



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
PROGRAM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

**IN SEARCH OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO  
IMPROVE CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION: THE CASES  
OF IFOR, SFOR, KFOR AND ISAF**

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DOCTOR of PHILOSOPHY THESIS

İSTANBUL, DECEMBER, 2020

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PHD THESIS

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the requirements for the degree of PhD in the Program of International Relations

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCOMC	Comprehensive Operations and Crisis Management Center
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
GO	Governmental Organizations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	International Organizations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NATO	North Atlantic treaty Organization
NFIU	Force Integration Units
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NRDC-T	NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey
NSD-S	NATO Strategic Direction-South
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
SSR	Security Sector Reform
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World health Organization

# **IN SEARCH OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVE CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION: THE CASES OF IFOR, SFOR, KFOR AND ISAF**

## **ABSTRACT**

In the early 1990s the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Peace Operations carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina and then in Kosovo in the following period caused civil and military entities to act together more than ever before. In this environment, there were many actors on the ground such as; the people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, wide variety of organizations, and the international military forces. This situation forced civilian and military entities to coordinate and cooperate on wide variety of topics. This development, which is expressed as the emergence of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), is actually the beginning of a civil-military convergence. Following the process in the Balkans, during the interventions to Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, a Comprehensive Approach model keeping CIMIC at the center was tried to be implemented. The visible form of this approach was Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Even though the PRTs failed and their activities were terminated in 2014, Comprehensive Approach was adopted. Considering the Balkans and Afghanistan experiences, the assumption that the soldiers will not be able to provide security on their own has been effective in the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. In the following period, the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian crisis and the Hybrid Threat and Hybrid Warfare debates contributed to the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. The concept of Resilience and the Cross-Cutting Topics became more important within military.

In this study, the civil-military convergence process is examined from past to present. Within this context, the problems are indicated and it is claimed that civil-military convergence must be understood as a process that should start from a peacetime period and including wide range of topics and relevant actors at all levels.

**Keywords:** Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Comprehensive Approach, Hybrid Threats, Hybrid Warfare, Resilience, Cross-Cutting Topics.

# SİVİL-ASKER İŞBİRLİĞİ'NİN GELİŞTİRİLMESİ İÇİN KAPSAMLI BİR YAKLAŞIM ARAYIŞI: IFOR, SFOR, KFOR VE ISAF ÖRNEKLERİ

## ÖZET

1990'lı yılların başlarından itibaren Yugoslavya'nın dağılması sürecinde yaşanan savaş ve müteakiben önce Bosna-Hersek ve daha sonra Kosova'da icra edilen Barış Harekâtları sivil ve asker oluşumların harekât alanında daha önce olmadığı kadar yakınlaşmasına ve birlikte hareket etmesine neden oldu. Bu ortamda, bir yanda acil insani desteğe muhtaç halk, bir yanda organizasyonlar ve diğer yanda uluslararası askeri oluşum olmak üzere birçok aktör bulunmaktaydı. Bu durum sivil ve asker unsurların eşgüdüm ve işbirliği yapmalarını zorunlu kılıyordu. Sivil-Asker İşbirliği (SAİ)'nin ortaya çıkışı olarak ifade edilen bu gelişme aslında bir sivil-asker yakınlaşması sürecinin de başlangıcıdır. Balkanlardaki sürecin ardından 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında Afganistan'a yapılan müdahaleler esnasında, SAİ'nin de içinde olduğu bir kapsamlı yaklaşım modeli uygulanmaya çalışıldı. Bunun görünür şekli Bölgesel İmar Ekipleri (BİE)'dir. Kapsamlı Yaklaşım'ın benimsenmesinde, Balkanlar ve Afganistan tecrübeleri göz önüne alınarak, askerlerin mevcut ortamda tek başlarına güvenliği sağlayamayacak olduğu kabulü etkili olmuştur. Takip eden süreçte Kırım'ın ilhakı, Ukrayna krizi ve bunların getirdiği Hibrit Tehdit ve Hibrit Savaş tartışmaları Kapsamlı Yaklaşım modelinin daha fazla benimsenmesine yol açtı. Bu tartışmalarla birlikte beklenmeyen şoklara karşı esnek olma olarak tercüme edilen Elastikiyet (*Resilience*) kavramı ile Kesişen Konular olarak adlandırılan konular daha fazla gündeme gelmiştir.

Bu çalışmada, sivil-asker yakınlaşması süreci geçmişten günümüze incelenmektedir. Bu inceleme doğrultusunda uygulamada ortaya çıkan sorunlara işaret edilmekte ve sivil-asker yakınlaşmasının sadece belirli konular üzerinden ve kriz anında değil geniş kapsamlı ve barış zamanından başlaması gereken bir süreç olması gerektiği ve her seviyede uygulanabileceği ileri sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Sivil-Asker İş Birliği (SAİ), Kapsamlı Yaklaşım, Hibrid Tehdit, Hibrid Savaş, Esneklik, Kesişen Konular.

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# CHAPTER-I

## INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

“In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did ... now we can't live without you” (Admiral Leighton Smith, COMIFOR, April 1996)<sup>1</sup>.

### **1.1. Introduction**

The subject of this dissertation is Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Although the term CIMIC is not new, it was almost never on the agenda during the entire Cold War period. Within its current meaning, CIMIC was first time appeared during NATO's peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina with Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995-1996 and at the early phases of Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996-2004 deployments. The importance of CIMIC increased with the deployment of Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo in 1999 and became an indispensable element of the entire mission. In Afghanistan, CIMIC continued to be important by evolving into a different dimension after NATO took over the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2003-2014). The milestones in emergence and development of CIMIC was shown in Figure-1.1.

The Bosnian War as the first international crisis of the post-Cold War period provided clues about coming armed conflicts. It can be argued that with the Bosnian War and intervention, the international paradigm for global conflict resolution changed at that time. CIMIC was one of the most significant experiences from the operations in the Balkans. CIMIC in the Balkans is very important from a civil-military convergence perspective, and it can be asserted that CIMIC paved the way for the Comprehensive Approach.

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<sup>1</sup> Admiral Leighton Smith was the Commander of the Implementation Force (COMIFOR) in 1996.




Figure-1.1: Milestones from CIMIC perspective.

In the Bosnian War, rape and torture were used as a method. Cultural and religious assets were deliberately destroyed, unarmed civilians were forced to displace in the country and seek refuge in other countries. These came to the fore as the political aims of the war. As a result of this severe humanitarian crisis, the international community was actively involved, primarily via non-governmental organizations. In this environment, with the active participation of the soldiers, the dynamics that helped CIMIC to emerge were formed.

From the CIMIC point of view, the three main actors took their place on the battlefield in Bosnia. These main actors were: indigenous population, non-military organizations (mostly international and non-governmental organizations), and soldiers. However, the coexistence of these actors on the battlefield was not enough for the emergence of CIMIC. There should be needs, resources, and capabilities that make these actors come and work together. All of these were in the area and created the interface where civilians and soldiers interact. This interface occurred spontaneously in the Bosnia-Herzegovina case.

The indigenous people were subjected to severe human rights violations, and most of them were refugees and displaced persons in the area where CIMIC emerged and developed. In addition to these, many international and non-governmental organizations were in the field to contribute within their capacities and capabilities.<sup>2</sup> In these areas, administration became incapable; infrastructure was significantly damaged; ordinary and organized crime became widespread. These points, which summarize the environment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are common to the operations like peace operations and Non-Article 5 Operations.<sup>3</sup>

During the crises in the Balkans that there was a wide range of actors in the area of operation other than the military. Related to this, it was seen that there was an interface between civilian and military entities. This interface included issues such as providing security, facilitating logistics activities and especially coordinating and cooperating on humanitarian issues. These points can be regarded as the main issues of CIMIC, which were transferred to the next missions as a legacy.

This environment was nearly the same in Afghanistan. Apart from this similarity, an essential difference between the Balkans and Afghanistan was that there was enemy to fight in Afghanistan while there was no enemy in the Balkans (Zaalberg, 2008, p. 19). While CIMIC and related activities were executed, operations were being conducted against Taliban ve Al-Qaeda.

In addition to many civilian tasks in the Balkans and Afghanistan, humanitarian activities were also carried out by the military. These were necessary at the outset of the deployments because there was no administration, relevant civilian bodies, and a secure environment. But later on, when it was realized that humanitarian assistance activities were effective in preventing harm to military forces, ensuring public acceptance of military forces, and facilitating the collection of intelligence, soldiers focused on

---

<sup>2</sup> When IFOR deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were more than 530 international and non-governmental organizations in the area (Landon, 1998, p. 135). This number was around 300 on the first day of KFOR deployment in Kosovo (Wentz, 2002, p. xxi), and in a short period of time, it reached thousands.

<sup>3</sup> Peace Operations and Non-Article 5 Operations were defined in the Conceptual Framework Chapter of this study.



humanitarian aid activities. For this reason, CIMIC was mistakenly associated with humanitarian assistance activities and engraved in memory of soldiers as a military function that provides humanitarian assistance and heals the wounds of the war-torn people.

However, CIMIC was envisaged from the very beginning. During the planning process for the deployment of IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, CIMIC was considered as a function that would provide liaison between soldiers and civilians and prepare an environment for coordination and cooperation for various activities. Although a good plan<sup>4</sup> was prepared on paper, there were no trained personnel; there was a lack of awareness and no CIMIC organization to apply this plan. This is among the reasons why soldiers focused on humanitarian activities.

CIMIC was one of the much-discussed topics in the 19-year period from Bosnia-Herzegovina to the end of ISAF deployment in Afghanistan in 2014. During this period, non-military actors diversified and increased. They affected the operation and were affected by the operation. Especially with the KFOR deployment, CIMIC raised not only within NATO but also in the armies of the member countries. CIMIC units were established, CIMIC elements were formed in headquarters, the CIMIC doctrine and other relevant literature began to emerge and CIMIC training was provided.

After the Balkans, CIMIC became one of the most important functions in Afghanistan. CIMIC mainly contributed via Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRTs consisted of various military and civilian personnel, including key actors such as diplomats, economic development and governance experts, as well as education, health, agriculture experts and representatives of the Afghan government (NATO, 2008c, p. 21). The main purpose of the PRTs was to support regional development and establish a link between the Afghan government and the people. The main aim was to show that there is an

---

<sup>4</sup> Tasks assigned to CIMIC for IFOR Operation Plan;

- Conducting civil-military activities to support the military implementation of the Dayton Accord;
- To encourage cooperation with the civilian population, various institutions, and national governments; harnessing the capabilities of NGOs, international organizations and national governments;
- Create a parallel, unified civic effort to support the implementation of the Dayton Agreement;
- Be prepared to assist in government, international and non-governmental humanitarian, public safety, and health emergencies (Landon, 1998:120).

Afghan state, there is a government and they are capable of providing basic services for the citizens.<sup>5</sup> What required the PRTs to function effectively were establishing strong relationships with non-military stakeholders, assessing the needs of the population, and providing a full picture of the civilian situation. This placed the CIMIC at the heart of the PRTs.

At the outset of the NATO command of ISAF and while the PRTs were expanding throughout Afghanistan, a new approach started to be discussed within NATO. This was mainly the result of the security environment and NATO's capabilities and mission in this environment. While opening Prague Summit in 2002, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson stated that;

“NATO was at the heart of Europe's transformation in the 1990s. It reached out to heal a divided continent, and it acted to bring and then keep the peace in the Balkans. NATO is still doing these jobs, and doing them well. But September 11, 2001 and its aftermath confronted the whole world with new challenges. A deadly cocktail of threats is now menacing free societies. Terrorists and their backers, the failed states in which they flourish, and proliferating weapons of mass destruction, pose a genuine threat to everyone in the free world” (NATO, 2002, p. 6).

Within this context, in 2004, Denmark proposed this new approach, which was based on Denmark's own experiences, to NATO countries. In June 2005, the first Comprehensive Approach seminar was held in Copenhagen with extensive participation of NATO and non-NATO countries. After discussions, this new idea was approved as NATO official policy at Riga Summit in 2006.

Although the Comprehensive Approach was not considered only for the Afghanistan case, it was evolved together with PRTs historically and conceptually in Afghanistan. Considering that CIMIC was at the center of PRTs, it can be asserted that PRTs and CIMIC were the tactical level application of the Comprehensive Approach, which was discussed and developed at the political level.

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<sup>5</sup> Although this was clever and exciting, two main obstacles prevented this plan from being realized. One was that there was no unity between PRTs and the other was the widespread corruption, especially within the Afghan officials.

As it is shown in Figure-1.2, the members of the international community were active with their own means and for their own purposes. What was aimed via the Comprehensive Approach was to direct these efforts for one end-state by coordinating and cooperating, as it is shown in Figure-1.3.




Figure-1.2: Efforts of the international community (Wolf, 2018, NRDC-T CMI/CIMIC Seminar).

With the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach, it has been consistently stated that there are no set of rules to be followed to apply the Comprehensive Approach or to be comprehensive. For NATO, the Comprehensive Approach was an understanding, and that this approach should be adopted in all activities and documents. One important point must be emphasized here, and as it is shown in Figure-1.3 that NATO was considered as a member of the international community. It is shown that the military does not stand on the one side and non-military actors on the other. The military stands side-by-side with the non-military actors and contributes to their efforts.

In Afghanistan, CIMIC was generally performed with the legacy from the Balkans, not through the lessons learned. Despite the positive developments like PRTs and the Comprehensive Approach, this legacy caused the same problems as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The main issues were the lack of planning with non-military actors and overemphasis on humanitarian assistance.



Figure-1.3: Efforts of the international community (Wolf, 2018, NRDC-T CMI/CIMIC Seminar).

Since CIMIC remained the same, soldiers regarded PRTs as appropriate structures to provide humanitarian assistance. The relationship between soldiers and humanitarian workers has blurred. One of the most important effects of this was that the neutral image of the international and non-governmental organizations was seriously affected, especially for the local population (Parepa, 2014, p. 38; Gjørsv, 2014, p. 101). The instrumentalization of humanitarian assistance by the military on the one hand, and the blurred line of responsibility between civilian and military actors on the other negatively affected international and non-governmental organizations (Maass, 2010, p.221). Unfortunately, this was the most remembered feature of CIMIC and PRTs from Afghanistan. ISAF deployment was terminated and PRTs were removed in 2014.

In the post-Cold War period, when we look at the period until the publication of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, we see that new wars and peacekeeping were discussed around the Bosnian case, humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement were discussed around the Kosovo case and failed states, war against terrorism, nation-building, security through development, and comprehensive approach issues were discussed around 9/11 and Afghanistan.

In the 2010 Strategic Concept, it was stated that the Alliance was affected by the developments occurring beyond its borders in political and security areas and could affect these developments. It was also stated in the same document that NATO and relevant countries and organizations would jointly respond to these developments (NATO, 2010a, para. 4). Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has focused on a series of operations and crises at the global level instead of focusing on regional defense and deterrence issues in Europe. This transformation was largely based on the perception that Russia was no longer posing a threat to NATO, and a belief that the primary security problems faced by allies originated beyond the Euro-Atlantic area (Belkin and others, 2014, p.1). However, with the Annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, a conventional threat perception reached its highest level since the end of the Cold War, and NATO returned to the front. Within this context, it might be expected that the importance of CIMIC would decrease, but the developments indicate the opposite.

The Annexation of Crimea and what happened in eastern Ukraine showed that it was uncertain where, how and when the threats would come from, and also it was seen that conventional and unconventional attacks would be exposed below the line a declaration of war.

These developments sparked the debate on Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare. It was discussed that societies should be prepared for open and covert attacks, and necessary measures should be determined quickly in case of attacks. Within this context, the issues of resilience and protection of civilians came to the fore.

It is getting more difficult for soldiers to deal with these threats and to ensure security alone. In this environment, soldiers must come together with non-military actors and think and act comprehensively. In this respect, it is revealed that CIMIC will be one of the critical functions, especially at the tactical level for now.

There is a relationship between CIMIC and developments in the security environment and conflicts. This relationship is too essential that cannot be degraded to post-conflict

reconstruction efforts. In fact, this was also the case before, but humanitarian issues veiled that importance. Now it is clear that CIMIC has something to say in areas other than humanitarian. Today soldiers must understand the non-military environment very well in order to understand the security environment and the area of operation. Thus, they can make accurate evaluations and appropriate plans, manage crises and take part effectively in the post-conflict environment. CIMIC, which is the window through the outer world for soldiers and a bridge between non-military actors and issues, stands out as the element that will contribute the most.

The security environment that we have come across recently includes different risks and threats. In this environment where the unity of societies is targeted, cultural assets, environmental issues, social media and cyberspace are used as weapons. It is clear that one single measure cannot be taken against all of these and none of them can be answered by a state or an organization individually. In this case, societies should be prepared for sudden shocks and have the ability to recover quickly in the aftermath of the shocks. In this environment, CIMIC will be beneficial not only for Non-Article 5–like operations but also for other kinds of operations, including Article 5.

It is highly likely that military and non-military actors will work together in this unpredictable security environment. In order to work effectively when required, soldiers and civilian actors must come together in peacetime in different ways. Thus, both parties will be able to understand the structures, capabilities and decision-making processes of each other. Getting together in peacetime will help to eliminate issues that may hinder communication, coordination and cooperation in the area of operation.

At this point, we should look at the definition of CIMIC, which we have stated that it is not a humanitarian assistance element and to which we attached great importance. CIMIC, which was officially mentioned in the Ministerial Guidance for the first time in 1997, was first defined in the MC 411/1 document dated to 2001. The latest definition of CIMIC was provided in AJP-3.19 CIMIC Doctrine dated to 2018. In this document, CIMIC was defined as;

“a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors” (NATO, 2018b, p. 2-1).

As can be understood from the definition, CIMIC is not a military function dealing with humanitarian assistance, providing help to the war-torn people and distributing food and other related items to them. That was not included in the previous definitions as such. These activities were not wholly refused but were subject to some conditions.

Generally, soldiers are not trained to perform humanitarian activities, but they support these activities when needed and when appropriate means are provided. In contrast, CIMIC supports its military bodies to achieve their tasks successfully in the area where a wide range of civilian actors exist, including international and non-governmental organizations, different agencies, the private sector, and of course, local people and administrators. Especially the international and non-governmental organizations might have different expertise and various resources. Via CIMIC, the non-military layer of the area of operation can be understood, and liaison can be established with relevant actors to support military forces and, when necessary, to support the civilian environment.

Recently it has been stated that military means alone are not enough to overcome many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. In connection with this, it was noted that a comprehensive approach to crises should be implemented effectively and national, international and non-governmental organizations should contribute with a concerted effort (NATO, 2018c). The most important inference to be made from this statement is that soldiers have to undertake missions outside their responsibility. That's why they cannot be successful on their own. So, what the role of CIMIC will be in an environment where soldiers cannot provide security alone and various organizations must contribute?

This question can be answered in three possible scenarios. The first scenario is about an attack against a NATO member country and invocation of Article 5. The second scenario is about NATO's participation in an operation outside the Euro-Atlantic area to ensure the Alliance's security and contribute to global security. This scenario includes

operations such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, war on terror or support in natural disasters, and large-scale non-combatant evacuation operations. The third scenario includes destabilizing attempts that take place below the line of declaring war and that may involve all kinds of manipulation. It is highly likely in this case that aggression may turn into an armed conflict at the earliest opportunity. In the first scenario, close cooperation with the host country and assessment of civil preparedness will be necessary. In the second scenario, a detailed and comprehensive civil situation picture of the region to be deployed will be required. This civilian picture will include defining non-military actors and information about social, political, economic and cultural situations. In the third scenario, it will be necessary to discuss the measures that can be taken by evaluating the non-military risks and threats, the preparedness of civilians against sudden attacks, and measures to protect the civilians.

What is common to these scenarios is the existence of civilian or non-military actors either to be protected or to cooperate. Related to this, currently within the CIMIC community resilience, and cross-cutting topics are being discussed. These topics are Protection of Civilians; Cultural Property Protection; Children and Armed Conflict, Women, Peace and Security and Building Integrity. Today's security environment shows that the issues to be evaluated are not limited to these topics. Epidemics; energy security; climate, food and water security; ecological security and maritime security will be among them.

## **1.2. Research Design**

### **1.2.1. Aim**

The purpose of this dissertation is to discuss the emergence of CIMIC, its evolution in the historical process and its possible transformation in the next period. From its emergence in the mid-1990s to the period when Article 5 operations began to be discussed again with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, CIMIC mostly coordinated humanitarian assistance in the area of operations, established good relations with the local population and organizations. This contributed force protection measures of the military and promoted the acceptance of foreign military forces by the local population. Although this was the reality in the area of operation and accepted by contributing



nations, this approach does not match with the purpose of CIMIC. CIMIC has three main functions. The first function of CIMIC is liaison, the second is support the force, and the last is support the civilians. This last function is applied if the military has enough resources and when demand comes from the civilian side. Accordingly, as a military function, the main task of CIMIC is to analyze the civilian environment of the area of operation, to ensure the effective presence of soldiers in the area where civil-military interaction takes place, to evaluate the effects of the operation on the civilian environment and vice-versa, and to advise commander.

Today, there are a lot of non-military actors in the area of operation. They are high in number and they have different aims, structures, resources and mandates. They have the potential to affect the operation from various angles positively and negatively and they can be affected by the operation. This creates an interface between military and non-military actors. In this interface, the relations include coexistence, consultation, deconfliction, coordination and cooperation. While coexistence is a natural situation and does not require communication, as shown in Figure-1.4, cooperation is the ultimate goal, so it is not always possible. The purpose of CIMIC is to create an environment that enables cooperation. This requires CIMIC staff to be aware of the non-military environment and to be fully aware of the mission of its own military body so they can identify the issues for consultation, coordination and cooperation. In addition, they can also define how to support the non-military environment when it is necessary.

### 1.2.2. Scope and Content

CIMIC has been a very important component of many military operations conducted in the post-Cold War period. Although CIMIC emerged within NATO during the interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s, it was also adopted by the armies of member states and relevant bodies were established in both command and force structures. The reason for the continued importance of CIMIC after its emergence is the assessment that the operations like peace operations and Non-Article 5 Operations will increase gradually and a wide variety of civilian actors will appear more and more in the area of operation. Besides, during multinational interventions, countries have applied CIMIC as a means of realizing their policies.




Figure-1.4: Relations between civil and military actors in a civil-military interface  
(Toonen, 2017, p. 17).

CIMIC is a necessary function in environments in which the military and a wide variety of civilian actors exist together, such as peace operations, post-conflict reconstruction, natural disaster response, non-combatant evacuation and support to humanitarian assistance. Although this function is applied by soldiers mainly for the success of their operations, it can also be useful for the non-military actors. By coordinating their own activities with those of the military, non-military actors might avoid duplication of effort, time, and resources, and both sides can assure that one does not harm the other's projects. Organizations also need a safe and secure environment to be able to implement their expertise, capabilities, and resources properly. These civilians, who may be insufficient to provide their own security, need soldiers in this regard.

In fact, CIMIC is important not only in the execution phase of the operations but also during the planning phase of the operations. This importance stems from the fact that it enables the soldiers to understand the civilian environment. Current conflict environments involve a wide variety of civilian actors and civilian related issues. Since these civilians affect the military operation and vice-versa, the military planners should have extensive knowledge about the civil environment.

During the CIMIC activities executed so far, the soldiers at the tactical level did not come together with the possible civilian counterparts or stakeholders in the area of operation. Discussions between military and civilians at the political and perhaps at the strategic levels were not properly transmitted to the tactical level practitioners. If there is a failure in the application of CIMIC, the lack of cohesion and communication between the upper and lower levels is one of the reasons and this is also valid for non-military actors.

The mentioned points indicate the importance of CIMIC for military and civilian actors. So, why should CIMIC be studied scientifically? When we bring the words “war”, “soldiers” and “civilians” generally three things come to mind:

- Civil War,
- International law defining civilian and soldier, and including arrangements about the protection of civilians in times of war,
- Humanitarian issues.

The last one is mostly related to today’s CIMIC understanding. CIMIC emerged within this environment and so far did not change so much. Two things prevented CIMIC from changing. One is that although CIMIC literature was created and related training and education were provided, because of the assumptions mentioned above, CIMIC remained as to how it emerged and did not renew itself. The second reason is that non-military actors assumed CIMIC as how they met first-time in the Balkans and kept the relations at a minimum later on. While soldiers assumed civilians as people who needed help and as organizations who helped those people, non-military actors assumed the

military as destroyers and considered CIMIC as a helping hand of the military. This caused misunderstandings, prejudice and erroneous applications.

The operational and security environment is getting more complex and the activities of civilians and soldiers intersect at more and more points. Risks and threats contain more civilian aspects and these risks and threats directly target civilians. Besides, even humanitarian issues are also not that simple. Humanitarian assistance should be coordinated with the relevant non-military actors who have experience, knowledge, resources and capabilities.

Scientifically studying CIMIC will help to remove the biases and enable CIMIC to develop so it can be applied properly in the current security environment. Studying CIMIC requires looking at the historical roots and historical process of CIMIC to understand the conditions that caused CIMIC, to examine how CIMIC was applied so far and to reveal the relations between security and CIMIC.

In this study, CIMIC is examined within the framework of operations conducted by NATO. These operations are peacekeeping operations or post-conflict reconstruction referred to as Out-of-Article 5 or out-of-area operations in NATO terminology. In addition, definitions of terms were also provided within NATO terminology and relevant documents were applied when required. Although it was possible to reach classified military documents, no information was obtained and used in this study.

Lastly, it should be accepted that the area of operation is a web of relations. This makes it difficult to examine each actor and factor. Thus, putting CIMIC in the center, other actors and factors were examined around it.

Within this framework, in this study;

1. What is CIMIC?
2. Why do soldiers need CIMIC?
3. How has CIMIC been implemented during the operations considering existing literature?

4. Should CIMIC be applied only in Non-Article 5 Operations?
5. Do the changing security environment, risk and threat assessments and the changes in conflict affect CIMIC?
6. In case security cannot be provided by military means alone, how can CIMIC support achieving security?
7. Can CIMIC facilitate the Comprehensive Approach?

With the emergence of the current CIMIC, discussions also started to define it. Defining CIMIC was not easy since there were two different approaches. While traditionalists were defending that CIMIC should remain in a narrow framework since it was a military unit, enthusiasts were claiming that there will be a requirement for more CIMIC units having a civilian perspective to conduct non-military tasks<sup>6</sup>. It can be asserted that traditionalists were aware of Civil Affairs from the Second World War and the “winning the hearts and minds” concept from the Malayan Emergency in 1952-1954. These discussions took place in the late 1990s. After this, CIMIC was first-time defined in 2001 and changed three times so far. Answering the first question will help us to find out how the CIMIC understanding changed.

Generally, the answer to the second question is that the soldiers need CIMIC because there are civilians in the operation area. This is a good start to answer this question but not enough. To be able to answer properly, we need to know who these civilians are, are they an organic element of the area of operation and why they are important.

CIMIC applied mostly around humanitarian issues such as dealing with the refugees and IDPs, facilitating or directly involving in humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure repairment. Within years, although the definition of CIMIC has changed, the application did not change parallelly. With the third question, it will be investigated what kind of difference exists between doctrine and practice and why this difference arises.

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<sup>6</sup> Zaalberg reported that Lieutenant Colonel Mark Rollo-Walker, who served at SHAPE as Chief CIMIC Section, joined the discussions and observed that two main camps emerged during the discussions on definition of CIMIC. So called “traditionalists” and “enthusiasts” were not two structured opposing groups actually (Zaalberg, 2006a, 453).

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, peacekeeping was conducted; in Kosovo, peace enforcement was conducted, and in Afghanistan, war against terror or a kind of counterinsurgency was conducted. In all these cases, CIMIC was applied, and related activities were conducted after the armed conflict in a post-conflict environment. This created an assumption that CIMIC is only applicable in Non-Article 5 Operations. By answering this question, we will try to understand whether CIMIC is an appropriate function also for other kinds of operations.

Answering the fifth question will require examining the relationship between CIMIC and the security environment. Before the end of the Cold War, it was generally foreseen that the post-Cold War security environment would include regional conflicts emerging from political, social, ethnic, or religious disputes. The 1991 Strategic Concept also reflected the same assumption, and unfortunately, the war in the Balkans approved it. It was stated in the 1999 Strategic Concept that Alliance security interests could be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism and the 9/11 attacks that came in 2001. NATO responded to these cases in a manner aiming at humanitarian assistance, development, capacity building, and democratization. In the 2010 Strategic Concept, it was stated that the modern security environment contained a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations. Also, in 2010 in a different document from NATO, hybrid threats were mentioned and defined. After four years from the latest strategic concept and hybrid threats assessment, Crimea was annexed by Russia, and NATO came back in the trenches. Thus, by answering the fifth question, we will understand how CIMIC can be applicable in this scenario.

It seems that the future security environment and armed conflict will be highly unpredictable, and military means alone will need assistance. In this environment, CIMIC can support the military to understand the environment by providing information from a non-military perspective, and also, CIMIC can contribute to the efforts of non-military actors. This support would not be limited to the operation but could include preparation for the operation and evaluating the risks and threats.

Major international and non-governmental organizations have resources, capacities and they are willing to intervene in crises. As it was observed in the Bosnia-Herzegovina and especially Kosovo cases, high-level talks between these organizations and the military were necessary, but when this was not transmitted to the tactical level, these talks remain useless. Being comprehensive requires both military and non-military actors need to facilitate communication at all levels, and a top-down approach should be complemented with below-up activities. Answering the last question will allow us to think about how CIMIC can contribute to and facilitate the application of the Comprehensive Approach.

With CIMIC, the military became aware that the post-Cold War area of operation included a wide variety of actors. Both military and non-military actors realized that they co-exist in the same area and were targeting the same people for nearly the same end state. The main aim in the Balkans was to provide security, support the post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts and return life to normal as soon as possible. Here the main contribution of CIMIC to the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach was that the military irreversibly experienced that it was required to know the actors other than the military and establish relations from coordination to full cooperation.

In this context, the hypotheses of this dissertation are as follows:

1. There is a relationship between security environment-armed conflict and CIMIC.
2. In the current security environment, which includes a wide variety of actors and subjects, soldiers alone cannot provide security and cannot properly fulfill the tasks assigned to them.
3. Legacy of CIMIC application from the Balkans is not proper to apply in the current operations.
4. CIMIC is one of the main facilitators of the Comprehensive Approach and it should be at the core of this approach.

### **1.2.3. Importance and Original Value**

What adds unique value to this dissertation and makes it important is that it sees CIMIC as a civil-military convergence. The failure or inadequacy of CIMIC, which was

implemented in the framework of peace operations in the past, is due to the fact that the civilian environment was not properly understood. In addition, civilian and military entities came together in the area of operation in the post-conflict environment; they did not plan or exchange ideas before. Considering that the soldiers need information in different fields and that they cannot have expertise in every subject in an increasingly complex operational environment, meeting with non-military actors during crises and conflicts has disappeared. CIMIC can help to create a culture of soldiers working with civilians. This situation started in the field, namely at the tactical level, and will spread to higher levels with the pressure of the existing security environment. This has not happened until now because CIMIC is perceived only in terms of humanitarian assistance, which is also not that simple. This study basically points to the convergence between military and non-military actors and asserts that this is required for all kinds of operations at all levels and should be considered not only after the operation but also before and during the operation.

This study is also unique since it includes perspectives, *emic* (as an insider having 10-year active CIMIC duty) and *epic* (as an outsider having an academic perspective). Other points that distinguish this study from its peers are that it examines CIMIC by looking at the dynamics related to security but not humanitarian context; looking at the relations with the civilian environment and NGOs and including international perspective, not one nation's experiences.

#### **1.2.4. Method**

In this study, we employed some qualitative research methods such as historical and document analysis and case study. In addition to this, although the ethnographic method has not been adopted in this study, the personal experience of the researcher brings the method closer to this method. Historical research aims to discover the events of the past and relate them with the present and the future from a critical perspective (Mohajan, 2018, p. 14). The historical approach is necessary to explain how CIMIC emerged and evolved in a certain period. In the study, important developments were determined and the historical process was examined through them.



The case study research method is another method applied in this study. Case study can be defined as a method that allows the researcher to effectively understand how the subject functions about a particular person, social environment, event or group. Case study is an approach that can examine simple or complex phenomena with units of analysis ranging from individual to large institutions and events that change the world (Lune and Berg, 2017, p. 170). Parallel to the historical approach three cases were defined for this study. The first case is the NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the concept of CIMIC emerged in its present sense. CIMIC was also at the forefront of the Kosovo intervention that took place shortly after Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why the Kosovo intervention is the other case studied. Afghanistan is important as it brought some innovations to the application of CIMIC. The last event in the evolution of CIMIC is the Annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflicts in eastern Ukraine. Although CIMIC was not at the forefront, it has been evaluated in terms of security and the changing nature of the armed conflict.

In this way, the existing literature was reviewed in the historical process of the study. Therefore, unclassified military documents, academic articles, dissertations, lessons learned documents, reports of NATO centers of excellence and related organizations, statements and works of personnel participating in the operations were examined.

As stated before, the researcher's personal experience and knowledge resulting from his duty have brought this research closer to the ethnographic method. The ethnographic method is based on observing the research subject in its normal (daily) course and for a long period of time. This observation is made by participation, not by looking from outside. This approach helps researchers to clarify the situation, uncover practices, and develop awareness and sensitivity, reveal the perspectives, priorities and systems of meaning related to the subject (Mohajan, 2018, p. 13-14). However, the concept of ethnography places researchers in the middle of what they are studying (Lune and Berg, 2017, p. 108). Therefore, this approach has been supported by historical and document analysis, as it can bring the researcher's own perspective problem to the fore.

Thus, it should be explained here how the researcher's personal experience and knowledge contributed to this study? First of all, considering the appropriateness of the ethnographic method, the experience of the author who conducted this study should be evaluated. First impression, information and experiences about CIMIC were obtained during the working period at the CIMIC Branch of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) Headquarters in 2010-2013. During this duty, a national and an international CIMIC course was taken and information was obtained about CIMIC activities in the operations contributed by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Lebanon. The projects offered by the CIMIC units of the military entities conducting the operations were examined in terms of necessity, compliance and financing, and the approval stages were followed and instructions were given on their execution. In addition, the opportunity has been obtained to examine the CIMIC annexes of the real operation plans. In addition, the CIMIC activities that were conducted in Kosovo were observed on-site, meetings were held with CIMIC staff and relevant non-military representatives. During these developments, the NATO literature on CIMIC was examined. In the last period of this assignment, the TAF CIMIC Concept was prepared and published by the author of this dissertation. The concept has been used so far and is currently being updated.

