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HARMONIZATION UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION: THE NORM LIFE CYCLE OF EDUCATION FOR SYRIANS IN TURKEY 2013-2017

AMBER ÇAKAR

ADVISOR: PROF. SERHAT GÜVENÇ

MASTER'S THESIS

ISTANBUL, JANUARY, 2021

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Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in the Program of International Relations

ISTANBUL, JANUARY, 2021

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This work entitled **HARMONIZATION UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION: THE NORM LIFE CYCLE OF EDUCATION FOR SYRIANS IN TURKEY 2013-2017** prepared by **AMBER ÇAKAR** has been judged to be successful at the defense exam held on **JANUARY 14, 2021** and accepted by our jury as **MASTER'S THESIS**.

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ABSTRACT

Between 2013-2017 Turkey welcomed 2.7 million Syrian refugees with one third being children of compulsory school age. With a vision of temporariness while undergoing rapid domestic institutional changes and decreasing legitimation with its own citizens, the Turkish government was ill-prepared to accommodate, among other necessities, educational needs for the 90% of refugees living in host communities after abrupt urbanization. This research applies Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998) "Norm Life Cycle" framework to illustrate Turkey's changing policies regarding education for Syrians between 2013-2017. It is a descriptive thesis utilizing desk research and examining the norm and evolution of refugee education in Turkey vis-à-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey. Finnemore and Sikkink's three-stage norm life cycle aims to provide further analysis of the "tipping points" or "thresholds" that carried Turkey from one stage to the next in the evolution of refugee education vis-à-vis Syrians in Turkey. Closer examination of these tipping points and surrounding events with a constructivist lens aims to bring actors closer to international norms in education. By studying the capabilities and flexibilities of an extreme case such as Turkey in approaching education for over one million students in a protracted situation, it may better inform future models and norms in international refugee education policy and lessen the negative impacts on refugees and host country communities.

Keywords: Refugee, Education, Forced migration, Integration, Harmonization, Norms research, Identity, Legitimation, Constructivism

TEZ BAŞLIĞI

ÖZET

Türkiye 2013 – 2017 arası üçte biri zorunlu eğitim çağında 2,7 milyon Suriyeli mülteciyi ağırladı. Geçicilik vizyonuyla hareket edilen bu süreçte hızlı kurumsal değişimler geçiren ve vatandaşları tarafından meşruluğu azalan Türkiye hükümeti, başka ihtiyaçlarının yanında şehirlerde ikamet eden mültecilerin %90'ının eğitim ihtiyaçlarını karşılamaya hazır değildi. Bu araştırma, Türkiye'nin 2013-2017 yılları arasında Suriyelilerin eğitimine ilişkin değişen politikalarını tanımlamak için Martha Finnemore ve Kathryn Sikkink'in (1998) Norm Yaşam Döngüsü'nü kullanmaktadır. Bu betimsel çalışma, masa başı araştırma yöntemlerini kullanarak Türkiye'deki mültecilerin eğitiminin norm ve evrimini Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler üzerinden incelemektedir. Finnemore ve Sikkink'in üç aşamalı norm yaşam döngüsü modeli Türkiye'nin, Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler'i baz alarak, mülteci eğitiminde bir aşamadan diğer aşamaya evrilmesine sebep olan baraj noktalarını ve kritik eşikleri detaya inerek incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu kritik eşiklerin ve çevrelerindeki olayların konstrüktivist bir bakış açısıyla incelenmesi, aktörleri uluslararası eğitim normlarına yaklaştırmaktadır. Türkiye gibi ekstrem bir vakanın bir milyondan fazla mülteci öğrencinin eğitimine yaklaşımındaki yetkinliklerini ve esnekliklerini incelemek, uluslararası mülteci eğitiminde gelecek model ve normlara kaynak oluşturabilir ve mülteciler ile ev sahibi ülkenin toplulukları üzerindeki negatif etkiyi azaltabilir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Mülteci, Eğitim, Zorunlu göç, Entegrasyon, Uyum, Norm araştırması, Kimlik, Meşruiyet, Konstrüktivizm, Yapılandırmacılık

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my mother

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ACRONYMS

AFAD   Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

DGMM   Directorate General of Migration Management

EU   European Union

IOM   International Organization for Migration

LFIP   Law on Foreigners and International Protection

MoNE   Ministry of National Education

NGOs   Non-governmental Organizations

PICTES   Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System

TEC   Temporary Education Center

TP   Temporary Protection

TPS   Turkish Public School

UNHCR   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF   United Nations Children's Fund

1. INTRODUCTION

As a result of the continuing 2011 Syrian uprisings, between 2013-2017 Turkey welcomed approximately 2.7 million Syrian refugees with one third being children of compulsory school age (UNHCR 2020a). With a vision of temporariness while undergoing rapid domestic institutional changes and decreasing legitimation with its own citizens, the Turkish government was ill-prepared to accommodate, among other necessities, educational needs for the 90% of refugees living in host communities after abrupt urbanization. At first, valiant efforts were invested in services provided in the many temporary accommodation centers and tent cities at the southeastern Turkey-Syria border as illustrated by the 89 percent school attendance rate, however the biggest problem lay in the 87 percent of Syrian children *not being engaged* in any form of educational activities outside of the camps (AFAD 2013a). Albeit the enrollment rate of Syrian students increased to 62 percent by the end of 2017, nearly 400,000 Syrian children remained out of school in Turkey.

In 2015 Turkey became the largest refugee hosting country in the world, accommodating 2.5 million Syrians; more than all other neighboring countries combined (Lebanon 1m; Jordan 620,000; Egypt 117,000; Iraq 158,000) (UNHCR 2020b). In comparison to the regional response to the Syria crisis, Turkey is the only neighboring country that posed the most challenging barrier to education for refugees: language. Also, in contrast to Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey exhibits less flexibility in aspects of identity, knowledge, and shared beliefs shaped by the national education system such as morality and religion in addition to language. Insufficient educational opportunities for refugee children deprive them of protection and often force situations of exploitation and abuse such as child labor and early marriage.

1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

This research applies Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998) "norm life cycle" framework to illustrate Turkey's changing policies regarding education for Syrians between 2013-2017. It is a descriptive thesis utilizing desk research and examining the norm and evolution of refugee education in Turkey vis-à-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey by asking the question: How did Turkey manage education for Syrians from 2013-2017?

Investigating Turkey's approach to education for Syrians in this way may provide some insight that other theoretical approaches cannot due to the absence of norms focus. In other words, much research on the topic discusses outcomes; what happened, when, what should continue to happen. Finnemore and Sikkink's three stage norm life cycle model aims to provide further analysis of the "tipping points" or "thresholds" (1998, p. 901) that carried Turkey from one stage to the next in the evolution of refugee education vis-à-vis Syrians in Turkey from 2013 to 2017.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE QUESTION

As of last year, one percent of the world's population was displaced due to forced migration and nearing the end of 2020 more people are in protracted situations than ever before due to conflict, climate change, natural disasters, a global pandemic, and fear of political or ideological persecution (UNHCR 2020a). Unfortunately, the concept of refugees and related terminologies (asylum-seeker, stateless persons, persons under temporary protection, etc) are not phenomena, but the ways in which host countries navigate mass forced migration movements between upholding aspects of state identity, shared knowledge and beliefs—and adhering to international agreements recognizing and realizing basic human rights such as education is still new. Beyond the right to exist as a physically and emotionally healthy human being, ensuring education to children in protracted situations provides safety, structure, and most importantly more opportunities for their future and the future of their country if or when they return.

The legal status of Syrians in Turkey has proven toughest on children (including of host communities) as everything about Turkey's early approach was based on a short-term stay. Conflict increased in Syria, resulting in more people crossing the border for safety

and eventually both societies accepted millions of Syrians were in Turkey for the foreseeable future. Between 2013 and 2017 Turkey reached two tipping points which significantly evolved the government's approach to education for displaced Syrians. Closer examination of these tipping points and surrounding events with a constructivist lens aims to bring actors closer to international norms in education and to prevent what many have referred to as a lost generation (Beste 2015; UNICEF 2014a; Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2015).

In this lost generation it was unsurprisingly reported that child marriage, child labor, and human trafficking of undocumented minors increased in Turkey (UNICEF ed 2014). By studying the capabilities and flexibilities of an extreme case such as Turkey in approaching education for over one million students in a protracted situation, it may better inform future models and norms in international refugee education policy and lessen the negative impacts on refugees and host communities.

1.3 KEY CONCEPT: TEMPORARY PROTECTION

According to international protection under Turkish law, there are no Syrian Refugees in Turkey. Owing to its unique geographical position between Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, Turkey has been a transit and destination country for those seeking refuge for hundreds of years. In 1951, the UNHCR set forth guidelines in the Geneva Convention Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees and an additional protocol of 1967 defining international protection that would apply to those seeking refuge all over the world due to, among other reasons, war or a 'well-founded' fear of persecution in their home country (UN General Assembly 1951, Article 22). In 1961 and 1968, this protocol was ratified by Turkey and throughout this process, Turkey was one of four countries that maintained a geographical limitation, clarifying that the 1951 Convention only applies to refugees coming to Turkey from Europe, due to aforementioned reasons applicable to Europe (Eksi 2016). Turkey's geographical limitation remains one of the biggest legal obstacles for Syrians within the temporary protection framework.

Temporary Protection (TP) is one of four main categories applicable to persons seeking international protection in Turkey and is defined in Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) as follows:

> Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection. (DGMM 2019).

The LFIP and secondary legislations in 2014 and 2016 afforded more rights regarding employment and education to TP beneficiaries. In September 2014, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) Circular No: 2014/21 concerning foreigner's access to education stipulated that TP beneficiaries must register with Turkish authorities (if they had not already) for access to education, along with their TP identification card or residence permit; if they did not have either, they could register as "guests" (Asylum Information Database (AIDA) 2015). Another pillar of the LFIP was rooted in the 1951 Geneva Convention principle of *non-refoulement*, preventing states from returning persons seeking international protection to their country of origin. DGMM (2019) defines Temporary Protection as follows:

> Temporary protection is a kind of protection which is developed for immediate solutions in the event of a mass influx. It is a practical and complementary solution which is implemented in the framework of *non-refoulement* of States without loss of time with individual status determination procedures, to persons arriving the borders.

Moreover, a later modification was made to TP as part of secondary legislation founded in the LFIP titled as the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR). According to AIDA (2018, p. 123):

> Article 25 TPR explicitly excludes temporary protection beneficiaries from the possibility of long-term legal integration in Turkey. According to Article 25, the Temporary Protection Identification Document issued to beneficiaries does not serve as a residence permit as such, may not lead to "long term residence permit" in Turkey in accordance with Articles 42 and 43 LFIP.

Furthermore, Syrians under TP may only naturalize through marriage to a Turkish citizen or under special conditions such as highly skilled workers that would benefit Turkey. In other words, TP beneficiaries were not meant to have a future in Turkey and

thus, their rights and obligations would always by default, depend on how long they would stay.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is divided into three main sections to understand the dynamics behind the case of education for Syrians in Turkey. The first section gives a brief introduction of refugee education studies, then points to the literature specific to Syrians under TP in Turkey. This is the longest section due to the specificity of the research question. The second section explores the inner workings of the government of Turkey and its historical response to refugees. The last section contextualizes education for Syrians in Turkey within the existing national education framework as well as the role of religious education in shaping national identity and promoting the ruling government's political ideology.

2.1 REFUGEE EDUCATION

Refugee studies as a field emerged in the 1930s and have always been connected to policy developments (Black 2001). Ninety years later the 'refugee problem' persists and while time spent in exile differs from crisis to crisis, there has been a focus on education for refugees in host countries since the right to education was outlined in Article 22 of UNHCR's 1951 Convention on the status of refugees and again with the implementation of UNICEF's 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child. By refugee, UNHCR's definition is taken as it states in Article I of the 1951 Convention:

> Someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. (UN General Assembly 1951).

By education, a hybrid definition by Robertson and Dale 2008 (cited in Dryden-Peterson 2016a, p. 475) is used as "the components of educational governance, including funding, provision, ownership, and regulation as well as the experiences of teaching and learning in schools". Dryden-Peterson's (2016a) division of refugee terminology is followed in the two sections below. The first section provides a brief

background of the emergence of refugee studies, the right to education, and barriers to education and refers to the 73% of refugees hosted in countries next to their country of origin which is engaged in conflict (UNHCR 2020a) as opposed to what Dryden-Peterson (2016a, p. 474) refers to as "distant resettlement countries". In contrast, the second section reverts to the TP framework to illustrate Turkey's response to the education of Syrians since 2011. Despite legal terminology, similarities in barriers to education and friction between international obligations and national educational structures persist.

2.1.1 Education for Refugees in Protracted Situations

The available literature on refugee education all stresses the importance of addressing the needs of refugee school children in the long-term and comes from three main perspectives which are not mutually exclusive: education, migration, and more recently with the securitization of refugees, international relations. For example, Taylor and Sidhu (2012, p. 40) cover all three within their framework, arguing that forced migration must be "understood and studied in the context of social transformations that have emerged from earlier and present waves of globalization". The authors highlight the "challenges and good practices" literature, while calling attention to the "limitations and possibilities proposed by the institutions of human rights and citizenship" in the case of who is charged with inclusive education for refugee children (2012, p. 42). They are critical of the previous lack of refugee-specific policy research, formation, or implementation in Australia.

Similarly, Dryden-Peterson (2016a, p. 480) calls for future research on the ways in which partnerships between globalized actors (such as UNHCR) and national governments "negotiate the age-old tension between the sovereignty of the nation-state and global responsibility". Dryden-Peterson uses her extensive field research to highlight the lack of attention, experience, and preparedness the UNHCR had prior to 2011 with regards to education for refugees in neighboring host countries. For instance, she found between 1998 and 2011 UNHCR had not employed even one education officer in a refugee-hosting country and quoted one former senior education officer's description of it as a "total lack of expertise" in the UNHCR education sector (2016a, p.

478). Dryden-Peterson (2016a) examined archival documents from UNHCR since 1951 through the lens of refugee education since WWII and conducted semi-structured interviews over the course of 13 years (October 2002 and April 2015) to understand how to realize such policies recognizing education for all as well as guarantee that refugees would have opportunities to use said education to participate in society in the future. Since her focus was on the protracted nature of education for refugees in neighboring host countries, the research is particularly relevant to this thesis, although she differs in framework with a global institutionalization model to illustrate how the field has changed in three phases in nearly 70 years.

Barriers to refugee education include lack of inclusivity and recognition (Göksel 2017; Keddie 2012), state of uncertainty (for both the refugees and the host participants), language barriers, and variation in teaching approaches (Taylor & Sidhu 2012; Dryden-Peterson 2016a, 2016b, 2017). Though UNHCR has taken a different approach encouraging all neighboring countries to integrate refugees and those in protracted situations since 2012 into the national education system regardless of how long they are projected to stay (Dryden-Peterson 2016a), these barriers to refugee education still clearly exist in the case of Syrians in Turkey as explored below.

2.1.2 Education for Syrians in Turkey

Turkey's approach to the education of Syrians evolved from indifference to implementation of complete integration into the national schooling system in just under six years. Unutulmaz (2019) claims this drastic transformation in education policy happened in three overlapping stages based on changing realities of the growing number of Syrians granted temporary protection status, availability and allocation of resources, and the likelihood of them going back to Syria. At first, Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) aided by non-state actors opened the first Temporary Education Center (TEC) in 2011 in a camp in the southern Turkish city of Hatay (Akyüz et al. 2018). Before Turkey could produce a meaningful response to the crisis, a parallel education system had emerged and for the first time, MoNE allowed a foreign curriculum (Syrian) to be taught in a foreign language (Arabic) under

government regulated public education for and primarily taught by individuals with a temporary legal status (Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey).

Empirical research has employed comparative and qualitative case studies including interviews with Syrian students and parents, Turkish and Syrian school personnel (in both TECs and TPS), government officials from MoNE, and leading members in NGOs. In addition, many policy reports have been produced, reviewing empirical studies and providing their own assessments. The following three sections reveal the common themes on Turkey's policy responses for the education of Syrians since the decision was made to provide Temporary Education Centers for Syrian students to continue their schooling while waiting out the war in Turkey. The second section highlights notable policies and government supported programs that were realized once the situation started to feel less temporary. The last section has the largest body of existing literature, which is consequently about the major obstacles that were magnified once domestic policy finally began to implement full integration into Turkish Public Schools, otherwise referred to by the Turkish government as harmonization.

