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## Science and flags: deconstructing Turkey's Antarctic strategy

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### ABSTRACT

This article explores Turkey's recent increased interest in the Antarctic by deconstructing how this interest contributes to the making of Antarctic nationalism(s). It makes two arguments. First, Turkey's status-seeking by being present in the Antarctic contributes to Antarctic nationalism(s) by invoking three distinct yet overlapping strands of nationalisms – banal, pragmatic-techno and Kemalist nationalisms, or what we term *assemblage nationalism*. Second, we argue that it was this nationalist trope that became the mutual language between Turkey's ruling elite and scientists, and one of the factors that prompted a change of strategy in Turkey's Antarctic policy. Turkey's status-seeking combined with this nationalist trope, which highlighted compatibility with the former's broader discourse on technological upgrading and economic development, helped the Turkish ruling elite and scientists frame and make sense of the country's presence in Antarctica. We conclude that when status-seeking involves collaboration with foreigners, a 'more benign' form of nationalism becomes possible.

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The Antarctica Scientific Research Camp that enabled our flag to be flown [there] has been established. The meteorological station is operational, and the [Turkish] Naval Forces completed the mapping of the seabed. I discussed the matter with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and perhaps, we will continue to work [in Antarctica] with Britain furthering the research. Our ultimate goal is to have a say in the future of the continent by changing our status from that of 'observer' to 'consultant' within the Antarctic Treaty System. (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey, December 2019)<sup>1</sup>

Speaking at the Annual Award Ceremony of the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK), in December 2019, among the issues that Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan touched upon was Turkey's presence in Antarctica.<sup>2</sup> His remarks above that combined the country's 'scientific endeavour' with the Turkish 'flag'<sup>3</sup> were preceded by Turkey's 11th Development Plan, announced in July 2019, which declared the need for 'polar research to be conducted in a manner to strengthen the country's international positioning', and take 'the necessary measures to establish a base in the Antarctic'.<sup>4</sup> The discourse and practice that amalgamated the 'flag' with 'scientific endeavour' and combined those with 'strengthening Turkey's international positioning' comprised a U-turn in Turkey's Antarctic

strategy. Despite having signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1995, Turkey showed no interest in participating in the Antarctic Consultative Meetings until 2013. Turkey's disinterest was so high that, during those years, the continent<sup>5</sup> was misspelled as 'Antartika' (rather than 'Antarktika'), and was classified as a country rather than a continent in official documents.<sup>6</sup> However, from 2013 onwards, Turkey not only began attending these consultative meetings but, as of 2020, has sent four scientific missions, led by a female Turkish scientist (Dr Burcu Özsoy). So, what explains Turkey's reformulation of the Antarctic strategy? And, more importantly, embedded in nationalist tropes, both discursively and visually, what might the Turkish case mean for the emerging Antarctic nationalism(s)?

It is argued that Turkey's recent reformulation of the Antarctic strategy was a result of Turkish policymakers' desire to showcase their country's scientific and technological self-sufficiency and Turkey's ambition to become a global actor.<sup>7</sup> Turkey's recent surge of interest in the Antarctic could be attributed to its 'foreign policy activism' as a 'rising power' status – a rise that both scholars<sup>8</sup> and politicians alike<sup>9</sup> thought was happening. We concur that status-seeking has been the main motive behind Turkey's recent reformulation of its Antarctic strategy. However, since 'regional or global hegemonic inclinations' and 'national pride mobilized through Antarctic programs' have the potential to ignite Antarctic nationalism(s), disturbing the balance created on the continent,<sup>10</sup> it is also necessary to deconstruct Turkey's status-seeking via the Antarctic embedded in nationalist tropes. In this piece, we deconstruct these interventions and explain what they might imply for Turkish Antarctic nationalism(s).

At this point, it is necessary to define what we mean by the latter term. Hemmings, in the context of Australia, defined Antarctic nationalism as 'having a national interest that is *special* and *superior* to any other state.'<sup>11</sup> Since Turkey is not a claimant state like Australia, in Turkey's Antarctic nationalism, nationalism is the symbolic and material mobilisation of artefacts of nationhood (eg flag, women, domestic capabilities) to signal the superiority of the nation in question through the Antarctic. The Antarctic is an instrument rather than a goal through which symbols of nationhood are remembered and rearticulated.

We make two arguments contributing to the debate on Antarctic nationalism(s). First, we argue that Turkey's strategy in the Antarctic produces *assemblage nationalism*, containing elements of banal, pragmatic-techno and Kemalist nationalisms.<sup>12</sup> Banal nationalism is produced as a result of constant flying, referencing and showcasing of the Turkish flag in a variety of events related to Antarctica – within and out of Antarctica – by Turkish scientists, political elite and the media. Pragmatic-techno nationalism is also present because while Turkey's presence in the Antarctic is justified via feelings of national pride with constant references to the Turkish flag, both the country's ruling elite and the scientists have been open to scientific and technological collaborations with foreigners on research in Antarctica. Finally, Turkey's Antarctic strategy also includes traces of Kemalist nationalism upholding the Western identity and ideals of the West. This is because the Turkish state's identity is correlated with the advancement of women's status and science – both of which are artefacts and symbols of Western modernity and identity, and part of Kemalist nationalism. This promotion of Turkey's Western identity through artefacts of Western modernity takes place by constantly highlighting the 'femaleness' of the team leader and occasionally showcasing the talents (read: prowess) of Turkey's female athletes, as was the case with world-renowned Turkish deep-water diver Şahika Ercümen. What is more, to justify, legitimise and historicise Turkey's presence on the continent, Turkish politicians are also not shy in referring to their

scientists and their scientific collaborations and accomplishments in the Antarctic before the rise of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) to power – a period which they associate with Kemalism and are critical of. However, such an assemblage of ‘benign’ nationalism is quite paradoxical, for two reasons. First, since 2011, as part of manifesting Turkey’s ‘new’ role as a ‘global power’, the country has been embroiled in wars in Syria, Iraq and Libya (very recently in Nagorno-Karabagh), all of which were accompanied by very ‘hot’ Islamist-nationalistic discourses<sup>13</sup> and by a tint of neo-Ottomanism. Moreover, the Islamist-nationalist rhetoric of JDP has pervaded everyday life more and more since the JDP came to power in 2002.<sup>14</sup> As democratic backsliding of JDP-led Turkey progressed, and as the JDP became more populist to remain in power and to mobilise the Islamist base, not only did the rejection and critique of Turkey’s Kemalist past and Western identity increase, but also the elite maintained a very anti-Western discourse (and practice of foreign policy), especially since 2011.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, at both the popular and the elite level, symbols of national ‘pride’, ranging from historical figures<sup>16</sup> to traditional sports, were mobilised to galvanise the conservative Islamist base of the party.<sup>17</sup> Given this, from a political perspective, Turkey’s reformulation of Antarctic strategy, adorned with eclectic nationalist symbols that evoke ‘national pride’, can be regarded as yet another crowd-pleasing, base-mobilising campaign, yet with potentially positive scientific outcomes.

