “workshop” that attracted foreign direct investments during that time. Technology has been considered a pivotal player in national security and economic security, apart from China’s prestige. Deng’s agenda consisted of investing in light industries rather than capital intensive, promoting industry demilitarization, and increasing technology's importance in the economy (Feigenbaum, 2003). Kluver (2005) argues that Deng Xiaoping aimed at catching the digital age and turned to reforms in essential fields: agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. Getting rid of humiliation in the history of lagging ignited him to integrate with the global market system (Kluver, 2005).

Like the other Asian states, China has slowly undergone several changes and became more open and market-oriented with the liberalization reform processes. However, the state has continued to control important assets like state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and banks. Naughton and Segal (2003) argue that science and technology have always been affected by the government’s position. Deng described science and technology as the key to revitalizing a nation (Suttmeir and Cao, 1999). Leaders also follow a market-oriented, individual innovation with foreign direct investments and mutual gains with foreign companies rather than a state-directed central planning economy. This trend has been solidified with the entrance of China to the WTO. The leaders sought policies that are associated with techno nationalism. Although China has connected itself with the world at first glance, no one can deny techno nationalism’s reins and re-emergence in its policy(Naughton and Segal, 2003).

Chinese desire to attain the rightful position globally and play a prominent role in the world with its gigantic economy made nationalism significant for China (Naughton and Segal, 2003). Indeed, nationalism, especially in technology and the economy, poses an alternative to unite the country after socialism’s dissolution. It is highlighted that Chinese leaders’ actions are similar to the old Japanese techno nationalism style (Naughton and Segal, 2003). However, the authors claim that population size, geography, and several factors make China more advantageous than these states. Secondly, the reform process is continuing. The joining of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) strengthened this reform process. The humiliation in history and the desire to acquire great power statues make China more concerned about the military and strategic issues. Therefore they invest more closely with the military technology products—globalization seen as a threat and domination of the US. However, central leaders are seeking to profit within the market system.

PRC's entrance to WTO prevents using such strategies to protect the domestic market. However, a group of scholars still argue that China's tendency to follow Techno nationalism is possible. For instance, it is demonstrated that the Chinese government follows discriminatory policies the foreign companies, even prevent their entrance into the Chinese domestic market. Since technology is seen as a security issue, the government seeks to produce domestic national innovations without foreign partners.

Therefore, it is necessary to ask how a latecomer country can catch advanced nations in the technology industry? Gao (2015) argues that the government must interfere with the economy and create an environment to foster R&D industrialization to strengthen indigenous innovation. Kim (1980) highlights that more than 50 percent of states' economic growth derives from technological innovations such as improving productivity and producing new products and industries. Previous studies highlight the necessity of states' role in the development, and it is argued that development of the local scientific community, education, science, and technology policy on the industrial development of the governments constitute an essential place. Also, Moravcsik (1975) claims that the technology transfers through importation and adaptation of foreign technology are another critical factor. Therefore the role of multinational firms and R&D institutions cannot be denied. This debate is beyond this thesis and necessitates considering the International Political Economy literature; therefore, I do not want to focus on it here.

If we turn China, Shen (2016) maintains that joining WTO contributed to China's speed of integration with the global economy. Going out strategy encouraged the domestic industries to go to foreign countries and extraterritorial markets. Thus, Beijing complied with global norms in order to leverage the opportunities of globalization. However, naturally, conflicts and frictions emerged over time, especially within China and the USA (Morrison and Laborte, 2008). The US has not contended with China's slow economic reform process jeopardizing the free market economy due to the discriminatory approach of the Chinese government towards foreign firms. Also, the maintenance of state interference is seen as a threatening factor (Che, 2019).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that after the Asian crisis in China, the elites' opinions have dramatically changed about the Korean style model's weaknesses. Several reforms have been done, like taxes, credits, employment, and banking (Naughton and Segal, 2003). Reforms helped both private and non-governmental companies. Startup companies have been supported for domestic innovation; like Silicon valley, Chinese scientists played an enormous role in

technological developments. The government provided several kinds of supports for the domestic innovation local firms (Naughton and Segal, 2003). However, Segal (2018) argues that the government has never taken hands-off in technology and considers innovative domestic technology a security concern.

Hughes (2011) presents a good analysis of the clashes between nationalism and the effects of globalization in China. The author focuses on the reform-opening process in the 1970s, strengthened after the Tiananmen riots, to the last decades. For the author, globalization and new circumstances have affected the Chinese Communist Party and its patriotism. Arguably, patriotism and nationalism necessarily affected the process, and elites played a crucial role. For instance, to legitimize the free market, the party invented world scientific and technological revolution aims. There was a linkage between success in science and technology and the growth of economic prosperity. In the party's eyes, it was a kind of revolution that might be best described as techno nationalism. It can be accepted as elitist techno nationalism to be compatible with the world's new atmosphere (Hughes, 2006). The role of the party in the engagement of China with neoliberalism cannot be denied. Liew (2005) asserts that the Chinese government has never intimately embraced the market's principles; instead, it practically and selectively carried out such policies. Nevertheless, no one can deny its resounding success in the market.

It is a known fact that in the aftermath of joining the WTO, China was compelled to pay foreign-owned product fees due to intellectual property rights. The government felt itself in a trap and turned to find a way to curtail huge spendings, waste of money (Suttmeir et al., 2005). It can be argued that economic concerns were one of the main reasons for accelerating the indigenous innovation projects. Suttmeir et al. (2005) argue that China's standard strategy signals the re-emergence of a new kind of techno nationalism. However, given China's historical background from the founding times, techno nationalism has always existed; hence re-emergence is not surprising. Mao Zedong necessarily pursued to achieve technological self-reliance. Nuclear weaponry and space technology have been vital to economic development (Suttmeier et al., 2005). As a criticism of this approach, I argue that the history of a country can not be proof that it necessarily follow restrictive policies. China is still learning to adapt to the global market; the developments and regulations should not be ignored. China presents a middle way, neo-techno nationalism; with its unique system, the state still constitutes a significant part in managing technology innovation under the free market circumstances.

Nakayama (2012) argues that a market-driven approach has been promoted in the Deng Xiaoping era. This strategy consisted of cheap labor in the first step but manufacturing products to export to developed countries. In this way, China could sneak into the world market. Furthermore, the government focused more on scientific and technological product manufacturing in time. Given the booming Chinese economy, it was a successful journey from cheap labor to the giant tech industry (Nakayama, 2012).

The Chinese fifteen-year plan for science and technology announced in 2006 by the Hu Jintao government spans 2006 to 2020, demonstrates Beijing's ambitions and long-term plans in these sectors. Innovation has been repeated almost 300 times in the text; this is suitable proof of how leaders emphasize technological innovation in the R&D industry (Liu et al., 2017). Given the plan, which is important because of another reason: it was the first plan after China's WTO entrance. In line with neo techno nationalism, it is evident in the plan that China fosters its domestic industry while reducing dependence on foreign actors by %30 levels. Beijing has been attempting to catch the most advanced nations in technology and mastering core technologies till 2020 (Serger and Breidne, 2007).

Moreover, it can be seen in the plan that the critical sectors for fulfilling these objectives have been determined: energy, water supply, environmental technologies, standards, and patents, which will contribute to the strength of China in the competitive market. Serger and Breidne (2007) assert that besides the Chinese approach toward technology economically, it is also about national prestige. They argue that the Chinese government's emphasis on indigenous development can be misunderstood like techno nationalism's re-emergence. However, China is more than open to cooperation now; other states shall take China's intentions seriously, positively but also constructively (Serger and Breidne, 2007).

Similarly, the Made in China 2025 Plan demonstrates the objectives of the Chinese government, such as turning the country into a "manufacturing superpower". The strategy focuses on vital high-tech industries ranging from automotive, aviation, robotics, and information technology to machinery. Indigenous innovation and self-sufficiency are stressed, and the Chinese government aims to increase Chinese firms' domestic innovation and market share for the basic core components and materials to 70% as of 2025. To fulfill these aims, the foreign competitors of Chinese companies encountered some exclusions and a set of barriers. However, on the other side, the strategy reiterates the importance of keeping global trade and investment open (Wübbeke et al., 2016). For this reason, it can be said that NTN presents an excellent perspective to understand China's technology policy.

While the issues are discussed from a neo-techno nationalism perspective, it is essential to highlight a few main points. First, China emphasizes international norms and cooperation and pursues economic-security interests by leveraging globalization's advantages compared to the techno nationalist perspective (Suttmeier et al., 2004). Second, nationalism is a crucial element to promote Chinese power in the economy and technology after the dissolution of socialist ideas (Naughton and Segal, 2003). Beijing has realized the importance of working under the established architecture and the significance of relative gains, not obsessively about absolute gains. Like other Asian states, China has also undergone market and economic liberalization, especially after WTO. While political leaders were determined to have a centralized state-based economy, they recognized the importance of flexibility, a market-oriented economy, bottom-up rather than top-down. Neither China wants to close its doors nor wants to be isolated from the market (Segal, 2008). Thus, the policy of China is different from protectionism and interventionism, actually techno nationalism. Third, China is aware of technological developments' importance which will catalyze their security globally, regionally. Therefore, China leverages globalization to promote national interests in technology (Segal, 2008).

China's mission to play an impregnable and indispensable role, taking the first rank in cyberspace in the technology market: robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), has been evident after Xi came to power in 2012. Therefore, the acquisition of patents constitutes one of the most significant concerns of the Chinese government. Given the global top five in the patent applications, China was the number one with its 11.6% rate in the patent applications. As the 2017 AI Strategy document has shown, the Xi government gives so much importance to AI. To be precise, AI patents have been noticeably obtained as a part of the government's ambitions to surpass and get ahead of other countries (Ndzende and Marwala, 2021). As a result, %70 applicants of the artificial intelligence patents have been awarded (Okoshi, 2019). Ndzednde and Marwala (2021) argue that the competition between China and the US has increased since both countries' economies depended on AI.

China tries to strengthen the nation through technology and science to be a world leader by 2050 (Appelbaum et al., 2011). Kennedy states that one cannot argue that China is completely a Techno globalist state since it is less cooperative than them, but also one cannot claim China is techno nationalist; China is decidedly pragmatic (Kennedy, 2013). It is crucial to notice that owing to its ambition to prevent not falling behind; China is seeking to globalist view and techno nationalism at the same time. The author argues that renewable energy, which is so significant to China due to energy security, can be accepted as evidence of the Pragmatic

version of techno nationalism. The officials consider that the more independence in energy for the outside world means the safer China. While the state supports national Chinese wind-solar firms, but on the other hand, there exists flexibility if there is tension with the challenges of economic partners (Kennedy, 2013).

Regarding the standards, it is argued that China's approach towards standardization has translated from techno nationalistic to techno globalism. Focusing on the Chinese 3G -4G mobile industry with two cases: time division synchronic code division multiple access mobile phone (TD-SCDMA) and time division long term evolution (TD-LTE), Kwak et al. (2012) argue that ties with foreign partners, especially in the case of technical assistance, have been strengthened. TD-SCDMA is dominated by indigenous Chinese firms, whereas most firms are foreigners at TD-LTE, in which China pursued to engage with foreign firms to the success of such indigenous projects. Besides, for Segal, China has become aware of the importance of standard-setting. To this end, Beijing is pursuing controlling standards, guaranteeing Chinese firms' status in the market, providing profits.

Accordingly, Stewart et al. (2011) argue that TD-SCDMA demonstrates China's changing position towards standards. To reach success, Chinese firms need to work together with foreign firms. Chinese firms and the government have been learning how to react to the market's expectations in the shadow of pressures. There is a learning process that affects China and the partners of China in the economy. The Chinese government's position has been turned from indigenous innovation to embracing foreign players. However, the government's pragmatic stance in tackling the market's expectations can not be denied (Stewart *et al.*, 2011).

Nevertheless, as a criticism to the scholars who explained Chinese strategy to interfere with the economy, Gao et al. (2012) assert that TD-SCDMA has encountered many ambiguities and challenges. It was proposed in 1998 and accepted as one of the international 3G technology standards by International Telecommunication (ITU) in 2000. The government's aggressive support in the first step; however, after the standard's exception, some difficulties have appeared due to firms' lack of common aims and government policy. Nationalism does not practically unite all interests of each actor on the contrary to common belief.

Applying actor-network theory, Shim and Shin (2019) argue that China's ruling party-state wants to determine how the smart tv market operates; therefore, it is strict and can be regarded as techno nationalist. The government tries to reduce foreign reliance on the smart tv market and supports Chinese firms' domestic innovation. Similarly, even in nanotechnology, the

government supports the firms by funding them. Segal (2018) asserts that the overlapping of China's willingness to cybersecurity with techno nationalism. The primary priority is to free China from dependency, mainly on US technology companies, securing the development in China's hands. Beijing wants to create a world of national internets in which states have supreme control under the name of the cyber world's sovereignty. The central government aims to weaken bottom-up US internet governance to strictly control and regulate information technology (Segal, 2018).

Similarly, focusing on China's governmental policies towards the online game industry, Ernvit and Mirko (2008) argue that the stance mainly consists of information control, techno nationalism, and pragmatic nationalism. According to research findings, top-down and negotiated processes in the Chinese government's attitude—the difficulties in protecting socialist values while the growing economy has been discussed. The author summarizes the techno nationalist policy of China in the online game industry: in order to reach technology development in the high tech industry and boost the economy, the government in a spirit of autonomously director in the objectives finance projects, related with the high tech industry, supports education and research (Ernkvist and Ström, 2008). For example, it opened game schools and supported the game developers with financial incentives. In addition, the government closely worked with companies in the industries to help domestic industries create local industries that can compete with foreign companies.

When it comes to the Chinese government's approach to internet governance, it is evident that China supports domestic companies against so-called security threat; therefore can be seen as TN. The central government's rifts in the internet sector have been more evident after Xinjiang and Arab Spring unrest. In the name of security, the government strengthened its restrictive regulations: banning Google, Facebook, and even youtube. Domestic local companies have been supported to develop domestic alternatives to these giant applications and databases. They have been supported as long as they abide by the central government's rules and ambitions: providing economic prosperity and security concerns (Plantin et al., 2019).

Another distinguishing view towards the Chinese internet view is that the leaders are entirely neo techno nationalists. It is well known that the Great Wall of China was built against nomadic tribes to protect imperial China. Given the broadening and widening meaning of security in the post-Cold War period, China's measurements to protect its cybersecurity, like Great Firewall, are understandable. However, considering the Great Firewall reality, it is necessary to ask why this kind of central government in China has decided to bring internet, which can jeopardize

the state's capability politically in 1994. Political elites were of neo techno nationalist ideas; the main aim was to use the internet as a component of modernization despite the risks. Indeed, the political leaders and elites sought to capitalize on the benefits of the internet while avoiding negative consequences using stringent controls and regulations (Lei, 2011).

It is true to say that the Chinese approach towards the internet was associated with the neo techno nationalist position and ambitions in fulfilling the dreams in economy and politics. Besides, Shen(2016) argues that China's approach to the internet has been shaped by the reformist leaders who pursued entering the international economic system. As another example of internet governance, in the e-governance sector, China pursues stability, especially to legitimize the CCP (Kluver, 2005). Plantin et al. (2019) argue that WeChat provides an excellent example Chinese government's inclination for the protection of national cybersecurity. Also, the cohesion of China authority and Chinese technology companies' interests paved the way for this success. If it had not been for Beijing's support, even enforcements, WeChat could not have been used by millions.

Similarly, it is essential to look at how administrative instruments have been used in technology development. In China's case, the government has encouraged joint ventures with foreign firms and state-led firms. A standard's success should be figured out by considering the development process and its usage in the market (diffusion). Gao explains the government's involvement in TD-SCDMA, 3G standard, especially in the diffusion process. Otherwise, it could be a failure. Indeed, China could not be successful, but for other companies like Motorola, Nokia, Siemens.

As shown, the literature mostly takes China as an authoritarian state that decides everything monolithically and manages technology policy. However, Shen (2016), through historical explanation of internet governance, there are multifaceted actors in the economy like Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, State Internet Information Office and power holders, manufacturers, providers. Therefore, it is necessary to look at China escaping from this prejudged view. Neither the Chinese state nor corporate China is monolithic and decides on its own. China's integration with the global world made the relationship more complex than ever because China seeks to benefit from the free market while presenting a positive image like following a neoliberal approach, win-win strategy. Without this strategy, the sounding success of China would not have been possible, given the complex but benefit-oriented international market.

Contrary to common belief, the Chinese government has not been fully intervened in the economy. It can be accepted as a platform creator, facilitator, and strategy setter to reach innovation (Băzăvan, 2019). The government plays multifaceted roles: business partners, strategic investors, and observers, rather than monolithic. It is also essential to keep in mind that this paved the way for the domestic/national companies' contradictory position, which clashed due to the differences of interests. The state can not decide anything alone. Simultaneously, one path tries to protect the market interests, and the other is more likely to focus on national benefits.

Băzăvan (2019) asserts that China has ambitious plans to use technology to nurture its economy since innovation is accepted as sacred in this way. However, a high dependency on Western products still exists despite reaching the creator's status and standard-setter in the technology. For example, although China dominates smartphones' production, it still depends on imported microchips. Thus, it is too hard to cut ties abroad for China, preventing globalization. For instance, even though China could not be a part of 3G, 4G mobile networks, the situation dramatically changed. In 2016, Huawei surpassed many companies in the fifth-generation mobile networks. Despite the continued dependency on foreign technologies, Chinese giants such as Huawei and ZTE have grown dramatically and become a part of the technological network.

Although there is a lack of research about how other states take China's policy and carry out policies, Williams (2011) points out that the USA looks at China as a destructive actor to free trade jeopardizing the competitive market through continuous state intervention, enforcement of the actors to use Chinese standards to enter the Chinese market. In contrast, the European Union (EU) sees it as an opportunity to align, maybe due to the positive impact of Chinese standards in the European market (Williams *et al.*, 2011). Trump government's policies and sanctions towards China ignited the central authority to promote domestic innovations. China turned to come true a new dream-like producing microchips in China by 2025, cutting the dependency. It seems like China will dominate the sectors by 2030 and can use technology for nation and military purposes (Segal, 2018).