The other experience regarding CIMIC was obtained during the assignment to NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey (NRDC-T) in the 3rd Army Corps Command in Istanbul. In 2013-2019 CIMIC Liaison Officer and Head of CIMIC Liaison Section posts were filled at CIMIC Branch. During this period, three important (certification) exercises were conducted in İstanbul (certification of NRDC-T), Bulgaria (certification of Rapid Reaction Corps-France) and Italy (certification of Multinational CIMIC Group). Besides many small-scale international exercises, many international seminars and meetings abroad and within NRDC-T were conducted. Well-attended and beneficial international CIMIC Seminars were organized as well. All were participated in and actively experienced from the CIMIC perspective by the author. Besides several certificate educations and training, during this period, one last CIMIC course was taken at NATO School-Oberammergau. In addition, an opportunity was provided to deploy EUFOR Headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a 6-month duty, and the Operational

and Training Advisor post was filled. In the last period of this duty in NRDC-T, operations planning and exercise execution studies were initiated with the participation of relevant civil organizations and individuals.

Serving actively in national and international headquarters for nearly ten years made it possible to observe CIMIC activities of practitioners closely, which constitutes another reason for the ethnographic method. For the practitioners, the learning process was usually conducted through the transfer of lessons learned, and experiences gained. It is highly likely that a new topic, which enters into the military agenda, will remain as to how it was entered. This situation affects the training and application. The accepted issue on the agenda turns into daily military knowledge. This is positive in one way and negative in the other. The reason why it is positive is that unity can be achieved in practice and education, doctrine, materials and equipment can be provided accordingly. The negative effect is that if the subject turns into daily military knowledge, it is not easy to adapt to changing conditions. Since the CIMIC was first defined within the scope of peace operations (and Non-Article 5 Operations) and humanitarian assistance, it is widely assumed in the same way at present. For example, large numbers of refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have occupied the agenda. If there are no refugees in a scenario of an exercise, the question of what CIMIC will do is asked. An exercise around a scenario that does not contain refugee and IDP situations were first-time conducted in early 2019. In this exercise, the situation of children in armed conflict, the protection of cultural property, and the ability of the society to recover during sudden shocks were tested in terms of CIMIC.

Observations were not only focused on the military's activities, but also non-military actors were observed during the missions, exercises, and meetings. CIMIC can affect non-military actors both in and out of the area of operation. Civilians in the operation area were examined in the study. For the civilians, out of area the following example can be given regarding the non-military actors out of the area of operation. The Dutch army contributed by sending troops to the operation conducted within the framework of ISAF in Afghanistan. CIMIC activities were also carried out there by the Dutch Army. Soldiers established contacts and sought ways for cooperation with local people, local

administrators, and organizations in their areas of responsibility. To be able to establish contacts, they developed various projects. The Dutch government should approve the source for these projects exceeding a specific limit. Later on, it became apparent that these projects will continue, and they are not just about financing but about the interests of the Dutch government as well. Thus, the Dutch government decided to create a single point, including Ministries of Defense, Economy, and Foreign Affairs should work together to manage such activities in Afghanistan from a single source. This initiative caused the Netherlands to develop and adopt the 3D (Diplomacy, Defense, and Development) approach.

In the meantime, by joining academia as a Ph.D. candidate in 2014, a chance was obtained to be able to utilize these observations, training, educations, and experiences.

#### **1.2.5. Literature Review**

It is not possible to collect the studies on CIMIC under one group. The reason for this is that for quite a long time, CIMIC was generally understood as Civil-Military Relations, which is a sub-field of military sociology or political science, or the lexical meaning of the words as cooperation between civilians and soldiers.

Within its current sense, CIMIC started to be examined in NATO magazine and military journals published by the member countries' armies in the period from its emergence in 1995-1996 until 2001. In this period, the papers focused on humanitarian assistance and based on the observations of the military personnel. CIMIC has been included in academic articles and books since 2001, when its importance was raised. It is possible to categorize these works into two main groups: those written about civil-military cooperation in the lexical meaning and those written on CIMIC as a term. The works with the lexical meaning focus on the activities such as logistics and health, and the joint activities of civilians and soldiers in cases such as natural disasters. There are three main emphases in the works about CIMIC as a term. The first is the CIMIC understanding of the countries and the activities carried out within this framework. While many NATO member countries accept the concept of CIMIC with the definition made within the framework of NATO, some have made different definitions. Whether

accepting the definition in the context of NATO or its own country, the common feature of these works is that they examine the activities performed by their own country's armies in post-conflict environments in regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq. These are works that generally qualify as lessons learned. In the second group, works deal with civil-military relations in post-conflict environments on the basis of humanitarian aid and taking this into the center. The works in these two groups take the concept of CIMIC for granted and kept its scope quite narrow.

In the third group, the works take place, which question the concept of CIMIC, its emergence, and its applications until today and evaluate other application areas. One of the first works that can be evaluated within this framework was published by Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg in 2006. Zaalberg states that the NATO CIMIC doctrine was prepared according to the principles of conventional warfare and outdated peacekeeping. He argues that CIMIC strived to support the operational objectives, instead of that it should ensure that the soldiers make a consistent contribution to the political aims (Zaalberg, 2006b, p. 399). Moreover, Zaalberg states that despite the creation of the civil-military interface, no significant progress has been made, and there is a gap between ideas and practice (Zaalberg, 2006b, p. 399-400).

It is seen that the works in the third group are especially concentrated in 2010 and after. The most important reason for this is that the concept of the Comprehensive Approach was adopted within NATO in 2006, and the implementations directed towards this have become widespread, especially in 2010. One of the most striking works in this group belongs to Hans-Jürgen Kasselmann, the CIMIC COE Director at that time. In this article published by PRISM, he stated that CIMIC was still perceived as a supporting function of humanitarian aid and development (Kasselmann, 2012, p. 19). Stating that the basic principles of CIMIC are still not reflected in the general understanding of command and control of the armed forces, Kasselmann argues that to achieve the desired cooperation it is necessary to expand the application of CIMIC to other levels such as operational and strategic (Kasselmann, 2012, p. 21-23).

Another work that can be considered in this group is “The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation-Canada in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan” by Christopher Ankersen. Ankersen states that CIMIC is a defining feature that indicates the transition from peacekeeping to peace support operations and beyond, and that civil-military cooperation will continue intensely (Ankersen, 2014, p. 6-7).

Within the scope of CIMIC, various studies have been conducted to examine this area of interaction since Bosnia-Herzegovina from different aspects. Most of these studies are postgraduate dissertations and scientific articles prepared by soldiers. The works produced by civilians were mostly conducted after the deployment of ISAF in Afghanistan and especially with the recognition of the Comprehensive Approach within NATO. Many of these studies are related to the CIMIC activities of the armies of contributing nations such as “Norwegian CIMIC in Afghanistan”, “CIMIC in Netherlands Army” and “Canadian CIMIC in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan”. These studies mostly take CIMIC for granted, focusing on post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian activities. Some studies examine how the CIMIC activities affect the civil-military relations in their countries. Few studies have recently begun to emerge on how CIMIC can lead to convergence between civil and military entities and how CIMIC can be applied in current operations. It is acceptable that the conditions and dynamics related to the humanitarian situation paved the way for CIMIC to emerge. Although it is like this, for example, it is still unclear what the differences are between IDP, refugee, and asylum seeker; what is NGO and IO or INGO.

In our country, there is no thesis related to CIMIC, but there are two articles published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal. When a quick search was done with the words "civil-military" in the (Turkish) Council of Higher Education national thesis database, 36 results were found. 33 of the 36 studies were about Civil-Military Relations, one was about targeting civilians in armed conflicts, and only two studies included the term “civil-military cooperation”. These were studied within the lexical meaning of the words, not as a term of CIMIC. One is titled “Evaluation of logistic skills in civil-military cooperation performance in humanitarian logistics” (2019), which examines civil-military interaction within logistics during humanitarian crisis. Other thesis titled

“Conflict and Crisis Management in Humanitarian Intervention Operations: Debate On Civil-Military Cooperation” (2018). This PhD thesis examines civil-military cooperation within Responsibility to Protect framework. In this thesis, no definition of the concept of civil-military cooperation was provided. Although the suggestions are very valuable, they are limited to the lessons learned from the cases examined.

#### **1.2.6. Structure**

This study contains eight chapters. Introduction and Research Design were provided in the first chapter. The first section of this chapter includes introductory information about CIMIC and main related topics. Another section reveals how the research was conducted.

In the second chapter, debates on security and war were examined generally. Additionally, definitions of important terms were provided to be able to avoid misunderstandings. Considering the difficulties in making definitions, which are satisfying for all, these definitions have been taken from certain sources and their relevance to CIMIC was briefly evaluated.

The third chapter includes information about so-called historical roots of CIMIC. Within the CIMIC community, Civil Affairs in the Second World War and “winning the hearts and minds” in the Malayan Emergency are frequently referred to as historical roots of CIMIC. In this chapter and throughout all study these historical roots were not taken for granted. Instead, it was examined how much it could have contributed to the current CIMIC concept.

The fourth, fifth, and the sixth chapters of this study analyze CIMIC within Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan cases. Bosnian case constitutes the beginning, and Kosovo and Afghanistan cases constitute development.

In order to properly understand NATO's intervention and the emergence of CIMIC, the disintegration process of Yugoslavia and the pre-war situation of Bosnia were briefly examined, and the environment in which CIMIC emerged was conveyed by examining

the war and post-war process. The same approach was applied to the Kosovo case. We can assert that CIMIC grew up in Kosovo. In Afghanistan, soldiers having experience from the Balkans established and managed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRT is one of the main topics of this chapter. Another topic is the Comprehensive Approach, which was discussed and examined how it was assumed by NATO during the ISAF deployment.

Each case begins with describing the pre-conflict environment, provides information about the actors and application of CIMIC within this environment. In addition, each case includes good and bad examples, lessons learned, and contributions to creation of military CIMIC literature.

In the seventh chapter, it was examined how CIMIC was affected by the changes in the concept of security and war. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflicts in eastern Ukraine was in the midst of the discussions within the concepts of hybrid war and hybrid threats. Since these concepts were discussed in the second chapter, in the seventh chapter, some events were analyzed to be able to understand what NATO faces and how CIMIC can contribute to.

In the conclusion part, the findings were discussed, and implications were provided regarding how CIMIC was applied and how it will be in the future. Also, it was discussed what the requirements are for CIMIC to be applied in a proper way.



## **CHAPTER-II**

### **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

A general framework about security and war is required to be able to understand the security environment in which CIMIC emerged and is still transforming. For the scope of our study, post-Cold War period security issues and debates on war are important. In order to understand how CIMIC has emerged and to see that there is great room for improvement, we need this review.

In addition, besides discussing security and war, CIMIC-related definitions will be provided. In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of CIMIC and its relation with security and war, these concepts have utmost importance, such as Out-of-area Operations, Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, Peace operations, and so on.

#### **2.1. Debates on Security and War**

In the post-Cold War era, changes were observed in the concept of security and the phenomenon of war, as in many other areas. The main drivers of this change were factors such as uncertainty, the rise of the concept of identity, developments in technology and globalization (Patman, 1999; Bilgin, 2005). The most fundamental change in the concept of security has regarding the definition of the risks and threats.

Throughout the Cold War, it was evaluated that if something was directed to national security, then it was a threat. It was foreseen that the threats would originate from other states, and they have been evaluated according to the military capacities of other states (Miller, 2001). During this period, security was reduced to military security, and the main actor was the soldier.

In the post-Cold War era, security and threat assessments were made at two levels as global and individual. At the individual level, new values were combined with human rights and needs. And it focused on transnational values common to all humanity, such as environmental pollution, diseases, drugs, crime, and the spread of unconventional weapons, seen as common threats to both democracy and the free market and the well-

being of mankind at the global level (Miller, 2001; Kaldor, 2014; NATO, 1991; NATO, 1999a; NATO, 2010a). This change in the concept of security also brought about changes in the tools and methods used to ensure security.

It has also been discussed that the phenomenon of war has also changed in various aspects in the post-Cold War period. It was observed, in the post-Cold War era, that ethnicity-based civil wars have increased, where civilians were targeted directly, and violence against women, children, and cultural assets were used as weapons (Kaldor, 1996b; Booth, 2001; Turku, 2018). According to Kaldor, who discussed the new war over the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, regular armies were no longer the dominant image on the battlefields, but ethnic hatred played a role in wars rather than political purposes (Kaldor, 2012). She also stated that, in the new wars, identity had been one of the main drivers and notions of civil and military had completely mixed. Other features of new wars were ethnic cleansing, uncertainty on when the war starts and ends, uncertainty on the periods of peace and war, and economy of war (Kaldor, 1996b; Kaldor, 2012).

### **2.1.1. Debates on Security**

The main concern of this study is directly related to the notion of security, which is the sub-discipline at the heart of International Relations (IR). One of the aims of this study is to understand the relation of CIMIC with security, which is evolving in time with actors, threat and risk assessments or assumptions and responses to them.

The main concern of the 20th century, which started with a world war and continued with another, was security. Anxious about their security, many states contributed to the establishment of stability at the international level and tried to survive within their borders. Especially the international order, which was created after the Second World War, was established on these basic security and stability demands. During the Second World War, the Western alliance and the USSR established a short-term coalition. After the end of the war, both camps went their own ways and started to execute their own programs. They immediately started to institutionalize economically, politically and

militarily. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were the two military formations that were established for the security needs of these two camps.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the dissemination of the USSR, it was assumed that the Cold War had ended. Thus, the only threat to the Western Alliance would have disappeared. But the post-Cold War events showed that the need for security had not ended. The formation of the risks and threats had changed and the things that needed to be protected; furthermore, all of these had happened simultaneously.

Especially throughout the end of the Cold War, security was examined and analyzed by many researchers from different fields, and the practitioners and decision-makers, for the name of it, made many decisions. In fact, the definitions for security reflect different views and even though they are very close to each other, there is no unity on the definition of security. But there are components of security, which are the same in all definitions, such as; threat/risk, the things, values, or persons to be protected (protectees), and protection.

Victor Cha states that the definition of security and the understanding of security must not be searched for in the usual battlefields but in non-traditional battlefields of non-traditional threats (Cha, 2000). Defining the security within a non-traditional context indicates a disengagement from Cold War logic but looking at the battlefield is not. So, where should we look in order to define security?

Brauch states that we cannot define security independently from a context; security is always related to individual or societal values and has political and societal connections (Brauch, 2008, p. 2). From this statement, we can understand that the definition of security may change according to time, conditions and components. For example, we can assume that while the meaning of security was avoiding the collapse of the Roman Empire by external threats, Hobbes put forward avoiding civil war as the meaning of security. After the Second World War and during the all Cold War period, at least conceptually until the 1980s, security was defined over “national security”. During the

Cold War period, national security was equal to military security and it was defined with the terms of armament, intelligence and strategy (Brauch, 2008, p. 12).

About the notion of security, J.F.M. Arends', Benjamin Miller's, David A. Baldwin's, and Barry Buzan's studies are also important. While Arends discusses security conceptually and provides conditions to define it (Arends, 2008), Buzan defines it as an effort to be free from threats. Miller states that the traditional security concept comprises five basic dimensions; roots of the threats, nature of the threats, responses to the threats, responsible person or structure providing security and basic values to be protected. Besides, Baldwin defines security as "the absence of threats to acquired values" (Baldwin, 1997). Baldwin also states that if one wants to define security, he/she must answer some of these questions:

- For whom and for which values?
- Against which threats?
- By what means?
- At what cost?
- For how long?
- At what degree?

From the IR perspective, nearly all IR theories have something to say about security, and Realism and especially its neo- form is dominant in this area. Studies on security named as Strategic Studies within Realist IR theories. Realist IR theory states that the international system is anarchical and the only actors are the states in this system. There is no higher authority and the states, as rational actors, are acting to realize and maximize their interests in this anarchic system. In this system, the main interest is to survive and therefore, security is the main concern. The main parameter is power according to this theory. All states want to have power, so they struggle for power. In realism, power means military power. We are currently talking or reading about economic and/or political power, but they are meaningful through military might.

What is the meaning of security in this anarchical system? John Baylis' study gives us an idea about this and about how the concept of security changed from the beginning of the Cold War till today (Baylis, 2008). He states that generally, IR studies and especially security studies are influenced by the ideas from Hobbes, Kant and Grotius. He starts with the Realist writers such as E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau and informs us about their views on security. He continues with Neo-Realist writers; Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer.

Waltz states that security is the highest objective in the state of anarchy and when states reach it, then they can continue to look for other objectives such as power, profit and peace (Waltz, 1979). Mearsheimer also indicates the anarchical environment and he states, with a vision-confirming Waltz, that after the Cold War, we are going to face power struggles again as in the 17th century (Mearsheimer, 1990).

Realists aim to explain the world as they see it. They want to make estimations about the future and try to find universal notions and laws to make this possible. They believe that the world has been full of violence in the past and it is going to be the same in the future and deductions show us that the best way to provide security is to fight for power. These ideas were criticized during the 70s and 80s. From this critique and the debate between positivist and post-positivist writers, critical IR theories emerged.

By focusing on the human being, critical theories stated that environment, gender issues, identity, values and etcetera must be added to the analysis. Parallel to that, strategic studies, which reflect the Realist security assumption, were questioned by the same voices. They argued that security could not be assessed only from a military perspective and state-centric analyses are inadequate. Buzan and others state that during the 1970s and 1980s, security assumptions were criticized over economic and environmental issues and during the 1990s, this was widened through identity problems and transnational crimes (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998, p. 2).

After the end of the Cold War, these voices started to get form. Within the context of Alexander Wendt's studies, some focused on identity-security relation. Some other

researchers, such as critical constructivists from Minnesota University, focused on security culture and the post-colonial approach. Feminist theories also joined the discussion from their perspective. Ken Booth, from the Aberystwyth School, developed Critical Security Studies. The latest studies on this aspect came from Copenhagen School by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver. Their studies cover the critical security assumption and bring a wider approach to security.

Generally, one major weakness of the critical theories' is their lack of proposal in the place of things that they criticize. But it seems this is hardly true for security studies, at least for some important topics. For example, security studies from a critical perspective state that the reference point of security has changed forever. Before, it was "states" and its "borders," but now it is the human being: its "existence" and its "freedom". Ken Booth, introducing himself as a student of security, states in his book titled *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* that "*the threats to human society are more multidirectional than ever before*" (Booth, 2005, p. 1). From this statement, we understand that, now, one dimension of security is about the existence of human. One other dimension is his emancipation. Emancipation is to set the people free from physical and humanitarian limitations, preventing them from choosing what they want. Booth states that real security is going to be provided by emancipation, not power and order. Within this context, Booth submits to take the state as a means (Booth, 1991, p. 313-326).

Another deduction from Booth's statement is that the threats have changed also. When we put the human being at the center, naturally, threats are becoming wider, and also Booth states that for some reason, such as globalization, threats became multidirectional. Under these new conditions, Booth states, strategic studies have problems.

Pınar Bilgin also points out some issues while criticizing the traditional approach. According to her, traditional approaches assessed that security is about decreasing the violence against states. For them, it meant that if there is minimum violence, then there is maximum security. But the meaning that they ascribe to violence was military-

centric. Since they did not consider economic, cultural, or social reasons for violence, which was directed to the human being, they could not understand and explain post-Cold War tensions and conflicts (Bilgin, 2005, p. 63-64).

Different from Critical Security Studies but criticizing the traditional approach, Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, 1998) developed a third way in security studies. While they share the concerns of critical approach such as “*security is something different from defining and defeating the military threats*”, Copenhagen School researchers do not agree on the assumption that everything might be regarded as threats to the human being. Within this context, Copenhagen School researchers developed the Securitization Concept. According to this, something can be constructed as a threat against the existence of the things that are accepted as valuable and important. Thus, the measures, which were developed to protect that thing, become legitimate. After this so wide conceptualization, Buzan analyzes the security agenda of the military and he applies the four periods (Buzan, 2008, p. 107):

- European Classical Big Power Period (From 1648 to 1945)
- Cold War Period
- Post-Cold War Period
- Post 9/11 Period

The discussions made through the end of the Cold War are important for our study. Although different opinions were expressed in the evaluations made about the post-Cold War world, the common point was the opinion that the ideas, people, goods, services and capital will move freely, and the borders will be more permeable. In this environment, the issue of how the security would evolve and whether it would change was also the subject of discussion.

The traditional understanding of security, which prevailed during the Cold War, perceived the concept of security in terms of military security. It was expected that the threats and risks would come from other states. However, the concept of security was expanded after the Cold War and different topics were discussed. John Baylis and

others state that after the Cold War, the concept of security went beyond the military context and that political, economic, social and environmental issues were included in the security discussions (Baylis, 2014, p. 231).

In the uncertain and complex environment of post-Cold War security, multilateral security organizations had difficulties moving from a unilateral understanding of security to complex challenges (Ortiz, 2008, p. 284). Some experts foresaw these developments during and after the Cold War. For example, some writers pointed out that the concept of security should come out of the national security dimension, including other issues. The concept of security should be expanded to include floods, earthquakes, droughts and political, economic, social, environmental and military elements (Buzan, 1986, p. 11; Ullman, 1983, p. 138).

In his article written in 1991, John Lewis Gaddis evaluated the Cold War period as a struggle for democracy against totalitarianism. He stated that with the end of the Cold War, the threats did not disappear but were spread (Gaddis, 1991, p. 113). According to Gaddis, the post-Cold War world will be the period of struggle between integrationist and fragmentationist powers. Integrationist powers would be politics, economy, religion, technology and culture, and the act of integration would be over the concepts of the communication revolution, economic developments, security, ideas and peace (Gaddis, 1991, p. 103-105). Gaddis stated that fragmentation would be on nationalism, deterioration of ecological balance and consequently epidemics, population growth and famine (Gaddis, 1991, p. 109). Gaddis also predicted that with the collision of integrationist and fragmentationist elements, the balance of power would deteriorate, instability will arise, migration may occur and countries cannot fight this alone (Gaddis, 1991, p. 115).

Similarly, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, in her 1989 article "Redefining Security," pointed out the issues that are not on the classic security agenda, such as environmental issues, climate change, water scarcity and population growth, would become security issues. Mathews also mentions projections for 2030, 2050 and 2100, and predicts that governments would grapple with poverty and instability as a result of these problems



instead of dealing with them (Mathews, 1989, p. 166). Mathews also stated that such problems require regional cooperation and global decision-making processes. However, she stressed that as a result of the failure to see ahead in the current situation, there was no clear view on where the long-term threats to global security would come from (Mathews, 1989, p. 172-173). Mathews pointed out that dealing with the consequences of global change would be difficult, and no nation or organization alone would be able to face the challenge (Mathews, 1989, p. 175). In parallel with Mathews, Björn Hettne also pointed out that economic development should be sustainable in the post-Cold War period. He stated that without consuming natural resources, harmony between peace, economic structure and political-military organization is necessary to be sustainable (Hettne, 1991, p. 279).

W.S. Lind and others also gave us some clues about post-Cold War security. They stated that the definitions of military and civil would interfere, activities will be carried out in the depths of societies, not physically but culturally, and targets will be chosen mostly in the civil domain (Lind, Nightengale and others, 1989).

In addition, in its strategic concept released after the Cold War, NATO outlined that no conventional threat was expected and the possible threats and risks that NATO might face in the future were as follows:

- Economic, Social, Political difficulties,
- Ethnic rivalries,
- Territorial disputes,
- Religious rivalries,
- Inadequate or failed efforts at reform,
- Dissolution of states,
- Fostering extremism,
- Disruption of the flow of vital resources,
- Actions of terrorism and sabotage (NATO, 1991).

In these evaluations made after the Cold War, it was envisaged that the scope of the concept of security would expand. This was also manifested in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept. What is important here is the authors' view that states alone cannot deal with a wide range of risks and threats. This view was confirmed during the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the post-Cold War period. These crises showed the need for military, governments, local and international organizations to work together (Davidson, Hayes and Landon, 1996, p. 14-24).

This reality, expressed by Davidson, Hayes and Landon, emerged explicitly during the intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. As a result of the relationship between development, security and governance in Afghanistan, the understanding of joint efforts towards the common goal has come to the fore at all levels and with the contribution of many of the actors involved.

### **2.1.2. Debates on War**

According to Buzan, from the end of the Cold War, everybody, except extremist realists, thinks that war is possible in the periphery but unthinkable between big powers (Buzan, 2008, p. 116). This statement is also being supported by NATO's Strategic Concepts, which were published after the Cold War in 1991, 1999 and 2010. Additionally, in the post-Cold War era, since the lack of macro securitizations, the importance of the military sector decreased. Yet, states continued armament, fed their armies, allocated a big amount of money to their defense ministries, and NATO still exists. This means that governments need armed structures, but for what?

In the 1990s, one of the main problems was domestic revolts and civil wars at the local levels: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, dissemination of Yugoslavia, Georgia, and etc. In these cases, the military was heavily applied under the Peace Support Operations concept. Nevertheless, this development did not allow another way of using military power other than classical. When we came to the post-9/11 period, the agenda of the military started to change fundamentally. Different actors and different topics as risks or threats started to occupy the military agenda. Buzan states that it is early to say

something about how long this will continue, but it is obvious that this created a sharp change (Buzan, 2008, p. 107).

As different from traditional understanding; currently, everything in the military sector is not directly related to security. When securitization focuses on an external threat, the military is one of the most useful tools from offensive actions to deterrence (Buzan, 2008, p. 108). Even though the military has its own logic and circumstances, in our age, these are not independent of other factors such as political, economic, geographic and global (Buzan, 2008, p. 109-110).

With the 9/11 attacks, a new security era began. Military power came to the forefront again, and a new war started against terrorism. Meanwhile, weak or failed states and nuclear weapons were thought together with globalization and they all posed threats and risks. From this perspective, failed states turned into places where instability is produced, and this had the potential to spread out via globalization. The other threat was that terrorists might have nuclear weapons (or weapons of mass destruction-WMD).

When we consider post-Cold War era security studies, it is obvious that the agenda of the security, threat and risk assessment and the responses developed against these new threats and risks have changed. The reference point of the security has changed and it is not only states. Now, while other states' (especially the failed states or the evil states as it was defined by the US) military power remain as threats or risks; we count terrorism, drought, famine, infectious disease, corruption, environmental issues, identity, culture and etcetera in threat and risk assessment. Currently, the thing is being protected, is not only states but also the economy, trade system, world we live in, society and energy routes. This view is from the academic side but what about the practical side.

While these developments are being observed within the security environment, what happens on the warfare side? According to Colin S. Gray, the future is not foreseeable, so we do not know future wars, warfare episodes, and strategies (Gray, 2009, p. 17). Gray continues by stating that for the future, the main issue will be to cope with the uncertainty, not try to diminish it, and main challenges will be great power rivalry,

adverse climate change, resource rivalries and shortages (food, water, energy), overpopulation, disease pandemics, terrorism and insurgencies and nuclear proliferation (Gray, 2009, p. 25). It is unquestionable that the future is unpredictable but when we consider the challenges and evolution of warfare so far, we can make some deductions. As Ofer Fridman discusses, the nature of warfare has transformed via three main generations: manpower, firepower and maneuver (Fridman, 2018, p. 19). Within the modern warfare framework, 1st Generation Warfare (GW) was Napoleonic wars. In this warfare, battles were formal, the battlefield was orderly and line and column tactics were applied. 2nd GW included more technology in weapons, transportation means and communication. Mass firepower, which was provided mainly by artillery, was seen as a solution. 3rd GW was more conceptual in nature. Major technologies and new tactics characterized the 3rd GW. It can be said that the tactics in the 3rd GW were the first non-linear tactics (Fridman, 2018, p. 22). The 4th GW is an evolved form of insurgency which exploits all available networks such as political, social, economic, military targeting adversary's decision-making process (Fridman, 2018, p. 23). Military Revolution, which was studied widely by Michael Roberts, Clifford Rogers, Geoffrey Parker, Max Boot, Williamson Murray and others, include similarities.

One other analysis about warfare belongs to colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsiu from the Chinese People's Liberation Army. They stated in their book, titled "Unrestricted Warfare" that future wars will be characterized by;

- Omnidirectionality (besides air, maritime and land domains, economic, social, political and cultural domains will be battlefield),
- Synchrony (occurrence, action and completion will be simultaneous),
- Limited objectives,
- Unlimited means,
- Asymmetry,
- Minimal consumption,
- Multidimensional coordination,
- Adjustment and control of the entire process (possible combinations, unexpected links and influential factors) (Liang and Xiangsiu, 1999, p. 206).

By looking at these topics, they claim that conflict transcends the limits of the traditional military domain, thus infiltrating other domains of human interaction (Liang and Xiangsiu, 1999).

Münkler also discusses the wars of the 21st century. He assesses the more or less same non-military challenges such as growing environmental risks, global inequality in the distribution of consumer goods, in educational opportunities and in living conditions; the imbalance in demographic rates and the related waves of migration; the instability of the international financial markets and the dwindling ability of States to control their own currency and economy; and, finally, in some parts of the world, the rapid disintegration of States for the current and future conflicts. But different from other writers, he indicates that these challenges will enforce people to fight for their future.

He states that the use of force for a better future will become the key element of their political reasoning and they will be ready not only to fight for vital resources but also to begin asymmetrical wars with superior adversaries (Münkler, 2003, p. 11). Although it is not a resource war only, the Annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the crisis in Ukraine might be one example of asymmetrical wars.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the emergence of the crisis significantly affected civil-military convergence. These events showed that it was possible to create instability by applying multiple tools other than weapons. This indicates the new era of warfare. It was observed that not only conventional defense methods, which were forgotten but also societies must have been strengthened from different perspectives against this new warfare. At this point, civil-military convergence comes to the forefront to facilitate developing measures.

When we look into the events that happened from December 2013 till now, we see two of these come forward as main events, the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in eastern Ukraine, including armed conflicts. Regarding the perspective of this study, Galeotti summarizes that;

“when Russian special forces seized Crimea at the end of February 2014, without their insignia, but with the latest military kit, it seemed as the start of a new era of warfare” (Galeotti, 2016, p. 149).




Figure-2.1: Evolution of warfare from Western and Russian perspectives (Fridman, 2018, p. 13).

This era of new warfare was named as hybrid warfare/hybrid threats and writers cited Gerasimov's article published in *Military-Industrial Courier*, in February 27, 2013, titled “*The Value of Science in Prediction*”.<sup>7</sup> In the article, the General described the 21<sup>st</sup>-century security environment as well as the missions and roles of the Russian Army. He argued that the Russian Army must apply conventional and unconventional warfare utilizing all aspects of national power. He also stated that;

“the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of weapons in their effectiveness” (Gerasimov, 2013, p. 2)<sup>8</sup>.

This statement is often referred to as “hybrid warfare” (Bartles, 2016, p. 30).

Russian actions in Crimea and in Ukraine are considered to constitute the definition of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. According to some writers, hybrid warfare is not something new and it is true that this concept has been discussed for some time. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor argued in their book titled “*Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present* (2012)” that hybrid warfare is;

“a conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerillas, insurgents and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose and had been used since fifth century BC” (Murray and Mansoor, 2012, p. 3).

Frank G. Hoffman argued that hybrid warfare is focusing on means and has a strict military perspective. According to Hoffman the definition of hybrid warfare is;

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<sup>7</sup> Original resource information: Военно–промышленный курьер, № 8 (476), стр. 02, 27 февраля – 5 марта 2013 года, Валерий ГЕРАСИМОВ. For translation of this article: [https://www.huffpost.com/entry/valery-gerasimov-putin-ukraine\\_b\\_5748480](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/valery-gerasimov-putin-ukraine_b_5748480) and <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>

<sup>8</sup> In the article, Gerasimov did not use the term of “hybrid”.

“any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives” (Hoffman, 2009).

In his study, Glenn distinguishes dimensions and tools/tactics and describes hybrid warfare as an exploitation of these tools/tactics in different dimensions in a synchronized way. He states that hybrid warfare is;

“An adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some combination of (1) political, military, economic, social, and information means, and (2) conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive / criminal warfare methods. It may include a combination of state and non-state actors” (Glenn, 2009).

The term of hybrid threat was also discussed within NATO in 2010. In “Bi-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone” document, hybrid threats were identified as the threats;

“those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives” (NATO, 2010b, p. 2).

instead of defining hybrid warfare. According to this paper, NATO assumes a more general definition without defining the means and the targets in detail.

Another definition focuses on means and does not mention why they are being called as hybrid. According to this definition, hybrid threat is;

“an umbrella term encompassing a wide variety of existing adverse circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption, ethnic conflict, and so forth” (Aaronson, Diessen and others, 2011, p.115).

Even if hybrid warfare or hybrid threats may have been applied or discussed for many years, developments since the Annexation of Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine impacted these discussions so as to magnify its importance and meaning. Currently, threats and risks were evolved with the help of globalization, technological developments and the change in reference point of security. These developments provided new tools to potential aggressors, and trained personnel are applying these tools in a coordinated way



by targeting society's cohesion (Pindják, 2014). These developments also made the risks and threats unpredictable and more devastating. As a result, it is safe to say that hybrid warfare is something new or maybe it is not a new way of fighting but a strategy (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 178).

Why are there so many definitions and why are they different from each other? It seems that all these definitions are looking at the same thing from different aspects and in fact, this same thing is the security environment. According to Nicander and Saarelainen;

“the security environment is not simply black or white. It is complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional. Thus, analysis of what has changed, how it is changed and what does it mean for democratic states is at the core of understanding the nature of the current security environment in Europe” (Nicander and Saarelainen, 2018, p. 1).

Within this context, they claim, “there are six major changes driving hybrid threats to the fore:

- 1- Nature of world order (referring to the post-Cold War world).
- 2- The new type of network-based action, the dark side of globalization.
- 3- Cyberspace where national and international rules of the game have yet to be created.
- 4- The changing domain of information space, and the media landscape.
- 5- The changing nature of conflict and war.
- 6- Generational change (referring to the erosion of historical memory and political manipulation of historical events) (Nicander and Saarelainen, 2018, p. 2). Although this assumption is true, this is only one part of the coin. These points may just explain what facilitated hybrid threats or hybrid warfare to emerge but do not answer why societies and their cohesion is being targeted.