Second, we argue this ‘benign’ form of nationalism manifests itself in the Antarctic because it has been the scientists rather than the ruling elite who played a key role in the creation of Turkey’s Antarctic policy. It was this nationalist trope that became the mutual language between the two parties, an instrument of persuasion that enabled Turkish policymakers to reformulate their Antarctica strategy. Also, one of the reasons for reformulation was that the discourse on Antarctica has been compatible with the Turkish ruling elite’s broader discourse on economic development through ‘*yerli ve milli*’ (indigenous and national) technology, and aspirations for a global role. As the 2008 global economic crisis led many experts to criticise the merits of neoliberal globalisation, many countries endorsed more heterodox approaches to development. Turkey is one of the countries that initiated state-led developmental attempts,<sup>18</sup> by prioritising and promoting high-tech indigenous production. Put differently, the timing of the reformulation of Turkey’s Antarctic strategy around 2011 coincided with JDP’s vision for mobilising nationalist symbols for strengthening its hold on power, status-seeking in the foreign policy realm, and reformulation of the country’s economic development policies. A presence in the Antarctic was a win–win situation for Turkey’s policymakers both domestically and internationally. We conclude that, ironically, when status-seeking requires foreign collaboration, when it is the scientists rather than the policymakers in the lead, combining to portray a more desirable image to the world, more ‘benign’ forms or manifestations of Antarctic nationalism become possible.

Our arguments are based on an analysis of statements by Turkey’s ruling elite and scientists, Anadolu Agency (AA)’s coverage of Turkey’s Antarctic initiatives, and official and organisational documents. We systematically analyse public announcements made by the Turkish Presidency (12 posts made between 28 August 2014 and 12 January 2021), statements of Turkish bureaucrats and scientists (systematic analyses of bureaucrats’ and scientists’ statements in the AA news), and AA’s reports on Antarctica in Turkish (250 news items in total between 27 January 2012 and 12 January 2021).<sup>19</sup> We analyse AA’s coverage for two reasons. First, founded in 1920, even before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, AA is Turkey’s official news agency. Thus, it reflects the state’s official view while extensively quoting the

ruling elite and scientists. Second, many other news portals cite AA while reporting on Turkey's Antarctica initiatives, since AA is quite active in covering the country's activities in Antarctica.

This paper is structured as follows. In the following two sections, we elaborate on the Antarctic nationalism literature and explore the links between Turkey's recent foreign policy formulated towards this continent regarding banal, pragmatic-techno and Kemalist variants of nationalism. Then, after providing a historical background on Turkey's interest and involvement in the Antarctic region, we analyse the statements of politicians and scientists regarding the country's endeavours in the Antarctic, deconstructing them discursively, showing how *assemblage nationalism* has become the consensus language between Turkish scientists and policymakers. In the conclusion, we reiterate our major findings.

### **'Claiming' Antarctica: science, flags and the making of Antarctic nationalism**

The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), signed in 1959, not only began to regulate the affairs of the continent and the adjacent seas, but also suspended the sovereignty claims of countries, including Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand and the UK.<sup>20</sup> This suspension of sovereignty, however, paved the way for claimant countries to find more creative alternatives to mark their presence on the continent – if not sovereignty, then through what scholars termed 'sovereignty performances'.<sup>21</sup> A mix of discourses and practices that evolved around 'maps, postage stamps, public education, flag-waving, place-naming, scientific activity, the regulation of fishing, flying pregnant women to the region, and public ceremonies' was used to mark the presence of the claimant countries on the continent.<sup>22</sup> These items justified and legitimised the presence and the claims of these countries on the continent both for their competitors and for the general public, making the Antarctic part of the public imagination.<sup>23</sup>

Among the items on the list, flying/waving flags and conducting scientific activity are the most common 'sovereignty performances' employed by both claimant states and non-claimant states like Turkey. Flying/waving flags is quite straightforward; not only are flags part of symbolic 'possession ceremonies' marking the ownership of territory at a symbolic level,<sup>24</sup> they are also markers of national pride. The 'sovereignty performances' through scientific activity, on the other hand, are more complicated than flying the flag. The ATS, which suspended the sovereignty claims of the claimant states, also led to the establishment of a symbiotic relationship between politicians and scientists, pushing science and scientists into the forefront of Antarctic geopolitics in two ways. First, the Preamble of the Treaty declared that the continent would be used 'exclusively for peaceful purposes', and for the creation of 'scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation'.<sup>25</sup> Second, of those countries that acceded to the treaty, the original 12 signatory countries were declared, by the treaty, to be Consultative Parties that would participate in Consultative Meetings. These countries were given the right to decide which other nations could be invited to join the Consultative Meetings, only after these candidate nations demonstrated that they 'conduct substantial research activity there'.<sup>26</sup> In other words, the only way for statespeople, especially those who wanted to adhere to the ATS, to legitimise their presence on the continent was for their scientists to demonstrate that they produced 'substantial impactful research', thus making Antarctica a site of track-two diplomacy and scientific diplomacy.<sup>27</sup> As scientists did science on the continent, they simultaneously 'advanced' the political projects of their

respective countries.<sup>28</sup> In this way, science, to quote Dodds, became both a 'symbolic capital' that allowed symbolic 'territorial control' and a kind of 'sovereignty performance'.<sup>29</sup>

While science became an important 'sovereignty performance' in the Antarctic region, it was and is, at the same time, a benchmark measuring whether or not a country is 'modern'.<sup>30</sup> This is because, over the years, science as the trademark of Western progress, rationality and Enlightenment has become an important 'standard of civilisation' measuring the level of modernity that a country possesses,<sup>31</sup> thus making science an instrument of international status. Therefore, it is not uncommon for states to pursue scientific projects that in some ways could be counted as conspicuous consumption, which would bring them prestige and higher status in the international society.<sup>32</sup> Given this, for non-claimant states, or for late-comers to the continent, such as Turkey, doing science and being present in the Antarctic may not be a case of 'sovereignty performance',<sup>33</sup> per se, but rather a 'status performance'. We argue that it is this 'status performance' in the Antarctic that contributes to Antarctic nationalism(s), by invoking three distinct yet overlapping strands of nationalisms, or what we term *assemblage nationalism*: banal, pragmatic-techno and Kemalist.