Regarding China's space technology policy, Johnson et al. (2006) argue that space technology achievement aims are a part of a long-term commitment of Chinese techno nationalism. Besides prestige and its contribution to the domestic economy, the Chinese government carries out technology and science policy apart from economic diplomacy. China and European Union have some commonalities in their look for space technology: profiting from the universe's

common goods and maximizing resources. Therefore, the European Union is seen as a more amenable partner. Nevertheless, America is accepted as an actor looking at space technology from a militaristic and zero-sum game perspective.

The other side of technological developments is the reality of inequality. Neither techno nationalism nor techno globalism or neo techno nationalism can guarantee equality in society. Given these perspectives, technology constitutes the main driver of economic growth, which means higher welfare and living conditions for their populations. Investing money in technological development does not encompass public health, resource utilization, and common welfare in China. Thus, there is a widening between poor and wealthy populations, the Gini coefficient gives negative signals, and society is gradually segregated (Segal and Naughton, 2003). Liew (2005) argues that the CCP coopted with new groups who were more likely to align with the party to maintain its supremacy. Thus, the emergence of inequality in the new social strata is not a surprise. Through presenting this discussion, I want to show a different perspective on the issue.

2.6 Conclusion

After this lengthy discussion of the literature, the reason why this study prefers to use Neo-Techno nationalism concept to explain China's technology innovation policy should be legitimized. As already mentioned, the world's conditions have changed, with China's entrance to WTO, reformist leaders coming into power; Beijing's expectations and look have also changed. When China has considered, it should be realized that the state is no more monolithic, and there are other different and various actors linked with the market economy. The state is not alone in the decision-making process and can not decide alone to prevent globalization in order to promote domestic innovation. Needless to say, Chinese authority has continued to interfere in the economy. However, the government is seeking to create better institutional conditions. Technological development with indigenous development has constituted a crucial part of the policy of Chinese development. China is decidedly pragmatic and leverages globalization to its national interests. It is not correct to say that China follows a protectionist, techno nationalist policy anymore.

As can be seen in the literature, the discussions about the place of technology in China are just from the perspective of China. Therefore, there is a gap in how other states carry out such policies towards China's neo techno nationalism. For this reason, this study will try to find an explanation for this issue, focusing on the US perspective towards China's Neo-

Technonationalism. In the following chapter, why the US might securitize China's neo techno nationalism will be discussed in order to understand the securitization of Huawei by the Trump government in the fourth chapter. In the fourth chapter, applying Critical Discourse Analysis, the thesis seeks to the securitization of Huawei regarding China's technology policy and the arguments of the Trump government.



CHAPTER 3. WHY MAY THE US SECURITIZE CHINESE TECHNOLOGY POLICY?

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, China's technology policy has been discussed from the perspective of neo-techno nationalism. The economic reforms, the desire to leverage globalization while protecting national interests, and the government's approach towards technology paved the way for considering China as a neo-techno nationalist state. However, it is essential to consider the perception of the US towards China in technology. Therefore, my purpose is to bring two different but interrelated research fields and link them in the thesis's central argument: The US securitization of China's neo-techno nationalism.

As Robert Gilpin argued, technological revolutions have played an enormous role in the rise of the US. Innovation is seen as the savior of the developed world (Kennedy and Lim, 2018: 555). As known, the US domination in technology and science have been maintained for decades. In 2016, 65 leading software companies were in the US, and other developed countries had fewer than five companies (Kennedy, 2018). Similarly, Ndzenze and Marwala (2021) point out that the first three industrial revolutions have determined the present-day inequalities and US domination. Concerning the market values and market share, 8 out of 10 most prominent technology companies like Microsoft, Apple, Facebook are American; only Tencent Holdings, as a Chinese firm, is in this rank (Ndzenze and Marwala, 2021:39). It is proof of the unique leadership of the US in the ICT sector. Innovation has been dominated by ICT firms investing in R&D and researches in the US. In other words, innovation represents economic development. For this reason, the US government considers the diffusion of know-how as if it leads to the destruction of supremacy.

With a different look, new technologies are most profitable and applicable to the military. Thus, the one who invents the technology achieves more advantages over their rivals. Even the US, the ICT sector leader, uses these technologies to fulfill military aims (Kennedy, 2018). However, with the dramatic rise of the Chinese government and its technologies globally, this supremacy has been challenged. Kennedy (2018) argues that a rising power will need to produce newer innovations to the world as getting a rise. While catching up with the developed technologies in the short run can be possible with imitating and reforming the domestic technology, the rising power must achieve new technologies in the long term.

Although the US presidents have been on the alert of Chinese technology since the Cold War era, the securitization of Chinese rise in technology is a relatively new topic for the USA, as can be guessed during the Trump administration that has increased. Securitization has become the most contentious aspect of the relationship because the possibility of immediate confrontation has increased. There has always been great power competition, mistrusts in East Asia, Hong Kong Protests, 5G equipment, and the COVID-19 virus have also contributed to the tension between the two actors (Abb, 2020). In the remoted times, COVID-19 became the central issue sharpening the ideological conflicts between two actors. The US blamed China for being unopened, untransparent, and irresponsible (DeLisle, 2021). However, I want to focus on the role of technology between China and the USA in this chapter.

This chapter aims to demonstrate why the US government securitizes the rise of China in technology with its technology policy. In this vein, it is necessary to look at how previous studies have discussed the approach of the US government to emerging technologies in China. Considering which theories have been applied and what kind of methods have been used to prove that there is a securitization will provide us a better understanding of this issue.

The central argument of this chapter is that the US securitizes the technology policy, neo-techno nationalism, of China. For this reason, this chapter proceeds with two main sections. Firstly, I would like to discuss how identity differences between China and the US contributed to the securitization discourse. To this end, the role of authoritarianism and liberal democracy disputes in the shadow of violation of human rights and morals. The Chinese government's ambitious grand strategies aiming to surpass the US in the securitization process will be detailed in this section. Secondly, how technical and economic reasons strengthened the securitization arguments and extraordinary measurements were taken will be elaborated. Also, the section will try to show how China constitutes a challenge to the US in technology regarding the state-driven model economy of the Chinese government and its closed ties with technology companies, cybersecurity threats, 5G technology, intellectual property thefts, and espionage activities of China. The following table 3.1 summarizes the main arguments of this chapter.

CHINESE IDENTITY	TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS
Authoritarianism vs. Liberalism	State-led economy model
Violation of human rights	Close ties with technology companies
Ambitious grand strategies aiming to surpass the US	Cybersecurity threats/5G technology
Exporting illiberal Chinese model as an alternative	Intellectual Property Thefts
	Espionage Actions

Table 3.1 The Securitization of Chinese technology policy, Source: The author’s own compilation

3.2 THE CLASH OF IDENTITIES AND SECURITIZATION

Identity differences constitute a significant factor of the American approach to the Chinese technology policy. Identity describes who actors are, preferences, and interests (Onuf, 1989; Went, 1992). Also, identity acquisition is seen as a part of interaction formed by social processes (Went, 1992). As known, the security concept has been broadened and widened in the last decades. Also, the definitions of a threat, accepting it as a security concern, have been shaped and formulated by the policy makers’ narratives (Thomas et al., 2020). A group of scholars argues that the American officials have securitized China due to its threats to the global position of the USA, an unliberal and authoritarian regime. In this section, I would like to explain the role of authoritarianism and liberal democracy disputes, the Chinese government’s ambitious grand strategies challenging the US supremacy, and violation of human rights and morals in the securitization process.

Thomas (2020) argues that the securitization of technological innovation is mainly relevant to political cultures and perceived intentions rather than concrete capabilities. Using Copenhagen School’s securitization theory to analyze better the narrative shift focusing on discourses and narratives, the author argues that the US’s definition of itself consisted of the leader of the free world motto. However, it has encountered some challenges to protect the homeland, which even encompasses the free world as a whole. It aimed at deterring any power from aggressive action as a challenge to its position. China is not directly threatening the US but challenges American domination in the liberal world.

In other words, it is argued that the securitization stems from the individual choices of these states, which are competitive and try to reform their countries as challenging the US. Thus, it primarily stems from identity, not a growing capability that bothers the US (Ambrosio et al., 2020). The study of Ambrosio et al. (2020) focuses on the speeches and texts, “Congressional

testimony,” hearings of Senate Intelligence (started in 1992) presented annually, Congressional testimony by executive branch officials as primary resources since they provide the best presentation of securitization of the US and gives great importance to Russia and China, specifically. Thus, using primary resources and applying both quantitative and qualitative methods, the research provides an excellent perspective to understand the securitization of China and Russia.

The differences between regime types considering the rivalry of authoritarianism and liberal democracy, the ambitious state plans that destroy the existing international order, and violation of human rights play an essential role in shaping the discourse and position towards China. Therefore detailing them is crucial to understand the main arguments of the thesis.

3.2.1 Authoritarianism versus liberal democracy

The US has been aware of the threat, especially cyber threats from China, in the last 90s; however, the issue has been securitized during Trump’s presidency. Although Bush and Obama had restricted the investments and entrance of Chinese companies to the USA, stringent regulations have been on the rise during the Trump age. For many, implementing these precautions could be possible by posing the narrative of defending the national security of the US against communist adversaries (Hao, 2020). Therefore, the government turned to take extraordinary measurements against technology companies in the name of protecting national security (Kartatasmida, 2020). For instance, the discourse mainly composes that companies pose an enormous threat to the US’s liberty, privacy, and national security; therefore, they have been seen as existential threats.

Campion (2020) uses critical discourse analysis to explain how the US has securitized CNOOC and Huawei as an existential threat. This method provides the reader with an understanding of how threats are socially constructed, referencing the national security concerns. The study focuses on how the US position the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in its relationship with China. For Campion (2020), the China threat view has enormously affected the creation of this securitization. Laying the post-positivism, which contributes to understanding the constructions and biases in states' national security and foreign policy view, the author argues that the Chinese threat is not valid, obvious, but discursively produced. The author discusses how China has been produced as a threat actor by the US, looking at US government statements’ official discourse. Chinese backwardness during the opium war was included, but this changed with the opening up of China in the 70s; the assertiveness of China has joined this threat discourse.

Chinese communist links, even China's economic growth in the 90s, were the center of this discourse. In the last version, the US sees China as a threat to its economy (Campion, 2020).

Kartasmita (2020) uses the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School and maintains that any issue can be securitized without real threats by crucial agents. Sun (2019) points out that the Trump administration tries to be the one as moralistic. In contrast, it tries to create an image of China, an authoritarian state-led, unfair. For Sun (2019), this is a kind of politicization that is a new form of technological and economic politicization that Trump administration exaggerates the security issues.

Even before the Trump administration, the US tried to restrict the Chinese technology industry; during the Cold War, the advanced technologies transfer to the USSR and China were prevented because of the ideational differences. With Wassenaar Agreement in 1996, The US followed the ways to maintain its high-tech field domination. In short, it aimed at preventing the development of Chinese military and civilian high-tech industries (Hao, 2000). However, securitization was being done during the Trump administration. Sun (2019) asserts that technological war emerged due to these powers' political values and interest differences. Indeed, the US sees itself on the moral high ground and wants China to accept it, not create a challenge against the US. Even in the technology, the Trump administration seeks to leverage it to favor American benefits with a zero-sum approach (Sun, 2019).

The National Security Strategy in 2017 proposing the sanctions and relevant measures against China, extraordinary measurements of the US government like signing Executive Order banishing Huawei, putting most of the Chinese companies in the Entity List, Pompeo's announcements to create a Clean Network Program excluding China have shown as the proof of the securitization by many scholars (Kennedy, 2020; Sun, 2019). Kartasmita argues that the Trump administration has taken this kind of step because of the differences between the two states, like political values, ambitions, and rivalries in regional and global (Kartasmita, 2020). Allegations like utilizing technology as a tool to spread authoritarianism, government-backed companies' existence has been seen as a threat. The US exaggerated the issues and securitized them, arguing that Huawei's closed ties with PLA are another reason to see it as the long arm of Communism.

Fields (2018) highlights that Trump's moves show his zero-sum understanding of international trade by putting it as one of the national security priorities. As known, tech war includes sanctions, restrictions of the technical personnel while entering the US, high export controls,

monitoring and controlling the investments. He agrees with securitization theory and argues that it is an action that is not good or bad but a step to determine national security according to their preferences (Fields, 2018).

To illustrate, although the US has been one of the most important actors, even the leader in artificial intelligence, many nations are getting stronger. It seems like the space race during the cold war between the US and USSR. This competition is more likely to be intense and complex due to multipolarity and several kinds of sectors to apply artificial intelligence. It will affect the military and economy. Therefore leadership in artificial intelligence would be a crucial factor to be a great power. However, the lack of a structured and determined national strategy for artificial intelligence makes the US disadvantageous in the race (Horowitz *et al.*, 2018). It stems from ideological positions and regime types. China is an authoritarian country that controls almost everything with grand strategies. For Horowitz et al. (2018), the strategies that the US needs to implement are followed by China, so it is more likely to emerge a crisis.

China's identity with authoritarianism is one of the most critical reasons shaping the US perception of China. It is seen as an ambitious challenge to the liberal world order and American supremacy. Its rise defied international law and liberalism, mainly with its state-led market economy, constitutes a threat. The grand strategy of China seizes entering the new markets for national advanced Chinese technology. China is a revisionist power that challenges the American rules-based order (Kasim, 2019).

The US National Security Strategy 2017 shows China as a revisionist power, seeks to displace the United States, spreading its state-led economic model, and ordering the regions in its favor.

“ Three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners. Although differing in nature and magnitude, these rivals compete across political, economic, and military arenas and use technology and information to accelerate these contests in order to shift regional balances of power in their favor. These are fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies.” (Trump, 2017).

The studies mostly take this strategy report since Americans gave massive importance to innovation-based security. Despite the hopes of the US that China would follow liberal market principles, as argued, China tries to spread its authoritarian model and expands its power in the military and economy. In a nutshell, today's Chinese and American confrontation is more fierce

and complex, can immediately turn into a military confrontation (Feng, 2019). Feng maintains an asymmetrical war between Huawei, a private company, and the American government. For Shen, this war will end with the victory of Huawei because of the lack of proof showing security risks and violation of market rules through excluding a private company. The market will exclude the exclusion act, and this war will end (Feng, 2019). The securitization stems from the clashes of identities, and the US can not find concrete proofs to show its rightfulness.

Another factor of China's technology policy securitization is that China is blamed for using technology while violating human rights and values. For example, the US argues that China harnesses high-tech to oppress Uyghurs and other minorities, increasing control through biometrical databases and facial recognition cameras (Wang, 2019). The lack of democracy in China and proposing an alternative model to the authoritarian and human rights violater states is another concern of the US government. It is seen that the Chinese government exports high-tech illiberalism and digital authoritarianism to challenge US supremacy and values (Wright, 2018).

3.2.2 Chinese ambitious grand strategies challenging the superiority of the Us

This section will focus on how the US has approached China's ambitious grand strategies. However, before detailing, it will be fruitful to consider the well-known political economist Robert Gilpin's useful distinction between malevolent and benign mercantilism while analyzing its strategies towards trading partners. Whereas malevolent mercantilist intimidation refers to a more hostile kind of economic warfare due to seeking expansionary policies rather than a reasonable level of protection for their economies (Balaam and Dillman, 2008), benign mercantilism is more defensive, seeking to preserve the economy from economic and political forces (Gilpin, 1987:33). Therefore, it might be argued that the Chinese government is considered a malevolent mercantilist by the Trump administration even though China sees itself in the frame of benign mercantilism.

Under Xi, China has followed a more assertive industrial policy, following relatively economic nationalism, statist but integrationist to the international market. In this section, I will try to show the impact of ambitious Chinese plans on securitization. The industrial policy of China aimed at making the Chinese industry more innovative and globally competitive. The primary purposes of China account for being one of the most innovative countries by 2020, leading innovator by 2030. Also, China aims at being the leader in global science and technology until 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC (Brown and Singh, 2018).

Although cooperation in science and technology has existed between them, like after the cold war, the US used China with its low-skilled labor force. It is not the case anymore. Even in the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese economy rose despite the other actors not do so. US Europe has been deeply affected. For this reason, Chinese enterprises in the high-tech industry have constituted a challenge to Westerns. As mentioned, the Obama administration tried to prevent them from investing in US industry and made the entrance to American technology more tight/difficult. Trump administration changed it radically, like tech war since his judgments. He was aware of Chinese ambitions and sought to postpone this challenge (Sun, 2019).

2017 US National Security Strategy framed China as an explicit threat. The technologies China has achieved or looking for were mainly about the military, if not civilian but can be applied to the military. Therefore, Americans looked at the issue with the security lenses (Abb, 2020). This securitization and safeguarding can be seen in US actions against Chinese firms like Huawei, which is excluded from the market. Most of the studies without using a method emphasize this strategy document as proof of securitization.

As known, Section 301 investigation was accepted as the starting the trade war in 2018. In addition to the tariffs on the goods, devices, high-tech industry materials are controlled by the US. However, with the Executive Order signing, Trump declared a national emergency and took extraordinary measurements against threats from foreign adversaries (Hao, 2020). The actions of the Trump government show the existence of the securitization of Chinese technology companies. Hao (2020) utilizes the discourse analysis method to explain the securitization of Chinese technology. He mainly focuses on the 2017 National Security Strategy and the key persons' selected speeches in the Trump administrations like Pompeo and the president of the FBI.

Trump's administration changed the view of China in the USA, and it is no more a strategic partner but a strategic competitor. Therefore, the US has taken more steps and measurements in five required fields: trade, economy, technical standards, technological dominance, military advancement. Although previous leaders have been aware of the threats coming from China, the competition has not been transparent as the Trump administration. Instead, it became like a zero-sum game. The most important proof is the 2017 National Security Strategy, which described China as a revisionist power that aims to displace the US in the Indo-Pacific region and spread the state-led economy model, reordering the region. China, for them, uses technology and military modernization as a tool to fulfill its dreams; therefore, it is a strategic competitor for the US (Tellis et al., 2020).

Robert Williams (2020) argues that the securitization process is accelerated by strengthening the systemic base of distrust: derives from the Chinese government's strategic intentions. China tries to upgrade its manufacturing sector want to be more competitive. Chinese leaders' desire to be a superpower in science and technology is not a secret. They reiterated it several times. Made in China 2025 economic plan 2017 and New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (aiming to make China is the primary AI center till 2030) are the most ambitious plans that challenge the supremacy of the US in the technology sector.

