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THE STRUCTURING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING OF DISCOURSES ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

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APPROVAL

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Bengü Çelenk

_____

Date (20 /06 /2022)

To My Dearest Family …

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THE STRUCTURING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING OF DISCOURSES ON
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to understand how the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) structured climate change and security discourses and institutionalized them in its practices between 2007-2021. In this regard, Maarten Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis has been employed to assess how the UNSC structured and institutionalized these discourses. The study additionally formed a multilevel security framework to employ over both the processes of discourse structuring and institutionalizing in order to strengthen Hajer's analysis and make the discourses on climate change and security more meaningful. Based on the analytical literature review, the multilevel security framework establishes causal chains among climate security, human security, national security, and international security. This research understands the UNSC's process of structuring discourses on climate change and security to still be in the developmental phase. In the context of a multilevel security framework, the discourses on whether the discourses on climate change as an international security issue or not were observed to have not been structured yet. However, climate change was observed to have been structured as a security problem by establishing causal links between climate security, human security, and national security. The second part focuses on whether or not the UNSC has institutionalized climate change and security discourses in its practices. The findings show the UNSC to have partially institutionalized discourses on climate change and security. Despite the increase in the frequency of the relevant outputs and the number of members defending climate change and the UNSC's relationship with it, the UNSC was found to have institutionalized the discourses on climate change and security in line with the discourses of the Russian Federation. In the context of the multilevel security framework, climate change was found to have been institutionalized as a security problem by establishing causal links between human security and national security. The answer to the question at the beginning of the thesis of whether the realist security-based nature of

the UNSC as problematized has changed with regard to the level of global security is that it has not changed yet.

Keywords: Climate Change, United Nations Security Council, UNSC, Security, Marteen Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis, Multi-level Security Analysis

BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER GÜVENLİK KONSEYİNDE İKLİM DEĞİŞİKLİĞİ VE GÜVENLİK SÖYLEMLERİNİN YAPILANMASI VE KURUMSALLAŞMASI

ÖZET

Bu tez, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi'nin (BMGK) 2007-2021 yılları arasında iklim değişikliği ve güvenlik söylemlerini nasıl yapılandırdığını ve uygulamalarında nasıl kurumsallaştırdığını anlamayı amaçlamaktadır Bu bağlamda, BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin bu söylemleri nasıl yapılandırdığını ve kurumsallaştırdığını değerlendirmek için Maarten Hajer'in tartışmacı söylem analizi kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca, Hajer'in analizini güçlendirmek ve iklim değişikliği-güvenlik söylemlerini daha anlamlı kılmak için bu çalışmada oluşturulan çok düzeyli bir güvenlik çerçevesi hem söylem yapılandırma hem de söylem kurumsallaştırma süreçlerine dahil edilmiştir. Analitik literatür incelemesine dayanan çok seviyeli güvenlik çerçevesi, iklim güvenliği, insan güvenliği, ulusal güvenlik ve uluslararası güvenlik arasında nedensel zincirler kurarak iklim değişiklşiği ve güvenlik literatürüne kapsamlı bir bakşış açısı sunar. Bu araştırmada, Konsey'de iklim değişikliği ve güvenlik söylemlerinin yapılandırılma sürecinin henüz gelişme aşamasında olduğu anlaşılmıştır. Çok düzeyli bir güvenlik çerçevesi bağlamında, iklim değişikliğinin uluslararası bir güvenlik sorunu olarak ele alınıp alınmadığına ilişkin söylemlerin henüz yapılandırılmadığı gözlemlenmiştir. Ancak iklim değişikliğinin, iklim güvenliği, insan güvenliği ve ulusal güvenlik arasında nedensellik bağı kurularak bir güvenlik sorunu olarak yapılandırıldığı gözlemlenmiştir. İkinci bölüm, Konsey'de iklim değişikliği ve güvenlik söylemlerinin uygulamalarda kurumsallaşıp kurumsallaşmadığına odaklanmaktadır. Bulgular, BMGK'nın iklim değişikliği ve güvenlik konusunda kısmen kurumsallaşmış söylemlere sahip olduğunu gösteriyor. İlgili çıktıların sıklığı ve iklim değişikliğini ve Konsey ilişkisini savunan üye sayısındaki artışa rağmen, Konsey'de iklim değişikliği ve güvenlik söylemlerinin Rusya Federasyonu'nun söylemleri doğrultusunda kurumsallaştığı tespit edilmiştir. Çok düzeyli güvenlik analizi bağlamında, iklim değişikliğinin sadece insan güvenliği ile ulusal güvenlik arasında nedensellik bağları kurularak bir güvenlik sorunu olarak kurumsallaştırıldığı tespit edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla bulgular, iklim değişikliği ve güvenlik konusundaki söylemlerin Konsey'de kısmen kurumsallaştığını göstermektedir. Tezin başında da sorunsallaştırılan BMGK'nın

gerçekçi güvenlik temelli doğasının küresel güvenlik düzeyinde değişip değişmediği sorusunun yanıtı, henüz değişmediğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: İklim Değişikliği, Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konsey, BMGK, Güvenlik, Marteen Hajer'in Tartışmacı Söylem Analizi, Çok Seviyeli Güvenlik Analizi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

xiii

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AWG	Anthropocene Working Group
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
CRED	Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
DPPA	United Nations Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EITs	Economies in Transition
ESA	European Space Agency
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
GAW	Global Atmospheric Watch
GISS	Goddard Institute for Space Studies
ICS	International Commission on Stratigraphy
ICSU	International Council for Science Union
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IEA	International Energy Agency
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUGS	International Union of Geological Sciences
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SQS	Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC   United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change

UNISS   United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel

UNSC   United Nations Security Council

WBGU   German Advisory Council on Global Change

WMO   World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to examine how the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has a critical position in maintaining international peace and security, structured the security dimensions of climate change discursively and institutionalized them in practice by employing Maarten Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis. In this context, the main research question has been designated as: How and to what extent has the UNSC structured climate change-related security discourses and institutionalized them in practice between 2007-2021?

The research theoretically offers a comprehensive security approach by establishing causal links between referent objects of security by asking what the role of climate change is on climate security, human security, national security and international security and whether there is any connection between them. In this way, many key details from climate change and security literature are presented in a comprehensive and multi-level security framework. Specifically, the extent to which the Council's discourses on climate change and security are structured by taking into account the reference objects of security and the causal chains between them and which reference objects of security are taken into account in their practices are evaluated by adopting this multi-level security framework. This framework also aims to strengthen Hajer's analysis and make climate change-security discourses more meaningful by engaging in discourse structuring and institutionalizing processes.

Also, this study empirically analyses the UNSC as a case study. In this sense, it is first examined how the UNSC discursively structures climate change and security by prioritizing the five permanent members' (P5) discourses.[1] Secondly, it asks under what conditions the Council institutionalizes climate change as a security issue in its presidential statements, resolutions and institutional practices. The Council, established after the United Nations International Organization Conference held in San Francisco in

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[1] China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States

1

1945, has fifteen members, including five permanent members and ten non-permanent members (elected for two-year periods). According to Articles 23 and 24 of the United Nations Charter, [2] the UNSC is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security with certain powers assigned to it. Moreover, it is one of the most critical organs of the UN system due to the binding nature of its resolutions.

Analyzing how UNSC's discourse on climate change and security is structured and reflected in its practices is an important attempt in terms of providing researchers with an opportunity to examine a previously inaccessible phenomenon. As examined in more detail in the following parts, a comprehensive study that applies in-depth discourse analysis to the Security Council's climate-themed meetings and evaluates them in the light of recent developments that has not been conducted yet. Furthermore, this research is not only considering how the UNSC has structured and institutionalized climate change and related security discourses but also raises the awareness of whether the realist security-based nature of the UNSC has changed at the global security level.

Why the UNSC?

The UN, which started to strengthen environmental awareness after establishing the World Meteorological Organization in 1950, started its first attempt to deal with environmental problems in the 1970s and continued to advance this issue until now. In this context, as a remarkable step, the decision to establish the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was taken at the Stockholm Conference, held in 1972 and known as the first world environmental conference. The UN had considered climate change as a subcategory of environmental problems and the ozone layer issue rather than a specific discipline until the 80s. However, the 1980s marked a turning point for climate change as a global problem and after then, the UN has continued to struggle with this issue as a global leader. In those years, one of the most critical actions of the UN was establishing the IPCC under the leadership of UNEP in 1988. As a scientific organization, the IPCC constitutes the basis of climate change literature worldwide, from natural to social sciences. In addition, the organization, which informs policymakers with its reports

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[2] The founding document of the United Nations

published regularly, has become one of the primary reference points in international negotiations on climate change.

Subsequently, the second world summit, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The most prominent output of this conference is that the groundwork for future climate negotiations was laid within the scope of UNFCCC. The first important meeting of the UNFCCC, which entered into force in 1994, was held in Berlin in 1995 under the Conference of Parties (COP). As of 2021, a total of 26 COP conferences have been held and necessary agreements have been signed, such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), the Cancun Agreements (2010) and the Paris Agreement (2015). These agreements are examined in detail in the literature part (Chapter 1).

Although 193 states are UNFCCC members as of 2019, the decisions taken at the COP conferences, especially the targets such as emission reduction, are not legally binding. Therefore, no positive feedback has yet been received from these attempts affiliated with the UN, where the declaration of intent is essential. At least, it seems that emission rates continue to increase in the atmosphere.

The UN Security Council, which has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and is the only body with binding decision-making authority on the member states among the UN's six main bodies, opened climate change as a security issue to discussion for the first time in 2007. The UNSC's consideration of the security dimension of climate change, on the one hand, reveals the importance of the possible threats and current effects of climate change. On the other hand, it has also started to give rise to thought about what the Council, which has the power of sanction, could do in this regard. Climate change and related security issues are still on the UNSC agenda and have become increasingly important, especially in its resolutions on Africa since 2008.

In the light of the information above, this thesis raises the following research questions:

1) How and to what extent has the UNSC structured climate change-related security discourses and institutionalized them in practice between 2007 and 2021?

1.1) What is the role of climate change on climate security, human security, national security and international security? Is there any connection between them?

1.2) Under what conditions does the Council define climate change as a security threat in its presidential statements, resolutions and institutional practices?

Although climate change has attracted the international community's attention since the early 1980s, the UNSC officially declared climate change as a security threat in 2007 for the first time. Therefore, the time period of this study covers the years between 2007 and 2021.

When the current literature on the UN Security Council and climate change is examined, many studies and reports have been published recently on the relationship between the Council and climate change in general (Romita 2021; Sanwal 2013; Vivekananda et al. 2020, Scott and Ku 2018), the approaches to the Climate-Security Nexus of the Council's member states (Hardt and Viehoff 2020), the global role of the Council on the issue of climate change (Conca 2019; Cousins 2013; Ng 2010; Scott and Andrade 2012), whether the Council is a legal authority within the framework of the causes and consequences of climate change (Penny 2007) and whether the Council could securitize climate change (Kurtz 2012; Murphy 2021). Detraz and Betsill (2009) examined the climate change debates and the UN Security Council's approach to climate change in the context of environmental security and environmental conflict using content and discourse analysis. However, an in-depth study examining the Council's official statements, resolutions, open debates and briefings on climate change and security impacts, and the speeches of member states' representatives and invited participants at these meetings, have not been conducted yet. Therefore, analyzing how UNSC's discourse on climate change and security has been structured and reflected in its practices is important in providing researchers with an opportunity to examine a previously inaccessible phenomenon. As discussed in more detail in the following chapters, a comprehensive study that applies in-

depth discourse analysis to the Security Council's climate-themed open debates and briefings and evaluates this process in the light of recent developments has not yet been conducted. Furthermore, this research not only looks at how the UNSC has structured and institutionalized climate change and related security discourses, but it also raises the awareness of whether the realist security-based nature of the UNSC has changed at the global security level.

Methodology: Maarten Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis

This thesis aims to allow a deeper insight into climate change-related security studies by employing Maarten A. Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis and taking the UNSC as a case study. Prior to examining Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis, describing the argumentative discourse analysis from a general perspective in this section would be helpful for strengthening this method's background.

"The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning," published by Frank Fischer and John Forester (1993) is a remarkable study on argumentative discourse analysis. Fischer and Forester's study indicated the focus on the importance of argumentation in planning and policy practice based on Frankfurt School's critical social theory, American pragmatism, French post-structuralism, and ordinary English language analysis (1993, 2). In this sense, they demonstrated a simple but profound understanding of practical and political aspects by trying to understand the environments where the actors are influential in policymaking and planning, the effectiveness and constraints language has on the actors, how they represent and define their practical rhetoric, what they do or do not cover in this sense, and more (1993, 2). In this sense, they emphasized that the way analysts examine a policy analysis or planning is to argumentatively focus on the issue's analytical content and its practical performance. In other words, the argumentative analysis considers the technical content and its political expression as an entire process. Fischer and Forester (1993, 3) additionally argued that a very complex relationship exists for technical, analytical, or theoretical content with its respective evolution into the political discourse. At this point, they gave the following anecdote on this point as an example they'd witnessed to keep this subject more memorable: When the department manager in a metropolitan city planning department meeting was asked, "What are the challenges of

presenting project analysis in debatable meetings?", the department manager replied, "The hardest part is knowing what not to say" (Fischer and Forester 1993, 3). The department manager appeared to be aware of the effectiveness and importance of words; however, the manager was also aware that what should and should not be talked about during the meeting are shaped according to the atmosphere of the meeting. From the point of view of argumentative discourse analysis, researchers need to have information about policymakers/planners' motivations and what they actually do in order to make a more accurate analysis. At the same time, researchers should also consider in this process the daily politics of rationality, how they define problems, in which framework they position them, and what prejudices they have (Fischer and Forester 1993).

Another point is that Fischer and Forester had signaled that argumentative discourse analysis would be weak if only internal coherence or political/institutional conditions were considered. In this regard, they did not radically separate epistemological concerns (analytical content) from institutional concerns (practical performance), yet neither do they appear to have focused on post-structuralist discussions. Instead, they positioned a practical rhetorical approach at the forefront of argumentative discourse analysis.

In short, argumentative discourse analysis is a much more comprehensive method than other discourse analysis, which only consists of interpreting, organizing and ranking discourses. This method helps expand one's perception of reality by generating various insights in both theory and practice. Then how did Maarten Hajer position his own argumentative discourse analysis?

Hajer brought the argumentative discourse analysis to the literature for the first time in 1993 over the issue of acid rain issue, which went on to become one of the most important environmental problems in England with the policies implemented against it; he continued to develop this method until 2009. Hajer (1993) considered acid rain, which earned Britain the *dirty man* label in the 1980s and 1990s, to actually be one of a series of environmental problems and attributed the delays in solving this problem to governmental conflicts of interest. In this context, Hajer examined the conditions or scope

under which the acid rain narratives had moved beyond scientific debates and become a political problem through questioning using his argumentative discourse analysis.

In this regard, Hajer argued that whether a problem could be accepted as a political issue or not depends on the narratives developed over the related problem and explained this topic with an example that he repeated many times in his studies (1993; 1995; 2002; 2006). Accordingly, whether the death of a group of trees is a political issue depends on how the case is narrated. These trees may die from natural causes such as cold, drought, or extreme weather events; in such a narrative, people inherently attribute these trees' death to natural disasters. However, this case becomes a political issue as the death of these trees resulting from acid rains would lead to certain criticisms such as the industrial society crisis by reason of the fact that the rain did no longer occurred in its natural form but now damages nature instead of nourishing it.

In this regard, Hajer (1993; 1995; 2002) emphasized an argumentative turn as opposed to a linguistic turn and argued that conducting a discourse analysis of only the spoken or written words and the speaker's thoughts would be insufficient. According to him, examining the discourse as a whole by taking into account the opposing stances and criticisms is also necessary in order to apply argumentative discourse analysis; otherwise, the argumentative aspect of the discourse remains weak.

The most important challenge in applying argumentative discourse analysis is the ability to combine an analysis of the discursive production of reality with an analysis of the socio-political practices that involve actors (Hajer 2002, 62). In this context, Hajer highlighted argumentative discourse analysis as having three dimensions: discourse, practice, and meaning. In other words, "the allocation of meaning in a given context is thus analyzed in terms of particular forms of discourse within the context of the particular practices in which the discourse is produced" (Hajer 2002, 62).

On the other hand, Hajer (1993) pointed out that *discourse* under normal circumstances is a singular concept in the literature; however, accepting discourse as a collective concept makes more sense from the perspective of argumentative discourse analysis. According

to Hajer, discourses can be fed from a wide variety of sources in the context of a political discussion. For instance, environmental policy issues could cause multidimensional discussions as they are complex and even ambiguous structures by their nature; therefore, actors' arguments can be divided into more than one discourse, such as the scientific discourse (what are the causes of climate change?), the economic discourse (what are the economic effects of climate change?), the engineering discourses (what can be done about renewable energy sources?), and the political discourse (what sanctions can be applied to combat climate change?).

Hajer and Versteeg's study (2005a) defined argumentative discourse analysis as the first examination of what is said, to whom, and in what context. In other words, they emphasized that people produce various meanings by interacting with each other while conveying their expressions and stated the argumentative discourse analysis to be based on a detailed analysis of these interactive discourses. Hajer also noted on this point that argumentation should not be confused with *discussion* in order to avoid possible confusion. Secondly, as Fischer and Forester (1993) stated above, argumentative discourse analysis considers the influence of the environment where these interactively meaning-producing discourses occur. Hajer developed some conceptual tools for analytically examining empirical research in argumentative discourse analysis. The next section examines these concepts in detail, which involve discourse coalitions, storylines, metaphors, discursive affinity, discourse structuring and discourse institutionalization. The aim here is to examine how mutual relations are constantly reproduced and transformed by overcoming the static divisions between individuals and institutions (Hajer 2002).

The Concepts of Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis
Hajer aims to make sense of the continuous reproduction and transformation of interrelationships between individuals and institutions by developing tools such as discourse coalitions, storylines, metaphors, discursive affinity, discourse structuring, and discourse institutionalization in order to examine the empirical data more easily. The two central linguistic mechanisms in Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis are storylines and metaphors. In this context, the storylines and metaphors mentioned as argumentative

discursive tools illuminate and provide an in-depth examination of the discourse. Hajer also highlighted the analysis of these two mechanisms to be particularly powerful when examined in conjunction with the *social-historical* conditions in which the expressions are produced (Hajer 2006; 2009).

Storylines: Hajer defined storylines as a type of narrative in which actors take advantage of various *discursive categories* to understand a range of *social and physical phenomena* (1995, 56). In other words, storylines are narratives created upon social reality by actors with different interests, ideas and areas of expertise who come together through a common understanding. Hajer (1995) pointed out the primary purpose of these storylines to be to simplify the discourse confusion caused by complex and uncertain issues such as environmental problems or climate change. Secondly, he indicated that, as these storylines are accepted and different actors become interested in these, a specific permanence occurs regarding the relevant issue. Lastly, Hajer also predicted that, when considering how these storylines are fed from fields that would require more than one expertise, experts who contribute to this would have the opportunity to develop their own discourses.

Each storyline consists of an introduction, a development and a conclusion. According to Hajer (2006), if an issue has a complex character, the whole story does not get told; instead, short clues are used within the storylines. Therefore, the exact meaning of the story remains unclear, which encourages actors to develop the story, modify it for new insights, or fill in gaps over time. For example, the concept of climate change shows very complex and sometimes even ambiguous features in terms of its scientific content. At this point, the aim is to explain reality by simplifying the subject as much as possible using a storyline that will be constructed. According to Hajer (2006; 2009), having a group of actors who do not share the same ideas, interests and theories determine the storylines and the metaphors that will be detailed later on is valuable, because these actors are from different backgrounds and may not fully understand one another; however, they can produce *meaningful politics* under a storyline that feels right to them. For example, politicians, scientists and energy sector representatives may agree on the effects of climate change in a surrounding where climate change storylines are commonly shared, but each

actor interprets these effects differently. Hajer (2006) defined the merging of these people from different backgrounds under the same storylines as a *communicative miracle*.

Storylines not only cause the emergence of a problem but also provide options such as protest and litigation by strengthening individuals' motivations through increased awareness, thus having them become efficient at establishing a social and moral order in specific areas (Hajer 1995). For example, storylines about climate change not only include scientific arguments but also contains social, economic, political, and security dimensions in its storylines. Individuals who borrow from these storylines for their future; or farmers to grow crops, fishermen to hunt, or those with asthma, bronchitis, or high blood pressure for their health can get the chance to claim their rights by filing a lawsuit or legal protest.

Metaphors: Hajer defined (2009, 64) the metaphor as "understanding and experiencing a particular thing/event in terms of another." He (2009) stated metaphors to generally be used in politics and this situation to be proof that the related case is well understood. Hajer and Versteeg (2005a) additionally argued that metaphors are valuable in terms of making sense and shaping the world and realities by referring to Burke's explanation as a metaphor is "seeing something in terms of something else, bringing out the 'thisness' of a that or the 'thatness' of a this" (Hajer and Versteeg 2005a, 176 cited from Burke 1969, 247). According to Hajer (2009, 61), metaphors are often used in politics, which indicates the relevant mechanisms to be well understood. Hajer (2009, 61) briefly explained the political mechanism of metaphors as being to focus, simplify, compress, and appeal. In this context, Hajer (2009) cited the metaphors of the *war on drugs* and the *green greenhouse effect* as examples. A leader's use of the *war* metaphor indicates how much they care about the issue. On the other hand, the *green greenhouse effect* metaphor connotes that the world temperatures are now emphasizing that the necessary support and planning should be made to prevent this problem. Brito (2015), who used Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis in her doctoral thesis on the EU's climate change and security discourses, emphasized metaphors as also being used in terms of climate change. For example, the use of the metaphor *sick planet* emphasizes that the planet needs

treatment not, and the use of the metaphor *fight against climate change* necessitates combating climate change (Brito 2015, 39).

Discourse affinity: Hajer (2009, 65) defined discursive affinity as the "arguments that may have very different roots and meanings but that together uphold a particular way of seeing" and stated that arguments may change over time, but the way of conceptualizing the world will retain a similar structure (2005b). The strength of a text depends on its multiple interpretabilities rather than its coherence; as such, discursive affinity is what holds storylines together (Hajer 1993; 1995). As mentioned above, storylines do not have to be consistent; however, they are shaped over the issue through discursive affinity (Hajer 1995). In a discourse coalition formed over any issue, actors provide the necessary support on the points that are within their area of expertise or jurisdiction. However, due to the complexity of the subject, no one is able to understand the whole problem in detail. At this stage, discursive affinity comes into play and facilitates the understanding of differences of opinion among actors because, although the arguments seem to be different, the way they conceptualize the world is similar (Hajer 1995; 2005b). Hajer provided a clearer understanding of discursive affinity on this point by citing the pollution problem. For example, the arguments of a discourse coalition based on pollution policy could be listed as follows: the moral argument that *nature should be respected*, the scientific argument that nature should be considered as *a complex ecosystem*, and the economic argument developed on *the economic cost of preventing pollution*. Although all of the arguments mentioned so far are different from each other, their essence, "from each of the positions the other arguments 'sound right'" (Hajer 2005b, 304). In this regard, Hajer stated the analyst's responsibility to be to reveal these discursive affinities (2005b, 304).

Discourse coalitions: Hajer (2009, 64) defined the discourse coalition as "the ensemble of particular storylines, the actors that employ them, and the practices through which the discourse involved exert their power." In this regard, a discourse coalition with its linguistic background differs from interest-based political coalitions (Hajer 1995). In the case of a new discourse being put forward by the discourse coalition, it is assumed that this discourse would produce a storyline about the problem through its conceptual

mechanism (Hajer 1993). For example, the discussions on sustainable development carried out in the context of climate change problems are the conceptual mechanism of the climate change problem. A particular storyline is created by the discourse coalition over the relationship between climate change and sustainable development. In short, a discourse coalition is a collection of practices in which actors from different backgrounds come together around a particular discourse, form a storyline, and act in harmony with it (Hajer 1995; 2005b; 2006). In this sense, storylines act as *discourse cement* that prevents the disintegration of the discourse coalition (Hajer 1995). Hajer (1993, 48) found the discourse coalition advantageous in three respects:

> (1) it analyzes strategic action in the context of specific sociohistorical discourses and institutional practices and provides the conceptual tools to analyze controversies over individual issues such as acid rain in their wider political context; (2) it takes the explanation beyond mere reference to interests, analyzing how interests are played out in the context of specific discourses and organizational practices; and (3) it illuminates how different actors and organizational practices help to reproduce or fight a given bias without necessarily orchestrating or coordinating their actions or without necessarily sharing deep values.

In Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis, the success of discourse depends on two conditions: discourse structuring and discourse institutionalization.

Structuring of discourse: The fact that discourse is becoming increasingly dominant and influential in conceptualizing the world while at the same time being used by many people to conceptualize the world can be characterized as the structuring of discourse (Hajer 2005b).

Discourse institutionalization: Discourse that is reflected in institutional arrangements allows discourse institutionalization to be mentioned. Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis makes no clear mention of whether a sequence exists between discourse institutionalization and discourse structuring (Brito, 2015). Apart from this, while discourse structuring can be analyzed through metaphors and storylines, how to analyze discourse institutionalization is more difficult to trace (Brito 2015, 43). In her doctoral research, Brito stated Hajer's research on ecological modernization to be useful in examining discourse institutionalization with examples such as the transfer of transportation from highways to railways after an environmental discussion and the

opening of new departments in relevant institutions. Lastly, in order to measure discourse structuring and institutionalization, having a relevant topic span approximately 10-15 years is important for the relevance of the research (Hajer 2009).

Ultimately, measuring the success of discourse in argumentative discourse analysis depends on two conditions. The first is using a generally accepted discourse to conceptualize the world, and the second involves institutionalizing this discourse by transforming it into various policies, laws, rules, and practices. If these two criteria are met, one can argue a discourse to have become dominant (Hajer 2005).

This study analyses how these discourses are institutionalized in its resolutions and institutional practices by examining how the UNSC structured its discourse on climate change and security in its official documents, open debates, Arria formula meetings, and press statements. This thesis relies on various sources to conduct analysis: *i)* thematic open debates of the UNSC on climate change *ii)* UNSC's Arria formula meetings on climate change *iii)* UNSC's briefings on climate change *iv)* UNSC's official documents, statements in print and visual media on climate change *v)* resolutions and presidential statements *vi)* multilevel security framework formed in this thesis *vii)* scientific research *viii)* institutional reports (specifically NASA, WMO, IPCC reports) *ix)* secondary sources *x)* government reports (such as Germany and the US).

Theoretical Background of Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Approach
Influenced by Foucault's social discourses on social discipline, punishment, and sexuality as well as the *social-interactive* discourse theories of Harre and Billig, Hajer (1995) stated that he had developed the theoretical roots of his method over these scholars' discursive theoretical approaches. Foucault's discourse theory had been the main influence through the concepts of problematization and the microphysics of power (Brito 2015, 35). However, Hajer (1995) still criticized the idea that an in-depth examination of small and inconspicuous practices, which Foucault had defined as *micro-powers* in analytical research that desired to make inter-discursive relations visible through all their dynamics, would show how institutional systems work. According to Hajer, the position of the discursive subject was ambiguous and thus lacking in terms of interpersonal interaction

because the focus on micro-powers had been one of Foucault's methodological principles. On the other hand, Hajer had examined Michael Billig and Rom Harré's research in the field of social psychology as involving an approach (which he called *social-interactive* discourse theory) that complemented Foucault's theory due to its focus on the level of interpersonal discourse where *subject-positions* are considered. In this way, Hajer attempted to find the middle ground between Foucault's and Billig and Harré's social interaction theories of discourse.

Hajer (1993; 1995) expressed social constructivism's contribution to political science as indisputable. On the other hand, he also argued that the explanations regarding public problems as being socially constructed to be platitudes anymore. Hajer also opposed the notion of social constructivism as a theory positioned against mainstream approaches, highlighting that "social constructivism has come up with the building blocks for a refinement of the established theory of organization as mobilization of bias" (1995, 42). Referring to thinkers such as Berger, Douglas, and Giddens, Hajer stated social constructivism to show that different views are able to occur regarding the problem and criticizes the *one question-one answer* policy of politics (1995, 43).

Hajer (1995, 44) defined the discourse as "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities." However, studies on this subject in recent years caused Hajer to realize some weaknesses in his own definition of discourse. In this regard, he noticed that ideas, concepts and classifications are all cognitive concepts; however, less cognitive concepts such as stories, metaphors, and images actually play crucial roles in empirical analysis. When defining discourse, Hajer at this point provided a central role to *notion* such as stories, metaphors, and slogans, which he defined as less cognitive tools, ideas that are open to more explicit assumptions and causal reasoning in addition to concepts and categorizations. As a result, Hajer (2009, 60) in his study titled Authoritative Governance: Policy-making in the Age of Mediatization developed his definition of discourse as "an ensemble of notions, ideas, concepts, and categorizations through which meaning is ascribed to social and physical

phenomena, and that is produced in and reproduces in turn an identifiable set of practices."

According to Hajer, discourse does not have to be consistent in all circumstances. For instance, consistency is strong in the field of Law as the discourse is based on trust-based units such as a constitution, laws, statutes, regulations, and international treaties. However, issues such as environmental issues are almost like equation with more than one variation (Hajer 1995). Due to environmental issues involving much uncertainty and confusion, inconsistencies may occur in discourses regarding these issues. As mentioned above, when dealing with environmental problems, not only do the ecological dimension but also the economic, social, political, scientific, ethical, philosophical, and engineering dimensions also come into play. In other words, environmental degradation is a multidimensional problem that concerns not only ecology but also many other fields. Therefore, having a uniform discourse is not possible regarding the decisions to be taken for preventing this problem.

Lastly, Hajer (1995, 44) stated discourse analysis in the social sciences to have emerged from the post-positivist tradition, but when examined in-depth, he noted discourse analysis to have taken its roots from language, rhetoric, history, philosophy, and ideology. He also stated discourse to be able to be evaluated as a conversation or discussion in daily life (1995, 44). According to Hajer, whether oral or written, discourse in terms of the social sciences can be evaluated in three stages. First, the context and to whom the discourse is directed in an analytical order should be questioned based on the background and social conditions that constitute a discourse. Next, the place a discourse has in the social practices should be examined as a set of ideas, concepts, and categorizations by focusing on its content. The last concerns the institutional dimension of discourse. Hajer considered discourses that make sense of physical and social realities to be a set of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are constantly produced and transformed within their social practices.

Limitations and Strengths of Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis

This research has the opportunity to examine how the UN Security Council, which has an essential role in maintaining international peace and security, has discursively structured and institutionalized the relationship between climate change and security by employing Hajer's Argumentative Discourse Analysis. The UNSC emphasized the security dimension of climate change for the first time in 2007 and appears to have intensified its discourse on this issue. The UNSC has five permanent members (i.e., China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 10 non-permanent members that are elected every two years, and the members are invited to thematic meetings; as such, the UNSC appears quite suitable for using this methodology. The five permanent member states also notably produce the most emissions globally. The fact that non-permanent members who are low emission emitters and the most affected by climate change also participate in the discussions on climate change and security and the possible effects of these countries' discourses on the decisions taken show Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis to be a reasonable method to use. In this context, analyzing how permanent and non-permanent member countries in the UNSC structure the security dimension of climate change discursively and how effective the member states are in the institutionalization process by considering their climate change-related backgrounds will make an essential contribution to the security literature. The quantitative method has not been used in this study as it is not well-suited to the research questions. This is because, instead of interpreting the concepts or words used in discourse with numerical data, this research aims to examine the effects from the discourse by looking at the contexts, eras, and under which conditions the discourses have been structured and institutionalized. In this context, while Hajer's development of new conceptual tools that facilitate the analysis of discursive structuring is one of the strong points of this method, one of its weak points is that discursive institutionalization analysis is not considered in detail. At this point, this research is aimed to improve the weaknesses by getting support from the multi-level security framework formed in the second chapter.

This study used qualitative data analysis to reveal the storylines and metaphors of the UNSC's climate change and security discourses between 2007-2021 using the Council's official documents, open debates, Arria formula meetings, and press statements. As

mentioned in this chapter, a great deal of importance is attributed to *context* in argumentative discourse analysis. Therefore, how the permanent and non-permanent members of the UNSC make sense of the relationship between climate change and security outside of the Council will be examined based on their approaches at the COP conferences and their domestic politics in general. Thus, the opportunity will exist to understand whether the nature of the topic of security at the UNSC, which is dominated by the realist security agenda, has changed or not.

The UNSC's official resolutions, presidential statements, and institutional developments are also been examined in order to understand whether the institutionalization of the discourse on climate change and security is succeeding or not. In this context, the reflection of climate change as a security threat, especially in Africa and the most recent Cyprus resolutions, may be signs of discourse institutionalization. To understand this, the relevant resolutions that will be made are examined in-depth as well as analyses made regarding the conditions under which the UNSC accepted climate change as a security problem and reflected it into its policies.

Theoretical Framework

Theoretically, a multi-level security framework formed in the second chapter is employed in both discourse structuring and discourse institutionalizing processes to strengthen Hajer's analysis and make climate change-security discourses more meaningful. By asking *What is the role of climate change on human security, national security and international security? Is there any connection between them?* the first sub-question of the thesis, the multi-level security analysis framework is created by establishing causal links between referent objects of security based on the analytical literature review. In this regard, it offers a comprehensive security approach by establishing causal links between referent objects of security through climate security, human security, national security and international security. This thesis employs this framework for an in-depth examination of to what extent the UNSC has structured and practically institutionalized security discourses on climate change. It also aims to strengthen Hajer's analysis weak points and make climate change-security discourses more meaningful by engaging in discourse structuring and institutionalizing processes.

It should be noted beforehand that the theoretical approach of this thesis will be examined in more detail in the second chapter. So, a brief explanation is aimed to be given in this section on how this framework should be read in the thesis.

1. A DETAILED LITERATURE REVIEW ON CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM NATURAL SCIENCES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

1.1 Introduction

The primary purpose of this chapter is to conduct a comprehensive literature review on climate change, from scientific evidence to social sciences and international politics. In social sciences studies, climate change is generally considered as given information. In other words, it has been observed that the scientific dimensions of climate change are generally neglected in prominent studies and only focus on the social, political, economic, or cultural repercussions of their effects (Barnett 2003; Brown et al. 2007; McDonald 2013; Mortreux and Barnett 2009). This thesis also focuses on the UNSC's climate change discourses from a multi-level security framework perspective. Unlike these studies, this chapter examines all aspects of climate change - at the expense of being lengthy. Thus, a more in-depth examination of climate change and security discourses is envisaged.

According to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), *evidence, causes, effects,* and *solutions* constitute the whole structure of climate change studies. Correspondingly, the first section introduces the climate itself. By doing this, the concepts and the differences between the climate and the weather are first illustrated. In the second section, the definitions and scientific processes of climate change are examined by also taking advantage of the primary literature on the scientific developments of climate dating back to the 1930s. The third section presents the natural process of climate change in history. It briefly analyses the *Little Ice Age* in the context of human development, as it is one of the most important natural-induced climate change periods in the Medieval Age after the recorded history. This section is mainly expected to have an enlightening feature in terms of understanding the effects of today's human-induced climate change, which is also the subject of this thesis, on societies and states. The fourth section mainly focuses on the *evidence* and *causes* of human-induced climate change and illustrates the relations between social science and climate change within the debate of the *Anthropocene Era*. On the other hand, the aim also is to understand how climate change -as a scientifically-

has become the subject of social science because the evidence shows that climate change has not just destroyed the natural structure of the earth, but also it existentially affects humanity through extreme weather events like droughts, sea-level rise and deterioration of the ecosystem. The fifth section illustrates the two main international structures on climate change: the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).[3] This section outlines these institutions' aims, solution-seeking, and structures regarding the neo-liberal politics becoming popular after the 1990s. This section mainly aims to provide the background for international negotiations, which are handled in the following chapters in the context of climate change and security approaches.

1.2 A Scientific Framework on Climate and Climate Change

Before going into the climate change discussions, it would be helpful to examine what climate is and what differences are between the features of climate and weather that which are very confusing concepts. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007b, 1) describes that "a common confusion between weather and climate arises when scientists are asked how they can predict climate 50 years from now when they cannot predict the weather a few weeks from now." These confusions sometimes also may put politicians in challenging positions. For instance, in an interview in 2015, while US President Donald J. Trump was trying to be making a statement on climate change; he confused climate with weather and stated as ''…in the 1920s, people talked about global cooling... They thought the Earth was cooling. Now, it is global warming. And, we have had times where the weather was not working out, so they changed it to extreme weather, and they have all different names, you know, so that it fits the bill'' (Hewitt, 2015).

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[3] A detailed explanation of IPCC will be made in the following stages, but it would be appropriate to give a brief explanation. IPCC was founded by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1988, and today, 195 states are members of the IPCC. Although it does not conduct its research, thousands of scholars from natural science to social science worldwide contribute to the IPCC's reports, assessments, and analysis of climate change. IPCC comprises three Working Groups; Working Group I focuses on The Physical Science Basis of Climate Change, The Working Group II deals with Climate Change Impacts, Adaptions and Vulnerability and the Working Group III studies on Mitigation of Climate Change. Therefore, IPCC, which contains and produces a wide range of climate change literature, plays an essential role in the literature chapter of this thesis.

"Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years" (IPCC 2013, 1450; WMO 2019). As this system will interact and change in itself, it can also change with external effects through volcano eruptions, human-caused effects, solar variations, etc. (IPCC 2013, 1451). WMO (2019) reported that a minimum 30-year average, including temperature, precipitation regimes, and winds, should be taken to describe a region's climate.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration[4] (NOAA 2018) points out that most of the weather conditions temporarily come into existence in the troposphere which is the closest atmosphere layer to the earth and "tells us what to wear each day." It gives the hourly, daily, weekly and monthly data for specific areas for specific times, while climate refers to the long-term average of temperatures -average up to 30 years- of the certain regions with their seas, territories, all species, including humans (Gutro 2017; WMO 2019).

In short, as NOAA (2018) points out "climate is what you expect, the weather is what you get." It is essential to make realize that the instant changes in the weather conditions are considered normal but, the changes in the climate expectations obtained by taking the average of decades pose a problem and are called climate change.

1.2.1 The role of the greenhouse gases

This section provides information about the conditions that cause the warming and cooling of the earth. Especially greenhouse gases that play a significant role in human-induced climate change are deeply emphasized. Because in this thesis, in which the security effects of human-induced climate change are analyzed, examining the content and properties of greenhouse gases are enable us to make the subject more understandable.

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[4] NOAA is a scientific office of the United States Department of Commerce

The conditions that create the climate are the distance between the earth and the sun, the distribution of land and seas on earth, and the atmosphere, which determines how the earth's light shines from the sun and then how it releases into space (Kurnaz 2018; Ma 1998; Sharp 2017). NASA reports that if the atmosphere did not surround the world, its average temperature would be around -18°C, but today the world's temperature is measured as roughly 16°C. That is to say, when it comes to the climatic conditions of the world, it is specifically necessary to analyze the structure of the atmosphere and look at how the atmosphere affects the world's temperature. IPCC (2001, 87) describes the components of the atmosphere as follows:

> The Earth's dry atmosphere is composed mainly of nitrogen (N_2, 78.1% volume mixing ratio), oxygen (O_2, 20.9% volume mixing ratio, and argon (Ar, 0.93% volume mixing ratio) … However, there are a number of trace gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO_2), methane (CH_4), nitrous oxide (N_2O), and ozone (O_3), which do absorb and emit infrared radiation. These so-called greenhouse gases, with a total volume mixing ratio in the dry air of less than 0.1% by volume, play an essential role in the Earth's energy budget.

The first traces of the atmospheric *greenhouse effect* were found in the French mathematician Jean Baptiste Joseph Fourier (1768-1830) studies. Although he did not directly use the term *greenhouse effect*, Fourier discovered the character of the atmosphere that keeps the heat between the earth and the sun. However, he did not find out why heat is held in the atmosphere (Anderson and Hawkins et al. 2016; Fleming 1999, 72). Nils Gustaf Ekholm is one of the first scholars to use the greenhouse concept as a metaphor. "Firstly, the atmosphere may act like the glass of a green-house, letting through the light rays of the sun relatively easily, and absorbing a great part of the dark rays emitted from the ground, and it thereby may raise the mean temperature of the earth's surface" (Ekholm 1901, 19). However, the first scholar who scientifically used the concept of the *greenhouse effect* by referring to his colleague Prof. Lowell was the English Scientist J.H. Poynting in 1909 (Weyler 2019). Poynting (1909, 749) points out:

> Prof. Lowell's paper in the July number of the Philosophical Magazine marks an important advance in the evaluation of planetary temperatures, inasmuch as he takes into account the effect of planetary atmospheres in a much more detailed way than any previous writer. But he pays hardly any attention to the "blanketing effect," or, as I prefer to call it, the "greenhouse effect" of the atmosphere.

Thus far, many studies have confirmed the effectiveness of the greenhouse effects on climate change (e.g., Rodhe 1990; Mercer 1978; Mitchell 1989; Schneider 1989). IPCC (2007a; 2001) explains that greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, chlorofluorocarbon, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, and ozone, which comprise % 0.1 of all gases in the atmosphere) are successful gases in the sense of keeping the solar energy and warming the world. Nitrogen (covers %78 of the atmosphere) and oxygen (covers %21 of the atmosphere) do not hold the solar energy (equal to the one-third of the total solar energy reaching the Earth), *"the remaining two-thirds is absorbed by the surface and, to a lesser extent, by the atmosphere. To balance the absorbed incoming energy, the Earth must, on average, radiate the same amount of energy back to space"* (IPCC 2007a). As seen in Figure 1.1, this solar radiation, absorbed in the atmosphere, then spreads to the Earth and warms the world. So, this process is called the greenhouse effect, as it seems that without the greenhouse effect living in the world would be impossible.

Figure 1.1: Greenhouse effect (IPCC 2007a.)

In this regard, by comparing Venus and Mars, we can understand how vital greenhouse gases are for a habitable-temperature planet. Venus is closer to the sun than the Earth, and Cabbage and McCarthy (2016) state that carbon dioxide, the most determining gas of the greenhouse effect, is 90 times more in Venus than on Earth. As a result, its average temperature is approximately 471 °C. On the other side, the European Space Agency (ESA) (2003) highlights that the red planet Mars, farther from the sun than the Earth, has

a very low carbon dioxide rate and no atmosphere. Therefore, its average temperature is -60°C.

Do greenhouse gases all have the same effect? This question is significant in terms of recognizing the greenhouse gases that cause human-induced climate change and understanding how much we affect these gases as a result of our activities. The last report of WMO and Global Atmospheric Watch (GAW) (2019) points out that the characteristics and the thermal transmittances of each GHG in the atmosphere are different from each other. Carbon dioxide is one of the most important Greenhouse Gases (GHG) in the atmosphere. Before the Industrial Revolution, the CO2 was measured as 278 ppm[5] in the atmosphere, but NOAA's Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii in June 2020 measured the rates of CO2 as 416.18 ppm. Although CO2 has naturally occurred in the atmosphere, human-induced effects are very effective in terms of raising its rates. The relationship between CO2 and the industrial revolution will be deeply analyzed in the following stages.

Methane (CH4) is the second prominent GHG in the atmosphere. CO2 is the most crucial gas among greenhouse gases due to being the highest volume gas, but methane is approximately 20 times stronger than the same amount of CO2 (Anisimov 2007). In the atmosphere, two-fifth of the methane has been emitted by natural sources such as wetlands, including bogs and termites. For instance, in Western Siberia, there are large bog regions under the glaciers. If these glaciers thaw, a considerable amount of methane will be released into the atmosphere, severely affecting the world climate system (Anisimov 2007). Also, the three-fifth of methane arises from human-induced sources. For instance, fossil fuels, rice agriculture, biomass burning, and cattle farming (bacteria in the digestive systems of ruminant animals) are the most methane-forming actions.

