



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION STUDIES

'PRO-FILMIC THOUGHT' IN TIME-IMAGE
'LECTOSIGNS' AND 'SUB-REALITY' IN *MIRROR* (1975)

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MASTER'S DEGREE DISSERTATION

ISTANBUL, JUNE 2021



Mustafa Ozan Karyagdi

Master's Degree Thesis

YEAR 2021

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SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
WITH THE AIM TO MEET THE PARTIAL REQUIREMENTS REQUIRED TO RECEIVE A
MASTER'S DEGREE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION STUDIES

ISTANBUL, JUNE 2021

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ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL (For Master's Degree Thesis)

This study, titled '**PRO-FILMIC THOUGHT**' IN TIME-IMAGE '**LECTOSIGNS**' AND '**SUB-REALITY**' IN *MIRROR*, prepared by the **MUSTAFA OZAN KARYAĞDI**, was deemed successful with the **UNANIMOUS VOTING** as a result of the thesis defense examination held on the **17/07/2021** and approved as a **MASTER'S DEGREE THESIS** by our jury.

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‘PRO-FILMIC THOUGHT’ IN TIME-IMAGE:
‘LECTOSIGNS’ AND ‘SUB-REALITY’ IN *MIRROR* (1975)

ABSTRACT

When discussing cinema as a 'pre-linguistic' system of images and signs, audiovisual thinking gains another dimension as a 'pre-verbal' act of creation that lays the groundwork for a new kind of thinking. It attributes that a film could capture the unutterable through the peculiar cinematic expression beyond the 'rational monotony' and 'given codes in language'. Following the interrelated relationships, I problematize the notion of cinema-thinking that has critical distinctions in kind between filmmaking and spectatorship. Bergsonian method of intuition was approved to address this problem of irreducibility within the process of inter-exchange. That is in-between 'pre-determinant response' and 'pro-filmic thought' in spectatorial activities, moreover on the filmmaker side, cinematographic thinking of engendering movement/duration blocks through the strategic and intuitive way of thinking. Through Deleuzian taxonomy of images and signs, I specify the pure virtual domain called 'lectosigns' in *Mirror* (Tarkovsky, 1975), in which the spectator actively reads the images to engender autonomous thoughts proceeding beyond the narrative; to reconnect the collapsed images with actual life. In this concern, I trace *Mirror* back to its production process with the help of the diaries of Tarkovsky to unveil his strategic and intuitive thinking of cinematographic ideas. On the production side, strategic and intuitive thinking to actualize virtual cinematographic ideas following the unique potentialities of the medium as well as pre-determinant response and pro-filmic thought to reconnect images with the whole in spectatorial activities. As a result of the analysis of *Mirror*, the concept of 'sub-reality' manifests itself referring to the subdued realities by the oppressive ideologies that could be 'sealed' in time and 'rescued' by active cinematic 'lectorship' in a different space-time by the spectators through 'pro-filmic thinking' within the domain of lectosigns, in which cinema and philosophy collaborate.

Keywords: 'Cinema-thinking', pro-filmic thought, intuitive thinking, lectosigns, lectorship, sub-reality, time-image, time-pressure, *Mirror*

‘PRO-FİLMİK’ DÜŞÜNCE VE ZAMAN-İMGE:
AYNA (1975) FİLMİNDE ‘LEKTO-GÖSTERGELER VE ‘ALT-GERÇEKLİK’

ÖZET

Sinemayı ‘dil öncesi’ bir imge ve göstergeler sistemi olarak ele almak yeni bir tür görsel-işitsel düşünme biçimine zemin hazırlar. Böylece sinema ‘rasyonel tekdüzeliğin’ ve ‘dildeki verili kodların’ ötesine geçen, dile getirilemez olanı yakalayabilen, düşünceye yeni alanlar açan, kendine özgü, ‘söz öncesi’ bir ifade geliştirebilir. İzleyicilik ve film yapımı süreçlerinin karşılıklı etkileşimi ‘sinema-düşünme’ eyleminin tek tip bir düşünme biçiminden ziyade, farklı türleri olan kompleks bir kavrama atıfta bulunur. Bu çalışma temel olarak sinematik düşünme biçimleri arasındaki indirgenemezlik problemini belirtmek ve ‘sinema-düşünme’ eyleminin farklı türlerini tartışmak için tasarlanmıştır. Seyircilikteki temel ayırım tek anlamlı, ‘önceden belirlenimli’ düşünce ile filmden özerk, ‘pro-filmik’ düşünce arasındadır. Öte yandan, film yapım sürecinde, ‘sinematografik’ düşünmek hareket/süre blokları yaratma eyleminin birbiriyle etkileşen ‘stratejik’ ve ‘sezgisel’ pratikleri olarak ikiye ayrılır. Bu çalışmada seyircilik ve film yapım süreçlerini birlikte ele alabilmek için Bergsoncu *sezgi* yöntemi kullanılmıştır. İmgelerin ve göstergelerin Deleuzecü tasnifiyle, izleyicinin otonom bir düşünce yaratarak imgeleri yaşamın kendisiyle yeniden bağladığı salt virtüel alana işaret eden ‘lekto-göstergeler’ incelenmiştir. Sinematografik fikirlerin hayata geçirilmesine ilişkin ‘stratejik’ ve ‘sezgisel’ düşünce biçimlerini ortaya koymak için, Tarkovksi’nin yazdığı günlükler yardımıyla *Ayna* (1975) filminin yapım sürecine değinilmiştir. Her iki süreçte de kendine özgü sinema-düşünme türlerinin ayırımı; virtüel sinematografik fikirlerin stratejik ve sezgisel yollarla aktüel hale getirme sürecinin yanı sıra, izleyicilik sürecinde ortaya çıkan ‘ön-belirlenimli’ düşünce ile çerçevenin ötesindeki hayatla virtüel bağ kuran ‘pro-filmik’ düşünce tartışılmıştır. *Ayna*’nın analizi sonucunda ‘alt-gerçeklik’ mefhumu; dilin sınırları içerisinde söylenemeyen fakat ‘mühürlenebilen’ ‘gömülü’ virtüel gerçekliklere atıfta bulunur. ‘Lekto-göstergeler’ gömülü geçmişin gelecekteki yeni öznel yorumlarına olanak tanır. ‘Fakat Deleuze’ün belirttiği gibi, öznellik bize değil, *zamana*, salt virtüel olana aittir. Dolayısıyla düşünce özgürlüğünün kısıtlandığı belirli uzay-zamanlarda, ‘görsel-işitsel’ sanatçı sezgisel yolla, ‘söylenemez’ olana dair ‘dil öncesi’, görsel-işitsel bir ifade geliştirerek ‘pro-filmik’ düşünceye alternatif bir alan açar. Böylece, pro-filmik düşüncenin yeni felsefi fikirlerle kurduğu iş birliği, kavram yaratma yoluyla dilin sınırlarını genişleterek düşünceye yeni alanlar açar.

Anahtar Sözcükler: ‘Sinema-düşünme’, pro-filmik düşünce, sezgisel düşünme, ‘lekto-göstergeler’, ‘sinematik lektörlük’, ‘alt-gerçeklik’, zaman-imge, zaman-basınç, *Ayna*

„PRO-FILMISCHES DENKEN“ IM ZEIT-BILD:
„LECTOSIGNS“ UND „SUB-REALITÄT“ IN „DER SPIEGEL“ (1975)

ABSTRACT

Wenn man das Kino als ein „präverbales“ System von Bildern und Zeichen diskutiert, ist die Schaffung eines audiovisuellen Denkens aufgrund der wechselseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Zuschauerschaft und des Filmemachens problematisch. Ich problematisiere den Begriff des Kino-Denkens, der eine kritische Unterscheidung zwischen dem Filmemachen und dem Zuschauen vornimmt. Diese Studie ist grundlegend darauf ausgerichtet, dieses Problem anzugehen. Das heißt, zwischen „vorbestimmter Reaktion“ und „pro-filmischem Denke“ in der Zuschauertätigkeit, darüber hinaus auf der Seite des Filmemachers, kinematographisches Denken des Erzeugens von Bewegungs-/Dauerblöcken durch die strategische und intuitive Denkweise. Um die Implikationen beider Prozesse in Bezug auf das Kino-Denken zu untersuchen, verwende ich die Bergsonische Methode der Intuition. Mittels der Deleuz'schen Taxonomie von Bildern und Zeichen spezifiziere ich den rein virtuellen Bereich, der in Tarkowskijs „Der Spiegel“ (1975) „lectosigns“ genannt wird, in dem der Zuschauer aktiv die Bilder liest, um ein Denken jenseits der Erzählung zu schaffen, um die kollabierten Bilder wieder mit dem Leben selbst zu verbinden. In diesem Anliegen verfolge ich „Der Spiegel“ mit Hilfe von Tarkowskijs Tagebüchern bis zu seinem Produktionsprozess zurück, um sein strategisches und intuitives Denken von kinematographischen Ideen aufzudecken. Somit möchte ich die Unreduzierbarkeit der unterschiedlichen Arten des Kino-Denkens in beiden Prozessen aufzeigen, kinematografische Ideen mit ihrem einzigartigen Akt des kreativen Denkens als strategisch und intuitiv, wie auch die vorgegebene Reaktion und das pro-filmische Denken in den Aktivitäten des Zuschauers. Als Ergebnis der Analyse von „Der Spiegel“ manifestiert sich das Konzept der „Sub-Realität“, das sich auf die unterdrückten Realitäten durch die unterdrückenden Ideologien bezieht, die in der Zeit „versiegelt“ und durch aktives filmisches „Lektorat“ in einer anderen Raum Zeit durch die Zuschauer „gerettet“ werden könnten, durch „pro-filmisches Denken“ im Bereich der „lectosigns“. Mit anderen Worten: Das Kino als „vorsprachliches“ System des audiovisuellen Ausdrucks kann die Aphasie, in der die Freiheit des Sprechens kaum gewährleistet ist, als Akt der Freiheit des Denkens eigenwillig überwinden.

Stichworte: Kino-Denken, pro-filmisches Denken, intuitives Denken, lectosigns, Lektorat, Sub-Realität, Zeit-Bild, Zeit-Druck, *Der Spiegel*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe my thanks to my supervisor Asst. Prof. Defne Tüzün for her helpful feedbacks speeding up the process, Boğaziçi University Mithat Alam Film Center for moral and material support, Dr. Angelika Seppi for advising me on Gilles Deleuze during my one-year stay at Humboldt-Universität-zu Berlin, Prof. Dr. Bülent Diken and Assoc. Dr. Zeynep Özarslan for accepting to be the members of the jury, M. Feyzi Erçin for inspiring conversations and stimulating classes on classical music in art movies and the music of auteurs that ignite my interest in Tarkovsky's cinema on a deeper level during my undergraduate years, Dear Lydia for the German translation of the abstract, and to my lovely mother and father for exciting talks on arts and cinema since my childhood.



To Mithat Alam and Feyzi Erçin

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LIST of ABBREVIATIONS

Gilles Deleuze

B *Bergsonism*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, The MIT Press, 1991.

C1 *Cinema 1: The Movement Image*. London & New York: The Athlone Press, 2002.

C2 *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: MIT Press, 1988.

WP and Guattari, F., *What is Philosophy*, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell Columbia University Press New York, 1991.

Henri Bergson

CE *Creative Evolution*, translated by Arthur Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911 (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1944). *L'Evolution creatrice*, 1907.

MM *Matter and Memory*, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1911. *Matiere et Memoire*, 1896.

Paul Schrader

TSF *Transcendental Style in Film*, With a New Introduction: *Rethinking Transcendental Style*, University of California Press, 2018.

Andrei Tarkovsky

ST *Sculpting in Time*, University of Texas Press, 1987.



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1. INTRODUCTION

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in their seminal book *What Is Philosophy?* (1994) have already revealed that the collaboration between philosophy and filmmaking has a great potential to engender unique thoughts. The significant coalescence between the two fields occurs in relation to the creation; 'philosophy is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts' whereas cinema is the art of creating images (WP: 2). Like philosophers, some great cinema 'auteurs'ⁱ, thinking with cinematographic images just as concepts, are capable to pave alternate ways for thought. Therefore, "the cinema forms part of art, part of thought, in the irreplaceable, autonomous forms which these directors were able to invent [...]" (C2: 15). In other words, cinema deserves an equivalent place with other fields in the history of art and philosophy since it can create autonomous forms for thought (ibid). Concomitantly Deleuze, in his ground-breaking *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (1983) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1985), rather than presenting a film theory nor a history of the cinema, fundamentally suggests forming and fabricating cinematic concepts, in which the coalescence between film and philosophy can create an alternate atmosphere for thinking. Through new cinematic concepts, Deleuze has brought unuttered parts of cinema, of which is a 'pre-verbal' system, into a discussable, thinkable domain. Consequently, Deleuze's film philosophy has currently opened new opportunities and possibilities for cinematic thought. Thus, some unique films not only have become better comprehensible with the Deleuzian cinematic concepts but also resulted in new philosophical questions pertaining to the cinema.

Cinema is – for Gilles Deleuze – 'the spiritual automaton', 'the system of pre-linguistic images and signs' which also takes 'utterances up again in the images and signs proper to this system' (C2: 262). In other words, the cinematic medium is not language but an idiosyncratic way of interaction with images and signs, an interplay between filmmaker and spectator. I contend that the idea of placing the cinematic medium as 'a pre-verbal system' is very plausible because of two reasons. First, it lays the groundwork for a new kind of thought which can be beyond the 'rational monotony' and 'given codes in language' (ibid). Second, it concordantly points out that a film might contain unutterable parts being expressed in a cinematic way. Some cinematic strategies with idiosyncratic styles can break our sensory-motor logic, our perception towards truths that we have taken for granted, in order to engender thoughts. Although a film fundamentally represents a closed system, these films pave the way for the open, the whole including us, through creating disunities and ambiguities with specific strategies, rejecting

pretense to the truth with cracks, in which the spectator must eventually join the film as an active interpreter. Deleuze calls that domain 'lectosigns', pure virtual correlates of actual images (on-screen images), representing the infinite limit of all time-images that emerge when the film inevitably requires an active readership from the spectator. That sort of thought is not a pre-determinant response but an autonomous creation by the spectator as an ongoing interpretative activity of cinema-thinking.

Cinema-thinking is a complex notion that has different parts with their own processes occurring distinctively during filmmaking and spectatorship. As for spectatorial cinematic thought, Deleuzian taxonomy of images and signs in *Cinema 2* is fundamental. Deleuze introduces an overall definition by referring to Martin Heidegger to uncover the question of 'what is thinking'. According to both Deleuze and Heidegger, thinking discovers 'the essence of the things and time' that has a collective attitude proliferates when there are multiple possibilities. With reference to Gilbert Simondon, the act of thinking manifests itself as a 'psycho-collective' and 'individuating activity': a process to *connect* 'the psychological and the collective' that also fundamentally gives a new perspective towards cinema and thinking (Dillet: 263, 264) (emphasis mine). In this regard, cinema-thinking during spectatorship refers to *relinking* images, not only with the other images but also with life itself. Pure cinema-thinking appears in reciprocal 'noosphere' within the domain of 'lectosigns', in which the film starts to demand an ongoing interpretation from us to reconnect the de-linked images with the whole, in turn, our lives with the world. Concomitantly, I regard this sort of active interpretation of the actual images through pure virtual memory not beyond the pre-established narrative but 'substituting' the connecting efficacy of the story. Hence, this kind of creation of cinematic thoughts during spectatorship manifests itself as 'pro-filmic thought' since the prefix 'pro-' emphasizes both the 'proceeding' nature of cinema-thinking into the open, and linking the images and 'acting for' the story goes in the mind of the spectator. The activity autonomously attaches the images with the whole through virtual memory and consciousness of the audience rather than the pre-determinant univocal thought depending on the classical narrative systems. Yet it is still in-between, a connecting process, not an 'ultra-filmic'ⁱⁱ thought out of the filmic image.

To articulate, 'pro-filmic thinking' precisely refers to the process in which the spectators reconnect the de-linked actual images with the open whole through their virtual memory and consciousness. Those kinds of autonomous thoughts arose in the spectator's mind, specifically when the film directly requires an active readership. During the interpretation of the time

images and signs, the virtual thoughts of the spectator reconnect the images with the actual life when the film itself does not think but creates ‘unthought’ by rejecting to narrate. Even though gaps and circuits are pre-established by the filmmaker, pro-filmic thought does not come across as a pre-determinant response planned by the filmmaker. Rather images, which no longer corresponds with their actual correlates, lead to the proliferation of possibilities giving room for autonomous thoughts to relink them with virtual ones. Thus, the audience subjectively procreates thought associated with their own lives proceeding beyond the frame as a pure virtual connection with the open whole, the life itself. The ‘proceeding’ nature of this sort of cinema-thinking substitutes it to a certain extent and moves ahead of the filmic image. Therefore, it seems inevitable for me to use the prefix ‘pro-’ from Latin, then, it can intrinsically indicate three remarkable characteristics of a distinctive kind of cinema-thinking during spectatorship:

pro⁻¹, prefix. 1. *pro-* comes from Latin, where it has meaning "forward, forward movement or location; advancement": *proceed; progress; prominent; promote; propose*. 2. *pro-* is also attached to roots and words and means "bringing into existence": *procreate; produce*. 3. *pro-* is also attached to roots and words and means "in place of": *pronoun [...]*

pro⁻² prefix. 1. *pro-* comes from Greek, and has the meaning "before, beforehand, in front of": *proboscis; prognosis; prophylactic; prothesis [...]* (Dalgish, 1997:587)

In this regard, I explicitly propose to use the prefix *pro-* from Latin since it very well explains three aspects of cinema-thinking during spectatorship. First, it is a creation of the virtual links by the spectator when the film engenders 'unthought'. Second, it substitutes the filmic image and story to a certain extent since the film stops narrating. Third, *pro-*filmic thinking directly proceeds us from the artifact to life itself. (Figure 1.1). In some films dominated by lectosigns,




Figure 1.1 The three aspects of the prefix ‘pro-’ⁱⁱⁱ and pro-filmic thinking during spectatorship

the autonomous thought of the spectator replaces the narrative and proceeds the film into ‘noosphere’ since the film itself demands a meaning creation, an active readership of images and signs by the spectator. In other words, the film rejects to narrate a unitary univocal truth

to open the horizons in favor of multiple interpretations that substitute for the narrative in some respects. There is no longer any connection with the linear story, but it opens a new path for thinking with the whole. In this concern, relinking the collapsed actual images with the life emerges as a progressing event, a process of connecting them with the whole getting ahead of the narrative. Yet, that is not an 'ultra-filmic' event, that means beyond the film, which may sound irrelevant to the film, but a linking activity of the spectator with the beyond; in other words, pro-filmic thought is a relinkage proceeding the film further, into the whole. In this concern, pro-filmic thinking is a process of re-creation of bonds between the film and the life, and that linkage is not outside of the process of filmic event. Therefore, it is not simply an 'ultra-filmic' activity, but it attributes to the linking process in-between the film and the life beyond the frame.

As for clarification and prudence, there is a critical distinction to bear in mind between 'pro-filmic thinking' that I propose and 'profilmic space' already used in film studies. The former prefix comes from Latin and the latter from Greek. In this context, the prefix 'pro-' is borrowed from Greek to accurately refer to "in front of" the camera (Dalgish, 1997:587). Therefore, in film studies, profilmic space refers to '[t]he slice of the world in front of the film camera; including protagonists and their actions, lighting, sets, props, and costumes, as well as the setting itself' that would not necessarily appear on the silver screen but exist in the axis of the camera. (Kuhn, 2012, *Oxford Dictionary of Film Studies*: 989). Concordantly, a profilmic element denotes any component of the audiovisual image located in front of the camera, including diegetic sound, even before recording. For in-studio productions, the profilmic event implies a set constructed for filming. On the other side, some forms like direct-cinema could be an actual location, in which the filmmaker could try exploring and preserving 'the integrity of the real-life space and time of the profilmic event' by preferring on location-shots as regularly seen in Italian Neorealism (ibid). In this context, profilmic space could attribute to the actual space in the viewpoint of the camera(s). In addition, a 'profilmic event' could be a spontaneous incident in front of the camera during the shooting. That happening does not require a cut because it is still harmonious with the filmic universe and its verisimilitude. For example, if someone or something such as a person, a cat, or a balloon simultaneously enters the mise-en-scène without any contrary effect on the pre-determinant purpose of the shooting script, re-take is not necessary; therefore, that person or object cited as the profilmic one. Briefly, the main distinction relies on the different etymological roots originating from Latin and Greek. In film studies, the Greek prefix refers to the elements in front of the camera lens

such as set, lighting, diegetic sound, actors and actresses, and the location may contain real-life people and events. To underline, I use the prefix 'pro-' from Latin to mark the three aspects of cinema-thinking during the spectatorship beyond the pre-determinant response. Those characteristics of pro-filmic thought pertain to producing virtual links between the film and life, the substitution of contemplation for the narrative, and proceeding thought into the open whole within the continuous process of spectatorship.

Filmmakers and spectators have something in common, they both watch the film and engender pro-filmic thoughts but in different ways. Filmmakers see the rough shots with potentialities, unlike the closed final draft. It is explicit that the difference relies on the ontology of the actual and the virtual. The filmmaker's pro-filmic thinking during the production has different virtual quality since the film is still open to new ideas to actualize while the final draft implies the utmost actualized product. Moreover, when discussing cinema as a pre-verbal system of images and signs, the creation of audiovisual thought becomes problematic since it is irreducible to spectatorship. In other words, there is also another side of cinema-thinking that attributes to intuitive and strategic thinking by filmmakers. In other words, there is also another side of cinema-thinking that attributes to intuitive and strategic thinking by filmmakers. In other words, the two distinctive but irreducible cinematographic thoughts arousing during the filmmaking process, such as cinematographic thinking with the potentialities of the idea and the intuitive act of creative thinking. The former pertains to potentialities specific to the cinematic medium and requires analytical thinking to plan and structure. It stems from the fact that a cinematic idea could come across with its engagement and potentials specific to the medium (Deleuze, 1987). Furthermore, the latter plays a crucial role in the ineffable side of cinematic production. That is another sort of creative thinking which depends on intuition. For example, a director can intuitively know that the shots are not good enough and necessary to shoot again without being able to explain why. Also, some directors like auteurs have direct authority to spontaneously change the shooting script and give actors room for improvisation or intuitively capture the inner rhythm of the moment in a shot that they never planned. That is briefly a spontaneous way of thinking that is different from the well-planned and structured cinematographic idea; those are two sides to cinema-thinking in production: strategic and intuitive.

In short, I problematize that the notion of cinema-thinking has critical distinctions in kind between filmmaking and spectatorship. This study is fundamentally designed to address this problem of irreducibility. That is in-between pre-determinant response and pro-filmic thought

in spectatorial activities, furthermore on the filmmaker's side, cinematographic thinking of engendering movement/duration blocks through the strategic and intuitive way of thinking. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the implications of the interrelated relationship between filmmaking and spectatorship in terms of the different sorts of cinematic thoughts. In this concern, before referring to specific film techniques and intuitive tendencies, it is necessary to initially trace Deleuze's film philosophy back to the philosophy of Henri Bergson and then Charles Sanders Peirce's semiology to define the key terms and concepts of Cinema books, to specify the domain in which cinematographic thoughts engendered.