"Made in China 2025" consists of integrating IT and industry, improving innovation, globalization of manufacturing, and fostering Chinese Brands. Unlike China's 2006 Indigenous innovation program, MIC25 seeks to increase domestic innovation, pays a great emphasis on the market, supporting even small firms (Hammer, 2017). For this reason, exaggeration of the issues and linking them with national security is a typical situation for a state which tries to protect its national interests.

Chinese ambitions are strengthened by hiring foreign experts, investing in artificial intelligence; robotics is also considered a threat. Standard-setting competition, not obeying WTO rules are other reasons for the emergence of threat discourse. The announcement of Made in China 2025 blueprint in 2015 made the US uneasy, and the US has started to find a way to prevent China's fundamental threats against itself (DeLisle, 2021). This plan aims to modernize the IT market, more strong enterprises and competition in the key markets, and long-term aims. Therefore, the US did not want to lose its superiority (Sun, 2019).

The technology transfer method to increase the Chinese economy's size and value is reiterated in the multi-decade plan. It includes increasing the level of investments in core technologies and the acquisition of American firms. China also is seeking to recruit talents in US companies through sponsoring. Technical expertise can be attained from US Technologies in this way. It is estimated that if China continues to strengthen at this speed, it more likely be 150% the size of the US, surpassing the US relevance by 2050 (Brown and Singh, 2018).

Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, Augmented Reality is vital sectors for the Chinese government. Those are seen as core and will be the primary determiner in the future. As demonstrated in the Five Year Plan and Made in China 2025, China wants to be the number one technology through indigenous innovations. As Segal pointed out, China seeks leadership in critical technologies to ensure its competitiveness in the next future (Brown and Singh, 2018). It is necessary to discuss the 13th Five Year Plan of 2016-2020 "Internet Plus" lay emphasis on

the more substantial government control over Chinese networks to the global network in the telecommunication technology. These plans are considered a challenge to US supremacy, and the discourse framing China as a national security threat got strong.

In February 2019, the US government announced a new strategy document about artificial intelligence, DoD AI Strategy. Artificial intelligence became a national priority over competing with China because American leadership in the AI sector is never assured and uncontested (Work *et al.*, 2021). Like China, the US tries to control artificial intelligence with the government's guidance, but it is still less clear if it succeeds or not. In short, the US has not contended with the ambitious strategies of the Chinese government and considers it as damaging.

3.3 SECURITIZATION BECAUSE OF TECHNIC AND ECONOMIC REASONS

There is a growing concern in the US about the risks of Chinese technology companies. Americans consider them as a challenge both for prosperity and American security. Although there has been tension between the US and China about Taiwan, US forces, PLA, securitization is relatively new. The economic relationship has been securitized, the economy is seen as a tool to protect American national security and competitiveness in the free playing field (Medeiros, 2019). Also, it is true to say that securitization made the competition between two actors tenser during the Trump government.

In contrast to the previous literature that focuses on the military relationship between the US and China, Kennedy and Lim (2018) offer a new insight. They argue that the US has benefited from Chinese activities since it became the most critical customer. Also, the US became the most important partner of China in R&D. However, Chinese activities started to challenge American interests day by day. The technological modernization made the US uneasy since military confrontation can emerge in Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Straits, and the US might not handle China due to this rapid innovation. Furthermore, Trump argues that China has been militarily modernized because of Chinese accession to US innovation and its universities. He blames China for stealing or illicitly acquiring America's intellectual property explains the Chinese success with being theft. In a nutshell, it is argued that China uses illegal means destruct America's long-term advantages.

Most importantly, Chinese emerging technologies destroy the economic security of the USA. No one can deny that the ICT sector constitutes an essential part of the budget of the states. They have risen dramatically in the marketplace and become an integral part of military innovation. The sector's representation in the nation's capital is another critical issue. The presence of the Hight tech community, mainly in academies and corporations, has increased immensely (Kennedy, 2018). Even their lobbying budgets have risen with new companies like Amazon, Google, Facebook. Thus, Trump emphasized the importance of implementing strict measures against Chinese companies. Kahata (2020) asserts that restrictions on Huawei and ZTE provide the US to take advantage of the market dominated by Chinese technology companies.

Bateman (2020) states that Trump seeks a way to leverage China and attain political advantages. Zero tolerance for Chinese apps in the US has been proved with the banishment of Tiktok and WeChat in the US. Although the recent actions of the Trump administration, like against Huawei, Tiktok, companies of China, are associated with national security concerns, the US will also be affected by this, and its companies will get hurt. This is because cyber issues are started to be looking from the lens of national security. In other words, technological issues have been securitized in the last decades (Bateman, 2020).

Kim (2016) points out that the US can not affect its most important rival, China, with economic measures. The new trade system which US security leaders lead tries to exclude China, also Trans-Pacific Partnership is designed to balance China in Asia militarily; it is a kind of US restriction. Even though China poses a serious threat to US domination in East Asia, the globe, and the economy, the US must stop fuelling China's isolation with securitization and find appropriate commercial policies. Considering all these debates, understanding the technical and economic reasons behind these fears is essential. Thus, this section will discuss how the state-driven economy model, the risks to cybersecurity, intellectual property theft, and espionage activities have played a significant role in securitization.

3.3.1 State Driven economy model and securitization

State-led economy, party-state governance, the Chinese legal system entirely different from the US are crucial reasons for threat perception. As Allison (2017) said, China and the US are destined to be in hostile relations. The concerns of the Trump administration are closed ties of the technology companies can damage the fair competition in the market due to discriminative

activities. Also, the closeness threatens data privacy; whenever the Chinese government wants to reach the data, the companies would not reject the request. Thus, although there is no proof of the second version, the US securitizes the Chinese technology policy and firms.

Focusing on the Trump and Obama administrations, Foot and King (2019) argue that the technological advances of China bothered the US, especially in the ones having military and strategic significance. While the Obama administration tries to find a way to cooperate, refraining from zero-sum game dynamics, For the Trump era, it is visa versa. There also was no coordinated policy to deal with the technological innovation of China. It might be accepted as another reason for securitization. As known, the more scared one is the unknown one. For the US, Chinese advances in technologies are strongly likely to threaten Us strategic choices, especially in determining global standards, which is a determiner of the global position of a country (Foot and King, 2019). So the US turned to policies to this ambitious challenge of China. For example, the US applied trade tariffs, restricted China's outward investment policies, and targeted Chinese technology companies like Huawei and ZTE.

In the eyes of US officials, China can already lead the technology-based industry with its state-led economy. Discriminative domestic policies towards foreign companies, standard-setting strategy, and forcing others to accept and adopt domestic standards, Great Firewall all contribute to controlling over the data on the internet. Alibaba, Baidu, supported by the government taking the privileges in the domestic industry, are now becoming high-tech global companies (Brown and Singh, 2018). Therefore, the US sees this action as unfair and tries to protect the interests of national companies. Nevertheless, Xi has been aware of the interconnectedness and the importance of being integrated into the system to benefit more. Thus, China strives to revitalize the nation through science and technology without cutting its ties to the world market, leveraging globalization.

For the Trump administration, the party can easily affect technology companies; they can not resist the government's requests (Williams, 2020). It is argued that closed ties with the government can easily create backdoors to reach the information (Mulligan and Linebaugh, 2021). For this reason, it poses an inherent security threat. Hao mainly focuses on the 2017 National Security Strategy to explain securitization and argues that the concerns of the US are more than the experience. The threats stem from personal safety, privacy, close ties with the government, and unresistance of the technology companies to the government's requests. However, as Snowden (2013) leaked, Microsoft, Apple even Google even could not resist the government (Guardian, 2013). Hao maintains that companies can not reject government

requests to reach data. Therefore, not just Chinese firms but all technology firms are risky (Hao, 2020). There exists an exaggeration to take advantage of this unfair competition.

Obama administration even tried to imposed restrictions on Huawei and ZTE due to cybersecurity threats and tried to find a way to prevent Chinese entrance into US technology. The state-driven economy model closed ties with the government to explain why the US considers Chinese companies unreliable partners. Chinese banning the government computers using Microsoft System and Google related means for the US forces localization and politicization of technology (Clover, 2014).

Given China's standard-setting strategy, the US considers China's actions to exploit this position and uses this advantage in favor of itself. In addition, the Trump administration fears that the government's subsidization of Chinese firms would penetrate new markets and force less advantaged competitors to accept Chinese rule or be excluded (Clover, 2014). In short, the US wants to maintain the rule maker status and not be challenging by any power.

In the aviation sector, specifically the drone industry, US domination has continued for decades. The close knits with the military and drone industry increased its importance in the eyes of government officials. However, with the rise of Chinese domestic industry in this sector, the US has been challenged. China enjoys a well-established and bond structure, so that this situation puts the US companies in a disadvantageous position. While China can control the market thanks to the strict government control pushing the firms to innovation, academia, State-Owned Enterprises(SOE). Also, it is significant to say that the Aviation sector, with the government's guidance, can develop the economy rapidly and lead China to surpass the US. Nevertheless, it is argued that too early to say there is a securitization (Cheok, 2018).

Kennedy and Lim (2018) argue that innovation activities have two impacts in the world affected by the dominant state's response. In the first one, negative security externalities, the dominant state may fear itself incomplete unsafety due to the impairment of other states' rise. Similarly, in the second impact, negative order externalities, the dominant state faces a challenge to its dominated international order by the rising state (Kennedy and Lim, 2018). Brezinski said China is more steady, slowly rising, and wants not to be accepted as a challenge. However, the more China rise in technology, the more the US perceives China as a threat.

3.3.2 Cyber Security threat

Trump administration sees the Chinese rise in technology as risky since it threatens cybersecurity. As will be discussed, Huawei is the leading company in the 5G technology, surpassing other firms in this field. Technological risks are getting higher for the US; 5G network will destroy the core telecom network. 5G provides faster download speed, bigger and more potent capacity for many devices. There is a fear that more connectedness in the network will become more vulnerable to data thefts and attacks. Huawei and 5G is the most critical factor in the securitization of Huawei and taking extraordinary measurements.

The US has many concerns since the cybersecurity risks coming with 5G, Huawei's past actions, violation of the agreement and sanctions against Iran, strong ties with the government. Naturally, this situation made Huawei unacceptable in the eyes of the US leader (Williams, 2020). In May 2019, Huawei and 68 other Chinese companies were added to the security threats to the US by the US Department of Commerce. Trump also was seeking to persuade the other companies to take a step against Huawei. These actions are accepted as shreds of evidence of the securitization by scholars. The trade war has been exacerbated by putting Huawei on the entity list last May in 2019 by the USA. For Rollet, it is the end of global tech (Rollet, 2019).

Another critical point is that there is competition in artificial intelligence, the primary driver for economic development. The Chinese investments in artificial intelligence paved the way for more vulnerabilities considered a national security threat. With the rise of artificial intelligence technologies, data poisoning attacks, adversarial actions, exploitation of flaws have risen. The US suspects that China will be more likely to use vulnerabilities of other states through using its national champions (Tellis et al., 2020).

The US fears that the Chinese government is creating an enormous database of US citizens via several methods to use later. This situation poses a potential national threat for the USA. Therefore, this plays a vital role in the emergence of securitization. As Hao (2020) indicated, all technology companies are risky and unreliable; this should not be seen as if it is just peculiar to Chinese firms. The US seeks to realize the Clean network Program excluding China and provide a comfortable and reliable environment for intelligence information (Kahata, 2020). There is an unfortunate trend of securitization and economic competition between these partners. It is necessary to recognize how much getting interdependency in this sector without securitizing (Chen *et al.*, 2019)

3.3.3 Intellectual Property theft and Espionage activities

It is a well-known fact that the United States is a world leader in the high technology goods industry. However, violations of intellectual property rights threaten American firms since they prevent fairly compete in the market. Implementation of laws and rules in China that may negatively affect the exports and American manufacturing and innovation in technology is considered an enormous threat. Chinese Policies and practices led to the securitization process, according to Williams (2020).

The US sees China as a massive threat because this state steals the property without the rights of agents. As China developed, the theft of intellectual property has risen. To replace the US with itself, with a Machveellian spirit, the Chinese government applies even illegal ways. 2017 Commission of Intellectual Property theft shows that China is the number one state in this activity. The Chinese government has not prioritized protecting property rights for decades, even after entering the WTO. FBI director Wray claims that more than 1000 investigations open into Chinese technology theft across 56 offices. He maintains that no country can damage the USA more than Communist China since it tries any means to steal American technologies (Wray, 2020). In 2019, the Office of US Trade Representative listed 36 states that violate intellectual property rights; it demonstrated that the Chinese legal system does not give much importance to protecting them. According to the IP Commission, China's actions led to the US's loss of 2225 billion dollars annually.

Since the Regan government, this issue is taken seriously. Similarly, the Obama administration gave considerable importance to cybersecurity, and intellectual property was one of the government's priorities. Obama tried to solve this important issue with diplomacy and signed an agreement with China in 2015. Despite the deal between Obama and Xi in 2015, this pledge has not been kept. Beijing blatantly violates the agreement. Chinese actions like espionage and intellectual property war helped the US securitize intellectual property (Clarke and Kanaka, 2019). Not only hardware but also the software is threatened by the activities of China for the US.

Trump administration has acknowledged one of the priorities of the US. In the remoted times, intellectual property theft has been considered a national security threat by the USA. In 2018, the Department of Justice announced a "China Initiative" to fight against property thefts and espionage activities (Council of Economic Advisers and Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2015). Harbert(2016) argues that the articulation of IP as a threat is relatively new. Other

states, especially China, have been responsible for these activities. Taking intellectual property as a national security issue made it possible for the US government to control the internet governance system easily.

Espionage activities

The access to US innovations paved the way for the modernization of the Chinese military. Thus, the US accused China of stealing its technologies and tried to prevent them with these restrictions. The scholars steal even intellectual property in the universities. Therefore, entrance visas have been tightened. Sun (2019) argues that the 2019 signification of an executive order on the American AI initiative and strategy shows the US a new path to protect its interests and maintain US supremacy. The author argues that it is a kind of securitization of the rise of China in technology. Furthermore, it is a kind of new arms war in the name of safeguarding security.

For Brown (2018), China has engaged in a sophisticated espionage strategy for decades to harness them domestically. FBI reports that the intelligence services of China have been more aggressive now and getting more aggressive day by day. The US argues that China puts the insiders and human spies in American firms and quickly achieves the information. Therefore, seeing Chinese firms as a security threat results from these actions (Abb, 2020). As for graduate students whose departments are mostly related to the technical issues in these theft and espionage actions, the US government restricted the entrance to America through stringent visa controls or rejecting them.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained the factors that contributed to the securitization process considering the discussions in the literature. The main argument of this chapter is that the US securitized the technology policy of the Chinese government. Given the literature, it is fair to say that the US has securitized the rise of Chinese technology for two main reasons. These are 1- the challenges because of the Chinese identity: authoritarianism and the violation of human rights and moral values, and the Chinese government's ambitious grand strategies aiming to surpass the US; 2- the threats deriving from technical and economic reasons such as the state-driven model economy of the Chinese government and its closed ties with technology companies, cybersecurity threats, 5G technology, intellectual property thefts, and espionage activities of China.

In the literature, the technology policy of China has been discussed concerning techno-nationalism, neo-techno nationalism. However, I want to present a comprehensive analysis of Sino-American relationships in the case of Huawei considering Chinese technology orientation. By analyzing two different perspectives to the same story and subject, I am pursuing contributing the literature with a grand look. In this vein, this study will focus on the Trump administration and securitization. It will use Congressional Hearings of Executive Government published annually and provide an excellent perspective to understand security threats of the USA during the Trump administration and National Strategy report 2017 and Cyber Security Strategy report 2018. Critical discourse analysis will help to show the hidden and obvious securitization of the officials. Also, this method lets us see how the hegemon power, the US, created a discourse against and Huawei, the suppressed excluded one. The thesis argues that due to the securitization process, Huawei is started to be seen as a company constituting a security threat.

CHAPTER 4 . HUAWEI

4.1 Introduction

The economic development of China in the last two decades has been staggering. Chinese competitiveness is no longer confined to low value-added goods. With the governmental industry policy to help Chinese firms catch up in the developed countries, most companies could fulfill these dreams (Ahrens, 2013). Huawei has offices in more than 140 countries and became the second-largest telecommunications equipment company. Indeed, Huawei is one of the biggest telecommunication equipment suppliers and the second-largest smartphone. The following figure 4.1 shows the dramatic change in the revenue of Huawei in the last decade. Accordingly, Haveman (2016) argues that the name of Huawei constitutes a hidden motto of the government’s industrial policy: China can, splendid act. It is also evidence of Zhengfei’s mission to advance China using technology as an effective tool (Haveman, 2016).




Figure 4.1 Revenue of Huawei from 2009 to 2020, Source: Huawei

<https://www.huawei.com/en/annual-report/2020>

As discussed in the previous chapter, the reasons for the Securitization of Chinese Technology Policy also encompass Huawei. Nevertheless, the company has undergone a rough period in the remoted times (Cheng, 2018). There is no exception in this case. Rollet (2019) maintains that the policy of the U.S. towards Huawei should not be looked at from just one perspective. It destroys the globalized order and gives the U.S. the right to take this kind of action to protect the United States from foreign adversaries and their not well-intended technologies.

In this chapter, I will try to demonstrate how the Trump government has securitized Huawei. Before applying Critical Discourse Analyses to the Congressional Hearings and National Security Strategy report from 2017, Cyber Security Strategy Report 2018 during the Trump

administration, it is necessary to discuss Huawei and the Trump government and how this securitization started to be scrutinized. To this end, I will first elaborate on the reasons behind the securitization process of Huawei by the U.S., closely linked with the Chinese Technology Policy, given the existing literature. In the second section, I will discuss Critical Discourse Analysis and my reasons for choosing this method in this study. In the last part, I will apply this method to the documents that I have chosen to explain the securitization of Huawei by the Trump government.

4.2 THE SECURITIZATION OF HUAWEI

It is argued that the Trump government securitizes China because of identity differences and technical, economic concerns. When it comes to Huawei, these reasons also can not diverge from each other. Given the identity differences, it is fair to say that being a Chinese firm is accepted as a threat. Mainly, the close ties with the government make Huawei an unreliable partner in the eyes of the West. Additionally, the founder's previous experiences in the army as an engineer even increased the suspicions about the company.

Secondly, the economy constitutes the primary determiner of the development of a company. Information technology is of great importance; it became the primary catalyst of economic success. Ndzenze and Marwala (2021) point out that technologies are good indicators of innovation, industrial policies, and infrastructural advancement besides nation-building. In this section, I will discuss the ambitions of the Chinese government to lead the market and how Huawei's role necessarily has affected the decisions of the Trump administration. The role of concerns over the Chinese state-led economy and unfair competition will be analyzed as regards Huawei.

