



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
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**AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD THE TURKIC WORLD: IDENTITY AND
INSTITUTIONALISATION**

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A thesis submitted to
the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University
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APPROVAL

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In addition, I acknowledge that any claim of irregularity that may arise in relation to this work will result in a disciplinary action in accordance with the university legislation.

LÜTFİ KOÇOĞLU

20.02.2023

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AN ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE TURKIC
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ABSTRACT

The evolving identity literature pays insufficient attention to interactions among states that share a common or similar identity. As a result, this dissertation prefers to investigate inter-state relations among states that claim a common or similar identity. It reveals states' historical experiences and questions the extent of cooperation and the motivations for collaboration in a single framework. Understanding Turkic identity and its influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, revealing Turkey's and the Turkic World's historical experiences, and questioning the motivation of states in relations between Turkey and the Turkic World, primarily through the Organization of Turkic States, have been chosen as foci in this regard.

The Turkic World became of particular interest to international relations and political science researchers at the end of the twentieth century due to its geopolitical and geostrategic location and the potential of its natural resources. As a result, during this period, the quantity of research on the dynamics of the Turkic World and relations between Turkey and the Turkic World founded on common identities, values, and goals increased. This research investigates Turkic identity and its impact on Turkish foreign policy, particularly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this regard, it examines Turkey's foreign policy from Özal's administration in 1989 to the AKP's presidency in 2023. The historical context of Turkish Foreign Policy and the institutional progress in Turkey-Turkic World interactions from the first Turkic-speaking states' summits (Ankara Summit on October 30-31, 1992) to the Organization of Turkic States have been investigated, and the findings presented herein to analyze Turkish Foreign Policy over the last three decades and comprehend the Turkic identity's influence on it.

Keywords: Identity, Turkic Identity, Turkic World, Turkish Foreign Policy

TÜRK DÜNYASINA YÖNELİK TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ ANALİZİ: KİMLİK VE KURUMSALLAŞMA

ÖZET

Kimlik üzerine gelişen literatür, ortak veya benzer bir kimliğe sahip devletler arasındaki etkileşimleri yeteri kadar dikkate almamaktadır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma, ortak veya benzer bir kimliğe sahip olduklarını iddia eden devletler arası ilişkileri incelemeyi tercih etmektedir. Devletlerin tarihsel yaşanmışlıklarını ortaya koyarak, işbirliklerinin boyutlarını ve temel kaynaklarını tek bir çerçevede sorgulamaktadır. Türk Kimliğini ve Türk Kimliğinin Türk Dış Politikası üzerindeki etkisini anlamak, Türkiye'nin ve Türk Dünyası içerisinde yer alan devletlerin tarihsel yaşanmışlıklarını ortaya koymak ve Türkiye ile Türk Dünyası devletleri arasındaki ilişkilerin itici gücün ne olduğunu özellikle Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı üzerinden sorgulamak odak noktası olarak belirlenmiştir.

Türk Dünyası, jeopolitik ve jeostratejik konumu ve doğal kaynakları nedeniyle 20. yüzyılın sonlarında araştırmacılar tarafından en çok ilgi gören bölgelerden biri haline geldi. Bu nedenle 20. yüzyılın sonlarına doğru Türk Dünyası dinamiklerini ve Türkiye ile Türk Dünyası arasındaki ilişkileri ortak kimlik, değer ve hedefler doğrultusunda inceleyen çalışmaların sayısı artmıştır. Bu tez de özellikle Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından bu yana Türk kimliğini ve Türk Kimliğinin Türk Dış Politikası üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda 1989 yılındaki Özal yönetiminden 2023 AK Parti'sine kadar Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasını analiz etmektedir. Türk Dış Politikasının yaklaşık otuz yıllık faaliyetlerini analiz edip, Türk kimliğinin bu faaliyetlere etkisini ararken, Türk Dış Politikasının tarihsel geçmişi ve Türkiye-Türk Dünyası ilişkilerindeki kurumsal gelişimi özellikle Türk Dili Konuşan Devletler Zirvelerinin ilk gününden Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı'nın kuruluşuna kadar incelenmiştir. Buna paralel olarak Türk kimliğinin özellikle son otuz yılda Türk Dış Politikası üzerindeki etkisi ayrıntılı olarak keşfedilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik, Türk Kimliği, Türk Dünyası, Türk Dış Politikası

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	VI
ABSTRACT	VII
ÖZET.....	VIII
LIST OF FIGURES	XI
LIST OF TABLES	XII
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	XIII
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Research Problem and Research Questions.....	3
1.2. Literature Review on Identity and its Influence on Foreign Policy	6
1.2.1. Understanding the concept of the Turkic World and its linkage with the Turkic identity.....	10
1.3. Limitations and the Scope of the Study	15
1.4. Research Design and Method	16
1.4.1. Analysis of method and data collection	19
2. THE LINK BETWEEN IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	22
2.1. Historical Progress of Identity: Phases of Identity	23
2.2. The Examination of Different Types of Identities	29
2.3. Awareness of the Differences between National Identity and State Identity	32
2.4. Theoretical Approaches to Identity and Their Contribution to the Study ...	35
2.5. The Literature on State Identity	38
2.6. Identity's Influence on Foreign Policymaking Process	41
3. THE ROOTS OF THE TURKIC/TURKISH IDENTITY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	49
3.1. Turkic Identity in Turkish Foreign Policy	56
3.2. Özal and Demirel Administrations' Influence on Turkish Foreign Policy ...	70
3.3. The State Identity Dilemma of Turkish Foreign Policy	76
3.4. The Role of Turkic Identity in Turkish Foreign Policy Making during the AKP Era	83
4. TURKEY-TURKIC WORLD RELATIONS' INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK	93

4.1. The Fundamentals of Turkey-Turkic World Relations and Pre-Institutionalisation Process.....	94
4.2. Turkic-Speaking Countries' Heads of State Summits	97
4.3. Assisting Organisations to Turkey's Relations with the Turkic World and Their Institutionalisation Process	110
4.4. The Establishment, Purpose, and Structure of the Turkic Council.....	114
4.5. The Turkic Council Summits Process.....	119
5. CONCLUSION.....	136
BIBLIOGRAPHY	147
APPENDIX A	167
A.1. Interview Questions	167
APPENDIX B	169
B.1. Interviewees.....	169
APPENDIX C	170
C.1. Charts of Turkic-speaking States Summits and Turkic Council Summits' Topics.....	170
APPENDIX D	172
D.1. Nakhchivan Agreement	172

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Conceptual Reasons of Turkic Identity's Influence on Turkish Foreign Policy.....5



LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: The Contents of the Turkic-speaking States Summits: Differences and Common Focal Points.....	108
Table 4.2: The Scope of the Turkic Council Summits: The Persistence of the Discussions.....	133



LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AKP</i>	The Justice and Development Party
<i>BTC</i>	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
<i>CHP</i>	Republican People's Party
<i>CIS</i>	Commonwealth of Independent States
<i>CSTO</i>	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
<i>EU</i>	European Union
<i>IBSS</i>	International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
<i>MHP</i>	Nationalist Action Party
<i>NATO</i>	The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<i>OSCE</i>	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<i>PLO</i>	Palestine Liberation Organization
<i>RFE</i>	Radio Free Europe
<i>RL</i>	Radio Liberty
<i>SCO</i>	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
<i>TIKA</i>	Turkish Cooperation and Development Administration
<i>TRT</i>	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
<i>TURKPA</i>	Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries
<i>TURKSOY</i>	International Organisation of Turkic Culture
<i>UN</i>	United Nations

US

The United States of America

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

YTB

Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities



1. INTRODUCTION

For decades, identity has been a key focus for international relations and political science literature. The legacies of migration, colonialism, globalisation, the growth of new social movements, and forms of identity politics have, since the end of the Second World War, put the question of identity at the core of debates in the humanities and social sciences (Guillaume 2010, 18). Following the Second World War, interest in identity and the number of scholars who studied its varieties started to increase (Erikson 1950; Handlin 1951; Glasser 1972). However, the growth of interest from a number of institutions and scholars in identity-related subjects accelerated at the end of the Cold War (Alexandrov 2003, 35).

As the field of research into identity studies has grown, the phenomenon that has been researched most within the varieties of concepts was the concept of state identity which has been influenced reciprocal mostly with foreign policy. Nevertheless, several scholars who addressed foreign policy have needed help to evaluate and conceptualise the possibility of identity's capability of shaping foreign policy due to the strength of existing theoretical dispositions. Therefore, in recent decades, identity debates have primarily informed international relations research about eradicating such difficulties. Consequently, identity's influence on the foreign policymaking process of states, the institutions that are affected by identity-related subjects, identities of states, and their preferences became popular topics for scholars to research (Campbell 1992; Wendt 1994; Checkel 1999; Yavuz 1998).

Due to the complexity of the concept and increasing interest, the main topic of this dissertation was determined as the influence of identity on foreign policy. In that regard, the main topic has been supported with the exemplification of Turkic Identity's influence on Turkey's Foreign Policymaking process. The reason for such exemplification is that investigating Turkic identity's influence on Turkey's foreign policymaking process may help clarify the fundamental characteristics and dynamics of identity studies and visualise the future prospects to help identify useful areas of study.

The broader research context of this dissertation is identity. It is built upon a range of theoretical, conceptual, and methodological themes due to these themes' capability of

contribution to the analysis of the research. Therefore, theoretical and conceptual debates on identity's influence on foreign policymaking and literature on identity constitute the theoretical grounding of the dissertation by providing different perspectives on identity that may help shape the foreign policies of states. However, as this dissertation focuses on the influence of identity on foreign policymaking, it is also aided by literature on national identities and national interests.

Examining national identities and national interests is essential to reveal the types of identities, goals, and expectations of states in order to establish the characteristics of states, and provide a better understanding of states' approaches to 'others' in a particular political area. In this context, while exploring the national interests and national identity of Turkey, and presenting Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, the Organisation of Turkic States and its institutionalisation progress have been investigated in this dissertation as a particular institution. Therefore, this dissertation's analytical framework consists of literature on identity, identity's influence on foreign policy, national identity, and national interests.

In the current literature on identity, the theoretical, empirical, and conceptual frameworks are not able to provide comprehensive explanations of the phenomenon of identity's influence on foreign policy, which is heavily related to states' historical, cultural and linguistic roots and experiences (Hayit 1995; Özdağ 2001; Pavlenko 2018). Due to that deficiency, the dissertation touches on a theoretical framework and combines its theoretical contribution with historical, cultural, and linguistic roots of states to analyse the dissertation's main context. Therefore, its foundation and expected contribution to the work may be summarised below:

- 1) To present the influence of identity on states' foreign policymaking processes.
- 2) To question the contents of the relations that claim to have common identity.

The main motive behind the dissertation is to examine different types of approaches to understanding the role of identity in foreign policymaking. In order to reach the expectation of these contributions, the research is conducted through a qualitative strategy aided mainly by interviews as research design and method. In this context, the interviews have been used to answer the main question of the research and confirm the

hypothesis of this dissertation which is “Identity is an essential building block of foreign policymaking process”. Therefore, the first chapter of the research is devoted to giving brief information on the research problem, motive, research questions, and research design, together with reviewing the previous studies in the literature.

1.1. Research Problem and Research Questions

Identity and identity's influence on foreign policymaking are two prominent foci of contemporary literature (Hopf 2002, 11; Musabay-Baki 2014, 136; McCartney 2019, 679). However, despite the valuable contributions of studies in the research, they still need significant improvement. Firstly, the studies of the literature on identity mainly have a state-centric perspective and mostly approach the phenomenon without considering the internal matters of states, individual reactions to the change in the identity of states, and an institutional approach to identity-related politics. As part of this perspective, they examine the motivations behind identity's influence on foreign policy and its triggers. However, they barely research the internal dynamics of the states, individual responses to states' changing identity, and institutional approaches to identity-related politics.

Secondly, the studies on identity and the influence of identity on foreign policy mostly approach the phenomena from a very traditionalist perspective. The traditionalist perspective of identity studies primarily seeks an answer to the uncertainty of the definition of identity and investigates identity mostly from a state-centric perspective. However, it contains a number of weaknesses. The main weakness of the traditionalist approach is the researchers' lack of originality and the traditional approach's complex nature (Alons 2007; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003; Güneş 2012). In addition, the traditionalist approach mostly lacks original sources such as the official reports of states, press releases, interviews, political speeches, the perception of the elite and surveys on public reaction. Therefore, the need for systematic attention to the internal dynamics of states, observation of regional dynamics, the institutional approach to identity-related politics of states, and an approach to individual's perspectives leaves a gap in the existing literature on identity theories.

The existing literature on the phenomenon of identity and identity's influence on foreign policy is quite wide-ranging. Therefore, answers to the questions these studies raised are crucial for understanding the nature of identity's influence on foreign policymaking. However, the answers to the questions that are raised by such studies are not sufficient to understand all aspects of identity's influence on foreign policy. Therefore, this dissertation limited to focus on understanding identity's influence on foreign policy based on common identity, culture, language, and history claims of states in a particular region to narrow the research focus.

The existing studies (Smith 1991; Woodward 2000; Mattern 2001) require further explanation of whether the identity's influence on foreign policy may be shown with an example of a state or not and how this may affect states' relations with 'others' in a given region.¹ These points that remain unexplained by the number of existing studies and the methods of these studies are the catalysts for this dissertation. Therefore, the influence of identity on a state's foreign policy, institutions' approach to identity-related politics, and the individual approach to states' identity changes have been explained by Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy through discussion in the subsequent phases of the dissertation.

This dissertation intends to take some of the shortcomings of the literature and provide an alternative interpretation to the effects of identity's influence on foreign policymaking. In this context, examining the patterns of identity-related interactions among geographically related states and organisations is prioritised to understand the effects of identity's influence on foreign policymaking - this is the central aim of this dissertation. Therefore, it seeks to understand Turkey's ties with the states of the Turkic World and explain the dynamics shaping the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World. The figure 1.1 below might be helpful to clarify the particular strategy of the dissertation to explore these relations.

¹ Despite the wealth of identity studies in international relations, the lack of identity's influence on foreign policies of states still stands unexplained in many studies in the literature, including Tsygankov's (2019), Alaranta's (2015), and Bozdağlıoğlu's (2003) works. However, there is also the undeniable existence of works that are included the identity's influence on state politics, such as Telhami and Barnett (2002) and Vucetic (2017).




Figure 1.1: Conceptual Reasons of Turkic Identity's Influence on Turkish Foreign Policy

In brief, as can be interpreted from the schema, Turkic identity has been used both as an ideology and as an instrument. Even though the strategy of the usage of Turkic identity on Turkish Foreign Policy shows alterations in recent decades, throughout this dissertation Turkic identity's way of use has been enlightened by dividing that process into periods. In order to understand the differences between these periods and show the extent of cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World the dissertation presents additional charts that contain the topics that have been discussed during the Turkic-speaking states summits and the Turkic Council summits.

In order to investigate the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World, the dissertation is structured to answer these three research questions:

- 1) What is identity? What is the role of Turkic identity in Turkish foreign policymaking?
- 2) How may Turkic identity motivate states to be members of the Organisation of Turkic States?
- 3) Does the Organisation of Turkic States have a chance to become successful as an identity-related organisation?

1.2. Literature Review on Identity and its Influence on Foreign Policy

Although the nature of ‘the self’ and the meaning of ‘personhood’ have occupied philosophers since Plato, the concept of identity entered the social sciences in its modern form only in the 1950s with the work of Erik Erikson. Erikson’s work in psychology was the first example of identity studies. Subsequently, identity spread to other disciplines quickly, including sociology, anthropology, international relations, and political science.

In the 1960s, when identity studies diffused from psychology into other disciplines, international relations were taking a behavioural/scientific and systemic turn (Berenskoetter 2010, 3597). The focus of scholars who studied identity (Erikson 1950; Deutsch 2016; Holsti 1970; Jervis 1976) was mainly on identity crises, the dilemma of self and others, self-images, and interests. Nevertheless, these prominent scholars, who highlighted the impact of perceptions and cognitive bias in decision-making, have mostly yet to use identity as a notion.

In the 1970s, the term ‘identity’ flourished in the social sciences. According to Gilligan (2002, 71), in 1970, 0.1% of all the literature indexed by the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) had ‘identity’ in research titles.² In short, the term identity with national, ethnic, religious, and cultural qualifiers has taken a firm hold in studying nations, nationalism, and ethnicity. However, most scholars applying an identity perspective were to re-read the state and its system in various ways.

The two decades following the 1970s have witnessed a dramatic revival of interest in the state and its political identity construction. Since the 1970s, political scientists, anthropologists, geographers, historians, and sociologists have written extensively on state-making's complex and contradictory process of state-making, understood as state formation, evolution, and consolidation (Glasser 1972; Tilly 1975; Parmaksızoğlu 1977). The primary purpose of these studies was to examine various political, economic, technological, and socio-cultural dimensions of state-making process.

² Gilligan (2002) presents detailed information on flourishing the use of the term identity in human sciences during his study ‘Identity as a Key Concept for Understanding the Peace Process in Northern Ireland’.

When the term started to appear in the international relations literature of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it seemed fitting to speak of a "discovery" of identity-related studies rather than a "return" of identity studies. Because even though identity has been a part of human and social sciences since the 1950s, its connectivity to international relations and political studies was started mainly in the late 1980s. Consequently, identity has been one of the conceptual shooting stars in international relations scholarship since the 1990s, at least among scholars seeking an alternative to the realist-rationalist vocabulary.³

During the 1990s, the dissolution of seemingly stable political entities such as the Soviet Union raised questions on nationalism, loyalties, and the ability to manipulate them. In addition, due to globalisation and the European integration process, the Westphalian states' conception as the dominant entity in world politics had started to change. Therefore, international relations scholars searching for new conceptual vocabulary became interested in identity to highlight the nature of the state and explain the causes and conditions of war and peace (Bloom 1990, 16).

Interest in identity, nations, nationalism, and foreign policy resurfaced particularly after the Cold War, precipitating a global epidemic of nationalist conflict with the establishment of new nations and states (Aydin 1996; Checkel 1999; Yilmaz 2008). Following the end of the Cold War, twenty-nine new nation-states came into being, with most of these entities emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Omelicheva (2015, 21) emphasised, these newly independent countries influenced by the modern trends of nation-building provided researchers with "national laboratories" for developing and testing competing explanations for the emergence and impact of nationalism.

International relations scholars, who underline the concept of identity and investigate the influence of identity on foreign policy, aim to understand how the historically constructed notion of identity leads to particular interests and practices and how these

³ According to Brubaker and Cooper (2000), identity was a popular phenomenon during the 1990s and afterward. Most scholars of international relations were stuck with a debate over rationalist-realist thought at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. The emergence of identity as a phenomenon created a 'new', fresh, alternative topic for scholars of international relations.

identities influence foreign policies. In this context, Telhami and Barnett (2002, 31) explain that there are at least four possible answers to these two questions. The answers conclude that identity does not matter; that it constrains foreign policy; that identity essentially constructs the world so that the individual's identity defines perceptions of one's state and the others; that it influences the ethnopolitical strategies of rational politicians.

Over the years, instances of how identity leads the state to particular interests and influences the states' foreign policies have been visible worldwide. Nevertheless, scholars continued to have difficulties when evaluating and conceptualising the possibility that identity may shape foreign policy due to the strength of existing theoretical dispositions. Still, several studies have been conducted since the emergence of state identity as an explanatory tool for foreign policy. Lene Hansen's (1996) investigation on Slovenian identity, in particular after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia; Jutta Weldes' (1999) work on how insecurity arises and is dealt with using case studies such as the Cuban Missile Crisis; and Alina Hosu's (2003) investigation on the relationship between state identity and European integration in Romanian foreign policy are three of the studies that refined the concept by tending to argue that states' identities have the capability to be one of the most critical influences on foreign policies.

In recent years, the literature on identity and identity's influence on foreign policymaking has also been studied through different case studies focusing on different regions. In this context, Ashizawa (2008), Lu (2013), and Rozman (2014) took organisations in East Asia into their focus. Similarly, Telhami and Barnett (2002), Altorafi (2012), and Akbarzadeh and Barry (2016) investigated the Middle East; Laitin (1995), Alexandrov (2003), and Portas (2020) examined Russian territory and post-Soviet areas throughout Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Other regions, including America and Europe, are also analysed as cases in studies focusing on identity's influence on foreign policies (Campbell 1992; Risse 2012).

Despite a range of studies on identity and identity's influence on foreign policy, there remains no consensus on the definition of identity and its relation to foreign policy.

Although there is no consensus on what identity is and what it is to foreign policy, some scholars (Campbell 1992; Weldes 1999; Telhami and Barnett 2002) continued to seek an answer to the definition of identity, and investigated state identity and its influence on foreign policy while simultaneously being influenced by international structures. In regards to the literature of identity studies, there have been three broad explanations as to what role state identity plays in foreign policy decision-making:

1. There is a causal relationship between state identity and foreign policy,
2. Identity intervenes between the foreign policy and domestic spheres,
3. The relationship between state identity and foreign policy is constitutive.

However, the crucial point in understanding the influence of identity on state policies which needs to be further considered (Risse 2012; Rozman 2014; Tsygankov 2019), is to ask how and where state identity can be located. The answers to that question may be presented briefly as follows:

- State identity may influence state policies in different ways
- State identity can be a tool for mobilising support or diffusing opposition
- It can serve as a constraint on action or imagination
- State identity may be a device for justifying or legitimising policy
- It can provide an opportunity for stabilising other countries

As a result, the literature shows that the scholars of identity studies have yet to explore the influence of identity on foreign policy, the relations of states with common identity claims, and the mutual benefits of states' influence in shaping states' identities. In that regard, a lack of systematic analysis reveals the interactions between the states that claim to have a common identity that reflects structural characteristics and cooperation agendas. Hence, it proposes studying the phenomenon of identity's influence on foreign policy by focusing on a particular region in which states that claim to have a common identity are revealed through a comparative evaluation of cooperation agendas reflected as discourses of the states.

Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World constitutes a considerable place in the literature on international politics. However, the literature on Turkic identity's influence

on Turkish Foreign Policy still needs to be improved due to the majority of the states of the Turkic World's short-time existence as independent entities. As Gömeç (2007, 118) explains that despite the fact that the number of studies that focus on the economic and political relations between Turkey and the Turkic World is high, the extent of relations between Turkey and the Turkic World on common identity claim is limited. Therefore, choosing to observe the interactions between Turkey and the Turkic World among institutional structures, which were mainly based on common identity claims, may also explain the reasons behind this limited literature. In this context, the Organisation of Turkic States has been chosen as a particular institutional structure to explore why this part of the literature has yet to be studied in depth.

1.2.1. Understanding the concept of the Turkic World and its linkage with the Turkic identity

The "Turkic World" was added as a term to the literature in Turkey by Turan Yazgan when his ideals on the unity of all Turks began with the establishment of *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı* (Turkic World Studies Foundation) and the series (*Sevgili Okuyucular*) that Yazgan wrote to his readers and followers through this foundation's publications.⁴ Yazgan, whose ideology was shaped by the works of Hüseyin Nihal Atsız, was one of the most important representatives in Turkey who adopted the ideal of unity in language and thought, and the work of İsmail Gaspıralı; who played a significant role in the awakening of the national consciousness of the Turks.

Although it is not possible to draw the boundaries of the Turkic World properly, Cafersoy believes that a limitation can be made based on the state borders with its main lines.⁵ Studies relating to the Turkic World consist of the independent Turkic Republics established in Central Asia and the autonomous Turkic Republics, a large part of which is located in the Asian continent. However, within the scope of human-economic geography, the field of research expands much further. In that regard, some of the researchers' (Çınar 2011; Öke 2016; Akkoyun 2017; Çelik 2020) work on Turkic communities and activities in Europe, Asia, and Africa, especially in the Balkans and the Middle East, further expand the borders.

⁴ Asker, A. personal communication, March 11, 2021; Yüce, M. personal communication, March 24, 2021; Bıyıklı, M. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

⁵ Cafersoy, N. personal communication, May 26, 2021.

According to Yazgan (2010, 12), the Turkic World refers to the geography of communities with a Turkic identity worldwide. The vision of Yazgan (The unity of Turkic people) corresponds to an ideal that needs to be worked on and a concept that requires effort to realise that ideal. His vision is not limited to Turkic Republics that became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union but also contains all the communities that claim to have roots in Turkic history, language, culture, and customs. In parallel to Yazgan's opinions, Akıncı indicates that, for a while, the Republic of Turkey officially admitted that the Turkic World as a term meant the region that Turkic Republics occupied that became independent after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁶ However, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs nowadays avoids using terms like Turkic World or Turkic Republics. Instead, they prefer to refer the aforementioned republics as Central Asian Republics.⁷

Due to the international dynamics and alteration of political priorities, the official authorities of Turkey changed their approach to the way of referring to the region. However, throughout this dissertation, the Turkic World, Turkic-speaking states, Turkic Republics, and the states of the Turkic World terms have been used to address the former Soviet Republics that claim they are historically, culturally, traditionally, or linguistically Turkic. These terms have been used in this context to point out Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, without containing other Turkic identity-related regions.

There are several reasons for this dissertation to focus on Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy and the institutionalisation process of identity-related relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World, mainly through the Organisation of Turkic States. Throughout history, there has not been such an organisation that exclusively brings together all Turkic Originated states with their own will (Özdağ 2001, 26; Akıncı 2013, 41). The reason for this rarity is that the regional formation in

⁶ According to Akıncı, the official authorities of Turkey identified the communities that gained their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union as Turkic Republics. Similarly, the political authorities of Turkey identified the region formed with Turkic societies as the Turkic World for a period of time (Akıncı, H.personal communication, January 29, 2021).

⁷ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d). Orta Asya Ülkeleri ile İlişkiler available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-orta-asya-ulkeleri-iliskileri.tr.mfa> (Accessed in 22 November, 2022).

the Turkic World used to be and remains fragmented among regional organisations.⁸ In particular, after the Cold War, the states of the Turkic World started to get involved in many regional organisations.⁹ Therefore, the relative success of the Organisation of Turkic States has been considered as worthy of researching to understand the dynamics of the Turkic World and the understandings of the Turkic identity concept claimed by the states of the Turkic World.

The Organisation of Turkic States evolves in a complex region and affected by various influencers.¹⁰ Therefore, even though the roots of the Organisation of Turkic States were laid in the 1990s when the first summit of Turkic-speaking states was held in Ankara, the organisation has since become a debated topic for studies on identity in the Turkic World. However, it is worth noting that the Organization of Turkic States is not the only institution that aims to increase the cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World. Similarly to the Organization of Turkic States, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) had the same or related goals. In this context, instead of undermining others, the organisations of the Turkic World try to help each other to accomplish their missions¹¹. However, even though the institutions that work on Turkey's relations with the Turkic World support each other, compared to other institutions that aims to develop identity-based relations, the success and insistence of the institutionalisation process of the Organization of Turkic States caused it to be the main agenda of this dissertation.

⁸ Although there have been experiences of regional organizations built based on various dimensions (economy, identity, or shared goals), their lifetime, functionality, and their success was limited. Eurasian Economic Union, The Arab League, and The Commonwealth of Independent States could be given as the instances of such organizations.

⁹ Commonwealth of the Independent States, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, and the Organization of Turkic States are regional organizations established after the Cold War.

¹⁰ As former Soviet Republics, each Turkic Republic has its own historical experience during the Soviet dominance. Therefore, while some only intend to avoid conflicts, others still enjoy their relations with Russia. In the aftermath of their independency, Turkic Republics had alternatives to collaborate with the West, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Nevertheless, Russian, Turkish, European, Iranian, and Turkic goals are different from each other. Thus, the expectations make the relations more complicated.

¹¹ Since its establishment, Turksoy has been carrying out activities to strengthen the ties of brotherhood and solidarity among Turkic peoples, transmit the common Turkic culture to future generations and introduce it to the world. To achieve these goals, both TURKSOY and the Organization of Turkic States present each other as partner organizations on their websites.

As Davutoğlu (2009, 53), Akıncı (2012, 29), and Bayaliyev (2014) highlight; compared to other regions, the states of the Turkic World had limited formal institutions in their relations due to the lengthy existence of their dependency to Russia. Despite that, in the international politics and nation-building literature, the states of the Turkic World constitute well-known studies examining the influence of identity and the nation-building process.¹²

One of the recent and more explanatory studies on identity studies in the Turkic World is Pelin Musabay Baki's (2020) research, *Cooperation among Turkic Speaking Countries and New Regionalism*, in which the scholar provides a contributive analytical framework by analysing the relations between Turkic-speaking countries and presenting a clear understanding of a new approach on regionalism for the topic.¹³ In this research, Musabay-Baki discusses the relations between the Turkic-speaking states and examines the regionalist approach. However, she underexplores the influence of identity on foreign policymaking and regional organisations' role in identity-related politics.

Musabay-Baki's work is valuable in bringing discussions of identity-related cases to the region. However, it mainly focuses on the bilateral relations of Turkic-speaking states and observes identity's influence on foreign policies of states and identity-related institutions that help to cooperate superficially. In that regard, it needed to present a systematic analysis that would unveil the patterns of interactions in a joint institution such as the Organization of Turkic States. Zeybek (2013, 61) expresses these kinds of deficiencies by declaring that despite the high number of works on identity studies, the extent of common identity claims is limited. Therefore, due to the limited number of studies on common identity claims in existing literature, this dissertation contains common identity claims of Turkic-speaking states based on common history, culture, and language.

¹² Saray (2014), Omelichava (2015), Portas (2020), and Yılmaz's (2021) works are some of the instances that contributed to the literature on international politics and the nation-building process with case studies.

¹³ According to Musabay-Baki (2020), when the impact of globalisation is increasingly felt, regionalisation has been gaining momentum worldwide. This development has directly affected Eurasia, as the region most affected by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which is analyzed within the theoretical framework of new regionalism. According to definitions, this region's geographic limits differ and are subject to numerous regional cooperation initiatives. The emergence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as new independent actors following the dismemberment of the Soviet Union was an opportunity to reconsider, from a regional cooperation point of view, the ties between these states and Turkey.

For approximately three decades, organisations including TİKA, TURKSOY, the Organization of the Turkic States, and the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries (TURKPA) as four organisations of the Turkic World, have been simultaneously carried out to examine the cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World. Compared to other identity-related cooperation areas, states of the Turkic World have aimed for multiple goals and achieved valuable results in their related works, such as having joint decisions in international organisations¹⁴, and creating mutual solidarity in political cases, tourism, health, and other areas.

These multiple goals, projects, and valuable and successful partnerships have been studied by scholars such as Geybullayev and Kurubaş (2002), Çınar (2011), Özkan (2017), and many others. Nevertheless, despite the number of studies that researched Turkic identity-related organisations, it is possible to claim that the scholarship on this particular topic could be explored further.

The reasons for unsatisfying scholarship are that the literature tends to examine Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World by focusing on the cooperation in economy, culture, and political relations, without touching upon other dimensions such as common identity claims¹⁵ of states or people (Özey 2018, 34; Aka 2019, 29). Similarly, even though studies in the literature on Turkic identity or Turkic communities constitute actual examples of identity studies, the institutional affinity of Turkic communities has not been extensively studied from the perspective of identity's influence on foreign policy. In addition, due to the methods used in these studies (state-centric or traditionalist approaches), it is not possible to analyse the considerations of people from various Turkic communities on Turkic identity. In that regard, this dissertation claims that it could enrich the field of research by presenting people's considerations on the relationship between the states of the Turkic World, mainly based on the claim of common identity.

¹⁴ The decisions of the Turkic-speaking states in the United Nations through the same direction could be a proper example of a sign of having a joint decision-making process of the members of the Organization of Turkic States.

¹⁵ Demirtepe's (2012) work on the relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan, Erol's (2017) work on the cooperation test of the Turkic Council and Kazakhstan, and Ismailzade's (2005) work on Turkey-Azerbaijan relations are some of the works that focus the cooperation among the states of the Turkic World on economic, political and cultural matters.

1.3. Limitations and the Scope of the Study

As a researcher, the lack of study on Turkey's relations with the Turkic World, the Turkic World's importance for Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkic identity, and its influence on foreign policymaking are the fields that I would like to study. Since I decided to focus on these subjects, I have identified some limitations and refined my research focus. In order to do this, firstly, I ignored the details of economic relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World. Instead, I focused on the political and cultural relations built between the Organization of Turkic States between Turkey and Turkic Republics. While I was looking intensely at these relations, I focused on the existence of the Organization of Turkic States from the first years of its establishment to better understand the historical process of these relations and their institutional background.¹⁶

Secondly, states that are included in the area of focus are determined as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan is excluded from the study due to its Persian cultural, linguistic, and ethnic roots. Although Tajikistan has common cultural characteristics with Uzbekistan and considers itself different from fellow Persian speakers (Atkin 1993, 154), the roots of Tajikistan's difference from the states of the Turkic World caused it to be excluded from the research.

Lastly, since interviews were used during this study as a method, they do not allow me to examine the members of the Organization of Turkic States' relations with other organisations; because the priority of the interviews was not looking for external relations or decision-making progress of the abovementioned regional states. Instead, the dissertation approaches the topic from an observing perspective. It primarily considers the process that Turkey and the Turkic World experienced since the day of the first meeting of Turkic-speaking states.

¹⁶ Political and economic relations between Turkic-speaking states officially re-started in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first of the summits was held in Ankara in 1992 in order to develop the relations between Turkic-speaking countries at the highest level. In that regard, The Turkic Council was established as an intergovernmental organization to promote comprehensive cooperation among the Turkic-speaking states and institutionalize their relations. After eight official meetings under the name of the Turkic Council, states decided to take this organization to the next step by renaming it the Organization of Turkic States.

In brief, the dissertation aims to reveal a better understanding of Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policymaking. In order to achieve this, it mainly enquires about Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policymaking by presenting new data gathered through interviews. By examining the institutional relations of Turkey with the Turkic World over the Organization of Turkic States, the central aim of the research has been achieved.

Choosing this area to examine, mainly through an institution, gives me a chance to study identity from the perspective of common identity claims of states. Also, it allows me to fill the gap in the literature on identity studies by enriching the process of thirty years of relations between Turkey and the Turkic World with and without the help of joint institutions. Thus, this particular subject helps answer the research questions of the dissertation and contributes to the literature on identity studies by providing a systematic analysis of an institutional relationship that has not been studied much in this way.

1.4. Research Design and Method

The contribution of studies in the identity literature which shed light on identity's influence on foreign policymaking cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, identity's influence on foreign policy remains conceptually, theoretically, and empirically improvable within the literature on identity. Hence this dissertation aims to reveal a better understanding of identity's influence on states' foreign policies by approaching the topic through the help of questions directed to the interviewees.

The dissertation mainly consists of semi-structured interviews. The content of the questions includes Turkic identity, the roots of Turkic identity, its expansion throughout history, and its influence on Turkish Foreign Policy. In addition to focusing on Turkic identity and its influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, it also questions the structure of the Organization of Turkic States as an institution that would help analyse Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy. By addressing these questions, the dissertation intends to reveal the factors affecting foreign policies and their effects on the cooperation agendas of identity-based institutions. However, due to the impossibility of

explaining the phenomenon by looking at all cases, the scope of this dissertation has been limited to a region. Hence, it takes the Turkic World region as a strategic point.