I

The division between movement-images and time-images is fundamentally inspired by the philosophy of Henri Bergson. The primary philosophical theme of Bergson relies on the distinction in kind between 'spatialized time' and 'duration.' The former represents scientific unity as space-time, measurable and objective, and the latter refers to a relative, internal time belonging to the human consciousness. Through this distinction, Bergson develops his method to evaluate the process between material reality and perception. Bergson writes *Matter and Memory* (1896) is 'frankly dualistic' because it confirms "both the reality of matter and the reality of spirit" (MM: vii). Nevertheless, the method of Bergson is neither monist nor dualist per se, yet it is the method of 'intuition,' serves for 'the re-formation of a monism' through a temporary dualism in favor of pluralism, in which the problem of matter and spirit "must converge at the end of their different processes, all the way to the case of aphasia" (B: 29-30). In other words, Bergson problematizes monistic thoughts of materialism as well as of idealism by revealing the multifaceted interactions between matter and mind, image and duration since "truth itself [...] will be reached if two of them can be prolonged to the point where they intersect" (ibid) (Bergson 1946, *Creative Mind*). Articulately, on the one hand, the materialist ontology perceives matter as the only reality in which mind and consciousness come into existence through the former. The idealist ontology, on the other hand, proposes that the mind is the progenitor. Hence the matter is subordinated to consciousness, ideas, and thoughts, for instance. In this concern for Bergson, "theory of knowledge and theory of life" are inseparable from each other. Therefore it is inevitable to conjoin the two inquires through "a circular process, push each other unceasingly" (CE: xii). In brief, Bergsonian pluralism can be understood following the univocity of Being and Time, and through the multi-directional relationships between matter and mind; body and consciousness; sensory-motor system and spontaneous thought; space and time; movement and duration; and eventually between the

actual and virtual. That is, multiplicity is inherently wholistic; it is “One, in conformity with its type of multiplicity” (B: 85) (a discussion also explored in depth by Deamer 2016: 5–15, 70-73). I regard the dualism as a fractal in structure, ‘each part of which has the same statistical character as the whole; that is, the same recurring patterns of matter, image, body, sensory-motor logic, can be continually observed on that same actual side of the tree at smaller scales. Memory, duration, consciousness, ‘the reality of spirit’ are on the virtual side of the fractal tree. In other words, the exchange between actual and virtual can happen in a variety of ‘circular’ processes, which repeat similar patterns within themselves. Briefly, dynamic interactions and mutual relationships between matter and memory play a fundamental role in Bergsonian dualism for the sake of monism, the absolute reality, that attributes to the primary genealogy of Deleuze’s Cinema books as the roots of the cinematic images and signs. In this regard, it is necessary to clarify what matter and image mean for Bergson to define the actual and the virtual in favor of better comprehension of the distinction between two regimes of cinematic images, movement-images, and time-images.

As for ‘image’, it is neither solely a picturesque depiction of a thing nor merely a material thing itself but rather germinates both characteristics in inter-exchange. Henri Bergson writes:

[B]y ‘image’ we mean a certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing, -an existence placed halfway between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’. This conception of matter is simply that of common sense [...] For common sense, then, the object exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but a self-existing image (MM, vii-viii) (Deamer 2016).

Image for Bergson is neither ‘a representation’ nor ‘a thing’, but in between, has both characteristics in some respects. Image refers to an intermediary existence between idealist and realist understandings, in which it must be considered as two-folded such as the object is perceived, and the subject itself is present. Therefore, image is not only a pictorial representation of a thing, nor a thing itself, yet employs both inter-exchangeable features within their correspondences. Concordantly, ‘an aggregate of images’ refers to what ‘matter’ is, according to Bergson (MM, vii).

‘Matter’ is an assemblage of images, which are to be divided into actual and virtual. For Deleuze, both the actual and the virtual are real, yet the latter does not have a concrete form, whereas the former refers to material existence. They have a mutual relationship that is fundamentally coherent with the division between matter (bodies, brains) and memory (consciousness, spirit). Spontaneous thought is the virtual towards the actual, ‘not a

consequence of the movements of matter,' rather 'a perspective towards the movements of matter' (Deamer, 2016). In this concern, virtuality refers to filtering the actual matter through consciousness. Therefore, the actual matter endures in memory as part of consciousness within its internal duration, becoming its virtual correlates. Deamer refers to this relationship:

The virtual is the realm of consciousness which is actualised in the body and its brain as memory-images, with affects, with perceptions, with actions. Memory is actualised through the sensory-motor system; and the duration of the actual movements of matter endure only through becoming virtual. (2016:11)

To put it another way, two kinds of images constitute two-folded and irreducible association with the thing and its representation in mind. Virtual aspects towards actual matters appear in the realm of consciousness in duration. 'Body' and brain are the concrete forms of actuality via their sensory-motor system. The sensory-motor system is particularly significant as the actual system of consciousness perceiving the matter. It represents the integration of the motor and sensory nervous system standing for the system of the body that primarily refers to material life and the world in comprehensive space and chronological time. Body and mind have mutually dynamic and temporal relations, which occur as images and vibrate within themselves, within their fractal structure. Even though matter and memory are inseparable in fact, as the division between space and time is scientifically impossible, it gives us virtual perspectives towards the dynamic relations in actual unity of space-time; articulately, space as spatialized time, and time as temporalized space (Table 1).

Sensory-motor system	Pure memory
space	time
... or rather, spatialised time	... or rather, temporalised space
movement	duration
matter (bodies, brains)	consciousness (spirit, soul)
image	thought
actual	virtual

Table 1.1: Bergson's correlates of 'the sensory-motor system and pure memory' (2016: 9)

As it is seen in the visualization of Bergsonian division by David Deamer, images have both virtual and actual characteristics which correlate each other and within each other, both vertically and horizontally, between sensory-motor system and pure memory, as well as pure memory and its duration, in more broadened domain actual and virtual. Concomitantly, movement-images and time-images can be readily considered as the branches of the same tree. Those are movement and duration, space and time, the actual image and its virtual correlate

that engenders cinematic thought. Shortly, 'image' refers to an intermediary existence in-between a thing and its representation, whereas 'matter' is an assemblage of images that has both actual and virtual characteristics interchanging within the process of interaction.

Movement-images and time-images together are the univocal multiplicity of images and signs, and the difference can be revealed through the mutual and multi-faceted relationship between the two regimes. Movement-images refer to matter images that are directly compatible with the sensory-motor system. Articulately, cinema of the movement-image tends to create a juxtaposition of images in comprehensive space and chronological time, in which memory and thought are engendered under the sensory-motor system. In other words, the film has the pretense of a coherent closed system with its verisimilitude. Thus, the perception of the audience is easily determined by the central characters. Point of view shots with the main characters can allow the spectator to identify with them to a certain extent. Thus, the character's perception, action, and affection can be easily followed by the sensory-motor scheme. In this context, images of time are indirect time images since they are chronologically justified in a coherent space; as well as memory and dream images are always diegetic, well explained by the motivated shots under its narrative logic. For instance, we follow a central character who dreams in a sequence being composed of dream images. At first glance, we may not be sure whether it is real or imaginary. Yet, cinema of movement-images shows the diegetic motivation as soon as the character awakes from her sleep. We no longer feel confused about which shots or sequences are actual or virtual since explanatory images directly link us with the character's sensory-motor logic and the film's narrative. In short, movement-images are fully adaptable to the sensory-motor system, and images of time, dream, perception, affection, and action on the main character's comprehensible environment with the construction of a chronological time.

On the other hand, the direct time-image tends to completely break the actual image (on-screen image) through its virtual correlates. At that moment, the actual image can no longer explain the virtual image under the sensory-motor scheme or narrative logic as dream sequences in the movement-image, for example. It does not connect the previous actual image to its actual correlates. That is the crisis of the movement-image, heralding a new kind of image, time-image 'in the absence of pre-determined trajectory' (Rudowick, 1997: 75). It becomes necessary to associate the actual image with its virtual correlates. The on-screen image becomes incompatible with the sensory-motor trajectory, and its virtual correlates create a

crystalline structure in which time-image manifests itself in the vagueness between actual and virtual images. In other words, time-image comes across with cracks on the surface of everyday life, on the sensory-motor logic via circuits, gaps, and disparities between events. Time-image narration (chronosigns) de-links the actual images and makes their virtual correlates indiscernible from each other. In this crystalline state, narration rejects telling a unitary truth; there is no more pretense to the truth. The image requests to be re-connected, to be interpreted by the spectator. Hence, time-image eventually engenders pure spontaneous thought in their mind. The transitivity between the actual and the virtual images leads to a proliferation of possibilities for interpretations. The actual image and its virtual correlates become indistinguishable from each other and become crystallized. This crystalline state is the very foundation of time-image to give rise to infinite alternatives to contemplate. Lack of actual tie between the images creates circuit and shock in some respects, which results in cinematic thinking. Yet, it is not the thought of filmmakers, but it is an 'unthought' of the film since classical narrative logic is abandoned with reluctance to narrate. That is a gap to be filled in. Therefore, cinematic thought is a creation of spectators in which they connect matter images with their memories. Deleuze calls that domain lectosigns, in which thought becomes us through re-linking the image with the whole, with our pure memories; that is the pure virtual domain. In this regard, the semiotic taxonomy of signs by Charles Sanders Peirce plays a crucial role in grounding the lectosigns and the division between matter images and thought images.

Deleuze refers to Charles Sanders Peirce so as to classify and distinguish movement-images and time-images as the taxonomy of signs. Deleuze's Bergsonian approach to cinema thus becomes sufficient as far as the interrelated nature between matter and memory is concerned. In other words, Peirce's semiotics attributes to the 'matter' of Cinema books, whereas Bergson to the 'memory'; 'image' and 'thought'. Peirce contributes to well-determining the images as the signs (the matter) of the Bergsonian dualism. In this context, there are five fundamental signs of time-images, borrowed from Peirce, that can be dualistically approached since the two signs are the core similar with the distinction between the actual and the virtual. Those two are the pure actual images as 'opsigns and sonsigns' on the one side, and their pure virtual correlates as 'lectosigns' on the other side. In other words, the former is the initial ground on which the actual image can no longer relate to its actual correlates, opsigns-and-sonsigns, which refer to pure optical and sound situations directly attributing to their virtual correlates. The torn on the sensory-motor system leads to a crisis of movement-image through a failure

on perception-image. Henceforth, the actual image no longer serves for perception, affection, and action but opens a way for its virtual correlates. In this context, opsigns and son signs become representative of purest zero-ness as 'the negative condition of the upsurge of the new thinking image' via its virtual correlates. (C1: 215). Hence, the ground for the crystallization of actual and virtual images is named opsigns and sonsigns. Lectosigns come across when the film requires active readership, as the common boundary of all time-images as the final aspect of direct time-image. The pure-optical and sound images require to be associated with their virtual coordinates in that domain. In this concern, cinematic thought is not engendered as a pre-determinant response, but the break on the actual image creating the open; the whole involving our life and pure virtual connections stemming from their memories and thought. That is, cinematic thought, resulting from the crack on the actual image, becomes the virtual memory of us, the possibility to think the life itself in the domain of pure virtual correlates called as lectosigns connecting us to the domain of the whole is 'the open' relating back to 'time or even spirit', 'to pure memory and the virtual' (C1:17) (2016, 164). In brief, 'the pure opsigns-and-son signs' and 'pure virtual lectosigns' are the two fundamental branches of the Bergsonian dualism between image and thought, the actual and the virtual. Lectosigns, in this regard, embodies a pure virtual plain for the spectator's procreative thought occurring not as a pre-determinant univocal thought but rather as pro-filmic creations in which multiplicities of pure virtuality and pure optical images engender an assemblage in harmony with our own subjective and collective memories (C2: 245-279).

The interplay between opsigns and lectosigns are performed by the interrelated composition of hyalosigns, chronosigns, and noosigns; respectively means description, narration, and narrative of time-images. Crystal-images equals with hyalosigns and refers to fragmental images which emerge as the description of time-images. After the actual-image cuts off its sensory-motor link, the on-screen image can no longer relate to its actual correspondence but the virtual one. When virtual correlates of the actual image become indiscernible from the latter, the imaginary from the real, past from the present; the image becomes crystallized with its multiplicities. In this regard, hyalosigns occur in three different ways: 'face to face', 'limpid and opaque', and 'seed and milieu'. The first crystal description, called 'face to face', stems from the indistinguishability between simultaneities of different presents, that are the catoptric fragments as multiple facets on different presents. The second type of description, 'limpid and opaque' refers to the ambiguities between impenetrable past, which is virtual, and actual present. This kind of crystalline description is related to the inaccessibility to the past in the

actual present, which is also constantly becoming past. The third type of description emerges as the indiscernibility between indeterminate, virtual future, and actual milieu (2016, 147-150). Therefore, the interpenetration between actual and virtual come across between the environment and the future, as the earth and seed. Briefly, these three sorts of crystalline descriptions occur as a result of the interpenetration of actual and virtual from three perspectives of time such as the present, past, and future. That are respectively ‘face to face’ between multiple presents, inaccessible past and actual present, and virtual present and actual environment.

As for chronosigns, three syntheses of time similarly play a fundamental role in differentiating three characteristics of time-image narration, from the perspectives from present, past, and future. ‘Peaks of present’ are the simultaneities of multi-layered, heterogenous presents whereas and ‘sheets of past’ mean pure pastness of non-casual events, which ricochet backward and upwards to discover time itself. In this concern, memory does not serve for coherent space but rather in order of non-chronological time. Fundamentally, the first two chronosigns are the coalescence of hyalosigns to constitute narration out of the linear order. The third one, named as ‘power of the false’, is the narration ceases claiming to be true in which not only plays havoc with the chronological time but also discovers a serial form of time in harmony with repetitive motifs, themes, plans, and so on. ‘Power of the false’ has no pretense to telling a unitary truth, it is not only self-reflexive but also denies narrating pseudo-reality, and eventually forms its narration from the perspective of serial powers. In this context, the present is “a product of past, and future a consequence”, in which rejecting to narrate the truth opens the possibilities for thinking beyond the on-screen image. (C2: 133). Hence, events, themes, and motifs can come across repetitively, even as leitmotifs in serial form rather than in order of time. In short, the narration of time-image has fractal nature with its description, chronosigns and crystal-images intermingle within each other. The former is the coalescence of the latter from the perspective of the present, past, and future as ‘peaks of presents’, ‘sheets of past’ as well as ‘power of the false’.

When it comes to the narrative signs of time-image, noosigns are the dissonant images as bodies and the world to engender story in the mind of spectators. The disparity between actual and virtual images leads to crystallization, and the coalescence of crystal images generates chronosigns in order and serial form of time. The absence of actual links creates gaps and a non-chronological form of time in its narration. Owing to this sort of gap and circuits on the sensory-motor logic, the spectator starts looking for a meaning to reconnect images in the mise-

en-scène. In this regard, *mise-en-scène* refers to the ‘cinema of the brain’, a ‘cerebral space’, the world containing everything that is seen and heard, for example, the set, background, lighting, color, and so on (C2: 211). The body existing in the world has two aspects as ‘gests’ and ‘attitude’. ‘The body of attitude’ refers to a non-acting body with its ‘daily attitude’ whereas ‘the body of gest’ as a ‘ceremonial body’ exercises ‘a direct theatricalization of bodies’ (C2:191-194). Such bodies can be thought beyond the script, and have precedence over the plot, in which narrative serves for the plurality of individuals, people, and worlds. *Mise-en-scène* becomes a ‘cerebral space’, a ‘noosphere’, in which every image is conceived as an image of thought. That pertains to the thought of the beholder since the film itself does not think; it just produces a sphere to stimulate the nervous system in favor of thinking, stemming from the disparity between bodies and their environments (C2: 205-211). In this concern, the film makes the spectator think of the whole through connecting its pure virtual correlates, with our memory intermingling with external reality in a reciprocal noosphere, in which noosigns and lectosigns intertwine each other. That is, the story is created by the spectator in an infinitely open plain. In brief, noosigns are the relations between body and world, cosmos and brain, actors and *mise-en-scène*, in which coalescence of images stops to narrate around a central character’s guidance but exist as bodies with attitude and gests in the landscapes becoming the mental states.

To sum up, signs of time-images are fractals that come across as the result of the relationships between actual and virtual following Bergsonian dualism. Cinema fundamentally consists of matter images classified as actual and virtual images. Crystal-image (hyalosigns) emerges as the description when the on-screen image cannot comply with the sensory-motor system. In this concern, the actual image cannot relate to its actual correlates but refers to its virtual correspondences; that is the pure optical-and-sonic signs pave the ground for the generation of time images. The combination of crystal images engenders time-image narration in order and serial of time called chronosigns. Concomitantly, both narration and description of time-images have three circuits from the perspective of the present, past, and future. Noosigns become the narrative of time-image in which the story is not actualized on the screen but virtually goes in the mind of the spectator. Actors as bodies with attitude and gest do not guide to narrate; however, they exist as parts in the *mise-en-scène*, in ‘cerebral space’ which opens ‘noosphere’ as the fractal of the pure virtual domain of lectosigns (C2). To paraphrase, a fragmental crystal image is a shot capturing the world and its bodies. Coalescence of that images as narration also has similar patterns within its structure and within the image itself.

Similar patterns repeat themselves at both grand and molecular scales. In other words, crystal images (hyalosigns) and chronosigns are perfect matryoshka dolls. Moreover, the mise-en-scène and bodies of noosigns are not out of the crystal images; it has mutual interactions with the description and its narration. Therefore, all signs interrelate to each other. Opsigns and lectosigns are two fundamental sides of time-images and signs as pure actuality and pure virtuality, in which hyalosigns, chronosigns, and noosigns interact with and within each other. To illustrate, noosigns resemble the neurons inside the brain; chronosigns refer to neural pathways constituted in which an adaptation to the paradigm shift becomes inevitable. That is the plasticity of the brain in the pure virtual domain of lectosigns to make new connections. Paradigm shift emerges as the initial ground of time-images with pure optical-and-sonic images, but the neuroplasticity engendering new paths for re-connection is the pure virtual. Paradigm shift emerges as the initial ground of time-images in the domain of pure optical and sonic images but the neuroplasticity engendering new paths for re-connection is the pure virtual. All images and signs together engender disunity and circuit on the sensory-motor system or even shock to it, which leads to pro-filmic thought when the film itself requests to be interpreted in the domain of lectosigns. The spectator is forced to take part in the film body through creating new neural pathways via the brain's plasticity towards the whole, as the vibrating neurons as pure memory beyond the actual images in the domain of the open, the pure virtual. In other words, cinematic thought which relinks the actual images with their virtual correlates cannot be reduced into univocal thought but rather comes across as an infinite number of interpretations with the subjective memory and consciousness of the beholder. Cinematic thought has something more than a univocal, a pre-determinant thought established by the filmmaker, that is pro-filmic creation of the audience in the pure virtual domain of lectosigns. In this concern, it is necessary to keep in mind that the filmmakers are also spectators in which their 'pro-filmic thinking' could turn into 'cinematographic ideas' resulting in new productions. That is a fractal pattern that repeats itself at different scales. Therefore, the dualism between the spectator and filmmaker concerning cinema-thinking is temporary, which occurs in different processes with distinctive characteristics interweaving with each other in certain respects, in favor of cinematic monism. At first, philosophers, film lovers, film critics, and filmmakers are also spectators. The virtual 'pro-filmic thought' during spectatorship could result in cinematographic or philosophical ideas being actualized in accordance with the specific potentials of the mediums. Philosophers create concepts while filmmakers engender images. 'Cinematic concepts' affect the next interpretations of the film, and 'crystal images' lead to an eternal openness to constantly absorbing them in the domain of lectosigns. Thus,

cinematic lectorship refers to the interpretation, active readership of the crystal images in the pure virtual domain to re-connect them with the whole. That is pro-filmic thought proceeding the film beyond the frame, connecting with the life itself. In short, 'pro-filmic thought' is a virtual link between the image and life itself.

II

Deleuzian taxonomy of images and signs is apparently useful to specify the domain in which cinema engenders pre-determinant and pro-filmic thought in the mind of the spectator. The distinction in kind has currently become explicit in terms of cinematic thought emerging during spectatorship. However, when discussing cinema as a 'pre-verbal' system of images and signs, the creation of audiovisual thought becomes problematic in terms of the inseparable multiplicities of cinematic processes between filmmaking and spectatorship. In this regard, I aim to problematize the interconnected nature of the cinematographic thought of filmmakers with the pre-determinant and pro-filmic thought of the spectators. As spectators could create pro-filmic thoughts beyond the actual images with their virtual correlates, some filmmakers have a great tendency towards connecting their actual lives with the virtual fiction film. In other words, the open whole becomes the meeting point to reconnect the virtual with the actual life in the domain of lectosigns. Some filmmakers pave the path for lectosigns for the sake of the open, the life, to connect it with the film during the process of production. For example, extra-diegetic information regarding the actual life of filmmakers could enter through that crack in which the spectators relink the actual images with their virtual memories which are also connected to the whole. Briefly, cinematic thought is two-folded, and it is inevitable to investigate the filmmaker's way of thinking to actualize cinematic ideas.

Cinematographic thinking can be regarded as the process in which ideas are captured by filmmakers. This sort of thinking is fundamentally related to the process of film production. In this concern, I propose two types of cinematographic thinking such as analytical/strategic and intuitive in accordance with Bergson's method of intuition that is explained in the method section. The former refers to systematic thinking to actualize cinematic ideas, which can be perceived as very well-structured, predetermined but not spontaneous thinking throughout the production. Most big-budget productions are dominated by this kind of cinematographic thinking. The latter, filmmakers' intuitive thinking, belongs to the irreducible part captured in cinema which is a 'pre-linguistic' system of audiovisual expression. Articulately, intuitive thinking of filmmakers refers to the spontaneous act of creation during the shooting, editing,

and writing processes, as well as specific tendencies towards making time itself ‘tangible’. Hence, the creation of audiovisual images and thoughts gains effable forms of cinematic expression that is irreducible to the text but could only be noted occurring as temporary actualization for the sake of the utmost aim; that is to exhibit on the silver-screen. Cinematographic thinking of creators must be discussed in their own processes, that could be readily followed in relation to actualization process of the virtual ideas in which constantly breeds each other within each other until the final cut. In short, it is necessary to discuss the cinematographic thought of filmmakers since the process of cinema-thinking is inseparable from its process of creation, in which analytical and intuitive thinking of filmmaking interpenetrates concerning the actualization of cinematic ideas.

Deleuze asks in the seminar called *What is the Creative Act?* (1987), “[w]hat is it to have an idea in cinema?” Afterward, he states that “ideas in cinema can only be cinematographic” since ideas inherently rely on their own fields with specific types of potentialities (1987). Therefore, a cinematic idea must be thought with its engagement with the cinematic process in which virtual potentialities become actualized. Concomitantly, intuitive thinking in cinematic production and its simultaneous moments play an essential role in engendering cinematic images and thoughts, that fundamentally appear in three processes: pre-production, shooting, and post-production. These so-called ‘pre’ and ‘post’ productions are both are different types of productions including cinematographic ideas and intuitive acts of creation. Therefore, pre and post prefixes should not misguide since cinematographic ideas are produced and actualized in both processes, which include distinctive simultaneities of filmmaking idiosyncratically belonging to the medium. For instance, when writing the script, scenes must be written with images in which events reveal themselves in juxtaposed images in their process without any need for verbal guidance. Without any doubt, fancy words must be avoided to focus on the audiovisual images. Even in the most intense writing activity in film production, cinema writers think of images as blocks of movement/duration. Therefore, it can be readily asserted that the cinematographic ideas are not fully actualized on the paper since it is still mediatory; the silver screen is the final point in which cinematographic ideas arouses with its unique potentialities with movement and time images on the screen.