2.1.2.1 Temporary Education Centers (TECs)

According to the Turkish Ombudsman *Special Report on Syrians* the purpose of TECs was to provide basic access to education for Syrians in temporary protection centers (camps) near the border (The Ombudsman Institution of the Republic of Turkey 2018). However, by 2016 there were over 400 of these centers located nationwide with the majority in Hatay and Istanbul (AIDA 2018). TECs allowed primary and secondary Syrian children to be taught a curriculum designed by the Ministry of Education of the Syrian Interim Government, modified by MoNE to include Turkish language and history courses taught by Turkish nationals (Aras & Yasun 2016; Balkar, Babahan & Şahin 2016). The centers were not closely monitored by MoNE at first, resulting in massive variations in quality of education as well as content (Çoşkun & Emin 2016a). Syrian teachers were strictly considered as volunteers due to their TP status, but as some TECs were backed by partner NGOs, Syrian teachers were given a minimal stipend (Bozkırlı, Er & Alyılmaz 2018). As of 2016 to encourage the transition from TECs to

TPS, Syrian students entering preschool and first grade levels were only allowed to attend TPS and MoNE began to shut down all TECs by 2020 (Aras & Yasun 2016).

Balkar, Babahan and Şahin (2016), Bozkırlı and Alyılmaz (2018), and Çoşkun and Emin (2016a) found through interviews with Syrian teachers at the TECs that they felt ill-prepared, underqualified and had much different classroom management styles as well as approaches to teaching and learning than their Turkish counterparts. Bozkırlı and Alyılmaz used a focus group of forty Syrian teachers to get feedback on Turkish instruction to Syrian students in TECs and found that some of the biggest issues included prejudices of Syrian students toward the Turkish language and motivation to learn Turkish, as well as lack of teacher support and inappropriate behavior by support staff. Moreover, Balkar, Babahan and Sahin determined that lack of motivation, among other things, was often attributed to Syrian teachers and students, and questions of validity: of Syrian teachers' credentials, and for students, whether or not their diploma or TEC documentation would be recognized should they continue their education at another school.

Other contentions were that the classroom environment was typically not conducive to learning since TECs operated out of anywhere from a residential basement to any building available in the area of need; however, TPS buildings were made available for second shift use once MoNE started monitoring TECs more closely (Çoşkun and Emin 2016a). The issues highlighted by Balkar et al. (2016), Bozkırlı and Alyılmaz (2018), and Çoşkun and Emin (2016a) further illustrate the temporariness with which the education of Syrians in Turkey was approached. All three studies mentioned negative attitudes between Syrian and Turkish students, reflecting on the trickle-down effect of Turkish society's understanding of the situation for Syrians in Turkey and to what extent cultural differences should be resolved.

2.1.2.2 From policies to implementation

As mentioned, Unutulmaz (2019) divides the evolution of Turkey's policies into three stages characterized by a drastic shift in Turkey's attitude toward a meaningful response. Meanwhile, McCarthy (2017) questions the political preferences of the

Turkish government and their misguided political vision for Syrian students. McCarthy critically states that the government is not so much concerned with what is best for the Syrian children, but rather how Syrian students could advance national political objectives by the ruling government. Conversely, Unutulmaz (2019, p. 249) is more outspoken about the need for inclusion of Syrians in education policy conversations as "the refugees themselves – seems either to be taken as a passive recipient in need or to be left out of the discussion altogether."

While Turkish Public Schools were an option for Syrian students seeking education in Turkey, first they had to overcome the bureaucracy of registration and language barrier (Coşkun & Emin 2016a,b). At first, many Syrian families did not want to send their children to TPS, as they too did not expect to stay in Turkey long-term and it was not a considerable option before 2013 due to the TP framework. However, even after MoNE sent out circulars in September of 2013, and again in September of 2014 declaring the right to education for all Syrian children under temporary protection, it was not until after an EU-Turkey agreement in 2016 that MoNE began implementing its first major program: Promoting Integration of Syrian Children to the Turkish National Education System (PICTES) (Akyüz et al. 2018). The goal of PICTES was to integrate all Syrian students into TPS' and close down all TECs by 2020, including the addition of extra language classes and teacher training among various other initiatives.

Two other notable efforts that followed were the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTE) and the Accelerated Learning Program (HEP), (AIDA 2018). CCTE was a collaboration between MoNE, AFAD, Turk Kizilay, UNICEF, and the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services which provided monetary assistance to qualified families, enforced by case management and conditional on school attendance. According to the Asylum Information Database, the cash transfer program was most effective for students at the elementary level (AIDA 2018). The Accelerated Learning Program (HEP is the Turkish acronym for *Hizlandirilmis Egitim Programi*), was launched in mid-2018 as a catch-up program for children between 10-18 years old who had missed three or more years of schooling and by the end of 2018 it had reached approximately 6,600 children (AIDA 2018). While it is too soon to understand the

impact of such implementations, all the literature urges consistent follow-up to ensure strengthening of national norms in education and social cohesion in the broader societal context.

2.1.2.3 Barriers to education for Syrians in Turkey

Even before Syrians started arriving in 2011, Turkey had well-known problems within the already existing, and constantly changing, national education system (Çelik & Erdoğan 2017; Çelik & Icduygu 2018). While many barriers to education for Syrians in Turkey have emphasized the language barrier, bullying, lack of psycho-social support, gaps in available resources, and unorganized coordination efforts, Syrians' access to education opportunities were ultimately "tied to the politics of how long they will stay" (Culbertson & Constant 2015, p. 8). Additionally, Syrians' TP status did not allow them to work, forcing many families to rely on children to work and contribute to supporting the family (HRW 2015; Aydin & Kaya 2017; Akyüz et al. 2018).

As for the language barrier, TPS' are instructed in Turkish, making it difficult for native Arabic-speaking Syrian students; and especially challenging for the majority of Syrians coming from rural areas where approximately one-third were illiterate in their mother tongue (AFAD 2013a; Kirisci 2014; Biehl et al. 2018). Once Syrians did enroll in a TPS, it was not uncommon to face further problems exacerbated by bullying due to misinformation about refugees in the public sphere, and the incapacity of TPS teachers and staff to accommodate diversity and especially, trauma (Kirisci 2014; Çoskun & Emin 2016a; Çelik & Icduygu 2018). Another major barrier that both TECs and TPS' faced was the reliability of datasets. While there were official numbers—nobody knew just exactly how many Syrians there were in Turkey, especially children. This is reflected in Turkey's reporting of school enrollment rates, as the percentage of Syrian children in primary school is listed as 108% for the academic year of 2017-2018 due to some TEC students not attending their assigned classes (partly because parents did not want their child to transfer to TPS) as well as gaps in various datasets for tracking TEC students (The Ombudsman Institution of the Republic of Turkey 2018; OECD 2018).

2.2 GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY

Since the government of Turkey determines domestic refugee policy, which is inevitably linked with its foreign policy, this section is divided in two parts which illustrate Turkey's capabilities of fulfilling international agreements vis-à-vis refugees while maintaining domestic order. The first section discusses Turkey's domestic governance under the ruling Justice and Development party: *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP). The second section contextualizes Turkey's Syria response to the Syria crisis by examining its institutional response to refugees and asylum seekers since the 1990s as well as the shift in humanitarian response toward Syria since the start of the uprisings.

2.2.1 A New Presidential System

Turkey's new presidential system is a result of over fifteen years under AKP rule: a self-proclaimed conservative democracy (Şimşek 2013). AKP was founded on Islamic values in 2001 by (now President) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan whose identity and ideologies are now symbolic of the party. Erdoğan was elected 12th President of Turkey in 2014 and after a failed military coup in 2016, moved for a constitutional amendment in 2017 under an extended state of emergency to change Turkey to a presidential system; in 2018 he was the first president elected under the presidential system (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2020). Scholars have described Turkey as a hopeful democracy (Erisen & Kubicek 2016), a troubled democracy (Yabanci 2016; Esen & Gümüşçü 2016, 2017), and a defensive democracy (Yilmaz 2017), but finally yielded a collapsed democracy (Esen & Gümüşçü 2020). Albeit varied, authoritarianism was argued either as a quality, tendency, or trajectory of AKP or Erdoğan leadership, with an additional proposal for 'Erdoğanism' as the new political regime in light of some form of authoritarianism (Yilmaz & Bashirov 2018).

It is evident from the literature that contemporary Turkish policy cannot be separated from President Erdoğan. Yilmaz and Bashirov (2018) argue that authoritarianism misses key features in describing Turkey's political regime and they underscore four key features of their alternative 'Erdoğanism': an electoral system as electoral authoritarianism; an economic system run on neopatrimonialism; a political strategy

guided by populism; and a political ideology of Islamism. In Erdoğanism, electoral authoritarianism means an "opposition exists but opponents are not allowed to win the majority of votes" (Yilmaz & Bashirov 2018, p. 1817). This is confirmed by Esen and Gümüşçü's (2016) political economy account of the 2015 parliamentary elections, and analysis of the 2017 referendum vote to change to a presidential system where they found that AKP campaigns benefitted from "extensive media and resources" while stifling and witch-hunting opposition efforts (2017, p. 313). Dependency models introduced by Esen and Gümüşçü (2020), Onis (2019), and Yabanci (2016) highlight the neopatrimonial element through clientelism where the patron buys the client's loyalty in exchange for protection of the client's interests (Yilmaz & Bashirov 2018); this is especially true in Yabanci's (2016) analysis of AKP's infiltration of trade unions in the construction and education sectors.

The dependency models have also contributed greatly to AKP's lengthy tenure and consolidation of power including reforms to the constitution, national education system, and restricted freedoms. Yilmaz and Bashirov (2018, p. 1816) quote Somer, calling this "capturing the state". In 2010 the government gained control of the justice system; in 2011 top military officials were purged, weakening traditional military checks on power; in 2012 a controversial religious-based education reform was launched; in 2013 free speech was stifled starting with excessive force during the infamous Gezi Park riots; in 2014 media companies were forcefully taken over. By the end of 2015 the populist strategy of 'us' versus 'them' had given AKP nationalism a new meaning with disruption to the Kurdish peace process. While most scholars agree on populism as AKP's political strategy, Yilmaz (2017, pp. 483-490) argues that AKP's framing of the Turkish-Islamist identity as "victim of Western forces and its internal collaborators, who ended its golden ages by permanently and secretly working together" goes beyond just a populist strategy of 'us' (AKP's base of innocent, moral, devout (Sunni) Muslim, pious, authentically Anatolian, traditional, conservative, oppressed, 'Black Turks') versus 'them' (elite, oppressive, Western, modern, civilized, Kemalist, supporters of the more secular-oriented Republican People's Party [CHP]) rhetoric to a discourse of "social suffering" and victimhood that encourages further dramatization with pro AKP media, institutions, and civil society.

2.2.2 Government Response to Refugees

Research in the years before the height of the Syrian crisis illustrates Turkey's policy response to asylum seekers as reactionary. For example, in 1994 Turkey implemented a parallel asylum process with UNHCR after national security concerns from the refugee flow from Iraq and in 2005 Turkey began accession talks with the EU again and proposed an 'Action Plan' to align asylum processing with EU procedures (Biner 2014; Yilmaz 2014). Biner (2014), Yilmaz (2014), and Altiok and Tosun (2019) confirm that prior to the Syrian crisis, the largest number of refugees (UNHCR term) in Turkey since the early 1990s came from Iraq and Iran (over 570,000, with 460,000 coming in one "wave" in 1991), and Afghanistan (increasing by thousands since 2008). Biner (2014) and Yilmaz (2014) conducted interviews (from 2008-2009 and in 2013 respectively) as part of case studies in one of the first of seven known "satellite" cities, Van, where asylum-seekers would go to register separately with both UNHCR and Turkish authorities to await their fate for up to 12 months as eligible for third-country resettlement, or rejection and deportation. Biner points out that applicants could appeal their rejection and remain in the application process "ad infinitum" provided they pay yearly fees and emphasizes issues with the dual asylum process, terminology, and different recognition based on ethnicity and religion. For instance, Baharai and Farsi interviewees reportedly experienced preferential treatment over their Kurdish-Iranian counterparts who waited up to eight years for status decisions and improvements in allocation of resources and access to (especially Turkish language) education (Biner 2014; Yilmaz 2014).

In contrast to Biner (2014), Yilmaz (2014) used Van as a case study of the status of international migrant children in Turkey. It was pointed out that Article 90 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey states that when there is discrepancy on "fundamental rights and freedoms" between international agreements and national laws that the international law shall prevail (cited in Yilmaz 2014, p. 351). Unlike Biner, Yilmaz (2014, p. 366) found no legal barriers to continuing education due to a circular from MoNE in 2010 however, a common experience was shared by an Afghan family who registered their children (aged 11, 9, and 7) to TPS in 2013 who were told "*let's register all of them in first grade, we replace them next year based on their course*

points". A common contention of Biner and Yilmaz interviewees was the lack of Turkish language support mainly filled by NGOs with unstructured curriculum, and less opportunities for use in ethnic enclaves and camps.

Later research shows a more securitized and opportunistic response in continuation with EU relations and exemplified by former AKP prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu's 2001 strategic depth vision for Turkey as a rising world power with particular geopolitical importance. Even though Turkey continued to demonstrate compliance-seeking with EU accessions, 2015 was a marked year in the literature for Turkey's struggle to meet international obligations while maintaining its sovereignty. For example, Şenoğuz (2017, p. 175) concedes that border violence had heightened since 2015 because the Turkish state "does not embrace a biopolitical governance of migration control by producing the Syrian refugees as a knowable and governable population, as much as it invests in retaining its territorial control and national integrity".

Unanswered calls for burden-sharing and diplomatic rewards vis-à-vis the EU was further exacerbated as demonstrated in Altiok and Tosun's (2019) comparison of Iraqi and Syrian flows to Turkey, outlining how Turkish foreign policy objectives securitized domestic refugee policy when international actors intervened or not at their behest (i.e. the U.S. and the Kurdish question). Similarly, Tsourapas' (2019, p. 475) comparative study of EU pacts with Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey between 2015-2016 identified what he referred to as "refugee rent-seeking behavior" where states seek to "leverage their position as host states of displaced communities for material gain" evidencing Turkey's 'blackmailing strategy' as opposed to Jordan and Lebanon's 'backscratching', observed in President Erdoğan's recent public and private remarks to flood Europe with displaced Syrians. Finally, Turkey's ongoing military operations in northern Syria and Iraq since 2016 confirm Ataman and Özdemir's (2018, p. 21) analysis of Turkey's changing Syria policy that a humanitarian-centered approach made it impossible for Turkey to achieve any ambitious political aims and after many diplomatic attempts and departure from allies, "Turkey acknowledged that its diplomacy did not bear fruit".

2.3 EDUCATION IN TURKEY

Education has always been politicized to some degree in Turkey due to the purview of the ruling political party at any given time period. Norms, identities and culture are shaped through education in Turkey which play an important role in domestic policy decisions and set the context for how Turkey approached education for Syrians. The following section affords a brief history of education in Turkey including ideological debates and discusses the tools and time periods which have influenced social engineering through religious education under the ruling AKP. The section concludes by connecting Turkey's newest *Education Vision 2023* with its harmonization project.

Just as AKP has been capturing the state, according to the literature on Education in Turkey they are capturing the youth, too. According to the 1982 Turkish Constitution, Turkey is a democratic, secular state even though it is predicted that 99% of the population identifies as (mainly Sunni) Muslim (Hendek 2019). Dichotomies in the literature provide Atatürk's 1923 vision of democracy versus AKP's 'conservative democracy', through which oppressive secularism is replaced with righteous Islamic practice (starting as early as primary school), and either Atatürkism or Erdoğanism as a brand of loyal nationalism. In response to 'a failed multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire' (Meral cited in Hendek 2019, p. 8), Turkey's 1924 Law on Unification of Education deemed all public and private education under the state-led Ministry of National Education in hopes of unifying the nation as both ethnically and culturally homogenous, categorizing all citizens as Turkish regardless of their individual ethnicity (Hendek 2019, p. 8).

According to Kandiyoti and Emanet (2017, p. 870) the decision to use schooling as a main tool to advance Kemalist secularism has created "a perpetual tug-of-war over the place of religion and religious education" in a nation where Islam has been a pillar of culture for a thousand years. They point out that Turkish education cannot be divorced from religion, as it is protected in the 1982 Constitution. Hendek (2019) elaborates that in this sense religious education is both a duty and a right-- students have a right to religious education just like they have a right to withdraw from it (a result of later legislation passed in the 1990s at the request of Christian and Jewish communities), but as Muslims they have a duty to study it, too. It should be noted that the largest religious

minority in Turkey, the Alevi sect of Islam, continues to be denied the right to withdraw from religious classes as required by MoNE even after attention from the European Court of Human Rights (Hendek 2019).

