



## To Have Done with Representation

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# To Have Done with Representation

## Resnais and Tarantino on the Holocaust

**Emre Koyuncu**

Philosophical questions regarding the Nazi regime in Germany and the Holocaust engage with a wide range of topics. The most urgent problem in the immediate aftermath of the genocide was to translate this tragic event into historical and legal discourse. However, this was not an easy task because the Nazi government had tried to destroy all the records and documents of its deeds before its ultimate fall. In the absence of documentation, testimonies of those who managed to survive the horrendous atrocities became an important resource in writing the history of the period. During the decade after World War II, personal accounts and memories of the survivors constituted an important component of the evidence against the Nazi government in courts. The second problem pertains to the philosophical conceptualisation of the extreme suffering experienced by the victims of the genocide. The question of how a modern state could resort to killing a whole population led philosophers to reconsider the founding values of the said modern state. This also intersects with the question of responsibility, as many philosophers and historians are convinced that the sphere of responsibility should extend well beyond the actual policy-makers and officials of the Nazi period. Despite the diversity of the philosophical problems about the Holocaust, the question of the capacity and limits of representation has always remained at their intersection. The historico-legal status of oral testimonies, for instance, has been questioned in relation to the rigour of personal accounts as representative evidence. The problem of a truthful conceptual representation of what took place is also of particular significance in this case, because even the question of how this tragic event should be named is often regarded as a matter of doing justice to the singular experience of the victims of the Nazi regime and of showing respect for their memory.

Artistic engagements with the Holocaust reformulate this problem of representation in creative ways. However, not every attempt is met with applause. Since films constitute the most popular artistic form, they have always been at the very centre of these debates. Among those films, Academy Award winners *Schindler's List* (Steven Spielberg, 1993) and *Life is Beautiful* (Roberto Benigni, 1997) have created the biggest stir. In the case of *Life is Beautiful*, critics were perplexed by the use of comedy as a rhetorical tool for communicating the atrocities of the Holocaust. Benigni was accused of distorting historical facts and even of Holocaust denialism.<sup>1</sup> *Schindler's List*, on the other hand, was criticised for its Americanisation of the Nazi phenomenon by turning it into a Hollywood romance,<sup>2</sup> despite its fastidious reproduction of Nazi Germany, from extermination camps to the most mundane details. What all these criticisms imply is that the films on the Holocaust are evaluated against a different set of criteria than other historical films. Regardless of the fact that these films are fictional, they are all expected to describe Nazi Germany in the most historically accurate way, so that the audience does not lose sight of the depressing reality of the genocide. This expectation is not formulated in terms of an aesthetic preference but of a moral obligation. Any artistic representation that does not remain true to what actually happened in the sense of distorting the truth of the genocide is not only regarded as a bad film, but also as having violated a moral code. Moreover, this is not specific to any particular genre. Fiction films are as liable to the principle of verisimilitude, authenticity and accuracy as documentary films. It is at this intersection between ethics and aesthetics that this article sets out to discuss two films, namely, Alain Resnais's documentary short *Nuit et brouillard* (Night and Fog, 1956)<sup>3</sup> and Quentin Tarantino's fictional film *Inglourious Basterds* (2009).<sup>4</sup> In what follows, I examine how the two films challenge the limitations of their respective genres and effectively translate their aesthetic novelty into a creative engagement with the question of representation and memory.

In an article written in support of Benigni's film, Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi sets out to reveal the unwritten rules of producing a work of art that reflects on Nazi Germany.<sup>5</sup> Focusing on the academic responses to *Life is Beautiful*, *Train de vie* (Train of Life, Radu Mihăileanu, 1998), and *Jakob the Liar* (Peter Kassovitz, 1999), Ezrahi identifies two main stances in the debate.<sup>6</sup> The first stance criticises artistic productions on the Holocaust for not living up to the expectations of accurately representing the event, implying that it is possible to come up with a truthful representation. The second stance is a flat-out denigration of poetic interpretations of the Holocaust, be it in the form of comedy or romance, assuming a truthful poetic representation to be impossible. Common to both stances is that they put forth verisimilitude as a main criterion in evaluating the artistic value of fictional works, and expect these works to present historical truths in a documentary style rather than by merely taking them as a point of departure. Artistic reinterpretation of historical documents is considered an act of distortion in and of itself.