Filmmakers produce audiovisual images as movement/duration blocks in order to create the story and thought. With time-image narration (chronosigns), some directors crack the classical narrative logic through opening a pure virtual domain (lectosigns), thus they could invite the

audience to participate in the story creation of the film (noosigns) with their own memories. In this regard, if the spectator is a philosopher, the pure virtual correlates referring to her memory may engender a philosophical idea, which would result in the invention of cinematic concepts; or might lead to cinematographic ideas if she is a filmmaker to shoot a film. There is a subtle connection between having an idea and pro-filmic thinking. In other words, pro-filmic thought could lead to ideas that have specific types of potentialities relating to the fields. Actualized philosophical or cinematographic ideas, in turn, can come across as non-diegetic elements to affect the process of interpretation during spectatorship.

In the seminar, Deleuze also emphasizes that thinking is not only intrinsic to philosophy and every field has its unique thinking mechanism. Then Deleuze underlines the precedence of filmmakers and film critics to predominately think of cinema:

The only people capable of thinking effectively about cinema are the filmmakers and film critics or those who love cinema. (Deleuze, 1987)

Intermedial aspects of film production require another perspective approaching the creation of cinematic thought from the audiovisual perspective. In this concern, I am willing to refer to two writer-filmmakers, Andrei Tarkovsky and Paul Schrader since they have remarkable insights and veracious filmmaking experiences. Schrader's essay *Rethinking Transcendental Style* (2018) and some parts from Tarkovsky's diaries *Time Within Time* (1994), and his book *Sculpting in Time* (1987) were chosen to investigate the implication of two kinds of cinema thinking and their cooperation to capture images. Intuitive thinking, and systematic thinking toward a cinematographic idea, involve a plurality of productions and irreducible in multiple aspects. The former refers to the plasticity of filmmaking to spontaneously alter the plan whereas the latter structural organization a long time in advance. In brief, Schrader's and Tarkovsky's and approaches to filmmaking can be readily used to address the problem of intermediality because both are writers and directors, in which they have significant insight and unmediated filmmaking experience.

First, Paul Schrader is very useful to comprehend filmmaker's part of cinema-thinking during production to create the pure virtual domain of lectosigns. Schrader reveals that some directors like Robert Bresson, Carl Theodor Dreyer, and Yasujirō Ozu figured out some common distancing devices to create an 'uneasy' situation in which the spectator must solve the 'disparity'. That is, "an actual or potential disunity" between the central character and the world, where the spectator must eventually accept "an alternate film reality - a transcendent

one”; ‘stasis’ (TSF: 75-80). In other words, this ‘stasis’ stemming from the ‘disparity’ happens in the domain of lectosigns, in which the spectator participates in the film through cinema-thinking, re-connecting the delinked images as what Deleuze puts. Therefore, it can be readily asserted that Paul Schrader was interested in the other side of the coin; the cinematic style producing cinematic thought, 13 years before *Cinema 2: Time-Image* was published. It is quite interesting since the filmmaker's part to engender cinematographic thought can be readily investigated with the help of Schrader, who recently reviewed his theory and explained where it could fit in his essay *Rethinking Transcendental Style* (2018). Schrader evaluates Deleuze’s *Cinema* books and perceives his theory as a part of time-image as well as a ‘precursor’ of ‘slow cinema’. Then, Schrader refers to the four criteria listed by Harry Tuttle to clarify what ‘slow cinema’ means, such as “plotlessness, wordlessness, slowness, and alienation” encapsulating many different terms as contemplative, ‘stasis’, landscape, mediative, austere, ‘transcendental’ and so on (TSF: 10). The fundamental tendency is to retard time to reverse the narrative tendency of classical cinema, in which time itself becomes a story or/and its central element (ibid). Articulately, slow cinema assesses how time influences cinematic images. Concordantly, Schrader explains some slow cinema techniques, which are also compatible with transcendental style, such as off-set or delaying edits (in Deleuzian term it refers to ‘non-rational’ cut), long-takes, wide angles, static frame, minimal coverage, non-acting, minimal dialogue, color and so on (TSF:11-16). When thinking about the techniques of ‘slow cinema’ in accordance with the main components of ‘transcendental style’, that are disparity, the everyday, decisive action, and stasis; it becomes possible to see the technical and stylistic connections with Deleuzian cinema-thinking towards temporal tendencies in filmmaking. In this concern, Schrader’s revisit of his theory 45 years later paves the way for better comprehension as to how to approach the filmmaking side of cinematographic thinking to engender lectosigns.

As for a possible counterpoint to spontaneous and intuitive acts of creation, some would argue that all the process of big-budget productions is strictly determined a long time in advance. The role of producers has a great effect on the process since every product has an economic aspect. Thus, according to this view, there is no time and money to intuitively experiment. In this kind of productions, script, storyboard, shooting plan, acting, post-production, and even distribution might represent a quasi-closed system. I agree with them to a certain extent, yet there are also independent film productions paving the field for simultaneous creation and intuitive improvisation in filmmaking. Some films, especially made by writer-directors

(auteurs), who have full authority to spontaneously change shooting script, or let actors improvise, shoot unexpected sequences and even alter all meaning of the film at the montage desk. In this context, unique styles have come across mostly in a small but very compact crew who can create supplely where the director can simultaneously and intuitively think. It is my contention that cinema's potential has been grasped mostly in supple environments allowing simultaneities that are idiosyncratic to the form. In this concern, I will divide captured cinematic thought into two parts such as schematic application of a pre-determinant cinematographic idea and intuitive act of creative thinking. In other words, cinematographic thinking in film production is also two-folded: analytical and intuitive thinking.

When it comes to the intuitive act of filmmaking, Tarkovsky's notion of 'time-pressure' plays a critical role in elaborating on. For Tarkovsky, what makes cinema art is its direct relationship with time, its duration per se. He makes an analogy and compares cinema with other arts to reveal that time is the most fundamental element for film art, that is critical as much as color in painting, sound in music, text in literature (ST). In this regard, time that 'runs through the shot' is the matrix of Tarkovsky's intuitive and poetic style. Tarkovsky writes in *Sculpting in Time*:

Time, imprinted in the frame, dictates the particular editing principle; and the pieces that 'won't edit'—that can't be properly joined—are those which record a radically different kind of time. One cannot, for instance, put actual time together with conceptual time, any more than one can join water pipes of different diameters. The consistency of the time that runs through the shot, its intensity or 'sloppiness', could be called time-pressure: then editing can be seen as the assembly of the pieces on the basis of the time-pressure within them. (ST: 117)

In other words, most cinema techniques of Tarkovsky such as framing, long take, camera movements, acting, soundscapes, and editing, are fundamentally determined by unique time-pressure that is captured in a shot. I claim that time-pressure is not a term only for montage but also an intuitive approach towards creating a certain type of rhythm in the mise-en-scène. Therefore, Tarkovsky, as an auteur who has full authority on all the production processes, develops his cinematographic ideas in harmony with the idiosyncratic possibilities of time-pressure. In other words, Tarkovsky intuitively thinks with cinematographic ideas to engender lectosigns cracking open the screen so that time could "make itself felt in a shot":

[Time] becomes tangible when you sense something significant, truthful, going on beyond the events on the screen; when you realise, quite consciously, that what you see in the frame is not limited to its visual depiction, but is a pointer to something stretching out beyond the frame and to infinity; a pointer to life. Like the infinity of the image [...] And it always turns out to have more thought, more ideas, than were consciously put there by its author. Just as life, constantly moving and changing, allows everyone to interpret and feel each separate moment in his own way, so too a real picture, faithfully

recording on film the time which flows on beyond the edges of the frame, lives within time if time lives within it; this two-way process is a determining factor of cinema [...] The film then becomes something beyond its ostensible existence as an exposed and edited roll of film, a story, a plot. (ST: 117-18)

I can readily assert that there is a strong correlation between time-image and time-pressure. 'The infinity of the image' is the pure virtual domain of lectosigns in this regard. 'More thoughts' arouse in the spectator's mind than 'consciously' engendered by the filmmaker; those are pro-filmic thoughts beyond the story. Filmmakers pave the way for the pure virtual domain, and then the spectator takes part in the film as an active interpreter via pure memory. When time becomes 'tangible', the actual images demand to be relinked with the pure virtual correlates. The virtual infinitely affect that which we experience time and absorbing out subjective interpretations. Concordantly, Tarkovsky tends to intuitively think and capture internal time (duration) in a shot through intuition and juxtapose them in harmony with their unique rhythms. Therefore, his temporal tendency plays a fundamental role in his intuitive style with specific film techniques such as long takes, wide angles, slow camera movements, less coverage, and minimal acting.

The intuitive way of filmmaking can be related to searching for the inner rhythm, the duration of the scene and using editing for the sake of connecting the unique, internal time of shots. Spontaneous shooting, slow camera movements, sound usage, minimal acting, minimum coverage, and lesser montage effects serve for that uniqueness of film art, in which time becomes 'tangible' to create the open. In brief, Paul Schrader's reviewed 'transcendental style' with 'slow cinema' strategies (2018), and Andrei Tarkovsky's theory of 'time-pressure', clarifies how can cinema intuitively capture and engender pure spontaneous thought with temporal tendency beyond the screen. In this regard, I aim to investigate the implications of pro-filmic thought in the mind of the spectator relation to intuitive thinking of filmmaking. In other words, with the help of Deleuzian film-philosophy, I apply the Bergsonian method to inspect the multi-directional relationship of filmmaking and spectatorship in terms of cinema-thinking in *Mirror*. Therefore, I can positively state that, my thesis brings new thoughts with new concepts manifesting themselves in interrelations between filmmaking and spectatorship, as well as cinema and film-philosophy.

When discussing cinema as 'pre-verbal' system of images and signs, the creation of cinematic thought can be problematized in terms of the irreducible and interconnected relationship between image and text as well as filmmaking and spectatorship, in which their multiplicities

create the filmic whole. On the one hand, an audiovisual expression beyond the text is possible in cinema. On the other, the spectator's interpretation can be part of the filmic whole to affect spectatorship in turn. That is, thoughts come into spectatorship's mind in the domain of lectosigns, connects us to the whole, which can also turn into philosophical ideas or another kind of ideas with their potentialities in the end. Therefore, pro-filmic cinematic thought can turn into a text affecting the way of interpretation as well. Moreover, the distinction between thoughts engendered in the mind during spectatorship has a direct relationship with filmmaking. In other words, cinematographic thinking has two faces to approach. Therefore, I aim to inspect two-folded cinema thinking between spectatorship and filmmaking without neglecting the problem of irreducibility between image and text. In order to investigate the implications of how it could be possible for the cinematic medium as a 'pre-linguistic' system to transcend the 'given codes in the language' and 'rational monotony', I use Bergson's method of intuition following intermedial approach. Bergsonian intuition is not a gut feeling, it is a method of division with a pre-conceived concept that reality and experience inseparably intermingle with each other. In *Bergsonism* (1989), Deleuze explains the method as a tool of problematizing with 'strict rules' for 'precision':

Intuition is neither a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a fully developed method, one of the most fully developed methods in philosophy. It has its strict rules, constituting that which Bergson calls "precision" in philosophy... We might say, strangely enough, that duration would remain purely intuitive, in the ordinary sense of the word, if intuition - in the properly Bergsonian sense - were not there as method (B: 13).

Intuition, as Bergson evaluates it methodologically, already assumes duration and its vertical connection with the virtuality, with the fundamental division between matter and memory. In other words, matter and memory, actual and virtual, body and mind, real and fiction, are like a matryoshka, have similar fractal characteristics that interpenetrate with each other. This dualism, in an epistemological context, is regarded as the relationship between two sorts of knowledge, absolute and relative. The latter presumes science, analytical research, analyzing films with the perspective of specific theories. The former, in Bergsonian terms, is 'sympathy' to know absolutely through insight with experience. In this concern, the method has three 'strict rules' such as (1) statement of problems, (2) discovery of genuine distinctions in kind, and (3) comprehensions of real-time with its temporal process, duration. Deleuze then states that the problem is 'solved as soon as it is properly stated.' (B:15).

Concomitantly, I aim to properly establish and evaluate the problem of irreducibility between image and text to profoundly comprehend two sides of cinema-thinking. In this concern, (1) I problematize that there is an interrelated and inseparable relationship between spectatorship and filmmaking to engender cinematographic thought. The problem fundamentally manifests itself through different thoughts in kind: (2) pre-determinant and pro-filmic thought in the spectator's mind, and strategic/analytical thinking and intuitive thinking to capture the thought of filmmakers. (3) Therefore, I will try and reveal the inter-connected relation in the process of filmmaking and spectatorship. (Fig.1.1) Nevertheless, cinematic thought during spectatorship could find its output as text or image in constant return. Shortly, with Bergson's method of intuition, I aim to properly evaluate the problem of irreducibility between text and image through the mutual relation between pre-verbal expression and cinematic thought to make new grounds for discussing how pro-filmic thought in the domain of lectosigns re-connects the images to the whole, which is the open, through intuitive ways and idiosyncratic strategies pertaining to the uniqueness of cinematic medium.

With the help of the Bergsonian method, I state the problem of irreducibility in film and differentiate four types of cinema-thinking. In the filmmaker's mind, strategic and intuitive thinking guides to actualize and spontaneously capture cinematographic ideas. Intuition is critical to capturing the duration, the inner rhythm of a shot. Filmmakers can intuitively and strategically create open, the pure virtual domain of lectosigns. Therefore, the spectator joins

Multiplicities of Cinematic Process




Diagram 1.1: Multiplicities of Cinematic Process concerning Cinema-thinking (Left)

Pro-filmic Thinking (Cinematic Lectorship)




Diagram 1.2: Pro-filmic thinking in detail and its fractal nature (Right)

the film by re-connecting the collapsed links of sensory-motor logic as pro-filmic creative thinking. In other words, beyond the pre-determinant response limited by the filmmaker, there is another kind of cinema-thinking as pro-filmic thought autonomously engendered by the spectator. Cinematic thought re-connects the actual images with their virtual correlates cannot be reduced to a pre-determinant response but comes across as an infinite number of interpretations with the subjective memory and consciousness of the spectator. Also, it is necessary to remind that the filmmakers are also spectators in which their 'pro-filmic thinking' could turn into 'cinematographic ideas' resulting in new productions. That is a fractal pattern that repeats itself at different scales (Diagram 1.2-1.3). Hence, the dualism between the spectator and filmmaker regarding cinema-thinking is temporary, which occurs in different processes with distinctive characteristics interweaving with each other in certain respects. It is not a dichotomy but a dualism for the sake of monism in the end. At first, philosophers, film lovers, film critics, and filmmakers are also spectators. The virtual 'pro-filmic thought' during spectatorship could result in cinematographic or philosophical ideas being actualized in accordance with the specific potentials of the mediums. Philosophers create concepts while filmmakers engender images. 'Cinematic concepts' affect the next interpretations of the film, and 'crystal images' lead to an eternal openness to constantly absorbing them in the domain of lectosigns. Thus, cinematic lectorship refers to the interpretation, active readership of the crystal images in the pure virtual domain, to re-connect them with the whole, that is pro-filmic thinking proceeding the film beyond the frame, to the life itself. That is to say, 'pro-filmic thought' is a virtual link between the image and life itself. In brief, there are parts that filmmakers captured spontaneously and intuitively, as well as the spectator's pro-filmic event beyond the filmmaker's thought where the film itself does not think. That is, cinema-thinking with lectosigns stems from the torn on sensory-motor logic. Therefore pro-filmic thought pertains to the spectator's introspection to link.

As for dissemination, this study with the new concepts 'sub-reality' and 'cinematic lectorship', can foster inter-comprehension of collaboration between filmmaking and thinking, also different arts with idiosyncratic audiovisual expressions. The ineffability of the audiovisual arts could be differentiated through these notions and supported by the Bergsonian method of intuition and intermediality. In other words, since it elaborates on both processes of cinema-thinking to pave an alternate way for thought, the thesis can be quite cooperative with interdisciplinary studies to consider. Furthermore, this study can inspire some filmmakers to consider their styles to tend towards no pretense to the pseudo-truths of the dominant

authorities by breaking the sensory-motor logic. Some filmmakers suffering from aphasia, freedom of thinking and speech, can find unique expressions declining to narrate. In short, this study could appeal to the multi-disciplinary examinations of audiovisual arts for the researchers, especially those who get their impetus from intermediality and intuition; and it could be interesting for the filmmakers who pursuit cinematic expression to overcome aphasia.

Nevertheless, there are two crucial limitations to consider beforehand. First, it would be better to analyze more films to evaluate both sides of cinema-thinking, and the second to broaden conceptual framework. For the former, some films by Alain Resnais such as *'Nuit et brouillard'* (1955) and *'Hiroshima mon amour'* (1959) are quite compatible to co-think Deleuzian and Bergsonian concepts with the notion of 'sub-reality' since these films have a direct relationship with the post-war history. Also, they consist of some documentary footage to pave the way for thinking of the whole, the traumatic past, particular space-time in Auschwitz and Hiroshima. In other words, films display the past in the post-war present of France (1950s). Thus, it could be a good idea to investigate since they open the horizons for thinking of life or even questioning its meaning. Similarly, for contemporary examples, Elia Suleiman's self-reflexive silence and the problem of 'uncontested past'^{iv} in Palestinian Issue in many of his films as *Divine Intervention* (2002), and *The Time That Remains* (2009), *'Vals im Bashir'* (2008) by Ari Folman with the direct relation with 'false memory' and with a great emphasis on the impossibility to narrate even to remember a traumatic event, so that the concept of 'sub-reality' seem compatible with these films in terms of spectatorial cinema-thinking to think of the whole. However, the styles of Resnais, Suleiman, and Folman would not be well appropriate to analyze intuitive thinking during production. The intuitive way of creative thinking with virtual cinematographic ideas could suit the films spontaneously thinking with the camera. In this context, it would be a great idea to analyze Naomi Kawase's first autobiographic documentaries called *'Ni tsutmarate'* (1992) and *'Katatsumori'* (1994). In these documentaries, her introspective style is a valid example of intuitive thinking during shooting because of her off-screen voice talking to her grandmother and holding a handheld camera with spontaneous movements. That is simultaneous thinking with the camera. Especially in *'Ni tsutmarate'* means 'being embraced' in passive voice, Kawase seeks to reach her biological mother and father who abandoned her at birth. It is dramatically captivating to follow Kawase's first time talk to her father on the phone when she records with her camera at the same time. We start thinking of the whole, of being embraced and loved by our parents. In many scenes, her actual life, memories, and the film become indiscernible from each other while she

intuitively thinks and talks with the camera. In short, even though there are some suitable films to analyze, it is better to divide them into parts since it is not reasonable to try finding only one movie to focus on four aspects of cinema-thinking between spectatorship and filmmaking. Consequently, peculiarities of cinema-thinking and the sub-reality' could be separately investigated.

For the latter, the conceptual framework would be expanded through Rudolf Arnheim's *Visual Thinking* (1950) as well as Deleuze's *The Logic of Sense* (1969) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980) to more focus on the terms such as 'assemblage' and 'logic of sense' that could provide a deeper comprehension in terms of multiple functionalities interchanging between audiovisual arts and philosophy. Without any doubt, it would contribute to a deeper discussion on intuition and exchangeability with the collaboration between the fields. Thus, the notion of 'lectorship' could match with its root in the intersection between the two disciplines. In brief, there are a lot of different films suit well when they are approached separately, as well as other theories^v and concepts to expand the scope. Yet, I preferred to narrow down the scope to be able to go deeper. Therefore, the primary sources are Cinema books, and I mainly focused on the time-image and chose Tarkovsky's *Mirror* since it is the most suitable film to investigate both sides of cinema-thinking, namely intuitive and strategic thinking by the filmmaker during the production, and 'pre-determinant' and 'pro-filmic thought' by the spectator. In other words, I preferred narrowing down the scope for this study to go deeper and focused on the most remarkable points.

To conclude, I investigate the implication of interrelation between cinematic thoughts with the help of the Bergsonian method of intuition. I refer to some slow cinema strategies, as well as time-images and their signs in *Mirror* to reveal how Tarkovsky's intuitive style relates to two kinds of cinema-thinking. Then discuss whether *Mirror* could create an alternative domain outside grand narratives and repressive ideology of Soviet Russia. The thesis is that cinema as the 'pre-verbal' system can seal 'subjectivity' which is not ours but 'time' itself, captures 'subdued reality' with idiosyncratic cinematic ways like intuitively searching for the 'unique rhythm' in a shot as Tarkovsky does during the filmmaking process of *Mirror*. Cinema gives us the virtual past in the actual present, what may seem unutterable in a specific space-time. Nevertheless, in another but appropriate space-time outside the oppressive ideology, the subdued image of time, which is intuitively sealed in a film, can be read or 'rescued' by lectors with new interpretations as the activity of 'pro-filmic thought'.

2. WHAT IS CALLED *CINEMA-THINKING*?

Deleuze introduces an overall definition by referring to Martin Heidegger to uncover what 'thinking' is. For both Deleuze and Heidegger, thinking discovers 'the essence of the things and time', which has a collective attitude, and it proliferates when there are multiple possibilities. For Heidegger, science does not think since it does not have access to being, to the 'incalculable' or 'meditative thinking' yet stands for the application of certain methods (Dillet, 2013). Therefore, thinking is privileged to the discipline of philosophy that has access to being. Nevertheless, Deleuzian ontology of actual and virtual, contrary to Heidegger, is not solely privileged to philosophy; but every field has its own system of thinking (WP). With his reference to Gilbert Simondon, thinking manifests itself as a 'psycho-collective', as 'an individuating activity' to *link* 'the psychological and the collective' that also fundamentally gives a new perspective towards cinema and thinking (Dillet: 263, 264) (emphasis mine). In this regard, cinema-thinking within the process of spectatorship refers to re-linking images not only with the other images but also with life itself. Pure cinema-thinking appears in 'noosphere' within the domain of 'lectosigns' which requires an active interpretation to reconnect the delinked images with the whole, in turn, our lives with the world. In this concern, I regard this sort of interpretation of the actual images with pure virtual memory as beyond the pre-established narrative, as substitutes for the function of the story. To divide and investigate the implications of the cinematic processes between filmmaking and spectatorship in terms of thinking, I call this sort of creation of cinematic thoughts during spectatorship as 'pro-filmic thought' since it is autonomous production, acting for connects the actual images with the virtual correlates, and proceeds into the whole.