Nitrous Oxide (N_2O) is the third most prominent GHG in the atmosphere. Natural sources have emitted three-fifths of Nitro Oxide, whereas two-fifths are emitted by anthropogenic

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[5] Since GHG represents 0.1% of the total gases in the atmosphere, the CO2 concentration is defined as parts-per-million (abbreviated ppm).

sources, which come from bacteria and fungi in soil and water and nitrogen fertilizers (WMO and GAW 2019; Kurnaz 2018).

Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC) completely consist of human-induced (anthropogenic) effects. CFCs and HCFCs are used in refrigerators, air-conditioning, aerosol propellants and solvent cleaning to improve efficiency. Nevertheless, the ratio of these gases in the atmosphere is not as much as methane and carbon (McCulloch 1994).

Thus far, the conditions that create the climate have been explained and the importance of the atmosphere for the warming of the world has been mentioned. The fact remains that the world's global average temperature has not always been constant and has experienced many climate changes for natural or anthropogenic reasons. Therefore, in the next section, by examining climate change due to natural causes, the groundwork is prepared for the human-induced climate change literature, which is the main subject of this thesis.

1.3 Before the Industrial Revolution: The Natural Process of The Climate Change-Little Ice Age Between 1315-1850

Climate has naturally changed by natural effects such as CO_2 changes in the atmosphere, changes in ocean currents, changes in solar radiation and sunspots on the sun, volcanic eruptions and changes in the world's orbit, etc., for million years. For these reasons, the planet has undergone glacial ages many[6] (Carlowicz 2004; Eddy 1977; Hewitt 2000; Kirchner et al. 1999). As seen in Figure 1.2, the world has experienced many ice ages and epochs of glacial expansion until now.

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[6] The evidence of the natural-induced climate change in the past is found as research on tree rings, ocean sediments, layers of sedimentary rocks, coral reefs, and layers of ice in glaciers (NASA).

Figure 1.2: The Geologic Time Scale (Gradstein et.al. 2012 cited in British Geology Survey)

The last glacial age begun 120.000 years ago and ended approximately 11.700 years ago. Since then, the interglacial period (warmer period), which is called as Holocene, has started and "witnessed all of humanity's recorded history and the rise and fall of all its civilizations" (Waggoner 1996, 1).

Climate historians establish close links between climate change and social developments (DeMenocal 2001; Parker 2014; Price 2017; Gerste 2017). As mentioned above, the Holocene period is considered the beginning of human history. At the beginning of this period, communities started to transition to settled life (about 12,500 to 9500 B.C.). After the development of agriculture, surplus value was obtained in agricultural production, and society started to develop and modernize itself in the remaining times (Standage 2016). In fact, humanity has entered a new era with the invention of writing by the Sumerians between 3500-3000 BC (Price 2017; Schmandt -Besserat 1998).

DeMenocal (2001), Parker (2014), Price (2017), and Gerste (2017) claim that any fluctuation in global temperature is one of the reasons or triggering factors for famines,

wars, and social and political transformations, as is witnessed from the little ice age which is one of the notable examples of climate change that is arising out of between 1315-1850. In this section, due to being the nearest ice age witnessed by written history, this period is taken as an example to see the effects of climate change based on natural reasons in the context of social, political, and economic developments. Primarily, this chapter is expected to be an inspirational feature in terms of understanding the effects of today's human-induced climate change process, which is also the subject of this thesis, on societies and states. Otherwise, it should not be forgotten that this case does not argue that every climate change impacts societies in the same way. As DeMenocal (2001) reminds us that these historical transformations associated with climate change could not be adapted to the current contemporary globalized world because we are talking about human-induced climate change rather than natural climate change today. Therefore, each period's social, economic, political, geopolitical, and technological dynamics are entirely different from the last centuries.

While examining the social, political, and economic transformations of this period, the reasons for natural-induced climate change are briefly discussed as well because only focusing on natural-induced climate change's results without mentioning its causes is insufficient to understand this transformation. Although the last ice age had completed nearly 11.700 years ago, the world has also witnessed a mini-ice age in the Holocene Era. The year 1315 has scientifically been accepted as the beginning of the little ice age by decreasing the number of sunspots and volcanic eruptions and decreasing the atmospheric CO_2 (Briffa et al. 1998; Eddy 1977; Gerste 2017). Maunder discovered that during the little ice age, there was the number of sunspots had decreased, and even almost no sunspots[7] were seen throughout the coldest periods between 1675-1715 (Eddy 1977; Luterbacher 2001). As seen in figure 1.3 below, due to the decreasing sunspots on the Sun's surface, the world naturally got colder between the 1650s – the 1700s period, which is also called as Grand Solar Minimum.

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[7] The strong magnetic fields arising from the sun cause sunspots on its surface and these spots become cooler than the other areas of the Sun (Maunder cited in Eddy 1977). Typically, the surface temperature of the Sun is 5500 C, while it is 3600 C at the sunspots. This situation disrupts the regular order on the surface of the Sun and causes serious amounts of hot gas to be sprayed into the space. As a result of this interaction, the earth's atmosphere gradually heats (NASA, 2019).

Figure 1. 1: Historical Total Solar Irradiance Reconstruction, Time Series (The University of Colorado's LAPS Interactive Solar Irradiance Datacenter 2020)

Volcanic eruptions are also one of the factors that change the climate, so the large-scale eruptions such as Vanuatu in the Pacific in 1453, Bougainville in the Pacific in 1580, Huaynaputina in Peru in 1600, Parker in the Philippines in 1641, Long Island in New Guinea in 1640 and Tambora, in Indonesia in 1815 played essential roles in intensifying the little ice age (Briffa et al. 1998). The particles emerging with the volcanic eruptions reach the top layers of the atmosphere and prevent the sun's rays from reaching the earth. After the volcanic eruptions of Vanuatu in 1453 and Tambora in 1815, the summer seasons did not occur, and even the sun was not seen for days, which endangered food security and caused severe food shortages (Gerste 2017).

CO2 changes in the atmosphere are also one of the reasons for the natural climate change in the little ice age. Sudden weather changes started due to the fluctuations in the atmosphere towards the beginning of the 14th century. Especially between 1314 and 1322, also called the *Great Famine*, Europe experienced heavy rainfalls, hails, and cold weather conditions that damaged agricultural production. Because people could not get almost any crops from the fields, they could not feed themselves and their animals and could not provide any manure. Consequently, the population declined by 10% - 15%, only in Europe (Headrick 2012, 45; Gerste 2017). In 1347, after the *Great Famine,* the plague pandemic called the *black death* caused great devastation and it is estimated that millions of people died around the world (Gerste 2017; Headrick 2012). Although it is a

controversial approach by some scholars (Hoof et al. 2006), others claim that with the decrease of the population after the black death, nature had started to renew itself and the forest areas had gradually expanded instead of settlements. Since forests keep CO2, the carbon dioxide ratio in the atmosphere has decreased and it has been effective in cooling the world, as presented in the example of Mars above (Gottfried 2010, 135; Gerste 2017; Headrick 2012; 45).

So far, natural climate change and its impacts on human development have been examined specifically for the little ice age. At this point, Parker (2014, 1) urges that "climate alone did not cause all catastrophes…, but it exacerbated many of them." In other words, it should be considered that climate change is not the only reason for any case, but it should be taken as a trigger. According to the current records and evidence, the little ice age has been one of the periods that well described the natural-induced climate change and its effects on human development. So, this period has been chosen as an example for this section to explain the nexus between climate change and humanitarian development. Following this, the next section will deeply examine human-induced climate change and its impacts on the climate system.

1.4 After the Industrial Revolution: Human-Induced Impacts on Climate Change

As explained above, the climate has naturally changed throughout history, but the world has been faced with human-induced climate change for the first time. NASA and IPCC highlight that rising global temperature, warming oceans, shrinking ice sheets, glacial retreat, decreased snow cover, sea-level rise, declining Arctic Sea ice, extreme weather events, and ocean acidification are evidence of human-induced climate change. Even though this period has been called *Anthropocene Epoch* by many scholars, this is not yet officially accepted by the International Union of Geological Sciences (IUGS)[8] (Crutzen 2006, 13; Lewis and Mark 2015, 171; Steffen 2011, 842; Waggoner 1996).

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[8] International Commission on Stratigraphy's (ICS) *primary objective is* "to define precisely global units (systems, series and stages) of the International Chronostratigraphic Chart that, in turn, are the basis for the units (periods, epochs and age) of the International Geological Time Scale; thus setting global standards for the fundamental scale for expressing the history of the Earth" (https://stratigraphy.org/, 2022, 1).

Human-induced climate change has attracted the attention of many scholars since about the 18th century. Lewis and Maslin (2015) point out that Buffon was one of the first scientists to notice the human effects on the environment in 1778, even though he did not use the term *Anthropocene.* In 1854, the Welsh scholar Thomas Jenkyn used a notion to define the era affected by humans: *Anthropozoic.* Then, Italian geologist Antonio Stoppani, American geologist James Dwight Dana, 20th-century Russian Geologist Aleksei Pavlov and Ukrainian geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky developed the human-induced climate change and its impacts on the world (Lewis and Mark 2015, 519-520). The term *Anthropocene* was mainly popularized after the 2000s by Crutzen, a Nobel Prize-winner and Atmospheric Chemist in 1995. In general, it is indicated that the Anthropocene era will end the Holocene Era by altering the land surface and changing the composition of the atmosphere by producing a high rate of CO_2 (fossil fuels) (Steffen et al. 2011; Zalasiewicz et al. 2011). Although significant parts of the emissions are caused by fossil energy consumption, urbanization, misguided agriculture methods, and livestock policies at various scales also affect anthropocentric climate change (Karl and Trenbert 2003, 1719). Many studies have assessed the increase of atmospheric CO_2 since the Industrial Revolution (NASA; Lal 2004, 1; Luthi et al. 2008; Karl and Trenberth 2003; IPCC; UNCCC), but there are also some claims that Anthropocentric effects began much earlier than the Industrial Revolution, as seen in Table 1.1 (Steffen 2011, 842, Lewis and Maslin 2015).

Event	Date	Geographical Extent
Megafauna extinction	50,000–10,000 yr before present (BP)	Near-global
Origin of farming	Approximately 11,000 yr BP	Southwest Asia, becoming global
Extensive farming	Approximately 8,000 yr BP to present	Eurasian event, global impact
Rice production	6,500 yr BP to present	Southeast Asian event, global impact
Anthropogenic soils	Approximately 3,000–500 yr BP	Local event, local impact, but widespread
New–Old World collision	1492–1800	Eurasian–Americas event, global impact
Industrial Revolution	1760 to present	Northwest Europe event, local impact, becoming global
Nuclear weapon detonation	1945 to present	Local events, global impact
Persistent industrial chemicals	From approximately 1950 to present	Local events, global impact

Table 1.1: Potential start dates for a formal Anthropocene Epoch (Lewis and Maslin 2015)

1.4.1 Human-induced emissions

Broadly, the Industrial Revolution has been accepted as a turning point of human-induced climate change in the literature due to causes the high amount of carbon emissions and various pollutants (Kumar et al. 2020, 2). Crutzen (2002) asserts that after the invention of the steam machine by James Watt in 1776, the limits of industrial production have increased gradually; therefore, the demand for fossil fuels has increased sharply. "In the burgeoning literature on the Anthropocene, the steam-engine is often referred to as the one artefact that unlocked the potentials of fossil energy and thereby catapulted the human species to full-spectrum dominance" (Malm and Hornborg 2014, 63). After the industrial revolution, population, energy consumption, and industrial production increased rapidly compared to previous periods. For instance, the world's population increased from 1 billion to 6 billion from 1800 to 2000. Accordingly, energy consumption has increased 40 times, and economic production has increased 50 times more than before the industrial revolution (McNeill 2000 cited from Steffen et al. 2011). Apart from these, anthropogenic effects and total land use in the world have increased from 10% to 25%, causing many species to become extinct (Dirzo et al. 2014). Dirzo et al. call this trouble an *Anthropocene Defaunation*, due to the 25% of animal species have become extinct since 1500.

Studies show that greenhouse gas production caused by human influence is gradually increasing after the industrial revolution. This means that Greenhouse gases accumulating in the atmosphere have increased the greenhouse effect since 1850. As is seen the Figure 1.4, the rise of Carbon Dioxide (CO2), CH4 (Methane) and N2O (Nitrous Oxide) are the most important greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

Figure 1.2: Globally averaged greenhouse gas concentration (IPCC 2014, 3)

As mentioned above, the most likely cause of rising the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is energy consumption. The use of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and natural gas causes the rising carbon dioxide ratio in the atmosphere. While CO2 concentration was measured as approximately 285 ppm during the 1850s, it was measured as 416 ppm by NOAA Mauna Loa in July 2020. As shown in Figure 1.5, the CO2 level sharply increased after the industrial revolution.

Figure 1.3: Carbon dioxide level for 800.000 years (Source: NASA)

Also, Figure 1.6 shows that there has been a sharp increase in energy consumption around the world in the 50s, which is also called the *Great Acceleration* (Steffean et al. 2015). However, why was 1950 a turning point in terms of energy consumption? The answer to

this question lies in the political and economic situation of the world until that date. World War I (1914-1919), World War II (1939-1945), and the Great Depression in 1929 are the most important political and economic events that occurred before 1950 and affected industrial production and energy consumption.

Figure 1.4: Global primary energy consumption between 1800-2015 (Berners-Lee 2019)

In addition, during the Cold War, world politics turned into a bipolar system between the USA and the USSR. This competition required those countries (including others) to concentrate on production and strengthen and defend themselves as much as possible. Competition between the USA and the USSR, nuclear missile crises, the first satellite sent to space by the USSR, technological developments, and so on might be thought that all of these developments have intensively generated energy needs.

If we look from the viewpoint of some counties' energy consumption in Figure 1.7, it is understood that the political and economic developments in specific years such as 1945, 1979, 1990, and 2008 are reflected in energy consumption globally. For instance, there was a sudden drop in energy consumption around the world till the end of the war in 1945. However, in the following years, it is understood that the world has gained considerable

momentum. Another point is that the trend, which started to decline in the 1974 and 1979 oil crises, started to rise worldwide again after the crisis. In 1990, at the end of the Cold War, neoliberal policies shaped the international system, and annual CO2 emissions continued to increase with these policies until 2009. Although production of the global carbon emission reached a low point due to the global financial crisis in 2008, it started to rise to a higher point in the following years and peaked every year compared to the previous years until March 2020. Mooney et al. (2020) argue that the global carbon emission unexpectedly decreased by %17 between January 2019 and May 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, while this chapter was written in July 2020, the International Energy Agency (IEA) announced that carbon emissions have started to rise again.

Figure 1.5: Annual total CO2 emissions, by world region Source: Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC): Global Carbon Project: cited from "Our World in Data"

On the other hand, these intensive human effects also bring a new carbon footprint approach. After climate change has become popular in the context of social, political, and economic agendas, humanity has turned its attention to calculating the total amount of CO2. This calculated CO2 is called a carbon footprint due to the production and

consumption at the individual, national and global levels (Wiedmann and Minx 2008). The concept arises from the direct and indirect effects of human-induced CO2 emissions. Direct effects are formed by the combustion of fossil fuels, while indirect effects consist of the whole process of production. For example, driving a car, travelling by plane, and domestic activities (using electricity without renewable energy, etc.) are known as direct effects. The energy consumption until production or material is ready for use is called indirect effects. Such as raw materials, which need to be processed, then be transferred to the process to reach the consumers or textiles that need washing and drying before wearing; food needs cooking, heating, or chilling before eating (WRI and WBCSD 2013, 114). In short, carbon fingerprinting aims to stimulate the general awareness of reducing total greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the actions of a person, event, product, government, or institution by measuring how much carbon is produced (kg or ton). Carbon footprint is a controversial subject due to both taking into account only carbon dioxide in the greenhouse gases and the difficulty of measuring CO2 (Wiedmann and Minx 2008). However, this approach provides a general quantitative perspective. Starting from the individual level, it can be understood how much national and global actions contribute to climate change.

1.4.2 Effects of the human-induced climate change

This section lays the groundwork for establishing the relationship between climate change-related disasters and security approaches, examined in the following sections. Therefore, the current situation of the effects of climate change, such as global warming, rising sea levels, and extreme weather, which have effects on human, national and international security, will be examined.

Global Warming

With the increase in the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, climate change shows itself as global warming. The average temperature of the world is about 15°C, but the special report of IPCC in 2018 presents the level of global temperature that has increased

to 1.0ºC (*likely*[9] between 0.65°C - 1.06°C) since the pre-industrial levels. It means that the consequences of current 1.0ºC global warming already exist as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, melting of the Arctic, deforestation, etc. (IPCC 2019, 5). Under normal conditions of the Holocene epoch, the world's average temperature is about 15°C, but the special report of IPCC in 2018 presents the level of global temperature that has increased to 1.0ºC (likely between 0.65°C - 1.06°C) since the pre-industrial levels. It means that the consequences of the current 1.0ºC global warming have already come to exist as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, melting of the arctic sea, deforestation, etc. (IPCC 2019, 75). However, in the latest assessment report of the IPCC published in 2021, it has been announced that the world's average temperature is 1.09ºC and stated that "human influence has warmed the climate at a rate that is unprecedented in at least the last 2000 years" (IPCC 2021, 5-7). According to the special report of IPCC in 2018, 1.5ºC warming is a critical limit for sustainable development and poverty prevention. Limiting global warming up to 1.5ºC means avoiding many permanent effects on ecological systems and habitats. If greenhouse gases continue to increase in this manner, global warming inevitably will exceed 1.5ºC in a short period. To prevent this, it is necessary to reduce global emissions likely by 45% between 2030-2052 compared to 2010 and necessary to reach net-zero emission by 2050. According to the IPCC's assessment report in 2021 (IPCC 2021, 17), the earth's average temperature is expected to exceed 2°C in the 21st century unless there are significant reductions in CO2 and other greenhouse gas production. WMO has announced that the probability of exceeding the 1.5 ºC threshold will likely be exceeded by 20% in the next five years (WMO 2020). According to new predictions of WMO, it is likely estimated that all regions will be warmer than in the recent past. Also, Gavin Schmidt -Director of Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS)- reports that the last decade is the warmest measured today and highlights that since 1960 every decade has been warmer than before (NASA 2020). For instance, on June 20, 2020, WMO announced that the new record temperature had been measured at 38°C in its history in the Russian town of Verkhoyansk, one of the coldest places in the Arctic Cycle. As seen in Figure 1.8 below, global temperature has been increasing significantly for each month of the year since 1880.

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[9] According to the Uncertainty Guidance Note of IPCC, the term ''likely'' refers to 66-100% probability. For more information: https://wg1.ipcc.ch/docs/AR5_Uncertainty_Guidance_Note.pdf

Figure 1.6: Monthly divergence from the mean annual temperature on Earth (calculated for 1980-2015) (Source: NASA, 2020)

According to IPCC (2014), global land and ocean surface temperature has gradually increased, especially since the 1970s (as seen in Figure 1.9). In 2020, the Northern Hemisphere's surface temperature was predicted to be 0.8°C warmer than in the recent past, and many parts of Australia, Southern Africa, and South America are likely to be dryer than in the recent past (WMO 2020).

Figure 1.7: Globally averaged combined land and surface temperature (IPCC, 2014: 3)

Sea-Level Rising

Another problem due to anthropocentric climate change is the sea level rising. Sea level rise arising from global warming and affected by two factors: "added water from melting ice sheets and glaciers and, expansion of seawater as it warms" (NASA 2020, 1). IPCC (2019, 6) Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate highlights that "over the last decades, global warming has led to widespread shrinking of the cryosphere, with mass loss from ice sheets and glaciers (very high confidence), reductions in snow cover (high confidence) and Arctic Sea ice extent and thickness (very high confidence), and increased permafrost temperature (very high confidence)."[10]

Since the satellite data was recorded in 1880, the sea level rise has increased about 21-24 cm, and a third of this has occurred in the past 20-30 years (Lindsey 2020). Lindsey (2020,1) states that:

> The global mean water level in the ocean rose by 0.14 inches (3.6 millimeters) per year from 2006–2015, which was 2.5 times the average rate of 0.06 inches (1.4 millimeters) per year throughout most of the twentieth century. By the end of the century, global mean sea level is likely to rise at least one foot (0.3 meters) above 2000 levels, even if greenhouse gas emissions follow a relatively low pathway in coming decades.

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[10] IPCC assessment process consists of three stages: "1. Evaluate evidence and agreement 2. Synthesize findings and assess confidence (qualitative judgment) 3. Quantify uncertainty with a likelihood assessment when necessary and where possible (requires sufficient confidence; uncertainty is not always quantifiable (Zwiers, 2013). Confidence refers to the qualitative expectations like low, medium, high and, very high confidence, while likelihood approach refers to the quantitative analyses like Virtually certain ≥ 99% Very likely ≥ 90% Likely ≥ 66% Unlikely ≤ 33% Very unlikely ≤ 10% Exceptionally unlikely ≤ 1%"

Figure 1.8: Globally averaged sea-level change (IPCC 2014, 3)

Extreme Weather Events

Climate change also shows itself with extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, storms, hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, or heavy rainfalls. IPCC (2012, 111) highlights that "a changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of weather and climate extremes, and can result in unprecedented extremes." The Fifth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) highlights that climate change-related extreme weather events are already observed in many regions. According to the Synthesis Report of IPCC (2013), it is *high confidence* that hotter and colder days are now experienced in North America and Central America, Europe and Asia (including south-east Asia and Oceania); Europe has witnessed more heat waves (high confidence); North America and Central America (high confidence) and Asia (medium confidence but increases in more regions than decreases) have struggled with extreme precipitation. As shown in Table 1.2, significant differences were observed in extreme weather conditions between 1949-2019 in the world.

All Natural Disasters	Number of Reported Disasters			
	1949	2019	Absolute Change	Relative Change
All Natural Disasters	20.00	361.00	+341.00	+1,705%
Drought	No Data	15.00	-	-
Extreme Temperature	No Data	20.00	-	-
Extreme Weather	8.00	85.00	+77.00	+963%
Flood	2.00	170.00	+168.00	+8,400%
Volcanic Activity	2.00	4.00	+2.00	+100%
Landslide	1.00	22.00	+21.00	+2.100%
Earthquake	6.00	32.00	+26.00	+433%
Wildfire	1.00	13.00	+12.00	+1,200%

Table 1.2: Natural Disasters between 1949-2019 (Source: Our World in Data cited from Em-Dat Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED))

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This section has discussed the reasons for climate change, from natural causable climate change to human-induced climate change. While doing this, the sections have not just focused on the evidence and causes of climate change, and the chapter also tries to understand climate change with its scientific (physical) effects so far. Nevertheless, climate change is an extensive study area and needs to be studied by social sciences as an interdisciplinary due to threatening every creature, from microorganisms to the whole ecosystem. Hence, precautions to be taken at all levels, starting from the individual level, are essential, but it is much more critical that these precautions are taken into account and acted jointly at the international level. Because if climate change is a problem, space, time and boundaries lose their importance and the threats that emerge at the end of the day are familiar to everyone. Therefore, the following section analyses how climate change in terms of its effects, precautions, expectations and possible risks are carried out through international institutions.

1.5 Climate Change Policies on a Global Level

As stated above, threats arising from climate change are global, so efforts to prevent or adapt to these threats also require global cooperation. In the following sections, international institutions and organizations established against climate change are examined in detail to prepare the ground for discussing the effectiveness of international negotiations within the framework of climate change and security approaches.

Farbotko and Lazrus (2012) maintain that climate change is both *a discursive* and *material phenomenon*; hence it is essential that analyses of the regions affected by climate change should also be considered as sociological, psychological, political and economic structures; otherwise, the results that only obtained with scientific data may cause imperfect knowledge. Therefore, climate change is an interdisciplinary subject, and it could not be considered apart from social science. In this context, the concept of climate-induced migration, climate-induced economic crisis, climate-induced health crisis, climate-induced conflicts, climate-induced food security, climate-induced water scarcity, climate-induced justice and vulnerability has emerged as a new phenomenon in social science since the Cold War (Brown et al. 1976).

The recognition of environmental degradation by international society dates back to the 1960s.[11] In addition to the nuclear missile crises between the US and the USSR, the invention of the hydrogen bomb[12] and several environmental disasters[13] that occurred after the 1960s and have caused people's existential anxiety to increase (Roussopoulos 2017). Green politics, various environmentalist movements and related conferences

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[11] Climate change in social science is also examined under the name of "environmental crisis" or "ecological crisis," even though these approaches are more comprehensive than it.

[12] Seven years after the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the US -then the USSR- invented the hydrogen bomb, which is called "Mutually Assured Destructions" by security studies. This bomb is thousands of times more potent than the atomic bomb thrown into Hiroshima, and its power is expressed in megatons while the atom bomb's power is expressed as kilotons (Davis 2015, 419).

[13] In 1966, Aberfan Mining Disaster: Aberfan is a village in Wales/UK. 144 people (including 116 schoolchildren) were killed due to the collapse of the coal waste stack (BBC 2016).

In 1967 Torrey Canyon Disaster: It is known as the biggest oil spill in the UK, and it is estimated that 875.000 barrels of crude oil spread over the coast of South-West the UK. Thousands of tons of detergent were used to get rid of spilt oil, but this damaged biodiversity. 2 years after the disaster, the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution was established (Roussopoulos 2017, 34, Vaughan 2017).

In 1969, Union Oil: was known for a Santa Barbara oil spill disaster that occurred on the coasts of California and caused significant damage to marine life. (NOAA 2014).

Japan, between 1953-1961, there were hundreds of people died due to mercury pollution in Minamata-Japan (Roussopoulos 2017, 34)

1978 Spain Alcanar: The disaster is known as the Los Alfaques occurred as a result of a gas truck exploding and causing more than 200 deaths (Roussopoulos 2017, 35)

emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. These periods signalled that climate change is not only a scientific problem but also a problem threatening humanity.[14]

Although these trends emerged as comprehensive environmental problems, they have also led to climate-specific movements and corporations that state and institutions to act individually or collectively on climate change (Giddens 2013). The first World Climate Conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1979.[15] Approximately 350 climate change and related disciplines experts from 53 countries and 24 international organizations attended the conference to discuss the possibility of cooperation on climate change, its related risks, and humankind (Zillman 2009). The conference (Zillman, 2009; UNFCC 2000) concludes and urges the world below:

(a) To take full advantage of man's(sic) present knowledge of climate;
(b) To take steps to improve significantly that knowledge;
(c) To foresee and prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity.

Another comprehensive conference on climate change was organized with 29 countries in Villach, Austria, to discuss and offer measures to increase human-made carbon dioxide in 1985. According to the conference report (WMO 1986, 3):

> Major uncertainties remain in predictions of changes in global and regional precipitation and temperature patterns. Ecosystem responses are also imperfectly known. Nevertheless, the understanding of the greenhouse question is sufficiently developed that scientists and policy-makers should begin an active collaboration to explore the effectiveness of alternative policies and adjustments. Efforts should be made to design methods necessary for such collaboration.

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[14] In a modern sense, the first Green Movement's roots and the first Green Party were established in Germany during the 70s, and they organized the first world meeting before the Rio Conference in 1992 (Giddens 2013). In 1945, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 1945 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); in 1960, World Wildlife Fund (WWF); were established for environmental and social reasons. On the other hand, one of the first environmental conferences, the Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources, was held in New York by United Nations in 1949. In 1968, the Intergovernmental Biosphere Conference was organized by UNESCO in September 1968. In 1972, United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm. In addition to being a comprehensive conference on development, it was also decided to establish United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP).

[15] The conference was organized with the contributions of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO).

Villach Conference was held in cooperation with WMO, UNEP, and International Council for Science Union (ICSU).[16] At the end of the conference, participants proposed that states take responsibility for climate change and establish international cooperation to prevent, control and adapt to climate change. After the conference, the head of UNEP, Moustafa Tolba, got in contact with the US Secretary of State George Schultz and called for international cooperation on climate change as the US was the first contributor to the greenhouse effect and "the biggest financial patron of the UN system" in those days (Oppenheimer 2007; Agrawala 1997, 3). The US decided to support an intergovernmental scientific panel on climate change right after that. Following this, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established in 1988 with WMO, UNEP, and the USA.

1.5.1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

IPCC, which provides ''regular assessments of scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaption and mitigation,'' was established in 1988 (IPCC Official Website 2020). The headquarters of the IPCC is located in Geneva, Switzerland. Today the organization has 195 member states around the world. In addition to this, the Principles Governing IPCC Work (2013) highlights that any UN and WMO member state could become a participant of the IPCC anytime (IPCC Official Website). The institution aims to provide *any scientific, socio-economic*, and *technical* knowledge on climate change to the governments to improve their policies. "Representatives of IPCC member governments meet one or more times a year in Plenary Sessions of the Panel. They elect a Bureau of scientists for the duration of an assessment cycle. Governments and Observer Organizations nominate, and Bureau members select experts to prepare IPCC reports" (IPCC Official Website 2020, 1). In 2007, IPCC and Albert Arnold (Al) Gore Jr., who was the 45th Vice President of the US between 1993-2001, were both awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change" (UN 2007, 1).

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[16] ICSU has played a crucial role in climate change and related studies since 1950. For more information: https://council.science/what-we-do/our-work-at-the-un/climate-change/history-icsu-and-climate-change/

IPCC is a very influential institution that affects the world's approach with regard to human-induced climate change through its reports and analyses. It has been publishing comprehensive assessment reports every six years since 1990. The last report (the Fifth Assessment Report) was published in 2014, and the subsequent report (the Sixth Assessment Report) is expected to be published in 2022.[17] IPCC also publishes methodology reports and special reports on specific themes, apart from the assessment reports.[18] Giddens (2013, 42) argues that preparing an assessment report takes a long time not just because of the bulky structure of the organizational process but also because there are many scientists involved in the preparation and reviewing processes of the report. For example, while the Fourth Assessment Report (AR 4) was prepared in 2007, it had to be evaluated by policy-makers and experts. As a result, approximately 90,000 comments were made in the report. Although scientists and policy-makers requested that the assessment reports be shorter and published at more frequent intervals, no changes have been made thus far (Giddens 2013, 13).

Another important point is that IPCC uses an *uncertainty language* (as seen in Table 1.3 below) in its reports and analysis to meet a common ground and calibrated language (Mastrandrea et al. 2010). *Climate* is defined as a complex geo-atmospheric ecological system, and therefore, this complexity naturally produces a variety of confusions within itself (Dryzek et al. 2011). Budescu et al. (2012) point out that IPCC uses seven types of uncertainty language, from the level of *exceptionally unlikely* to *virtually certain*, to describe the possibilities arising from uncertain predictions and results.

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[17] First Assessment Report (FAR) was published in 1990; the Second Assessment Report (SAR) was declared in 1995; the Third Assessment Report (TAR) was published in 2001; the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) was completed in 2007.

[18] The special reports consist of following themes: Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES); Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (SRREN); Special Report on Managing the Risk of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptions (SREX); Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 C (SR15); Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL); Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC).

IPCC Likelihood Scale	
Term	*Likelihood of The Outcome*
Virtually certain	*99-100% probability*
Very likely	*90-100% probability*
Likely	*66-100% probability*
About as likely as not	*33-66% probability*
Unlikely	*0-33% probability*
Very unlikely	*0-10% probability*
Exceptionally unlikely	*0-1% probability*

Table 1.3: IPCC Likelihood Scale (uncertainty language) Source: (IPCC (AR 5) 2010, 3)

Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR 5) (2010, 1) explains this as follows*:* "It is important for author teams to develop findings that are general enough to reflect the underlying evidence but not so general that they lose substantive meaning." Though, Budescu et al. (2012, 193) argue that this *uncertainty language* is misunderstood by public opinion, and therefore, these misinterpreted thoughts cause unwarranted reactions like people to find the terms *very likely* and *unlikely* less extreme than implied by the scientists of the reports.

The uncertainty language of IPCC has also led to building different scenarios for the future. Not only does the complexity of the climate system led to the uncertainty, but also, the human factor, which consists of economic growth, limited resources, population growth, increased the usage of eco-friendly technology, and regional inequalities, plays an essential role in evaluating future predictions in these scenarios (SRES 2000; Giddens 2013, 31). For these reasons, IPCC creates six different scenarios considering these conditions (as seen in Table 1.4). In this way, these scenarios give alternative analyses to see how driving forces could affect future emissions and how to be assessed the related uncertainties (SRES, 3).

Temperature Change (°C) 2090-2099 compared to 1980-1999			Sea Leve Rise (M) 2090-2099 compared to 1980-1999-
Scenarios[19]	*Best Estimate*	*Likely Range*	*Model-based range excluding future rapid dynamical changes in ice flow*
Constant year 2000	0.6	0.3- 0.9	NA
B1 Scenario	1.8	1.1- 2.9	0.18- 0.38
A1T Scenario	2.4	1.4- 3.8	0.20- 0.45
B2 Scenario	2.4	1.4- 3.8	0.20- 0.43
A1B Scenario	2.8	1.7- 4.4	0.21- 0.48
A2 Scenario	3.4	2.0- 5.4	0.23- 0.51
A1FI Scenario	4.0	2.4- 6.4	0.26- 0.59

Table 1.4: IPCC Scenarios at the end of the 21st-century Source: (IPCC 2007c, 13)

The world is expected to warm between 1.1 and 2.9 °C in the best scenario, in case all necessary precautions are taken. In case of emission generation, economic, technological, and social developments continue as they are today, it is expected that global temperatures will be 1 °C warmer than today, and at the end of the century, it will be approximately 3 °C warmer than today. This scenario is called *Business as usual* by IPCC (IPCC 2000).

After IPCC was established in 1988, it also became one of the critical instruments of global climate change negotiations. This process started with the Second World Climate Conference in November 1990, and the United Nations General Assembly established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC). However, the most notable conference became the Rio Conference in 1992 and continued with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1994 in parallel with the strengthening of neoliberal policies after the Cold War period.

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[19] "The set of scenarios consists of six scenario groups drawn from the four families: one group each in A2, B1, B2, and three groups within the A1 family, characterizing alternative developments of energy technologies: A1FI (fossil fuel intensive), A1B (balanced), and A1T (predominantly non-fossil fuel). Within each family and group of scenarios, some share "harmonized" assumptions on global population, gross world product, and final energy" (IPCC, 2000, p. 4).

1.5.2 1992 Rio Conference and beyond

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also named the "World Summit and Rio Conference" in different sources, was organized in Rio de Janeiro/Brazil between the 3-14 June 1992. Roughly 35.000 participants, including 178 nation-states, 117 presidents and 9.000 journalists, attended the conference (UN Outcomes for Sustainable Developments; Roussopoulos 2017, 42). Although the summit has been criticized for the sustainability and effectiveness of the decisions taken, it is an important conference in which neoliberal policies, new security issues, and diplomatic relations play important roles after the Cold War. Speth (1992, 145-146) underlines the three international developments for the Rio Conference process; first of all, military-oriented and classical power-based security understanding has expanded, and other vital threatening issues such as environmental security and climate security have turned into the new types of security concerns. Secondly, relations between the nation-states have begun to be built on collective decision making, common acting and joint responsibility instead of conflict management. Thirdly, the conference brought a new approach to world affairs by replacing the East-West divide of the Cold War with South-North. Fourthly, after the Cold War, it was no longer decision-makers composed of the states and the leaders in the international system; it has turned into common acting with non-governmental organizations, scientists, activists, business groups and policy experts. In other words, it is clearly understood that the Rio Conference did not suggest a control regime, but it aimed to provide a general framework for expected negotiations (Paterson and Grubb 1992, 293).

After the Rio Conference, three agreements were submitted for signature:
1. "Agenda 21" was signed by 178 countries to promote sustainable development for developing countries.
2. The "Rio Declaration on Environment and Development" describes the responsibilities and the rights of the member states with the 27 articles.
3. The "Statement of Forest Principles" offers sustainable managements to protect the forest around the world. However, it was able to be published as a declaration (UN Outcomes for Sustainable Developments).

Except for them, three more documents were submitted for signature. First, the "United Nations Convention on Biodiversity" was signed to protect wild plants and animal species. However, as the timetable and the main goals were not clearly agreed upon, the convention could not be effective (Roussopoulos 2017). Secondly, the "Convention to Combat Desertification" (UN Outcomes for Sustainable Developments) was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1996. The third one is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which has been playing a significant role in the following years and was signed in 1992 (UNFCCC 1992). Hereunder, member countries are divided into Annex 1, Annex 2 and non-Annex 1, following their developmental levels and emission productions. While Annex 1[20] countries are identified as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) counties and 12 countries with Economies in Transition (EITs) from the post-Soviet region, Annex 2[21] countries only consist of the developed countries (OECD countries). In addition to this, non-Annex 1 also refers to the developing countries (UN 1992). Although Annex 1 countries also involve Annex 2 countries, Annex 2 countries have more responsibilities than Annex 1. In other words, Article 4.5 of the convention points out that developed countries "shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention" (FCCC/INFORMAL/84 1992, 8). According to the convention, Annex 1 and Annex 2 countries would support the countries that are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and it was also agreed that Annex 1 countries would keep their emission levels at the 1990 level until 2000 due to being responsible for the high rate of the GHGs (UNFCCC 2020a). At the end of the Rio Conference, it was decided that the management of the processes and the responsibilities of the conference

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[20] Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Economic Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America ((FCCC/INFORMAL/84 1992, 23).

[21] Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Economic Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America (FCCC/INFORMAL/84 1992, 24).

obligations would be discussed at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to be held regularly under the UNFCCC each year, and these meetings have been held regularly every year as agreed. The important COP conferences that leave their marks on climate change policies will be discussed briefly in the next section.

1.5.3 UNFCCC: from Kyoto Protocol to Paris Agreement

Although UNFCCC was signed in 1992 during the Rio Conference, it was able to enter into force in 1994. The main goal of the UNFCCC, which 197 countries have ratified, is to prevent human-induced intervention that would endanger the climate system (UNFCCC 2020b). For this reason, the countries were divided into three categories, and it was agreed that the countries producing higher emissions would reduce their emissions, as stated above. By doing so, some grants and loan supports were created through the contract, and industrialized countries agreed to share their technologies with developing countries (UNFCCC 2020b). COP conferences started in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1995, and it has been continued regularly every year, as shown in Table 1.5 below.

Conference of Parties	Year	Place
COP1	1995	Geneva, Switzerland
COP2	1996	Berlin, Germany
COP3	1997	Kyoto, Japan
COP4	1998	Buenos Aires, Argentina
COP5	1999	Bonn, Germany
COP6	2000	The Hague, Netherlands
COP6-2	2001	Bonn, Germany
COP7	2001	Marrakech, Morocco
COP8	2002	New Delhi, India
COP9	2003	Milan, Italy
COP10	2004	Buenos Aires, Argentina
COP11	2005	Montreal, Canada
COP12	2006	Nairobi, Kenya
COP13	2007	Bali, Indonesia
COP14	2008	Poznan, Poland
COP15	2009	Copenhagen, Denmark
COP16	2010	Cancun, Mexico
COP17	2011	Durban, South Africa
COP18	2012	Doha, Qatar
COP19	2013	Warsaw, Poland
COP20	2014	Lima, Peru
COP21	2015	Paris, France
COP22	2016	Marrakech, Morocco
COP23	2017	Bonn, Germany
COP24	2018	Katowice, Poland
COP25	2019	Spain, Madrid
COP26[22]	2020	Glasgow, UK (Cancelled)
COP26	2021	Glasgow, UK

Table 1.5[1]: The list of UNFCCC Meetings (Source: UNFCCC)

Even though the list seems too long, the milestone meetings of UNFCCC where the critical decisions on climate change were taken are COP3 (1993, Kyoto Protocol), COP15 (2009, Copenhagen), COP18 (2012, Doha), and COP21 (2015, Paris Agreement). In this

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[22] The COP 26, which was planned to be held in Glasgow in Nov. 2020, has been postponed to 2021 due to Covid-19 Pandemic.

regard, the following sections briefly explain the essential points of the COP processes after the Kyoto Protocol.

Kyoto Protocol (COP3) and Beyond

After the UNFCCC came into the force in 1994, the first COP conference was held in 1995 in Geneva, Switzerland. Since preventing and adapting the climate change process is a very new agenda, the meeting, which can be described as a milestone, was held only in 1997 in Kyoto. According to the UNFCCC Article 2, "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system." As O'Neill (2002) and Smith et al. (2001) state, the term *dangerous interference* does not just refer to the deteriorating climate system itself; this term also includes the combinations of scientific, economic, political, ethical, and cultural considerations. Therefore, the realization of the goals had been spread over time, and it was aimed to shape the details with the COP conference to be held. So, the COP3 held in Kyoto in 1997 was an important step in achieving these goals. The protocol was opened to the signature in 1997 to reduce and limit greenhouse gas emissions in conformity with the identified targets of countries. However, it was able to enter into force in 2005 due to the *complex ratification process* (UNFCCC 2020c). In other words, a sufficient number of signatures could not be collected for the protocol to enter into force.[23] According to the Kyoto Protocol Article 25, "This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990." After Russia and Canada ratified the protocol in 2004, a sufficient number of ratifies and emission rates were reached and then the protocol finally entered into force in 2005.

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[23] Expressly, the withdrawal of the United States from the protocol in 2001 was accepted as an important case (Vezirgiannidou 2008; Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow 2002). Apart from the energy lobbies' pressures, the US did not want to meet the financial burden of the emission reduction targets outlined in the protocol because it was equal to the %3 GDP of the US (Wallstreet Journal 1997 cited in Vezirgiannidou 2008, 41). While the protocol was signed in 1997, US President Clinton was an important supporter of the Kyoto Protocol. However, when the US withdrew from the protocol in 2001, the president was George Bush. Bush stated that *"I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 per cent of the world, including major population centres such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US economy."* (Hovi et al. 2010,130 cited from Whitehouse Archives 2001). Therefore, as China had no obligation to reduce its emissions, it posed a "relative gain" problem for the United States.

The Kyoto Protocol is based on "common but differentiated responsibility and respective (CDBR)" as stated in the 7th Principle of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1997. In this regard, Ranni (2014,1) emphasized the CDBR as follows:

> In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.

The Kyoto Protocol is a binding international protocol based on the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC and follows its annex-based structure. The protocol determined the period between 2008-2012 as the 'Commitment Period' to achieve its goals first.

The First Commitment Period between 2008-2012

For this period, it was expected that Annex 1 countries would reduce their emissions and report their rate of emissions at frequent intervals. The targets of the period are expected to reduce six substantial greenhouses: Carbon Dioxide (CO_2), Methane (CH_4), Nitrous Oxide (N_2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF_6) (UNFCCC 2008). Emission targets for Annex 1 countries were agreed upon under the title of Annex B countries, as stated Table 1.6 below.

Annex 1	Targeted Emission Limitation/ Reduction
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	-8%
United States of America	-7%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland	-6%
Croatia	-5%
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine	0
Norway	+1%
Australia	+8%
Iceland	+10%

Table 1.6: Targeted Emission Limitation and Reduction as stated in Annex B in the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2008, 13).

The protocol has also provided some flexibility to Annex 1 countries in order to achieve the emission targets. "The Kyoto Protocol allows Annex I Parties to add to or subtract from their initial assigned amount, thus raising or lowering the level of their allowed emissions over the commitment period, by trading Kyoto units with other Parties" (UNFCCC 2008, 15). By doing so, the protocol consists of three flexible *market-based* mechanisms that depend on the trade of emission permits.