In another article defending Benigni's aesthetic preferences, Hilene Flanzbaum criticises the view that takes verisimilitude as a necessary condition for a successful Holocaust film.<sup>7</sup> Under such a condition, any fiction film about Nazi Germany starts off with an undeserved disadvantage compared to its documentary equivalents, and a film such as *Life is Beautiful*,

1 See, for instance, Sander Gilman, 'Is Life Beautiful? Can the Shoah be Funny? Some Thoughts on Recent and Older Films', *Critical Inquiry*, vol 26, 2000, pp 279–308; John Simon, 'Life is Beautiful', *National Review*, vol 51, no 3, 1999, pp 54–55; Kobi Niv, *Life is Beautiful, But Not for the Jews: Another View of the Film by Benigni*, Jonathan Beyrak Lev, trans, Scarecrow Press, Lanham, Maryland, 2003.

2 For a collection of essays on a wide range of artistic engagements with the Holocaust in the US, see Hilene Flanzbaum, ed, *The Americanization of the Holocaust*, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 1999.

3 Alain Resnais, director, *Night and Fog*, Criterion, 1956

4 Quentin Tarantino, director, *Inglourious Basterds*, Universal Studios, 2009

5 Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, 'After Such Knowledge, What Laughter?' *The Yale Journal of Criticism*, vol 14, no 1, 2001, pp 287–313

6 *Ibid*, p 297

7 Hilene Flanzbaum, "'But Wasn't it Terrific?": A Defense of Liking *Life is Beautiful*', *The Yale Journal of Criticism*, vol 14, no 1, 2001, pp 273–286

which extracts a comic element from the misery of actual events, would naturally attract critical opprobrium for an excessive use of fictional elements. For Flanzbaum, this ‘avid policing of representations’, prevalent in academic circles, stems from a will to undermine the argument of Holocaust denialists.<sup>8</sup> However, she thinks this view not only ends up regarding films primarily as historic-legal evidence rather than works of art but also succumbs to the aesthetic standards of the deniers.

Comparing the attitudes of academics accusing film directors of ethical insensitivity with the views of survivors of the Holocaust who occasionally express their sympathy for these films, Flanzbaum also shows the disparity between the way in which film scholars think these films would affect the audience and how the audience actually react. For Flanzbaum, the assumption that the viewer of *Life is Beautiful* would ‘remain unmoved by any of the psychological pain he witnesses’ is simply an unfounded exaggeration.<sup>9</sup> However, the core of her argument lies in the recognition of an impossibility: ‘Let’s all agree right now that no artistic representation of the Holocaust will ever sufficiently depict the horrors of that event – and move on to more explicit and meaningful discussion.’<sup>10</sup> It is therefore not only unfair to expect these films to attain impossible standards, but this expectation also prevents us from doing what is most needed: to engage in a more meaningful discussion about the limitations of traditional artistic and philosophical tools in addressing the trauma of the Holocaust.

Ezrahi, too, emphasises that there is no plausible end to the demands of the morality of accurate representation:

*The Diary* was deemed, by potential producers, as *too negative*, too painful for contemporary audiences... the survivor in Roth’s story [*Eli the Fanatic*] was considered to be *too Jewish*; the character in Wallant’s novel [*The Pawnbroker*] and the film based on it was *too Christian*; the inmates’ uniforms in Green’s television series [*Holocaust Series*] were *too starched*; D. M. Thomas’s novel [*The White Hotel*] was *too sexy*; *Maus* was *too daring*, *Schindler’s List*, *too positive*; *Life is Beautiful*, *too hopeful*.<sup>11</sup> (emphasis in the original)

For Ezrahi, these films serve a very important function even when they do not employ a documentary-style narration: far from distorting historical truths, they help consolidate the place of these events in public memory. Focusing on films that use comedy as a fundamental rhetorical strategy in representing the Holocaust, she argues that the strength of those films stems from their ability to produce mimetic and non-mimetic representations at the same time.<sup>12</sup> A strategic use of comedy in historical films helps maintain a distance from actual events such that the audience ‘come close to... something that touches the essentials of human experience that can be reconstituted after shock, mourning and a sense of the tragic have been explored’.<sup>13</sup> However, this artistic distance between historical fact and the actuality of the audience does not coincide with the distancing particular to forgetting. It may be argued that in defending the use of fiction in films on the Holocaust, both Ezrahi and Flanzbaum give the functioning of memory a certain priority over the influence of representations. They contrast representations of memory with filmic representations, claiming that the latter cannot be evaluated independently of the former. This conception finds its most succinct formulation in