Interviewing has been specifically chosen as the research method. The use of interviews allows for the exploration of unbiased information from the interviewees and creates an opportunity to see the interviewees' perspective on Turkey's approach to the Turkic World with its all dynamics, including perception of the elite, public opinion, and personal knowledge and experiences of experts in the area. Therefore, by using interviews, it is possible to interpret Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish authorities' formal way of approaching the Turkic World¹⁷ the considerations of Turkic communities about the common identity claims of states, and the idea of cooperation with the mutual organisations.

Even though there has been a vision of cooperation between Turkic States for almost three decades, this may or may not mean that they share the same or similar norms, aims, and agendas for the future. Therefore, interviewing also allows an opportunity to detect those internal and external reasons that prevent following the same agendas of Turkic World communities. In consequence, interviewing is commonly used throughout this dissertation as the primary source. Through the use of semi-structured interviews, several questions were asked to each interviewee during the interview. The nature of these interviews allows the researcher to ask additional questions if an exciting line of exploration happens during the interview and offers reassurance when conducting a detailed discussion of a precise topic.

The interviewees are from various backgrounds (Academicians, Professors, Politicians, Diplomats, and Researchers) because interviewing various people from various states and professional backgrounds helps gather information on whether related states share

¹⁷ There is a particular reason for using the terms Turkic Republics and the Turkic World throughout the research. First of all, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many politicians and academics in Turkey (Yazgan, 2010; Akıncı, 2013; Şimşir, 2021; Yılmaz, 2021) defined the states established by the peoples of Turkic origin in the Caucasus and Central Asia as Turkic Republics. Likewise, the reports prepared by the State Planning Organization of the Republic of Turkey every five years include Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, which gained their independence after the Soviet Union pointed out as Turkic Republics. Last but not least, Bilal Şimşir (2021) and Halil Akıncı (2013), former diplomats of the Republic of Turkey during the dissolution era of the Soviet Union, informed that the Republic of Turkey regarded the societies in these lands as Turkic societies and defined the newly established republics as Turkic Republics.

specific goals. The interviewees' varieties and differences based on visions, nationalities, and professional areas of interest have been chosen to explore a full range of viewpoints and contribute to the literature. Through the interviews, the existing literature has been enriched with new information because the people interviewed have knowledge about the previously unpublished data. This is particularly true of the diplomats, politicians, and academicians who have been in high state positions or academic positions who shared their personal experiences.

Therefore, presenting the questions of the interviews to add new information to the existing literature and unpublished data would be enlightening. The questions directed to interviewees may be found at the end of this dissertation in the appendix section. These questions are directed to the interviewees with preliminary information and sub-questions, deepening the knowledge of the reader as to the contents of the interviews. In addition to these questions, there are also questions about the interviewees' background to present unpublished data and personal experiences of the interviewees which have been redacted for ethical considerations. In that regard, the interviewees' answers to the questions have been systematically used during the dissertation to contribute to the literature on Turkic identity and Turkish Foreign Policy.

Apart from interviewing, this dissertation also took into consideration various documents consisting of the Heads of Turkic-speaking states' meetings, official documents of the Joint Statements of Heads of State Meetings, Joint Statements of Foreign Ministers Meetings Series of the Turkic Council, annual reports of the Turkic Council, and the member states' official authorities' statements. Examining these documents is crucial because by doing so, it is possible to highlight the organisation's political agenda and map the relationship of member states in terms of political agendas.

Primary sources are also complemented by information received from the media, which is a vital source to help to fill the academic gap. This information is provided online by some well-known media agencies such as Radio Free Europe, daily newspapers of Turkey (Sabah, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Yeni Şafak), and local media outlets. The data obtained from the websites of various state institutions of Turkey and the Turkic Republics, the annual reports documenting the activities, projects of the institutions, and

organisations that have been inside the bounds of this dissertation are also used throughout this work.

Previous academic research on Turkic Identity, the Turkic World, and the Organization of Turkic Republics have been used as secondary sources. That includes books, journal articles, PhD. theses, policy papers, and conference proceedings. The secondary sources are consulted in providing data mostly on Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Turkic World, the historical background of relations between Turkey and Turkic Republics, and the region's dynamics since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

1.4.1. Analysis of method and data collection

The interview is an essential data-gathering technique involving verbal communication between the researcher and the subject. As Mathers, Fox, and Hunn (1998, 22) indicate, interviews are compelling for qualitative research because they help explain, better understand, and explore the research subject. In this context, Dornyei (2007, 17) notes that qualitative data is 'quite often' collected by researchers through interviews and questionnaires. However, interviews are more potent than questionnaires in eliciting narrative data as it allows researchers to probe people's views in greater depth.

A research interview involves an interviewer, who coordinates the process of the conversation by preparing and asking the questions, and an interviewee, who responds to the interviewer's questions. While interviews may be conducted face-to-face, it is possible to use the internet through online meetings. Interviews are appropriate for collecting in-depth information on people's opinions, thoughts, experiences, and feelings. Interviews are helpful when the inquiry topic relates to issues requiring tough questioning and considerable probing.

An interview is generally a qualitative research technique that contains open-ended questions to communicate with the interviewee in order to collect data about a topic. Due to the nature of open-ended interview questions, in-depth data is collected after the interview. In other words, interviews allow the researcher to explore topics in considerable depth with their subject. By exploring the topics in considerable depth,

interviews also help the interviewer discover the interviewee's viewpoint and the reason for holding that view.

However, the value of interviewing is not only due to its capacity to analyse words or report upon the detailed views of interviewees but also because it allows interviewees to speak in their own words. Therefore, they can express their thoughts and feelings (Berg 2007, 13). As such, due to the goal of an original contribution to the literature, interviews are preferred as a method of data collection for this dissertation.

Interviews may be designed differently depending on the needs and information sought. They may be grouped into three types: Structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, and unstructured interviews (Alshenkeeti 2014, 42). Semi-structured interviews will be preferred in this dissertation, because as Bernard (2006, 30) notes, semi-structured interviewing is the best way when you have only one chance to interview someone with pre-prepared questions. During the interviewing period of this study, the outbreak of Covid and people's cautious attitudes towards face-to-face meetings prevented me from meeting interviewees more than once. The suitability of this type of interview to this dissertation and the unexpected Covid process led me to use the semi-structured interview.

In a semi-structured interview, while the interviewer uses a set of standard and predetermined questions, the interviewees answer the questions in their own words. Therefore, semi-structured interviews offer considerable interviewer leeway to investigate the interviewee and maintain a basic interview structure (Kabir 2016, 26). Semi-structured interviews are helpful when there is a need to collect in-depth information systematically from several interviewees (Alshenkeeti 2014, 43). The interviewer may use a topic guide as a checklist to ensure that all interviewees responded to the same topics. The interviewer may probe areas based on the interviewee's answers or ask additional questions for clarification.

There are advantages and disadvantages of semi-structured interviews. The preparation process for the interviewer before the scheduled interview provides the interviewer time to analyse and re-check the questions. By employing the semi-structured interview method, the researcher is more likely to collect valid qualitative data. On the other hand,

due to the flexibility offered to the interviewee, interviewers may question the reliability of these interviews. It is also hard to compare two different answers and to put them in order after the interviews.

The semi-structured interviews require a clear guide; or set of instructions for the interviewer and may provide reliable, comparable, and qualitative data. Semi-structured interviews often contain open-ended questions that may diverge from the interview guide. Due to this, it is generally better to tape-record interviews and later transcript these tapes for analysis. Accordingly, tape-record interviews have been utilised during the interviewing process of this dissertation. To ensure an ethical approach; at the beginning of the interviews, I verbally asked for each interviewee's consent to use these tape-record interviews throughout the dissertation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkic World states that are mentioned above started a series of meetings under Turkic-speaking states Heads of State summits which underpins this dissertation. Despite years of cooperation and regional partnership, the need for more institutionalisation in relations and the highlighting of common identity claims of states caused these meetings to be at the centre of this dissertation. Even though the transformation of Turkic-speaking states summits to the Organization of the Turkic States and the institutionalisation process of relations between Turkey and the Turkic World has been evaluated throughout the dissertation, the link between identity and foreign policy should have been examined first due to their relevance as the fundamentals of this research. Therefore, the second part of this dissertation examines the link between identity and the foreign policymaking process to create a theoretical and conceptual framework for the research.

2. THE LINK BETWEEN IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Throughout history, the definition of identity and what scholars or states understood of it has been elaborated upon by many researchers in different ways. The reason for the re-evaluation of the concept of identity in various ways is that identity studies have not been monolithic. There has yet to be a consensus on the definition of identity. As Ereker (2010, 39) indicates, the notion is considered within the authors' point of view and methodology within the framework of classifications for the study. Therefore, it is possible to face significantly different conceptualisations about identity.

However, despite a broad-ranging interest in identity, the concept remains an enigma. Philip Gleason's (1983, 922) observation almost fifty years ago remains true today: The meaning of "identity" as we currently use it, is not well captured by dictionary definitions, which reflect the word in older senses. Our present idea of "identity" is a relatively recent social construct and a rather complicated one. Although everybody knows how to use the word correctly in daily discourse, it is difficult to give a short and succinct statement that captures the range of its present meanings.

The meaning of identity varies from one author to another due to authors' perspectives' different features and ways of focus. In order to define identity, many scholars (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2006; Baumeister 2011) have argued that identity represents only certain aspects of human self-definition. Those who wish to emphasise the conflictual nature of human interaction defined identity as "difference" in that people try to define themselves against what they are not (Derrida 1982, 44; Sökefeld 1999, 431). Similarly to these groups of scholars' definition of identity, Baumeister (2011, 51) claimed that identity is about belonging to something, such as a group or community. It is about what you have in common with a group of people and the difference between you and others. To give a basic explanation, it gives you a sense of personal location and a stable position to your individuality, but it is also about your relationships and involvement with others. However, insisting on differences over sameness as the key to identity is to ignore part of the meaning of the notion.

Even though the surrounding societies and social relationships influence people and lead people to think of sameness, each person is still unique. Each human being responds to the circumstances of the moments and problems of life quite differently. According to Layder (2004, 25), this capacity of a person reflects his/her identity and allows him/her to experience life in a way that is different from others. In other words, identity could be summarised as people's concepts of who they are, what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 47; Deng 1995, 36).

This dissertation presents these clarifications and brief definitions of identity because identity has been one of the preferred concepts of international relations scholarship since the 1990s. For its protagonists, identity is central to our understanding of international politics. Scholars including David Campbell (1992, 42), Ted Hopf (1998, 186), and Anthony Burke (2005, 401) declare that identity is an inescapable dimension of being, and no one could be without it. "A world without identities would be a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy". Therefore, investigating the definitions and clarifications provides better knowledge of identity and its relevance to international relations and politics. However, instead of only focusing on providing a definition to identity, investigating the historical progress of identity studies and its developing context is also equally essential. By enlightening the historical progress of identity studies and its developing context, it is possible to present a particular identity's changing dimensions, and scope of focus area. Therefore the next section presents the development process of identity studies.

2.1. Historical Progress of Identity: Phases of Identity

Since the work of Erikson (1950), the number and contents of identity studies and understandings of identity has changed and developed dramatically. To understand the alterations of the concept, and compare the understanding of identity in different eras, changes and developments on identity particularly since the 1950s are examined throughout this part of the dissertation in four major phases. Erikson's work has been admitted as the starting spot and the first phase of these major phases.

In terms of practical and theoretical sense, identifying changes to identity characteristics in each phase is possible. Even though distinguishing each phase from the others is complex due to intertwined similarities and differences based on research interests, it is necessary to separate the development of identity studies into periods to understand the changes and different perspectives of identity. Therefore, throughout this section, these four periods marking the identity development process are designed as phases.

Although the word 'identity' has been used in English since the sixteenth century (Berenskoetter 2010, 3601); throughout this dissertation, the first phase of identity has been associated with studies from the 1950s to the 1970s. The main theories in the first phase of identity show that theoretical explanations in this period focused primarily on the individualism of identity and the essence of humankind which has been associated with the perennial mind-body problem in philosophy since the time of John Locke (Gleason 1983, 926). The meaning of identity in this philosophical context was close to its meaning in ordinary usage, which is the sameness of a person at all times, individuality, and personality. An individual's attitudes toward others and how these attitudes could be changed to prevent identity crises were at the core of these theoretical explanations.

During the 1960s, identity as a concept diffused from psychology to other disciplines, including international relations and sociology. Psychology and international relations scholars primarily endeavoured to theorise identity-related works at the core of these related theories. However, due to the scientific and systematic evolution of the concept of identity in the 1960s, the first phase of identity took its main conceptual and methodological inspiration from microeconomic models, and left little room for analysis of seemingly esoteric matters such as identities.

The effect of leaving little room for identity analysis is ironic because the superpower confrontation during this era seems to invite an analysis of foreign policy and international relations guided by images of "self and others". As a reflection of that invite, promising steps were made by Karl Deutsch (2016) who suggested that transactions and communications may establish a 'we' feeling through "partial identification in terms of self-images and interests" (Berenskoetter 2010, 3603). In addition to Deutsch's work, Kenneth Boulding's (1959) notion of "national images" and

Kal Holsti's (1970) "role conceptions" were the exceptional works of the first phase that enriched the literature of identity studies.

The first phase of identity studies was primarily based on identity crises, the concepts of self and others, self-images, and interests (Boulding 1959; Deutsch 2016). In this context, Gleason (1983, 924) claims that Erikson's term "identity crisis" significantly popularised identity. Even though the group of scholars that highlighted the concepts of self-images, the concepts of self and others, and interests; a limited number of scholars used the notion of identity in their works. In that regard, Oscar Handlin's 'The Uprooted' (1951) is perhaps the last major work that used 'identity' as a term during the discussion on immigration. Although Handlin used identity a half-dozen times, it was not an essential context term; because the theme of Handlin's book was not expressed using 'identity' but by words like uprootedness, alienation, and loneliness.

Rather than Handlin's book, Will Herberg's (1955) "Protestant-Catholic-Jew" may be a turning point in using 'identity' as a word in the literature. Because identity repeatedly shows up during Herberg's book, and together with identification is in a sense, what the book is all about. Herberg seeks answers to questions such as the effect of religion on identity, questions of the self, and what ethnic identity is. In other words, Herberg mainly defined the search for identity.

C. Vann Woodward's essay "The Search for Southern Identity" in 1958 and W.L. Morton's "The Canadian Identity" (1961) were some of the other works that started using identity in titles or subtitles in the late 1950s and the 1960s. However, particularly in the works of Robert Penn Warren in the middle of the 1960s, "Who Speaks for Negro" (1965) and "The Identity Society" (1972) by William Glasser, identity and identity crisis had become well-known notions of international relations. Thus, with the contributions of these works, identity had reached generality and diffuseness in the first phase of identity. By the late 1960s, the terminological use of identity was even out of control, and identity was no more the same as role-playing; it was not just self-conception or self-image, and it was not simply an answer to the question of "Who am I?"

The second phase of identity, which emerged mainly after Erikson and his successors' works' purposes that understood by the researchers, came to the stage with its theoretical positions interpreting the effect of international structure on building an identity. In that regard, the scholars of the second phase of identity were mainly interested in understanding terms like identity, nation, nationalism, and ethnicity. Identity as a concept was used to define the national, ethnic, religious, and cultural features of a person or a nation. These terms have taken a firm hold in the studies of nations, nationalism, and ethnicity; thus, the identity perspective has become rapidly well-known.

The growth of interest in identity, ethnicity, nations, nationalism, and the nation-building process seemed to become more evident by the 1970s. Because scholars of the second phase of identity studies believed that with the perspective of identity, a state and political identity's construction process might be observed or analysed more effectively. In this context, many professionals in geography, history, sociology, anthropology, and political science have expanded the literature of identity by writing on state-making's political, economic, technological, and socio-cultural dimensions and the processes of the construction of state-making, which is interpreted as state formation and reproduction (Sökefeld 1999, 433).

Despite the evident growth of interest in identity during the 1970s, Hollinger (1997, 338) believes that humanists, social scientists, and scholars of international relations in the post-1970s proved reluctant to renounce a generically academic ethos. They were determined to engage in fundamental theoretical issues on culture and society that belonged exclusively to no discipline. However, none of these issues proved deeply engaging to more scholars from more disciplines than the issue that came to be flagged with the term "identity".

Woodward (2000, 28) explains the reluctancy of humanists, social scientists and scholars of international relations in a logical context. According to Woodward, academic intellectuals in previous decades were felt by many of their immediate successors to have been incapable of appreciating the enabling function of groups and the diversity of the life sustained by groups. This incapacity was part of an enormous failure to measure how human lives were structured by race, class, and gender.

However, these blind spots of the previous generation were corrected in the early and mid-1970s, often in a spirit of great confidence and conviction.

The third phase of identity studies started when the key features shaping the phenomenon of identity changed in the late 1980s and 1990s. International relations scholars who focused on identity over any other ideology began with a different perspective of social reality. The scholars of the third phase mainly aimed to understand the construction process of identity throughout history, which led them to specific interests and practices. However, with the rise of race, class, and gender in the 1980s as the "holy trinity" of literary criticism and cultural studies, the humanities joined the fray (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2006, 700). Nevertheless, a crisis of overproduction and consequent devaluation of meaning, which may be defined as an identity crisis, showed no sign of abating in identity studies during the 1980s and 1990s.

International relations witnessed a surge of literature that paid particular attention to identity at the end of the 20th century. Although identities and other ideational factors such as cultures and norms were harshly marginalised (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996, 47) in international relations under the domination of neorealism/positivism for years, the end of the 1980s and early 1990s saw the end of this marginalisation, primarily due to the advent of constructivism. In this context, Horowitz's (2002, 62) research explains the end of marginalisation and the domination of neorealism/positivism with a notable increase in the number of constructivist works and the use of identity in international journals between 1990 and 2002.

Despite the interest of those constructivist scholars in identity-related subjects, it is worth emphasising here that some of the scholars within the critical theory approach and well-known analysts from the realist tradition (Snyder 1993; Huntington 1993) have also contributed to the literature. Nevertheless, the works of constructivist scholars primarily brought the reintroduction of identity into the international relations discourse due to their forthright pursuit of meta-theoretical reflection when dealing with identity.

The fourth phase of identity is the current phase that focuses upon various extensions and meanings of identity in international relations. In the fourth phase, identity has become a well-known notion that has also been used in ways that make it synonymous

with culture, language, and simple in-group allegiances. Since the start of the fourth phase of identity, international relations scholars have studied individual identity, social identity, social interaction, identity changes, and identity influencers. In addition to these subjects, the fourth phase of identity has also been shaped by complex and various studies like states' behaviours, states' identities, the identity of nations/communities, and political identities (Aydın 1996; Demirtas 2008; Karpat 2009).

International relations scholars' understanding of identity in the fourth phase was primarily based on the singular belief that 'identity is not set in stone'. The growing influence of constructivism on identity studies was attached to this idea because constructivist scholars primarily believe that the interaction between individuals, societies, and states causes changes in identities. As Baumeister (2011, 49) notes, through these social interactions, actors create values, norms, beliefs, role conceptions, attitudes, stereotypes, and other cognitive, affective, and motivational phenomena that become embodied in and change the actor's psychology.

In brief, identity as a field of study in international relations presents an intellectual richness in theoretical and methodological discussions. That is why the variety of theoretical and research approaches to the phenomenon of identity are categorised under these four aforementioned significant phases. By dividing the progress of identity studies into phases, distinguishing the fundamentals of the phases in terms of theoretical sense has been achieved, which also prepared the ground for the theoretical position of this dissertation.

Although the topic is remains complex to understand, the discussions surrounding how to study identity, how to examine its place in international relations, and how to explain the elements that influence it are still ongoing to increase the understanding of identity. However, despite the contribution of ongoing studies, the field of identity still suffers from shortcomings in explaining different types of identities and their fundamental features to help solve the complexity of identity. Therefore, to better understand the concept of identity and to help finding the shortcomings of identity studies, the next section of the research examines different types of identities in order.

2.2. The Examination of Different Types of Identities

In addition to the centrality of our understanding of international relations and politics, the complex nature of identity, and the lack of consensus on a definition, identity also has a variety of types (personal identity, national identity, collective identity, state identity, and many others) which makes the concept more confusing. Even though identity pervades the human experience and constitutes the subjectivities of individuals, nations, groups, ethnicities, religions, and other collective formations, it remains a "slippery" concept.

In order to help avoid this slippery ground of identity, the literature on identity contains various studies focusing on different types of identity. There are numerous categories of identity, each of which reflects different criteria that may be used to differentiate individuals, groups, and establishments to reinforce commonality amongst or within them. These criteria include sex, gender, age, generation, socio-economic (class), culture, ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, language, ideology, and territorial allegiance. According to Rummens (2003, 29), the types of identities these criteria define are based on socially and/or culturally relevant similarities and distinctions in any given societal context. However, their nature and relative saliency may vary from situation to situation, culture to culture, and society to society. Even though understanding the nature of all types of identities is complicated, controversial, and challenging, the explanations of scholars on different varieties of identities may ease the understanding of the concept. This section of the dissertation particularly examines the individual, social, and collective identity to create a better understanding of the concepts of state identity and national identity which are determined as priority concepts to create a better understanding of Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy.

Although the identity of individuals is not the core focal point of this dissertation, as Bloom (1990, 40) indicates, it would be beneficial to comprehend the details of individual identities to reach the primary goal of understanding the identity of societies and states. In this context, the definition of individual identity announced by Erikson (1968, 44) decades ago remains true today: identity is one's ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others. Individually, identity is a feeling that I am what I think I am, that other people seem to agree on what I am, and that this

consensus regarding what I am is relatively stable over time. In other words, the answer to "what is identity?" is mainly formulated as "how a person defines who he/she is; self-definition or self-understanding."

In that case, it is possible to claim that individuals hold multiple identities as an individual may feel attached to different social groups and imagined communities. Therefore, explaining an individual's identity is the problem of stating what aspects of a person it refers to and precisely how these are essential at any given moment. This view is supported by Anthony Smith (1991, 38) who notes that individual identity is all of the subjective judgments he/she creates to find himself/herself in the environment he/she lives in. Individuals construct their own identities but do not construct them as they wish; they do construct them under the circumstances encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.

The formation of an individual's identity is a progressive and adaptive process inherent within each human. Therefore, due to the variety of identities an individual has, the components of an individual's particular identity may change according to the situation or time. Due to the nature of the ongoing and progressive individual identity of a human being, a variety of influences can shape an individual's identity. Tajfel and Turner (1979, 35) claim that a community or an organisation is capable of changing individual behaviours by modifying their self-identity or part of their self-concept that derives from the knowledge of and emotional attachment to the group.

In order to support Tajfel and Turner's claim, it is worth noting that the similarities or the differences of humans dictates the distance of individuals to each other. In this context, Abrams and Hogg (1990, 43) indicate that social identities' existence due to similarities of people, connects individuals to social groups in the sense of a "collective we." In other words, through a shared identity, individuals act together to preserve, defend and enhance their common identity because social identity is the portion of a person's self-concept derived from perceived membership in a relevant social group (Turner and Oakes 1986, 243).

Collective identity represents the collective consciousness of individuals; that is, while individual identities construct social identity, newly produced identities are affected by

social identity. Collective identity is a multifaceted concept that is subjective as morale, esprit de corps, or in-group feelings of affection such as brotherhood/sisterhood (Wendt 1994, 56). It can also be based on narrative or legend, as seen in indigenous populations. However, in some instances, this leads to negative attitudes towards the 'outgroup' even though the others may also be regarded in neutral terms. As such, whilst the members of a collective group express themselves as "us", they form the construction of the "other" over time mainly through cultural differences and define those who are not members of this group as "other". In this context, the construction of nation-states and regional organisation's identity in the discourses of many political and social elites might be given as examples of such 'us-other' differentiation which is also highlighted in this dissertation to emphasise the Turkic World States' relations based on political elites.

In summary, the concept of collective identity usually evokes two substantive components. First, they define what is unique about the respective community. Then, they delineate the boundaries between us and others. That is the way in which they describe the boundaries of communities. However, the collective identities of groups within society are constantly being reconstructed through changing external world conditions and their relationships with other actors. Therefore, there is always the possibility for change between the societies that are referred to as us and other.

Even though individual and collective identities are briefly explained here to help understand the existence of different types of identities, examining the concepts of state identity and national identity is the main agenda of the research. Nevertheless, despite the importance of concepts of state identity and national identity, many scholars (Hall 1999; Layder 2004; Omelichava 2015) neglect to provide an explicit definition to create better understanding on these concepts.

Both state identity and national identity are mainly seen as a part of culture, which most constructivists (Wendt 1994; Katzenstein 1996; Onuf 2012) define as socially shared beliefs. However, there are other definitions of state identity and national identity presented by international scholars. Due to the existence of a variety of definitions of state identity and national identity, classifications regarding the types of identity, and confusing similarities of the definitions of state identity and national identity, they are

both examined and compared in the next part of the dissertation to clarify the main focal point of the dissertation.

2.3. Awareness of the Differences between National Identity and State Identity

The pre-modernist nature of the state was situated within a traditional-customary ground until the essence of the traditional way of understanding of state in cultural, sociological, and political terms changed with the start of nationalist movements throughout the world. Since the rise of nationalist movements, similarities of nations' heritages, and historical, cultural, and linguistic experiences have led international relations scholars to research common identity claims of nations and states, and their relevance to the development of the concept of identity. In this sense, the formation of "national identity", which is the tool of the nation-state formation process, has expanded its influence on states with the world perception brought by modernism (Karaduman, 2010, 2887). Therefore, the identity of states and the hypothetical identities of the citizens who constitute the state have overlapped since the modernisation process began. Thus, elaborating on the concepts of national and state identity became a necessity to understand the nature of the notions and emphasise their differences.

National identity is one of the topics that has been of interest to international relations scholars, particularly since the end of the Cold War. It became a primary explanation for many political, economic, social, and cultural processes in many issues, such as governance, development, security, peace, and conflict (Rozman 2014; McCartney 2019; Portas 2020). Nevertheless, there is still a need for clarity in understanding the definition of national identity due to the misunderstanding and misuse of the notion.

Although it is not easy to distinguish state and national identity from one another, it is worth noting some differences between these two notions for a more precise understanding of the focus of the research. There are different types of approaches amongst scholars who are using the term national identity concerning what state identity is (Berger 1996), and others that divide identity into internal and external dimensions (Banchoff 1999). During this dissertation, national identity and state identity concepts are divided from each other and respectively aim to be defined and explained

because defining the terms and identifying the differences is crucial to understand the differences between these two concepts.

The national identity of a country can be expressed as containing three characteristics. The first is “historical reality”. National identity is based on situations, experiences, milestones, and other factors. Due to the existence of its people, a state does not just embrace one national identity. It may have different allegiances; one side of its “identity” might present at a given moment and not at another. Therefore, it should be admitted that identity is dynamic and presents a series of alterations and continuities over time. Second, national identity contains a context that derives from an institutional framework. It is built by a set of events through time, and it comes to an end being materialised in the conformation of some given state institutions and policies and the arising of certain political personalities which differ from those of other states. Thirdly, it expresses a “relational reality”. Identity is not created in a complete void. Therefore, it requires interaction, contact, and communication with various external actors.

National identity also requires a particular political community in addition to these characteristics. In this context, citizens in a political community must have a single law regarding certain common institutions, rights, and duties. The community members need to find a social space that creates a sense of belonging, a piece of land with definite boundaries, and a legally binding basis with which they can identify themselves (Hall 1999, 71). National identity describes that condition in which a mass of people have made the exact identification with national symbols – have internalised the symbols of the nation – so that they may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity.

State identity on the other hand, is a conceptualisation of what the state has in terms of its uniqueness and difference within an international context, or to put it more simply as Özdaşlı indicates, what the state is and what it represents.¹⁸ State identity plays a crucial role in maintaining the national community's sense of "we" against the 'other'. It emerges from both domestic processes and interactions with counterparts located abroad. The internal aspect of state identity points to the representations and

¹⁸ Özdaşlı, E. personal communication, May 4, 2021.

corresponding beliefs held by the state's elites and the general public. In contrast, the representations of and beliefs about that state amongst the elite and the public in other states belong to the external dimension of state identity. Therefore, its structure is related to self-perception and self-representation issues and the perception and representation of “others”. In light of these explanations, Turkey’s state identity in terms of its uniqueness, the perception of Turkey’s elite of state identity, the approach of the general public towards state identity, and other states’ considerations over Turkey’s state identity has been explained throughout the dissertation to situate the theoretical approach of the dissertation within a particular case.

Similarly to individual identities, state identity is often formed and changes over time in response to relations and interactions with other states and other international actors. Meanwhile, cultural and institutional instruments of states’ internal and external atmospheres also help construct the concept of state identity. Therefore, state identity is not just an exemplary character of a state, but is also a social and relational conception referring to the state to reflect the existence or identity of others. Hence, changes in Turkish Foreign Policy since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey’s relations with Turkic World States particularly based on common cultural, historical, and linguistic claims, and Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World through the Organization of Turkic States has been presented throughout the dissertation to present the fundamentals of state identity.

Taking into account these considerations, analysing state identity by referring to four basic interrelated questions: ‘Who are we?’, ‘What assumptions can we make of ourselves?’, ‘How are we perceived?’ and ‘What are our aspirations?’ would help to understand the identity of a state because these questions provide a brief but precise framework to structure the analysis of something as complex as state identity.

To present the differences between national identity and state identity briefly, shared features of national identity bind states to believe in an imagined community. In contrast, state identity is understood as shared beliefs about the self. In this context others may play an essential role in sustaining the togetherness of the national community. Therefore, the difference between national identity and state identity does not simply consist of fundamental distinctions but it also occurs due to the different

theoretical concerns and priorities of research across the disciplinary fields of political science and international relations. Accordingly, the existing theoretical approaches of different kinds of schools of thought pertaining to the concept of identity, and the importance of identity to international relations scholars has been briefly presented in the next part of the dissertation to elaborate upon the shortcomings of the literature.

2.4. Theoretical Approaches to Identity and Their Contribution to the Study

Due to its status as the central research context of the dissertation, identity has been extensively investigated, from its historical development to its place in theoretical debates. However, the importance of identity's influence on the identities of states as a concept in the discipline of international relations and theoretical approaches' contribution to this concept has not yet been appropriately presented. In order to do this, the comparison of different schools' approaches to the development of identity studies has been investigated in this part of the dissertation.

Since the first phase of identity studies, theories of research on identity and the contributions of discussions about identity moved the focus from "the search for identity" to "states' identities, nations' identities and influencers of identities". Thus, identity started to be considered as a process influenced by various indicators, including the historical, cultural, and linguistic roots of states, the impacts of globalisation, and the change of interests towards humans, states, or organisations.

In the new age of identity studies, identity has started to be accepted as a factor of international relations that is influenced by states' acts, preferences, international organisations' structure, these organisations' approaches to the members, and nations' feelings about their instincts on their identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 34). Due to the developments and perspective changes within identity studies, studies on international relations explaining the phenomenon of identity started to try to answer some significant problems, such as:

- 1) How do states' identities affect their foreign policies and internal dynamics?
- 2) What is the essence of foreign policy preferences of states with common identity-related bonds to cooperate?

3) What is the influence of states' common identity claims towards having closer relations?

It is possible to find different answers to these questions, depending on the school of thought to which the scholars belong. These differing answers to the same questions are similar to the difference between rationalist and constructivist visions. For instance, state identity approaches represented by Peter Katzenstein (1996), Alexander Wendt (1999), and Nicholas Onuf (2012) have become a part of the exclusive rationalist mainstream of international relations theory. In that regard, these approaches have been considered to be the most severe challenge to rationalist dominance, claiming that the theoretical framework based on state identity can offer a viable alternative to rational choice theory (Alexandrov 2003, 39).

The typical realist proposition is used to question the dominance of the "national interest". In other words, it used to focus on the calculations of regime survival in pursuing foreign policy over all other considerations, including ideological ones. In that regard, realists (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 54) used to claim that ideologies, identities, and ideas formed by theoretical elements could not shape foreign policy. Apart from excluding irrational fields in their analysis, they assume that the state, which they accept as the leading actor in the international system, is a rational unit and that foreign policy decision-makers always act rationally.

In order to clarify the realist proposition, the driving factors of Özal's Presidency's foreign policy goals and the goal of the development process of cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic States could be given as an example. In this scenario, the changes of the decision-makers in Turkey triggered the changes of foreign policy goals of Turkey. Therefore, the alteration of decision-makers and foreign policy goals of Turkey simply expresses the central weight of self-interest of states or states' decision-makers. Bıyıklı expresses the association between the self-interests of states or states' decision makers and changing foreign policy goals as follows; according to Bıyıklı, states tend to specify their foreign policies and follow their interests first due to their identity.¹⁹ Even though cooperation with the Turkic World was one of the main foreign

¹⁹ Bıyıklı, M. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

policy goals of Özal's and Demirel's administrations, the foreign policy of Turkey was not entirely dependent on the dream of Turkic Unity. Instead, Turkey's self-interest was beyond any other policies.

Even though the realist approach raises accurate points when explaining the relations between identity and foreign policy, the drawbacks of the realist approach is that the theoretical elements formed by norms, ideologies, identities, and ideas may actually shape foreign policy. That is why social constructivists (Wendt 1999; Onuf 2012; Tuğtan 2014) try to understand these aforementioned notions and use them in foreign policy analysis. Furthermore, constructivists claim that the acceptance of other concrete or intangible instruments that shape foreign policy has revealed the necessity of examining the state. This is because according to constructivist reasoning, the interests of states are shaped by their identities, while state identities themselves are subject to change in the interaction process (Chandra and Laitin 2002, 13).

In order to show the existence of different concrete or intangible instruments that shape foreign policy, constructivists focus on connecting identities and interests. In this context, Wendt (1999, 55) points out that interest presupposes identities and treats identity as "a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioural dispositions". According to Wendt, identities belong to the belief side of the intentional equation that may calculate as $\text{desire} + \text{belief} = \text{action}$. In addition, while interests belong to the desired side, neither identities have motivational force, nor interests have direction without identities. Thus, a state's action is motivated by various interests rooted in the state's identity.

In brief, what Wendt (1999) and many other constructivists (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1999; Onuf 2002) indicate is that the identities of political actors are the primary forms in which they create their interests; because the constructivist approach places prominence on identity as a determinant in political action. As ideas and social norms, identity defines the actions and interests of interlocutors in international relations and constructs the structures in which their activities may occur. Thus, states do not follow foreign policy as a strategy for mere survival but rather are motivated by underlying ideological and social interests.

Due to the conflicting nature of the constructivist-realist approaches, different perspectives on understanding identity, and the question of identity's relation with interests, scholars who work on identity (Chafetz 1999; Bozdağlıoğlu 2003; Çaman and Akyurt 2011) tended to pose their research questions and organise their research designs to answer the following question: Do identities or interests shape a state's foreign policy?

Sophisticated realists and neorealists answer that question by emphasising the incapability of brute material forces to drive interests. That is why their opinion on interests often includes references to ideational factors. However, their formulation fails to recognise this because identities can actually be a source of interest. Therefore, posing the question as interests versus identities as realists do would be misleading. The national identity and the national interest are the instruments that make it meaningful, together with the content of the states' foreign policies, which compose the whole of the basic paradigms that guide their foreign policies.