From the annexation of Crimea and crisis in Ukraine perspective, one of these earlier definitions about hybrid warfare may help us to understand current issues. McGuen states that;

“hybrid warfare is full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone’s indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community” (McCuen, 2008, p. 108).

As different from other definitions, McCuen emphasizes a new layer of the combat zone by indicating non-military actors. This definition makes us think that the combat zone (or area of operation in a meaning) includes two kinds of actions: one is warfighting and the other is all issues related to non-military actors. In our time, this combat zone is not only the place where armed conflicts take place. The combat zone has become the whole of a country from a non-military issues perspective, such as influencing the target country’s population, and this is one of the most significant features of hybrid warfare.

Another definition that was made after the annexation states that;

“Crimea represented a new form of “hybrid warfare”—a skillful mixture of overt military measures and covert action, combined with an aggressive use of propaganda and disinformation carefully calculated to avoid crossing established thresholds for military response” (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, 2015:6).

In hybrid warfare, territorial integrity and social unity of a population or stability of a region is targeted. With hybrid warfare, it is aimed to erode the target entity’s internal political cohesion and disrupt its economy (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 178; Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 10). Hybrid warfare is applicable for territorial expansion and the imposition of indirect rule over another sovereign state. Thus, we can understand that hybrid warfare is not simply guerilla warfare waged by a strong state, mix of regular and irregular tools and tactics, or is not a defensive strategy used by status quo states (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 189). Additionally, hybrid warfare is something that a military alliance alone, such as NATO, might not be able to deter (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 193).

However, what defines twenty-first-century hybrid threats is the simultaneous and complementary use of many of these instruments to achieve a common objective (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 45). The irregular military component of hybrid warfare can encompass different tactics of varying intensity, many of which have been

used by insurgencies. These tactics are propaganda, espionage, agitation, criminal disorder, fifth columns, inserting unmarked soldiers and border skirmishes (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 179). Additionally, domestic media outlets, social media, fake news, strategic leaks, funding organizations, political parties, oligarchs, Orthodox Church, cyber tools, economic leverage, and proxies can also be applied (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2015, p. 6; Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 45-59) as it was observed in Ukraine. According to Mattsson, in new generation warfare, the military is applied at last after the above-mentioned tools (Mattsson, 2015, p. 66).

In one of the documents published lately by NATO, hybrid warfare was defined as;

“... the true combination and blending of various means of conflict, both regular and unconventional, dominating the physical and psychological battlefield with information and media control, using every possible means to reduce one’s exposure. This may include the necessity of deploying hard military power, with the goal of breaking an opponent’s will and eliminating the populations support for its legal authorities” (Lasconjarias and Larsen, 2015, p. 3).

In Lasconjarias and Larsen’s study, it was also stated that hybrid wars are complex and sophisticated so can come into play at every level of the spectrum of conflict, from the tactical to the political. And also, it is adaptive and flexible; within hybrid wars, a wide array of means can be applied to convey a political or ideological message from the battlefield to the world without regard for international laws or norms and without even necessarily proposing an alternative model (Lasconjarias and Larsen, 2015, p. 3).

To sum up, when we look at the latest discussions on warfare, we can state that non-military aspects of wars are and will increasingly be evident. This will be important at all levels (tactic, operational, strategic and political), at all phases (before, during and after the conflict) and in more domains such as political, economic, social, cultural, information, infrastructure other than land, air and maritime.

## **2.2. Out-of-Area Operations and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO)**

Out-of-area operations, which have been on NATO's agenda since the beginning of the Cold War, indicate the operations carried out in areas outside of the territorial integrity of NATO member countries (Stuart, 1991, p. 1-5, 19-21). Although NATO did not exclude Collective Defense in the post-Cold War period, with the changing security environment and armed conflicts, it was assessed necessary to focus on destabilizing risks and threats outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and out-of-area operations were discussed.

In the post-Cold War period, NATO's first out-of-area operations took place with participation in peace operations under the UN mandate. But some argue that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo missions should be seen as transitional operations, so they are not to be fully considered as out-of-area operations (Mihalache, 2017, p. 250). However, these missions constitute important turning points in terms of preparation for NATO's future out-of-area operations. During the missions in the Balkans and after the 9/11 it has been evaluated in NATO circles that the Alliance needs troops with a high level of preparation and the ability to act in a short time to be deployed outside the Euro-Atlantic area (Pop, 2007).

Out-of-area operations are broadly but unfairly identified with NA5CRO and peace operations. NA5CRO can take place within NATO territory and out-of-area operations do not necessarily have to be peace operations. This can easily be seen when looking at the operations carried out by NATO<sup>9</sup>.

The importance of the out-of-area operation concept for this study is that it is performed in a complex environment. These are environments where there is no functioning government, as well as damaged infrastructure, limited resources and long-lasting crises such as ethnic or religious conflicts and drought. These environments include actors

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<sup>9</sup> Operation Distinguished Games, 18 June - 29 September 2004; NATO Relief Mission to the United States after Hurricane Katrina, 9 September - 2 October 2005; NATO Support to Latvia during the Riga Summit, 22 August - 29 November 2006.

deployed to respond to the above-mentioned crises from local, regional and international organizations. In case a requirement emerges for a military deployment, CIMIC can make a significant contribution in these environments (Rehse, 2004, p. 28). In this atmosphere, soldiers can perform or contribute to activities such as conflict prevention, crisis management, and setting the environment for humanitarian activities (Ortiz, 2008, p. 297).

NA5CRO had a large place in NATO's Strategic Concept published in 1999. Operations conducted in the Balkans were important in this. These operations were also effective in changing NATO's security perception. This situation is expressed in the concept in question as follows:

“The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension” (NATO, 1999a, para. 25).

Within this context, the risks and threats were defined as:

“... the appearance of new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (NATO, 1999a, para. 3).”

It has been stated that the NATO deployments in the Balkans and especially IFOR and later SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina proved that NATO could carry out NA5CRO (Rehse, 2004, p. 26).

Basically, the purpose of NATO's NA5CRO is to keep the risks at a certain distance, to prevent crises in the early period, the spread of armed conflicts and to prevent them from threatening the Alliance. Within this framework, the NA5CRO can be peace operations, extraction operations, tasks in support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, search and rescue (SAR) or support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), freedom of navigation and overflight enforcement, sanction and embargo enforcement, support to stabilization and reconstruction activities, and

counterinsurgency (COIN) (NATO, 2010c). These operations can be limited in target, means, area and duration and possibly will include international and regional organizations such as UN, EU, OSCE, ICRC and other non-governmental organizations. The most prominent of these operations are peace operations.

### **2.3. Peace Operations**

During his mission in 1953-1961 as the second Secretary-General of UN, Dag Hammarskjöld stated that;

“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.”

Regarding our topic it can be said that Dag Hammarskjöld noticed the need for a civilian component and he emphasized that “*only soldiers can do it*” because they were the only organized, capable, and internationally operable entity at that time.

In 1992, “An Agenda for Peace” document was issued by the UN and in that document, it was stated by the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that UN peacekeeping notion widened including preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, and peace enforcement involving both civilian and military elements. There is a new sense of the necessity of delegating peace enforcement to states and regional organizations (An Agenda for Peace, 1992).

Later on, the first UN High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Carl Bildt, stated in May 1996 that;

"Whatever we call these operations, peace enforcement or peacekeeping, they will require a civilian component and a civilian-military interface. That's been the case in all of these operations in the past and most certainly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it will be one of the key lessons learned for the future."

Hammarskjöld stated that peacekeeping is the job of two main components. He indicated that the civilian component should be the primary actor, but they were not capable. With the end of the Cold War, some major developments affected UN missions

(Gordon, 2001). First of all, the UN faced more intrastate conflicts and regional crises. The number of UN peacekeeping missions rose from 5 in 1988 to 15 in 1992. Secondly, the number of international and non-governmental organizations also rose considerably and they started to become more effective. As the last point, it was observed that the UN might be incapable of responding to all these crises and conflicts. In this environment, Boutros-Gali indicated that peace-enforcement would be in the forefront and the UN alone will not be capable. Lastly, Carl Bildt stated that the sort of mission would not be important and certainly, there will be two components as civil and military having equal importance and responsibility.

From the UN's peace operations perspective, operations in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were turning points in the post-Cold War era. These operations paved the way for a more robust and demanding civil-military convergence and entailed a civil-military interface in which military and civilians had to work together. In this interface, military had to take the responsibility of non-military missions and at the same time the civilian environment (GOs, IOs and NGOs) showed great effort during and after the armed conflict, especially to support the population in domains such as humanitarian, social, infrastructural etc. for a long-term.

This interface required close coordination and cooperation between civil and military entities that assumed and worked for one single end state. With this coordination and cooperation, the military side aimed to create a unity of aim, unity of effort (to avoid duplication of effort), to avoid wasting time, money, manpower, and other resources. For this purpose, NATO developed the notion of Civil-Military Cooperation in the late 1990s. In peace operations in the 1990s, the military mission was generally seen as the creation of a secure environment by separating and possibly disarming and demobilizing military adversaries (Rietjens and Bollen, 2008, p. 16).

CIMIC applied during these peace operations by which NATO aimed to keep, establish or enforce the peace. Differently from the past, post-Cold War peace operations show that there is interdependency between civilian and military domains. This is one reason why CIMIC became important. The other reason is the existence of civil actors in the

operation area but what is more important is the status, capabilities and possibilities of these actors. The last reason is the security environment in the 21st century. In fact, this last point forms a basis for the integration of civil-military interdependency and the development of civil actors.

The statement of peace operations is an umbrella term that covers conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The relationship between these operations is shown in Figure-2.2. Within NATO, a doctrine issued in 2001 as “AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations”. This doctrine was revised and published as “AJP-3.4.1 Military Contributions to Peace Support”. In this doctrine, it was stated that peace operations cover a wide range of operations and they are applied to;

- Prevent conflict from taking place.
- Restore peace and order between major conflicting parties.
- Secure a ceasefire or peace settlement following the outbreak of conflict.
- Keep the peace while a ceasefire or peace settlement is implemented.
- Help extend state authority where capacity is weak to help build a society where disputes in the future are less likely to escalate to conflict (NATO, 2014c).

In this doctrine, the operations were defined as follows.

**Conflict Prevention:** A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.

**Peacemaking:** A peace support effort conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement involving primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by the direct or indirect use of military assets.

**Peace Enforcement:** A peace support effort designed to end hostilities through the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It is



likely to be conducted without the strategic consent of some, if not all, of the major conflicting parties.

The peace enforcement requires a UN mandate as it was stated under the Chapter VII of the UN-Charter which enables the UN to take coercive actions ranging from imposing economic sanctions, like embargos, to dispatching troops. With the peace-enforcement, it is aimed to force the warring parties to accept a peace agreement. As in the Kosovo case, the UN Security Council may delegate the authority to use violence to another party.




Figure-2.2: Conceptualization of peace support efforts (AJP 3.4.1, 2014, p. 1-3).

**Peacekeeping:** A peace support effort designed to assist the implementation of a ceasefire or peace settlement and to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace. It is conducted with the strategic consent of all major conflicting parties.

Peacekeeping operations are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter that promotes the settlement of disputes through peaceful means, such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. As in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR created buffer zones and monitored ceasefires.

**Peacebuilding:** A peace support effort designed to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by addressing the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support efforts (AJP 3.4.1, 2014, p.1-3 – 1-7).

It was always difficult to achieve the desired end state via peace operations. In his article titled “The Crisis of Peacekeeping-Why the UN Can’t End Wars” Severine Autesserre states that conflicts take place not between states but within states; peacekeepers generally lack local level developments; current peace operations require actors who specialized in the development, gender, politics, economics, administration, justice, human rights, land-mine removal, elections, media and, communication degraded efficiency of peace efforts (Autesserre, 2019, p. 106-112).

#### **2.4. Comprehensive Approach from NATO Perspective**

The Comprehensive Approach mainly emphasizes coordination, cooperation and/or collaboration of military and civilian entities at all levels with appropriate actors. This approach was proposed by Denmark in 2004 in light of its experiences from its own practices and was adopted at NATO's Riga Summit in 2006.

According to some authors, although the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach in NATO could be brought back to the Harmel Report<sup>10</sup> published in 1967 (Ortiz, 2008, p. 291), the Comprehensive Approach came mainly with the proposal of Denmark in 2004.

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<sup>10</sup> The Allies needed to review political measures aimed at establishing a fair and sustainable order in Europe, ending the division of Germany and ensuring the security of Europe (NATO Dergisi, 1968, p. 29, para. 12). The main concern was to define how to do these while maintaining political solidarity and defense measures (Brosio, 1968, s. 4). In 1966, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel launched an initiative to be able to strengthen the Alliance as a permanent factor for lasting peace. For this it was required to define the tasks of the Alliance in the near and distant future and to specify the measures and methods to be applied. This initiative was named as Harmel Plan and the report named as Harmel Report. Four working groups were established and the report included their findings. One of the main suggestions of the report was to encourage the members to discuss related issues with relevant countries, UN and other international institutions (NATO Dergisi, 1968, p. 29, para. 15). It is claimed that The Harmel Report affected NATO's efforts to establish dialogue and cooperation between East and West, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe process, the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO's arms control and disarmament policy (Kaplan, 2007).

Denmark announced in March 2004 that it would embed relevant civilian actors at the appropriate levels to its military missions abroad, as a result of the experiences from countries such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Eritrea and Iraq. This initiative was called “Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations”, or CPA in short (Fischer and Christensen, 2005, p. 1).

According to Petersen, Binnendijk and others, Denmark sought ways to coordinate and collaborate with other organizations for her own needs and developed this initiative. Then, the Danish authorities took the responsibility to spread this initiative within NATO and proposed the Comprehensive Approach. The aim was not to make NATO the center of coordination and cooperation but to bring NATO to the same level as other organizations (Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 78).

For this end state, Denmark organized a meeting on 20-21 June 2005 to share their experience with NATO bodies and this was the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach. The discussions went on from June 2005 till the spring of 2006. During the discussions, it was stressed that;

“the aim was not to develop new, independent NATO capabilities but to improve its existing capabilities as well as strengthen its ability to engage in cooperation with—not control of—other actors and to improve mission planning in these areas” (Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 79).

The topic was brought to the agenda for the Riga Summit in November 2006. During the Summit, it was stated that;

“the experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors, and provides precedents for this approach. To that end, while recognising that NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, we have tasked today the Council in Permanent Session to develop pragmatic proposals in time for the meeting of Foreign Ministers in April 2007 and Defence Ministers in June 2007 to improve coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments as well as practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant

international organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and local actors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations wherever appropriate. These proposals should take into account emerging lessons learned and consider flexible options for the adjustment of NATO military and political planning procedures with a view to enhancing civil-military interface” (NATO, 2006, para.10).

Thus, the Comprehensive Approach has emerged. The Bucharest Summit, which was held in 2008, included the following statements:

“... We have endorsed an Action Plan comprising a set of pragmatic proposals to develop and implement NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach. These proposals aim to improve the coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments and enhance practical cooperation at all levels with other actors, wherever appropriate, including provisions for support to stabilisation and reconstruction. They relate to areas such as planning and conduct of operations; training and education; and enhancing cooperation with external actors. We task the Council in Permanent Session to implement this Action Plan as a matter of priority and to keep it under continual review, taking into account all relevant developments as well as lessons learned” (NATO, 2008a, para. 11).

While this definition fails to define the Comprehensive Approach, it was stated what was expected with reference to the Action Plan. The plan was designed to be able to develop capabilities in five major areas of work, such as:

- Planning and conduct of operations;
- Lessons learned, training, education and exercises;
- Enhancing cooperation with external actors;
- Public messaging; and
- Stabilization and reconstruction (NATO, 2009a).

Later on, the ISAF’s Strategic Vision published in 2008 and provided more perceptible data by stating that:

“There can be no lasting security without development and no development without security. Success requires a comprehensive approach across security, governance and development efforts and between all local and international partners in support of the Afghan Government. We will

intensify our contribution to such a comprehensive approach” (NATO, 2008b, para 6).

This statement completed what was stated at the Bucharest Summit, introduced NATO as a part of the international community and indicated that it would contribute to the efforts of the international community. It should be noted here that, at the time Comprehensive Approach was assumed as the efforts of the wider international community and NATO was contributing to it (NATO, 2008a).

The New Strategic Concept of NATO, which was issued in November 2010, also emphasized the Comprehensive Approach and stated;

“The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort” (NATO, 2010a, para. 21).

It is important that in this statement, it was also emphasized that the Alliance would engage other international actors before, during and after crises. To be able to realize this, NATO needed to define, establish a liaison, exchange information, plan together, coordinate and collaborate with these international actors during the execution of exercises and operations. All these require a tactical and operational understanding and also guidance and detailed directions.

After NATO's New Strategic Concept was issued, one of the main developments was the update of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. The Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, which was issued in 2008, reviewed and re-issued in 2011. NATO's Action Plan is built on four pillars. The first pillar is related to the internal Comprehensive Approach. The second pillar is related to training, education, and exercises and also lessons learned. The third pillar is to enhance its cooperation with external actors. The fourth pillar is related to public messaging (NATO, 2011a; Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 82-84).

After this development, a number of official documents were also reviewed, revised and updated. What was reflected with these updates was that;

“NATO should promote a shared sense of purpose among international actors and that an effective implementation of the comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, was clearly conveyed” (NATO, 2014a, p. 4).

Related to that, NATO Operations Planning Directive was renamed as “Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD),” and the operations center was activated as “Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Center (CCOMC)”. Also, the Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) program was developed and the Community of Interest was established.

There are several reasons and preparatory developments in the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach within NATO. First of all, the changing security environment since the end of the Cold War indicated that risks, threats, and security understanding changed. This enforced states of being more collaborative with each other and other relevant organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Secondly, within this environment, it was observed during the crises in the Balkans that there was a wide range of actors in the area of operation other than military actors. Thirdly, related to the second one, it was seen that there was a requirement for an interface between civilian and military entities on security, logistics and especially humanitarian issues. In this interface, civilian and military actors interacted frequently. The second and third points can be regarded as the legacy of CIMIC. In the fourth place, it can be said that the developments in the security and operational environment showed that the military was not enough in responding to the challenges alone. In the fifth place, it can be assumed that no single organization is capable of intervening alone from the resources’ perspective, including money, time, effort, and manning. Lastly, it can be said that there were similar attempts to prioritizing interagency cooperation such as “Integrated Approach”, “3D (Defense, Diplomacy and Development) Approach”, and “Whole-of-Government Approach”. These reasons or developments paved the way for the Comprehensive Approach.

The Comprehensive Approach is different from Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC is a tool used to support the operational military work and may constitute a sub-element (at tactical and sometimes operational level) in the overall effort (Wesselingh, 2015, p. 2).

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), was one of the most significant experiences from the operations in the Balkans. CIMIC in the Balkans was very important from a civil-military convergence perspective and paved the way for a Comprehensive Approach. With CIMIC, the military became aware that the post-Cold War area of operation included a wide variety of actors. Both military and non-military actors realized that they co-exist in the same area and were targeting the same people for nearly the same end state. The main aim in the Balkans was to provide security, support the post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts and return life to normal as soon as possible. Here the main contribution of CIMIC to the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach was that the military irreversibly experienced that it was required to know the actors other than the military and establish relation from coordination to full cooperation.

However, in the first CIMIC doctrine, which was published in 2003, it was stated that NATO must be ready

“to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations” (NATO, 2003a, p. 1-1).

This doctrine indicated the importance of being familiar with the civilian environment, defining the non-military actors and cooperating with them for the mission purposes. By referring to the 1999 Strategic Concept, it was also indicated that the current security environment is complicated and coordination and cooperation with civilians are crucial for mission success (NATO, 2003a, p. 1-1).

As it was discussed earlier, the Comprehensive Approach was proposed by Danish authorities in 2004 and

“discussions focused on demonstrating how it went beyond the existing NATO doctrine on enhanced civil military cooperation” (CIMIC) (Ortiz, 2008, p. 287).

When it is considered that the Comprehensive Approach seeks to establish relations and seeks for contribution from the civilian side, then CIMIC should be at the core of this approach. However, this assumption was ignored after the Comprehensive Approach was developed and CIMIC was not replaced in the Comprehensive Approach structure since it remained at the political/strategic level while CIMIC remained at the tactical/operational level.

One of the issues commonly cited in documents on the post-Cold War security environment and comprehensive approach is the recognition that it would be very difficult for soldiers to provide security and stability on their own (Davidson, Hayes and Landon, 1996, p. 14-24; Ortiz, 2008, p. 285; Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 75). This is currently stated as follows;

“Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis situations requires nations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations to contribute in a concerted effort” (NATO, 2018c).

So, what does it mean that soldiers alone will not be enough? When it is considered that the instability and crisis emerge from failing and fragile states, stabilization and reconstruction efforts raise and preventing state failure becomes important. According to Patric and Brown;

“to advance reform, prevent state failure, and promote peace and recovery in war-torn states, donors need to employ the entire panoply of policy instruments at their disposal. In short, stove-piped policy responses are ‘out,’ integrated approaches (*such as Comprehensive Approach*) are ‘in’” (Patric and Brown, 2007, p. vii).

Parallel to that, Hynek and Marton stated that the soldiers;



“were deployed to Afghanistan to deal with a complex set of tasks. Among them, in order to assist in state building and to provide governance assistance at the sub-state level” (Hynek and Marton, 2011, p. 3).

The most important inference to be made from these statements is that soldiers have to undertake missions outside their responsibility. That's why they cannot be successful on their own.

During the peace operations and crisis management efforts in the post-Cold War period, it was observed that;

“problems of an extremely complex nature and present security environments require activities beyond the organic capability set of any one single organization” (Hallett, 2012, p. 15).

It was stated that one of the lessons learned from peace operations in the 1990s was that the UN was no more enough to conduct peace operations alone (St-Pierre, 2008, p. 8). According to the report;

“the UN needs partners to meet the demand for peacekeepers and to intervene where the UN is not capable or willing to do so. The UN has recently witnessed a surge in the number, size and complexity of its peacekeeping missions, as the demand for UN peacekeepers reached an all-time high” (St-Pierre, 2008, p. 8).

Besides, as it was stated by Kofi Annan in 2004 that there is a strong relationship between security and development (UN, 2004, p. viii). Here there are two facts: one is that the UN will not be able to conduct peace operations on its own and the other is that development and security are strongly related to each other. If an organization like the UN cannot carry out such operations, no other organization can. So, why cannot these organizations conduct operations alone?

One reason might be that the organizations operating in the crisis areas mostly face security problems. In NATO's Political Guidance, this situation was mentioned as the non-military actors “cannot operate freely due to a hostile security environment” (NATO, 2011b, para. II-5).

The other reason is that the non-military actors lack enough financial resources, capacities and capabilities. This situation was also mentioned in the same document stating that these non-military actors “do not possess sufficient equipment, capabilities or expertise” (NATO, 2011b, para. II-5). Patric and Brown provide an example from Kosovo. According to them, the international community was not well organized and donor agencies were not aware of how to combine governance, security, development and the rule of law with each other (Patric and Brown, 2007, p. viii).

The issues such as the complex security environment, unpredictable risks and threats, civil-military convergence and the reality that no single organization is capable forced governments and multinational organizations to consider and assume interagency approaches in the 2000s. Meharg and St-Pierre defined ten approaches such as:

- 1-3D (Diplomacy, Defence, Development)
- 2-Whole-of-Government
- 3-Joined Up
- 4-Interagency
- 5-Comprehensive Approach
- 6-Integrated Missions
- 7-Hybrid/Joint Operations
- 8-Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
- 9-Clusters
- 10-One UN (Meharg and St-Pierre, 2010, p. 52).

The first five of these approaches are related to political and strategic levels and the rest of them are at tactical and operational levels. Besides, there is one more approach assumed by Germany named Networked Security Approach, which belongs to political and strategic levels.

All these approaches aim to bring different actors together. Different actors have different opportunities, resources, abilities and expertise. The main objective is to contribute to security, whether national or international.

Since 2004, NATO did not provide a definition for the Comprehensive Approach but often stated what it was not. In the formal and informal documents and in working papers, it is stated that the Comprehensive Approach must be understood as a “philosophy”, a “mindset” or “a journey without a destination” (Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 78; Molnar, Smith-Windsor and Mengarini, 2008, p. 2). Meanwhile, different authors tried to define the Comprehensive Approach. For example, according to Ortiz, Comprehensive Approach;

“would mean a higher degree of effective coordination at all levels within and more effective cooperation NATO with other actors to complement and mutually reinforce each other’s efforts to achieve the desired common goals, if possible, within an overall strategy agreed and owned by local authorities” (Ortiz, 2008, p. 286).

It is difficult to understand because no definition of the comprehensive approach has been made and the evaluations made in reference to official publications remain theoretical.

So far, a theoretical background was provided and the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach was examined. In the following part, the requirement for the Comprehensive Approach, its features, contributions and critiques will be discussed.

From the very beginning, according to Ortiz the rationale behind the Comprehensive Approach was;

“to adopt a more holistic perspective to operations that would integrate and appropriately synchronize political, security, economy, governance and other aspects. The objective was to move from existing ad-hoc coordination arrangements on the ground towards a more proactive approach in engaging with actors in charge of reconstruction and peace building” (Ortiz, 2008, p. 295).

According to Neal and Wells NATO needs the Comprehensive Approach because

“the need for effectiveness in an increasingly complex international environment, and efficiency in an era of declining defense resources” (Neal and Wells, 2011, p. 2).

Another view indicates that crises may exceed and spread over, so they threaten global peace and security. This could be avoided by applying the Comprehensive Approach since;

“the Comprehensive Approach supports a growing consensus that outward-focused, integrated, and multidisciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must be the norm” (Leslie, Rostek and Gizewski, 2006, p. 12).

As it is obvious from the statements above, the Comprehensive Approach was approached from different perspectives and different comments were provided. One statement indicates the transformation of NATO, but narrows its scope to reconstruction and peacebuilding; another indicates that NATO needs to be effective in the complex security environment and defense resources decline; the last one proposes that the Comprehensive Approach may help NATO in providing peace and security globally. It is very easy to see that this confusion will continue over time because when we look back, we see that no operation is the same as the previous one and it will not be the same in the future. What NATO needs is a flexible approach and when the expectations are defined properly, it is not that difficult to find one. The expectations of NATO from the Comprehensive Approach were clearly provided in AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine. It was stated that there are three goals of Comprehensive Approach:

- 1-Improve the coherent application of the Alliance’s own crisis management instruments, including its military and political planning procedures.
- 2-Improve the Alliance’s practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant international organizations (IOs), governmental organizations (GOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), contractors, commercial partners and local actors when planning and conducting operations.
- 3-Enhance the Alliance’s ability to support stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts in all phases of a conflict in concert with other actors (NATO, 2017a).

Comprehensive Approach is a wide topic, which should be examined and evaluated more deeply. So far, we have provided an overview of the Comprehensive Approach.

Related applications and assessments were provided within the Afghanistan case in Chapter IV of this study.

## **2.5. Coexistence-Consultation-Deconfliction-Coordination-Cooperation**

The aim of CIMIC is to provide full cooperation with the relevant non-military actors at appropriate levels. This aim includes a period from coexistence to full cooperation. These are explained as follows:

**Coexistence:** Existing at the same time or in the same place (AJP-3.19, 2018, p.1-5). Basically, this refers to the situations in which military and civilian stakeholders exist in the same area of operation but unaware of each other. In case they exist in the same area, most probably they operate for the same end state.

**Consultation:** Seeking the opinion or advice of other actors (AJP-3.19, 2018, p.1-5). The relevant members of these two entities need their expertise. Generally, NGOs ask for assistance for security.

**De-confliction:** Avoiding undesirable interference among actors, especially where they perform the same function or occupy the same physical space (AJP-3.19, 2018, p.1-5). Generally, soldiers tend to get results in a short time, to use force and to use their resources optimally. Civilians, who adhere to humanitarian principles, tend to be calm and assume long-term planning. These behavioral features may negatively affect each other's activities, especially soldiers who harm civilians' projects. To prevent this, mutual communication should be created.

**Coordination:** Bringing together different elements of a complex activity or organization into an efficient relationship (AJP-3.19, 2018, p.1-5). Soldiers and civilians should act in coordination with each other in order not to interrupt the above-mentioned activities. Coordination also helps to use the same scarce resources effectively and efficiently in operation or crisis management and avoid duplication of the same projects.

**Cooperation:** Working together for mutual benefit (AJP-3.19, 2018, p.1-5). Here, full cooperation is aimed, starting from planning together.

## **2.6. Civil-Military Relations**

Civil-Military Relations, in its simplest form, is about the political level relationship between the decision-makers, the people constituting the civilians, and the army constituting the soldiers. Although it is basically one of the subfields of military sociology and political science, it can be handled in an interdisciplinary context in terms of the subjects it touches. Regardless of the context in which it is taken into consideration, the main issue that makes civil-military relations worth studying is the power given to the military and the management of the use of this power. The main question is “Can the soldiers, who are obliged to protect the society by using this power, direct it to what they are obliged to protect?” Based on this, two basic levels of study have emerged; one of them is the problem of civil-military relations and the other is the cultural divide. These studies are generally related to the structure and duties of the army, the status of the officers who are at the decision-making level in the army, the place of the soldier in the society, training and education of the officers, the security situation and regime of the country. Various theories have been produced in the field of Civil-Military Relations such as Samuel P. Huntington’s Objective Control Theory, Morris Janowitz’s Convergence Theory, Rebecca Schiff’s Concordance Theory and Peter D. Feaver’s Principal-Agency Theory.

While preparing this dissertation, it has been observed that CIMIC was often intermingled with the concept of Civil-Military Relations. As it was discussed in Chapter I, CIMIC is prejudicedly understood as the helping hand of the military. This causes people to discuss CIMIC as a kind of civil-military relations in the post-conflict areas.

The second reason could be that a narrow group of people such as members of the organizations in the area of operation and those who work on these organizations are aware of what is CIMIC (Ankersen, 2014, p.18). Lack of knowledge about CIMIC causes misunderstandings.

The other reason might be the similarity of the actors in these two concepts. Basically, these two concepts discuss civilians and soldiers but while the civilians in CIMIC are actors such as the local population, non-governmental and international organizations, private sector and agencies, the civilians in Civil-Military Relations are state officials at the political level.



## **CHAPTER-III**

### **HISTORICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION**

#### **3.1. Historical Roots**

From that point of view, one may find many individuals and local examples of positive civil-military convergence. Some officers even claim that this kind of convergence between civilian and military is as old as war itself. Yet from the CIMIC perspective, it can be said that positive civil-military convergence starts with the Second World War. Additionally, some lessons were taken from counterinsurgencies such as the Malayan Emergency in conducting and shaping CIMIC. According to some writers (Mockaitis, 1995, p. 6; Rietjens and Bollen, 2008, p. 10), these two notions constitute the historical roots of CIMIC as its version applied in the Balkans. Even so, this assumption might be problematic.

Looking for the roots of the CIMIC and searching it in the past depends on from which point the researcher looks at. Some base the roots of CIMIC upon wars. They claim that wars are as old as human being so CIMIC is as old as human being. Some other writers look for roots of CIMIC in the Second World War. During the Second World War Civil Affairs-Military Government was applied in both occupied and liberated areas by US and UK armies. At that time, the Civil Affairs-Military Government's motto was “bury the dead, feed the living,” and there were not enough GOs or NGOs that could take responsibility from the military.

Some think that one another historical root of CIMIC is in the Malayan Emergency conducted by British Army in Malaya between 1948-1960. The most popular legacy of this emergency is the concept of “winning the hearts and minds of the people” and the proposal of British authority in Malaya, pouring more troops to the hearts of the people, not to the jungle.

One can find the roots of convergence of civilian and military domains in Civil Affairs-Military Government activities during the Second World War (Rietjens and Bollen,



2008, p. 10) and Counter-Insurgency Operations in the imperial era (Mockaitis, 1995, p. 6). These roots just indicate something but not any clue for the current CIMIC.

### **3.1.1. Civil Affairs in the Second World War**

Convergence between military and civilian domains during an armed conflict has a long history in the US Army. According to a research published in CIMIC Messenger by CIMIC Center of Excellence (CCOE), the history of civil-military convergence dates to 1775, during the continental army's march to Montreal. From this point in the development and institutionalization of Civil Affairs there are turning points such as the 1812 Battle of Niagara and war with Mexico in 1847. During these wars, civil-military issues were conducted by fragmentary orders. During the Civil War, civil-military issues started to get a form with the Adjutant General Order of April 24, 1863, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field" (CCOE, 2013, p. 4). During these wars, the orders that were given included human-sensitive directives for soldiers, such as respecting the rights and property of the local population, local government, and the religious places.

"The Adjutant General Order of April 24, 1863" was incorporated into the "Rules of Land Warfare – 1914" (CCOE, 2013, p. 5). Six years later, in 1920, Col. Irwin L. Hunt published his report titled "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920". With this report, the need for Civil Affairs officers and organizations to plan and conduct Civil Affairs was mentioned for the first time (Hunt, 1920, p. 80-81).

Col. Hunt stated that the US Army's occupation forces were lacking the expertise in dealing with the problems of nearly one million civilians (Hunt, 1920, p. 65). In his report, Col. Hunt proposed that to be able to conduct an effective Civil Affairs, the army should prepare prior to operation and be ready to establish an effective Military Government. Yet, he foresaw that paying importance and establishing a Military Government could be difficult since both the army and the government will not accept their legitimacy or will not assume that they can be useful (Hunt, 1920; Holshek, 2018). His foresight was realized, and the army ignored his advice until the midst of the Second World War.

So long after Col. Hunt's report, in 1936, the "Rules of Land Warfare" of 1914 was revised containing a section about Civil Affairs. The Rules of Land Warfare – 1936 was to be replaced again in 1940, with much attention being paid to only the military occupation and government of the enemy territory. In 1940, the first separate document, "Field Manual (FM) 27-5: Military Government" was published and revised in 1943.

From the Civil Affairs point of view, the Second World War was different from previous examples in duration and size. During the Second World War, Civil Affairs was applied in a more specialized, experienced and institutionalized way. In the Second World War, not only soldiers but also civilians were active in the execution of Civil Affairs. All these personnel dealt not only with humanitarian problems but also with political problems (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. viii). This brings Civil Affairs and Military Government closer to current CIMIC understanding.