8 Ibid, p 276

9 Ibid, p 282

10 Ibid, p 284

11 Ezrahi, ‘After Such Knowledge, What Laughter?’, op cit, p 296

12 Ibid, p 298

13 Ibid, p 301

Flanzbaum's remark that 'if they deny the Holocaust, it is not because they have seen *Life is Beautiful*'.<sup>14</sup> In a sense, both authors dismiss the stylistic restrictions on fictional films only after making sure that the representations of memory can eventually bridge the distance created by the use of comedy between historical fact and the actuality of the audience.

This shifting of the burden of accurate representation from films to memory itself is embodied in Lanzmann's nine-hour documentary *Shoah* (the biblical word Shoah (שואה), also spelled Shoa and Sho'ah, translates as 'calamity' in Hebrew [and is also used to refer to 'destruction' since the Middle Ages], became the standard Hebrew term for the twentieth-century Holocaust as early as the 1940s, 1985). In an attempt to circumvent the problems of realistic filmic representation, Lanzmann avoids any use of archival material altogether and turns to the oral testimonies of survivors. By interviewing the survivors and witnesses of Nazi atrocities in concentration camps, he constructs an unconventional story without the happy ending peculiar to the films *Americanising the Holocaust*. This solution, however, can only partially circumvent the problem of accurate representation in Holocaust films, because *Shoah* seems to consider the question of representation only within the framework of visual materials through which the memories of Nazi cruelty would be invoked. In his struggle against the reign of truthful representations in Holocaust films, Lanzmann, just like Flanzbaum and Ezrahi, displaces the sovereignty of representation only to relocate it in memory itself. Is there any way to have done with the regime of truthful representation altogether, which does not amount to a distortion of the historical fact or a forgetting of the Holocaust tragedy? Ezrahi primarily draws on the power of comedy in inventing new ways of posing artistic and philosophical problems, but is it possible at all to challenge the moral restrictions on the representation of the Holocaust without subscribing to comedy? Tarantino's *Inglourious Basterds* and Resnais's *Nuit et brouillard* seem to have found a way: in their critical responses to political history, these films invent a new kind of image that opens up new possibilities both for cinema and philosophy by redefining the relationship between memory, filmic representation and thought.<sup>15</sup>

*Nuit et brouillard*, released in 1956, adopts a novel method to undermine the reign of representation: Alain Resnais fuses the present with the past to the point of indiscernibility. In this film, the visual track switches back and forth between present and past images, while the voice-over gives a description of what happened in the concentration camps. The narrated text, authored by Jean Cayrol, interacts with the images without attempting to guide them. The film thus unfolds in three independent but interacting modalities, which Resnais manages to harmonise without ever reducing them to one another: powerful images; a poetic voice-over narration; and sombre music in the background. Occasionally, the audience is left alone with images without any vocal orientation. For instance, there is a long sequence of silence in the scene showing Jewish people being forced to board a train. We, as spectators, cannot but be distraught by being put in the position of a bystander at the train station. Similarly, there is no voice-over as the camera makes a tracking movement before the ovens. In these scenes, a strict disjunction between words and images creates an interval in which the audience are invited to look back at themselves. One of the opening lines of the voice-over

14 Flanzbaum, "“But Wasn't It Terrific?”, op cit, p 283

15 Marcia Landy also discusses the potential of cinema for 'expanding our thinking on what constitutes historical thought', focusing rather on Deleuze's distinction between movement-image and time-image in *Cinema and Counter-History*, Bloomington, Indiana, 2015.

narration is an invitation to such a solitary reflection: ‘No footstep is heard but our own.’