The Kyoto Mechanisms

1. International Emissions Trading
2. Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM)
3. Joint Implementation (JI)

International Emission Trading is detailed in the Kyoto Protocol in Article 17. Accordingly, Annex 1 countries unit or transfer their emissions to another Annex 1 country to achieve the targeted emission. There is no change in the sense of total targeted emissions during this trade. CDM is identified under Article 6. CDM is a project-based

mechanism like Joint Implementation (JI). However, the difference from the JI is that "The CDM involves investment in emission reduction or removal enhancement projects in developing countries that contribute to their sustainable development, while JI enables developed countries to carry out emission reduction or removal enhancement projects in other developed countries" (UNFCCC 2020d, 1). Despite the flexible mechanisms, the emission targets could not be achieved for the first period. As a result, the Fifteenth United Nations Climate Change Negotiation was held with great expectations in Copenhagen in 2009. The aim was to be agreed on new targets and binding agreements after the Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol that would end in 2012 (Christoff, 2010). For this reason, "nearly 27,000 people, including 10,500 delegates representing 190 states, and over 120 heads of state and government" attended the summit (Christoff 2010, 637). Although the Copenhagen summit was held with great expectations, the conference failed due to the parties not reaching an agreement that has not been formed on liabilities and financial assistance to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Another important summit was held in Doha (COP18) in 2012. During the summit, it was decided to prepare an amendment in order to continue the First Commitment Period of the Kyoto protocol, which ended in 2012. However, it has been decided to move on to the second commitment period between 2013-2020; the Doha Amendment has not been able to come into force due to insufficient signatures (144 more signatures are needed) (UNFCCC 2020c).

Paris Agreement (COP21)

COP21, organized in Paris in 2015, aimed to be formed a new protocol instead of the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement is the first "legally binding global climate change agreement" entered into force less than one year after its adoption (European Commission 2020). Paris Agreement Article 2 (2015, 3) gives the central aims of the agreement as follows:

1) pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
2) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and

3) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

The agreement expects the member countries to make their best effort to mitigate, adaption and provide financial support to the effects of climate change through "nationally determined contributions" (NDCs). As stated in Article 2, the member countries' effort aims to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees relative to the pre-industrial revolution. The agreement requests that countries submit their "nationally determined contributions" to adapting, avoiding, and mitigating climate change to accomplish this target. However, the agreement does not clearly determine these contributions and gives the member countries initiative, causing some discussions on the agreement's effectiveness (UNFCCC 2020e). Rogelj et al. (2016, 631) draw attention to the weak points of the NDCs as:

> These include whether efforts are distributed equitably among countries; how much adaptation may be required given the current level of mitigation ambition; how 'intended' national proposals will be implemented; how they will be financed; and the extent to which the INDCs contribute to the achievement of other goals of the UNFCCC by building on institutions that can support adaptation to climate change, technology advancement, development path transformation, sustainable development and enhanced awareness.

Consequently, as Seo (2017) stated in his article that although the Paris agreement has been one of the *turning points* or *milestones* of the climate negotiations, it has not been able to be a firm agreement. Even though it is considered the most critical agreement after Kyoto, the Paris agreement was much weaker than the Kyoto agreement in legal force, such as national plans of member states to reduce greenhouse gases based on the nations' own decisions. On the other hand, although the US is the second biggest emitter globally, the Trump administration's announcement of its withdrawal from the agreement negatively impacted the process. Lastly, with the Covid-19 pandemic that occurred in 2019, countries had to constrain or even suspend their production processes. This unexpected disaster has reduced emission rates for a while, but it remains uncertain how the pandemic increased or decreased the emission rates (Liu et al. 2020).

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This chapter aims to establish comprehensive literature on climate change from its scientific evidence to social and political dimensions for the following chapters. The biggest motivation for doing this literature review stems from the fact that climate change is generally considered as given information, and the scientific process is ignored by taking the essence of scientific studies in climate change studies in the social sciences literature. So, the focus of this chapter has been to develop a comprehensive overview of the evidence, causes, effects and solutions of climate change.

Secondly, the world has faced human-induced climate change for the first time since the Industrial Revolution. As stated in the literature review, it has been scientifically proven that the world will face many disasters if necessary precautions are not taken. It is necessary to pay more attention to climate change and its effects and provide the necessary measures and adaptations. These measures or adaptation processes are a wide range of responsibilities extending, which need to be taken starting from the individual level to international negotiations. However, it is difficult to say that international negotiations have been successful too. The day before the COP25, which was held in Madrid in 2019, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (UNFCCC 2019, 1) emphasized that international efforts to prevent climate change are *utterly inadequate* and continued as follows:

> Climate-related natural disasters are becoming more frequent, more deadly, more destructive, with growing human and financial costs. Drought in some parts of the world is progressing at alarming rates destroying human habitats and endangering food security. Every year, air pollution, associated to climate change, kills seven million people. Climate change has become a dramatic threat to human health and security.

Mr Guterres' speech at COP26 held in Glasgow in 2021 took on a more anxious and harsh tone than his speech in 2019. In this regard, Guterres (UNFCCC 2021, 1) highlighted that:

> The six years since the Paris Climate Agreement have been the six hottest years on record. Our addiction to fossil fuels is pushing humanity to the brink. We face a stark choice: Either we stop it — or it stops us. It's time to say: enough. Enough of brutalizing biodiversity. Enough of killing ourselves with carbon. Enough of treating nature like a toilet. Enough of burning and drilling and mining our way deeper. We are digging our own graves.... The sirens are sounding. Our planet is talking to us and telling us something. And so are people everywhere. Climate action tops the list of people's concerns, across countries, age and gender. We must listen — and we must act — and we must choose wisely. On behalf of this and future generations, I urge you: Choose ambition. Choose solidarity. Choose to safeguard our future and save humanity.

As discussed above, anthropocentric climate change has progressed so rapidly, and it seems that humanity no longer has the choice to postpone practical climate actions.

Thirdly, as Dryzek et al. (2011) state, the climate is a complex system, so studying this subject naturally brings many uncertainties. Even today, natural sciences cannot make confident predictions for the future, neither about the extent of climate change nor its effects on humanity. At this point, it should be noted that not only the complexity of the climate system causes uncertainty, but also the unpredictability of human behaviour is an important factor in building the different climate scenarios.

In conclusion, these climate-related risks and uncertainties also raise security concerns through direct threats (extreme weather, food security, or water scarcity) or indirect threats (internal or external migration, political instability, economic crisis, etc.). Based on this, the next section will discuss how climate change and environmental degradation have shaped security studies in International Relations. Then, it will be discussed how climate change could inevitably become an overarching security issue unless mitigated or adapted by governments and international collaborations.

2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY: WHY IS A COMPREHENSIVE MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY FRAMEWORK NEEDED?

"It is necessary to recognize that security may be defined not merely as a goal but as a consequence-this means that we may not realize what it is or how important it is until we are threatened with losing it" (Ullman 1983, 133).

"Climate change is already affecting every inhabited region across the globe with human influence contributing to many observed changes in weather and climate extremes" (IPCC 2021, 13).

2.1 General Overview

The literature on climate change-related security lacks a long history. Despite having been examined under the scope of environmental security studies since the early 1970s, climate security was conceptionally mentioned as a specific field at the beginning of the 2000s. Since then, a growing body of literature has begun to acknowledge the importance of this issue. The relevant literature has often examined the referent objects of security separately in this context under the titles of human security and climate change, national security and climate change, and international security and climate change. Therefore, the first sub-question of the thesis asks, what role does climate change have in human security, national security, and international security and is there any connection among these? and aims to provide a broad perspective on the literature addressing climate change and security by establishing a causal chain between the referent objects of security and climate change through the adoption of a multi-level approach.

Why does this research prefer the comprehensive multi-level security approach? Græger (1996, 114) argued environmental security to be able to be expressed conceptually and politically within the framework of a multi-level security approach and continues as follows:

> Some environmental security problems are global and thus are best dealt with at the highest possible level of governance. But although the state level may be too restricted for resolving problems that require global action, it may be too wide for others that require a subnational approach. A multilevel security perspective is both comprehensive and universal.

Deudney (1991) also emphasized the need for a more comprehensive security framework, pointing out how examining environmental problems based on the national security perspective might weaken the paths to complete solutions. Belgium Representative Johan C. Verbeke's 2007 speech at the UNSC meeting held under the theme of climate change in 2007, he stated that security policies are generally handled at the national security level. However, Verbeke argued that national security alone is ineffective on an issue such as climate change and that a comprehensive security policy should be followed instead (S/PV.5663 2007, 5). Some scholars have indicated state-led policies to be limited in seeking solutions to global problems and as such argued that the responsibility of tackling these problems should be handled within the state, private and public institutions, and organizations as well as individually (Boas and Rothe 2016, 616 cited from Reid 2013, 362; Joseph 2013, 43). However, these studies that support a comprehensive security approach mainly refer to international security and specifically suggest that every unit is responsible for combating climate change.

Kalliojärvi (2020) analyzed the UNSC discourses on climate change by employing a poststructuralist discourse theory alongside Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's revision of Gramsci's concept of hegemony and established a causal link between the referent objects of security in her research "Age of Changes: Threat of Climate Change and Its Meaning for Security." Kalliojärvi (2020, 16) formed these causality chains among human security, national security, and global security in a normative framework based on the importance of ensuring sustainable development and described it as follows: "sustainable development is presented as an antidote against vulnerabilities, which if let unmanaged can turn into security threats." In other words, while Kalliojärvi developed her approach over three reference objects of security; she defined climate security as a sustainable development issue based on the threat multiplier effects. Unlike Kalliojärvi's framework, this thesis aims to establish a multi-level security approach by forming a causal link between each level (i.e., climate security, human security, national security and international security). This framework shows characteristics similar to Kalliojärvi's

study in terms of highlighting the importance of developing a more comprehensive and multi-level perspective in climate change-related security studies; however, the current study is more comprehensive and detailed than hers. This research focuses on the four referent objects of security and establishes causal links among them. It also provides a more comprehensive analytical framework by taking into account the direct effects of climate change, as shown in Figure 2.1. Lastly, studies specific to each reference object of security should be noted as being invaluable and essential to providing a detailed perspective on the direct and indirect threats to climate change. Moreover, analyzing these studies over multiple levels is critical for developing the awareness that many global environmental problems are caused by the combination of neglected local environmental problems, as emphasized by Græger (1996).

Figure 2.1: Climate Change and Security: Multi-Level Security Approach and Causality Chains (created by author)

This framework develops a comprehensive and multi-level approach by establishing analytical links between the essential articles published on climate change and security. Therefore, Figure 2.1 could be interpreted as the output of an analytical literature review. In this regard, detailed explanations of this framework are handled as follows: The first section examines how climate has become a security problem due to human-induced effects. Based on this, the second section addresses whether climate change can become

a threat to national security unless governments mitigate or adapt to it in order to ensure human security. The final stage examines whether the issues triggered by climate change that are unresolvable at the national level can turn into international security issues. This thesis does not interpret climate change as a single threat to security. It agrees with the understanding in the literature that describes climate change as a *threat multiplier* (CNA 2007). As mentioned initially, this research aims to develop a more analytical, comprehensive, and multi-level perspective on the threat multiplier effect.[24]

2.2 How Has Climate Change Become an Issue of Security Studies?

After World War II, the traditional security understanding based on realist theories began to be criticized through the emergence of new security discourses (Bilgin 2003; Buzan 1983; Buzan and Hansen 2009, 1; Wæver 2006). Since then, many countries have begun adopting the new security concepts that had gradually been broadened from economic issues to environmental degradation and deepened in the context of the reference objects of security (Buzan 1983; Buzan and Hansen 2009; Brown 1989; Krause and Williams, 1996, 229; Mathews 1989; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Ullman 1983; Wæver and Carlton 1993). In this regard, the Copenhagen School analyzed the broadening part into five sectors (i.e., economic, political, military, social, and environmental) and examined the deepening portion under five levels of analysis (i.e., human security, societal security, national security, regional security, and global security; Brauch 2003; Baysal and Lüleci 2015). However, Baruch (2008, 7) and Bilgin (2010) indicated the Copenhagen School to have not examined the sectoralization of security from the perspectives of international security, regional security and human security perspectives but instead to have focused on existential issues that specifically concern the survival of the state. In the context of climate security, the Copenhagen School argued that climate should not be made a security issue and claimed the understanding of "less security and more politics" (Baysal and Karakaş 2017; Græger 1996; Wæver 1993, 56).

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[24] The literature shows the threat multiplier effect to have been studied under separate forms (e.g., effect of climate change on political instabilities, economic disruptions, or conflicts, as well as the effect of climate change on migration).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, environmental awareness started to increase in the 1960s. The existential threats of nuclear weapons and the effects of certain environmental disasters played significant roles in this regard. Academically, environmental security studies arose during the 1970s. Richard Falk's "This Endangered Planet" (1971) and Meadows et al.'s "The Limits Growth" (1972) are two pioneering environmental security studies from those years. They generally argued humanity to not have an unlimited time to act against environmental threats such as high population growth rates, air pollution, resource depletion, and the likelihood of wars of mass destruction (Piper 1975; Meadows et al. 1972, 25). Falk even warned that society would still need 10 to 100 years to recover the destroyed environment (as cited in Piper 1975, 371).

The Stockholm Conference of 1972 was the first global environmental conference to be held and can be considered a turning point in environmental security studies. However, this conference (UN 1972, 21) did not address the concepts of environment and security together, it made suggestions regarding situations that might endanger environmental security as follows:

> It is recommended that Governments be mindful of activities in which there is an appreciable risk of effects on climate, and to this end: (a) Carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects and disseminate their findings to the maximum extent feasible before embarking on such activities; (b) Consult fully other interested States when activities carrying a risk of such effects are being contemplated or implemented.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also established a center to investigate the links between environmental issues and security in 1977 (Brauch 2003, 65). Furthermore, the Brundtland Report, also called as "Our Common Future" was released in 1987 with the support of the UN. This report stated that combating environmental problems could no longer be sustained through the traditional security approaches and highlighted that "there are no military solutions to environmental insecurity" (WCED 1987, 19). The report also recommended that governments and international organizations consider cost-effectiveness analyses among poverty reduction, environmental degradation prevention, and military expenditure to ensure security.

At the end of the 1970s, environmental security began to be studied more specifically based on national security (Brown 1977; Mathews 1989; Myers 1989; Ullman 1983). Even, since the end of the 80s, the relevant literature has become more specific about environmental security and conflict relations. In the late 1980s, Holst (1989) and Westing (1989) were among the first pioneering scientists to link environmental security to conflict. Nevertheless, Holst (1989, 123) also noted, "the evidence is incomplete and the data insufficiently systematic to support theories about general trends, but the scale and nature of human activity as it affects ecological balances appears to create regional and global impacts." During the 1990s, Homer-Dixon (1991; 1994) attracted attention as one of the impressive scientists linking environmental problems to conflicts. He identified six types of environmental degradation that cause violent conflict: anthropocentric climate change, ozone depletion, soil erosion, deforestation, reduced access to water and overfishing.

Besides the conceptual discussions on expanding and deepening security studies, interest in empirical studies also increased during the 1990s. While environmental security studies attracted attention in terms of conflict and environmental security (Carius et al. 1999; Homer-Dixon 1991; 1994; Kaplan 1994; Levy 1995; Myers 1993), a close link began being established between climate change and food security in these years (Adams 1989; Adams et al. 1990; Downing 1991; Parry et al. 1999; Sinha et al. 1988). This period can be said to have also paved the way for climate change and security to become a specific field as opposed to sub-categories of environmental security studies.

Climate Security

As a specific field, climate change and security started to attract attention conceptually after the 2000s. In 2004, the UK government's chief scientific adviser David King claimed climate change to be more dangerous than international terrorism (BBC 2004). However, the concept of climate security was first used by UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett in 2006 (Trombetta 2008, 595). Since then, climate change and security have remained on the agenda as a subject that attracted attention and it started to raise concerns with its political, social, economic and scientific dimensions. In this regard, international organizations, political leaders, scientists and diplomats have started to

express their shared view that climate change is a security issue (Mcdonald 2013; UNSC 2007; UN General Assembly 2009; Zhang 2009; Trombetta 2008). For instance, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in his 2007 COP22 conference speech, emphasized climate change as a security problem requiring urgent responses in terms of adaption and mitigation strategies (Goswami 2016; NPR 2008). The Presidential Memorandum on Climate Change and National Security (The White House Archives 2016, 1) highlighted the following:

> Climate change poses a significant and growing threat to national security, both at home and abroad. Climate change and its associated impacts affect economic prosperity, public health and safety, and international stability. Extended drought, more frequent and severe weather events, heat waves, warming and acidifying ocean waters, catastrophic wildfires, and rising sea levels all have compounding effects on people's health and well-being.

According to Trombetta (2008, 595), "climate security suggests a concern for the security of the climate which is understood as the maintenance of stable climatic conditions as a prerequisite of all human enterprises, rather than the security of the climate itself." As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, climate change may arise due to natural and human-made causes. Increasing fossil fuel production due to post-Industrial Revolution energy needs, improper land use, rapid urbanization, and even the proliferation of livestock farms have been the most important causes of climate change. Having caused climate to become a security threat, humanity would clearly become the security object most affected by this threat, as seen in the following sections in this chapter. Before this discussion, asking how climate change has become a security issue would be appropriate. NASA (2020) and the IPCC (2007c) highlighted rising global temperatures, warming oceans, shrinking ice sheets, glacial retreats, decreased snow cover, sea-level rise, declining Arctic Sea ice, extreme weather events, and ocean acidification to all be evidence of human-induced climate change. These natural calamities occurring as a result of climate change have started threatening human security, national security, and international security directly and indirectly (IPCC 2007c; Lippert 2019; NASA 2020). The indirect effects of climate change are called *threat multipliers* in the security literature due to how they exacerbate political, social, and economic issues (CNA 2007; Froese and Schilling 2019). Namely, combining severe climate-related events such as sea-level rise, extreme temperatures, storms, typhoons, drought, and water scarcity are combined with social, economic, and political issues can exacerbate violent conflicts, instability, migration, and economic

issues as a threat multiplier effect (CNA 2007; Scheffran 2008). The next section in this context will analyze the relationship between climate security and human security as the first link of the causality chain.

2.3 Causality Chains between Climate Security and Human Security

Having reached the literature through the UNDP's (1994) Human Development Report, the concept of human security has three components: "freedom from fear and freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity" (UN 2010, 1). Furthermore, the UNDP's Human Development Report also examined human security under seven categories as shown in Table 2.1.

Security Category	Threat Types
Economic Security	labour force, basic income, unemployment, social safety
Food Security	accessing the basic food, distribution of public food, famines
Health Security	poor nutrition, infectious and parasitic diseases, cancer-causing environmental risks, access to health services, maternal mortality, AIDS and HIV
Environmental Security	healthy physical environment, degradation of ecosystem, water scarcity and pollution, climate change, pressure on land usage, air pollution, environmental catastrophes such as Chernobyl
Personal Security	threats from, a state and other states, ethnic tension, street violence, threats directed against women and children, self-destruction
Community Security	Identity or culturally based threats to a family, a community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group
Political Security	fundamental human rights violation, state repression, political insecurity

Table 2.1: Human Security Categories adopted by UNDP (1994, 25-33)

The Human Development Report (1994, 33) states, "among these seven elements of human security are considerable links and overlaps. A threat to one element of human security is likely to travel-like an angry typhoon to all forms of human security." Human security is all about ensuring the opportunity for people to realize themselves, protecting their freedoms through rights and entitlements, and providing a living for all human races (O'Brien et al. 2010). Although some climate change and security experts tend to

underestimate human security by prioritizing national security (Dalby 2009; Floyd 2008; Oels 2013); ensuring human security should be noted to be related to how states provide health, education, transportation, infrastructure, and social and economic welfare to their citizens (Froese and Schilling, 2019).

Studies on the links between human security and climate change generally focus on how direct and threat multiplier effects push those who are culturally, socially, economically, politically, and demographically vulnerable. Moreover, Barnett's (2001; 2003) comprehensive studies on climate change and human security stated that underdevelopment and poverty become doubly vulnerable when combined with climate change-related threats.

Climate change-related threats such as food security, water scarcity, extreme weather conditions, global warming and rising sea levels have threatened human security by undermining livelihoods, challenging cultural lives and identities, forcing people to migrate, and weakening states' capacity to provide prosperity (Adger et al. 2014).

Food security, water scarcity, extreme weather conditions and rising sea levels are direct threats vital to human security studies. According to IPCC's Special Report on Land and Climate Change (2019), the food system, which covers all planting, production, transportation, wholesale and retail sales, consumption, and waste processes, provides more than one billion people with workforce opportunities around the world. Apart from climate change impacts, the rapid population growth, increase in average income levels and increased demand for animal products resulting in the increased use of nitrogen-based fertilizers and water have also created significant burdens on food security. When examining the latest IPCC report, it furthermore predicts with *high confidence* that extreme weather conditions, temperature increases, and changing climate models will affect climate change in the future. The report also predicts with *high confidence* that agricultural societies will be affected much more by this situation. The production of fruits and vegetables, which are essential elements of healthy nutrition, have been estimated with *medium evidence* and *high agreement* will also be affected by climate change (Mbow et al. 2019, 439–440).

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization's (FAO 2015, 3) "The Impact of Natural Hazards and Disasters on Agriculture and Food Security and Nutrition," climate change-induced natural disasters are one of the leading causes of food insecurity. The report estimates that 1.9 billion people in developing regions had been affected by disasters between 2003 and 2013 at a cost of approximately half a trillion US dollars (FAO 2015, 3). Sova et al. (2019, 4) claimed that, rather than natural disasters, drought may become the greatest threat to food and agricultural security, highlighting, Sova et al. (2019, 4) claimed that, rather than natural disasters, drought may become the greatest threat to food and agricultural security, highlighting, "the link between climate change and global instability often runs through our food systems." However, some quantitative studies have also claimed that heavy rains increase tendencies toward conflict. For instance, Adano et al. (2012) and Theisen et al. (2012) found meaningful connections between wet conditions being more susceptible to conflict than dry periods in Kenya. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) emphasized flooding in this region to possibly cause resource scarcity. Also, many studies have already occurred on the increase in conflicts, health problems and political and social instabilities due to the impacts of climate change on food security (Barnett 2003; 2010; Lake et al. 2012; Parry et al. 1999; Piesse and Thirtle 2009; Sanchez 2000; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007; Shindell et al. 2012).

Clean water scarcity is another significant threat to human security. The decreased water levels in rivers due to decreased precipitation and the destruction of water resources due to extreme weather events (e.g., floods, droughts) endanger human health, food security, and ecological balance (Garhwaite 2019). IPCC's (2011) Climate Change 2001: Impact, Adaptation and Vulnerability Report emphasized that 1.7 billion people experience water shortages. According to the UN (2020, 1), "in the early to mid-2010s, 1.9 billion people, or 27% of the global population, lived in potential severely water-scarce areas. In 2050, this number will increase to 2.7 to 3.2 billion people." Sowers et al. (2011) argued that the water resources in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries are vulnerable to climate change and emphasize that this is still a *low priority* issue for the relevant countries in the region. On the other hand, freshwater sources are getting mixed with salt water due to rising sea levels, especially in small island developing states such as Kiribati

and Papua New Guinea (Kiribati Government 2020; Oliver-Smith 2011). While sea levels had on average risen by 1.7 mm from 1950 to 1993, it was observed to have risen another 3.3 mm from 1993 to 2009, another 3.6 mm between 2006 and 2015, and still an additional 6.1 mm from 2018 to 2019 (Nicholls and Cazenave 2010; Lindsey 2020). Moreover, "a total of 680 million people in low-lying coastal zones depend directly on these systems. Four million people live permanently in the Arctic region, and small island developing states are home to 65 million people" (IPCC 2019, 1). This means that some regions such as the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic are near sea level and will be the first to be affected in the 21st century (Dasgupta et al. 2007; Lindsey 2020). Saltwater getting mixed with freshwater resources in areas below sea level triggering the deterioration of ecological habitats, damaging the infrastructure in coastal areas through flooding, degrading the lands of communities that depend on agriculture and fishing there, and the resulting insufficient water resources put human security at risk (IPCC 2019). The regions most affected by this are mostly atoll countries (e.g., Kiribati, Tokelau, Tuvalu) and some Arctic communities (IPCC 2019; Dasgupta et al. 2007). Apart from the physical security risks for these regions, "it poses significant risks to the livelihoods, culture, and health of millions of people" (Barnett 2003, 7).

Another direct threat to human security from climate change is health problems. As mentioned above, endangered food security and decreased clean potable water are problems that will directly affect human health. Apart from these, extreme weather conditions may also have fatal consequences. As stated in Chapter 1, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED 2021) has compared the number of natural disasters between 1949 and 2019. As a result, it was understood that the number of natural disasters experienced increased by approximately 1,705% in 2019 compared to 1949. According to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2020), approximately 5,000 people lost their lives due to the hurricanes between 2005-2018 in the USA. Due to extreme temperatures in the summer of 2003, around 15,000 people in France and around 70,000 people across Europe died (McAuley and Freedman 2019; Robine et al. 2008). Meehl and Tebaldi's (2004) extensive study estimated that heat waves will occur longer and more intensely in the 21st century.

Psychologists and sociologists have established links between extreme heat waves and aggression (Anderson et al. 2000; Anderson 2001; Plante et al. 2017). For example, Mares and Moffett (2016) found homicide rates increase by 6% for every 1-degree increase in temperature; however, they also stated their results were not valid for all regions in the world. Nardulli et al. (2015) also discovered that natural disasters caused by climate change effectively form interpersonal conflicts. By taking social and economic factors into account, Burke et al. (2009) proved that for each degree Celsius increase in temperature in Africa, the probability of civil war increased by 5%.

The Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007b, 3) explained the impact of human activities on global warming as *very likely*. Humanity appears to also be the victim of direct and indirect threats from the climate change they cause. Consequently, this section attempted to explain the relationship between climate change and human security. Essentially, the direct effects of climate change affect human security first, while the threat multiplier factors express a more comprehensive concept. Therefore, while this section defines the intersection points of the direct effects of climate change and human security, the next section will try to define the intersection points of human security and national security through threat multiplier effects.

2.4 Causality Chains between Human Security and National Security

This section discusses how the relationship between climate change and human security has turned into a security issue through the threat multiplier effect at the national level. Before starting the section, it is worth explaining that this research does not claim that only indirect effects of climate change threaten national security. As could be seen from the studies in this area, states are also directly affected by climate change (Barnett 2003; Busby 2008; Campbell et al. 2007; CNA 2007; Colgan 2018). According to the IPCC (2019) Special Report on the Ocean and the Cryosphere in a Changing Climate, global warming has increased by 1° Celsius compared to pre-Industrial Revolution temperatures. Therefore, this issue has not only caused an increase in acidity levels and decrease in productivity in the oceans but has also caused the sea level to rise gradually due to glaciers melting in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, which has also incidentally endangered the physical borders of some states. This threat is undoubtedly true for countries such as

Tonga, Fiji, Samoa and Tuvalu in the South Pacific that are currently suffering from this situation (Barnett and Adger 2003; Becker 2012; Church et al. 2006).

Another example of the direct effects of climate change on national security is the damage to military bases and facilities due to rising sea levels and extreme weather events Colgan's (2018, 33) comprehensive study highlighted that "climate change can create knock-on environmental problems associated with a base's infrastructure or waste. Those knock-on problems create a mix of subnational, international, and transnational political contestation that raises the political costs of overseas bases and could even rupture an international relationship." In 2017, United States Defense Secretary James Mattis declared climate change to be real and to have threatened the Pentagon's interests and presence both at home and abroad (Revkin 2017). Following this statement, the US Department of Defense (2019) Effects of a Changing Climate Report presented the vulnerabilities of military installations that could be damaged in the following 20 years. According to the report, most of the 79 military facilities are officially threatened by climate change effects such as floods, drought, desertification, and wildfire.

This chapter mainly aims to explain the effects of climate change from climate security to international security by establishing a causal chain. As such, a detailed examination of the direct effects of climate change on national security or international security is beyond the scope of this research. The main question that needs to be answered is to examine under which conditions climate change transforms from human security into conflicts or social/political instability, or more precisely, into a national security problem.

As mentioned in the previous section, climate change affects human security through issues such as drought, food security, water scarcity, extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and migration. In the context of national security, previous studies have revealed how the threat multiplier effect of climate change transforms into a security problem at the national level through riots and radicalization (Telford 2020; Tonwe et al. 2013), economic crises (Egenhofer and Alessi 2013; Gallego-Álvarez et al. 2014), internal migration (Toscano 2015), social and political instabilities (Salehyan 2005; Sofuoğlu and Ay 2020), and conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1993; 2007; 2010; Barnett 2003; Barnet and

Adger 2007). This section examines how soft security problems like human security turn into national security issues as a result of climate change.[25]

In 2007, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) released the report *Climate Change as a Security Issue*. The report suggested that climate change is a threat to humankind and that collective action should mitigate and adapt to its effects. The report stated that, if this problem remains unsolved, climate change could trigger a large number of conflicts both within and among countries. Furthermore, the report attributed the impact of climate change on conflicts to four factors: "climate-induced decline in food production, climate-induced degradation of freshwater resources, climate-induced increase in storm and flood disasters, environmentally induced migration" (WBGU 2007, 1). On the other hand, IPCC's (2018, 245) The Impacts of 1.5°C Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems Report revealed that natural disasters caused by climate change trigger conflicts in the least developed regions and the relevant vulnerable groups, stating, "However, drought significantly increases the likelihood of sustained conflict for particularly vulnerable nations or groups, owing to the dependence of their livelihood on agriculture. This is particularly relevant for groups in the least developed countries" (IPCC 2018, 245; Schleussner et al. 2016; Von Uexkull 2016). Barnett (2003) emphasized solid states to be likely to succeed in their policies for measures, mitigations, and adaptations to environmental degradation due to their effective hierarchical order and adequate economic capacity. For instance, Smith (2020, 1) pointed out that "since 1980, the U.S. has sustained 258 weather and climate disasters where the overall damage costs reached or exceeded $1 billion. The cumulative cost for these 258 events exceeds $1.75 trillion." This means that, although the United States is one of the countries most affected by climate change, the country lacks a severe national security concern due to its crisis management and strong financial capacity. However, this does not appear to be the case for vulnerable countries, because Hauge and Ellingsen (2001, as cited in Barnet 2003) found a positive correlation conflicts and states that are unable to manage environmental

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[25] At the press conference on 23 September 2003, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained the concepts of soft security and hard security as follows: ''We have what I will call the hard threats: weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. But we also have the soft threats: poverty, deprivation and the HIV epidemic'' (UN 2003, 1). Fatić (2002, 95) pointed out that, while hard security is about military power, ensuring soft security is about effective social governance that avoids the internal conflicts and depends on *policy priority based.*

degradation. Eckstein and Gurr (1975) also found a weak tendency toward conflict in democratic and authoritarian states in terms of regime types.

Homer-Dixon (2010) indicated nearly half of the world's population to be dependent on local resources, with around 60-70% of poor people being dependent on agricultural activities. As a result, he highlighted the possible scarcity in regional natural resources to also have the potential to greatly affect the world's population. According to Homer-Dixon (1998; 1999), natural resource scarcity occurs for three reasons: population growth, resource degradation, and the distribution of resources among individuals and groups. In this context, recent studies have shown droughts, floods, and other extreme weather events to cause conflict or instability by putting pressure on food and water security in certain regions and stated the inability of weak states to manage this or the gradual weakening of the power of an already fragile state to resultantly cause a security problem at the national level (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; de Soysa 2002; Urdal 2005). For instance, Brown et al. (2007) pointed out that Africa suffers from climate change and various security, development, and environmental problems and that, unless climate change adaptation policies are taken into account, these problems will trigger water scarcity and decreased agricultural production and increase tensions in regard to destabilized population movements and diminishing natural resources. In this regard, some quantitative findings have emphasized the relationships between climate change and conflict to have become more potent. For instance, Burke et al. (2009) "foresaw 393,000 additional battle-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa over 28 years up to 2030 if temperatures continued to rise and new conflicts were as deadly as those in the period 1981–2002" (cited from Gleditsch and Nordås 2014, 82). Moreover, Hendrix and Saleyhan (2012) examined over 6,000 social conflicts across Africa and found rainfall regimes to have significant effects on large-scale and small-scale conflicts. They also reported intense periods of precipitation to have greater tendencies toward conflict compared to dry periods. Ghimire and Ferreira (2015) examined the effects of large floods on armed conflict between 1985 and 2009 and found floods to significantly impact conflict. They stated that treating such natural disasters as *external phenomena* causes the effects of this situation to be underestimated.

The next section will briefly discuss the literature on the impact climate change has on the conflict in order to more analytically examine the relationship among human security, national security, and conflict.

Direct and Indirect Relations Between Climate Change and Conflict

After the 1990s, a significant part of the literature considered the development of democracy, the strengthening of international institutions, international trade and, economic developments; and the reduction of conflicts and the resultant deaths as indicators of liberal peace (Gleditsch 2008; Theisen et al. 2013; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011; Wiltse 2014). Even after this period, qualitative and quantitative analyses have shown economic fragility, low individual incomes, weak political institutions and unrest in a region or neighboring regions to be the main reasons that trigger civil wars, conflicts, and social/political instabilities (Collier 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, what role does climate change play in conflict and instability? In 2013, Theisen et al. published a paper examining the relationship between climate change and conflicts. They acknowledged economic crises, fundamentalist ideologies, and population growth to have undermined peace processes by causing conflicts after the 1990s. However, they were skeptical about the direct effects of the relationship between climate change, which is considered an important threat in the literature, and conflict. In this regard, they distinguished the threat multiplier from the direct effects climate change has in causing conflicts.

Consequently, they asserted that climate change would indirectly affect the deterioration of vulnerable societies, weak governments and fragile economies through the threat multiplier effect. While Barnett (2001; 2003) and Suhrke (1997) took approaches similar to Theisen et al.'s arguments on this point, Swart (1996) and Homer-Dixon (2007), Director of the International Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP) Kevin Noone (Gleditsch and Nordås 2010 cited from Askelin 2004), and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2007) established direct links between climate change and conflict. Ki-moon even called the civil war in Darfur the first climate war in 2017 (Popovski 2017).

Even if the IPCC had been undecided about the direct effects of the relationship between climate change and conflict in early reports, it did establish a positive relationship between threat multiplier effects and their impacts on national security, especially in certain regions. For instance, the relationship between climate change and conflict was mentioned in IPCC's 2001 and 2007 Assessment Reports (Gleditsch and Nordås 2014), which stated climate change to have impacted some conflicts at the regional level, especially in Africa. Moreover, a particular section was created in IPCC's (2018) The Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems Report, which pointed out the importance of the threat multiplier effects on the relationship between conflict and climate change using quantitative and qualitative approaches.

State capacity and regime type evidently play a vital role in reflecting climate change-related human security issues of national security. As Trobbiani (2013) pointed out, evaluating the concept of national security only in terms of external threats may lead to misinterpretations anymore. Due to the changing nature of threats, ensuring national security evidently means ensuring human security. Therefore, human security is considered part of national security in this thesis. The following section will discuss how the issues climate change triggers that are unresolvable at the national level can turn into international security problems.

2.5 Causality Chains from Climate Security to International Security

This section discusses the links between international security and climate change, which make up the last link of the causal chain. However, a brief and general introduction will first be made regarding the direct effects climate change has on international security.

The impact of global warming on Arctic glaciers and its reflections on international security have recently become attention-attracting issues. Nowadays, the opening of new sea routes and the sharing of energy resources due to glaciers melting in the Arctic have been discussed as controversial issues directly affecting international politics. For instance, Goodell (2015) reported approximately 15% of untapped oil reserves, nearly 30% of natural gas, and some minerals to be contained in the North Pole and to have a worth of about 1 trillion US dollars. Goodell (2015, 1) also warned that access to these

reserves will become more accessible when the ice sheets in the region melt, which will create tensions among major powers such as Canada, China, and Russia. In this regard, Rear Admiral of the United States Coast Guard Daniel Abel summarized this issue by saying, "Imagine if you have the Panama Canal and Saudi Arabia's worth of energy show up at the same place in your area of responsibility. How would you embrace that?" In this case, conflicts and discrepancies would appear not only from resource scarcity but also from resource abundance.

Another effect climate change has on international security can be considered as changing sea lanes. Some sea routes in the Arctic are open only at certain times of the year, but these are expected to be accessible for a longer period of time due to glaciers shrinking (Guo and Wilson 2020). This issue is geopolitically important because the Northern Sea Route through which ships are able to pass between August and October due to iceless conditions may become an alternative route to the Suez Canal in terms of commercial relations between Asia and Europe (Staalesen 2019). Although the Northern Sea Route is actually a more profitable and quicker option, it has remained in the background compared to other routes due to it being inconsistently open to sea traffic. However, this situation may potentially lead to geopolitical rivalries among China, Russia, and the USA in the future (Guo and Wilson 2020). For instance, the leading commercial powers of Germany and China have been preparing new plans for the strategies they would follow in case the Northern Sea Route is opened (Blunden 2012). Compared to the Suez Canal, the Northern Sea Route considerably shortens the distance between Asia and Europe. For example, the German company Beluga Shipping used the Northern Sea Route from the Ulsan Port in South Korea to Rotterdam in the Netherlands and made a profit of $300,000 US per ship while saving upwards of 10-15 days compared to the Suez Canal between August and September 2009 (Blunden 2012; Wan et al. 2018). Schøyen and Bråthen (2011) examined the distances between Eastern and Western ports in their comparative analysis of the Suez Canal and the Northern Sea Route. Accordingly, the Northern Sea Route is 40% shorter than the Suez Canal and naturally reduces the number of days spent at the sea. As such, while a journey from London to Yokohama takes approximately 32 days via the Suez Canal, it takes around 18 days via the Northern Sea Route (Schøyen and Bråthen 2011).

Despite the disadvantage of insufficient infrastructure and as yet unclarified administration of international seaborne traffic in the Northern Sea Route, the risk of huge cargo ships blocking the Suez Canal, piracy attempts around Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, and political instabilities in the Middle East have increased the attractiveness of alternative routes (Martínez-Zarzoso 2013). Table 2.2 shows the distances from Hamburg to ports in the East, comparing the Northern Sea Route, the Suez Canal, and other alternative routes.

From Hamburg to:				
Shipping routes via:	Vancouver	Yokohama	Hong Kong	Singapore
Northern Sea Route	**6,635 miles**	**6,920 miles**	**8,370 miles**	**9,730 miles**
Suez Canal	15,377 miles	11,073 miles	9,360 miles	8,377 miles
Cape of Good Hope	18,846 miles	14,542 miles	13,109 miles	11,846 miles
Panama Canal	8,741 miles	12,420 miles	12,920 miles	15,208 miles

Table 2.2: Alternative Shipping Routes from Hamburg to East Ports (Didenko and Cherenkov 2018, 2)

The Wall Street Journal (2013) reported on Yong Sheng, the first Chinese ship to travel from China to Europe using the Northern Sea Route in place of the Suez Canal and listed the pros and cons of both routes (see Figure 2.2).

China's New Shipping Frontier

How the new Northern Sea route compares to the traditional Suez Canal route

NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

Travel time
35 days

Dangers
Icebergs

Travel window
July to November

Container-carrying vessels
One this year

SUEZ CANAL ROUTE

Travel time
48 days

Dangers
Access to Suez Canal under question with upheaval in Egypt

Travel window
Year-round

Container-carrying vessels
17,000 last year

Sources: Northern Sea Route Information Office; National Snow and Ice Data Center; Cosco; Lloyd's List

The Wall Street Journal

Figure 2.2: Current and New Routes in the Arctic Region (Paris, 2013 as cited in the Northern Sea Route Information Office)

Thus far, the direct effects of climate change on international security have been explained through energy resources and changing trade routes. The warming of colder climates shows that some changes will occur in geopolitical relations. However, as these discussions are beyond the scope of the thesis, they are only briefly explained to strengthen the foundation of this section.

The following section discusses the last link of the theoretical framework that the researcher has examined in depth by establishing a causal chain regarding the threat multiplier effect on climate change and security.

The literature refers to people who have been forced to migrate due to climate change-related disasters as *climate migrants, climate refugees*, or *environmental migrants*.[26]

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[26] The concepts of migrants and refugees are legal terms with very different definitions. This study analyzes the impact of climate change on migration as a security issue; therefore, the definition or analysis of these concepts is beyond the scope of this study.

Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines environmental migrants as "persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move within their country or abroad" (IOM 2014, 14 cited from IOM 2011, 33). Recently, studies have characterized forced or voluntary migration as an international security problem due to the impacts of climate change (Barnett and Adger 2007; Barnett 2003; Bello 2017; Bettini 2013; Boas 2015; Lonergan 2002; Myers 2005; Parsons 2021).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2021) highlighted disasters such as droughts, floods, sea-level rise, uncontrollable fires, and climate-caused effects exacerbating conflict to be able to make living conditions unlivable, trigger displacement, and even prevent the return of displaced people. According to one of the latest research projects from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2021), approximately 40.5 million people were displaced in 2020. As shown in detail in Figure 2.3, almost 9.8 million people were displaced due to conflict, while 30.7 million people were displaced due to drought, extreme temperatures, landslides, wildfires, floods, storms, or other geophysical disasters.

New displacements in 2020: breakdown for conflict and disasters

Figure 2.3: IDCM's displacement analysis by conflict and disaster type (2021)

79

According to the World Bank's Groundswell Report (2021), climate change will have displaced approximately 216 million people by 2050. Based on its previous report released in 2018, the World Bank made the following prediction: "Sub-Saharan Africa could see as many as 86 million internal climate migrants; East Asia and the Pacific, 49 million; South Asia, 40 million; North Africa, 19 million; Latin America, 17 million; and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 5 million" (Groundswell Report 2021, 1).

The UNEP (2021) acknowledged the global consensus that climate change affects every nation-state's social, political and economic systems. In this regard, field research was conducted in the Sahel in 2011 with the cooperation of UNEP, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN University and the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and identified a total of 17 regions most affected by climate change in the last 20 years. That study examined data from the previous 40 years and showed the temperatures in the Sahel to have been increasing gradually, droughts to occur more frequently, and precipitation to cause more floods. The changes in the region's climate system have reduced agricultural production and led to competition over natural resources; as a result, the problem of food security has come to the fore (UNEP 2011, 8). According to the report's results, these conditions have led to conflicts and/or migration in the region. In brief, the already existing social, political, and economic vulnerabilities in these regions were observed to have been exacerbated by climate change, forcing the people of the region to migrate.

 Abel et al. (2019) examined refugee flows in the scope of climate, conflict and migration using binary data on asylum applications for 157 countries between 2006 and 2015. Their results show "climatic conditions, by affecting drought severity and the likelihood of armed conflict, played a significant role as an explanatory factor for asylum seeking in the period 2011–2015" (Abel et al. 2019, 239).

However, not just conflicts but also situations where states were unable to struggle with the direct effects of climate change have caused people to migrate. The most obvious example of this is the Pacific Islands' struggle with rising sea levels. The case of Ioane Teitiota, who had to leave the island country of Kiribati in the Pacific in 2013 and applied

to New Zealand to become a climate refugee, caused the United Nations Human Rights Committee to make a historic decision on climate refugees. The committee's official decision (UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016) stated the threat multiplier effect of climate change under the title of Factual Background as follows:

> The author claims that the effects of climate change and sea level rise forced him to migrate from the island of Tarawa in the Republic of Kiribati to New Zealand. The situation in Tarawa has become increasingly unstable and precarious due to sea level rise caused by global warming. Fresh water has become scarce because of saltwater contamination and overcrowding on Tarawa. Attempts to combat sea level rise have largely been ineffective. Inhabitable land on Tarawa has eroded, resulting in a housing crisis and land disputes that have caused numerous fatalities. Kiribati has thus become an untenable and violent environment for the author and his family.

However, sea-level rise does not always lead to the same results. The Netherlands, a third of which is below sea level, has been affected by floods and severe weather events for thousands of years (VanKoningsveld 2008); however, the Netherlands' struggle with their position has led them to strengthen water management. As Kimmelman and Haner (2017, 1) stated, "Like cheese in France or cars in Germany, climate change is a business in the Netherlands." The country now follows adaptation strategies instead of preventing rising sea levels due to climate change and has been developing various technologies for decades with respect to smart cities, floating houses, port protection, and sustainable drinking water supply (Kwadijk et al. 2010). Being a strong country and investing in technology has turned the rising sea level crisis in the Netherlands into an opportunity, while island countries in the Pacific are expected to become uninhabitable and face the danger of physical extinction.