#### Definition

So, what was Civil Affairs and Military Government during the Second World War? Shortly, Civil Affairs and Military Government was designed to establish or to support establishing civil order and welfare and provide basic humanitarian needs in the area of operation. Civil Affairs units made an effort to stabilize rear areas and provided support in restoring governance, local economies, and order (Millen, 2019, p. v). By doing this, Civil Affairs officers allowed combatant units to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems (CCOE, 2013, p. 6).

According to the FM 27-5, there were three core terms to understand the Civil Affairs. The term "civil affairs" is used to describe the activities of the government of the occupied area and of the inhabitants of such an area except those of an organized military character. "Civil affairs control" describes the supervision of the activities of civilians by an armed force, by the military government, or otherwise. The term "civil affairs officers" designates the military officers, who, under the military governor, are engaged in the control of civilians" (US Army, 1943, p. 1).

In the Field Manual 27-5, Military Government was defined as;

“The supreme authority exercised by an armed force over the lands, property, and the inhabitants of enemy territory, or allied or domestic territory recovered from enemy occupation, or from rebels treated as belligerents.” “The theater commander bears full responsibility for military government. He is, therefore, usually designated as military governor, but may delegate both his authority and title to a subordinate commander” (US Army, 1943, p. 1).

According to Harry L. Cotes and Albert K. Weinberg, the authors of “Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors”,

“the Army manuals generally referred to occupational operations in liberated countries as Civil Affairs and to those in conquered countries as Military Government” (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. vii).

They state that, either in liberated or in conquered territories, the issues for the military were very challenging from governmental point of view. In liberated areas, existing governmental bodies could be helpful and the military could assist them to reestablish government and deal with the humanitarian-heavy issues. But in conquered territories, which means enemy countries, demanding changes should be applied in laws, institutions and administrators (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. vii).

Dr. Raymond A. Millen, the author of “Bury the Dead, Feed the Living: The History of Civil Affairs/Military Government”, shares the same ideas with Coles and Weinberg and states that the FM 27-5 did not mention establishing a military government to the liberated territories overtly. Millen thinks that “this was a politically sensitive issue since the term Military Government indicated complete military administrative control of the occupied territory, implying that no distinction existed between belligerent and liberated inhabitants” (Millen, 2019, p. 11). To be able to desensitization of the political issues, the term of Civil Affairs was used for aid and assistance national governments in reestablishing civil administration in liberated areas. The term of Military Government was used to carry on the governmental issues in the territories belonging to an enemy (Millen, 2019, p. 11).

The main aim of both Civil Affairs and Military Government was to control the local population by establishing rules and regulations, to provide a safe and secure

environment and to assist in humanitarian issues. This was required for the military to be able to focus on the enemy and fight. Besides, this was providing freedom of movement, at least in the rear area for logistics, transportation and movement. From this point of view, the military needed dedicated Civil Affairs officers and units.

During the Second World War, Civil Affairs was applied in northwest Africa, Sicily, Italy, France, the Benelux, Japan and Germany. Despite the need for dedicated Civil Affairs and Military Government units, the US government did not allow the War Department to establish Civil Affairs Divisions (CAD) until 1943. Besides the government's reluctance, another reason for the late establishment of CADs was that combat units were oblivious of Civil Affairs detachments and often undermined their activities (Millen, 2019, p. 3). Thus, Civil Affairs activities were conducted by the CA officers till 1943.

#### Recruitment, Training and Education

Defining the authorities, legal frameworks and obligations, and recruitment and training of Civil Affairs personnel began with the Provost Marshal General's Office publication of Field Manual 27-5, in July 1940 (Millen, 2019, p. 10-11). Yet, the School of Military Government (SOMG) was opened and the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP) was applied in 1942. CATP included the following topics:

- Army organization and procedure, including staff work, supplies, etc.
- Principles of the military government and the administration of occupied territories.
- The law of land warfare applying to the occupied territory, the conduct of military commissions and tribunals.
- Experiences in the military government, including brief accounts of previous military occupations, and actual experience [in the] present war.
- Training in the major Axis countries and special areas, geography, population, economic, political, governmental institutions, psychology, history, and recent trends.
- Language training.
- Miscellaneous training relating to economic, social, military and other problems in occupied areas (Millen, 2019, p. 23).

Specific instruction on technical skills needed for Military Government included:

- Fiscal matters of far-reaching economic importance
- Control of local banking establishments
- Disentanglement of monetary systems from Axis-imposed regulations
- Occupational currency
- Rates of exchange established.

Additional subjects included;

- Care and feeding of liberated peoples
- Public health and sanitation
- The broad field of public utilities (Millen, 2019, p. 29).

When the area of operation and the number of populations in the Second World War were considered, it is obvious that huge numbers of CA officers were needed to accomplish CA missions. After the first CATP, only 85 officers were ready to deploy (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. 13). At the beginning, it was decided to increase the number of the schools but it was observed that not qualified officers were being sent to the schools. Consequently, “extraordinarily qualified” civilians “because of their experience in government or in public utilities or in sanitary or civil engineering” were enrolled in the CATP (Millen, 2019, p. 29).

Civilians were selected according to their skills in the areas such as administration, public safety, law and order, economics and finance, health and civil infrastructure. These civilians were referred to as “functional specialists” (Oehrig, 2009, p. 11). Thus, the manning problem was solved but establishing CA Units was more challenging.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied Supreme Commander, stated that keeping rear areas safe and secure was important for the presence of combat power at the front. He was aware that without dealing with the problems such as looting of military equipment, infectious diseases, famine and uprisings, Allied forces would not be successful in accomplishing their mission (Millen, 2019, p. 3-5). At the same time, by stating that “I am having as much trouble with civilian forces behind aiding us as I am with the enemy

in front of us” he pointed out the requirement of capable officers and units to deal with the issues (Zaalberg, 2006a, p. 27).

From a military perspective, within this context, the requirement for a dedicated civil affairs organization was clear. Yet, the US government was not thinking in the same direction. According to President Roosevelt, dealing with the above-mentioned problems, civil affairs and issues of governance should be conducted by civilian agencies, and the military should be focused on military tasks and warfighting (Oehrig, 2009:2; Millen, 2019, p. 9-10). During the first two years of the war, President Roosevelt did not approve of establishing CA units; instead, he offered civilian agencies take the lead (Millen, 2019:1). According to Millen, despite the requirement for unity of command for the unity of effort, President Roosevelt was skeptical about the War Department and accused them of trying to impose military authoritarianism (Millen, 2019:1-2). What the president and his office were not aware of was that at that time, there were not enough civilian agencies/organizations, they were not that capable in conducting civil affairs and coordination between the military and these existing civilian organizations was weak.

Some governmental bodies and civilian agencies such as the Department of State, Department of Agriculture and Board of Economic Warfare and Lend Lease tried to involve in the North Africa campaign in 1942 but their unsuccessful attempts helped neither military nor civilians (Zaalberg, 2006a, p. 27). The Red Cross provided necessary but limited support and the organizations like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) were not effective. The organizations were not capable of deploying and operating in conflict areas and they could not take over the military’s efforts in dealing with the post-combat situations (Donnison, 1961, p. 341). These points might have convinced President Roosevelt that establishing CA Divisions and conducting Military Government was logical but he was going to resist until the invasion of Italy in 1943. According to Oehrig, the US government would not let the military to establish a Military Government and provide authority for the civilian issues if there had been proper civilian organizations (Oehrig, 2009, p. 8).

Establishing CA Division

After the experiences from the campaigns in North Africa and Sicily and the invasion of Italy in 1943, President convinced that the Army would need to administer Military Government for an indeterminate period (Millen, 2019, p. 9). On 01 March 1943 President Roosevelt agreed with the military on establishing the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) (CCOE, 2013).

Subordinate to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and under the leadership of Major General John H. Hilldring the division's primary responsibilities were to:

- Advise the Secretary of War [Henry Stimson] concerning policies in areas occupied by the United States military forces,
- Maintain close cooperation with the United States and Allied combat forces, and with appropriate civilian agencies at Washington, and
- Represent the War Department in relations with inter-Allied boards concerning problems of military occupation.” (Millen, 2019, p. 15).

For Major General John H. Hilldring, head of the original Civil Affairs Division (CAD), the objectives of CA were two-fold:

- CA was to secure the civilian population to the fullest extent, and therefore maintain law and order.
- CA was to prevent civilians from interfering with military operations and in doing so, treat civilians in a way “that they [would] be able to assist the forward movement of our troops to the greatest extent possible” (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. 3).

#### CA Application in Germany

Amongst the campaigns in Europe and Africa, Japan and Germany are the most important ones since they are assumed as successful stabilization efforts (Dobbins, Poole and Runkle, 2008) and in many respects, Civil Affairs and Military Government activities reached their zenith of effectiveness from June 1944 to August 1945 (Millen, 2019, p. 6). The main reason for this was that Civil Affairs units and staff were experienced and the Civil Affairs organization was consolidated. There was no functioning government in liberated territories in Germany and Japan. This complete

lack of civil governance paved the way for the involvement of this experienced and consolidated military as Military Government (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. vii).

“For liberated territories in Europe, the main objectives were to assist in the winning of the war by securing cooperation from occupied citizens and to further long-range national policies.” (Coles, 1950).

To be able to realize that the military had two major strategies for addressing civil affairs in Germany:

- Direct control approach.
- Indirect control approach.

According to Oehrig, the preferred strategy was the indirect control approach. One of the main reasons to pick the indirect control approach was the idea of exploiting the exiled governments. In most of the areas, the exiled government was still legitimate and had an influence on civilians and would therefore be most effective and efficient in governing their own localities (Oehrig, 2009:5). The other reason was not to create the perception that Allied liberators had taken over governance in a similar way to the totalitarian regime they had just abolished (Oehrig, 2009:5). This indirect control approach was providing a possibility for the military to show less effort and gain more. Civil Affairs officers were establishing liaison with the heads of the bodies and avoiding communicating directly with civilians.

Generally speaking, we can say that the key missions of civil affairs between 1944-1946 were almost entirely military governance. In Germany, when Civil Affairs personnel entered into a town, first of all, they were posting ordinances including curfews, laws and other pieces of information to ensure cooperation from local inhabitants. They were then often selecting a new mayor or police chief, and in the interim, they were holding absolute power over arrests, dismissals and, in some cases, policy (Zaalberg, 2006a, p. 36). The main issues for Civil Affairs personnel were maintaining law and order as well as public safety were huge issues tackled by civil affairs detachments. Many towns were largely lawless, with looters, rapists and other criminals.



“Civil affairs officers drawn from local US police forces became invaluable during this period of the war not only in directly managing crime issues but also in retraining the loyalty and skills of local German police forces” (Oehrig, 2009, p. 6).

After taking control over the settlements by establishing governance and providing public safety, the other core mission; managing displaced persons and dealing with their feeding, sheltering and caring, was starting. As it was mentioned before, civil organizations were inadequate in responding to such cases. They were simply unequipped to manage the awesome task of providing food and shelter for so many refugees. The Army dutifully took the lead in this area as well, and many civil affairs detachments became involved in more general public order and refugee services (Oehrig, 2009, p. 6). Even in areas where the Army was largely unprepared to participate, such as refugee services and basic humanitarian needs, Civil Affairs detachments effectively reinstated law and order and prepared the German police force to reassume the responsibility for civil control (Oehrig, 2009, p. 8).

While the objective of civil affairs, in general, was to assist military operations in winning the war, Germany’s case provided opportunities to use military government installations to inculcate democratic ideals, follow through with de-Nazification efforts, and develop sound economic plans for the future that would balance punishment with prosperity (Oehrig, 2009, p. 4).

### Challenges

Despite the Civil Affairs activities reaching their zenith during the 1944-1945 period in Germany, there were some challenges. Writers agree that there were two main challenges: dividing Germany into four zones and lack of capable civilian organizations (Zaalberg, 2006a, p. 33; Dobbins, 2008, p. 26; Oehrig, 2009, p. 8-9).

After Germany’s surrender in 1945, four zones of command were created to be able to share the burden and share the responsibility of administration but this complicated the conduct of Civil Affairs effectively. Dividing Germany into zones made it impossible to deliver equal humanitarian assistance in a short period and to develop one single

national policy, especially on economic and central government issues in the long term (Oehrig, 2009, p. 8-9).

The other reason, the lack of capable civilian organizations, put the military in a very difficult position. After soldiers fought and provided a safe and secure environment, they had to deal with the problems. In the short term, the military dealt with clothing and sheltering the thousands of displaced persons and, later on, in the long term, dealing with social, economic, health and governmental issues. Since the military could not deliver these responsibilities, civil affairs operations prolonged for nearly four years.

### General Overview

Civil Affairs, which was conducted during the Second World War, especially by the US Army, keeps important data that helps us to understand today's Civil-Military Cooperation. There are three distinguishing features of Civil Affairs in the Second World War. The first one is about the aims: With the Civil Affairs during the Second World War, the military firstly aimed to control the population, which means keep the civilians away (or under control) and let the military fight. The other aim was to help the people in need and rebuild the nation. The second is that; the military was almost alone in its efforts since there were no International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, or agencies as there are now. The last one is the Military Government. As a result of the second feature, the military realized its aims mainly via Military Government, either directly or indirectly.

### Aim

The Second World War was different from the war with Mexico, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and WWI in duration and size of civil affairs operations. Civil Affairs operations were much greater since the area was great and the population was much larger (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. x). When it was aimed to control civilians, meet their needs, and assist them in establishing their own governance or build it directly, Civil Affairs officers required a wide variety of specialization. Soldiers had to handle political problems to an extent never necessary before. Coles and Weinberg state that Civil Affairs operations, even though conditioned by war, concern chiefly generic

social problems that involve human nature rather than technological factors. It needs to be paid greater importance for public, academic, and military understanding and evaluation than in almost any other phase of war (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. x).

#### Lack of organizations

During the Second World War, two aspects of civil-military convergence appeared. One was the Army's relations with the U.S. government bodies such as the State Department and the other was the relations with the civilian organizations such as Red Cross, UNRRA, etc. Especially after the failures of U.S. agencies in North Africa, the Army recognized that their voices should be heard at the table during the discussions about the war at the political level. For this reason, interagency coordinating groups were set up in Washington to facilitate action on interdepartmental civil affairs issues. One of the most successful of these groups was the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, organized in 1944 (Hayward, 1950, p. 19-27).

The other aspect of civil-military convergence, which is between the Army and the civilian organizations at the tactical level was not that effective since the lack of capable, organized and properly manned, trained and educated civil organizations. The military had to deal with providing food, shelter, health care and taking the responsibility of a government and establishing governmental bodies in liberated or occupied areas.

In these two convergences, the military was at the center. Advising the upper echelons at the political level and informing them how to do and ordering lower echelons and defining what to do. Armies, in general, are having the same problems currently.

#### Military Government

In the beginning, the US government was reluctant and had drawbacks in letting the military to establish Military Government and conduct governmental issues in liberated and occupied areas. In the end, the government agreed and the military performed governmental functions or closely supervised them. In the liberated areas, their

intervention was far less direct. In various senses and degrees, soldiers became governors (Coles and Weinberg, 1986, p. vii).

In the end, this was important for the civilian population. They were provided governance, a safe and secure environment, a more or less functioning system and civil services, of course, with shortages. Yet, according to Oehrig, Civil Affairs and Military Government provided more than that. He claims that Civil Affairs was an integral part of Germany's transformation from a totalitarian regime into one of the world's most booming democratic economies (Oehrig, 2009, p. 7).

### **3.1.2. Winning the Hearts and Minds**

Another so-called root of CIMIC was experienced in Malaya during colonial policing and counterinsurgency operations. Lieutenant-General Harold Briggs and General Gerard Templer's applications during this counterinsurgency in Malaya were assessed as one of the cornerstones in this domain. Briggs made a plan and General Templer developed and applied it. Briggs' plan simply had two pillars: fight against insurgents and isolate them from the population. General Templer focused on the latter to be able to facilitate the first one, which was already started and ongoing. During his mission, General Templer said in a speech, indicating the second aim, that "the answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people. The shooting side of this business is only 25 percent of the trouble and the other 75 lies in getting the people of this country behind us" in 1952.

Templer's statement of "winning the hearts and minds" became a motto of CIMIC officers during the peace operations in the Balkans. To be able to win the hearts and minds of the people, soldiers provided food, water and shelter, constructed schools, repaired houses, fixed infrastructures and etc. In fact, applying "winning the hearts and minds" in this way was problematic from two points in the Balkans. One was that the Balkans were different from Malaya socially, demographically, politically and the most important, conceptually. Operations in the Balkans were peace (support) operations, but the Malaya was an example of counterinsurgency. The other problematic point was making "winning the hearts and minds" a job for soldiers. In Malaya, Templer tried to

apply it not so overtly, even maybe as an implied task, but in the Balkans (and later in Afghanistan), this turned into “buying the hearts and minds” and unfortunately, for the wrong purpose.

### The Malayan Emergency

After the Second World War (Second World War), the Malayan Union (precursor of Malaysia) was formed as a British colony. The government was inadequate, the economic situation was fragile and the security structure was weak and undermanned. Rural areas where the Chinese minority was living were under the control of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). In general Chinese people in Malaya were apolitical. They were only interested in their own world and needs. They were not demanding ideals like democracy and representative government (Hosmer and Crane, 2006, p. 72). Komer stated that Chinese minorities were not represented in the political structure. The number of Chinese in government services or the security forces was very less (in 1948, there were only 228 Chinese in the 10,000-man police force) (Komer, 1972, p. 6). Rubber and tin industries were the most important sources of revenue in Malaya and most of the Chinese were working in these industries (Comber, 2012, p. 46).

In this environment, CPM found a ground for its activities. CPM was an organization composed largely of Chinese members who fought against the Japanese during the Second World War and was committed to an independent, communist Malaya. The CPM was against the colonial government, which provided special rights to Malays. There was an armed wing of CPM, which was founded against the Japanese Army during the Second World War. In 1945-48 this wing was passive and CPM was active politically. In early 1948, the armed wing of CPM stood up and it was named as Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army. In 1949 it switched to the "Malayan National (Min-tsu) Liberation Army" (Hack, 1999, p. 99).

In 1948, the MNLA began a guerrilla insurgency by establishing camps in the jungle, attacking government and military installations, damaging Malaya's rubber industry and creating areas of Communist control.

On the morning of 16 June, 1948 three European estate managers were murdered in two separate incidents in Perak city by members of the MNLA and on June 18, 1948, the government declared a state of emergency. After two years from the declaration of the state of emergency, in 1950, Lieutenant-General Harold Briggs was assigned as Director of Operations under High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney (Comber, 2012, p. 47). After taking over the mission, Briggs prepared a report including a plan and recommending two main measures: isolating the MNLA from population and military operations (counterinsurgency) against MNLA. Other complementary measures were local elections, establishing new villages and creation of village councils (Komer, 1972, p. 18-19; Hack, 2009, p. 388-389). Nearly 500,000 Chinese resettled into “New Villages” guarded by security forces. It was aimed to cut the ties with insurgents and force them to go deep into the jungle. In the next step, it was aimed to apply military operations (Hack, 1999, p. 102-103).

By the mid-1950s, the rebels had become accordingly isolated, but yet, the MNLA activity reached a peak in 1951 with the ambush and killing of the British high commissioner to Malaya - Sir Henry Gurney. However, under his successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, Malayan Emergency had entered into a positive phase.

#### Templer’s Activities or Winning the Hearts and Minds

During the 4-year period of Malayan Emergency between 1948-1952, the response against MNLA was inadequate, and it looked as if the government was losing (Komer, 1972, p. v). The turning point in the conflict was the appointment in January 1952 of General Sir Gerald Templer as British High Commissioner and Director of Operations (Hack, 2009, p. 390). Templer reorganized police training and intelligence, applied new jungle tactics and intensified psychological warfare campaigns (Hack, 1999, p. 114, Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 79). As a result of these measures, two-thirds of the guerrillas were neutralized, the incident rate fell from 500 to less than 100 per month, and the civilian and security force casualties from 200 to less than 40 (Komer, 1972, p. 20; Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 79). Under Templer’s leadership, positive developments were achieved in political and economic domains. (Komer, 1972, p. v).

Templer did not prepare a plan; he decided to use the Briggs Plan and developed it in his own way. What he did really was to find ways to apply the plan. To be able to apply the Briggs Plan effectively, he mobilized the government system and raised the morale of the people and provided the support of the people of Malaya. Templer's method had two pillars; ensure the government for taking the initiative and provide the consent and support of the people of Malaya. All the attempts he made were around these two pillars.

#### Government Aspect

Templer believed that if the government were reliable, the defeat of the insurgents would be possible. To him, the first thing to be done was to make the Chinese minority believe that if they remain loyal to the government, communists cannot harm them (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 86). To be able to realize that the government should be capable in providing physical security and socio-economic development thus, Templer conceived his first task to be energizing government at all levels (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 83). In fact he assumed that government should be the center of both violence and benevolence. For this, well trained and good structured police forces would be the key.

Templer initiated a revision program for the police and the force was completely reorganized. He introduced an extensive new training program with an emphasis on basic civil police duties and good relations with the populace (Komer, 1972, p. 39). A new Police Training College opened in October 1952. New jungle tactics were also applied, the intelligence system revamped and the psychological warfare campaign intensified (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 79). Templer ordered to establish the post of Director of Intelligence and he brought in Mr. John Morton, a civilian who was chief of MI-5 in Singapore, to handle the issues about intelligence (Komer, 1972, p. 43).

The psychological warfare campaign was supported by the Department of Information. Templer brought in to head the Department of Information in 1952 Mr. A. D. C. Peterson. He was responsible for all psychological warfare activities of the department (Komer, 1972, p. 70). To be able to conduct psychological warfare activities, mobile unit field teams were created and they visited rural areas and New Villages. They aimed

to inform the people about the ongoing campaign, present them with film shows and anti-communist skits (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 86).

#### Morale Aspect

Templer aimed to show the other face of the government, which does not restrict but provides freedom. He aimed to refresh the declining colonial administration. This new life included new settlements, safe and secure areas to live and work without disturbed by communists, set up a functioning government and relate the people with the government by legal bounds such as citizenship and emotional bounds such as consent.

He adopted the idea of Resettlement Areas of the Briggs era, but he changed the name into New Villages (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 87). Besides, he ordered the creation of White Areas where insurgents were defeated. In the White Areas, people were rewarded by lifting the emergency regulations (Komer, 1972, p. 20-21; Hack, 2009, p. 409) and Good Citizens' Committees, which organized anti-communist and pro-community actions, were established (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 87). White Areas avoided CPM and MNLA from interfering with the population and created an environment to be able to apply further developments in political, economic, social and information domains.

Templer also cared about the economic, social and daily life of the people. In a speech, he stated that;

“the counterinsurgency could not be overcome by military measures alone, but must be fought on the social, economic, and political fronts as well” (Komer, 1972, p. 53).

Within this context, he formulated a checklist for evaluating the people's quality of life:

- the provision of adequate agricultural land, especially for those who were full-time farmers and not wage earners on nearby mines and estates;
- the availability of titles to house plots within the Villages;
- adequate sanitation and hygiene; and
- provision for schools and teachers' quarters (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 87-88).



### CIMIC and Winning the Hearts and Minds

In the early phase of the Emergency, the population, government and soldiers felt depressed. They were thinking that they have a good plan and they are trying a lot but cannot succeed. Morale superiority was on the MNLA side. Templer got the picture very well and decided to raise the morale by showing them insurgents can be beaten. The first thing to be done for this was to win over the people to his side.

General Templer, who appointed to Malaya in 1952 and changed the course of the crisis, said in a speech that

“the answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people. The shooting side of this business is only 25 percent of the trouble and the other 75 lies in getting the people of this country behind us”.

His principle was to win the battle for hearts and minds (Komer, 1972, p. 77) and vice versa.

The aim of Templer's activities in governmental and moral domains was to build trust. At first, he tried to become a man feared during his first six months and later on, he could be kind. (Hosmer and Crane, 2006, p. 137-138). With this, he projected the image of power. He did not bother to go out, visit marketplaces and village councils. He was the first European who was recognized and greeted by rural Chinese (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 89-90). Templer utilized civil and military assets in good coordination. He applied a mixed strategy encompassing civil, police, military, and psychological warfare programs (Komer, 1972, p. v). Furthermore, the main effort was not military (Komer, 1972, p. 11). Templer's comprehensive understanding, planning and executions created a new spirit and he successfully exploited and extended this spirit. Thus, the MNLA threat could be eliminated. By the time Templer left Malaya at the end of May 1954, there were 1,314,400 Malaysians residing in White Areas (Ramakrishna, 2001, p. 89).

This was achieved by winning the hearts and minds strategy, which was an implied task developed by Gerald Templer. This was an implied task since he did not overtly announce or order to do so. He was aware that whatever to be done should be

population-centric and building trust among the community. He convinced the population that if they obey and accept the government power, they will live a stable life politically, socially and economically. In case they refuse the same power may destroy them with the insurgents. Thus, it can be stated that winning the hearts and minds is not to do kindness or favor to the population (Strachan, 2007, p. 8; Dixon, 2009, p. 365).

Winning the hearts and minds is convincing the population by force and consent. Within this strategy, coercive actions are applied less than convincing activities. A civilian authority representing the state should apply this kind of a strategy. There are two reasons for this: 1) military activities constitute a small part of the strategy and 2) the population should be avoided experiencing violence to be able to sustain support.

## **CHAPTER-IV**

### **CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION in BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA**

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Bosnian crisis arose as the first large-scale crisis of the post-Cold War era. In this crisis, the UN made efforts for negotiations between the warring parties, assigned more than 45.000 personnel in various missions within the framework of peacekeeping, and although many ceasefires were achieved as a result of these efforts, they could not successfully be implemented. The Bosnian War was ended with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), also known as the Dayton Agreement, which was signed on December 14, 1995. With this agreement and the UNSC Resolution 1031, the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina under NATO command.

CIMIC is a military function that emerged as a result of requirements in the area of operation during IFOR and SFOR deployments. In this chapter, the emergence of CIMIC will be examined. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the NATO deployment started with IFOR within Operation Joint Endeavor in December 1995-December 1996 and continued with SFOR deployment within Operation Joint Guard in December 1996-June 1998. NATO's latest mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted with SFOR deployment but within Operation Joint Forge from June 1998 till December 2004. In this chapter, we examined the period from December 1995 till 1999 when NATO intervened in Kosovo. Examining this period will provide us to see how CIMIC emerged, what the conditions were, and how the security environment affected the emergence of CIMIC.

#### **4.1. Road to Crisis (before 1992)**

The crises in the Balkans in the 1990s were not the product of that period. These crises and wars have deep roots and it is not easy to understand. The soldiers, who deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina from other countries, stated after serving for a while that the one who claims that he/she understood the problems in the Balkans was either lying or misinformed. Here, the crises in Yugoslavia and the developments that led to the wars

in the 1990s will be briefly addressed instead of trying to understand the problems that have deep historical roots and became very complicated.

#### **4.1.1. Bosnia and Herzegovina Before the War**

During the Second World War, the name of the country was designated as Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. In 1946 the new constitution was adopted and the name of the country was accepted as the "Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." In this constitution, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia were defined as Federated Republics, while Vojvodina, a region in Serbia including Hungarians, and Kosovo, where Albanians were in the majority, were organized as autonomous territories (Uzgel, 1992, p. 224). However, the ethnic identities, such as Albanian, Hungarian and Bosniaks with high population, were not recognized as founding nations in this constitution (Bora, 1995, p. 82). With the 1963 Constitution, the name of the country was changed one more time and became "The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (SFRY). With this constitution, the autonomy of the federated units was expanded. With the constitutional regulations made in 1974, the autonomies were expanded once again (Veremis, 1998, p. 22). The issue of expanded autonomies was going to be one of the most important reasons for the disintegration of SFRY in the 1990s by causing the erosion of the cohesion of people from different ethnic and religious identities living together.

The economic situation was also not good. In fact, it started to deteriorate since the end of the 1970s. Yugoslavia could not keep up with the changes in the global economy in the 1970s. With the economic crisis, the value of the land increased, regional ties between ethnic groups strengthened; thus regional competition brought economic fragmentation (Duffield, 1994, p. 22). This means that ethnic and religious problems did not deteriorate the economy, but economic problems undermined the cohesion. In addition, with the deaths of the balancing actors, Edward Kardelj in 1979 and Josip Broz Tito in 1980, in the ethnic management of the SFRY caused unrest and ethnic crises arose in the political structure of the country (Judah, 2000a, p. 46).

With the death of Tito, while the leaders of all other nationalist movements within SFRY were expecting the dissolution of Yugoslavia to form independent state apparatus of their own, the Serbs opposed the dissolution of Yugoslavia for reasons they found in their expanded population and their political history (Ülger, 1998, p. 162). Despite the opposition of the Serbs, with the end of the Cold War and the process of change that started in the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia's dissolution started. Increasing economic difficulties within the Federation since the beginning of the 1980s, the differences between the levels of development of the federated republics and the emergence of new political regimes in some republics in the Federation contributed to the dissolution.

Slobodan Milosevic came to power in the SFRY in 1986. Milosevic had explained the political program of his party with nationalist discourses such as re-establishing Serbia's sovereignty over the autonomous regions, repealing the 1974 Constitution, and reuniting Yugoslavia under the rule of Serbia (Uzgel, 2006). Accordingly, Milosevic revoked the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989. Using nationalism effectively to maintain his power, Milosevic gathered the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after the pro-western nationalist and liberal parties won the elections held in Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia. The aim of the meeting was to address the problems between the republics and the federal administration and to seek ways to remove differences of opinion. At the meeting, Slovenia proposed a federation with wider rights, a free-market economy and parliamentary democracy. Unlike Croatia and Macedonia, which advocated a radical change in the federal system together with Slovenia, Serbia argued that such changes would lead to dissolution and that the central administration should be strengthened. Thus, the ground for compromise disappeared and the republics that constitute the federation were determined to leave the federation (Hall, 1994). As a result of the meetings, an important decision was made, and the "Communist Party of Yugoslavia" was dissolved (Denitch, 1994).

With the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, the Yugoslav Federal Army under Milosevic command, consisting mostly of Serbs, responded to these developments by taking action to disarm the illegal armed groups of Croatia and Slovenia (Marijan, 2001). The purpose of the operation to Croatia was to

take the Krajina region where Serbs live. As a result of the conflicts, approximately 30% of the region was taken under control by the Yugoslav Army. In the following period, the Yugoslav Army attacked Slovenia and, after a series of defeats, agreed with Slovenia and withdrew its forces (Wentz, 1998, p. 12).

In order to stop the bloody assaults organized by the Serbs against these separations, the Western European Union (WEU) was the first in the international platform. The WEU organized a peace conference, whose first round of talks was held in The Hague in September, to stop the conflicts and ensure that the inevitable dissolution was achieved through peaceful means. In addition, the SFRY's position in PHARE, the aid program initiated by the WEU for the former Eastern European countries, was suspended; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was declared by joining Montenegro with the claim of Serbs to be the continuation of the SFRY, was not recognized by the UN; it was first removed from the UN General Assembly and then OSCE membership was suspended (Uzgel, 2002, p. 158-161). However, some WEU member states, notably Germany, recognized Croatia and Slovenia, which left the SFRY until the end of the spring of 1992, as independent states.

The general situation of Yugoslavia directly affected Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since more than half of the federal budget was allocated to military expenditures in 1990, state support to Bosnia was cut, and unemployment increased rapidly (Wentz, 1998, p. 13). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population mainly consisted of Muslims (44%), Serbs (33%), and Croats (17%) (CIA World Factbook 1992). Nearly one million Bosniaks, corresponding to 20-25% of the population, left the country just before the war. The pre-war population distribution is shown in Map.4.1 and the regions where Muslims lived in Map-4.2.

#### **4.1.2. NATO Before the War**


During the Cold War, NATO's strategy was based on defense and deterrence, and this goal was achieved with the help of large numbers of conventional military units, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons. We can call the Cold War period a conventional or traditional evaluation period. Since 1991, a broader approach was assumed within

NATO. According to this, while not rejecting the defense and deterrence commitments, NATO prioritized cooperation and security.

The first post-Cold War strategic concept was published in 1991. This concept was NATO's first strategic concept shared with the public. With this concept, it was declared that;

"Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies" (NATO, 1991, para. 9).


Instead, it was assessed that the adverse consequences of economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, would cause instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic region.



Map-4.1: Map of population density in pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (Monckton, 2016, p. 8).



According to NATO's assessment, threats arising from these risks would come step by step. First of all, these risks could lead to crises and even armed conflicts in a country, then these crises or conflicts could spread to neighboring countries, including a NATO member. In case a NATO member is involved, it would have a direct or indirect impact on the security and stability of the Alliance. Within this context, the stability and peace of the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East were important for the security of the Alliance as it was approved by the 1991 Gulf War (NATO, 1991, para. 11).



Map-4.2: The places where the Muslim population lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war<sup>11</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> [https://enacademic.com/pictures/enwiki/66/BiH\\_-\\_UM\\_N\\_1991.gif](https://enacademic.com/pictures/enwiki/66/BiH_-_UM_N_1991.gif),



The concept also mentioned that the Alliance's security interests could be affected by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of vital resources, and other broader risks such as terrorism and sabotage (NATO, 1991, para. 12). The comparison of the threats and risks specified in the concept with the Cold War period perceptions is given in Table-4.1.

	RISKS & THREATS			POSSIBLE AFFECTS	STRATEGIC AIM
	Conventional Risks & Threats	Risks & Threats to Peace and Stability	Other Areas of Concern		
DURING THE COLD WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conventional Arms and Forces</li> <li>- Ballistic Missiles</li> <li>- Nuclear Arms</li> </ul>	-	-	Conventional and/or nuclear attack.	Defence and Deterrence
1991 SC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic,</li> <li>- Social,</li> <li>- Political difficulties.</li> <li>- Ethnic rivalries.</li> <li>- Territorial disputes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Proliferation of WMD.</li> <li>- Disruption of the flow of vital resources.</li> <li>- Actions of terrorism and sabotage.</li> </ul>	These risks and threats will cause instabilities which may cause armed conflicts and they can spill over.	Security and Stabilisation

Figure-4.1: Risk and threat assessment in the Cold War era and in the 1991 Strategic Concept.