Resnais’s *Nuit et brouillard* may be regarded as the opposite of Lanzmann’s *Shoah* as far as visual content is concerned. Resnais, unlike Lanzmann, prefers actual footage and still photos over personal testimonies and even employs footage extracted from propaganda films of the time and film material shot by the Nazi officers themselves. However, despite its intense use of actual historical footage and stills, the film ultimately creates an almost counter-historical narrative by emphasising the present and the future rather than the past. Defamiliarising the audience from both the present and past images of the concentration camp it depicts, the film conjures an uncanny reality against which the audience is implicitly warned. The film never tries to provide the audience with a complete representation of the Nazi atrocities. Listening to the voice-over, the audience is always reminded that ‘no description, no image can reveal their true dimension’. The images are rather intended to serve as a warning against an imminent danger. In this regard, one of the most powerful scenes of this nature in *Nuit et brouillard* is the depiction of the hospital in the concentration camp. In this sequence, Resnais employs shifts between archival stills and current photos in order to bring under the spotlight the horrendous experiments conducted by Nazi doctors in the name of scientific research. The interpenetration of temporal layers produces an uncanny feeling that the danger is far from over.

The editing of *Nuit et brouillard* performs two important functions. First, memory is freed from its function of recollection and replaced by something akin to what Nietzsche calls active forgetting.<sup>16</sup> Active forgetting, in this particular case, has nothing to do with the forgetting of the historical fact of the Holocaust. On the contrary, it reintroduces a distance between events and their inscription in historical discourse so as to challenge the assumption that all those bad things belong in the past. As Deleuze aptly remarks, Resnais’s style is the antithesis of flashback and recollection: it rather operates on the level of pure or virtual memory.<sup>17</sup> Unlike the actual memory of remembering anchored in the past, the virtual memory of forgetting is always orientated towards the future. The second function consists in proposing a new conception of responsibility. As we are shown images of Nazi officials denying responsibility at the trials in the aftermath of the tragedy, Jean Cayrol’s text asks the audience: ‘Then who is responsible?’ By invoking the concept of responsibility, the film not only invites us to reconsider our own responsibilities and complicities in what happened but also challenges the traditional understanding of responsibility altogether. In fact, these two functions complement each other, as memory could not be raised to a virtual level were it not for the expansion of the scope of responsibility. With a future-oriented sense of responsibility, our reaction to those atrocities changes from a feeling of ‘guilt’, which works on the basis of a memory anchored in the past, to a sense of ‘vigilance’, which forces us to face our ignorance of the future consequences of our current actions. The ethics of shame proposed by the film makes moral restrictions on fictional representations almost irrelevant, giving it a trans-historical character. The closing lines of the voice-over, in fact, crystallise the call for a new practice of responsibility that is characterised by perpetual vigilance:

16 For more on Nietzsche’s praise of forgetting, see Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, *Untimely Meditations*, R J Hollingdale, trans, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp 57–124.

17 ‘*Night and Fog* could even be thought of as the sum of all the ways of escaping from the flashback, and the false piety of the recollection-image’, in Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: Time-Image*, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, trans, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989, p 122.

There are those reluctant to believe or believing from time to time. There are those who look at these ruins today as though the monster were dead and buried beneath them. Those who take hope again as the image fades as though there were a cure for the scourge of these camps. Those who pretend all this happened only once, at a certain time and in a certain place. Those who refuse to look around them, deaf to the endless cry.

Resnais does not simply substitute memory with forgetting, keeping everything else intact. This is a point Flittermen-Lewis seems to miss in her article that focuses on the role of memory in *Nuit et brouillard*. Although she acknowledges the importance of forgetting in Alain Resnais's conception of responsibility, she takes the task of forgetting to be an attempt at rediscovering the 'fundamental beauty of humanity'.<sup>18</sup> However, what Resnais tries to achieve is exactly the opposite. Instead of grounding responsibility in a notion of innocent humanity, the film seeks a way to expand the scope of responsibility in the absence of a definitive index. This distrust in humanity, or in any other fundamental foundation for responsibility, paves the way for Resnais's transition from a morality of guilt to an ethics of shame. Materialising a non-linear temporality, the film does not prescribe what the audience should do, but rather calls for perpetual vigilance about what can still happen. The forgetting produced by Resnais's intertwining of the past, the present and the future has nothing to do with forgetting our past but puts forward a new conception of responsibility, crystallised in the following rhetorical questions that Cayrol asks the audience: 'Who is on the lookout from this strange watchtower to warn us of the coming of new executioners? Are their faces really different from our own?'