### The making of Turkey's *assemblage nationalism* in the Antarctic

Banal nationalism, as formulated by Michael Billig, explains the subliminal production of nationhood in the everyday lives of ordinary people in the 'West' through artefacts of nationalism such as the 'flag hanging unnoticed on the public building'.<sup>34</sup> Although conceptualised to denote nationalist currents in the 'West', the term has since been applied to cases beyond the West, including Turkey.<sup>35</sup> In this sense, Turkey's Antarctic strategy involves bits of banal nationalism, because it reproduces the Turkish nation in the popular imagination through the Turkish flag, sometimes in the Antarctic, and sometimes right at home. Yet the 'flying' (read: visual and discursive references to) of the Turkish flag happens in a very inconsistent way. At times, the Turkish flag is 'flown' in a very 'noticed' way, especially as part of the sovereignty-cum-status performances to herald that Turkey, too, is in the Antarctic. But, at other times, the 'flying' of the Turkish flag happens in a very 'unnoticed' way, incorporated into visuals or the speeches of the scientists or politicians. Partly what perpetuates this 'unnoticedness' at the elite level since the early 2000s is that the Turkish flag has become more and more omnipresent in everyday life in Turkey, beyond public holidays or national celebrations.<sup>36</sup> So, flying flags in and out of Antarctica construes banal nationalism in the sense that it is unnoticed, but such flying of the Turkish flag does not constitute an 'everyday nationalism' as it does not involve ordinary people 'self-consciously mobilizing nationhood in their social interactions'.<sup>37</sup>

Turkey's Antarctic strategy contains elements of pragmatic-techno nationalism as well. Conceptualised in the context of Chinese politics, pragmatic nationalism denotes Chinese foreign policy justifying its foreign collaborations in the presence of a very thick inward-looking nationalist discourse that simultaneously promotes the alleged superiority of the Chinese nation. Accordingly, Chinese foreign policy can pursue foreign collaborations, which otherwise is looked down upon, as long as they serve the advancement of Chinese interests.<sup>38</sup> Just like pragmatic nationalism, pragmatic-techno nationalism, combining elements of techno-nationalism and techno-globalism, was coined to describe the Chinese attitude towards foreign collaboration, this time in the field of science and technology.<sup>39</sup> Pragmatic techno-nationalism, which combines pragmatic and techno variants of nationalism, explains

China's state-led activism in technological innovation, allowing foreign collaborations to make technological advancements at the national and domestic level continuous and sustainable while maintaining an otherwise negative attitude about foreigners and about collaboration with them.<sup>40</sup> The formulation of both pragmatic and pragmatic-techno nationalism flourished as a result of China's goal to overcome the stigma of backwardness by using science and technology.<sup>41</sup>

A similar – three-way – dynamic is at work in Turkey's pragmatic-techno nationalism in Antarctica. First, the desire for status in the international system (and achieving this by being present in the Antarctic) forces Turkey's politicians and scientists to collaborate with foreigners (mostly from the West) and produces a discourse that approves of foreign collaboration at a time when anti-Western rhetoric is very high in Turkey. Second, the Antarctic strategy is expected to contribute to economic development through research and innovation, especially through Turkey's '*yerli ve milli*' (indigenous and national) technology upgrading initiatives. Third, the Antarctic becomes a platform to showcase Turkey's own recent technological advancements, thus winning, or at least making the claim for superiority in, the game – ie the science that has come to define Western modernity. This is the point where pragmatic-techno nationalism overlaps with Kemalist nationalism – the founding ideology of Turkey, which envisioned a Western identity for Turkey. The selection of artefacts that came to symbolise Turkey's Western identity and associated with Kemalist nationalism is ironic. This is because not only Kemalist nationalism but also Turkey's Western orientation has been disowned by the successive JDP governments, with rare episodes of lip service. Through science or by highlighting Turkey's success in science both at home and abroad, the JDP government instrumentalises symbols corresponding to Turkey's Western identity – the founding stones of Kemalist nationalism.

In addition to science, which has become the benchmark of Western modernity, Turkey's Antarctic strategy involves another reference to Western modernity that further bolsters the discourse of Kemalist nationalism: the constant highlighting of the 'femaleness', or the gender identity, of the Turkish expedition team leader sent to the Antarctic; and, from time to time, adorning these references with a hint of the success of Turkey's female athletes performing their talents in the Antarctic. Obviously, this is not the first time a female scientist or an athlete was in the Antarctic.<sup>42</sup> But what is distinct in the Turkish case is how Turkey's politicians, scientists and media highlight this gender component while making the case for Turkey's presence in the Antarctic. Since the status of women, or advancing the status of women, has become one of the standards of civilisation or a mark of whether a country is one of the 'modern' states,<sup>43</sup> showcasing the 'advanced' state of the Turkish women to the world via Antarctica helps Turkey's policymakers to make their case for status-seeking once again. However, this situation contains another paradox, because this constant emphasis of the 'femaleness' of scientific lead Şahika Ercümen as the only Turkish athlete to make her way to the Antarctic is another adoption or reappropriation of Kemalist nationalism, which in the founding years of the Republic neatly made women one of the symbols of Turkish modernisation and the Westernisation project and nationhood.<sup>44</sup> Needless to say, such a use of Western benchmarks of progress in science and the status of women comes at a time when anti-Western discourse and practice in Turkey's foreign policy are very high,<sup>45</sup> and women's rights and gender equality have regressed substantially under the JDP rule.<sup>46</sup> In the section below, we provide a brief historical background on Turkey's recent interest in Antarctica before substantiating our arguments on the making of *assemblage nationalism*.