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In conclusion, this chapter has performed an analytical literature review on climate change's direct and threat multiplier effects. In this regard, a multilevel security analysis has been created by establishing causal links between the analysis levels of security. This thesis focused not just on the threat multiplier effect but has been comprehensively compiled to include the direct impacts of climate change on climate security, human security, national security, and international security. In this way, many key details from climate change and security literature were presented in a comprehensive and multi-level security framework.

What is the significance of this framework for the empirical analysis of this research?
This research aims to examine how the UNSC structured the security dimensions of climate change discursively and institutionalized them in practice. As seen in detail in the methodology part, this research has employed Maarten Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis. This method attempts to understand the success of discourses by analyzing whether or not climate change is structured through narratives, metaphors, and storylines as a security issue and institutionalized in practice (Hajer 1993; 2009).

The discourse structuring part is analyzed based on the Council's open debates, briefings and Arria Formula meetings, which are held directly and indirectly on the theme of climate change. Moreover, the institutionalization portion is evaluated using the Council's presidential statements, resolutions, and institutional practices. In addition to these, a multi-level security framework is applied both in the discourse structuring and discourse institutionalization processes to strengthen Hajer's analysis add greater meaning to the climate change-security discourses. Thus, it is examined in depth to what extent the UNSC has structured and institutionalized the security discourses on climate change.

<div align="center">***</div>

The next chapter makes a general introduction to the UNSC by briefly touching on the UN's relationship to climate change. This will be followed by an examination of the discourse structuring of the UNSC's discourses on climate change and security between the years 2007-2021 by determining the storylines and metaphors. Lastly, it will analyze the resolutions and presidential statements that the Council recognizes as a threat to climate change. In addition to them, a multi-level security framework will be applied both in the discourse structuring and discourse institutionalization processes to strengthen Hajer's analysis and make the climate change-security discourses more meaningful. The study analyzing the UNSC's discourse on climate change and international security in this way will provide researchers with an opportunity to examine a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible while more importantly aims to answer the question of whether the UN Security Council's approach to climate change can be accepted as evidence that

the nature of its security agenda may out of necessity change and broaden at the global security level.

3. THE STRUCTURING AND INSTITUTIONALIZING OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY DISCOURSES IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

In this chapter, the main research question of the thesis, how and to what extent the UNSC has structured climate change-related security discourses and institutionalized them in practice between 2007-2021, is analyzed by employing Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis. Besides them, the level and extent of the Council's discourse structuring and institutionalization processes on climate change and security are examined considering the multi-level security analysis presented on climate change and security in the third chapter. In this regard, the first section begins with a short history of the UN Security Council and examines its role in maintaining international peace and security, as well as briefly addressing the debates in the literature between 2007-2021 on whether climate change is an issue for the UN. In the second section, how the UN Security Council has been structuring climate change and related security discourses is examined in depth by adopting argumentative discourse analysis through the Council's officially recorded open debates, Arria formula meetings, briefings and official presidential statements prioritizing the P5. This method attempts to understand the success of discourses by analyzing whether climate change is structured through narratives, metaphors and storylines as a security issue and institutionalized in practice (Hajer 1993; 2009).

In addition to structuring the discourse, Hajer (2005) states that implementing the policies and practices necessary for solving the related problem shows that the discourse has become institutionalized in practice. Since the dominance and success of the discourse also depends on the completion of the structuring and institutionalization of the relevant discourse, in the third section there is an analysis of whether climate change and related security understanding of the UNSC have been successfully institutionalized. This issue is on the agenda of the UN Security Council but is also included in many resolutions, presidential statements, and institutional developments. Although the resolutions are binding, presidential statements are published in cases where the permanent members with veto power cannot adopt a resolution on any issue (Denk 2015, 174). Presidential

statements are not binding; however, they are essential in terms of indicating the Council's interest on a political level (Denk 2015, 174). As the UNSC's resolutions represent the Council's practices on climate change-related security issues, they are examined as an essential part of the institutionalization process of climate change and security discourse in the Council. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, Hajer's development of new conceptual tools that facilitate the analysis of the discursive structuring process is the strong point of this method; however, the fact that the discursive institutionalization analysis is not discussed in detail is also a weak point of the analysis. In this regard, the aim is to analyze the institutionalization process of discourse in more depth to improve the weaknesses by getting support from the multi-level security analysis by asking, under what conditions does the Council define climate change as a security threat in its official resolutions? which is the last sub-question of this thesis. Figure 3.1 shows the analysis process of the structuring and institutionalization of the Council's discourse on climate change and security.

Figure 3.1: Analysis Process of Climate Change and Security Discourses of the UNSC

As a result, this research not only looks at how the UNSC structures and institutionalizes climate change and related security discourses, but it also aims to contribute to the literature by drawing attention to whether the realist security-based nature of the UNSC has changed at the global security level.

3.1 A General Overview on the UNSC

The UN Security Council, which was established after the United Nations International Organization Conference held in San Francisco in 1945, has fifteen members, including five permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) and ten non-permanent members (elected for two-year periods).[27] According to Articles 23 and 24 of the United Nations Charter, which is the founding document of the United Nations, the UNSC has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security with certain powers assigned to it and it is also one of the most critical bodies of the UN system due to the binding nature of its resolutions. As seen in Figure 3.2, the UN has six main organs in total:

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[27] According to A/RES/1991(XVIII) of 17 December 1963 which entered into force in 1965, the quotas and groups of non-permanent members of the Security Council elected every two years are as follows: "Five from African and Asian States; One from the Eastern European States; Two from the Latin American States; Two from Western European and other States."

Figure 3.2: The Main Bodies of the UN System (created by author)

According to Article 30 of the Charter, the UNSC determines its working procedures, including the election methods of the president of the Council. The most striking practice of the President of the Council is that in some situations where the permanent members with veto power cannot agree, the President could publish a Presidential Statement and shows the Council's interest in the relevant issue (Denk 2015). Denk (2015) points out that presidential statements show that a political step has been taken by the Council, but he also states that the motivation of the presidents to take the initiative in this respect is also open to some criticism.

Another important issue is the bindingness and veto power of the resolutions adopted by the Council. According to Article 27,

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members…

That is, in order for the Council to adopt resolutions *on all other matters*, the Council shall receive affirmative votes from nine members and none of the permanent members shall use a veto vote. Although there are many debates about which matters will be evaluated within the scope of *procedural matters* and which matters will be considered within the scope of *on all other matters*, these discussions are beyond the scope of this thesis.

The Council, which only centered itself on a realist framework until the end of the Cold War, started to expand its security agenda after the 1990s by focusing on non-military issues (Romita 2021). At the first summit at the level of Heads of State and Government held on January 31, 1992, it was discussed that human rights are an integral part of peace and security. During his speech, the president (S/PV.3046, 1992, p. 143) stated as follows that new security threats are now a severe problem that needs to be resolved:

> The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters.

In the presidential statement (S/23500) adopted after this meeting, the Council developed a broad approach to take action on the domestic problems of states and humanitarian situations that may pose a threat to international peace and security (Vivekananda et al. 2020). According to the Presidential Statement (S/23500):

> The members of the Council note that United Nations peace keeping tasks have increased and broadened considerably in recent years. Election monitoring, human rights verification and the repatriation of refugees have in the settlement of some regional conflicts, at the request or with the agreement of the parties concerned, been integral parts of the Security Council's effort to maintain international peace and security.

After this period, although the Council did not break away from the realist security framework at its centre, non-military security issues have also begun to occur in its

official resolutions. For instance, in 2011, US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke persuaded the Council to pass Resolution 1983 on the impact of HIV/AIDS on international peace and security (Vivekananda et al. 2020). Then, the Council also recognized that HIV/AIDS is "one of the most formidable challenges" to the stability and development of societies and that this requires an exceptional and comprehensive global response, but nothing has actually been done in practice (Vivekananda et al. 2020, 9; S/RES/1983). Additionally, in the resolution S/RES/2177 (2014) adopted against EBOLA in 2014, the Council stated that social and political instability and unrest in the affected countries might cause security problems unless this epidemic was brought under control. Another example is Resolution 2532, adopted in 2020 due to Covid-19; besides underlining the global international response against Covid-19, it has been recognized to conclude a ceasefire, since the pandemic conditions could intensify ongoing conflicts (Vivekananda et al. 2020, 9). These samples could be multiplied, but the main question is how has climate change become a Security Council issue? What can the Council do about it? Does the Council, which positions itself within a more realist security framework, putting soft security issues like climate change on its agenda mean that it has exceeded its borders? Before discussing the Council's approach to climate change, it is helpful to briefly consider how the relationship between the Council and climate change has been examined in the literature in order to form a general idea.

When the current literature on the UN Security Council and climate change is examined, a few studies and reports have been published as follows: Romita (2021), Sanwal (2013), Vivekananda et al. (2020), Scott and Ku (2018) comprehensively focus on the Council's climate change approach within the framework of the UN Charter, the Council's practices, and they also discuss the Council's limits against new sorts of threats and how climate change and security risks affect the UNSC's mandate to act. In 2020 Hardt and Viehoff published a comprehensive report on whether UNSC members establish the links between climate change and security and how they position themselves concerning the thematic debates in the UNSC. The report focused on fifteen members (P5 and non-permanent) of the Council and found that they identified the nexus between climate change and security in complex, variable and country-dependent ways. (Hardt and Viehoff 2020). The global role of the Council on the issue of climate change and studies

on whether the council should securitize climate change or stay out of this debate have received relatively more attention than other issues (Conca 2019; Cousins, 2013; Ng 2010; Scott and Andrade 2012). Penny (2007), questioning whether the Council is a legal authority within the framework of the causes and consequences of climate change, concluded that the Council has the legal authority. Some of the studies carried out in the context of the UN Security Council's approach to climate change have been examined within the scope of securitization. These studies mentioned above on the securitization of climate change and its possible effects, it has been concluded that the Council has a distant stance against the securitization of this issue and that the risk of militarization and depoliticization will increase as a result of the securitization of climate change (Ide 2020; Kurtz 2012; Louis and Maertens 2021; Murphy 2021, Scott 2009). Using content and discourse analysis, Detraz and Betsill (2009) examined the climate change debates and the UN Security Council's approach to climate change in the context of environmental security and environmental conflict. However, there has not yet been any study deeply conducted that examines the official statements, resolutions, open debates and briefings of the Council on climate change and the discourses of the member states on this point using the discourse analysis method. Recently, Kalliojärvi, who analyses the UNSC's discourses on climate change by employing a post-structuralist discourse theory and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's revision of Gramsci's concept of hegemony, establishes a causal link between the reference objects of security in her research in 2020 called "Age of Changes: Threat of Climate Change and Its Meaning for Security." Kalliojärvi forms these causality chains between human security, national security and global security in a normative framework based on the importance of ensuring sustainable development and describes thusly: "sustainable development is presented as an antidote against vulnerabilities, which if let unmanaged can turn into security threats" (Kalliojärvi 2020, 16). However, the most important points of Kalliojärvi's study that distinguishes it from this research are that it focuses on the UNSC's discourses in recent years and questions how climate change discourses change the meaning of security. This research differs from that of Kalliojärvi's study in that it focuses on the four referent objects of security and establishes causal links between them. It also provides a more comprehensive analysis, taking into account the multilevel security framework formed in the third chapter.

3.1.1 Development of climate change and security discourses in the UNSC

The Council, which has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and is the only body with binding decision-making authority on the member states, among the UN's six main bodies, opened climate change as a security issue to discussion for the first time in 2007.[28]

The Council's consideration of the security dimension of climate change, on the one hand, reveals the possible threats and current effects of climate change; on the other hand, it has started to give rise to thoughts about what the Council, which has the power of sanction, could do in this regard. As stated in the literature (Chapter 1) and theory (Chapter 2) chapters, both the complexity of the climate system and the inability to predict how human-induced emissions production will affect the atmosphere in the future lead to some conceptual blurriness and uncertainties regarding the security concerns. Although climate change brings some security concerns with direct threats and threat multiplier effects, it is difficult to determine the relative strength of the impact of climate change. This situation makes it challenging to develop concrete policies against climate change and puts policymakers or institutions such as the UNSC in a dilemma. Although the Council's putting climate change on its agenda as a security issue has been criticized by some members of the UN as exceeding its borders and powers, Paul Romita (2021, 4 cited from Penny 2018) responded in his research report prepared in 2021 as follows:

> The precise nature of "international peace and security" in Article 24 (1) is not specified, and it is up to the Council to determine what this entails. The lack of a clear definition of "peace and security" in the Charter may be one reason why determining what issues fit appropriately within the Council's mandate is so hotly contested. The Security Council's efforts to combat climate change are often cast in terms of its conflict prevention work—a need to understand and respond to a severe environmental challenge that can exacerbate the risk of conflict.

Climate change and related security issues are still on the UNSC agenda and have become increasingly important in its resolutions on Africa (mostly), the Middle East and Cyprus since 2008. Therefore, this situation also raises the question of whether the nature of

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[28] 2007 could be accepted as a turning point of climate change for instance, publication of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC; the award of the Nobel Prize to the IPCC and the US Vice President, Al Gore, who is known for his fight against climate change; and at the annual summit with leaders of industrialized countries in the same year, citing climate change as the culprit for the conflict in Darfur by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon had created a global awareness on this issue.

security is necessarily changing anymore in the UN Security Council, which is dominated by the realist security agenda. In the next section, the Council's open debates, briefings, Arria Formula meetings and presidential statements will be analyzed using Hajeri's argumentative discourse analysis to understand how the Council's discourse is structured.

3.2 A General Overview of UNSC Meetings on Climate Change and Security

In this section, the transcripts of the UNSC meetings in the context of climate change and security obtained via undocs.org and the presidential statements will be analyzed within Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis framework. As explained in detail in the methodology part, argumentative discourse analysis does not only consist of interpreting, classifying, and ordering discourses; it is a more comprehensive approach. This method helps us expand our perception of reality by generating various insights, both in theory and practice. Hajer states that whether an issue is considered a political issue depends on the storylines produced about it (1993; 1995; 2002; 2006). In this context, Hajer (1993; 1995; 2002) emphasizes an argumentative turn instead of a linguistic turn and argues that it would be lacking to conduct a discourse analysis only on the words spoken or written and the speaker's thoughts. According to Hajer, it is necessary to examine the argumentative discourse analysis as a whole, taking into account the opposing stances and criticisms; otherwise, the argumentative aspect of the discourse will be weak. Hajer formulates a set of concepts such as storylines, discourse coalition, and discursive affinity to apply his discourse analysis. This study aims to analyze the UNSC meetings on climate change and security using these concepts. In this context, by asking specific questions generated on these concepts to each meeting, how climate change and security discourses are structured in the Council will be analyzed. Before passing on to the analysis of the meetings, it would be helpful to give information about the general structure of the meetings held throughout the Council. According to rule 2 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure (S/96/Rev.7), "The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council." In addition, apart from the Council members, the UN members and one other person, UN organs, NGO's and relevant institutions may participate in the meeting without voting. Accordingly, the UNSC (2021, 1) summarizes this issue as:

Articles 31 and 32 of the United Nations Charter and rules 37 and 39 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council provide for invitations to be extended to non-members of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in certain circumstances. In general, Member States of the United Nations are invited under rule 37, and other persons are invited under rule 39, which include representatives of United Nations organs, subsidiary bodies, or agencies and funds and programmes, regional or other international organizations or other individuals such as experts, representatives of certain organizations including NGOs, entities or individuals specifically invited in their personal capacity.

As can be seen in Table 3.1 below, the Council held a total of twenty-six meetings between April 2007 and December 2021.

	Year	Format	Organizer	Themes	Characteristic
				UNSC Meetings Related to Climate Change and Security	
1	17 April 2007	Open Debate	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Energy, Security and Climate	Official and climate change themed
2	25 June 2007	Open Debate	Belgium	Natural resources and conflict	Official and indirect climate change themed
3	20 July 2011	Open Debate	Germany	The impact of climate change	Official and climate change themed
4	23 November 2011	Briefing	Portugal	New challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention", including pandemics, climate change, and transnational organized crime	Official and climate change themed
5	15 February 2013	Arria Formula	United Kingdom, Pakistan	Security dimensions of climate change	Informal Meeting
6	19 June 2013	Open Debate	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources	Official and indirect climate change themed
7	30 June 2015	Arria Formula	Spain, Malaysia	Climate change as a threat multiplier for global security	Informal Meeting
8	30 July 2015	Open Debate	New Zealand	Peace and security challenges facing small island developing States	Official and indirect climate change themed
9	26 May 2016	Briefing	Egypt	Peace and security in Africa Challenges in the Sahel region	Official and indirect climate change themed
10	22 November 2016	Open Debate	Senegal	Water, peace and security	Official and indirect climate change themed
11	10 April 2017	Arria Formula	Ukraine (with the support of Germany and Sweden)	Security Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise	Informal Meeting
12	06 June 2017	Briefing	Bolivia	Preventive diplomacy and transboundary waters	Official and indirect climate change themed

13	14 December 2017	Arria Formula	France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Maldives, Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and the UK	Climate Change: Preparing for security implications of rising temperatures	Informal Meeting
14	20 December 2017	Open Debate	Japan	Addressing complex contemporary challenges to international peace and security	Official and indirect climate change themed
15	11 July 2018	Debate	Sweden	Understanding and addressing climate-related security risks	Official and climate change themed
16	16 October 2018	Briefing	Bolivia	Root causes of conflict — the role of natural resources	Official and indirect climate change themed
17	26 October 2018	Arria Formula		Water, peace and security	Informal Meeting
18	25 January 2019	Open Debate	Dominican Republic	Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security	Official and climate change themed
19	22 April 2020	Arria Formula		Climate and security risks: the latest data	Informal Meeting
20	24 July 2020	Open Debate	Germany	Climate and Security	Official and climate change themed
21	17 September 2020	Video-teleconference / open debate	Niger	Humanitarian effects of environmental degradation and peace and security	Official and indirect climate change themed
22	3 November 2020	Video-teleconference / open debate	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Contemporary drivers of conflict and insecurity	Official and indirect climate change themed
23	23 February 2021	Video-teleconference / High Level Open Debate	United Kingdom	Climate and security	Official and climate change themed
24	24 September 2021	High Level Open Debate	Ireland	Climate and security	Official and climate change themed
25	09 December 2021	High Level Open Debate	Nigeria	Security in the context of terrorism and climate change	Official and climate change themed
26	13 December 2021	Debate	Niger	Climate and security	Official and climate change themed

Table 3.1: UNSC meetings related to climate change and security

As shown in Figure 3.3, ten of the twenty-six meetings have been held with the official and direct themes of climate change and security, while these issues were indirectly addressed in ten meetings. Additionally, six meetings have been held informally (as it is known as Arria Formula Meetings) on climate change and security themes.

Figure 3.3: Characteristic of the UNSC Meetings on Climate Change Between 2007-2021 (created by author)

In Figure 3.4, the formats of the Security Council meetings on climate change and security are shown by year.[29] Of the twenty-six meetings, eleven are open debates, two are debates and two are high-level open debates, six are Arria Formula, and four are Briefings.

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[29] The Handbook on the Working Methods of the Security Council (2021, p: 13) describes the formats of the UNSC meetings as follows: (i) "Open debate": briefings may or may not be conducted, and Council members may deliver statements; non-Council members may also be invited to participate in the discussion upon their request;
(ii) "Debate": briefings may be conducted, and Council members may deliver statements; non-Council members that are directly concerned or affected or have a special interest in the matter under consideration may be invited to participate in the discussion upon their request;
(iii) "Briefing": briefings are conducted, and Council members may deliver statements following briefings.

Figure 3.4: The UNSC's Climate Change and Security Related Meeting Formats by Years (created by author)

Among these twenty-five meetings, the special focus will be on the formal and direct climate change and security themed meetings as listed in Table 3.2 due to their giving the clearest storylines.

		Climate Change and Security Themed Official Meetings of the UNSC Between 2007-2021		
	Year	**Format**	**Organizer**	**Themes**
1	17 April 2007	Open Debate	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Energy, Security and Climate
2	20 July 2011	Open Debate	Germany	The impact of climate change
3	23 November 2011	Briefing	Portugal	New challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention", including pandemics, climate change, and transnational organized crime
4	11 July 2018	Debate	Sweden	Understanding and addressing climate-related security risks
5	25 January 2019	Open Debate	Dominican Republic	Addressing the impacts of climate-related disasters on international peace and security
6	24 July 2020	Open Debate	Germany	Climate and Security
7	23 February 2021	Video-teleconference/ open debate	United Kingdom	Climate and Security
8	24 September 2021	High Level Open Debate	Ireland	Climate and Security
9	09 December 2021	High Level Open Debate	Nigeria	Security in the context of terrorism and climate change
10	13 December 2021	Debate	Niger	Climate and Security

Table 3.2: Climate Change and Security Themed Official Meetings of the UNSC Between 2007-2021

Apart from the above, ten meetings have been held where climate change and security were considered, formally but indirectly. Transcripts of these meetings will also be examined in-depth and relevant parts will be included in the analysis. Finally, eight Arria Formula meetings were held with the theme of climate change and security; however, these meetings are informal, not open to the public and are not recorded, so their transcripts are not available. Nevertheless, the press statements of the members and non-UN participants attending the meeting will be included in the analysis. In short, the official meetings organized under direct climate change themes will be placed at the center of the discourse analysis to be implemented. Discourses of other meetings on climate change and security will be included in the analysis.

Before moving on to the analysis, it would be beneficial to give a brief overview of how this would be implemented to make it more understandable. In order to reveal the discourse structure, a number of questions will be asked within the framework of Hajer's argumentative discourse in each transcript and related document. The questions shaped by the concepts that Hajer developed to determine the discourse structuring are as follows:

- Whom does the discourse coalition consist of?
- What kinds of storylines and metaphors are structured in the context of the relationship between climate change and security?
- What are the crucial arguments of these storylines?
- How is the discursive affinity established?
- Is there any output from the debate?

A discourse coalition consists of a group of actors with different backgrounds and opinions who gather through a specific discourse, create a storyline, and act accordingly (Hajer 1995; 2005b; 2006). In this study, discourse coalitions consist of clusters formed by the participants during the debates over arguments through storylines consisting of the issues informed by official letters before each debate on climate change and its security implications. Participants consist of the five permanent members of the UNSC, ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms, and other UN members who voluntarily

or by invitation participate in the discussions.[30] In this sense, storylines could be regarded as discourse cement that prevents the disintegration of the discourse coalition (Hajer 1995).

The analysis of the storylines is actualized in three stages. First of all, it should be examined in the context of the background and conditions that formed the discourse. Then the content of the discourse should be examined as a set of ideas, concepts, or categorizations. The third stage is institutionalization, and this will be examined in detail in the last section.

Finally, actors may perceive and interpret a storyline in different ways, but the discursive affinity holds these different interpretable storylines together. In short, discursive affinity is the arguments that support a particular way of seeing.

3.2.1 How are the security discourses on climate change structured in the UNSC?

2007- the first debate
The matter of climate change and its effects on security, which was brought to the UNSC for the first time under the theme of "Energy, Security and Climate" by the United Kingdom on 17 April 2007, caused important discussions among the Council members. While the dominant storyline could be expressed as the threat multiplier effect of climate change, the central argument shaped over climate change should be an issue of the Security Council. Also, in the background of these open debates, it could be clearly mentioned that the IPCC (AR4) report published in 2007 had a great impact on all members and that almost all of them developed their own security discourses based on it.

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[30] According to Article 31 of the Charter, any UN member who is not a member of the Council may participate in discussions without voting if the member considers that their interests are affected. Furthermore, according to Article 32, any UN member that is not a member of the Council or any non-UN member state, "if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation, of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations."

As could be seen in Table 3.3, while most of the participants defined climate change through the threat multiplier effect, especially for fragile countries, three different views emerged as to whether this issue should be a matter for the Council: defenders, opposers and abstainers.

17 April 2007 Open Debate on *Energy, Security and Climate*	
Organiser	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Members	Belgium, China, Congo, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, United States of America
Storylines	Climate Change Has a Threat Multiplier Effect Direct Effects of Sea-Level Rising
Argument	Climate change is the issue of the Security Council
Defenders of the Argument	Belgium, Congo, France, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea (on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Small Island Developing States), Peru, Slovakia, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Opposers of the Argument	China, Indonesia, Namibia, Pakistan, Russian Federation, South Africa (on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group), Qatar
Abstainers of the Argument	United States of America, Maldives (on behalf of the Group of 77 and China)
Discursive Affinity	R/1625/2005 culture of prevention[31]
Outputs	-

Table 3.3: 17 April 2007 Open Debate on *Energy, Security and Climate*

Firstly, EU states and states directly affected by climate change such as the Small Island Developing States and Ghana have constructed their perspectives on the fact that the security dimension of climate change should be a subject of the Council. As seen in Table

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[31] This resolution was adopted in 2005 on the role of the Security Council in preventing armed conflicts, particularly in Africa. The resolution, which emphasized the importance of strengthening peace, security and development in the prevention of armed conflicts, recognition was adopted to resolve international disputes through preventive diplomacy through peaceful means and to support civil society and reaffirmed that "the need to adopt a broad strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the root causes of armed conflict and political and social crises in a comprehensive manner, including by promoting sustainable development, poverty eradication, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, gender equality, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights." In addition, it was agreed to increase the cooperation between the Council and regional organizations to obtain assistance from the Economic and Social Council if needed and provide necessary coordination by emphasizing the role of the UN in preventing violent conflicts.

3.3, all of the defenders developed their discourses by focusing on the threat multiplier effects of climate change, and some focused on both the threat multiplier and the direct effects. In particular, EU states mentioned the importance of the threat multiplier effects for fragile states. In general, all participants agreed on the anthropogenic impacts on climate security. While the interaction of drought, water scarcity and food security were mainly mentioned within the scope of human security, the effects of extreme weather events and sea-level rise on human life were also considered another prominent issue. It is observed that the defenders (especially the EU states), who state that these threats within the scope of human security cause instability and conflicts in fragile states, establish a causal link between human security and national security. In terms of international security, it was discussed that those who could not live in their country due to economic or social instability or fled the conflict due to these processes had to migrate. Papua New Guinea Representative's speech on behalf of the Small Island Developing States most affected by climate change focused on the direct effects of climate change. He specifically commented on the strong impact of human security due to sea-level rise and the effects of tropical storms and their social and economic effects at the national security level. As shown in Table 3.4, the states defending the "Climate change is the issue of the Security Council" argument consider climate change as a comprehensive and multi-level security problem. While the sea-level rising is the only issue discussed in terms of direct effects, not only those who suffer from this problem but also countries such as France and Germany have attached importance to this issue.

					Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (17 April 2007)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Belgium	+	+	+	+	n/a
Congo	+	+	+	+	n/a
France	+	+	+	+	+
Germany	+	+	+	+	+
Ghana	+	+	+	+	n/a
Italy	+	+	+	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+
Panama	+	+	+	+	n/a
Papua New Guinea	+	+	+	n/a	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+
Slovakia	+	+	+	+	n/a
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	n/a
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.4: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (17 April 2007)

To sum up, defenders generally argued that the threat multiplier effect of climate change threatens international peace and security by causing various economic, social, and political instability, conflicts over natural sources and especially migration. Besides the IPCC (AR4) report as mentioned above, it could be understood from the meeting records (S/PV.5663) that developed countries were generally touched by the Climate Change Economics report published by the Stern Review in 2006. The report, which warns that "the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the ... costs", also states that the conflicts triggered by climate change significantly threaten international peace and security. The general rationale of those who defend that climate change should be a matter of the Council is to develop a comprehensive understanding of climate change globally and prevent conflicts due to climate instability. However, while developed countries emphasized that climate change should be addressed collectively, no country except Italy and Japan mentioned the Kyoto Protocol. This is also a remarkable point because the Kyoto Protocol was based on the principle of *common but differentiated responsibility,* and developed countries had made some commitments to developing countries, such as technology transfer and financial support. Therefore, it would be supposed that these

developed countries (specifically the EU) had economic concerns as well as security concerns.

The second group consists of the opposing countries, which claim that climate change should not be the Council's issue. Except for China and the Russian Federation, all of these countries are developing countries and many of them represent the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement.[32] Accordingly, these developing countries expressed their opinion that this discussion should not continue within the Council's borders based on the economic concerns that the sustainable development and economic strategies fed by Agenda 21, UN Millennium Development Goals, Kyoto mechanisms, and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation may be interrupted. As seen in Table 3.5, the consensus of those who defend the main argument of the meeting in defining climate change is not observed among those who oppose it.

Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (17 April 2007)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
China	+	+	+	n/a	+
Indonesia	+	+	+	n/a	n/a
Namibia	+	+	+	n/a	+
Pakistan	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Russian Federation	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
South Africa	+	+	+	not yet	+
Qatar	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.5: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (17 April 2007)

It has been observed that Russia and Pakistan, which are among the states that agree that climate is a security problem due to human-induced effects, do not define the security dimensions of climate change. Except for Russia and Pakistan, the states that oppose the "Climate change is the issue of the Security Council" argument emphasized the

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[32] In fact, before the open debate, two letters (S/2007/211, S/2007/203) were written by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan (on behalf of the Group of 77 and China) and the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cuba (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement) to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council in which they expressed their opinions on this issue.

importance of the threat multiplier effect by establishing a causal relationship between climate security, human security and national security, while the states other than Qatar and South Africa did not mention the international security dimension of climate change. This may be due to the Security Council's primary role in maintaining international peace and security because these states, which argue that climate change is a sustainable development problem and should not be included in the scope of the Council, will contradict themselves if they emphasize international security. Qatar and South Africa are two states affected by climate change among those who oppose the general argument. In this context, while Qatar considers all the security dimensions of climate change, South Africa has expressed an opinion that climate change will become an international security problem unless necessary mitigations and adaptations are made.

During the meeting, opposers generally emphasized that "the Council's primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. On the other hand, other issues, including those relating to economic and social development, are assigned by the Charter to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly" (S/2007/211). Even the Permanent Representative of Pakistan made the following statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China "we hope that the decision by the Council to hold this debate does not create a precedent or undermine the authority or mandate of the relevant bodies, processes and instruments which are already addressing these issues" (S/PV.5663). However, the British representative Mrs Beckett, who organized and chaired the meeting, and other defenders express it was not their aim to undermine initiatives like the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies, the United Nations agencies and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Moreover, Mrs Beckett even referred to herself thusly: "I am the last person who would wish to undermine its work or that of any other."

Another remarkable point is that China, which was the second-largest emitter after the USA in 2007, has the same concerns as developing countries (ourworldindata.com, 2021). Developing countries in the Kyoto protocol are in the category of non-Annex I countries, including China. Hereunder, it aims to provide them with insurance, investment and technology transfer from developed countries to combat climate change. In addition,

non-Annex I countries are also released from emission reduction targets like developed countries. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the Chinese representative persistently referred to the Kyoto Protocol during his speech at the Council and gave specific messages to developed countries about the urgency of reducing emissions and providing the necessary technology transfer and financial support for developing countries.

The third group consists of abstainers. The USA, which produced the most emissions in 2007, and the Maldives, most affected by climate change, abstained from the main argument in the meeting and drew attention to their climate-related vulnerabilities. US President George W. Bush had already withdrawn the USA from the Kyoto protocol in 2001. He attributed the reason for withdrawing from the agreement that China and India were not subject to emission restriction requirements and stated that this issue could disrupt the US's economy (The White House Archive 2001). Parallel to this, the US Representative's speech was mainly was energy security and sustainable development during the open debate. However, he did not mention the security effects of climate change, as seen in Table 13 below, and the Council's role in this issue. During the meeting, it was mentioned that climate change is a sustainable development issue and that the USA has provided the necessary investments and aid around the world. At the end of his speech, the US representative interestingly stated that the only way to combat climate change would be economic growth and continued as follows:

> Well-governed countries grow and prosper. Economic growth provides the resources, in both developed and developing countries, to address energy and environmental challenges, including challenges associated with climate change. The United States has a long history of extending a helping hand so that people can live in democratic societies with robust economies and strong and stable governance. We intend to continue that support, working with freedom-loving people everywhere to face the future constructively with confidence and determination.

Although the Maldives stated that it was on the Group of 77 and China's side, it abstained from the main argument of the meeting. The Maldives representative, who frequently repeats the importance of sustainable development in the fight against climate change, was in line with the Group of 77 and China in this regard. However, the Maldives, which is one of the countries most affected by climate change and is under an existential threat from the rise in sea-level, has remained silent about the Council's putting climate change on its agenda, showing that its union with the Group of 77 and China is not political, but

a humanitarian crisis. As seen in Table 3.6, the Maldives representative, who established the causal link between climate security, human security, and national security, mainly mentioned the direct effects of climate change during the meeting.

Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Maldives	+	+	+	n/a	+
US	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Table 3.6: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (17 April 2007)

To sum up, a clear answer could not be reached due to those who defend, oppose, and abstain from this matter. As the Qatar Representative stated that "we all run the risk of being submerged, we must work collectively to save ourselves from drowning," the consensus of the Council is therefore that climate change has a threat multiplier effect, and it is necessary to act collectively to combat this threat. During the discussion about whether climate change should be the Council's issue or not, the members mostly agreed on the Council's culture of preventing conflict by referring to Resolution 1625 (2005) which is related to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict. In this regard, it could be stated that there is a general opinion that if climate change causes a conflict, the Council should act only on matters falling under its jurisdiction.

20 July 2011 Open Debate on "Maintenance of international peace and security: the impact of climate change"

After the debate in 2007 on whether climate change would be the UNSC's matter, a second climate change-themed open debate was held in 2011. Compared to the first open debate, this meeting, where climate change and security effects were discussed for longer and in more detail, took place in two sessions on the same day (S/PV.6587; S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1)). The first of the remarkable comments of the meeting was that the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon characterized climate change using the metaphor of *mega-crisis* at the beginning of the meeting (S/PV.6587, 2). Two dominant storylines emerged from this open debate: the threat multiplier effect and the direct effect related to the rise in sea-levels. In this regard, while the debate's first dominant storyline was shaped by the threat multiplier effect of climate change, this was more detailed than the first open debate in 2007. For instance, as the Nigerian Representative describes that "scarcity breeds fear, which in turn fuels conflict"*,* it was discussed that droughts and extreme weather events could affect food security and exacerbate socio-economic or political instability and even conflict in fragile countries.   Parallel to this, the Luxembourg representative Ms Lucas (S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1, 4)) summarized the threat multiplier effect as follows, taking into account the general point of view of the EU countries:

> There is no doubt that a vast spectrum of such interdependent factors as ethnic tension, cross-border disputes, deepening inequalities within societies and failed States can contribute to armed conflict. However, climate change, with its potentially tragic consequences for security — such as the displacement and transfer of populations, the former of which we have already witnessed — will become an increasingly critical factor in the underlying causes of conflict as the climate continues to change at an ever-faster pace.

While the main argument of the first debate was based on whether climate change would be the UNSC's issue, this debate's main argument is based on whether the Council should deliberate on the security implications of climate change, consistent with its mandate and advance the dialogue on this issue from the security perspective. Although both arguments are very close to each other, in this open debate, the relevant arguments have been deepened over the extent to which climate change will be a matter for the Council. Even the Secretary-General expressed the following words that climate change is an international peace and security problem in the opening speech of the meeting as "We must make no mistake. The facts are clear. Climate change is real, and it is accelerating

in a dangerous manner. It not only exacerbates threats to international peace and security, it is a threat to international peace and security" (S/PV.6587, 2). Thus, he showed his support for the Council to keep climate change on its agenda. As could be seen from Table 3.7, this meeting was generally divided into three as those who supported this argument, those who did not and those who abstained.

20 July 2011 Open Debate on *Maintenance of International Peace and Security: The Impact of Climate Change*	
Organizer	Germany
Members	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
Storylines	Threat Multiplier (Drought, Extreme Weather > Food Security > Conflict> Migration),[33] Direct effect: Sea-level rising
Metaphor	Climate change is a ''mega-crisis''
Argument	The Council should deliberate the security implications of climate change, consistent with its mandate, and advance the dialogue on this issue from the security perspective
Defenders	Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica (the Group of 77 and China), Denmark, El Salvador, Finland, Fiji, France, Gabon, Ghana (the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and China), Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Luxemburg, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines (the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and China), Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom, United States of America
Opposers	- India, Russian Federation - On behalf of the Group of 77 and China: Argentina Brazil - On behalf of the Group of 77 and China and the Non-Aligned Movement: Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania - On behalf of the Arab Group, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and China: Islamic Republic of Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Sudan - On behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): Egypt
Those who don't comment on the argument	Chile, Ecuador (the Group of 77 and China), Honduras, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya (the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and China), Pakistan (the Group of 77 and China), Republic of Korea, Turkey
Discursive Affinity	International Cooperation, Uncertainty of Climate Change, Culture of Prevention
Outputs	S/PRST/2011/15

Table 3.7: 20 July 2011 Open Debate on *Maintenance of International Peace and Security: The Impact of Climate Change*

As seen in Table 3.8, the states defending the general argument of the meeting recognized all dimensions and direct effects of the threat multiplier effect of climate change.

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[33] In the first open debate in 2007, the ''threat multiplier'' effect of climate change was expressed without going into details, while in this open debate, the content of the ''threat multiplier'' was described as ''Drought, Extreme Weather > Food Security > Conflict; Sea-level Rising > Migration.''

Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (20 July 2011)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	*Direct Effects to National/ International Security*
Australia	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+
Bosnia and Herzegovina	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	n/a	+
Colombia	+	+	+	+	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+
Finland	+	+	+	+	+
Fiji	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Gabon	+	+	+	+	+
Ghana	+	+	+	+	+
Hungary	+	+	+	+	+
Iceland	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+
Italy	+	+	+	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+
Kyrgyzstan	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+
Nauru	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+
Nigeria	+	+	+	n/a	+
Palau	+	+	+	+	+
Papua New Guinea	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+
Portugal	+	+	+	+	+
Singapore	+	+	+	+	+
Slovenia	+	+	+	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
USA	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.8: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (20 July 2011)

In the terms of the international security dimension of climate change, Nigeria, which was directly affected by climate change, shared their own experiences and Canada assessed

within the scope of states that are vulnerable to climate change. The representatives of both states did not comment on the international security dimension of climate change, emphasizing instead the importance of international cooperation. In addition, Costa Rica, Ghana, the Philippines from the Group of 77 and China, which took a strong stance that climate change should not be an issue of the Council in 2007, were moderate in this meeting that the Council may put climate change on its agenda within its mandate.[34] In addition, these three countries, which are among the countries most affected by climate change, stated that they agree with the Group of 77 and China and the Non-Aligned Movement on sustainable development, and they declared that the Council might have roles in emission reduction and conflict issues. While countries affected by climate change consider the threat multiplier effect as a humanitarian, political and economic crisis, developed countries, especially the EU, have also emphasized these issues such as displacement and migration. As it is highly possible that the climate-induced migration flows that will intensify in the future will be from the southern countries most affected by climate change to the north countries and will be a security threat for them. The second storyline was formed over the direct effect of climate change, especially the rise in sea-levels in the Pacific Island States. All participants affirmed that existential security issues could be triggered by rising sea levels compromising the borders of the Small Islands Developing States in the Pacific. In this regard, the landless states, and the legal status of the citizens of these states (because the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which are the most comprehensive and key legal documents on this subject, has not recognized the climate-induced migrations), etc. were discussed as issues that would challenge international politics in the future.

Defenders have repeatedly reiterated the importance of international cooperation to combat climate change while emphasizing that the Council should be aware of the impacts of climate change and maintain a culture of conflict prevention under the S/RES/1625 (2005). They have also commonly articulated the importance of international cooperation in the struggle with climate change, respecting the duties and responsibilities of the relevant organs of the UN (General Assembly and the Economic and Social

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[34] The Philippines and Ghana also stated that they were align themselves with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Council) on this issue. In this regard, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also made the following statements on this issue: ''The members of the Council bear a unique responsibility to mobilize national and international action to confront the very real threat of climate change and the specific threats to international peace and security that derive from it'' (S/PV.6587, 3). Based on the threat multiplier effect, Steiner (S/PV.6587, 6), Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, also expressed why, in line with the Council's mandate, the Council should discuss the security implications of climate change and advance the dialogue on this issue from a security perspective:

> We have to recognize that climate change is an issue that needs to be viewed not just from a scientific and technological perspective of managing carbon emissions, but truly from a geopolitical and security perspective. Our response will either unite us in cooperative action or divide us and lead us into chaos, tension and potential conflict.

A significant transformation has also been observed in the discourse of the USA, which has abstained from the relationship between the Council and climate change since the first meeting held in 2007. The influence of Barack Obama, who became president in 2009 and is known for his fight against climate change, is undeniable in this regard. In fact, the US representative, Rice, made a statement ''that [it] is more than disappointing; it is pathetic, short-sighted and, frankly, a dereliction of duty'' for those who do not find it appropriate for the council to take responsibility for climate change (S/PV.6587, 7). In addition, Costa Rica, Ghana, the Philippines from the Group of 77 and China, which took a strong stance that climate change should not be an issue of the Council in 2007, were moderate in this meeting that the Council may put climate change on its agenda within its mandate.

In parallel with the first meeting held in 2007, in line with the Council's mandate, those opposed to discussing the security implications of climate change and furthering the dialogue from a security perspective consisted of members representing the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab Group and Group of 77 and China. States opposed to the general argument of the meeting expressed the security dimensions of climate change as in Table 3.9.

					Direct Effects
Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (20 July 2011)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Argentina	+	+	+	n/a	+
Bangladesh	+	+	+	+	+
Barbados	+	+	+	+	+
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Brazil	+	+	+	+	+
China	+	+	+	+	+
Cuba	+	+	+	+	+
Egypt	+	+	+	n/a	+
India	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+
Russian Federation	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	+
South Africa	+	+	+	+	+
Islamic Republic of Iran	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kuwait	+	+	+	n/a	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+
Plurinational State of Bolivia	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan	+	+	+	+	+
United Republic of Tanzania	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.9: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (20 July 2011)

According to the meeting in 2007, the representative of Russia, one of the members, who gave more details about climate change and its security dimension, mentioned the direct effects of climate change on the developing small island states and stated that the threat multiplier effect is uncertain. Instead of a speech on the security dimension of climate change, Iran emphasized the importance of international cooperation and negotiations. However, the most interesting reaction was made by the Venezuelan Representative. The representative (S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), 35) criticized the president of the meeting, who read the Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2011/15) before the end of the speeches of the representatives, and expressed his criticisms and general dissatisfaction with the Council as follows:

> As we have all heard, the Security Council has adopted a presidential statement on the topic under deliberation today (S/PRST/2011/15). The statement was read out before today's debate had ended and before the statements of 11 delegations on the list delivered to us by the Secretariat, including the Venezuelan delegation, having been heard. That procedure, to say the least, is inconsiderate and another example of the exclusive nature of the Security Council's decision-making. While voicing such concern about the procedure, I would like to state the view of the Venezuelan delegation on the topic under consideration.

However, unlike the first meeting in 2007, opponents generally supported the motion that the Council should be responsible for climate change's security impacts only within the scope of its conflict prevention culture under the comprehensive security framework. Dominantly, the opponents referred to "the respective responsibilities of the principal organs of the United Nations, including the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security conferred upon the Security Council and the responsibility for sustainable development issues, including climate change, conferred upon the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council" which was part of the UN General Assembly's resolution A/RES/63/281 in 2009. Therefore, they emphasized that the UNFCCC is essentially the key instrument in the struggle with climate change and highlighted the *common but differentiated responsibilities* principle of the Kyoto Protocol. The interesting point here is the statements of the Cuban representative speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China. Defending that the Council may have specific roles in the fight against climate change, the Representative emphasized that the UNSC should accept that developed countries with high emissions are responsible for climate change and that the Council should put pressure on the technology transfers expected to be made to developing countries, which are also included in the Kyoto Protocol (S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), 11-12).

The third group consists of abstainers. As seen in Table 3.10, all states expressed their concerns about climate change's threat multiplier and direct effects.