In summary, even though the scholars of international relations focus on different aspects of identity with different ways of approaches, all the contributions show that identity is a complex process shaped by various effects including, state-to-state interactions, national interests, and the contents of the foreign policy of states. In addition, all these discussions that are shaped by states' interactions imply that identity's influences on states are closely related to critical factors, including common historical, cultural, or linguistic bonds of states, mutual goals, common hesitations, and familiar friends. Therefore, to understand the development of state identity in the literature and its influence on foreign policymaking process of states, the literature on state identity has been presented in the next section of the dissertation.

2.5. The Literature on State Identity

Although identity has long been developed as a subject of research by those who specialised in other social science disciplines such as sociology and anthropology, the concept was introduced into political science during the behavioural revolution in the 1960s to study the political development of states. However, compared to other notions (participation, integration, and political culture) introduced around the same time that

produced plenty of research projects and literature, studies on state identity remained relatively poor (Dittmer and Kim 1993, 66).

In international relations, a subdiscipline of political science and interest in state identity was considerably thin, limited mainly to a few studies that employed the term 'national role conception' regarding its impact on the international system through quantitative analyses (Holsti 1970, 271). Since the introduction of identity into political science, the concept of state identity was harshly marginalised (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996, 64) in international relations under the domination of neorealism/positivism discussions for almost three decades, until the marginalisation trend was reversed in the early 1990s. With this reverse, the developments in post-Cold War international relations led even well-known analysts and neorealists (Huntington 1993; Snyder 1993) to look at identity-related subjects like nationalism and the formation of states in detail.

Since the 1990s, state identity has been presented in various ways and examined through different scopes that represent the theoretical and methodological reflections of analysts. Part of the studies in the literature (Weldes 1999; Wendt 1999; Onuf 2012) treated state identity as a foundational concept for theorising the constructivist approach to international relations. Others focused on empirical analyses with specific causal inferences centring on identity: How the state identities shape their interest (Banchoff 1999; Lee 2006); how a change of national identity brings about a change in state policy and the international system (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994; Berger 1996); how a policy of a state can be employed as a way to deal with an identity crisis by its political leaders or as a political practice to produce and maintain the identity of a state (Campbell 1992; Barnett 1999); and how an identity of a state, together with its material power influences foreign policy (Nau 2002).

There are also several other scholars who focus on interactive relations between the identities of states and international-level actors, addressing, for instance, how international institutions, norms, and the environment shape state identities (Eyre and Suchman 1996), how domestic conceptions of state identities interact with international norms (Checkel 1999), and whether dynamics of identity among states inevitably cause the conflicts (Mercer 1995).

In brief, despite the first appearance of identity in international relations as a concept in earlier decades, research on state identity and related topics has increased in international relations, particularly since the early 1990s. However, despite increasing attention on state identity, the influencers of state identity and identity's influence on foreign policy still stand as some of the subjects that can be researched to deepen the field of literature.

Even though identity or state identity has been one of the striking concepts of international relations since the 1990s, a group of scholars (Chafetz, Spirtas, and Frankel 1998) remain sceptical of the concept of identity and believe that the contribution of state identity to our understanding of state policy is inefficient and that the concept of interest better serves us. Indeed, many international relations scholars (Weldes 1999; Hernandez 2006; Lu 2013) turn to the concept of national interest to express why states pursue particular foreign policies. Nevertheless, the connection between state identity and state interest prevents us from thinking these two notions are separated. Therefore, elaborating upon the importance of national interest and its influence on foreign policies is also crucial for the completeness of this dissertation.

The concept of national interest is often contentious, owing to constant bickering over its definition (Chafetz 1999, 22). Therefore, it would be more accurate to explain the complexity of this concept with an example instead of defining the national interest, which we can briefly call the policies determined by the states in line with the interests of societies. In order to exemplify this, presenting Turkey's national interests and foreign policy choices would be helpful. In this context, Turkey's interest in the Turkic World, particularly after the independencies of Turkic Republics, was once considered as an emotional act of a state or a part of the strategy of Turkey's common identity claim within the region. However, mainly after the establishment of institutions like the Organization of Turkic States, Turksoy, and other assisting organisations, the approach of Turkey to the Turkic World started to be seen significantly similar with reflection of Turkey's national interest.

Whether the foreign policies of states are outcomes of national interest or state identity, states need a foreign policy to define and distinguish 'us' and 'others', because the contestation of national interests has crucial implications for external relations. In order

to be able to control these implications, foreign policy choices should be made carefully in line with national interests. Therefore, it is possible to claim that foreign policy is one of the most powerful means of awakening and keeping both the state identity and national interest dynamics alive. Furthermore, the importance of states' foreign policies in shaping their identities and identity's influence on their foreign policies has been presented in the next part of the dissertation. Moreover, the fundamentals of the national interests of states and their complex and changeable structures have been exemplified through Turkey's changing perspective and styles of approach in the subsequent parts of the dissertation.

2.6. Identity's Influence on Foreign Policymaking Process

Identity's influence on foreign policy and influencers of identity are not new terms for international relations.²⁰ As Fearon (1999, 32) indicates, due to the rise of attention given to the notion of identity-related subjects, multiple disciplines and subfields have been producing expanding literature on the definition of identity, the development of ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and other types of identities, and their roles in the decision-making progress of states.

In addition to the subjects mentioned by Fearon, expanding literature on identity-related subjects also contains studies that approach the phenomenon of identity's influence on foreign policy²¹ which mainly examine the possible influence of identity on political choices of states towards international relations (Balcı 2008; Akıllı 2013; Aydın-Düzgit 2018). During these examinations, the scholars defined the state's interests and compared the historical backgrounds of states, languages, experiences, and cultures as the essential criteria for constructing or reconstructing a state in regards to policymaking. The studies that examine the influence of identity on the foreign policy of states question the conditions of states regarding their interests, regional ambitions, goals, and historical experiences. Therefore, they are generally built upon the idea that

²⁰ Identity has been studied in sociology, anthropology, geography, international relations, and many others for years. In regard to exemplify these works, Burke (2005) as a sociologist, Sökefeld (1999) as an anthropologist, and Erikson (1950) as a psychologist studied identity.

²¹ Altorai's 'Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision-Making' in 2012 and Guillaume's 'International Relations and Identity: A Dialogical Approach' in 2010 could be counted as two of the instances.

identity's influence on foreign policy restrains deepening relations and cooperation with others due to clashing security concerns of states and rivals.

In order to comprehend the correlation between state identity and foreign policy, the literature on the influence of identity on foreign policy produced various approaches. However, despite these differing approaches, it is not easy to fully understand the relationship between state identity and foreign policy. Therefore, exploring the notions and their relations through proper explanation would be helpful to explore the relevance of these concepts in relation to the literature.

Firstly, foreign policy can alter the salient meaning of particular identities of which state identity is composed, because identities change over time due to the influence of international or regional environments, which cause them to compete, cooperate, or oppose each other. In this sense, foreign policy might be a symbolic battlefield for identity conflicts. Turkey's changing identity due to international or regional dynamics, and changing partners and enemies has been investigated in the subsequent parts of this dissertation to demonstrate the relationship between identity and foreign policy.

Secondly, foreign policy can lead decision-makers to change their perceived state identity, especially when under pressure from other states or international organisations. Therefore, Turkey's changing foreign policy strategies, the characteristics of the political elite, and affiliated international organisations or cooperation groups have been explored to broaden the lens of the relationship between identity and foreign policy. This is because external events or the involvement of foreign actors in particular cases might also change the domestic policies of a state and may alter an existing state identity.

However, the third explanation suggests that people and leaders —the foreign policymakers—seemed to care deeply about something deemed unimportant. Therefore, the decisions of the elite or policymakers are worth explaining in order to understand the relations between foreign policy and state identity. As such, Turkey's elites' or policymakers' influence on the foreign policymaking process of the country has been researched to show the influence of individuals on the relations between states. As Saideman (2002, 36) questions, if material interests drive foreign policy, it is unclear

why politicians delay or refuse to alter their foreign policy according to new international circumstances.

There are possible answers to the lack of clarity that Saideman questions. Firstly, since the works of Erikson, the fundamental claim of many scholars on identity was the necessity of separation of 'us' and 'them'. In that regard, nations could be claimed as a product of self-other separation and exclusion. Describing the national 'self' versus 'the other' is a prior condition for the integration of nations because those belonging to 'the self' hold a sense of shared fate and mutual attachment, generating national unity and loyalty. 'The other' may be ethnic, religious, political, or cultural societies living in the same territories of 'the self' or outside nations closely interacting with 'the self' in precise historical and political contexts. In other words, those posing a positive self-other relationship would support cooperation with that country, while those insisting on a negative one would set a line with that country or would have confrontation with it to prevail. That is the mutually constructive nature of the relationship between foreign policy and state identity, which may be an obstacle to seeking material interest.

Secondly, due to state identity's causal and constitutive relationship with foreign policy, past foreign policy influences present state identity, which in turn influences future foreign policy in an ongoing cyclical relationship. In this context, Alons (2007, 223) explains that the relationship between domestic and external constraints and foreign policy fluctuates. Domestic or external factors significantly influence a state's foreign policy decision-making at any given time based on how power is distributed domestically and internationally. Based on the success of this power distribution over time, seeking material interest may be complicated.

Thirdly, in pluralistic societies, a state's identity and, consequently, its interests arise from a struggle among various domestic groups trying to affect the course of the state's foreign policy through their identity conceptions. In this context, there has been a long-standing debate in political science over how the political elite can shape the opinions of their citizens. The literature on the United States of America (US) public opinion was the first to establish that citizens are cued by political elites, meaning that "if they support a particular political party or political leader, they will bear to follow their line in making their political decisions" (Zaller 1992, 46). Similarly, studies in European

integration have found that elite discourse can be reflected in public debates on Europe and may play an essential role in individual opinion formation on integration (Gabel and Scheve 2007, 1021). Therefore, in order to understand the political approaches of Turkish people as a society, the influence of a political party or political leaders upon these approaches has been explored to elaborate upon the historical experiences of Turkish people on politics.

In brief, the decision makers or political elite of states are influenced by the separation of 'us' and 'other' concepts, which may change constantly due to the internal and external dynamics of the state. They can be influenced by past foreign policies or future expectations of states. Moreover, they can be influenced by a struggle between various groups' intentions to affect the course of the state. Therefore, even though material interest or a state's identity drives the state's foreign policy, the decision-makers of states cannot ascribe their particular preferences upon the foreign policy of states or alter it based on the material interests of states.

In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between state identity and foreign policy, the conceptualisation of foreign policy and national interests/state identity discussion is crucial (Hintz 2018, 86). In brief, the relationship between state identity and foreign policy may be defined as ongoing debates amongst groups holding differing understandings of what constitutes the appropriate state identity for their state. This is because this definition would offer a broader lens for analysing the relationship between state identity debates and foreign policy than those viewing the latter solely as an outcome of struggles amongst competing identity groups or as the source of those struggles.

As Gleason (1983, 917) indicates, even though defining the relationship between state identity and foreign policy would not respond to all the questions of identity studies, or identity-based theories²² and may not be responsible for every change in foreign policy

²² Social Identity Theory", pioneered by Tajfel and Turner (1979), categorises "the other groups" other than themselves as "good-bad" or "positive or negative" by comparing them, which became a trend in the 1970s. While they show positive attitudes and feelings towards those similar, they display negative attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors towards those different. Similarly, Smith (1991), who examines identity in two dimensions as "individual and collective identities", defines individual identities as multifaceted (family, gender, class, region, religion, ethnicity,

and claim universal assumptions on the behaviour of states in the international arena; they still offer great explanatory value for various case studies in international relations where identity politics dominate.

States' identities have been seen for years as the perception of their role and what status they should have among other states. Nevertheless, particularly constructivist scholars (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Onuf 2012) have provided new theoretical leverage on interaction dynamics and developed practical solutions for significant issues in world politics by focusing on critical aspects of state identity. Acknowledging that state identity limits foreign policy and that foreign policy is, in return, defined by the cultural, institutional context within which states act has been a crucial contribution of recent norms research. In this context, since the emergence of state identity as an explanatory instrument for foreign policy, several studies have been conducted, enriching the research base.

In 'Writing Security', Campbell (1992) examined the then-dominant method of investigating foreign policy, where scholars' goal was to connect foreign policy to fulfilling national interests. His approach to the case was a direct challenge to the old method, which perceived identity as non-static. Additionally, he argued that the practice of foreign policy itself creates a dynamic, changing identity for states that engage in it in response to external threats. In that regard Campbell (1992, 49) claims that states constantly change and transform, so 'for a state to end its practices of representation would be to reveal its lack of pre-discursive foundations' or state identity existing prior to engagement in the international system. In other words, whether domestic or international, it changes each time the state engages in policymaking.

Apart from Campbell, Risse-Kappen (1995) and Mattern (2001) have analysed the Suez Crisis as a case study of how state identity played both a causal and constitutive effect on Britain's foreign policy during the Suez Crisis of 1956, explaining that Britain was in the process of reformulating its state identity from being an imperial power to being a central state. Hopf (2002) drew a linkage between broad Russian social discourses and the decisions of Soviet foreign policymakers, emphasising the domestic construction of

and nation) and often situational identities that can change in importance depending on times and conditions.

state identity. Similarly, Cederman's (2001) theory of the formation of state identity in Europe took Switzerland's state identity as a case study of how four distinct political cantons, each with their unique political institutions and social histories can interact with each other over time to constitute a shared and common national identity.

Instances of states' changing identity and their influences on states foreign policies could be further enriched. In this regard, Nau's (2002) manifestation of how the contestation between isolationists and internationalists over the convenient state identity for US foreign policy influenced military force and the success or failure of long-term US alliances; Lene Hansen's (1996) investigation on Slovenian Identity, in particular after the break-up of the former Yugoslavia; Alina Hosu's (2003) investigation of the relationship between state identity and Romanian foreign policy regarding European integration; Şimşir (1992), Amirbek (2017), and Aka's (2019) analysis of how normative structures of Turkic politics shaped the social interactions between Turkic states in different periods, representing how dialogues between these states created moments of transformation could be proffered as some of the best known examples.

The common idea of all these studies is that these works directly addressing the abovementioned challenges engage the role of norms and identity in foreign policy, thus developing an overarching analysis of the relationship between domestic identity politics, external identity politics, and foreign policy. They all put identity at the centre of the state's interests, and they all progress on the assumption that changes in how a state responds to any threat or characterises its enemies signal a change in state identity. Therefore, the existence of such works allows us to emphasise that nation-states constantly construct their identities through their foreign policies because they aim to legitimise their existence in the international system.

In summary, the identity of states can be reconstructed or partly changed in interaction with other states through their foreign policy, but interaction may be only one of many sources of state identity. The identity of states, which determines their interests and foreign policy actions, is also determined by internal processes of states and other complex reasons (the perception of the elite, particular cases that states face and extraordinary regional dynamics).

During the last decade, the expanding literature on identity's influence on foreign policy has been particularly evident in international relations and political studies. Nevertheless, the existing studies in both international relations and political studies contain inconsistencies in the details of states' identities and their interests due to the complexity of defining the state identity. Even though the contribution of these studies cannot be underestimated, identity's influence on foreign policy remains conceptually, theoretically, and empirically underdeveloped within the identity literature in several aspects.

First, identity studies in the literature have mainly individualistic or state-centric perspectives. They mainly try to explain and analyse the reasons why and how individuals or states prefer to create relations with others. Secondly, the literature on identity studies tries to approach the phenomenon of identity's influence on foreign policy from the cause-and-effect perspective. As part of this perspective, the studies concentrate on the motivations behind states' behaviours toward others and discuss the possible effects of identity. Consequently, they barely consider the historical, cultural, and linguistic ties among the states concerning the motivations of those behaviours. Thirdly, studies in the literature mostly approach the phenomenon of identity's influence on foreign policy from a traditionalist perspective, leading these studies to become primarily qualitative and lacking in originality.

As a result, the lack of systematic attention to interactions among identity-related states that claims to have a common identity, history, culture or other factors leaves a gap in the existing literature on identity theories. They needed to clearly explain whether the historical, linguistic, and cultural bonds of states influence the relations between states or not. Also, if so, how does this situation affect the relations between two identity-related states? These questions remain unexplained by existing studies and their methods open a new research area for further study. In consequence, this dissertation focuses on these unexplained questions by revealing the ties of identity-related states (Turkey and Turkic World States).

Identity studies have a broad research area, including individual, institutional, and state identity discourses. Therefore, the main purpose of this dissertation is limited to looking for answers to the relationship between identity and foreign policy and the correlation

between state identity and foreign policy. The following chapter seeks to explore and understand the roots of the Turkic/Turkish identity, presenting its value for this dissertation, and explains the difference between the fundamentals of the terms Turkic and Turkish.



3. THE ROOTS OF THE TURKIC/TURKISH IDENTITY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of family is the core of our social lives and is also the first structure in which national values are formed and which individuals interact with the national identity. These structures, ranging from family to national identity, change over time as they are being affected by people's experiences. In order to explain these institutional structures and their changes, Gökcalp (2011, 119) names the social development extending from the family to the nation-state (*Aile'den Ok'a*).²³ In this framework, he describes the social structure formed by the merging of families as lineage, the structure formed by the merging of the lineages as clans, the structure formed by the merging of the clans as the tribe, and the structure formed by the merging of the tribes as the state.

The importance of the social development process described by Gökcalp for this dissertation is stateisation's and state identity's relationship with the nationalisation process. Stateisation is the first step of nationalisation. Therefore, examining the processes of nationalisation and stateisation of societies show the reasons that unite states, the formation process of mutual relationships, and the historical progress of understanding common identity. For this reason, this part of the dissertation mainly focuses on unifying factors of these communities/states, the roots of the common identity claims of identity-related states, and the experiences of these common identity claims throughout history by examining the stateisation and nationalisation processes of societies. In that regard, Turkey and the states of the Turkic World's common identity claims, their relations' historical background, and the reasons that unified them are used to present the concept as a proper instance of identity-related relation.

The literature contains multiple studies on societies' nationalisation and stateisation processes. As a result of these studies, many different definitions of nations are offered in terms of sociology. The common point of these definitions is the unity in language, culture, and emotions. In this context, Camille Julian defined nation in 1913 as a society consisting of people and families who established a state in a particular geography in

²³ Gökcalp described 'the family progress' in Turks as "Yuva-Ocak-Soy-Boy-Ok". In this context, 'Ocak' means the marriage of children by having a new family with a new house open a new house. 'Soy' consists of second-degree relatives on the side of the family members. 'Boy' emerges by the merging of the lineages.

the distant past, lived independently for a long time, where individuals got to know each other, and had a common language, customs, and traditions (Hobsbawm 1992, 86). Atsız (2011, 47) adapted Julian's definition about a century ago; applying it to Turkey's status and defined the Turkish nation as a community consisting of people from Turkish roots and people Turkicised, similarly to people from Turkish roots.

There is a particular reason for presenting these two definitions. Throughout this part of the dissertation, common elements that are identified by these two definitions, including united communities based on identity, history, geography, language, and customs, help to increase the quality of the research by answering questions like what Turkishness is, if a common Turkic identity exists in the Turkic World, and what the unifying elements of the Turks are.

As Bartold (2013, 60) stated, more than just being a Turkic is needed to learn or research the entire history of the Turkic communities. In order to understand the whole historical experiences of the Turkic people, it is necessary to be a Mongolist, Arabist, or Sinologist according to their stages since different societies throughout history have influenced Turkic societies. However, there are different ways to learn the history of the Turkic people, what the concept of Turkishness means and what kind of changes the content of the concept has undergone to the present day. In order to reveal these methods; the historical, cultural, geographical, and anthropological characteristics of the Turkic people are investigated by touching upon the emergence of the Turkic communities on the stage of history, their migration to different geographies and choosing different lifestyle choices over time, and their dominance over different parts of the world.

There are different claims about the first appearance of the Turkic people in the prehistoric era. Although considerations based on factors like culture, language, anthropology, and archeology, aim to shed light on Turkic societies' history, the examination of ancient civilised language monuments and sculptures shows that

mistakes have been made in the interpretation of the language, culture, and anthropological characteristics of the Turkic people for years.²⁴

In this context, anthropology and archaeology has been misapplied over the years to describe some nations as Turkic, whose language is undoubtedly not. By examining people's skulls, it was investigated whether societies had a similar anatomy. The Hittites or Sumers, who do not belong to the roots of the Turkic people in terms of language, anthropology, law, and customs, were shown as the ancestors of the Turks of Turkey for years.²⁵ However, when their anatomy, laws, customs, traditions, and writings of the past were examined, it was understood that there were merely basic similarities and that the Hittites were not the ancestors of the Turkic people. Atsız (1985, 33) indicates that some of the studies (Czaplicka 1918; Togan 1977), including the first-period works on Turkish history that were published by the Turkish Historical Society, have considered many of the old civilised nations as Turkic in order to give civilised seniority to the Turkic people.

The basis of the claims about the emergence of the Turkic people on the stage of history is written in various sources (Siddiqui 1994; Bartold 2013; Togan 2018). Many of these sources indicate that the migration of Turkic communities which started in the 11th century BC from Central Asia to the West of China and today's Turkestan reached Central Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Iran, and Anatolia until the

²⁴ The widespread views that deal with the existence of Turks in history based on culture claim that the oldest traces of Turkic culture emerged as the Afanasyevo culture that developed in the Altays. This is the oldest known Turkish culture, and the human type in this culture is accepted as Prototurks (proto-Turks) by different studies. It is thought that this culture spread over time to Altai, West Turkestan, the Tian Shan, and some of its branches to Transoxiana, and even came into contact with the Finn-Ogur tribes. Linguists, who consider the emergence of Turks on the stage of history based on language, emphasize the similarities of the wall-rock inscriptions left by communities such as ancient Anatolian tribes, Sumerians, and Etruscans with ancient Turkish and their alphabets.

The fact that the inscriptions in France and Finland were written in the old Turkish alphabet is one of the essential data of these claims. The claim of Mirşan (2011) that the Turks found the writing and that it spread to other parts of Asia, Europe, Anatolia, the Middle East, and Egypt with the Turks' migrations has been tried to be supported by the traces of the old proto-Turkish found in the rock inscriptions found in Portugal and France. Another claim is that Reha Oğuz Türkkän (2008) put forward, in the light of anthropology and archaeological findings, that the roots of Turkish tribes go back to a copper-skinned race living in Central and East Asia. Türkkän, who dealt with a very long and complex migration and mixing process, argued that Turks and Indians had kinship relations at the base of his theory. The points of similarities between the American Indians and the Turkish world regarding anthropology and language are the central premise behind this claim.

²⁵ The fact that Turks, Sumerians, and Hittites have common words such as "Axe and Tengri", similar methods of training horses, and the way they bury the dead has led to the claim that these communities are descended from the same lineage.

eleventh century (Johanson 2007; Şimşek and Satan 2007). The reasons for the Turkic communities' migration from Central Asia to innumerable destinations were explained by the researchers (Ross 1929; Schuyler 2007; Beihammer 2020) based on the nomadic natures of Turkic communities, the growth of the population, limited resources, mutual goals of the communities, the leaders' ideals of finding success for their communities, and protecting and sustaining their national identities.

The migration of the Turkic communities from Central Asia to the West, together with the tribes that gathered around Anatolia, was one of the most significant periods of the middle ages. Since the migration of Turkic communities from Central Asia to the West, the Seljuk Empire's settlement in Anatolia starting in the 11th century has resulted in permanent Turkic settlement and presence, which was a breakthrough for Turkic communities. Since then, modern nations with significant populations, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and some other Turkic populations²⁶ have existed as part of this Turkic settlement. However, sharing a geographical area was not the only commonality of these communities because they were all also influenced by the Seljuks or other Turkic communities' traces, primarily based on culture and language.

With the spread of Turkic societies' migrations to such broad areas, communities with different names and geographical locations like Huns, Gokturks, Uyghurs, Karahans, Seljuks, Ottomans, Western Huns, Danube and Idil Bulgars, Khazars, Akhuns, Ghaznavids, Harzemshahs, Mamluks, Timurids, Altınordu and Mughals, Uzs, Kipchaks, and Pechenegs were described as Turkic states (Erzurumlu 2007, 41). Although some of these communities (Western Huns, Avars, Pechenegs, Bulgars, and Khazars) could not preserve their national culture and similarities over time, each is still a part of the Turkic people's history (Durmuş 2017, 42).

Due to the geographical spread of Turkic communities, trying to understand and evaluate the entire history of Turkic societies is almost impossible. Therefore, limiting the area to today's Turkic World would be logical because, even though Gokturks, Kyrgyz, Seljuks, and other communities have been referred to as sharing Turkic roots,

²⁶ Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Uyghurs, Sakha Republic, and Crimean Tatars are some Turkic populations that maintain their existence within other nations.

these states/nations have different historical experiences that caused a variety of changes in their identity. Therefore, choosing the Turkic World as the primary focus necessarily limits the research framework and serves the area that this dissertation claims to contribute towards.

The modern Turkic World, which enjoys political independence today, covers a total area of 4.730.000 square kilometres. However, as emphasised by experts of the area (Tekin 1978; Johanson 2016), the "mutual agreement rate" between Kazakhs in the easternmost part of the Turkic World and Turkish people in the westernmost part is not one hundred percent due to the different accents or dialects. Still, the language barrier between Kazakh-Kyrgyz, Tatar-Bashkir, or between Turkey and Azerbaijan is not as different as that between the French and Spanish due to the common linguistic and cultural roots of these societies (Pavlenko 2018, 92).

In response to the linguistically complex nature of the Turkic World, Johanson (2007, 97), as a Turcologist, presents the concept of Turkia (Turcia), which represent the linguistic region where the branches of Turkic language are spoken and the area covered by the Turkic-speaking peoples. The concept is not a Turkic state, a country, or a contiguous region. Still, Turkia, which represents the Turkic-speaking peoples of the world, has borders on the political map. These borders are in highly comprehensive, sometimes stubbornly drawn, but well-defined, connected circles.

The linguistic region presented by Johanson presents stretches from Bosnia to the Great Wall of China and Central Iran to the Arctic Ocean. The region, which can be briefly divided into three parts, refers to,

- 1) Anatolia, Northern Iran, and Trans-Caucasia lying in the West,
- 2) The sparsely settled West Turkestan in the east of the Caspian Sea,
- 3) The East Turkestan region behind the T'ien Shan Mountains.

The languages used in the western part are Turkish and Azerbaijani. Turkmen is spoken in the south-west of West Turkestan, Uzbek in the middle, Kyrgyz on the eastern edge, Kazakh and Karakalpak in the northern steppe region, and modern Uyghur in Eastern Turkestan. However, it is worth noting that Turkia is not limited to these languages

alone. There were/are half a dozen other languages spoken and written even within the Soviet Union (Chuvash, Nogai, Kumyk). Although the rate of mutual agreement in this ‘language group’ region presented by Johanson is currently low, it should be noted that this is mainly due to the historical experiences of states which will be elaborated upon later.

In English, the term ‘Turkic’ has been used for a long time in English to refer to these languages that come from a mother tongue in the distant past. In this context, Nauşabayeva-Hekimoğlu claims that all societies whose mother tongue is Turkic accept the objectivity of Turkicness in different ways due to their different political and national awareness levels.²⁷ Although the content of the word Turkic has been increasingly discussed increasingly over the years, naming the Turkic World as the communities whose mother tongue is Turkic and who live their lands as autochthon is scientifically and practically correct (Öner 2020, 1561). Therefore, it is possible to talk about a family of Turkic languages today, despite the differences and low level of understanding. In order to explain the complexity of this language family, it should be noted that Turkic societies who adapted to settled life borrowed words from Arabic and Persian; and societies that continued nomadic life adopted words from Mongolian to Turkic languages. Thus, the difference between languages has widened, and mutual communication has become more complicated.

In order to exemplify that complication, Bıyıklı claims that, Turkish, as the language of Oghuz Turks, who conquered Anatolia towards the end of the 11th century and founded Seljuk State and Ottomans that spread to three continents, also kept up with the process of integrating the lexical and grammatical rules of different languages.²⁸ Due to the interaction with ethnic groups such as Georgian, Armenian, Kurdish, Albanian, and Bosnian, it has started to borrow new words from other languages and is losing its nature of Turkic linguistic identity.

The rich diversity and complexity of ‘Turkia’ has also led to the inability to present a cultural model that can encompass all Turkic societies. Although the cultural similarities of societies in the Turkic World are striking, it is apparent that the Chinese,

²⁷ Nauşabayeva-Hekimoğlu, A. personal communication, April 30, 2021.

²⁸ Bıyıklı, M. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

Iranians, Mongols, Russians, and Western Europeans influenced the cultures of the societies existing in Turkia. However, despite the differences and complexities in terms of language and culture, barriers within Turkia were established quite late. After the Timurid period, the division of Turkestan into small feudal states and the warring of these states with each other could be given as the first step of these barriers' emergence (Lee 2016, 117).

Turkic World States of the future were at war with each other and could not unite against the Russian expansion policy. The administrative division of the Turkic World into many states and the transformation of these states into ethnic nations, especially during the Soviet period, contributed to the prevention of Turkic societies from getting closer to each other for years. As a result, Turkic communities have yet to develop a common culture and a common and understandable language heritage that all Turkic communities could understand (Tekin 2007, 69).

To conclude, the societies of the Turkic World were intensely influenced by the Turkic language, culture, and identity primarily between the 10th and 14th centuries. Although the communities of the Turkic World consequently had differences due to different influences of historical and geographical developments, they continued to share traces of common identity, culture, language and history for years until facing the sovietisation strategy of Russia. Since the beginning of the sovietisation strategy, the common or similar traces of identities, customs, and cultures of the Turkic communities has urged the Soviet Union to eliminate all the possible obstacles that it may face in the future.

According to Asker, the Soviet Union's desire to eradicate the traces of the past was the most extensive strike that the common identity, culture, language, and common history of Turks faced.²⁹ In order to achieve the desire for Turkic identity's eradication in Turkic communities, Russia initiated its policies towards the region through the invasion of Kazan in 1553 and Crimea in 1783 (Oliphant 2013, 11).³⁰ Consequently, Soviet and Chinese invasions of Turkic regions in the 19th and 20th centuries brought

²⁹ Asker, A. personal communication, March 11, 2021.

³⁰ The Russian occupation of Kazan ended the Turkic communities' domination in the region, which had been going on since the 4th century. Likewise, the Russian annexation of the Crimean Khanate ended the Turkic domination in Crimea, which had been going on since the 6th century (Lee, 2016).

new social, economic, cultural, and social structures and caused the division of old historical and cultural values.

In line with the strategy of Russia mentioned above, Russia occupied Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and the rest of Central Asia in the 19th century (Suny 2012, 27). Regarding the occupation of future Turkic World states, Abdibaitova-Pala claims that the Russians, who exerted great efforts to colonise the Turkic communities, caused spiritual and material harm through their strategies, including Russification and Sovietisation of Turkic territories for almost a century.³¹

Despite the years of common historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious bonds of Turkic communities, Russian intervention in the Turkic territories triggered questions about the differences between 'Turkish identity' and 'Turkic identity'. Russia's occupation of the Turkic communities in Central Asia, the gradual establishment of new administrative structures, the targeting of cultural and ideological structures, and making Turkic societies economically dependent on Russia caused the differentiation between Turkic identity and the Turkish identity.

Today, Turkey's effort to establish a bond with the Turkic World through its foreign policy based on its common culture, language and identity claims is experiencing challenges due to Russia's former activities to assimilate the Turkic-originated cultures and identities of Turkic societies. Therefore, the following section examines the fundamentals of a republicised Turkey's national identity in the last century to present Turkey's current state identity.

3.1. Turkic Identity in Turkish Foreign Policy

States' foreign policies or identity changes emerge as fields of study in international relations that includes small-scale adjustments, regulations, and large-scale changes that may be defined as reorienting or restructuring foreign policy or state identity. However, the widespread opinion suggests that foreign policy or state identity changes, in particular radical ones, are not a frequent occurrence. In order for such changes to take place in democratic countries, the bureaucratic elite and the public should both

³¹ Abdibaitova-Pala, B. personal communication, May 14, 2021.

persuaded in this direction which causes researchers to approach the subject of change at a distance (Demirtaş 2008, 40). However, despite the hesitations of the researchers on digging a foreign policy or identity change in a democratic country, Turkey presents a compelling case worthy of analysis due to the significant transformation of its domestic and foreign policies since the nineteenth century.

In identity research, what name a nation uses for itself and how it builds its identity are essential. In this context, the term and point of view of the Turkic World are directly related to the idea of "Turkishness" and the national identity that developed in the nineteenth century. The era in which Turkology³² also rose coincided with the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the fundamentals of Turkish national identity started to be developed. During this period, the generation that founded the Republic of Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk began to be educated and witnessed successful steps taken by Turkology, which preserves its value even today.

The fact that Turkology and the Turkic World came onto the agenda as both a political and cultural entity after the Constitutional Monarchy (1908) was highly influential in the generation that founded the Republic of Turkey (Ercilasun 2019, 53). Throughout this period, writers and scholars (Yusuf Akçura³³, Ziya Gökalp³⁴, and many others) not

³² In academia, the languages and civilization of the Turkic peoples with a traditional emphasis on sources written in Turkic languages. The modern Turkic languages include Turkish, Uzbek, Kazakh, Azeri, Kazan Tatar, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Chuvash, Bashkir, Karakalpak, Yakut, Kumik, Crimean Tatar, Uighur, Tuvan, Gagauz, Karachay, Balkar, Xakas, Noghay, Altay, Shor, Dolgan, Karaim, and Tofas.

³³ Yusuf Akçura was born on December 2, 1876 in Simbir / Russia. He was a writer and politician of Tatar origin and one of the leading representatives of the Turkism movement. In his 32-page article Three Styles of Politics, "*Üç Tarzı Siyaset*" which is accepted as the manifesto of the Turkism movement, Akçura argued that there were three main views (Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkish Nationalism) for the recovery of the Ottoman Empire. According to Akçura, the most appropriate among them was the doctrine of Turkish nationalism.

Akçura, who managed the *Türk Yurdu* magazine and took an active part in the establishment of the *Türk Ocağı*, later served as the Deputy of Istanbul and the President of the Turkish History Institution. Yusuf Akçura died due to heart failure on March 11, 1935, while he was the deputy of Kars. '*Şark Meselesine Ait Tarihi Notlar*' (1920), '*Türk Yılığ*' (1928), and '*Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Dağılma Devri*' (1934) were some of the well know publications of him.

³⁴ Mehmet Ziya Gökalp was born in Diyarbakır on March 23, 1875. He sought a new national identity during the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The main idea of his thought was to achieve a synthesis by fusing Turkish society's unique moral and cultural values with some Western values it received. The cultural element of this approach was Turkism, which he summarized as "Turkifying, Islamizing and Modernism", and its moral element was Islamism. He died on October 25, 1924, in Istanbul. *Kızıl Elma* (1914), *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (1923), *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, and Muasırlaşmak* (1929) were some of the well-known publications of him.

only brought Western publications to the country but also trying to establish the Turkish written language and the Turkish national identity in the political and cultural realm in general (Sadođlu 2003, 31).