Despite its unconventional presentation, deploying a poetic strategy, *Nuit et brouillard* has not received much negative feedback from those who prioritise verisimilitude over aesthetic style in depictions of the Holocaust. This might be explained by the documentary tenor of the film. Unlike Lanzmann in *Shoah*, Resnais shows the most shocking documentary material without a hint of hesitation. Jean Cayrol's text supports the documentary material with an oral testimony that seeks to redefine the limits of responsibility for the modern spectator rather than recount personal experiences. For Resnais and Cayrol, the modern spectator can never come close to understanding the anguish of the actual victims of this genocide, but they should not content themselves with the idea that all these things belong to the past either. Like memory, responsibility also takes on a trans-historical meaning, because in Resnais's narrative we are reminded of our responsibility for what is happening and what will happen in addition to what has happened. From Resnais's perspective, to judge an artistic engagement with the historical fact of the Holocaust by the criterion of a truthful representation of the past risks failing to perceive what's happening around us.

Another crucial feature of Resnais's film is that both image and sound are allowed to speak for themselves. This is a very risky move on the director's part, because, as Hebard states, there are moments in the film in which 'the gaze of Resnais's camera becomes the gaze of the Nazi'.<sup>19</sup> This identification, however, has nothing to do with an act of empathy in an attempt to show the events from the viewpoint of the Nazis. It is rather about letting the image speak for itself without the help of any

18 Sandy Flitterman-Lewis, 'Documenting the Ineffable: Terror and Memory in Alain Resnais's *Night and Fog*', *Documenting the Documentary*, Barry Keith Grant and Jeanette Sloniowski, eds, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1998, p 220

19 Andrew Hebard, 'Disruptive Histories: Toward a Radical Politics of Remembrance in Alain Resnais's *Night and Fog*', *New German Critique* 71, 1997, p 98

other means or the guidance of interpretation. For example, the images of the daily routines of camp inhabitants are all recorded and displayed from the perspective of the Nazi officials. In these scenes, Resnais's camera seems to suffer from a 'moral corruption',<sup>20</sup> but this corruption ultimately serves to push the audience to question their own supposed innocence.

Another turning point in the history of Holocaust movies is Tarantino's *Inglourious Basterds* (2009), a counter-historical narrative on Nazi Germany, which is set in France. The film is divided into five parts and brings together the stories of two different groups whose common enemy is the Nazi government. The leading actress, Mélanie Laurent, plays a Jewish woman, Shosanna, who manages to escape from Colonel Hans Landa during his unexpected visit to a little cottage in rural France, where she and her family are hiding from Nazi forces. Later in the film she appears as a young French woman, Emmanuelle Mimieux, who owns a small film theatre that is occasionally forced to change its schedule upon the demands of the occupying Nazi administration. Meanwhile, a troop comprised of Jewish-American soldiers called The Basterds, notorious in France for their brutal slaughtering of the Nazis, is on a mission to kill high-rank Nazi officials and thus end the war. The stories of Shosanna and The Basterds coincide when Shosanna's theatre is selected for the French premiere of *Nation's Pride* directed by Goebbels, which is based on the true story of a German soldier shooting down over a hundred American soldiers in Italy. Shosanna and The Basterds, completely unaware of each other's intentions, plan to slaughter the guests of the premiere, which mainly consist of the Nazi elite, including Hitler himself. At the intersection of these stories, Colonel Hans Landa, a very talented detective, notices the assassination plan, namely Operation Kino, to be carried out by The Basterds. He is nevertheless completely oblivious to the very elaborate plan to be carried out by Shosanna. After taking the chief of the Basterds, Aldo, into custody, Hans Landa, a devout Nazi official, unexpectedly starts negotiating with the American forces, demanding several personal benefits in exchange for letting them proceed with their assassination plan. In the end, both Shosanna's and The Basterds' plans end up working out, resulting in a spectacular destruction of the theatre with hundreds of Nazi officials inside.

Tarantino's version of history has obviously no regard for historical fact since in the film, Hitler, along with other high-rank Nazi officials, is brutally killed in Paris. Interestingly enough, although the film does not depict Nazi atrocities directly, except for the scene in which Hans Landa and his soldiers rake the basement of a cottage with gunfire to kill the last Jewish family living in the region, *Inglourious Basterds* did not trigger a significant negative public reaction for its lack of accuracy in representing the historical facts about the Holocaust. Even more interestingly, almost all the violence and brutality in the film is planned and carried out by Jewish people. For instance, the Jewish gang in the film are famous for their violent signatures: cutting off the scalps of the people they kill and carving a swastika on the foreheads of those they let go. Likewise, Shosanna and her French-African accomplice are at the heart of the gruesome destruction plan for the film theatre.