Throughout his time in office—President Erdoğan, a graduate of a religious Imam Hatip school, has been outspoken about raising a 'pious generation' and has even stretched powers of the 1982 Constitution to impede on unmarried university students living together in dormitories or off-campus housing (Yilmaz 2018). Yilmaz, co-author of the four-part 'Erdoğanism' regime, claims the AKP has been using four tools to execute their 'pious youth' project through the national education system namely: Imam Hatip Schools (originally vocational schools where imams could be trained), national curriculum, Quran courses, and Islamic foundations. All of the literature mentions that under Kemalist rule, a more secular understanding of religious courses was included in the general (K-12) curriculum in order to shape a Western modernization project, with more devout religious education being a staple of Imam Hatip schools. While Yilmaz (2018) focused on four tools, Kandiyoti and Emanet (2017) outlined four distinct time periods which illustrate how such tools have been successful in pivoting away from Atatürk inspired critical thinking to social engineering through increased religious education from 2002-2007, 2007-2012, 2013-2016, and after 2016 respectively.

Up until recently, the most visible change to Turkey's education system has been the astounding increase in religiosity and number of schools and students in Imam Hatip schools. The curriculum of these schools was originally secular and designed to introduce students to religion and prepare future imams and preachers for work in the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). After legislation in 1997, Imam Hatip was forbidden for middle school and covered women and girls were banned from entering some universities, a forever memorialized example of social suffering experienced by the "Muslims on the periphery" until AKP came to power (Yilmaz 2017). In 2002 there were 536 Imam Hatip schools nationwide with 64,534 students in total (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcan 2017), a dwindled number from previous decades. Kandiyoti and Emanet (2017, p. 870) support Yilmaz (2018) in the national curriculum argument as the authors highlight AKP's first term changes to "textbooks, consolidated compulsory religious

courses, and tightened links between the Diyanet and the Ministry of National Education".

More notable changes under Kandiyoti and Emanet's (2017) three remaining time periods included the 2009 status change of Imam Hatip schools to Religious Education Intensive Regular High Schools, 2012 reforms to a new compulsory 4+4+4 system (primary, middle, high school) which allowed for Imam Hatip middle schools again, and spending on students doubled in comparison to pupils at mainstream schools—by the end of 2016 President Erdoğan was publicly celebrating "1.3 million students in over 4,000 schools" (quoted in Yilmaz 2018, p. 18). The growth in numbers is attributed to a few factors. Many mainstream schools have been converted to Imam Hatip, especially in remote neighborhoods even at the contestation of parents (Hendek 2019; Kandiyoti & Emanet 2017; Yilmaz 2018). Furthermore, the highly competitive high school entrance placement examinations have, by default, in the last few years placed all students below a certain bracket into Imam Hatip schools (Yilmaz 2018). Additionally, Syrian students transferring to or entering high school were automatically placed in Imam Hatip, even if they achieved high test scores (Taştan & Celik 2017, p. 51).

In addition, financial success in the education sector leads back to the dependency models when referring to Yilmaz's (2018) 'foundations' as one of AKP's social engineering tools. For example, Yabanci (2016, p. 603) revealed how AKP-tied Egitim-Bir-Sen (Educators) trade union became "the most active participant" of MoNE's council which organized meetings and workshops "to hear the proposals of relevant stakeholders in the process of education reform". Moreover, Yabanci lists another responsibility of Egitim-Bir-Sen as "policy areas, like the writing of a new constitution and the introduction of a presidential system as sought by the government" (2016, p. 603). Yabanci (2016), Yilmaz and Bashirov (2018) and Yilmaz (2018) also mention TURGEV, the Service for Youth and Education Foundation of Turkey, as a pillar in fundraising efforts in the name of education that may in turn reward generous donors with government deals in various sectors.

The latest changes to Turkey's national education system can be seen again in the curriculum at the intersection of the implementation of the harmonization project to integrate all Syrian students into the national education system (PICTES), and a post 2016 failed coup attempt that has hailed President Erdoğan the hero of modern Turkey (Kandiyoti & Emanet 2017). To illustrate, Kandiyoti and Emanet (2017) and Yilmaz (2018) point out the 'brain drain' (firing of thousands of teachers and academics) after the failed coup attempt of 2016, the absence of philosophy (specifically, evolution), and the newly added July 15th victory day content since 2016. Currently, the government and MoNE are in the midst of strengthening national, cultural, and moral values as stated multiple times in its 2018 publication *Education Vision 2023* (MoNE 2018, p. 10) as "an approach to education that unites democracy" and asserting "the primary goal… is to vitalize an understanding of being and knowledge that is based on the concept of morality and centered on being fully human" (p. 18).

This ideology is present in the last of Yilmaz's (2018) tools, Quran courses, which were also examined by McCarthy (2017) as a function of faith-based organizations running TECs. However, unlike the Arabic instruction in TECs and many community-led Quran courses, it is clear that with the harmonization project, the identity, norms and values instilled through the Turkish national education system require students to overcome the main barrier to education for refugees in host countries if they are to exercise their right to education even under temporary protection as it is declared in *Education Vision 2023*: "The preservation and development of the Turkish language will be treated as the backbone of basic education" (MoNE 2018, p. 85).

2.4 CONCLUSION

While Turkey's identities, interests and outward messaging has changed over the years regarding varying aspects of hosting Syrian refugees, norms and ideas about human rights or the right to education which tend to originate from the start of one's schooling, have not. Most people agree on the importance of education for all children and this international norm is demonstrated in international agreements such as the UN's 1951 Geneva Convention upon which Turkey built its own temporary protection legislation for Syrians, as well as the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which Turkey is

a signatory to. Education can be used by states as soft power, for peacebuilding, and in light of the growing need to address education for refugees in, particularly host countries with neighbors engaged in armed conflict, it is important to situate this new or newly adaptable norm within the appropriate context of such countries to understand if and how new practices can emerge, evolve and hopefully, succeed.

This chapter has attempted to do so by examining the literature on refugee education in a broad sense and with regards to Turkey, as well as to better understand underlying aspects of the Turkish government's key decision-makers and issues that confront Turkey's position in the region insomuch as it affects the ruling government's international legitimation and in turn, domestic refugee policy with particular attention to the already existing national education system. Keeping this brief introduction to education for Syrians in the Turkey context, the next chapter will introduce a theoretical model for dissecting the evolution of education for Syrians in Turkey from 2013 to 2017 followed by application of the model which adds depth to existing social sciences interdisciplinary literature and reveals some interesting future investigative prospects within the scope of IR norms research.

3. THEORETICAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research applies Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998) "Norm Life Cycle" framework to illustrate how Turkey managed education for Syrians between 2013-2017. It is a descriptive thesis utilizing desk research and examining the norm and evolution of refugee education in Turkey vis-à-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey. The norm life cycle model was selected to examine how Turkey managed education for Syrians because while many variables have come and gone in the Turkey case, there is a prescriptive value to Turkey's norms that appears to supersede other norms: morality. Investigating Turkey's approach to education for Syrians in this way may provide some insight that other theoretical approaches cannot due to the absence of norms focus. In other words, much research on the topic discusses outcomes; what happened, when, what should continue to happen, as illustrated in the literature review in chapter two. Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle model aims to provide further analysis of the "tipping points" or "thresholds" (p. 901) that carried Turkey from one stage to the next in the evolution of refugee education vis-à-vis Syrians in Turkey.

Chapter 3 begins by situating constructivism in the field of international relations, then Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) three-stage model is explained for examining the research question: How did Turkey manage education for Syrians between 2013-2017? It should be noted that the education projects concerning Syrians are ongoing. However, the scope of this research is limited to four years due to the timeline of decisive and tangible actions taken by relevant actors that illustrate Turkey's changing strategy regarding education for Syrians from the first needs assessment done by AFAD and UNHCR in 2013, to the implementation of PICTES—the program funded by the EU to shut down all TECs by 2020 and integrate all Syrian students under TP into the Turkish National Education System. In the second section, data collection and analysis are discussed and lastly, limitations and one ethical consideration are briefly addressed.

3.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism in international relations is a framework that is philosophical in nature and causes one to think about changing processes over time. Rather than make assumptions about IR and political outcomes as a result of good or bad human nature or focus on material factors (classical and neo liberalism or realism), constructivism argues that the world is socially constructed; that actors calibrate their identities and interests by participating in 'intersubjective' or shared beliefs that in turn, form their interests. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p. 391), "constructivism's distinctiveness lies in its theoretical arguments, not in its empirical research strategies". They go on to emphasize a core feature of constructivism as the "focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics" stressing in particular the role of collectively held or "intersubjective ideas and understandings on social life" (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001, p. 392). Similarly, Bjorkdahl (2002, p. 21) points out that these collective ideas are "social and holistic, not simply individual conceptions that are shared".

Other scholars have claimed or compared constructivism to an extension of neo-utilitarianism; not necessarily a *theory* of international relations but rather a "theoretically informed approach" (Ruggie 1998, p. 879). Ruggie (1998, p. 856) states: "constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in the international life" referring to *collective intentionality* as the concept of shared intersubjective ideas. In this case shared meaning is emphasized; constructivists claim that international politics cannot exist without a set of mutually recognized ideas.

Constructivism also places great importance on identities, which Finnemore, Sikkink, Ruggie, and others have claimed that the classicals, neos, and rationalists often take for granted. Alexander Wendt (1992, p. 398) explains "Identities are the basis of interests. Actors… define their interests in the process of defining situations". In his important article, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics" Wendt (1992, p. 412) discusses the inadequacies of the neo and rationalist theories in accounting for changes in identities and interests under an anarchical system over time and illustrates three evolutions of identity and security interests wherein states could

avoid a "Hobbesian world of their own making" with regards to sovereignty, cooperation, and converting egoist into collective identities.

One area of constructivist research in IR that contains the least literature in comparison is that of norms. Although now over twenty years old, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle model still provides a relevant perspective to understand norm influence on political change. Other notable efforts either add to Finnemore and Sikkink's research by looking at the origins of international norms (Bjorkdahl 2002), criticize the authors for their use of exclusive language and assumptions that primarily Western norms are equivalent to "good norms" in the norm life cycle (Engelkamp & Glaab 2015), or propose some kind of norm "cluster" that allows for more flexibility in explaining change and continuity that occur simultaneously (Rosert 2019; Winston 2017). Despite differing focal points, all studies discuss the insufficient tendency of norms research to explain change or stability in terms of norm adoption or rejection. Nevertheless, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) do have flexibility in their model, which is highlighted in the relevant sections to follow.

The social constructivists mentioned have explored what constitutes a norm; how norms, identities and interests are socially constructed; and criticized the rigidness of a 'macro-model' such as Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) which focuses on norm identification and norm influence in international politics. Throughout their article, Finnemore and Sikkink distinguish norms from other sets of rules and identify three stages of norms (emergence, cascade, and internalization) shaped by different actors, motives, and dominant mechanisms in each stage. As Winston (2017, p. 645) describes, in stage one, states are convinced to "do the right thing" because it resonates with who they are but in stage two states may continue due to perceived benefits either domestically or internationally. The next section will discuss the norm life cycle as it pertains to this thesis.

3.1.1 Norms and the Norm "Life Cycle"

In their seminal article "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 893) highlight "international or regional norms that set

standards for the appropriate behavior of states"; an idea parallel with a goal of this thesis—to bring actors closer to international norms in education for students afflicted by forced migration. The authors argue that "norms evolve in a patterned 'life cycle'" and that "different behavioral logics dominate different segments of the life cycle" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 888). They begin by clarifying the general consensus on the definition of a norm as "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity" (ibid, p. 891) and mention three different types of norms: regulative, constitutive, and prescriptive. As explained, regulative norms give structure to and limit state behavior (i.e. economic models) and constitutive norms "create new actors, interests, or categories of action" (Ruggie cited in Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 891 [i.e. sovereignty]). Though the authors point out that prescriptive (also known as evaluative) norms receive much less attention than they should, thus revealing a gap in norm research for further examination. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, pp. 891-892) contend:

> …it is precisely the prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of "oughtness" that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules. Because norms involve standards of "appropriate" or "proper" behavior, both the intersubjective and the evaluative dimensions are inescapable when discussing norms.

The authors then go on to address their main research questions: "How do we know a norm when we see one? How do we know norms make a difference in politics? Where do norms come from? How do they change?" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 892). The effect of "oughtness" and "shared moral assessment" on norms is referred back to, claiming that an accessible stream of communication between actors can be studied due to the number of justifiable actions they take in the process of norm evolution (ibid). Each stage of the norm "life cycle" is defined by actors, motives, and dominant mechanisms that shape the norm until it reaches a tipping point and continues to the next stage. To illustrate, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998, p. 898) original table is included below:

TABLE 1. *Stages of norms*

	Stage 1 *Norm emergence*	*Stage 2* *Norm cascade*	*Stage 3* *Internalization*
Actors	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms	States, international organizations, networks	Law, professions, bureaucracy
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant mechanisms	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

Table 3.1 Finnemore and Sikkink's *Stages of norms*

As shown in stage one norm emergence, the actors are norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms; it is claimed they are motivated by altruism, empathy, or ideational commitment to persuade actors to adopt, or in the case of Turkey adapt, the emerging norm. These may be international organizations such as UNICEF, UNHCR, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Mercy Corps, Save the Children, Theirworld, Support to Life, The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries (SESRIC), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC); local NGOs such as Turk Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent), Egitim Bir-Sen (Educators Trade Union), IHH Islamic Humanitarian Relief Foundation, YUVA (Association for life-long learning), TURGEV (Turkey Youth and Education Service Foundation); social enterprises for instance ERG (Egitim Reformu Girisimi [Education Reform Initiative]), SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, Istanbul Policy Center (IPC); or academics, for example, experts or researchers affiliated with institutions publishing on the topic. Chapter 4 refers to such studies published by Hacettepe Migration and Politics Research Center (Erdoğan 2014), Suleyman Demirel University Journal of Social Sciences (Şeydi 2014), and the Migration Research Center at Koc University (Icduygu & Millet 2016; Celik & Icduygu 2018; Elitok 2019).

The second stage norm cascade occurs around a tipping point which happens once a "critical mass" (p. 901) has been convinced to adopt the norm(s), typically at the behests of the norm entrepreneurs. This stage is characterized by states, networks of norm entrepreneurs, and international organizations participating in a process of 'socialization' that pushes the intended actor to adopt the norm by comparing their procedures with other states/actors following such international standards (p. 902). The authors claim that by comparison, a form of peer pressure develops to become a norm follower (as opposed to a norm-breaker) and three reasons are given to explain an actor's response to this socialization: "legitimation, conformity, and esteem" (p.903). Finnemore and Sikkink argue that in stage two state leaders comply with new norms to boost national esteem, in turn enhancing their own self-esteem, and to circumvent dissatisfaction due to noncompliance (p. 904). To illustrate the tipping point and threshold in the norm life cycle, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998, p. 896) original figure is included below:

FIGURE 1. *Norm life cycle*

Figure 3.1 Finnemore and Sikkink's *Norm life cycle*

Stage three of the norm life cycle is "internalization" and is characterized by institutionalization. At this point, the norm has generally been adopted by the state as illustrated by changed laws, ratified treaties, widely implemented programs and such that the norm becomes internalized—that is, complying with the norm has become automatic (p. 904). While Finnemore and Sikkink explain that many norms do not reach this stage, this thesis argues that the institutionalization of education for Syrians in Turkey was established to some extent with the implementation of PICTES, the program funded by the 2015/6 EU-Turkey agreement. It sets a path forward for Syrian students to completely integrate into the Turkish public school system, even as Syrian students continued to bear TP status. For this reason, 2017 was chosen as the last year of analysis because while PICTES was launched in 2016, it was not until 2017 that MoNE

published a comprehensive booklet detailing the streamlined path to "harmonization" and highlighting the minor differences in the curriculum (namely, Turkish as a second language) for Syrian students studying in public institutions.