After the Second Constitutional Monarch declaration on July 24, 1908, the elaboration of language, literature, art, sports, and philosophy clubs in an environment of freedom increased interest in the idea of nationalism. It led to the further strengthening of pan-Turkism, which corresponds to the "realpolitik" situation in domestic and foreign politics (Akçura 1981, 26).

The publications of '*Jön Türk*'³⁵ and '*Tanın Newspapers*'³⁶, strengthened the idea of establishing a "wide-ranging" Turkic association and guided the employees towards this framework. During this period, thinkers and intellectuals (Yusuf Akçura, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver³⁷, Ahmet Ferit Tek³⁸, Ahmet Ağaođlu³⁹, and many others) who

³⁵ Although the concept of *Jön Türk* (Young Turk) refers to very different groups, the most important of them is undoubtedly the people who emerged to oppose the II. Abdulhamid regime through the organizations they established and the magazines they published. Since 1889, Young Turkism has become an opposition movement, especially for students who have higher education in schools in Istanbul, spread to a wide range with the participation of bureaucrats, officers, and scholars in 1894 and especially gained momentum after 1895. Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmed Ferid Tek, Ali Şefkati, Samipaşazade Sezai, and Yusuf Akçura are well-known prominent Young Turks. Although it is challenging to discuss a general ideology encompassing the Young Turks, the common point between the Young Turks was discontent with the second Abdulhamid regime and the desire to overthrow it and establish a constitutional regime.

³⁶ *Tanın* is one of the influential newspapers of 20th-century Turkish press history. It was published by Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) for a total of seventeen years in three periods. The newspaper, directed by Hüseyin Cahit Bey, became synonymous with the Party of Union and Progress. Yalçın advocated the ideas of the unionists, which also influenced his political life.

³⁷ Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver was born in Istanbul in 1886. He was the Chairman of the Türk Ocakları for 19 years, which he became a member of it in 1912. Tanrıöver, who also served as a deputy and ambassador to Bucharest, later on joined the national literature movement. Some of the known works of Tanrıöver, who died on June 10, 1966, are as follows: *Namık Kemal Bey Magosa'da* (1909), *Anadolu Milli Mücadelesi* (1946).

³⁸ Ahmet Ferit Tek was born on March 7, 1878 in Bursa. Ahmet Ferit Tek was one of the first ambassadors of the Republic of Turkey and one of his time's influential politicians and intellectuals. In addition, he became the first president of the Türk Ocakları. Ahmet Ferit Tek, who died on November 25, 1971, combined the idea of nationality and the ideal of nationalism with the consciousness of reality throughout his life. He wrote articles for newspapers, including *Şûra-yı Ümmet*, *Türk*, *İşhâm*, and *Türk Yurdu* magazine. He also wrote the books "*Tarih-i Medeniyet*" and "*Tarih-i Siyasi*", which he wrote during his teaching at the Civil Service, and "*Turan*", which he wrote during his exile in Sinop and published in Istanbul under the signature of Tekin.

³⁹ Ahmet Ağaođlu (Ahmet Agayef) was born in 1869, in Shusha. Ahmet Ağaođlu was one of the politicians who played an essential role in the formation and massification of the thought of Turkism/Turkish nationalism together with other names, including Akçuraoglu Yusuf, Ayaz Ishaki, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, Zeki Velidi Togan who settled in Turkey during the Second Constitutional Period. Although he has many works, his central ideas are in his works such as "*Üç Medeniyet*", and "*Devlet ve Fert*".

adopted the idea of pan-Turkism began to express aloud that the lost self identities of the Turks should be restored. According to these intellectuals, it was necessary to have national consciousness in order to stand as a nation (Tanrıöver 1946, 56; Yurdakul 1973, 29).

Thus, on June 20, 1911, a large-scale meeting was held with intellectuals, politicians, and journalists who adopted Turkism. The outcome of this meeting was the decision to establish a new society based on nationality. That society was going to be named "*Türk Ocağı*" (Turkish Hearts). After establishing "*Türk Derneği*" on December 25, 1908, "*Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti*" on August 18, 1911, and *Türk Ocağı* in 1912, Turks emerged for the first time as a prominent and influential organisation within the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Turkish nation's self-knowledge movement was institutionalised and functionally worked until the First World War.

After the First World War, the primary purpose of Atatürk's administration was to save the "Turkish parts" from the Ottoman Empire's wreckage and to establish an independent Turkish national state, which is essentially compatible with the European model and stands out with its Turkish identity (Sarıay 1997, 19). The Republic of Turkey, which was born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, was born old in body and young in spirit (Ayata, Yücel 2015, 48). Turkey, born with the Ottoman body, with many problems left over from the Ottoman Empire (caliphate/reign, minority/identity-based problems due to the multinational structure, the transformation experienced in the modernisation process, and the problems brought by this transformation) sought the roots of the problems in the Ottoman Empire (Gökalp 2014, 30).

During the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, while Turkey was attempting to be recognised by other countries to obtain material and moral aid through making various agreements with countries toward common enemies, it gave importance to a policy towards 'the East' due to the threats it faced from 'the West'. Although Turkey and the East's goals differed, the fact that Turkey and the East have acted together against their common enemies saved Anatolia from international loneliness (Rouleau 1996, 76).

In the post-First World War era, the aim of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Socialist Republics was to avoid confrontation. According to Oran (2010, 89), in 1921,

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics guaranteed not to spread communism in the lands of Turkey. In return, Turkey promised not to support Turanist⁴⁰ movements and hid its desire to be united with the Turkic communities who used to live outside the territories of Turkey to avoid the Soviet Union's uneasiness. According to Yeşilot, by agreeing on these terms, Turkey aimed to give the Soviets no reason to complain about Turkey's probable pan-Turkic strategy, and the Soviets, in return, were well aware of the dangers of Turkic-Muslim communities in their territory and wanted to avoid such a threat.⁴¹ The reason why Turkey aimed to avoid this threat and why Turkic communities did/could not have any relations with Turkey, was due to both Moscow's strict policies and Turkey's agreement with Russia (Hale 2012, 63).

During the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, the case of Turkic communities had become a core agenda of Turkish Foreign Policy due to the rise of pan-Turkism all over the country. However, no political initiative was taken regarding the Turkic communities of Russia, who were simply under the domination of the Soviet Union. The reason for the lack of political initiative towards Russia and striving to avoid any crisis against them demonstrated itself with *Türk Ocakları*'s surprising receding and merging story.

Although *Türk Ocakları* had been in service for Turkism and the preservation of Turkic identity for years, on March 24, 1931, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk decided to merge *Türk Ocakları* and *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (The Republican People's Party, CHP) (Kodal 2014, 299). One of the most important reasons for the transfer of the *Türk Ocakları*, which carried out activities throughout the country for a long time with the financial and moral support of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to the Republican People's Party, or shutting down was the Turanist or pan-Turkic tendency of *Türk Ocakları*.

⁴⁰ Turkism is an ideology that aims to unite Turkic people into a state or union. The ideas of Turkism were brought to Turkey by the students who went to Europe for the first time and by the thinkers who escaped from the East, especially from the Russian pressure. Thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and Hüseyinzade Ali formed the infrastructure of this idea. According to this idea, in the Great Turkic Union, All Turks in the world, whose languages, customs, races, and even most of them have the same religion, should gather around a political union. Turkic culture and history, thousands of years of the history of Turks, should be revealed, and their contributions to world civilization should be stated. According to Turkists, the Turkic language was the nation's heart, so Arabic and Persian words and idioms must be removed from the language, and the spoken language must be transformed into Istanbul Turkish.

⁴¹ Yeşilot, O. personal communication, March 29, 2021.

The Turanist tendency of *Türk Ocakları* was seen as a threat by the Soviets, with whom Turkey had good relations in the 1930s and intended to maintain. The members of *Türk Ocakları* thought it was possible to establish a state of Turan to bring all Turks together. However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk considered the idea of Turanism 'delusional'.

Atatürk expressed his understanding of nationalism on January 15, 1923, indicating that neither Islamic unity nor Turanism was a logical policy for Turkey (Akçura 1981, 57). However, Özdaşlı notes that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's attitude toward the 'Outside Turks' (*Dış Türkler*)⁴² did not mean that he was not interested in the Turks outside the borders of the Republic of Turkey.⁴³ In fact, Atatürk primarily dealt with the Outside Turks case as a cultural issue, emphasising that "their case should be dealt with as much as the conditions and possibilities allow" (Sarımay 1997, 20).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk believed that in order to uphold the good relationship between Turkey and the Soviets, the interest of Turkey towards Outside Turks would continue culturally even though it could not do so in political ways. In order to achieve this, Atatürk initiated institutions including Turkic Studies Institute in Istanbul University. As Sarı claims, in addition to the establishment of the Turkic Studies Institute affiliated with Istanbul University⁴⁴, the establishment of the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) and the Turkish Language Association (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) can be seen as the concrete steps of Atatürk's interest for all Outside Turks.⁴⁵

⁴² From the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, the interest in Outside Turks developed with Turkism thought in the Turkish intellectual life. In Turkology, the search for identity, which started with the studies of Turkish history and the Turkish language, laid the groundwork for the development of Turkism in Ottoman intellectual life, primarily in the cultural context. In this regard, cultural interaction took place between Russia's and Ottoman Turks, together with the "Jadidism" movement, which was systematized with the slogan of "unity in language, thought and business" by Gaspıralı İsmail, one of the Russian Turks, who was the community that can be described as Outside Turks. This interaction was further strengthened by the emigrant Turkish intellectuals such as Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Hüseyinzade, and Mehmet Emin Resulzade, who escaped from the pressure of Tsarist Russia and took refuge in the Ottoman Empire. This development triggered the increased interest of Ottoman intellectuals in Turks living in Russia.

⁴³ Özdaşlı, E. personal communication, May 4, 2021.

⁴⁴ Istanbul University, the most renowned institution of higher education in Turkey, has been a pioneer in science, contemporary values, and the enlightenment of society throughout its history. The foundation of Istanbul University dates back to the city's conquest by Sultan Mehmet II in 1453. It is among the first ten universities established in Europe and now ranks among the top 10 in the country.

⁴⁵ Sarı, Y. personal communication, April 30, 2021.

Turks in Turkey have adopted the term *Dış Türkler* for the people of their race. The term *Dış Türkler* contributes to the formation of public opinion about the extent and geography of Turkish culture. *Dış Türkler* is an essential concept to reveal the universality of Turkish culture, the historical missions of foreign societies on Turks, and the breadth of the geography where the Turkish people live.

Interest in the subject of Outside Turks has developed alongside studies on pan-Turkism. In Turkology, the search for identity, which started with the studies of Turkish history and the Turkish language, laid the groundwork for the development of Turkism in Ottoman intellectual life, primarily in a cultural context. Although interaction could not occur between the Turks living under Russian and Ottoman territories for years, Jadids'⁴⁶ emergence led to an increase in communication between Turkic communities and underlined the Turkic identity of Turkic communities; which was a milestone for both the Turks of Turkey and the Outside Turks. Briefly, the goals of Jadids could systematise with the slogan of "unity in language, thought, and work" by Gaspıralı İsmail. In that regard, the framework outlining the concept of Outside Turks has expanded in Turkish Foreign Policy, and the Turks who remained in the liquidated Ottoman lands have begun to be dealt with in the axis of Outside Turks policy.

In order to intensify the communication between the Turkic communities and the common understanding of Turkic identity, magazines like *Türk Yurdu* and *Türk Kültürü* were founded to serve vast knowledge of geography and culture. Therefore, integration was achieved in the concepts of "Country-General-Universal", and the convictions of the fact that *Dış Türkler* and Turks from Turkey were inseparable parts of the same culture were reinforced (Parmaksızoğlu 1977, 761).

Consequently, an emotional connection between the Turks living in East Turkestan, Turkestan, Kazan, Crimea, Siberia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Balkans, and

⁴⁶ The Jadids were Muslim modernist reformers within the Russian Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Jadid movement advocated for an Islamic social and cultural reformation through the revival of pristine Islamic teachings; while simultaneously engaging with modernity. Jadids maintained that Turks in the Russian Empire had entered a period of decay that could only be rectified by acquiring new knowledge and modernist, European-modeled cultural reform. Modern communication and transportation technologies, such as the telegraph, printing press, postal system, and railway, as well as the spread of religious literature through periodicals, journals, and newspapers, played a significant role in the dissemination of Jadid ideals.

other regions has been maintained due to such pan-Turkist publications. Nowadays, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), which was established on April 6, 2010, has undertaken the task of coordinating the work for Turkish citizens abroad, their sister communities, and their international scholarship students studying in Turkey has also developed the services and activities in these areas.⁴⁷ Today, when Outside Turks are mentioned, even if they do not possess a Turkish identity, people who belong to the Turkic race come to mind wherever they live.

Although *Türk Ocakları* was shut down or 'emerged with CHP' by the decision of Atatürk due to various reasons⁴⁸, Atatürk was determined to investigate the nature of Turkic identity, the Turkish history and historical, cultural, and linguistic roots of Turkic communities. In that regard, on April 28, 1930, in the last session of the sixth Congress of the *Türk Ocakları*, which Atatürk personally attended, a proposal with 40 signatures that was presented by Afet Inan was accepted. Consequently, a decision was made to establish a permanent committee to conduct research and examine Turkish history and civilisation scientifically (Öner 2015, 91).

Consequently, the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) and the Turkish Language Association (*Türk Dil Kurumu*) were established in 1931 and 1932 to examine, research, promote, disseminate and publish the historical experiences of Turkic identity, the history of Turkey, and related issues. The purpose of these institutions has been explained as revealing the essential beauty and richness of the Turkish history and language.

Since the Republic of Turkey's establishment, the state's main goals were the institutionalisation process of structuring a new nation-state, questioning historical roots, experiences, linguistic and cultural wealth, and the rejection of the imperial legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, a western model primarily shaped the Republic of Turkey as a nation-state despite different identity-based movements and activities. Forming a new nation-state based on a western model was crucial for Turkey

⁴⁷ The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities. (n.d.). Başkanlığımız. <http://www.ytb.gov.tr/kurumsal/baskanligimiz-2> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁴⁸ Personal Conflicts, criticisms over the members of *Türk Ocakları*, one-party political life, uncontrollable improvement of power as a community were some of the reasons of the closure/emergence with CHP of *Türk Ocakları*.

because in order to build a new state based on secularism, the religious characteristics of the Ottoman Empire should be eliminated to embrace the new identity of the Republic of Turkey.

With the abolition of the caliphate, Turkey tried to adopt policies suitable for its new identity. According to Karpaz (2009, 68), following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the visibility of Islam in social life was reduced, and religion fell under the control of the state. The state was the leading actor in the formation processes of discussions of political identity in Turkey. In other words, the state was capable of forcing people to accept a new type of political, religious or cultural identity at that time.

The last seventy years of the Ottoman Empire were spent searching for an identity to keep the empire alive through identity reforms. In the last period of the Ottoman Empire, the importance of religion was seen in the ideas of nationalism which were excluded by the founding leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with the proclamation of the Republic. In this context, the modern nation-state building process can be seen as a political modernisation process that breaks its connection with the Ottoman identity, representing reactionary and traditionalist approaches. However, at that time, the Republic of Turkey was the only Muslim country trying to build a secular democratic state. Although the revolutions of Atatürk (1923-1938) relegated Islam to the private sphere, Islam has remained an active force in Turkish society. It is manifested both in the articulated views of a section of the intellectual elite and in the activities of Islamic religious brotherhoods (Mert 1994, 94), which were going to be the influencing factors of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.

The founding will of the Republic of Turkey carried out the country's modernisation process within the framework of a westernisation policy. In this transformation, the main goal was to become an industrialised, independent, secular, and westernised nation-state in which a modern national identity could be built. By experiencing these changes, the aim was to build a new structure to take over the function of constantly protecting a political mission rather than being a practitioner of politics.

Regarding the transformation of the country, membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions has allowed Turkey's policymakers to assert the country's western identity.

Nevertheless, Turkey's westernism may not be expressed only by adopting ideas and manners from the West. In addition, joining western institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also played an essential role in this transformational process. In fact, this would be the most crucial factor in forming the westernised character of foreign policy, because by becoming a member of western organisations, the republicans of the country would turn their face to the West and embrace a western state identity despite the highly complex structure of a modern western-style, sovereign nation-state identity of Turkey.

According to McSweeney (1999, 55), westernism in foreign policy was embodied through the goal of being a part of the European system of states because this target also coincided with the status quo and defensive foreign policy line. In parallel to McSweeney's claim, Turkey normalised its relations with the West in the 1930s, and entered the League of Nations in 1932 to actively initiate its participation in international cooperation. However, Turkey did not desire to break its relations with the Soviet Union, the main element of its foreign policy since the first years of its establishment (Yavuz 1998, 32). Therefore, it tried to establish a delicate balance between Europe and the Soviet Union. In order to protect that delicate balance, since the Second World War, Turkey has established its foreign policy to avoid being part of the war and to remain neutral. Therefore, it has tried to display a balanced attitude by making agreements with different sides of the war.

During World War II, international politics and the conditions created by the war influenced the domestic political developments in Turkey. In Purtaş's words, Germany's war against the Soviet Union revived the pan-Turkic dreams of some groups in Turkey.⁴⁹ In this context, the political movements advocating Turanism in Turkey tried to spread their ideas effectively in the public opinion by taking advantage of the Turkish-German rapprochement experienced in the first years of the Second World War (Vural 2009, 18). Regarding this rapprochement, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to collaborate with pan-Turkics (Sarıay 1997, 20; Sayarı 2000, 174) in Turkey and caused a revival of the dreams of pan-Turkism. In parallel, Germany also provoked Turkic societies living in the Soviet Union against the Soviet Union.

⁴⁹ Purtaş, F. personal communication, March 1, 2021.

Therefore, pan-Turkism was attempted to be used as a diplomatic tool while Turkey tried to maintain its non-participation in the war.

After Turkey refrained from entering the war despite all these initiatives, the German government used far-right movements in Turkey as propaganda material against the Soviet Union. According to Koçak (1996, 62), Germany was ready to offer official cooperation to the Turkish government to resolve the problem of Turkic societies in Crimea and the Caucasus and even go further by approving the enlargement of Turkey in these regions. With this offer, it would support various Turanist organisations and publications to try to influence the Turkish public and government with effective Turanist propaganda.

The fundamental purpose behind this offer was to convince Turkey to join the war on the side of Germany against the Soviet Union. In this context, intense German propaganda was carried out in Turkey between 1941 and 1943; pan-Turkism activities became an important diplomatic issue between the two countries, and public opinion in Turkey became dominated by pan-Turkic propaganda (Vural 2009, 19).

Germany's insistence on Turkey to join the war continued until 1943 when the Soviets began to gain the upper hand over the Germans. Following the changing dimensions of the Second World War, the Soviet Union, disturbed by the Turkic atmosphere created in public opinion, tried to appease. In order to achieve this, an arrest warrant was issued in Turkey for the leading figures of the previously supported pan-Turkic movement in May 1944. These names were tried in courts, and there was an attempt to suppress the pan-Turkic movement (Ergun 2014, 70).

Whereas, in the establishment of a restricted land-centred, country-based, territorial nation-state, western, democratic, sovereign, secular nation-state system, factors such as nationalism, nation, ethnicity, nationality, state, language, religion, secularity, culture, national, international, regional and universal concepts; ideologies were not disintegrated, but became intertwined and in conflict with each other in the East (Alakel 2013, 12). In Turkey, only one or two other options (ethnic and civic nationalism) were active until the end of the Second World War. In that regard, Akçura's Turkish

nationalism based on ethnicity and language was one of these well-known nationalist approaches.

Nevertheless, despite the rise of these nationalist approaches Turkey's structure continued to be perceived as westernised, non-religious and Turanist. Turkey's admission to the Council of Europe and its efforts to join NATO after the Second World War continued to point to the country's western-based foreign policies. Still, it is worth noting that the 1950s also corresponded with the maturation period of pan-Turkism as a political movement and intellectual development. According to Kavuncu, initiatives like the Nationalists' Association (*Milliyetçiler Derneği*), the Nationalists' Union (*Milliyetçiler Birliği*), the Campaign Against Communism Association (*Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*), the Turkish Youth Organization (*Türk Gençlik Teşkilatı*), the Turkish Cultural Association (*Türk Kültür Derneği*), the Nationalists' Federation (*Milliyetçiler Federasyonu*), the Turkish Nationalists' Association (*Türkiye Milliyetçiler Derneği*), the Turkists' Solidarity Association (*Türkçüler Yardımlaşma Derneği*) showed that a new political stance on nationalism has begun to turn into a general experience.⁵⁰

In this period, while the pan-Turkics expanded their interests from the Turks under Soviet rule to the Turkish Cypriots, Western Thrace, Kirkuk, and Bulgarian Turks in Greece, they also began to expand their limited interests in history, literature, and poetry (Atsız 2011, 36). Approaches including the Turkish-Islamic synthesis which emerged in the late 1940s and the 1950s led to the emergence of anti-communist versions such as the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP*) in the 1960s and new nationalist versions that established links between pan-Turkism and Islam (Çınar and Arıkan 2002, 33).

Following the 1960s, names including Alpaslan Türkeş and Nihal Atsız played leading roles in politics. Consequently, pan-Turkism continued to assert its influence in the country's politics, through party groups and publications in the form of newspapers and magazines (Vural 2009, 19). The leading role of these figures and successors' influence upon internal matters also influenced external matters. In this context, the Cyprus

⁵⁰ Kavuncu, O. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

Conflict, which occupied an important place in Turkish Foreign Policy throughout the 1960s, and disagreements with Greece are two consequences of this pattern.

While developments within Turkey were progressing in this manner, the developments in the international arena showed why the world order created by the struggle between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period was bipolar. In the Cold War, during which long-term tension was experienced between the democracies of the Western World and communist countries of Eastern Europe; the West was ruled by the US, and the Soviet Union ruled Eastern Europe.

Throughout this long-term tension during the Cold War, the radio played a significant role in the ideological conflict between the East and the West. It became an essential tool for both sides regarding psychological strategy and political propaganda. After the outbreak of the Cold War, the use of the radio, according to the expectations of the target audience, increased (Risso 2013, 147). Radio broadcasts conveyed countries' policies, ideologies, and languages to influence public opinion about achieving foreign policy objectives. In summary, the radio broadcasts aimed to encourage public acceptance of foreign policy objectives.

Along with the expansion of the Soviet Union, the US carefully focused on radio broadcasting against communism, and the radio came to the fore with its structure that allowed it to disseminate democratic values and provide an alternative perspective (Somerville 2012, 66). American radio, which gained a new role during the period of the Cold War, created historical moments by influencing the world regarding content and strategy. American radios conveyed anti-communist discourse, including social, cultural, and political features in their broadcasts. As a result of the uniform media of the communist governments dominating society in the struggle of the West against the Cold War, American radios presented millions of people who had been challenged with alternative political views and the sound of hope.

In accordance with this objective, Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL) began its broadcast during the Cold War period with a mission to diminish the influence of communism. During the Cold War, RFE broadcasted the latest news from the 'Iron Curtain' countries. It supported the opponents of communism by offering an alternative

view to the propaganda disseminated under the control of these countries and was designed to promote resistance. According to Folly (2015, 51), by accomplishing these goals, the RFE had been a critical element of the Cold War's psychological operations and achieved phenomenal success.

In the first years of the Cold War, RFE and RL adopted more aggressive editorial policies than Western broadcasters. However, the broadcasts produced under these policies did not promote uprisings; instead, they emphasised evolutionary system change (Johnson and Parta 2010, 42). In what came to be called "surrogate" broadcasting, RFE and RL provided an unbiased, professional substitute for the free media countries that those behind the Iron Curtain lacked. According to Risso (2013, 149), unlike other Western broadcasters, the programs of RFE and RL focused on local news that was not covered in state-controlled domestic media, religion, science, sports, Western music, and locally banned literature and music. With these broadcasts, by encouraging people behind the iron curtain to stand against communism, an attempt was made to show that they deserved more than the systematic obstacles imposed on them.

In brief, RFE and RL were established to transmit uncensored news and information to audiences behind the Iron Curtain. They played a significant role in the collapse of communism and the rise of democracies in post-communist Europe by pursuing this goal. In that regard, the role of these radio broadcasts in the sovereignty and freedom of countries, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, cannot be underestimated.

In this atmosphere of a bipolar World order, particularly during the Cold War period, Turkey adopted a foreign policy based on NATO membership and the systematic predictions of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. Turkey's foreign policy identification with the West was certainly the imperative of geographic and Cold War considerations. However, it was also a function of the political orientation and legitimation of the Kemalist elite. In fact, in order to maintain the legitimation of the Kemalist elite, foreign relations filtered down from the secular elite's self-ascribed European identity, which was the basis for framing "Turkish national interests".

The end of the Cold War has created a virtual environment for Turkey to expand its influence in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and Central Asia by promoting its cultural and historical values. Although there is no chain of events to show that the Westernist identity, which has dominated Turkish Foreign Policy since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, has been wholly abandoned, it was agreed by the administrators of the period that the 'Turkic World' was an essential alternative for Turkish Foreign Policy.

Yeşilot claims that Turkey started to adopt a different foreign policy approach due to a willingness to overcome geographical determinism and security-oriented foreign policy in the post-Cold War period.⁵¹ As Yeşilot noted, a severe will was put forward to get close to neighbouring geographies at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. In order to elaborate upon the evolution of Turkey's foreign policy, the following section of the dissertation explores Turkey's experiences in the last period of the Cold War and the post-Cold war. In this context, particular attention has been given to the observation of the Presidency era of Özal and the administration of Demirel.

3.2. Özal and Demirel Administrations' Influence on Turkish Foreign Policy

The 1980s and the 1990s were the decades in which Turkey's state identity visibly started to change. Turgut Özal's foreign policy approaches and the way that he dealt with the issues were rare compared to former presidents or decision makers. Turgut Özal, who became the Prime Minister of Turkey on November 6, 1983, shared his considerations that Turkey and the Soviet Union taking part in separate pacts would not prevent them from developing economic relations. He expressed his considerations on this relationship in an interview with a Japanese newspaper, "Yomiuri", in 1985: "Negotiations in commercial relations can help resolve differences of opinions. For this reason, good relations can be established economically, if not politically."⁵²

The personal touches of Özal and the mutual positive approaches of Turkey and the Soviet Union in subsequent meetings provided the basis for Turkey's friendly relations

⁵¹ Yeşilot, O. personal communication, March 29, 2021.

⁵² Personal Website of Prof. Abdulvahap Kara. (2021, March 8). Türk Dünyasında İş Birliğinin Mimarı Turgut Özal. <http://www.abdulvahapkara.com/turk-dunyasinda-is-birliginin-mimari-turgut-ozal/> (Accessed in November 22, 2022).

with the Soviet Union, even though the Soviet Union would collapse in a short time (Ataman 2003, 53). According to Nauşabayeva-Hekimoğlu, even though the Soviet Union would collapse shortly after these meetings, the initiatives taken towards achieving friendly relations with Soviet Union authorities was also an opportunity to get closer and know better the Turkic communities of the Soviet Union.⁵³

Turkey's relations with Turkic communities in Central Asia remained weak until the era of Gorbachev, who 'relaxed' the central control of the Soviet Union (Şimşir 1992, 13). Despite the lack of relations with Central Asia for decades, it is essential to note that keeping itself away from the strategies of Sovietisation or Russification was a key policy for Turkey (Şimşir 2021, 99). In that regard, Aydın (2004, 58) asserts that since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Turkey used to have two crucial policies:

- 1) Standing against the Soviet ideological and regional expansionism and protecting the republic's independence by securing it.
- 2) To protect the secular, modern, and nationalist regime. Following the rules of the agreement discussed in 1921 allowed Turkey to continue to chase its crucial policies.

The end of the Sovietisation era, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union created opportunities for Turkey during Özal's administration. However, Özal's Presidency of Turkey started on November 9, 1989, the very day the Berlin Wall fell. Therefore, Özal's Presidency neatly coincided with the end of the Cold War and dramatically complicated the task of understanding whether the changes in Turkish Foreign Policy in the early 1990s resulted from his commitment to a more active policy or the radically altered global circumstances. Additionally, the image Özal gained from resisting the power of the military and challenging secularist, and nationalist views on various social issues often cast an ideological shadow over the interpretation of his foreign policy decisions.

Nevertheless, Danforth (2008, 87) claims that, under the leadership of Özal, Turkey engaged the world with two motives:

⁵³ Nauşabayeva-Hekimoğlu, A. personal communication, April 30, 2021.

- 1) It sought and used opportunities to advance Turkish interests directly by increasing Turkey's regional influence and economic position.
- 2) It sought to indicate Turkey's permanent value to the United States and NATO, which he believed were still necessary partners for Turkey even with a lesser or reducing Soviet threat.

Thus, the goal of Özal's activism was to take advantage of the new possibilities that the Soviet collapse had brought while minimising the adverse outcomes that it may also cause.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is one of the best examples of Özal's desire to seize new political and economic opportunities. Because BSEC was founded in 1992 at Özal's initiative, which was an attempt to institutionalise a new and profitable relationship with countries that had almost all previously been trapped behind the iron curtain. Similarly, in reaching out to the Turkic Republics of Central Asia, Özal contacted an area that had previously been off-limits to Turkish diplomacy.

According to Kavuncu, during Özal's Presidential era, Turkey experienced the fruition of the economic and political reforms he had instituted while he was the Prime Minister.⁵⁴ In consequence, by the late 1980s, the Turkish economy was increasingly dynamic, export-oriented, and more deeply integrated into the world economy. According to Bıyıklı, Özal's administration quickly realised that many of Turkey's neighbours could serve as much-needed markets for Turkish goods.⁵⁵ As a result, increasing political relations were set as a foreign policy goal of Turkey as the first step toward consolidating a profitable economic relationship with Turkic Republics. In parallel to that, Özal showed his commitment to putting Turkey's regional relations in service of its economic interests by bringing a delegation of businesspeople with him whenever he travelled abroad.

On the other hand, “the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”, which was revived in Turkey on September 12th and turned into a state policy by the internalisation of the then Prime Minister and President Özal, has been a supportive element in placing these new states

⁵⁴ Kavuncu, O. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

⁵⁵ Bıyıklı, M. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

at the centre of Turkish Foreign Policy with the rhetoric "From the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China" (Ereker 2010, 65). However, despite the Özal Administration's activity in the region, it is hard to tell if the idealistic expectations were met in the first years of foreign policy toward the Turkic World.

After the elections held on October 20th, 1991, Demirel's Prime Ministership process began. In the first days of his Prime Ministry, Demirel stated the government's stance regarding the Soviet Union was as follows: "Our government attaches importance to friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, which is in a historical restructuring process. Our relations with the newly established republics by separating from the Soviet Union will be in this direction" (Turgut 2001, 40). Nevertheless, while the world was shocked by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the then the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel was the first statesman that realised the possibility of the emergence of new republics. In fact, he was also the first politician to define the emerging of new political geography as the "Eurasia and its realities".

The foreign policy manoeuvres of Turkey from 1989 to 1993 show that Turkish governments at the time were heavily affected by the idea that Turkey might play a significant role in the Turkic World. In that regard, Demirel pointed out his considerations on the Turkic World as "Turkey can and should assume the leadership of a giant Turkic World stretching from the Adriatic Sea to China" (Winrow 1995, 39). Through this statement and similar others, the people of Turkey were also encouraged by the seemingly irresistible opportunity to assert a leadership role in a major world region which was also the birthplace of the Turkic communities seemed irresistible.

Although Turkey was aware of the potential economic benefits of the region, its initial response was influenced to a large degree by ideological concerns. The rediscovery of the territory, populated chiefly by Turkic people, appealed in Turkey to some benign form of pan-Turkism. Additionally, Turkey's probable foreign policy toward the territory was also supported by the European Union and the United States against the Iran threat and Russia's new activities. Therefore, the possible pan-Turkist effects in the country and external support on Turkey's foreign policy created an atmosphere for the political elites of Turkey to decide the benefits and losses of this opportunity.

Süver (2020, 47) believes that the region's rise psychologically gave Turkish people a sense of pride due to belonging to a broader ethnocultural entity. A chance to be part of a broader entity, emerging nationalist sentiments in Turkey, Europe and the support of the US towards Turkey's political approach toward the Turkic World encouraged Turkish political leaders and the public to focus on Turkic solidarity and brotherhood. However, although the orientation of Turkey toward the Turkic World was a reflection of the Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkey would have to face the facts that a Turkic Union idea or a pan-Turkic policy in a short period would harm Turkey and other newly established Turkic Republics. Still, as Asker similarly indicated, in just a few years, the Turks started to feel and consider that they were not alone and by embracing the Turkic communities in Central Asia, they would become politically significant in regional and global politics due to their cultural and ethnic links with the region.⁵⁶

In this context, Erdal İnönü, as the then head of the Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SDPP*) and the state minister in the coalition government advocated that: "The profound changes in our northern neighbour will have important consequences on the Turkic Republics as well as on Turkey. Although some uncertainties exist, these new developments create new opportunities and visions for our foreign policy. These alterations also usher in a new era in which Turkey's role and political importance will be increased dramatically in the region and the world." (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003, 74)

Demirel, who had intense contact with the states of the Turkic World during his term as Prime Minister, kept the Turkic World on his agenda during his Presidency. In order to reveal his considerations on the Turkic World, Demirel emphasised more than once that the aim of Turkey in these relations was not to create a pan-Turkic union. The structures of peace and stability would make Turkey grateful enough so that the states of the Turkic World would not fall under Russian domination again.

In order to avoid such a scenario and create a stable and peaceful region, Demirel and the leaders of the Turkic Republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan)

⁵⁶ Asker, A. personal communication, March 11, 2021.

participated in their first meeting in Davos in 1992. In the meeting, with gestures towards mutually shared views, Demirel expressed his feelings audibly for the first time with the words, which would later mark the period: "The Twenty-first Century will be the Turkish Age from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China".⁵⁷ Demirel, who worked to improve the relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World based on common identity, history, and culture, tried to ensure that the Turkic World would always be on Turkey's agenda by bringing up the positive developments in Turkey and the Turkic Republics.

In this context, in the fifth year of his Presidency, he made the following statement about the Turkic World and the Turkic Republics (Turgut 2001, 77):

“The most critical foreign policy issue of Turkey is the Turkic Republics. With the independence of these countries, the Turkic World came into being. Over time, these brothers, with whom we share a mutual language, religion, culture, and identity, will take Turkey as a model for themselves, which successfully implements a democratic, secular, and market economy. Thus, in the words of the great intellectual Ismail Gaspirali, 'Unity will be achieved in language, idea and work' among the Turkic tribes located within the borders of the Turkic Cultural Basin stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”.

It was worth reflecting on the periods of Özal's and Demirel's Presidency and their aftermath because, in Turkey, the 1990s was when an identity change became frequently discussed, particularly in foreign policy due to the emergence of the Turkic World as an alternative for Turkish Foreign Policy.⁵⁸ In addition, Özal and Demirel's interest and support for the Turkic World were the main causes of the initiations of a Turkic identity-based foreign policy period. Therefore, to understand Turkey's state identity changes and its triggers, Özal and Demirel's administrations are crucial due to their active foreign policies particularly during the 1990s.