Abstainers' climat- related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (20 July 2011)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Chile	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	n/a	+
Honduras	+	+	+	+	+
Israel	+	+	+	+	+
Kazakhstan	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of Korea	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.10: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (20 July 2011)

In this group, Kenya recognized the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 and China and, Ecuador and Pakistan also agreed with the statements of the Group of 77 and China. The abstainers recognized all dimensions of the security threats of climate change and frequently emphasized the importance of international negotiations and cooperation to combat it. However, they did not comment on the general argument of the meeting, keeping quiet about what the Council could do about it. Pakistan, which opposed the Council's putting climate change on its agenda in the open discussion in 2007, highlighted the security threats of climate change for their country and the world. Referring to the importance of sustainable development in this process, the Pakistani representative talked about the necessity of reducing emissions and providing the necessary support to developing states but did not comment on the general argument of the meeting. In the representative's speech, it is understood that natural disasters have increased gradually in recent years in Pakistan, which has experienced the direct effects of climate change. Considering the possible effects of these disasters on economic and social development, it has been observed that Pakistan has doubts that sustainable development is the only solution to combating climate change.

Lastly, although the main argument was formed on three opposing ideas in this open debate, all sides agreed on the importance of international cooperation in combatting

climate change. In addition, the speech of the President of Nauru about the small island states has led to an increase in awareness about these states that are under existential threat due to sea-level rise. Almost all state representatives have made statements on the impacts of climate change on national security and international security and declared their support for the small island states. Apart from this, it is also observed that the scientific uncertainty of climate change was emphasized in the discourses of all sides. While supporters explained that this could be a security issue, opponents emphasized that development should be prioritized to deal the scientific uncertainty of climate change. Although there is no complete consensus in this open debate, it has raised some hopes that the Council could put climate change on the agenda in the future, and that the Non-Aligned Movement, Group 77 and China have softened their rhetoric that the Council could be responsible in the context of the culture of conflict prevention under the aforementioned comprehensive security framework (in the first open debate, the opponents were more distant from this idea).

In this open debate, a presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15) was issued by the president of the UN Security Council. Accordingly, the primary role of the Council in maintaining international peace and security was reaffirmed and the importance of the Council's culture of conflict prevention was emphasized. The Council *recognized* that sustainable development issues, including climate change, are the responsibility of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council and the UNFCCC's key role in climate change. The Security Council also noted "Protection of global climate for present and future generations of humankind" in the General Assembly's resolution 65/159 in 2010 and expressed concern about climate change's long-term effects on international peace and security, regarding the potential security problems of small island states that will lose their land due to sea-level rise.

23 November 2011 Briefing on ''New challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention''
After the impact of the climate change-themed open debate organized by Germany in July 2011, the themes of the pandemic, transnational organized crime and climate change were discussed within the scope of maintaining international peace and security at the briefing

format meeting organized by Portugal on November 23 of the same year. In general, the meeting was shaped by how the Council could address new security threats on these three challenges more strategically and comprehensively in cooperation with other institutions.

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the Director-General of the WHO representatives of the relevant UN bodies were also invited to the meeting, where the effects of the pandemic, climate change and transboundary organized crime on international peace and security were discussed. The general argument of this meeting, where three different themes were discussed, was based on the fact that international peace and security now requires a more comprehensive and harmonious approach. In this context, the argument on the theme of climate change is structured on how the Council should address climate change more strategically and comprehensively in cooperation with other institutions. At the beginning of the meeting, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized that these challenges are not actually new, but that these three problems are important today as they are transnational and have security implications from human security to national security, regional security and international security. Finally, he stressed that the most important challenge is climate change.

As shown in Table 3.11 below, the dominant storyline of the climate change-themed argument was the threat multiplier effect of climate change as in other open debates, but the dominant role in this threat multiplier storyline was climate change-driven migrations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' handling of migration in the context of climate change plays a significant role in this regard. Guters, who took the floor at the beginning of the meeting, stated that the patterns of migration and displacement have changed, and that people are now forced to migrate for reasons other than the ones discussed at the 1951 Refugee Convention. Stating that climate change has an effect that increases problems by interacting with *megatrends* such as population growth, urbanization, food security and pandemics, Guters underlined that people's displacement is getting more complex. He also emphasized that the relationship between

climate change and migration should be integrated into conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts concerning the threat multiplier effect.

23 November 2011, briefing on *New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention, Including Pandemics, Climate change, and Transnational Organized Crime*	
Organizer	Portugal
Members	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
Storylines	Threat Multiplier Effects, Sea-Level Rising (as a direct effect)
Argument	The Council should address new security threats more strategically and comprehensively in cooperation with other institutions
Defenders	Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Gabon, Germany, Lebanon, Nigeria, United Kingdom, United States of America,
Opposers	Colombia, India, South Africa
Abstainers	Brazil, China, Russian Federation
Discursive Affinity	• New security challenges and the changing nature of international peace and security • Climate change is a complex and multifaceted threat • International cooperation
Outputs	-

Table 3.11: 23 November 2011, briefing on *New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention, Including Pandemics, Climate Change, and Transnational Organized Crime*

As can be seen in Table 3.11, three different discourse coalitions emerged from this argument: defenders, opponents, and abstainers.

The defenders of "the Council should address climate change more strategically and comprehensively in cooperation with other institutions," the main argument of this meeting, structured their storyline based on the relationship between the threat multiplier effect and climate-related migrations. In this context, the defenders of the main argument structured the security dimensions of climate change as in Table 3.12 in their discourse.

Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 November 2011)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	***Direct Effects to National/ International Security***
Bosnia and Herzegovina	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Gabon	+	+	+	+	+
Germany	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Nigeria	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	n/a
USA	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.12: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 November 2011)

The defenders emphasized that the Council should retake a position against these threats, receive regular reports from the Secretary-General and cooperate with other institutions by referring the international security dimension of migrations that may arise as a result of instability and conflicts due to climate change. The effect of the 17th COP conference, which would be held in Durban, South Africa, on 28 November 2011, five days after this meeting, was also felt in this meeting. Considering the climate-related migrations, especially the USA, Germany and France expressed that it was necessary to act jointly for possible security problems regarding climate change and pay attention to emission reductions.

In this meeting, a discursive change is observed on the Lebanese side, which opposed the argument that "the Council should deliberate the security implications of climate change, consistent with its mandate, and advance the dialogue on this issue from the security perspective" in the previous meeting of the Council. Emphasizing the importance of creative diplomacy in the fight against climate change, the Lebanese representative explained that the Council should be collaborative on other issues within its scope without intervening in sustainable development issues. In Lebanon's Second National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2011 report, it was emphasized that the direct effects of climate change had a significant impact on limited water resources and agricultural land. Lebanon emphasized the importance of

international cooperation at the COP17 in 2011 and summarized their situation as follows: "We also believe that developing countries such as Lebanon, which are experiencing now more than ever the very real impacts of climate change, also need the continuous and unsuspended support to identify concrete adaptation actions to be implemented on the ground. We need real and tangible adaptation actions to be put in effect" (UNFCCC 2011). In addition, it was stated in the Climate Diplomacy Report (2015) that not only the internal pressures arising from the increasing population and urbanization but also the refugees who migrated to Lebanon as a result of the civil war in Syria put pressure on these limited resources. This situation could be associated with the 2011 Arab Spring and the political turmoil in Lebanon. In fact, in the Economic Costs to Lebanon from Climate Change: A First Look report prepared by the Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Environment and UNDP in the same year, they acknowledged the impact of climate change on limited resources creating instability and conflict. Therefore, Lebanon's speeches at the Council could be based on these developments.

Another discourse coalition consists of those who oppose the argument that the Council should address new security threats more strategically and comprehensively in cooperation with other institutions. Three different threats were discussed in the meeting, so this was an opportunity for states to focus on other discourses instead of climate change. As seen in Table 3.13, those who opposed the meeting's argument on climate change did not comment on this issue.

Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 November 2011)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Colombia	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
India	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
South Africa	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Table 3.13: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 November 2011)

India and South Africa in this coalition reiterated their past discourses and reiterated that climate change is a sustainable development issue which is the responsibility of the

Economic and Social Council and related sub-organizations. In this context, India, one of the largest emitters in 2011, referred to the "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" in the 39th article of the UN Charter and stated that the Security Council should only deal with the issues of war and peace in interstate relations (S/PV.6668, 23). The South African representative emphasized that the Kyoto Protocol was a crucial tool in combating climate change and that climate change can only be combated by complying with the commitments in this protocol. Also, prioritizing the 17th COP conference to be held in South Africa after this briefing, the representative expresses that the Durban Conference "provides the international community an opportunity to demonstrate real leadership in finding effective solutions to the threat that climate change presents to the livelihood, quality of life, dignity and, in many cases, the very survival of millions across the globe'' (S/PV.6668, 18). The Colombian representative described this situation as *growing securitization* and expressed their concerns on undermining development initiatives (S/PV.6668, 11).

Brazil, China and the Russian Federation could not demonstrate a transparent approach on the Council should address new security threats more strategically and comprehensively in cooperation with other institutions. As seen in Table 3.14, they took a similar approach to those who opposed the general argument about climate change and did not touch upon the issue of climate change.

Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 November 2011)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Brazil	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
China	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Russian Federation	+	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Table 3.14: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 November 2011)

The Chinese representative stated that it is possible to combat climate change through international negotiations and cooperation and stated that they have always taken a proactive and constructive approach in this process. However, the Chinese representative

did not comment on the Security Council. Russia also took a similar approach and did not even address the climate change issue at this meeting. In this context, it could be argued that Putin considered the discourses on climate change and security as a threat to his regime and in response to this, he feeds his arguments with climate denialism (Tynkkynen and Tynkkynen 2018). Apart from this, the fact that Russia is the world's largest crude oil producer, the second largest dry natural gas producer and a large coal producer and that one-third of its economy is based on these hydrocarbons (EIA 2017) can be shown as another reason why the Russian Federation is opposed in this regard. The discourses of the abstentionists are generally structured on the fact that the Council exceeds its mandate in the UN Charter, acting on issues not related to it, securitizing sustainable development issues and inhibiting these processes. Even the Colombian representative described this situation as *growing securitization* (S/PV.6668, 11). The general expectations of the abstainers were that the Council was informed about climate change by the Secretary-General but did not take any initiative for development.

When all the arguments in the briefing are examined, the important points that bring the discourse coalition closer could be listed as follows: They agree that new security problems are powerful enough to change the nature of international peace and security. All members have affirmed the importance of international cooperation in dealing with these threats. There is a general consensus that climate change is a complex and multifaceted threat in this regard. Last but not least, however, it has been observed that the discussions on other threats such as pandemics and transnational organized crimes along with climate change create an opportunity for dissidents and abstainers not to mention the subject.

Between 2013-2017- Arria Formula Meetings and Indirect Climate Change Themed Debates Period

After the last official Council meeting held on 23 November 2011 in briefing format with the theme of climate change, the next official climate-themed open debate was held by Sweden in 2018. Between 2013-2017, four open debates and a briefing indirectly discussed the security effects of climate change, and three Arria Formula meetings under the direct theme of climate change were held, as seen in Table 3.15. In this section, first, the Arria Formula meetings, which were held with the direct theme of climate change, and then the open discussions that indirectly brought climate change to the agenda, will be analyzed.

	Year	Format	Organizer	Themes	Characteristic
	UNSC Meetings Related to Climate Change and Security Between 2013-2017				
1	15 February 2013	Arria Formula	United Kingdom, Pakistan	Security dimensions of climate change	Informal Meeting
2	19 June 2013	Open Debate	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources	Official and indirect climate change themed
3	30 June 2015	Arria Formula	Spain, Malaysia	Climate change as a threat multiplier for global security	Informal Meeting
4	30 July 2015	Open Debate	New Zealand	Peace and security challenges facing small island developing States	Official and indirect climate change themed
5	26 May 2016	Briefing	Egypt	Peace and security in Africa Challenges in the Sahel region	Official and indirect climate change themed
6	22 November 2016	Open Debate	Senegal	Water, peace and security	Official and indirect climate change themed
7	10 April 2017	Arria Formula	Ukraine (with the support of Germany and Sweden)	Security Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise	Informal Meeting
8	06 June 2017	Briefing	Bolivia	Preventive diplomacy and transboundary waters	Official and indirect climate change themed
9	14 December 2017	Arria Formula	France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Maldives, Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and the UK	Climate Change: Preparing for security implications of rising temperatures	Informal Meeting
10	20 December 2017	Open Debate	Japan	Addressing complex contemporary challenges to international peace and security	Official and indirect climate change themed

Table 3.15: UNSC Meetings Related to Climate Change and Security Between 2013-2017

In this section, we will first focus on the Arria Formula meetings, which are held with the direct theme of climate change. This meeting format, which was formulated by the Venezuelan Ambassador Diego Arria in March 1992, enables experts, various institutions, and non-governmental organizations outside the Council to benefit from their expertise (Security Council Report 2020). Arria formula meetings are not official meetings of the Security Council, so these meetings are not recorded. If deemed necessary by the members of the Council, it is organized to consult the opinions of external experts or institution representatives, but no official conclusion is reached (Security Council Report 2020). Since we do not have official transcripts or documents for the analysis of climate change-themed Arria Formula meetings, a general evaluation will be made through the official news of the UN and the analyses of some think tanks.

After the open debate on the theme of climate change in 2011, the first thematic meeting was organized by the United Kingdom and Pakistan in February 2013. In the first Arria Formula meeting, which was closed to the press and observers, climate change was discussed over the threat multiplier effect. After the meeting, Tony deBrum, Minister in Assistance to the President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, held a press conference. In this regard, he emphasized that there were discussions on the threat multiplier effect and expressed the urgency of the situation for small island developing states. Stating that the Security Council has *difficulty* dealing with the threat of climate change, deBrum expressed his concerns for his own country, according to the International Institute for Sustainable Development's news (sdg.iisd.org 2013) as follows:

> deBrum said he had made a plea for the Marshall Islands' survival, just 35 years after he made petition for the country's independence to the same UN body. Highlighting challenges such as flooded roads, salinated well-water, a lack of fruit, and human migration, deBrum stated that "many of our friends throughout the world do not realize the urgency of this problem."

On the day of the meeting, Group 77 made a statement on their website that climate change was a sustainable development issue and that the Council should stay away from this issue (g77.org 2013). However, the most important issue in this meeting is that Pakistan, which insistently defends the view that climate change should not be a matter

for the Council, is one of the organizers of this meeting (Security Council Report 2015). At COP21 held in Paris in 2015, Pakistan stated that it is one of the countries with the lowest greenhouse gas emission production per capita, but that it is one of the countries most affected by climate change in recent years. The Pakistan representative stated that if the necessary measures and investments are not made, all development moves made so far will be undermined (UNFCCC 2015). At this point, it can be said that there has been a shift in Pakistan's rhetoric as it faces serious security threats from climate change.

Using the metaphors of *greatest challenges* and *greatest global challenges*, Spain and Malaysia held an Arria Formula meeting in June 2015, wishing to continue the debate on the security implications of climate change within the scope of the Security Council. It is understood from the concept note Spain and Malaysia published before the meeting that the general storyline is based on the threat multiplier. It is also understood that the predictions of the IPCC's comprehensive report AR 5 in 2014 regarding the increase in economic shocks, instability and conflicts that may develop due to climate change played an important role in this meeting (spainun.org 2015).

The last two Arria Formula meetings of the 2013-2017 period were held in April and December 2017. The dominant storyline of the Arria Formula meetings held in 2017 was on the direct effects of climate change. Especially the extreme heat in Europe and the hurricanes in the USA were effective in the formation of the storylines of these meetings, where the threat multiplier effect was also effective. While the first meeting was held in April by Ukraine, sponsored by Germany, on the rise in sea levels, the main discussion topics of the meeting held in December were the direct effects of climate change, especially in the context of rising temperatures (Security Council Report 2021).

Indirect Climate Change-Themed Debates between 2013-2017
As mentioned before, although the members tried to keep the issue of climate change and security impacts on the Council's agenda through the Arria Formula meetings, no formal and climate change-themed meeting was held between 2013 and 2017. Although climate change has been increasing its effects with each passing year, there is no clear answer as to why no official meeting was held on this issue between 2013-2017. In this regard,

besides the inability to get any significant results from the direct climate change-themed meetings held in an official format before, the failure to provide international cooperation within the scope of UNFCCC, which is accepted by the Council as the key institution in the fight against climate change (even though the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is about to expire), may have caused complacency among council members. However, this does not mean that the climate change and security dimension has been underestimated. The EU, New Zealand, Australia, Small Island Developing States, and some African countries continued to keep this issue hot on the Council's agenda during these years.

2013: Open Debate on "Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources"

In the open debate on "Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources" organized by the UK in June 2013, climate change was mentioned four times in total by Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Republic of Korea, and Ms Rebeca Grynspan, Under-Secretary-General and Associate Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (S/2015/543). The participants mentioned above emphasized that climate change is a situation that threatens global security and exacerbates conflict and instability by briefly speaking about its impact on natural resources.

2015 Open Debate on "Peace and Security Challenges Facing Small Island Development States''

After the *Climate change as a threat multiplier for global security*-themed Arria formula meeting organized by Malaysia and Spain in 2015, the issue of climate change made a quick entry in the same year to the Council's agenda in the open debate organized by New Zealand under the theme of "Peace and security challenges facing small island developing States.'' Before the open debate on 30 July 2015, New Zealand sent a concept note (S/2015/543) to the Council members on four challenges that could pose security threats to small island developing states. These were "transnational crime and piracy, illicit exploitation of natural resources, climate change and climate-related natural disasters and uneven development" (S/2015/543, 2). Although these four challenges were expected to be discussed equally, climate change and security implications came to the fore as the primary agenda matter in the open debate, in which the developing small island states

were invited, alongside the fifteen members. At this point, it can be said that it may be unfair to use *the indirect climate change theme* for this open debate.

The main storyline of this debate has developed over the geopolitical position of the small island developing states. It was emphasized that the geopolitically fragile nature of these states has made them attractive to transnational organized crime organizations (drug and weapons trafficking, piracy, money laundering, human smuggling, exploitation of women and children). In other words, it was pointed out that their isolated location, vast coastlines and gaps in maritime law, economic dependence on imports, and weak security structures cause these states to have to deal with multiple security threats. Therefore, the expectations of these states from the Council and developed countries, in general, have been to approach them with a holistic security method. In this context, they strongly emphasized the three main points needed to solve these problems: development, international cooperation, and the necessity of expanding the Council's realistic security approach by considering the new generation threats.

If it is examined in terms of climate change and its security implications, it is understood that the dominant story of this open debate is that climate change is an existential threat to developing small island states. This story can be roughly generalized as follows: climate change is an existential security threat for the small island developing states. Especially since sea-level rises could cause territory loss, this paves the way for the destruction of a state. In addition, the deterioration of freshwater resources due to sea-level rises may cause forced migration as it will affect food security and human security. In addition, these states, which are dependent on ocean fisheries, are significantly affected by the increase in ocean acidification due to global warming. Another point is that extreme weather events have turned into an existential threat in these countries. The representative of New Zealand (S/PV.7499, 10), who presided over the open debate, stated that extreme weather events have seriously damaged the economy of these countries with the following words:

> The recent cyclone in Vanuatu caused $360 million worth of damage — approximately 45 per cent of Vanuatu's gross domestic product (GDP), and Hurricane Sandy cost $315 million in damage across the Caribbean, but the important point here is not just the impact of climate change or natural disasters themselves. Rather, it is their impact on countries that are already vulnerable. Most SIDS simply do not have the economic diversity or the resources to handle major shocks. Being a small island developing State is to have an inbuilt force multiplier whenever a natural disaster or man-made conflict strikes, and such security and development challenges can have regional consequences.

Although transnational organized crime, development and exploitation of natural resources were among the agenda items of this meeting, none of them were defined as an existential threat. Even climate change came to the fore and became the main agenda item of the meeting after the first half of the meeting.

In this open debate, it is understood that important expectations had been set for COP21, which would be held in Paris in December 2015. For the COP21 to be held in Paris, the UN Secretary-General, EU, USA, Russian Federation, China and small island developing states threatened by climate change made promising speeches to provide the necessary support to the states affected by climate change and to take binding decisions in terms of reducing the emissions of major emission producers and ensuring the transition to sustainable energy. This open debate, which created an atmosphere of unity and support for COP21, has been a ray of hope for global cooperation on climate change.

Although the meeting had four main themes, the main argument of the debate that developed in the context of climate change was that the Security Council should take a resolution declaring that it recognized climate change and its effects. Developing small island countries which reiterated their commitment with the decisions taken at the Samoa Pathway[35] at the Third UN Small Island Developing States Summit held in September 2014, the EU, USA, China, and other African and Middle Eastern countries, excluding Brazil, the Russian Federation and Barbados, argued that the Council should take this issue seriously. In this regard, when the previous open debates and briefings are taken into consideration, it has been noticed that there are some breaks in China's discourse. China, which insisted in its previous arguments that only the UNFCCC, the Economic

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[35] At this summit, all small island developing states acknowledged that they are vulnerable to impacts such as the sea-level rise and undermining sustainable development caused by climate change and that a union of forces is needed to cope with these challenges.

and Social Council and the General Assembly should have critical roles in the fight against climate change, excluded the Council from these debates. In this regard, China has stated that the most appropriate response to non-traditional security threats could be given by regional organizations such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Caribbean Community. However, it has slightly changed its discourse by stating that the relevant UN agencies could also deal with the issue within a clear division of labour within its jurisdiction.

Barbados, Brazil and the Russian Federation have reiterated that a relationship could not be established between the Council and climate change, which they see as a development problem. In this sense, all the Council members agree that climate change is a matter of sustainable development. However, other countries that consider the flip side of development as security have agreed that the Council should develop a comprehensive security approach. While establishing the discursive affinity between discourse coalitions that climate change is a development issue, no resolution was taken at the end of the meeting that the Council recognizes climate change.

2016-1: Briefing on "Peace and Security in Africa Challenges in the Sahel Region"
In 2016, Egypt organized a meeting in the briefing format on the challenges to peace and security in Africa, especially in the Sahel Region. Although climate change and security impacts were not the main themes of this briefing, it was understood from the meeting records (S/PV.7699) that this issue played a dominant role throughout the meeting. In this regard, the members agreed that one of the most critical vulnerabilities of the region is climate change.

The overall storyline of the meeting could be summarized as the consolidation of collective efforts of urgent regional action and national aids to combat terrorist groups, declining agricultural productivity, organized crime, droughts, climate change and poverty in Africa and the Sahel region. In this regard, Mr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, Mr. Jean-Paul Laborde, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and

Assistant Secretary-General and Ms. Monique Barbut, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, also briefed on these issues.

The dominant storyline of this meeting, particularly climate change, was that it had the threat multiplier effect on human security and conflicts. In their briefings, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Jean-Paul Laborde and Monique Barbut emphasized that climate change would not only lead to conflict, but it would also worsen the fragile governances and imbalanced use of natural resources, drought-related food insecurity, increased youth unemployment and other socio-political problems. Although the classic argument that climate change should be a subject of the Council is not considered by Russia, Uruguay and Venezuela, it is understood that the countries defending this argument have developed and clarified their discourse in this regard. For instance, Spain's representative stated that the absolute solution to combat climate change does not only depend on the Security Council. However, he stated that the Council should not underestimate climate change within the scope of its responsibility to the maintenance of international peace and security, and continued as follows: "Climate change is already changing the rules of the game, and ignoring the truth will just lead us to failure" *(S/PV.7699 12)*. At this point, the Spanish representative presented three suggestions within the scope of the Council's authority and power:

- Providing the necessary information for the Council to continue its preventive function,
- Developing a holistic security approach for regions with complex security problems such as the Sahel,
- Ensuring that the commitments undertaken by the Council on climate change are not invalidated (S/PV.7699 12).

In this open debate, Spain and other defenders referred to the UN system and reiterated the importance of relevant institutions such as G-5 Sahel[36] and the United

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[36] The G-5 Sahel is intergovernmental cooperation established by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to provide regional cooperation on issues such as development and security in West Africa.

Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS),[37] emphasizing their critical roles in combating climate change.

In this meeting, some developments were observed among the discourse coalitions of defenders and opposers of the argument that climate change should be a subject of the Council. While the defenders at the first meetings did not have a clear argument about what the Council should do, importance was attached to the regional institutions and organizations of the UN system related to climate change in this meeting. The exciting thing is that countries that oppose the argument that climate change should be a subject of the Council somewhat withdraw their discourse. It is observed in the meeting records that they end their speeches by explaining them with a few sentences, but their message on this issue is clear: climate change is a sustainable development issue and the security council does not have sufficient tools in this regard. This issue should be addressed in the relevant UN agencies and the Council should not undermine development initiatives by securitizing this issue. So far, these developments could be regarded as signs that the realist agenda of the Council has not yet expanded and that it persists in preserving its classical position.

2016-2: Open Debate on "Water, Peace and Security"
The general storyline of the *Water, Peace and Security* themed meeting organized by Senegal in November 2016 was that water was vital for all humankind, but it had the potential to threaten peace and security due to mismanagement, urbanization, pollution, population growth and climate change. In a way, the open debate's storyline had been shaped by the threat multiplier effect of water. The concept note sent to the members before the meeting included the following statements (S/2016/969, 2) about the importance of water in the context of international peace and security:

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[37] UNISS; the resolution (S/RES/2056 (2012)) taken by the UNSC in response to the Mali crisis in 2012, the Council requests "to develop and implement, in consultation with regional organizations, a United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues, including through the involvement of the United Nations Office for West Africa, and requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council on progress made by 15 September 2012" from the UN Secretary-General. In this context, UNISS was launched in 2013.

Fresh water represents 2 per cent of the total water in the world but just 0.02 per cent is usable by human societies. Nine countries share 60 per cent of the world's water reserves, namely, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Peru, the Russian Federation and the United States of America…. Asia accounts for 61 per cent of the world's population but has 36 per cent of available water resources, whereas Europe, with 12 per cent of the world's population, has 8 per cent of the water. Latin America has 6 per cent of the world's population and 26 per cent of the world's water resources… There are 1.7 billion people who are currently lacking fresh water and are below the real rarity threshold established by the United Nations, 1,000 m3 per person per year. This number is expected to rise to 2.4 billion people by 2025.

During the meeting, Danilo Türk, Chair of the Global High-Level Panel on Water and Peace, made the statement "Out of the 263 shared river basins, involving 145 States in the world, only 84 have joint water management bodies. Some of those institutions are not very effective" regarding freshwaters (S/PV.7818, 4). That is, the need for international cooperation was expressed in order to have common management in the sharing of at least 179 river basins. General Secretary Ban Ki-moon underlined that access to freshwater could cause social tensions and called for water as a cause of cooperation rather than conflict. Apart from this, some discussions were held on the possibility that freshwater could become a weapon of war for the civilian population and a strategic tool for the military during the conflict. The general argument of the open debate was that the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, should consider water as a fundamental element in conflict prevention. The EU, USA, Canada, African and Asian countries defending this argument called for the development of the Council's conflict prevention culture, conflict resolution and the implementation of water diplomacy to ensure cooperation between countries. In addition, they also called for resolutions to be taken under humanitarian law in order to [prevent the use of it] as a weapon against civil rights in conflict zones. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and the Russian Federation argued that the freshwater issue is the subject of sustainable development and that the Council should stay out of this issue. In this regard, while Brazil maintained that by securitizing water, sustainable development efforts would be weakened, Russia argued that water could not be the sole cause of the conflict and should not have a priority for the Council.

In terms of climate change and security, it has been stated that water will pose a problem for international peace and security due to climate change. Apart from that, Council members and participants did not make any arguments about climate change during the meeting.

2017-1: Open Debate on "Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary Waters"

This open debate with the theme *Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary Waters* organized by Bolivia in June 2017 could generally be seen as a continuation of the previous open debate held with the theme *Water, Peace and Security* in 2016. The information given at this meeting about the vital importance of water, common basins in the world and some of the states that share them, and the effects of climate change on water security is similar to the information given in the 2016 open debate.

The general storyline of this open debate was based on the fact that the consumption, sharing and management of limited freshwater resources are under threat due to climate change, urbanization, population growth, and so on. The main argument of the meeting was that the Security Council should have taken the necessary resolutions to prevent conflicts that may occur regarding the sharing and access of water resources and transboundary water resources.

The members defending this argument, especially the EU countries and others, focused on preventive diplomacy and made statements about cooperation on managing common water basins and transboundary waters. They also advised the Council to develop an early warning system by providing the necessary information on this issue. The only country that clearly opposes this argument is the Russian Federation. Their Representative, who began his words with "in recent times, we have heard about the issue of water here at the Security Council with enviable regularity," emphasized that water management is under the national jurisdictions and he also added that the path to intervention in countries' sovereignty might be opened through preventive diplomacy.

As in the previous meeting in 2016, climate change was seen as a reason that only had an impact on water security, so, in this regard, any storyline was not structured in this open debate.

Finally, some discursive changes have been observed in China's approach. In this regard, while they broadly agreed with the argument of the meeting, they, like the Russian Federation, reiterated that national sovereignty should be respected.

2017-2: Open Debate on "Addressing Complex Contemporary Challenges to International Peace and Security"

The main storyline of the open debate held by Japan in December 2017 was that some challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, climate change, pandemics and transnational organized crime had severe impacts on international peace and security. Moreover, it was discussed that these factors play an important role in exacerbating conflicts and complicating the lives of local people in post-conflict situations in many cases. The main argument of the meeting was that the Security Council should be at the centre of these new threats emerging around the world. In other words, in his opening speech, the Secretary-General announced the launch of a three-pronged reform effort aimed at repositioning the UN system in the face of these new challenges, reorganizing the internal administration and strengthening the secretariat's stance toward peace and security.

At the beginning of the meeting, the President (Japan's Representative) stated that it is very important for the Council to discuss these challenges, which they describe as contemporary challenges, in a holistic and methodological manner. In this regard, in this open debate, where the expansion of the nature of the Council, which is actually based on the existing realist security agenda, was discussed, Japan addressed the members who would oppose the Council's powers and limitations, as follows: "The Council has a clear mandate to maintain international peace and security, and the Council cannot fully assume its responsibilities without addressing mutually reinforcing, multidimensional factors that are closely interlinked with peace and security" (S/PV.8144, 4). In general, states advocating that the Council should be at the centre of these new challenges have developed their discourse within this framework.

Brazil, Colombia, Ethiopia, and the Russian Federation opposed the Council's centrality in dealing with new security threats. Although Brazil favored cooperation with the council in the matters covered by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, at the end of the day, it reiterated that these problems are development problems. It also stated that although the link between security and development is complex and nuanced,

it does not necessarily pose a threat to international security. Russia, on the other hand, repeated its classical rhetoric and stated that it was not appropriate for the Security Council to adopt resolutions on matters of expertise that it did not have.

The striking point in the 2016 and 2017 records was the change in the climate change discourses of the USA. Donald Trump, who became president in 2016 and known as a climate denier, withdrew his country from the Paris Agreement, which was adopted into force in 2015, right after he became president. Concordantly, US representatives also hardly touched on the issue of climate change in the Council's meetings.

In conclusion, although the relevant meetings in 2016 were not held specifically on climate change, some arguments about its security dimension played dominant roles. As mentioned in the previous section, two Arria Formula meetings under the theme of climate change were held in 2017. Apart from these, two more official meetings were held, and the climate change and security dimensions were one of the main agenda items of these meetings. However, compared to previous years, especially 2016, there was not much focus on this issue, and storylines on climate change could not be created in either meeting.

Current Climate Change and Security Arguments in the UNSC between 2018-2021
2018-1: Open Debate on "Understanding and Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks"
Seven years after the last open debate under the theme of climate change, the following open debate was organized by Sweden in June 2018 under the title of "Understanding and Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks." Apart from the Council members and invited states, Amina Mohammed, the Deputy Secretary-General; Baron Divavesi Waqa, President of the Republic of Nauru; Hassan Janabi, Minister for Water Resources of the Republic of Iraq; Hindou Ibrahim, the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change also briefed on climate change and its security impacts on international peace and security. At the beginning of the meeting, Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed summarized the main storyline of the open debate as follows: climate change is intertwined with today's challenges, and the states most vulnerable to climate change were also the most undefended to conflicts. In this context, Mohammed (S/PV.8307, 2-

3) summarized the main storyline of the relationship between climate change and conflict by giving the example of the Lake Chad Basin:

> The basin is experiencing a crisis brought on by a combination of political, socioeconomic, humanitarian and environmental factors. The drastic shrinking of Lake Chad by more than 90 per cent since the 1960s has led to environmental degradation, socioeconomic marginalization and insecurity affecting 40 million people. Exacerbated competition over scant resources and the vicious cycle of risk and vulnerability have decreased the resilience of populations to cope with the humanitarian crisis.... Declining economic activity and agricultural loss have led to a lack of employment opportunities across the region. The resulting socioeconomic marginalization has exposed populations, in particular the young, to the risk of violent extremism and has provided a breeding ground for recruitment by groups such as Boko Haram. The Boko Haram insurgency in north-east Nigeria and the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and the Niger has left over 10 million people displaced and has resulted in the massive destruction of basic infrastructure, health-care and educational facilities, commercial properties, private homes and agricultural assets.... The multidimensional nature of the crisis underlines the complex relationship between climate change and conflict.

The main argument of the meeting was that the Security Council should develop tools on the ground to understand the security risks of climate change better and ensure a regular flow of necessary analysis and reports. For this purpose, the Swedish representative Ms. Wallström, who was the president of the meeting, suggested establishing an institutional home where the information provided by the relevant UN bodies on climate change was gathered in one place. She argued that the institutional home would increase the chance of early intervention of the Council by producing more evidence-based reports and analyses through inter-institutional cooperation, avoiding duplication of work and loss of time. As can be seen in Table 3.16, three discourse coalitions were formed: those who agree with this argument, those who oppose, and those who abstain.

	11 July 2018 **Open Debate on *Understanding and Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks***
Organizer	Sweden
Members	Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
Storylines	Climate Change Exacerbates Conflicts and Displacements (Threat Multiplier Effects)
Argument	The council should be provided with necessary information on climate change. For this, an ''institutional house'' should be established where the necessary information provided by the relevant UN bodies is gathered in one place.
Defenders	Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Maldives, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, United Kingdom
Opposers	Kuwait, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Russian Federation
Those who don't comment on the argument	China, United States of America, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago
Discursive Affinity	• Compliance with the Paris Agreement • Threat multiplier effect of climate change in Lake Chad Basin, West Africa
Outputs	-

Table 3.16: 20 July 2011 Open Debate on *Understanding and Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks*

As Table 3.17 shows, advocates have expressed concerns about all aspects of climate change in the context of multi-level security. In addition, these advocating states have problematized Africa in the context of the threat multiplier effect and the small island states in the context of direct effects.

Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (11 July 2018)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Côte d'Ivoire	+	+	+	+	+
Ethiopia	+	+	+	+	+
Equatorial Guinea	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Iraq	+	+	+	+	+
Kazakhstan	+	+	+	+	+
Maldives	+	+	+	+	+
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.17: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (11 July 2018)

Member states who defended that the UNSC should be informed regularly on climate change and its security impacts agree that the Council needs to be strengthened, particularly on risk assessment, conflict analysis and early warning systems. Emphasizing the importance of a holistic security structure, these states (especially the EU) argued that coordination between institutions should be ensured in a way that the powers of the UNFCCC, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council would not be undermined. It is observed that these states, which consider the effectiveness of the Council on climate change as significant, have gradually developed and focused their arguments since 2007. However, the institutionalization of their discourse will be analyzed in the last chapter; the least that can be said is that the efforts of these states were not fruitless for now.

As seen in Table 3.18, there are four states opposing the proposal that climate change should be on the Council's agenda: Bolivia, Kuwait, the Russian Federation and Trinidad and Tobago. These states were creating their storylines on the threat multiplier and direct effects of climate change. Russia, for the first time, stated that climate change is not a threat to international security. Accordingly, while the Russian representative

acknowledged the direct effects of climate change, he was skeptical about the threat multiplier effect and expressed that each region should be handled specifically: "I am once again obliged to point out that climate change is not a universal challenge in the context of international security but should rather be addressed with regard to the specifics of each situation" (S/PV.8307, 15).

Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (11 July 2018)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Kuwait	+	+	+	+	+
Plurinational State of Bolivia	+	+	+	+	+
Russian Federation	+	+	+	-	+
Trinidad and Tobago	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.18: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (11 July 2018)

Among these states that repeated the classic rhetoric of "the Council lacks specific expertise and tools to tackle climate change, so securitizing this issue undermines development solutions," the Russian Federation hardened its rhetoric more in this meeting.

The Russian Representative stated that they fancy themselves as a global leader in the fight against climate change and underlined that they also consider this issue as an important security issue. However, the Russian Representative (S/PV.8307, 15) stated that they rejected the main argument of this meeting and continued as follows:

> We refuse to be reconciled to the fact that in our view today's meeting is yet another attempt to link the issue of preserving the environment to threats to international peace and security. Regrettably, we are creating the illusion among those who follow our work that the Council is now taking on the climate issue and that will immediately bring about a turning point. That is a dangerous illusion and a clear deception.

Russia (S/PV.8307, 16) claimed that the climate change problem could not be solved within the Council and asked why the states that brought this issue to the agenda of the Council remained silent about the destruction caused by armed conflicts as follows:

> If we are so principled about this, why are we always silent during the discussions initiated on this pretext about a no less serious aspect of the issue, the damage to the environment that results from violent military operations and unilateral sanctions, a glaring example of which have been the bombings of Yugoslavia, Libya and Syria by Western coalitions? It is strange, to say the least, that no speakers today have expressed concern about the massive environmental damage that such action inflicts, not to mention the colossal harm to the health of the citizens of those countries.

Expressing their rhetoric more aggressively, the Russian Representative expressed an opinion on increasing the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement for the basic colution and underlined how they tackled climate change and what assistance they provided for vulnerable countries.

As seen in Table 3.19, the abstainers expressed their concerns about all aspects of climate change in the context of the multi-level security framework.

Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (11 July 2018)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
China	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan	+	+	+	+	+
USA	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.19: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (11 July 2018)

Although the USA and China defended the importance of global cooperation in the fight against climate change, they did not comment on the Council being informed and acting accordingly. Despite Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the USA representative stated that they accepted climate change and defined this crisis as a national and international security problem, but they did not emphasize the Council's effectiveness on this issue. However, we can say that while climate change was seen as a problem that could be solved by using more energy during the Bush era, the increasing frequency of natural disasters and the effects of sea-level rise were an obstacle to diverting the discourse in the Trump era.[38] On the other hand, the sustainable development discourses

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[38] We can understand this from the Council speeches that that consistently emphasized the increasingly frequent climate catastrophes.

that China constantly emphasized have been replaced by security discourses. The Chinese representative stressed the need to create a comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept to combat climate change and defended the importance of the international community's responsibilities. This can be understood from the council speeches that consistently emphasized the increasingly frequent climate catastrophes. Trombetta (2019) attributes China's discourse shift to two reasons; adapting its economy to the *new normal* and its commitments in the Paris Agreement (The USA's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has made China, the largest emission producer, more visible). Apart from this, worsening air pollution and understanding that development steps would be undermined in the face of increasing extreme weather events are also issues to be considered.

Although no output was obtained from this meeting, the fact that all members agreed on a common denominator, namely discursive affinity, was positively increasing the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement and the existence of conflicts triggered by climate change in the Lake Chad Basin, Mali and Somalia.

2018-2: Open Debate on "Root Causes of Conflict — the Role of Natural Resources"
The overall storyline of the open debate held by Bolivia in October 2018 is that the control, exploitation, access to and sharing of natural resources are catalysts for armed conflicts. At the beginning of the meeting, the UN Secretary-General gave a briefing where he stated that more than 40 per cent of the internal armed conflicts in the last 60 years were caused by natural resources. The Bolivian representative also stated that the access to, operation and control of oil, natural gas, water, minerals and other natural resources has become a strategic target of armed groups and criminal organizations and that foreign interests or multinational corporations back such formations. He also expressed that it was not enough to simply monitor and punish such armed groups and criminal organizations, it was essential to take more comprehensive and multi-level security measures and to impose sanctions. At this point, the president (the Bolivian Representative) of the meeting, who put forward the general argument of the open debate, stated that the Security Council should organize the powers of the bodies dealing with

sanctions and, where necessary, the Council should be able to impose sanctions on armed groups and companies.

The argument was generally supported, but Russia and Peru argued that the issue was beyond the Council's powers. Peru emphasized that issues such as the control, exploitation of and access to natural resources are the subjects of sustainable development, while Russia stated that this issue is a matter for the Economic and Social Council. In addition, the Russian Representative noted that the conflicting issues related to natural resources are a matter of national security, so intervening would be contrary to the principle of national sovereignty. China also argued that if natural resources are in dispute, the Council should only act on conflict and prevention issues.

In this open debate, little attention was paid to the impact of climate change on natural resources. Therefore, no storylines or arguments were created on this issue.

2019: Open Debate on "Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security"

This open debate organized by the Dominican Republic under the theme "Addressing the Impacts of Climate-related Disasters on International Peace and Security" in 2019 attracted great attention from the UN member states and international organizations. In addition to the Council members, while some countries affected by climate change were invited to give speeches, many experts[39] were also invited to give briefings. Some significant developments that formed the background of the meeting attended by approximately 80 government representatives and briefers were as follows: the Global Risk Report 2018 and the Global Risk Report 2019 of the World Economic Forum; the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C of IPCC; and the World Bank Report on Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. According to the Global Risk Report 2018, extreme weather events and inadequate adaptation and prevention efforts are two essential threats to global security, while in the 2019 report, it is stated that extreme weather events

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[39] Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Achim Steiner, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme; Pavel Kabat, Chief Scientist of the World Meteorological Organization; and Lindsay Getschel, Research Assistant at the Environmental Security Program of the Stimson Center (S/PV.8451, p: 2)

and other effects of climate change are an existential threat to all humanity. According to the World Bank's report, it is predicted that approximately 140 million people will be displaced in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and South Asia by 2050. However, the most referenced development was the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C of IPCC, which explains the extreme weather events, drought, flood and sea-level rise that would increase in case the global warming could not be limited to under 1.5 C. In addition, the fact that the hurricanes that occurred in 2017 and after caused many deaths and significant economic damages caused concerns, especially in the USA and island countries.

In the light of all these developments, the main storylines of the open debate consisted of the direct effects and the threat multiplier effects of climate change. While the general argument of the meeting was climate change is a global threat and this issue should become a routine work of the Council, the argument was discussed by three different discourse coalitions as seen in Table 3.20: defenders, opposers and abstainers.

	25 January 2019 Open Debate on *Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security*	
Organizer	Dominican Republic	
Members	Belgium, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America	
Storylines	Direct and Threat multiplier Effects of Climate Change	
Metaphor	Existential Threat	
Argument	Climate change is a global threat and this issue should become a routine work of the Council.	
Defenders	Algeria, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Estonia, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Nauru, Netherlands, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam	
Opposers	Brazil, Islamic Republic of Iran, Russian Federation	
Those who don't comment on the argument	Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey	
Discursive Affinity	• Holistic security approach to combat climate change • International Cooperation • Compliance with the Paris Agreement	
Outputs	-	

Table 3.20: 25 January 2019 Open Debate on *Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security*

First of all, it is observed that the number of states defending for the Council to keep climate change on its agenda and act accordingly is increasing. In this regard, 55 of the 73 states participating in the meeting expressed a positive opinion about the Security Council keeping climate change on the agenda as a threat and acting accordingly. As seen in Table 3.21, defenders have made connections between climate security, human security, national security, and international security regarding the threat multiplier effects of climate change within the multilevel security framework.