3.2 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, p. 79) write that "Good description is better than bad explanation" which is precisely what this thesis intends to do utilizing desk research and examining the norm and evolution of refugee education in Turkey vis-à-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey. In other words, it is an interpretive in-depth case study of education for Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey. Owing to the many definitions of case study in social science research, George and Bennet (1997) are followed as outlined by Christopher Lamont (2015, p. 149), constituting a case study as "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events". In this case the historical episode is the Syrian refugee crisis, with education for Syrians in Turkey as the aspect under detailed examination. This research employs process-tracing, which centers decision-making procedures, "investigate[ing] and explain[ing] the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes" (George and McKeown 1985, p. 35). As King et al. (1994, p. 359) explain, in process tracing:

> Instead of treating the ultimate outcome (for example of an international crisis) as the dependent variable, new dependent variables are constructed: for instance, each decision in a sequence, or each set of measurable perceptions by decision-makers of others' actions and intentions, becomes a new variable.

Similar to Finnemore and Sikkink, George and Mckeown (1985) highlight the accessibility of communications between actors due to the public nature of this decision-making process which King et al. (1994, p. 359) claim often lead back to the individual actor. Moreover, George and Mckeown (ibid, p. 37) emphasize that even if it was not the most reliable information, the communication(s) would disclose a great deal about "the attention focus, the decision rules, and the behavior of actors".

To employ Finnemore and Sikkink's 1998 model, a timeline was constructed by reviewing official documents and information available in English on the Government

of Turkey websites (MoNE circulars, Turkish Ombudsman Special Report on Syrians, official statements and guidelines on Temporary Protection and Harmonization from DGMM, AFAD, Directorate of Foreign Affairs, and Turkish Grand National Assembly Meeting Archive). In addition, monthly and annual reports as well as empirical studies and reports by norm entrepreneurs mentioned in the previous section were utilized. Among others, great importance was placed on three documents in particular: the AFAD Survey (2013a), the MoNE Circular 2014/21, and the 2015/16 EU-Turkey agreement and sub-section outlining PICTES. Luckily, reliable English translations were available for all of these—either from the primary source or, the MoNE Circular 2014/21 was available in English by a comprehensive report from Theirworld, a UK-based charity.

3.2.1 Limitations and Ethical Consideration

Limitations for the research included a language barrier, available (and reliable) datasets, and a high number of variables; for example, events specific to the Turkey case such as elections, a failed military coup, and so on. Many primary sources are published in Turkish but sources in English were utilized more. Where there was discrepancy, for example articles published on the AFAD website, Turkish Grand National Assembly Meeting Archives, and one important empirical study only available in Turkish (Şeydi 2014), translation applications and native Turkish speakers were consulted.

When visiting the websites of primary sources published in Turkish (listed above), the most used translation mechanism was Google translate within the Google Chrome web browser to first identify any phrases or words related to education for Syrians in the given time frame of 2013-2017, (i.e. dates, locations, and important announcements resulting from or related to meetings or correspondence between relevant actors: AFAD, MoNE, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM, and the European Union). To provide a comprehensive timeline of events, searches were made using both English and Turkish keywords individually and as combinations both before and after selecting to translate to English such as education (eğitim), Syrian (Süriyeli), official document (resmi belge), refugee (mülteci), asylum-seeker (sığınmacı), temporary education center (geçici eğitim merkezi), and meeting (toplantı). Şeydi's (2014) article "Türkiye'nin Suriyeli

Sığınmacıların Eğitim Sorununun Çözümüne Yönelik İzlediği Politikalar" (*Policies of Turkey Regarding the Solution of Educational Problems of Syrian Refugees*) was discovered as a citation in McCarthy (2017) and became of particular importance, informing the timeline with official statements by Turkish officials on education for Syrians from 2011-2013 where there still appears to be a gap in the literature.

One curious limitation arose from the date system on the AFAD website where it appears all articles and press releases were published or republished starting on January 1, 2016—this could mean that the governmental body updated or reorganized its archives, so it is unclear if any previous announcements are missing. However, it is unlikely that this affected the following analysis because searches on the Turkish websites were more focused on the what, which, and when, rather than the why. In short, the Turkish sources were to ensure that the English sources did not miss any important meetings or decisions (what) between norm entrepreneurs (which) in the timeline of 2013-2017 (when); these facts were compared with English sources and when there was not an English translation available, for instance comments made by President of AFAD at that time, Fuad Oktay, two native Turkish speakers were consulted, one male and one female, who both hold graduate degrees with the medium of study being in English.

Both native Turkish speakers had some previous experience translating short texts professionally and due to the differences in Turkish and English grammar structure, they adhered to an informal technique of transposition—keeping the vocabulary the same but reorganizing the sentence structure to maintain the integrity of the meaning. These translations are used with the following citations: (AFAD 2013b, 2014; Şeydi 2014); AFAD (2013a) was published in English—these were the first major field survey results which establish the beginning of the scope of analysis for this thesis, so, that it is published in English creates one less limitation. As for the English translation of MoNE Circular 2014/21, it was published by Theirworld UK (Jalbout 2015), a prominantly recognized international charity which worked closely with Turkish government officials and international and domestic stakeholders to produce the report; needless to say, the text is reliable and freely available.

On another note, as mentioned in the literature review, some datasets (particularly numbers of registered Syrians in Turkey) may not be accurate and some of the sources needed for research were not available online such as interviews or meeting minutes among Turkish government officials. To overcome these limitations, information from several sources were sought. To address the number of country specific events, the conditions of the selected events were only included briefly and in the relevant sections of the research.

On a personal note, due to field work with Syrian refugees in Turkey and Greece, this author has undoubtedly formed some opinions about policies, implementations and overall attitudes towards education for refugees in the region. This is one reason why constructivism was chosen as the theoretical framework because the main aim is to understand, rather than to position the research to criticize, project, or prove one particular point. Lastly, this research complies with all Ethics Committees policies for conducting scientific research as outlined in the Kadir Has University directive: Scientific Research and Publication Ethics Regulation (see https://my.khas.edu.tr/uploads/files/mevzuat/academic-ethics.pdf).

4. THE LIFE CYCLE OF EDUCATION FOR SYRIANS IN TURKEY
2013 - 2017

As established in the previous chapter, this thesis applies Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998) "norm life cycle" model to illustrate how Turkey managed education for Syrians from 2013-2017. It is a descriptive thesis utilizing desk research and examining the norm and evolution of refugee education in Turkey vis-à-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey. Other researchers have also recognized three stages of Turkey's approach to education for Syrians and their findings have contributed to the description outlined in this chapter. For example, Unutulmaz (2019) characterized three stages of education policies towards Syrians in Turkey as: stage one community-based education and a vision of temporariness (2011-2014), stage two mixed education with NGO support under strict government control (2014-present [2018 at that time]), and stage three full integration into the formal education system. Similarly, Cloeters et al. (2018) called these "three strategic phases": 1. Impromptu Emergency (2011-14), 2. Systematic Emergency and Regulatory (2014-16), and 3. Institutional and Long-term (2016-today), (p. 15). Likewise, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) life cycle model contains three stages thus, this chapter is broken into three sub-chapters namely, stage one norm emergence, stage two norm cascade, and finally stage three internalization. To illustrate, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998, p. 898) original Table 1. *Stages of norms* has been adapted to reflect the norm life cycle of education for Syrians in Turkey from 2013-2017 in Table 4.1 below:

	Stage 1 Norm Emergence 2013-2014	Stage 2 Norm Cascade 2014-2016	Stage 3 Internalization 2016-2017
Actors	Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms Int'l Organizations (UNICEF, UNHCR, Support to Life, IHH Humanitarian Relief…); Local NGOs (Turk Kizilay, YUVA); Individuals (camp residents, volunteer educators, academics, wealthy philanthropists)[1]	States, international organizations, networks Government of Turkey (Presidency, MoNE, Ministries of Interior / Foreign Affairs / Family and Social Policies; Diyanet, AFAD), Governments of Jordan, Lebanon, EU+Stage 1 NEs	Law, professions, bureaucracy EU-TR Joint Action Plan, Government of Turkey's stricter NGO regulations; Training of Educators, Ed. Working Clusters; MoNE-EU € Contracts Int'l Stakeholders for the *EU Regional Trust Fund Response to Syrian Crisis*
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant mechanisms	Persuasion: 1. Memo of Understanding 2. Awareness of #s 3. Framing 4. Child protection training	Socialization: Regional Response, peer pressure Institutionalization: DGMM est., LFIP/TPR Demonstration: MoNE Circular 2014/21	Habit: Turkish as a second language, Teacher / Trainer/ Trauma Trnings Institutionalization: EU Facility for Refugees TR; PICTES

Table 4.1 Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) *Stages of norms* adapted for the norm life cycle of education for Syrians in Turkey from 2013 to 2017

Contrary to the comprehensive appearance of Table 4.1 above, the first two subchapters of analysis, norm emergence and cascade, are noticeably longer than the last, stage three for two reasons. First, there is a focus here on the tipping point that occurred between stage one and stage two as well as the threshold that carried the norm from stage two to stage three. As such, Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998, p. 896) Figure 1. *Norm life cycle* has been adapted in Figure 4.1 below to preview the focal points:

Norm emergence 2013 – **2014***		"Norm cascade" 2014 – **2016****		Internalization 2016 - 2017
Stage 1	***Tipping point** MoNE Circular 2014/21	Stage 2	****Threshold** EU-TR Agreement	Stage 3

Figure 4.1 Adaptation of the *Norm life cycle* with tipping point and threshold

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[1] The list of norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms is not exhaustive, especially with the absence resources only published in Turkish, due to the language barrier, time and scope of the project.

Secondly, although this thesis argues that internalization was established with the implementation of PICTES in 2016 along with normalization of Turkish language courses in the national education curriculum, too many obstacles remained through 2017 to confirm Finnemore and Sikkink's "taken for granted" quality of the norm to the extent that confirms stage three internalization. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks, however major findings are highlighted in the chapter five conclusion.

4.1 STAGE 1: NORM EMERGENCE (2013-2014)

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 898) claim the first stage of the norm life cycle is characterized by norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms. From the beginning, responsibility for provision of education services for Syrians residing in the camps was claimed by MoNE with AFAD, though UNICEF and UNHCR appear to have led the education response, even while operating under limited capacity (UNICEF 2012a). Besides informal rapid needs assessments for children in the camps, UNICEF and regional NGO Support to Life (Hayata Destek in Turkish) engaged with camp residents for community outreach on issues of health and child protection immediately (UNICEF 2012b; Support to Life 2013). Thus, the camp residents became norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms, too.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 898), norm entrepreneurs are motivated by empathy, altruism, or ideational commitment to persuade actors to adopt new norms. Empathy or altruism may refer to the selfless Syrians and Turks volunteering to teach for UNICEF incentives in TECs both inside and outside of the camps. Another example may be one of the many wealthy Syrian or Arab businessmen such as Ghassan Aboud, a philanthropist associated with the foundation Orient for Human Relief. Watenpaugh, Fricke and King (2014) report on their visit to the Orient school in Reyhanli that instruction was being provided to more than 1,600 primary and secondary displaced and refugee Syrians, while an additional 2,000 students had taken Turkish, English, and test preparation courses (open to non-Syrians as well) at the related Orient Languages Center where Orient covered student fees and their books. Similarly, Meredith and Oğuzertem for Save the Children (2015, p. 21) emphasize for a majority of TECs often

housed in private buildings, "the burden for paying rent falls on the Syrian school leadership and teachers themselves".

Ideational commitment can be understood in different ways but in this case, it mainly refers to aligning moral values along religious lines. Watenpaugh, Fricke and King (2014, p. 19) in their report on the vulnerabilities of Syrians missing university in Turkey state that the Turkish NGO IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation may have had "exclusive access to the camps because of IHH's ideological harmony with the Turkish government". Indeed, in their *Syria Activities Report 2012-2019* IHH highlight their work in the education response for (mainly orphaned) Syrian children: "Thanks to courses that support moral values, more than 300,000 people were reached. Approximately 20,000 children who receive hafizship education were supported and 474 of them completed their hafizship." (Arslan et al. 2020, p. 32). Also notable is the three-school, 990-orphan capacity "Reyhanli Education Village", a collaboration between IHH and Qatar-based Sheikh Thani Bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (RAF) which opened after two years of construction in 2017 (ibid, p. 26; RAF 2020).

With over one million Syrian children having become orphans, and another three million displaced regionally it is worth examining the motivations of norm entrepreneurs that Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest as empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment. In the case of Turkey, these narratives were actualized into policy based on how closely the government was aligned with the motivations of the norm entrepreneurs. This was demonstrated later when MoNE first assigned the management of TECs to the Diyanet (Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs) with MoNE Circular 2014/21 as opposed to strategic partners or community stakeholders, which became involved later under the new regulations (Sarmini, Topçu & Scharbrodt 2020).

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 897) also point out that "new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interests". Darcy et al. (2015)

highlight this in the cross-cutting issue of child protection in Turkey. It was reported that AFAD and government counterparts were apprehensive to recognize child protection as a relevant issue at first (Support to Life 2013; UNICEF 2012b) because as noted in an evaluation of UNICEF's response to Syrians in Turkey from 2012 to 2015:

> As is the case in many other contexts, child protection is extremely sensitive in Turkey. The need to protect children is understood as an implicit allegation of existing threats that the State is not able to address. For that reason, in many cases, child protection is referred to merely as 'psychosocial support', which has been found to be a less threatening term for channeling concerns related to child well-being. (Darcy et al. 2015, p. 18, footnote 74).

Darcy (ibid, footnote 77) went on to explain that the Government of Turkey's perception of child protection may have been influenced by the separation of education and protection programming by UN bodies, although in a noted interview with AFAD in Ankara UNICEF was said to have engaged in "too much insisting" on child protection since the very first day of the crisis.

Following the results of the first major field survey conducted by AFAD in the summer of 2013, education for Syrians outside of camps in Turkey became a top priority as most visibly promoted by norm entrepreneurs such as UNICEF, UNHCR, Turk Kizilay, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, World Vision, YUVA, IOM, and academics in the field. The field survey results revealed stark inequalities between the percentage of students attending school in the camps (82%) and those outside (13%) (AFAD 2013a, p. 51). At the time AFAD conducted their survey of approximately 2,700 households, there were approximately 200,386 Syrian refugees in the camps and an estimated 350,000 outside but they did not give any explanation as to where the second figure came from (ibid). A closer look at other reports suggests this number came from a UNHCR update on the *Inter-agency regional response for Syrian Refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey* for the week of May 16-22, 2013 (UNHCR, 2013a). To put Turkey's first schooling rates of Syrians into perspective, Lebanon, with no formal camps, borne the largest number of refugees by percentage of population of all neighboring countries in 2013 (one in five of the population a refugee), and estimated to reach approximately 25% of the 350,000 registered refugee children of compulsory school age (up until 15 years old in Lebanon) with formal and nonformal educational activities (UNICEF 2013a, pp.1-2).

At the same time, Turkey was making ardent strides to manage the mass migration problem by redefining 'Temporary Protection' in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in April 2013 and establishing the Directorate for Migration Management (DGMM). Moreover, instead of only making international headlines for its incredible hospitality, turmoil between the Turkish government and society escalated into the Gezi Park riots in the summer of 2013 warranting 24-hour news coverage of Istanbul's city center on fire, illustrating loss of trust in the Turkish government and its leaders—ironically while declaring to be on the side of the Syrian people over the Syrian Government (Seligson 2013). In this way, Turkey was not prepared to address the rapid urbanization of Syrians as the border remained open and the number of refugees increased six-fold (from 224,655 in early 2013 to approximately 1,519,286 in 2014 (UNHCR 2020b).

Furthermore, according to a number of sources, including meeting minutes from the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Syria working groups, independent evaluations of UNICEF and UNHCR responses to the Syria crisis in Turkey, and weekly, bi-weekly, and monthly updates from UNHCR and UNICEF representatives, the relationship between UNICEF, UNHCR, MoNE, and AFAD was tumultuous from the outset (INEE 2013, 2014; Darcy et al. 2015; Caglar et al. 2016; UNICEF 2013b,c; UNHCR 2013a,b). Compared to the regional response, including various educational activities and programs launched in Lebanon and Jordan at the same time, norm entrepreneurs in Turkey struggled in the first stage with persuading the government of Turkey to immediately attend to education for Syrians outside of the camps.

Shortly after the AFAD survey results were published in September 2013, MoNE sent out its first circular attempting to address education for Syrians outside the camps—"Education services for international citizens under temporary protection" (MoNE 2013). This was a big step considering efforts from UNICEF and UNHCR had reportedly been swept aside previously. For instance, Caglar et al. (2016, p. 16, footnote 68) mention a cross-sectoral tool for education and protection rapid needs assessment

had been proposed to MoNE by UN bodies in February 2013, five months before the AFAD survey, but was rejected. Other examples mentioned AFAD frustrations with UNICEF's untimeliness as one school and library took nearly eight months to build in one camp early on as well as winter donations arriving late, prompting an unhelpful winter jackets distribution in summer (Darcy et al. 2015).