⁵⁷ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı. (2000, April 4). Cumhurbaşkanı Sayın Süleyman Demirel'in Türkçe Konuşan Ülkeler Devlet Başkanları VI. Zirve Toplantısında Yaptıkları Konuşma. <https://tccb.gov.tr/konusmalari-suleyman-demirel/1718/4127/cumhurbaskani-sayin-suleyman-demirelin-turkce-konusan-ulkeler-devlet-baskanlari-vi-zirve-toplantisinde-yaptiklari-konusma> (Accessed in November 22, 2022).

⁵⁸ The end of the Cold War had significant consequences for Turkey. In this context, Turkey faced a tendency to be excluded from the European Union such as losing its strategic importance in the eyes of the western world during this period. However, in the same period, it became possible for Turkey to play a more influential role in the wider Eurasian region. Thus, during the Cold War years, the one-dimensional Turkish Foreign Policy became multifaceted.

3.3. The State Identity Dilemma of Turkish Foreign Policy

According to Kirişci (2009, 39), since Turkey joined NATO, it became common to evaluate all international events from the perspective of the US. Although events like the Cyprus Issue and the Johnson Letter caused Turkey-US relations to be reviewed, Turkey maintained its importance on behalf of the US until the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, after there was no concept of common interest, Turkey ceased to be an ally to be guarded in the eyes of the United States of America. In this context, Turkey's goal to be part of the European Union and its membership offer was also rejected at the end of the 1980s.

Bozdağlıoğlu (2003, 77) claims that the failure of the political elite to secure Turkey's membership in the EU in particular, led many people in the country to question the validity of the Kemalist modernisation project and the identity envisioned by it. Furthermore, the emphasis of EU officials on cultural factors for their rejection of Turkey's application created an identity crisis for Turkey. Because, although the primary goal of Turkey's modernisation project was based on the formation of a culturally western state and nation, the EU announced the reason for the rejection of Turkey's application as cultural difference.

Turkish Foreign Policy was generally carried out around the global policies of the Cold War until the 1990s. The new international environment that emerged after the Cold War led to Turkish Foreign Policy changes (Sönmezoğlu 2006, 66). Regarding these changes, Bıyıklı claims that the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the rejection of European Union membership, and the emergence of new republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia forced Turkey to restructure its regional policies and caused the start of a new pursuit in its foreign policy.⁵⁹

The negativities that Turkey faced at the end of the Cold War were not the only reason that forced Turkey to alter its foreign policy. In addition to these, the appearance of five ethnically Turkic communities, with a population of almost 60 million people, also created a great stir and a new foreign policy opportunity for Turkey. The most significant opportunity and change that the end of the Cold War provided for Turkey

⁵⁹ Bıyıklı, M. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

was to establish relations with the Turkic communities living in the Former Soviet Union. Therefore, this opportunity became one of the new targets of Turkish Foreign Policy.

The emergence of the Turkic Republics, which have historical, cultural, and linguistic ties with Turkey, has given Turkish Foreign Policy a wide range of actions. Therefore, Turkey's prominence as a model country for these newly established countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus became a mission for Turkey. On the other hand, the crises in the Middle East and Central Asia brought Turkey's importance to the agenda of the West again. However, Turkey's desire to become an EU member was not the only foreign policy goal due to its changing state identity.

Yüce claims that the emergence of Turkic Republics and the West's positive re-approach to Turkey has been a step forward for Turkey's security needs, such as ensuring regional stability and maintaining the importance of dialogue in the resolution of conflicts.⁶⁰ The considerations of the Westernist secular elite of Turkey on Turkic World discourse by defining the area as a better option for Turkish Foreign Policy also supports the claims of Yüce.

Throughout the 1990s, Turkey's attempts to become a regional power were frequently emphasised to reflect the changing identity of Turkey. That process of change and the pan-Turkic tendencies in definitions of state identity have strengthened the arguments that Turkey's identity is changing despite criticisms over these changes. According to Akıncı, despite the criticisms, the idea of changing state identity was a historic opportunity to derive political, economic, and psychological benefits from the transformation of the regional dynamics.⁶¹ The opportunity to benefit from this transformation was interpreted by the president of that period (1989-1993), Özal, as "The ending of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR had given the Turks a historic opportunity to assume regional leadership for the first time in 400 years and that this opportunity 'must' not be missed" (Çaman and Akyurt 2011, 54). Nevertheless, as Ereker (2010, 43) notes, identity or foreign policy changes cannot be revealed only by looking at the behaviour. Instead, it must be demonstrated that identity or the state

⁶⁰ Yüce, M. personal communication, March 24, 2021.

⁶¹ Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

perceptions of foreign policy have changed and that it has completely transformed the logic of foreign policy by gaining continuity.

In order to gain continuity in its foreign policy, Turkey had a long-standing interaction with transitional geography and a complex array of economic, political, and cultural relations with these neighbouring regions. However, due to the aforementioned changes in international dynamics, the region experienced turmoil that destroyed existing values and norms. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved, fifteen new republics arose, and the loss of the Soviet sphere of influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus meant a security gap in the region.

The Turkic World is crucial due to the Turkic republics' geographical location and natural resources. The common historical, cultural, and linguistic bonds between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World's traces that go back centuries are advantages for Turkey to improve its relations and fill the security gap that arose due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After years of cold-shouldering by the West and uneasy relations with the Middle Eastern neighbours, Turkey had a chance to again approach establishing the Turkic World as a part of its foreign policy, which were hitherto little-known states with whom they could claim kinship due to common Turkic identity, history, culture, and language and who seemed to appear friendly towards Turkey.

Yuldashev believes that the idea behind promoting the Turkish model for the newly emerging republics of the Soviet Union was due to Turkey's modern, democratic and secular state structure that also implemented liberal free-market principles within its values.⁶² Through its presentation as a role model to the Turkic Republics, the foreign policymakers of Turkey aimed to cooperate with the leadership of the newly emerging states and guide them to be modern, democratic, and secular states. By accomplishing that aim, it was believed by the foreign policymakers of Turkey of the time that the successful transition of the region to the world market would also enhance Turkey's importance to the West in strategic and economic terms.

However, after gaining independence, although the relations developed in the first period created impressive expectations, the need to uphold expectations of these new

⁶² Yuldashev, D. personal communication, March 12, 2021.

states could not be met in some fields. The list of reasons for the failure to be a role model included the limited sources of Turkey, underestimation of the economic issues of the Turkic Republics, and technological limits. Also, due to their experience with Russia, Turkic Republics were afraid of the idea of having another 'big brother'; as such, they did not welcome the approach of Turkey.

Turkey was the ideal connection for the West to initiate relations with independent Turkic Republics. During the first years of the Turkic Republics' independence, this was the reason why they supported Turkey as the role model, guarantor, and key to the region's economic developments. However, the more profound investigation of the region and the realisation of Turkic Republics' natural resources (petrol, gas, mines, and coal) evoked the West and caused the West to invest in the territory independently.

Cotayev believes that although Turkey tried to be effective in the region by presenting the 'Turkish Model' after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its goal was not limited to creating closer relations with the states of the Turkic World but also to benefit from the resources of the region just as the West did.⁶³ Apart from setting an example for the new republics of the Turkic World, Turkey also had to deal with its internal issues such as identity problems. One of the primary reasons for the source of these identity problems was the driving force of the pan-Turkic foreign policies of Turkey since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, interpreting Turkey's foreign policy only based on its self-interest would be a mistake due to its complexity.

Turkey faced its identity crisis during the 1990s with two dimensions: domestic and international. The identity crisis at the domestic level was closely linked to the adverse effects of the modernisation project. The bureaucratic-authoritarian elite in Turkey single-handedly carried out the modernisation project in the country which caused the changes in Turkey's state identity. As Doğu Ergil (2000, 50) argues, when state identity is not a construct negotiated by its citizens, it creates issues for neglected and excluded groups that can escalate into perceived security threats by the hyper-sensitive state. In the case of Turkey, whilst the state became more authoritarian, religion in more traditional segments of society presumed the role of political opposition and became

⁶³ Cotayev, Z. personal communication, May 22, 2021.

further politicised. The inevitable result of this process was the burgeoning of a culture of conflict where society was pitted against the state, and social groups were pitted against each other. At the end, this massive societal confusion hampered the process of nation-building and caused a profound identity crisis.

Regarding these developments, the role of religion became one of the most central and controversial questions in Turkish politics throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, where a religious outlook became firmly embedded in the ideology and program of the mainstream conservative parties in Turkey (Kasaba and Bozdoğan 2000, 14). Since the new national identity created by nationalism was not convincing or attractive to citizens, the people in Turkey could not fully adapt to this new identity and continued to cling to their traditional identities and communities or create new communities in different social settings.

As religious interests become embedded in the politics of Turkey, particularly during the last decade of the 20th century, the polarisation between Islamists and secularists and the ascendancy of political Islam became a significant determinant of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. This was most evident in the Welfare Party's (*Refah Partisi*) attempts to establish closer ties with the Islamic World, in particular with Iran and Libya, during their brief tenure in the coalition government with the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*) between 1996 and 1997 (Sayarı 2000, 174; Tekin 2017, 226). Despite its attempts to reorient Turkish Foreign Policy, the Welfare Party's foreign policy initiatives did not radically alter Turkey's traditional foreign policy preferences. However, it did intensify the conflict between the country's secularist and Islamist political forces.

The Nationalist Action Party was also one of the other factors that complicated Turkey's state identity debates regarding foreign policy preferences. The emergence of new Turkic Republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus was particularly strengthened and encouraged nationalists to be more active in internal politics. The resurgence of ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus added to the rising nationalist sentiments in Turkey since they involved Muslim and Turkic communities with whom Turkey has long historical and cultural ties (Keyman 2011, 29). By bringing these

geographies on the agenda, they pressured Turkish governments to pursue a more active foreign policy towards these regions.

The end of the Cold War and the EU's constant rejection of Turkey's full membership on the one hand and the nationalists and Islamists' increasing political power on the other dragged the westernised elite's monopoly to the end of their political power. This became clear by the electoral victory of the Islamist Welfare Party in 1995 and Nationalist Action Party in 1999.

As a result of the end of the westernised elite's monopoly in Turkey, following the electoral victory in 1999, nationalists under the banner of the Nationalist Action Party of Alparslan Türkeş took an anti-EU position and claimed that membership in the European Union would cause Turkey to lose its national values and sovereignty (Uzunyaylı 1990, 47). Instead, they advocated for a closer relationship with the newly emerged Turkic Republics, with whom Turkey claims to share a common identity, culture, history, and language. Therefore, Turkey's changing state identity once more started to influence its foreign policy based on the common identity claim of the political elites. Regarding the common identity claim, Türkeş emphasised his opinions and his party's considerations on Turkic identity in a Turkish Grand National Assembly speech that "200 million people speak the Turkish language. This means that there are 200 million Turks in the world. We should try to create unity in our alphabet with these republics. If this is realised, it will greatly contribute to our ideal 'unity in language, thought, and action" (Türkeş 2000, 52).

According to Wendt (1999, 61), states, like individuals, hold multiple identities that inform them of who they are and what they should do in a particular context. He notes that if they all pressed upon us equally at each moment, we may become confused. Fortunately, most identities are activated selectively depending on the situations we find ourselves in. Accordingly, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union triggered different identities in Turkey to rise, such as Turkic, nationalist, religious, and secular. Even though these identities may be named as the main pillars of Turkey's history of state identity, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of nationalist sentiments let Turkey increasingly embrace mainly Turkish and Muslim

identities as Turkey's state identity. In consequence, this situation coincided with Turkey's western identity becoming questioned seriously by the West (Ergun 2014, 49).

Although the domestic transformation within Turkey and the independence of the Turkic Republics played the most critical role in the re-imagination of Turkey's state identity, external events, such as Bulgaria's deportation of its Muslims (mainly the Turks) in 1985 and the break-up of Yugoslavia also played a constitutive role in the deconstruction of a narrow secular national ideology.⁶⁴ In that regard, the public in Turkey has increasingly become conscious that the definition of Turkic identity incorporates more than Anatolia and Euro-centric Westernisation. The political re-emergence of Muslim communities in the Balkans and the larger "Turkic World" from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Western China has fostered a new sense of Ottoman/Turkish identity. This identity increasingly contributed to a re-examining of Turkey's relations with possible partners for the future.

Even though Turkey sought a new foreign policy in response to its identity issue, it is not entirely possible to claim that the state identity imposed by the political administrations has changed due to the state's preservation of its western character despite the Turkic World's tendencies towards foreign policy in the 1990s. In this regard, Purtaş indicates that the search for an alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy as the Turkic World did not mean Turkey's distancing from the West because the Turkic World was not the replacement for the western policy.⁶⁵ Even though Turkey started to pursue foreign policy toward the Turkic World as an alternative to its western policies, it is worth noting that Turkey and the West's worth to each other maintained stable. Therefore, claiming that the Turkic World had the only or dominating foreign policy of Turkey during the 1990s would be a mistake. Instead, it might be seen as an attractive alternative to Turkey's long-standing western politics.

⁶⁴ Kulaoğlu, H. (2019, May 23). 30th anniversary of the 'forced migration' of Bulgarian Turks. Anadolu Agency. <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/bulgaristan-turklerinin-zorunlu-gocununun-30-yili/1485177> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁶⁵ Purtaş, F. personal communication, March 1, 2021.

3.4. The Role of Turkic Identity in Turkish Foreign Policy Making during the AKP Era

In the early years of the 2000s, the orientation of Turkey's Foreign Policy was swung towards the European Union, despite a party with roots in an anti-Western tradition of Political Islam coming into power. Despite its anti-Western tradition of political Islam, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*) proclaimed European Union membership as one of its foreign policy goals upon gaining power. In that regard, it undertook political and economic reforms to become a member of the EU and employed optimistic and cordial rhetoric in dozens of meetings with its presumably future partners (Hintz 2018, 98). However, despite the long-standing western policy of Turkey and AKP's proclamation of the EU membership goal, part of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy transformation has been attributed to the role of the AKP, which has governed the country since November 2002.

Fundamentally, the transformation of the internal and external politics of Turkey was due to Turkey's internal dynamics, the contestation of state identities, and the prospect of creating deeper ties with former Ottoman territories, the Turkic World, and other Muslim states. Turkey has inhabited a fascinating and valuable empirical window throughout history due to its highly contentious relations along multiple, often complex overlapping lines of identification: Turks and Kurds, Alevis and Sunnis, Muslims-non-Muslims, religious-secularists. Nevertheless, since the AKP came to power, Turkey's contestation of state identities and the competition of identities to become a hegemon became increasingly discussed by the public, researchers, politicians, policymakers, and their supporters.

In this context, a number of international relations researchers contributed to the literature on state identity. In order to question Turkey's complex identity and exemplify the contestation of identities in the country, Soner Cagaptay (2009) investigated how Turkish nationalism grappled with Islam, secularism, and ethnic identity. Tanıl Bora (2003) compared the multiple and competing versions of Turkish nationalism by categorising the versions as "Official, Kemalist, Liberal, and Turkist Radical Nationalism". Şener Aktürk (2015) explained the differences in intellectual movements of Turkey by naming them Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, Westernism, and

Eurasianism. Lisel Hintz (2018) identified four national identities that held and contested each other throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey as Pan-Turkic Nationalism, Western Liberalism, Republican Nationalism, and Ottoman Islamism.

However, despite such works, defining a hegemonic proposal as an understanding of the Republic of Turkey's state identity that is widely distributed across a population is more complex. Indeed, there are numerous proposals as to what the identity of the state and its citizens should be. Nevertheless, whether these proposals spread widely across the country's population or manifest in government institutions and policies depends on many factors.

The most essential of these factors is to map identity proposals that existed when the state was formed. Due to its emergence from defeats and victories, its precise sovereign starting point where a clear identity proposal is proclaimed, Turkey sets an extraordinary instance to understand the dynamics of the state formation process. In this context, Turkey's changing dynamics and dominant state identities could be understood as follows:

- 1) An imperial past in which religious identity stood out primarily both within the empire and in its foreign relations,
- 2) The process of gaining dominance through a war that profoundly shaped the military elites' perceptions of ethnic, religious, and western identities,
- 3) The engagement of nationalists and republicans towards an identity contestation battle against the competing proposals of Turkey's national identities: Ottoman, republican, western, and Turkic.

The transformation of Turkey's external politics at the beginning of the 21st century which also influenced state identity was due to Turkey's intention to create closer relations with the former Ottoman territories, the Turkic World, and other Muslim states. Accordingly, the country's cultural, religious, and historical experiences, geopolitical concerns of the governments, increasing energy needs, and Turkey's desire to become an energy transit hub have mainly influenced the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy since the first years of the 21st century.

The reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP administration was the manifestations of Turkey's changing foreign policy and state identity. The Islamist background of AKP members, societal trends of Middle Easternisation or Neo-Ottomanism, the surge of Islam and Ottoman-based public discourse at both elite and societal levels, and the emphasis on Turkic identity by political characters were the prominent elements that reoriented Turkey's foreign policy and its state identity.

Starting with the first term of the AKP, following active and multi-dimensional foreign policy, and giving particular importance to relations with the Middle East and former Ottoman territories as a requirement of that policy could be addressed within the framework of the Turkish Foreign Policy program change. The willingness of Turkey to diversify its foreign policies and strengthen its relations with key Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Syria, and Iraq, as partners with mutual economic interests and shared cultural heritage was a threshold in the change of Turkish Foreign Policy agenda (Özgür 2020, 62).

Considering the difficulty of establishing relations with the countries of the region, which mainly existed under the auspices of Europe in the early republican period, and the limitations brought by the Cold War conditions, it may be observed that the policy of "staying away from the Middle East" was a practical foreign policy approach. However, as Bıyıklı asserts as well mainly the Islamist tendency of the AKP and the party's goal of diversifying foreign policies and changing Turkey's state identity led to the development of relations with the leading actors of the region.⁶⁶

Even though the AKP's foreign policy goals look set particularly towards the Middle East, former Ottoman territories, the Turkic World, and the other Muslim states; EU membership was still a foreign policy goal of Turkey, and traditional Western foreign policy of the country was still active in the first term of the AKP (2002 – 2007). In that regard, Ahmet Davutoğlu's "strategic depth" concept and his realist thinking regarding regional and global relations, coupled with the EU anchor, could briefly define the basic parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy. Recognising that its policy is not just Islamist or Turkic makes it clear that, in trying to balance Turkey's strategic relationships rather

⁶⁶ Bıyıklı, M. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

than prioritise relations with the US and NATO, the AKP has demonstrated continuity not only with Özal's Neo-Ottomanism but also with the non-alignment of Atatürk and İnönü in its first term. However, the efforts that the party exerted to diversify and improve external relations with neighbouring countries, the Middle East, Muslim States, and the Turkic World, mainly through its second, third, and fourth terms, distanced the Turkish Foreign Policy from its long-standing westernist foreign policy.⁶⁷

As a consequence of the goals of foreign policy diversification, change of state identity, and new regional partnerships of the AKP, the differentiation in Turkish Foreign Policy was inevitable. One of the most apparent differences between the foreign policy initiatives of Turkey in the first AKP administration from the previous administrations was that the relations established with Middle Eastern countries have developed in a way that sometimes jeopardises relations with the West; instead of being just a means to consolidate ties with the US and Europe (Kara and Ahmet 2016, 51; Özgür 2020, 64). In fact, the new aspect of Turkey under the AKP administration was evidently illustrated when the Turkish parliament rejected the American forces' proposal to initiate the invasion of Iraq from Turkish territory in March 2003.

Sarı believes that the Strategic Depth Doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu has triggered policymakers to question and re-organise the status of Turkey amongst the international order to become an active, autonomous, and independent player in the region.⁶⁸ That trigger also caused Turkey to become more self-confident while formulating its foreign policies. In other words, Turkey has become autonomous and sometimes deviates from its Western allies' agenda while pursuing its own. Regarding these inferences, Davutoğlu has summarised Turkey's foreign policy in the AKP's first administration as: "Turkey's orientation and strategic alliance with the West remain perfectly compatible with Turkey's involvement in, among others, Iraq, Iran, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East peace process, and Afghanistan" (Davutoğlu 2013, 8).

⁶⁷ The AKP, who believed it did not get what was expected from its foreign policy towards Europe in its first administration, focused more on the Middle East for the rest of the first period. Although in the first period of the AKP Administration, Turkic Republics were not the main agenda of the Turkic Council, the second and third periods of the AKP Administration considered the Turkic Republics as one of the priorities in foreign policy.

⁶⁸ Sarı, Y. personal communication, April 30, 2021.

In the first ruling period of the AKP, policies that were compatible with the EU and US, Turkey's prominence as an independent regional actor and its interest in the Middle East were all contradictory. Nevertheless, Turkey's drive towards the Middle East was prioritised to be the AKP's main foreign policy goal in its second term. In this context, the Arab World, in particular, became the focal point of Turkish diplomatic efforts, which were differed significantly from traditional Turkish Foreign Policy. A closer look at Turkish Foreign Policy activism in the second phase of the AKP government reveals certain alterations in the style of foreign policy. The second phase was mainly characterised by a pronounced weakening of the commitment to EU membership and the desire to act as an independent regional power via emphasising assertive and active foreign policy.

Indeed, Turkey has been able to formulate a new vision for its foreign policy aimed at the Middle East and the former Ottoman territories, based on its historical role and geographical location, reflecting the religious-conservative ideology of the AKP. However, Turkey's growing role in the Middle East criticised by the both internal and external extensions of Turkey; and this new formulation of Turkey's Foreign Policy interpreted as Turkey's axis shift since AKP's second term in foreign policy away from its traditional Western orientation (western identity) or Özal and Demirel's 'top discourse' Turkic World (Turkic Identity) (Cornell, Cagaptay, Lesser and Taşpınar 2011, 9).

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Islamic, Balkan, Anatolian, Kurdish, and Turkic political identities have played a critical role in the cartography of state-society relations. However, since the axis shift of Turkish Foreign Policy, the Ottoman-Islamic and Turkic-Islamic origins of Turkish nationhood in particular have become more assertive and effective in conditioning and shaping the state's policies and society's perception of "self" throughout the AKP administrations.

For decades, Turkey's state identity and its foreign policy were bound together. However, throughout the Republic of Turkey's history, the nature of this link and political Islam's influence upon it are poorly understood and hardly, if ever, examined. Nevertheless, the expansion of higher education, mass media, communications, and the development of a substantial bourgeoisie has played a critical role and created the new

public emergence of Ottoman-Islamic and Turkic-Islamic synthesised identities discourses at the highest levels of Turkey. The emergence of these relatively new identities also influenced the foreign policy of the country and are reflected in the change of long-standing western politics to the Middle East or the former Ottoman territories.

The main catalysts behind the formulation of the discourse of Ottoman-Islamic or the Turkic-Islamic synthesis of Turkey have been two significant interrelated developments:

- Domestic societal transformations created alternative discursive spaces for critical thinking within the emergence of a new liberal political and economic milieu.
- Significant international developments, such as the gradual collapse of the bipolar system, the Cyprus crisis, the European Union's refusal to accept Turkey as a full member, and European indifference to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

The Turkic-Islamic and Ottoman-Islamic syntheses embodying the values of the AKP and the change in articulated Turkish identity in AKP discourse (regarding the AKP's changing representations of Europe; which have been a critical component of the discursively constructed Turkish identity since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey), have been explored by plenty of works (Koyuncu-Lorasdağı 2011; Altunışık and Martin 2011; Kaya 2015; Hintz 2018).

The current literature on Turkey's state identity illustrates that the change in Turkish Foreign Policy and the souring of Turkey–EU Relations became the catalyst for the change in the crafted identity of the state at the elite level as distanced from Europe (Manisalı 2011, 37; Aydın-Düzgit 2016, 26). The positive representations of Europe in AKP discourse turned into a negative, where the 'European Other' was increasingly constructed as an 'unwanted intruder' in Turkish Foreign Policy, as an 'essentially discriminatory entity' with fixed civilisational (religious, cultural, and historical) differences from Turkey, and as an entity that is 'democratically/politically/morally inferior to Turkey'.

Aside from the souring of Turkey-EU relations, the elites' perception of external and internal constraints and their way of interpreting the identity of the state also play a part in accounting for foreign policy change. In this context, Aras and Görener (2010, 77) explain that changes in perceptions of decision-makers of states stand out as the most potent elucidations for major foreign policy realignments. Similarly, Robert Jervis (1976, 64) points out that the perceptions of top decision-makers are of particular interest to clarify and understand their policies; as people in the same conditions behave differently since they vary in their perceptions of the world and other participants. In other words, as Kavuncu emphasised, "understanding and explaining elites' beliefs is of critical importance in understanding how elites recognise events and subsequently formulate policy".⁶⁹ Therefore, it is possible to claim that the reconfiguration of the political elite in Turkey may also have played a prominent role in transforming Turkish Foreign Policy and its state identity in recent decades and are worthy of being observed (Yurteri 2019, 181). Because of the Islamist background of AKP members, leader-centric identity arguments cite the religious background of top party figures such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Abdullah Gül as the potential driving force behind Turkey's apparent reorientation toward its Muslim neighbours.

In order to exemplify the argument pertaining to the influence of elites on foreign policy, between 2000 and 2007, during the presidency of Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a harmonious collaboration could not be achieved between the ruling party AKP and Sezer. The fact that Sezer used his veto power 67 times during his seven-year term (Ecevit and Kapan 2020, 682) indicates that the dialogue between the president and the parliament did not go through a proactive process. The AKP-Sezer conflict also manifested itself in foreign policy. The active foreign policy of the Özal and Demirel periods, particularly towards the Turkic World, was replaced by a conflicting decision-making process. The Middle East, the former Ottoman territories, and the Turkic World were not the foreign policy priority of Sezer even though he hosted the leaders of the Turkic World twice during his 7-year presidency regarding the concept of Turkic-speaking States meetings.

⁶⁹ Kavuncu, O. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

When Gül became president in 2007, the Turkic World, the Middle East, and Islamist states had become once again one of the top agendas of Turkey's foreign policy (Yurteri 2019, 183). Contrary to Sezer, Gül's first visit as president was took him abroad to the Turkic World, and he was sought more cooperative relations throughout his presidency. In that regard, Gül attended the third Turkic Council Summit and referred to the Turkic Council Summits in his speech as the strongest indicator of unity and solidarity of brotherly peoples.⁷⁰

In summary, after a period of initial neglect of the Turkic World due to the priority given to the Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy, the Justice and Development Party's policies towards the Turkic World gained new impetus with the 2007 election. Through this impetus, Gül, who attached importance to the Turkic World in his foreign policy, continued his visits with the revival of multilateral cooperation schemes. In that regard, the establishment of TURKPA in 2008 and the establishment of the Turkic Council in 2009 during Gül's presidency were signs of the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Turkic World through planned and constant strategies towards institutional progress.

Since the start of the second term of the AKP, Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World moved to form deeper relations with the region. For almost two decades, while chasing to deepen relations with the Turkic World, Turkey misinterpreted the expectations of the Turkic World and tried to use common religious, linguistic, cultural, and ethnic roots for its benefit.

The influence of Turkic identity on Turkish Foreign Policy started to become more effective not only due to the common identity, history, culture, and language claims of Turkey and the Turkic World but also due to Turkey's realisation of potential benefits from its relations with the states of the Turkic World. However, Turkey's goal of becoming an autonomous, active, independent player in the region and the decision-makers' diverted policies in the AKP era prevented Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy from remaining permanently dense.

⁷⁰ Abdullah Gül's Personal Website. (n.d.). Üçüncü Türk Konseyi Zirvesi. <http://www.abdullahgul.gen.tr/ziyaretler/UcuncuTurkKonseyiZirvesi/> (Accessed in November 22, 2022).

As Henry Hale's (2012) discussion of "ethnicity-epiphenomenal" theories explains, epiphenomenal arguments pointing to causal mechanisms ranging from elite manipulation to political action coordination assert that identities such as ethnicity and other commonly shared understanding of group members have not simply intrinsic value, but serve as tools in the pursuit of primarily material interests such as power, resources, and security. All of these arguments could ostensibly apply to Turkey, as a state that has at different times contested Iran and Russia for dominance in the Middle East, made Turkic overtures to the Turkic World in the hope of obtaining further pipeline access and establishing new markets for its goods, and lobbied to secure its legitimate place in the transatlantic security community through NATO membership. Indeed, these whiplash-inducing switches among Sunni-Muslim, Turkic, and Western identity appeals seem to lend credence to arguments that states can select from a "menu of choices" for identity.

Regarding these changes of identity, Yüce claims that since the AKP came to rule, national, religious, western, and global identities have applied in Turkish Foreign Policy depending on the states involved.⁷¹ In relations with countries such as Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina, Palestine, Malaysia, and Morocco: religious; in relations with Turkic Republics and Turkish minorities in Europe: national; in relations with Germany, France, Austria: Western; in relations with the US, Russia, and United Kingdom: global identity and values coming to the fore demonstrates the credibility of Yüce's claim. That is why it is hard to define the Justice and Development Party's proper ideological perspective due to the list of states that it engaged. Therefore, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's state identity changes in the last two decades may be given as an example of the complexity of explaining the ideological perspective of the AKP.

Even though it is worth claiming that since the 2000s, the main pillars of Turkish Foreign Policy were Turkic and Islamic identity, then the President Abdullah Gül's visit to Armenia to create closer relations demonstrates that the AKP has also pursued its "zero problems" policy with neighbours as an alternative to its foreign policies towards the Middle East or the Turkic World based on Islamic or Turkic identity. Likewise, despite ups and downs, the cooperation between Turkey and Russia, in number of

⁷¹ Yüce, M. Personal communication, March 24, 2021.

fields, also show that even though the relations with the Turkic World stands as one of the top goals of the Turkish Foreign Policy agenda in the last few decades, the policymakers of Turkey did not limit Turkey's Foreign Policy cooperation with the Turkic Republics' former 'big brother'.

Even though the complexity of the AKP's foreign policy perspective is evident, Turkey's continuous, planned, and institution-based relations with the Turkic World have been permanent since the start of the Turkic-speaking states' summit process. Therefore, to understand the objectives of these meetings, the institutional development of these meetings, the participant states' common goals, common identity, history, language, and culture claims' benefit to the cooperation has been presented in the following chapter.

4. TURKEY - TURKIC WORLD RELATIONS' INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World are an essential example to show how societies and states with a common identity, culture, language, and historical claims can coalesce in foreign policy despite the years in which states were conscribed to be separated from each other due to external factors. The possibility of the parties acting with a win-win approach by pursuing mutual interests in foreign policy with a sense of common identity has been repeatedly demonstrated in the relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World (Akıncı 2012, 26). However, the lack of binding reasons in bilateral and collective relations, the dependencies of policies based on the policymakers of the country, and conflicts of interest between countries has created the necessity of an institutional structure's establishment to uphold binding rules.⁷² Therefore, this part of the research examines:

- 1) The necessity of institutionalisation in relations between Turkey and the Turkic World by summarising the historical experiences of this relationship,
- 2) The influence of Turkey and the Turkic World's common identity claims on Turkish Foreign Policy,
- 3) The institutional progress of the Organisation of the Turkic States since "Turkish-speaking states summits".

In brief, the lack of systematic attention to the internal and external dynamics of states, the institutionalisation process of identity-based relations, the cultural and linguistic relations of Turkey and the states of the Turkic World, and interactions amongst the states that share common or similar identities inspired this section. By researching Turkey and the influence of the states of the Turkic World's common identity claims upon Turkish Foreign Policy, the importance of the Turkic World to Turkey in its foreign policy, and the cruciality of the Organization of the Turkic States for Turkey, this chapter of the dissertation seems to address some of the gaps in the existing literature.

⁷² Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

4.1. The Fundamentals of Turkey-Turkic World Relations and Pre-Institutionalisation Process

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the Turkic societies of Asia were mainly under Russian hegemony, relations between the Turkic communities were minimal and had to be conducted legally and politically through Moscow. As Nauşabayeva-Hekimoğlu noted, the 1990s were a milestone in these relations because the in Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Eastern Bloc of the Cold War leader was experiencing its last period due to international competition, conflicts, and internal dynamics.⁷³

For decades, Turkish Foreign Policy towards this region was dominated by the policies that once refrained from creating an ethnocentric bridge between Turkey and Turkic communities under the Soviet Union, to avoid tensions between Turkey and the Soviets. Nevertheless, Akıncı emphasises that while the Soviet Union was showing signs of collapse, the official authorities of Turkey were already prepared to develop economic, political, and cultural relations with the republics to be established.⁷⁴

In 1989, during Özal's Presidency, the loss of the Soviets' central control urged Turkey to take steps to establish and develop economic and cultural relations between Turkey and the communities about to become sovereign nations (Zeybek 2013, 63). As Akıncı noted as well, before the official disintegration of the Soviet Union, two separate delegations were sent to the Soviet geography by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct observations (Şimşir 2021, 102).⁷⁵ According to this observation, the delegation's report suggested that these communities were about to gain independence. Therefore, Turkey should not have wasted any time on recognising their independence

⁷³ Nauşabayeva-Hekimoğlu, A. personal communication, April 30, 2021.

⁷⁴ According to Akıncı, the administration of Turkey has sent a group of diplomats to the Turkic Republics to be established to understand whether they were ready for independence or not (Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021). After the reports of these societies' status by Şimşir, Akıncı, and Taskent as the diplomatic officers, Turkey was prepared for the recognition of these republics and willing to develop relations in many fields.

⁷⁵ Halil Akıncı indicated that a delegation (Bilal Şimşir, Halil Akıncı, and Kurtuluş Taşkent) was sent to Central Asia in 1991 by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey to investigate and report the countries of the region (Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021). The content of this report was mainly based on the Turkic Republics' preparation for independence. The delegation explained the readiness of the Turkic Republics for the establishment in two titles. In that regard, Akıncı explains these reasons as the historical debt to these communities and the importance and possible benefits of being the first state to recognize these states (Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021).

(Azer 2011, 53; Şimşir 2021, 104). The foresight of the delegate was that the independence of these societies would be recognised by other states soon, and being the first state to recognise these states would create benefits for Turkey through cooperation in the following years. Therefore, having achieved the opportunity to be the first country to recognise the countries that declared their independence, Turkey quickly started diplomatic relations with the newly establishing countries.

According to Aydın (2006, 21), the foundations of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region are shaped in line with this report. With the USSR's disintegration, the international system and the "Turkic World" gained a new appearance. Five Turkic-speaking countries declared their independence, four in Central Asia and one in the Caucasus. As Sarı noted, the 1990s (when the international system entered a new era) was a period of great excitement for Turkey and newly independent Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan due to the common cultural, historical and linguistic ties of these states.⁷⁶ Regarding this excitement and the hope for common foreign policy interests, Turkey started to take new initiatives in its foreign policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

In the post-Soviet era's first years, the newly emerged Turkic Republics tried to evaluate the bilateral and multi-actor cooperation opportunities and build their post-independence nation-states. In this context, they tried to impose their nation-state structure on the international community (Geybullayev and Kurubaş 2002, 37). While the Turkic Republics were chasing legitimacy in the international community, Turkey supported them in every way so that the Turkic Republics could be involved in the international community, introduce the structure of their nation-states, adapt to international organisations, and complete their transition to the world market.