As it has been mentioned above, to designate three outstanding qualities of the peculiar kind of cinema-thinking during spectatorship, I give special attention to employing the prefix 'pro-' from Latin, which already explained the difference from the Greek origin in the introduction (p. 2-7). For reminding^{vi}, 'pro-filmic thinking' principally points to the process in which the audience reconnects the collapsed actual images with the open whole by their virtual memory and consciousness. Besides, 'post-filmic creation' corresponds to the actualization of the virtual 'pro-filmic thought' with inspiration, in a written or an audiovisual form. For instance, Deleuzian film-philosophy can be perceived as the result of multiple lectorship of the films in which his pro-filmic thoughts turn into philosophical ideas in the virtual domain of his consciousness, and lead to 'post-filmic creation' in written form, in turn, affects the posterior readership of the related films. Furthermore, there is a strong correlation between the cinematic

thought of the spectator and the cinematic idea arousing in the mind of filmmakers. Deleuze writes in reference to Rossellini to emphasize the task of an artist:

[T]he less human the world is, the more it is the artist's duty to believe and produce belief in a relation between [the human] and the world because the world is made by [the human] (C2: 171).

There is a tendency towards connecting humans with the world that points to the interrelated relationship between two sides of cinema-thinking: the one on the spectator's mind and the cinematographic idea of the filmmaker. In other words, cinematographic thinking with its unique engagement with the ideas during the production process is another side of cinema-thinking. Shortly, I investigate the implications of the interaction between cinematographic thinking during the filmmaking as well as cinematic thought arousing in the mind of the spectator. Hence, cinema-thinking refers to interconnected multiplicities of the two-process creating an interplay between the filmmaker and spectators. On the one side, filmmakers engender cracks and reject the pretense to a unitary truth. On the other side, spectators attach the de-linked images with their virtual correlates, in turn, to connect ourselves with the world out of the univocal imposed pseudo-truth. In brief, I regard cinema-thinking as a two-folded and inseparable interaction between filmmaking and spectatorship, which leads to different kinds of thought relating to each other at both levels. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate both sides of cinematic thought between spectatorship and filmmaking.

2.1. The Radical Distinction Between Cinematic Thoughts

In addition to the main distinction between spectators and filmmakers, there are fundamental differences in kind for both sides. Those are cinematic thoughts as pre-determinant reactions and pro-filmic creation in the spectator's mind, as well as the cinematographic thinking of engendering movement/duration blocks through the strategic and intuitive way of thinking. In other words, the filmmaker creates movement/duration blocks through strategic and intuitive thinking to pave the path for the open. During all processes of film production (pre-production, shooting, post-production), filmmakers think both strategically and intuitively to capture and engender cinematographic thought. Intuition plays a crucial role in finding idiosyncratic cinematic expression with the creation of images beyond the text, and language in which aphasia may occur. Strategic thinking attributes to creative but analytical acts with well-structured plans. Both intuitive and strategic thinking in filmmaking interpenetrates with each other. On the other side, the spectator follows the sequences to comprehend and construct the coherent story under the sensory-motor logic in her mind, in which the filmmaker's strategies

create univocal thoughts with the juxtaposition of images. That is the pre-determinant thought of the spectator, which has been strategically established by the filmmakers. This direct relationship mostly happens in the cinema of movement-images. Nevertheless, there is an open field for the active creation of thought in the pure virtual domain of the lectosigns established by the cinema of time-image. In this concern, pro-filmic thought refers to a creation stemming from the active interpretation of images with their virtual correlates in order to make the film proceed to another realm of thinking, with the whole which is the open. Articulately, pro-filmic creation in the mind of the spectator occurs beyond the film's narrative, but in relation with the actual images on the silver screen in 'noosphere' in re-place of the filmmaker's thought since it is spontaneously beyond the filmmaker's thought. In other words, it is the active lectorship of the images to connect the fiction with the real, the film with the life *itself*. In this context, before investigating the filmmaking strategies such as intuitive and strategic thinking, I initially layer the specialties of spectatorial thinking in accordance with the movement-images and time-images.

Deleuze differentiates two regimes of cinematic thought engendered in the spectator's mind as in the movement-image and in the time-image, which can be readily called pre-determinant reaction and pro-filmic creation. Deleuze reveals that distinction by borrowing some elements from Martin Heidegger and Antonin Artaud to distinguish the cinematic thought of the time-image from the movement-image, that is conceptualized by Sergei Eisenstein. In the 7th chapter of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze discusses cinematic thought in relation to 'the capability to think', 'the impotence of thinking', and the 'belief in this world' (C2: 156-188). Whereas the former belongs to the movement-image (pre-determinant response), the last two fundamentally belong to the time-image (pro-filmic thought).

In the first part, Deleuze articulates the relationship between cinema and thought at the level of movement-image by citing Eisenstein's model of the three relationships: from image (percept) to concept (thought), from concept to image, and as an identity between them. In other words, thought encounters image and image encounters thought in which they respectively provide a basis for the 'critical', the 'hypnotic' and the 'action-thought' at the level of movement-image. First, for the 'critical thought', the initial moment moves from 'image to concept'. The shock causes thinking through stimulating the nervous system in which automatic movement triggers a spiritual automaton of the spectator. That automatic movement (self-movement) is reached by the cinema as an industrial art; in which "the image moves in

itself.” Concordantly, Eisenstein evaluates whether the paintings of Leonardo da Vinci are cinematographic, which results in that pictorial images are not cinematographic since they are inherently immobile even if they cause thought with their potential movement. The beholder completes the action in her mind, not in the image itself. On the other hand, a cinematographic image itself instinctively ‘makes’ movement. In this sense, cinematographic movement no longer relies on “a moving body, nor an object which realizes it, nor on a spirit which reconstitutes it”, which is neither figurative nor abstract; it is autonomous. (C2: 156) Hence, cinema does not give us a movement added to the image but directly the movement-image. In this concern, the artistic essence of the image is “*producing shock to thought, communicating vibrations to the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly*” through automatic movement leading to “a spiritual automaton in us” (ibid, original emphasis). Therefore, a ‘nooshock’ is one of the essential points to trigger the spectator to think automatically:

Spiritual automaton no longer designates – as it does in classical philosophy – logical or abstract possibility of formally deducing thoughts from each other, but the circuit into which they enter with the movement-image, the shared power of what forces thinking and what thinks under the shock; a nooshock. (C2: 156)

In this context, automatic response under the shock creates thought. Since it is related to the sensory-motor system, cinematic thought must be perceived as a pre-determinant response. In other words, ‘the cerebral shock’, as the ‘neuro-physiological resonances’ in the brain of the spectator, leads her to think of different possibilities. Although there is no guarantee of being capable of thinking, Deleuze deduces, cinema triggers this capacity to think with the shock by arousing ‘the thinker in the beholder’ (C2: 157). That is, “subjective and collective automaton for an automatic movement: the art of the ‘masses’” (ibid). Yet, the shock is not figurative violence of the represented as in ‘bad cinema’, it is rather a ‘sublime’, the conception of cinema. Shortly, the spectator ‘FEELS’ the stimulation which leads to ‘THINK’ the whole of the two contradictory factors. Concordantly, the second moment is complementary to the first one, the movement goes ‘from concept to the image’ in return:

The complete circuit thus includes the sensory shock which raises us from the images the conscious thought, then the thinking in figures which takes us back to the images and gives us an effective shock again.

Therefore, the second movement is inseparable from the first one, returns from concept (thought) to affect (image). Deleuze evaluates it as “a matter of giving ‘emotional fullness’ or ‘passion’ back to the intellectual process.” (C2: 158) Dialectical understanding still plays a crucial role in the relationship between thought and image. At this moment, the correlation

between 'intellectual cinema' and 'sensory thought ('emotional intelligence') is emphasized by Sergei Eisenstein. There is a strong relationship between "the highest form of consciousness" in art and "the deepest form of the subconscious" following two coexisting moments (159). The whole can be considered a dialectical that has a 'dynamic effect' on its own cause in which it is "no longer the logos which unifies the parts", on contrary, it is more like a scattering pathos. Therefore, 'syntactic sequences' are constructed by images as cracks on the surface or 'zig-zags'. Deleuze perceives this as 'a primitive language' (thought) and to 'an internal monologue' ('a drunken' one) which is "much too individual and constitutes the segments or links of a truly collective thought." (ibid). In this sense, the thought in the second moment is named hypnotic-thought because of its half awareness status. Unlike the first moment, here we go from 'the unconscious concept to the material image' in which 'figure image creates shock in turn.

The third moment is 'the identity of concept and image'; "the concept in itself in the image, the image for itself in the concept" (C2: 162). Deleuze describes it as action-thought, rather than being organic or pathetic as in the former moments, it is 'dramatic, pragmatic', and 'praxis'. Action-thought is mainly related to 'monism' and depends on the relationship between humans and the world in a sensory-motor integration of nature (161-162). That is sublime; nature is in perfect harmony with this unity, it is 'non-different' to humans. Consequently, action-thought represents the sensory-motor linkage between nature and thought. Those relations can be briefly explained in three parts: as critical thought triggered by 'nooshock' concerning "a whole which can only be thought in higher awareness"; hypnotic thought can only be shaped in the subconscious unfolding of images; and action-thought as "the sensory-motor relationship between world and man, nature and thought." (163) In short, all three moments fundamentally belong to the movement-image, in which the limits are perfectly determined by the sensory-motor system.

On the other side, Deleuze refers to Artaud and Heidegger to evaluate the relationship between thought and cinema following the paradigm of time-image. As for the impotence of thinking, powerlessness is the core of thinking in this concern. As in all other forms of art, cinema has always been used for every kind of propaganda^{vii}. Deleuze argues that cinema as the spiritual automaton became 'fascist' and was misused by Hitler and Hollywood. Thus, cinema has been dying in many respects. In this regard, Deleuze refers to Artaud, thinking that an image is just an object for the functioning of thought. There is a strong opposition between Eisenstein and

Artaud presupposing that thinking is the innermost reality of the brain but not of the whole. His critical argument attributes to consciousness and to what cinema advances. That is the impower of thought rather than the strength of it. Georges Duhamel, for instance, expresses that he cannot think what he wants anymore, “the moving images are a substitute for” his thoughts (p.166). It is named ‘the theft of thoughts’ that seems a situation of hypnotic ossification. In this concern, the spiritual or mental automaton has become ‘[m]ummy, paralyzed or frozen instance’ verifying “the impossibility of thinking that is thought” (p.166). It is both inabilities to think and to act; it is too much to be able to think. In this concern, “what forces us to think” is ‘the impower of thought’, ‘the figure of nothingness’, ‘the inexistence of a whole’ which can be barely thought (p. 168). The image serves as the ‘suspension of the world’ by ‘disturbance’ when the image is no longer associated with the sensory-motor scheme. This sensory motor torn makes the spectator face something intolerable, the ‘unthinkable in thought’. It resembles a psychic circumstance of the beholder who sees but cannot think naturally within the established sensory-motor logic of the classical narrative cinema. Through the virtue of the absurd is the way by believing in life, as beyond thinking. That comes to the uniqueness of cinematic art that can reveal what is ‘unthinkable’ or unutterable, it has a special relationship with belief. Deleuze puts forward, we lost our 'belief in this world', and cinema must regenerate it, our trust and hope for this universe. For Deleuze, regardless of being ‘Christians’ or ‘atheists’, our belief must be in the world, not in anything “other,” but the flesh, sustaining 'belief' in the body and life (172-73). Henceforth, it could be possible to reconnect humans and the world.

The first aspect for the new thinking cinema relies on the break on the sensory-motor link, and the second depends on abandoning figures (173). Deleuze states that Orson Welles and Alain Resnais introduced a depth of field which opened a new direction in cinema that is ‘theoromatic’ rather than figurative. Moreover, he refers to Artaud who expresses the new tendency towards minimal narrative cinema and claims that ‘cinema of cruelty’ does not tell a story but develops a sequence of spiritual states which are deduced from one to another that “thought is deduced from thought” (174). Deleuze states that kind of cinema is capable of problematizing, being haunted by a question that cannot be answered. The film “puts unthought into thought” due to the break internal order of things: “Thought finds itself taken over by the exteriority of a ‘belief’, outside of any interiority of a mode of knowledge” (176). In other words, it becomes inevitable to think of the external world which is beyond sensory-motor logic. The whole, in this context, is outside in contrary to classical cinema. It is constituted by

the disassociation of the images via dissonance instead of harmony; it is the interstice between actual images. The juxtaposition of images makes each sequence-independent via irrational cuts. Therefore, the break in the unity between the human and the world occurs. Eventually, due to the unthought, the spectator finds herself being left with only the world to reconnect de-linked images or to regenerate belief in this world. Deleuze sums up the new tendencies of modern cinema during the post-war period by three aspects:

[...] the obliteration of a whole or a totalization of images, in favor of an outside which is inserted between them; the erasure of the internal monologue as whole of the film, in favor of a free indirect discourse and vision; the erasure of the unity of man and the world, in favor of a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world. (188)

The film disconnects the man from the world and stops thinking but creates ‘unthought’ the impower of thought under the sensory-motor logic. The image requires an interpretation to be re-linked with the life itself. In this concern, a new kind of ‘thought-image’ stems from the loosening of the sensory-motor linkage through discontinuity supported by irrational cuts. Time-image consequently engenders crystal images leading to a disparity between the actual and the virtual, the human and the world for the sake of problematizing the pretense to the univocal truth. ‘The problem’ that makes us think. Therefore, the cinema gains the power of promoting a new way of thinking through problematizing in the pure virtual domain of lectosigns that gives us possibilities for ‘believing in this world.’

In conclusion, movement-image and time-image have different connections with thinking. Each regime of images has its unique semiotic system of signs in relationship with the sensory-motor system. Eisenstein’s model is mentioned for cinematic thought at the level of movement-image, which is fully adaptable to the sensory-motor logic. ‘Critical’, ‘hypnotic’ and ‘action-thought’ are pre-determinant responses, and they must be paired with the sensory-motor system. Nevertheless, time-images tend to break that system through circuits, gaps, and ‘unthought’ by ‘problematizing’ in which the interpretation is directly demanded (lectosigns). In this regard, thinking is no longer a pre-determinant reaction but pro-filmic creation of the links connecting the actual images with their virtual correlates, the detached human with the world beyond the screen, through hope for ‘a belief’ in this universe; that is cinema-thinking and the power of the time-image.

2.2. Classification of Time-Images and Signs

As far as the interconnected characteristics of cinema-thinking are concerned, the taxonomy of images and signs plays a fundamental role in determining the distinctions and intersections

between image and thought. Then it will guide us to specify the interrelation between the filmmaker and the spectator. The break on the sensory-motor system is the initial ground for the time-images and their signs which are named opsigns and sonsigns (pure actual image); lectosigns (pure virtual correlate) which are a composite tie of hyalosigns (description), chronosigns (narration), as well as noosigns (narrative). In the domain of lectosigns (pure virtual correlate), the film inevitably requires interpretation by the spectator. That is the matrix of pro-filmic thinking arouses from 'unthought' since the film itself does not think but problematizing. The spectator creates links between the film and the life in the pure virtual domain lectosigns.

2.2.1. The Pure Actual Ground for the Time-Image: Opsigns and Sonsigns

Opsigns and sonsigns are the pure optical and sound situations that lay the base for cinematic semiosis of the time-image. The break on the sensory-motor system results in a crisis of the movement-image. Movement-image is fundamentally perception and it 'will not constitute a first type of image without being extended into the other types' since 'perception-image is strictly identical to every image' (C1: 31) In this concern, perception-image is the initial point of conceptualizing the movement-image in which all kind of images depends on the sensory-motor system. The audience encounters any-space-whatevers rather than a privileged central and perceivable image. It means no longer the image expresses affect leading to action. This kind of failure on the perception-image paves the way back for the purest zero-ness since it 'is no longer extends into the laws of action, and the entire system delinked and collapses' (2016, 138). That is, the collapse of the movement-image disrupts the chronological order of seeing, acting and feeling. Through a failure on perception-image, disengagement of the connections leads to a crisis on the action-image. The on-screen image cannot be linked with its actual correlates anymore. In this context, a paradigm shift from the movement-image to the time-image becomes inevitable. Optical and sonic signs become representative of the purest zero-ness as 'the negative condition of the upsurge of the new thinking image' which cut 'perception from its motor extension' (C1: 215) (C2: 69). In this concern, chronological order of time, comprehensive space, and sensory-motor logic are broken, and the actual image is dominated by its virtual correlates on the starting ground of the direct time-image. It paves the way for the description, narration, and narrative of time-image heralding the new image of thought in the virtual domain of interpretation.

2.2.2. Hyalosigns or the Crystal-Image: The Description of Time-Image

In the fourth chapter of *Cinema 2*, Deleuze refers to Bergsonian theses on time, that there is a 'coalescence' between the real and its reflection; actual and its virtual correlates (68). Then he takes this formation to co-think it with 'specific genre of description' by Robbe-Grillet that makes it possible to discuss vaster circuits 'corresponding the deeper and deeper layers of reality and higher and higher levels of memory or thought' (68-69). In this regard, hyalosigns mean the description of the crystal image of time, which are mainly image fragments cutting from sensory-motor logic for the sake of a simultaneous relinkage of an actual image and its virtual image (127). The opsigns and signs are the ground in which there is no way to fulfill the sensory-motor system, and re-linkage of the actual-image to its virtual correlates becomes inevitable. Then, the fragmental image with a circuit from its motor extension leads to indiscernibility between the actual image and the virtual image. That is the first time-image as the crystalline description. Deleuze mentions three types of crystal-image concerning indiscernibility of multiple presents, accessible present sinking into inaccessible past, and virtual seed to infinite future, and vice versa.

First, 'face to face' catoptric fragments of crystal-image can be regarded as mirror-image which is regarded as completed crystal. In this context, the image on the screen multiplies the perspectives in the present in which it is 'cracked open, depicted space is complex, the body is a crystal' (C2) (2016: 147). The world and bodies are reflected in distorted and multiple perspectives intermingling with each other in the present as multiplicities or simultaneities of the present. Second, 'limpid and opaque' pertains to the dynamic exchange of virtual past and actual present. Past is impenetrable and obscure; the act of remembering is reconstruction per se. The crystallization process flows from visible to hidden, from clear to ambiguous. The virtual image of the past becomes indiscernible from the actual image of the present in which the time itself crystallized. Thirdly, seed and milieu pertain to the crystallized description which leads to a disparity between present and indeterminate future. Virtual seed and actual environment, and vice versa become crystal in duration. The seed is of an environment which is the *mise-en-scène* of the seed. Briefly, 'hyalosign is fractal, images within images, images without images' (2016, 150) and coalescence of hylaosigns pave the path for time-image narration; chronosigns.

2.2.3. Chronosigns: The Narration of Time-Image

With the help of the fourth commentary on Henri Bergson, we reach the core of the time-image narration. Deleuze briefly mentions the crystal, which is a uniting image between the actual and virtual, 'a ratio cognoscendi' of time; 'the ground of knowledge' for it (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). On the other hand, *time* is *ratio essendi*; 'the cause or ground of the existence of a thing' (C2: 98) (ibid). In this regard, the crystal reveals a direct-time image being free from the movement by reversing the subordination to it. Deleuze states that "memory is not in us; it is we who moving in a Being-memory; a world-memory" (ibid). Through our perception, we can take up spatial aspects, which in turn trigger our memory. Concomitantly, the time-image narration is divided into three parts such as peaks of the present that is heterogeneous, sheets of the past as non-chronological nature of past, and powers of the false pertaining to serialism, ongoing ungrounding of the image with no more pretense to the truth.

Initially, 'peaks of present' refer to the way when images reveal the present moment is combined, intermingled with multiple, heterogenous presents. Even if it is a reaction to past events, it is a cracked surface in the living moment. There is the juxtaposition of images for the sake of linearity of events but a 'simultaneity' of the moments of the presents (C2: 100-101). As for 'sheets of past', there are jumping events forward and backward without any direct cause and effect relation. Every image has its rhythm and conception of space-time, and as they intermingled with each other, an image of pure past gives clue regarding the ratio essendi of time. Here, memory no longer serves for space, but it discovers the time itself; pure pastness of space-times as 'disparate non-causal events' in order of time. (2016). Eventually, 'the power of the false' is very striking since the narration 'becomes fundamentally falsifying' it stops claiming to be true and represents more than a reflection, warns and inspires us that is cinema (132). In this regard, narration not only disrupts chronological time but also discovers a serial form of time through 'problematizing'. Similar themes, motifs, symbols, sounds, objects, the environment can repeat but differently: it must be 'from the perspective of a series of powers' which refer to each other in which the present is 'a product of past, and future a consequence' (133) (2006,154-56). In other words, 'power of the false' can be considered as a narration from the perspective of future which is unknowable but becoming as 'potentialized (C2: 275). In brief, chronosigns represent the narration of time-image from three distinctive perspectives: the simultaneities of the multiple presents target refer to 'peaks of the present', coalescence non-chronological pasts called 'sheets of the past' in favor of pure past, and from the perspective of future and of series of powers that is 'power of the false', in which time image

narration starts problematizing and rejecting pretense to the truth. It falsifies a unity of single truth for the sake of evoking new potentialities for thought.

2.2.4. Noosigns: The Time-Image Narrative Goes on in the Mind of the Spectator

When it comes to the narrative of time-images, noosigns play a critical role in the story creation during the spectatorship. The linear storyline is not revealed directly, it is served by chronosigns in time, but the spectator links the events in chronological order in her mind. In this regard, noosigns also become ‘problematic and problematizing’ since it demands us to think (*Logic of Sense*: 64). Noosigns can be discussed in two parts as the world and bodies. The former is the cinema of the brain that refers to *mise-en-scène*. Whatever is seen and heard, the set, colors, lighting, backgrounds, diegetic sounds belong to the world, to the cinema of the brain. Deleuze refers to Friedrich Nietzsche and defines a body ‘as a genesis of forces’ to emphasize the importance of the relationship between forces; since ‘every force is related to others’ and regardless of whether the body is a biological, social, or political one, ‘every relationship’ constitutes a body’ (2016:160) (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*: 37). ‘Body of gestures’ and ‘body of attitudes’ is ‘not a human body’ and “cinema of the brain is not human consciousness” in this concern (ibid) The former describes a body that does not act but exists in the frame, in its everyday life. There is no performance by actors and actresses just presence. For the latter, actors and actresses can act with theatrical gesture and mimics. Yet, it should be kept in mind that, the main intention is related to breaking sensory-motor logic. Therefore, action is replaced by attitudes and gestures, a minimal or no acting as well as direct theatrical acting of bodies. When there is no direct link between acting and plot, we create our narrative in our mind, in which we again find ourselves in the domain of lectosigns. In short, Noosigns refer to the bodies of attitudes and gestures as well as the cinema of the brain as a genetic sign of the world.