4.1.1 Tipping Point (2014)

One might argue that the norm of providing education for refugees in Turkey is still in stage one because the geographic limitation still remains. Afterall, as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896) point out in a prime example, the first stage of norm emergence for women's suffrage lasted more than eighty years. Thus, raising the question: how could education for refugees in Turkey reach a tipping point for change during the Syria case if one still cannot evade legalities and semantics in the terminology? Foregoing a rigid interpretation of Finnemore and Sikkink's model, this research concludes that Turkey reached a tipping or threshold point in 2014 because as the authors explain, at this point "norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 901).

In the case of education for Syrians in Turkey, 2014 is an overlapping year for stage one norm emergence, norm tipping, and stage two norm cascade due to the rapid escalation of forced migration and urbanization of refugees in the region. In this way, the "critical mass" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 901) refers to countries included in the UNHCR, UNICEF, and IOM regional response: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Finnemore and Sikkink (ibid) point out a gap in theoretical explanation for the cause of norm tipping, but the authors do claim empirical studies show that norm tipping usually happens after one-third of the critical mass adopts the norm. In this case it appears as two out of five, most glaringly indicated by the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies' Februrary 2014 compilation *Mapping the Education Response to the Syrian Crisis*, where 34 respondents were surveyed from 27 different agencies, of which 50% were working in Lebanon, and 35.3% were working on education interventions in Jordan.

Meanwhile, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt were reported to have minimal education interventions at that time, though as described below Turkey soon followed suit most notably after participation in a June 2014 regional convention in Jordan and implementation of legal measures soon after, as outlined in the LFIP and MoNE Circular 2014/21. While there were prior MoNE circulars regarding education for foreigners such as Circular 2010/48 "Foreign National Students" (MoNE 2010) and affirming the right to education for Syrian children under TP in September 2013 (MoNE 2013), the infamous MoNE Circular 2014/21 (MoNE 2014) referred to in all relevant reports was released and implemented in mid September 2014, signifying Turkey's commitment to norm adaptation and intentions to comply with regional standards of urgent education interventions as part of the Syria crisis response.

The MoNE Circular 2014/21 "Education services for foreign nationals" (MoNE 2014) removed the requirement for a resident permit to enroll in schools for Syrian children and was followed immediately by the October 2014 TP Regulation amendment to the LFIP that provided registered Syrians access to basic services, including education (DGMM 2019). The MoNE circular 2014/21 also officially introduced TECs outside of camps under the care of MoNE and the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and stipulated other measures being taken to address education for Syrians in urban areas reaching students from primary school to higher education institutions. MoNE Circular 2014/21 is the first tangible demonstration of institutionalization, which Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 900) claim increases the possibility for a norm cascade as it clarifies "what, exactly, the norm is and what constitutes violation […] and by spelling out specific procedures by which norm leaders coordinate disapproval and sanctions for norm breaking".

The MoNE Circular 2014/21 was signed by Minister Nabi Avci with the support of AFAD, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Directorate of Religious Affairs, and UNICEF, UNHCR, and IOM Turkey Representations. MoNE Circular 2014/21 identified the need to provide clear explanation and guidance in line with new legislation (Law 6548 LFIP) "to eliminate problems and hesitations experienced regarding enjoyment of education services by

foreigners in our country" (translated from Turkish in Jalbout 2015, Appendix 2, p. 24). The document identified who would be responsible for the education of Syrians in Turkey and at which levels—this started with the MoNE Deputy Undersecretary establishing a Ministry Commission to ensure smooth coordination including monitoring and evaluation of Provincial Commissions and TECs, as well as data entry and issuing of documents. Important issues such as accreditation, prioritization of teaching Turkish to foreigners, attendance and progress tracking via the e-okul (e-school) and e-yaygin (e-non-formal) automation systems, as well as who could work inside and support from outside TECs, were all addressed by MoNE Circular 2014/21 (MoNE 2014). A few examples of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) 'norm violation[s]' are outlined in section 3 of MoNE 2014/21 (Temporary Education Centres):

> a) The principle of "Education against the unity, security and interests of Turkish nation state and contrary to the Turkish people's national, moral, humanitarian, spiritual and cultural values shall not be taught at the temporary education centres." shall be accorded.

As well as in section 6 (Other Provisions):

> d) Hesitations and problems related to the education of foreign students shall be initially evaluated and solved by the provincial commissions; unresolved problems shall be referred to the Ministry.
>
> e) If it is determined that outside the scope of this Circular, education activities under any name are unauthorized, necessary procedures shall be conducted in line with the provisions of the referred Law (ç); certifications issued as a result of unauthorized activity shall be deemed invalid.
>
> (Jalbout 2015, Appendix 2)

It was clear from MoNE Circular 2014/21 that the government of Turkey acknowledged that they must adapt to the changing situation of providing education for foreigners in Turkey and tying such provisions to the TP regulation in the LFIP specified that these rules applied to Syrians under TP. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 900) mention that institutionalization may not be necessary for a norm cascade, and that it may come after a norm cascade commences but in this case it appears to have preceded stage two. Obviously, with the situation getting worse every day in Syria, the sheer number of people crossing the border warranted urgent action from the government of Turkey to address the educational needs of Syrians outside of the camps. However, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) emphasize persuasion as the dominant mechanism promoting change in stage one norm emergence, so what other factors may have convinced the government

of Turkey to change its approach to education for Syrians leading up to MoNE Circular 2014/21?

To begin with, UNICEF and UNHCR were reported as major influences on the MoNE circulars evolving educational opportunities for Syrians in Turkey (2014b,c), especially after UNICEF and MoNE signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' on October 8th, 2013 to "solidify the relationship for joint implementation of education activities in camps *and in non-camp settings[2]* for Syrian children" (UNHCR 2013b). Another major factor highlighted by Şeydi (2014) was the realization that as more Syrians came across the border, even more were leaving the camps to seek more long-term opportunities as illustrated by AFAD President Fuad Oktay calling out to those outside the camps to "Come to the Camps". According to Şeydi (2014, p. 283 translated from Turkish), Oktay emphasized in a press conference in December 2013 that training (educational opportunities) among other services were available in the camps and in much better conditions than UN camps in other countries, "…Park, garden, and we reserved areas in our camps for forty-thousand Syrians on the streets… we insistently invite those staying outside into our camps". While Oktay's call may have fallen on deaf, or non-Turkish speaking, ears, it is likely those spaces reserved in the camps were filled up quickly with UNHCR reporting over 45,000 newly registered Syrians between December 2013 and January 2014 alone (UNHCR 2020b).

A third push factor refers back to what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) call 'framing'—a persuasion technique used by norm entrepreneurs to convince actors to adopt the new norm. The authors explain how activists "work hard to frame their issues in ways that make persuasive connections between existing norms and emergent norms" (ibid, p. 908). Examples of this technique include dramatizing situations, particularly with symbols, images, or language, which is where organizational platforms and international audiences become useful.

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[2] *Author emphasized.* This was the first official acknowledgement from a Government of Turkey office allowing UN bodies to officially conduct educational activities for Syrians in urban areas. The permission granted to UNHCR in March 2013 pertained to mobile registration units but was not focused on education (AFAD 2013b). This new Memorandum of Understanding allowed for better support of programs such as teacher trainings and volunteer incentive programs in TECs outside of camps.

Although it is unclear how effective framing was in the Turkey case, these tactics are illustrated in a variety of campaigns including a March 2014 collaborated press release by UNICEF, UNHCR, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and World Vision "Risk of a lost generation, say leading aid agencies" which highlighted the larger 'No Lost Generation' campaign calling for massive urgent appeals for funding of up to $1 billion USD "to improve education and strengthen psychological protection for children affected by the conflict" (UNICEF 2014a). A coinciding March 2014 education monitoring report from UNICEF was also released titled *Under Siege: The devastating impact on children of three years of conflict in Syria* which is filled with heartbreaking photos of Syrian children in shanty refugee camps, their stories, and selected quotations from interviews; one highlighted from Turkey reads:

> Some children are simply being left behind. "I wanted to be a doctor before," eight-year-old Jumana, now living in Turkey, told us. But after three years out of school because of the conflict, she has almost no hope of catching up again. Now she collects rubbish for $4 a day. (UNICEF ed 2014, p. 14).

Some of the more shocking images from *Under Siege* feature a nine-year-old boy veiled in dirt collecting used ammunition to sell as scrap metal in Syria (cover photo), a child crying while "telling a UNICEF aid worker about her family's harrowing journey" (p. 12), baby Ghina being pulled out of rubble after a bombing (p. 4), and a photo of an x-ray image showing a dead fetus with a bullet in its skull (p. 6), (UNICEF ed 2014). Moreover, cooperation between UNICEF and Turkey seems to be nonexistent with the absence of information about Turkey (as well as Egypt) concluding the *Under Siege* report, which gives an overview of UNICEF's 2013 response in numbers with tangible outcomes listed for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq (UNICEF ed 2014, p. 19). However, it only includes Turkey and Egypt in a small section at the bottom of the page requesting minimal funding for 2014 for the two ($16m Egypt, $65m Turkey) compared to the other four ($105m Iraq, $171m Jordan, $222m Syria, $250m Lebanon) (ibid).

These tactics continued even after MoNE Circular 2014/21, as demonstrated in an October 2014 report by UC Davis which also utilized eye-catching interviewee quotes in the title and throughout their publication "We will stop here and go no further: Syrian students and scholars in Turkey" (Watenpaugh, Fricke & King 2014), and later, a November 2015 report by Human Rights Watch, "Preventing a Lost Generation: Turkey

"When I picture my future, I see nothing" Barriers to education for Syrian Refugee Children in Turkey (Human Rights Watch 2015). In the decision-making timeline, these further framing efforts may have had some effect on policy makers for the stage two norm cascade, especially for the state's responses to Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) "socialization" process: legitimacy, reputation, and esteem. While these instances of framing tell hard truths of the time, admittedly the examples given were meant to urgently evolve education for Syrians in Turkey and the region, thus the elevation of the most dramatic words, symbols, and images for persuasion.

4.2 STAGE 2: NORM CASCADE (2014-2016)

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) say that it takes substantial domestic pressure to initiate normative change but that a new dynamic begins once a tipping point has been reached. In stage two of the "norm life cycle" the norm begins to spread more quickly among countries, even when there is no domestic pressure to do so. The authors nod to a descriptive "contagion" effect by other scholars but argue more specifically that a norm cascades due to a process of international socialization wherein countries comply with norms in the second stage because they are under peer pressure to comply as other countries in the region have which may stem from "legitimation, conformity, and esteem" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, pp. 902-3). Unlike stage one norm emergence, states may be actors in stage two but Finnemore and Sikkink (ibid) claim that in stage two norm cascade, international organizations and norm entrepreneur networks also promote socialization when pushing intended actors "to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and by monitoring compliance with international standards".

As demonstrated in the March 2014 *Under Siege* report by UNICEF in stage one norm emergence, there was a regional response promoting urgency in approaches to education for Syrians inside Syria as well as in the bordering countries of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey—with little to no report on UNICEF activities in Turkey in 2013 (INEE 2013, 2014; UNICEF 2013a,b, 2014). However, Unutulmaz (2019) claims the important changes to Turkey's education policies towards Syrians in 2014 were due to growing numbers, acknowledgement of continuing policy effects, and security concerns

about the education content being taught in TECs. The author cited an interview with a MoNE civil servant in Hatay who claimed they had appealed multiple times to the ministry in Ankara to take control of community-based education such as TECs because "the situation was so open to abuse—by "radical militant organizations" seeking to recruit young Syrians or by various "foreign intelligence agencies" seeking to plant spies" (Unutulmaz 2019, quoted on p. 240). This would fit Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) substantial domestic pressure, considering civil servants and other affiliates of MoNE as norm entrepreneurs, and Turkey would be more likely to respond to a security threat than a humanitarian appeal with regards to providing education for refugees.

In their discussion about the tipping point, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 901) write that the norm reaches a threshold point once a 'critical mass' is persuaded by norm entrepreneurs. A critical mass, the authors suggest, may refer to the importance or influence of a critical state endorsing the norm, or it may depend on the critical state's moral stature (ibid). For instance, when comparing different approaches to education for Syrians in the region, Turkey would likely have been more influenced by what Jordan and Lebanon were doing, than programs going on in Egypt or Iraq.

Furthermore, countries accepting high numbers of refugees in Europe such as Germany, Greece, and Sweden would not have the same effect upon comparison since these are considered resettlement countries as opposed to the protracted nature of refugees hosted in neighboring countries. In addition, European countries, mainly following Christianity, do not share (in majority) the same Muslim values that exist at least to different extents in all of Syria's neighboring countries (Crul et al. 2019; SESRIC 2016). As Winston (2017, p. 643) points out using norm structure, "states with similar identities, or "cultural attributes" (including values), will have similar interests (problems) and will generally adopt similar policies (behaviors)". While Turkey is similar to the European countries in that there was not a large UNHCR or UNICEF presence before the Syria crisis, especially with regards to provision of education services for refugees, the number of Syrians in European countries pales in comparison to the reception by especially Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan.

Therefore, this thesis contends that Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) critical mass for adapting to new approaches to education for Syrians in the region includes Lebanon and, Jordan in particular, for advancing Turkey from stage one norm emergence to stage two norm cascade in its evolution of education for refugees vis-à-vis Syrians in Turkey. The main reason for this points to June 2014 when UNHCR took members of MoNE for field observations and trainings on the importance of addressing child protection and education for Syrians outside of camps in Jordan (Darcy et al. 2015). Compared to UNICEF's *Under Siege* global appeal for fundraising and clear use of framing, Turkish officials were more receptive to the observations and trainings in Jordan, as noted by their active participation in the June 2014 conference "Syrian Children and the Conference on Improving the Education Quality of Children in Vulnerable Host Communities" in Amman addressing better approaches to education for Syrians in the region, as well as follow-up actions taken to improve child protection efforts in Turkey (AFAD 2014; Darcy et al. 2015; Caglar et al. 2016).

Moreover, following the conference, more detailed reports about education for Syrians in Turkey began to appear on UNICEF and UNHCR's Regional Response Plan (RRP) as well as in the 2015 development of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) (UNICEF 2014b,c; 3RP 2015 [Annual Report]). By clarifying the relationship between child protection and education through first-hand observations in a similar setting outside the Turkey context, UNHCR was an effective norm entrepreneur in advancing education for Syrians in Turkey in stage two of the norm life cycle.

Between 2014-2016 an abundance of reports were published by international actors and networks of norm entrepreneurs documenting Turkey's approach to providing education for Syrians (Ackerman 2014; Ahmadzadeh et al. 2014; Cagaptay & Menekse 2014; Dorman 2014; Erdoğan 2014; UNICEF ed 2014; Watenpaugh, Fricke & King 2014; Beste 2015; Culbertson & Constant 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015; International Middle East Peace Research Center (IMPR) 2015; Jalbout 2015; Kanat & Ustun 2015; Meredith & Oğuzertem 2015; Plan International 2015; Beltekin 2016; Çoşkun & Emin 2016a,b; Icduygu & Millet 2016; Kaya & Kıraç 2016; Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) 2016; UNESCO 2016).

Right in the middle of it was the tragic viral image of toddler Alan Kurdi washed ashore on the beaches of Bodrum, Turkey in September 2015 during the height of the 'refugee crisis' (Plan International 2015).

All reports referred to a Syrian education crisis in Turkey, some made suggestions for policy planners to heed and while many acknowledged Turkey's incredibly generous hospitality through its open-door policy for Syrians, all acknowledged that education for Syrians in Turkey (as well as in Lebanon) was severely insufficient to meet the need. For example, in 2015 Lebanon had just 102,000 of 408,000 Syrian students enrolled in formal education while the enrollment in Jordan was 128,000 of 220,000 (Culbertson & Constant 2015, p. 14). Meanwhile at the same time Turkey reported 226,900 of 620,900 Syrian students enrolled in school, with the caveat that enrollment was 90% in the camps but just 26% in host communities where 90% of Syrians were reportedly living (Jalbout 2015).