In the first years of Turkish Foreign Policy after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, foreign policy towards these newly emerging republics, which were trying to be established with the messages of brotherhood and the emphasis on the common identity and history, attempts were made to lay the foundations of economic and cultural relations with the support of organisations, starting with the initiative of TİKA.

⁷⁶ Sarı, Y. personal communication. April 30, 2021.

However, the support that was offered to the Turkic Republics who had just gained their independence was not just limited to this initiative. The interest in establishing closer relations with the Turkic Republics also showed itself in various other fields. In that regard, the initiatives of diplomatic training programs, student exchange programs, and support for these republics to establish cooperation with international organisations are only some of the examples that illustrate Turkey's support.⁷⁷

The emergence of independent states in the region presented opportunities but also created some obligations for Turkey as well. Therefore, regarding the changing foundations and assumptions of Turkish Foreign Policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey stated its goals for the region as: "Consolidation and strengthening of the sovereignty and independence of brotherly countries, ensuring the adoption of a democratic and secular society model based on a free market economy, mediating their integration with the world, developing the relations in every field, integration to the organisations and systems such as the United Nations, European Security Cooperation Organization and the Economic Cooperation Organization".⁷⁸

Based on the new opportunities and obligations for Turkey, Yesilot asserts that "indeed, the very foundations and primal assumptions of the Turkic World view have been changed, perhaps bringing about a fundamental shift in the character of Ankara's modern policy".⁷⁹ Regarding the shift in Ankara's policy, the emergence of newly independent Turkic Republics has led Turkish Foreign Policy to rise on two pillars: Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism (Tüysüzöglü 2013, 307).

Oğuzlu (2012, 29) defines the Eurasianism policy of Turkey as developing relations with the Turkic Republics; acting as "brothers" to these republics when necessary; developing tighter economic and strategic relations with the Russian Federation, and not using the Turkic identity of the country for subservience to the EU's political goals. However, the missing point in Oğuzlu's definition of Eurasianism is that the newly established Turkic Republics' last wish was to have a new brother after what they had experienced under the name of "brotherhood" by Russia.

⁷⁷ Musabay-Baki, P. personal communication. May 8, 2021.

⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.) Orta Asya Ülkeleri ile İlişkiler. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-orta-asya-ulkeleri-iliskileri.tr.mfa>. (Accessed in March 25, 2022)

⁷⁹ Yeşilot, O. personal communication, March 29, 2021.

Therefore, even though the independence of Turkic Republics created new areas of partnership for Turkey and created the possibility to make Turkey a power that could lead or guide new alliances in the region, the Eurasianism policy of Turkey did not produce the desired results because of the experiences that the Turkic Republics had under Russian hegemony. In addition, the needs of the Turkic Republics could not be precisely interpreted by Turkey which caused them to be incapable of assistance.

Although the expectations of Turkey and the Turkic Republics from each other did not show parallelism at that time, Özal's words for the Turkic communities were: "The next century will be the century of the Turks" which kept Eurasianism and the pan-Turkic sentiments towards the Turkic Republics on Turkey's political agenda.⁸⁰ In fact, these kinds of approaches and statements of both Özal and Demirel during their terms as prime ministers and presidents also evolved Turkey's state identity and helped to lay the foundations of cooperation and the construction of joint organisations to be carried out between Turkey and the Turkic World in the coming years.

4.2. Turkic-Speaking Countries' Heads of State Summits

Making an effort to progress in relations with the Turkic World, Turkey pioneered the regional cooperation. In the first years following the Turkic Republics gaining of independence, the cooperation discourse was mainly on common identity, history, culture, and language claims. Therefore, the parameters in the relations established between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World have been determined as to develop economic relations, to disseminate the Turkic language by establishing a common alphabet, to initiate student exchange programs and to increase the knowledge of the public of common history and culture by organisations including TIKA, TURKSOY, and others.⁸¹

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the leaders of the Turkic Republics made official visits to Turkey between 1991 and 1992 in order to develop their cooperation.

⁸⁰ The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. (August 5, 1999). Minutes of the General Assembly of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=1301&P5=B&page1=25&page2=25 (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁸¹ TURKPA, Turkic Academy, International Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, and Turkic Business Council are the organizations that collaborate to establish deeper relations and increase the knowledge of common history, language, and culture between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World.

With the cooperation need and synergy that emerged as a result of these visits, the Turkish-speaking states summits process, which could be counted as the first institutional step in the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World, was initiated in 1992 between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The Turkish-speaking States Summit Process was led primarily by Turkey to discuss the relations and political developments of Turkic States institutionally at the level of Heads of State. Aside from the goal of discussing the relations and political developments, the Turkic Republics' geographical location and resources also encouraged Turkey to initiate this cooperation. However, Turkish Foreign Policy's tendency toward the Turkic World cannot be described only with the self-interest of Turkey. The Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy following the Turkic communities' emergence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, increasing nationalist sentiments in Turkey, and these communities' common identity, history, culture, and language claims with Turkey were equally important reasons that shaped Turkey's foreign policy towards the Turkic World.

Despite the years of Russian hegemony upon these Turkic communities, the support of Turkey and the common Turkic identity claims were one of the first ways to end Russian influence in the region and to be part of the international community. The languages, culture, history, and customs of Turkey and the newly emerged Turkic Republics were the same or similar in many aspects. Regarding these resemblances and their affinity, Turkey was the main and probably the only option these republics could receive assistance from to become a part of the international community. Therefore, the common identity, culture, history, and language claims of Turkey and the states of the Turkic World, mutual interest in foreign policies and the goal of mutual gains led the President of Azerbaijan Ebulfez Elcibey, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev, the President of Uzbekistan Islam Kerimov, and the President of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov to participate in the first summit hosted by President Turgut Özal and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in Ankara on October 30-31, 1992.

At the summit in Ankara, the desire to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Turkic States was reiterated. The will to cooperate in international organisations was declared to support the sharing of similar views on various regional and international problems (Bayaliyev 2014). In the summit, which ended with the signing of the Ankara Declaration⁸², the establishment of a free trade order that allows the free movement of people, goods, and services by harmonising the customs legislation between the Turkic Republics, establishing joint investments and development bank, development of the railway, road and air connections and telecommunication opportunities, the issues of transferring the natural resources of the Turkic Republics to Europe via Turkey and developing coordination and cooperation opportunities in economic matters in order to be integrated into the world economy were emphasised.⁸³

In brief, the cooperation at the first summit was not designed for a single area but as a multidimensional one. Due to the variety of matters being discussed, the necessity to establishing working groups related to the realisation of regular summits was determined to continue the summits as a cooperation initiative. By doing this, it aims to handle urgent matters of discussion instead of losing control while focusing on particular areas.⁸⁴ Accordingly, the participants agreed to publish a statement containing the topics discussed at the end of each meeting.

The second summit, hosted by then-the President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel on the 18th-19th October 1994 in Istanbul, was attended by the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, and the same Heads of State from other participant countries who had attended the previous summit. At this summit, where foreign policy issues were addressed more than in the previous one, the cooperation for the preparation of a comparative dictionary of Turkic dialects within the scope of linguistic unity, mutual understanding, cultural cooperation, and the preservation, restoration, and promotion of shared cultural heritage works was welcomed (Amirbek, Anuarbekuly and Makhanov 2017, 189). Regarding these goals, it was also underlined that cooperation between universities should be

⁸² The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d.) “Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi: Zirveler Tarihçesi”, , <http://www.turkkon.org/tr-TR/zirveler-tarihcesi/4/52>, (Accessed in November 22, 2022).

⁸³ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Summits. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. https://www.turkkon.org/tr-TR/zirveler_sureci_bilgi_notu/4/52 (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁸⁴ A.g.e

developed, and student exchange programs with scholarships should be upgraded and continued.

Following the recommendations and discussions over potential cooperation fields, the Heads of State agreed on the necessity of cooperation to develop trade without ignoring international obligations. In that regard, a heavy emphasis was placed on cooperation in the energy and transport sectors. Apart from energy and transport, the positive effects of the revitalisation of the historical Silk Road and Eurasia with the contribution of other relevant countries of the region, were also discussed during the summit.

In brief, during the second summit, the cooperation items have been diversified, and the framework of its scope has been drawn in more detail. However, as Yeşilot notes, despite the diversity of subjects held in the second summit, the urgent topic for the participants was cooperation in economic relations; because the newly emerged Turkic Republics' primary interest was to become economically independent and stable countries as soon as possible.⁸⁵

By becoming a bridge between Europe and the Turkic Republics, and diversifying the areas that it could cooperate, Turkey chased the goal of supporting out the states of the Turkic World to develop the standards of its partners. However, helping these states overcome their obstacles was not only due to the pure intention of benevolence but also to Turkey's self-interest in avoiding its international loneliness, mainly due to Turkey's changing state identity after the foreign policy perspective of the country was changed by Özal and Demirel. Therefore, by emphasising the spirit of brotherhood, and common identical, historical, cultural, and linguistic ties between the Turkic communities at the end of each summit, the international loneliness of Turkey was sought to be avoided.

The same leaders who have been part of the second summit attended the third summit as well, which President Akayev hosted in Bishkek on August the 27th – 29th, 1995. At this summit, unlike the previous ones, it was deemed appropriate for the related ministers to meet to take the necessary measures to ensure direct and transit transportation links, to facilitate the free movement of services or capital, to improve the working conditions of

⁸⁵ Yeşilot, O. personal communication, March 29, 2021.

businesspeople, and to remove the obstacles that hinder or limit mutual trade, banking, and insurance activities.⁸⁶

In order to develop cultural and humanistic ties, the establishment of joint educational institutions and the organisation of festivals and cultural days were emphasised. To facilitate this, the Heads of State welcomed the establishment of joint educational institutions such as Azerbaijan-Turkish, Kazakh-Turkish⁸⁷, and Kyrgyz-Turkish Universities⁸⁸, which are among the essential steps of the Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World. Due to the developments experienced in the immediate geography of the member countries, the importance of combating terrorism, drug and psychotropic substance smuggling was included for the first time in the Bishkek Summit Declaration, and the need for international cooperation in these matters was also emphasised (Şimşir 2021, 109).

Even though all the Heads of State of participant countries addressed their feelings about common identity claims through the summits, more than statements on identity claims are needed to prove the mutual interest towards continuing cooperation. Therefore, in order to take advantage of common identity, culture, history, and language claims, the necessity of the preparation of a comparative dictionary of Turkish dialects within the scope of cultural cooperation and the preservation, restoration, and promotion of shared cultural heritage, cultural days, and joint educational institutions were discussed throughout the second and third summits in particular.

The same leaders who attended the Bishkek Summit also participated in the fourth summit, which President Kerimov hosted in Tashkent on October 21, 1996. At the fourth summit, the Heads of State declared for the first time that they are in favour of establishing a suitable legal environment for facilitating economic cooperation between

⁸⁶ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Summits. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/tr/zirveler> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁸⁷ Since the "Cooperation Agreement in the fields of education, science, culture, and sports" was signed between Turkey and Kazakhstan, it was decided to make Turkistan State University a joint university of the two countries. In that regard, the agreement on establishing the International Hoca Ahmet Yesevi Turkish-Kazakh University in the City of Turkistan was signed in Ankara on October 31, 1992, between the two countries' governments, at the Summit of the Heads of State of the Turkic-speaking countries.

⁸⁸ Kyrgyzstan-Turkey Manas University (KTMU) was established jointly between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan on September 30, 1995, in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, within the framework of developing bilateral relations.

actual and legal persons in order to create a common market for goods, services, capital, and labour, provided that it is not contrary to international obligations (Amirbek, Anuarbekuly, Makhanov 2017, 191). In this context, they were keeping the door of a joint market establishment ajar for the future. Additionally, cooperation with Turkic-rooted states and other regional and non-regional actors in transportation and the methods applied for economic development were listed in detail at this summit for the first time (Musabay-Baki 2014, 150).

The Tashkent Summit is where the decision to establish the Turkish-speaking States Summit Secretariat and to prepare its charter was taken, and the foreign ministries to arrange this were assigned. Coordinating the documents to be prepared in this context, making the preparations for the meetings, organising symposiums to introduce the Turkic language and culture, researching the sources examining the past and present of the Turkic peoples, and compiling and preparing them for publication were the first duties given to the secretariat, which was decided to be established but could not be implemented for a long time.⁸⁹

Although the leaders that attended the Tashkent Summit tried to start institutionalisation in their relations by proposing the creation of a secretariat and its charters, the Tashkent Summit was the last summit attended by the Heads of state of six Turkic States (Kodaman and Birsal 2006, 427). The first indication of that lack of unity in the Heads of State's participation was experienced in Astana. Turkmenistan participated in the fifth summit hosted by Nazarbayev in 1998 in Astana, at the level of the parliament speaker.⁹⁰

At the Astana Summit, steps were taken based on the institutionalisation of the cooperation. The secretariat charter was adopted, and the foreign ministries were assigned to supervise the secretariat's work. According to the charter, the secretariat would carry out its work according to the action plan drawn up by the host country and

⁸⁹ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). History of the Organization. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/en/organizasyon-tarihcesi> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁹⁰ Orhan Kavuncu stated that even though this was seen as the first setback at the summits of the Turkic-speaking state, it did not raise any question marks for the institution's future. According to Kavuncu, Turkmenistan's efforts to remain neutral and impartial have caused it to take such steps from time to time (Kavuncu, O. personal communication, January 29, 2021).

approved by the foreign ministries. In that regard, the host country was obliged to provide the secretariat with the necessary facilities and conditions to perform its mandate.

The secretariat was given duties such as compiling notes of the adopted decisions, monitoring their implementation and preparing the necessary documents, and the right to request necessary information from Turkic-speaking states in order to fulfil its functions. Participating states were going to send representatives to the secretariat, chaired by the host country's summit representatives. According to these provisions, a mobile and temporary secretariat structure was considered. However, such a secretariat was not ready to be established at that time.⁹¹

While Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan participated in the sixth summit hosted by Heydar Aliyev on April 8, 2000, in Baku at the president's level, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan participated at the level of the speaker of the parliament. The Heads of State interpreted the lack of participation on the Presidential level by the two states as a sign of the necessity for changes in the strategies of the summits. In that regard, the participants of the Baku Summit pointed out the need to give a new impetus to cooperation based on mutual benefits and equality at the first summit of the 21st century.

At the summit, unlike the previous ones, importance was attached to the development of regional cooperation regarding the realisation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey-Europe Caspian transit natural gas pipeline (Ismailzade 2005, 7). The reason for pointing out the need for regional cooperation was due to the Turkic Republics' improving developments and independence status. The states of the Turkic World were enjoying almost a decade of their independence, their relations with Europe were not predominantly based on Turkey's help, and their independence from Russia in various fields was confusing the leaders of the Turkic Republics in continuing the summit process with Turkey.

⁹¹ Pelin Musabay Baki noted that this situation could not be denied according to the conditions of that day. Although the Heads of State were interested in constituting the secretariat, in terms of cooperation and common interests, joint decision have made to focus more prioritised areas for improvement of the institutional summits on these dates (Musabay-Baki, P. personal communication, May 8, 2021).

Therefore, the Heads of States agreed upon the necessity of taking the cooperation between Turkey and Turkic-speaking states to the next step.

Throughout the sixth summit, a proposal was made to create a joint data bank to harmonise the regional support given to the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and other international organisations' reform efforts to ensure peace and security. The steps to be taken in the fight against drug smuggling, and to quickly transmit information on criminal activities in this area, once again were also presented at the Baku Summit.

At the sixth summit of the Turkic-speaking Heads of State in Baku, in accordance with the context of the summit, Demirel gave a speech by addressing the Presidents of the Turkic Republics as 'brothers'. During this speech, he emphasised that participating in these summits, which contributed to the formation of mutual understanding, solidarity, and mutual consciousness, was delighting for him and his country. As Yuldashev stated, while he encouraged the development of economic relations and the increase of the contribution of cultural organisations within the summit, he also indicated his wish to take Eurasia to its old days with the works of these summits.⁹²

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan participated at the presidential level in the seventh summit held in Istanbul on April 26th – 27th, 2001, hosted by the President of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Turkmenistan participated at the Head-of-State level upon Turkey's invitation. Uzbekistan participated at the level of the parliament speaker.⁹³ Most of the issues in the previous summits were repeated at this summit. In this context, a consensus was reached on the acceleration of the work carried out to revive the Great Silk Road and promote regional and international cooperation in all fields.

The seventh summit of Turkish-speaking states once again reflected the summits' desire for improvement or evolution. The most critical problem regarding the Turkish-speaking Heads of State summits was that they needed to be more varied, but they were unable to put the targeted common working principles into effect. Therefore, although

⁹² Yuldashev, D. personal communication, March 12, 2021.

⁹³ Professor Asem Nauşabayeva Hekimoğlu attributed this to the fact that the problems experienced in the past with Uzbekistan could not be overcome. On the other hand, Turkmenistan did not appreciate the value of the institution sufficiently and wanted to keep itself as an isolated player of the region like Switzerland (Nauşabayeva-Hekimoğlu, A. personal communication, April 30, 2021).

the start of the relations was based on common identity claims and the mutual goals of its members, the summits' cooperation goal with a win-win ideal of economic, cultural, and linguistic relations could not be fully achieved.

Despite this relative failure, a decision was made to hold the next meeting in Ashgabat in 2002 to continue the pursuit of the summits' goals. However, the next summit was held in Antalya, which was hosted again by Turkey, with a delay of four years. Although Uzbekistan did not participate in the eighth summit, Turkmenistan participated at the ambassador level hosted by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on November 17, 2006 (Terzioğlu 2012, 71).

The insistent requests of Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev led this summit to be able to organise. In his speech at the summit in 2006, Nazarbayev drew attention to the fact that nearly 200 million Turkic people are spread worldwide, and spoke the same language for four centuries until Russia separated the Turks from each other. Nazarbayev continued his words by quoting Atatürk: "As Atatürk mentioned, the Turk has no friend other than the Turk and that they should always act together in a friendly and brotherly manner towards the high goals in front of them."⁹⁴ After the four years break due to the members' internal and external issues, the purpose of that speech was interpreted as encouraging the members of the summits to continue to develop their collaboration.

Unlike others, the statement of the Antalya summit primarily emphasised the importance of the joint struggle against terrorism, separatism, extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime in the Eurasian region. Ibrahimov noted that the difference between the Antalya Summit and the subjects that it contained was mainly due to the developments after September 11th, 2001.⁹⁵ In that regard, attention was drawn to Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, and the importance of summits' continued commitment to contribute to permanent peace, and the necessity of support to activities carried out by the international community have been underlined.

⁹⁴ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Press Release of the Sixth Summit of the Turkic Council, The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. https://www.turkkon.org/en/haberler/press-release-of-the-sixth-summit-of-the-turkic-council_1670 (Accessed in November 29, 2022)

⁹⁵ Ibrahimov, R. personal communication, May 26, 2021.

Throughout the Antalya summit, the progression of cooperation processes in transportation and energy were appreciated.⁹⁶ The need to simplify and speed up visa procedures to facilitate interaction between Turkic communities was discussed for the first time by the Heads of State. More importantly, as of this summit, the summit declarations started to be signed not in Turkish-Russian, but in Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkish, which was a big step toward furthering the cooperation.

Additionally, due to the importance of the principle of sovereign equality amongst the Turkic states in the cooperation process, the expression of "Turkish-speaking Countries"⁹⁷ began to be referred to as "Turkic-speaking countries". Therefore, from this summit on, no misunderstandings were allowed based on the undertaking of the credits of the organisation.⁹⁸ According to Cafersoy, the change of the summit's name was made due to the following reasons:

- 1) Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan started to not participate in the summits at the level of Heads of State so the participants of the summits thought changing the name and the contents of the summits would be refreshing and encourage a new start for the participants;
- 2) The possibility of Turkmenistan, which aims to maintain an impartial status, being dissatisfied with the definition of Turkish-speaking states;
- 3) The name of the summits was evoking the language that only Turkey is uses.⁹⁹

Despite the gradual progress in the relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World in their relations' first decade, the economic crises experienced in Turkey in 1994 and 1998-1999 and reoccurring in 2001; and the political, economic, and social "triple transition" process¹⁰⁰ in the states of the Turkic World caused the desired results

⁹⁶ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Statement of Antalya Summit. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/tr/zirveler> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁹⁷ For the states participating in the summits of Turkic-speaking countries, the word Turkish evoked the meaning of the language spoken by the people of Turkey. Therefore, the summits transformed to be referred to as the Turkic-speaking states' summits instead of the Turkish-speaking states' summits.

⁹⁸ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Statement of Istanbul Summit. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/tr/zirveler> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

⁹⁹ Cafersoy, N. personal communication, May 5, 2021.

¹⁰⁰ Burulkan Abdibaitova Pala stated that the newly independent republics' first reaction to their independency was pure happiness. However, due to the need for economic, political, and social structuring in the early days following their independence, there were difficulties on reaching the international

to not to be fully achieved by the summits. While these countries continued to restructure their state identity and institutions within state-building process, they also tried to cope with the difficulties experienced in the transition to a market economy. Despite such a scenario, the programs of summits and the goals it planned to achieve could be counted as achievements. In that regard, the table 4.1 below emphasises each summit's goals, commonalities between the summits, and new agendas to interpret and understand what the first decade of relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World was like.



market and constructing their democratic structure (Abdibatova-Pala, B. personal communication, May 14, 2021).

The Contents of the Turkic-speaking States Summits: Differences and Common Focal Points

<i>Turkic-speaking States' Heads of States' Summits</i>	1992 Ankara Summit	1994 Istanbul Summit	1995 Bishkek Summit	1996 Tashkent Summit	1998 Astana Summit	2000 Baku Summit	2001 Istanbul Summit	2006 Antalya Summit
<i>The Establishment of Free Trade Order, Developing the Trade Volume and Economic Relations</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Joint Investments and Development Banks, Establishment of Mutual Insurance Companies</i>	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Development of Transportation (Railway, Air Connections) and Telecommunication</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<i>Natural Resources' Transfer to Europe and the World Market</i>	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
<i>Cooperation between Universities, Student Exchange Programs, Establishment of Joint Educational Institutions</i>		✓	✓					
<i>Revitalisation of Historical Silk Road</i>		✓			✓	✓	✓	
<i>Combating Terrorism, Drug, Smuggling and Preserving the Peace and Security</i>			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<i>Institutionalising the Summit Structure</i>	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
<i>Regional Cooperation over Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines</i>			✓			✓	✓	✓
<i>Facilitating Interaction of Turkic People, and Protecting the Legacy of Turkic Culture</i>		✓	✓	✓				✓

Table 4.1: Information is taken from Summit Papers.

As can be interpreted from the chart, throughout all the summits since 1992, the development of economic relations has been the primary goal of every summit. Apart from that, the transportation, telecommunication, interaction, the institutional structure of the summits, and the transfer of natural resources to Europe or the world market has been discussed in most of the summits based on mutual gains. However, more specific goals like promoting the Turkic Culture, the revitalisation of the Historical Silk Road and developing cooperation in education has sometimes been on the summits' agendas. An outcome could be noted that the goal of the participants to take advantage of these summits may be varied. Therefore, in the first decade of the summits, Heads of States discussions were focused on the need to define the most urgent needs of all participants to determine the expectations of participants of these summits.

In summary, the first summit held in Ankara was followed by nine more until it received a new name and structure. The multilateral outcome of these meetings was summit declarations that consisted of primarily non-binding provisions. Clement claims that it was not possible to achieve all of the objectives determined by Turkey on cooperation with the newly emerged Turkic Republics because these republics, which spent their first two decades of independence consolidating their sovereignty, were showing little interest in joining multilateral cooperation or regional integration.¹⁰¹

It is true that in the first years of their independencies, the leaders of the states of the Turkic World were not willing to be a part of an organisation to which they would devote themselves. Still, the Turkic-speaking states' summits process began with Turkey's initiative between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan due to the need for cooperation and synergy. Through this mechanism, summit statements were published at the end of each summit, mainly based on the existing spirit of brotherhood, solidarity, cooperation, and distinctive ties between Turkic communities and their shared identity, history, language, and culture. In that regard, it has been adopted that the basis of relations and cooperation between Turkic States has been adopted as being founded on independence, sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality. The fact that the

¹⁰¹ Clement, V. personal communication, May 16, 2021.

mentioned cooperation contributes to peace, security, stability, and economic development in Eurasia is an issue emphasised in many of the summit statements.¹⁰²

Attempts to develop relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World were based not only on the Turkic-speaking Heads of state summits. In accordance with developing cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World, assisting organisations were also established. For this reason, it will be helpful to explain the link between Turkey and the Turkic World by explaining these auxiliary organisations and presenting Turkey's goals towards the Turkic World comprehensively.

4.3. Assisting Organisations to Turkey's Relations with the Turkic World and Their Institutionalisation Process

The Eurasia where the traces of the Cold War are felt most is located on the historical Silk Road with its vast natural wealth and human resources. It is one of the areas where the number of organisations' establishment increased based on the regional cooperation in the post-Cold War period. While some of these regional cooperations in Eurasia were organised in non-institutional ways, the others started to be constituted by newly establishing regional organisations.¹⁰³ In other words, along with many public institutions, private sector organisations and non-governmental organisations have also played a role in the regional cooperation process.

Akıncı notes that Turkey used some of the foreign policy tools it developed after the Cold War for the Eurasian region for the first time.¹⁰⁴ In this context, there are initiatives that have been built with the characteristics of public diplomacy and economic and political breakthroughs amongst these tools. Within the scope of breakthroughs in the economic field, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was established in 1992 as an institution under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey to coordinate aid primarily to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

¹⁰² The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Summits. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/tr/zirveler> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁰³ According to Professor Mehmet Yüce, Turkish business people's commercial investments and mutual economic relations with the Turkic World had started before the interstate commercial cooperation. Therefore, these initiatives mainly introduced Turkey's ethics, cultures, and values to the Turkic World (Yüce, M. personal communication, March 24, 2021).

¹⁰⁴ Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

Turkey started its initiatives with TİKA to seize the new opportunities that flourished in the Turkic World and integrate with its cognates, which it avoided for years. In this regard, TİKA planned to act as an organisation that would implement and coordinate the activities and foreign policy priorities.¹⁰⁵

TİKA, as one of the first steps of institutionalising relations between Turkey and the Turkic World, was established to develop strong cooperation with the states of the Turkic World, and societies that have identical and cultural ties with Turkey. In addition to providing aid to the states of the Turkic World, TİKA also played a significant role as an economic diplomacy tool in creating the necessary working groundwork for Turkish businesspeople in the states of the region.

According to Özkan (2017, 221), the basis and the primary purpose of TİKA's activities were to reach the heart of the historical and cultural depth in Turkic-speaking countries and to revitalise the heart that stopped with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In response, Turkey's aid and approach toward the Turkic World was not limited to economic assistance. As Musabay-Baki noted, despite the independence of the Turkic Republics, they lacked trained diplomatic staff in the first place.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, to overcome such obstacles, Turkey initiated additional projects such as diplomatic training programs for the staff of the foreign ministries of these countries. The reason for such initiatives was that Turkey considered these services as its duty to guide the Turkic World States in international forums due to the respect for their common identity claims and historical roots. In this context, Turkey provided aid to these newly established states in accordance with its capacity in many activities on various cooperation fields.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. (n.d). About us. The official website of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency. https://www.tika.gov.tr/en/page/about_us-14650 (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁰⁶ Musabay-Baki, P. personal communication, May 8, 2021.

¹⁰⁷ According to Musabay-Baki, in the years following the independence of the Turkic Republics, Turkey rushed to help the Turkic Republics in many matters, especially in diplomatic works. Gün Kut, who was Musabay-Baki's thesis advisor and Süleyman Demirel's advisor on political matters, mentioned to Musabay-Baki that during the first visits to the Turkic Republics, Turkic Republics were assisted in every possible way, even taking into account the details such as the drafting of the constitution and the establishment of the central bank (Musabay-Baki, P. personal communication, May 8, 2021).

Purtaş emphasised that another step taken by the Republic of Turkey after the collapse of the Soviet Union was to develop cultural diplomacy between the states of the Turkic World.¹⁰⁸ By developing cultural diplomacy between Turkey and the Turkic World States, the intention was to ease the political interaction between the parties due to the natural features of cultural diplomacy. However, due to the difficulty of determining the scope of cultural diplomacy, measuring the capacity of cultural diplomacy in Turkey's relations with the Turkic World is not possible.

Cotayev believes that the realisation that there is room for improvement in the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World, particularly in economic and cultural areas, led Turkey to search for new foreign policy tools.¹⁰⁹ In order to discuss the possible improvement of relations, the Ministers of Culture of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan gathered in Istanbul and Baku. Regarding these discussions, the Heads of States reached an agreement to establish cultural, diplomatic initiatives and cooperation in 1992 (Musabay-Baki 2020, 71).

In order to increase cooperation in the cultural field, at the meeting held in Almaty on July 12th, 1993, the Ministers of Culture signed the agreement on the Establishment and Operating Principles of the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY)¹¹⁰ and started projects on the Joint Administration of Turkic Culture and Arts with its headquarters in Ankara.¹¹¹ In this regard, since its establishment, TURKSOY asserts its mission as “carrying out activities to strengthen the ties of brotherhood and solidarity among Turkic peoples to transmit their common cultural heritage to future generations and promote it worldwide.”

The particular needs of the Turkic World and Turkey led them to commence initiatives on economic and cultural basis, but the institutionalisation process of this relation needed further initiation. In order to develop institutional relations, increase inter-

¹⁰⁸ Purtaş, F. personal communication, March 1, 2021.

¹⁰⁹ Cotayev, Z. personal communication, May 22, 2021.

¹¹⁰ Firat Purtaş asserted that “TURKSOY's goal is to consolidate the cultural partnership of the member countries. TURKSOY is not an institution that can solve this responsibility alone as an institution.” According to Purtaş, to accomplish such a mission, communities need to be collectively mobilized to it (Purtaş, F. personal communication, March 1, 2021).

¹¹¹ TURKSOY (International Organization of Turkic Culture). (n.d.) About. <https://www.turksoy.org/en/turksoy/about>. (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

parliamentary cooperation between Turkic-speaking countries, and bring national legislation closer based on the partnership of history, culture, and language, the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TURKPA) was established in 2008.

The Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking Countries announced its primary goals as the principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial and state boundaries integrity, legal equity, and mutual respect grounded on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. In accordance with these goals, the strengthening of political and economic security of the countries on the grounds of refrainment from the threat or use of force or economic or any other pressure, the growth of national prosperity through the whole and rational use of natural resources, an endeavour towards new progress in the sphere of parliamentary diplomacy, the establishment of new relations and development of existing ones with parliaments and other international organisations of the countries in the region and all over the world are determined as other goals of the institution.¹¹²

Apart from economic, cultural, and institutional cooperation, Turkey's assistance to the states of the Turkic World was varified by launching the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation's (TRT) Eurasia channel, providing support for the transition from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet, and making an effort to create a common alphabet for mutual understanding in order to develop relations.

To conclude, there is a particular reason for discussing assisting organisations in the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World in this part of the dissertation. Since the start of the cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World, the development process of these relations has been supported by institutions and organisations like TIKA, TURKSOY, TURKPA, the Turkish Universities Union, the Turkic Academy¹¹³ the

¹¹² TURKPA (Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking countries) (14.07.2017) About TURKPA. https://turk-pa.org/en/content/about_turkpa. (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹¹³ The International Organization of the Turkic Academy, officially known as the International Turkic Academy, was established on August 23, 2012, between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey, to support academic research and education. In addition, facilitating the integration of Turkic peoples, researching the historical and spiritual role of Turkic culture, questioning the contribution of Turkic peoples to the development of world civilization, and promoting educational and scientific cooperation between Turkic-speaking countries were some of the other goals of the academy.

Turkish Business Council, the Young Diplomats Joint Training Program, the Turkish Culture, and the Heritage Foundation. Therefore, this dissertation envisions that elaborating upon the leading organisations and their goals that develop Turkey's cooperation with the Turkic World leads towards a better understanding of the fundamentals of these relations.

4.4. The Establishment, Purpose, and Structure of the Turkic Council

After eight summits held in Ankara in 1992, Istanbul in 1994, Bishkek in 1995, Tashkent in 1996, Astana in 1998, Baku in 2000, Istanbul in 2001, and Antalya in 2006, the founding agreement of the Turkic Council was signed between the founding members (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey) in 2009 in Nakhchivan.¹¹⁴ The establishment of the Turkic Council was an outcome of the Turkic-speaking states' summits. However, even though Turkmenistan's President Berdimuhamedov was part of the summits process, he decided not to sign the agreement that would make Turkmenistan a founding member. Clement believes that Turkmenistan did not sign the agreement to maintain its neutral status, which it announced after gaining its independence.¹¹⁵ Regarding this decision, Turkmenistan was willing to not fully be apart of any organisation or pact.

With the Nakhchivan Agreement on the Establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking Countries dated October 3rd, 2009, which concluded indefinitely, the tenth and last summit of the Turkic-speaking states' summits process was officially announced with the Istanbul Declaration on September 16th, 2010. With this announcement, the priorities and the road map of the Turkic Council had been revealed.¹¹⁶ In this context, with the establishment of the Turkic Council as a permanent structure, the summits were renamed as the Turkic Council Summits.

The Nakhchivan Agreement has been a turning point in institutionalising the relations between the Turkic-speaking countries and establishing a stable structure for their

¹¹⁴ Organization of Turkic States. (n.d.) History of Organization. <https://www.Turkkon.Org/en/Organizasyon-Tarihcesi>. (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹¹⁵ Clement, V. personal communication, May 16, 2021.

¹¹⁶ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d.) Organization of Turkic States. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/en/turk-konseyi-hakkinda> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

relations based on common identity, language, culture, and history claims in the geography of Turkic World, where global powers such as the US, Russia, China, and regional powers like India and Iran, and Afghanistan are striving to influence. Due to existence of such geographical concerns, apart from honouring the common identical, historical, linguistic, and cultural heritage claims, each Turkic Council member state joined the alliance for hard-headed reasons. Russia's near-abroad doctrine towards the former Soviet countries, revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, economic crises, and fluctuations in domestic politics were some of the reasons that led the states of the Turkic World to search for a strong and reliable alliance. Therefore, the underlying aim of the Council was to sustain and promote the members' position as subjects rather than objects of the geopolitical relations in Eurasia in a unified effort.

According to Ibrahimov, with the signing of the Nakhchivan Agreement and the Turkic Council's establishment, the Turkic-speaking states entered a new phase of cooperation based on concrete institutional mechanisms.¹¹⁷ In parallel to Ibrahimov's claim, the statements of the Nakhchivan Agreement emphasises that the Turkic Council was built to constitute a new stage in the strengthening of the relations between Turkic-speaking countries. In order to constitute that new stage, the formula has been developed by the member states to deepen relations. In that regard the importance of the role of economy and trade in international relations, and the necessity of the cooperation between the Turkic-speaking countries is confirmed. Apart from these agreements and mutual interests due to common identity, language, history, and cultural unity claims, the necessity of additional measures to increase cooperation by the potential of Turkic-speaking countries in commercial-economic, scientific-technical, and social fields was also emphasised.¹¹⁸

In recent years, the Turkic Council has proven its efficacy with its comprehensive and inclusive approach to cooperation between its member states. In a short period, the organisation has gained recognition as an essential actor of regional cooperation based on shared values and principles that include voluntariness, consensus, solidarity, and

¹¹⁷ Ibrahimov, R. personal communication, May 26, 2021.