## Turkey's scientists: key drivers in the Antarctic strategy

As noted above, the ATS placed scientists in claimant and non-claimant countries in the driver's seat in formulating the respective countries' Antarctic strategy. In Turkey's case, Turkish scientists started to assume a key role in the country's Antarctic strategy around 1991, four years before Turkey signed the Antarctic Treaty, at a national conference.<sup>47</sup> At this conference, which was also attended by representatives of key state agencies, Turkish scientists advised the policymakers to sign the Antarctic Treaty and to allocate resources to initiatives on Antarctica.<sup>48</sup> However, TÜBİTAK, Turkey's national funding agency for science and research, dismissed these suggestions, arguing that being active in the Antarctic did not serve Turkey's national interests.<sup>49</sup>

Turkey did, nevertheless, sign the ATS in 1995, but as a state remained indifferent to the affairs of the Antarctic until the early 2010s – almost a decade after the JDP came to power. The first development that attracted the attention of Turkey's ruling elite and media to Antarctica was the arrival of *Uzaklar II*, a 14-metre craft, after its 8500-mile voyage to Antarctica in November 2012. As the first Turkish navigators to reach the continent, Osman Atasoy and Sibel Karasu sailed to Antarctica to record a documentary for the national public broadcaster TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation). The boat's return to Turkey aroused interest, and Atasoy and Karasu were met by a crowd at Marmaris, a port city on the Mediterranean coast. Bülent Arınç, the then deputy prime minister, was also in the crowd, while many citizens proudly waved the Turkish flag on the shore.<sup>50</sup>

Almost simultaneously, the Antarctica Polar Scientific Research Center (TAKBAM) and Turkish Marine Research Foundation (TUDAV), two civil society organisations for researchers interested in Antarctica, played significant roles in bringing up the Antarctic issue. Not only did these researchers get in touch with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012 to discuss the establishment of a Turkish scientific research base in Antarctica,<sup>51</sup> but they also encouraged and participated in Turkey's first-ever attendance at an Antarctica consultative meeting in May 2013.<sup>52</sup> The scientists' initiative and spearheading role in pushing Turkey's bureaucrats to participate in the Antarctica consultative meeting was acknowledged by the Turkish state itself in official strategy documents.<sup>53</sup>

Turkey's first-ever attendance at an Antarctica consultative meeting in May 2013 opened the floodgates to scientific activity that involved conferences, workshops, research expeditions, and centres. In January 2015, Istanbul Technical University Polar Research Centre (PolReC), which played a key role in the formulation and implementation of Turkey's Antarctica policy, was established.<sup>54</sup> In 2016, a research team of 13 academics from seven Turkish universities and researchers from TÜBİTAK embarked on a two-week-long trip to Antarctica.<sup>55</sup> The symbiotic relationship between Turkish scientists and policymakers was reinforced when Turkey signed, ratified and decided to implement the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol) in 2017. This was a crucial step because a country is not permitted to carry out scientific research in Antarctica without signing the Madrid Protocol. Between February and April 2017, even before the protocol was fully implemented, Turkey organised its first-ever 'official' scientific 'expedition' to Antarctica (TAE-1).<sup>56</sup> In December 2017, this was followed by the creation of Turkey's first National Strategy Document on Antarctica.<sup>57</sup> Subsequently, 'research expeditions' became regular, carried out in 2018, 2019 and 2020 by Turkish scientists, led by Dr Burcu Özsoy. Finally, Turkey's Polar Research Institute (KARE) was founded in 2019 within TÜBİTAK Marmara



Research Centre, further institutionalising the country's interest in Antarctica and cementing the symbiotic relationship between state and scientists as Özsoy became the institute's founding director.

### Turkey's *assemblage nationalism* at work

This symbiotic relationship not only led to a discourse that justified Turkey's presence in the Antarctic to foreign and domestic audiences, fulfilling Turkish politicians' ambitions for status, but also gave way to an *assemblage* of nationalism: banal, pragmatic-techno and Kemalist nationalisms. Turkey's Antarctic strategy involves bits of banal nationalism because it reproduces the Turkish nation through the national flag, sometimes in the Antarctic and sometimes at home. Yet the 'flying' (read: visual and discursive references to) of the Turkish flag happens in an inconsistent way. At times, the flag is 'flown' in a very 'noticed' way, especially as part of the sovereignty-cum-status performances to herald that Turkey, too, is in the Antarctic. But at other times, the 'flying' of the flag happens in a very 'unnoticed' way, subliminally incorporated into the speeches of scientists or politicians. References to the flag started with the very first Antarctica-related event that attracted the attention of media and high state officials: the return of *Uzaklar II* to Turkey following its voyage to Antarctica in November 2012. Bülent Arınç, the then deputy prime minister, joyously welcomed *Uzaklar II*, making the following reference to the Turkish flag:

This boat is Turkish-made. Its crew is Turkish and so is its flag. Our friends have advanced to a level that with a 14-meter-long boat they went to Antarctica – a place we can only imagine as a place full of ice and penguins – and even filmed a documentary there, and suggested the establishment of a Turkish base there. We really need to congratulate them ten times.<sup>58</sup>

The Turkish flag was also at the heart of the statement given by Osman Atasoy, one of the two navigators of *Uzaklar II*, while describing their arrival in Antarctica and the national pride conveyed by the flag: 'The only thing of another colour in the stark whiteness that completely covers Antarctica was our red boat, *Uzaklar II*, and the red and white Turkish flag on its mast!'<sup>59</sup> Aside from being the first unofficial yet very publicised trip to the continent, this journey to the Antarctic was important because it established the mutual or consensus language among Turkey's scientific community, bureaucrats and politicians that justified Turkey's presence in the Antarctic: references to 'national pride' through the 'Turkish flag'. For instance, after becoming the prime minister, and just before the country's second national scientific expedition to the continent in February 2018, Binali Yıldırım noted:

The mission that you are on is not only a scientific mission. This is a step that puts forth Turkey's future vision, power, and determination. When the Turks' flag flies in Antarctica, friends, and foes will see that Turkey cannot be squeezed into this geography. Our flag with crescent and star will always fly in Antarctica, 15 thousand kilometres away. It will remain as the marker of our beloved state and nation.<sup>60</sup>

A systematic analysis of the discourse among Turkey's ruling elite and scientists on Antarctica reveals that the above references to 'national pride' and the 'Turkish flag' are not isolated instances; rather, they illustrate the broader pattern of how actors in Turkey made sense of and legitimised the country's interest and activities in Antarctica. We argue that this

nationalist trope employed by the scientific community was one of the reasons that enabled Turkey's scientific community to draw politicians' attention to the continent, garnering support in their scientific endeavours.