Consequently, in 2015 Turkey shifted its focus significantly to refugees outside of camps, initiating 19 Provincial Action Plans to vamp up the response for the education needs of Syrian children in the communities with the highest numbers of refugees (3RP 2015, p. 18). In fact, in contrast to UNICEF's global appeals in 2013 and 2014, after the establishment of the 3RP by UNICEF and IOM in 2014, Turkey's education funding was the only fully funded program above other categories including protection, food security and livelihoods, health, basic needs, shelter, and wash (ibid). Furthermore, among the countries covered in 3RP (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt), Turkey and Lebanon were the only two countries that received more funding than requested albeit Lebanon's education funding was nearly four times that of Turkey's ($241m to $67m) (3RP 2015).

With the unfolding of events above, it is suitable to return to the motivations pushing states to comply with norms in stage two: legitimacy, conformity, and esteem. To begin with, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 903) emphasize that states are concerned with international legitimacy because it is a crucial element in how the state's own citizens perceive domestic legitimacy—that is, how the citizens of a state understand their

government's legitimacy is directly proportionate to how legitimate their state is seen in the international sphere. Domestic legitimation was invaluable for AKP in this considerably shaky time period (2014-2016)—from the government's continued crackdown on media, civil freedoms, and education reforms to the disruption in the Kurdish peace process. Furthermore, the parliamentary elections in 2015 highlighted that AKP was losing followers as they briefly made way for the Kurdish party HDP to be represented in parliament. Security concerns also began to mount with multiple terrorist attacks, including a suicide bombing in Ankara that claimed 95 lives and injured hundreds more in October 2015, just one month after Alan Kurdi was found washed ashore in Bodrum (BBC News 2015). Finally, an extended state of emergency after a failed coup attempt by the terrorist FETO organization in July 2016 set the course for President Erdoğan to continue with changing Turkey to a presidential system in a few short years.

As discussed in the chapter two literature review, AKP increasingly became more authoritarian and remained ambitious as a regional leader. In light of these events, all of the international publications mentioned above putting a spotlight on the plight of Syrian children in Turkey, along with increased violence inside Syria resulting in the continued rise in numbers pushed Turkey and the European Union to an agreement in November 2015 to be enacted in 2016. Most notably, Turkey became the largest refugee hosting country in the world in 2015, nearly doubling from hosting 1.5 million Syrians in 2014 to 2.8 million Syrians by the end of 2016, not to mention the additional 346,000 refugees of other nationalities (mostly from Iraq and Afghanistan) (UNHCR 2020b).

4.2.1 Threshold (2016)

Finnemore and Sikkink's critical states at this juncture again, refer to Jordan and Lebanon which, like Turkey, struck agreements with the additional critical state here, the European Union (EU), to 'keep the refugees,' so to speak. While in 2015 Turkey became the country hosting the largest number of refugees in the world, the sheer scale of the refugee crisis and mass migration reached a shocking climax in the second half of 2015 and by the end of the year it was reported that in addition to the 4 million Syrian refugees being hosted in neighboring countries (UNHCR 2015a), over 1 million

refugees had reached Europe by sea and an additional estimated 3,700 had drowned (UNHCR 2015b). At the height of the crisis, negotiations commenced with the EU-Turkey joint action plan in October 2015 (European Commission 2015) and set the stage for Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) 'conformity' and 'esteem' motivations for why states comply with norms in stage two.

The Action Plan was the beginning of the EU's answer to Turkey's call for more burden sharing of the refugee crisis and attempted to address what they referred to as the 'crisis situation' at that time in three ways:

> (a) by addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (b) by supporting Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey (Part I) and (c) by strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU (Part II). (European Commission 2015).

In fact, the EU-Turkey refugee agreement was first meant to halt the movement of illegal migration coming from Turkey to Greece as well as the Balkans route(s) (listed as (c) and (Part II) above). This was defined by its 1-in, 1-out feature; for every person caught trying to migrate illegally and returned to Turkey, the EU would resettle another from Turkey through legal channels. It was a controversial deal, riddled with questions about human rights and violation of the principle of *non-refoulement* (Elitok 2019) and at this point one could argue that the EU became a norm breaker with regards to its commitment to the 1951 Geneva Convention. In addition, there seems to have been a role reversal in EU-Turkey relations where the EU, a model for democracy, human rights, and international law, switched from "appropriate" to "consequential" decision-making according to its refugee externalization efforts, which is discussed at greater length in the chapter five conclusion of this thesis.

Besides the EU's meek attempt at burden sharing through the 1-for-1 resettlement option, another condition related to the joint action plan almost immediately mentions how the agreement is "consistent with commitments taken by Turkey and the EU in other contexts notably the Visa Liberalisation Dialogue" (European Commission 2015). Tsourpas (2019) highlights Turkey's visa liberalisation dialogue by pointing out that Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey all enjoyed concessions in each pact granted by the EU

that were not directly related to the Syrian refugee crisis—the bargaining chips for Jordan and Lebanon came in the form of low-interest loans, grants, financing, and investments into host communities utilizing the *EU Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syria Crisis* which had been established in December 2014 (European Commission 2016a).

Additionally, Turkey-EU accession talks resumed with the joint action plan which not only provides the motivation for Turkey to comply with EU terms, but it also relates to Turkey's esteem as a democratic state. Finnemore and Sikkink build on Fearon's (1997) argument that "identity is based on those aspects of the self in which an individual has special pride or from which an individual gains self-esteem" (Fearon quoted in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 903). The authors conclude that one's inclination to secure or protect pride or esteem may explain norm following (ibid). Based on this reasoning, since AKP elites pride themselves on Turkey being a democracy, regardless of authoritarian tendencies they will be interested in following norms associated with democracy, especially when conformity may result in international legitimation.

Most importantly for advancing the norm of education for Syrians in Turkey from stage two norm cascade to stage three internalization, the EU-Turkey joint action plan resulted in the establishment of *The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey*, a tool for coordinating the EU's response to the Syrian refugee crisis in the region starting with the commitment of €6 billion divided into two installments. The first projects announced in March 2016 dedicated €55 million "to address the immediate needs of Syrian school children in Turkey for access to formal education" (European Commission 2016a) with an additional €27 million going toward educational infrastructure, skills training and social support for Syrian refugees under the *EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis* (European Commission 2016b, 2020). The EU made good on its promises to expedite the process as emphasized by one EU official in a May 2016 Press Release:

> The EU Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis is one of Europe's key instruments for delivering our €3 billion pledge to help Syria and the region. The new funding for Turkey focuses on two key priorities of the EU-Turkey Joint Statement: to provide schooling to all children and to invest in livelihoods and social cohesion for refugees and host communities,

ensure stability and provide refugees with the hope and perspective of a better life.

(European Commission 2016b)

The EU further made good on its monetary dedication to the regional response to the Syrian refugee crisis with a €300 million contract to be allocated directly to MoNE for the program Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System (PICTES) which began in October 2016 (EU Delegation to Turkey 2016). The program, launched in 23 provinces with the highest Syrian populations, proved successful enough in its long-term aim of ensuring that 'School-age Syrian refugees have access to and receive quality education in the Turkish education system' (SUMAF 2019). PICTES aimed to increase public school enrollment rates by decreasing barriers to refugee education and broadening the capacities and operations of supply of educational services for Syrian refugee students (ibid). According to the May 2019 monitoring report, the program went even better than expected—170,000 educational staff were trained (of the expected 31,000), 849 of 970 school facilities were upgraded, and most importantly the enrollment rate of the Syrian school-age population in TECs and TPS increased from 30% to 62.5% (SUMAF 2019).

Furthermore, the *EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis* vetted various international stakeholders to supplement the response to providing education to Syrians in Turkey by funding local efforts deemed appropriate by a steering committee headed by a representative from MoNE and the European Commission such as teacher trainings and social cohesion activities (European Commission 2018; Lorch 2017; Watt 2019). In light of the immense financial support the EU provided to Turkey, in addition to Jordan and Lebanon the EU is also considered a critical state under Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998, p. 901) threshold definition because without this essential EU support "the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised". Even with shortcomings, considering there were still nearly 400,000 Syrian students out of school by the end of 2016 (SUMAF 2019), this thesis argues that with the implementation and notable successes of the PICTES program, education for Syrians in Turkey evolved into stage three internalization.

4.3 STAGE 3: INTERNALIZATION (2016-2017)

By the end of 2016 it was no longer a matter of whether or not to provide education to Syrians outside of the camps or whether to enroll in a TEC or TPS; with the carrying out of PICTES among other programs under 3RP, No Lost Generation, and the *Facility for Refugees in Turkey* along with the *EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syria Crisis*, a path forward was set toward integration of all Syrian students under TP into the national education system. In stage three internalization Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 904) claim that "norms may become so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a "taken-for-granted" quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic". While Turkey and many partners have achieved much with their undertakings to provide education for nearly 1 million Syrian children in just four years under this analysis, there is still a lot of work to do to manifest the taken-for-granted quality that Finnemore and Sikkink speak of.

With lots of hard work in the future under consideration, education for Syrians in Turkey began a process of internalization between 2016-2017 by Finnemore and Sikkink's standards thanks to the heavily increased: trainings of teachers, trainings of trainers, and Turkish language support for Syrian students. For instance, in 2017 UNICEF partnered with MoNE to roll out a pilot 10-day course in 21 provinces, utilizing 500 Syrian volunteer educators to train 20,500 colleagues to increase the quality of education in the over 400 remaining TECs as the government continued to gear toward integration into the national education system where organizational capacities allowed (MoNE 2017; Lorch 2017). This was the second of two teacher trainings with additional support through the *EU Trust Fund*, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the US Bureau of Population, with others (Lorch 2017).

Other notable efforts include trauma trainings for Turkish teachers as a collaboration between UK-based charity Theirworld and Istanbul-based Maya Vakfi which launched in 2016, training over 1,000 teachers to date in comprehending trauma experiences of their Syrian refugee students (Watt 2019) and teacher support programs through German-backed Beraberce (2017) and local organization Citizens Assembly (Yurttaslik Dernegi 2017). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 905) claim that through such

professional trainings, participants actively socialize and agree to "value certain things above others". Considering PICTES also provided professional trainings for approximately 170,000 educators, administrators, and MoNE affiliates (SUMAF 2019), the reach of these professional trainings and common point of providing education for Syrians in Turkey may also lead to "another powerful and related mechanism contributing to the consolidation and universalization of norms after a norm cascade… iterated behavior and habit" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 905).

In other words, the authors present the argument that gradual unintended normative, ideational, and political junctions could be the result of changes to procedures that cause new political processes (ibid). This means that in order for internalization to happen, the effect of conformity on actors in stage three (law, professions, bureaucracy) would mean "changed identity and changed norms as empathy and identification with others shifted" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 905). This would imply that especially in the case of trauma trainings for Turkish teachers which are teaching them to value empathy above all, internalization of education for Syrians in Turkey has begun. A simple demonstration of this effect is given by one Turkish teacher who attended the Maya Vakfi/Theirworld training: "I didn't know that the trauma is not only affecting their psychological wellbeing but has a serious impact on learning. I learned instead of labelling them lazy I should have a different perspective" (participant quoted in Watt 2019).

Three other mechanisms that may contribute to this iterated behavior and habit are stricter legislation passed by the Turkish government to regulate NGO activities working with refugee children in June 2017 (Aykuz et. al 2018) and two comprehensive guidebooks printed for educators and guidance counselors by MoNE and UNICEF in September 2017. Simlar to the MoNE Circular 2014/21, these guidebooks are a demonstration of further bureaucratic institutionalization by advancing knowledge, outlining procedures, and providing roadmaps for attending to the needs of Syrian students (students under TP) (Geçici koruma statüsündeki bireylere yönelik Özel eğitim hizmetleri kılavuz kitabı [*Education services guidebook for people under temporary protection*] MoNE & UNICEF 2017a; Geçici koruma statüsündeki bireylere yönelik

Rehberlik hizmetleri kılavuz kitabi [*Guidance services guidebook for people under temporary protection*] MoNE & UNICEF 2017b). All these training and guidance materials contribute to stage three internalization by further clarifying what the norm is and by nature promotes a culture of coexistence and ultimately harmonization between Turkish and Syrian students during the process of integration into TPS. In the same way, with UNICEF as the major partner disseminating these mechanisms, it is assumed that Turkey is complying with international standards in its provision of education services to refugees or in this case, persons under TP.

Lastly and most importantly, the language barrier was addressed more aggressively through the development of exams to assess the academic levels and Turkish language skills of Syrian teachers and students (EU Delegation to Turkey 2016), capacity building for teaching Turkish as a second language coordinated by MoNE, UNICEF, and the Yunus Emre Institute (Coskun & Emin 2016b) and the increase in Turkish as a second language being taught in TECs from five to fifteen hours per week, with additional trainings made available at public education centers and after-school hours (SUMAF 2019). Moreover, PICTES aimed to enroll 390,000 Syrian children in Turkish language training whether they were attending school or not (EU Delegation to Turkey 2016). Finally, further increased participation in educational activities was thanks to the availability of Arabic language classes in addition to Turkish courses and access to course and education awareness-raising materials in both languages (ibid). By taking away the barriers of language and access to education through these efforts, Syrians are able to develop their own iterated behaviors and habits as students and participants in daily social life in Turkey, thus reciprocating the process of internalization.

Despite all of this, stage three internalization of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) life cycle model regarding education for Syrians in Turkey is still incomplete in the time frame chosen for analysis for this research. This is noted in the Turkey Education Working Group notes in 2017 (UNHCR 2017a,b) as well as reports that continue to be published by norm entrepreneurs suggesting better practices for policymakers (Biehl et al. 2018; Unutulmaz 2019; Sarmini, Topçu & Scharbrodt 2020; Maya Vakfi 2020; UNESCO 2020). Consequently, there are too many ongoing projects at this time to

confidently say that the norm and evolution of refugee education vis-à-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey was internalized by the end of 2017.

The year 2017 was chosen as the last year of analysis in this research because of the clear and tangible actions taken to advance the norm of education for refugees vis-à-vis Syrians in Turkey toward internalization such as the trainings of trainers, trainings of teachers, and normalization of teaching Turkish as a second language. These actions are further acknowledged in publicated partnerships (MoNE & UNICEF 2017a,b) as well as legislation—the government tightened its responsibilities for Syrian students by bringing stricter guidelines to NGO activities working with refugee children in June 2017 (Aykuz et. al 2018). The timing is also apt to provide openings for further research as the internalization process is ongoing at this point, just as the war in Syria continues.

To sum up, this chapter has attempted to give a comprehensive analysis of Turkey's approach to education for Syrians from 2013-2017 using Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998) "norm life cycle" model. While many variables have come and gone in the Turkey case, this chapter aimed to provide further evaluation of the "tipping points" or "thresholds" that carried Turkey from one stage to the next in the evolution of refugee education vis-à-vis Syrians in Turkey. Investigating Turkey's approach to education for Syrians in this way should have provided some insight that other theoretical approaches cannot due to the absence of norms focus. Major findings and implications for further research are highlighted in the following chapter five, conclusion.

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis has applied Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's (1998) "Norm Life Cycle" framework to examine the norm and evolution of refugee education in Turkey from 2013-2017 vis-a-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey. The case of education for Syrians in Turkey holds many variables during a time of conflicting ideas about national identity, political ideology, and religion in the domestic sphere starting with the national education system. It is also unique due to its legal treatment of asylum-seekers from non-EU countries, but the ultimate response to integrate all Syrian students into the monolingual, largely monoethnic national education system despite their continued protracted status may set an example for other countries in burden sharing positions due to mass forced migration.

To begin with, we may return to the original question: *How did Turkey manage education for Syrians from 2013-2017?* Since much of the research on Turkey's response to education for refugees have focused on outcomes such as what happened, when, what should continue to happen; as Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p.391) explain, the distinctiveness of this study "lies in its theoretical arguments, not in its empirical research strategies". Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) life cycle model focuses on the actors, motives, and dominant mechanisms in three stages—norm emergence, cascade, and internalization which in this case has revealed three major findings with implications for future research.

5.1 FINDINGS

First, Turkey's decisions to implement MoNE Circular 2014/21, to make changes to the LFIP and the regulation on TP plus establishing the DGMM but on the other hand deciding not to remove the geographical limitation, reveals a desire to conform to international standards in provision of education to Syrian refugees for superficial reasons related to esteem and international legitimation "insofar as it reflects back on a

government's domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in power" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 903). This is illustrated in the keeping up of appearances in press releases by AFAD—no small deed went unpublished, as well as notes on antagonisms in sectoral-agency coordination namely between UNICEF, UNHCR, MoNE, and AFAD. Moreover, regardless of the crucial funding the EU provided in its *Facility for Refugees in Turkey* and subsequent *Trust Fund* Turkey has not taken kindly to the stalled concessions proposed in the EU-Turkey joint action plan of October 2015 such as the visa liberalization discussion and EU accessions talks. This is demonstrated in Turkey's 2018 Ombudsman *Special Report on Syrians* where specific comparisons are made to reflect poor burden-sharing on the EU's part:

> A ministry of National Education memorandum dated August 14th, 2017 states that in total 492,544 Syrian children benefited from the education and training services; this number is even higher than the population of countries such as Malta or Iceland. (p. 49).