146

States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	*Direct Effects to National/ International Security*
Algeria	+	+	+	+	+
Barbados	+	+	+	+	+
Belize	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+
Côte d'Ivoire	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	n/a	+
Estonia	+	+	+	+	+
Equatorial Guinea	+	+	+	+	+
Fiji	+	+	+	+	+
Finland	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Germany	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+
Hungary	+	+	+	+	+
Indonesia	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+
Italy	+	+	+	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+
Kazakhstan	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	+	+	+	n/a	+
Latvia	+	+	+	+	+
Liechtenstein	+	+	+	+	+
Maldives	+	+	+	+	+
Mauritius	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+
Nauru	+	+	+	+	+
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+
New Zealand	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	+	+	+	+
Papua New Guinea	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+
Portugal	+	+	+	+	+
Qatar	+	+	+	+	+

Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (25 January 2019)

Republic of Korea	+	+	+	+	+
Romania	+	+	+	+	+
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	+	+	+	+	+
Slovakia	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	+
Sudan	+	+	+	+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	+
Trinidad and Tobago	+	+	+	+	+
Tuvalu	+	+	+	+	+
United Arab Emirates	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
United States of America	+	+	+	n/a	+
Uruguay	+	+	+	+	+
Uzbekistan	+	+	+	+	+
Viet Nam	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.21: Defenders' climate related-security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (25 January 2019)

Among the countries most affected by climate change, Ecuador and Kenya evaluated the effects of climate change on human and national security over their own countries and regions; however, they did not comment on its impact on international security. Similarly, the USA also touched upon the threat multiplier effects of climate change and their relationships. The US representative explained in detail how their own country and region were affected by climate change, but he did not comment on the international security dimension. Representatives of all three states talked about conflicts and migrations that threatened international security, but they did not mention the international security dimension due to prioritizing their own countries. However, this should not mean that they do not consider the effects of climate change on international security. Although they talked about the problems that could threaten international security, such as conflict and migration, all three representatives prioritized the effects of climate change on their countries and regions.

In this open debate, the states defending "climate change is a global threat and this issue should become a routine work of the Council" argument defined climate change with the metaphor of *existential threat*. The topics they cover in general are developing the preventive security structure, implementing early warning systems, sharing the risk analyses made by expert organizations on climate change with the Council, and taking concrete policies regarding climate change within the Council. Apart from this, some developments have been observed in the discourses of the countries that favor the Council-climate change relations. These countries, which insistently repeat in all meetings that climate change impacts international peace and security, generally made structural suggestions on how to respond to this threat. However, the proposal to respond according to the regional needs expressed by the Russian Federation in the previous meetings was met at this meeting. While the defending countries emphasized that the effects of climate change are local, but the solution is global, they agreed that the Council should respond according to regional needs. Lastly, Germany, one of the states that offered to establish an institutional house in the last meeting to ensure the flow of important and necessary information about climate change to the Council, gave the following news about a related development: "Last year, we established the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, together with Nauru and partners from around the world. The Group is supported by a broad international network of experts. Together, we will submit proposals to the Security Council on how we can improve our response" (S/PV.845, 12). Although it is not an institution established within the UN, it has been one of the institutionalization steps of climate change and its security discourses (as will be discussed under the title of 3.3).

The four states that opposed the general argument of the meeting defined the security threats of climate change, as seen in Table 3.22, within the scope of multi-level security analysis. The four states that opposed the general argument of the meeting defined the security threats of climate change as seen in Table 3.22, within the scope of multi-level security analysis. India, Iran, and Russia's approach to the threat multiplier effect has been surprising among the states in this group.

Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (25 January 2019)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Brazil	+	+	+	n/a	+
India	+	?	?	?	+
Islamic Republic of Iran	+	+	+	-	+
Russian Federation	+	+	+	-	+

Table 3.22: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (25 January 2019)

Russia and Iran, two of the states opposing the "climate change is a global threat and this issue should become a routine work of the Council" argument, stated that they do not see climate change as a global problem in the context of international security. The Representative of Russia stated that climate change would not cause conflict everywhere; therefore, it is important to give regional answers on this issue and emphasize the importance of cooperation. Iran also claimed that it has not been proven that climate change threatens international peace and security and expressed that they could not understand why the Council brought this issue to the agenda. Russia, which took a positive step, albeit small, for the first time in the relationship between the Council and climate change, stated that the Council should strengthen the vulnerable states but underlined that they still oppose the securitization of climate change by the Council. On the other hand, India stated that they regard climate change as a global challenge but are skeptical of its securitization. They also noted that international cooperation is more critical, and the UNFCCC process plays a central role in addressing the issue. These states opposed to the general argument of the meeting stated that climate change is a sustainable development issue and is not within the competence of the Council.

As seen in Table 3.23, abstainers predominantly defined climate change's direct and threat multiplier effects. When evaluated within the scope of multi-level security analysis, states directly affected by climate change have conveyed their own experiences of security risks and have not mentioned the international security dimension.

Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (25 January 2019)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Armenia	+	+	+	n/a	+
Australia	+	+	+	n/a	+
Bangladesh	+	+	+	+	+
China	+	+	+	+	+
Colombia	+	+	+	n/a	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+
Haiti	+	+	+	+	+
Iraq	+	+	+	+	+
Kuwait	+	+	+	+	+
Morocco	+	+	+	n/a	+
Nicaragua	+	+	+	+	+
Pakistan	+	+	+	n/a	+
Sri Lanka	+	+	+	+	+
Turkey	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.23: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (25 January 2019)

Although the abstainers agreed that climate change is a security issue, they did not comment on what the Council should do about it. On the other hand, China, which is in the process of transitioning to a green economy, advised on the transition to green technologies and emphasized the importance of cooperation in the fight against climate change.

In general, at this meeting, it was observed that the number of states arguing that climate change should be on the Council's agenda and that it should act accordingly is increasing. The number of states opposing it is also decreasing. Although there has been a transformation in China's rhetoric, it abstains from the fact that this issue is the Council's issue. The approaches of Russia and China, which have veto power, again prevented a resolution or presidential statement from being taken at the end of the meeting. However, this does not mean that no resolution on climate change has been taken in the Council (developments related to this will be examined under the title of 3.3).

2020-1: Open Debate on "Climate and Security"

The first open debate on the theme of climate change after the Covid-19 pandemic was organized by Germany in July 2020. One of the important features of this meeting was the support of Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, the United Kingdom and Viet Nam as co-sponsors as well as Germany's presidency of the meeting. At the meeting held via video teleconference, some members also presented their written briefings. The main storyline of this open debate, in which the USA and the Russian Federation did not participate, developed over the impacts of direct and threat multipliers effects of climate change on human security effects. In this regard, the main argument of this debate has been that the UN and relevant bodies should regularly inform the UNSC and be encouraged to take action in important climate-related insecurity situations. As seen in Table 3.24, the overwhelming majority of the participants in the open debate supported this argument.

24 July 2020 **Open Debate on *Climate Change and Security***	
Organizer	Germany
Members	Belgium, China, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Indonesia, Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam
Storylines	Climate Change Impacts on Human Security; Direct and Threat Multiplier Effects
Metaphor	Environment Suffers, Existential Threat
Argument	The UN and relevant bodies should regularly inform the UNSC and be encouraged to take action in important climate-related insecurity situations
Defenders	Belgium, Belize, China, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nauru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Tuvalu, Viet Nam, United Arab Emirates
Opposers	Brazil, India
Those who don't comment on the argument	South Africa, Nepal, Nigeria, Sri Lanka
Discursive Affinity	• International Cooperation • Compliance with the Paris Agreement
Outputs	-

Table 3.24: 24 July 2020 Open Debate on *Climate Change and Security*

During the open debate, where the effects of climate change on a regional basis were considered, the impact of sea-level rise in the Pacific, water scarcity in Central Asia, the increase in pressure on natural resources in Africa, and the related conflicts on human security were discussed. One of the important points of this meeting is that the effects of climate change, which has been expressed weakly for the last two years, on women, children, youth and men were declared more vociferously at this meeting. While it is mentioned that men have to migrate to earn an income or join terrorist groups, it is emphasized that women and children are left alone and could be exploited. When examined in terms of the multi-level security framework, all of the states defending the general argument of the meeting commented on the direct effects of climate change. As seen in Table 3.25, defenders, except for China, Kenya and Mexico, have made causality chains between all referent objects of securities. Kenya and Mexico highlighted the security threats of climate change on their countries and regions and did not mention its effects on international security. Although China stated that they consider climate change as a development issue rather than a security problem, they supported the Council to act within its own mandate on climate change. China, which previously abstained from the Council's fight against climate change, made the following statement about the Council at this meeting: "the Security Council, as the organ handling international peace and security issues, should act in line with the mandates of the relevant resolutions, analyze security challenges and the security implications of climate change for the countries concerned and discuss and handle relevant issues on a country-specific basis" (S/2020/751, annex 9). Highlighting international cooperation, the Paris Agreement and development, the Chinese Representative mentioned climate change as a global challenge rather than as international security.

Defenders' climate- related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 July 2020)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+
Belize	+	+	+	+	+
China	+	+	+	n/a	+
Costa Rica	+	+	+	+	+
Cyprus	+	+	+	+	+
Czech Republic	+	+	+	+	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+
Estonia	+	+	+	+	+
Ethiopia	+	+	+	+	+
Fiji	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Germany	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+
Indonesia	+	+	+	+	+
Iraq	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+
Italy	+	+	+	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	+	+	+	n/a	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+
Liechtenstein	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	n/a	+
Nauru	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+
Portugal	+	+	+	+	+
Qatar	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of Korea	+	+	+	+	+
Saint Vincent	+	+	+	+	+
Senegal	+	+	+	+	+
Slovakia	+	+	+	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	+
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	+
Tuvalu	+	+	+	+	+
United Arab Emirates	+	+	+	+	+

United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
Viet Nam	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.25: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 July 2020)

Members supporting the "UN and relevant bodies should regularly inform the UNSC and be encouraged to take action in important climate-related insecurity situations" argument agreed that the Council should be informed regularly and that the Secretary-General should report to the Council. They also suggested that climate change be adapted to peacekeeping operations and special political missions. In other words, they focused on the need to be put into practice rather than on rhetoric. In addition, the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, launched under the leadership of Germany in 2018, came to the fore at this meeting. At the open debate in 2019, Germany announced that this group would regularly provide information to the Council, and at this meeting, the Dominican Republic, Nauru, Czech Republic, Portugal, and Spain initiated their speeches or written briefings on behalf of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security. At the same time, these representatives expressed their concerns that the Covid-19 pandemic may leave the climate change discussions in the background.

As seen in Table 3.26, Brazil and India were the two members to oppose the main argument. Taking a skeptical attitude towards the characterization of climate change as an international security threat, the Brazilian Representative expressed concern that this would lead to undesirable securitization. Therefore, he described the relationship between climate and security (the representative even preferred to use the term *difficulty* instead of security) within the development framework. Acknowledging that climate change is a multidimensional issue, India was skeptical of considering this issue from a security perspective. In this regard, the Indian Representative expressed their opinion as follows: "Climate change is a multidimensional issue and viewing it through the narrow prism of security is akin to oversimplifying the issue and taking it out of context" (S/2020/751 annex 30).

Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 July 2020)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Brazil	+	+	+	?	+
India	+	?	?	?	+

Table 3.26: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 July 2020)

The Brazilian Representative stated that security is not the most important dimension in addressing climate change; he expressed that they find the climate and security discourses misleading. According to Brazil, it is misleading to assume climate change will cause conflicts because the causes of conflicts are multidimensional; therefore, "attempting to use military action as a preventive response to climate change is completely counterproductive" (S/2020/751 annex 22). When the general structure of the meeting is examined, it is understood that Brazil's approach does not make strong sense. At the beginning of the open debate, the Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas, Miroslav Jenča, expressed that there is no direct link between climate change and conflict, but that it exacerbates conflicts. Apart from this, briefers and representatives do not establish a direct link between climate change and conflict in the states. In addition, it is clear in the meeting minutes that they did not seek a military response from the culture of preventing climate change. The Indian Representative also emphasized that it is more important to structure a climate change struggle, ranging from individual efforts to international cooperation, without securitizing it.

As can be seen in Table 3.27, abstainers mentioned all dimensions of climate change and the relationships between them.

Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 July 2020)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Nepal	+	+	+	+	+
Nigeria	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	?	+
Sri Lanka	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.27: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 July 2020)

Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka have described all dimensions of climate change, but South Africa has expressed reluctance to impact international security. The South African Representative, who established the causal chain between climate security, human security and national security, said his approach to this issue is as follows: "'There is currently little scientific evidence to support the more generalized conclusions of a direct causality between climate change and threats to international peace and security" (S/2020/751 annex 14). The South American Representative argued that it was unclear what the Council could do on climate change and concluded his speech on the importance of sustainable development, international cooperation, and the Paris Agreement's commitments.

When the thematic meetings held since 2007 are examined, it is observed that climate change and security is now a matter for the Council. It is also observed that most of the members attending these thematic meetings have left behind the argument on whether climate change should be a subject of the Council, and the arguments on how the Council could be strengthened on climate change are dominantly voiced.

2020-2: Humanitarian Effects of Environmental Degradation and Peace and Security
The objective of the meeting (S/2020/882, 3), which was organized by Niger in September 2020 in an open discussion format over video teleconference under the theme of "Humanitarian Effects of Environmental Degradation and Peace and Security," was stated in the letter dated September 1 as follows:

> The meeting will give the members of the Security Council an opportunity to address the links between the humanitarian effects of environmental degradation, including desertification and soil erosion, and armed conflict, as well as conflict resolution. The discussions will also focus on the consequences of the destruction of the natural environment in armed conflicts and the measures to be taken by the United Nations and Member States to combat those effects.

While it was expected that the use and management of natural resources and the damage to the environment caused by conflicts would be on the agenda, putting climate change at the centre of environmental problems was one of the interesting points of the meeting. Therefore, the main storyline of the open debate was shaped by the effects of climate change on environmental and human security. The threat multiplier effect of climate change was predominantly on the agenda of the meeting, especially in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and Horn of Africa. In this regard, the effect of drought due to climate change on agricultural activities and the resulting instability and conflict relationship formed the general structure of the open debate.

The main argument of the meeting was the holistic strengthening of all dimensions of climate change in the Security Council and combining its efforts with other UN bodies. The vast majority of members supported this argument, but Brazil, China, Guatemala, India, South America and the USA did not generally comment on this. Although they agree that climate change is a security problem, they emphasized supporting development for the solution.

During the meeting held under the theme of Climate and Security in July 2020, China stated that the Council should address climate change in line with its own mandate, but the Chinese Representative abstained and did not comment on the general argument in this meeting. The Chinese Representative stated that no country is immune to this problem and acknowledged the threat multiplier effect of climate change. Also, he stated that this issue is a development problem and that countries should enter the low carbon process.

Russia has again hardened its rhetoric and opposed the general argument of the meeting. The Russian Representative stated that there is no automatic connection between climate change and conflict but recognized that climate change is a security problem and the importance of the threat multiplier effect. Therefore, he pointed out that climate change

should be tackled within the scope of development. Finally, he stated that the Council would contribute to minor environmental damage by ensuring international peace and security, which is its primary responsibility.

As a result, although Russia was against and China abstained from the discussion of climate change in the Council, as stated before, climate and security discourses continue to be kept on the Council's agenda.

2020-3: Open Debate on "Contemporary Drivers of Conflict and Insecurity"

The main storyline of the open debate held by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in November 2020 was the impact of contemporary challenges, especially the pandemic and climate change, on international peace and security. The main argument of the meeting held under the theme of *Contemporary Drivers of Conflict and Insecurity* was that the Council should adopt the *whole-of-system* approach to combating these contemporary threats. In this way, the Council would be able to break out of the realist security mold and integrate with the challenges of the modern era.

Issues such as organized terror groups and cybercrime were also discussed at the meeting, but the agenda items equally discussed in the top three were COVID-19, climate change, and human rights protection. The damage caused by the inequality environment created by COVID-19 and climate change to human rights (especially women and girls) and the impact of climate change on conflicts formed the storylines developed on climate change at this meeting. In this context, the exacerbating effect of climate change on conflicts in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin (in general West Africa) was mainly discussed. In addition, the UN Secretary-General expressed for the first time in the Council that the Middle East is one of the regions affected by climate change.

Almost all participants looked at the general argument of the meeting positively and the strengthening of the role of the Peace Building Commission in the context of climate change and pandemics has been frequently mentioned. Russia, which is generally opposed to such arguments, displayed a positive approach in this meeting, also regarding the effect of the pandemic. However, the Russian Federation Representative annotated

the climate change part of the main argument that "the Council should adopt the 'whole-of-system' approach to combating contemporary threats." In this context, the Representative of the Russian Federation stated that they do not see climate change as a global problem, but they accept its local effects and its relation to conflict. This is an important discursive change for the Russian Federation, as they have stated in previous meetings that climate change does not have an aggravating effect on conflict. Another important point was that at the beginning of the meeting, Russia (S/2020/1090 Annex 10) expressed the effects of environmental impacts on international security with the following words:

> I am referring to the attempt to present human rights violations as all but the main prerequisite for crises. We believe that the successful settlement of armed conflicts and the reconciliation of conflicting sides create the foundation for improving human rights, promoting sustainable development and resolving environmental and other issues...We do not deny the link connecting these issues in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Except for Russia, which made contradictory statements, no country contradicted the argument. The United States has remained unresponsive to the general argument by highlighting its aid for COVID-19. China renewed its argument at the previous meeting, acknowledged contemporary challenges, and emphasized the importance of sustainable development. Apart from this, informing the council through this commission and requesting cooperation among other UN organs has been a significant development in terms of institutionalizing climate change discourses.

2021-1: High-Level Open Debate on "Climate and Security"
The first High-Level Open Debate with the theme of climate change and security was organized by the United Kingdom on 25 February 2021. During the meeting, where UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Chair of the United Nations Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change, Nisreen Elsaim, presented their briefings, six Prime Ministers and three Presidents also took the floor.[40] COP26, which would be held in Glasgow from

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[40] Prime Ministers and Presidents participating in the High-level Open Debate: Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Boris Johnson; President of France, Emmanuel Macron; President and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta; President of Tunisia, Kaïs Saïed; Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas; Prime Minister of the Niger, Brigi Rafini; Prime Minister of Norway, Erna Solberg; Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ralph Gonsalves; Prime Minister of Viet Nam, Nguyen Xuan Phuc.

31 October to 12 November 2021, was an important point of this meeting. All participants agreed on the necessity of taking important steps to combat climate change at COP26. This point was also the subject of the strongest discursive affinity between the discourse coalitions at the meeting. In addition, all members expressed their satisfaction that the US became a party to the Paris Agreement again after Biden became President. In this regard, the general argument took form around "the Security Council should play a proactive role rather than a reactive role on security issues related to climate change." As seen in Table 3.28, three different discourse coalitions were formed over this argument: defenders, opposers and those who do not comment.

24 February 2021 **High-Level Open Debate on *Climate and Security***	
Organizer	United Kingdom
Members	China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam
Storylines	Threat Multiplier Effects
Metaphor	Existential Threat
Argument	The Security Council should play a proactive role rather than a reactive role on security issues related to climate change.
Defenders	Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, USA, Viet Nam
Opposers	Argentina, Brazil, Russia
Those who don't comment on the argument	Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan
Discursive Affinity	• Supporting sustainable development • Taking important steps in the fight against climate change at COP26
Outputs	-

Table 3:28: 24 February 2021 High Level Open Debate on *Climate and Security*

As seen in Table 3.29, the states defending the general argument of the meeting recognized the direct and threat multiplier effects of climate change. They also established causality links within the scope of threat multiplier effects.

Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 February 2021)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Afghanistan	+	+	+	n/a	++
Antigua and Barbuda	+	+	+	+	+
Austria	+	+	+	+	+
Belgium	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	n/a	
Cyprus	+	+	+	+	+
Czech Republic	+	+	+	+	+
Denmark	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+
Estonia	+	+	+	+	+
Fiji	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Georgia	+	+	+	+	+
Germany	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	+	+	+	+	+
Latvia	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+
Liechtenstein	+	+	+	+	+
Maldives	+	+	+	+	+
Malta	+	+	+	+	+
Morocco	+	+	+	+	+
Nepal	+	+	+	+	+
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+
Niger				n/a	
Nigeria	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	+	+	+	+
Malawi	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+
Portugal	+	+	+	+	+

Qatar	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of Korea	+	+	+	+	+
Saint Lucia	+	+	+	+	+
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	+	+	+	+	+
Slovakia	+	+	+	+	+
Slovenia	+	+	+	+	+
Spain	+	+	+	+	+
Sri Lanka	+	+	+	+	+
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	+
Tunisia	+	+	+	+	+
Tuvalu	+	+	+	+	+
Ukraine	+	+	+	+	+
United Arab Emirates	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
United States of America	+	+	+	+	+
Viet Nam	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.29: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 February 2021)

In this high-level open debate, the states that defended "the Security Council should play a proactive role rather than a reactive role on security issues related to climate change" argument were EU countries, the USA, and countries that are affected by climate change, such as small island states, the Middle East countries and African countries. These countries defending that the Council should act urgently stated that the Council should act and take necessary resolutions on the development of early warning systems, the provision of renewable energy and infrastructures, and the financial support for adaptation and mitigation to countries affected by climate change. Moreover, they argued that the Council should take more responsibility and urgently take action in practice compared to previous open debates. In this regard, Boris Johnson stated that the Council should mobilize all UN agencies, funds, and programs to maintain international peace and security. In addition, in this meeting chaired by the United Kingdom, Johnson (S/2021/198 Annex 3) criticized the countries that advocated that the Council should stay out of climate change and related issues as follows:

> I know there are people around the world who will say this is all kind of "green stuff" from a bunch of tree-hugging tofu munchers and not suited to international diplomacy and international politics. I could not disagree more profoundly. We have to address the causes of climate change, but as Ms. Elsaim and the Secretary-General stated in their briefings, the effects are absolutely clear.

Notably, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, Emmanuel Macron, President of France and Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom stated that 12 of the 20 most-affected countries in the world are vulnerable to the effects of climate change and they insisted that climate change should be taken into account in prevention efforts and post-conflict peacebuilding process. In addition, Afghanistan by the Secretary-General and the Arctic Region by French President Macron were mentioned as the regions affected by climate change in the Council for the first time.

As seen in Table 3.30, only three members opposed the general argument of the meeting and each made different statements on climate change and security in terms of a multi-level security framework. For instance, Russia has taken a negative approach to the link between international security and climate change. Brazil was skeptical of addressing climate change within the security framework and reiterated that the solution lies in sustainable development, international cooperation and the Paris Agreement. Argentina, similarly, expressed that the most appropriate bodies to combat climate change are the Economic and Social Council and UNFCCC processes.

Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 February 2021)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	?	?	?	?	?
Russian Federation	+	+	+	-	+

Table 3 .30: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 February 2021)

Argentina, Brazil, and Russia also opposed the argument of "the Security Council should play a proactive role rather than a reactive role on security issues related to climate change." The Russian Federation Representative, who claimed that the Council did not

even once discuss the effects of climate change in the context of international peace and security, stated that it was only dealt with in the regional context. However, just before these words, the Representative, who started his speech with "Climate change is one of the global challenges that humankind is facing today," actually contradicted themselves as in the previous meeting. At this point, it should be noted that the situation of states that lose their lands due to sea-level rise, especially migration due to climate change, was discussed in the context of international peace and security in all thematic meetings. Apart from this, Russia continued its usual discourses, but it was observed that there was a bit of a shift in their discourse at this meeting. Although the Representative reiterated that climate change is a sustainable development issue and that the General Assembly should advance this work, this time he expressed the issue of discussing climate change within the Council thusly: "Indeed, the discussions on the climate agenda in the Security Council appear advantageous and politically meaningful" (S/2020/198 Annex 17).

Table 3.31 shows how the abstainers handle the effects of climate change. Within the scope of multi-level security analysis, Bangladesh and Japan established a causal chain between all referent objects of security in the dimension of the threat multiplier effect. China, Egypt, India and Indonesia did not comment on the impact of climate change on international security. South Africa reiterated its arguments from the previous meeting, arguing that the effect of climate change on international security is not evident.

Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 February 2021)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
Bangladesh	+	+	+	+	+
China	+	+	+	n/a	+
Egypt	+	+	+	n/a	+
India	+	+	+	n/a	+
Indonesia	+	+	+	n/a	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+
South Africa	+	+	+	?	+

Table 3.31: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (24 February 2021)

Although China has been silent since 2015 about what the Council can do to combat climate change, it has consistently used sustainable development and security approaches together in its discourse. In this meeting, attended by many prime ministers and presidents worldwide, the Chinese representative used both approaches in his discourse, but he attached great importance to sustainable development and mentioned that climate change is a development problem at its core. Between the lines of the speech of the Chinese Representative, the significant investments made by China in the fight against climate change can be seen as the background of the development discourses. Sahu (2021) stated that China gave an important policy priority to climate change and made significant investments on a national basis. During the meeting, the Chinese Representative (S/2020/198 Annex 16) also drew attention to their international investments with the following words:

> We are committed to win-win cooperation. China has launched the Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme to help Belt and Road partner countries to develop renewable energy projects including hydro, wind and photovoltaic power. China has also worked with other developing countries within a South-South cooperation framework to build low-carbon demonstration zones and undertake mitigation and adaptation projects, in pursuit of green development. China will host the fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity this year. We look forward to discussing with all other parties new strategies for post-2020 global biodiversity governance.

China's positioning of its low-emission green investments as the *new normal* in economic and political terms may be an indicator of why it has returned to development in its discourses. In addition, the withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement in 2017 has made China, the largest producer of emissions, the global leader in the fight against climate change. However, according to Trombetta (2019), China was cautious in this regard and emphasized multilateralism instead of taking a leading position. Trombetta (2019, 116) also analyzed China's security discourses as "specific threat construction by the Chinese government, which is based on a security discourse that aims at securing economic development and legitimacy."

Finally, during the last meeting, India opposed the general argument of the meeting. Although they did not comment on the relationship between the Council and climate

change at this meeting, they clearly drew this issue as sustainable development. In this regard, they were actually closer to opposers than abstainers.

It is understood that the members had great expectations for COP26 at this meeting. Therefore, it has been frequently stated that important steps should be taken within the scope of the Paris Agreement, as well as what the Council should do. Although Russia's contradictory speech at this meeting aroused curiosity about how its discourses would evolve, the High-level Open Debate format meeting, held for the first time, was a remarkable development.

2021-2: High-Level Open Debate on "Climate and Security"
Just before COP26, which was held on 31 October - 12 November 2021 in Glasgow, a High-Level Open Debate was organized by Ireland on 23 September 2021 under the theme of *Climate and Security*. In addition to the briefings given by António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, and Ilwad Elman, Chief Operating Officer of the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, the President of Estonia, the Minister of State and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Republic of the Niger, and the President of Viet Nam also made statements on the security effects of climate change. It has been observed that the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the IPCC, published just before this meeting, was met with concern by many members, especially the Secretary-General. Referring to the AR6, the Secretary-General used the metaphor *Code Red* to describe the current climate change situation, the President of Viet Nam described it as *a war without gunfire*, and Representatives of Tunisia, the United Kingdom and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines also emphasized the seriousness of the situation by using the *existential threat* metaphors. The main storyline of the meeting was the effects of climate change on peace and security, and its central argument was shaped by "the effects of climate change on peace and security are directly relevant to the Security Council, and the Council should take practical measures in this regard." As shown in Table 3.32, most of the members supported the general argument. However, Russia and India opposed it while China abstained.

	23 September 2021 **High-Level Open Debate on *Climate and Security***
Organizer	Ireland
Members	China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam
Storylines	Direct and Threat Multiplier effects of Climate Change on Security
Metaphor	Code Red for humanity, a war without gunfire, existential threat
Argument	The effects of climate change on peace and security are directly relevant to the Security Council and the Council should take practical measures in this regard.
Defenders	Estonia, France, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United State of America, Viet Nam,
Opposers	India, Russian Federation
Those who don't comment on the argument	China
Discursive Affinity	• Taking important steps in the fight against climate change at COP26 • International Cooperation
Outputs	-

Table 3.32: 23 September 2021 High-Level Open Debate on *Climate and Security*

As seen in Table 3.33, besides the direct effects of climate change, those who defended the general argument of the meeting defined the threat multiplier effects at all referent objects of security levels by establishing the causality chains.

Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 September 2021)					
States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Estonia	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+
Niger	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	+	+	+	+
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	+	+	+	+	+
Tunisia	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
United States of America	+	+	+	+	+
Viet Nam	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.33: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 September 2021)

One of the most important developments of this meeting was Ireland's announcement that it would hold debates to draft a thematic resolution on climate and security. As a result of the thematic meetings held since 2007, the Presidential Statement was issued only in 2011 (S/PRST/2011/15). Still, no resolution or presidential statement was accepted from the thematic meetings held after that time. As will be examined in-depth in the next section, the Council has taken presidential statements and resolutions recognizing climate change for Africa, the Middle East and Cyprus, but no internationally binding and sanctioned resolution has yet been taken.

During the UN Secretary-General's briefing at the beginning of the meeting, he mentioned that 90 per cent of the refugees now come from the most vulnerable and least adaptable countries to climate change and that the host countries are also affected by climate change and these migrations also put pressure on them. Members that defend the general argument that climate change poses a threat to international peace and security, such as the Secretary-General, also agreed that a significant portion of the countries where conflicts and instability are experienced are those countries most affected by climate

change. Reiterating the importance of providing regular information to the Council by the UN Secretary-General, these states also expressed their satisfaction with the support of the Informal Expert Group on Climate Change and Security, which started its activities under the umbrella of the UN Security Council in 2020, to the work of the Council. These members, which insist on adapting the peacebuilding and security strategies, conflict prevention, peace protection and conflict resolution efforts of the Council to climate change, also emphasized the strategic importance of the building of resistance and supporting adaptation.

As seen in Table 3.34, among those who opposed the general argument of the meeting, India opposed the securitization of climate change. The Indian Representative preferred to express the effects of climate change as a *difficulty* rather than addressing it from a security perspective. While Russia did not provide a detailed definition of security on climate change, the Russian Representative commented that this issue is not an issue of international security.

Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 September 2021)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
India	?	?	?	?	?
Russian Federation	+	n/a	n/a	-	n/a

Table 3.34: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 September 2021)

The Representative of the Russian Federation stated that they deeply shared the international concern about climate change and further stated that this issue should be a uniting agenda for the international community. This discursive change is important for Russia, which has until recently declared that climate change is not an international threat. However, Russia, is still opposed to the issue being handled within the Council, with the Representative reiterating their view that the securitization of climate change would not be an answer to the solution of this problem. Opposing the "effects of climate change on peace and security are directly relevant to the Security Council and the Council should take practical measures in this regard" argument, India has returned to the first stages of

climate change-themed debates, arguing that climate change should not be the subject of the Council. In this regard, according to the Climate Action Tracker (2021),

> While the additional stimulus is a positive step, India continues to support coal, with fresh loans to a number of thermal power projects, undermining a green recovery… Based on current coal expansion plans, India's coal capacity would increase from current levels of over 200 GW to almost 266 GW by 2029-2030, with 35 GW expected to come online in the next five years: an increase of 17.5% in coal capacity. India's coal-fired power plant pipeline is the second largest in the world and is one of the few to have increased since 2015.

It is conceivable that, for economic reasons, India would oppose the securitization of climate change because it will have to reduce its emissions if the Council adopts a binding decision. Therefore, India's approach, which emits the most emissions worldwide after China and the USA, in the Council is not surprising.

As seen in Table 3.35, the only abstaining member state is China. The Chinese Representative, who gave a general view of climate change, did not go into too much detail.

Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 September 2021)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	**Direct Effects to National/ International Security**
China	+	+	n/a	n/a	+

Table 3.35: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (23 September 2021)

China emphasized the importance and implementation of the Paris Agreement but stayed away from the Council's role on climate change and security for reasons mentioned at the meeting on February 24, 2021.

Finally, the draft resolution that Ireland would prepare can be considered as an important development. Another significant development is that Russia changed its rhetoric that climate change is a global security problem without running into a contradiction. In this meeting, it is observed that all members had high hopes for COP26, and they all agree that necessary steps should be taken within the scope of the Paris Agreement. And, of

course, the reflection of the post-COP26 process on the discourses in the Council is important. For instance, Russia and China, who argued that the Council should stay out of the issue of climate change, put forward sustainable development and the Paris Agreement. Therefore, it is worth discussing whether their commitment at COP26 is in line with their discourse in the Council.

2021-3: High-Level Open Debate on "Security in the Context of Terrorism and Climate Change"

A High-Level Open Debate on "Maintenance of international peace and security: security in the context of terrorism and climate change" was held on 9 December 2021 by Niger just after COP26. The storyline of the high-level open debate was shaped by the relationship between the threat multiplier effect of climate change and terrorism. All members discussed the impact of climate change on the growth of terrorist groups at the beginning of their speeches. Accordingly, while a drought that developed due to climate change causes a severe food crisis, this situation also causes serious economic and social disruptions in agricultural societies that make their living from farming. This situation naturally prepares the ground for an environment where terrorist groups can grow. These terrorist groups, which get closer to the farmers who can no longer do any agriculture, start to get stronger by promising the farmers high wages and a life of prosperity. The point to note in this storyline is that none of the members of the Council accepts climate change as the only factor in a civil war or the growth of terrorist groups. They emphasize that it intensifies the way to conflict on these states, which are already economically, socially and politically fragile. However, the arguments of the meeting were developed in the context of the need for the Council to take serious steps on climate change and its security impacts rather than the relationship between terrorism and climate change. In this context, two critical arguments were developed at the meeting. The first argument was formed as "the Council has recognized the effects of climate change on peace and security, especially in Africa, but more comprehensive steps should be taken from now on. The second argument was also improved as the Council should better manage and act climate-related security matters on its mandates; therefore, the members should adopt a resolution in this regard." As shown in Table 3.36, these arguments have been discussed by three discourse coalitions as defenders, opposers, abstainers.

09 December 2021	
High-Level Open Debate on *Maintenance of international peace and security: security in the context of terrorism and climate change*	
Organizer	Niger
Members	China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam
Storylines	Threat Multiplier Effects to Peace and Security
Argument	• The Council has recognized the effects of climate change on peace and security, especially in Africa, but more comprehensive steps should be taken from now on. • The Council should better manage and act climate-related security mattes on its mandates; therefore, the members should adopt a resolution in this regard.
Defenders	Albania, Australia, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, United Kingdom, Viet Nam
Opposers	Belarus, Brazil, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Philippines, Russian Federation
Those who don't comment on the argument	Bahrain, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, China, Egypt, El Salvador, Japan, Morocco, Peru, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan
Discursive Affinity	• Keeping global warming to 1.5°C • Global cooperation • Increasing the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement
Outputs	-

Table 3.36: 09 December 2021 High-Level Open Debate on *Maintenance of international peace and security: security in the context of terrorism and climate change*

As seen in Table 3.37, besides the direct effects of climate change, those who defended the general argument of the meeting defined the threat multiplier effects at all referent objects of security levels by establishing the causality chains.

Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (09 December 2021)					
States	**Climate Security**	**Human Security**	**National Security**	**International Security**	*Direct Effects to National/ International Security*
Albania	+	+	+	+	+
Australia	+	+	+	+	+
Bahrain	+	+	+	+	+
Burkina Faso	+	+	+	+	+
Dominican Republic	+	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+
Estonia	+	+	+	+	+
Fiji	+	+	+	+	+
France	+	+	+	+	+
Gabon	+	+	+	+	+
Germany	+	+	+	+	+
Greece	+	+	+	+	+
Guatemala	+	+	+	+	+
Ireland	+	+	+	+	+
Italy	+	+	+	+	+
Japan	+	+	+	+	+
Kenya	+	+	+	+	+
Lebanon	+	+	+	+	+
Luxembourg	+	+	+	+	+
Maldives	+	+	+	+	+
Malta	+	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+
Morocco	+	+	+	+	+
Netherlands	+	+	+	+	+
Niger	+	+	+	+	+
Nigeria	+	+	+	+	+
Norway	+	+	+	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+
Portugal	+	+	+	+	+
Republic of Korea	+	+	+	+	+
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	+	+	+	+	+
Sri Lanka	+	+	+	+	+
Sweden	+	+	+	+	+
Switzerland	+	+	+	+	+
Tunisia	+	+	+	+	+
Ukraine	+	+	+	+	+

United Arab Emirates	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+
United States of America	+	+	+	+	+
Viet Nam	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.37: Defenders' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (09 December 2021)

Members that defend these two arguments have also made statements about improving the situation of women and girls in countries most affected by climate change. Although there are some resolutions that the Council recognizes climate change and its security implications, these resolutions have been adopted on a regional basis in Africa, Iraq and Cyprus. Therefore, statements were made about the Council taking a more comprehensive decision and better managing the impacts of climate change and security. In fact, by announcing that Ireland and Niger had prepared a draft resolution, they have shown that they are insistent that this discussion should act upon.

As seen in Table 5.38, those who opposed the general arguments of the meeting expressed their concerns about the effects of climate change on international security. In this context, the Iranian Representative directly stated that there is no connection between climate change and international security and that this problem is not security, but development. The Russian Representative also expressed his opinion that the issue is not a global security problem, but also stated that due to the nature of climate and terrorism, there are threats that transcend borders and require international cooperation. For the first time since the previous meetings, Brazil described climate change not as a *difficulty* but as a security problem, but the representative also stated that they were cautious while making this statement. India took a similar approach and described climate change, which they described as a *difficulty* in the last meeting, as a security issue. However, he did not comment in the context of international security.

States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Belarus	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	+	n/a	+
India	+	+	+	n/a	+
Islamic Republic of Iran	+	+	+	-	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	+
Russian Federation	+	+	+	?	+

Table 3.38: Opposers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (09 December 2021)

As seen in Table 3.39, the members, who abstained from the general arguments of the meeting, defined the threat multiplier effects of security levels on all reference objects by establishing causal chains as well as the direct effects of climate change. Only China has remained silent about the international security dimension, but they have brought international cooperation to the fore, like other abstaining members.

States	Climate Security	Human Security	National Security	International Security	Direct Effects to National/ International Security
Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (09 December 2021)					
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+
Chile	+	+	+	+	+
China	+	+	+	n/a	+
Egypt	+	+	+	+	+
El Salvador	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	+	+	+	+	+
Qatar	+	+	+	+	+
Uzbekistan	+	+	+	+	+

Table 3.39: Abstainers' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework (09 December 2021)

Members who oppose the two arguments, especially the Russian Federation, stated that the essence of the issue will be overlooked in the case of securitization of climate change. The Russian Federation noted that the addressee of this issue is the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the UNFCCC within the UN body and argued that

the matter would turn into a political issue if the Council adopted a resolution on this issue. Members that do not comment on the relevant arguments, especially China, have developed their discourses on development, low-emission technologies, etc. Countries in both groups stated that positive progress had been made on COP26.

During the meeting, all members also agreed that some progress had been made in COP26. The Russian Federation, which opposes the Council's putting climate change on its agenda, and China, which abstained on this issue, have so far argued that climate change is a development issue. In this context, they attributed important meanings to the UNFCCC in dealing with climate change in all meetings. However, the leaders of both countries did not attend COP26, citing the pandemic as the reason, but both countries sent their delegates to COP26. In this regard, Biden criticized the Chinese and Russian leaders' non-participation in COP26 thusly: "Mr Biden said climate was 'a gigantic issue' and China' walked away' - adding it was the "same thing with Russia and Putin" (BBC 2021).

When COP26 is evaluated in general, it is understood that some steps have been taken to combat climate change. In this regard, financial support to countries affected by climate change, commitments to reduce emissions and keep global warming at 1.5°C are positive developments in COP26. In this context, it is important that fossil fuels have been included in an agreement for the first time in UNFCCC history. In the Glasgow Pact, which is seen as the fruit of COP26, this development took part as "accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power" (UNFCCC 2021). In fact, the "phase-out" of coal had been discussed in the early days of COP26. However, due to China's and India's opposition, it was added to the Glasgow Pact as "accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power." COP26 President Sharma criticized this negative development as "China and India will have to explain themselves and what they did to the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world" (Khadka 2021).

Besides the Glasgow Pact, some declarations and agreements have also been signed by the members. For instance, in the first week of COP26, 46 countries declared the *Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement* and committed to switching to clean energy by ending investments and incentives related to coal. However, "the world's six largest

coal consumers—China, India, the United States, Russia, Japan, and South Africa—did not sign, although they consume 80 percent of the world's coal" (Tsafos 2021). In addition, during COP26, more than 100 countries have committed to reducing their methane emissions by 30% until 2030, in the Global Methane Pledge. Countries such as the USA, Brazil, those in the EU, and Pakistan, which have the largest methane emissions, have signed this commitment, but China and Russia, the other major methane emitting countries, did not sign.

Thus far, Russia and China, in particular, have rejected or abstained from arguments that climate change should be a Council issue, citing the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the UNFCCC's key roles. In addition, as it could be understood from the discourses of these countries in the Council, they have defended that climate change is a development problem and that its solution lies only in international cooperation. However, at the 26th COP conference held in Glasgow, it was observed that both countries did not approach collaboration due to their economic interests. In particular, the issue of whether the matter of the *phase-out* or *phase-down* of coal has been met with disappointment by the international community. It would seem that Russia, which is the second in the world in coal reserves, sixth in production and fifth in consumption, and China, which is fourth in coal reserves in the world and first in the world in production and consumption, oppose the international cooperation on reducing the use of fossil fuels due to economic reasons.[41] As for the Council and the issue of climate change, in case securitization of climate change, it will pave the way for imposing sanctions, especially on countries with high carbon emissions. In this regard, it is understood why China and Russia would not particularly welcome this situation considering the fact that they did not sign the coal and methane-themed agreements brought to the agenda at COP26.

Right after Biden became US president, he has been trying to make his country a global leader again in the fight against climate change. However, the USA did not sign the *Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement* in the COP26. In the official statement

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[41] Although China abstained from the discussions on the Council's putting climate change on its agenda, they have occasionally made statements that it is a security issue.

made by the White House on November 2, no plans were also announced for the *phase-out* or *phase-down* of coal in the United States. In this regard, it is understood that coal is still a dominant political force in America, alongside Biden's all-out fight against climate change (Storrow 2021).

Finally, in this chapter, Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis has been supported by a multi-level security analysis formed in the context of climate change and security. However, the discussion part is planned to be discussed in the next chapter to keep the integrity of the analysis. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical findings of the analysis and the answers to the main and sub-questions of the research will be discussed in the next chapter.

2021-4:[42]

In the High-Level Open Debate under the theme "Maintenance of international peace and security: security in the context of terrorism and climate change" held on December 9, 2021, Ireland and Niger, as the co-pen holders, announced that they had prepared a draft resolution. Four days after that meeting, this draft resolution (S/2021/990) was submitted to the Council's vote at the UNSC's 8926th meeting held under the presidency of Niger. Under the draft resolution, reports and recommendations on climate change and its risks are requested from the Secretary-General, and it recognizes mediation to resolve conflicts before they evolve (S/2021/990 para. 3, 6). It also encourages cooperation between member states and scientific communities (S/2021/990 para. 5, 9). One of the most important texts of the draft resolution is in the fourth paragraph (S/2021/990 para. 4), accordingly:

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[42] There is not enough information to analyze the members' climate-related security concerns in the context of the multi-level security framework.

The draft resolution invites the Secretary-General to integrate, when relevant, the security implications of the effects of climate change into conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions' assessment and planning, peacebuilding support, conflict relapse risk reduction efforts, disaster risk reduction efforts and humanitarian response; requests the inclusion in relevant mission and thematic reporting to the Security Council of gender- and age-sensitive information relating to the security implications of climate change and recommendations to address it; requests further that the Secretary-General takes steps to improve the collection of data, monitoring and analysis of the effects of climate change in the context of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.

On the other hand, while the draft resolution encourages relevant political missions, peacekeeping operations and UN country teams to adapt their work in line with their mandates, taking into account the effects of climate change (S/2021/990 para. 3, 13, 15), it recognizes the importance of non-governmental organizations in peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts (S/2021/990 para. 12).

At the beginning of the meeting, the Irish Representative announced that 113 UN members co-sponsored the draft resolution. This statement is important as it reflects the majority's will among the UN members. When considered comprehensively, the general argument of the meeting can be briefly described as "The Council should recognize its role in the fight against climate change and adopt a resolution on integrating climate-related security risks into our conflict resolution, prevention and mediation efforts." As shown in Table 3.40, the draft resolution submitted to the vote did not adopt due to the against-vote of Russia, which has the right to veto. China also maintained its general position on this issue and abstained from voting.