This concept was including many uncertainties about the evaluations of the security, risks and threats. While not neglecting the threats from Russia, it was trying to cover all other potential risks and threats to the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. In fact, this situation was indicating how the security environment was uncertain in the post-Cold War era. In addition, a remarkable feature of this concept is the addition of political, economic, social and environmental dimensions to security assessments (NATO, 1991, para. 24). This approach also pointed to a transformation in NATO's assessments and assumptions. It should be noted that this concept is key in understanding future concepts and future security environment.

The concept contained two main ideas. The first one was that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of risks and threats within new dimensions did not change the purpose or security functions of the Alliance. Second, the new situation resulting from the transformation of the security environment was seen as an

opportunity to evaluate the Alliance's strategy within the framework of a broad security approach.

#### **4.2. War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)**

Considering the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina also declared independence in February 1992. There was almost an international consensus over the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and this consensus supported these newly recognized states, but things did not work in the same way for Bosnia and Herzegovina. After this declaration of independence, the developments that took place showed that the same scenario was not valid for Muslim Bosniaks. As a result of the Milosevic administration's provocations, Bosnian Serbs declared autonomous regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Soon after, the Federation Army attacked and the war began in April 1992.

During this period, various missions were carried out by the United Nations (UN), WEU and NATO. First of all, the UN Security Council (UNSC) decided on September 25, 1991, to implement a general arms embargo with Resolution 713. With the UNSC Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992, the UN Protection Force's establishment was approved. Besides UN, WEU and NATO also conducted missions in the following process.<sup>12</sup>

Among these, UNPROFOR was the most important one. UNPROFOR was the most expensive, broadest and most comprehensive peacekeeping mission that the UN conducted at that time. As of March 1994, 37 countries contributed to UNPROFOR with 38.000 personnel. 15.000 of these were deployed in Croatia, 1,000 deployed in Macedonia and the remaining personnel were in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR's annual average cost was \$1.6 billion and the total cost for 12 January 1992-31 March 1996 period became \$4.6 billion. The UNHCR representative was in

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<sup>12</sup> These missions performed by these actors during the war were; Operation Provide Promise (June 1992-January 1996), UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) (March-September 1995), UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) (January 1996), UN Confidence Restoration Organization (UNCRO) (March 1995-Joined to IFOR), Operation Sharp Guard (January 1993-October 1996), Operation Deny Flight (April 1993-December 1995), Operation Deliberate Force / Dead Eye (30 - 31 August 1995 & 5 - 14 September 1995), Danube Operation (July 1994-October 1996) and Mostar Operation (June 1993-September 1996).

charge of UN missions in Yugoslavia as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (Wentz, 1998, p. 16, Baumann and others, 2004, p. 40). UNPROFOR was first established for a period of one year. In the following period, the term of office was extended each year and served for four years in total. UNPROFOR's task was to end the war and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.

UNPROFOR was first deployed in Croatia to observe the ceasefire between the Serb-controlled Yugoslav Army and the Croats. Over time, UNPROFOR has expanded both in number of personnel and area of responsibility. With the crises that emerged after independence and war, UNPROFOR deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In December 1992, extended the mission to Macedonia to prevent Macedonia from turning into a conflict zone.

UNPROFOR, which was deployed in the region in order to prevent conflicts, could not be successful. Despite the difficult humanitarian situation and violations of human rights, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General did not allow the use of force in order not to impede the existing operations of the peacekeepers and not to endanger the soldiers of the governments supporting the peacekeeping forces (Burnazovic, 2001, p. 279-291). The WEU countries, who immediately helped the Croats in the same process, could not reflect in a joint way and remained reluctant when the human rights violations reached the highest level. Serbs, who aimed to create a great Serbia, followed a policy of preventing Bosnia's independence and practiced ethnic cleansing for this purpose. Even though many activities were carried out under the umbrella of the UN, the international community remained ineffective against what happened in Bosnia for a long time, and a humanitarian catastrophe occurred. The initiatives such as Vance-Owen Plan, Safe Zones Plan, and Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which is also known as the Three-Zone Plan, created by the international community to ensure peace were not accepted by the parties and remained useless (Yapıcı, 2007, p. 4).

By choosing the simple path, the WEU countries that could act jointly on passive, peaceful ways, which do not require the use of force, have accelerated their humanitarian aid activities (Duffield, 1994, p. 22). According to Duffield, this was

because the West wanted to cover its political failure with a veil of humanitarian aid (Duffield, 1994, p. 23). When a joint decision could not be taken regarding the use of the peacekeeping force within UNPROFOR as a combat force, Serbs' acts of violence increased.

When the war started in Bosnia, the US focus was on the Middle East Region due to the First Gulf War. The US continued its activity in the region through other countries at the outset of the conflict and during the peace negotiations (Burnazovic, 2001, p. 281). When the war worsened, the US took the diplomatic initiative and ensured the establishment of the Bosniak-Croatian Federation in Washington in March 1994 (Yapıcı, 2007, p. 3). Although the Croatian-Bosniak Federation provided a relative balance against the Serbs, it could not stop the conflicts.

In the meantime, the US Administration, which did not support the use of force to solve or freeze the problem, supported a tougher response against Serbs after a series of developments. These developments included the shooting of an American F-16, which was tasked to control the no-fly zones under the UN umbrella, by the Serbs in the spring of 1995; the Srebrenica massacre in July of the same year; the murder of the three American negotiators in Bosnia, after the Clinton was elected as the US President in August 1995 and, Serb attack to the marketplace killing 35 civilians (Ronayne, 2001, p. 133, Rehse, 2004, p. 25). After these events, with the request of the Clinton administration, a heavy NATO bombardment against Bosnian Serbs started on August 30, 1995, and continued until both sides sat at the table for peace negotiations (Kapetanovic, 2001, p. 183-204).

This bloody civil war lasted nearly four years and left a disgraceful memory in the history of Europe. When the Serbs announced that they would implement the UN decisions, NATO ended the bombardment on September 20, and thus the ethnic war in the region was stopped. These conflicts, which spread to the whole of Yugoslavia, were terminated with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), also known as

the Dayton Agreement, which was prepared during the meetings held in Dayton-Ohio on November 21, 1995<sup>13</sup> (Veseli, 2004, p. 23).

According to the Agreement, the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina would consist of two units, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Respublika Srpska (Serbian Republic), and Bosnia would be referred to as a single state with the name "Bosnia and Herzegovina." Although the Dayton Agreement established peace, the division of the country into two regions would cause problems in making permanent peace.<sup>14</sup>

Following the Agreement's signing, the Allies declared that they would assume a neutral role with limited time and scope in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They agreed to send a NATO military force to the region to take over the mission from the UNPROFOR existing in the region (GFAP, 1995). Within the framework of the Agreement, the force that will replace UNPROFOR is called the Implementation Force (IFOR). The main unit of this force was the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a corps-level land force deployed in Moenchengladbach-Germany. The operation that would be carried out was called the Operation Joint Effort.




Figure-4.2: IFOR Command Structure (Siegel, 1998a, p. 29).

<sup>13</sup> The Dayton Agreement was initialled on November 21, 1995 in Dayton-Ohio and was signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris.

<sup>14</sup> Mary Kaldor reported that the agreement failed although only 4 months had passed (Kaldor, 1996a).

### **4.3. Post-War Environment (1995-1999)**

During this war, Bosnian Muslim civilians, including women and children, were raped, tortured, killed, displaced, and their historical and cultural assets were destroyed. As shown in Map-4.3 and Map-4.4, it is understood that Bosnian Muslims were besieged within a certain plan, not only in Sarajevo but throughout the country. This means that the above mentioned humanitarian catastrophe was carried out by directly targeting civilians in a planned way rather than the always observed consequences of war. Besides, the US ambassador to the UN reported that the war's political aim was to kill and displace the Bosnian Muslims (UN, 1992b, p. 6, para. 12; Khan, 1997, p. 287). Approximately 200.000 civilians lost their lives in the war, 174.000 civilians were injured, and 2.5 million people were displaced (Kaldor, 1996b; Lescher, 2013, p. 43-44). While 30.000 Croats and 30.000 Muslims lived in Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska, before the war, these numbers were 3.000 for both groups after the war (Kaldor, 1996a). After the war, 40% of the population was Serbs, 38% Muslims and 22% Croats (CIA World Factbook, 1995).

Many historical buildings were destroyed during the war. The historical Sarajevo Library was deliberately targeted by the Serbs and destroyed with about 1.5 million items in it. Mostar city and its bridge, Stari Most bridge, Ferhat Pasha and Arnaudiye Mosques in Banja Luka and other mosques in other places were also deliberately targeted to destroy the traces of history and all kinds of heritage left by Muslims (Kaldor, 1996a; Wentz, 1998, p. xxii). These cultural assets were also targeted to create negative psychological effects (Kaldor, 1996a).

In addition to these, the communication, water and energy infrastructure in Bosnia was largely destroyed during the war. The mined urban areas and forests throughout the country and especially around Sarajevo also increased the destruction and the number of civilian casualties.

The Bosnian War led to new practices and understandings in some areas. First of all, it was one of the first international crises of the post-Cold War period and included severe human rights violations. Secondly, those who tried to understand how the wars would

be in the post-Cold War era discussed the new wars around Bosnian War. Accordingly, it was stated that higher civilian casualties, less certainty, and tendency to spread would be the features of the new wars (Kaldor, 1996b). In new wars, the civilian sector was not only the actors who were affected by the war, but they became direct targets because of their identity (Rehse, 2004, p. 11). The targeting of civilians was through their lives and the destruction of homes, critical infrastructure, economic centers, and especially cultural assets having historical and religious significance (Duffield, 2001, p. 13-17).



Map-4.3: Conflict points during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Duffield, 1994, p. 21).

The third important point brought by the Bosnian War was that the UN declared its inability to stop the conflicts and opened the discussion on the principle of using force for peace (UN, 1992a, p. 22, para. 84) (this was going to be the most debated topic with

the Kosovo intervention). Thus, the concept of forcing to peace multidimensional peacekeeping operations (Rehse, 2004, p. 13) and the concept of "second-generation peacekeeping" arose and were discussed.



Map-4.4: Mined areas (these were the 18.086 known areas, there were approximately 30.000 mined areas) (General Accounting Office Report, 1998, p. 185).

The fourth point is that, since the conflicts became more complex due to human rights violations, forced migration, a direct attack on historical/cultural assets, genocide, and an increasing presence of non-state armed and unarmed actors, civilian and military stakeholders had to work together in the cessation of conflicts, establishing and maintaining of peace and in post-conflict reconstruction process (Duffield, 1994, p. 21; Phillips, 1999, p. 269; Duffield, 2001, p. 12). Fifth, a new mandate and target were created for NATO, which was left without an enemy in the post-Cold War period. Finally, the Bosnian War has also brought some changes in terms of humanitarian activities. The most important of these changes was that NGOs came to the fore in



humanitarian aid, and they had to work with the soldiers in this new environment (McMahon, 2017, p.93).

In this post-war period, the tasks in the Dayton Agreement were defined in two sections as civilian and military. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was going to be responsible for the fulfillment of civilian tasks. Military tasks were going to be performed by IFOR. The following military tasks were given to IFOR:

- To provide continuity of cease-fire,
- To ensure that the warring parties draw their forces from the designated ceasefire separation zones to the appropriate areas and the separation of the forces,
- To ensure the collection of heavy weapons in the barracks and other military areas, and demobilization of the remaining forces,
- To provide necessary conditions for the rapid, regular and safe withdrawal of UN forces from areas not under IFOR control,
- To control Bosnia and Herzegovina airspace (GFAP, 1995, Annex 1-A).

Complementary or implied tasks that support these tasks were as follows:

- To support cessation of hostilities,
- To provide a safe and secure environment for other actors to operate in order to ensure peace,
- To provide transportation to support the humanitarian activities of organizations,
- To support the humanitarian activities of international organizations such as ICRC and UN agencies (GFAP, 1995, Annex 1-A; Peace Implementation Conference, 1995, p. 3; Landon, 1998, p. 120).

The three framework nations of the agreement, the USA, the UK and France, divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into three administrative regions as North (North), South-West (SW) and South-East (SE), as shown in Map-4.5, and led division-level units. The troops in these regions were called Multinational Division (MND) and the names of the regions were defined as MND (N), MND (SW) and MND (SE). The US was responsible for MND (N), UK MND (SW) and France MND (SE).

MND (N) consisted of three brigades, one from Turkey, one from Russia and a brigade called the NordPol Brigade consisting of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Poland. Canadian, Dutch and Danish troops contributed to MND (SW) and, Italy and Portugal contributed to MND (SE). Thus, IFOR consisted of approximately 60,000 personnel.





Figure-4.3: IFOR Task Force organization (Layton, 1998, p. 41).

This operation was important in terms of being NATO's first ground operation, the first operation conducted outside of the area of responsibility, and the first operation conducted with the participation of troops not only from NATO members but also from Partnership for Peace members and non-NATO nations, including Russia (Wentz, 1998, p. xxiii). As of September 1996, non-NATO troop-contributing nations were Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia and Morocco (Wentz, 1998, p. 27).



Map-4.5: Military administrative districts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The initial force, which was consisting of 2.600 troops, deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia in early December 1995. The task assigned to this force was to facilitate the deployment of the big part of IFOR troops. This was executed by making preparations for the establishment of the headquarters, the preparation of communication services and the completion of logistics needs (Wentz, 1998, p. 28). A big part of the IFOR deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the UNSC Resolution 1031 and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the deployment of IFOR operational plan (OPLAN 10405) on December 16, 1995 (Lescher, 2013). On December 20, 1995, UNPROFOR removed and transferred the authority to IFOR.

The first thing what the IFOR did just after the deployment was to openly announce to the warring parties that the IFOR was tasked to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and that the IFOR was authorised to use force when necessary in executing this task. At the outset of the mission, the road checkpoints and the barricades

established by the warring parties were removed. The warring parties were separated. It was provided that warring parties withdrew forces and weapons to their barracks in separation zones (Wentz, 1998, p. 412).

As of January 19, 1996, 30 days after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR, the warring parties withdrew their forces to the separation zones as specified in the Agreement. The transfer of the forces to the rear areas was completed on the 45th day of transfer of authority (NATO, 1997b, p. 34). Consequently, Bosnia and Herzegovina had become a quieter place than expected with the fulfillment of the military tasks. With the exception of a few isolated incidents to IFOR facilities and personnel, the warring parties applied the provisions of the Dayton Agreement (Wentz, 1998, p. 412).

It was clear that the fulfillment of the provisions of the Agreement by the warring parties and achievement of the military tasks by IFOR would not be enough to establish peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The civilian tasks of the Agreement were also required to be fulfilled for long-term peace. By fulfilling the military tasks, the IFOR created a safe and secure environment and contributed to the preparation of conditions for civilian (non-military) actors' efforts. Civilian tasks of the Agreement would be fulfilled by relevant civilian bodies such as international and non-governmental organizations (McMahon, 2017, p. 96).

For the civilian side of the Agreement, the Peace Implementation Conference was held in London on 8-9 December 1995. At the conference, Carl Bildt, the UN High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina, was assigned to observe whether the civil convictions of the Agreement were fulfilled and to coordinate with relevant organizations (Peace Implementation Conference, 1995, p. 3).

Due to the necessity and importance in the implementation of the civilian side of the Agreement, IFOR supported the fulfillment of civilian duties within its authority and capabilities. In this respect, IFOR established a relationship with the High Representative Office (OHR), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the

International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In addition, IFOR tried to establish relations, coordinate and cooperate with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and around 400 non-governmental organizations (Wentz, 1998, p. 30). IFOR supported these non-military actors by providing emergency shelter, treatment and evacuation, vehicle repair and maintenance, transportation support, information sharing about security issues and other logistics areas (NATO, 1997b, p. 34).

The Operation Joint Endeavor and IFOR deployment ended on December 26, 1996. In the Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina published at the NAC Ministerial Meeting, it was stated that IFOR would be replaced by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in accordance with the VII. Section of the UN Charter and the authorization of the UNSC. On December 12, 1996, SFOR deployment was approved to replace IFOR with the UNSC resolution 1088. SFOR, which was activated on December 20, 1995, consisted of nearly 30.000 troops that are approximately half of the IFOR (Wentz, 1998, p. 32). While NATO members and non-NATO nations participating in IFOR continued to support SFOR, Slovenia and Ireland also joined.

Basically, the tasks remained the same, but as different from IFOR, the mission of SFOR was to sustain the stabilization and provide a permanent peace. The tasks assigned to SFOR were as follows:

- To deter or prevent the resumption of hostilities and the emergence of new threats to peace,
- To sustain the conditions provided by IFOR,
- To provide the appropriate atmosphere for transferring the peace process to the future,
- To support civil organizations in certain domains within the existing capabilities (Wentz, 1998, p. 32).

As in IFOR, SFOR continued to support non-military tasks since they were very important and necessary to be able to sustain the created safe and secure environment.

Yet, because the number of personnel decreased, SFOR had to prioritize these duties (Wentz, 1998, p. 33).

SFOR continued to serve in Bosnia and Herzegovina until 2004, and at the end of the mandate, SFOR handed over the mission to EUFOR within the framework of EU's Operation Althea. Although the EUFOR deployed under EU control, NATO continued its existence with the headquarters called "NATO BiH" and continued its contacts and activities at the political level.

The NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was very crucial during the IFOR period and the period of SFOR until 1999. With the onset of conflicts in Kosovo and NATO's intervention, the attention of the international community shifted from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 191). With this development, the humanitarian assistance provided, especially by NGOs, also decreased over the years (McMahon, 2017, p. 120).

The crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina included some post-Cold War world indications from military, political and humanitarian perspectives. It was experienced during this period that (armed) conflicts, politics, humanitarian issues and organizations changed in an irreversible way. New roles and responsibilities rose for civil organizations and the main challenge emerged as coordination and cooperation between military and non-military actors and activities. This difficulty first appeared during the IFOR deployment. Military forces that were seen as the guarantors of global security started to look for ways to work with these organizations (Wentz, 1998, p. 119).

An important issue was the involvement of an organization like NATO in the peacekeeping operation following UNPROFOR's failure. NATO conducted its peacekeeping mission with its own troops together with the external troops from non-NATO nations deployed under UN mandate (Landon, 1998, p. 125). Although this is not a measure of the success of this operation in general, it is important in terms of its ability to fulfill the tasks assigned by the Dayton Agreement.

NATO's intervention has shown that the alliance can adapt its forces and policies to the post-Cold War world's needs while continuing to provide collective security and defense for all allies. In addition to fulfilling requirements about the defense issues of the Alliance, NATO approved that military forces had the flexibility to be used under the UN mandate and outside the NATO area with an open political policy (Wentz, 1998, p. xxiii). Operation Joint Endeavor and Operation Joint Guard also demonstrated that the alliance was ready to deal with the new, multifaceted and vital security risks facing Europe with the end of the Cold War (Wentz, 1998, p. xxiv).

In the post-Cold War period, the intervention of the international community in armed conflicts and crises increased. This situation led to the development of a relationship between humanitarian organizations and international military forces (Rehse, 2004, p. 9). In particular, the IFOR deployment was a living prototype of the post-Cold War response to complex global instability in many ways. This deployment was a response to the developments, which were foreseen in the studies conducted before the end of the Cold War.

It can be argued that with the Bosnian war and intervention, the international paradigm for global conflict resolution changed at that time and that makes this case important for us. As Landon points out, this was a paradigm shift that emerged in the development of civil-military coordination, and in case this could properly be addressed, the lessons learned from the IFOR deployment would serve as a guide to bringing new concepts of civil-military cooperation into the 21st century. (Landon, 1998, p.138). Both IFOR and SFOR played an important role in the emergence of CIMIC (Phillips, 1998, p. 22; Rehse, 2004, p. 27).

#### **4.4. CIMIC Activities**

As it is shown in Figure-4.3 that there was a CIMIC unit within IFOR structure. Since there were not trained and capable NATO personnel and a related doctrine or guidance, the CIMIC unit was mainly composed of U.S. personnel and they conducted these activities according to the US Civil Affairs doctrine and practices (Siegel, 1998a, p. 107).

The CIMIC unit, which was heavily supported by US Civil Affairs, consisted of approximately 352 staff, including lawyers, experts on education, public transport experts, engineers, agronomists, economists, public health officials, veterinarians and communication specialists. They were tasked to provide technical advice and assistance to various commissions and working groups, non-governmental organizations, local authorities and IFOR units (Wentz, 1998, p. 31).

Civil Affairs personnel were capable of conducting activities to support civilian tasks of the Dayton Agreement, but in the first 18 months of the deployment, they could not succeed. It was asserted on this issue that;

“General Framework Agreement for Peace’s (GFAP) greater emphasis on implementing military objectives than accomplishing civilian objectives hamstrung CIMIC missions in 1996 and early 1997. ... NATO failure to coordinate with US Civil Affairs planners also hindered initial prospects for mission success. ... Only during the second and third years of the mission were US Civil Affairs soldiers called upon – or in some cases they called upon themselves – to facilitate important non-military activities, such as the holding of local elections and other reconstruction efforts” (Ridge, 2008, p. 2).




Figure-4.4: NATO, UN and other organizations (General Accounting Office Report, 1997, p. 27)



At the beginning of the operation, there were not enough CIMIC officers at the relevant headquarters of NATO and that the commanders did not have knowledge and experience about CIMIC (Ridge, 2008, p. 2-8; Lescher, 2013, p. 64-65). This situation was expressed by COMIFOR Admiral Leighton Smith as follows:

"In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea what you did ... now we can't live without you" (Admiral Leighton Smith, COMIFOR, April 1996).

However, Landon asserted that NATO had a good CIMIC plan (Landon, 1998, p. 120). Landon's statement was based on the briefing presented to the COM IFOR, Admiral T. Joseph LOPEZ, in 1996, not prior to the operation or deployment. Confirming this, Ridge stated that;

"By the spring of 1996, however, IFOR – with the assistance of US Civil Affairs personnel – began instituting principles to encourage greater levels of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and more proactively facilitating Bosnian reconstruction" (Ridge, 2008, p. 4).

According to Landon, the duties of CIMIC, which were defined seven months after the deployment of IFOR, to support the above-mentioned tasks were as follows:

- To conduct civil-military operations to support the military implementations of the agreement;
- To promote cooperation with the civilian population, various institutions and national governments;
- To leverage the capabilities of international and non-governmental organizations and national governments;
- To create a parallel and combined civil effort to support the implementation of the agreement; and
- To be ready to assist in emergency situations from government, international and non-governmental organizations operating in humanitarian assistance, public safety and health (Landon, 1998, p. 120).

Among the objectives of NATO's civil-military campaign were to encourage cooperation with civilians, various institutions and national governments; benefit from the capabilities of international and non-governmental organizations, national governments to achieve the desired end-state; and to create a parallel and unified civil effort in support of NATO Peace Plan initiatives (Landon, 1998, p. 132). Here we have to emphasize that, as seen, there were no tasks assigned to the CIMIC such as healing the wounds of the war and relieving the pain of war-torn societies.

Although there was a late CIMIC plan prepared before SFOR deployment, there was no common understanding or approach to CIMIC activities at the beginning of the IFOR deployment. The commanders often did not have a basic understanding of the role and importance of CIMIC (Landon, 1998, p. 137). It was asserted that more than 30 CIMIC approaches were evident in Bosnia (Flint, 2013, p. 239).

In this period, it was observed that a properly trained, equipped and structured CIMIC headquarters and CIMIC troops were needed in order to fulfill the duties determined regarding the civil environment and assigned to IFOR. On the other hand, although not completely, the only unit suitable to perform CIMIC missions in Bosnia was the Civil Affairs of the US military. This situation caused the activities to be conducted from Civil Affairs (and Psychological Operations) perspective.

Before jumping to what the Civil Affairs and CIMIC did in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be better to look at the other components of the civilian layer of the operational environment. These components are the organizations mainly consisting of NGOs and IOs.

The number of NGOs has increased since the second half of the 1990s. It was estimated that the number of NGOs involved in crises and armed conflicts around the world was around 29.000 in the period between mid-1990s-2001 (Duffield, 2001, p. 53). Since the beginning of the war in Bosnia, international organizations such as UN, UNHCR, WEU, OSCE, ICRC, donors such as the World Bank and hundreds of NGOs started basic humanitarian aid activities in the region. Thirty-four of the 123 countries that

recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted humanitarian aid activities and all of them provided aid through NGOs (McMahon, 2017, p. 94). Although the numbers are not known exactly, it was stated that when the IFOR forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, around 530 organizations in the area of operation were already working (Landon, 1998, p. 135). There are two main reasons why NGOs came to the field before soldiers. One of them is that they experienced the catastrophic consequences of entering the field later with peacekeeping troops, waiting for the end of the conflict (Duffield, 1994, p. 20). The other reason was that the crisis started before the war so that the NGOs were already there to do their job.

States, which did not want to intervene in the conflicts in Bosnia and did not want to be a party to ethnic problems, created a policy gap, and this gap was filled by the NGOs. These states, which funded NGOs engaged in humanitarian aid activities, provided support within their interests. This policy gap and state funding caused a rise in the number of NGOs in a short period. Among these activities carried out by NGOs, there were urgent humanitarian needs such as food, shelter and health support, as well as aid activities for refugees and displaced persons.

Infrastructure activities were also carried out through NGOs. As of 1996, \$230 million of resources were transferred to NGOs to be used in infrastructure activities. However, with the return of refugees in the following two years, the need increased and the amount transferred to NGOs reached \$520 million (McMahon, 2017, p. 97-98).

It is claimed that in Bosnia, NGOs were better funded than other examples in the past and therefore they were more dependent on donors who provided funds, they were more political and better accepted by the public (Rieff, 2014, p. 134). One of the reasons why NGOs were supported by the people was also related to the past of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Emerging from years of conflict and an independent communist structure, many Bosnians were understandably doubtful about foreign intervention. Moreover, representatives of international organizations that were tasked with ending the conflicts on the ground were ignorant and insensitive about the history of the country and unpleasant experiences of the people. In this case, NGOs were the only

actors that Bosniaks could apply for urgent humanitarian support (McMahon, 2017, p. 120-121).

Meanwhile, NGOs faced many problems in order to be able to perform their activities. First of all, the terrain in Bosnia and Herzegovina was very rough and was allowing limited transportation. Generally, the roads were already inadequate and remaining ones were closed or destroyed, and secondary roads were at risk of mines. In addition, there was a need for security at the outset of the mission, especially against looting. The warring parties in Bosnia had not yet laid down their weapons. Besides, terrorism, organized and ordinary crimes were common (Wentz, 1998, p. 411). Although they did not want to, NGOs had to work with soldiers (Duffield, 1994, p. 20; Baumann and others, 2004, p. 197). One of the reasons why non-governmental organizations did not want to work with soldiers was that the soldiers entered the non-governmental organizations' area of responsibility by engaging in humanitarian aid activities (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 195; Rehse, 2004, p. 13).

In the Bosnian operation area, there were people in need as it was described in the "Post-War Environment (1995-1999)" section of this chapter; there were a number of IOs and NGOs mentioned above and the soldiers having no idea what to do with these all non-military actors. Current CIMIC emerged within this environment.

At the outset of the operation, communication requirements and information exchange procedures between IFOR units and the civilian environment were not properly assessed and structured. This caused problems during the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in transferring necessary information related to the civilian environment. UNPROFOR's information and support to organizations could not be provided by IFOR since IFOR did not know the organizations and could not establish the necessary relationships. One of the reasons for this was that organizations were concerned that they would be dependent on IFOR (Landon, 1998, p. 135). In this context, the only thing done in the early phase of IFOR deployment was to inform the organizations about what IFOR was and their duties. This information was limited to the organizations in Sarajevo.

This communication problem created a difficulty that the units needed to provide the necessary communication infrastructure could not be effective, and the personnel in various areas of the operation area could not communicate with each other and with the headquarters properly (Wentz, 1998, p. 286). For example, while the mission of CIMIC was to establish liaison with civil organizations, their communication tools were few in number and inadequate in terms of capacity. When they needed more communication, they had to go to the headquarters buildings (Wentz, 1998, p. 428). In addition, CIMIC personnel, who were moving throughout the country for mission purposes, did not have radios in their vehicles. A channel from the communication network provided to the Office of the High Representative was allocated to IFOR and the communication need of the CIMIC personnel in the field was met through this channel (Wentz, 1998, p. 306).

Since the contributing nations assigned CIMIC personnel after a while following the deployment and since the focus was on implementing the military tasks of the Dayton Agreement, dealing with CIMIC related issues were delayed (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 192).

As their communication needs were met and as the CIMIC elements became familiar with the environment, they started to conduct their activities in a better way. CIMIC staff developed a working relationship with organizations at the tactical level. Although limited, IFOR CIMIC elements started to work with organizations on the reconstruction of infrastructure, training the police and on displaced persons and refugees in the entire operating area (Landon, 1998, p. 122-135). The activities conducted by CIMIC or the activities were contributed through CIMIC can be grouped under the following titles: Supplying Energy (Electricity, Coal and Natural Gas), Maintenance and Repair of Roads and Bridges, Communication, Water, Legal and Property Rights, and Activities for Refugees and Displaced Persons. For example, IFOR engineers repaired and opened more than 50 percent of the roads in Bosnia and Herzegovina and rebuilt or repaired more than 60 bridges, including those connecting the country to Croatia (Wentz, 1998, p. 31). They also took part in demining and repairing railways and supported the opening of airports to civilian traffic. CIMIC was important in determining the needs by

monitoring the large part of the country and meeting with relevant people in these activities.

CIMIC began to act as a bridge between civilian actors and organizations and IFOR in the following process. For example, in order to ensure harmony between the political/strategic and tactical levels, one CIMIC personnel was assigned to the Office of the High Representative as a liaison officer. This position required establishing liaison with senior officials from all international organizations. Other CIMIC staff was also assigned to units of the High Representative Office in the regional Joint Civil Commissions (JCC) in Banja Luka and Tuzla. Related to this, CIMIC staff supported the determination of the damaged infrastructure throughout the country within the scope of administrative and logistics projects carried out by the Office of the High Representative and supported the compilation of relevant information. In addition, the CIMIC units worked with local authorities to facilitate and coordinate the activities of civil organizations (Landon, 1998, p. 122).

Later, finance experts joined these functional specialists and provided significant support to the World Bank-sponsored Emergency Recovery Program (ERP). This program provided a variety of loan support to local market owners affected by the war. IFOR analyzed the projects for the loans to be allocated by ERP with the contribution of the CIMIC units. CIMIC units trained local residents in order to sustain the program (Landon, 1998, p. 124).

The CIMIC units coordinated the transportation requests of non-governmental organizations to transfer hundreds of tons of food and other materials in order to meet the needs of the civilian population (Landon, 1998, p. 123).

NATO continued to assist these organizations in their efforts to establish long-term peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR units worked in OSCE offices together with OSCE staff on election preparations and human rights monitoring. Logistical and other support was provided to the ICTY in the investigation of war crimes and UNHCR was assisted in the return of refugees and displaced persons. The IPTF was assisted in

maintaining law and order, and air and ground transportation support was provided to the Office of the High Representative and other civilian units. IFOR units have also provided mine awareness training to local schools and community groups. With the help of IFOR Public Relations and Information Operations Units, significant support was provided to all agencies in the form of both printed materials and electronic media (Wentz, 1998, p. 31). These activities, which required the support and effort of CIMIC, were also continued within SFOR.

With the deployment of SFOR, CIMIC gained a more appropriate structure. The Combined Joint CIMIC (CJCIMIC) Task Force was established within SFOR as provided in Figure-4.5.

In the following process, a Combined Joint Civil-Military Task Force (CJCMTF) unit was established in 1997 to better coordinate non-military organizations. This unit focused on establishing liaison with non-military organizations, which were operating between the government and the municipal level, to prepare national regulations and encourage reconstruction. This element also made it relatively easy for many non-governmental organizations to interact with IFOR to find support for their projects (Landon, 1998, p. 130).

Tactical level CIMIC structures were also established and multinational division areas were supported with approximately 180 personnel (Phillips, 1998, p. 23). With the deployment of SFOR, CIMIC activities became more popular. CIMIC units were established in each MND region. Each troop-contributing nation in the MND (N) region formed CIMIC units and worked with the US Civil Affairs teams. A civil affairs team was also established in the MND (SW) region in order to coordinate with other CIMIC units and to monitor civil activities. In the MND (SE) region, CIMIC activities were carried out through military police units (Gendarmerie, Guardia Civil and Condottieri) and logistics, medical and communication units (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 192). Civil affairs projects conducted by the UK and Canadian soldiers at the MND-SW did not comply with any of SFOR's plans. Tactical importance was attributed to CIMIC in this region.




Figure-4.5: CJCMTF Organization (SFOR Informer Online)

With the CJCIMIC Task Force other nations' contributed CIMIC personnel. As it was stated in the SFOR Informer Online;

“Previously staffed exclusively by Americans, the CJCMTF is at present 45 percent European soldiers, most of them from NATO states. This proportion should increase to 75 percent by the summer”.

Russia also provided support for the Joint Endeavour and the later Joint Guard operations. Russia's support was important from various points. From the CIMIC perspective, it was observed that Russia had different applications. NATO armies routinely performed implied tasks, which were mostly CIMIC related, in addition to military tasks. Russians assumed the Dayton Agreement as an order. They only dealt with military tasks and established very limited communication with the non-military environment. Again, the Russians had limited support for civilians, and this support remained solely for Orthodox Slavic groups (Landon, 1998, p. 127). In this case, we can understand that the Russians did not assume civilians in the area of operation as a complementary element for the success of the operation.



CIMIC courses were organized during the SFOR period. In these courses called "NATO Pre-Employment CIMIC Course", 26 instructors from different troops of different nations provided lectures at the 7th Army Training Center in Vilseck, Germany. Most of these trainers were members of Civil Affairs (Phillips, 1998, p. 24). A total of 104 personnel from 10 NATO member nations and 5 non-NATO nations participated in the first course, which was operated on November 1997. In the course, "Regional Orientation and Civil Status in Bosnia and Herzegovina", "CIMIC Procedures", "Relations with Civil Organizations" and "Personal Force Protection Measures" lessons were provided (Phillips, 1998, p. 24).

In the deployment of SFOR, CIMIC units could be proactive by assigning liaison staff to civil organizations to intervene in the emerging problems earlier, collect the necessary information on time, and keep the information up-to-date. In the ongoing process, a reporting system reaching from local to the top military unit was established through the CIMIC centers which were opened in various parts of the operation area (Landon, 1998, p. 136).