Lastly, the technical concerns have accelerated by the domination of Huawei in the 5G market and telecommunication equipment. The U.S. accepts Huawei as a security threat because of property thefts and 5G vulnerabilities. For many scholars, the declaration of Huawei as the national champion also contributed to the emergence of this belief. Also, the existence of the Intelligence Law obliges even Huawei to cooperate with the government if requested. Huawei's violation of sanctions against Iran and North Korea is another reason to see it as a risk. Therefore, this section will focus on the differences of identity, technical and economic factors behind the securitization of Huawei.

4.2.1. IDENTITY MATTERS

Two main reasons are leading to the securitization discourse of the Trump administration: Being a Chinese company and the story of Huawei with its structure and founder.

4.2.1.1 Being a Chinese Company makes Huawei a menace

Technological innovation can be presented as a security threat (Rolenc, 2020). Huawei has undergone a rough process during the Trump administration since 2017. A group of scholars such as Kartasasmida (2020), Thu (2019), and Champion (2020) agrees that Huawei is securitized because it is a Chinese company. Accordingly, the authoritarian character of the Chinese government threatens liberal democracies. The arguments used often are that the relationship of Huawei with the army and Beijing might jeopardize trade secrets and data privacy since the laws oblige all companies to cooperate with the government. “The United States government has banned Huawei from the country and has accused the company of bank and wire fraud, obstructing justice, and conspiring to steal trade secrets” (Archibald, 2020:50). Also, the previous experience of the company’s founder is considered strong evidence of the close ties with the government by the Americans.

It is fair to say that the great power competition continues in the technology and the innovation race. Thu (2019) argues that the Trump administration banned Huawei because it hid the Chinese government’s authoritarian character. The U.S. National Strategy asserts that the world is divided between groups that favor a repressive authoritarian system and favor free liberal democracies. China is acknowledged as repressive and uses technology as a tool for this suppression. Therefore, China must be prevented since its rise in technology will lead to the rise of authoritarianism and enhance illiberal regimes globally (Thu, 2019).

Similarly, Kartasasmida (2020) agrees that cybersecurity is a vital issue for the states. However, Trump’s steps against Huawei are the differences between the two states like political values, ambitions, and rivalries in the regional and global arena. Trump administration securitized the technology competition due to fears like spreading authoritarianism. He highlights that the U.S. exaggerated the issues and securitized, arguing that Huawei’s close ties with the army (PLA) are another reason to see it as the long arm of Communism.

Champion (2020) applies critical discourse analysis to explain how the U.S. has securitized CNOOC and Huawei as an existential threat. The Chinese threat is not valid, obvious but discursively produced. The U.S. acknowledges Huawei as an existential security threat, and this

threat does not stem from extant cyber attacks or a particular event but the cumulative threat discourse about China. As for Huawei, Miller (2019) argues that Huawei became the embodiment of the China threat; the menace derives from China, not from this company. Rather than extraordinary measurements, as seen in other securitization cases, the cumulative threat discourse made this securitization at the normal political level, although it is exceptional (Champions, 2020).

For Chen (2020), dealing with Huawei means handling the Chinese government and Communist Party. Huawei is seen as the star by the government because it benefits from the party-state-led economy and fulfills the Chinese ambitions to dominate the market. The company is not an ordinary firm in the market; it has a mission to combine the government's commanding power and industrial policy (Chen, 2020). Huawei is a threat due to its close links with the Chinese government and defense in the eyes of the American government. Downer states that the cyberwar against Huawei derives from its being a Chinese company, all about Sinophobic attitudes (Magee, 2019). Also, the close links in Urumqi Xinjiang to provide technical assistance to the government bothered human rights.

Yılmaz (2020) points out that the trade war between two states was to protect the American strength; however, the main reason was the desire of Trump to maintain technological supremacy. The identity of China bothers the U.S. because America accepts it as a political, ideological, and economic existential threat. The U.S. government sought to persuade the government not to provide chips (few states have this technology to produce it) to Huawei or reject the request. By doing this, Trump wants to prevent the development of Huawei and surpassing American technology.

The Chinese identity of Huawei has a significant impact on the emergence of threat discourse. Donahue (2020) argues that the U.S. must protect its military, economy, and technology domination as a global power. The role of the U.S. in the system makes the U.S. carry out this kind of policy. Technology is an issue for homeland and national security; therefore, raising the barriers to convince other partners against Huawei is natural. Last but not least, the Trump administration blames Huawei arguing that Huawei has no Western values as if being Western makes a company more reliable, secure, and respectful to privacy (Huawei, 2020).

4.2.1.2 The story of Huawei makes it a threat

Huawei was a product of Deng Xiaoping's reformation process in 1978 when China opened its doors to Western business. During Deng's reform and go global strategy, the weakness of the country's telecommunication infrastructure led to the government adopting a three-phased strategy and importing from abroad, encouraging joint venture equipment manufacturing and developing indigenous technologies. In 1988, most of the technology companies were interested in program-controlled switches. Huawei was founded in this environment. China's telecom equipment, 100% percent, depended on imports; Alcatel, Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia dominated the market. The founder of Huawei, Zhengfei Ren, was aiming at creating a domestic competitor to these firms. Founder Ren said that Huawei is like a mountain goat that has to run faster not to be caught by predators (Ahrens, 2013).

While Huawei was only a manufacturer and a startup company, it switched its vision and tried to be a leading brand in the technology sector (Haveman, 2016). Moreover, in 1996, the government stated Huawei as the national Champion and had enormous support and subsidy to go global. As known in the first years of the foundation, Huawei imported switches from a Hong Kong Company, Kangli (Ahrens, 2013). Huawei established research centers and tried to reach local users in which other Chinese firms have not been involved. Furthermore, this brought Huawei success because, in 1996, the government and military declared Huawei as National champion; in the last years of the 90s, Huawei overtook Shanghai Bell and dominated the market. The internationalization of Huawei has been possible in the last years. However, now Huawei has its brand and produces its devices, handsets, and mobile phones. Huawei is not a state-owned company but a private enterprise.

As mentioned before, the accusations against Huawei also stem from the founder's background and the government's support. Ren was sure foreign companies would not share and transfer cutting-edge technologies, standards; therefore, Huawei turned on mostly R&D. In 1990, Ren's goal was to keep the pace of the advanced technologies through developing domestic industry with foreign counterparts. Being not an SOE led to Huawei undergoing difficult times; however, no one can deny the government's support in the following years. In the mid-1990s, Ren said, "If there had been no government policy to protect (nationally owned companies), Huawei would no longer exist" (Ahrens, 2013: 6).

Huawei was importing telephone switches and then changed its rotation and turned to build its products. Huawei developed a large-scale switch system, a more complicated and other

multinational company unwilling to transfer to China, which is a milestone for Huawei, distinguishing it from other firms (Williams, 2020). From 1997 to 2001, Huawei accelerated and increased its researches globally. The first international customer was Hutchison telecommunications in Hong Kong in 1996. In times its vision has altered, and Huawei in 2011 decided to produce its mobile phones and be the leader in this sector (Haveman, 2016). With its accessibility and reachability in price and high quality, Huawei offered an excellent chance to undeveloped countries. An agreement with Russia Beto Corporation to jointly produce switching equipment. Huawei signed a partnership deal with Synnex Group, which helped Huawei enter the U.S. market. Huawei first entered developed markets in Europe, Netherlands, Germany, Dutch. Huawei expanded, and new contracts have been made. These contracts, indeed, made a positive impact on the brand of Huawei (Haveman, 2016).

Even though Huawei insisted on no such government company relation, it is not seen by the U.S. Clarke (2019) argues that Huawei is a so-called private enterprise; however, the company is owned by the founder and “trade union committee” whose members are not known. To reject the claims that Huawei is state-owned, the company intentionally follows this strategy. Zhengfei being an engineer in the army and companies’ ownerships lying on the trade union committee appointed by the state shows this close tie. Huawei has a shareholding employees system, each CEO has a right to say and manage the company each term, but Zhengfei has a veto right beyond these managers. Clarke (2019) asks that knowing who owns and controls the company is essential to rely on Huawei, but it is still contested, therefore approaching Huawei as a security threat is understandable.

Another critical reason is that China’s National Intelligence Law of 2017 forces whole firms to provide necessary support assistance with intelligence work if requested. There exists persistent anxiety over the dominance of Huawei in the 5G technology; Sherman (2020) claims that there are good reasons to concern due to its entanglement with the government. Rolenc (2020) explains ZTE and Huawei, focusing on Czechoslovakian politicians’ speeches and discourse analysis; the Chinese government’s business and military espionage activities are shown as the reasons for this securitization (Rolenc, 2020).

Due to offering lower prices and high quality, Huawei spread its scope. However, the company’s strong connections with the government lead to the emergence of suspicions that Huawei would accelerate the spying activities with the entrance to their most vulnerable data. Without Huawei, Africa’s mobile technologies could not have been possible. However, the

belief that a closed relationship with the government makes Huawei understood as a national security threat (Haveman and Vochtelloo, 2016).

Extraordinary steps have a considerable impact upon the discourse and a mind of consensus in which the activities of Chinese technology companies have not been questioned and trusted (Rollet, 2020). Even though there are no concrete shreds of evidence showing that Huawei cooperates with the government, suspicions have been created with an international campaign against Huawei. Feng (2019) asserts an asymmetric war between Huawei and the U.S. government, which is that the U.S. government will be defeated because it destroys the global trade structure. Because Huawei's dispute results from great power competition, the effects and impacts will be long-term and unresolvable (Feng, 2019: 69).

Chen et al. (2019) warn that Huawei's ban decreased the U.S. attractiveness. At first sight, these banishments and exclusion of Chinese firms provide the U.S. competitive advantage; however, this might bring disastrous consequences for the international order (Chen et al., 2019). On the other hand, the U.S. has consistently reiterated the importance of respect to free competition and intellectual property since they are the main drivers of economic development. Furthermore, the U.S. does not pose substantial shreds of evidence that Huawei is a threat. The following section will explain the economic concerns of the U.S. while securitizing the company so as to understand the main arguments.

4.2.2. TO BE OR NOT TO BE: ECONOMY

As discussed before, the leading information and communication technology (ICT) industry is one of the most significant economic and technical development drivers. It not only provides communication but constitutes the backbone of the world economy. Plus, the competition is overachieving the technology and innovations in the global world. The new competitors from China joined this game, which has bothered other dominant actors of the telecommunication equipment industry (Pawlicki, 2020). The entry of Huawei tremendously restructured the market. As Napoleon once said, "When China awakens, the world trembles." The success of Huawei can be seen as a concrete example of shaking up the world. Established in 1988 in Shenzhen, Huawei made a humble beginning selling essential products before manufacturing at the peak of China's economic reforms. In time, the company has grown dramatically in the international market. Sales increased, markets expanded to the world range from the Middle East to the USA (Haveman, 2016).

Following the same strategy in the global era, first focusing on the developing areas like South East Asia, South America brought Huawei success. The firm expanded its scope in the Middle East and developed world thanks to its lower price and high-quality goods. As a result, the company is the world's second-largest supplier of digital subscriber lines. Huawei is one of the world's largest telecommunication firms with more than 188 thousand employees and famous for smartphone manufacturing in the last years. Pawlicki (2020) claims that Huawei's strategy to success has rooted the government's go abroad motto. Additionally, providing the equipment satisfying the needs of the developing markets, offering relatively low prices, and customer support in the technical issues helped Huawei move up the ladder.

Steinbock (2019) highlights that Huawei is one of the most misunderstood companies domestically and globally. While it has been suspected that being the first generation Chinese private company in China, it was seen as an agent of China by the U.S. Similarly, whereas it is a private and not a public company and seen as the beater of national champions, it is accepted as a public sector company. The technology companies which threaten economic security and damage the competitive advantage of the U.S. in the market with its state-back unfair competition are tried to be restricted by Washington (Hao, 2020).

Data science in 5G construction with the dominance of Huawei, a Chinese company, inevitably threatens the U.S. economy. Huawei is seen as a tool for I.P. theft and technology transfer to China. Trump acknowledged the threats against economic security as a national security concern and constructed this threat with its discourse as if they were against national unity and the citizens in a mood of emergency. For Mahbubani (2019), the decision to chase after Huawei is a strategic decision, but it is suspected that the U.S. has a coherent strategy like reform or destroy it is not determined.

However, many accept that Huawei is like the other Chinese companies controlled by the government and unrightfully affects the free market principles (Huawei at the crossroads: The dilemma at the heart of the next big telecoms giant, 2007). The Trump administration argues that Huawei sells its products cheaper since the government supports it (Huawei, 2020). The focused governmental industry policy made Huawei advantageous (Sharma, 2019). Accordingly, the belief is that this is not a success of Huawei but the Chinese government (Hosain, 2019).

Huawei constitutes a long-term economic security threat to the USA due to its government-backed company character (Lecher and Brandom, 2019). Similarly, Williams asserts that risk

needs to be mitigated since it threatens the economy and cybersecurity of the US (Lecher, 2019). Scissors and Bucci (2012) claim that neither Huawei nor ZTE should be reliable work partners. As shown by the House Permanent Selected Committee on Intelligence report, using hardware and software of these two companies entail a tremendous risk for American national and economic security (Scissors and Bucci, 2012).

Therefore, Huawei faced major trading blocs from the giants due to its strong national identity in its impact on the market and the absence of liberal free-market ideas. Low (2007) argues that state-directed policies continued and supported indigenous firms like Huawei despite China's concessions. "Huawei continues to receive plenty of state support, including soft loans to help with their international expansion" (Low, 2007: 140).

Champion (2020) highlights that the criminal investigations against ZTE preceded this threat discourse against ZTE due to its violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran in 2012 to benefit the economy. Even though Huawei has succeeded to be a global player in the last decade, Americans heard Huawei not with this success but with its menace to American security. The trade tariffs against China have followed with the sanctions against Chinese firms, representing the violation of the specific U.S. laws by helping terrorist states. Accordingly, the daughter of the founder and Huawei's financial officer has been detained because of the allegations that Huawei violated the U.S. laws helping Iran. This event has enormously affected the relationships between the two states (BBS News, 2018)

Nolan (2016) states that the emergence of China's state-owned enterprises, the national champions in the ranks of Fortune 500, results from a long government determination. However, although Chinese success is rising, it is still a developing company, and the state-owned companies are not capable of competing with leading global technologies. Therefore, the common belief of China is that buying the world is so prejudged, they do not constitute a considerable menace and can be negligible (Nolan, 2016). Nevertheless, is the situation similar to the Huawei case? What is the place of Huawei in the economy?

Contrary to the common belief, Wang argues, Huawei is not a state-owned enterprise but a private enterprise like Alibaba and Tencent, founded in China's economic reform process in the 1980s (Lecher and Brandom, 2019). There is no direct government support to the private enterprises, and they develop their technologies both inside and outside China with Westernist liberal economic principles. Nevertheless, Huawei is seen as a menace because the government supports subsidization, leading to unfair commercial advantages.

The Made in China 2025 Strategy aiming to make China dominant and the technology manufacturing leader has been enough to accept China as an adversary. As Graham (2019) reiterated, the perception of China is not so positive: communist dictatorship; naturally, it has an impact on the steps. The other reason Huawei is seen as a threat is its close ally with Russia, the main rival of NATO, BRI project, and Chinese ambitions to be a dominant power as a monopoly is considered poorly intended. Too much relying on a single country would cost too much (Paphiti, 2019)

The impact of Huawei enormously increased all over the world. Especially with its lower price and full advantages to the developing world, Huawei became an indispensable partner for many states. Although Five Eyes Alliances exclude Huawei from their network, most states will use Huawei's 5G technology. This situation constantly made the U.S. uneasy. However, the U.S. does not pose an alternative as good as Huawei to this state. For this reason, anti-Chinese discourse and spying conspiracy theories will not work according to him. The world is not becoming China-centric anymore (Mahbubani, 2019).

In time, Huawei's practices damaging economic security have involved the discourse that Huawei aims at destroying data privacy and information security. Trump's administration has dramatized and exaggerated the relationship between the company and the government. Furthermore, the U.S. followed conspiracy theories like opening the backdoors to the government for espionage and data thefts showing no evidence. Trump securitized Huawei making the audiences aware of the strength of the menace, and the company was put on the "Entity List," which is an extraordinary measurement (Hao, 2020).

Alfayad argues that the R&D strategy of Huawei brought success, and it can provide all necessary elements in the 5G network, this leading position led to the attention of the U.S. government (Alfayad, 2019). Although it is still infancy age. 5G network will bring faster data movement in the wireless platforms with higher capacity for the devices. It will bring previous and future so has considerable importance. It will be efficient, fast, and reliable. The following section will focus on the 5G vulnerabilities and the securitization of Huawei to figure out the most crucial factor triggering this process.

4.2.3 HUAWEI AS AN INFRASTRUCTURAL THREAT

4.2.3.1 5G Technology and Securitization

It is a well-known fact that the largest operator for the 5G technology is Huawei. In the last years, surprisingly, we have witnessed the exclusion of the company from this network. The number of companies that ban or exclude Huawei from their 5G Networks has gradually increased. Trump said, “The race to 5G is a race America must-win” and issued an executive order banning Huawei, which affects the U.S. and other countries. Indeed, the anxiety derives from the belief that Huawei cannot reject the government’s request. It will be unable to be independent. Huawei would also support espionage activities and thefts of intellectual property in their eyes.

It is expected that 5G technology will be beneficial to most of the sectors ranging from health to industry and from education to traffic; by providing speed. The world will be connected, and it will pave the way for global wireless connection. 5G will alter communication and affect machines, vehicles, and buildings by software and electronics. Patent ownership will inevitably influence determining which states lead the technology economy market (Pohllman, 2019). America’s approach towards Huawei should not be seen from a security perspective (Inceefe et al., 2019). There exist other reasons, Huawei is in the leading position at the 5G technology, providing polar coding rather than low-density parity-check coding or turbo coding as the western partners used.