¹¹⁸ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Key Documents-Nakhchivan Agreement on the Establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/en/temel-belgeler> (Accessed in November 22, 2022).

transparency. Consequently, the Turkic Council gave impetus to further expanding relations in many areas, followed by the establishment of two newly affiliated organisations – the Turkic Academy and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation.¹¹⁹ Thus, the Turkic World cooperation platform featured an institutional complementarity by pursuing multilevel interaction amongst the member countries. As Abdibaitova-Pala implies, these multilevel interactions and the process of institutionalisation as a whole has also systematically introduced the concept of the “Turkic World” to the international political discourse.¹²⁰

In order to cooperate in politics and announce the functionality of the Turkic World, organisations are established in the form of sub-organisations of the central organisation to strengthen cooperation among member states in other fields. To this end, the Turkic Council functioned as an umbrella body for all other autonomous collaboration mechanisms including TURKPA, TURKSOY, the Turkic Academy, and the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation.

The Turkic Council makes an effort to work in a broad area with an institutionalised and intensified cooperation. In order to achieve its goals, it is structured by five organs which are going to be elaborated upon due to their importance on the Turkic Council’s decision-making mechanism: The Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Senior Officials Committee, the Council of Elders¹²¹ and the designated Permanent Secretariat. Apart from these fundamental bodies, it has institutional ties with five related organisations:¹²² The Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking countries, the International Turkic Cultural Organization, the International Turkic

¹¹⁹ Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation were established on August 23, 2012, by the joint decision of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey in order to protect, research and support Turkic culture and heritage based on the historical ties, common language, culture and traditions between the peoples of Turkic speaking countries. The foundation's center, whose institutionalization process continues, is in Baku, and the depositor country is the Republic of Azerbaijan.

¹²⁰ Abdibaitova-Pala, B. personal communication, May 14, 2021.

¹²¹ The Council of Elders, whose functioning is determined by additional documents and meets regularly, is an advisory board that operates permanently. Consisting of member state representatives, this structure continues the tradition of consulting elders in Turkic culture.

¹²² The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Organization Chart. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/en/organizasyon-semasi> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

Academy, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, and the Turkic Business Council.¹²³

The Council of Heads of State is the main decision-making body of the Turkic Council. The Turkic Council Heads of state summit, held every year, aims to be organised with a particular cooperation theme. Musabay-Baki believes that the difference between the Turkic Council Heads of State summits from the previous summits process has been formed to achieve results by concentrating the work in a particular area.¹²⁴ By doing so, concentrating on a particular area, the repetition of the discussions that already agreed on would be avoided and the summits would be more productive.

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is tasked with evaluating the issues related to the activities on the agenda of the Turkic Council, determining the current international issues to be discussed in the Council of Heads of State, approving the personnel structure and financial report of the secretariat, and making a statement on behalf of the Turkic Council. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs meets every year before the Council of Heads of State meeting and can also hold extraordinary meetings at the location determined by the agreement of the member states. The country that hosts the regular meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers holds the term presidency of the Council until the next regular meeting.¹²⁵

The Senior Officials Committee, composed of representatives of the foreign ministries of the member states, is authorised to submit the draft documents prepared by the secretariat to the Council of Foreign Ministers for approval and to evaluate and approve before the final approval of the Council of Heads of State.¹²⁶

The secretariat was established as a permanent executive body to assist in executing the Council's mandate and objectives. The secretariat consists of the secretary-general, assistant general secretaries, and secretariat officers and is managed by the secretary-

¹²³ The Joint Business Council of Turkic Speaking Countries (Turkic Business Council) was established as a civil and non-profit international organization, considering the importance of promoting regional economic cooperation. The parties representing the Turkic Council member states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey) signed the contract on October 20, 2011, under the auspices of the Turkic Council.

¹²⁴ Musabay-Baki, P. personal communication, May 8, 2021.

¹²⁵ Abovementioned information is specified in detail in Articles 6 and 8 of the Nakhchivan Agreement.

¹²⁶ In Article 7 of the Nakhchivan Agreement, this information has been elaborated on.

general. The secretary-general is appointed by the Council of Heads of State, on the proposal of the Council of Foreign Ministers, on a rotational basis of three years, in accordance with the English alphabetical order of the names of the member states.

Akıncı explained the duties of the secretariat is to take the administrative, organisational, protocol, and technical measures that will be needed to organise the meetings of the Council of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Senior Officials Committee, and other meetings.¹²⁷ In addition: preparing draft documents, classifying and archiving documents; and serving as a clearinghouse of documents and information transmitted by member states and other international organisations and forums, are also the duties of the secretariat. The secretariat also publishes general information about the Turkic Council, performs other duties to be assigned by other organs of the Council, and reports to the Senior Officials Committee on financial activities.¹²⁸ In addition to its regular duties, the secretariat also has an international legal personality to sign agreements, buy and sell property, appear in court as plaintiff and defendant, open bank accounts and conclude contracts on cash assets with the consent of all parties.¹²⁹ Thus, the authority to make treaties is given to the secretariat, one of the elements of the international legal personality.

In summary, while moving towards the 20th year of their independence, the states of the Turkic World had made significant progress in their geopolitical, geo-cultural, and geo-economic transformations compared to the first days of their independence. With the maturation of the conditions, the modalities of regional cooperation began to be determined within an institutional framework.

In the first fifteen years, Turkey has developed its cooperation with the Turkic World primarily based on common identity, language, history, culture, and tradition claims. However, political and economic relations have been limited to bilateral relations due to the Turkic-speaking state summits' inefficient collective decision-making mechanism. Additionally, Turkmenistan's policy of neutrality, Uzbekistan's distancing from the

¹²⁷ Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

¹²⁸ In Article 10 of the Nakhchivan Agreement, this information has been elaborated on.

¹²⁹ A.g.e

relations due to a variety of reasons¹³⁰ the existence of border and ethnicity problems between the members, some of the members' capacity to cooperate with Russia in the political and military fields (due to the fact that Russia has some leverages for pressure in relations with these states) and China's increasing economic weight in these regions caused relations between the members to be limited mainly to cultural issues.

The states of the Turkic World largely completed their state formation during the initiation of the Turkic Council. In this context, by establishing the Turkic Council the intention was to show that the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World were different from the first day in the context of the scope of the collective relations. Therefore, the purpose of the establishment of the Turkic Council, its mission, and the contents of the summit have been explained in the next section in order to present the importance of the council and its contribution to Turkey-Turkic World relations.

4.5. The Turkic Council Summits Process

The Turkic Council summits, which planned to enter a new institutional era with the Nakhchivan agreement in 2009, continued with a summit in Istanbul on September 16th, 2010, hosted by President Abdullah Gül. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan attended the meeting at the presidential level, while the President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguli Berdimuhamedov, was the host's guest.

At the 2010 summit, the Heads of State expressed their hopes that the Turkic Council would develop an institutional quality to the cooperation amongst the member states and contribute positively to regional cooperation (Şimşir 2021, 124). Following the discussions on the institutionalisation of the organisation, the final stage in establishing the secretariat of the Turkic Council located in Istanbul was welcomed by the leaders. With the approval of the four Heads of state, Halil Akıncı¹³¹ was elected as the Turkic

¹³⁰ Uzbekistan's opposition leader Muhammed Salih's presence in Turkey while the President of Uzbekistan, Kerimov, was accusing him of treason; a Turkish citizen who was part of the crew that attempted to assassinate Kerimov; and Turkey's being among those who condemn Kerimov with the declaration on the Andijan Massacre in the United Nations were some reasons that caused the distancing of Uzbekistan from the relations of Turkic World.

¹³¹ Halil Akıncı believes that the Secretary-General of the Turkic Council should be able to act as an arbitrator in solving the problems between the states of the Turkic World. According to Akıncı, it is vital to stand together against common external problems. Regarding these opinions, it is worth noting that his interest in the Turkic World and his vision of the Turkic Council was influential in his being the first secretary-general of the Turkic Council (Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021).

Council's first Secretary General, who worked on the field of the Turkic World and served as Turkey's Ambassador to Moscow. More importantly, Halil Akıncı was part of the delegation sent by Turkey to the Turkic communities and Tajikistan when the USSR was about to dissolve.

It was not just a coincidence that Halil Akıncı was appointed as the Secretary General of such a mechanism by the Heads of States. The appointment of a figure who worked on the preparation process of the summits as the founding Secretary General of the Council could serve a reminder of what was missing in the past and what might shed light on the steps that should be taken in the future.

Under this structure, the permanent secretariat, which became operational in 2011, has continued to increase its cooperation in many fields, including the economy, transportation, customs, education, culture, science, foreign policy, diaspora, and tourism. In this regard, with the instructions expressed by the Heads of State in the summit declarations, working groups are formed in the relevant field of cooperation within appropriately identified areas.

One of the changes presented in the Istanbul Summit Statement¹³² was to draw attention to the importance of establishing a mutual attitude in regional and international organisations so that the common sensitivities of Turkic-speaking countries would be known and cared for by other international organisations.¹³³ In order to achieve this, meetings are held between the relevant ministers under the coordination of the secretariat and the decisions that have been taken by the ministers approved by the Heads of State.

As Musabay-Baki previously indicated, unlike the Turkic-speaking state summits, the Turkic Council Heads of State Summits are held annually and organised with a particular cooperation theme to achieve results by intensifying work in that area.¹³⁴ That

¹³² "İstanbul Zirve Bildirisi", 24-26 Nisan 2001, http://www.turkkon.org/Assets/dokuman/05_Istanbul2001_7_Devlet_BaskanlariZirvesiBildirisi_20140418_103624.pdf (Accessed in June 11, 2021).

¹³³ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). The Organization of Turkic States-Statement of Istanbul. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. <https://www.turkkon.org/en/turk-konseyi-hakkinda> (Accessed in November 22, 2022).

¹³⁴ Musabay-Baki, P. personal communication, May 8, 2021.

decision was also one of the most important differences between the Turkic Council and the Turkic-speaking Heads of State summits, because the Turkic Council was trying not to repeat the issues it discussed and achieve the missions it aimed towards addressing the issues one by one within the institutional structure.

In this context, the Almaty Summit which is the first summit organised under the institutional umbrella of the Turkic Council was held on October 20th– 21st, 2011 under the "Economic Cooperation" theme, with the participation of Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, the Kyrgyz Republic President Roza Otunbayeva, and Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ from Turkey.

During the Summit, Bekir Bozdağ firstly emphasised the importance that was placed upon the Turkic World by Turkey. According to Bozdağ, the Almaty Summit was necessary to revive ties and cultural textures between the people of the Turkic World. By expressing the necessity of the revival of ties, he also highlighted the duties that each country has to develop relations between themselves. In that regard, he claimed that the most important of these duties is ensuring visa-free transits. Bıyıklı explains the reason why Bozdağ considered that visa-free transition was crucial as it would accelerate the development of economic relations and mutual understanding of people.¹³⁵

Through the Almaty Summit, the Heads of State demonstrated their satisfaction with the start of a new process in the development of cooperation. However, despite the convincing progress since the Nakhchivan Agreement, the member states' leaders were determined to develop relations further with the support of common identity, culture, language, and history claims. In that regard, the establishment of the Turkic-speaking countries' media platform stepped up to inform society about the Turkic Council and its related institutions in the press organs of the member countries.¹³⁶

The theme of the Almaty Summit was based on economic cooperation. Therefore, the main focus during the summit was to develop cooperation in commercial and economic

¹³⁵ Bıyıklı, M. personal communication, January 29, 2021.

¹³⁶ Radio and Television Supreme Council. (2021, December 20). Media Union is Established by Turkic-speaking Countries. The official website of the Radio and Television Supreme Council. <https://www.rtuk.gov.tr/-turkce-konusulan-ulkeler-ve-turk-devletleri-tarafindan-medya-birligi-kuruluyor/4186> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

initiatives. In this context, the summit's statement pointed out the necessity of joint work, mainly in industry, agriculture, transportation, and communication. However, while working on such projects, commercial transactions should be secured by establishing a joint insurance company union to facilitate mutually expanding investment opportunities among member countries. Therefore, the Heads of State welcomed the establishment of the Turkic Business Council to facilitate the necessary adjustments in securing such relations.

The Second Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking countries was held in Bishkek on August 22nd – 23rd, 2012. The summit was themed "Cooperation in the Fields of Education, Science, and Culture". The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan Artur Rasizade, the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev, and the President of Turkey Abdullah Gül attended this meeting.

In his speech at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting held before the second Summit of the Turkic Council, Davutoğlu underlined significant steps¹³⁷ that had been taken towards the institutionalisation of the council in such a short time since the Nakhchivan Agreement established the Turkic Council. In accordance with these steps, he showed his contentment towards the Turkic Council's institutionalisation process and becoming an internationally recognised and reputable organisation. Davutoğlu indicated that he was proud of the common cultural heritage of Turkic States. Yet, he expressed his wishes to increase the density of the cooperative initiatives, particularly on common language, history, and scientific research, to level up the cooperation.¹³⁸

At the end of the Second Summit of the Turkic Council, the Presidents signed the Bishkek Summit Declaration; the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Turkic Council member countries signed the agreement on financing the Turkic Council General

¹³⁷ The Secretariat of the Turkic Council was quickly established and started to operate in Istanbul. In this regard, the ministers of the member states and assisting organizations worked to develop relations since the Nakhchivan Agreement signed.

¹³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. (n.d.) Türk Konseyi II. Zirvesi Bişkek'te düzenlendi. The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-konseyi-II-zirvesi-biskekte-duzenlendi.tr.mfa> (Accessed in November 22, 2022).

Secretariat, and the Ministers of National Education signed agreements on establishing the Turkic Academy in Astana and the Turkic Cultural Heritage Foundation in Baku.

In consequence, it was decided that the Turkic Academy would be established at the end of the Nakhchivan Summit with the proposal of the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, gaining international status. Asker noted that through the Turkic Academy's gain of international status, which had been working with the possibilities of Kazakhstan for the last two years, would now be able to carry out its activities more strongly with the support of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey.¹³⁹

However, the most important and historic decision of the summit was the determination of the flag of the Turkic Council.¹⁴⁰ The flag, which consists of the colours and symbols taken from the flags of the four-member states, could also be seen as a common flag symbolising Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey due to its colour, star, crescent, and sun.

The Third Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking countries was held in Gabala, Azerbaijan, on August 15th – 16th, 2013, with a "Transportation and Connection" theme. Within the scope of the summit's theme, it was considered by the Heads of the state that promoting multimodal transport with the Caspian Crossing in the East-West transportation corridor would increase the trade between the member countries and allow the realisation of the transit potential of the countries.¹⁴¹ In this context, it was also emphasised that the efforts to facilitate customs procedures should accelerate.

Within the scope of the summit, foreign ministers met on August 15th. Following the meeting of foreign ministers, the Heads of State meeting was hosted by Ilham Aliyev and was held on August 16th with the presence of the President of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Mr. Almazbek Atambaev, and the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül. Fattah Heydarov, the Azerbaijani member of the Council of Elders within the Turkic Council, Ramil Hasanov, TURKPA Secretary

¹³⁹ Asker, A. personal communication, March 11, 2021.

¹⁴⁰ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Logo and Flag. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States.<https://www.turkkon.org/en/logo-ve-bayrak> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁴¹ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Press Release of the Third Summit of the Turkic Council. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States.https://www.turkkon.org/tr/haberler/turk-kenesi-uncuncu-zirvesi-basin-duyurusu_35 (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

General, Dusen Kaseinov, TURKSOY's General Secretary, and Sakir Ibraev, the President of the Turkic Academy presented their reports on the previous year's activities to the Foreign Ministers and the Heads of State.¹⁴² Likewise, the Turkic Council Secretary General Halil Akıncı also presented a comprehensive report on the meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of State regarding the efforts to deepen the cooperation between the member states in the third year of the secretariat responsible for the coordination of the Council's activities.¹⁴³

During his speech at the Gabala Summit, President Gül emphasised the Turkic Council Summits as the strongest indicator of unity and solidarity of brotherly peoples. According to Gül, the decisions that were taken under this roof served the mutual desires and expectations of the peoples of brotherly countries. While emphasising the global realities of making an adequate transportation and communication network essential for comprehensive cooperation and integration between countries and nations, Gül summarised his opinions on transportation and communication network as: "The economic and cultural integration of the Turkic World is closely tied to implementing projects that will connect the transportation infrastructures between our countries."¹⁴⁴

According to Gül, by accomplishing these missions, the Turkic World could be one of the central regions of the global economy in the years that followed, which he claimed as the necessary top priority of the organisation. In parallel to Bozdağ's and Davutoğlu's recent speeches, by announcing the importance of the Turkic World in Turkey's political agenda, the political elite of Turkey once again reminded the members that the Turkic World and the Turkic Council was one of the top priorities of Turkey mainly due to its transformed state identity that now embraced the common bonds of Turkic communities.

¹⁴² TURKPA and TURKSOY as the assisting organizations to the Turkic Council, inform both the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Heads of State about the work of their institutions during the Turkic Council.

¹⁴³ Halil Akıncı stated that he presented this report to the foreign ministers and the Heads of State to contribute to the development of the Turkic Council. The report contained the first three years of works of the Turkic Council, institutional shortcomings, and views on how they could improve the institution (Akıncı, H. personal communication, January 29, 2021).

¹⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. (n.d.) Türk Konseyi Üçüncü Zirve Toplantısı Gebele'de gerçekleştirildi. The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-konseyi-ucuncu-zirve-toplantisi-gebele_de-gerceklestirildi.tr.mfa (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

The Fourth Summit of the Turkic Council was held on June 5th, 2014, in Bodrum. The President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atambaev, and the President of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov attended the meeting hosted by the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül.

A few days before the Bodrum summit, establishing the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana led to questions of its importance. However, Gül and Aliyev clarified this issue throughout their speeches. The President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, emphasised that the cooperation of the states of the Turkic World was not in conflict with any organisation. Regarding the Eurasian Economic Union's establishment, Gül denoted his opinions by explaining that it was natural to look to strengthen the relations of peoples with shared roots, culture, and history. In parallel to Gül's speech, Aliyev asserted his satisfaction with the economic relations, transportation, and cultural relations developments of the Turkic Council. He then explained precisely his consideration of the Turkic Council as: "Of course, common identity, language, roots, culture, and history stand based on our unity, and today we establish good cooperation on this solid foundation."¹⁴⁵

The Turkic Council Summits' theme in 2014 was determined as "Tourism Cooperation". During the previous year, the Turkic Council Member States held a series of meetings to initiate and develop tourism cooperation. In this context, the Ministers of Tourism of the Member States met for the first time in Istanbul in April 2014. Following the meetings of the Ministers of Tourism, the Heads of State also committed to working together to benefit from the mutual tourism potential of the Turkic Council Member States. In this context, they all welcomed the concrete steps taken by the institutions responsible for tourism, such as the "Tourism Joint Cooperation Protocol" and the initiative to create the "Turkic Council - Modern Silk Road" tour package consisting of tourism destinations of the Turkic States on the Silk Road.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Uluslararası Politika Akademisi. (June 13, 2014). Bodrum Zirvesi: Türkçe Konuşan Devletlerin Birleştirici Stratejisi. <http://politikaakademisi.org/2014/06/13/bodrum-zirvesi-turce-konusan-devletlerin-birlestirici-stratejisi/> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁴⁶ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Modern Silk Road Joint Tour Package. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States.https://www.turkkon.org/tr/isbirligi-alanlari/turizm_6/modern-ipek-yolu-ortak-tur-paketi_13 (Accessed in May 16, 2022)

At the end of the Bodrum Summit, the Heads of state declared their support for the First Nomad Games¹⁴⁷ to be held jointly by the Kyrgyzstan Government and the Turkic Council Secretariat in Issyk Kul on 8th – 14th September 2014. They also expressed their support for the First Turkic University Games¹⁴⁸ which was planned to be hosted by Turkey in 2015, and approved by the "Turkic Universities Union"¹⁴⁹ and the Directive on the Establishment of Higher Education Area", which would form the basis of the cooperation between the universities of the Turkic World.

The Fifth Summit of the Turkic Council was held in Astana on September 11, 2015, under the theme of 'Developing the Common Information Space and Multilateral Cooperation'. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the President of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atambaev and the Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Turkey Ismet Yılmaz attended the summit hosted by Nursultan Nazarbayev. In addition to these representatives, the Prime Minister of Turkmenistan Sapardurdi Toyliyev attended the meeting as the host's guest.

At the ceremony held on September 11th, 2015, foreign ministers of the member states agreed to sign the Turkic Academy, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, and the Center of Nomadic Civilisation's¹⁵⁰ complementary documents as newly affiliated organisations of the Turkic Council. As indicated by Sarı, by constituting such organisations, the members of the Turkic Council took an essential step toward the institutionalisation of this organisation.¹⁵¹

At the summit, where the ministers in charge of Media and Information of the Members States also participated, the Heads of State signed the Fifth Summit Declaration of the

¹⁴⁷ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). World Nomad Games. The official website of the Organization of Turkic States. https://www.turkkon.org/tr/isbirligi-alanlari/genclik-ve-spor_7/dunya-gocebe-oyunlari_27 (Accessed in June 11, 2022)

¹⁴⁸ The University Sports Games, which did not occur on the planned schedule in Istanbul, could only be held in Baku in 2018 to facilitate social relations. Organized in 7 different sports branches, approximately 400 university athletes and coaches from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey attended the event.

¹⁴⁹ The Union of Turkic Universities was established on March 29, 2013, under the umbrella of the Turkic Council in order to create the Turkic Council Higher Education Area, by developing cooperation in the field of higher education, among the member countries of the Turkic Council, in the process determined as the Orhun Process.

¹⁵⁰ Azernews. (2018, August 27). Turkic speaking countries create Center of Nomadic Civilization. Azernews. <https://www.azernews.az/nation/136744.html> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁵¹ Sarı, Y. personal communication, April 30, 2021.

Turkic Council. In this framework, they welcomed the Joint Cooperation Protocol on Media and Information signed by the Member States of the Turkic Council and the Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation among Official News Agencies and National TV Channels of the Member States.¹⁵² The Heads of State encouraged the establishment of the International Turkic News Channel and emphasised their appreciation for activities performed in the economy, including the organisation of business forums held during the last year.

Along with economic cooperation, the Heads of State instructed the relevant institutions of the member states to work towards the realisation of the Turkic Council Modern Silk Road Joint Tour Package, which the Secretary General of the Turkic Council presented during the summit with a compact disc and brochure regarding the tourism cooperation (Bostanci and Lüleci 2019, 736).

Following the fifth summit of the Turkic Council, Shavkat Mirziyoyev was elected as the President of Uzbekistan in 2016. Throughout his speech in parliament on September 8th, 2016, Mirziyoyev revealed his preferences as a policymaker regarding security and foreign policy. According to Mirziyoyev, his country would not pursue membership in any military-political alliance during his presidency.¹⁵³ However, due to the Turkic Council's cooperation strategies, Mirziyoyev was excited about the Turkic Council. As the new President of Uzbekistan, Mirziyoyev was looking for a foreign policy that might progress through soft power. In that regard, the Turkic Council's cooperation process based on common identity, history, language, and culture seemed appropriate for his administration.

In this direction, the administration of Mirziyoyev has increased the range of diplomatic initiatives regarding the resolution of border disputes with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and tried to facilitate the transit and transportation of citizens of neighbouring Turkic World states across the borders of Uzbekistan. In addition, during his official visit to Turkey on October 25th-26th, 2017, Mirziyoyev also stated that he would facilitate the visa

¹⁵² The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). Information&Media. The Organization of Turkic States. https://www.turkkon.org/en/isbirligi-alkanlari/information-media_8 (Accessed in May 28, 2022)

¹⁵³ Gazeta Uz. (September 9, 2016) Metin: Başbakan'ın Parlamento Genel Kurulundaki Konuşması, <https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/speech>. (Accessed in May 28, 2022)

process for Turkish citizens¹⁵⁴ which was previously elaborated upon by Bozdağ during a summit and would increase the bilateral trade volume to 3-4 billion dollars in the coming years. Briefly, the decisions of Mirziyoyev have been implemented, and the preferences that he has made in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan since he became the president were signals of Uzbekistan's re-approach to the Turkic Council.

The Sixth Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states was hosted by Sooronbai Zheenbekov, President of Kyrgyzstan, on September 3rd, 2018, in Cholpon-Ata on the theme of "Youths and National Sports". While Ilham Aliyev, as the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the President of the Republic of Turkey and Ramil Hasan as the Secretary General, joined the Summit. In addition to these representatives, Shavkat Mirziyoyev as the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Viktor Orban as the Prime Minister of Hungary also participated the summit at the invitation of Zheenbekov.

In his opening speech, President Zheenbekov welcomed the Presidents to Cholpon-Ata, where the opening ceremony of the Third World Nomad Games¹⁵⁵ was held the previous day with broad worldwide participation. At the summit, the Heads of State delivered their speeches and shared their considerations surrounding the further development of Turkic World cooperation. In this regard, President Erdoğan emphasised the need for new initiatives to increase the trade volume and evaluated the improved potential of economic cooperation between the member states better in his speech. After evaluating the potential of economic cooperation, Erdoğan also pointed out his consideration of the relations between the member states as: "The dependence of international trade on the dollar has now become an obstacle to us. In this regard, we propose to focus on the option of trading in our currencies."¹⁵⁶ He then finalised his

¹⁵⁴ Yeniçağ Gazetesi. (October 27, 2017) "Özbekistan'dan Türkiye'ye Vize Kolaylığı!". <http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/ozbekistandan-turkiyeye-vize-kolayligi-175493h.htm>, (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁵⁵ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). World Nomad Games. The Organization of Turkic States. https://www.turkkon.org/en/isbirligi-alanlari/youth-sports_7/world-nomad-games_27 (Accessed in June 11, 2022)

¹⁵⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. (n.d.). Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Türk Konseyi 6. Devlet Başkanları Zirvesi'ne katıldı. The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/96393/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-turk-konseyi-6-devlet-baskanlari-zirvesi-ne-katildi> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

words by signifying the cruciality of fighting against problems they face as collaboratively.

In addition to Erdoğan's speech, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Ilham Aliyev, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Viktor Orban gave their speeches on the matters that they sought to address. In that regard, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, underlined the importance of the Concept Paper to be prepared in consultation with both existing affiliated and related organisations of the Turkic Council and relevant authorities of the member states, to be submitted until the 7th Summit of the Turkic Council to furthering the Turkic integration and cooperation.¹⁵⁷ The President of Azerbaijan, Aliyev, emphasised the significance of transportation and energy projects in the Turkic-speaking states, highlighting their added value in empowering regional cooperation.

In his speech, the President of Uzbekistan Mirziyoyev noted their willingness to participate in the meetings and projects of the Turkic Council. Referring to the Modern Silk Road Joint Tour Package Project of the Turkic Council¹⁵⁸ Mirziyoyev expressed their readiness to include historical cities such as Bukhara and Khiva in this joint package. Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, referring to common cultural and historical ties with the Turkic States, stated that they would like to work closely with the Turkic Council and expressed his gratitude to the Presidents for granting observer status to Hungary at the Council.¹⁵⁹

In summary, during the sixth summit's speeches, the presidents of the member states precisely emphasised their countries' interests which could be supported by this organisation. Turkey's trouble against the dollar or any other currency, Azerbaijan's interest in energy projects, and Uzbekistan and Hungary's wishes to be part of the cooperation process were mainly due to the self-interest of the decision-makers of the

¹⁵⁷ The Organization of Turkic States. (n.d). The 7th Summit of the Turkic Council was held in Baku.https://www.turkkon.org/en/haberler/7th-summit-of-the-turkic-council-was-held-in-baku_1907 (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁵⁸ Modern Silkroad Joint Tour. (n.d.) About the Silk Road. Modern Silkroad Joint Tour Package. <http://www.modernsilkroadtour.com/en/about-the-silk-road> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

¹⁵⁹ Esma Özdaşlı asserts that Hungary was one of the countries that aimed to join the Organization of Turkic States as an observer due to its linkage to the Turkic identity, which obtained observer status in 2018 (Özdaşlı, E. personal communication, May 4, 2021).

member states. In that regard, it is worth claiming that, despite the nature of the start of the summit process which was mainly based on common identity, culture, language, and history claims, later iterations became more complex than ever due to national interests and ambitions of political elites.

The Seventh Summit of the Turkic Council took place in Baku on October 15th, 2019, with the participation of Ilham Aliyev, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sooronbai Zheenbekov, President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of the Republic of Turkey, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, Purlı Agamyradov, Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan and the Turkic Council Secretary General Baghdad Amreyev.

The summit coincided with the 10th Anniversary of the Nakhchivan Agreement, the founding agreement of the Turkic Council, and greeted Uzbekistan as the newest member of the organisation. The Baku Summit was dedicated to the theme of "Supporting the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises". Therefore, the Heads of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries of the Member States also attended the summit to be part of the discussions about the content of the relations.¹⁶⁰ During the summit, the Heads of State deliberated its high agenda. They discussed major issues of multilateral cooperation amongst the member states in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. They also elaborated upon and exchanged views on pressing political issues in the region and beyond. In this context, member states expressed their approaches towards Turkey's operation Peace Spring as it could contribute to fighting terrorism, ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria, liberate local Syrians from the oppression of terrorists, and create conditions for the safe and voluntary return of displaced Syrians to their homeland.¹⁶¹

The Eighth Summit of the Turkic Council was held in Istanbul on November 12, 2021 and hosted by the President of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It was

¹⁶⁰ Turksoy. (2019, October 16). 7th Summit of the Turkic Council in Baku. Turksoy. <https://www.turksoy.org/en/news/2019/10/16/7th-summit-of-the-turkic-council-in-baku> (Accessed in May 28, 2022)

¹⁶¹ Anadolu Agency. (2019, October 15). Turkic Council supports Turkey's anti-terror operation. Anadolu Agency. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/operation-peace-spring/turkic-council-supports-turkey-s-anti-terror-operation/1614575> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

attended by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kasim-Jomart Tokayev, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Jabarov, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the President of Turkmenistan, Gurbangulu Berdimuhamedov, the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban and the Secretary General of the Turkic Council Baghdad Amreyev.

During the Summit, which was dedicated to the theme of "Green Technologies and Smart Cities in the Digital Age", the leaders underlined the importance of joint action concerning the pressing topics of the global agenda. They made decisions on several important issues concerning the organisation's future and made an agreement to change the organisation's name from the Turkic Council to the "Organisation of Turkic States"¹⁶² in order to continue to the institutionalisation process of the institution's structure.

The Heads of State's decision to change the name of the institution from the Turkic Council to the Organization of Turkic States is to commit to taking roots, growing, developing, and flourishing more quickly, especially persistently, with a new name and a new structure.¹⁶³ As the President of Kyrgyzstan indicated, the completion of the transformation of the Council into the Organization of Turkic States would create a positive effect by strengthening the organisation's position in the international arena. In this regard, Sadyr Jabarov claimed that this transformation would encourage the expansion of the scope of the organisation's activities and enable other countries to join the organisation or seek observer status.

The Istanbul Summit in 2021 coincided with the 30th anniversary of the independence of the Turkic States, when the organisation's members greeted Turkmenistan as the newest observer member. In addition to Turkmenistan's observer status' approval, the

¹⁶² At the Eighth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Turkic Council, held before the Summit of the Turkic Council Heads of State, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, confirmed that the name of the Turkic Council would be changed with the following words: "We are changing the name of our Family Assembly to the Organization of the Turkic States. The time has come for that."

¹⁶³ Ulusal. (2021, November 12). Cumhurbaskani Erdogan Acikladi: Turk Konseyi'nin ismi degisti. Ulusal. <https://www.ulusal.com.tr/haber/8627982/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-acikladi-turk-konseyinin-ismi-degisti> (Accessed in November 22, 2022)

main agendas of the Istanbul Summit was the determination to forge new cooperation modalities with third parties and institutions, the establishment of the Turkic Investment Fund, and the approval of the Turkic World Vision-2040, which lays out the Organization's medium and long-term goals and tasks.

The leaders also exchanged opinions on several significant regional political and economic developments, emphasising the increasing role and the promising future of the organisation in addressing political and economic challenges in the international arena. They expressed that fruitful collaboration needs to be further strengthened in all core fields of mutual interest, remarkably increasing trade and investments, transport and logistics, green and renewable energy, and the environment.

The Eighth Summit of the Organisation of Turkic States was a historical event that constituted a significant turning point. Cooperation between the member states entered a new era where the member states expressed their will for closer cooperation and deeper integration in the Turkic World. An increased interest in the organisation and the participation of Uzbekistan as a member, and Turkmenistan and Hungary as observers created opportunities for the members of the Organization of Turkic States to cooperate in broader geographies with wider contexts. However, the unifying factors of the members are no longer limited to common identity, culture, language, and history claims. Instead, the priorities of the member states started to gain economic or political interest from this organisation or the institutions affiliated with the Organization of Turkic States.

To conclude, with the establishment of the Turkic Council under the structure mentioned above, issues including the economy, culture, transportation, customs, science, foreign policy, and tourism were discussed in the council's secretariat, and efforts to increase cooperation were made. In this context, themes on economic cooperation in Almaty in 2011, education, culture, and science in Bishkek in 2012, transportation and connectivity in Gebele in 2013, tourism in Bodrum in 2014, media and information cooperation in Astana in 2015, youth and national sports in Cholpon-Ata in 2018, the support of small and medium-sized enterprises in Baku in 2019 and green technologies and smart cities in the digital age in Istanbul in 2021 were implemented. In order to understand the details of the organisation, the main topics of

the summits, the content of the cooperation and repetitive matters that have been dealt by the Heads of State can also be interpreted by Table 4.2 below.

The Scope of the Turkic Council Summits: The Persistence of the Discussions

<i>The Turkic Council Summits</i>	2011 Almaty Summit	2012 Bishkek Summit	2013 Gabala Summit	2014 Bodrum Summit	2015 Astana Summit	2018 Cholpon-Ata Summit	2019 Baku Summit	2021 Istanbul Summit
<i>The Protection and the Promotion of the Turkic Council and the Turkic Culture</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
<i>Cooperation in Economy, Tourism, Industry, Agriculture, and Sport</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Development of the Transport Network and Strengthening the Cooperation in Customs</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<i>Cooperation in Education and Science, Publication of Common History Book by Using Common Terminology and Common Terms</i>		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
<i>Utilisation of Oil and Natural Gas pipelines</i>	✓				✓	✓		✓
<i>Institutionalisation the Relations between the Member States</i>	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
<i>Preserving Security and Regional Prosperity (Combatting Terrorism, Discrimination, and Extremism)</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
<i>Emphasising the Development of Relations through the New Initiatives</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓

Table 4.2: The Informationis taken from the statements of the Turkic Council Summits.