As CIMIC gain acceptance and the relevant staff trained, it became very effective in facilitating a wide range of activities supporting the Office of the High Representative and OSCE, UNHCR, World Bank, WEU, ICRC, and other relevant organizations working in the fulfillment of the Dayton Agreement (Landon, 1998, p.120).

CIMIC had to be in close coordination with the military units within the military structure as well as with the civilians. CIMIC personnel were not intelligence components and the duties of CIMIC units did not include intelligence collection. Yet, it might be beneficial for the operation to share their observations and the information they obtained with the relevant military units, as they were in contact with the civilian environment. Therefore, it was important to meet with the relevant units of the headquarters as well as to produce regular reports. The most important military units that CIMIC should be in close contact with were Public Information or Public Affairs, Information Operations (InfoOps), Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counterintelligence. For this reason, CIMIC became a

member of the Joint Information Coordination Committee (JICC), which met every week at the IFOR headquarters (Siegel, 1998b, p. 178).

A good example of possible cooperation between these non-kinetic units was experienced in the Multinational Division-North (MND (N) area of responsibility. InfoOps, PsyOps and Civil Affairs units supported and strengthened the efforts of other units in SFOR's development of influence and information activities. One of the best examples to this relationship that supported each other during the deployment of SFOR was the mine awareness program. InfoOps launched a comprehensive campaign to inform civilians about the dangers of mines and defined the themes for awareness. PsyOps produced related media messages that would broadcast on local radio and TV stations. This unit also created mine awareness messages to be printed on comics and soccer balls. Civil Affairs units supported this effort by distributing these products to their local non-military partners, schools and directly to children while carrying out their activities (Lescher, 2013, p .64).

There was no coordination mechanism at the political level between civilians and military for the execution of civil and military tasks determined by the agreement. Civilians at the political level were interested in political processes such as holding elections in the short term, leaving the government to civilian authorities throughout the country as soon as possible, and development for long term projects. While the Office of the High Representative coordinated activities related to this, the humanitarian dimension of the activities was left to UNHCR (Duffield, 1994, p. 21). There were no guidelines on the military's duties regarding the civil environment. Since the soldiers did not take direction at the political level or were not properly directed, they could not find civilian interlocutors at the strategic, operative and tactical levels, respectively.

CIMIC activities were directed from the operations center in Sarajevo. This situation prevented CIMIC from being used properly and created difficulties for the tactical commanders in directing and managing the units subordinate to them (Layton, 1998, p.46). Establishing CIMIC centers across Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed to solving this problem.

At the beginning, the CIMIC activities performed by the US Civil Affairs were assumed as proper CIMIC applications by other armies. These were conducting CIMIC activities for force protection (Wentz, 1998, p. 414), and executing CIMIC projects to gain the hearts and minds of the population in order to obtain information.

Since CIMIC emerged within the framework of peacekeeping operations, it was regarded that it could only be applied in such operations (Jenkins, 2003, p. 121). Although this idea was supported with the operations conducted in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the issue of the application of CIMIC in Article 5 operations discussed in AJP-9 CIMIC Doctrine (NATO, 2003a, p. 3-4).

In the previous periods, the civilians in the area of operation were referring to the local population. In Bosnia, the concept of civilians included international, non-governmental and governmental organizations, local authorities and donors in addition to this population. Communicating with them was a new phenomenon for soldiers (Wentz, 1998, p. xiii). In the post-Cold War period, the opportunities, capabilities, areas of expertise and resources of these organizations, which were very diverse both in number and in terms of duty, were unknown by the soldiers. Since their activities were thought to be limited to humanitarian aid, they were often ignored by the military. The heterogeneous structure of organizations was also one of the reasons for this (Rehse, 2004, p. 13).

Unlike the previous ones, in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the military was authorized to use force not only for self-defense but also to implement the tasks assigned by the Dayton Agreement (GFAP, 1995, Annex-1A, Article-I.2(b)). This led the military to deploy their heavy weapons and armored vehicles to the region. This empowered the military to provide deterrence but caused the soldiers to act as the owner of the entire operation area and gain full control. This situation caused tension between the organizations and the soldiers and prevented the non-government organizations from coordinating and cooperating with the soldiers (Rehse, 2004, p. 13).

Civil organizations tried to understand local dynamics, infrastructure, ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics in historical, economic and political contexts and developed relationships with the local population (Wentz, 1998, p. 419). In addition, organizations technically developed their own communication networks since they came to the area before the soldiers. This network of relationships and information that they created for humanitarian aid and development, and for the long term, were issues that soldiers could never create or obtain.

One of the reasons why a web of relations could not be established between SFOR CIMIC and non-governmental organizations was that the soldiers did not share much information with the NGOs because the information was classified. On the other hand, the information obtained from the NGOs was not considered as important because they were sometimes regarded as irrelevant (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 195).

Although NGOs seem to be quite active, widespread and have diverse resources and expertise, their ability to both provide aid and help build civil society and lay the foundations for long-term peace were exaggerated (McMahon, 2017, p.94). This was due to the soldiers' inability to contact NGOs at the appropriate time and recognize them.

Although Western countries that supported the operation stated that they contributed for humanitarian purposes, this did not exactly reflect the truth. Gordon claimed that France and Italy contributed to the operations in order to get contracts for reconstruction activities (Gordon, 2001). CIMIC has provided a unique opportunity for this. Nations tried to establish good relations with the population by transferring resources to the CIMIC units of their armies to show their flags and to form a supportive group, and thus to influence administrative authorities (Landon, 1998, p.150-152; Paul, 2009, p.5-8).

In the following process, the CIMIC was considered more and more as a tactical level issue, rather than a concept that how the convergence between military and civilians should be in future operations. In this context, CIMIC elements of the countries opened

vocational courses, conducted medical screening and organized travel organizations (Wiharta and Blair, 2010, p. 89).

Wentz claims that information is very important to accomplish the mission successfully and can be used as a weapon in peace operations (Wentz, 1998, p. xi). Information is very important not only in peace operations but also in other kinds of operations. In conventional operations, information about enemy status, friendly status, terrain and weather conditions are always decisive. In terms of information, the point related to peace operations was that the information was in the civilian environment and the soldiers were not aware, adequately trained and equipped to access this information. In addition, success in peace operations is achieved not by fighting but by establishing relations and communication, so it is not appropriate to weaponize the information in this case. Regarding this, it was stated that among the lessons learned in the US military for Bosnia, early deployment of Civil Affairs personnel in the operation area could be a great "force multiplier" (Landon, 1998, p. 129). CIMIC should not be seen as a force multiplier. Such an approach is not compatible with the CIMIC perspective of the operation.

In the light of the SFOR deployment and especially the experiences gained in the field after mid-1997, changes began to occur in the Civil Affairs or CIMIC understanding of the countries. Americans felt that they needed to change their Civil Affairs doctrine. In the new doctrine, the Civil Affairs units' efforts should be combined with the PsyOps and InfoOps. In addition, these efforts had to be matched with other government agencies, international organizations and relevant non-governmental organizations through the Civil-Military Operations Working Group (Lescher, 2013, p. 75).

The need for a CIMIC doctrine also emerged within NATO. The official statement for this need was included in the NATO Ministerial Guidance in 1997:

“In the light of the increased need to establish and maintain relationships with a variety of civilian authorities and organizations in Peace Support Operations and out-of-area missions, Alliance Commanders require a dedicated means for Civil-Military Cooperation” (NATO, 1997a).

In the light of this, the first CIMIC definition was made in 1997 in Chapter 21 of the NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01 as follows:

“The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed” (NATO, 1997c).

It was stated that these regulations were to cooperate with NGOs, international organizations and local authorities (Rietjens and Bollen, 2008, p. 5).

Defining CIMIC was not easy. It was asserted that there was an emerging divide within NATO over the purpose and scope of CIMIC. This situation sparked a debate between “traditionalists” and “enthusiasts,” both were soldiers (Toonen, 2017, p. 31-32). As Toonen stated, the traditionalists argued that;

“CIMIC should not be more than a continuation of its Cold War status: technical and logistic in nature, wholly concerned with providing resources to the force and comprising little more than properly trained staff” (Toonen, 2017, p. 31).

Thus, they insisted that the definition of CIMIC should remain in a narrow framework (Rietjens and Bollen, 2008, p. 16). On the other hand, the so-called “enthusiasts” predicted that soldiers were going to engage with more civilian tasks in the future and military bodies would need more CIMIC staff and units (Toonen, 2017, p. 32).

#### **4.5. Conclusion**

From the CIMIC perspective, the three main actors in the emergence of CIMIC took their place in the area of operation in Bosnia. These main actors were: civil population, civil organizations and soldiers. However, the coexistence of these actors on the battlefield was not enough for the emergence of the CIMIC concept. There should be needs, resources and capabilities that bring them together. Thus, an interface where civilians and soldiers interact was created.

This interface was formed spontaneously in the Bosnia and Herzegovina case. The civilian population was in need of humanitarian assistance, international and non-governmental organizations had resources and the military was providing security and had the means of transportation. These three elements were sufficient for the spontaneous formation of an interface at the tactical level between civilians and soldiers. On the other hand, OHR and NATO did not have a structure that would harmonize and coordinate the civil and military tasks of the operation and the Dayton Agreement. The fact that such a mechanism was not properly determined from the top to the lowest level was a very important deficiency considering the necessity of civil and military efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Landon, 1998, p. 133).

There was no structure in the planning group to evaluate the information obtained about the civil environment within a format and determine the tasks. There was only one CIMIC officer at NATO headquarters at the time of IFOR deployment (Wentz, 1998, p. 419).

Planning disruptions stemmed from the soldiers' not understanding the new world order and the new war in this order. According to Baumann, soldiers, who were trained according to the Cold War conditions and mostly dealt with strategic level planning, had difficulties in planning at the new situation and at operational and tactical levels (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 71-84). This lack of planning led to miss the fact that the area of operation was including a wide variety of civilians. Soldiers planned with the resources they have by focusing on risks and threats, and the civilian layer of the operation area was not one of the priorities in that period (Lescher, 2013, p. 80).

The lack of a directive or doctrine regarding CIMIC at the beginning of the operation also led the soldiers to become involved in humanitarian activities. In fact, a civil-military mechanism could be created under the responsibility of the Office of the High Representative and the framework of the activities could be determined, but this was not possible (McMahon, 2017, p.117). There was never a harmonization between the

tripartite structure<sup>15</sup> envisaged by the Dayton Agreement for the successful execution of the operation (Wentz, 1998, p. 422). This lack of coordination, which occurred at the top, was reflected within IFOR to the tactical level, and relations with the civilian environment remained weak due to the lack of adaptation to civilian tasks (Layton, 1998, p. 35).

The other reason why the soldiers were directly involved in humanitarian activities might be the situation of the non-governmental organizations. Although there were lots of NGOs in the area of operation, they did not have enough experience, they had security problems and they were conducting the activities that their donors dictated. The absence of specialized civilian structures pressured soldiers to take the initiative in the fulfillment of the civilian tasks of the Dayton Agreement (Landon, 1998, p. 132).

After that, although CIMIC began to institutionalize within SFOR, the understanding of CIMIC has never been homogeneous among the countries that supported the operation. Almost every country understood and applied CIMIC in different ways. Following points might be the reasons;

- The assumption of the nations that CIMIC was a means of helping the local population within the national interest framework (Landon, 1998, p. 126),
- The late emergence of the definition and doctrine,
- The lack of military literature on CIMIC and a common CIMIC training.

Here we can sum up the main topics that were transferred to future operations. The most important of the common lessons learned from CIMIC activities in the Joint Effort operation was “establishing liaison” (Landon, 1998, p. 137). Establishing liaison was limited with the upper levels during IFOR deployment. In SFOR deployment military established liaison with the actors at the tactical level. Some of the important problems regarding this were the qualifications of the liaison personnel, the authorities they would be given and the means of communications they would use (Baumann and others, 2004,

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<sup>15</sup> A High Representative Office responsible for the execution of the whole mission and tasked with coordinating civilian tasks; a military force for military dimension (NATO-IFOR) and UNHCR for humanitarian activities.



p. 193). It was also necessary to find a common language or use an interpreter with NGOs both locally and from various parts of the world. Liaison was going to be the first of the three functions of CIMIC in the definition.

The Bosnian example showed that the new operational environment should be involved with the military and the capabilities that can evaluate the political, economic, humanitarian, historical, cultural and social situation and thus form the appropriate strategic framework (Gordon, 2001). This issue was given importance in the CIMIC literature that emerged in the following period.

It was observed that CIMIC should work closely with other military units such as PsyOps, InfoOps, Public Relations and Intelligence.

Finally, it should be stated that the tour of duty of IFOR and SFOR CIMIC personnel was limited to 6 months. This period limitation was very important for CIMIC because it was not possible to transfer the contacts, experiences and relationships established by the previous staff to the next one. When the successor arrives, everything starts from the beginning, when he/she learns time to leave comes. This situation avoided creating a common language between the civilian environment and the soldiers (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 196).

The Bosnian example also represented the transition from the Civil Affairs understanding to the CIMIC understanding (Baumann and others, 2004, p. 196).

Different histories, identities and understandings are intertwined in Bosnia. In order to end the conflicts and tensions, it was not enough to separate the warring parties and to collect their weapons. In addition, the international structures that intervened in the region also had different experiences, world views or interests and resources. This made the problem more complex (McMahon, 2017, p. 120-121). In such a situation, those who want to be involved in the problem should try to understand the causes of the conflicts and make a comprehensive civilian assessment of the region. This situation

confirms the assessment that soldiers should also understand locals. The appropriate unit for this is CIMIC.

A convergence emerged between civilians and soldiers in Bosnia. It was clear that this convergence would be faced with frequently in future operations. Nevertheless, this convergence remained in a very limited framework and the focus was on activities that will bring rapid short-term impact. Although high-level organizations such as OSCE, OHR, ICRC were worked on, the necessary link between the levels could not be established. Finally, as shown in Figure 1, the concept of CIMIC emerged at the tactical level and was transferred to the next operation in this way.




Figure-4.6: Emergence of CIMIC in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

## CHAPTER-V

### CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION in KOSOVO

Kosovo constituted the other bloody scene of Yugoslavia's disintegration process.



Map-5.1: Kosovo

#### 5.1. Road to Crisis (before 1998)

Albanian nationalism was on the rise in the Kosovo region since the late 1960s (Malcolm, 1999, p. 128). In the new constitution adopted in 1974, Albanians were given "the right to vote the amendments in the constitution" and "the right to use their own flag". These privileges were to control rising nationalism and prevent ethnic conflicts in the federation (Langer, 2012, p. 1). With the constitutional amendment, the autonomous regions were given a status equal to that of the republics in most respects, they were allowed to be represented in the federal bodies of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and it was accepted that the autonomous regions could make their

own constitutions (Langer, 2012, p. 1). Thus, Kosovar Albanians gained the right to adopt their own constitution, parliament and courts, and they would be able to form their own police force and establish their own schools. Kosovo, which also had the right to establish a central bank and collect taxes, gained partial sovereignty over the legislative and budgetary issues. Kosovo's governance structure was shaped similar to the institutional structure in an independent republic (Arsava, 2009, p. 3). While these arrangements were made in favor of Albanians, Serbs were extremely uncomfortable with Tito's Kosovo policy. Since they could not overcome Tito's blocking and other federated states, they could not intervene in the process.

With the death of Kardelj in 1979 and Tito in 1980, the two major actors in the ethnic management of the SFRY, unrest and ethnic crises began to emerge in the political structure of the country (Judah, 2000a, p. 46). After Tito's death, the first nationalist conflict in Yugoslavia emerged with the riots in 1981, which originated from the protests of university students in order to gain the Republic status of Albanians in Kosovo (Judah, 2000b, p. 62). These protests first spread to Kosovo and then to other regions where Albanians live in Macedonia and Montenegro. With these developments, Serbian pressure increased on Albanians. Albanian origin civil servants, doctors and teachers were dismissed, Albanian nationalists were suspended from the party and government in Kosovo, and pressure and violence based on ethnic discrimination increased.

Slobodan Milosevic came to power in 1989, exploiting the sensitivity of the Serbs towards Kosovo. Milosevic explained his political program to re-establish Serbia's sovereignty over the autonomous regions, abolish the 1974 Constitution, and reunite Yugoslavia under Serbian rule (Uzgel, 2000). The Serbian Assembly retrieved the autonomy of Kosovo with its decision on March 28, 1989.

Retrieving the autonomy increased the tension between Albanians and Serbs, and led to human rights violations and ethnic cleansing. In particular, while Albanians were expelled from their jobs, and mistreatment and interrogation became daily events;

generally, the other peoples of the region began to suffer from this oppression and violence (Uzgel, 1999, p. 34).

Most of the members of the parliament, which was dissolved after Serbia took over the administration in Kosovo, Albanian politicians and intellectuals formed the "Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo" in Zagreb in September 1990 and declared the "Kaçanik Constitution" on September 7, 1990. After that, an Albanian administration as a shadow government was established in Kosovo politics (Judah, 2000b, p. 65). The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo came together in a secret meeting in Pristina in 1991. At the meeting, it was decided that Kosovo was an independent republic and it was agreed that a referendum on this issue would be held on 26-30 September. In the same meeting, İljaz Ramajli was appointed as the chairman of the assembly unanimously. Through the 1990s, Albanians did not foresee independence due to the belief that the SFRY would continue. With the dissolution, they voted for the declaration of independence at a rate of 99% in the referendum that was held informally in September 1991 (Judah, 2000a, p.65). Thereupon, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo officially declared on October 19, 1991, the independent Republic of Kosovo. Following this announcement, it was announced that Albania recognized the Republic of Kosovo.

In the following political process, Ibrahim Rugova was elected as president. The political strategy of the Kosovar Albanians, led by Rugova, for the period up to 1997, was based on a passive resistance similar to the Gandhi movement. Ibrahim Rugova carried out passive resistance by stating democracy against violence until the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was commonly known by its Albanian abbreviation UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës), took action. The problem was tried to be carried on to the international platform by boycotting the elections and other passive actions (Malcolm, 1999).

When Albanians observed that the passive resistance, which they relied on international intervention to solve the problem, did not provide the support they expected, the option of armed resistance started to come to the fore. When the belief of the passive resistance was virtuous but useless a pressure increased from the supporters of armed action to get

results against heavy pressure. The armed resistance of the Kosovar Albanians was organized by the KLA. The emergence of the KLA brought a new dimension to the problem. In the early days, the KLA claimed responsibility for killing several Serbian police officers between 1993 and 1995. In the following period, some Albanians who claimed to cooperate with the Serbs started to be among the targets in the increasing KLA actions. During this period, there were hundreds of armed members of the KLA. In a short period of time, the KLA enlarged, with the participation of members within and the increasing support from the Albanian diaspora (Judah, 2000b, p. 66-67).

## **5.2. War in Kosovo (1998-1999)**

The KLA, established for the liberation of Kosovo, could succeed in getting the support of the public in a short time and at the same time become the main determining factor in international negotiations regarding the solution of the problem. At this point, the KLA declared on November 28, 1997 that the war for the unification of Kosovo with Albania began (International Crisis Group (ICG), 1998). The Serbs launched a major operation against the KLA in February 1998 near Drenica. As a result of this operation in which women and children were also killed, Adem Jashari, one of the founders of the KLA, was killed. Subsequently, the Racak massacre on January 15, 1999 drew the attention of the world to Kosovo.

45 people, including civilians, were killed in the village of Racak by Serbian forces, and around 5,000 local people were forced to leave the area (Gowans, 1999). The next day, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) held an urgent meeting. NATO threatened the Serbs with airstrikes and declared that the events in Racak were a clear violation of international humanitarian law (NATO, 1999b).

Following the developments, the parties came together last time under the threat of NATO bombardment in the Rambouillet negotiations that started in France on February 6, 1999. The main purpose of this conference, which was officially announced, was "to find a legal and political solution for the political future of Kosovo". The basic principles of this conference were that Kosovo was going to be under NATO control for a temporary period, within a three-year period, Kosovo was going to prepare for self-

governance, and therefore at the end of this period, Kosovo was going to decide on its final political status (Bekaj, 2010, p.25).



Map-5.2: 1998-1999 Conflicts all over Kosovo (Maloney, 2018, p.75).

Considering that the ineffectiveness in Kosovo could spread to the region and weaken the US and NATO forces in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, the US was more sensitive about timing this time (Türbedar, 2004, p. 63). While the issue of intervention in Kosovo was heavily discussed within NATO, the air campaign started on March 24, 1999, when the Rambouillet conference failed and countries such as the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Greece opposed the land operation. The Operation Allied Force (OAF) demonstrated the characteristics of post-Cold War military operations including humanitarian concerns, avoiding loose of troops, and restrictive engagement rules (Nardulli and others, 1999, p. 116; Rehse, 2004, p. 13, Sperling and Webber, 2009, p. 497). During the 78-day NATO bombardment, Serbian attacks on Kosovar Albanians also increased and almost half of the Kosovars had to leave their homeland in very unfavorable conditions.

On June 3, the day when US President Bill Clinton would meet with the Force Commanders and discuss ground operations, Milosevic accepted the peace plan, and the Serbian parliament approved the plan with 136 votes against 74 (Naegele, 1999). According to the plan, which included all of the articles put forward in the Rambouillet negotiations, the repression and violence in Kosovo will be stopped immediately; refugees will be allowed to return to their homelands, all Serbian military and militia forces in Kosovo would be withdrawn within the specified period; a military force would be deployed under the supervision of the UN; NATO would be part of the international force; Kosovo would be administratively under UN control and the KLA would be disarmed (Taşdemir and Yürür, 1999, p. 148). After the completion of these procedures, a limited amount of Serbian military and police forces would be able to enter Kosovo; Serbian military presence would support international humanitarian aid organizations, contribute to the clearance of minefields, and autonomy would be given to Kosovo within the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 172).

Upon the opposition of the Serbian side, NATO jets bombed Novi Sad and the refineries in Pancevo on 7 June, while negotiations on the peace plan were continuing. As a result, negotiations ended with military and technical agreement on 9 June (Uzgel, 2001). This Agreement set out the details of the withdrawal of the Serb forces and the advance of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops to replace them. A day later, on June 10, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1244. Thus, NATO-led KFOR was officially charged with the international security mission and the international civilian body in the region will be UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo).

### **5.3. Post-War Environment (1999-2001)**

It would not be enough to evaluate NATO's presence in Kosovo only within the framework of the agreements reached, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here, on the one hand, NATO contributed to the efforts of the international community in terms of ensuring security and creating a stable environment as a military organization. On the other hand, NATO intervened to ensure the security of the Alliance, based on the



UNSC's decision 1190, which stated that Kosovo poses a "threat to peace and security in the region."

Following the NATO Summit held on April 23-24, 1999, the second strategic concept of the post-Cold War era was published. This concept provided explanations to remove ambiguities and to detail the definitions given in the previous concept. First of all, in the previous concept, the expression "less likely calculated aggression" about the conventional attack changed in this concept as "highly unlikely large scale conventional aggression."

Another point that should be emphasized depending on the evaluations made about the conventional threats is the risk and threat assessment. The risks and threats listed in the first concept continued to be detailed as military and non-military risks and threats. Threats referred to in the 1991 Strategic Concept as economic, social and political difficulties, ethnic strife and regional conflicts were detailed in the 1999 concept as religious strife, inadequate or unsuccessful efforts for reform, violations of human rights and the disintegration of states. It was also stated that the security interests of the Alliance could be affected by organized crime, which has a broader structure. It was assessed that the uncontrolled movement of large numbers of populations, particularly as a result of armed conflict, could pose security and stability problems and affect the Alliance (NATO, 1999a). In both concepts, it was stated that risks and threats were increasingly getting complex and it was increasingly uncertain from where and when they would emerge. Within this context, it was evaluated that the risks and threats listed in the 1999 concept could create uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and could lead to regional crises that might rapidly spread in the periphery of the Alliance (NATO, 1999a).

On the other hand, although it was stated that conventional attack was not expected and the non-military risks and threats were mentioned a lot, by stating that "*the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists*" NATO never ignored conventional aggression. Thus, the door of the collective defense within the scope of Article 5 was remained open and it was declared that it was not abandoned.

A general comparison of 1991 Concept with the 1999 Strategic Concept was presented below in Figure-5.1.

	RISKS & THREATS			POSSIBLE AFFECTS	STRATEGIC AIM
	Conventional Risks & Threats	Risks & Threats to Peace and Stability	Other Areas of Concern		
1991 SC	- Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies.	- Economic, - Social, - Political difficulties. - Ethnic rivalries. - Territorial disputes.	- Proliferation of WMD. - Disruption of the flow of vital resources. - Actions of terrorism and sabotage.	These risks and threats will cause instabilities which may cause armed conflicts and they can spill over.	Security and Stabilisation
1999 SC	- Large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists.	- military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and difficult to predict. - Religious rivalries. - Inadequate or failed efforts at reform. - The abuse of human rights - Dissolution of states.	- Organised crime. - Uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people.	These risks and threats will cause human suffering, and armed conflicts which may affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over.	Security and Stabilisation

Figure-5.1: Risk and threat assessments in 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts.

The two interventions, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, are often compared. Since NATO's intervention in Bosnia was determined with an agenda determined not in Brussels but in New York to implement UNSC resolutions and to support UNPROFOR, it was reactive, unplanned and lacking of clear leadership (Sperling and Webber, 2009, p. 483). However, it can be argued that the Kosovo intervention was proactive and planned. Nevertheless, what was uncertain for both was post-conflict activities.

The post-conflict process in Kosovo was similar to that of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to UNHCR data, about 860.000 people were forced to leave their homes and became refugees. 444.600 of them took refuge in Albania, 344.500 in Macedonia and 69.900 in Montenegro (Suhrke and others, 2000, p. 6). In addition to these, 59.071 people were displaced within the country. 38.517 of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who were relocated within the country were resettled in Macedonia and Albania, while 20.554 took refuge in the collection centers in Kosovo or with other families

(Suhrke and others, 2000, p. 45). It is estimated that 10.356 civilians died during the war (Tabeau, 2009, p. 881).

According to the data prepared before the conflicts, the ethnic distribution in Kosovo was as in Map 5.3. Ethnic distribution prepared according to current data is given in Map-5.4<sup>16</sup>.

As in Bosnia, approximately 45.000 soldiers with a different understanding, organization and experience; around 300 officially registered NGOs with different specializations working for their financiers, and of course, the population with various needs, especially security and humanitarian aid, were in the area of operation. In addition, actors such as donor governments, donor organizations and the private sector took their place in the area of operation (Duffield, 2001, p. 52). Among these main actors, the main organizations that existed in the area were:

- UNMIK (Activities related to civil administration),
- UNHCR (Humanitarian assistance activities),
- OSCE (Institution building activities to establish civil administration),
- EU (via EULEX) (reconstruction activities) and
- KFOR (Activities aimed at ensuring security and stability) (Zaalberg, 2006a, p. 296-297).

When KFOR was deployed, UNMIK was not yet fully operational. UNMIK was given a lot of duties and responsibilities and authorized with providing cooperation with relevant actors, its establishment and deployment were delayed. UNMIK had tasks in four areas: humanitarian assistance, civil administration establishment, institution building and economic reconstruction (Wentz, 2002, p. 483). In this context, UNMIK's duties were to rebuild or create various civil institutions from policing to a working government and observing the activities of the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 7).

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<sup>16</sup> Detailed numerical data regarding the conflicts in Kosovo (deceased, refugee, missing) can be found in Ewa Tabeau's "Conflict in Numbers".

UNMIK's policy was to establish a relatively normal administration as quickly as possible where a major role was deemed necessary for self-government (van Loon, 2002, p. 122).





Figure-5.2: Key KFOR Staff as of September 2000. In this structure J9 refers to CIMIC (Wentz, 2002, p. 303).

Due to the structure of UNMIK and its broad job description, it has been compared to a "clumsy monster" with a few heads, too many limbs and unaware of what is happening at the local level (McMahon, 2017, p. 143-149).

Although the task of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was the organization of humanitarian activities, it did not have the authority to cooperate with organizations in the field (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 7). NGOs, on the other hand, were more directly interested in humanitarian assistance, activities for civil society development and infrastructure. As in Bosnia, both international and local NGOs get the most attention and financial support in this area (McMahon, 2017, p.129).

OSCE has been given the primary task of building civil institutions and democracy. OSCE paid special attention to the development of civil society, especially supporting

marginal groups such as women and minorities (McMahon, 2017, p.132). Over time, the participation of OSCE in this area was overshadowed by the European Union, which became the biggest donor of Kosovo (McMahon, 2017, p. 132).




Map-5.3: Ethnic distribution in Kosovo (Maloney, 2018, p. 34).

The European Union (EU) was responsible for the economic reconstruction, but managing Kosovo's transition from the socialist to the market system was problematic. Initially, the EU experienced shortages in terms of money and personnel, but one of the main problems that the EU faced was the lack of light or heavy industry in Kosovo to create jobs for the unemployed (Wentz, 2002, p. 487-488).

The approximately 300 NGOs that were officially registered in the region at the time of the KFOR deployment were actually those who arrived before the KFOR deployment.

After KFOR deployed, stabilization was relatively provided and refugees started to return, the number of NGOs boomed and their number increased considerably until the mid-2000s. The reasons for this were that the attention of the international community shifted from Bosnia to Kosovo, the need for assistance in a wide variety of areas increased, states preferred to contribute NGOs instead of direct intervention, and thus the NGO establishment turned into a sector.



Map-5.4: Current ethnic distribution in Kosovo (UK House of Lords, 2017, p. 70).

In this post-conflict environment, the first KFOR units started to deploy on June 12, and with the withdrawal of Serbian forces, they completed deployment on June 20. With the UNSC Resolution 1244, very specific tasks were given to KFOR as follows:

- To deter re-emergence of hostilities between ethnic groups, to impose the ceasefire and to ensure withdrawal and to prevent the return of Yugoslav army, police and paramilitary forces to Kosovo;
- To disarm and demobilize the KLA and other armed Kosovar Albanians;
- To create a safe and secure environment for refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes; to support the international civilian presence in establishing an interim administration and providing humanitarian assistance;
- To ensure public safety and public order and to supervise the de-mining missions until the international civilian presence takes over;
- To support the efforts of the international civil presence and to cooperate closely with them;
- To conduct border monitoring missions and
- To ensure the protection of international civilian presence and other international organizations (UN, 1999).

As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the operation area was divided into military responsibility regions in order to fulfill the tasks given to KFOR and to get the maximum benefit from the contributing nations. These regions were called as Multinational Brigade (MNB) with the abbreviation of directions. MNB (N) was under the responsibility of France and consisted of 9208 soldiers provided by Hungary, Greece, Denmark, United Arab Emirates, Russia and Belgium. MNB (E) was under US command consisting of 8543 personnel from Russia, Netherlands and Poland; MNB (S) commanded by Germany consisting of 8053 personnel from Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Russia, Austria and Turkey; MNB (West) was commanded by Italy consisting of 522 personnel from Turkey, Bulgaria, Finland, Portugal and Spain and MNB-Center (MNB (C)) was under UK responsibility consisting of 9380 personnel from Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Russia, Czech Republic, Norway, Canada and Hungary (Mockaitis, 2004; Maloney, 2018). The aforementioned areas of responsibility are shown in Map-5.5.

Russia also contributed to KFOR as in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The areas that Russia was included and controlled are shown in Map 5.6. There was no difference in the

approach of the Russians compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the protection of the Serbian minority was the top priority (Zaalberg, 2006a, p. 343).

Although one nation was responsible for one region, unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, crossings between these regions were allowed as long as they stick to the operation plan (Nardulli and others, 1999, p.102). The transition between regions was mostly experienced in CIMIC activities. For example, the troops in the MNB (S) region under the German command were able to carry out CIMIC activities in the MNB (W) region under the responsibility of Italy. It can be stated that all Kosovo was opened to CIMIC activities of all contributing nations. The positive side of this was that if CIMIC was carried out within the same operation plan, it would contribute to the success of the operation. The negative impact could be that the contributing nations would only conduct CIMIC activities for the communities supporting this nation.



Map-5.5: KFOR Deployment (Mockaitis, 2004, p.8).



In this context, KFOR's first task was to monitor the withdrawal of Serbian forces on the date specified in the Military Technical Agreement. With the withdrawal of Serbian forces on the specified date, KFOR troops intensified their humanitarian aid activities, assisting IDPs, people in need of basic humanitarian supplies and refugees wishing to return home. This task was taken over by UNHCR as soon as they established their presence in the region. Thereupon, KFOR units opened CIMIC centers in each MNB region and coordinated humanitarian assistance (Nardulli and others, 1999, p.104).

KFOR troops also ensured the disarmament of the KLA. In accordance with the agreement signed under the title of "Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the KLA",<sup>17</sup> the KLA has committed to make a ceasefire, leave the conflict zones, leave the military service and join society. It was decided that this will be done within 90 days. Hence, KFOR units created weapon collection areas (Nardulli and others, 1999, p.105). The Kosovo Protection Force (KKK) was established on 21 September 1999. Under KFOR and UNMIK, the KKK was tasked with issues such as natural disaster relief, search and rescue, humanitarian aid support, support for mine clearance activities, and support for infrastructure construction activities. The KKK consisted of 5000 staff, 3000 of which were active, 2000 of which were reservists. The KKK was not responsible for tasks such as providing security, law enforcement, riot control and internal security.

However, the most important problem faced by KFOR and UNMIK was the problem of instability throughout Kosovo, and this hampered international efforts. Although the KLA was disarmed, they or their criminal organizations still had control in important areas, and the desired results were not achieved because neither UNMIK nor KFOR had units to deal with it. Moreover, KFOR did not have enough personnel to fulfill the responsibilities of UNSC Resolution 1244. This problem was tried to be overcome by establishing a police academy by UNMIK.

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<sup>17</sup> This is a unilateral undertaking by the KLA (UCK) to adhere to the cessation of hostilities. In this undertaking KLA forces agree to demilitarise and reintegrate into civil society. This agreement was offered by Hashim Thaqi and received by Lt. General Michael Jackson on 21 June 1999, Available at: <https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-demilitarisationuck99>

Although the Kosovo case had the characteristics of post-Cold War interventions, such operations had their own political-strategic context and operational military challenges. These were important obstacles to planning and execution (Nardulli and others, 1999, p.111). On the other hand, after the end of the air campaign, NGOs and KFOR elements who came to the region wanted to implement what was done in Bosnia-Herzegovina instead of evaluating Kosovo in their own unique situation. This approach made it difficult to reach the final goal desired to be achieved in Kosovo.