When compared, the technology of Huawei in coding contributes to its dominance and development. As Ren said, no company will be able to catch Huawei in the 2- 3 year period. As discussed in previous chapters, standard-setting constitutes a significant part of this race. The joining of China to this race with its standards naturally made the other actors uneasy (Inceefe et al., 2019). According to the ranking in the patents of 5G technology compiled by IPlytics as of February 2021, Qualcomm is an American company competing with Huawei. Huawei takes first place (15.4%). Figure 4.2 shows the companies with the highest shares of global 5G technology patents as of February 2021. American company Qualcomm is behind Huawei (Buchholz, 2021). For Inceefe, the rage of the Trump administration stems from the belief that they have already lost the 5G war against China, Huawei. It wants to maintain American supremacy in the 5G sector; therefore never gave up protecting Qualcomm even if the extraordinary actions damage the positive image of the USA.




Figure 4.2 Companies with the highest shares of global 5G technology patents as of February 2021 Source: IPlytics

Thu (2019) argues that the question of digital iron curtain is coming or not has started to be discussed. The war will emerge between the team of China and America in the technology. The choice of the 5G provider is an essential issue in the atmosphere of politicizing the technology. Cerulus (2018) demonstrates that the U.S. positioned Huawei as an existential threat due to its mistrust destructive structure.

In 2018, Huawei passed Apple and became the largest producer of smartphones, its ambitions are higher than other companies, and it wants to be the leader and dominate the market in 5G technology. 5G technology is the last generation of wireless mobile technology to provide more immense data speeds and connect more quickly, making the system more interconnected and vulnerable. Huawei achieves most of the patents in 5G standards and devices. A potential threat in the network might damage the whole network, so the 5G technology in the dominance of Huawei is seen as a threat (Kaska et al., 2019).

Solid accountability and transparency minimizing the risks are essential to use this 5G technology while preventing threats against national security. The malicious and unwell intended actor can exploit 5G technology, and no one can prevent the vulnerabilities and damages. 5G should be considered a security matter for the network since it might lead to long-term and irreplaceable damage. A former French government official Corre says Huawei is dangerous because you give a company power over your data; you are not giving your shoes (Cerulus, 2018).

Archibald et al. (2020) focus on the Canada case and securitization of Huawei, specializing in software and hardware technologies. Huawei's proposal to build the 5G network in Canada and

other Western countries alarmed the U.S. because it means direct access to the critical infrastructure and threatens their security. Canada is a part of the intelligence alliance, The Five Eyes (The US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the UK), which provides each state sharing classified information. However, the actions and speeches of the U.S. government towards Huawei banning company from the U.S., alleging its links with the Chinese government and military, some conspiracy-like stealing trade secrets, obstructing justice, threaten the future of this alliance. The U.S. even warned that their access to American classified information would not be possible and permitted unless they break the tie with Huawei (Archibald et al., 2020).

There are many conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 tying the spread of the virus with 5G technology. The transition to 5G is essential to keep the pace of the digital age and artificial intelligence. However, as known, Huawei is labeled as an arm of the Chinese Communist Party, explained with the 2017 National Intelligence Law. Most of the scholars agree that securitization does not stem from concrete technical reasons. Several factors are affecting the process.

Kaska and Beckvard (2019) assert that Huawei must be assessed from a general perspective since its actions can not be separated in the civilian and military fields. Also, the public-private partnership and espionage activities make Huawei a primary concern for the security and defense domain. They argue that Chinese companies are subsidized by the government and work together with intelligence services. Moreover, they are legally compelled to work with the government. The Chinese National Intelligence Law 2016 and 2014 Counterintelligence Law, which entail cooperation, support the intelligence, are seen as the main reasons for the threat. Thus, this strong collaboration makes Huawei and other technology companies a threat to national security. The fear is that adopting the 5G technology from Huawei is too risky, and no one can guarantee privacy and cybersecurity in peacetime and crisis times.

The attempt of Huawei to create a massive network in 5G has become a contentious issue and faced tremendous direct diplomatic pressure of the U.S. Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, and Japan followed the way of the U.S. The U.S. has convinced allies to reject the 5G system promoted by Huawei since it is seen as a considerable threat to cybersecurity and intelligence. Also, even everyday devices will be connected to the internet network, from driverless cars to traffic signals, making the system vulnerable (Paphiti, 2019).

The inclusion of Huawei in the networks of Canada means it might threaten the Five Eyes network. There are concerns about opening a backdoor to the Chinese government, hardware vulnerabilities of Huawei (Sparling, 2020). Western democracies' practices towards Chinese technology, Huawei, differ according to their different security understandings, digital dependency level, and capabilities to deal with the threat (Kaskaet al., 2019). Binding legislative and administrative regulations, abstention from restrictions, and guidance are several methods against Huawei.

In contrast, specifically in Southeast Asia, Huawei has a long history and constitutes an integral part of the technology industry in this region with its financial assistance. Indeed, Huawei has an advantage because of not only its availability but also accessibility with lower prices. Thu (2019) claims that the political alignments and the fears of security would not prevent the decision of these states. They give much more importance to the practical needs in their economies. The lack of posing an alternative makes these states not follow the way of the U.S.

4.2.3.2 Intellectual Property Theft allegations

It should be noted that China is a tremendous cyber power, and it uses cyber operations in the military and strategy for years; China is also blamed for several hacks on the government in the U.S. Intellectual property thefts cause losses of 3000 dollars annually (Paphiti, 2019). Miller (2019) argues that the U.S. considers 5G, in which China dominates the market, a national security threat that must be defeated.

For Shoebridge (2018), relying on Huawei in the design, hardware, software, and updates brings risks and vulnerabilities. This Chinese company and technology company reminds cyber espionage and secret attacks of data to many states. Beyond the close ties with the government, Huawei is a threat to the U.S. because China is famous for thefts of intellectual property, stealing trade secrets, and commercial- in- confidence materials of multinational companies. Shoubridge (2018) argues that the African Union case in which the data was transferred to Shanghai in the middle of the night every day and found some microphones on the desks and walls can be accepted as solid evidence. Huawei has been seen as responsible for these actions (BBC News, 2019).

Inkster (2019) maintains that China sees technological development in key areas like artificial intelligence as a tool for economic development and domination in the world market. Accordingly, Huawei and ZTE play a hugely important role in implementing Chinese strategy to fulfill their ambitious dreams. Similarly, the BRI project and also these companies are

consistent with each other, helping to control the scope of the government. Given R&D, Huawei is the world's largest producer of telecommunication equipment and the second-largest smartphone industry. However, the U.S. sees Huawei's success coming from its stealing American technology companies. In the eyes of Americans, Huawei hardware equipment may contribute the espionage and sabotage actions. Therefore, for the U.S., Huawei must be excluded from the involvement in the key areas (Inkster, 2019).

This section explained why Huawei had been securitized by the U.S. government, considering identity, economic, and technical factors. The U.S. government securitizes Huawei since it is a successful Chinese company; the reasons can not be exclusively differentiated. The company is seen as an apparatus of the Chinese administration to spread authoritarianism. Dealing with Huawei equals handling the Chinese communist party in the eyes of the government officials. It can be said that what bothers the U.S. is Huawei's being a Chinese firm; I do not think that any other country would have the same impact. In the following sections, I will elaborate on this issue, considering the discourse of the Trump administration.

The Trump administration sought to protect its interests in the technology industry-main driver of economic development when it comes to the economy. Vulnerabilities coming with 5G, which Huawei dominates, is another most essential factor of the securitization. In conclusion, Huawei was securitized by the Trump administration, and some extraordinary measurements have been taken. Persuading the alliances to reject Huawei technology and banishments against Huawei can be seen as proof. To this end, the following section will explain the Critical Discourse Analysis method that I used to demonstrate the securitization of Huawei in the discourse.

4.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.3.1 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

In this section, the main arguments of the thesis have been analyzed by using the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method. CDA investigates the legitimization of discrimination, exclusion, and creating unequal power relations, focusing on language. Through discourse, identities are labeled, inequalities regarding gender, culture, and race have been recreated. Therefore, Wodak (2014) seeks to demonstrate the actual meanings and real intentions behind the discourse. This study argues that Huawei has been the one that is excluded by the dominant discourse. The discourse of the Trump administration as the dominant one affected the international arena. As a result, a threat discourse is constructed, and many states decided to exclude Huawei. CDA is not a single-minded approach but encompasses several different perspectives, so the thesis uses Vienna School's Discourse Historical Approach since it allows to look from a perspective beyond the discourse.

Ruth Wodak's analysis model will be used to understand how Huawei has been securitized by the Trump administration, considering the Congressional Hearings from 2017 to 2020. These resources are openly accessed on the website of the American government (See <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/chrg/117/house/Committee%20on%20Financial%20Services>). The reason why this thesis takes DHA is twofold. The first is that DHA has developed an analytical toolkit through its multiple theoretical, multidimensional approach to trace inclusion and exclusion using interdiscursivity and intertextuality in text analysis. DHA bridges so many approaches that help us analyze discourse considering historical and social factors. Thus, it will help us analyze the hearings from a grand perspective. The second reason is that it helps to understand how the identities of "us" and "other" are shaped by orators sharply, overtly/covertly (Duzgit, 2018). Therefore, it will help to understand how the dominant discourse of the Trump government has excluded Huawei due to several concerns, which are discursively constructed and shown as a threat to security, to which extraordinary steps have been taken.

The common belief is that discourse analysis is mainly related to the methods of linguistics. Nevertheless, it has been realized that discourses are more than language in recent times. As an important example, Critical Discourse Analysis is a theory and a method to research the ties of cultural/social factors and discourse in a range of social domains. The approach considers the discourse a form of social practice that helps the constitution of particular identities and specific relations. Titacher (2000) claims that its roots go back to Bakhtin's game theory, Gramsci,

Frankfurt School, and Althusser's theory of ideology. Critical Discourse analysis is rooted in rhetoric, text linguistics, philosophy, cognitive science, Socio- Psychology, and multi-theoretical.

Following the 1960s, the discipline has involved in the humanities, social sciences. CDA is problem-oriented and studies in an interdisciplinary method since studies social phonemes do not investigate just the linguistic unit. CDA emerged in the early 1990s. Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak are the foremost pioneers in creating this analysis. The CDA network was launched with Van Dijk's *Discourse and Society* (1990) journal. Now, CDA became an established academic discipline (Billig, 2003). CDA has never attempted to be a single method and a single theory. Instead, it uses many different theoretical backgrounds, data, and methodologies.

As Anthonissen (2001) said, the 1970s witnessed the emergence of discourse analysis giving importance to the role of language in the structuration of power relations. Using the language in institutional settings and historical perspective's involvement in the discourse has been possible in 1989. Wodak (2014) argues that different scholarly backgrounds share similar perspectives in power, ideology, and history plays a central role in the discourse. While she relies on Hallidayan linguistics, Foucault, Habermas, and Bakhtin's analyses; argue that the relationship between language and society is complicated to understand and entails an interdisciplinary approach (Wodak, 2014). Also, the roots of CDA lie in Text linguistics, rhetorics, philosophy, anthropology, and literary studies. During the interpretation of the texts, ideology, power, hierarchy are all acknowledged as relevant. Indeed, CDA has a particular interest in the relationship between language and power (Weiss and Wodak, 2014).

The CDA network emerged in 1991, following a symposium in Amsterdam with prominent scholars like Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, and Ruth Wodak (Wodak and Meyer, 2007: 4). CDA is a school consisting of lots of principles interdisciplinary and eclectic. When discussing CDA, it is necessary to know what critical is and what discourse's actual meaning is. Firstly, Reisigl and Wodak (2014) argue that the dimension of critique is understood differently as if the approach adheres to Frankfurt School or Marx's notions. Wodak asserts that critical refers to positioning the data taking a political stance explicitly not as objective but as criticizing and reflecting while doing research. Hence, Critical theory's main objective is to assist in the remembrance of the past (can be forgotten) for the sake of emancipation. Critical points out that the research must produce the knowledge that can help emancipation people from domination (Wodak and Meyer, 2014).

Similarly, CDA aimed at the enlightenment and emancipation of disadvantaged groups. These approaches seek to describe and explain and root out the delusion (Wodak, 2014). Dijk (2001) highlights that CDA is biased and never denies its character, instead be proud of it. CDA emphasize social problems, the role of discourse on the production of unequal relationship in favor of domination and power abuse (Dijk, 2001). CDA is not a single method but an approach comprising different levels. Wodak and Meyer highlight that CDA has never attempted to be a single specific theory with one specific methodology. Instead, it is multifarious with different theoretical backgrounds and methodologies (Wodak and Meyer, 2014: 5).

Asking different questions, CDA is like an advocacy of the groups suffering from discrimination. CDA is seeking to provide a perspective to emancipation of humans from domination. The primary purpose is enlightenment and emancipation as being critical. CDA aims at demonstrating opaque and transparent structural ties of dominance and discrimination in language. Using language, CDA is seeking to investigate social inequality legitimized, constituted. I argue that the US as a hegemon decides to the definition and labeling the other actors. The thesis aims to demonstrate how Huawei has suffered from the dominant discourse. As discussed, Huawei is dramatically excluded from the market and discriminated against by the Trump administration from a CDA perspective.

It should be noted that language is not decisive but gains power by using influential people. Power does not stem from the language, but language can alter, challenge and subvert the power (Weiss and Wodak, 2007). As for the view of discourse, it should be noted that CDA sees discourse as social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). The context of language use is also another significant issue for understanding the main arguments. Language in both forms, oral and written, is a form of social practice. Discursive event is shaped by social institutions, structures, situations but also shapes them. Therefore it is accepted that discourse is socially constitutive and conditioned (Weiss and Wodak, 2007). As mentioned, CDA gives great importance to the notion of context involving social, psychological, political, and ideological pieces of evidence (Meyer, 2001). Therefore, CDA accepts that the context of language is more important because it sees language as social practice.

Furthermore, discourse can impact the mass cause the dominant ones use it to inject the dominant ideology. Discourse is not a direct demonstration of reality but a power to recreate reality with a specific aspect (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). CDA sees semiosis as a fundamental part of the social process consisting of visual images and body language. CDA is an analysis of dialectical relationships of semiosis and other parts of the social practices.

Accordingly, every practice comprises of social relations, identities, cultural values, productive activity, semiosis. All practices are the practices of production (Fairclough, 2001).

To put it simply, CDA is a constitutive problem-oriented, multimethodological, and multidisciplinary approach. This approach is interested in social problems. The main aim is to show the domination in the relations. Furthermore, the approach sees the discourse as a continuation of history and ideology. For this reason, CDA is seeking to create a descriptive and explanatory frame for the relationship between discourse and society (Dijk, 2001). For the analysis of CDA, the discourse consists of overt and covert domination, hegemonic, discriminatory features. Thus, the main objective is to help the subordinated ones' emancipation. Fairclough and Wodak (2014) argue that the features of CDA are focusing on social problems considering discourse as a field showing power relations. The discourse constitutes society and culture, and representations, relations, and identities are determined by discourse. Discourse is historical; Wodak primarily focuses on the be hurt ones, who have critical power, be responsible actors of discrimination and exclusion. Since there exist many methodological perspectives, this thesis will specifically use Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach.

4.3.1 Discourse Historical Approach

As mentioned before, Critical Discourse Analysis consists of many different approaches to theorization, and so, this study will use Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). Therefore, it is necessary to mention how it works and how the methodology helps to analyze which dimensions in which aspects in order to apply Discourse Historical Approach. In this section, the aims of DHA, the importance of discourse, and the apparatus of DHA will be discussed.

DHA has been influenced by several disciplines and theoreticians, the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory, Hallidayan systemic linguistics, argumentation theory. In DHA, history is the interest of the analysts who used this approach. That does not mean that the approach only focuses on historical events; the method analyzes the current discourses associated with history; there is a specific strong relation, history plays a significant role in continuing these discourses. Referencing the intellectual tradition of the Frankfurt School from Adorno to Habermas, Bernhard (2011) shows the importance of the emancipatory and transformative aims of DHA. Adhered to Frankfurt School, DHA differs from other approaches of CDA.

The first time the approach was developed in 1986 by Wodak to analyze Kurt Waldheim's (Austrian presidential campaign) discourse against Jews (anti-semitic discourse) how these discourses were stereotyped and used publicly. In the campaign, Waldheim used much discriminatory, antisemitic discourse Wodak used newspapers, presses. The approach has been applied in more recent studies like immigrants in Romania, a discourse of national identity in Austria. Besides discursive practices, material and semiotic practices have been focused.

The main characteristics of the DHA can be summarized: it is interdisciplinary (theoretical, methodological, research practice), problem-oriented, it is eclectic, uses different theories and methods to figure out a particular problem, fieldwork and ethnography are acceptable, combines abductive reasoning, and if possible deduction, various genres and public spaces besides of intertextual an interdiscursive ties are studied, historical facts context are considered (Wodak, 2014). DHA has been primarily used to show the racist discrimination and division of national identities considering us and others from political speeches and various genres. Therefore, the essential feature of DHA is its interdisciplinarity in several levels, theory, teams, practice, being problem-oriented, not just focusing on linguistic discourse items (Wodak, 2020).

DHA approach centers on political issues and tries to explain specific issues besides the historical facts. Beyond the linguistic analysis, the historical perspective provides a better understanding of the issue. The content of the data, discursive strategies, and linguistic realization of the contents and strategies are primary features of the DHA. The historical dimension integrates all information and investigates the types of genres and discourses that are changed (Van and Wodak, 1999). Both written and spoken discourse is a kind of social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997).

Wodak seeks a multidisciplinary approach to prevail the complicated relations (Cakmak and Bilisli, 2019). It is argued that DHA adheres to the Critical Theory in terms of socio-philosophy; as such, it follows three essential concepts of social critique: text/ discourse immanent critique, socio- diagnostic critique, and a future related prospective critique. Accordingly, the DHA's three-dimensional conceptualization of critique: 1-Immanent critique problematizes the disputes in the text, discourse to be objective; 2- Socio- diagnostic critique: seeks to reveal the propagandists, populist practices standing in the normative position; 3- prognostic- retrospective critique: aims at transforming the currently existing one by guiding principles like the rejection of suffering and human right (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

As Fairclough (1992) said, discursive practices are specific social practices relevant to the other social ones. DHA has socio-philosophical roots based on three kinds of critique: are immanent critique (dealing with the internal structure of the discourse argumentation and structure of the discourse (cohesion, order, coherence, paradoxes). Second, socio-diagnostic critique demystifies the latent/ hidden, possibly persuasive, and manipulative features of discourse. Thanks to this critique, the analyzer exceeds the texts with political, social relations, and processes background. Also, this critique aims at exposing the actual problem in the discourse, like ethical problems in the discursive practices and the disparity, differences between discourse and social practices. Moreover, prospective critique/ prognostic contributes to improved communication with its guidelines against discriminative discourses. In short, the analysis gives proposals and guidelines to the institutions, policymakers- gives some solutions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005).