2.2.5. Lectosigns: Pure Virtual Correlates

Lectosigns considered the common limit of all time-images as the final aspect of direct time-image, is a composite tie of hyalosigns, chronosigns, and noosigns in which inevitably requires the interpretation of the spectator. As it has been mentioned above, after a break-up of sensory-motor linkages, no longer the integration of the movement-image is possible since the entire system is delinked and collapsed. In that ground of opsigns and sonsigns, the actual images on the silver screen cannot be differentiated through sensory-motor logic. Since actual linkages between images are not strong or completely collapsed, and/or overrun by their virtual

correlates, relinkage becomes indispensable in this regard. Hence the scene must be actively read by the spectator to make the shots and sequences meaningful together (2016). At this juncture, the idea of relinkage heralds the idiosyncratic cinematic thought. Yet cinematographic thought arouses from unthought since the film itself does not think. In other words, there is no pre-determined response, rather a disparity plays a crucial role; a circuit, a gap in which the spectator gets a space to retrospectively co-think with the de-linked images. The spectator might start to contemplate on the possible reasons for the interstice, and thus tries to interlink the images by recollecting the previous images and/or her own memory. Although the spectator can think the possibilities, the connection still stays ambiguous, outstanding and open to multiple interpretations on the mirrored facets of indiscernibility. Here are the lectosigns of crystal image, in which interpretation becomes a must. I emphasize that the crystal-image is a mirrored fractal that becomes us since we end up following our own thoughts and may find ourselves while introspectively thinking of our actual life. In other words, the actual life of the spectator can find a space on of the facets of crystal image in which circuits distract them from the pseudo-story of film for the sake of reminding an alternate reality. Thus, cinematic thought makes it possible for us to think the life itself; lectosign concordantly brings us to the domain of the Whole which is ‘the open’ relating back to ‘time or even spirit’, ‘to pure memory and the virtual’ (C1:17) (Deamer 2016, 164). In this regard, it is pretty interesting that cinema, with the aforementioned unique relationships between time, space, and thought, grounds a more profound dimension than we see. Cinema reminds me of a four-dimensional shadow on the two-dimensional surface of the silver screen, cracking a void through lectosigns to think the life itself.

To sum up the images and signs of time-images, the crystal-image (hyalosign) is a fragmental description, a shot to capture the world and its bodies. Coalescence of crystal-images constructs the time-image narration (chronosigns), which also has similar patterns within its structure as well as within the image itself. Similar patterns repeat themselves at both macro and micro scales. In other words, hyalosigns (crystal-images) and chronosigns are perfect fractals recurring the similar patterns with and within each other. Furthermore, the *mise-en-scène* and bodies of noosigns exist in the crystal images to engender the story in the mind of the spectator, in the ‘noosphere’ that has also mutual interactions with the description and its narration. All signs interconnect with each other. Opsigns and lectosigns are two main sides of time-images and signs as pure actuality and pure virtuality, where crystal-images, chronosigns, and noosigns interact with and within each other. When the narration becomes problematizing, through

circuits and disparities, the interpretation is demanded in the pure virtual domain of lectosigns. To put it in another way, if the time-images and signs were the components of the brain, crystal-image (hyalosign) would be the neural signal of the paradigm shift. In this example, noosigns are the neurons inside the brain. On the pure actual ground of the nervous system, it is no longer possible to construct the same neural pathway with the new information. Chronosigns start to create coherent signals with coalescence of the crystal-images. Yet, the adaptation to the paradigm shift is necessary. The plasticity of the brain is the lectosigns to make new neural pathways to the information. In other words, the spectator creates new pathways between actual images and their virtual correlates as a result of the adaptation to the paradigm shift. Moreover, cinematic thought is not univocal but refers to a proliferation of interpretations with the virtual memory and consciousness of the audience. Therefore, it is not a pre-determinant response established by the filmmaker but a pro-filmic creation of the beholder. In short, all images and signs engender circuits and breaks on the sensory-motor system for the sake of problematizing. That leads to pro-filmic thought when the film itself requests active readership in the domain of lectosigns. The spectator is invited to take part in the film body by creating new neural pathways through the brain's plasticity towards the whole, as the vibrating neurons as pure memory beyond the actual images in the open domain of the pure virtual.

2.3. Filmmaking Strategies and Simultaneities Engendering *Lectosigns*: Transcendental Style and Time-Pressure

As far as the intermedial features of the production process of the time-image films are concerned, cinematographic thinking becomes problematic owing to its irreducible but distinctive characteristics of creative thinking. This kind of creative process requires both strategic and intuitive thinking of cinematic ideas, which demands another approach to better comprehend the ineffability of cinematic expression. In other words, cinema as the 'pre-verbal' audiovisual system, can exceed the limits of the text (even the shooting script). The filmmakers think with movement- and time-images to create sequences in harmony with the cinematographic ideas. Hence, it is necessary to consider the production process to better comprehend two different but intertwined cinematographic thinking such as intuitive and strategic in relation to creation of lectosigns. Furthermore, I deal with intuitive thinking not as completely separated from strategic thinking but affecting each other within the process. It is similar to the dualism between matter and memory that are neither independent nor taken precedence over each other. They mutually interact with and within each other. Therefore,

strategic, and intuitive thinking with movement and duration blocks to capture and actualize cinematographic ideas, neither can be completely separated nor irreducible to each other.

Strategic thinking in filmmaking can be related to cinematic strategies to a certain extent. However, there are some critical problems even though pre-established, well-planned ideas can be evaluated with the narration-wise strategies. To better state the problem of intermediality in terms of cinematographic thinking, it can be referred to David Bordwell who reaches a very concrete definition of narration in his seminal book called *Narration in the Fiction Film* (1985):

[N]arration is the process whereby the film’s syuzhet and style interact in the course of cueing and channeling the spectator’s construction of the fabula. (1989: 53)

These terms refer to a basic classification; the distinction between ‘the story that is represented’ and ‘the actual representation of it’, which were theorized by the Russian Formalist, and ‘it is indispensable to a theory of narration’ for Bordwell (49). ‘Fabula’ refers to the spectator’s search for some ‘causal or spatial or temporal links’ to construct ‘a chronological, cause-and-effect chain of events occurring within given duration and spatial field’ whereas ‘syuzhet’ refers to ‘the actual arrangement and presentation of the fabula’ (49-50). The former sometimes is translated as “story” arousing in the mind of spectators, as ‘a pattern which perceivers of narratives create through assumptions and inferences’ (49). In other words, it slightly resembles ‘noosigns’ of time-images but it is distinctively ‘pre-determinant’. On the contrary, the film style can be perceived as “plot” but not the text, it refers to ‘a system’ dealing with




Figure 2.1. ‘Film as Phenomenal Process’ by David Bordwell (1989: 50)

arrangements, orders, and series of events; that is similar to ‘choronosigns’. Nevertheless, ‘syuzhet’ is distinctively a textual order of narration and independent of the medium, it could be in any other form of art whereas cinematic style pertains to ‘film’s systematic use of cinematic devices.’ (50) (Figure 2.1.) Therefore, ‘syuzhet’ structure attributes to a form of temporary actualization of cinematographic ideas, that is in the textual form but remain incapable of depicting the complete idiosyncrasies of the cinematic medium. For Bordwell,

'syuzhet' is the filmic text, 'style' is technical applications of it, and they together influence the spectator's activity in favor of the creation of the 'fabula'(ibid). Nevertheless, we cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that cinematographic thinking has 'pre-verbal' uniqueness could be beyond the written text. In this context, the style plays a fundamental role especially in the cinema of the time-image. That is the incompatibility with Deleuze, the circuit occurs in which cinematic style cannot be reduced to narration-wise strategies but refers to a way of strategical cinematographic thinking. That tension is also between the cinema of movement-images and of the time-images. For the former, the spectator tries to construct a narrative in her mind and make them in order even though the narration is non-linear. Duration and repetition of images in sequences clue regarding the story through its narration in 'a spatial frame of reference' as well as 'muddling and undercutting our comprehension' (1989: 51). Hence, 'fabula' is distorted by 'syuzhet' and its application through 'film techniques' in favor of various spectatorial effects. Yet, the time-image narration (chronosigns) undercuts our comprehension for the sake of the open, to problematize narrating a unitary truth. In short, the narration is the process in which 'syuzhet', and 'film style' collaborates to orient the spectator's 'fabula' construction by cluing or hindering a linear cause-effect chain. Concordantly, narration-wise strategies are related to channeling spectatorship that can be divided into two parts such as 'visible' and 'invisible' narration strategies. The latter intends to create an illusion of reality whereas the former self-consciously reveals that the film is an artifice, a construct. That is the third of 'chronosigns'; 'the power of the false', in which narration has no more pretense to truth, but 'problematizing' to engender pure virtual domain of 'lectosigns' in which the spectator is invited to create their own stories (noosigns). Thus, the creation of 'fabula' can be readily differentiated in two ways; as 'pre-determinant response' and 'pro-filmic thought' in the pure virtual domain of 'lectosigns'.

Producing lectosigns to pave the way for pro-filmic thought is directly related to the cinematic style that provides multiple ways to cultivate and actualize cinematic ideas on the silver screen. Without any doubt, the cinematic process cannot be reduced to textual actualizations nor perceived as the continuation of literary ideas. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the actualization processes of the cinematographic ideas with its audiovisual idiosyncrasy in creating movement/duration blocks. Hence, it is possible to approach the relationship between cinematographic idea and its own way of thinking through the interaction between the actual and the virtual to pave the room for the spontaneous and intuitive act of creation.

On the one hand, the cinematographic idea is fundamentally virtual. On the other hand, it stems from the actual world, and the cinematographic idea is in a state of constant actualization during the production process. In this concern, initially, it must be borne in mind that a cinematic idea can never be actualized as it is; actualization means constant metamorphoses. Cinematographic ideas are virtual seeds, and the actualization can occur in the actual environments during both processes of production such as ‘pre-production’, ‘shooting’, and ‘post-production’. The seeds grow together in their own processes, and they are directly affected by the environment. Ideas must be cultivated to stay alive and to blossom. Therefore, I perceive all the creation process as the ‘production’ of virtual thoughts and matter-images, with sets, decors, costumes, and so on, as well as the texts which are the offshoot of the ultimate actualization. Furthermore, all the process is not linear, and creation sometimes requires ricocheting backward and upwards. In this regard, cinematic spontaneities are the actual movements out of the pre-determinant plan, that is the open system of creation giving room for spontaneity and intuition. Cinematographic ideas can be produced and actualized in both processes which interpenetrate with and within each other. Then the process has more possibility to include distinctive simultaneities of filmmaking and strategies idiosyncratically belonging to the medium and the potentialities of its ‘techne’(τέχνη)^{viii}. In this concern, the written text represents *temporary actualization* when compared with the decisive target of cinema. That is, cinematic ideas are determined by the utmost projection on the silver screen. Except for the final cut after montage, the production process refers to many temporary actualizations. For example, ideas written as the script on paper, or sketches drawn as a storyboard of the film serve to produce the movement-images and time-images. In the end, all actualizations are temporary for the eventual goal. In a creative production, it is great to have an openness to spontaneously decide to reshoot after editing. ‘pre’ and ‘post’ production intertwines, and actualization occurs in its form when facing the conflicts or/and more potentialities with the actual environment, and performances of the actors. In this regard, the attempt at actualization of cinematographic ideas naturally is problematic. Since it is not technically possible to capture pure virtuality, it is always necessary to find practical solutions or maximize the impact of the film when faced with the actual environment. Concomitantly, I state that the idiosyncrasy of cinema relies on minimizing ‘uncinematic’ temporary actualizations through giving room for spontaneous and intuitive thinking. Therefore, the emancipation of the cinematic style beyond the ‘uncinematic’ actualizations comes true by giving priority to thinking with the medium itself; with its own technical potentialities, ‘pro-filmic event’ in front of the camera in favor of the life beyond the silver screen. It is ‘impotence to think’ with a classical paradigm but adaptation to the new one

to create new neural pathways in favor of our actual lives. That is, I claim, the meeting point of the filmmaker and the spectator, in the open whole, in which uniqueness of cinematic art depends on the temporal openness that we become vibrations of a specific space-time against pretense to truth, idolatries of 'closed' systems, to save the open in the eternal present. To articulate, some auteurs giving priority to connect their own lives with the film itself, have a great tendency towards the open, to crystallize their actual life with the artifact. When this connection is supported by no pretense to the truth and by approving the impenetrable nature of the past in advance, crystallization comes across on a larger scale, between the life of the filmmaker and the film. In the end, recollections of life and film become indiscernible from each other. Chris Marker's remark on memory is quite striking:

I remember that month of January in Tokyo, or rather I remember the images that I filmed of the month of January in Tokyo. They have substituted themselves for my memory. They are my memory. I wonder how people remember things who don't film don't photograph, don't tape. How has mankind managed to remember? (*Sans Soleil*, 1983)

Even though filmmaking is to create the virtual, irrespective of fiction or documentary, it is part of our material life, which affects our way of recollections. In some cases, the distinction between actual life and the virtual film becomes indiscernible from each other. Concomitantly, it is hope for film artists to leave a legacy staying alive for the future. In this regard, some auteurs autobiographically interweave their own lives with the film through engendering lectosigns. In this regard, some auteurs autobiographically interweave their own lives with the film through engendering lectosigns. That is, the open concerns the virtual future that prospective spectators can participate in the 'sealed time' through the torn stemming from the crystallization between the actual and the virtual. The ontology between the actual and the virtual, the matter and memory, leads to the crystals of time on a larger scale, that is in the filmmaking process as the other side of the open, the catoptric space of time to see our present in harmony with the captured past on the 'celluloid' of the film, or recorded to the Solid-State Disk. In short, the cinematographic idea is virtual which is in the cinematic process of constant actualization. With the help of, minimizing 'uncinematic' actualizations, the idiosyncrasy of cinema manifests itself through crystals of time. However, these crystals are not images that are actualized after the final cut, but on a larger scale; it is a creation of indiscernibility of the life of the filmmaker and the film itself. The tendency of the auteurs towards intertwining their actual lives with the virtual film refers to the other side of the open whole. In this regard, recollecting actual life becomes virtual, and the act of remembering demands intuitive and spontaneous thinking to revitalize the lost time in the actual present. Concomitantly, the

attempt at actualization of cinematographic ideas interpenetrates with the memory and results in approving the impenetrability of the past, impossibility to think the past as it was. Eventually, we are, as both the filmmakers and the spectators are left with virtuality, to spontaneously think and re-connect collapsed images within the open whole.

Strategic thinking is a systematic way to actualize cinematic ideas. It is not regarded as a spontaneous activity but as a very well-structured, predetermined thinking process ongoing throughout the production. Yet, it does not mean that it does not stem from intuition. That attributes to inter-assemblage, intuition may develop a strategy, and mutually strategic thinking can lead to intuitive creation. The strategic thinking of creating images tends to materialize, actualize, and metamorphose the virtual ideas into actual cinematic matters while intuition remains pure virtual, which cannot be inherently assimilated. Filmmakers giving importance to intuition can eliminate the temporary mediators for the ultimate cinematographic idea actualizing on the silver screen. Then they can minimize transfiguration and save the virtuality to a greater extent by thinking with cinematic tools, techniques, and strategies. In the context of engendering lectosigns, those which belong to the irreducibility of cinematic art, which is a 'pre-linguistic' system of audiovisual expression, self-conscious and self-reflexive narration-wise strategies to renounce pretense to the truth are not inapplicable neither to time-image nor to slow cinema techniques, but complementary to each other in *Mirror's* case since the narration problematizes (power of the false) to fracture the dull surface of the grand narratives. In this regard, the spontaneous and strategic acts of creation lectosigns in favor of the open whole can reinforce this tendency through intuitive thinking during the writing, shooting, or editing processes. Therefore, the creation of audiovisual images and thoughts can find its uniqueness via cinematic ineffability via intuition. It is a sort of expression that is irreducible to other forms, and so that cinematographic thinking must be discussed within the processes production in which virtual ideas are actualized and metamorphosized for the sake of creating lectosigns. That is the open domain of the subtle inter-assemblage, a connection between the actual life of the auteur, intuitively captured and crystallized within the film, and the pro-filmic thinking of the spectator entering through the openness to relink us with the whole.

As for the correlation between cinematic strategies and intuitive thinking of the creation of the time images and signs, I co-think Paul Schrader's 'slow cinema' strategies with the intuitive tendency of Andrey Tarkovsky, which can be traced back to the theory of time-pressure. To investigate intuitive thinking during film production, I add one more sub-chapter, named

rhythm, in addition to the three main technical components such as frame, shot, and montage discussed in the sub-chapter called lectosigns by Deamer (2016:163-169). Deleuzian concepts with intuition and cinematic strategies in favor of engendering lectosigns pave the ground for two sorts of cinematographic thinking that intertwines during the filmmaking process.

2.3.1. Frame

Frame not only determines the amount of information in mise-en-scène as a set, a neutral border as a closed system which is the brain-screen (2016, 163) but also primarily produces ‘vantage point onto the material within the image’ since it signifies a position, a perspective in the space (Bordwell, 1985). Thus, frame both regulates geometrical and physical borders as well as the position of perspective, that is point of view. Wide-angle lenses are used for long shots to include more data of the environment, so the frame, like ‘a tableau’, ‘doesn’t direct the viewer’s gaze; it frees to wander’ through wide shots (TSF). The aspect ratio is the frame of that tableau in this regard. Furthermore, tele or macro lenses are mostly used for medium shots or close-ups to focus on the details, which can also lead to restriction of space. Points of view are the direction of the camera, the specific perspective for the audience to see characters and events. In this context, different angles play different psychological roles in a shot. For instance, seeing the characters from the bottom makes them superior as in *Citizen Kane* (Orson Welles, 1941). As for the limitation of the frame, Deleuze mentions ‘geometrical’ and ‘physical’ ones; the latter principally refers to changing the size of the frame whereas the former is related to settings and bodies that exist as parts in mise-en-scène, but they do not act since the main intention is not to narrate the story (C1: 13) (Deamer 2016, 164). For example, a zoom-out change the physical limitation of the frame, alternating from a close-up to an extremely wide shot. In this regard, depth of field also plays a crucial role in limiting data in mise-en-scène although it is not mentioned in this context. Fundamentally, the highest depth of field refers to the frame where all environment is in focus, while the low depth of field blurs the environment to a certain degree, in favor of hiding or focusing on specific data. According to Schrader, a high depth of field with wide-angle lenses creates ‘a democracy of the eye’ (Bazin, 2005) letting the spectator enjoin the narrative process; ‘spectator’s meditation’ on the ‘director’s tableau’ (TSF: 19).

When it comes to one of the datum points of framing for the relation between cinematic thought and the open, there is a specific type of out-of-field for time-image narration which also guides other aspects of framing. For the movement-image, the on-screen image supposes the continuity of the off-screen image as a homogenous closed system; a CU shot of the face

presumes the rest of the body (164). Yet in the time-image, out-of-field does not exist out of the frame, “but rather ‘insists’ or ‘subsists’ within the frame” (ibid) (C1:17). That is the indication of pure virtuality of lectosign, contrary to creating a space with homogenous continuity in a closed system since it here points a ‘radical elsewhere’ outside the frame without physical continuity (ibid). It is the very power of framing of time-image which tends to create the open ‘outside homogenous space-time’ other than creating a universe in a closed system; the frame reflexively reveals itself in which the actual image is surpassed by its virtual correlates through weakening the actual linkages (ibid). In this regard, there is a direct relationship with the whole being the open, and “the open ‘relates back to time and even spirit’ to pure memory and virtual” (C1:17) (ibid). Interpretation becomes a must via relinkage of the images, that is the lectosign; pure virtual since cinema-thinking is ‘the spectator’s own thought’, not ‘a pre-determined response’ in this concern (2016, 164) (*italics mine*). Therefore, it directly refers to fabula which is outside of the syuzhet; which stemmed from cinematic style itself. In other words, some distancing strategies of slow cinema away from narrative rejects to create a pre-determined fabula in the spectator’s mind but demands her to involve the narrative process with her memories and thoughts. It is fundamentally by rejecting the expectations of the spectator in favor of their involvement. Distancing devices replace action, without acting and identification, it becomes possible to ‘deny the viewers what they seek’ over and over again, the spectators involve the process and create their world (TSF: 17). Therefore, the spectator must involve in the narrative process that is not a predetermined fabula through syuzhet, but through paving the path for lectosign; the open, in which images are to be reconnected through pro-filmic thinking of the whole, life itself; beyond the frame.

2.3.2 Shot

Paul Schrader concomitantly states that a static frame in harmony with a long take arouses the feeling that there is something hidden in which we start thinking beyond the frame (TSF). Shot fundamentally captures movement in space-times, in two ‘facets’: ‘the relationship between parts and...state of the world’ (C1:19) (2016, 165). In this regard, there are two essential parameters of shot between the camera and set, as for being static or mobile. Four combinations are possible: a static camera with the static set, a mobile camera with a static set, a mobile camera with moving data, or a static camera with movement in the frame (2016, 165). In this regard, reframing of the mobile camera creates a continuous space under the closed system in which ‘the flow creates an interdependency upon different areas’ (ibid). Also, Deamer states, ‘shot can be put under the pressure of time as long as movement is restricted’, less new

information through fewer movement results in contemplation by disturbing space to engender the lectosigns (ibid). In this context, long takes can pave the way for thinking other than seeing whatever comes by action. If there is almost no action in a shot with a static camera or with slow camera movements without a cut for a long time, we start thinking of virtual coordinates of the actual image. That is to say, the power of the shot is not the actual image on the screen but in radical elsewhere. 'This elsewhere is not its actual cinematic materiality but what image engender in the brain of the spectator, its virtual coordinate (ibid). That is the domain of lectosign to infinity, in which an actual image on the screen is essentially required to be read through introspective contemplation. The key point is what the image generates in the brain of the beholder, that is pure virtual disrupting its actual space for the sake of the open. Long-takes with high depth-of-field with static frame reminds us of a 'tableau', with slow camera movements as in an endless tracking shot, we find ourselves when slowly walking in that tableau with our thought-brushes to make life colorful.

2.3.3. Editing

That wide-angle tableau with long shot should be supported via editing. Schrader introduces offset edits as an editing technique of slow cinema which 'threw off the viewer's rhythm by cutting too "early" or too "late" (TSF: 12). That creates a gap between two shots; 'temps mort' between actions in which spectator starts feeling there is something uneasy because it is not in harmony with what they are used to see on the silver screen. As for invisible narration, editing must serve for the impression of reality with continuity editing. Cuts are mostly on the action following the movement to pretend there is no editing. Yet for the time-image editing, the cut does not have to be on the movement anymore, but rather serves for 'destroying the possibility of a logical space-time continuum' (2016, 166). Jean-Luc Godard's jump-cuts (*Breathless*, 1964) are the well-known examples of breaking the spatial rules and conventions opening up the new possibilities to read, to think. However, Schrader clarifies another type of cut by differentiating how editing manipulate filmic time in addition to a smash cut in movement-image, that is delayed cut to create 'temps mort' which demands 'the viewer's participation' (TSF: 18) That is to say, jump-cuts can be regarded as too "early" smash cuts away from action. Yet delayed cut creates a temporal gap, we feel nothing is happening but 'time make itself felt in a shot' (ibid) (ST). So how does time become 'tangible' in a scene? In this regard, Tarkovsky thinks that every moment has its unique rhythm that is captured in shot; therefore, editing must serve for the inner rhythm of the shot in favor of moulding the marble to make sculpture (time) itself perceptible. Thus, the primary inclination of 'slow cinema' is to 'retard time' to convert the narrative tendency of classical cinema, so that time itself could become the central element

replacing the story (TSF: 10). Therefore, long takes, wide-angle, slow camera movements, or static camera, off-set edits are used as distancing devices to generate ‘uneasy’ circumstances in which the spectator must solve the ‘disparity’. That is, “an actual or potential disunity” between the protagonist and the world, where the spectator must ultimately admit “an alternate film reality - a transcendent one” (TSF: 75-80). In Deleuzian terms, disparity leads to lectosigns creating cinematic thoughts. Plotlessness serves for “alienation”, off-set or delaying edits (or ‘non-rational’ cut) minimal coverage, non-acting, images over dialogue obey the same purpose (TSF:11-16). Those techniques are compatible with the main tendencies of ‘transcendental style’, which are to produce ‘disparity’ within ‘the everyday’ life. By refusing to place a limpid story, the spectator becomes outfitted for the decisive action, in which stasis leads us to approve an alternate reality beyond the film. That can also be readily seen in the technical and stylistic consolidations with Deleuzian cinema-thinking towards the open, with temporal tendencies in filmmaking. Nevertheless, Tarkovsky’s intention is more than to ‘retard time’, Tarkovsky endeavors to intuitively seize the moment and its unique rhythm in a shot. In other words, cinema can ‘seal’ the peculiar rhythm in a space-time with its sort of time that is distinctive from the one in the other shot. Consequently, editing must serve for the inner rhythm captured in the shot in favor of molding the marble (matter-images) to make the sculpture (time itself) visible.