Our first example is the announcements made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. A keyword search reveals that between 28 August 2014 and 12 January 2021, 12 posts made by the Office of the President mentioned the word 'Antarctica'.<sup>61</sup> Only five of these posts are relevant for our inquiry, as Turkey's Antarctica initiatives are not mentioned or elaborated upon in the others. In the first relevant post (5 April 2017), a photo and a short video were shared shortly after the Turkish research team returned from the first Antarctic national expedition and paid a visit to the presidency. In the photo Erdoğan and the team posed while holding a large Turkish flag in front of them, whereas the video shows Erdoğan greeting the team members individually.<sup>62</sup>

The next two posts are on the subject of Erdoğan's speech at TÜBİTAK and TÜBA (Turkish Academy of Sciences) Awards Ceremony (30 December 2019). For the first time while elaborating on Turkey's Antarctic initiative, the president made a strong reference to the Turkish flag in his address (quoted in the epigraph at the beginning of this article). The final two posts are on Erdoğan's address in a parliamentary group meeting (February 19, 2020), where he briefly gave information on the fourth national scientific expedition to Antarctica (the number of participants and scientific projects) and noted the possibility of cooperation with Great Britain on a shared research base on the continent. Even in that context, Erdoğan stressed that the objective was to have the Turkish flag flown in Antarctica forever.<sup>63</sup>

In addition to Erdoğan's announcements, there have been strong references to the Turkish flag in the discourse of Ministers of Science, Industry, and Technology – both in speech and in visual representations, again making the flag the benchmark for symbolising and reflecting national pride and success. For example, Faruk Özlü, the former Minister of Science, Industry and Technology, when enumerating the scientific activities conducted in the first official Antarctic expedition, did not forget to emphasise the Turkish flag flying over the Antarctic: 'The team made four thousand kilometres, 17 topographical measurements in 38 fields [...]. Our flag has been flown over the Antarctic continent during the scientific expedition'.<sup>64</sup> Likewise, Mustafa Varank, the acting Minister of Industry and Technology since July 2018, noted shortly after Turkey established its temporary research base in Antarctica in February 2019: 'We founded our temporary scientific base. This is a scene that makes us proud. Flying our flag, our banner there makes us proud'.<sup>65</sup> Examples like these can easily be found.

A systematic examination of AA's Antarctic coverage further supports our argument that a mutually agreed nationalist trope, based mostly on the declaration of national pride, and with references to the Turkish flag both verbally and visually, is what persuaded the Turkish politicians to support the scientists' endeavours in Antarctica. AA published 250 news items between 27 January 2012 and 12 January 2021 in which the word 'Antarctica' was mentioned at least once (Table 1). While 114 of these are not relevant for our inquiry (these are general news items reporting discoveries, climate change, scientific developments, etc.), 136 of them were on the subject of Turkey's Antarctica initiatives. More importantly, in almost half of the relevant AA news pieces on Antarctica (62 out of 136), there was either an explicitly verbal or a visual reference to the Turkish flag. What is more, we find that the news extensively quoted Turkish scientists and other actors who reflected their sense of national pride and feelings of accomplishment by making strong references to waving the Turkish flag on the

**Table 1.** Anadolu agency reporting on Antarctica (27 January 2012 and 12 January 2021).

Year	Total number of news items	Relevant news items	References to the Turkish flag	References to other national endeavours
2012	5	2	1	0
2013	0	0	0	0
2014	3	0	0	0
2015	2	1	1	0
2016	14	4	3	0
2017	33	15	9	0
2018	34	16	7	4
2019	99	65	29	8
2020	58	33	12	4
2021	2	0	0	0
Total	250	136	62	16

‘white continent’. To illustrate, Burcu Özsoy (the leader and coordinator of national scientific expeditions, director of PolReC and the Polar Research Institute) noted, in April 2016,

I am very happy to be part of this giant step, which I believe will contribute to Turkey’s visibility in the world. We hope that in the upcoming years, we can carry out our work with a Turkish ship carrying a Turkish flag, and at a base where the Turkish flag flies continuously.<sup>66</sup>

In a similar vein, Özsoy expressed the scientific team’s gratitude to Turkey’s political elite for their support, and for providing the team with the opportunity to ‘proudly carry the Turkish flag in Antarctica.’<sup>67</sup> Likewise, Şahika Ercümen, the nine-time world record-holder Turkish free-diver, participated in the third Antarctic expedition (January–March 2019), and dove into the Southern Ocean to celebrate the opening of a temporary Turkish research base. There was a strong reference to the Turkish flag in almost all visuals on Ercümen’s story, such as the athlete holding and waving the flag under and above the water.<sup>68</sup> Ercümen was frequently quoted in the news, the quotations reflecting the diver’s feelings of national pride and highlighting how the ‘red’ flag stood in contrast to the ‘whiteness’ of the snow and ice of Antarctica.<sup>69</sup> Many scientists and politicians commented on Ercümen’s success with similar feelings and expressions; these were covered by the AA news. At the centre of these statements, not surprisingly, was the Turkish flag. The ruling party’s spokesperson Ömer Çelik noted: ‘We know that esteemed Ercümen accomplished many firsts in diving, by flying the Turkish flag, became the first Turkish female to free-dive in Antarctica. Let me take this opportunity to congratulate the scientific team and our national athlete.’<sup>70</sup>

Last but not least, the shared feelings of national pride and triumph were demonstratively reflected during ceremonies in which the Turkish flag became the symbol and carrier of the mutual and sacred sentiments. To illustrate, a day before the scientific team’s departure on the third national Antarctic expedition in January 2019, the leader of the research team took the Turkish flag from Vice President Fuat Oktay and then placed it on her forehead after kissing it – a practice considered sacred in Turkish society, reflecting the national bond, sentiment, pride and respect.<sup>71</sup> AA covered this event in the form of a short video, with the subtitle ‘Turkish Flag Was Taken over With Great Pride’. Then, upon their arrival in Antarctica, the scientific team planted this flag in front of the newly established temporary research base and sang the national anthem while standing at attention.<sup>72</sup> After the team’s return to Turkey, the same flag was handed over to President Erdoğan as a symbol of national success and pride.<sup>73</sup>