Discourse is a cluster of semiotic practices in a specific context socially constituted and has a strong tie with the macro topic, and the argumentations are related with the validity claims (Reisigl and Wodak, 2016). In other words, discourse is “ a complex bundle of simultaneous interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as “texts” that belong to semiotic types, i.e., genres” (Wodak, 2001b: 66). Thus, texts are the parts of discourse. DHA sees written and spoken language as a social practice. Therefore, discourse presents a domain of social practice. Wodak (2020) argues a dialectical relationship between certain discursive practices and the fields of action (institutional frames, situations). While situation, institution, social-political processes affect the discourse, discourse also influences them discursively and nondiscursively. Discourse can be seen as linguistic acts, texts, genres. Discourse is a macro topic (Wodak, 2020).

DHA gathers historical sources, the background of social and political fields embedded in the discourses, and poses a branch of knowledge (Wodak, 2020). Four levels of analysis provide a great perspective to DHA: immediate language context; intertextual and interdiscursive ties of texts, genres, and discourse; extralinguistic level (the variables and institutional frames affecting the context of situation); social and historical context hidden in the discourse. When it comes to the division of three essential concepts: discourse, text, and genres, Wodak and Reisigl argue that discourse is a kind of mass of semiotic practices placed in the social action fields, related to the macro topic, socially constructed and constitutive (Wodak, 2001b).

Texts are the part of the discourse that can be both oral and written. Therefore, another distinctive character of DHA is that focusing on intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Intertextuality means that texts have strong ties with each other, previous ones or the following ones, for example, by explicit reference to a topic or an actor, same events, arguments from text to text. Therefore, previous related documents that intertextuality is about or referred to should be taken into consideration.

As for recontextualization, an event can have a new meaning by using it in a formed structure. The differences of the contexts. For instance, a journalist can select citations fitting the article; quotations in this situation are framed and recontextualized with new meanings. Interdiscursivity signifies that discourses are linked to each other, open and hybrid. New topics can extend the meaning of the discourses, points. For example, news about some African's death in New York Times, Guardian, and Tanzanian daily news is utterly different in the analysis of Wodak, from the selection of words to using passive-active sentences.

The context in DHA can be macro, mezzo, and micro-levels. The core text is cohesion; intertextual and interdiscursive (what are the commonalities with other discourse); social factors and institutional frames of the contexts (identities, national religion, linking to the factors to explain the discourse), on the macro level, we gather socio-political and historical factors affecting the discourse. Discourses rely on four primary discursive strategies: constructive strategies (aims at constructing the identity), preservative/ justificatory strategy (aiming at the preserve, justify, reproduce of narratives of identity), transformative strategy (may change national identities), destructive strategy (dismantling the national identity).

Given the definition of discourse as social practice, Wodak distinguishes four types of macro-strategies: constructive, perpetuation- justification, transformation, and destructive. First, constructive strategies provide a better analysis of linguistic acts to build "we" and "they". Second, similarly, perpetuation- justification strategy reveals the discourse aiming at maintaining, supporting specific identities. Thirdly, transformation strategies are used to justify implementing, reformulating rules laws to maintain the status quo. Lastly, destructive strategies serve to demolish the status quo have an enormous effect on the transformation (Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 93). While analyzing the specific discourse, the strategies deserve special attention since they provide orienting particular questions and guidance

3 Dimensions of DHA:

DHA has three dimensions: 1-identification of the specific topics, 2-discursive strategies, and 3- linguistic means. Thus, the analytical apparatus of DHA comprises three main steps: a- outlining main contents, themes namely discourse topics; b- the exploration of discursive strategies; c- linguistic means to realize the discursive strategies. Wodak (2001b) orientated the research with five main questions while approaching these strategies. Firstly, how are people, objects, events, and processes referred to, named, described linguistically? Secondly, what kind of characteristics are thought to belong to them, the qualities attributed to them? Thirdly, how are the arguments used to justify and legitimize their exclusionary, discriminatory actions? The perspectives that labelations, attributions expressed are these arguments articulated overtly, can be overt/covert racism. By asking the same questions for Huawei, I would like to contribute to the emancipation of Huawei from the dominant discourse thanks to the critical approach of DHA.

Fourthly, how are the perspectives explaining the labels and arguments? Using topoi of argumentation theory as an effective tool, the analyzer can provide a better understanding. Topoi are defined as “ parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises in the shape of content-related warrants that connect the arguments with the conclusion” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 74). Wodak claims that discrimination and exclusion can be expressed regarding topos (usefulness, advantage, definition, danger, threat, humanitarianism, burdening, finance, culture, law, and right topoi) from the argument to the conclusion. They can be considered as the reasons for taking action (Wodak, 2017). Lastly, are the respective utterances overtly articulated, intensified? Given these questions, the author focuses on five discursive strategies shown in the table to indicate positive self and negative other thoughts. Remarkably, the discursive construction of they and we is focused.

Given these questions, these strategies are essential to show positive self-presentation and negative other presentations. Five discursive strategies have been followed to achieve the aims of the approach. There are five discursive strategies in constructing a positive “Self” and opposing “Other”. These are “referential/nomination”, “predication”, “argumentation”, “perspectivization”, “intensification or mitigation”. Following table 4.1 summarizes five discursive strategies. The first is referential/ nomination strategies that focus on understanding the membership categorization using metaphors and are concerned with constructions of in-groups and outgroups using like membership categorization with metaphors, verbs/nouns. The second one is predicational strategies that consider the labels given to the actors: negative,

positive traits with hidden or explicit predicates attribute negative/ positive features to the actors. Using these strategies, I seek to show how Huawei is labeled and the discursively constructed security threat.

DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES

STRATEGY	PURPOSE	DEVICES
<p><i>NOMINATION</i></p> <p><i>How are persons, objects, events, actions named and referred to linguistically?</i></p>	<p>Discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena / events, and processes/actions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc • tropes such as metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum pro parte) • verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions
<p><i>PREDICATION</i></p> <p><i>What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, events and processes?</i></p>	<p>Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena/ events/processes, and actions (more or less positively or negatively)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits • (e.g., in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses, and participial clauses or groups) • explicit predicates or predicative nouns/ adjectives/pronouns <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • collocations • explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors, and other rhetorical figures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) allusions, evocations, and presuppositions/ implicatures other

<p><i>ARGUMENTATION</i></p>	<p>Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • topoi (formal or more content-related) • fallacies
<p><i>What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?</i></p>		
<p><i>PERSPECTIVIZATION</i></p>	<p>Positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • deictics • direct, indirect or free indirect speech quotation marks • discourse markers/particles • metaphors animating prosody other
<p><i>From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and arguments expressed?</i></p>		
<p><i>INTENSIFICATION/ MITIGATION</i></p>	<p>Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • diminutives or augmentatives • (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctive, • hesitations, vagues • expressions, etc. hyperboles, litotes • indirect speech acts (e.g., question instead of assertion) verbs of saying, feeling, thinking other
<p><i>Are the respective utterances articulated overtly? Are they intensified or are they mitigated?</i></p>		

Table 4.1 Discursive Strategies(The content of the table is directly taken from the book of Martin Resigl and Routh Wodak, “The Discourse- Historical Approach”, 2016: 33)

Another one is argumentation strategies, which help justify legitimization of positive and negative attributions (Wodak and Boukala, 2015). They emphasize the justification and questioning of claims considering topoi; the analysts see how negative/ positive attributions, discrimination, and exclusion of the groups are legitimized. Perspectivisation strategy shows the speaker's level of involvement; analysts focus on how speakers position themselves in the discourse. Lastly, intensifying strategies- mitigation strategies aim at modifying the illocutionary force, so helps to analyze the ethnicist, nationalist mitigation. Strategies provide a more or less accurate and intentional plan of practices (Wodak, 2001b).

Wodak argues that understanding the concept of topos is significant in the analysis of arguments which full of prejudgements and discriminations. Following the Aristotelian tradition, the author argues that topos is a rhetorical and dialectical scheme providing the systematic analysis of arguments and statements of the leaders, orator, opponents while convincing their audience. Topos helps to justify the transition process of the arguments to the conclusion. Also, they contribute to analyzing the arguments since they demonstrate the significant parameters in constructing identities in the discourse involving inclusion and exclusion strategies. A metaphor is a metaphor linguistically and might represent the inclusion or exclusion of the specific groups (Wodak and Boukala, 2015).

The analysis of content-related arguments can be carried out considering topoi which are various and necessary to explain. The topoi can be listed as usefulness- advantage, uselessness- disadvantage, definition-name interpretation, danger- threat, humanitarianism, responsibility, burdening/ weighting, finances, history, culture, and abuse. Topos of advantage- usefulness refers to the necessity of acting as a specific relevant point for maintaining domination. Similarly, topos of usefulness- disadvantage serve the same aims; being conditional, it says that the decision must be rejected unless the political actions do not serve the declared aim. If existing rules are not helpful to the declared aims, they must be changed (Wodak, 2019: 12).

Topos of definition is concerned with the name- interpretation, as known when a group/ person or a thing is labeled, anything comes with this labels such as qualities, traits, attributes. As for the topos of danger which is quite commonly used, it supports that under the circumstances of a specific danger, threatening consequences, one should immediately perform against it to prevent any harm. Finally, the conditional formula of topos of responsibility is finding solutions since a state and the group are responsible for problems.

Topos of burden and topos of finance are mainly used in the analysis of the securitization of Huawei. Therefore it is necessary to provide a clear explanation about them. Topos of burdening necessitate the diminishing burdens of the specific group-person-institution. Similarly, topos of finances can be characterized by the conclusion rule: if a specific situation cases too much money loses, one should take action to prevent this loss and decrease the costs. Topos of finances emphasize the negative socio-economical consequences (Wodak, 2019: 13). Topos of numbers follow that acting is required when the numbers prove a specific topos. Topos of history necessitates taking action since history teaches specific actions that paved the way for particular consequences. The topos of culture is another critical perspective since its argumentation is that a culture of the specific group causes specific situations. Last but not least,

topos of abuse reiterates that if a right/ help is abused, it should be withdrawn, and some precautions should be taken (Wodak, 2019:13).

A thorough discourse historical analysis necessitates implementing these steps recursively. 1- literature review, consultation of theoretical knowledge, 2- the systematic collection of data and resources from various discourses, genres, and texts, 3- selection and preparation of data for the analysis with downsizing, 4- determining research questions and assumptions' formulation considering literature review, 5- qualitative pilot analysis, 6- detailed case studies, 7- formulation of critiques on the following on interpretation and explaining the results, 8- practical application of results (Wodak and Meyer, 2016). These steps should be taken several times, coming and going between texts and genres to analyze better.

In conclusion, Discourse Historical Analysis provides an excellent perspective to reveal hidden/clear ideas of the dominant ideology looking at discourse and social phenomena. After determining content frames in the securitization of Huawei as regards China's neo-techno nationalism, discursive strategies will be applied. Finally, given topos, the Trump government's arguments will be analyzed on taking extraordinary actions against Huawei. The five questions will contribute to the determination of our analysis. First, how are Huawei and China's technology policy are named and referred to linguistically? What traits and qualities are attributed to them? What arguments are employed by the Trump administration from which perspective? Those all will help to show the main arguments of the thesis through an analytical perspective.

4.3.2 APPLICATION

The discussions about Huawei and China's neo-techno nationalism have been shown in the previous chapters. In this chapter, how Huawei has been a security issue will be analyzed. To this end, this study has chosen Congressional Hearings as primary resources while demonstrating the securitization of Huawei by the Trump government. A hearing is usually a public meeting or a session comprising of a Senate, House, joint or special committee of Congress to achieve information about specific topics or legislation in order to conduct an investigation or evaluate the activities of government departments. Hearings are defined as "the principal venue and formal instrument for members of Congress to gather the information needed to act as informed policymakers" (Xinsheng et al., 2015: 490). These resources contribute to figuring out the government's current interests, threat perceptions, and foreign policy directions.

Regarding the main objectives of this thesis, hearings about China, worldwide threats, economic challenges, and cyber threats topics have been chosen and deeply analyzed. The first reason for this decision is that the hearings are held annually coming in a written format. They provide a comprehensive general perspective about the perception of threats and interests of the US government. The second reason is that they are the most formal version of the US government's securitization practices. Also, China is explained in different fields and specific sections intensely, so focusing on them will help highlight the US government's main arguments against Huawei. Indeed, these executive branch assessments will provide an understanding of the narratives in Self and Other discourse.

Given the resources, it is necessary to point out that Huawei is acknowledged as a threat stemming from its Chinese character and closed ties with the Chinese government. The impact of economic and technical factors can not be denied. However, when we look at the hearings, it is evident that Huawei is seen as an agent of Chinese authoritarianism. The explanations and argumentations of the officials mainly refer to its identity. Huawei is a massive risk since its government's direction differs from the US. Using the Critical Discourse Analysis approach, I want to show how the Trump government puts this private company as a security matter and legitimizes its extraordinary actions.

In essence, Huawei is the threatening, radical Other for the Trump government. The US in the discourse has been shown as being under threat; the self needs to be secured. Nevertheless, Huawei is a threat because it is a successful rival and brings technical vulnerability. Besides,

the American officials reiterate all reasons with the Chinese government, its state-driven economy model, ambitious plans surpassing the US. Before applying discourse historical analysis to the congressional hearings, it is necessary to know the Trump government’s recent developments and extraordinary measurements against Huawei. The following table 4.2 is showing the chronological order of the securitization of Huawei by legal steps.

2017 December	National Security Strategy Report	Proposing sanctions and relevant precautions against China
2018 July	Department of Commerce Report	The necessity to control China’s technological achievements and high-tech plans
2018 August	The signing of the Defense Authorization Act	Huawei and ZTE will be banned from use by the US government/ government contractors
2019 January	US Department of Justice(DOJ) allegations	Huawei was charged with bank fraud and stealing trade secrets, money laundering, flouting sanctions on Iran
2019 May	Issuing Executive Order 13873	Declaring a national emergency due to the foreign adversaries harnessing vulnerabilities of American technology services Given the right of blocking national companies from security risks equipment, especially from Chinese companies
2019 May	Adding Huawei to a trade blacklist - Entity Control List	Restrictive measurements to prevent Huawei do business with US companies
2019 November	The Federal Communication Commission’s restrictions	Prohibition of telecommunication carries from using Universal Service Fund, which already uses Huawei equipment in their networks
2020 July	Visa Restrictions	The employees of Huawei has been restricted to enter the US
2020 March	The signing of a legislation	Prevention of telecom carries from using US subsidies to buy network equipment from Huawei- national security threat
2020 August	Clean Network Program	Exclusion of Chinese companies- Huawei from 5G Network

Table 4.2 Chronological look to securitization steps- Author’s own compilation

As mentioned earlier, if we focus on hearings, the main themes can be divided into three main subjects: Huawei as an identity threat, Huawei as an economic threat, and Huawei as a technical threat. However, all of these themes gather on the idea that the Chinese identity of Huawei and

the US government China perception consisting of predatory industry ambitions aiming to surpass the US. The thesis does not argue that identity is the most important one. All of these factors play an essential role in the securitization process. However, the identity differences of this rival make a significant impact on the discursive construction of Huawei as an Other. Table 4.3 summarizes the methodology that the study followed to illustrate the securitization of Huawei by the Trump administration.

STRATEGY	PURPOSE
<p data-bbox="411 663 628 696" style="text-align: center;"><i>NOMINATION</i></p> <p data-bbox="261 792 780 864" style="text-align: center;"><i>How are Huawei and China named and referred to linguistically?</i></p>	<p data-bbox="874 607 1294 696" style="text-align: center;">The discursive construction of Huawei</p> <p data-bbox="935 719 1291 752">Institutional apparatus, tool</p> <p data-bbox="1027 775 1198 808">Trojan Horse</p> <p data-bbox="895 831 1331 864">Agent of the Chinese government</p> <p data-bbox="852 887 1374 920">Veiled as a telecommunication company</p> <p data-bbox="967 943 1259 976">Strong links with CCP</p> <p data-bbox="1083 987 1142 1021">Spy</p>
<p data-bbox="411 1167 628 1200" style="text-align: center;"><i>PREDICATION</i></p> <p data-bbox="217 1458 823 1570" style="text-align: center;"><i>What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to Huawei and Chinese technology policy?</i></p>	<p data-bbox="852 1055 1350 1133" style="text-align: center;">Discursive qualification of Huawei (positively or negatively)</p> <p data-bbox="1046 1144 1179 1178">Untrusted</p> <p data-bbox="1007 1200 1219 1234">Not good player</p> <p data-bbox="971 1256 1254 1290">High-tech illiberalism</p> <p data-bbox="979 1312 1246 1346">Threat to democracy</p> <p data-bbox="1027 1368 1198 1402">Authoritarian</p> <p data-bbox="879 1424 1347 1503">An instrument of Predatory Chinese Economy Policy</p> <p data-bbox="956 1525 1270 1559">Innovation mercantilism</p> <p data-bbox="975 1581 1251 1615">Enjoying free market</p> <p data-bbox="1003 1637 1222 1671">Protective policy</p> <p data-bbox="995 1693 1230 1727">Malicious, benign</p> <p data-bbox="1043 1749 1182 1783">Ambitious</p> <p data-bbox="887 1805 1342 1839">Stealing innovation Persistent theft</p> <p data-bbox="1054 1861 1171 1895">Untested</p> <p data-bbox="1003 1917 1222 1951">High risk vendor</p>

<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ARGUMENTATION</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?</i></p>	<p>Claims of rightness: Protecting US interests, technical security, Topos of threat/ disadvantage/ finance (Risk falling further behind competitors/ beating)</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>PERSPECTIVIZATION</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Positioning speakers' point of view and expressing involvement</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and arguments expressed?</i></p>	<p>Ideological Perspective: Neoliberal, free market Democratic Against authoritarianism</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>INTENSIFICATION/ MITIGATION</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Are the respective utterances articulated overtly? Are they intensified or are they mitigated?</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force</p> <p>State-sponsored cyber threat Hasty generalizations Steal intellectual properties Constant references to plans like Made in China 2025</p>

Table 4.3 A DHA look to the securitization of Huawei – Author’s compilation (the table uses Wodak’s DHA discursive strategies)

4.3.2.1 Huawei as an Identity Threat

As discussed in the previous chapters, securitization is made to achieve substantial political power and effects in a particular issue which is turned into a political and securitized issue through the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat (Hansen, 2011). In the eyes of American officials, Huawei is seen as an institutional apparatus of the Chinese communist government and digital authoritarianism. Accordingly, the discourse has systematically presented Huawei as an Other because of the Chinese state. Indeed, the officials divide the world like black and white between the US and China by simplifying the world and constructing power relations.