> The current enrollment number of 618,948 Syrian students in Turkey is remarkable, given that it is more than the total number of students in primary and secondary schools in many European countries. (p. 75).

In addition, Turkey's reassertion in its long-term education plan *Vision 2023* that: "The preservation and development of the Turkish language will be treated as the backbone of basic education" (MoNE 2018, p. 85) as well as repeated statements on uniting democracy and uplifting morality through education show that Turkey is unwavering in these aspects of Turkish identity which are shaped through its national education system. In this way, even withstanding a temporary dual education system, in the end the only major relevant change to the national education curriculum while attempting to integrate 1 million Syrian students under TP in just four years, was the addition of Turkish language courses. This implies a transferrable model to other protracted cases of mass migration and integration into the existing national education system, perhaps even making a case for more urgency.

Also, the tipping points that Turkey reached in the evolution of education for refugees vis-à-vis the case of Syrians in Turkey were characterized by the prescriptive norms discussed in the norm life cycle. For example, Turkey's first major comprehensive policy responses as outlined in the LFIP, TP Regulation, and MoNE Circular 2014/21

were direct results of the "oughtness" preceded by rapid border crossings and urbanization of Syrians, security concerns about what was being taught in the TECs, and different persuasion techniques by norm entrepreneurs. This confirms Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) contention that such prescriptive norms should receive more attention as drivers of state behavior, in this case—especially with respect to forced migration.

Second, while Turkey was not prepared to meet the educational needs of Syrians in host communities in such an unprecedented situation, neither were the UN bodies and this likely hindered coordination and response even further (Caglar et al. 2016; Darcy et al. 2015). UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNESCO all have completely different approaches to education for refugees in host communities—while UNHCR has promoted immediate integration into the host community's national education system since 2012, UNICEF believes in providing any and all educational opportunities even if it means developing and maintaining a dual education system such as the TEC/TPS systems in Turkey (ibid). On the other hand, UNESCO is the only UN body that focuses on life-long learning, therefore seemingly closer to the UNICEF concept (UNESCO 2016). In this way, an untrusting government needs to be met with a unified front in order to advance the norm, as noted in Evaluations of UNHCR and UNICEF responses to the Syria crisis in Turkey (Caglar et al. 2016; Darcy et al. 2015; Beltekin 2016).

Elitok (2019, p. 9) draws attention to Germany's role in the EU-Turkey agreement and the fact that important stakeholders including UNHCR and other NGOs working directly with the refugees themselves were left out of the policy making process when in fact Turkey was the first state to set that standard by limiting UN capacities until the end of 2013 while Jordan and Lebanon were in engaging with multiple international organizations including UNICEF and UNHCR. In this way, Turkey was a critical state for the EU and set a standard for western state relations with UN bodies in response to the Syria crisis. As a result, the controversial 1-for-1 EU-Turkey agreement moved forward with obvious implications for human rights abuses in particular relation to the principle of *non-refoulement*.

This demonstrates that if there is already existing domestic disturbance in a neighboring host country, it may save norm entrepreneurs some time, effort, and money to appeal to superficial motivations such as international legitimation and esteem in order to promote a norm more quickly with decision-makers. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 906) echo this thought, claiming that "if legitimation is a main motivation for normative shifts, we might expect states to endorse international norms during periods of domestic turmoil in which the legitimacy of elites is threatened". When it comes to providing education for refugees, norm entrepreneurs should understand what the most common practices or models are and decide how to present those options to the hosting government in a unified way. If the host country is in turmoil, then persuasion tactics appealing to legitimation or esteem may be considered in the first approach— coordinating and emphasizing possible benefits to the host country rather than play office politics while "oughtness" kicks in. Independent government decisions should be made both based on capacities in temporary accommodation arrangements and host communities as well as opportunities to expand organizational capacities with an understanding of an indefinite time frame.

Third, due to a shift in logic and regional roles marked by contrasting approaches to the Syria crisis, EU-Turkey relations now rely heavily on projects contracted through the *Facility for Refugees in Turkey*. The normalization of teaching Turkish as a second language and the active policies to increase formal education enrollment rates followed by a gradual closing of all TECs and harmonizing all Syrian students under TP into Turkish public schools would not have been possible without critical attention and funding from the EU. However, at this juncture the evolution and improvement of education for Syrians in Turkey rested on perceived benefits with the EU-Turkey joint action plan. At the same time, the EU had vested interest in keeping the refugees out of Europe so while both actors had different motivations, the joint action plan took on a more transactional nature. However, similar to previous accession talks, items such as the visa liberalisation that could have restored a decreasing legitimacy in Turkish politics never came to fruition, leaving not much else for the parties to relate on beyond major investments coordinated by the EU in education, social cohesion and livelihoods for Syrians in Turkey.

Consequently, with this analysis of the evolution of education for refugees in Turkey vis-à-vis Syrians, in particular the tipping points, it could be empirically argued that the EU became a norm breaker and Turkey became a norm leader in this process. For instance, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) discuss March and Olsen's "logic of appropriateness" opposite a "logic of consequences" (March & Olsen 1989 cited in Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, pp. 912-914). In IR this is referred to as the structure-agent debate; on one hand actors are driven by internalized understandings of what is good, desirable, appropriate behavior (social structure), while on the other hand self-interest and getting what one wants is prioritized (ibid).

In light of all of this, it appears the EU shifted from a logic of appropriateness to one of consequences and afforded Turkey prominence as a new norm setter. This is an important shift considering that it has historically been Turkey not meeting EU standards of appropriateness during accession talks, with growing concerns over human and civil rights abuses, as well as a backsliding democracy during AKP's tenure. Additionally, one might have even expected the EU to be a norm enforcer in this situation, being well-known advocates of human rights and international humanitarian law through the Council of Europe's European Court of Human Rights and the 1950 establishment of the European Convention on Human Rights.

On the contrary, while the EU's response to the Syria crisis was nearly mute until 2015 (Elitok 2019) followed by aggressive externalization policies and pacts with Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon to 'keep the refugees', norms about education and protection for children either internalized from social structure or explicitly enshrined in international agreements such as the 1951 Geneva Convention or the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, pushed the EU to unprecedented education interventions as part of an initial €6 billion in commitment to the *Facility for Refugees in Turkey* of which the very first projects announced were for education and livelihoods (European Commission 2016a). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 907) stress that "norm entrepreneurs must speak to aspects of belief systems or life worlds that transcend a specific cultural or political context" and what better way to do that than to promote the

well-being of children? By looking at this process through the evolution of education for Syrians in Turkey from 2013-2017 using Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework, some interesting questions arise for future research opportunities.

5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest the future of norms research in IR be met at multiple nexus' such as political theory, law, philosophy and psychology. However more recent trends in globalization, migration, and crisis and emergency management call attention to the necessity for bridging IR with global challenges faced at these intersections of study. Refugee education is just one example of education in emergencies (crisis and emergency management) which calls for unique cooperation and theorizing between IR and each of these to create successful models, inform evidence-based policy, and prevent future lost generations of learners in protracted migration movements.

This thesis describes possible scenarios as to how the "ought" became the "is" in the evolution of education for refugees in Turkey vis-à-vis the case of Syrians. Through the lens of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle framework, some future research prospects may be explored. One inquiry, a suggestion that has stood the test of time from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), may look at the roles of persuasion and legitimation in normative change and the influence these have on international politics. Other case studies could test hypotheses to better understand the empirical efficacy of these tools which may inform norm entrepreneurs in their quests to promote norms more quickly and improve evidence-based policy.

Another more specific set of inquiries relates to EU-Turkey identities and norms. For example, why did the EU switch from a "logic of appropriateness" to one of consequences? In this case, one might first have to argue that a logic of appropriateness exists (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, 913). Furthermore, what implications does this have for the future of EU-Turkey relations? Elitok (2019) provides a nice synthesis of current optimists and pessimists of the EU-Turkey deal which is likely to be an ongoing

conversation. Additional openings may ask: What implications does the EU-Turkey deal have for the EU's ability to lead crises responses in the future? Could EU intervention in the education sectors in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan be measured a success in light of the other concessions promised? Did Turkey become a norm leader and/or did the EU become a norm breaker? What would the norm life cycle look like if applied to burden-sharing in mass migration movements? Answers to these questions could, at the very least, provide arguments for or against compliance with international agreements whether legally binding or voluntary, and strengthen or weaken credibility for likely stakeholders.

Finally, this thesis has revealed what happens when governments do not prioritize continuity in education in emergencies, when stakeholders lack a comprehensive approach, and most importantly when there is insufficient funding. Dryden-Peterson has done extensive research on the different models countries use to approach education for refugees (2003, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2016a,b, 2017) and identifies three current models of inclusion of refugee students into national education systems currently being practiced in Uganda, Kenya, and Lebanon (2018). These models of inclusion may be compared with the case of education for Syrians in Turkey with particular attention to the second version of PICTES (called PIKTES, changing the c for children to k for kids) which secured €400 million in financing, rolled out in 2018 and appears to be even more ambitious than the first (PIKTES 2017; European Commission 2020). Additional resources to guide such research may be provided by the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards (2010) and Competency Framework (2020).

Needless to say, the case of education for Syrians in Turkey is exceptional but it illustrates that, as one industry professional puts it, abnormal circumstances require extraordinary solutions—solidarity and political will are necessary. Accordingly, to meet these global challenges, the scope of IR may include analyses of refugee education as a part of education in emergencies. After all, the causes of forced migration movements and side effects thereof are monitored closely by international norm entrepreneurs— the better these actors understand normative change in a country's

context, the closer they may get to achieving international standards of education for students affected by crises. On the other hand, most recently a global pandemic has forced school closures in over 185 countries in the past year, redefining education and education in emergencies around the world. We are living through a time of massive norm emergence, an exciting time for researchers of all disciplines.

As a result, it is not too early for states to reflect critically on existing national frameworks which address education in emergencies and to work across different sectors. This is particularly true for states bordering conflict and which have less flexibility in aspects of identity, knowledge, and shared beliefs shaped by the national education system such as language, morality, and religion. In this way, actors may come closer to international norms in education. This may yield more positive human interaction and improved understandings of shared ideational factors, thus resulting in true harmonization in protracted crises regardless of country of origin or legal status.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

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APPENDIX A

A.1 MoNE Circular 2014/21

MEB Mevzuat

T.C.
MİLLÎ EĞİTİM BAKANLIĞI
Temel Eğitim Genel Müdürlüğü

Sayı : 10230228/235/4145933   23/09/2014
Konu: Yabancılara Yönelik
         Eğitim - Öğretim Hizmetleri

GENELGE
2014/21

İlgi: a) 222 sayılı İlköğretim ve Eğitim Kanunu,
    b) 1739 sayılı Millî Eğitim Temel Kanunu,
    c) 6458 sayılı Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu,
    ç) 5442 sayılı İl İdaresi Kanunu,
    d) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Okul Öncesi Eğitim ve İlköğretim Kurumları Yönetmeliği,
    e) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Ortaöğretim Kurumları Yönetmeliği,
    f) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Öğretim Kurumları Yönetmeliği,
    g) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Yaygın Eğitim Kurumları Yönetmeliği,
    ğ) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Eğitim Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği,
    h) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Rehberlik ve Psikolojik Danışma Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği,
    ı) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Denklik Yönetmeliği,
    i) Göçmen İşçi Çocukların Eğitimine İlişkin Yönetmelik,
    j) Denklik İşlemleri Kılavuzu 2011,
    k) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Açık Öğretim Ortaokulu Yönetmeliği,
    l) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Açık Öğretim Lisesi Yönetmeliği,
    m) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Meslekî Açık Öğretim Lisesi Yönetmeliği,
    n) Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı Meslekî ve Teknik Açık Öğretim Lisesi Yönetmeliği,
    o) Halk Eğitimi Faaliyetlerinin Uygulanmasına Dair Yönerge,
    ö) 2010/48 sayılı "Yabancı Uyruklu Öğrenciler" Genelgesi.

        Türkiye, coğrafî, stratejik, kültürel ve siyasî konumu nedeniyle tarihsel süreç içerisinde önemli göç akınlarıyla karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Türkiye'nin artan ekonomik gücü ülkemize yönelik göç hareketleri için bir çekim unsuru oluştururken, yer aldığı coğrafî bölgede devam eden siyasî istikrarsızlıklar, Türkiye'ye yönelik göçü teşvik eden bir diğer unsur olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Son döneme kadar göç hareketleri açısından Türkiye daha çok "geçiş ülkesi" konumunda iken, yabancılar tarafından ülkemizin artan ekonomik gücü ve istikrarıyla giderek bir "hedef ülke" olarak görüldüğü ve bu bağlamda ülkemize yönelik göçün artarak devam ettiği de bir gerçektir. Diğer taraftan ilgi (a) ve (b) Kanunlar ile Çocuk Hakları Sözleşmesi, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve Kültürel Haklara İlişkin Uluslararası Sözleşme hükümlerinde; eğitim hakkı, ayrımcılık yasağı, özel ihtiyaç sahibi çocukların eğitim imkanlarına erişimi, çatışma etkilerinin azaltılması ve çocuklara fiziksel, hukuki ve psikolojik olarak korunma sağlanmasında tamamlayıcı çabaların desteklenmesi bakımından

eğitim politikalarının belirlenmesinde çocuğun yüksek yararının gözetilmesi gerekliliği vurgulanmaktadır.

Bu bağlamda ilgi (e) Kanunda yabancıların Türkiye'ye girişleri, Türkiye'de kalışları ve Türkiye'den çıkışları ile Türkiye'den koruma talep eden yabancılara sağlanacak korumanın kapsamına ve uygulanmasına ilişkin usul ve esasları belirlenmiştir. Bakanlığımızın, söz konusu yeni durum ile birlikte, ilgili mevzuatı doğrultusunda ülkemizde bulunan yabancıların eğitim-öğretim hizmetlerinden yararlanmaları ve yararlandırılmaları hususlarında yaşanmakta olan sorunların ve tereddütlerin giderilmesi amacıyla yol gösterici ve açıklayıcı bir düzenleme yapılmasına ihtiyaç duyulmuştur.

Ülkemizde bulunan, öncelikle zorunlu eğitim çağındaki öğrenciler olmak üzere, yabancılara yönelik yürütülen eğitim-öğretim faaliyetinin koordine edilmesi, eğitime erişim ve kaliteli eğitim hizmetlerinin sunulması, alanlarında ilgili birimler ve kurumlar ile eş güdüm içerisinde çalışmaların yürütülmesi ve acil durumlarda gerekli tedbirlerin alınmasına yönelik iş ve işlemler; tarafımca görevlendirilecek bir Müsteşar Yardımcısının koordinasyonunda olmak ve ilgi (a), (b), (c), (ç) kanunlar, (d), (e), (f), (g), (ğ), (h), (ı), (i), (k), (l), (m), (n) yönetmelikler, (o) yönerge ve (j) kılavuzun ilgili hükümleri kapsamında özel mevzuat hükümleri saklı kalmak üzere aşağıdaki açıklamalar doğrultusunda yürütülecektir.

Buna göre;

1- Bakanlık Komisyonu

Müsteşar, tarafımca görevlendirilen Müsteşar Yardımcısının koordinasyonunda, uygun gördüğü bir birim uhdesinde ilgili birimlerden görevlendirdiği personel ile bir komisyon oluşturacaktır. Gerek görülmesi hâlinde taşra teşkilatından personel de bu komisyonda geçici olarak görevlendirilebilecektir.

Bakanlık Komisyonu;

a) Bakanlığımıza bağlı her tür ve derecedeki eğitim kurumunda yürütülen eğitim faaliyetinden yabancıların yararlanmaları ve yararlandırılmaları hususlarında yaşanan sorunlar ve tereddütlerin giderilmesi amacıyla, görevlendirilen Müsteşar Yardımcısının talimatları doğrultusunda çalışma yürütecektir.

b) Ülkemize kitlesel olarak akın eden yabancıların eğitim-öğretim ihtiyaçları ile ilgili durumu gösterir raporlar hazırlayacak; söz konusu durum ile ilgili çalışmalar yürüten ilgili diğer kamu kurum ve kuruluşları, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve/veya uluslararası kuruluşlar (paydaşlar) ile koordinasyonu sağlayacaktır.

c) Bakanlığımıza bağlı her tür ve derecedeki eğitim kurumu ile kriz durumlarında geçici olarak oluşturulan merkezlerde, yabancılara yönelik olarak yürütülen eğitim çalışmaları ile ilgili gerekli izleme ve raporlama çalışmalarını yürütecektir.