Since the Turkic-speaking states summits turned into the Turkic Council Summits in response to the aim of institutionalising cooperation, the content of each meeting has

been determined in advance in order to be consistent and non-repetitive. However, despite this mission, the goals and interests of the member states, the issues they face, and the dynamics of the region caused the organisation to return to the same issues at different times. In that regard, cooperation based on economic, industrial, agricultural, and touristic fields have been part of each of the summits of the Turkic Council. On the other hand, compared to these initiatives, the discussions over oil and gas pipelines, cooperation in education, and protection or promotion of Turkic Culture have been emphasised to a lesser extent.

To summarise, the emergence of Turkic-speaking state summits and the institutionalisation of these summits by establishing the Turkic Council were aimed to engender cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World states based on common identity, culture, language, root, history, and custom claims. By embracing these commonalities, Turkey could benefit from these relations, and avoid its feeling of international loneliness. The Turkic Republics, on the other hand, as Former Soviet Republics, would be escorted by Turkey to reach their targeted independence and well-being on economic and political matters.

Although it is hard to speak of the consistency of Turkish Foreign Policy on the approach to the Turkic World, the lack of institutionalisation; particularly during the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Turkey's changing state identity in the last two decades due to the rising of new pillars in its internal agenda and the political elites' changing preferences in Turkish Foreign Policy, were the most important reasons for the flux in the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World. Therefore, due to its structure and relevance to Turkic identity, the Organization of the Turkic States has been elaborated upon the scope of its historical background, working principles and objectives by providing the details of the summits throughout this part of the dissertation.

Additionally, the contents of the summits, the speeches of the Heads of state during the summits, the experiences of the member states during the summits, and the reasons for the institution's name change have been analysed in depth to highlight the details of Turkey's relations with the Turkic World. In that regard, the activities of the Turkic Council since its establishment, its importance for Turkish Foreign Policy, the historical

moments of the summits, and why the process towards success of this organisation, which tries to shape its future in a planned manner has been delayed so much, what the changes and the expectations from this organisation have been examined.



5. CONCLUSION

The complex nature of identity and identity's influence on foreign policymaking, and increasing interest in it, caused the focus of this dissertation to be the influence of identity on foreign policy. It is expected that this work will contribute to the literature by presenting the influence of identity on states' foreign policy making processes and by questioning the contents of the relations between the states that claim to have common identity.

In order to contribute to the literature; the dissertation sought to examine different types of approaches towards understanding identity's influence on foreign policymaking. In that regard, interviews have been conducted to answer the research questions and confirm the hypothesis of the dissertation. In brief, the dissertation intended to take some of the literature's shortcomings by presenting new conclusions drawn from the data that was obtained from the interviews. In order to examine the deficiencies of the literature, and meet the research objective, the dissertation examined the historical progress of the identity concept, the development of identity studies, and identity's relation with foreign policymaking.

Due to its status as the main topic, identity's influence on foreign policy has been exemplified through Turkey's relations with the Turkic World based on the common identity, history, culture, and language claims of Turkey and the Turkic World. Additionally, in order to understand the content of the cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World, the structure, missions, and the possibility of success of the Organization of Turkic states has been investigated regarding mutual goals, shared perspectives, and correlations in themes reflected in documents produced by the Organization of the Turkic States.

This preferred method provided a chance to see; the fundamentals of identity from all dimensions; present an understanding of identity's relation with foreign policy; detect the differences, similarities, and conflicts of members of the Organization of Turkic States; and investigate the possibility of success in relations between the communities that claim to share a Turkic identity. The methodology helped to identify the patterns of complex relationships between Turkey and five other states and the type of institutional

relationship amongst these states. Therefore, in order to provide a clear conclusion to the research and interpret the future implications, the outcomes of Turkic identity's influence on Turkish Foreign Policy, the historical background of Turkey's relations with the Turkic World and the institutionalisation process of the Organization of Turkic States has been briefly summarised in the following conclusions.

In order to understand the critical turning point in Turkey's relations with the Turkic World, the end of the 20th century is crucial. In the latter years of the twentieth century, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of states with Turkic identities caused Turkey to turn its face to this geography in its foreign policy. Although the Turkic-speaking states struggled to structure their nation-states in their first years of independence in the post-Soviet era, they still attracted the attention of regional powers, including Turkey, due to the region's strategic importance and underground wealth.

The relations between Turkey and the states of the Turkic World started with mutual official visits in 1991 based on the common identity, culture, history, and language claims of the Turkic-speaking states' leader. Afterwards, these visits to start the institutional relationship were initiated with the Turkic-speaking Heads of State summits in 1992 through bilateral relations in communication, transportation, culture, education, trade, and economy. In addition to developing bilateral relations, cooperation between Turkey and the Turkic World has been developed by assisting organisations like TIKA, TURKSOY, and TURKPA. The establishment of these assisting organisations causes this research to interpret Turkey's primary concern toward the region and the possible regional cooperation as securing the welfare of the Turkic peoples and the stability of the region instead of benefitting purely in its relations with the states of the Turkic World.

However, despite the continuation of the Turkic-speaking states' Heads of State summits for almost 20 years and the establishment of new regional initiatives of the Turkic World, Turkey's Foreign Policy objectives in the Turkic World have yet to be fully accomplished. The cases discussed and the decisions taken at these summits could only be advisory due to the lack of a decision-making mechanism of the summits. Therefore, the expectations of the countries participating in the summits began to decline, and the perspectives of the participants changed. The main reason for the

discontinuance of relations seemed to be because of the advisory and repetitive structure of the summits.

When the topics of the summits were observed, it was interpreted to interpret that the member states' relations with each other were based not only on economies or politics but also on common identity, culture, history, and language claims. However, the summits' lack of an institutional structure and binding rules in the relations between Turkey and Turkic-speaking states has created a necessity for a brand-new institutionalised organisation.

In that regard, the Nakhchivan Agreement in 2009 was the start of a new era in Turkey's relations with the Turkic World in which the brand-new institutionalised organisation became established because the Turkic-speaking states summits' evolution to the Turkic Council was a product of the Nakhchivan Agreement. The reason for establishing such an organisation was to strengthen the ties between members of the Council. The signing of this agreement was a milestone in the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World because the Turkic Council Summits was held to accelerate the steps towards institutionalisation and to achieve a common working principle regarding many issues, including political, regional, or cultural issues.

During the Turkic Council summits, primary efforts were made to develop cooperation in the economy, education, science, culture, transportation, tourism, media, and sports. Although developments in cooperation can be observed in almost all targeted areas, the members still agreed on the need to increase the efficiency of these cooperations. Because even though the economic relations seem to be improved, for instance, it can be observed that the majority of the commercial capacities of the member countries were still under the dominance of Russia or other great powers.

In this context, the failure of the revitalisation of the historical Silk Road project could be given as an additional example. The member states of the Turkic Council have been planning to develop tourism on the Silk Road in tourism for years, however, this project's desired level of progress has yet to be achieved. In addition, China's plans for the Silk Road show that the Turkic Council needed to work more effectively and quickly in evaluating its project in tourism.

The exemplification of the decision-making mechanism's slowness of the Turkic Council could be diversified. In this context, due to the claim of common history and language claims, there has been planning regarding the projects of linguistic and historical fields such as composing mutual history books, curricula, or mutual courses. However, due to the impracticality and slowness of the council's lack of persistence, these projects remain in the queue to be accomplished as a goal of the Turkic Council. Similarly, the activities of the Turkic Council in sports are organised under the name of nomadic state sports events. However, although four of them have been organised by this point in time, the participation could be widened by the possibility of new members or the observers of the council. By incorporating this, the universal language of sport could reach to more states to develop cooperation through mutual benefits.

Nevertheless, despite the inefficiency, slowness, and lack of depth on many topics in the relations, there are also satisfying developments between Turkey and the Turkic-speaking states. In this context, the members of the Turkic Council have made an effort to include at least one Turkic State in the United Nations Security Council every year. By doing this, according to the members' common sense, the people of the Turkic States' rights would be defended and they would have a chance to speak on international matters from the Turkic perspective.

Similarly, the practice of making a joint statement from the member states' foreign ministers within the framework of the meetings of the Turkic Council and relevant international organisations, when necessary, could be considered as another example of the reflection of the development of political cooperation development within the Turkic Council. The "Common Attitude About Afghanistan"'s announcement at the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Istanbul Process for Afghanistan on April 26th, 2013, and the "Common Statement of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Turkic Council on the events that took place in Egypt" agreed at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at the margin of the third Summit of the Turkic Council, are just a few examples of these reflections.

In order to institutionalise the Turkic Council, and transform it into a more effective organisation, the latest step of the institutionalisation process and strengthening of the structure of the council was taken at the summit in Istanbul in November 2021, when

the seven members of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, plus Hungary and Turkmenistan as observers – renamed themselves as the Organization of Turkic States. The Heads of state of the Turkic Council, who gathered in Istanbul, announced that the institution's name was transmitted to the Organization of Turkic States with a statement published after the eighth summit. In this context, the Heads of State reiterated their commitment to deepen and expand cooperation and solidarity based on the Turkic-speaking peoples' common identity, history, language, culture, traditions, and values claims, in line with the aims and principles of the Nakhchivan Agreement. In addition, the Heads of State also announced that they accepted the "Turkic World 2040 Vision" initiated by Nursultan Nazarbayev, Honorary President of the Organization of Turkic States, as a strategic document that will guide future cooperation in areas where the Turkic States have common interests.

Based on this summary of relations, conclusions were drawn on two different levels. Firstly, in Turkey and the states of the Turkic World cooperation process, there are instances in which each cooperation process intersects with the others in terms of cooperation themes. However, due to minor aspects altering each cooperation process different, such as the methods used or contextual differences, they differ from each other. The fact that there is no detected unsolvable conflict over the cooperation projects in terms of the relationships between the Turkic-speaking republics, creates an expectation to overcome the shortcomings of the organisation particularly due to mutual statements of the leaders on the common interest, identity, and roots claims.

Nevertheless, in terms of institutional relations, the relations between Turkey and the Turkic World constitute complex dynamics. A lack of core regional organisation defined all regional and identity-based cooperation agendas and norms for almost thirty years. In that sense, there is a difference between now and thirty years ago due to the existence of the Organization of Turkic States. Since establishing an organisation with an institutionalised structure through the secretariat and other supportive branches, Turkey's relations with the Turkic World tends to cooperate in all manners despite minor differences and conflicts of members' interests.

Secondly, the research highlighted this complex institutional relationship from the state and institution-based perspectives. First observing mainly from a state-based perspective, the cooperation process emerged despite the rivalry between big powers as a product of agendas, states' goals, interactions, and positioning of the states of the Turkic World. Accordingly, Russia, Iran, China, and the United States are involved in the regional decision-making mechanism to ensure that Turkey or any other regional power does not dominate all cooperation fields.

In this complex domination of cooperation dilemma, Turkey uses the common identity, culture, language, and history claims as its privilege to advance the development of its relations with the states of the Turkic World. However, some Turkic-speaking states still prefer to be part of all cooperation options to prevent the tensions between the rivalries of the powers mentioned above. On the other hand, observing from an institution-based perspective, it is seen that despite the institutionalised relations between Turkey and the Turkic World, each member of the Organization of Turkic States shapes its priorities through various directions and various goals. Thus, despite the similar declarations of states on particular matters, the effort and desire of each member to become united under the Organization of Turkic States is different from each other. Although the Turkic-speaking states lack an unconditional will, the Organization of Turkic States still prevents other regional powers from becoming dominating decision-makers in the region.

In epitome, the Organization of Turkic States, which emerged with the claim of common identity, history, culture, and language, and an emphasis on mutual interests between Turkey and the Turkic-speaking states, has become an effective organisation in the Turkic World, with its history, institutional structure, and goals dating back to 1992. As can be understood from the tables shared in the fourth chapter, although the topics that the Heads of state consulted upon in the Turkic-speaking state summits formed the basis of structuring the relations in the first years, more specific and mutually beneficial issues were discussed later on by the establishment of the Organization of Turkic States.

However, the Organization of Turkic States members build partnerships to promote their domestic and foreign policy priorities because the Turkic World countries value their multi-vector orientation. Therefore, states of the Turkic World would not put all of

their diplomatic eggs in one basket. Instead, they would prefer to cooperate with Russia for historical reasons, China for economic investment, and the US for security reasons. Similarly, Turkey desires the development of economic, social, cultural, and scientific relations with the states of the Turkic World within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States. Even though Turkey has the power and capacity to develop this partnership, prioritising Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World not only on common identity but on common interests, acting with mutual respect and making joint decisions might cause Turkey to be Turkic-speaking states' cooperation priority.

In order to become the Turkic World's biggest partner based primarily on economy matters and politics, the Turkish Foreign Policy's tendency toward the region is increasing since Erdoğan became the most influential actor in the country. It is no secret that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wants to turn Turkey into a pivotal regional player. In order to do that, Turkey could pursue one of three models to realise this goal: pan-Islamism, neo-Ottomanism, or pan-Turkism. With pan-Islamism, the Turks have serious competitors like Saudi Arabia and Iran. Neo-Ottomanism is untenable because Turkey has lost its influence in its former European and Asian territories. Nevertheless, when it comes to pan-Turkism, the country has no rival equivalent to other models. In this context, Turkey's recent support to Azerbaijan in its 2020 war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh due to its unique relationship with Azerbaijan led and encouraged the rest of the Organization of Turkic States to make statements in supportive ways which could also be interpreted as the guidance of Turkey and its goal of organisational leadership.

Although Turkey's approach towards the Turkic World was based on the claim of a common identity, especially in the first years, with the steps towards institutionalisation steps of the Organization of the Turkic States, the claim of identity has become only a supportive argument of common interests. As a result of the interpretations in Charts 1 and 2, while subjects such as the development of economic relations, the increase of trade capacity, and the expansion of the transportation network are dealt with permanently, the rarity of discussions on a common history book and the glossary proves that common interests are at the forefront for the Organization of Turkic States.

The Organization of Turkic States has begun to plan its activities in many areas for the future. According to the 2040 vision of the Turkic World, in the economic domain, the Organisation of Turkic States members will focus on improving the transport corridors between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey, which are the shortest and most economical routes connecting China and Europe. Here, the organisation's geographic location may prove invaluable.

With a national income of 1.3 trillion dollars, a foreign trade volume of 560 billion dollars, a domestic investment stock of 250 billion dollars, and expansive production capacities, the Organisation of Turkic States points to economic potential. Increasing existing economic potential will become possible with deepening integration between the parties. Furthermore, the joint institutions and initiatives significantly contribute to economic infrastructure development. In order to gain more from the Turkic World, Turkey should continue to use organisations including TURKSOY, TURKPA, Turkic Culture, Heritage Foundation, Turkic Academy, Turkic Universities Union, and Union of Turkic World Municipalities for greater cooperation.

Similarly, in developing the relations and expanding the area that Turkic identity claims can influence, the Organization of Turkic States' expansion process with an observer status of Hungary is a step that has to be examined. The expansion of the Turkic Council's member numbers has been one of the cases under consideration for years. So far, the accession of Hungary in 2018 and the accession of Turkmenistan in 2021 as observer statuses has been completed. Nevertheless, the Organization of Turkic States opened myriad opportunities to Hungary regarding economic integration with Turkey and the states of the Turkic World. Hungary's intention to collaborate with the Organization of Turkic States members is crucial because this relationship may create a chance to get closer to Europe on economic and commercial subjects. With the inclusion of Hungary and Turkmenistan in the Organisation of Turkic States as holding observer statuses, this platform can create a new Visegrad Partnership over a vast region. The population of over 170 million and the area from Hungary to Turkmenistan (West to East) would create one of the world's most attractive and busy regions.

In addition to Hungary and Turkmenistan's observer statuses, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Northern Cyprus have officially or verbally demanded to be part of the

Organization of Turkic States in the past. The demand for Afghanistan in 2021, just before the Taliban administration, seems uncertain and not currently possible. The war between Russia and Ukraine keeps Ukraine's position uncertain as well. However, in 2022, Northern Cyprus President Ersin Tatar's declaration of his intention to demand the observer status of the organisation seems possible shortly, mainly due to Erdogan's support. Nevertheless, the accession process of Northern Cyprus also remains uncertain for now. The countries related to Turkic identity located in a variety of bases may seem possible candidates for becoming members or observers of the Organisation of Turkic States. In this context, a possible request may be made by Mongolia, the Balkan States, and Bulgaria due to their historical, linguistic, or cultural Turkic roots, and the organisation's map, population, and capacity may become broader.

Similar to economic relations, potential future energy cooperation amongst the Organization of Turkic States assumes considerable geopolitical weight. Four of the seven members – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan – have significant hydrocarbon reserves. Moreover, Turkey is positioning itself as a hub for delivering energy resources from Russia and the Caucasus to Europe. In this context, the prospects of the Zangezur corridor and its implications in the region are one of the latest main agendas of the Organization of Turkic States.

Likewise, within a few months after the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan reached an agreement over a problematic gas deposit in the Middle Caspian. By dividing this apple of discord between themselves, this development brought back the idea of the trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Although Turkmenistan's monopolistic gas consumer is China, Ashgabat is interested in diversifying its client base. It would be interesting for the Turkmen leadership to turn its attention westward. It can further consider joining the Azerbaijan and Turkish gas projects, namely the Southern Gas Corridor. However, given the domestic crisis and uncertainty in Armenia, it is likely to take some time to return to the idea of the Zangezur corridor.

Similar to economic, commercial, and energy cooperations, the transition of Kazakhstan to the Latin alphabet may increase the country's links with other members of the Organization of Turkic States, especially Turkey, and facilitate the transition of

Kyrgyzstan to the Latin alphabet. To this end, Kazakhstan's initiatives to develop and strengthen the idea of integration with the Turkic World should be further supported with concrete steps. Such support can enable and strengthen the development of the Turkic World integration idea in Central Asia.

In conclusion, the Organization of Turkic States has implemented more than 130 working groups and expert meetings, 28 conferences, forums, vocational training programs, and youth camps and festivals, many of which are at the international level. The 2040 vision of the Turkic World and the 2025 strategy of the Organization of Turkic States show that the meetings under this organisation will soon become regular.

During recent decades, the young Turkic Republics have solidified their independence and are now skilled at the game of multi-vectoring, albeit to varying degrees. Thus the Turkic World is different from three decades ago, with a multipolar configuration now in place, featuring relatively affluent Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. This provides a better and more stable ground for coalescing. Although Russia, China, and the West have said relatively little about the seven-member Organization of Turkic States, with the Eurasian chessboard becoming increasingly pivotal as great-power competition heats up, they are unlikely to remain silent.

Besides the threat of Russian and Chinese intervention to the Organization of Turkic States' cooperation process, some other challenges exist since the countries stretch across three crucial and unstable or potentially volatile regions: Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. They also rely on different security alliances: NATO in Turkey's case and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Complicating matters even further is that Kazakhstan is a member of the Customs Union with Russia and Belarus, while Turkey still aspires to become part of the EU.

The Turkic World is surrounded by the 2025 and 2040 visions of the Organizations of Turkic States, including on the one hand, prospects for developing relations in economy, energy, and other fields in the future, on the one hand, and the regional powers' interest in the region on the other. Even though the Organization of Turkic States claims that avoiding the Russian, Chinese, European, and Iranian influence is not

their purpose, at the end of the day, conflicts on mutual goals seem inevitable. In such a position, Turkey seems to continue its relations with the Turkic World through the Organization of Turkic States, mainly based on economic and political relations by using its identity claim privilege. However, the possible change of any decision-maker member may ruin the plans for the future. Therefore, the dependence on the leaders or political elites may cause a crisis in relations between Turkey and the Turkic World.

Even though this research attempted to make an original contribution by interviewing politicians, academics, and field experts from different countries, at the beginning of the dissertation, it was planned to visit the countries that are considered throughout the research and conduct interviews or surveys with the people of the region in order to feel and hear what they feel about their identity. However, the covid process and limited transportation opportunities were obstacles to achieving that plan. Therefore, based on these deficiencies, further research could contribute to the literature by emphasising the public Turkic World's considerations on Turkic identity claims.

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APPENDIX A

A.1. Interview Questions

- Does the Turkic identity have a role in the foreign policymaking of Turkey?
- What are the obstacles to establish foreign policy through Turkic Identity?
- Did Turkic World become one of the alternatives of Turkish foreign policy in particular since the collapse of the Soviet Union?
- What does Turkic World mean? What is the correlation between Turkic World and Turkic identity?
- What is your opinion about the institutional progress of the Organization of Turkic States?
- What are your expectations and prospects from this organization in the future?
- Do you think the Organization of Turkic States will successfully strengthen the ties between Turkey and the Turkic Republics?
- Is it possible for Turkey to develop its foreign policy toward the Turkic World with the argument of a mutual identity?
- How would you define "Turk"? Would there be a difference between a definition of Turkish and Turkic?
- Is it possible to establish an identity-related Turkic Unity?
- Is it possible to use Turkic identity as a tool in Turkish Foreign Policy?
- How would regional powers like Russia and China perceive Turkey's foreign policies in the Turkic World?
- What is the importance of institutionalized relations in Turkic World?
- What are the reasons that kept Turkey and the Turkic Communities apart? What did Turkic Communities experience under Russian hegemony?
- How would you define state identity? What is the difference between state identity and national identity?
- How would you interpret the choices of Turkish Foreign Policy in recent decades?
- What are the initiatives of Turkey to create greater relations with Turkic World?
- Does identity have an influence on states' foreign policy making process?
- How the summit topics are being determined?

- What are the essences of Turkish Foreign Policy changes in recent decades?
Why is it hard to follow a continuous foreign policy?
- What does Russia think of Turkic-speaking states summits, Turkic Council, and the Organization of Turkic States?



APPENDIX B

B.1. Interviewees

- Halil Akıncı, Former General Secretary of the Turkic Council,
- Prof. Dr. Fırat Purtaş, Former Deputy Secretary-General of Turksoy,
- Prof. Dr. Okan Yeşilot, Director of Institute of Turkic Studies in Marmara University,
- Prof. Dr. Asem Nauşabayeva, lecturer in Bitlis Eren University,
- Prof. Dr. Yaşar Sarı, lecturer in Bolu Abant İzzet Baysal University,
- Prof. Dr. Mehmet Yüce, lecturer in Bursa Uludağ University,
- Prof. Dr. Ali Asker, lecturer in Karabük University,
- Dr. Pelin Musabay Baki, Former Director of Projects in the Turkic Council,
- Dr. Orhan Kavuncu, Former Rector of Ahmet Yesevi University and Deputy of 20th Term of Republic of Turkey Assembly,
- Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Biyikli, lecturer in Kutahya Dumlupınar University,
- Assoc. Prof. Esmâ Özdaşlı, lecturer in Burdur Mehmet Akif University,
- Assoc. Prof. Zakir Cotaev, lecturer in Kyrgyz-Turk Manas University,
- Victoria Clement, Eurasian Regional Analyst in Marine Corp University,
- Dr. Burulkan Abdibaitova Pala, lecturer in Ankara University,
- Dr. Davran Yuldashev, lecturer in Celalabad University,
- Nazım Cafersoy, Researcher and Writer on Azerbaijan and the Turkic World,
- Ravshan İbrahimov, Researcher on Azerbaijan-Turkey relations.

APPENDIX C

C.1.Charts of Turkic-speaking States Summits and Turkic Council Summits’ Topics

<i>Turkic-speaking States’ Heads of States’ Summits</i>	1992 Ankara Summit	1994 Istanbul Summit	1995 Bishkek Summit	1996 Tashkent Summit	1998 Astana Summit	2000 Baku Summit	2001 Istanbul Summit	2006 Antalya Summit
<i>The Establishment of Free Trade Order, Developing the Trade Volume and Economic Relations</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Joint Investments and Development Banks, Establishment of Mutual Insurance Companies</i>	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Development of Transportation (Railway, Air Connections) and Telecommunication</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<i>Natural Resources’ Transfer to Europe and the World Market</i>	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
<i>Cooperation between Universities, Student Exchange Programs, Establishment of Joint Educational Institutions</i>		✓	✓					
<i>Revitalisation of Historical Silk Road</i>		✓			✓	✓	✓	
<i>Combating Terrorism, Drug, Smuggling and Preserving the Peace and Security</i>			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
<i>Institutionalising the Summit Structure</i>	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
<i>Regional Cooperation over Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines</i>			✓			✓	✓	✓
<i>Facilitating Interaction of Turkic People, and Protecting the Legacy of Turkic Culture</i>		✓	✓	✓				✓

The Turkic Council Summits	2011 Almaty Summit	2012 Bishkek Summit	2013 Gabala Summit	2014 Bodrum Summit	2015 Astana Summit	2018 Cholpon-Ata Summit	2019 Baku Summit	2021 Istanbul Summit
The Protection and the Promotion of the Turkic Council and the Turkic Culture	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Cooperation in Economy, Tourism, Industry, Agriculture, and Sport	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Development of the Transport Network and Strengthening the Cooperation in Customs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Cooperation in Education and Science, Publication of Common History Book by Using Common Terminology and Common Terms		✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
Utilisation of Oil and Natural Gas pipelines	✓				✓	✓		✓
Institutionalisation the Relations between the Member States	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Preserving Security and Regional Prosperity (Combatting Terrorism, Discrimination, and Extremism)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Emphasising the Development of Relations through the New Initiatives	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓

APPENDIX D

D.1.Nakhchivan Agreement

NAKHCHIVAN AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

THE COOPERATION COUNCIL OF TURKIC SPEAKING STATES

Turkic Speaking States, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"; based on historical ties, common language, culture and traditions of their peoples; aiming at further deepening the comprehensive cooperation; desiring to jointly contribute to strengthening peace, ensuring security and stability, in the region and in the world as a whole, in terms of development of processes of political multipolarity, economic and informational globalization; considering that the interaction within the common structure facilitates the disclosure of huge potential for good-neighborhood, unity and cooperation among states and their peoples; proceeding from the spirit of mutual confidence, mutual benefit, equality, mutual consultations and aspiration towards common development established at the Summits of the Heads of Turkic Speaking States; reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other universally recognized principles, and norms of international law, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders of states, as well as those related to the maintenance of international peace, security and development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations and the cooperation among states; have agreed as follow:

Article 1

Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States

The Parties hereby establish a cooperation mechanism in the form of an international establishment - "Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States" (hereinafter referred to as "CCTS").

Article 2

Purposes and Tasks

The main purposes and tasks of CCTS are: strengthening mutual confidence, friendship and good neighborhood among the Parties; maintaining peace, strengthening security

and confidence in the region and in the world as a whole; search for common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including those in the framework of international organizations and at international fora; coordination of actions to combat international terrorism and separatism, extremism, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, as well as the assistance to international policy on control over illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;

promotion of effective regional and bilateral cooperation in political, trade and economic, law enforcement, environmental, cultural, scientific-technical, military-technical, educational, energy, transportation, credit, and finance areas and other areas of common interest; creation of favorable conditions for trade and investment, further simplification of customs and transit procedures aiming at facilitation of movement of goods, capital, services and technologies, and simplification of financial and banking operations; aiming for the comprehensive and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region through joint actions on the basis of equal partnership in order to steadily increase and improve the living conditions of the peoples of the Parties;

discussing the questions of ensuring rule of law and good governance and guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law, expansion of interaction in the field of science and technology, education, health, culture, sports and tourism; encouragement of interaction of the mass media and communication of the Parties in promoting, popularizing and disseminating the great cultural and historical heritage of the Turkic peoples; discussing questions of exchange of legal information for the development of interaction and mutual legal assistance, and cooperation in various spheres of law.

Article 3

Structure

In order to fulfill the purposes and tasks of the present Agreement the following is established: The Council of Heads of States; The Council of Foreign Ministers; The Senior Officials Committee; The Council of Elders of Turkic Speaking States; The Secretariat.

Article 4

Other forms of cooperation

To deepen the cooperation amongst the parliaments of the Turkic speaking countries the Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic speaking countries is functioning pursuant to the Istanbul Agreement of 21 November 2008. With a view of developing cooperation in the field of science, education, culture and art, dissemination and popularization of the common values of the Turkic world at international level, deepening cultural ties amongst the Turkic Speaking States, the Parties are cooperating in the framework of TURKSOY.

Article 5

The Council of Heads of States

The Council of Heads of States (CHS) is conducting its activity in the form of regular meetings of the Heads of Parties, in the framework of which, there shall be: considered the questions of interactions of Parties on the settlement of actual international problems; defined the priority directions of cooperation of Parties within the CCTS; held the review of activity of CCTS. The meetings of CHS shall be held once a year. The venue of the next meeting of CHS is determined, as a rule, in accordance with the English alphabetical order of the official names of the Parties. Extraordinary CHS meetings may be convened based on the consent of Parties. The venue of the extraordinary meeting of the CHS is determined by consent of the Parties.

Article 6

The Council of Foreign Ministers

The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) within its competence shall: consider the issues of current activities of the CCTS, define more actual international issues for their discussion in the frame of CHS meetings; approve StaffMatrix and financial report of the Secretariat.

The CFM may, if necessary, make statements on behalf of the CCTS. The meetings of CFM, as a rule, shall take place before the meetings of CHS at the venue of CHS meetings. Extraordinary CFM meetings may be convened based on the consent of Parties. The venue of the extraordinary meeting of the CFM is determined by consent of the Parties.

Article 7

The Senior Officials Committee

The Senior Officials Committee (SOC) consists of, at least, one representative from each Party. SOC, within its competence, shall: coordinate activity of the Secretariat; consider and endorse draft documents, worked up by the Secretariat before their adoption by the CFM and approval by the CHS. The SOC meetings are convened, as a rule, prior to the meetings of the CFM.

Article 8

Chairmanship

Party hosting the regular meeting of the CHS shall be CCTS Chairnman until the next regular meeting ofthe CHS.

Article 9

The Council of Elders

The Council of Elders of the Turkic Speaking States (Council of Elders) is a permanent advisory-consultative institution, functioning under the auspices of CCTS. Detailed aspects of the activity of the Council of Elders, including financial matters, should be defined by a separate document titled Regulation of the Council of Elders, which shall be adopted (accepted) by CFM. The Council of Elders in its activities is guided by the present Agreement and the aforementioned Regulation.

Article 10

Secretariat

To facilitate the implementation of the purposes and tasks of the CCTS, the Parties establish a Secretariat, which is a permanent executive body of the CCTS. The Secretariat within its competence shall:

- take necessary administrative, organizational, protocol and technical measures for holding meetings of CHS, CFM and SOC, as well as other meetings under the auspices of CCTS;
- prepare draft documents;
- establish and ensure archiving of documents;
- act as clearing house of documents and information, submitted by the Parties and received from other international organizations and fora;

- disseminate common information on CCTS;
- implement other tasks and duties, defined by CHS, CFM and SOC;
- prepares draft Staff Matrix and submits it to the SOC for approval;
- submits to the SOC its financial activities report.

The Secretariat shall be lead by the Secretary-General, who shall be approved by the CHS upon the CFM proposal. The Secretary-General has deputies from each Party except from the Party of his/her nationality. The Secretary-General is appointed from among the citizens of the Parties on a rotational basis in accordance with the English alphabetical order of the official names of the Parties for a period of three years without the right to prolongation of the term of office.

The Deputies of Secretary-General are appointed from among the citizens of the Parties by the CHS decision for a period of three years without the right of prolongation for the next term. The officials of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Parties in accordance with their national legislations from among their citizens. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General, his deputies and other officials of the Secretariat shall not seek or receive instructions from any Party, as well as third parties. They shall refrain from any actions which might influence their position as international officials responsible only to the CHS.

The Parties undertake to respect the international character of the duties of Secretary-General, his deputies and other officials of the Secretariat and not to influence them while performing their duties. The location of the Secretariat is the city of Istanbul (Republic of Turkey). The Parties endows the Secretariat with the right to conclude an international treaty with the Government of the Republic of Turkey on the conditions of Secretariat's location in the territory of the Republic of Turkey, draft of which should be initially approved by the CFM.

The Secretariat of the CCTS shall enjoy in the territory of each Party such legal capacity as necessary for the implementation of purposes and tasks of the CCTS. The Secretariat shall enjoy international legal capacity to implement purposes and tasks of CCTS, in particular: conclude treaties with the consent of all Parties; acquire and dispose the property; act in the courts as plaintiff or defendant; open accounts and make transactions in cash assets.

Article 11

Financing

The Secretariat has its own budget, which is formed and executed in accordance with a separate international treaty concluded among the Parties.

The Parties themselves shall bear the expenses for the participation of their representatives and experts in the events within the frame of CCTS.

Article 12

Privileges and immunities

Members of delegations and officials of the Secretariat for the period of participation in the work of meetings of CHS, CMF, SOC and Council of Elders shall enjoy in the territory of Host Party privileges and immunities that are accorded by international law to the personnel of accredited diplomatic missions.

Article 13

Permanent representatives

In accordance with their national legislations the Parties shall appoint their permanent representatives to the Secretariat.

Article 14

Other meetings

The Parties may agree to convene the meetings of heads of relevant ministries, agencies and organizations of the Parties to discuss the specific and/or technical issues.

Article 15

Relations with international organizations and fora

The CCTS can enter into interaction and dialogue, including on specific areas of cooperation, with international organizations and fora.

Article 16

Observers

The observer status with the CCTS may be granted to the states, international organizations and international fora. The order and procedure for granting such status shall be established by the Rules of Procedure of the CCTS.

Article 17

Languages

The working languages of the CCTS are the state languages of the Parties and the English language.

Article 18

Rules of Procedure

Procedural issues shall be defined by the CCTS Rules of Procedure, which shall be adopted by the CFM and approved by the CHS.

Article 19

Relations with other treaties

The present Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international treaties which they are parties to.

Article 20

Settlement of disagreements

In case of disagreements concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement, the Parties shall settle them through consultations and negotiations.

Article 21

Amendments and additions

By mutual consent of the Parties amendments and additions may be made to the present Agreement in the form of separate protocols being an integral part of the present Agreement and entering into force in accordance with the procedure set forth in Article 22 of the present Agreement.

Article 22

Validity, entry into force and accession

This Agreement is concluded for an indefinite period of time. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the receipt of the third written notification by the depositary on the completion of domestic procedures required for its entry into force. After its entry into force this Agreement is open to accession by Turkic Speaking

States. This Agreement shall enter into force for the acceding State on the thirtieth day after the receipt by the depositary of its instrument of accession.

Article 23

The depositary

The depositary of the present Agreement is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey.

Done in the city of Nakhchivan, on the 3rd day of October 2009 in a single original copy in the Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkish and English languages. All texts are equally authentic.

The original copy of the present Agreement shall be kept by the depositary, which shall send to each signatory Party a certified copy.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Details

Lütfi Koçođlu

Education

Bachelor Degree: Istanbul University - International Relations and Politics- (2008-2012)

Master of Arts: University of East Anglia- International Security and Diplomacy- (2013-2015)

Doctor of Philosophy: Kadir Has University - International Relations- (2016-2023)

Languages: Turkish, English

Research Experiences

Turkish-Israeli Relations since the Arrival of Erdogan and Implications of the Arab Spring and the Mavi Marmara: Opportunities and Challenges (2015)

An Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Turkic World: Identity and Institutionalisation (2023)