Moreover, Huawei has a negative image because of the Chinese government. As known, China is seen as an authoritarian, not democratic nor in favor of human rights. Through using technology, China wants to challenge the dominance of the US for them. Accordingly, there are two completely different sides: the US is the leader, and in favor of freedom, human rights, liberty, the other one is opposite, comprising of negative traits. Hence, China constitutes a threat not only by its sounding success but also by exporting its authoritarianism harnessing technology. Therefore, China proposes an alternative model in which neither democracy nor freedom is essential. For this reason, the following citation is a good example to show how common belief about China is. Using the topos of threat as a tool to convince the audiences to believe that there is a tremendous threat due to organized top-down strategy must be taken action against it.

“China today, under Xi Jinping, is a powerful nation with a long-term agenda and vast resources. Yet, in global affairs, China often stands opposite the United States, not just on democratic values or support for human rights. As the United States retreats from the world under the Trump Administration’s policies, Xi Jinping is eager to present China as an alternative to the American model of global leadership. However, it is a stark reality. I am pleased that the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy identified China as a competitor and Chinese influence globally as a challenge that must be prioritized. China is exporting political capacity-building for authoritarianism, and it is doing it at the global level in terms of global governance. So, the same values that we see in China at home, China is exporting to other countries.” **Chairman Engel, 2019**

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116hrg36213/CHRG-116hrg36213>

When we ask how Huawei has been labeled in the hearings regarding Chinese identity, “Trojan Horse”, “agent of the Chinese government”, and “veiled as telecommunication company” can be given as examples. As can be seen in these metaphors and labels, Huawei is mainly linked to its Chinese company. Accordingly, Huawei shows Digital Authoritarianism of the malign actor; it results from aggressive, ambitious policies of the Chinese government. For the officials, China wants to shape the world that is antithetical to US values and interests.

“The Trump administration continues to raise the alarms with our allies and partners about the national security risks of Huawei and the Chinese Communist Party. To me, Huawei is a Trojan horse. Its deep links to the Communist regime are impossible to ignore.” **Senator BARRASSO, July 2020** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg42191/CHRG-116shrg42191>

Using the “Trojan Horse” metaphor, the senator conveys that Huawei should not be considered an innocent, vulnerable, and good-intent company. Similarly, it seems like the Trump administration is shown as the responsible leader protecting the interests of the whole innocent world damaged by the Chinese company by raising alarms. Given the context of this discourse, it is understandable that the speakers are against China. Because, as known, the expectation of the US was the liberalization of China after its entrance into WTO and high growth rate. In contrast, China maintained its nationalistic tendencies and followed more aggressive policies to catch up and even surpass the US.

As for perspectivization strategy to understand how the officials view Huawei, it is evident that all speakers positioned themselves in a democratic, free world and a liberal international order in which America is the leader. It is reiterated several times that the US is the best and has to maintain its status. However, the gap is narrowing with the rise of China in the high-tech industry. Technology is accepted as a jewel for economic development. One of the senators explains the current competition that there might exist a “technological cold war”. Huawei, like other Chinese companies, is seen as receiving substantial backing from the state. Therefore, it constitutes a tremendous threat to US domination.

“We’re now living in yet another new age, a time characterized by hybrid warfare, weaponized disinformation—all occurring within the context of a world producing more data than mankind has ever seen. The objective of our enemies has not changed. They want to see the United States weakened, if not destroyed. They want to see us abandon our friends and our allies. They want to see us lessen our global presence.” **Senator Richard BURR, February 2018** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg34697/CHRG-116shrg34697>

Naturally, the success of Huawei is acknowledged as a threat not only to the domination of America but also to all over the world who is in favor of freedom and liberalism. On the other hand, China is seen as a challenge to destroy existing international order by weaponizing digital platforms. For this reason, the extraordinary measurements are all seen as legal and necessary steps. These steps are taken because the US must protect its values, which are under threat. This example shows the justification of these actions and normative rightness.

“On July 15, the Secretary announced visa restrictions on certain personnel from Chinese technology companies, such as Huawei, which provide material support to regimes perpetrating human rights violations globally. These and other measures demonstrate the US resolve to protect our interests and uphold our values.” **STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Deputy Secretary of State, July 2020** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg42191/CHRG-116shrg42191>

Similar to previous examples, Huawei is labeled as a tool of Digital Authoritarianism, which demonstrates that China uses it to expand social control through undermining democratic values. As an example of digital authoritarianism, the speakers refer to using artificial intelligence in Xinjiang. In the following example, it can be seen that Huawei is untrusted and risky since it can provide critical data to the authoritarian Chinese government

“The Administration is deeply concerned about the dangers of networks that can be manipulated, disrupted, or controlled by authoritarian governments that have no democratic checks and balances and no regard for human rights, privacy, or international norms. Untrusted, high-risk vendors like Huawei and ZTE could provide the PRC’s Communist Party-led, authoritarian government the capability and opportunity to disrupt or weaponize critical applications and infrastructure or provide technological advances to the PRC’s military forces.” **STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Deputy Secretary of State, July 2020** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg42191/CHRG-116shrg42191>

From a similar perspective, the officials explain the success of Huawei by referring to PLA and aggressive government efforts to help Huawei in contracts. For them, Huawei is not a private company playing the game, obeying the rules. Instead, Huawei serves the ambitions of the Chinese government, as indicated in Made in China 2025 Plan. In another example, using topos of finance, Belt and Road and Digital Silk Road are menace since these projects aim to create monopolies for Chinese companies like Huawei. Eventually, all of them give China a chance to export authoritarianism. This example shows the view of officials: *“More and more countries*

are adopting oppressive laws modeled after China's digital authoritarianism, and the CCP is exporting its repression around the world." **Dr Richardson December, 2019.**

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116hrg38546/CHRG-116hrg38546>

Also, in another example, Huawei is seen as an instrument of the party. Furthermore, it is reiterated that Huawei must decide where to stay. It is not possible to be a state-led company and the world's largest provider. People realize how significant the threat is, and it is shown that Huawei can surpass Americans in the new technologies; therefore, it constitutes a big challenge.

"Huawei is a Communist Party-controlled surveillance agency veiled as a telecommunications company. It has maneuvered itself into a dominant position providing infrastructure across the globe, including to partners within the Five Eyes intelligence network of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand."

Senator Markey, March 2019

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg40644/CHRG-116shrg40644>

To sum up, the identity differences of the American government and Chinese administration necessarily affect the officials' arguments about Huawei. Huawei is not seen just as a company; instead, the company is seen on the side of its authoritarian state. The officials consider that Huawei contributes to China's power, which is the rival of America and its values. The following section will, in the same direction, try to explain the economic securitization of Huawei.

4.3.2.2 Huawei as an Economic Threat

As discussed before, securitization is mostly about explaining what practitioners, leaders, and elites are talking about in this process. In the name of security, the concept is no longer given meaning if the actors securitize them. Its meaning is equal to what they say. That is, security is an intersubjective and social construction (Floyd, 2007). Applying Critical Discourse Analysis portrays that Huawei, in the context of the economy, has many different arguments of the American officials. Firstly, Huawei is acknowledged as a part of the Chinese state-led economy character. Indeed, Chinese government strategies have an aggressive roadmap challenging American domination. Therefore, Huawei is excluded from the market due to the economic security concerns of the officials. Secondly, Huawei is seen as an apparatus of predatory industrial policy of the Chinese government. The officials accept that China is pursuing techno nationalism with its innovation mercantilism. Accordingly, China enjoys the free atmosphere of the market but follows a protective economy policy internally. Lastly, the rapid growth of

China in Artificial intelligence, the supremacy of Huawei in the 5G market necessitate taking action to prevent losing American power. Therefore, the speeches legitimize tariffs and restrictive measurements against Huawei.

As discussed before, China does not obey WTO regulations and rules and continues to support domestic companies. For sure, this creates a competitive disadvantage and damages the free market economy. To understand how Huawei is seen, it is necessary to look at the view of officials about Chinese trade and economic policy. Donald Trump explains Chinese activities in the economy as malicious, aiming at weakening the US economy. China approaches trade as a weapon with its deep and pervasive strategies. Therefore, working with allies to defend the existing order is shown as a must. Thus, China is represented as a challenger and revolutionizer in the discourse.

“Over the years, rivals have used sophisticated means to weaken our businesses and our economy as facets of cyber-enabled economic warfare and other malicious activities... We will work with our partners to contest China’s unfair trade and economic practices and restrict its acquisition of sensitive technologies.” **Donald Trump, December 2017**
<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

The following example demonstrates that the Trump administration considers the growth of China as not a success story but a product of persistent theft. Similarly, the free access of Chinese to the US universities, innovation is seen as the main reason for this staggering rise. Using topoi of numbers, the orator alarms that there is a danger for the US economy. Also, it gives the message that the US is the leader of those who want to live in peace as if China brings war with this trade growth. It is constantly reiterated that there is a necessity that the US must be the best; the US must maintain its domination. This speech shows how American officials dramatize this trade deficit. Economic security constitutes a prominent place in the Trump administration. As known, America followed First America and Made America Great Again strategies. For this reason, a trade war has started to protect the US economy. In this context, it is understandable to show China, especially Huawei’s supremacy in the 5G, as a menace to the economy.

“Now, the—we had a \$310 billion trade deficit with China. This is the largest persistent trade deficit in the history of the world. In 2015, it was \$336 billion. China is an emerging threat to the United States and an emerging threat to people who want to live at peace in the

world. Chinese who have not done anything but steal and rob from us, undermining our national security all these years.”

Mr. SHERMAN, April 2017

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115shrg25259/CHRG-115shrg25259>

“Many countries also agree that China continues to game the WTO’s international rules-based trading system and the openness of our economies in ways that threaten all of our economies and our long-term competitiveness.”

ORRIN G. HATCH, SENATOR March 2018

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115shrg36528/CHRG-115shrg36528>

Given the Digital Silk Road, it is indicated that China aimed at creating monopolies with whole Chinese companies. Therefore, with its supremacy in the 5G technology, posing lower prices and higher qualities, Huawei constitutes the best choice in this developing world. However, this project is seen as a challenge since it prevents market access to critical telecommunication technology. As can be seen in the following example, the official directly says that Huawei as a part of the Digital Silk Road is a threat to the US economy. Topos of threat are used to legitimize. China is blamed for using the opportunities of the market without complying with the regulations. Monopolies are risks for the late-comers, US business, and the economy is shown to be under assault with this standard-setting and monopolies.

“Huawei, China Mobile, and ZTE are closely involved in developing 5G technology and have increased their participation in international standard-setting bodies for 5G. The Digital Silk Road threatens US businesses and market access in critical telecom and technology. Innovation, of course, is the driver of our economy we cannot afford to lose.”

CAROLYN BARTHOLOMEW, CHAIRMAN, June 2019

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg43886/CHRG-116shrg43886>

Similarly, “Whether we discuss intellectual property rights, the so-called Belt and Road Initiative, technology transfers, trade, or the Made in China 2025 plan, it is clear that Beijing continues to enjoy the blessings of the rules-based international order while routinely flouting its rules to gain a competitive advantage. This is deeply unfair and also a direct threat to our national security.”

Witness, Robert Atkinson July 2018

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115shrg25259/CHRG-115shrg25259>

American officials’ view of China’s industrial policy is that China follows techno nationalism to its economic growth. Huawei is seen as the tool of innovation mercantilist strategy of the Chinese government. Assumingly, while it argues that China is a member of the global market, on the other hand, it follows protective policies. Similarly, it is argued that despite being the

second-largest economy in the world, China still continues to bend the rules to its own benefit and strong links with global Chinese companies.

“China’s techno-nationalism toolbox, which is a really good short resource for you and your staff about the tools that the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, has developed to maximize the benefits it receives under the world trading system while pretty systematically avoiding its obligations. So those include massive subsidies to firms particularly in the sectors that are part of the Made in China 2025 project that lowers the cost of capital, enables them to compete not just effectively at home but capture markets abroad against competitors; forced technology transfer requiring joint ventures with Chinese firms as a condition of doing business and then getting the technology; foreign investment restrictions designed to grow domestic champions; discriminatory regulatory enforcement against Chinese firms.”

March 2019

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg40644/CHRG-116shrg40644>

The governmental strategy in the economy is referred to as predatory and aggressive by the officials. Predatory constitutes a meaning that there is an actor who is seeking to exploit or oppress others. It is knowingly selected to show that China is aggressive and only considers its benefits. Also, the choice of adjectives indicates how positive and negative traits are attributed to the actors. For example, Americans are referred to as hardworking however disadvantaged due to China’s “predatory” acts. Those are not well-intended and try to create a common perception to make people believe China is responsible for this situation.

“To support hardworking Americans, we need a strategic, coordinated response from all countries that China’s predatory practices have disadvantaged. A key area in which our allies and partners share our frustration is responding to the challenge of China’s economic aggression. We are building an international coalition to address China’s state-led policies, which distort markets, discriminate against international competition, force technology transfer, and permit theft of sensitive intellectual property.”

Senator ROBERT MENENDEZ, July 2018

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115shrg40390/CHRG-115shrg40390>

The approach of the Trump administration towards China’s neo-techno nationalism will be shown in the following citation. The officials agree that there is a trade war with China, and during this process, the interests of Americans should be protected. As mentioned in the second chapter, China has been seeking a standard-setting to be one of the determiners in the market.

Standards contribute the economic development at a dramatic rate. China has become aware of the importance of standard-setting after its entrance to WTO. To this end, Beijing is pursuing controlling standards, guaranteeing Chinese firms' status in the market providing profits (Segal, 2008). Naturally, as the dominant power in the standard setting, the US is uneasy with this ambition. A topos of threat that shows depending on a Chinese company in 5G will be a threat. Dependence on a single company, which is a Chinese firm, in 5G is a big issue.

“And we live in a world where we are so weak that we allow China to say you don't get access to our market unless you transfer the technology to us. So we are in a trade war with China. For 18 years we have ignored it. I give the President credit for not ignoring it.” **Mr Sherman**
<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115hrg30708/CHRG-115hrg30708>

“They want to supplant us in all of these critical fields. As an example, any gains they make in 5G technology—if they establish supremacy in 5G, which they are on the path to doing, potentially all of the technologies and industries of the 21st century depended upon by 5G will be built to Chinese standards, meaning we will now be out of place in regards to that.” **Ms Singh, Assistant Secretary of State for the Economic and Business, July 2018**
<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115shrg40390/CHRG-115shrg40390>

In the same path, the speeches which justify the extraordinary steps against Huawei are so common. As discussed, the actions against Huawei, although it is a company, even if it is not a security issue before the securitization steps of the American officials it became politicized, securitized.

“These requirements are the harshest penalties and strictest compliance measures ever imposed in such a case and will protect US national security from unauthorized exports and reexports of telecommunications equipment.” **WILBUR L. ROSS, Secretary of Department of Commerce, June 2018** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115shrg38578/CHRG-115shrg38578>

4.3.2.3 Huawei as a Technical Threat

Applying Discourse Historical Approach has shown that the Trump administration considers Huawei as a technical threat. In the way of putting Huawei as a security matter, they use two main arguments. The first one is that Huawei, China, is consistently stealing the intellectual property of US companies by harnessing academic freedom in the universities and cyber attacks. Due to its ambitious policy to be a global leader in critical technologies, China is accepted as an emerging threat. The other one is that the 5G is the most critical issue in which

the US has no alternative to propose to its like-minded allies. For this reason, it is necessary to create domestic and global awareness against Huawei's technology, which brings a vulnerability to the network. In this vein, the restrictive actions are legitimized in the name of national security, the topos of finance/ threat is used systematically.

As a part of their mission, the hearings create power relations to maintain the status quo of the domination. It seems like the arguments are simplifying the world like populist arguments. As Reisigl argued, it is a kind of "subdivision of the world of social actors into friends and enemies by the rhetorical construction of internal and external scapegoats" (Reisigl, 2008: 114). Trump has considered China as revisionist power challenging American security and prosperity. Most importantly, in terms of technical Othering of Huawei, again, Chinese identity has been highlighted. Accordingly, China has been blamed for the persistent theft of US technologies; Chinese firms are cheating to achieve economic dominance in harmony with governmental ambitions. From the predication strategy perspective, in this example, America is represented by positive traits in contrast to China. If the positive and negative traits attributed to the actors are considered, as can be seen, America is referred to as "hardworking, dream big, determined. In contrast, for the Other, it is not the same. Trump says:

"We are a nation of people who work hard, dream big, and never give up. Not every country shares these characteristics. Some instead steal or illicitly acquire America's hard-earned intellectual property and proprietary information to compensate for their own systemic weaknesses. Every year, competitors such as China steal US intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technology and early-stage ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into free societies' innovation..." **Donald Trump, December 2017**
<https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>

Like the previous example, the following demonstrates that officials construct a positive "Self" and oppose "Other" by discourse. Accordingly, the Chinese are not good players to trust. When considering the officials' perspective towards the Chinese government, it is clear that they are seen as the actors stealing and robbing the US intellectual property and cheating. The aggressive path refers to governmental ambitions like the Made in China 2025 plan. It implicitly refers that without the US, China's cutting-edge technological developments would not have been possible. Accordingly, it can be said that American officials see China as a techno nationalist state focusing on its interests. Furthermore, the US is seen as the feeder of this innovation.

“I wish we could say, man, they are great players; we want to invite them over for lunch and dinner, and let our kids play with them. But we see them infiltrating our universities. They steal intellectual property from corn seeds to computer technology. You know, they have an aggressive path forward the first thing I would say is it is not a zero-sum game. So, we have US companies that are doing cutting-edge work in these fields accessing talent from China, which feeds into that innovation.” **Witness: Sacks, Ms. Samm, Cybersecurity Policy and China Digital Economy Fellow, New America, May 2019** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116hhr36213/CHRG-116hhr36213>

As mentioned before, Huawei is always discursively referred to by solid links to its government. The officials make a simplification disregarding the internal elements in the company. They see the company from a state-centered perspective. It is true to say the look of the administration towards China shapes its look to Huawei. The selection “jeopardize” as a verb indicates that they officially see Huawei as an existential threat to technological security.