We noted that the Turkish ruling elite's and scientists' nationalism concerning Antarctica is also a pragmatic-techno nationalism, in the sense that they promoted international collaboration on Antarctica. Turkey signed agreements with other countries to jointly conduct research on the continent; and both the political leadership and scientists frequently mentioned their willingness to cooperate with other nationals in their discourse.<sup>74</sup> There are arguably two reasons for this. First, effective international collaboration is one of the requirements to become a 'consultative country' to ATS. Thus, if Turkey is to reach its objective of becoming a consultative member, it has to build effective ties with other countries, and jointly carry out high-quality scientific research. Second, scientists are especially inclined to think globally; it is also in the best interest of Turkish scientists to collaborate with their foreign colleagues, ie networking, better research, etc. In any case, both the Turkish ruling elite and the scientists were pragmatic in their nationalism – they did not refrain from collaborating with foreigners as it served the attainment of the national agenda which aims to promote high-tech indigenous production. Turkish elite's discourse on 'national technology move' (*milli teknoloji hamlesi*) and policies aiming to strengthen the Turkish military–industry complex exemplify this strategic preference.<sup>75</sup>

In this context, the framing of the national Antarctic expeditions perfectly complemented the broad narrative on the country's 'indigenous and national' (*yerli ve milli*) endeavours. To illustrate, starting with the one in June 2018,<sup>76</sup> Turkey's ruling elite highlighted the country's Antarctic initiatives in the context of other national endeavours or stories of national success (Table 1). For instance, along with the production of domestic drones and tanks, and the construction of city hospitals and highways, Antarctic expeditions were among the issues that President Erdoğan highlighted to demonstrate his party's success in his long speech on the new presidential system.<sup>77</sup> Similar to Erdoğan, Varank referred to the national Antarctic expeditions as an illustrative case of achievement. He noted: 'we know it very well that the national steps that we take in industry and technology will ensure us against global risks and external shocks.'<sup>78</sup> Likewise, the AA emphasised that '[Turkey's researchers] warm up with "domestically produced" clothes for the Antarctic cold', in an article in which an academic elaborated on how Turkey's 'domestic and national polar clothes' were in the spirit of Turkey's attempts to develop its own domestic and national projects.<sup>79</sup> Many such examples can be given. In short, there has been a clear mutually reinforcing overlap between Turkish governing elite's discourse about Antarctica and other national endeavours for economic development.

The final element of *assemblage nationalism* feeding into the country's Antarctic nationalism is Kemalist nationalism. Turkey's Antarctic strategy contains traces of Kemalist nationalism that upholds the Western identity and ideals of the West: Turkey's Western identity is correlated with the advancement of women's status and science – artefacts and symbols of Western modernity and identity. Regarding the latter, in almost all news items and quotes, there are references to how Turkey's endeavours in Antarctica demonstrate the country's scientific capabilities – a reflection of its modernity. Furthermore, Turkish policymakers frequently refer to Turkey's scientists and their scientific collaborations and accomplishments in the Antarctic before the JDP period, to legitimise and historicise the country's presence in Antarctica – a period which they associate with Kemalism and are usually very critical of. Atok Karaali (the first Turkish scientist to conduct research in Antarctica, in 1967 at the US station), Serap Tilav (the first Turkish woman at the South Pole, who did research in 1980 and 1991 in the US stations) and Ümran İnan

(who carried out research from 1980 in the US stations) are commonly mentioned in this regard.

The positive spin that is placed on women's status is present from day one. During the return ceremony for the boat *Uzaklar II*, Bülent Arınç did not miss the opportunity to emphasise and appreciate the fact that one of the two navigators, Sibel Karasu, was female:

Undoubtedly, Osman Bey's experience and courage in this matter are not in question, but as a Turkish woman, a Turkish girl, I see that Sibel Hanım also shows great strength and courage in these vast seas. I want to congratulate her [also because] she sets an example to Turkish girls.

There have been many references to the 'femaleness' of the scientists who participated in Turkey's Antarctica endeavours. For instance, the title of an AA news item published in March 2017 was 'Turkey's pride in Antarctica'.<sup>80</sup> The opening remark was, 'A Turkish female scientist leads the [research] team, who waved the crescent-star flag with the work they conducted in Antarctica' – referring to Dr Burcu Özsoy, who played significant roles in shaping Turkey's Antarctic strategy. Likewise, another AA news item (published in March 2019) also emphasised Özsoy's gender with the title 'Female heroes of the Antarctic expedition'. Özsoy was quoted:

We reached the highest number of women thus far in the third expedition. This is a very proud situation. It is necessary to look at the subject as a scientist without discriminating between men and women. For this reason, we conduct awareness studies to introduce Antarctic science in primary, secondary, and high schools in Turkey. Little girls' interest makes me very happy. A truly powerful generation of female scientists is growing. I invite them all to do science in Antarctica.<sup>81</sup>

Turkey's record-holding deep-water diver Şahika Ercümen was also mentioned in this news item (and in many other news items), as one of the five women participating in the third expedition. Ercümen was quoted too: 'We worked without discriminating between men and women [...]. One of my biggest wishes is to bring our little girls who will shape our world in the future with sports and science and contribute to this'.

On 23 September 2020, Turkey's Antarctica documentary, *The Black Box of the Planet: Antarctica*, premiered at the presidential complex, hosted by the country's First Lady, Emine Erdoğan. After highlighting that Turkey's Antarctica expeditions demonstrated how the country became a major force in the scientific field globally, Erdoğan emphasised the role of Turkish women in the process:

One of these firsts is the recording of the expedition as a documentary. It is also remarkable that the director of the documentary is a woman. We have women researchers participating in scientific expeditions. The leader of the team is a woman ... I mean, we can almost say, 'Antarctica was touched by a woman's hand'. I especially congratulate our women. They have been a part of this important work with their courage, experience, and broad vision.<sup>82</sup>

Similar examples can be easily found. For instance, referring to the participation of Burcu Özsoy's and Fatma Şahin (Mayor of Gaziantep) in the fourth expedition, Mustafa Varank, the Minister of Industry and Technology, noted:

Thanks to them, we will see a very good example of women's solidarity in science. The fact that [Özsoy and Şahin] accompany the team gives a strong message to the youth and women in our country and boosting morale. We want our young girls to focus more heavily on the fields of science, technology, and engineering.<sup>83</sup>

Thus, what is certain is that Turkey's high-level politicians, scientists and other key figures systematically emphasised the gender of the women who participated in Turkey's Antarctica initiatives. We see a component of Kemalist nationalism that upholds the ideals of the West as the state's Western identity is correlated with the advancement of women's status and science.