2.3.4. Rhythm and Time-Pressure

For Tarkovsky, rhythm is not a tempo that stems from cutting pace, but the essence of shot has its own inner rhythm so that the essence of cinema pertains to time itself. In *Sculpting in Time*, he dispels the idea that cinema is essentially a ‘composite art’ and states:

The dominant, all-powerful factor of the film image is rhythm, expressing the course of time within the frame [...] One cannot conceive of a cinematic work with no sense of time passing through the shot, but one can easily imagine a film with no actors, music, decor or even editing. (ST: 113)

As time flows in the shot, in which bodies and the world in movement, the inner rhythm of the specific moment could be felt. The juxtaposition of shots in harmony with their internal rhythm creates scenes in which time itself ‘becomes tangible when you realize, quite consciously, that what you see in the frame is not limited to its visual depiction but a pointer to something stretching beyond the frame into infinity’ lectosign into the open (ST). As rhythm is the essence of shot, time itself arouses as the essence of cinema. Therefore, cinematic rhythm directly corresponds with all other aspects of frame, shot, and editing in which the narration-wise strategies of Tarkovsky are ready to be determined as his tools of asking questions without

answers to invite spectators for another experience through juxtaposing the images with their idiosyncratic inner rhythm. In this regard, Tarkovsky's notion of 'time-pressure' plays a critical role in elaborating on intuitive thinking during the filmmaking. For Tarkovsky, what makes cinema art is its direct relationship with time, its duration per se. Time is the most fundamental element for film art, that is critical as much as color in painting, sound in music, text in literature (ST). Hence, time that 'runs through the shot' is the matrix of Tarkovsky's intuitive and poetic style. 'Time' writes Tarkovsky, 'imprinted in the frame', prescribes the appropriate editing postulate, as well as the images that cannot be accurately aligned with others since those record an essentially different sort of time (ST: 117). In other words, it is impossible to connect 'actual time' with 'conceptual time', since each shot has peculiar flows of time. The correspondence of the time that flows through the image, its 'depth' or 'sloppiness', that is 'time-pressure' within the images. In this concern, editing serves for the arrangement of the shots based on the 'time-pressure' within themselves (ibid). That is to say, most cinema techniques of Tarkovsky such as framing, long take, camera movements, minimal acting, soundscapes, and montage, are fundamentally determined by the peculiar time-pressure that is captured in a shot. Therefore, Tarkovsky, as an auteur who has full authority on all the production processes, develops his cinematographic ideas in harmony with the idiosyncratic possibilities of time-pressure. In other words, Tarkovsky intuitively thinks with cinematographic ideas to engender lectosigns cracking open the screen so that time could "make itself felt in a shot":

[Time] becomes tangible when you sense something significant, truthful, going on beyond the events on the screen; when you realise, quite consciously, that what you see in the frame is not limited to its visual depiction, but is a pointer to something stretching out beyond the frame and to infinity; a pointer to life. Like the infinity of the image [...] And it always turns out to have more thought, more ideas, than were consciously put there by its author. Just as life, constantly moving and changing, allows everyone to interpret and feel each separate moment in his own way, so too a real picture, faithfully recording on film the time which flows on beyond the edges of the frame, lives within time if time lives within it; this two-way process is a determining factor of cinema [...] The film then becomes something beyond its ostensible existence as an exposed and edited roll of film, a story, a plot. (ST: 117-18)

In this concern, there is a strong correlation between time-image and time-pressure 'The infinity of the image' is the pure virtual domain of lectosigns in this regard. 'More thoughts' arouse in the spectator's mind than 'consciously' engendered by the filmmaker; those are pro-filmic thoughts beyond the story. Tarkovsky paves the way for the pure virtual domain, and thus the spectator participates in the film as a cinematic lector of the lectosigns creating pro-filmic thoughts via active interpretations. Time becomes 'tangible', the actual images demand to be relinked with the pure virtual correlates. The virtual infinitely affect that which we

experience time and absorbing out subjective interpretations. David George Menard exemplifies how time becomes ‘tangible’ and ‘material indicators of something stretching beyond the infinity of the image’ with an example from ‘electromagnetic field theory’: “the light wave’s potential becomes zero only at infinity” and connects it what Tarkovsky calls “pointers to life” (Menard, 2003)^{ix}. That is ‘unthought’ in my opinion, the common limit of all time-images, the conjunction between the image and our life within the pure virtual domain of lectosigns. *Mirror* then becomes a catoptric facet of life, which attributes the open ‘beyond ostensible existence’ of the story and the plot. Concordantly, Tarkovsky tends to intuitively think and capture the internal time, that is duration, ‘to point to life’, for the sake of the ‘two-way process’ in which ‘real picture’ ‘lives within time if time lives within it.’ In other words, ‘time within time’ can be intuitively ‘sealed’ in film stock to flow beyond it with the help of the pro-filmic creation of connections between the film and the life of the spectators.

Tarkovsky’s temporal tendency towards ‘sculpting in time’ plays a fundamental role in his intuitive style with specific film techniques such as long takes, wide angles, slow camera movements, less coverage, and minimal acting. Hence, time-pressure is not a tendency merely towards the post-production process but also an intuitive approach towards shooting a certain type of rhythm in the mise-en-scène. The intuitive way of filmmaking can be related to searching for the inner rhythm, the duration of the moment, an intuitive act of ‘*Carpe Diem*’ both to comprehend the inner quality of time and to capture it within the frame. Editing serves for the sake of connecting the unique, internal time of shots. Spontaneous shooting, slow camera movements, sound usage, minimal acting, minimum coverage, and lesser montage effects serve for that uniqueness of film art, in which time becomes ‘tangible’ to create the open.

Consequently, it can be stated that the idiosyncrasy of cinema relies on minimizing ‘uncinematic’ temporary actualizations in favor of the inner rhythm^x to make time living within time by giving room for spontaneous and intuitive thinking. Therefore, the emancipation of the cinematic style beyond the ‘uncinematic’ actualizations comes true by giving priority to thinking with the medium itself; with its technical potentialities, ‘pro-filmic event’ in front of the camera in favor of the life beyond the silver screen. It is ‘impotence to think’ with a classical paradigm but adaptation to the new one to create new neural pathways in favor of our actual lives. That is, I claim, the meeting point of the filmmaker and the spectator, in the open whole, in which uniqueness of cinematic art depends on the temporal openness that we become vibrations of a specific space-time against pretense to truth, idolatries of ‘closed’ systems, to

save the open in the eternal present. To articulate, some auteurs like Tarkovsky giving priority to connect their own lives with the film itself, have a great tendency towards the open, to crystallize their actual life with the artifact. When this connection is supported by no pretense to the truth and by approving the impenetrable nature of the past in advance.

3. SPACE-TIME CRYSTALS AND ‘SUB-REALITY’ IN *MIRROR*: TARKOVSKY’S STYLE TOWARDS THE OPEN

‘Whereof one cannot speak’ thereof must be an artist.^{xi}

With the concurrences and circuits of the different perspectives, chronosigns point out a distinctive layer; possible subdued realities in lectosigns. In this context, especially the power of the false of chronosigns with specific filmmaking strategies, not only rejects narrating the truth but also problematizes. It reveals an alternative reality that cannot be uttered but captured in that present since actual reality has been subdued by the dominant regime. Whatever cannot be spoken, not only depends on the limit of language but also on a specific space-time in which its ideologies restricting the right to freedom of speech. There is no freedom of thought in the end. Nevertheless, some films by auteurs like *Mirror* with idiosyncratic narration interweaving individual memories with collective ones, can ‘seal’ ‘subjectivity’ which ‘is never ours, it is *time*, that is, the soul or the spirit, the virtual’ (C2: 82-83) (italics mine). Whereof nobody can speak, thereof one can seal time as subjective expressions of that specific space-time. In this regard, the notion of ‘sub-reality’ manifests itself, which refers to subdued realities by the repressive organs and subjectivity belonging to the time itself. In other words, the intuitive act of creation by artists can seal subjectivity of time to be read in another space-time. It seems like such a message in a bottle that ‘lectors’ from different space-time can find and read it. In this concern, ‘lectorship’ refers to the active readership of the ‘lectosigns’. Cinematic ‘lectorship’ belongs to pro-filmic creation with the interpretations of ‘lectosigns’, and can be actualized both audio-visually and textually, via philosophy or film art. In this regard, the collaboration between art and philosophy demonstrates itself with ‘sub-reality’ and ‘lectorship’. Therefore, if the freedom of speech is not guaranteed, a filmmaker can intuitively seal the subdued reality, and it's time that subjectivity belongs. Thus, she invites the spectator to interpret the lectosigns, and then, film lectors could ‘rescue the word’ through pro-filmic thinking. Yet, thought is not enough for that. Virtual thoughts, which may lead to new ideas and their potentials pertaining to the medium, must be actualized in their forms. It could be a

film philosophy or another form of articulation that extra-diegetically and cyclically affects the next interpretations of the artwork and our world. Thus, intuitive thinking of the filmmaker and the active spectator, the cinema lectors, relinking the film with the life, meets in the domain of lectosigns, the whole which is open. In harmony with some narration-wise and slow-cinema strategies; to make the time itself 'tangible' in a shot, Tarkovsky intuitively searches for the inner rhythm of the moments, and attempt at 'sealing' the subjectivity of time, so to speak, as a message in a bottle thrown to the oceans, to be reinterpreted in different space-times. Deleuze as a great cinema lector determines the deficiency and creates concepts as a philosopher to articulate, to open new horizons for thinking. In other words, Deleuze was an active spectator whose philosophical ideas are actualized in his seminal *Cinema* books.

As far as the process of filmmaking is considered, it should be bear in mind that some filmmakers have more freedom to spontaneously change the shooting script since they are also writers of the movies. They have freedom for spontaneous shootings not planned during the pre-production. Similarly, since these directors are responsible for the final cut, they can make intuitional changes in harmony with the inner rhythms of the shots to make time 'tangible'. In other words, cinematic style can take precedence over pre-determinant construction in some respects. If the main tendency is not to narrate a predetermined classical story, intuitive thinking during filmmaking can guide to create duration/movement blocks to capture something unique. Correspondingly, 'la politique des auteur'^{xii} manifests that film should bear traces from the director's own life in favor of 'sincere conversation' without a didactic tone between people in front of the silver screen and behind the camera (Truffaut, 1954). 'Sincere conversation' may seem weird at first sight, but it underlines 'the democratization of the eye' to participate in the film. In short, Tarkovsky's tendency towards 'time-pressure' finds its support from the auteur policy which contributes to developing his unique style free from the constraints of mainstream producers. Therefore, he could get enough space to intuitively think and create. That enabled him to discover time with cinema and develop his theory of time-pressure. With the help of emancipation of his style, Tarkovsky can 'speak' through 'sealing' space-times with circuits and disparities beyond grand narratives. His style embraces crystals of time hovering in the line between actual and virtual, life and art. Tarkovsky seals and captures time-images both through strategic and intuitive cinematographic thinking.

3.1. Cinematographic thinking in *Mirror* leading to pro-filmic thought

Я МОГУ ГОВОРИТЬ^{xiii}

In this part, I investigate the interrelations between the process of filmmaking and the spectatorship in Andrei Tarkovsky's *Mirror* (1975). On the one side, cinematographic thinking during filmmaking has two kinds called strategic and intuitive that fundamentally interpenetrate with each other. In this concern, I trace his cinematographic thinking back to the filmmaking process of *Mirror* with the help of his diaries. Thus, the intuitive and strategic thinking during production (pre-production, shooting, and post-production) can be discussed in harmony with the creation of time images and signs to interrelate cinematic thought arousing in the mind of the spectator. On the other side, the spectator finds a pure virtual domain to create pro-filmic thoughts in 'noosphere' within the domain of lectosigns, and free from a univocal, pre-determinant thought imposed by the film. Concomitantly *Mirror*, in this context, has two sides to reflect. The film is produced by the idea and feeling of 'confession' by Tarkovsky, and it turns into a collective catoptric domain for the spectator. In other words, through *Mirror*, Tarkovsky initially looks at his own past, tries to recollect individual memories, and intuitively connects them with the collective during the production. In some respects, personal memories intertwine with collective ones. Therefore, the catoptric aspects of *Mirror* reflect the crystals of time on the silver screen. The actualized cinematographic idea with its ambiguities on the screen engenders a virtual domain of lectosigns in which the spectators reflect their memories. On that side of the mirror, the proliferation of pro-filmic thoughts occurs during the spectatorship. By re-connecting the de-linked images on the screen, the spectator re-connects the film with life in a specific space-time of spectatorship. That relinkages are pure virtual correlates as pure memory, which pertain to time itself, as a result of the brain's plasticity to adapt to the new paradigm of the film. Therefore, both sides of *Mirror* reflect and accept virtual reflections from Tarkovsky and the spectators to be actualized or to remain virtual in-between matter and memory.

With its unconventional narration dealing with memory and temporality, *Mirror* has a quite unique style to investigate cinematographic thinking with time images and signs. Without creating a linear story in the mind of the spectator, *Mirror* which is the most autobiographical film by Andrei Tarkovsky reflecting his childhood memories, inner life, beliefs, and anguish of war; flows through three different timelines such as pre-war past, present, and another past of the post-war period. In other words, narration (chronosigns) frequently ricochets backward

and upwards between the 1930s, 1940s, and 1975 not to construct a clear story, but in order to blur the lines between present and past, real and imaginary, matter and memory, the actual and the virtual. In this regard, *Mirror* is a perfect crystal of time, employing hyalosigns, chronosigns, and noosigns to engender the open, the pure virtual domain of lectosigns in which the spectator participates in the film. Three timelines supported by the objective shots including documentary footages which refers to ‘autonomous’ history, but this is not a support for the linear narrative but a circuit for a break on the sensory-motor logic. Thus, the indiscernibility between the objective and the subjective, grand historical narratives and individual memories, paves the ground for ‘noosphere’ within the domain of lectosigns in which an interpretation is required. In this concern, it is necessary to articulate cinematographic thinking in two ways such as strategic and intuitive. As for the former, I analyze cinematic strategies such as self-reflexivity, off-screen, and voiceover as well as intermedial references to reveal how the film strategically engenders between the actual and the virtual. For the latter, I analyze slow-cinema techniques in *Mirror*, which enables Tarkovsky to intuitively search for and capture the inner rhythm of shots, to make time ‘tangible’ within the film. In the end, I foresee that cinematographic thinking will have been uncovered through the mutual relationships between them during the process of filmmaking.

3.1.1. Chronosigns: Self-conscious strategies with ‘slow cinema’ techniques

To begin with, Tarkovsky prefers self-conscious narration rather than invisible narration to emphasize that the film is a construct and there is no pretense to the truth. Its narration employs crystals through self-reflexivity, off-screen, and voice-over usages. Thus, we can think of actual life, which accepts the multiple interpretations of truths. *Mirror* starts directly with a circuit between the actual and the virtual. After the very short intro of *MosFilm* (Мосфильм), the first image becomes visible with the sound of a television being turned on. This is a reflexive relationship between the film starting and the TV being turned on; a self-conscious strategy indicating a film within the film. From the very first moment, *Mirror* reminds us that the film is a construct, an artifice. We cannot see anything on the television due to lack of transmission signal but follow young boy Ignat looking at the TV. In the scene, we start hearing the voice of a woman from the next shot: “What is your first name, and last name?” (Fig. 3.1.1)




Figure 3.1.1: The first shot of the pre-credit opening scene (00:00' 09" – 00:00' 27")

In this little gap, since the stuttering boy cannot respond quickly, it becomes readily inferable that is the first meeting between the stammer and the practitioner, in the same manner as the first meeting with the movie and the spectator. The unanswered question is accompanied by the sound of the stammer with incomplete words. This is an audio transition called a sound bridge between the shots, yet in this context, it directly connects the actual and the virtual, colorful fiction shot with the black-and-white documentary footage. In the next shot, a stutter young Yuri Zhary tries to introduce himself and directly looks at the camera. A direct gaze on the camera also reminds us of the existence of the apparatus. It is quite different than a voyeuristic experience of invisible narration since we become more aware of the character knows that he is seen. It is a common distancing device to disturb the place of spectatorship. In short, the opening scene before the credit self-consciously underlines that we are seeing a movie and blurs the lines between the actual and the virtual, fiction and documentary.

On the other hand, the virtual image of the documentary footage of psychoanalytic treatment interestingly becomes more actual than the actual image owing to two reasons. First, its black-and-white one long take shot with simple slow pan movements as well as zoom-in-out techniques evoke the emotion of reality through its resemblance with the documentarist style of filmmaking. For the second, the characters are the actual people existing in the frame, they do not act but appear as themselves. That is a good example of noosigns; the body of attitude since the bodies do not act, only exists in the frame as 'primordial genesis' with 'ticks and inabilities' (C2: 197). The practitioner does a hypnotic séance in which we follow her commands, it is also possible to become quasi affected because of the mesmerizing effect of spectatorship in a dark theatre with a big silver screen. Through the end of the séance hypnotherapist says:



Figure 3.1.2: The second shot before the title appears (00:00'27" – 00:04' 05")

...One, two, three! Your hands don't move...You are trying to move your hands, but they are fixed. It is very hard for you to make the slightest movement. Now I'm going to lift this transfixion and you will be able to speak freely and articulately. From now on you will speak loudly and clearly...I'm lifting the tension from your hands and your speech. One, two, three! Go ahead, say loudly and clearly: I can speak! (Fig. 3.1.2)

He articulately says it: “ya mogu govarit”(я могу говорить)! And suddenly, without any blank space, we see the title *Mirror* (Зеркало) reflecting its catoptric, crystallized state as the discourse of the film, from the very beginning. This is a very self-reflexive start since it directly connects the scene with the crystal structure of the movie in harmony with the title ‘*Mirror*’. In this context, the opening scene as the prologue is the first ground of opsigns and sonsigns and lead to a crystallized description of the images as the paradigm of the time-image narration, which clues the indiscernibility from the fiction and documentary, life and artifice, the real and the imaginary, the actual and the virtual.

Since the TV does not show any images on the screen within the actual image, we directly start thinking of its nature with the juxtaposition of the documentary image. It is not ready to say that it creates shock since it is the very foundation of the film, yet it signals regarding the circuit, its narration, that is peaks of present from the beginning. As Yuri Zhary did, the film self-reflexively introduces itself, moreover, it warns and inspires its spectator. ‘BEWARE! This is cinema’ (C2). No more pretense to truth, then let's talk about our actual lives following those images. The utterance of the stammer becomes a whisper of Andrei Tarkovsky to be able to overcome aphasia through his audiovisual art that opens a domain for the spectator to co-think with their memories and collective consciousness propagated by the Soviet socialist ideology. In this concern, aphasia does not refer to the limits of a language system but refers

to a lack of freedom of speech due to the repressive regime. In other words, Tarkovsky overcomes the impediment through his cinema and becomes a whisper of the subdued realities in Soviet Russia. Due to the oppressive regime and traumatic memories of war, it might be impossible to ‘speak’ or even think. Due to the oppressive regime and traumatic memories of war, it might be impossible to ‘speak’ or even think. Hence, Tarkovsky states the self-conscious discourse of the film to think with the camera, remember, and overcome the aphasia. In this context, he self-reflexively employs chronosigns (time-image narration) through harmonizing the crystal images with some circuits between presents and pasts, memory and dream, the actual and the virtual. In short, Tarkovsky uses divergent documentary footage with the actual image to create possibilities to think of life together with disparities between actual and virtual images, the individual and the collective, life and war. The spectator's active lectorship is demanded within the domain of lectosigns from the very beginning. Tarkovsky answers a question asked in the Building Institute on 29 April 1975 concerning the first episode:

How is the first episode of the film, with the stammering boy, to be understood?

I shan't explain that [...] In any case that is not my function. I am there to do things, you are there to explain things. (Tarkovsky, 1994)

Tarkovsky here avoids channelling the spectator extra diegetically and leaves the scene open to the interpretations.

As for another self-reflexive strategy demanding interpretations, *Mirror* uses two different types of voiceovers which make a distance effect between the spectators and the story. We are never drifted by the illusion of reality in the story world, but ricochet between different timelines images in accordance with the voiceovers. The first one is the voiceover of the



Figure 3.1.3: The actual photo of Tarkovsky’s mother Maria Tarkovskaya on the fence (left), a filmic representation of this photo in color (middle), and the shot when the doctor leaving, extraordinary wind blows twice (right).

narrator who is also the protagonist, the adult Alexei representing Tarkovsky himself. After credits, we start hearing the voice of Innokenty Smoktunovsky acting as Alexie in harmony with the colorful shot of the summerhouse which they used to go to every summer before the war (Fig. 3.1.3). In that scene, the narrator tells how he used to spot people behind the tree as to whether one of those people was his father returning home or not:

[...] If he turned from the bush towards our house, then it was father. If not, it meant it was not father and that father would never come.

In this context, voiceover serves as more than a distancing device since it causes us to think of the narrator's own world, which never appears in the scene. For sure, it is still self-conscious since it makes us a step back from the story, but it is demanded to be thought beyond the frame, the life of that family related to the war because the narrator's non-presence on the screen points a 'radical-elsewhere' (C2). In this regard, the father represents more than a single father; it evokes a figure of the fathers going to war, who had to leave their family behind, possibly with no return when the actual effects of the war and virtual expression concerning them become indiscernible from each other. It is quite interesting that the actuality gains more depth with the second voiceover because it belongs to the poet Arseny Alexandrovich Tarkovsky who is the real father of Andrei Tarkovsky. Even though we know, with the help of non-diegetic information, the owner of the voice, Tarkovsky's father, returned from the war, film clues anguishes of the fathers who never came back. In other words, the film both mirrors Tarkovsky's life as well as others left behind, whose fathers could never come. Tarkovsky's father returned with poetry full of traumatic memories, with a heavy word tank.