	13 December 2021
	Debate on *Maintenance of international peace and security: Climate and Security*
Organizer	Niger
Members	China, Estonia, France, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam
Storylines	Voting to adopt the draft resolution (S/2021/990) on climate change.
Argument	The Council should recognize its role in the fight against climate change and adopt a resolution on integrating climate-related security risks into conflict resolutions, preventions and mediation efforts.
In favour	Estonia, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam
Against	India, Russian Federation
Abstaining	China
Discursive Affinity	-
Outputs	-

Table 3.40: Debate on *Maintenance of international peace and security: Climate and Security*

Before the voting, the Irish Representative, who stated that climate change is not a region or country problem, argued that climate change should be considered from a global perspective. The Russian Federation Representative, who took the floor after Ireland, started his speech with "Draft resolution S/2021/90 on climate change and security, is unacceptable to Russia" and indicated that they are against the link to be established between climate change and international security in the work of the Council and signaled that they would vote against. Further detailing his speech, the Representative of the Russian Federation claimed that positioning climate change as an international security threat would overlook the real problems. Later, the Representative (S/2021/990, 4), who started to use harsher words for his Western partners, stated that the states that are vulnerable to climate change today are vulnerable due to the colonial period policies:

> That having been said, the lamentable position of many of the most vulnerable States, from a climate perspective, is a direct consequence of previous colonial policies from Western donors. I would tell them directly how well they have devised this idea of blaming greenhouse-gas emissions, and the Sun and the Moon as well, and of suggesting that the responsibility lies with developing countries themselves. They have not, however, managed to convince us of that today.

Later, again, he criticized his Western partners for not bringing up the environmental problems caused by the conflicts. He also claimed that the peacekeepers had assessed climate change after a brief climate change training, then stated that such analysis was highly questionable. He went on to explain this issue with the following words: "Furthermore, such an approach would be a ticking time bomb. Its purpose would be to have a way to include virtually any country on the Security Council's agenda if it is deemed to be undesirable by someone. It would be easy to find a pretext, as the whole world feels the impact of climate change" (S/2021/990, 4). The Russian representative concluded his speech by stating that climate change is a sustainable development issue.

Ireland described the veto of the Russian Federation as an *anachronism,*[43] but the Russian representative intervened and stated that 80 UN members did not approve of this draft resolution and that they were ignored for this reason, and in this sense, he stated that the Western states created an anti-democratic atmosphere in the Council and pointed out that this was an *anachronism*.

India has acknowledged that climate change poses a security problem, especially in the Sahel Region. However, under the draft resolution, it opposed the securitization of climate change rather than holding states accountable for meeting UNFCCC commitments.

China has brought sustainable development and green transformation to the fore in the fight against climate change and accepted the effects of climate change on developing countries, especially in Africa and small island states. In this context, the Chinese Representative stated that developed countries should provide the necessary financial and sustainable development support to developing countries, especially Africa and small

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[43] According to the Cambridge Dictionary, anachronism is "a person, thing, or idea that exists out of its time in history, especially one that happened or existed later than the period being shown, discussed, etc." or "someone or something placed in the wrong period in history, or something that belongs to the past rather than the present."

island states. In addition, the Representative criticized the absence of a text regarding this assistance and cooperation in the draft resolution and expressed this situation as follows: "We feel that it is concerning that, if we continue on this path, developed countries will have new excuses not to take up their historical responsibilities" (S/PV.8926, 12-13). However, China did not object to the Council's putting climate change on its agenda on a regional or national basis and advocated that the Council should continue its work by supporting its decisions.

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In this chapter, the main research question of this thesis - how the UNSC has structured climate change-related security discourses and institutionalized them in practice between 2007-2021 - was analyzed employing Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis. During the analysis process, the arguments that formed the discourse coalitions were revealed after reaching the general storylines of each meeting. In this analysis, discourse coalitions consist of three groups in general: defenders, opposers and abstainers. Moreover, it is possible to see P5 members in all three groups. The arguments of the meeting are formed by the member state representatives who organize and chair the meetings. The defenders, abstainers and opposers of the arguments are identified in this context, as all the meeting presidents argue that the Council should act by keeping climate change on its agenda. After the storylines, discourse coalitions and arguments of the meeting were determined, the discursive affinities that held the discourse collections together and served as cement were determined. In other words, discursive affinities were extracted from the issues on which all three discourse coalitions agreed. Supporting international cooperation in the fight against climate change was the most dominant discursive affinity in this analysis. However, the findings and discussions of the analysis on how the Security Council structures climate change and security discourses will be examined in the last section after the discourse institutionalization analysis.

3.3 How Are the Structured Security Discourses on Climate Change Institutionalized in the UNSC?

According to Hajer, measuring the success of discourse in argumentative discourse analysis depends on two conditions. The first is the use of a generally accepted discourse to conceptualize the world. The second is the institutionalization of this discourse by transforming it into various policies, laws, rules, and practices. If these two criteria are met, then we can argue that discourse becomes dominant. In other words, if discourse is reflected in institutional arrangements, then we can talk about discourse institutionalization. In this section, it will be analyzed whether the climate change and security discourses of the Council are institutionalized or not. As stated at the beginning of the chapter, the most important outputs of the Council are resolutions and presidential statements.[44] The resolutions adopted by the Council are binding. That is, in order for the Council to adopt the resolutions on all other matters, the Council shall receive affirmative votes from 9 of 15 members, and none of the permanent members shall use a veto vote. Presidential statements can be published in cases where the permanent members with veto power cannot adopt a resolution on any issue. Presidency statements are not binding. However, they are important in terms of indicating that the Council has taken a political step by showing its interest in the relevant issue, although no decision can be taken on this issue (Denk 2015). The first part of this section will analyze how the thematic meetings held between 2007-2021 were reflected on the Council's official resolutions and presidential statements. The second part will examine whether the provision of regular information and analysis to the Council on the effects of climate change, which has been mentioned in every meeting since 2011, has been activated. Resolutions and presidential statements, which are the main indicators of the institutionalization process, are generally considered within this scope in the literature since they are the basic building blocks of international law. However, this thesis is basically built on security discourses and the effects of these discourses on practice; therefore, it will not be considered under international law.

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[44] According to Article 27, "1) Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 2)Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. 3) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."

3.3.1 UNSC's climate change-related outputs: presidential statements and resolutions

Hajer did not take a transparent approach as to whether discourse structuring or discourse institutionalization developed first. However, in this analysis, it is understood that the institutionalization process started after the discourse structuring. As is known, climate change and security issues have been on the Council's agenda with increasing importance since 2007. In this regard, the first indication of discursive institutionalization could be found in the presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15) taken at the "Impact of Climate Change" themed meeting held on 20 July 2011. Among these meetings held with the direct or indirect themes of climate, the presidential statement numbered S/PRST/2011/15 was accepted only after the meeting in 2011. Apart from this, adopted resolutions and the presidential declarations are the Council outputs in which the effects of climate change are taken into account over the existing problems. As shown in Table 3.41, 48 resolutions and presidential statements on climate change and security were adopted by the Council between 2011-2021.

	Output	Issue
1	S/PRST/2011/15	Maintenance of international peace and security: Climate change
2	S/PRST/2012/26	Peace and security in Africa
3	S/PRST/2013/10	Peace and security in Africa
4	S/PRST/2013/20	Peace and security in Africa
5	S/PRST/2014/17	Peace and security in Africa
6	S/RES/2242 (2015)	Women and peace and security
7	S/PRST/2015/24	Peace and security in Africa
8	S/PRST/2016/11	Peace consolidation in West Africa
9	S/PRST/2017/2	Peace consolidation in West Africa
10	S/PRST/2017/10	Peace consolidation in West Africa
11	S/RES/2349 (2017)	Peace and security in Africa
12	S/PRST/2018/3	Peace consolidation in West Africa
13	S/PRST/2018/16	Peace consolidation in West Africa
14	S/PRST/2018/17	Central African region
15	S/RES/2408 (2018)	The situation in Somalia
16	S/RES/2423 (2018)	The situation in Mali
17	S/RES/2429 (2018)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan
18	S/RES/2431 (2018)	The situation in Somalia
19	S/RES/2448 (2018)	The situation in the Central African Republic
20	S/PRST/2019/7	Peace consolidation in West Africa
21	S/PRST/2019/10	Central African region
22	S/RES/2457 (2019)	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security
23	S/RES/2461 (2019)	The situation in Somalia
24	S/RES/2472 (2019)	The situation in Somalia
25	S/RES/2480 (2019)	The situation in Mali
26	S/RES/2499 (2019)	The situation in the Central African Republic
27	S/RES/2502 (2019)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
28	S/PRST/2020/2	Peace consolidation in West Africa
29	S/PRST/2020/7	Peace consolidation in West Africa
30	S/RES/2520 (2020)	The situation in Somalia
31	S/RES/2524 (2020)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan
32	S/RES/2531 (2020)	The situation in Mali
33	S/RES/2540 (2020)	The situation in Somalia
34	S/RES/2552 (2020)	The situation in the Central African Republic
35	S/RES/2556 (2020)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo
36	S/PRST/2021/3	Peace consolidation in West Africa
37	S/PRST/2021/10	Peace and security in Africa
38	S/RES/2561 (2021)	The situation in Cyprus
39	S/RES/2567 (2021)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan
40	S/RES/2568 (2021)	The situation in Somalia
41	S/RES/2576 (2021)	The situation concerning Iraq
42	S/RES/2579 (2021)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan
43	S/RES/2584 (2021)	The situation in Mali
44	S/RES/2587 (2021)	The situation in Cyprus
45	S/PRST/2021/16	Peace consolidation in West Africa
46	S/RES/2592 (2021)	The situation in Somalia
47	S/RES/2605 (2021)	The situation in the Central African Republic
48	S/RES/2612 (2021)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Table 3.41: Climate Change-Related Outputs and Issues of the Council

In Figure 3.5, the distribution of the resolutions adopted and the presidential statements within the scope of the Council are shown by year. In this context, while only presidential statements were taken until 2015, the first resolution was adopted under *Women and Peace and Security* (S/RES/2242 (2015)).

Figure 3.5: UNSC'S Climate Change-related Outputs between 2007-2021 (created by author)

While six presidential statements and one resolution were adopted between 2011-2015, 13 presidential statements and 28 resolutions were adopted between 2016-2021. Especially after 2018, both the increase in the number of climate change-related thematic meetings and the significant increase in the number of adopted resolutions related to climate change could be read as signs that this issue is considered seriously in the Council's agenda. In addition, considering that the resolutions are binding, it could be accepted as an indication that the issue of climate change and security is now institutionalized within the Council.[45]

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[45] The contents of these resolutions and presidential statements will be discussed in the following sections.

When the adopted resolutions and presidential statements are analyzed based on countries and regions, it is understood that the Council's outputs are mostly fixed upon Africa. As shown in Figure 3.6, 43 of the 48 resolutions and presidential statements of the Council are related to Africa, and out of 43 Africa-related outputs, 18 are presidential statements, and 25 are resolutions.

Figure 3.6: Outputs of the UNSC on Climate Change by Countries, Regions and Issues (created by author)

As is known, the first output of the Council on climate change was the presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15) published after the open debate with the theme "The Impact of Climate Change" held in July 2011. Following this development, climate change was especially problematized in the Sahel region (as seen in Figure 3.7) in the adopted presidential statements under *Peace and Security in Africa* in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (S/PRST/2012/26; S/PRST/2013/10; S/PRST/2013/20; S/PRST/2014/17).

Figure 3.7: Sahel Region (Source: European Commission)

In the presidential statements adopted on *Peace Consolidation in West Africa* in 2016 (S/PRST/2016/11) and 2017 (S/PRST/2017/2; S/PRST/2017/10), the threat multiplier effect of climate change was central to the Sahel region. Even in the two presidential statements adopted in 2017 (S/PRST/2017/2; S/PRST/2017/10), the following was mentioned: "The Security Council ... highlights the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to climate change impacts." It is observed that the discourses on providing the essential climate-related information flow to the Council and preventing climate-related threats by cooperating with the relevant institutions, which have been voiced since the open debate with the theme "New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention, Including Pandemics, Climate change, and Transnational Organized Crime" *in* 2011, are institutionalized in these two presidential statements. In addition, the climate change-related parts of the resolutions and presidential statements adopted until 2018 are all related to the Sahel region. In 2018, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2018/17) on the *Central African Region*, except for the Sahel.

An important turning point in the reflection of climate change on the Council policies is the resolution (S/Res/2349) adopted on *Peace and security in Africa* in 2017. This development is significant in terms of the P5 recognizing the security implications of climate change for the first time. The Council mentions the threat multiplier effect of climate change as it "recognises the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water

scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors" in paragraph 26 under the heading *Root Causes and Development.* It also expresses their recognition of cooperation with the Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan of the LCBC for Chad while addressing Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria in terms of complex security threats in paragraph 23.

When the Council's resolutions on climate change are examined, it is understood that another turning point was experienced in the resolution (S/RES/2423) adopted on the *Situation in Mali* in 2018. Climate change was addressed for the first time under the VII Chapter of the United Nations Charter through the Mali resolution. In addition, as seen in Figure 3.8, climate change was addressed under Chapter VII in fifteen of the twenty-seven resolutions adopted between 2018-2021.

Figure 3.8: UNSC's Resolutions on Climate Change (created by author)

This means that climate change is addressed under Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (Articles 39-51)), where the Council's binding decision-making power qualifications are determined. In this context, Article 39 states the Council's responsibility to maintain international peace and security as follows: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." In other words, according to Article 39 of Chapter VII, in case of "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, under Article 41 the Council is authorized to take measures not involving the use of armed force." On the other hand, the Council may also take "measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" under Article 42. As shown in Table 3.42, climate change is also addressed specifically in the context of threat multiplier effect under Chapter VII in the relevant resolutions between the years 2018-2021.

	Output	Issue
1	S/RES/2423 (2018)	The situation in Mali
2	S/RES/2431 (2018)	The situation in Somalia
3	S/RES/2448 (2018)	The situation in the Central African Republic
4	S/RES/2472 (2019)	The situation in Somalia
5	S/RES/2480 (2019)	The situation in Mali
6	S/RES/2499 (2019)	The situation in the Central African Republic
7	S/RES/2502 (2019)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo
8	S/RES/2520 (2020)	The situation in Somalia
9	S/RES/2531 (2020)	The situation in Mali
10	S/RES/2552 (2020)	The situation in the Central African Republic
11	S/RES/2556 (2020)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo
12	S/RES/2567 (2021)	The situation in Sudan and South Sudan
13	S/RES/2568 (2021)	The situation in Somalia
14	S/RES/2576 (2021)	The situation in Mali
15	S/RES/2584 (2021)	The situation in Mali

Table 3.42: Adopted Resolutions Related to Climate Change Under Chapter VII

Two points are significant here. First, adopted resolutions under Chapter VII are country-based, not region or international security-related. Secondly, and more importantly, Russia stated that climate change and security dimensions are not universal but may be a threat based on national or specific areas during the climate-themed meetings. In this case,

it seems that the institutionalization of climate discourse in the resolutions, which is the most important output of the Council, is in line with Russia's discourses.[46] If the climate change-related articles in the adopted resolutions under Chapter VII are examined, it is observed that the Council recognized the threat multiplier effect on stability for all of the mentioned countries. Furthermore, in almost all of the relevant resolutions, the Council has emphasized "the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations."[47] In short, climate change has been recognized as a threat multiplier effect in country-specific resolutions, and it has been emphasized that the relevant countries and the UN provide the necessary risk assessments and risk management. Apart from these resolutions, no extra resolution has been accepted.

Last but not least, it seems that all of the adopted resolutions and published presidential statements focus on the threat multiplier effect of climate change. Additionally, the importance of cooperation in the fight against climate change was emphasized in two resolutions about Cyprus, but no details were given about its security impact (S/RES/2561 (2021); S/RES/2587 (2021)). If examined from the multi-level security analysis framework, the direct and indirect effects of climate change were detailed in the presidential statement (S/PRST/2018/17) adopted in 2018 on *Central African region* for the first time. After this development, the security impacts of climate change have been defined using the following statement in the adopted declarations and resolutions: "The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among other factors on the stability of…" When this standardized item is examined in terms of a multi-level security framework, it is understood that causal chains are established between human security and national security in the Council's outputs. Drought is the most crucial threat in the agricultural societies where global warming is felt the most. Moreover, it is also clear that desertification and land degradation caused

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[46] For more information: S/PV.8307, S/PV.8451, S/2020/929, S/2020/1090, S/2021/198, S/PV.8864, S/PV.8923, S/PV.8926

[47] For more information: S/RES/2431 (2018), S/RES/2448 (2018), S/RES/2472 (2019), S/RES/2480 (2019), S/RES/2499 (2019), S/RES/2520 (2020), S/RES/2531 (2020), S/RES/2552 (2020), S/RES/2556 (2020), S/RES/2567 (2021), S/RES/2568 (2021), S/RES/2576 (2021), S/RES/2584 (2021)

by drought will ultimately impact food security.[48] At this point, if necessary precautions are not taken in a society where food security is threatened, this could cause instability at the national security level. In this regard, in climate-themed meetings, these causal chains are discursively structured between climate security (anthropogenic impacts on climate security), human security (impact of climate change on human security), national security (climate induced-human security combined with other problems that threaten national security), and even international security (through international migration). However, it is observed that these structured discourses are institutionalized by establishing a causal link between human security and national security in the Council's resolutions and presidential statements. Another point that draws attention here is that the effects of human-induced impacts on climate (climate security), which are mentioned in all thematic meetings, are ignored during the institutionalization process. As will be tackled in the following chapter, the problematization of climate security means that the growth-oriented capitalist system begins to shrink economically. Production and growth are dependent on energy consumption, so emission generation is an essential requirement in this system. Therefore, institutionalizing human security and national security in the Council is not solving this problem, but it is taking measures by considering the existing problems.

3.3.2 UNSC's climate change-related institutional practices

The previous section analyzed how the UN Security Council institutionalized climate change and security discourses in its resolutions and presidential statements. This section examines whether the structured climate change and security discourses are institutionalized through scientific and specialized agencies. In this regard, it has been determined that three specialized agencies that provide information flow to the Council on climate change and security impacts have been launched.

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[48] These storylines in which the causality chains are established have already been frequently mentioned in detail in the discourse structuring section.

Group of Friends in Climate and Security

The Group of Friends in Climate and Security started its work in 2018 under the leadership of Germany and Nauru and reached 58 member states in 2021 (SIPRI, 2021). It also consists of members representing five UN groups: the African Group, the Asia-Pacific Group, the Eastern European Group, the Western European and Others Group, and the Latin American and Caribbean Group (Security Council Report, 2021). Germany's first announcement of the establishment of the Group of Friends in Climate and Security was made in 2019 in an open discussion with the theme "Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security." As of 2020, states such as the Dominican Republic, Nauru, Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, which support the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, especially Germany and Nauru, have made their statements on behalf of this group. This group aims to provide the necessary information flow on climate change and security effects to the UN and relevant institutions and increase their activities. Also, it has two main agendas: "one on the work of the Climate-Security Mechanism, and a second on the work of and dynamics in the Security Council, including the activities of the Informal Expert Group of Members of the Security Council on Climate and Security" Group (Security Council Report 2021, 1). In addition, meetings at the working level and the *ambassadorial level* are regularly within the Group of Friends in Climate and Security's scope (SIPRI 2021). Especially since 2018, this group has been one of the institutions where the corporate discourse, which provides the necessary information flow to the *institutional home* and the Council, has been put into practice.

Climate Security Mechanisms

The Climate Security Mechanisms was launched in 2018 with the support of the UN Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), UNDP and UNEP (Shafi 2022). In this regard, the Climate Security Mechanisms aims to comprehensively address climate change and security impacts within the scope of the UN's works and to analyze the process systematically (Shafi 2022). Although it was not established directly within the framework of the Security Council, it could be said that the Council had an impact on this process. The Council's first resolution to recognize the relationship between climate and conflict a year before the establishment of the Climate Security Mechanisms and the

organization of climate-specific meetings since 2007 led to the need for such an institution that would provide regular information flow about climate change and its security impacts related among UN bodies. Although a clear relationship could not be established, it was stated at the Council meeting in 2018 (S/PV.8307) that such an institution was needed. However, it should be noted that there is no indication that the Climate Security Mechanism was founded directly from these discourses.

Informal Expert Group on Climate Change and Security
The Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security of Members of the UNSC, whose co-chairs are Ireland and Niger, was established in 2020 with ten members of the Security Council, including Belgium, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, Tunisia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, and Vietnam (Security Council Report 2021). Both countries also prepared a draft for the Council to take a general resolution on climate change, but it could not be entered into force on 13 December 2021 due to Russia's against and China's abstention votes. The Informal Expert Group on Climate Change and Security works with experts and aims at a more systematic discussion of the climate and security relationship to the Council. To this end, it functions as an institution where Council members can discuss climate-related challenges and threats in missions and other operations under the UN (Climate Expert Group 2021; Security Council Report 2021). Although the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security is still a very new establishment, it was an important development for Ireland and Niger to present to the Council and, if accepted, a decision that would be a turning point in the history of the Council.

All three specialized agencies have been launched very recently. Therefore, there is no clear information about their activities, programs and functions yet. These three institutions, which are independent of each other, are very important in terms of institutionalizing the discourse of *institutions providing information to the Council*, which was frequently voiced in the Council after 2007.

In this chapter, the main research question of this thesis, how the UNSC has structured climate change-related security discourses and institutionalized them in practice between 2007-2021, has been analyzed by employing Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis.

Also, Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis has been supported by a multi-level security analysis formed in the context of climate change and security. However, the discussion part is planned to be discussed in the next chapter to keep the analysis's integrity. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical findings of the analysis and the answers to the main and sub-questions of the research will be discussed in the next chapter.

4. DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS BASED ON RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In this thesis, the main research question of this thesis, how the UNSC has structured climate change-related security discourses and institutionalized them in practice between 2007-2021, has been analyzed by employing Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis. In addition, in order to strengthen Hajer's analysis and make climate change-security discourses more meaningful, the multi-level security framework formed in the second chapter was employed in both discourse structuring and discourse institutionalizing processes. By asking ''What is the role of climate change on human security, national security and international security? Is there any connection between them?'', the first sub-question of the thesis, a multi-level security analysis framework was created by establishing causal links between referent objects of security based on the analytical literature review. At the time of this thesis, one of the most critical limitations of the extant literature on the threat multiplier effect, which is complex, sometimes large-scale, and multi-layered, tended to focus on one or two referent objects of security (Gregory et al. 2005; Podesta and Ogden 2008; Selby et al. 2017, Söderblom 2008; Wheeler and Braun 2013). Another limitation of the climate change and security literature was that studies based on the threat multiplier effect deal with the specific effects of climate change. For instance, the effects of climate change on food security, conflicts, and national or international migration are popular topics in the literature (Barnett 2003; Barnett and Agner 2007; Misra 2014; Wheeler and Braun 2013). Another limitation was that security studies considered the threat multiplier effect without relying on referent objects of security (Gleditsch 2012; Gleick 2014; Koubi 2019, L Perch-Nielsen et al. 2008). These studies were undoubtedly essential for an in-depth analysis of the effects of climate change, but they could not provide comprehensive knowledge on a macro scale. Therefore, this thesis aimed to develop a more systematic framework to expand the extant literature, which lacked sufficient detail for a comprehensive understanding of climate change and security.

In this context, in the first part of the analysis, the multi-level security framework was applied to deeply examine the climate change and security-related storylines. Also, in the second part, Council resolutions were examined in more detail using the multi-level security analysis framework. Thus, it has been systematically demonstrated that the Council adopts resolutions on climate change by considering which referent objects of security.

<div align="center">***</div>

R.Q-1) How has the UNSC structured climate change-related security discourses and institutionalized them in practice between 2007-2021?

4.1 Discourse Structuring Part

The first part focuses on how climate change and security discourses are structured in the Council. Despite the increase in the frequency of the relevant thematic meetings and the number of supportive members, this research understands the UNSC's process of structuring discourses on climate change and security to still be in the developmental phase. In addition, it is realized that the Council partly recognizes that climate change is a security issue despite some abstainer and opposer members. When these findings are examined in the context of multi-level security analysis, it is observed that the discourses on whether climate change is an international security problem were not structured yet. However, it is determined that there is a successful discursive structuring that climate change is a security problem in terms of climate security, human security and national security and the causal links between them.

Storylines and Metaphors

The dominant storyline of the twenty-six thematic meetings held between 2007-2021 was the threat multiplier effect of climate change. The second storyline was based on the direct effects of climate change on small island development states. As mentioned above, multi-level security analysis was used to analyze these storylines.

In terms of the threat multiplier effect, it was observed that all members attending the meetings established causal chains between climate security > human security > national security. However, the impact of climate change on international security still remains on

the agenda as a highly contentious issue. In this regard, India, Brazil, and especially Russia were skeptical/opposer regarding climate change's impacts on international security. Even though Russia did not comment on the impact of climate change on international security between 2007 and 2018, after 2018 it took the tough line that climate change has no impact on international security. At this point, it is apparent from the meeting records that Russia's insistence stems from its motivation not to bring climate change to the Council's agenda. In this context, Russia's main concern, and the claim, was that the Council could obtain the right to violate the sovereign rights of any state relying on climate change-related security reasons, as mentioned below (S/2020/929 Annex, 13):

> The social and economic situation in individual countries and subregions may be exacerbated by the adverse impacts of climate change and other manifestations of environmental deterioration. However, security and stability are often affected by more direct causes, about which not all the members of the Council are inclined to talk. These include external interference in Member States' domestic affairs, abuse or even the generation of conflict situations for the purpose of exploiting natural resources without the consent of host Governments.

Even, the Russia Federation Representative expressed these claims in the draft resolution meeting, which was put to the vote on December 13, 2021, as follows: "…its purpose would be to have a way to include virtually any country on the Security Council's agenda if it is deemed to be undesirable by someone. It would be easy to find a pretext, as the whole world feels the impact of climate change'' (S/PV.8926, 3-5). Climate change is a security issue that affects all countries globally. The global north is not yet faced with severe effects, but as mentioned in the second chapter, there may be disagreements over natural resources between the states that have a say in the region due to the melting of the glaciers in the North Pole in the future (Goodell 2015). In addition, as seen in Figure 4.1, if the Northern Sea Routes opens up, it is evident that Russia will be one of the most important actors on this route.

Figure 4.1: Northern Sea Routes (Source: The Economist 2018)

As a result, it is evident that if climate change is securitized to maintain international security by the UNSC, Russia will confront the Council regarding its interests. In addition, it is observed that Russia's political relations with the *West* shaped its climate change and security discourses. It is also possible to understand this from the aggressive and accusatory language in the meeting minutes. Brazil and India preferred to remain silent about the relationship between climate change and international security. As mentioned in the third chapter, India's economic interests come to the fore (Climate Action Tracker 2021). Brazil's approach to the impact of climate change on international security could also be read as preventing attempts at international surveillance of the Amazon rainforest, as Brenton (2013) stated.

However, countries affected by climate change, such as South Africa, Ecuador, Niger, Nigeria, and Kenya avoided commenting on climate change and international security. Especially South Africa was skeptical about whether climate change has an impact on international security yet. It has been observed that these countries highlighted the direct and threat multiplier effects of climate change on their own countries in the relevant

meetings. In this regard, they preferred to highlight the security threats against themselves instead of referring to international security.

The EU and the representatives of the states most affected by climate change established causal links between climate security > human security > national security > international security. In this context, it is observed that countries affected by climate change define the international security dimension of climate change through conflicts. The EU problematized climate-related migrations through international security because it is observed that they were worried about the mass migrations from the global south. The World Bank Groundswell report published by Clement et al. (2021) predicted that 216 million people around the world could be exposed to climate-related migration within their countries by 2050. According to the UNHCR's data (2020), "droughts, flooding, storms and hurricanes posed challenges to UNHCR operations from Bangladesh to the Sahel to Central America, and globally there were 30.7 million new displacements due to disasters." However, no serious steps have been taken to protect climate migrants in international law yet. The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol do not recognize those who had to leave their countries due to climate-related disasters as refugees. In this context, the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHCR) made a historic decision in January 2020 that those who had to migrate due to climate change could not be deported from the host country (CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016). Although this is a very advanced step in international law, it is also underlined that this decision is a general legal interpretation and strengthens states' hands as the context may change when applied to specific cases (Gunes and Celenk 2021). After the decision, it is observed that UNSC members from the EU, which problematized climate migration as an international security threat in the Council's climate-related thematic meetings, largely withdrew their discourses. After this decision, it seems that the motivation of the EU to raise the climate-related migration issue in the Council has primarily disappeared because recognition of climate refugees in the future is left to the mercy of western states through the relevant decision.

Storylines related to the direct impacts of climate change were problematized, mainly through the effects of rising sea levels on small island developing states. All the Council

members confirmed that existential security issues could be triggered by rising sea levels compromising the borders of the Small Islands Developing States in the Pacific. In this regard, the landless states, the legal status of the citizens of these states, etc., were considered issues that would challenge international politics in the future.

Arguments and Discourse Coalitions

In each of the thematic meetings held between 2007 and 2021, three discourse coalitions formed without any exception: Defenders, Opposers and Abstainers. The argument of the first meeting, held in 2007, was on whether climate change was a Council issue. Although some changes were observed in the arguments in the advancing years, the opposers repeatedly returned to the first argument, resulting in limited development of discourse structuring. In general, the main arguments of the thematic meetings held in these 14 years developed in four ways:

- The Council should discuss the impacts of climate change from a security perspective and act proactively.
- The Council should act comprehensively and strategically in cooperation with relevant UN organs and other organizations.
- The Council should be provided with necessary information on climate change. In addition, the essential information flow should be provided by establishing an "institutional house" within the Council.
- The Council should integrate combating climate change into conflict resolution, prevention, mediation and post-conflict efforts.

These findings are also supported by the existing literature (Conca 2019; Paul 2021; Scott 2015). Table 4.1 shows P5's approaches to the main arguments of climate change-themed meetings.

	2007	2011-1	2011-2	2018	2019	2020	2021-1	2021-2	2021-3	2021-4
China	-	-	?	?	?	+	?	?	?	?
France	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
United States of America	?	+	+	?	+	N/A	+	+	+	+
Russian Federation	-	-	?	-	-	N/A	-	-	-	-

Table 4.1: Permanent 5's approaches to the climate change-themed meetings arguments[49]

France and the United Kingdom consistently supported the abovementioned arguments in ten meetings directly themed on climate change. Both countries (France and the UK) affected by climate change make investments at the national level and support international cooperation in this regard. They also fully recognize the direct and threat multiplier effects of climate change and argue that the Council should have a proactive role in this regard. It should even be underlined that the UK was the first member to organize the first climate change-themed meeting. In this context, the findings related to France and United Kingdom's approaches are similar to Hardt and Viehoff's study (2020).

It is realized that there were partial instabilities in the US approach to the role and importance of climate change in the Council. In this context, it was observed that the discourses of the USA in the Council differ according to the ideologies of the Republicans and Democrats. Besides economic interests being at the forefront for the Republicans, Bush and Trump did not hesitate to show their skeptical/denial approaches on climate change. When the Bush and Trump administrations were compared, it was understood that the Bush administration's speeches on climate change both in domestic politics and in the Council showed consistency (S/PV.5663). Despite Trump's denial of climate change, US Representatives did not fully reflect the President's approach to the Council and abstained (S/PV.8307; S/PV.8451; S/2020/751; S/2020/1090). During the presidency of Obama and Biden, US Representatives made supportive statements in the Council in the fight against climate change. Although there were significant differences in

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[49] (+): Defender
(-): Opposer
(?): Abstainer
(N/A): Not Attended

understanding climate change and its security impacts between Republicans and Democrats, they have all made consistent statements within their ideologies. These findings are also compatible with Hardt and Viehoff's (2020) study. However, this research also identified partly inconsistent findings with Brenton's (2013) analysis. Brenton found the US's climate change policies cautious, but this study found that the US discourses on climate change and security in the Council varied. In other words, it has been determined that while Democrats took a stable stance against climate change in their era, Republicans took inconsistent approaches.

In the first thematic meeting held in 2007, China structured its discourses by claiming that climate change was a sustainable development issue rather than a security threat. At that time, China was in the non-Annex-I category within the scope of the Kyoto Protocol. This had inherently affected China's arguments, as the protocol aimed to provide insurance, investment, and technology transfer from developed countries to non-Annex I countries in order to combat climate change. Moreover, non-Annex-I countries were exempt from low emission targets. These developments demonstrate why China structured its discourses around the issue of sustainable development rather than a security threat at that time. However, it has been observed that China unexpectedly changed its discourses on the axis of development and security between 2011-2020. There are three likely causes why China changed its approach:

1. China's positioning of low-emission green investments as the *new normal* in economic and political terms may indicate why it continued to support sustainable development.
2. The withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement in 2017 made China, the largest producer of emissions, the global leader in the fight against climate change. In this regard, Trombetta (2019) found that China was cautious and emphasized multilateralism instead of taking a leading position. The findings of this study also determined that China abstained in seven of the ten thematic meetings it attended.
3. Understanding that development steps would be undermined in the face of worsening air pollution and increasing extreme weather events in China may also be effective in structuring security discourses. In this regard, Trombetta (2019,

116) summarized China's security discourses as a "specific threat construction by the Chinese government, which is based on a security discourse that aims at securing economic development and legitimacy."

The findings of this study for China are consistent with Trombetta's (2019) analysis on "Securitization of climate change in China: Implications for global climate governance."

The results of this study indicate that Russia's anti-Western attitude had an impact on structuring its discourses. By criticizing the main arguments of the climate change-themed meetings, Russia consistently argued that the Council should not handle the climate change issue because Russia believes that climate change is not a universal problem (S/PV.8307, 15). In addition, in 2018-2019 the Representative of the Russian Federation also expressed that there was no direct relationship between climate change and conflict. For example, its accusations against the "West," especially regarding the relationship between climate change and conflict, have been mentioned before (S/PV.8307, 16), as follows:

> If we are so principled about this, why are we always silent during the discussions initiated on this pretext about a no less serious aspect of the issue, the damage to the environment that results from violent military operations and unilateral sanctions, a glaring example of which have been the bombings of Yugoslavia, Libya and Syria by Western coalitions? It is strange, to say the least, that no speakers today have expressed concern about the massive environmental damage that such action inflicts, not to mention the colossal harm to the health of the citizens of those countries.

Still, Russia has recently structured its discourses regarding the Council to address climate change and security impacts on a case/country basis. But it seems that they are still quite cautious. As mentioned above, Russia's main concern and claim was that the Council could obtain the right to violate the sovereign rights of any state relying on climate change-related security reasons (see 6.2.2). However, today, it is unclear what stance Russia will take on this issue in the future. Brazil, elected as a non-permanent Council member for two years in 2022, and India, whose non-permanent membership will expire at the end of 2022, are strong supporters of Russia in the Council. In addition, the uncertainty of the results of the Ukraine-Russia war, which started in February 2022, may cause Russia to take a tougher stance on this issue at least in the short- and medium-terms. Hardt and Viehoff (2020) found in their analysis that Russia was skeptical of the

Council's climate change agenda. However, the findings of this research have determined that Russia is frankly opposed to the Council handling climate change as an international security issue. This thesis also found that Russia was cautious about addressing climate change on a case/country basis. The multi-level security framework formed in this thesis played an essential role in bringing to light this result due to its detailing all the referent objects of security.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

How P5 discursively structured their climate change and security discourse in the Council has been analyzed above. When examined more broadly, it has been observed that the dominant approach among the member states participating in the climate change-themed meetings of the Council is in favor. In Figure 4.2, the approaches of the member states participating in the relevant meetings to the Council-Climate change issue are shown on the map.

Figure 4.2: The Approaches of the Member States Participating in Climate Change-Themed Meetings (created by author)

207

Member states are divided into five groups on the map: defenders, opposers, abstainers, multiple arguments, and never attended.

In this regard, *defenders* generally argued that climate change should be adapted to the Council's agenda, and the UNSC should prepare for the foreseen climate change-related effects within its scope of authority. In other words, they were broadly in line with the arguments of the thematic meetings.

Opposers: Russia was undoubtedly the most important opposer in the climate-themed debates in the Council. It is observed in the records that Argentina, Belarus, Bolivia, and Cuba, which are allies with Russia, were also opposed to the Council's putting climate change on its agenda. Other opposer states were Namibia (S/PV.5663) and Tanzania (S/PV.6587). Both states associated themselves with the statements made on behalf of the Group of 77 and China at the climate-themed meetings they attended once. Therefore, in this research, it was found that the opposers structured their discourse by taking a political stance instead of prioritizing climate change.

Abstainers: Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Nicaragua, and Turkey did not take a transparent stand in the thematic meetings and preferred to abstain. Since their participation was limited, satisfactory results were not obtained from the analyses.

Multiple Arguments: In this analysis, it was also found that some states changed their arguments multiple times in thematic meetings. It is understood that these states have changed their discourses due to three reasons: economic, political and the increasing effects of climate change. In the P5 context, it was discussed that China changed its discourse for economic reasons and the US for political economy reasons. The approaches of the member states other than the P5 are analyzed in four groups as seen in Table 4.2: mostly defender, mostly opposer, from opposer to abstainer/defender, from defender to abstainer/opposer.

Mostly Defender	Australia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Maldives, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan
Mostly Opposer	Brazil, India
From Opposer to Abstainer/Defender	Bangladesh, Barbados, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Kuwait, Venezuela, Sudan, Indonesia, Qatar, South Africa
From Defender to Abstainer/Opposer	Colombia

Table 4.2: The Member States with Multiple Arguments

The states in the first group generally defended the main arguments of the thematic meetings. However, it is observed that they did not comment on the general argument in some meetings. This does not mean, however, that these states oppose the relevant argument; they all support the Council's putting climate change on its agenda.

The states in the second group mostly oppose the main arguments of the thematic meetings. Findings show that India's economic interests and Brazil's economic and political concerns played essential roles in structuring their discourses.

All of the states in the third group opposed the arguments of the meetings held in 2007 and 2011-1. It is understood that all of these states opposed the discussions on political and economic grounds and reflected the approaches of their affiliated groups, as mentioned below. However, it is observed that they abstained or adopted a supportive approach to the arguments of the following meetings they attended.

- The Africa Group & The Group of 77 and China & The Non-Aligned Movement: Indonesia
- The Arab Group & The Group of 77 and China & The Non-Aligned Movement: Lebanon, Kuwait, and Sudan
- The Group of 77 and China: Pakistan
- The Group of 77 and China & The Non-Aligned Movement: Bangladesh, Barbados, Venezuela, and South Africa
- The Non-Aligned Movement: Egypt

Between 2007-2011, the biggest motivation for these states' opposition was the concern that technology transfers, aids, and investments to be supported through the Kyoto Protocol would be interrupted. However, after 2018, it was observed that the Africa Group, the Arab Group, the Group of 77 and China, and the Non-Aligned Movement did not make a joint statement at the Council's climate change-themed meetings. There are two likely causes for this situation. The first reason for this is the possibility that climate change is undermining sustainable development investments. In this regard, it is understood that the discourses of these countries shifted from sustainable development to the axis of security. Another reason is that the Kyoto Protocol did not meet the expectations and had expired.

In addition, it is understood that Kuwait changed its discourse for different reasons than other states in this group. Kuwait is a member of the Arab Group, the Group of 77 and China, and the Non-Aligned Movement. However, in none of the climate-themed meetings, did Kuwait not associate their own statements with these groups. In this context, the change in discourse in Kuwait, which is governed by a constitutional monarchy, can be associated with the change of the Emir in 2020.

Colombia, which is in the fourth group, made supportive statements, albeit cautiously, about whether climate change was a Council issue in July 2011. The Colombian Representative stated that the Council had a role in the humanitarian protection responsibility in conflict and other instability issues exacerbated by climate change. However, four months later, Colombia completely changed their discourse at the meeting held with the theme of "New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention, Including Pandemics, Climate change, and Transnational Organized Crime." The Representative argued that economic, social, humanitarian and environmental problems could affect international peace and security, but this should not mean that the Council should address them. The Colombian Representative described this situation as "growing securitization" and expressed their concerns on undermining development initiatives (S/PV.6668, p: 11). Although Colombia abstained from the general argument of the last meeting in 2019, they were generally moderate. It seems likely that Colombia's unstable approach was related to the theme of the meeting held in July 2011. Colombia

is one of the world's largest cocaine producers, according to the 2021 data of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (UNODC 2021). In case of securitization of "New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention, Including Pandemics, Climate change, and Transnational Organized Crime" themes, Colombia may become open to intervention by the Council. Therefore, Colombia was likely to take a stance against securitization of these issues.

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The formats of the climate change-themed meetings between 2007-2011 were open debates, briefings, and Arria Formulas. In addition, three of the four meetings held in 2021 were in the High-Level Open Debate format, in which heads of states participated. A possible explanation for this might be that climate change is taken seriously in the Council. It seems that climate change is significant for Europe and developing countries affected by it. As shown in Table 4.2, the members who organized climate-themed meetings consist of these states.

Date	Organizer	Theme
17.04.2007	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Energy, Security and Climate
20.07.2011	Germany	Maintenance of International Peace and Security: The Impact of Climate Change
23.11.2011	Portugal	New Challenges to International Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention, Including Pandemics, Climate change, and Transnational Organized Crime
11.07.2018	Sweden	Understanding and Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks
25.06.2019	Dominican Republic	Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security
24.07.2020	Germany	Climate Change and Security
24.02.2021	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Climate and Security
23.09.2021	Ireland	Climate and Security
09.12.2021	Niger	Maintenance of international peace and security: security in the context of terrorism and climate change
13.12.2021	Niger	Maintenance of international peace and security: Climate and Security

<center>**Table 4.3:** Direct Climate Change-themed Meetings and Organizers</center>

Figure 4.3: Attendance Rates to the Climate-Related Thematic Meetings between 2007-2011 (created by author)

212

Figure 4.3 shows the participation rates of UN members in the Council's climate change-themed meetings. While China, France, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, among the P5 members, attended all the thematic meetings, Russia and the US did not attend the first climate-themed meeting in 2020, citing Covid-19. One of the key findings was that Africa, most affected by climate change, had a low participation rate at the meetings. Although it is not easy to make a clear inference by considering the participation numbers, the limited number of African seats[50] in the Council and the speeches made on behalf of the African Union may result in a small number of states attendances.

According to the general participation rates, it was determined that 76 members of the UN, which has 193 members, did not attend any climate-themed meeting (see Appendix A.4). In Table 4.4, participation rates for direct climate-themed meetings are shown.

Year	2007	2011-1	2011-2	2018	2019	2020	2021-1	2021-2	2021-3	2021-4	Average
Total	23	62	15	19	74	45	59	15	54	15	38,1
Percentage	12,0%	32,3%	7,8%	9,9%	38,5%	23,4%	30,7%	7,8%	28,1%	7,8%	20%

Table 4.4: Attendance Rates in the Council's Climate-Themed Meetings

In this regard, while the overall participation rate was 20%, the highest participation was the "Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security" themed meeting organized by the Dominican Republic in 2019. the Global Risk Report 2018 and the Global Risk Report 2019 of the World Economic Forum; the Special Report on Global Warming of 1,5°C of IPCC and the World Bank Report on Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. It is understood from the records that the effects of the future scenarios on climate change in these reports increase the motivation for participation.

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[50] According to the A/RES/1991 (XVIII), "…the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (a) Five from African and Asian States; (b) One from Eastern European States; (c) Two from Latin American States; (d) Two from Western European and other States."

Discourse Affinities

Identifying the discourses that held the coalitions together during the meetings was essential to ensure general integrity. The most dominant discursive affinity was the promotion of international cooperation to combat climate change. All members agreed on this point. In this context, in recent years, there has been a discursive consensus on compliance with the Paris Agreement. Apart from this, the "culture of prevention" of conflict was a subject supported by all members, especially in the first years.

4.2 Discourse Institutionalization Part

R.Q-1.2) Under what conditions does the Council define climate change as a security threat in its presidential statements, resolutions, and institutional practices?