## Conclusion

In this article, by examining Turkey's reformulation of its Antarctic strategy in the early 2010s, we heeded a call to elaborate on non-Western powers' involvement in the polar regions,<sup>84</sup> suggested to have the potential to prompt Antarctic nationalism(s).<sup>85</sup> We argued that Turkey's reformulation of its Antarctic strategy produced a nationalist trope contributing to the Antarctic nationalism that blended three variants of nationalism, or an *assemblage nationalism*: banal, pragmatic-techno and Kemalist. It was this nationalist trope that created a modus operandi between Turkey's scientists and policymakers, leading to a change in the country's Antarctic strategy. When this mutual language based on nationalism overlapped with the goals of policymakers in the realm of foreign and economic policy, a change in Turkey's Antarctic strategy was not only inevitable but a relatively low-cost adjustment.

Among the types of blending that occurred in the *assemblage nationalism*, banal nationalism was made possible with the Turkish flag as a frequent referent both discursively and visually in the speeches of Turkey's policymakers and scientists, and in the Antarctic-related news items. Pragmatic-techno nationalism came to life when Turkey's presence in the Antarctic necessitated foreign collaboration. This overlapped with Turkish policymakers' ambition to advance the country's economic development through 'indigenous and national' manufacturing. Turkey's variant of Antarctic nationalism contained traces of Kemalist nationalism that upheld the country's Western identity through Western artefacts, construed through highlighting Turkish scientific achievements in the Antarctic, and the claim made regarding the advanced status of the women in Turkey by referring to achievements of the female scientific lead and female athletes.

While this assemblage of nationalism maintained a 'benign' face of Turkish nationalism, paradoxes (but also irony), nevertheless, pervaded the situation. Embroiled in wars where Islamist-nationalist rhetoric is very high, such a 'benign' appearance of the nationalist trope was one level of paradox. The other paradox was the ease with which JDP adopted and instrumentalised the symbols of Kemalist nationalism – the advanced status of women and science that highlighted Turkey's Western identity. Not only has JDP been critical of Kemalist nationalism and maintained an anti-Western discourse, but also the status of women in Turkey has regressed as a result of JDP's harsh rhetoric against gender equality. Overall, the low adjustment costs and overlapping interests and rhetoric with the scientific community helped the JDP-led policymakers to reformulate Turkey's Antarctic policy. The nationalist trope that came as a result of this reformulation has been 'benign' compared to Turkey's other nationalist tropes, suggesting that it is possible to have 'more benign' nationalisms in the Antarctic when foreign collaboration is central to the strategy, and when the Antarctic is simply a tangential interest to the policymakers. But this does not mean that the current 'benign' state will necessarily remain the same. In a situation where scientists are relegated to a secondary position, and with Turkey's policymakers in the driving seat, the 'malign' face of nationalism can make its debut instrumentalising the Antarctic.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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## Notes

1. For the Presidency's post, see <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/114164/tubitak-ve-tuba-bilim-odulleri-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma> (accessed 12 March 2020).
2. Ibid.
3. "Dördüncü Ulusal Antarktika Bilim Seferi 9 Şubat'ta başlıyor," *Hürriyet*, 29 January 2020.
4. 11th Development Plan, 2019, 107. [https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Eleventh\\_Development\\_Plan-2019-2023.pdf](https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Eleventh_Development_Plan-2019-2023.pdf)
5. Turkey thus far has prioritised scientific research in Antarctica, even though the country has also been interested in carrying out research at the Arctic. Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology, "National Polar Science Program (2018–2022)," 8.
6. Indeed, between 1978 and 2012, 'Antarktika' is not only misspelt 'Antartika' but also classified as a developing country in 24 *Official Gazette* issues.
7. Depledge, Kennedy-Pipe, and Bilgic, "Turkey: A New Polar Power?"
8. Dal, "Conceptualising and Testing the 'Emerging Regional Power'"; Özerdem, "Turkey as a Rising Power"; Cornell, Knaus, and Scheich, "Dealing with a Rising Power."
9. Please see the remarks of Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, and Ahmet Davutoğlu at <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/58843/afrikali-kardeslerimiz-yol-gostericilere-degil-yol-arkadaslari-na-ihiyaci-var>; <http://www.abdullahgul.gen.tr/haberler/170/82003/turkiye-ve-kore-cumhuriyeti-asya-kitasinin-bati-ve-dogu-uclarinda-yukselen-iki-guc.html>; and <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-and-the-ambassadors-in-mersin.en.mfa>, respectively (both accessed 19 March 2020).
10. Hemmings et al., "Nationalism in Today's Antarctic."
11. Hemmings, "Subglacial Nationalisms," 36.
12. 'Assemblage' here denotes a 'collection of things or persons'. See <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assemblage#synonyms>
13. Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, "Nationalism and Foreign Policy Discourse"; Saraçoğlu, "Syrian Conflict"; Hoffman, Werz, and Halpin, "Turkey's New Nationalism."
14. White, *Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks*.
15. Aydın-Düzgüt, "De-Europeanisation through Discourse"; Kaliber and Kaliber, "From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism."