ç) Müsteşar Yardımcısı tarafından konuyla ilgili verilen diğer görevleri ilgili birimler ile eş güdüm içerisinde yürütecektir.

2- İl Komisyonu;

İl millî eğitim müdürlükleri bünyesinde, yabancılara yönelik eğitim - öğretim faaliyeti ile ilgili iş ve işlemleri yürütmek üzere il millî eğitim müdürü tarafından görevlendirilecek bir il millî eğitim müdür yardımcısı veya şube müdürü başkanlığında bir komisyon oluşturulacaktır. Bu komisyonda, her tür ve derecedeki eğitim kurumundan en az bir müdür ve yabancı öğrencilere mülakat yapabilecek yabancı dil öğretmeni veya tercüman ile vali tarafından gerekli görülen ilgili diğer kurumlardan (İl göç müdürlüğü, il emniyet müdürlüğü, il AFAD müdürlüğü, il müftülüğü, il aile ve sosyal politikalar müdürlüğü, il

sağlık müdürlüğü) yetkili birer kişi ve geçici eğitim merkezleri bulunan illerde eğitim koordinatörleri (Kitlesel akından etkilenen illerde il/ilçe millî eğitim müdürlüklerine bağlı olarak faaliyet yürütmek üzere geçici eğitim merkezi/merkezleri kurulması durumunda bu merkezlerde yürütülecek eğitim faaliyetinin koordine edilmesi amacıyla geçici olarak görevlendirilen eğitim ve öğretim hizmetleri sınıfından personel) bulunacaktır. Kitlesel olarak o ile akın eden yabancılardan, eğitim-öğretim konusunda deneyimli olanlar arasından komisyon tarafından belirlenecek temsilciler, gerek görüldüğünde komisyona davet edilebilecektir.

İl Komisyonu;

a) Yabancı öğrencilerin, bu Genelge'de yer alan kayıt kabullere ilişkin şartları taşımaları hâlinde, diploma ve öğrenim belgelerine dayalı olarak denkliklerini ilgi (ı) Yönetmelik ve ilgi (j) Kılavuza göre belirleyerek öğrenci yerleştirme ve nakil komisyonları aracılığı ile öğrenim görecekleri eğitim kurumlarına yönlendirecektir.

b) İlgi (e) Kanunda tanımlanan, ancak ikamet izni alamayan ve/veya yabancı kimlik numarası edinemeyen, ilgili kurumca yabancı tanıtma belgesi verilmek suretiyle kayıt altında olan ve sınır dışı edilmeyenler de dâhil olmak üzere, yabancı öğrencilerden öğrenim belgesi bulunmayanları, beyanlarına dayalı olarak mülakat, gerektiğinde yazılı veya sözlü sınav yoluyla ülkelerinde öğrenim gördükleri sınıf seviyesi üzerinden denkliğini belirleyerek öğrenci yerleştirme ve nakil komisyonları aracılığı ile ilgili eğitim kurumlarına yönlendirecektir.

c) Kitlesel akın ile ülkemize gelen yabancılar için illerde barınma merkezi/merkezleri oluşturulması hâlinde, söz konusu merkezlerde ilgili paydaşlar ile iş birliği içerisinde, il/ilçe millî eğitim müdürlüklerine bağlı olarak faaliyet yürütmek üzere geçici eğitim merkezi kurulması amacıyla gerekli tedbirleri alacaktır. Geçici eğitim merkezlerinde yürütülecek faaliyeti koordine etmek için komisyona geçici olarak yeterli sayıda personel görevlendirilmesini sağlayacaktır. Personel görevlendirilmesi il millî eğitim müdürlüğü önerisi ve valilik onayı ile yapılacaktır.

ç) Kitlesel akından etkilenen illerde, barınma merkezleri dışında da ihtiyaç duyulması hâlinde ilgili diğer paydaşlar ile iş birliği içerisinde, il/ilçe millî eğitim müdürlüklerine bağlı olarak faaliyet yürütmek üzere geçici eğitim merkezleri oluşturulmasını valilik oluruna sunacaktır.

d) Bakanlığımıza bağlı her tür ve derecedeki eğitim kurumu ile oluşturulan geçici eğitim merkezlerinde Türkçenin öğretilmesi, yaygın eğitim kurumları aracılığıyla mesleki beceri kazandırılması, sosyal ve kültürel içerikli kurslar düzenlenmesi ve kurs dışı faaliyetlerin gerçekleştirilmesi için gerekli tedbirleri alacaktır. İstenilmesi ve uygun ortamın bulunması hâlinde konuyla ilgili her türlü destekleyici eğitim-öğretim çalışmalarının planlanması ve gerçekleştirilmesini sağlamak amacıyla, Bakanlık talimatları doğrultusunda paydaşlar ile iş birliği içerisinde çalışmalar yürütecektir.

e) Oluşturulan geçici eğitim merkezlerinde eğitim-öğretim faaliyetine gönüllü olarak destek olmak isteyen yabancıları, görevlendirilen eğitim koordinatörü ile birlikte değerlendirecek ve uygun bulunanların söz konusu merkezlerde eğitim koordinatörü denetiminde çalışmalara destek olmalarını sağlayacaktır.

f) Geçici eğitim merkezlerinin oluşturulmasına karar verilmesi hâlinde, ihtiyaç duyulan yerlerde kamu ve özel kurum ve kuruluşlarınca temin edilen binaların tam zamanlı veya yarı zamanlı olarak il/ilçe millî eğitim müdürlüklerine bağlı olarak faaliyet yürütmek üzere tahsis edilmesi çalışmalarını yürütecektir.

g) Yabancı öğrencilere gerekli ders araç gereci ile burs ve yatılılık imkânlarının sağlanması için imkânlar ölçüsünde gerekli tedbirlerin alınması yönünde paydaşlarla iş birliği içerisinde çalışma yürütecektir.

ğ) Her eğitim ve öğretim yılı dönem başlarında olmak üzere yılda en az iki defa,

bu tarihler dışında ise ihtiyaç duyuldukça toplanarak, il genelinde öğrenim gören yabancılarla ilgili değerlendirmeler yapacak ve alınan kararları ilgili kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarına bildirecektir.

h) Bakanlık tarafından konuyla ilgili verilen diğer talimatları, ilgili kurum ve kuruluşlar ile iş birliği içerisinde yürütecektir.

3- Geçici Eğitim Merkezi

Kitlesel akından etkilenen il/ilçelerde millî eğitim müdürlüklerine bağlı olarak faaliyet yürütmek üzere valilik oluru ile geçici eğitim merkezi oluşturulacaktır. Bu merkezlerde verilen eğitimin amacı, kitlesel olarak ülkemize akın etmiş yabancı öğrencilerin, ülkelerinde yarım bırakmak zorunda kaldıkları eğitimlerine devam edebilmelerini, ülkelerine döndüklerinde veya Bakanlığımıza bağlı her tür ve derecedeki eğitim kurumuna geçmek ve eğitimlerine ülkemizde devam etmek istemeleri hâlinde, sene kaybını önleyecek nitelikte olacaktır. Söz konusu faaliyetler, uygulamada birlik sağlanabilmesi amacıyla Bakanlık tarafından özel olarak belirlenecek haftalık ders çizelgeleri ve öğretim programları üzerinden yürütülecektir.

Geçici eğitim merkezinde;

a) "Türk devletinin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne, güvenliğine ve menfaatlerine aykırı, Türk milletinin millî, ahlaki, insani, manevi ve kültürel değerleri aleyhinde eğitim-öğretim yapılamaz." ilkesine uyulacaktır.

b) Yaygın eğitim kurumları aracılığı ile talep gören alanlarda, imkânlar ölçüsünde yaygın eğitim kursları ve kurs dışı faaliyetleri açılacaktır. İl komisyonu, faaliyetlerde ilgi (n) Yönergenin 9 uncu maddesi çerçevesinde öğretmen ve usta öğretici görevlendirecektir.

c) İl komisyonu, geçici eğitim merkezlerinde yapılacak olan Türkçe dersleri için;
1. Türkçe ve Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı alan öğretmenleri
2. Sınıf öğretmenleri
3. Yabancı dil dersi öğretmenleri
arasından görevlendirme yapabilecektir.

ç) Yürütülen eğitim faaliyetinde ihtiyaç duyulan materyallerin temin edilmesi hususunda paydaşlarla iş birliği içinde Bakanlık talimatları doğrultusunda gerekli tedbirler alınacaktır.

4- Kayıt Kabuller İçin Gerekli Şartlar

a) Yabancıların, Bakanlığımıza bağlı her tür ve derecedeki eğitim kurumuna kayıtlarının yapılabilmesi için ilgi (c) Kanunun 30 uncu maddesinde tanımlanan ikamet izinlerinden herhangi birine sahip olmaları veya ilgi (c) Kanunun 20 nci maddesinde tanımlanan ikamet izninden muaf tutulanlar ya da 91 inci madde kapsamına alınanlar arasında yer almaları şartı aranacaktır.

b) Kitlesel akın ile ülkemize gelen yabancılardan eğitim-öğretim çağında olanlar ile talep eden yetişkinlerin geçici eğitim merkezleri veya Bakanlığımıza bağlı her tür ve derecedeki eğitim kurumuna (yükseköğretim kurumları hariç olmak üzere) kayıtlarının yapılabilmesi için ilgili kurumca "yabancı tanıtma belgesi" verilmiş olması şartı aranacak ve il komisyonlarınca öğrenci yerleştirme ve nakil komisyonları aracılığı ile uygun görülen Bakanlığımıza bağlı eğitim kurumlarına veya geçici eğitim merkezlerine kayıtları yapılacaktır.

5- Veri Girişi ve Belge Düzenleme

a) Yabancı kimlik numarası bulunan yabancıların her türlü veri girişi e-okul ve e-yaygın otomasyon sistemleri üzerinden yapılacaktır.

b) Yabancı kimlik numarası bulunmayıp yabancı tanıtma belgesi bulunan yabancıların veri girişi öncelikle okul/kurum idareleri tarafından elektronik ve fizikî ortamda ve Bakanlık tarafından duyurulacak yabancı öğrenciler bilgi işletim sistemi üzerinden yapılacaktır.

c) Yabancı tanıtma belgesi üzerinden veri girişi yapılan yabancı öğrencilerin yabancı kimlik numarası edinmeleri hâlinde kayıtları e-okul otomasyon sistemine aktarılacaktır.

ç) Yabancı öğrencilere karne, tasdikname, diploma gibi belge düzenlenmesi, ilgili mevzuat doğrultusunda e-okul otomasyon sistemi veya Bakanlık tarafından duyurulacak yabancı öğrenciler bilgi işletim sistemi üzerinden yapılacaktır.

d) Geçici eğitim merkezlerinde gönüllü olarak destekleyici faaliyette bulunan yabancıların bilgileri, Bakanlık tarafından duyurulacak yabancı öğrenciler bilgi işletim sistemi üzerinden kayıt altında tutulacaktır.

e) Öğrenimini yarıda bırakan yabancı öğrencilere, istemeleri hâlinde, ülkemizde almış oldukları öğrenim süresi ve seviyesini gösteren öğrenim belgesi düzenlenerek kendilerine verilecektir.

f) Geçici eğitim merkezlerinde ortaöğretim son sınıf seviyesinde olan yabancı öğrencilere yönelik Bakanlığımızın koordinesinde ve kontrolünde menşei oldukları ülke müfredatında yapılan belgelendirme sınavlarında başarılı olanların denklik işlemleri, il komisyonlarına başvurmaları durumunda ilgi (j) Kılavuzdaki açıklamalar doğrultusunda yapılacaktır.

6- Diğer Hususlar

a) Geçici eğitim merkezlerinde yürütülen eğitim-öğretim faaliyetine gönüllü olarak destek olan yabancılara, Bakanlık tarafından hazırlanacak Etik Sözleşme imzalatılacak ve çalışmalarında söz konusu sözleşmede yer alan taahhütlere uygun davranmaları sağlanacaktır.

b) Bakanlık Komisyonu ve il komisyonları, geçici eğitim merkezlerinde yürütülen eğitim-öğretim faaliyetine gönüllü olarak destek olan yabancıları, maddi, manevi ve mesleki anlamda desteklemeye yönelik olarak paydaşlar ile iş birliği içerisinde çalışmalar yürütecektir.

c) Yaygın eğitim kurumları aracılığıyla açılan kurslarda kullanılacak temrinlik malzemelerin temin edilmesi hususunda, Bakanlık Komisyonu ve il komisyonlarınca paydaşlarla iş birliği yapılmak suretiyle gerekli tedbirler alınacaktır.

ç) Öğrencilerin okul, çevre ve diğer öğrencilerle uyum içerisinde öğrenimlerini sürdürebilmeleri, uyum zorluğu çekenlere gerekli destek ve yardımın sağlanması için ilgi (h) Yönetmelik hükümleri doğrultusunda geçici eğitim merkezi yönetimleri, okul yönetimleri, rehberlik servisleri, rehberlik ve araştırma merkezleri ile il komisyonunca gerekli önlemler alınacaktır.

d) Yabancı öğrencilerin eğitim-öğretimleri ile ilgili tereddüt ve sorunlar öncelikle il komisyonlarınca değerlendirilerek çözüme kavuşturulacak, çözüme kavuşturulamayan sorunlar ise Bakanlığa intikal ettirilecektir.

e) Bu Genelge kapsamı dışında her ne ad altında olursa olsun eğitim-öğretim faaliyetinin izinsiz yapıldığının tespit edilmesi hâlinde ilgi (ç) Kanun hükümlerince gerekli işlemler yapılacak; izinsiz faaliyet sonucu yapılan belgelendirmeler geçersiz sayılacaktır.

f) Bu Genelge yayımlanmadan önce valiliklerce yabancılara yönelik olarak

eğitim-öğretim hizmetlerinin sunulması amacıyla yapılmış anlaşmalar, projeler ve protokoller bu Genelge kapsamında gözden geçirilecek; gerekiyorsa yeniden düzenlenerek uygulamalara bu Genelgede yapılan açıklamalar doğrultusunda devam edilecektir.

g) Yabancı tanıtma belgesi ile Bakanlığımıza bağlı ortaokullara devam eden öğrenciler Bakanlıkça yapılan merkezi sistem ortak sınavlarına giremeyecek; milli eğitim müdürlükleri bünyesinde kurulan öğrenci yerleştirme ve nakil komisyonları tarafından okul kontenjanları da değerlendirilerek uygun bulunan ortaöğretim kurumuna yerleştirilecektir.

ğ) Ülkemizde bulunan yabancılar ilgi (k), (l), (m), (n) açık öğretim kurumları yönetmeliklerinin ilgili hükümleri doğrultusunda açık okullardan yararlanabilecektir.

h) Özel eğitime ihtiyacı olduğu tespit edilen yabancı öğrenciler için ilgi (ğ) Yönetmeliğin ilgili hükümleri doğrultusunda gerekli tedbirler alınacaktır.

ı) Yabancı öğrencilerin ve kursiyerlerin başarı, devamsızlık, disiplin ve benzeri durumlarının değerlendirilmesi ilgi (d), (e), (f), (g) Yönetmeliklerin ilgili hükümleri doğrultusunda yapılacaktır.

i) İlgi (c) Kanunun 59 uncu maddesinde yer alan geri gönderme merkezlerinde sağlanacak eğitim hizmetleri hususunda, il komisyonlarınca ilgili kurumlar ile iş birliği içerisinde gerekli tedbirler alınacaktır.

j) İlgi (ö) Genelge yürürlükten kaldırılmıştır.

Bilgilerinizi ve gereğini rica ederim.

                                                            Nabi AVCI
                                                              Bakan

DAĞITIM:
Gereği: Bilgi:
B Planı   A Planı
                           Başbakanlık Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı
                           Başbakanlık Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı
                           İçişleri Bakanlığı
                           Dışişleri Bakanlığı
                           Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı
                           UNICEF Türkiye Temsilciliği
                           UNHCR Türkiye Temsilciliği
                           IOM Türkiye Temsilciliği