As he vocalizes his own poems, the narration profoundly forks, takes a poetic shape, and serves for a polysemantic fabula creation in which poetry and film, the narrator's and father's voiceovers intermingle with each other. Before the first scene ends (Fig. 3.1.3), Arseniy Tarkovsky's poem called *First Meetings* self-reflexively echoes the poetic style of narration:

Every moment of our First Meetings
Was a celebration, like Epiphany [...]
Two steps at a time, and led me
Through moist lilac, into your domain
On the other side, beyond the mirror [...] (1962)

That is to say, the second voiceover reflexively reveals the poetic structure of narration because we are still in our first meeting with the film. Also, through the poem, we enter the domain of Tarkovsky's life and memory, beyond the frame, beyond the *Mirror*. In short, self-

conscious narration intertwines with poetry and is supported by off-screen voiceovers. In *Mirror*, we see that out of the field is achieved in two ways to create a presence without presence. First, the narrator is absent on screen-image, but we know that he is there. It points to the continuity of space. Second, it preoccupies regarding ‘outside homogenous space-time’ and connects us with the whole (C1: 17).

Since the beginning, the narrator has always been invisible, we only hear his off-screen voice, but we see his father a couple of times. Yet, the presence of the father never actually links with the poetry. Hence the absence reminds us of a radical elsewhere, ‘the whole’ which is the open (ibid). Similarly, in some scenes, the narrator’s existence becomes more ambiguous and makes us think radical elsewhere in the domain of lectosigns. In this context, I will try and reveal the difference between two off-screen voiceovers with four examples, which respectively refers to that two out-of-field framings supported by slow-cinema techniques in terms of shot and montage preserving the inner rhythm of time to create lectosigns.

The narrator’s invisibility is a very significant example of framing in *Mirror* which contributes to its crystallized structure. The first out of the field makes us think of the off-screen space through the non-existence of the character on the screen. We can complete the rest of the land and bodies in our minds. For example, the narrator never enters the frame in the scene he talks to his wife (Fig. 3.1.4). Yet we know he is there, behind the camera. He mentions that she always looks like his mother - paving a narrative way for a prospect crystallization- and she cynically answers that was the reason for their divorcement while looking at the camera through the mirror. In this scene, the absence of the narrator refers to the homogenous continuity of the space. Even more, it points to the presence of Tarkovsky himself



Figure 3.1.4: A mirrored frame: Self-reflexive off-screen space (00:34' 38" – 00:36' 45")

hidden behind the camera. In this concern, the direct gaze on the camera breaks the voyeuristic spectatorship, rather it self-reflexively breaks ‘the fourth wall’ between the movie and the audience by reminding the existence of the camera. This mirror usage metaphorically emphasizes the virtual characteristics of the film as the frame within the frame, despite the fact that is also an actual image on the screen. Therefore, that is the crystal image of time referring to the first of chronosigns; peaks of the present, since the actual images are composed of many heterogenous presents (C2: 100-101). We think both Tarkovsky’s presence as the director behind the camera and the narrator representing Tarkovsky’s memory in the present-actual image. This parallelism is supported by subjective POV shots to create mental subjectivity. The camera looks at the mirror with the eye of Alexei and moves in accordance with his gaze to right, with a pan movement to the right when their son Ignat comes (Fig. 3.1.4, right).

In another example, the narration warns us that the protagonist Alexei does not have a clear memory. In the scene in which speaking with his mother on the phone, we see that his slowly




Figure 3.1.5: The continuity of off-screen space (00:22' 20" – 00:23' 40")

moves in his flat. He asks questions regarding the specific events in his individual recollections are not trustworthy, he just tries to remember. Again, the subjective POV shot as one long take accompanies his off-screen voiceover. With a wide-angle frame, the camera memory, such as the hayloft which burnt at the farm, but we never see his presence (Fig. 3.1.5). In this concern, we slowly walk in his ‘tableau’ of memory but can never be sure whether the narrator tells the truth or reconstructs with his imagination. Thus, the line between present and past becomes more ambiguous and untrustworthy. His mother most probably knows more than the narrator himself, who has not spoken with anybody for three days and cannot get what time is, whether it is 6 a.m. or 6 p.m. In this context, Tarkovsky subtly implements the fact that act of remembering the past in the present is the reconstruction of the past itself in a reverse way. Therefore, there is no pretense to telling the truth, but there is a priority to problematizing it. In other words, that is the power of the false falsifying the narration. In brief, these examples

of out-of-field remind us of the continuity of off-screen space. Through self-conscious distancing devices and mirror usage, it prevents the spectator's direct engagement into the story but creates a domain for thought, in the transitive lines between the narrator and the director, being present at that moment and beyond the frame. The scene weakens our sensory-motor logic and awakens us that is not a mainstream movie. We must read the images following the whole, with our memories and the world. Nevertheless, it must be bear in mind that our sensory-motor system has been weakened but not fully collapsed yet.

The second out of field refers to 'radical-elsewhere'. Although we see the father in some scenes, which mostly pertains to recollection and dream-images, his poetry directly emphasizes the whole, the open which 'relates back to the time or even spirit' to pure memory and virtual (C2:16). To articulate, the body of voiceover does not exist in 'off-screen space', then there is no continuity with what is framed. The environment of the voice, the actual image is overrun by the poetry itself. In this context, owing to the inherent characteristics of poetry breaking language in favor of new construction, the actual links become weaker, and we enter 'on the other side, beyond' the *Mirror*, which connotes the interweaved structure between the poetry and the film. Nevertheless, there is a danger to lose thinking in a dreamlike, hypnotic state of consciousness in which 'vibrant rivers lay inside the crystal' (Arseniy Tarkovsky, 1962). In this concern, there is no circuit, we must read the on-screen images in accordance with the poem's time and its historical connotations. Therefore, whatever is interpreted belongs to the spectator, introspective thinking together with on-screen images. We stand in the domain of co-thinking of life with images and poetry. Hence, non-diegetic information with its intermedial references plays a crucial role in connecting the movie with life itself.

The fourth example of 'off-screen voiceovers' occurs in the scene that the narrator expresses that he continuously has the same dream. The camera slowly pans from the mirror to the room with one long take while he tells how this dream brings him into his childhood in which he used to believe that everything is possible. We enter the domain of intersection, recollection of past in the present through dreaming childhood. The *mise-en-scène* is the brain, images with color are mental images. Yet the body of the narrator is not there, it belongs to a radical elsewhere. This discontinuity makes the direct relationship with the whole. Off-screen space demands life to be brought into the whole. In other words, we create our own story not only with that non-chronological story world but also with the world itself. The body of voiceover does not exist in the frame, and actors do not act but only exist in the *mise-en-scène* as the body of attitude. Since the body of voiceover does not exist in off-screen space in the filmic

environment, images start working as ‘pictorial frame which isolates the system’, but points ‘outside homogenous space-time’ (C1: 16-17) (2016). Yet still, it can be easily argued that the thought engendered in the mind of the spectator is a ‘pre-determinant response’. There would be no guarantee for the capability of pro-filmic thinking if there were not ‘nooshock’ to



Figure 3.1.6: Intermingling recollections and dreams (01:16' 10" – 01:17' 54")

thought; to engender ‘unthought’ in the everyday. However, there are significant sequences that herald the dominant signs of the film through completely collapsing the sensory-motor logic: those are the lectosigns.

In the scene Natalia and Alexei talk to each other through the mirror (Fig. 3.1.4), which has been already mentioned above, there is another kind of reflexivity. In the next shot after Ignat comes, a Spanish speech is shown without subtitles. This scene directly points to language itself and paves the path for thinking of communication (00:36:18-00:38:54). Alexei warns Natalia and requests to stall the Spanish man because he foresees that it could cause problems. We do not understand why but follow their everyday talk under the sensory-motor system. However, in the next shot, we see black-and-white footage in which a matador fights with a bull. It is not a fully delinked image, not a shock yet but it is a non-diegetic image that cannot be assimilated together with the actual images. Then quickly we back to the actual color image in which the Spanish man acts like a famous matador with remarkable gesticulations and mimics in the living room. As Deleuze puts, that is Brechtian ‘theatricalization’ of ‘the body of gesticulations’ (C2). The actor’s exaggerated happiness can easily be read on his face. Yet suddenly we see another kind of documentary footage in black-and-white. We cannot relate but continue listening to Spanish without any subtitles. Then we see a cracked mirror in black and white (Fig. 3.1.7). With documentary footage from the Spanish Civil War, a big tear arouses on the actual image. It is a ‘nooshock’. Breakage on the mirror capturing the irrepresentable; traumatic memory which can be neither reflected nor remembered, that is a sort of aphasia stemming from the traumatic event seeded with the documentary footage of a stammering boy called Yuri Zhary.

Now we better guess why Alexei does not want him to talk about Spain. There is nothing to speak of except fractures of traumatic memory of the war. From pre-credit scenes, we have seen self-conscious intention and chronosigns of the movie which opens a field for different spectatorship. Until that shock, crystal images still pertained to juxtaposed images weakened our sensory-motor logic to a great extent but not fully collapsed. Yet from now on, there is no way to fulfill the sensory-motor logic anymore, the actual image on-screen completely loses its prominence and in turn, the virtual image



Figure 3.1.7: Fractured mirror in the documentary footage from Spanish Civil War (1936 - 1939) (00:38' 50" – 54").

becomes actual. Chronosigns, the coalescence of crystal images, with those non-diegetic documentary images, bring us to the pure virtual domain of lectosigns where we must interpret non-diegetic images (the virtual) to link with our ‘fabula’ creation. However, it is impossible since that is not a comprehension of the pre-determinant story but a pro-filmic thought of the spectator linking the image with the life itself. Therefore, the term ‘fabula’ is insufficient in this context. That is autonomously re-linking thoughts that proceed themselves beyond the frame. With this cracked mirror image (Fig. 3.1.7), we start seeing the subtitle, and but for a short time later, the sound becomes non-diegetic; we again break off the actual image on the screen. We hear his voice, but the plane of a Spanish man does not speak when his last sentences nail the ‘truth’ of war: “He knew they were thinking the same thing, that they probably never see each other again.” Then non-diegetic flamenco music is heard, and a young girl starts to dance. When we start watching her dance with a CU on her face to slow tilt down, man slap in her face and the music stops. It is a shock but an actual shock; there is no collapse from the sensory-motor logic. Afterward, we hear flamenco again in accordance with the juxtaposition of Spanish Civil War documentary footage^{xiv} including shots of children leaving their families for safer shelters. This is a shock on the sensory-motor logic, a collapse of it. The actual images become delinked and non-diegetic documentary images on screen become more actual (Fig. 3.1.8). It makes us think beyond the actual image, that is life pertaining to that period, including the traumatic effects of war in a different facet of the crystal. Hence, we must

interpret the images in harmony with non-diegetic information, with our memories, in the pure virtual domain of lectosigns. In my opinion, *Mirror* cracks itself open, with the help of the ‘power of the false’ without pretense to the truth, for the virtual; the ‘subjectivity’ which ‘is



Figure 3.1.8: Documentary footage from Spanish Civil War (1936 - 1939) and Soviet Air Balloon in a ceremony (00: 38' 54" – 00: 42' 00").

never ours, it is *time*, that is the soul or spirit’ (C2: 82-83) (emphasis mine). Through this openness, the spectators enter the domain to see ‘the continuation’ of their actual lives in *Mirror* with their virtual memories:

A teacher from Novosibirsk wrote: ‘I’ve never written to an author to say what I feel about a book or a film. But this is a special case: the film itself lifts the spell of silence and enables one to free one’s spirit from the anxieties and trivia that weigh it down. I went to a discussion of the film. “Physicists” and “Lyricists” were unanimous: the film is compassionate, honest, relevant—all thanks to the author. And everyone who spoke said, “The film is about me.”’ (ST:11)

That is us, our lives to meet in different facets of time, ‘the whole of the real’ becoming the spectacle as far as the lectosigns demands us to take part in, to create pro-filmic thoughts, to re-connect ourselves with the universe. After the shock to our sensory-motor logic, we start following the film by flowing between the actual and the virtual. The documentary footage from the Spanish Civil War and World War II put haunting questions on the life of the period. With the collapse of the movement-image, we no longer follow the action-images but the film demanding interpretation through ricocheting between de-linked images. In this concern, the dominant sign becomes lectosigns to engender an open field to think of life in the post-war period. The collective and individual, memory and history become indiscernible from each other in which the film requests interpretation by the spectator. That is the pure virtual domain of lectosigns. There are no answers but haunting questions pertaining to life itself.

Tarkovsky interweaves his memories with *Mirror*, in which his actual life and the virtual film become indiscernible from each other. In other words, Tarkovsky not only engenders lectosigns in favor of the open space for pro-filmic thinking but also for the sake of ‘sealing’ the life of people close to him in harmony with his memoirs:

It is an autobiographical film. The things that happen are real things that happened to people close to me. That is true of all the episodes in the film. But why do people complain that they cannot understand it? The facts are so simple, they can be taken by everyone as similar to the experience of their own lives. But here we come up against something that is peculiar to cinema: the further a viewer is from the content of a film, the closer he is; what people are looking for in cinema is a *continuation of their lives*, not a repetition. (1994: 367) (emphasis mine)

To put it in another way, Tarkovsky endeavors to capture everyday life in harmony with his childhood memories containing people who love. The everyday pertains to specific periods of time, and concordantly, the peculiarity of cinema provides us ‘a continuation’ of our lives following different layers of the captured virtual pasts for the sake of our lives at the actual present. For the same reason, Tarkovsky re-establishes their summer house according to the photographs, gives a role for his natural mother, and using the actual voices of his father to vocalize his poems. In relation to the history of the Soviet Union during the pre-war, war, post-war era, and the present in the early 1970s, we follow the everyday life of the individuals. Images ricochet upwards and backward in time, as well as between the personal and the collective. The protagonist Alexei’s memory also interweaves with the collective culture through intermedial references and classical music pieces and paintings having cultural baggage and connotations introduced as part of the main character’s actual life and memory (ST:158). In this concern, there are crystallizations between Tarkovsky’s memory and the film, the mother and wife, the father and son. Margarita Terekhova acts as both Tarkovsky’s mother and wife. In the scene where Tarkovsky’s actual mother rings the bell, Ignat opens the door



Figure 3.1.9: Photograph of Tarkovsky’s mother, herself, and her reflection on the mirror

and the uncanny feelings arouse on the spectator (Fig. 3.1.9). The ambiguity between the documentary and the fiction proceeds to a personal level, which becomes indiscernible in-between the individual and the collective. Therefore, through this crack, we think of the life of Tarkovsky. In this scene, the representation of Tarkovsky’s mother Maria Tarkovskaya is

conceptually questioned. While Ignat reads the book aloud to his teacher, we see her youth photo on the wall (left), and Tarkovskaya rings the bell enters the virtual film as an outsider of that space-time (middle) (Fig. 3.1.9). She was not motivated in the action-perception coordinates, and the scene arouses an uncanny feeling in us. For the third representation, the dreamy image of recollection occurs as the reflection on the mirror (Fig. 3.1.9, right). The reflection of Margarita Terekhova interpenetrates with the actual reflection of Tarkovsky's mother Maria Tarkovskaya. In this regard, the actual existence and filmic representation of Tarkovskaya interweave with each other. The three images of the mother of Tarkovsky interpenetrate within the filmic representation, blurring the lines between the actual and the virtual. Therefore, these images conceptually question the representation through the photographs and audiovisual images. In other words, 'chronosigns' serve the crystallization between the actual present and virtual pasts being inherently impenetrable. That is the coalescence of 'sheets of the past' that disrupts the linear order of time. Memory serves that purpose; it is impossible to penetrate the opaque past so that we can only reconstruct them in the present. The indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual is established through coalescence non-chronological pasts called 'sheets of the past' that crystallizes with the actual present. The memory-images become indistinguishable from the dream-images in turn, Alexei and Tarkovsky, the father and the son, mother and the wife, the actual lives, and the virtual memories become indiscernible from each other.

Self-conscious strategies discourse the power of the false with no pretense to the truth and creating circuits and shocks to engender a ground for pro-filmic thinking. With framing, mirror usages, and two different types of out-of-the-field, we start thinking of the off-screen space, the rest of the land and bodies as well as the radical elsewhere beyond the frame. Through a 'nooshock' collapsing the sensory-motor system, frame and mirror usages provide more profound opportunities for interpretation with plentiful possibilities. In the domain of lectosigns, it becomes a must to re-connect actual images with their virtual correlates, in which crystallization occurs in-between fiction and documentary, present and past, dream and memory, actual and virtual. In this regard, Tarkovsky's tendency towards 'time-pressure' gives room for his intuitive style in harmony with long-takes, wide angles, delayed cuts, and slow camera movements in favor of the cinematic rhythm making time 'tangible' in a shot.

Tarkovsky intuitively thinks of the opportunities to capture inner rhythm in a shot. In *Mirror*, Tarkovsky mostly used long-takes, wide-angle lenses with slow camera movements.

Concomitantly, he had very few shots with long takes, which is almost ‘half of a standard film’ (ST). Hence, the editing process was very tough to ‘mold ‘out the peculiar rhythm inside the shots to make the time perceivable. He mentions the process of the post-production in *Sculpting in Time*:

[...] I must say that a prodigious amount of work went into editing *Mirror*. There were some twenty or more variants. I don't just mean changes in the order of certain shots, but major alterations in the actual structure, in the sequence of the episodes. At moments it looked as if the film could not be edited, which would have meant that inadmissible lapses had occurred during shooting. The film didn't hold together, it wouldn't stand up, it fell apart as one watched, it had no unity, no necessary inner connection, no logic[...] (116)

In other words, Tarkovsky was intuitively striving for the juxtaposition of images under the time-pressure prescribing suitable editing legitimacy. The problem stemmed from the different kinds of rhythms ‘imprinted in the frame’, that cannot be accurately aligned with other images since they recorded fundamentally different sorts of time (ST: 116-117). He endeavored ‘spontaneously’ and ‘legitimately’ to find inner ‘propensity inherent in the material’:

[...] And then, one fine day, when we somehow managed to devise one last, desperate rearrangement—there was the film. The material came to life; the parts started to function reciprocally, as if linked by a bloodstream; and as that last, despairing attempt was projected onto the screen, the film was born before our very eyes. For a long time I still couldn't believe the miracle—the film held together. [...] It was clear that the parts came together because of a propensity inherent in the material, which must have originated during filming; and if we were not deceiving ourselves about its being there despite all our difficulties, then the picture could not but come together, it was in the very nature of things. It had to happen, legitimately and spontaneously, once we recognised the meaning and the life principle of the shots. And when that happened, thank God!—what a relief it was for everyone. (116,117)

In other words, it was a painful process for Tarkovsky since he gave priority to the inner rhythm of the shots, which has a unique relationship with time since he had to deal with relatively a few shots consisting of long takes and documentary footage. Tarkovsky endeavors to make the time itself alive within the time captured in the frame. That is, what time-pressure recorded inner side of the shot makes obligatory postulates. It was an obligation for Tarkovsky to obey the inner rules of flowing time to connect them with each other. Finally, irrespective of all the obstacles, footage of *Mirror* could come together in accordance with the very nature of time.

3.2 Intermedial References: Filmic Matter and Cultural Memory

As for the intermedial references, cultural and historical connotations have a great impact on Tarkovsky’s style leading to lectosigns in *Mirror*. Intermediality serves as a kind of invitation to co-think of the crystal-images with extra-diegetic information of life, which is two folded:

On the one hand, it relies on the collective consciousness with art and history, with the memory of World War II. On the other hand, diegetic information is directly related to the director's actual life and his individual memory. In this context, there are significant examples which paves the way for co-thinking of director's life and collective consciousness by directly referring to classical music, painting, literature, and history (Fig.3.11).



Figure 3. 2. 1: Intermedial References

In other words, *Mirror* attributes to 'matter' and 'memory' between the individual and the collective, in which pro-filmic thought appears in relation to the specific space-time of Soviet Russia. Tarkovsky intuitively captures the 'sealed' time as part of his individual memories and links them with the collective consciousness of Soviet Russia, which was dominated by a specific target of being one at the expense of being 'stammered'. In this concern, Tarkovsky, through *Mirror*, his last film produced with *Kinostudiya MosFilm* (Мосфильм) in the Soviet Union, tries to overcome the adverse effects of the ideology imposing one single truth. With the references to Fyódor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, Alexander Pushkin, and Anton Chekhov, the emancipation of wistful 'Russian Soul' leaks through that crack on the unitary repressive regime. In this context, intermedial references and extra-diegetic information also play a critical role in interpreting the film in the domain of lectosigns. Therefore, *Mirror* evokes the collective culture behind the Iron Curtain with intermedial references such as painting, music, history, and literature, being frequently introduced as parts of material life via the recollections of the main character Alexei.

Painting plays a critical role both in the narration and during the pre-production process of *Mirror*. The cinematographic idea to create visual indiscernibility inherited from visual arts and painting. Tarkovsky expresses that Leonardo da Vinci's capability paves the way for looking above the world, like Bach and Tolstoy, from outside to see the life from a broader perspective:

Let us look at Leonardo's portrait of 'A Young Lady With a Juniper', which we used in *Mirror* for the scene of the father's brief meeting with his children when he comes home on leave. There are two things about Leonardo's images that are arresting. One is the artist's amazing capacity to

examine the object from outside, standing back, looking from above the world—a characteristic of artists like Bach or Tolstoy. And the other, the fact that the picture affects us simultaneously in two opposite ways. It is not possible to say what impression the portrait finally makes on us. It is not even possible to say definitely whether we like the woman or not, whether she is appealing or unpleasant. She is at once attractive and repellent. There is something inexpressibly beautiful about her and at the same time repulsive, fiendish. And fiendish not at all in the romantic, alluring sense of the word; rather—beyond good and evil. Charm with a negative sign. It has an element of degeneracy—and of beauty. (ST: 108)

Tarkovsky's tendency towards creating ambiguity relies on his admiration for the capability of art making possible multiple interpretations at the same time. Leonardo da Vinci's 'A Young art making possible multiple interpretations at the same time. Leonardo da Vinci's 'A Young



Figure: 3.2.3: *Ginevra de Benci*, Leonardo da Vinci, c. 1474–1478, 38.1 cm × 37 cm, oil on panel
Figure: 3.2.4: *The Hunters in the Snow*, Pieter Bruegel the Elder, 1565, 117 cm × 162 cm, oil on panel

Lady with a Juniper' (or *Ginevra de Benci*) (Fig. 3.2.3) creates an ironic feeling on the beholder since we are both 'attracted' to her and 'repelled' at the same time. Hence, it accepts both reflections concerning her charm and shiver aspects. Concomitantly, during the production of *Mirror*, Tarkovsky aimed similar portrait to propose 'a timeless element into the moments' that are capable of accepting multiple reflections. Also, at the same time he endeavored to 'juxtapose the portrait with the heroine', to bring the same capability of Margarita Terekhova into open, 'at once to enchant and to repel' (ST). Furthermore, the scene between the documentary footage, in which a bird lands on the head of Ignat resembles the tableau called *Hunters in the Snow* (Bruegel, 1565) (Fig. 3.2.4, and Fig. 3.2.5). In this regard, it can be readily asserted that Western painting influenced Tarkovsky and made a remarkable impression on his childhood memories which are also introduced as a part of the everyday life of the protagonist. Both Leonardo and Bruegel play inspiring roles in the production process in terms of enabling Terekhova to keep ambiguous facial expressions at once attractive and repel, as well as setting



Fig. 3.2.5: A bird lands on the head of Ignat (01:04' 40" – 45")

character's past, which has a crucial effect on arousing thought on the medium as a part of Western arts and culture. Tarkovsky explains that intermedial tendency towards classical music in his book *Sculpting in Time*:

In the autobiographical *Mirror*, for instance, music is often introduced as part of material life, of the author's spiritual experience, and thus as a vital element in the world of the film's lyrical hero.