“Chinese telecom, like Huawei and ZTE, that are widely understood to have extraordinary ties to the Chinese government. I also ask you to provide your insights into how foreign commercial investments and acquisitions are jeopardizing the Nation’s most sensitive technologies.” **Senator RICHARD BURR, February 2018** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg41448/CHRG-116shrg41448>

The following citation demonstrates how Chinese technology policy is seen. Its goals are attributed as selfish since it seeks to monopolize “at the expense of the US and its allies’ security”. As discussed before, Beijing has been attempting to catch and surpass the most advanced nations in technology and mastering core technologies. Considering the interconnected world market conditions, an actor cannot turn techno nationalism by focusing only on its interests and restricting free trade. Instead, it is true to say that more than open to cooperation. However, the Trump administration accepts China as “imposing quotas”, “subsidization of companies”, and “unfair market condition”. Therefore, it is said that they create a threat not only for the economy but also for technology.

“Through its Made in China 2025 plan, China is attempting to become the leader in high tech industries. China is subverting the free market by imposing quotas and state subsidies to prevent competition and gain self-sufficiency. It is also prioritizing the takeover of foreign tech companies through state-owned enterprises. Combined with state-sponsored cyber theft, China hopes to monopolize high tech innovation and production at the expense of the United

States' national security and its allies and their national security.” **Ted Poe Chairman of Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, July 2018**

<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115hrg30708/CHRG-115hrg30708>

Using topos of numbers and finance, alarmist exaggeration like “costing hundreds of billion dollars” or “more than 2 million jobs”, the strategy of the Chinese government is simplified as if the whole aim is composed of theft in a spirit of warfare. The selection of economic warfare strategy word also indicates the necessity that China approaches this issue as warfare; therefore, it must prevent and defend the national interests in the technology.

“For decades, China has been engaged in a massive, prolonged campaign of intellectual property theft against US firms, costing potentially hundreds of billions of dollars and more than 2 million jobs. China’s IP theft campaign constitutes a large, if not the largest, part of what appears to be Beijing’s overall cyber-enabled economic warfare strategy against the US and the West more generally, which they themselves have described as, “a form of non-military warfare which is just as terribly destructive as a bloody war but in which no blood is actually shed.” **Dr Samantha Ravich, Senior Advisor, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, June 2017,** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-115shrg38379/CHRG-115shrg38379>

This citation also explains how the domination of Huawei is seen. Accordingly, the discourse shows that Huawei is the Other one supported by malign, ambitious character and constant stealing. Furthermore, When it comes to the 5G, the officials reiterate that the US and its allies must keep their fingers on the pulse. They indeed create a negative image of Huawei since it challenges the interests of the US. It has been repeated that the US must not rely on another country and should protect its supremacy in every field. Therefore, the domination of Huawei, a Chinese firm, necessarily creates a challenging situation. Although other companies as rivals from Europe exist, they are not seen as a threat. Indeed, it signals that this is the proof for “identity matters”. To this end, alarmist exaggerations are supported by the arguments like missing the boat.

“In 5G, the reality is you have two struggling European companies, and then, Huawei and the other Chinese telecom, ZTE. We missed the boat on that. So, 5G is a real issue. Is it possible for us to compete? It will be difficult. China, because of its manufacturing capacity, provides cheap and good enough technology that can be used for much of the developing world.”

Witness: Sacks, Ms. Samm, Cybersecurity Policy and China Digital Economy Fellow, New America, May 2019 <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116hrg36213/CHRG-116hrg36213>

Similar to the previous example, the necessity to be the leader and cutting the dependency is reiterated. The US has always been famous for innovation by being at the top. Dependency on any other state, especially China, is not acceptable in this respect. For this reason, it can be argued that the neo-techno nationalist policy of China aiming to surpass the US and other developed ones and in order to be the number one is a menace. This possibility necessarily creates a threat. Therefore, it is understandable that Huawei is securitized to protect the interests of the US.

“It is vital to our national security to reduce our reliance on other countries, such as China. And as I have stated, we don’t need to rely on any other country. We should, once again, tap into American ingenuity and unleash the American innovation and entrepreneurship that we are famous for.” **Bill Johnson, Vice Ranking Member September 2020** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116hrg42322/CHRG-116hrg42322>

Plus, the officials legitimize the suspension decision of Trump about post-graduate students, signing Executive Order and declaring a national emergency. It is evident that Huawei is securitized and became one of the critical issues of the politicians. Huawei is not just a company; instead, it became an existential threat that the US must confront and defeat. In short, the issue, even the students, is considered the server to the Chinese government technology policy.

“To protect the integrity of our open and collaborative research system and ensure that the United States remains the global leader on cutting-edge research, last month President Trump issued a proclamation suspending the entry of graduate and post-graduate students and researchers associated with entities that support the PRC’s military-civil Fusion strategy.”

“The Administration is taking strong action at home and abroad to confront this challenge. Domestically, President Trump signed an Executive Order May 15, 2019 entitled “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” and a national emergency continuation notice on May 13, 2020. **Stephen E. Biegun, Deputy Secretary of State, July 2020** <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg42191/CHRG-116shrg42191>

Last but not least, using topoi of usefulness/ disadvantage, the officials show that new regulations must be made and new precautions must be taken to prevent the harm of “untrusted” companies. Huawei is shown as one of the guilty responsible for these vulnerabilities. Huawei is seen as a part of China’s perception of the officials. They aim at legitimizing their steps by discourse as can be seen in the following example.

“Abroad, the administration is implementing a coordinated set of measures to 1) encourage countries to put in place risk-based security measures that prohibit the use of untrusted vendors like Huawei and ZTE in 5G and other next generation networks” **Biegun 2020**
<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg42191/CHRG-116shrg42191> ...one of the things we’re trying to do is view the China threat as not just a whole of government threat, but a whole of society threat on their end. I think it’s going to take a whole of society response by us. So it’s not just the intelligence community, but it’s raising awareness within our academic sector, within our private sector, as part of the defense.” **Director Wray, 2020**
<https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-116shrg34697/CHRG-116shrg34697>

With this lengthy discussion, I want to demonstrate how Huawei has been referred to and discursively constructed with the perspective of the Critical Discourse Analysis Method. Furthermore, the metaphors, the characteristics attributed to Huawei are also included. Using Discourse Historical Analysis, how a private company started to be understood as a security matter by the Trump administration is answered. The findings include that the Trump administration securitized Huawei due to identity concerns, economic threats, and technological risks. Huawei is accepted not just as a successful rival. Instead, its monopolization in 5G industry, the governmental policy to fulfill the ambitious dreams such as surpassing America and being the number one are seen as the main threats. They took extraordinary measurements and created awareness against it to both American interests and the existing international order.

This method provided us to see how the hegemon power, the US created a discourse against Huawei, which is the suppressed and excluded one. The negative traits and characters are attributed to Huawei to show the Trump administration’s vulnerabilities and rightfulness during this process. The critical discourse analysis method pays attention to how self and other discourse have been shaped, and negative traits are attributed to Others. Thus, it is essential to emphasize that Huawei is just a threat that the orators discursively constructed. Whether it is a threat or not depends on one’s interpretation. China, as a late-comer, wants to achieve power

and not feel vulnerable in this new world. Technology is always used as an apparatus to fulfill the dreams of the states. The US once did the same, so China followed the same path.

Hearings:

1. House Hearing, 115th Congress - The Broken Promises of China's WTO

Accession: Reprioritizing Human Rights

2. Serial No. 116-32 (House Hearing) - Smart Competition: Adapting US Strategy

3. Serial No. 116-8 (House Hearing) - Revitalizing American Leadership in Advanced Manufacturing

4. Serial No. 116-72 (House Hearing) - Reauthorization of the National Institute of Standards and Technology

5. Serial No. 116-30 (House Hearing) - Machines, Artificial Intelligence, and the Workforce: Recovering and Readyng Our Economy for the Future

6. S. Hrg. 116-300 - Advancing Effective US Competition with China: Objectives, Priorities, and Next Steps

7. House Hearing, 110th Congress - Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report 2007

8. S. Hrg. 115-278 - Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats

9. Serial No. 116-48 (House Hearing) - Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work

10. S. Hrg. 116-96 - Assessing the Role of the United States in the world

11. S. Hrg. 116-423 - China's Belt and Road Initiative

12. Serial No. 116-28 (House Hearing) - Fueling American Innovation and Recovery: The Federal Role in Research and Development

13. S. Hrg. 115-799 - Tariffs: Implications for US Foreign Policy and the International Economy

14. S. Hrg. 115-271 - How the Innovation Economy Leads to Growth

15. S. Hrg. 115-716 - State-Sponsored Cyberspace Threats: Recent Incidents and US Policy Response

16. House Hearing, 115th Congress - China's Technological Rise: Challenges to US Innovation and Security

17. Serial No. 116-86 (House Hearing) - Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics: Political and Religious Human Rights Challenges in China

- 18. Serial No. 116-2 (House Hearing) - Investing in America's Economic and National Security**
- 19. S. Hrg. 116-75 - Open Hearing: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence. Community**
- 20. House Hearing, 116th Congress - Maintaining US Leadership In Science and Technology**
- 21. Serial No. 115-134 (House Hearing) - Chinese Investment and Influence in Europe**
- 22. House Hearing, 115th Congress - Digital Authoritarianism and the Global Threat to Free Speech**
- 23. S. Hrg. 115-624 - Market Access Challenges in China**
- 24. S. Hrg. 115-618 - President's 2018 Trade Policy Agenda**
- 25. S. Hrg. 115-724 - Current and Proposed Tariff Actions Administered by the Department of Commerce**
- 26. S. Hrg. 116-215 - A New Approach for an Era of U.S.-China Competition**
- 27. House Hearing, 115th Congress - The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics**
- 28. Serial No. 115-149 (House Hearing) - China's Predatory Trade and Investment Strategy**
- 29. S. Hrg. 115-375 - The Need for US Leadership on Digital Trade**
- 30. Serial No. 115-67 (House Hearing) - Artificial Intelligence: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility**
- 31. S. Hrg. 115-735 - The China Challenge**
- 32. Serial No. 115-128 (House Hearing) - Telecommunications, Global Competitiveness, and National Security**

4.4. Conclusion

This fourth chapter constitutes the core of the thesis since how Huawei has been securitized is answered. In this vein, firstly, the reasons behind the securitization process of Huawei by the US, closely linked with the Chinese Technology Policy, given the existing literature, are discussed. There exist three main reasons behind this process: identity differences (being a Chinese company and the story of Huawei), economic concerns, and infrastructural threats like monopolization of 5G technology and intellectual property thefts. Then, after providing a

methodological perspective thanks to Discourse Historical Approach as a subbranch of Critical Discourse Analysis, the Trump administration's discourse has been analyzed by focusing on Congressional Hearings from 2017 to 2020 during the Trump administration and National Security Strategy report 2017 and Cybersecurity Strategy report 2018 to explain securitization of Huawei.

As a result, it should be reiterated that Huawei, which the dominant discourse of the hegemon power has excluded and suppressed, is discursively constructed and then is shown as a threat to security, to which extraordinary steps have been taken. First, Huawei is seen as an institutional apparatus of the Chinese communist government and digital authoritarianism. Accordingly, the discourse is systematically presented Huawei as an Other because of the Chinese state. Furthermore, Huawei is acknowledged as a part of the Chinese- state-led economy character, which has also been accepted as aggressive, aiming to surpass America. Therefore, Huawei is excluded from the market due to the economic security concerns of the officials.

As discussed, government officials consider China is pursuing techno nationalism with its innovation mercantilism, enjoying the market's free atmosphere but following a protective economy policy internally. Therefore, the supremacy of Huawei in the 5G market as a Chinese firm is shown as an existential threat that entails taking action to prevent losing American power. Furthermore, given technical concerns on the securitization of Huawei, the success of Huawei is represented as if the company is necessarily stealing the intellectual property of the US companies. As the last word, all reasons-economic-technical- identity- contributed to the creation of securitization. However, most importantly, Huawei is acknowledged as a threat stemming from its Chinese character and closed ties with the Chinese government. Hence, it is shown as the agent of Chinese authoritarianism, one of the most critical rivals of the USA.

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

This study began with a question that has long been discussed in the literature. How technology affects the balances in international relations? As discussed, the technological development of a state has been one of the main determiners of economic growth and welfare. Realizing the role of technology in the development of the states led me to investigate the intriguing relationship between technology and politics. I have realized that while some states see technology as a security concern and develop well-designed policies to catch up with the advanced nations, this might trigger the emergence of a threat perception. This study has taken China and Huawei, a successful national champion Chinese firm, as the main focuses. I endeavor to figure out the approach of the Trump administration towards China's technology policy.

The technology policy of China is accepted as neo- techno nationalist considering the rotation of the Chinese government. Neo-techno nationalism is taken as a governmental direction leveraging globalization to protecting national interests while opening borders in some circumstances rather than following restrictive policies. Also, state-led companies and private enterprises play an essential role in domestic innovation. The thesis argues that the staggering success of China, especially after the entrance to WTO, has been possible with the reform process. Instead of a protectionist and interventionist China, Beijing now leverages globalization to promote national interests in technology in the direction of Neo-techno nationalism. In short, the primary purpose of the Chinese government is to strengthen the nation by using technology (see Chapter2).

As discussed, even though different scholars discuss the impact of technology on the Sino-American relationship, there is a gap focusing on the Trump administration. Also, there is no study looking at China's Neo- Technonationalist rotation from the US perspective. Therefore, this thesis seeks to analyze the approach of the Trump administration towards China's technology policy. On that note, analyzing resources: Congressional Hearings from 2017 to 2020, the Security Strategy Report, and Cyber Security Strategy Report 2018 provided me with the chance to see that Huawei is acknowledged as a threat stemming from its Chinese identity and its negative image Chinese government agent. Focusing on Huawei, this study endeavors to demonstrate the arguments of the Trump administration during the securitization process of Huawei. The main argument of the thesis is that the Trump administration has securitized China's Technology Policy due to identity concerns, economic and technical reasons. The thesis does not reject the impact of economic, technical factors; however, the officials' arguments

consist of identity concerns. Using the Critical Discourse Analysis approach, I try to show how the Trump government Huawei translated from being a private company into a security issue.

Analyzing the documents by using the Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse Historical Approach provided to see that Huawei is shown as the “Other,” which threatens the national security of the US. The threat has been discursively constructed. The discourse analysis demonstrated that the Trump administration considers Huawei as a part of Chinese state-directed digital authoritarianism. Therefore, it can be concluded that the look of the US towards Chinese kind neo- techno nationalism is entirely negative, accepting it as a threat.

This study methodologically embraced Discourse Historical Approach as a branch of Critical Discourse Analysis. Using Discourse Historical Analysis, how a private company started to be understood as a security matter by the Trump administration is answered. The findings include that the Trump administration securitized Huawei due to identity concerns, economic threats, and technological risks. The relevance of this study is that it provided a methodological analysis of the securitization of Huawei in regards to China’s neo techno nationalism. Also, this thesis brings two different but interrelated pieces of literature together.

A specific topic might become a security issue through discursive politics. Putting a thing into the security agenda, the leader changes the understanding to achieve special rights (Wæver, 1989). As discussed before, the Trump administration considers Huawei as a threat to its identity. These concerns stem from the negative perception of China in the eyes of the officials. Accordingly, China proposes an alternative model with authoritarianism, undemocratic and not supporting human rights, challenging the supremacy of the US through using technology. Also, the discourse analysis has shown that the Trump government does not consider Huawei just as a company. The purpose of China is to shape the world that is antithetical to US values and interests, and Huawei is seen as a tool company used by the Chinese state to fulfill its dreams. Therefore, Huawei is approached like the Chinese government.

In terms of economy, Huawei, as argued, constitutes a menace to the existing international market, the rules of the free market. Huawei is shown as an economic threat since the officials see the Chinese- directed economy model and its ambitious strategies constituting a challenge to the US domination. In this context, the discourse legitimizes the exclusion of Huawei from the market. Another refreshing approach towards Huawei as a threat is accepting China to pursuit techno- nationalism with its innovation mercantilism. In order to fulfill the ambitions, Beijing leverages the opportunities coming with a free market but follows a restrictive domestic

economic policy. It is argued that despite being the second-largest economy in the world, China continues to bend the rules to its benefit and strong links with global Chinese companies. The last threat discourse comprises Huawei's supremacy in the 5G technology and artificial intelligence, jeopardizing the domination of the US in the market. For sure, the speeches legitimize tariffs and restrictive measurements against Huawei in the name of protecting the economic interests of Americans.

As for the discourse seeing Huawei as a technical threat, the security of the US is constantly shown as an under threat concerning cybersecurity, hardware, and software. The officials insist on the persistent theft leading by the Chinese government and Huawei, harnessing the academic freedom to reach intellectual properties, cyber-attacks used as a primary threat to technical security. The incapability of the US to propose an alternative in the 5G industry and monopolization in this sector by a Chinese firm, Huawei, led to the emergence of alarming discourse. Because the perspective is that China has ambitious dreams to surpass America and be number one.

Therefore, through using discourse, the Trump administration securitized Huawei, and then the restrictive actions are legitimized in the name of protecting national security. This method provided us to see how the hegemon power, the US created a discourse against Huawei, which is the suppressed and excluded one. With these method, it is fair to say that Huawei is just a threat that the orators discursively constructed. The negative features and the arguments, as discussed before, are attributed to Huawei to show the Trump administration's rightfulness while taking extraordinary steps.

5.2 Limitations and the Chance for Future Research

This study might be improved through subsequent works in many ways. Firstly, the research covers a limited number of speeches and congressional hearings. A total of 32 hearings, the 2017 Security Strategy Report, the 2018 Cyber Security Strategy report, have been analyzed. The study's weakness is to demonstrate the role of the president, key figures in the administration, elites, and pressure groups during the securitization process due to time and space constraints.

Future research might contribute all of them with a detailed analysis. Also, with using software, more extensive and more sophisticated data analysis might be done as a future study to provide a better understanding. The other suggestion that calls for further studies is the measurement of the success of securitization in the eyes of the audience. How these banishments cost Huawei,

what is the public perception of Huawei is another point that needs to be highlighted. All of these questions ask for future research.



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