Tarantino's carefully thought-out scenario circumvents criticisms of historical inaccuracy through an effective parody of the conventions of historical films on the Holocaust. Tarantino distorts historical fact in



two ways. Since the involvement of the American forces and their ultimate success in warding off the evil enemy is a common cliché among most of the Hollywood films dealing with World War II, the first aspect of Tarantino's parody is the extreme Americanisation of the story to the point of absurdity. In *Inglourious Basterds*, American forces are portrayed as the representatives of good, just as they are in American propaganda films shot during World War II. Secondly, Tarantino justifies the excessive use of violence in the film by changing its direction: all we see is a spectacular violence against the Nazis. In fact, having seen *Inglourious Basterds* at a local film theatre in Indiana, I was confounded by the audience's vocal support for the raking of Hitler's body with gunfire. Nobody in the theatre seemed to be even slightly bothered by the sheer violence carried out by Donowitz, Ulmer and Shosanna. Meeting viewer expectations in its own twisted way, the film manages to be a parody without making itself vulnerable to accusations of inauthenticity. By travelling back and forth between the alternative universe on the screen and historical fact, the film manages to discard the criticisms levelled at its comic counterparts by subtly forcing the audience to go beyond the actual visual material.

In the film, the series of violent acts starts with the setting on fire of the film screen following the screening of footage of Shosanna making a revengeful speech in response to a question asked in *Nation's Pride*. As soon as she starts to speak, the image of her face interrupts the Nazi audience's glorious memories of the Nazi occupation in Italy and their boisterous celebration. As we watch the silver screen burn down while hearing Shosanna's vengeful laughter in the background, she is already lying dead in the projection room. It is as if the flames surrounding the screen symbolise the burning down of the regime of truthful representation, with Shosanna's laughter of celebration in the background. Tarantino defies the sovereignty of representation with the power of the counter-historical.

Having broken all ties with historical fact, Tarantino's film also goes beyond what Ezrahi considers a peculiarity of comedy films. While *Life is Beautiful* seems to work in both mimetic and non-mimetic registers, Tarantino's film takes one more step and stops taking historical fact as a model. This does not mean that everything on the screen is counter-historical. The opening scene in which Nazi soldiers atrociously kill within seconds members of the same family could easily be found in any other film depicting the conduct of Nazi forces invading France. Despite this occasional parallelism between truthful reproduction and Tarantino's original universe, the story does not aim to approximate what actually happened. The film perpetually displaces its own narration by going back and forth between two alternative versions of history that constantly interpenetrate.

At times, Tarantino's *Inglourious Basterds* also appears to align itself with Nazi reasoning. As detective Hans Landa tries to cajole farmer Perrier LaPadite into telling him where the Jewish family is taking shelter, Landa comes up with a terrifying analogy in order to explain the Nazi hatred of the Jews. This long exchange between the detective and LaPadite is rather disturbing, as the audience, in a rare moment in the history of cinema, is presented with a rationale for the genocide from the perspective of a Nazi official. This dialogue, however, ultimately functions as an invitation for the audience to face their own hateful

inclinations and question the fallacious logic behind them. The detective's seemingly smooth line of reasoning reveals how inclined we all are to rationalise and normalise our own violent behaviour and attraction to a fascistic mindset.

Both *Nuit et brouillard* and *Inglourious Basterds* succeed in going beyond the representational standards in the depiction of Nazi Germany and in discrediting the conventions of their respective genres by redefining the problematic of memory and responsibility. Both films manage to do away with the morality of representational accuracy by opening up the concept of responsibility to a new temporality, instead of restricting it to a dialogue with the past. *Inglourious Basterds* is a parody of Americanised and linear narrative structure, prevalent in historical films produced in Hollywood. *Nuit et brouillard* undertakes the risky task of using actual footage shot by SS soldiers and propaganda film directors of the time for the sake of letting images speak for themselves and problematising the current viewpoint of the audience. Having freed the artistic creation from the burden of documentary proof, both films open up the possibility of a new mode of remembering that acknowledges the singularity of the past without losing sight of impending dangers. Refusing to define their problematic under the constraint of verisimilitude, both films invent their own cinematic regime of non-representation. In this new regime, the focus of the historical film shifts to a counter-historical narrative, constantly alternating between what happened, what did not happen, and what has not yet happened.

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