Map-5.6: Russians in the KFOR deployment (Nardulli and others, 1999, p.102).

The differences of this mission from Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of both force and environment can be listed as follows:

- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, after a peace agreement was signed between the warring parties, IFOR deployed in the region and ensured the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. KFOR deployed in Kosovo after a military campaign (peace enforcement).
- Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR's main duties were to maintain law and order until UNMIK took over.
- While there were three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were more minorities in Kosovo. Although people in Bosnia and Herzegovina were of different ethnicity, they used almost a common language. However, there was no such situation in Kosovo.
- Unlike in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was an administration in Kosovo. The Kosovars had one government, but in Bosnia, almost every city had its own assembly.

As can be seen, the situation in Kosovo was prominent not only in terms of humanitarian aid but also with its social, economic and political dimensions that should be evaluated in the short and long term. Here, as a requirement of the lessons learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina, before KFOR deployment, CIMIC could support military planners by providing a very comprehensive assessment of the entire civilian situation and could support coordination with major organizations. There are several reasons why such planning could not be done, and the most important of these was the lack of awareness.

#### **5.4. CIMIC Activities**

Not only in terms of CIMIC but also because of the intense air campaign and the refugee crisis it caused, the time was quite short for the operational planning for the post-conflict process. Roughly three scenarios emerged in the post-conflict period: entering Kosovo by conducting a land operation, a peaceful transition with the withdrawal of Serbs, and a hybrid situation somewhere between two extremes. For the most probable of these three scenarios, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Forces Europe (SHAPE) prepared the plan. It was having a comprehensive and flexible CIMIC Annex, at least on paper (Mockaitis, 2004, p.27). While SHAPE was making evaluations about CIMIC, KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) was informed that approximately two hundred civil and military experts were required. The COMKFOR

stated that he did not need a separate CIMIC Task Force and did not assume necessary adding them to his own forces (Zaalberg, 2006a, p. 391-392). There might be two reasons for his; one is that the COMKFOR regarded that all KFOR was going to conduct CIMIC activities and the other could be that he did not see how CIMIC was important.

According to the CIMIC Annex of the military plan, the duties assigned to the CIMIC were:

- To provide CIMIC support for military forces;
- To establish an interim administration when necessary, and
- To assist IO / NGO in maximizing their capabilities to assist Kosovars in establishing their self-sufficient civil administration.

The implied tasks that emerged alongside these tasks included all activities from infrastructure reconstruction to refugee return and democratization. The SHAPE plan envisaged the establishment of interconnected CIMIC Centers at the local level, MNB level and across the country (Wentz, 2002, p. 492). Neither UNHCR nor humanitarian organizations were involved in this plan (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 27).

Although KFOR had a plan on paper, it was unclear whether UNMIK had a plan. Although UNMIK had a plan at the outset of the operation, it did not include focusing, coordinating and synchronizing the efforts of KFOR, KFOR-affiliated MNBs and other civil organizations. After the deployment, KFOR provided personnel support to UNMIK to assist in the development of the strategic planning document (Wentz, 2002, p. 491-492).

Before UNMIK was established in 1999, IOs and NGOs were involved in nutrition, shelter and other humanitarian issues for victims of repression and violence. But when UN offices were established, Kosovo began to transform rapidly. The NGO boom was fast and impressive. Although exact figures were difficult to find, within a few months, as many as four hundred international NGOs and other international actors were working on the field in Kosovo (McMahon, 2017, p.134). If Bosnia was a milestone for

NGO participation in post-conflict settings, Kosovo was considered a golden age. International NGOs in Kosovo benefited from more financial resources, opportunities and support than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As in Bosnia, international priorities not only attracted large numbers of international NGOs, but these organizations also supported the creation of local groups (McMahon, 2017, p. 135).

As the number of organizations started to increase, organization clusters consisting of similar organizations emerged, such as the International NGO (INGO) Council and NGO Focal Point. However, as NGOs increased more, a more chaotic environment occurred (McMahon, 2017, p. 131). In this environment, not only NGO-public or NGO-military relationships but also relations between NGOs became important. International actors assumed local organizations as mechanisms to develop their own ideas (McMahon, 2017, p.143). Therefore, local organizations could not prepare long-term plans despite being on the ground for a long period of time and having information about the needs of people. Instead, the top-down approach of the international community, which tried to avoid sensitive issues and gave importance to its own priorities rather than what was happening in the field, prevented the progress and development of society (McMahon, 2017, p.148-149).

Within this environment, KFOR Commander General Mike Jackson conveyed the final purpose of the activities to be carried out according to the planning made by SHAPE to the subordinate commanders as follows:

“I seek a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign at low level, creating trust and mutual understanding. As relationships build, so will the flow of information allowing KFOR to pre-empt conflict. [...] It is an operation amongst the people, whose perception is the Center of Gravity: that all inhabitants of Kosovo are better off with UNMIK / KFOR than without, that we jointly offer a better future” (General Sir Mike Jackson, COMKFOR Directive, June 20, 1999).

This statement was quite similar to Templer's approach in Malaya. Templer also stated that they should send soldiers to people's hearts and minds, not to the forest; if 25% of this work was conducted with weapons, 75% was conducted through establishing good relationships. Thus, General Jackson was turning the KFOR deployment into a counter-

insurgency operation. When the aim of the operation was expressed in this way from the very beginning, the CIMIC activities were also shaped accordingly. Over time, CIMIC became one of the most important tools used to establish good relations with the public in order to provide force protection and gain information.

In order to provide coordination and cohesion with the tactical level CIMIC activities conducted by Multinational Brigades (MNB), KFOR was designed as an operational level CIMIC center. While MNBs carried out their activities at the tactical level, the KFOR headquarters aimed to coordinate and support UNMIK (Wentz, 2002, p. 483). KFOR allowed MNBs to perform activities such as direct humanitarian assistance or infrastructure maintenance and repair, in case they were within military means.

Due to the conditions in Kosovo and as a result of the absence of numerous public agencies, CIMIC units were obliged to undertake some of the specific civilian tasks until other bodies gained function. Here, the basic perception of KFOR was that public security and order should be established in order to create a safe environment (van Loon, 2002, p. 119-120).

The first thing that the KFOR troops should care about was the execution of the police tasks. The task of maintaining public law and order, and more specifically establishing a police force, was clearly given to civilian UN interim authorities (here to UNMIK) by UNSC Resolution 1244. The aim was to create an international police force (UNMIKPOL) to form an independent and impartial local police force (van Loon, 2002, p.120). The soldiers had to take over the police tasks until UNMIKPOL was ready. Another reason for prioritizing the establishment of the police force was that the KLA was very keen to take over the police role in Kosovo due to widespread crimes. These crimes were arson and looting, ill-treatment, carrying weapons against agreements, and theft.

There were also situations that were very difficult to predict beforehand. One of them occurred in the Orahovac region. In the forests surrounding this region, logging was always strictly regulated to prevent erosion of steep slopes that would affect the

valuable vineyards. The KLA turned this situation into an opportunity to enforce the authority there and started to monitor logging and impose sanctions. In order to prevent the KLA from gaining a limited police authority in this way, the wood-cutting control was temporarily undertaken by KFOR (van Loon, 2002, p. 120).

In the first place, with the provision of general public order, infrastructure repairing or reconstructing activities were increased. Parts of Kosovo's shattered infrastructure began to be rebuilt by KFOR troops. COMKFOR General Klaus Reinhardt stated that KFOR soldiers have built or repaired 200 kilometers of roads, six bridges, and several bypasses, helping relieve congestion and assisting humanitarian aid flow. Military engineers have restored the railway network, repairing 200 kilometers of track and rebuilding two bridges. Damage to Pristina airport has been repaired and the airport reopened to commercial flights (Reinhardt, 2000). In fact, these road and bridge construction, maintenance, and repairs were carried out not only to provide humanitarian aid, establish good relations with the public, or gather information but also establish contact between MNBs and KFOR center.

As it is going to be examined in the following parts, CIMIC activities differed by brigade regions. While the French were unsuccessful in Mitrovica in the MNB (N) region, they carried out effective CIMIC activities in Drenica. In the MNB (E) region, the US Civil Affairs unit was strictly applying principles of force protection as in Bosnia for a long time and they did not conduct CIMIC activities unless they provided force protection and freedom of movement. In the MNB (S) area while the Germans were very busy with the Netherlands providing a safe and secure environment, the Italians in the MNB (W) area were developing better relations with the public. In MNB (C), on the other hand, British people carried out CIMIC activities towards a democratic Kosovo goal.

The MNB (N) CIMIC unit consisted of approximately 60 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. A French Colonel was leading this unit, most of whom were reserve officers and working with a 4-month rotation. The head of the unit was appointed for a 6-month period. Although the CIMIC unit had a limited budget, good

relations with the French NGOs were developed and they provided financial support (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 9). However, although KFOR's task was to establish law and order and to create a safe environment, relations between MNB (N) and the UNMIK police were weak.

NGOs of non-French origin stated that it was difficult to understand the French soldiers. It has been reported that French soldiers refuse to provide security for NGOs on their way to the city of Mitrovica, which was in MNB (N) area of responsibility and did not facilitate the return of refugees (Serbs, Albanians and Romas) to their homes although that was a part of KFOR objective in order to achieve the UN's target of multinational Kosovo (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 10).

Brigade CIMIC teams were mostly conducting activities for the local population. These include building a bakehouse, laying pipes to supply water to villages, establishing a food and clothing distribution center, activities such as repairing roads and building bridges (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 10). The soldiers added a playground to the school built by the French Red Cross in a village in the MNB (N) region. Such activities were not only performed by their staff. Other units within the military structure were also charged when necessary. For example, a team that needed a bulldozer to level out the playground of a school in a hamlet near Skenderaj received the support of French and Belgian engineers (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 11).

In the MNB (E) region, there was only 55 Civil Affairs personnel belonging to the US Civil Affairs unit. The CIMIC activities were carried out at the national level by the contributing nations, and thus the liaison between the CIMIC units was not strong (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 13).

American units interpreted the UNSC Resolution 1244 as narrowly as possible and thus adopted "security" and "freedom of movement" tasks in traditional military terms. Within this context, they provided escorts for the returning Serbs, cleared landmines, disarmed the KLA and provided training in various fields. In addition, they took action to remove any obstacles to freedom of movement within their areas of responsibility



(Mockaitis, 2004, p. 14-16). Here it was considered that the task of rebuilding the infrastructure and institutions was the duty of the IO / NGO community and these activities were not carried out at the beginning. Therefore, there was a decrease in the funds transferred to the Civil Affairs units.

Despite the directive of the COMKFOR, the reason why the US Civil Affairs units perceived the tasks narrowly and were distant to the public might be their previous experience. Somali and Vietnam experiences dictated that soldiers should stay away from the local population (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 14). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, American Civil Affairs units also focused more on NGOs instead of establishing relations with the public.

Another problem that Civil Affairs units faced was the lack of coordination between military units due to their narrow assessment of the tasks. For example, an American Civil Affairs team had to dig wells to provide drinking water to the reconstructed villages in the Gilan settlement. Although they had trained personnel, they did not have the necessary funds for such a project, and engineering units' equipment was not used, as digging wells was not fully related to providing "security" or "freedom of movement" (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 16).

In order for the Civil Affairs units to do good at the tactical level, the importance of CIMIC had to be understood at the operational level. Later, there were developments in this direction. The G5 branch, the unit responsible for planning military operations, managed the Ministry of Defense's humanitarian aid program with a \$5 million budget (Wentz, 2002, p. 484-485). During this period, when the approval and execution of humanitarian projects turned out to be slow and difficult, the G5 Branch prepared procedures for quick impact humanitarian aid projects with funds of \$ 2.500 or less (Wentz, 2002, p. 485). This unit was also responsible for planning the return of the IDPs. G5 staff also created a database containing a wide range of information about the civil environment such as NGOs, village assessments, key leaders, local economy, USAID programs, district demographics, and village locations (Wentz, 2002, p. 485).

Civil Affairs units started to remove the distance they kept with the public over time. They were in direct contact with UNMIK, IO and NGO staff and local population and local leaders, and they were visiting villages, neighborhoods, civic administration and workplaces. This served to build trust relationships and enabled units to understand local concerns, needs and what worked and what did not (Wentz, 2002, p. 485-486). This is an essential issue for CIMIC. Projects produced within the scope of CIMIC are expected to meet specific needs and operational targets. Such visits allow the accurate identification of needs and proper assessments of whether the expected benefit was achieved or not. Production and evaluation of projects also require coordination between military units such as InforOps, PsyOps and Public Affairs.

When the stability was provided throughout the country, MNB (E) Civil Affairs units started to support long-term efforts as well as short-term and quick-impact projects. Among these, priority was given to coordination and cooperation with IOs and NGOs in areas such as reconstructing activities, reviving the industry, helping development programs, determining and activating sources of income, and restructuring public services (Wentz, 2002, p.488). For example, the Civil Affairs teams supported the Village Employment Rehabilitation Program (VERP) project, which was funded by the EU and implemented by the UNDP for the employment of local people. Construction projects were often given priority in terms of employment generation.

As a result of an evaluation produced in a SHAPE held meeting in March 2000, it was concluded that the international community could not accurately identify the local needs. Therefore, a team was formed to make the reconstruction efforts more efficient. This team met with 120 NGOs across Kosovo and supported the designation of projects properly and the efficient use of resources. The projects covered all aspects of reconstruction, from infrastructure repairment to economic revitalization (Wentz, 2002, p. 489).

Although contacts and relationships were established with a wide variety of civil actors, the issue of information sharing was always problematic. In order to prevent the problems in this regard, liaison personnel was sent to UNMIK buildings, or

Humanitarian Community Information Centers (HCIC) were established in places close to UNMIK. These centers were run by soldiers of CIMIC and Civil Affairs units and provided a visible presence of commitment and solidarity from KFOR and UNMIK. They also created a suitable environment for the local population to raise their complaints and seek assistance (Wentz, 2002, p. 490). Although it was very beneficial to establish such centers, which were in contact with important organizations such as UN-OCHA, USAID, DFID, IRC, OSCE, WFP, and Save the Children, it was necessary to evaluate the situation of the people when the soldiers were out of the country.

KFOR held weekly meetings to coordinate between CIMIC units. Although these meetings raised awareness in terms of the activities carried out between units and were important in terms of the lessons learned, KFOR did not share its evaluations with the CIMIC, Civil Affairs and other relevant units of the MNBs. As the result of these meetings, a plan was prepared by KFOR for CIMIC activities to be carried out at the company level in order to ensure standardization among the applications but was never implemented (Wentz, 2002, p. 492). The most important reason for this was the different CIMIC understanding of the countries, their different interests and the social, economic and ethnic differences between the regions.

While in some regions, CIMIC or Civil Affairs units had difficulty in communicating, in other regions, this was not a problem. Turkish soldiers started to establish fruitful communication from the first day without encountering any problems in the region where they deployed, and they were found more successful in establishing contact with the local people than others (Soeters and others, 2006, p. 91). On the other hand, it took one year for the US Civil Affairs units to gain the trust of the public, and at the end of this period, the attitude of the local people, especially the Serbian community, changed significantly (Wentz, 2002, p. 494).

Finally, the force protection principle should be mentioned regarding the US Civil Affairs unit in charge of MNB (E). This issue, which was the subject of criticism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, continued in Kosovo. The staff of organizations such as UNHCR and MSF (Doctors Without Borders) reported that force protection was

sometimes perceived as a show of strength, often intimidating people who were already scared (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 15). Force protection principles began to be loosened in the summer of 2002 in the MNB (E) region as a result of both the achievement of stability and the establishment of positive relations and contacts with civil actors.

The largest CIMIC unit within KFOR was in this brigade with more than 100 personnel. However, in the beginning, as in the IFOR and SFOR deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the CIMIC did not receive enough attention in the planning process of the KFOR deployment.



Photo-5.1: Deployment of Turkish soldiers in Kosovo.

Although there was a limited time for planning before the deployment, MNB (S) leading country officers prepared a detailed plan on the map. This plan included which unit would cover which regions and how. With the deployment, an unexpected situation occurred. Public order problems continued in the area, given to the Dutch army responsibility. On the first day of deployment, the Dutch army had to separate one of its units to maintain order upon demand of the Serbs (van Loon, 2002, p. 117).

The Dutch army did not assume that CIMIC activities would be carried out until the end of the planning process, and therefore did not allocate personnel for this. Towards the end of the planning process, two artillery officers were assigned for CIMIC planning. This reflects the commanders' knowledge and expectation about CIMIC. Although the

military planning can be done on the map even in detail, the environment cannot be evaluated. Since such planning was not prepared not only by the Dutch army, but almost all KFOR units maintaining public order became the most important task at the outset and KFOR continued to be the police for a long time in almost all Kosovo.

After establishing public order accordingly, some of the activities conducted in the MNB (S) region were to conduct pedestrian and vehicle patrols, participate in the disarmament process of the KLA, and oversee the distribution of humanitarian aid and to support the protection of minority areas. When Albanian refugees and IDPs returned and the brigade achieved some stability, the Germans became staunch advocates of the status quo (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 19).

The CIMIC units of the Dutch battalion in this region assumed a tactical civil-military liaison role and later on they engaged in initiating, running and supporting small-scale reconstruction projects. Strengthening the "force protection" by "winning the hearts and minds of the local population" was the rationale behind these projects. According to the Dutch battalion commander, his primary reason for undertaking these non-military tasks was to prevent rebels from filling the power vacuum that was created by the demobilization of the KLA. Within this context, it can be asserted that CIMIC remained far from being a support function to facilitate military operations (Zaalberg, 2006b, p. 400).

Another nation that contributed to MNB (S) was Austria. Austria did not have a humanitarian or development budget. Austrians became very successful at finding NGOs willing to fund a project and providing them military equipment (Mockaitis, 2004, p.20). As a unique innovation, they commissioned a person at the Austrian Defense Ministry to line up donors for CIMIC projects in Kosovo. For example, Austrian KFOR worked closely with German NGO Kinderberg to build a youth center in Suva Reka. In collaboration with an Austrian sports league, they also built a sports facility in the city. They also invited a planning team from the Vienna Technical University to visit their site and monthly monitor a local health clinic built by the Red Cross (Mockaitis, 2004, p.20). These actions of the Austrian units could serve as an

example for CIMIC activities. Projects should be conducted according to a certain logic and in a comprehensively planned way. Here, Austrian units identified the needs and the actors having resources, brought them together and conducted projects. It was not enough to just do projects, and they needed to be maintained. For this whole process, it was necessary to understand the local dynamics, which constituted the civilian layer of the operation area. As stated, these actions of the Austrian CIMIC could serve as an example for future CIMIC projects and CIMIC understanding in one aspect. The other aspect was whether these activities would contribute to operational objectives.

Long-term projects in the MNB (S) region were monitored and coordinated by a separate staff at the brigade headquarters, and activities were carried out by a special team called the Civil-Military Cooperation Task Force (CIMICTF). In this area, this unit supported building more than 30 schools and 960 homes, conducted road and bridge repairs, and it was involved in the completion of more than 350 other projects such as playgrounds and sports halls. Approximately 960 tons of humanitarian aid materials were distributed to villages having difficult access. Military hospitals also served civilians in emergencies. The MNB (S) was located in the countryside, where the main sources of income were agriculture and wine. In this area, training was provided to villagers to teach them how to repair tractors. In the first year, more than 68 million German marks were spent on construction (Wentz, 2002, p. 489). Cooperation between more than 70 NGOs, UNMIK, OSCE and UNHCR in the MNB (S) sector was problematic at the beginning. Later on, coordination requirements to be able to avoid duplication of effort, share the resources in the area and provide assistance in an efficient way increased. Thus, civilian and military actors had to communicate, they got familiar with each other and above-mentioned cooperation problems were solved.

The CIMIC unit of this brigade consisted of approximately 60 personnel. Due to their long-standing relationship with Albania, Italians had no difficulty understanding the local culture and were able to establish good relations with Kosovar Albanians. Initially, MNB (W) troops were too busy helping to maintain order and major humanitarian efforts as in other regions (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 21).

MNB (W) units established two field hospitals, a Spanish hospital in Istok and an Italian hospital in Banjica, to provide routine and emergency health service to civilians in the area. In this area, the Italian Red Cross supported the hospital in Pec. In addition, MNB (W) units contributed to the public efforts for garbage collection by providing trucks, front loaders, heavy equipment operators and hand tools; provided transportation support to "PEOPLE IN NeedED" NGO, which provided humanitarian aid, and supported OXFAM in the establishment of the water distribution network; repaired the bridge on the main highway from Pec to Pristina; collaborated with a Japanese NGO to establish a refugee camp in Loda located 5 km southeast of Pec, and worked on the restoration of schools with UNICEF in the area of responsibility.

The UK-led brigade worked to provide a safe and secure environment, facilitate the return of refugees, rebuild critical infrastructure, and they cooperated with UNMIK for a multiethnic democratic Kosovo (Mockaitis, 2004, p.22).

As a result of the lessons they learned from the process of countering the insurgency in Malaya, the UK personnel adopted the approach of "winning hearts and minds". In this context, it was claimed that the UK army changed the hostile or sullen population into a collaborator (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 24). According to the British, the cooperation with the local population generated intelligence about the actions and places of the rebels (here Serbs). With this information, British soldiers could use effective and focused force against rebels (Mockaitis, 2004, p.24). On the other hand, applying CIMIC in order to provide intelligence was an important problem and it damaged the credibility of CIMIC and the sustainability of related activities.

The British Army's approach to the CIMIC was different from that in other regions. There was a small CIMIC unit of 12 people in the area of MNB (C). CIMIC activities were not just the work of this unit. In this region, CIMIC was perceived and performed as the work of every soldier (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 24). This approach could have been suitable for all non-article 5 operations. As can be seen in the examples of other regions, the CIMIC emerged as an area that allowed each military unit to contribute and get the benefit.

In this region, CIMIC tasks were conducted in three operational categories:

- Supporting military operations,
- Supporting UNMIK (political development and critical infrastructure) and
- "Winning the hearts and minds" (schools, clinics, community centers, etc.) (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 25).

British troops were able to prevent most of the destruction that occurred in other brigade areas by initiating early pedestrian patrols in Pristina (Mockaitis, 2004, p.26). In the following process, British engineers, with the support of DFID and funds from UNMIK, succeeded to keep working the power plants in the region; troops provided food and shelter to 1800 Gypsies with the support of UNHCR; with the support from UNMIK the maintenance of the water distribution system in Pristina started; civilian assessments were conducted to define the needs; small businesses, which were a part of the program for normalization of life, were supported; cooperation was provided with UNMIK to re-establish the local transportation service; the fire department was strengthened; the repairment of the PTT infrastructure was supported, and health clinics were established in partnership with Medecins Du Monde.

Generally speaking, it should first be noted that the KFOR headquarters was more of a coordination headquarters than a command and control headquarters. MNBs were relatively independent and national political priorities determined their approach to CIMIC activities. The CIMIC activities became the tools for the military to show their skills and flags. As a result of this perception, they were establishing liaison with non-military organizations in the field, ensuring coordination and cooperation developed in one direction. Soldiers did not assume UNHCR as the designated lead agency for humanitarian coordination, but they usually addressed the organizations from their own countries or government-sponsored aid organizations. For example, US Civil Affairs worked with USAID, UK with DFID and Canadians with CIDA (Wentz, 2002, p. 493). Most of the troops deployed in Kosovo were organized for a conventional operation but were sent to conduct a peacekeeping operation. At the outset, this issue, which might be one of the reasons why CIMIC was not among the priorities in the planning process, was the second task of a military unit. With the increasing importance of CIMIC over



time, training increased, literature was formed and CIMIC units were established and professionalization was achieved (Ankersen, 2004, p. 76).

The deployment of civilian authority, and especially the police, in Kosovo, was slow; thus KFOR elements had to fill the gap. Although KFOR's actions in this area were required in terms of the post-conflict situation, it was very difficult for the soldiers because there were no plans and pre-determined procedures (van Loon, 2002, p. 119). It had to be evaluated in the preparatory stages prior to deployment on how the cooperation between military and civilian elements (KFOR, UNMIK, UNHCR) would be. In terms of this requirement, it was revealed that CIMIC was an important function that should be included in the decision-making process.

Another negative example of the lack of early planning was about the relationship between UNMIK and KFOR. The legal relationship between UNMIK and KFOR was never defined clearly. This situation opened up space for soldiers to do what they want (McMahon, 2017, p.149). The lack of legal relation caused soldiers to act as the sole responsible of the operation area, and they saw the NGOs as their subordinates.

In fact, the issue of planning together in advance was a lesson that emerged after Bosnia and Herzegovina and should be learned, but it was understood that this lesson was not well studied in Kosovo. In addition, it was necessary to meet not only with humanitarian organizations but also with all kinds of experts to get all relevant information about the civilian environment that was a non-military layer of the area of operation.

CIMIC was often described as a force multiplier in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. This description causes CIMIC to be perceived as a weapon or military vehicle and used in this way. CIMIC is a set of ideas and practices aimed primarily at understanding the civilian dimension of the operation area (van Loon, 2002, p. 118). With this kind of approach, the effects of the civilian environment on the operation and the effects of the operation on the civil environment can be evaluated.

The rotation of the soldiers for a period of 6 months was a criticized point in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Limiting the tour of duty to a period of 6 months reduces the possibility of long-term evaluation and action. Thus, it takes a long time to reach the desired end-state. When each staff arrives, the effort for getting to know the environment, meeting the actors, and understanding the task starts again. IO / NGO staff stated that they were tired of repeating the same briefings, answering the same questions, and rebuilding the same trust every few months (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 32).

Another important lesson on CIMIC was related to the classification of documents and information and sharing them with relevant actors. IOs and NGOs frequently complained that military units ask them to share information, but they did not want to share information with humanitarian aid workers (Mockaitis, 2004, p. vi-vii). This was the result of the process that sharing military information depended on certain procedures. If information was classified, it was almost impossible to share. In fact, it was about understanding the civil environment and sharing appropriate information rather than classifying the information. For this, actors should be evaluated very well, liaison should be established and relevant information should be shared with the related actors. Thus, soldiers could access information to successfully complete their duties.

One of the problem areas that arose in Kosovo was the organizational difference between soldiers and civilians. Soldiers wanted to conduct directly result-oriented activities and to reach the target in a short way. Thus, they expect maximum benefit by spending minimum resources. However, this approach was not particularly suitable for operations such as peace operations (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 17). While this approach of soldiers might hinder the achievement of the long-term desired end-state, it could interrupt non-military actors' long-term and demanding activities such as development, capacity building and social cohesion.

In this context, an evaluation also came from NGOs. For them, KFOR's participation was important, but good relations with the NGOs were not established. Organizational differences, unwillingness in information sharing, and direct involvement of soldiers in humanitarian assistance activities prevented the provision of aid impartially,

independently and effectively. Because of this situation, the trust in NGOs was shaken (McMahon, 2017, p. 150). NGOs became one of the important elements in the area of operation in Kosovo. If a force multiplier was sought, the NGOs would be the best force multipliers. On the other hand, the above-mentioned negative approach of the soldiers prevented the various NGOs in Kosovo from establishing good relations and working together with KFOR.

Especially in Kosovo, because the soldiers intensively dealt with humanitarian aid activities for various reasons caused the assumption that to conduct humanitarian activities was not difficult, but this was completely wrong. Although distributing food packages provided by countries and organizations, distributing seasonal clothing, and providing educational materials to schools were within humanitarian aid, if they were not executed properly, it could do more harm than good. To be able to provide humanitarian assistance properly, impartially and effectively, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the needs and situation of the civil environment. The simplification of humanitarian aid may cause it to become a carrot-stick tactic element or a tool of punishment that is contrary to human rights (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 28). Besides, the return of refugees and IDPs was not simply a transportation activity. The situation of the returnees, the environment they would encounter, the social, economic and psychological problems to be experienced should be taken into consideration (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 28-29).

Despite the difficulties and problems, many soldiers and civilians were aware that they needed each other. This need occurred from the different possibilities, capabilities, resources and perspectives that each other had. These differences could be exploited in a coherent way to prevent duplication of effort within the unity of purpose, ensure that one did not interrupt the other, and save time and resources. For this, measures such as information sharing, area sharing, personnel change should be taken (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 29).

As seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, international and non-governmental organizations became important in planning, providing and evaluating political, social,

or economic contributions during the intervention to international crises. In most cases, these organizations were an essential element of long-term solutions. Mostly, when the fight ended and after an armed conflict, they must take over economic, social, political and developmental issues. Soldiers should accept this in this way and find ways to work more closely with these actors (Landon, 1998, p. 119).

Another point that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo showed was that it was not easy for these actors to work together with the soldiers. The main reason for this was the soldiers' tendency in assuming these actors as subordinates to them and expectation that they should obey their directives.

As stated in Chapter IV, the first doctrine of CIMIC is accepted as the statements in the NATO Ministerial Guidance published in 1997. In this guide, the need for CIMIC was expressed as follows:

“In the light of the increased need to establish and maintain relationships with a variety of civilian authorities and organizations in Peace Support Operations and out-of-area missions, Alliance Commanders require a dedicated means for Civil-Military Cooperation” (NATO, 1997a).

Within this direction first CIMIC definition was provided in AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine as:

“The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed” (NATO, 1997c).

Although CIMIC was tried to be explained and grounded in this way, the countries' lack of experience in this matter or their feeding from different historical sources caused these statements to be ignored. Two years after the publication of these statements, while the war continued in Kosovo, the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept was approved. In this concept, CIMIC was stated as follows:

“The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance's military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.” (NATO, 1999a, para. 60).

There are no expressions in this statement to conduct humanitarian assistance or to coordinate it. The implication simply is that civil actors and soldiers should benefit from each other.

Although the need for CIMIC was pointed out and a definition was provided in 1997, member countries accelerated the establishment of CIMIC units in 1999 with the Strategic Concept. Following this development, these CIMIC units and headquarters elements were in need of a NATO-wide document to ensure unity in efforts with other actors both within the military structure and in the international environment. This document was the "MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation", published in 2001. Then, in 2003, the first CIMIC doctrine, Allied Joint Publication-9 (AJP-9), was going to be published. Meanwhile, after the publication of MC 411/1, the CIMIC Functional Planning Guide was also published. In this guide, the contribution of CIMIC to the operation plan was explained.

The MC 411/1 document was important in terms of showing that CIMIC was separated from the understanding of "winning hearts and minds", the Civil Affairs experience applied during the Second World War, or the Cold War period CIMIC understanding. In this document, it was stated that;

“...military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities, at the same time civil support to the military operation is important” (NATO, 2001, para. 1).

Stating that the specified situation was valid not only for the Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (Non-Article 5 CRO) but also for Collective Defense Operations (CDO), the CIMIC was defined as follows:

“The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.” (NATO, 2001, para. 4).

While there were no phrases in the definition that evoked humanitarian aid, the actors encountered in the Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo operation areas were counted.

There were some issues that may cause misunderstanding of the definition in the MC 411/1 document. One of these was the historical origins of CIMIC and Cold War period experiences. The other reason was the context in which it arose. Therefore, in MC 411/1 document, it was necessary to explain what it was and what was not in order to explain CIMIC. Accordingly, the definitions of Civil Emergency Planning (CEP), Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies (MAHE) and Host Nation Support (HNS) concepts were provided and the differences from CIMIC were discussed. The important point here was that CIMIC was also essential for these concepts.

In MC 411/1, it was emphasized that social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors should be taken into consideration when planning and executing operations in the existing security environment and operational environment, and it was stated that commanders should take into account the presence of international and non-governmental organizations, which were increasing in number (NATO, 2001, para. 8). Here we come up with the first contribution of CIMIC. Within this defined framework, CIMIC will firstly establish and maintain full cooperation between the commander and civilian authorities, organizations, agencies and the public in order to facilitate the unit’s fulfillment of its duty. Thus, when liaison is established with appropriate actors, the long-term goal of CIMIC is to help create and maintain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance goals in operations (NATO, 2001, p. 9). Certain conditions were defined for CIMIC to directly conduct civilian tasks, directly support a civilian plan, or carry out activities such as humanitarian assistance. These are the lack of an appropriate civilian authority to carry out these civil tasks, the existence of a civilian authority but not being able to fulfill its functions, demand from civilian actors and the existence of sufficient military means. It was stated that although non-military tasks are permitted under these conditions, civilian activities

should be transferred immediately when suitable civilian actors are formed. In this document, two important points are emphasized while performing CIMIC activities. One is that the use of most probably limited resources in the area of operations should be coordinated with civilians, and the other is that the principles of organizations engaged in humanitarian activities should be respected. It is stated in MC 411/1 that the planning of CIMIC activities would be made before and during the operation at the strategic level and below. It was stated that while CIMIC activities are being carried out, CIMIC should be planned to cover the whole plan, should be implemented with the principles of ensuring the unity of effort, being transparent and determining common goals with civilians.

After the MC 411/1, another document was needed to determine how the CIMIC planning would be conducted and evaluated (Hangya, 2014, p. 11). Within this direction, CIMIC Functional Planning Guidance was published in March 2002. This guide was designed to be applied in parallel with the NATO planning process. This document explained how CIMIC could contribute at which phase, and it would be beneficial to be able to determine the requirements for CIMIC planning in terms of the personnel qualification.

While comprehensive CIMIC literature was formed, CIMIC units and headquarter elements continued to be established. While countries were establishing their relevant units, two separate CIMIC elements were created within NATO during this period. One of them was CIMIC Group-North (CIMIC Group-North) and the other was CIMIC Group-South (CIMIC Group-South). CIMIC Group-North was established in 2001 with the initiative of the Netherlands and contributing nations were Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia. CIMIC Group-South was founded in 2002 under the leadership of Italy, and Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia contributed. Both of these elements were assigned to provide training and personnel regarding the CIMIC activities to be carried out by NATO. These centers were updated over time as needed and transformed from CIMIC Group-North to CIMIC Center of Excellence in 2005. CIMIC Group-South, on the other hand, continued to

train personnel and prepare them for duty with its new name of Multinational CIMIC Group (Multinational CIMIC Group) in 2009.