The second part focuses on whether climate change and security discourses are institutionalized in the Council. The findings show that the discourses on climate change and security were partially institutionalized in the Council. Despite the increase in the frequency of the relevant outputs and the number of supportive members, it is found that climate change and security discourses have been institutionalized in the Council in line with the discourses of the Russian Federation. In other words, the Council's resolutions and presidential statements on climate change and security impacts were adopted on a regional or country basis, as Russia emphasizes in almost every meeting. In the context of a multi-level security analysis, it has been found that climate change has been institutionalized as a security problem by establishing causal links between human security and national security. In addition, Hajer does not take a transparent approach as to whether discourse structuring or discourse institutionalization developed first, as mentioned before. However, in this analysis, it seems that the institutionalization process began after the discourse structuring. As is known, climate change and security issues have been on the Council's agenda with increasing importance since 2007. In this regard, the first indication of discursive institutionalization could be found in the presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15) adopted at the "The Impact of Climate Change" themed meeting held on 20 July 2011.

Resolutions and Presidential Statements

According to the findings, there are five critical milestones regarding the Council's outputs in the context of institutionalizing climate change and security discourse. Firstly, after the thematic open debate in 2007, climate change and security issues started to become institutionalized for the first time in 2011 through the presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15). Second, climate change was included in the resolution on *Women and Peace and Security* (S/RES/2242 (2015)) adopted in 2015. Third, the recognition of the threat multiplier effect of climate change was included in the resolution (S/RES/2349) adopted in 2017 on the *Peace and security in Africa* for the first time. Fourth, in the 2018 resolution (S/RES/2423) on *The Situation in Mali*, climate change was included under Chapter VII of the United Nations Convention. The last one was an attempt to adopt a general resolution on climate change in December 2021.

Firstly, the presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15) adopted in 2011 was an influential step in institutionalizing the discourses in the following thematic meetings and increasing the members' awareness on this issue. This finding is contrary to that of Vivekananda et al. (2020), who find that "the statement was silent about potential measures by the UNSC to mitigate the security effects caused by climate change, and its legacy is one of limited follow-up action." However, it is consistent with that of Maertens (2021), who considers the Council as a securitizing actor and a security arena where member states describe climate change as a security threat through the presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15) in 2011.

Secondly, although only six presidential statements addressing climate change were adopted between 2007-2015, the first resolution on this issue was adopted in 2015 on the *Women and Peace and Security.* Although no decision was explicitly taken on climate change, it was noted that climate change could be a security threat. Especially after the open debate (S/PV.8307) in 2018, there was a great deal of agreement that climate change should be considered in the Council and that the Council should adapt itself to this new threat. Similarly, there was a significant increase in Council resolutions and presidential statements. While six presidential statements and one resolution were adopted between 2007-2015, thirteen presidential statements and twenty-eight resolutions were adopted

between 2016-2021. As a result, despite the opposition of India and Brazil, and especially the Russian Federation, the increase in the interest in thematic meetings and the increase in the number of resolutions and presidential statements adopted after 2018 is an indication that this issue has been structured and institutionalized in the Council.

The third milestone is the resolution on *Peace and security in Africa*, in which the threat multiplier effect of climate change was recognized firstly in 2017. In this regard, this issue was mentioned in paragraph 26 as follows: "Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors."

It has been observed that all of the adopted resolutions and published presidential statements focused on the threat multiplier effect of climate change. On the other hand, the importance of cooperation in the combat with climate change was emphasized in two resolutions on Cyprus, but no details were given about the security impact of it (S/RES/2561 (2021); S/RES/2587 (2021)). When examined from the multi-level security analysis framework, the direct and indirect effects of climate change were detailed in the presidential statement (S/PRST/2018/17) adopted in 2018 on the *Central African region* for the first time. In this context, the security impacts of climate change have been defined using the following statement in the adopted declarations and resolutions: ''The Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among other factors on the stability of…'' If this standardized article is examined in terms of a multi-level security framework, it is understood that causal chains are established between human security and national security in the Council's outputs. Drought is the most crucial threat in the agricultural societies where global warming is affected the most. Moreover, it is also clear that desertification and land degradation caused by drought will ultimately impact food security. At this point, if necessary, precautions are not taken in a society where food security is threatened, as this could cause instability at the national security level. In this regard, in climate-themed meetings, these causal chains are

discursively structured between climate security (anthropogenic impacts on climate security), human security (impact of climate change on human security), national security (climate induced-human security combined with other problems threatens national security) and even international security (through international migration). However, it is observed that these structured discourses are institutionalized by establishing a causal link between human security and national security in the Council's resolutions and presidential statements. At this point, it is understood that climate change and security discourses were institutionalized in the Council in accordance with the Russian Federation's climate change and security-related discourses. That is to say, the Council's resolutions and presidential statements on climate change and security impacts were adopted on a regional or country basis, as Russia emphasizes insistently in almost every thematic meeting. In addition, it should be also stated that 43 of the 48 resolutions and presidential statements of the Council are related to Africa as detailed in Chapter 3.

Another point that draws attention here is that the effects of human-induced impacts on climate (climate security), which were mentioned in all thematic meetings, were ignored during the institutionalization process. Two weeks before the first climate change-related thematic open debate held on 17 April 2007, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shared a concept paper addressed to the President of the Security Council. The first point of this letter (S/2007/186), which determined the main agenda items of the open debate to be distributed to the Council members, was as follows:

> All members of the international community face a shared dilemma. To ensure well-being for a growing population with unfulfilled needs and rising expectations, we must grow our economies. Should we fail, we increase the risk of conflict and insecurity. To grow our economies we must continue to use more energy. Much of that energy will be in the form of fossil fuels. But if we use more fossil fuels without mitigating the resulting emissions, we will accelerate climate change, which itself presents risks to the very security we are trying to build.

It is already known that "Growth", the structural necessity of the capitalist system, is an indispensable goal for all countries (Hickel 2021, 42). Energy need, one of the essential growth requirements, has also been met with fossil fuels since the Industrial Revolution. Although green energy has been considered an alternative source for dealing with climate change in recent years, Hickel and Kallis (2020), in their research title "Is Green Growth

Possible", revealed that green energy is insufficient and does not support growth. Even, Hickel (2021) even emphasizes that new types of energies (including green energy) are complementing rather than replacing old ones to meet the ever-increasing energy demand for GDP growth.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the target of the Paris Agreement adopted within the scope of the UNFCCC in the fight against climate change is "to limit global warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius, compared to pre-industrial levels" (UNFCCC.int 2021). However, Haberl et al. (2020) reviewed 835 empirical studies and suggest that "degrowth" targets need to be established in order to achieve climate targets agreed upon through international negotiations. As seen in the concept paper of the first open debate on climate change and security in the Council, developed countries dependent on growth are trying to take precautions within the framework of the Council's realistic security nature instead of taking meaningful steps regarding climate change. Therefore, although they have structured climate security in their discourse, they have not yet made an effort to institutionalize it. For example, the direct effects of climate change have not yet been institutionalized in the Council. As seen in the analysis section, it was accepted by all participating states that the rising sea level is an existential threat to the small island developing states. However, no presidential statement or resolution has been taken for such a life-threatening threat. In the case of adopting a resolution on the direct effects of climate change, the expected developments could be listed as follows: reducing emission rates (it is not even on the agenda right now), encouraging technology transfers, and supporting the adaptation strategies of island states to rising sea levels (it is provided, albeit partially, within the scope of UNFCCC and through some states such as the Netherlands and Italy), etc.

Finally, it is seen that climate change and security discourses are institutionalized, especially over West Africa, with the dimension of the threat multiplier effect until 2020. However, Iraq (S/RES/2576 (2021)) and Cyprus (/RES/2561 (2021); S/RES/2587 (2021)) were also included in the countries where these discourses were institutionalized in 2021. Although this was a small step for the Council, it could be considered a promising development for adopting a global perspective in the future.

The fourth point was that climate change was included under Chapter VII of the United Nations Convention in the 2018 resolution (S/RES/2423) on *The Situation in Mali.* According to Article 39 of Chapter VII, in case of threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the Council is authorized to take measures not involving the use of armed force under Article 41. On the other hand, the Council may also take measures provided for in Article 41 that would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate. Also, the Council may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security under Article 42. Two points are significant here:

1. Adopted resolutions under Chapter VII are country-based, not region or international security-related.
2. More importantly, Russia stated that climate change and security dimensions are not universal but maybe a threat based on national or specific areas during the climate-themed meetings. In this case, it seems that the institutionalization of climate discourse in the resolutions, which is the most important output of the Council, is in line with Russia's discourses. If the climate change-related articles in the adopted resolutions under Chapter VII are examined, it is observed that the Council recognized the threat multiplier effect on stability for all of the mentioned countries. On almost all of the relevant resolutions, the Council has emphasized "the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations."

In short, climate change has been recognized as a threat multiplier effect in country-specific resolutions, and it has been emphasized that the relevant countries and the UN provide the necessary risk assessments and risk management. Apart from these, no extra decision has been accepted.

Lastly, the fifth milestone was an attempt to adopt a general resolution on climate change in December 2021. The draft resolution on climate change and security (S/2021/990) was submitted to the Council's vote at the 8926th meeting of the UNSC held under the presidency of Niger on 13 December 2021. However, it could not be accepted due to

Russia's against and China's abstaining votes. Under the draft resolution, reports and recommendations on climate change and its risks are requested from the Secretary-General, and mediation is recognized to resolve conflicts before they evolve (S/2021/990 Para. 3, 6). Cooperation between member states and scientific communities was also encouraged (S/2021/990 Para. 5, 9). On the other hand, while the draft resolution encourages relevant political missions, peacekeeping operations, and UN country teams to adapt their work in line with their mandates, taking into account the effects of climate change (S/2021/990 Para. 3, 13, 15), it recognizes the importance of non-governmental organizations in peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts (S/2021/990 Para. 12). One of the most important texts of the draft resolution is in the fourth paragraph (S/2021/990 Para. 4), accordingly:

> The draft resolution invites the Secretary-General to integrate, when relevant, the security implications of the effects of climate change into conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions' assessment and planning, peacebuilding support, conflict relapse risk reduction efforts, disaster risk reduction efforts and humanitarian response; requests the inclusion in relevant mission and thematic reporting to the Security Council of gender- and age-sensitive information relating to the security implications of climate change and recommendations to address it; requests further that the Secretary-General takes steps to improve the collection of data, monitoring and analysis of the effects of climate change in the context of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.

In this regard, it could be recognized that this draft resolution was prepared within the scope of the Council's realistic security framework. In other words, the answer to "whether the realist security-based nature of the UNSC has changed at the global security level," which was also problematized at the beginning of the thesis, does not seem possible for now.

What does it mean that the draft resolution submitted to the vote by the co-pen holders of Ireland and Niger was not adopted? First of all, although this voting failed, it does not mean that everything is over. The fact that 113 members of the UN, which has 193 members, sponsored this draft decision, is one of the indications that the issue of climate change and security has been successfully structured, at least discursively. Also, even though Russia voted "against" and China voted "abstaining" in this vote, both states have acknowledged that climate change is a security threat to certain countries and regions. In fact, Russia announced that they will prepare a draft resolution on conflict zones,

especially the Sahel region and that climate change will be included in this draft resolution. In fact, by doing this, Russia indicated that they are not against putting the security risks of climate change on the Council's agenda. Although this vote was unsuccessful in practice, the P5 appears to have developed a limited but significant approach that climate change is the Council's issue. However, there are still severe arguments about its scope, but it is apparent that it will happen. In this regard, it is understood that Russia and China will continue to discuss in the Council that climate change should be evaluated on a regional or even country basis. At the same time, France, the United States and the United Kingdom are unwilling to make concessions that climate change threatens international peace and security within the Council's realist security framework. However, it remains unclear how the Ukraine-Russia war will shape international politics and this debate in the future.

Discourse Institutionalization in the UNSC Practices

It has been observed that the discourse of establishing an institution that will provide the necessary information to the Council on climate change, which was frequently voiced during the meetings, was also implemented. Although the *institutional house* expectations are not met, the institutionalization of discourses through the Group of Friends in Climate and Security, the Climate Security Mechanism, and the Informal Expert Group on Climate Change and Security indicates that both the structuring and institutionalization of the discourse have been successfully completed.

CONCLUSION

This research set out to investigate how the United Nations Security Council structured climate change and security discourses and institutionalized them in its practices between 2007-2021. To achieve this, Maarten Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis was employed how the UNSC structured and institutionalized the relevant discourses. The thesis additionally formed a multilevel security framework to employ over both the discourse structuring and institutionalizing processes to strengthen Hajer's analysis and make the discourses on climate change and security more meaningful. Based on the analytical literature review, the multilevel security framework establishes causal chains among climate security, human security, national security, and international security.

This research found out that the UNSC's process of structuring discourses on climate change and security to still be in the developmental phase. In the context of a multilevel security framework, climate change was observed to have been structured as a security problem by establishing causal links between climate security, human security, and national security; however, the discourses on whether climate change is an international security issue or not was observed to have not been structured yet.

This research also focuses on whether or not the UNSC has institutionalized climate change and security discourses in its practices. The findings show the UNSC to have partially institutionalized discourses on climate change and security. Despite the increase in the frequency of the relevant outputs and the number of members defending climate change and the UNSC's relationship with it, the UNSC was found to have institutionalized the discourses on climate change and security in line with the discourses of the Russian Federation. In the context of the multilevel security framework, while it has been observed that climate security, which is predominantly expressed in the discourse structuring, is ignored in the institutionalization process, climate change was found to have been institutionalized as a security problem by establishing causal links between human security and national security.

The answer to the question at the beginning of the thesis of whether the realist security-based nature of the UNSC as problematized has changed with regard to the level of global security is that it has not changed yet.

This research contributes to the literature on climate change and security. Previous literature primarily emphasized the one or two referent objects of security in the context of threat multiplier effects or focused on the threat multiplier effect dealing with the specific effects of climate change, such as climate-related migration, food security, and so on. On the other hand, some prominent studies on climate change and security considered the effects of climate change without relying on referent objects of security. These studies were undoubtedly essential for an in-depth analysis of the effects of climate change, but they could not provide comprehensive knowledge on a macro scale. Therefore, this study aimed to develop a more systematic framework to expand the extant literature, which lacked sufficient detail for a comprehensive understanding of climate change and security.

To the best of my knowledge, few studies in the climate change-related security literature have been examined in the context of the multi-level framework. However, this research included a wider range of a comprehensive security approach. In this regard, a multilevel security analysis framework was created by establishing causal links between referent objects of security based on the analytical literature review by asking "What is the role of climate change on human security, national security, and international security? Is there any connection between them?" This thesis focused not just on the threat multiplier effect but has been comprehensively compiled to include the direct impacts of climate change on climate security, human security, national security, and international security. In this way, many key details from climate change and security literature were presented in a comprehensive and multilevel security framework.

Specifically, the extent to which the Council's discourses on climate change and security were structured and which reference objects of security were considered in their practices were evaluated by employing this framework. This framework also aimed to strengthen Hajer's analysis and make climate change-security discourses more meaningful by engaging in discourse structuring and institutionalizing processes.

In addition to the theoretical contributions detailed above, this thesis maintains several empirical implications. The empirical analysis of this research consisted of two parts. The first part examined how the Council's climate change and related security discourses are structured by prioritizing P5. The first part of the analysis consisted of three stages. In the first stage, the storylines and metaphors of the meetings on climate change and security were revealed. In the second stage, the records were reread, and the main arguments of each meeting were shown. Then, the discourse coalitions that appeared from these arguments are grouped. In the third stage, similar discourses were found that brought the discourse coalitions closer together. This situation, which Hajer describes as discursive affinity, serves as cement between discourse coalitions. The sum of these stages has revealed how the climate change and security discourses in the Council are structured.

Despite the increase in the frequency of the relevant thematic meetings and the number of supportive members, this research understands the UNSC's process of structuring discourses on climate change and security to still be in the developmental phase due to some abstainer and opposer members. In other words, it has been figured out that a well-established and assertive climate change and security discourse has not yet been formed and that the member states have not reached a complete agreement on the security dimensions of climate change. The dominant storyline of the twenty-six thematic meetings held between 2007-2021 was the threat multiplier effect of climate change. The second storyline was based on the direct effects of climate change on small island development states. As mentioned above, multi-level security analysis was used to analyze these storylines. In this regard, it is determined that there is a successful discursive structuring that climate change is a security problem in terms of climate security, human security and national security and the causal links between them; however, it is observed that the discourses on whether climate change is an international security problem were not structured yet. Undoubtedly, the Russian opposition has an essential role in the discourse structuring being in the developmental phase and climate change has not yet been structured as an international security issue. However, China's constant abstention and the approaches of the Republican presidents in the USA are also important factors in the disruption of the discourse structuring process.

The second part analyzed whether the Council has institutionalized climate change and security discourses in its practices. This part consisted of two stages. In the first stage, how the relevant discourses turned into practices and policies in the resolutions and presidential statements, which were the most important outputs of the Council, were examined. Due to resolutions' binding nature, especially they were examined in depth. Finally, in the second stage, whether there were expert structures on climate change within the Council was examined. According to the results, the discourses on climate change and security were partially institutionalized in the Council. In this regard, it is found that climate change and security discourses have been institutionalized on a regional or country basis in line with the expectations of the Russian Federation. In the context of multilevel security analysis, it has also been found that climate change has been institutionalized as a security problem by establishing causal links between human security and national security. In the analysis of the discourse structuring process, it was already predictable that climate change would be controversial in the Council as an international security issue and would not be institutionalized, primarily due to the approach of Russia, which has the veto right. However, "climate security," which is the first step of the multilevel security analysis, was an issue expressed by all members but was not included in the institutionalization process. In this regard, although Russia seems to be the most crucial actor in the institutionalization process, the silence of the Council members on climate security, who insisted that climate change should be included in the Council's agenda, can actually be described as insincerity. At this point, it should be noted that the multilevel security framework's contribution is undoubtedly invaluable as it provides more profound and broader insight and allows us to evidently realize the critical dynamics in discourse structuring and institutionalizing processed. It has been also observed that the discourse of establishing institutions that will provide the necessary information to the Council on climate change, which was frequently voiced during the meetings, was also implemented. It should be noted that it is still early to make inferences about the effectiveness of these institutions, as there are still very new implements.

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This research studied a wide range of referent objects of security which scholars can draw references from regarding their climate change-related security studies. In this regard, a multilevel security framework provides different advantages in terms of direct effects and threat multiplier effects of climate change. In this regard, scholars might draw different insights and use a different combination of referent objects of security for their intended purposes. Another point, this study provided a comprehensive analysis of UNSC's climate change-related security discourses that can be obtained through Hajer's argumentative discourse analysis. Such analysis can be valuable to scholars to gain a fuller understanding of whether the realist security-based nature of the UNSC has changed or not and how much the Council has internalized climate change-related security impacts. Finally, examining the structuring and institutionalization of the UNSC's climate change-related security discourses separately within the context of Hajer's discourse analysis and multilevel security analysis provides very important data for scientists. Scholars can use the UNSC members' climate change and security approaches as a source for information through the data specified in the appendix, whilst the use of comprehensive security analyses like a multilevel security framework was justified by this research.

Despite its important theoretical and empirical contributions, this research has some limitations. The thesis analyzes the climate change and security discourses of the UN Security Council through the relevant thematic meetings, Council outputs, and practices. In other words, this study was thoroughly examined wearing "security" glasses. Therefore, the analysis does not cover the legal dimensions of the resolutions and presidential statements. This point may limit the generalizability of the findings of the institutionalization process. For future research, it is recommended to focus on the legal and ethical aspects of the Council's climate change-related outputs, taking into account the discourses of its members and their position in global politics. Also, further studies need to be done on the member states influencing the Council's decisions, such as China, Russian Federation and the EU would be worthwhile. In particular, the discourses of the EU and its roles in institutionalization can be examined in more depth.

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APPENDIX A

A.1 UNSC's Official Documents

Meeting Records

United Nations Security Council, 3046th mtg., S/PV.3046, (31 January 1992) available from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20SPV%203046.pdf

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United Nations Security Council, 6587th mtg., S/PV.6587, (20 July 2011) available from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.6587

United Nations Security Council, 6587th mtg., S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), (20 July 2011) available from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.6587(Resumption1)

United Nations Security Council, 6668th mtg., S/PV.6668, (23 November 2011) available from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.6668

United Nations Security Council, 6982nd mtg., S/PV.6982, (19 June 2013) available from https://undocs.org/S/PV.6982

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United Nations Security Council, 7699th mtg., S/PV.7699, (26 May 2016) available from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.7699

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United Nations Security Council, 7959th mtg., S/PV.7959, (6 June 2017) available from https://undocs.org/S/PV.7959

United Nations Security Council, 8144th mtg., S/PV.8144, (20 December 2017) available from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8144

United Nations Security Council, 8307th mtg., S/PV.8307, (11 July 2018) available from
https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8307

United Nations Security Council, 8372nd mtg., S/PV.8372, (16 October 2018) available
from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8372

United Nations Security Council, 8451st mtg., S/PV.8451, (25 January 2019) available
from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8451

United Nations Security Council, video-teleconference, S/2020/751, (24 July 2020)
available from https://undocs.org/S/2020/751

United Nations Security Council, video-teleconference, S/2020/929, (17 September
2020) available from https://undocs.org/S/2020/929

United Nations Security Council, video-teleconference, S/2020/1090, (3 November
2020) available from https://undocs.org/S/2020/1090

United Nations Security Council, video-teleconference, S/2021/198, (23 February 2021)
available from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_198.pdf

United Nations Security Council, 8864th mtg., S/PV.8864, (23 September 2021)
available from https://undocs.org/S/PV.8864

United Nations Security Council, 8923rd mtg., S/PV.8923, (9 December 2021) available
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(9 December 2021) available from https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.8923%20(Resumption1)

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United Nations Security Council Presidential Statements, *Peace consolidation in West Africa,* S/PRST/2018/3, (30 January 2018) available from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2018_3.pdf

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United Nations Security Council Presidential Statements, *Central African region,* S/PRST/2018/17, (10 August 2018) available from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2018_17.pdf

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United Nations Security Council Presidential Statements, *Central African region,* S/PRST/2019/10, (12 September 2019), available from https://undocs.org/en/S/PRST/2019/10

United Nations Security Council Presidential Statements, *Peace consolidation in West Africa,* S/PRST/2020/2, (11 February 2020) available from https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2020/2

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United Nations Security Council Resolution*, The situation in Somalia,* S/RES/2408 (2018), (27 March 2018) available from https://undocs.org/S/RES/2408(2018)

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APPENDIX B

B.1 Climate Change Language in UNSC's Outputs

	Outcome	Issue	Climate Change and Security Language	Importance
1	S/PRST/2011/15	Maintenance of international peace and security: Climate change	"The Security Council reaffirms its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council stresses the importance of establishing strategies of conflict prevention. "The Security Council recognizes the responsibility for sustainable development issues, including climate change, conferred upon the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. "The Security Council underlines General Assembly resolution 63/281 of June 3, 2009, which: reaffirms that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the key instrument for addressing climate change, recalls the provisions of the UNFCCC, including the acknowledgement that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions, and invites the relevant organs of the United Nations, as appropriate and within their respective mandates to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications.	

			"The Security Council notes General Assembly resolution 65/159 of December 20, 2010, entitled 'Protection of global climate for present and future generations of humankind'. "The Security Council notes that, in response to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 63/281, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly on 'Climate change and its possible security implications' (A/64/350). "The Security Council expresses its concern that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security. "The Security Council expresses its concern that possible security implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level-rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States. "The Security Council notes that in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security under its consideration, conflict analysis and contextual information on, inter alia, possible security implications of climate change is important, when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace. In this regard, the Council requests the Secretary-General to ensure that his reporting to the Council contains such contextual information."	
2	S/PRST/2012/26	Peace and security in Africa	The Security Council *expresses* its concern about the underlying problems in the Sahel region and remains engaged in addressing the complex security and political challenges in this region that are inter-related with humanitarian and developmental issues as well as adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.	
3	S/PRST/2013/10	Peace and security in Africa	The Security Council *reaffirms* its concern about the alarming situation in the Sahel region and its commitment to address the complex security and political challenges in this region that are interrelated with humanitarian and developmental issues as well as adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.	

4	S/PRST/2013/20	Peace and security in Africa	The Security Council *reiterates* its continued concern about the alarming situation in the Sahel region and reaffirms its continued commitment to address the complex security and political challenges in this region, which are interrelated with humanitarian and developmental issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.	
5	S/PRST/2014/17	Peace and security in Africa	The Security Council *reiterates* its continued concern about the alarming situation in the Sahel region and reaffirms its continued commitment to address the complex security and political challenges to the stability and development of the region despite the collective efforts undertaken by the region and the international community and reaffirms its continued commitment to address these challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and developmental issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.	
6	S/RES/2242 (2015)	Women and peace and security	Noting the changing global context of peace and security, in particular relating to rising violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, the increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, the impacts of climate change and the global nature of health pandemics, and in this regard reiterating its intention to increase attention to women, peace and security as a cross-cutting subject in all relevant thematic areas of work on its agenda, including threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts	
7	S/PRST/2015/24	Peace and security in Africa	The Security Council *reaffirms* its continued commitment to address all these challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.	
8	S/PRST/2016/11	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council commends the Special Representative for its participation in the briefing on "Peace and Security in Africa: Challenges of the Sahel Region" that was held on May 26th, encourages further progress by the United Nations system and its partners towards the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), including through support to the Group of 5 for the Sahel (G5), in order to assist in addressing the security and political challenges to the stability and development of the Sahel region and reaffirms its continued commitment to address such challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.	

9	S/PRST/2017/2	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council encourages further progress by the United Nations system and its partners towards the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), including through support to the Group of 5 for the Sahel (G5), in order to assist in addressing the security and political challenges to the stability and development of the Sahel region and reaffirms its continued commitment to address such challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes, and, in this regards, highlights the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to climate change impacts.	
10	S/PRST/2017/10	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council encourages further progress by the implementation of the UNISS, including through support to the G5, in order to assist in addressing the security and political challenges to the stability and development of the Sahel region and reaffirms its continued commitment to address such challenges, which are interrelated with humanitarian and development issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes, and, in this regard, highlights the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to climate change impacts.	
11	S/RES/2349 (2017)	Peace and security in Africa	Recognises the complex challenges faced by the Region and welcomes the development of programmes by the respective Governments to help build and sustain peace by addressing the root causes of the crisis, namely the "Buhari Plan" of Nigeria, the Programme "Renaissance" of Niger, the "Recovery Road Map" the Special Youth Triennial Programme of Cameroon, the "Vision 2030: the Chad we want" of Chad, and the Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan of the LCBC; calls upon respective Governments to strengthen their coordination and prioritisation within these programmes to enable effective implementation, and calls upon international partners to extend their support in this regard; (phr. 23) Recognises the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors; (Phr. 26)	

| 12 | S/PRST/2018/3 | Peace consolidation in West Africa | The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors.

 The Security Council expresses concern over the overall humanitarian situation in the region, characterized by the impact of armed conflict and terrorism, extreme poverty, food insecurity, forced displacement, adverse effects of climate change and epidemics, which contribute to the high levels of structural, chronic and acute vulnerability in the region and continue to affect populations, and call for significant humanitarian and development action. | |
| 13 | S/PRST/2018/16 | Peace consolidation in West Africa | The Security Council expresses its concern for increased tensions between pastoralists and farmers in the region driven by competition for natural resources, rapid population growth, weak governance, pressures related to climate and ecological factors, and the circulation of small arms and light weapons, and encourages ECOWAS and its Member States, with the support of UNOWAS, to address these challenges in a coordinated and holistic manner.

 The Security Council expresses concern over the overall humanitarian situation in the region, characterized by the impact of armed conflict and terrorism, extreme poverty, food insecurity, including conflict-induced hunger and threat of famine, forced displacement, human rights violations and abuses, sexual and gender-based violence, adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters and epidemics, which contribute to the high levels of structural, chronic and acute vulnerability in the region and continue to affect populations, and call for significant humanitarian and development action as well as the disbursement of previously pledged funds.

 The Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, continues to stress the need for long-term strategies by | |

			governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilization and build resilience, and further requests that such information be taken into consideration by UNOWAS in its activities.	
14	S/PRST/2018/17	Central African region	The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of the Central Africa Region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, continues to stress the need for long-term strategies by governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilisation and build resilience, and further requests that such information be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its activities.	
15	S/RES/2408 (2018)	The situation in Somalia	*Recalling* its Presidential statement /PRST/2011/15, *recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and *emphasising* the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors;	
16	S/RES/2423 (2018)	The situation in Mali	*Recognizing* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Mali, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and *emphasizing* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the government of Mali and the United Nations relating to these factors, *Notes the importance* for the Government of Mali and the United Nations to take into consideration, as appropriate, the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change and other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their activities, programs and strategies in Mali; (Phr. 68)	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
17	S/RES/2429 (2018)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the situation in Darfur, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, *Requests* the United Nations and the Government of Sudan to consider the adverse implications of climate change, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Darfur, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors and further	

			requests the Secretary-General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting as appropriate; (47)	
18	S/RES/2431 (2018)	The situation in Somalia	*Recalling* its Presidential statement S/PRST/2011/15, recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and *emphasising* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
19	S/RES/2448 (2018)	The situation in the Central African Republic	Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African Region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and stressing the need for adequate risk assessment by the United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African Region and the United Nations to support stabilization and build resilience	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
20	S/PRST/2019/7	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council welcomes the decision of the Secretary General to conduct a strategic review regarding the scope of UNOWAS' mandate and activities, stresses the need for its independent nature and invites the Secretary General to present to the Council its recommendations as well as his observations on these recommendations, including on potential areas of improvement or new or refocused priorities, including on Counter Terrorism, effects of climate change on security, intercommunal violence as part of a broad prevention and sustaining peace agenda, and present these by 15 November 2019, in order to usefully inform the Council's discussions on the renewal of the Mission's mandate which will expire on 31 December 2019.

The Security Council welcomes the study concluded by UNOWAS on conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in the region, which concludes that tensions are being driven by competition for natural resources, rapid population growth, weak governance, pressures related to climate and ecological factors, and the circulation of small arms and light weapons. It encourages ECOWAS and its Member States, with the support of UNOWAS, to address these challenges in a coordinated and holistic manner. The Security Council further expresses its deep concern about the intensification of intercommunal violence in Central Mali and Burkina Faso, and reiterates that stabilisation of the situation and protection of civilians in this region requires a fully integrated response, led by the governments of those countries, with the support of UNOWAS and the international community, and | |

			encompassing simultaneous pursuit of progress on security, governance, humanitarian assistance and development, reconciliation, as well as protection and promotion of human rights.
			The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-term strategies, based on risk assessments, by governments and the United Nations, to support stabilisation and build resilience and encourages UNOWAS to continue to integrate this information in its activities..
21	S/PRST/2019/10	Central African region	The Security Council welcomes the cooperation between UNOCA and other regional entities. The Council encourages further enhanced cooperation between UNOCA and the United Nations Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), ECCAS, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and United Nations country teams, to address cross-border threats and inter-regional issues, such as the Lake Chad Basin crisis, transhumance, forced displacement, and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Council further encourages UNOCA to take into consideration climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors affecting the stability of the Central African Region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, continues to stress the need for long-term strategies by governments and the United Nations, based on risk assessments, to support stabilisation and build resilience, and further requests that such information be taken into consideration by UNOCA in its activities.
22	S/RES/2457 (2019)	Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	*Noting* that Africa still faces enormous challenges, including: governance deficits, economic difficulties, high rates of unemployment, the mismanagement of ethnic diversity, competition over power and resources, state fragility and weak state institutions, ungoverned spaces which leave room for illegal activities, the continued flow of weapons into the continent and their illicit circulation, mercenary activity, insurgencies and rebellions, inadequate border monitoring and control that facilitates transnational organized crime, illicit exploitation of natural resources, continued crisis that precipitate irregular migration, corruption, illicit financial flows which facilitate funding for illegal activities, climate change and

			natural disasters, and slow processes in the ratification of AU instruments and policies	
			Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of a number of AU Member States, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and *emphasizes* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the respective governments and the United Nations relating to these factors; (18)	
23	S/RES/2461 (2019)	The situation in Somalia	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and *emphasising* the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors, and *recalling its Presidential statement* S/PRST/2011/15

Requests the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to consider the adverse implications of climate change, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors and *further requests* the Secretary-General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting as appropriate (21) | |
| 24 | S/RES/2472 (2019) | The situation in Somalia | *Emphasising* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and the UN, of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, energy access, and other factors on the stability of Somalia | *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations |
| 25 | S/RES/2480 (2019) | The situation in Mali | *Emphasizing* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies, by the government of Mali and the United Nations, of ecological changes, natural disasters, drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, energy access, climate change, among other factors, on the security and stability of Mali, | *Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations |

26	S/RES/2499 (2019)	The situation in the Central African Republic	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, and energy access, and *stressing* the need for adequate risk assessment by the United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African region and the United Nations to support stabilisation and build resilience,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
27	S/RES/2502 (2019)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, and lack of energy access, among other factors, on the stability of the DRC, including through increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, flooding, forest fires, erratic precipitation and food insecurity, *welcoming* the leadership of the DRC in the development of national strategies to address these issues and in the preservation of the Congo basin forest *Welcomes* the efforts of President Tshisekedi and his government towards reconciliation and peace and stability in the DRC and to promote regional cooperation and integration, *notes* that political stability and security as well as increased State presence in areas of conflict are critical for the consolidation of the current political transition and sustainable peace in the DRC, *calls upon* the DRC authorities to work towards the stabilisation and strengthening of the capacity of State institutions, with the support of MONUSCO, in order to fulfil the rights and needs of all Congolese people, *further calls upon* all political stakeholders to work toward a climate of peace, transparency, inclusion and credibility during preparations for the holding of future elections, including local elections in accordance with the Constitution and the Electoral law, and to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women at all stages; (2)	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
28	S/PRST/2020/2	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among other factors on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-term strategies, based on risk assessments, by governments and the United Nations, to support stabilisation and build resilience and encourages UNOWAS to continue to integrate this information in its activities.	
29	S/PRST/2020/7	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity among other factors on the	

			stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-term strategies, based on risk assessments, by governments and the United Nations, to support stabilisation and build resilience and encourages UNOWAS to continue to integrate this information in its activities.	
30	S/RES/2520 (2020)	The situation in Somalia	*Emphasising* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and the UN, of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, energy access, and other factors on the stability of Somalia,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
31	S/RES/2524 (2020)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Sudan, particularly Darfur, and *stressing* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the Government of Sudan and the United Nations relating to these factors to support stabilisation and build resilience,	
32	S/RES/2531 (2020)	The situation in Mali	*Emphasizing* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies, by the Government of Mali and the United Nations, of ecological changes, natural disasters, drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, energy access, climate change, among other factors, on the security and stability of Mali,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
33	S/RES/2540 (2020)	The situation in Somalia	*Further recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and *recalling* its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15, *Requests* the United Nations, the FGS and the FMS to consider the adverse implications of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide an update in mandated reporting as appropriate; (13)	
34	S/RES/2552 (2020)	The situation in the Central African Republic	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, and energy access, and stressing the need for adequate risk assessment by the United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African region and the United Nations to support stabilisation and build resilience,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

35	S/RES/2556 (2020)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, and lack of energy access, among other factors, on the stability of the DRC, including through increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, flooding, forest fires, erratic precipitation and food insecurity, *welcoming* the leadership of the DRC in the development of national strategies to address these issues and in the preservation of the Congo basin forest,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
36	S/PRST/2021/3	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, and land degradation, as well as their impacts on food security, among other factors, on the stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-term strategies, based on comprehensive risk assessments, by governments and the United Nations, to, support stabilisation and build resilience and encourages UNOWAS to continue to integrate this information in its activities.	
37	S/PRST/2021/10	Peace and security in Africa	The Security Council recognizes the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of a number of African States, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the respective governments and the United Nations relating to these factors.	
38	S/RES/2561 (2021)	The situation in Cyprus	*Recognising* that effective contact and communication between the sides enhances the prospects for settlement and is in the interests of all Cypriots, and helps to address island-wide matters, including health, crime, environmental protection, and issues related to the adverse impacts of climate change,	
39	S/RES/2567 (2021)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	*Recognizing* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among other factors, on the humanitarian situation and stability in South Sudan, and *emphasizing* the need for comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies by the GoSS and the UN to inform programs relating to these factors,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
40	S/RES/2568 (2021)	The situation in Somalia	*Emphasising* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and the United Nations, of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters and other factors on the stability of Somalia,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
41	S/RES/2576 (2021)	The situation concerning Iraq	*Recognizing* that the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among other factors, can contribute to desertification and drought, the humanitarian situation and stability in Iraq, and emphasizing the need	

			for comprehensive risk assessments by the Government of Iraq with the support of the United Nations, upon the request of the Government of Iraq, to take meaningful actions to adapt to or mitigate challenges posed by climate change and ecological change, 4. *Requests* further that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMI, at the request of the Government of Iraq, and taking into account the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General (S/2021/135), shall: (b) further advise, support, and assist: (iv) the Government of Iraq on facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation, including on issues of border security, energy, trade, environment, water, adverse impacts of climate change, infrastructure, public health, and refugees;	
42	S/RES/2579 (2021)	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	*Recognizing* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Sudan, particularly Darfur, and *stressing* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the Government of Sudan and the United Nations relating to these factors to support stabilisation and build resilience,	
43	S/RES/2584 (2021)	The situation in Mali	*Emphasizing* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies, by the Government of Mali and the United Nations, of ecological changes, natural disasters, drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, energy access, climate change, among other factors, on the security and stability of Mali,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
44	S/RES/2587 (2021)	The situation in Cyprus	*Urging* the sides to step up their efforts to promote intercommunal contacts, reconciliation and the active engagement of civil society, in particular women and youth, and *recognising* that regular, effective contact and communication between the sides enhances the prospects for settlement and is in the interests of all Cypriots, and helps to address island-wide matters, including migration, health, crime, environmental protection, and issues related to the adverse impacts of climate change,	

45	S/PRST/2021/16	Peace consolidation in West Africa	The Security Council recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, including through drought, desertification, and land degradation, as well as their impacts on food security, among other factors, on the security and stability of West Africa and the Sahel region and continues to stress the need for long-term strategies, based on comprehensive risk assessments by governments and the United Nations, to, support stabilisation and build resilience and encourages UNOWAS to continue to integrate this information in its activities.	
46	S/RES/2592 (2021)	The situation in Somalia	*Further recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, environmental degradation, other ecological changes, natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Somalia, including through floods, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and *recalling* its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15, 6. *Further decides* that UNSOM should continue to coordinate United Nations efforts, maximising joint approaches and joint programming in relevant areas, in full cooperation with the FGS and FMS, and with a particular focus on the following tasks: (m) support Somalia's efforts to advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, working closely with the United Nations Country Team, provide strategic advice to institutional capacity building in line with the Somalia National Development Plan and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, collaborate with the international financial institutions to support the mobilisation of economic and development assistance, and ensure effective and integrated cooperation of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and promote cooperation with relevant partners, with a view to making maximum use of development financing in Somalia, including in response to climate change, flooding, drought, locusts and the COVID-19 pandemic, including the safe, effective and equitable distribution of vaccines; 9. *Welcomes* planned direct elections in Puntland and *urges* the FGS and FMS to create a conducive political and security climate for inclusive elections across Somalia and at all levels to foster political pluralism, ensure political space for the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted political parties, including opposition parties, uphold the rights of freedom of expression, association,	

			peaceful assembly and movement, including the ability of independent journalists to operate freely, and condemn hate speech and incitement to violence; 15. *Requests* the United Nations, the FGS and FMS to consider the adverse implications of climate change, environmental degradation, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide an update in mandated reporting as appropriate;	
47	S/RES/2605 (2021)	The situation in the Central African Republic	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, and energy access, and stressing the need for comprehensive risk assessment by the United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African region and the United Nations to support stabilisation and build resilience,	*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
48	S/RES/2612 (2021)	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	*Recognising* the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, and lack of energy access, among other factors, on the stability of the DRC, including through increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, flooding, forest fires, erratic precipitation, volcanic eruptions and food insecurity, *welcoming* the leadership of the DRC in the development of national strategies to address these issues and in the preservation of the Congo basin forest,	

Table B.1 Climate Change Language in UNSC's Outputs

APPENDIX C

C.1 Members' Approaches at Climate Change Themed Council Meetings

(0: Not Attended, 1: Defender, 2: Opposer, 3: Abstainer)

State	2007	2011-1	2011-2	2018	2019	2020	2021-1	2021-2	2021-3	2021-4
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Albania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Algeria	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Andorra	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Antigua and Barbuda	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Argentina	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Armenia	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Australia	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0
Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Azerbaijan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bahamas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bahrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Bangladesh	0	2	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0
Barbados	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Belarus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Belgium	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Belize	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0

Benin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolivia	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Botswana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	0	2	3	0	2	2	2	0	2	0
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burkina Faso	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Burundi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cabo Verde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cameroon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Central African Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	0
China	2	2	3	3	3	1	3	3	3	3
Colombia	0	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Comoros	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Congo	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Costa Rica	0	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0
Côte D'Ivoire	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cuba	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dominica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Ecuador	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Egypt	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0
El Salvador	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0
Equatorial Guinea	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Eritrea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estonia	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Eswatini	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethiopia	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Fiji	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Finland	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
France	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Gabon	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Gambia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Georgia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Germany	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Ghana	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Grenada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0

Guinea	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guinea Bissau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guyana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haiti	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Honduras	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
India	0	2	2	0	2	2	3	2	2	2
Indonesia	2	0	0	0	1	1	3	0	0	0
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
Iraq	0	0	0	1	3	1	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Israel	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Jamaica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	1	0
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kazakhstan	0	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Kenya	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Kiribati	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kuwait	0	2	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvia	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
Lebanon	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Liberia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Libya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Madagascar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Malaysia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maldives	3	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
Mali	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Marshall Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mauritania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mauritius	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Micronesia (Federated States of)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Monaco	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mongolia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Montenegro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	1	0
Mozambique	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Myanmar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Namibia	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nauru	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Nepal	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0
Netherlands	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
New Zelanda	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Niger	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Nigeria	0	1	1	0	0	3	1	0	1	0
North Macedonia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
Oman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	2	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Palau	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Panama	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Papua New Guinea	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	1	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	0
Philippines	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0
Poland	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Portugal	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Qatar	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3	0
Republic of Korea	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Republic of Moldova	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Romania	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Russian Federation	2	2	3	2	2	0	2	2	2	2
Rwanda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saint Lucia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Samoa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
San Marino	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

284

Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Serbia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Seychelles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Singapore	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovakia	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Slovenia	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Solomon Islands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	2	2	2	0	1	3	3	0	0	0
South Sudan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Sri Lanka	0	0	0	0	3	3	1	0	1	0
Sudan	0	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sweden	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Switzerland	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
Syrian Arab Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Timor-Leste	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Togo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tonga	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trinidad and Tobago	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
Tunisia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1

Turkey	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tuvalu	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ukraine	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
United Arab Emirates	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
United Republic of Tanzania	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States of America	3	1	1	3	1	0	1	1	1	1
Uruguay	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Uzbekistan	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
Vanuatu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Viet Nam	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yemen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zambia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table C.1: Members' Approaches at Climate Themed Council Meetings

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Kişisel Bilgiler
Adı Soyadı   : Bengü ÇELENK

Eğitim Durumu
Lisans Öğrenimi   : Trakya Üniversitesi, İİBF, Kamu Yönetimi (2005-2009)
Yüksek Lisans Öğrenimi : University of Leicester, Contemporary Sociology (2013-2014)
Bildiği Yabancı Diller   : İngilizce

İş Deneyimi
Çalıştığı Kurumlar ve Tarihleri: Araştırma Görevlisi, Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi, İ.İ.B.F. Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü (2015- Devam)