16. Tokdoğan, *Yeni Osmanlılık: Hınç, Nostalji, Narsizm*, 145–56.
17. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, “Okçular Vakfı Fetih Kupası Ödül Töreninde Yaptıkları Konuşma,” 29 May 2020, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/120332/okcular-vakfi-fetih-kupasi-odul-toreni-nde-yaptiklari-konusma>
18. Kutlay, “Politics of State Capitalism.”
19. Our analysis covers announcements, press releases and news in Turkish because we are primarily interested in how Turkish governing elites and scientists frame Turkey’s Antarctica initiatives to the domestic audience. The first date on which news about the Antarctic appears on AA’s webpage is 27 January 2012. All quotes for which we refer to original sources in Turkish are translated by us.
20. Dodds, “Guest Editorial – The 1959 Antarctic Treaty,” 145.
21. Leane and Jabour, “Performing Sovereignty over an Ice Continent”; Dodds, “Sovereignty Watch.”
22. Dodds, “Sovereignty Watch,” 234.
23. Leane and Jabour, “Performing Sovereignty over an Ice Continent,” 174; Dodds, “Sovereignty Watch,” 231, 235.
24. Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession*. Quoted in Leane and Jabour, “Performing Sovereignty over an Ice Continent,” 172.
25. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty; see ‘The Antarctic Treaty’ at <https://www.ats.aq/e/antarctic-treaty.html> (accessed 19 March 2020).
26. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty; see <https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Parties?lang=e> (accessed 19 March 2020). Since 1961, 25 more countries have received consultative party status.
27. Brady, *Emerging Politics of Antarctica*, 33. There are also exceptions: The Netherlands, though being among the Consultative Parties, did not establish a permanent research station. See Dodds, *The Antarctic: A Very Short Introduction*, 219.
28. Hemmings, “Subglacial Nationalisms.”
29. Dodds, *The Antarctic: A Very Short Introduction*, 219, 215.
30. Finemore, *National Interests in International Society*, Chapter 2.
31. Gong, *Standard of “Civilization” in International Society*, 92.
32. Gilady, *Price of Prestige*.
33. Hemmings et al., “Nationalism in Today’s Antarctic.”
34. Billig, *Banal Nationalism*.
35. Yumul and Özkirimli, “Reproducing the Nation”; Torsti, “History Culture and Banal Nationalism”; Köse and Yılmaz, “Flagging Turkishness.”
36. Çırakman, “Flags and Traitors.”
37. Antonsich, “‘Everyday’ of Banal Nationalism.”
38. Suttmeier and Yao, *China’s Post-WTO Technology Policy*, 18; Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations”; Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism.”
39. Kennedy, “China’s Search for Renewable Energy.”
40. Ibid.
41. Zhao, “Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations,” 9; Kennedy, “China’s Search for Renewable Energy,” 910.
42. Burns, “Women in Antarctic Science”; Rothblum, Weinstock, and Morris, *Women in the Antarctic*.
43. Towns, *Women and States*.
44. Kandiyoti, “Gendering the Modern,” 125.
45. Aydın-Düzgüt, “De-Europeanisation through Discourse”; Kaliber and Kaliber, “From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism.”
46. Cindoğlu and Ünal, “Gender and Sexuality in the Authoritarian Discursive Strategies”; Ün, “Contesting Global Gender Equality Norms.”
47. İzdar, “Türkiye’nin İlk Antarktika Girişimi Üzerine Notlar,” 6.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid, 6.
50. ‘Uzaklar-2 yuvaya geri döndü’, *Star*, 29 November 2012.
51. Öztürk, “Türkiye Nasıl Bir Antarktika Stratejisi Geliştirmelidir?”
52. Ibid., 5.



53. Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology, "National Polar Science Program (2018–2022)," 8.
54. Fortherelated*OfficialGazette*, see <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2015/01/20150117-4.htm> (accessed 12 March 2020).
55. An interview with Bayram Öztürk, "Antarktika: Türkiye'nin Bilim İnsanları Antarktika'da," *Atlas*. See <https://www.atlasdergisi.com/kesfet/bilim/antartika-turkiyenin-bilim-insanlari-antarktika.html> (accessed 12 March 2020). See also "Türk bilim insanlarından Antarktika çıkarması!" *Milliyet*, 22 March 2016.
56. İnam, Ünal, and Koçak, "Türkiye Antarktika Bilimsel Seferleri," 14.
57. Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology, "National Polar Science Program (2018–2022)," 3.
58. 'Uzaklar II yurda döndü,' *Yeni Şafak*, 29 November 2012.
59. An interview with Osman Atasoy in November 2012, *SkyLife*. See <https://www.skylife.com/en/2012-11/first-turkish-sailors-in-antarctica> (accessed 12 March 2020).
60. "Başbakan Yıldırım: Antarktika'da ay yıldızlı bayrağımız daima dalgalanacak," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 13 February, 2018.
61. For the results of the search, see <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/Search?s=antarktika&p0=antarktika&p1=410-365-356-353-1709-1695-355-354-&p2=28.08.2014&p3=12.01.2021&sT=1&langText=tr&presidentId=12> (accessed 13 January 2021). The first time that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly endorsed Turkish scientists' Antartica-related initiatives was on 4 February 2017.
62. For the post, see <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/74631/antarktika-arastirma-grubu-cumhurbaskanligi-kulliyesinde> (accessed 12 March 2020).
63. For the post, see <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/116717/-idlib-i-hem-turkiye-hem-debolge-halki-acisindan-guvenli-bir-yer-h-line-donusturmeye-kararliyiz-> (accessed 12 March 2020).
64. "Türk bilim insanları yeniden Antarktika yolcusu," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 27 October 2017.
65. "Bakan Varank, Türkiye'nin Antarktika'da geçici bilim üssünü kurduğunu açıkladı," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 25 February 2019.
66. "Türk bilim insanları Antarktika'daki çalışmalarını tamamladı," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 16 April 2016.
67. "Türkiye'nin Antarktika'daki gururları," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 7 March 2017.
68. "Milli sporcu Şahika Ercümen'den Antarktika'da tarihi dalış," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 5 February 2019.
69. "İlk olmak her zaman zor ve gurur verici," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 18 March 2019.
70. "AK Parti Sözcüsü Çelik: Kaşıkçı cinayetinde yeterli iş birliğiyle karşı karşıya değiliz," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 11 February 2019.
71. "Hedefimiz Antarktika'da Kalıcı Üssü Kurmak," *Milliyet*, 28 January 2019.
72. For the visual, see [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJi-bTnf6nl&list=LLXaN1b7BmP\\_I2HOflXOp-Aw&index=6&t=0s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJi-bTnf6nl&list=LLXaN1b7BmP_I2HOflXOp-Aw&index=6&t=0s) (accessed 12 March 2020).
73. "Antarktika'ya kurulacak üssün yeri belirlendi," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 7 June 2018.
74. For instance, see "Turkey, Belarus Sign Antarctic Cooperation Agreement," *Anadolu Agency*, 22 April 2019.
75. "National technology move to transform Turkey's technology industry," *Daily Sabah*, 8 April 2017.
76. "Erdoğan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Hükümet Sistemini anlattı," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 21 June 2018.
77. Ibid; "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Yeni bir şahlanış döneminin kapılarını açıyoruz," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 16 January 2020.
78. "Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanı Varank: Sanayi ve teknolojideki milli adımlar sigortamız," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 18 December 2018.
79. "Antarktika soğuşunda 'yerli üretim' kıyafetlerle ısınıyorlar," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 6 February 2019.
80. "Türkiye'nin Antarktika'daki gururları," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 7 March 2017.
81. "Antarktika seferinin kadın kahramanları," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 7 March 2019.
82. "Gezegeenin Kara Kutusu: Antarktika Belgeseli'nin ilk gösterimi yapıldı," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 24 September 2020.
83. "Bakan Varank 4. Ulusal Antarktika Bilim Seferi için yola çıkan heyeti uğurladı," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 9 February 2020.
84. Dodds and Hemmings, "Routledge Handbook of Ocean Resources and Management," 591.
85. Hemmings et al., "Nationalism in Today's Antarctic."

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