In the very beginning, we start hearing the prelude called *Das alte Jahr vergangen ist*^{xv} by Johan Sebastian Bach, which means 'the year that has passed' (Büke, 2005). The piece not only lays the groundwork for the filmic atmosphere but also, with its cultural baggage gives clue regarding the intermediary characteristic of the film in harmony with the plot and the character. Concomitantly, with the meaning of the prelude's title, we enter the atmosphere of nostalgia, the domain of the narrator Alexei's recollections. The piece not only lays the groundwork for the filmic atmosphere but also, with its cultural baggage gives clue regarding the intermediary characteristic of the film in harmony with the plot and the character. Thus, with the meaning of the prelude's title, we enter the atmosphere of nostalgia, the domain of the narrator Alexei's recollections.

Also, Giovanni Battista Pergolesi's 'Quando corpus morietur' is played together with the documentary shots of the Soviet Balloon. As far as the documentary footage and the name of the composition are concerned, which means "when the body died" in Latin, it is explicit that Tarkovsky chooses the religious piece by Pergolesi deliberately to emphasize the days of the war to create a dramatic atmosphere. Moreover, Henri Purcell's song from the opera *Indian Queen* plays an interconnecting role between two generations. During the telephone conversation, Alexei expresses that he was in love when he was at Ignat's age. Alexie's

presence is off-screen, and his recollection intermingles with his son's present time. Synchronically, 'They tell us that your mighty power' plays and connects two generations through arousing dramatic feelings on the spectator. Further, in the scene in which children are making target practice in the military camp, Tarkovsky preoccupies us with the reasons for war. After children's play with the bomb shows the danger by disquieting, the audience hears Arseniy Tarkovsky's poems from his own voice. Cut with the noisy and uneasy drums rasp the audience, and the disastrous pictures of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima juxtaposed with other images of war. Afterward, the spectator hears J.S. Bach's melodies from *Johannes-Passion* (BWW 245: *St John Passion*) for the first time while children are hugging their father, who returns from the battlefield. While both are crying, music provides destructive feelings stemming from the war.

As far as the religious context of *Johannes-Passion* is concerned, there is a strong correlation between Tarkovsky's pantheistic belief and his tendency to use J.S. Bach's divine compositions. J.S. Bach's *Johannes-Passion* recounts the last days of Jesus Christ as in the Bible, the Gospel of John. In this respect, using Bach's sacred passion has a direct intermedial reference to the Christian belief and creates a spiritual atmosphere following the juxtaposed images. We hear Choir Herr's version of *Johannes-Passion*, where the film ends in harmony when the camera moves elegantly. In the last scene, his father asks a question to her mother while they are leaning on the grass: "Would you rather have a boy or a girl?" (01:42' 40") We know the answer; it is going to be a boy, Tarkovsky himself. Terekhova smiles and looks at the camera in mixed feelings. Then without answering the question, she starts enigmatically crying. Afterward, young Maria looks behind and witnesses that Maria the Elder who shows the field round to the children, and then turns back, looks at us, at the camera again, and bites



Figure 3.2.6: The mother/wife (Margarita Terekhova) sees her future (01:04' 40" – 45")

her lip (Fig. 3.2.6). It can be readily asserted, that is a similar tendency with Leonardo da Vinci towards engendering equivocal images as ‘timeless’ elements to influence us in ‘two opposite ways’ at the same time; then it becomes impossible ‘to say what impression the portrait finally makes on us’ in favor of a broader perspective to look at the life. In other words, that is the decisive moment of the film in which Tarkovsky deliberately promotes the indiscernibility between his life and the film. He seals a specific space-time in the early 1970s Russia, interweaving his memories with the collective, flowing in-between 1930s and 1940s, through his peculiar audio-visual language. Therefore, *Johannes-Passion* becomes an inseparable part of the glorification of the crystals of space-times and its bodies. That is in-between mother and wife, father and son, fiction and documentary, the virtual artifice and the actual life intermingle and become indiscernible from each other. *Mirror* connects three different timelines, in which the pasts and the present, memory and dream, actual and virtual, become indiscernible from each other. Different generations conjoin as an eternal cycle. After the majestic climax of *Johannes-Passion*, Tarkovsky uses the diegetic silence of the forest again as well as the voice of the child which is in harmony with the bird calls.

3.3 ‘Sub-reality’ in *Mirror*: History, Oppression and Overcoming Aphasia

When it comes to the trademark of *Mirror*, chronosigns proceed the crystallization of time-images into another level as far as the indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual is concerned with the boundaries of the Iron Curtain. Through ‘pro-filmic thinking’, we can better comprehend the relationship between Tarkovsky’s inner time and the time that the Soviet Union had imposed a univocal target. That is the time within time, the virtual, “that is, the soul or the spirit” (C2:82-83). *The Mirror* enables us to enter the domain of pure virtuality, the ‘subjectivity’ that is ‘time’, in which ‘the whole of the real’, ‘life in its entirety becomes the ‘spectacle’ ‘sealed’ by the cinema (ibid). In this regard, *Mirror* captures the unique time of that space-time, in 1974-75 in Soviet Russia, and what is unutterable, not allowed to even think, due to the suppressive regime.

As it is mentioned before, Tarkovsky gives priority to capturing the inner rhythm and editing them in favor of a moment that time itself become ‘tangible’ within the film, and it encapsulates interpretations beyond the filmmaker’s intention since the image is “real” (ST) That is ‘pro-filmic’ thinking of the whole in harmony with the images. In Deleuzian terms, the actual images are no longer connected with their actual correlates that are the pure optical and sonic signs as the ground of the paradigm shift. Therefore, it is necessary to construct new neural pathways

to adapt to it. Crystal images are the description of that shift and extended by the chronosigns as ‘false continuity’ that consists of ‘peaks of the present’, ‘sheets of the past’ and ‘power of the false’ (C2: 99-147) (Deamer 2016: 152-156). In *Mirror* ‘power of the false’ the most dominant chronosigns that is ‘falsifying’ and ‘problematizing’ narration of time-images. The ‘sheets of the past’ support ‘power of the false’ with crystallization the different layers of the past in-between pre-war (the 1930s) and post-war pasts (the 1940s) as well as with the present (circa 1974-75). From the very beginning, the narration self-consciously reveals its fictional characteristics and problematizes by declining the pretense to the truth. In this concern, the most remarkable feature of *Mirror* manifests itself when the documentary footage from the war shocks the sensory-motor system (Fig. 3.1.8), (that is already analyzed in the 3.1st subchapter). That is us, our lives to meet in different facets of time, ‘the whole of the real’ becoming the spectacle as far as the lectosigns demands us to take part in, we engender pro-filmic thoughts to reconnect collapsed images with documentary footage. Haunting questions lead to thoughts, but it is beyond the narrative since we create our own connections through our consciousness. For example, the images of Mao Zedong, Soviet air balloon, dead soldiers, atomic bomb, political figures, mass people, Soviet soldiers, cannot be related to the narrative but can be linked with the life of those people, of Tarkovsky and his father while vocalizing the poems on death and life (Fig. 3.2.7). With the help of extra-diegetic information, we know



Figure 3.2.7 Sub-reality in *Mirror*: Documentary footage to shock to thought

that Tarkovsky’s father went to the war and came back with traumatic memories. Therefore, poetry arouses poetically dramatic feelings in us. We do not know who is Tarkovsky’s father, or none of us know Tarkovsky but we feel. We are shocked due to the war; it is not possible to comprehend the reason for war. With that collapse, we no longer look for a meaning construction of ‘fabula’ regarding the narrative but a meaning for the life. Lectosigns demands us to think of the open whole. That images open a field to think of life in the pre-and post-war period in our present, in 2021. Concomitantly, every image becomes potential for thought, that

is in 'noosphere' that we create our relinkages by pro-filmic thinking. Without no pretense to the truth, just as unreliable memories, the collective and individual, history and memory become indiscernible from each other. There are no answers but haunting questions of time itself.

On the other side, Tarkovsky paves the way for lectosigns to meet at 'noosphere' through his intuitive tendency to make time 'tangible'. The juxtaposition of different shots in accordance with their unique 'time-pressure', enables Tarkovsky to revisit his past and captures autobiographical memory, in which his actual life and the film interpenetrate with each other. With the pure virtual domain of lectosigns in which the interpretation demanded, the film becomes catoptric, *Mirror* reflects the life to us, our pro-filmic thinking is autonomous to a great extent because the film itself does not create thought but 'unthought' through shock (C2). The film already rejects to narrate, there is no pretense to truth, approves that it is an artifact from the beginning, it is not a documentary and not a complete fiction, but it is the subjectivity of time within time, a sealed piece of memory which crystallizes with the collective.

When co-thinking the first episode of the film with the shocking documentary shots, it can be readily regarded that Tarkovsky tends to overcome the impediment to speaking. In this concern, the unutterable does not only depend on the limits of language but also on the lack of freedom of thinking. Tarkovsky intuitively captures the time with its 'sub-reality' which refers to the bidirectional, and continuous relationship between subdued reality and subjective interpretation. Sub-reality is an opaque, partially visible, and subdued part of the actual matter captured within the film whereas cinematic lectorship is the virtual consciousness of the spectator, the mind, and the pure memory. Therefore, Tarkovsky finds its own expression beyond the oppressive regime of the Soviet Union through problematizing with the power of the false.

'Sub-reality' originates back to Henri Bergson's dualism between matter and memory, as well as the relationship between image and thought with duration. In other words, the concepts are fractal, sub-reality, and cinematic lectorship are the fruits of the same tree of movement-images and time-images; nothing is originally new, yet they pertain to time, that is the difference in the present. Articulately, the concept proclaims itself in a specific situation when the crystalline state of film between real and imaginary, documentary, and fiction, the actual and the virtual creates pro-filmic cinema-thinking in the domain of lectosigns. Once again, since the film itself does not think, it creates disunity between images and results in unthought. Re-connection

becomes a must, that is not relinking the images with the film; this is spontaneous, pro-filmic thought of the spectator to re-link the images with our life, with our actual present. Tarkovsky proceeds that into another level through intuitive cinema-thinking of the inner rhythm of the frame. In this regard, in the presence of a different space-time compared with the time when the film was produced, the virtual film becomes actual in a different space-time. The film is a closed system representing the time it was shot, but lectorship is present. It is open, the film body constantly absorbs new perspectives, interpretations into its body. In this concern, *Mirror* crystallizes and rejects the grand narratives of ideologies without pretense to the truth. Thus, it cracks itself and opens for the possibilities, that is, the power of the 'pre-linguistic system' of audiovisual expression to surpass aphasia. In this regard, the power of the false problematizes the narrative and celebrates the power of the ineffability in cinema, which is not immanent to the suppressive grand narratives.

As a result of the circuits of intermedial approach with Bergsonian dualism, it becomes necessary to point the specific relationship between the visible and the invisible, opaque, and limpid in the deeper layers of 'lectosigns', in which spectators could rescue what is prohibited or censored by repressive authorities. In this concern, the terms manifest themselves to explain the process of active spectatorship in a different space-time, in which the spectator could come up with new thoughts as parts of the whole, that is open. With autonomous thoughts beyond the filmmaker's conscious intention, the spectator connects filmic matter with their own life in 'noosphere'. We enter in the gap, through cracks with our memories, that are virtual but real, part of the whole through 'pro-filmic thinking'. In this regard, the film is the matter image representing an inter-assemblage of different images and signs, the 'sealed' space-time, which includes subdued reality. Spectators can intuitively infer what was subdued in a different space-time, that remains virtual. When expressing the interpretations with words or try to find audiovisual expression, it signifies the act of pro-creative lectorship to read, think and create within the domain of lectosigns by opening the ground for the collaboration between cinema and thinking through intuition; to solve the disparity between humans and their environment, ideologies and individuals, grand narratives and actuality, fiction and life. Bergson could propose, spectators may intuitively sense the 'absolute reality' as the dynamic parts within (MM). The time that we pertain to, encapsulates subdued reality has been made intuitively 'tangible' by the filmmakers to overcome the aphasia and the boundaries of speech, to be 'rescued' through the creative collaboration of lectorship with philosophy in the future. For instance, Andrey Tarkovsky intuitively sealed the subdued reality of the specific space-time of

the Soviet Union and created an alternative domain to think beyond the Soviet Ideology. In brief, the oppression may result in the lack of freedom of speech and the problem of interpreting the artifact out of the unitarity narratives imposed by the dominant regimes. That limits on thinking lead to aphasia within the closed system. An artist could overcome it by rejecting to use the same language system, with no pretense to the truth, by intuitively and strategically problematizing narration in favor of the open. Hence, what is unutterable could be intuitively expressed by the artist. It resembles a sailor's morse alphabet put in a bottle or a fly inside for being ultimately liberated through cinematic lectors who are philosophers, film critics, and film lovers who find their expression with new thoughts on the internet, blogs, and online video channels as the active participants within the 'noosphere', as vibrating cells of the open film body.

4. CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this study was to investigate the implications of cinema-thinking with its interrelated and inseparable relationship between filmmaking and spectatorship. Henri Bergson's method of intuition was approved to state the problem of irreducibility between the distinctive cinematographic thoughts in their process of procreation. Gilles Deleuze's taxonomy of time images and signs, Paul Schrader's and Andrei Tarkovsky's theories on filmmaking, were preferred to reveal the differences in kind within both processes. In the spectator's mind, 'pre-determinant thought' is a response, a univocal thought pre-established by the filmmaker, whereas the 'pro-filmic thinking' refers to autonomous production of new neural paths to the paradigm shift (cinema of time-image), which reconnects de-linked actual images with the virtual correlates, the world beyond the frame through pure memory of the spectator. Therefore, 'pro-filmic' thought is the spectator's creation of linkages between the film and the life itself, proceeding beyond the filmic image and narrative (noosigns) when the film does not think but engenders 'unthought' with circuits and shock to collapse the sensory-motor logic, which inevitably requires an interpretation within the pure virtual domain (lectosigns). On the filmmaker's side, cinematographic thinking inherently relates to the cinematographic idea that pertains to the peculiar potentialities of the film medium. The actualization process of the virtual ideas inevitably requires both strategic and intuitive thinking to capture and juxtapose the images following the initial purpose. In the cinema of time-images, narration (chronosigns) produces crystal images (hyalosigns) as the description for the new paradigm to engender indiscernibility between the actual and the virtual. In this regard, some auteurs like Andrei Tarkovsky have a great tendency towards seizing the 'inner rhythm' of the

moment and strive for making the time itself ‘tangible’ through specific shooting and editing techniques. With those kinds of inclination in cinema, Tarkovsky intuitively thinks to capture and mold the time, in both steps of the production process, just as a sculpturer to make the time perceivable. That tendency is reinforced and actualized by specific strategies and techniques such as long-take, slow camera movements, minimal coverage, delaying editing, or irrational cuts. All together with self-conscious and self-reflexive narration, the film denies pretense to the truth. In *Mirror*’s case, these strategies are not incompatible neither to Deleuze nor slow cinema techniques but complementary to each other in which the time-image narration problematizes (power of the false) to break the dull surface of the grand narratives. That is the crack where the light enters us, the open domain that we take part in the film through.

Andrey Tarkovsky’s *Mirror* was preferred to argue that cinema can overcome aphasia through generating ‘lectosigns’ with intuition and strategies paving the open way for thinking through beyond the screen. As a result of the evaluation of the cinema-thinking in both interrelated processes in *Mirror*, it could be readily affirmed that cinema as a ‘pre-verbal system’ can ‘seal’ specific space-times capturing the realities subdued by the dominant authorities. That is the time itself becoming ‘tangible’ during the process of spectatorship. Even though freedom of speech is not guaranteed, cinema can seize the ineffability of time to overcome aphasia dictated by the grand narratives. In this regard, the notion of ‘*sub-reality*’ manifests itself when referring to the *subdued* realities by the despotic regime, which could be determined by the active and *subjective* cinematic readership ('lectorship') belonging to the distinctive space-times from the perspective of the future. In other words, ‘whereof one cannot speak’, thereof must be an artist to express what is ineffable; moreover, there must be a ‘lector’, an active reader of that ineffability, of the ‘lectosigns’, who could be a film scholar, or a philosopher like Deleuze to create new concepts to transform it into the thinkable domain, or a filmmaker to be inspired for new productions, to think of the artifact in a different space-time, so as to rescue the ‘sub-reality’ out of the ‘rational monotony’ and ‘given codes in language’ as well as the hacking mechanisms of the dominant ideologies. That is the open domain of a film, in which philosophy and cinema collaborate to pave new paths for thought. Thanks to the method intuition, the collaboration between art and sciences gain depth and proliferates new possibilities to think. In future researches, cinema and the cultural, visual, spatiotemporal, and philosophical questions that it breeds could be well-evaluated following the notion of ‘sub-reality’ and distinctive kinds of cinema-thinking. Through creative collaboration among filmmakers and 'lectors' consisting of critics and philosophers to actively interpret images and lectosigns,

'subdued' time could be readily rescued through pro-filmic thinking to open new paths for thought.



Figure 4.1 Andrei Tarkovsky and Margarita Terekhova are on the set of *Mirror* for shooting the famous dream sequence.

NOTES

ⁱ Translator Hugh Tomlinson mentions the difficulty of translating the word ‘auteur’ in French texts and warns the reader to keep in mind that ‘auteur’ both means ‘director’ and ‘author’ (C2: xvii). In some contexts, I prefer using the word ‘auteur’ for the following reasons. First, it is more appropriate to compare auteurs with philosophers since it points to the fact that they are the writers and the directors of the same film with distinctive styles and thematic relevance. Second, as far as the correlation between *French New Wave* and *Cinema 2: Time-Image* is concerned, it could be a reason why Deleuze did not endorse other words as *directeur*, *régisseur*, or *réalisateur* in French; but preferably attributed to ‘the cinema artists’ by utilizing *auteur*. In brief, employing the word ‘auteur’ broadens the scope and associates the historical connotation with the heritage of French Cinema; it also emphasizes the artistic role of the writer-directors (ibid).

ⁱⁱ “ultrā, *adv.* and *prep.* + *acc.*, on the other side of, beyond” (LaFleur, 2010: 22).

ⁱⁱⁱ Another source for the etymological root of the prefix: “**pro-** 1. *pre* moving forward; moving ahead of (proclivity); 2. forth (produce); 3. substituting for; acting for (pronoun); 4. defending; supporting (prolabor)” (Sheehan, 2000: 70).

^{iv} For the prospective researches dealing with the contesting pasts and traumatic memory, Pierre Nora’s *Between Memory and History* (1989), *Mirrors without Memories: Truth, History, and the New Documentary* (1993) by Linda Williams, *The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the Engraving of Trauma* (1995) by B.A. Van der kolk and O. Van der Hart, Linda Mokdad’s *The Reluctance to Narrate* (2013), or Kamran Rastegar’s *The Time that is Lost* (2015) could procreate compelling synthesis with the notion of sub-reality and cinematic lectorship. In this context, Joshua Oppenheimer’s *Act of Killing* (2012) challenging previous Indonesian death-squad commanders ‘to reenact their mass-killings’ could be stimulating to think of the gloomy surface of national heroism and the univocal discourse of grand narratives.

^v Moreover, late phenomenological approaches on *Becoming* by Henri Maldiney, Jacques Derrida’s ‘unfinished text’, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968), *The Death of the Author* (1967) with ‘the birth of ‘reader’ (cinematic readership) as well as *Camera Lucida* (1980) by Roland Barthes, and *The Open Book* (1989) by Umberto Eco could suit well creating the pure virtual domain to think of the whole in cinema, for further discussions on openness and unfinishedness with support and contravenes.

^{vi} To remind the Latin prefix intrinsically attributing to three prominent qualities of the peculiar kind of cinema-thinking during spectatorship:

pro-¹, *prefix*. **1.** *pro-* comes from Latin, where it has meaning "forward, forward movement or location; advancement": *proceed; progress; prominent; promote; propose*. **2.** *pro-* is also attached to roots and words and means "bringing into existence": *procreate; produce*. **3.** *pro-* is also attached to roots and words and means "in place of": *pronoun* [...] (Dalgish, 1997:587) Shortly, 'pro-filmic thinking' provides me to denote the active process of the spectatorship and the thoughts procreated in the domain of lectosigns. The thinking process is not post-filmic but present with the juxtaposed images within the duration of the film.

^{vii} In her Ph.D. thesis, Lindsay Powell-Jones 'bring Deleuze's ideas into contact with the "Khrushchev 'Thaw'" cinema of the 50s and 60s', which refers to the period starting with Stalin's death gradually increasing artistic freedom in the Soviet Union. Powell-Jones thoroughly examines Tarkovsky's films with Deleuzian understanding of post-war cinema within the boundaries of the Iron Curtain.

^{viii} 'Techne' (τέχνη) refers to the notion of art in Ancient Greek that there was no distinction between craftsmanship and art making. The concept of art was nothing more than the technical skill pertaining to the field. (Shiner, 2001, *Invention of Art*)

^{ix} In 2003, David George Menard, a polymath physicist and filmmaker, publishes an article under the *Offscreen* journal about the correlation between 'time-image' and Tarkovsky's montage theory 'time-pressure' against Eisenstein's 'montage of attractions. Briefly, he shows the interrelations between three theories by analyzing Tarkovsky's later films (Menard, 2003).

^x Deleuze, in the chapter called *Painting and Sensation* of his book *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation* (1981), refers to Cézanne's ability to put 'a vital rhythm' into 'the visual sensation' to explain the 'logic of the senses' that is 'neither rational nor cerebral' but relies on the relation between sensation and rhythm which is "more profound than vision, hearing, etc." (42-43).

^{xi} The original: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" by Ludwig Wittgenstein in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921).

^{xii} In the first years of *Cahiers du Cinéma*, a French film magazine established by André Bazin in 1952, Francois Truffaut manifested that film auteurs with their specific characteristics are the real creators establishing film as the '7th art' (Bickerton 2009, *A Short History of 'Cahiers du Cinéma'*).

^{xiii} 'Ya mogu govarit' (я могу говорить) means 'I can speak' in Russian. I preferred using the subtitle with the Cyrillic alphabet without translation to self-consciously attribute to the form

and the language as in the scene of Spanish guest talking is exhibited without any subtitle in *Mirror* (1975).

^{xiv} In his article, Kierran Horner interrelates *Mirror* with Deleuze's notion of time-image. In this scene, he evaluates the documentary footage as 'the representation' of the Spanish character's 'memory' (Horner, 2011). However, these documentary images from the wars are non-diegetic since they are not motivated in the filmic universe. The footages abruptly come out of the diegesis, which leads to a critical torn on the actual image. In this regard, it is no longer possible to relate to their actual correlates as neither a 'recollection-image' nor a simple flashback of the character's memory. It is a shock, a circuit on the dull surface of the artifact in favor of the pure virtual domain, igniting our memory to relink the images with the whole. The scene demands us to think of life itself, our past with the traumatic memory of the wars proceeding beyond the Spanish character's memory, into the open whole; life itself.

^{xv} BWV 599-644 *Das Orgelbüchlein* – J.S. Bach's composition for the period from Noel to Easter consists of 46 short choral pieces (Büke, 2005).

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