### **5.5. Conclusion**

Kosovo provided an operational environment in which CIMIC was consolidated. Although there was a development parallel to the way it emerged in Bosnia, at least the importance of CIMIC was understood, CIMIC units were established and the literature started to emerge. However, in this positive atmosphere, in the period when stability was achieved accordingly in Kosovo, exaggerated evaluations were made about CIMIC. According to these evaluations, if applied properly, the CIMIC could reduce the number of personnel in peace operations, reduce the costs of the nation-building process, and close the cultural gap between organizations and soldiers (Mockaitis, 2004, p. 2-18). CIMIC would provide a significant contribution to all of these, but expecting CIMIC to fulfill them alone was unrealistic. These evaluations must be the results of lacking awareness about the security environment, non-military dimension, missions of soldiers and the definition of CIMIC.

In the same atmosphere, against the above-mentioned evaluations, more meaningful CIMIC assessments were also provided. According to an evaluation, CIMIC moved from a support element to a position with a primary function and has become more centralized. As a result, CIMIC experts started to take a different place in the decision-making process (van Loon, 2002, p. 125). This moving to the central position was about reconstruction and humanitarian activities but not about managing the civil-military interface, establishing liaison at appropriate levels with relevant stakeholders and creating the comprehensive civilian picture of the area of operation.

Under appropriate conditions, the contribution of CIMIC would be very important, but providing the necessary conditions might not be enough. CIMIC should be understood very well by planners and implementers and commanders and headquarters, so it was not enough for CIMIC personnel to establish good relations with organizations and know them.



One lesson from Bosnia and Herzegovina was the insufficient information about the civilians in the area of operation. This was the information that soldiers should have before they reach the area of operation. It was necessary to know the social, economic, political, and cultural, historical, and religious characteristics of the region where they would be deployed. Thus, good planning and adaptation of forces to the area of operation would be facilitated.

This inadequate knowledge and training of the soldiers, lack of comprehensive information about the civilian environment and their short tours of duty caused the soldiers to focus on short-term activities. Thus, at the beginning, soldiers conducted small-scale reconstruction projects as short-term targets. The “acceptance of force” and “force protection” by “winning the heart and mind” of the local people was the primary rationale behind these projects (Rietjens and Bollen, 2008, p. 6).

Lots of activities were conducted, projects executed, and humanitarian assistance was provided, but they were never evaluated whether they were successful or not. This was the result of the lack of initial planning. Later on, planned activities were conducted or supported. In this case, it was very important to evaluate whether the CIMIC activities were conducted as planned and whether they provided the expected benefit. For this, standardization should be provided, and effectiveness and efficiency measures should be determined (Wentz, 2002, p. 492). This required a CIMIC doctrine and it was prepared in 2003.

To sum up, the importance of CIMIC was obvious, especially in operations such as peace operations and should be involved in the operational planning process. For this, there should be cohesion between both planners, implementers and decision-makers (Wentz, 2002, p. 502-503). The most important task here falls on the CIMIC personnel. CIMIC personnel must be skilled in networking, coordination and cooperation in a multinational operating environment. At the same time, they should be a bridge between the military and civil worlds, and they should be able to relate the mission, resources and needs. They do not know all the necessary answers in the area of operation, but they must at least know how to find them.

As can be seen, CIMIC personnel are separated from other personnel. An important consequence of this was that the CIMIC and its personnel did not receive the required attention. According to Wentz, CIMIC personnel were mostly excluded; they were not regarded as a part of the team of the rest of the unit. Commanders tended to see CIMIC simply as a humanitarian coordinator and often did not know what CIMIC was doing. For this reason, they keep CIMIC away from them.

Finally, CIMIC personnel should be involved in broad planning to support the entire operational plan and military units. This situation was often hampered by understanding "why the humanitarian aid coordinator would like to understand this, how can he/she contribute to the operation" (Wentz, 2002, p. 503).





Figure-5.3: CIMIC in Kosovo.

## CHAPTER-VI

### CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION in AFGHANISTAN

In this chapter, CIMIC in Afghanistan will be examined. CIMIC was mainly applied via Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan. CIMIC was in the heart of the

PRTs. In order to fully understand the purposes of PRTs, the Comprehensive Approach also should be understood since they developed simultaneously.



Map-6.1: Afghanistan (Barfield, 2010, p. 271).

### 6.1. Road to Crisis (before 2001)


Charles Welsh describes Afghanistan as a cockfighting area in the preface to Angus Hamilton's book, published in 1910 with the title "Afghanistan". Stating that there are brave, warrior and freedom-loving people of various races who call themselves Afghans, Welsh states that Russia and Britain caused bloodshed in Afghanistan for their interests in India (Hamilton, 1910, p. ix-x).

In fact, in the 1900s and in the last 1500 years of Afghanistan's 4000-year history, tensions and conflicts such as invasion, occupation, the rivalry of the great powers, civil war, and religious strife have not been missing. The final curtain of this process was

opened in the 1950s, and today the Afghan people are still waiting for peace with the help of the international community.

In the early 1950s, Afghan administrators focused their attention on internal security and aimed to suppress opposition groups. The purpose of this was to protect the power that was strengthened but not adopted by the people. Since the authority of the government cannot go beyond Kabul, giving priority to security and control has limited the resources that can be transferred for development. In this process, the government tried to develop relations with the USSR and the USA and received significant support from the USSR. Although there have been developments in various fields with the support provided, the problems with the Pashtuns have caused the gap with Pakistan. Upon this, King Zahir Shah demanded the resignation of Mohammed Davut, the head of the government, and a new cabinet was established and a new constitution was adopted (Lee, 2018, p. 550-560).

According to the new constitution prepared in 1964, the country was divided into 27 provinces and political parties affiliated with the left, and the Islamic mainstream emerged. The order created by this constitution became dysfunctional in a short time, and as a result of the instability between 1969-1973, former Prime Minister Muhammet Davut took over the administration in 1973 with a military coup (Lee, 2018, p. 581). This administration had to deal with conflicts and tensions between radical Islamists, Pashtun tribes and communists. At the end of his second term of 5 years, the communists killed Davut in a coup in 1978 (Barfield, 2010, p. 210-217).



Map-6.2: Distribution of ethnic groups (Barfield, 2010, p. 19).

Even though the administration declared after the coup that it was not anti-Islamic and took steps in this direction, it could not get support from the public and stop the clashes. Thereupon, the Soviet occupation started in 1979 (Lee, 2018, p. 608). In this process, while the mujahids organized against the occupation, they got support from the US and Saudi Arabia. The Soviet occupation and the conflicts resulted in nearly five million people becoming refugees. The Russians left Afghanistan in 1989, where conflicts continued after the 11-year occupation. Yet, Russians continued to support the Afghan government financially. As a result of the Soviet retreat and with the end of the Cold War, the US interest in the region decreased. Afghanistan became a new area of contention for Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. During this period, a conflict between Pashtun and non-Pashtun occurred, and the bloodiest civil war started.

Before the 1978 communist coup, Afghanistan was self-sufficient in food production and political, social and economic conditions were relatively stable. However, the war

that had been going on since 1979 destroyed much of this progress. In addition, wars and associated mass movements of refugees undermined traditional tribal authority structures. As a result, a power vacuum occurred and the Taliban and Al Qaeda filled this gap (Hanagan, 2019, p. 30). The Taliban started to take control throughout Afghanistan in 1994, and with the conquest of Kabul in 1996, the Afghan Islamic Emirate was established. Taliban started to apply the Sharia rules (Lee, 2018, p. 629-640). After the capture of Kabul, groups against the Taliban established the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was effective in the North and North East of Afghanistan until 2001.

Afghanistan was far more shattered politically, economically and socially than Kosovo, which was on the agenda of the international community in 2001. This made Afghanistan a failed state (Hanagan, 2019, p. 30). On the other hand, it is claimed that Afghanistan might be a failed state but was not a failed nation. The lack of an effective central government, according to Thomas Barfield, was balanced by the strong sense of national unity created during the Soviet occupation, as well as the refugee experiences in neighboring Pakistan and Iran, and Afghans did not want their country to be divided along ethnic lines (Barfield, 2010, p.77-78).

Within this environment 9/11 attacks took place and over 3.000 people died. The event was the single bloodiest act of terrorism in history (Mansbach and Taylor, 2018, p. 367).

Edgar Buckley, who was Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Operations from 1999 to 2003, describes the atmosphere in NATO HQ on September 11, 2001, in NATO Review magazine. He states that Canadian Ambassador David Wright, who was also dean of the Council, assured US Ambassador Nick Burns of the support of all the Allies. As Buckley states Ambassador Wright said that "Hell, this is an Alliance, we've got Article 5." Buckley asserts that,

“That was the first reference to Article 5 I heard that day and it struck an immediate chord” (Buckley, 2006).

It was obvious that such an attack was not expected by the US and NATO as well, but it seems that NATO was not ready to invoke Article 5. In both 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, however, terrorism and related issues were regarded as risks or threats. Edgar Buckley provides us information about how NATO handled the situation;

“There was little to guide us. There had been hardly any discussion of terrorism at NATO up to that point. There was no clear policy, as far as I knew, on the use of NATO assets in response to terrorist attacks. There had been no consultation with delegations about what had gone on that day. We had not even discussed the way ahead or options with the Secretary General or his Private Office. There had been no "steer" from any capital” (Buckley, 2006).

Continuingly he states that;

“Article 5 contemplated an "armed attack" against any NATO Ally, but was an aircraft a weapon? We also discussed how to distinguish what had happened that day from "normal" terrorism, such as practised by the IRA, ETA or the PKK. The discussion was useful but inconclusive” (Buckley, 2006).

9/11 attacks brought new dimensions not only about means or tools but also about the security, threat and risk assumptions. This attack represented the main threat source changing from state to non-state actors (Buzan, 2008, p. 110). The US attacks by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, brought a sudden and unexpected end to the post-Cold War era (Buzan, 2008, p. 118).

Despite the predictions in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the 9/11 attacks could not be foreseen and there was no any preparation. After the attack, coalition forces bombed terrorists' positions in Afghanistan and later on NATO intervened by taking over the command of ISAF in 2003. While the Bosnia and Kosovo examples were in front of the decision-makers, NATO again started development issues. Buzan states that;

“Such political failures are difficult and costly to fix from the outside. These failures can also be supported by internationally organized mafias, who constitute the dark side of increased economic liberalization, as criminals

and terrorists can take advantage of areas where effective state control lacks” (Buzan, 2008, p. 118).

According to Buzan, NATO was not very successful in stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan (Buzan, 2008, p. 120). There could be lots of reasons for this failure but CIMIC could make significant contributions at the tactical level in case it had been properly planned before the deployment.

## **6.2. War in Afghanistan (2001-2003)**

The immediate reaction of the UNSC with the resolution 1368, which was taken on September 12, was to denounce the attacks as "terrorist acts" and to explain that they threaten international peace and security (UNSC, 2001a). With resolution 1373 taken on September 28, UN invited all states to take all measures against terrorism within the scope of the 7th article of the UN Treaty. The UNSC called on all states to prevent the financing of terrorist acts and to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. In addition, it was emphasized that all necessary measures will be taken to implement this decision (UNSC, 2001b).

NATO also reacted immediately and activated Article 5 on September 12. Although Article 5 was activated, NATO did not take action against Afghanistan. NATO was not prepared for such a situation. Factors such as uncertainty to what extent its capacity would respond to this situation and the long decision-making process prevented NATO from taking action against attacks. Besides, NATO was not a global security organization. Taking on an anti-terrorism and regime change mission was not included in NATO's mandate. Within this framework, NATO announced eight measures via invocation of Article 5:

- To enhance intelligence-sharing and cooperation, both bilaterally and in appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it;
- To provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other countries which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism;



- To take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory;
- To backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that is required to directly support operations against terrorism;
- To provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against terrorism;
- To provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO member countries for operations against terrorism, including for refueling, in accordance with national procedures;
- That the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve;
- That the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism<sup>18</sup>.

Although "terrorist acts" were mentioned among the risks and threats in the definition of changing the security environment in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, this did not turn into military activities in the context of the Alliance. Therefore, before 2001, the Alliance's military planning bodies had not developed any contingency plans to deal with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Existing NATO operation plans were not prepared for an attack like 9/11. It was also not envisioned of any unusual operations, such as the use of several hundred secret agents and special operations forces to organize more than 20,000 indigenous forces to fight the Taliban and others (Hanagan, 2019, p. 43). These activities were carried out by the coalition led by the US and the UK.

The coalition formed by the US and the UK launched Operation Enduring Freedom in early October with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. During the operation, terrorist positions in Afghanistan were hit, the Taliban was toppled in a short time and Kabul was taken under control at the end of November. This intervention has been the fourth foreign intervention in Afghanistan's last 160-year history (Barfield, 2010, p. 272).

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<sup>18</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm?selectedLocale=en), accessed 01.11.2018.

After the intervention, an interim government was established and Hamid Karzai was appointed as the head.

The operation was planned and carried out in four phases. In the first phase, the intelligence was collected needed for the operation. In the second phase, air defense systems and command and control centers were targeted via air force, while Special Forces were enabled to enter the operation area and contact the locals. Thus, the operational environment was prepared for the next operation. In the third phase, attacks on the rebel camps were carried out via airpower and Special Forces. In the fourth phase, after the combat operations, efforts were made to "win the hearts and minds" of the Afghan people (Wright, 2010, p. 46-51).

Here it should be indicated one of the important topics for CIMIC during combat operations. Even in a setting like the abovementioned operation plan CIMIC (or winning the hearts and minds activities as it was stated in the coalition plan) has a place. It is not an issue to be ignored until the end of the operation. It is true that CIMIC may not have something to say during the operation since harsh fighting may take place. Yet the post-conflict issues also should be planned before the operation in case CIMIC is not regarded as a helping hand that reconstructs what the army destroys. The relation between fight and CIMIC is shown in Figure-6.1 below.

The first phase of the operation took three months and coalition forces took control of Kabul on 26 November. There were concerns that Afghan security forces would not be able to provide stability in the country after the operation. It was not only to provide security and stability in Afghanistan but in Europe as well. Protecting Europe, therefore, meant eliminating the sanctuary in Afghanistan and creating a resilient Afghan state—which meant nation-building. Stabilization and reconstruction missions, like those that NATO had undertaken in the Balkans, would need to be repeated on a much larger scale in Afghanistan (Hanagan, 2019, p. 49).

Accordingly, the Bonn Conference was held in early December 2001 and the UN was asked to approve the establishment of a force to assist in the creation and training of the

security forces. UNSC adopted resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001. This decision included the establishment of a multinational power that would ensure the security of Kabul and the surrounding region and support the initiatives of the newly formed government to ensure an atmosphere of trust and stability (UNSC, 2001c). In this context, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established.




Figure-6.1: CIMIC and Armed Conflict Relation.

Deployed in Kabul and the surrounding region, ISAF was initially a coalition of willing countries under the mandate of the UN Security Council, not as a NATO or UN force. The mission of ISAF was to help the Afghan Government in creating a safe and secure environment for the entire country, thereby minimizing the possibility of terrorist groups using Afghanistan as a safe haven once again to plan their attacks.

18 countries supported this multinational force and Britain took the first command of ISAF. By February 2002, twenty-five countries were contributing to military activities in Afghanistan, including sixteen of the nineteen NATO members (Hanagan, 2019, p. 38). In August 2003, NATO took the command of ISAF.

### **6.3. Post-War Period (2003-2004)**

The first effect of the 9/11 attacks was that the alliance members put aside their disagreements and created an environment of solidarity. In this context, rapprochement with Russia has also been achieved. The Russian Federation (RF) announced its support to the US in the fight against global terrorism. It was stated that RF was ready to share intelligence, open an air corridor, and send troops to search and rescue operations that may occur in the region (Wright, 2010, p. 57).

With 9/11 important changes also took place in the international security environment. Three important changes have emerged in this new period (Rühle, 2003, p. 91):

- The first change occurred in the nature of the threat. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have emerged as new threats outside the European continent.
- The second change occurred within the scope of the strategies to combat these new threats. New threats have required an approach different from what NATO could provide. For this reason, the US preferred to act in ad hoc coalitions, which consist of states that have more capabilities and more willingness. From the NATO perspective, this caused the idea of the Comprehensive Approach, which aims to bring the efforts of different actors together for the same end state.
- The third change has occurred within the framework of military capabilities to address new threats. The issues of rapid response, power transfer and protection against weapons of mass destruction have come to the fore. These have been the issues in which the US was strong, but the European states remained weak since the end of the Cold War.

Within the scope of these changes, three basic orientations have emerged that NATO can follow: NATO should find a balance between traditional European-based missions and new threats; it should acquire the necessary military skills to combat these new threats and be able to act quickly and flexibly.

After the attacks, the first summit was conducted in Prague in 2002. This summit involved important clues on what kind of organization NATO would be in the future. Related points from the summit were as follows:

- NATO Response Force (NRF) will be established. These forces will be technologically superior, flexible, highly mobile, and sustainable and enable interoperability.
- Two strategic commands will be established to facilitate NATO's military command relations. Allied Command Operations (ACO) to be established in Europe, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to be established in the US.
- The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of the continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high threat environment was approved.
- A new military concept to combat terrorism will be formed.
- New measures in combating CBRN Weapons will be initiated.
- The capabilities of the alliance against cyber attacks will be strengthened.
- New NATO Missile Defence feasibility study will be initiated (NATO, 2002, para. 4).

In addition, cooperation with the UN, EU, and OSCE was emphasized especially related with the operations in the Balkans.

Looking at the Summit Declaration and the above articles, it can be inferred that NATO wanted to continue its commitment in defending the Alliance territory. In addition to that by gaining new capabilities and improving existing ones, NATO wanted to be one of the main contributors to global peace and security. NATO aimed to transform into an organization that can operate wherever and whenever required against new risks and threats in building, keeping and enforcing peace, and combating international terrorism.

Within this context, NATO took command of the ISAF in 2003. In the press release after the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Madrid on 3 June 2003, it was announced that;

“NATO is taking on new operations, which meet the common security interests of all Allies. We commend the participation of Allies in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the present role of Germany and The Netherlands as lead nations in the mission. From August, NATO will take the leading role by assuming the strategic coordination, command and control of ISAF. ISAF will continue to operate under United Nations mandate. NATO’s enhanced role will strengthen ISAF’s effectiveness and sustainability, and, together with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams being deployed by several Allies and Partners, reinforce the international community’s commitment to building a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan. The decision to use NATO’s assets and capabilities to ensure ISAF’s continuity also demonstrates our readiness to support or lead operations and deploy forces, wherever the Alliance decides, to ensure our common security” (NATO, 2003b, para. 3).

ISAF deployment was NATO's first deployment outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The task of ISAF was defined as to help ensure the security of the Afghanistan government and the international community. ISAF has also helped the Afghan government to be recognized throughout the country and to hold independent and fair elections under the rule of law. By the end of 2003, ISAF consisted of around 10,000 soldiers and its responsibility included the capital Kabul and the surrounding region.

With the UNSC resolution 1510, it was approved that the ISAF mission would be extended beyond Kabul to cover the whole country and in December 2003, NATO announced its intention to establish five more PRTs in addition to the existing PRTs. The first NATO-led PRT would be in Kunduz in the North, under German command.

At the NATO Summit held in Istanbul in June 2004, the expansion of the NATO mission in Afghanistan was discussed. The request of the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai at the summit was accepted and it was decided to place ISAF outside Kabul in line with the UNSC resolutions (NATO, 2004). The secretary-general asked more troops from the alliance members for the expanded mission.

At the same summit, the Secretary-General announced that COMISAF was authorized for the expansion. The ISAF expansion would be via PRTs in Mazar-i-Sharif and Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan. With the PRT in Kunduz, these five PRTs would be part of a progressive process in accordance with the previous decision by the North

Atlantic Council (NAC) to expand ISAF in a flexible manner to include other PRTs in the future. Additionally, NAC also authorized SACEUR to establish a Forward Support Base (a logistics hub) and temporary satellite presences in Sar-e-Pol, Samangan and Sheberghan, as well as to continue the necessary preparations for election support and for further expansion (NATO Press Release (2004)106).

The expansion concluded by the summer of 2006. ISAF had expanded across the entire country, establishing headquarters and PRTs based on a geographic regional command configuration. Thus, NATO has opened up firstly through the northeast, then west and south, and finally east and southeast, the country's most dangerous and explosive areas. The emergence of the uprisings supported by the Taliban between 2002-2006 made these tasks difficult.


While the 2002 and 2004 Summits gave due importance to Afghanistan, the developments in the Balkans, the risks and threats the Alliance would face in the future, the measures to be taken and the capabilities to be gained were also discussed. But in the Riga Summit held in 2006, it was clearly stated that NATO's key priority is to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Parallel to this, the Comprehensive Approach has been adopted as a strategy for stabilization.

As of 2014, the number of countries serving has reached 50. ISAF's ultimate goal was to leave the country after establishing a functioning state system in Afghanistan. ISAF has worked in many different fields, from health to development, and provided consultancy services to government bodies. The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force were trained and it was aimed to ensure their own security. In 2015, ISAF left its mission to the Resolute Support Mission, which aimed to support government bodies in Afghanistan and the Afghan people.

#### **6.4. CIMIC Activities**

The implementation of CIMIC during the deployment of ISAF in Afghanistan was different seemingly, from the CIMIC carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. This difference arose from the environment in which CIMIC was performed. Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Kosovo were the cases of a civil war involving conflicts in which civilians were directly targeted by the war, and international forces were deployed in the region after these conflicts ended. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the conflicts within the framework of insurgency continued.



Map-6.3: NATO Regional Commands as of 2011 (Hanagan, 2019, p. xiv).

In both cases, CIMIC played a central role. The reason for CIMIC's central position in both complex peace support operations and counter-insurgency proved that these missions mostly revolved around supporting, but at times even substituting, the civil power. Civil authorities could no longer maintain the monopoly on the use of force, either in the face of an insurgency or while implementing the civilian aspects of a peace agreement. In both complex peace support operations and counter-insurgency, the civilian aspects proved crucial for creating a sustainable peace (Zaalberg, 2008, p. 20).



In a stabilization mission like ISAF, the aim was to create a safe and secure environment to facilitate post-war reconstruction. In order to achieve this, the CIMIC concept primarily aimed;

- To shape civil-military relations by establishing, maintaining and coordinating relations with civilian actors in the field of operation;

- To support civil actors and institutions to create the necessary conditions for the accomplishment of the task, thereby increasing the acceptance and hence protection of the armed forces; and

- To support the armed forces and military leaders' decision-making by providing a direct perspective on the civilian situation on the ground. Thus, as an integral part of the planning and execution of military operations, CIMIC actually had little to do with humanitarian or development aid (Paul, 2009, p. 5).

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) were established by coalition forces in Afghanistan in order to carry out the restructuring activities centrally. Resembling the CIMIC Centers in Bosnia and Kosovo, the difference between the PRTs was the structures that included both civilian experts and soldiers. PRTs designed by the coalition forces aimed to win the hearts and minds of the people by conducting small-scale infrastructure projects and humanitarian assistance activities. With the deployment of NATO, the PRTs also aimed to legitimize the Afghan government and ensure that the people accept it. All these placed the CIMIC at the heart of the PRTs (Zaalberg, 2008, p. 8).

#### **6.4.1. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)**

Civil Affairs Teams and Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) were established in 2002 in order to ensure inter-agency cooperation by the coalition forces in the early stages of operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan (Petrik, 2016, s.165). Their mission was to assess humanitarian needs, carry out small-scale reconstruction projects and establish relationships with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and non-governmental organizations operating in the field (Perito, 2005, s. 2).

As the coalition restructuring activities within the scope of winning hearts and minds began to be increasingly important to the operation, great efforts were made to develop the delivery of humanitarian assistance and infrastructure improvement projects. In November 2002, the US added civilian personnel to the CHCL and guards for their security; thus, the first PRT was born in Gardiz (Petrik, 2016, s. 165). That PRT was activated in 2003. Later, PRTs were also established in Bamian, Kunduz and Mazar-e Sharif. These were not fully operational in July 2003 (Wright, 2010, p. 254).

This PRT model was successfully implemented. With the deployment of NATO, the PRTs soon expanded and started operating in other provinces under the command of NATO. Besides the reconstruction projects, the aim of PRTs was to allow the central government to get a stronger grip on the Afghan provinces.


In order to understand the importance NATO attributes to PRTs, it is necessary to look at the expressions in the Riga Summit declaration:

“There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security. The Afghan people have set out their security, governance and development goals in the Afghanistan Compact, concluded with the international community at the beginning of the year. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are increasingly at the leading edge of NATO’s effort, supported by military forces capable of providing the security and stability needed to foster civilian activity. Guided by the principle of local ownership, our nations will support the Afghan Government’s National Development Strategy and its efforts to build civilian capacity and develop its institutions” (NATO, 2006, para.6)

As of late January 2007, there were 25 PRTs led by 13 different countries, covering 31 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces under ISAF's command. As of 2009, the number of countries contributing to ISAF was 42, the number of soldiers was 58.390 and PRTs reached 26.

PRTs were small teams of military and civilian personnel working in Afghanistan’s provinces to provide security for aid works and help humanitarian assistance or reconstruction tasks in areas with ongoing conflict or high levels of insecurity (Maley, 2007). Structurally, PRTs were composed of various military and civilian bodies,

including diplomats, specialists in economic development and governance and a few representatives of the Afghan government (Shirzay, 2012). PRTs were also formed for counterinsurgency and mostly as part of an integrated approach to post-conflict reconstruction, which combines development, diplomacy, and defense (Williams, 2014, p. 25).



Map-6.4: ISAF RC and PRT Locations

(<https://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/index.html>)

PRTs were the primary means for ISAF to interact with the Afghan population (NATO, 2008c, p. i) and non-military stakeholders. CIMIC played a vital role in the execution of the tasks assigned to PRTs. Since the PRTs were tasked to contribute to development within their areas of responsibility, CIMIC facilitated their activities. The main idea behind the PRTs was that security would be provided through economic, political and social development.

Meantime, as the ISAF operation continued, the idea of a Comprehensive Approach was developed within NATO in 2004. With this formation, the concept was related to the political and strategic level and CIMIC and PRTs were raised as tools to apply the

Comprehensive Approach. Accordingly, NATO aimed to ensure security and stability through development in Afghanistan. This was not something NATO could do alone through the PRTs. One of the reasons for this was that the activities were being carried out within the framework of the bilateral agreements made between the Afghan Government and the country that established the PRT. This also guided NATO to adopt the Comprehensive Approach in order to direct efforts, resources and time towards a single final end-state that all actors aimed and expected.

Meanwhile, Comprehensive Approach must not be considered within the Afghanistan case only. As it was emphasized in the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO faces different risks and threats.

In 2010 NATO's New Strategic Concept was issued, which is still valid. In addition to previous ones in the new strategic concept, the producers of instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, defined as fostering extremism and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

Cyber threats and attacks and energy security were distinguishing features of this concept. It was observed that cyber-attacks were becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organized criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups could each be the source of such attacks.

The 2010 strategic concept states that all countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. It was assessed that some NATO countries would become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and, in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of

world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

Additionally, in this concept, we see the prediction of key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity, and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

These strategic concepts from 1991 to 2010 show us how NATO's security assumption and threat assessment changed extending to years. To sum up, it can be understood that NATO's focus shifted from state security to the security of society and individuals.

#### **6.4.2. Comprehensive Approach**

The adoption of the Comprehensive Approach in NATO and the effectiveness of PRTs in Afghanistan has historically coincided. This situation causes us to question whether there is a causal link between these two concepts. The Comprehensive Approach has been discussed in the Conceptual Framework section of this study. What will be done here is to look at the reflections of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan. Thus PRTs and CIMIC will be better understood.

It is generally claimed that Afghanistan is a laboratory in terms of civil-military relations in the field of operation. The reason why Afghanistan is called a laboratory, but not Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo, is the Comprehensive Approach. The Comprehensive Approach has emerged at the level of NATO's decision-makers, and thus CIMIC and PRTs became the practitioners of Comprehensive Approach at the tactical level.

At the Riga Summit held in 2006, the need for a comprehensive approach in Kosovo and Afghanistan was declared where civil and military efforts were used jointly. Almost a year later, the NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in the opening speech of the informal meeting with the foreign ministers of the countries that contributed to ISAF that

“... this is a team effort. NATO alone all by itself cannot help Afghanistan build lasting peace. We can only succeed if we all, civilian and military alike, pull our weight and pull together (NATO, 2007).”

By stating this, he was implying a comprehensive approach declared in 2006. In another statement in 2009, the Secretary-General again emphasized the Comprehensive Approach as follows:

“We need a comprehensive approach, a reinforced interaction between our military efforts and our endeavors with regard to civil reconstruction” (NATO, 2009b).

In fact, these statements indicate the same points as the assessments of High Representative Carl Bildt in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996. According to Mr. Bildt, operations carried out in Bosnia required civilian and military elements to work together; there was a need for a civil-military interface and this would be the lesson learned from Bosnia for future operations. Accordingly, Mark Duffield also emphasized the interface in 2001. To Duffield, one of the consequences of the new wars was the harmonization of security and development efforts. Networks linking governments, NGOs and the private sector began to emerge and consolidate as a result of the new wars (Duffield, 2001, p. 45).

Within this framework, the civil-military convergence started with the operations in the Balkans was also in the forefront in Afghanistan under the Comprehensive Approach umbrella. The main purpose in Afghanistan was to promote the development and provide security together. In Afghanistan, the military was relatively more organized than in the Balkans. However, despite previous operation experiences, NATO was late in establishing liaison and interacting with civilian actors. Soldiers applied temporary, situational and hasty arrangements (Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 77).

During the operations in the Balkans, the military was not experienced in engaging with civilian actors. Later on, civilian and military actors established liaison and coordinated and cooperated mostly on humanitarian issues. The soldiers did not establish a link between security, governance and development (Thruelsen, 2011, p. 80). But in

Afghanistan, there was a link between security, governance and development. Soldiers in Afghanistan established contacts with civil actors performing humanitarian and development activities and sought ways for cooperation. The soldiers also continued military operations to ensure security. Conducting operations, assisting civilian actors and establishing links between governance, development, and security resulted from Comprehensive Approach understanding.

It should be noted that NATO did not establish liaison, coordinate or cooperate with international and non-governmental organizations appropriately until the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has developed relations with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), African Union (AU) and the ICRC (NATO, 2013b). This is the result of the understanding that the military cannot respond to the current threats and risks alone. This is also the result of the transformation efforts of NATO.

#### Key Features of Comprehensive Approach

One of the Comprehensive Approach features is that it indicates a process not a result in crisis management and security issues. This process includes the defining of appropriate tools, actors and ways. Friis and Jarmyr stated that the Comprehensive Approach must be understood as;

“developing categories and definitions of various kinds of interactions and between various kinds of actors” (Friis and Jarmyr, 2008, p. 3).

de Conning and Friis, however, states that Comprehensive Approach is;

“a process aimed at facilitating system-wide coherence across the security, governance, development and political dimensions of international peace and stability operations” (de Coning and Friis, 2011, p. 245).

Hallett also indicates that the Comprehensive Approach is a process. According to Hallett, the cost of the interaction of different actors must be reduced and a self-synchronization should be established (Hallett, 2012, p. 15).

Another feature of the Comprehensive Approach is that it is bringing together different actors having different structures from different areas of expertise. Boiney and Schmorrow state;

“Each type of actor brings its own resources, organizational structure, situation awareness, constituencies, priorities and politics. Yet, ideally, all will function as part of an effectively coherent whole for a given operation” (Boiney and Schmorrow, 2010, p. 38).

Another feature of the Comprehensive Approach is that it has the potential to create a forum among the actors. According to Major ve Moelling, the Comprehensive Approach;

“reinvigorates the way crisis responses should be planned and carried out in view of enhancing both its efficiency and legitimacy by harmonizing the interaction and interdependence of tasks and actors involved” (Major and Moelling, 2009, p. 22).

#### Expected Benefits from Comprehensive Approach

First of all, the Comprehensive Approach helped NATO to transform itself into a new security environment. With the Comprehensive Approach, NATO changed from a “collective defence organisation into a multipurpose security agency” (Ortiz, 2008, p. 284). In addition, according to Petersen, Binnendjik and others, NATO should create a connection between its military capacity and capability with non-military elements of power. This would provide NATO to be more effective in crisis management (Petersen, Binnendjik and others, 2010, p. 78) and the Comprehensive Approach can help it.

There are a number of different actors and if they do not coordinate their actions with each other, they may face shortages of resources and they may hamper each other’s achievements (Petersen, Binnendjik and others, 2010, p. 89). This can be another benefit that the Comprehensive Approach provides an opportunity to the actors to coordinate their efforts so as not to harm what other actors do.



Another benefit of the Comprehensive Approach is that it can help the military to understand the root causes of the conflicts from useful perspectives in a more understandable manner.

#### Criticism of Comprehensive Approach

The Comprehensive Approach also faces various criticisms. These criticisms are generally made through activities conducted in Afghanistan. Frioriksson states that the Comprehensive Approach is inextricably associated with interventionism (Frioriksson, 2011, p. 44). In his work, he questions military and humanitarian activities and the tools used there. The military intervention in Afghanistan was coordinated with humanitarian assistance and development activities shortly after the intense conflict process, not before the operation. To be able to avoid this criticism, NATO should apply the Comprehensive Approach effectively before an operation.

In addition, Rynning criticizes the Comprehensive Approach that it brings actors together and creates a forum, but does not provide them an idea of what to do when the time comes and how strategies should be implemented (Rynning, 2011, p. 14). By looking at the PRT examples in Afghanistan, this criticism should be accepted as a fairly just criticism. In addition, the Comprehensive Approach is perceived as being owned by NATO and implemented at the political level. This does not fit the presentations of the official NATO bodies. The reason is the lack of institutionalization and a wide variety of different ideas about the concept within NATO. Some authors are more concerned about how NATO should adapt to ensure the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Approach (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2011, p. 27; Jakobsen, 2008, p. 3).

On the other hand, Wendling criticizes that the importance that is indicated by the Comprehensive Approach is very wide, its resources are diverse, and that it will lead to different practices by different actors (Wendling, 2010, p. 25). Similarly, it is stated that the Comprehensive Approach carries the risk of not turning into a useful tool since it cannot be understood consistently and harmoniously by many organizations (Major and Moelling, 2009: 22). In addition, Metcalfe and others argue that the mismatch between

actors is due to the difference in motivation, purpose and approach, not structure and culture. In this context, they state that, for example, humanitarian actors have principles such as impartiality and neutrality, which they must at least theoretically follow (Metcalf and others, 2012, p. 29).

It is also stated that humanitarian assistance is negatively affected due to the practices carried out as a result of the Comprehensive Approach. For example, Meharg argues that such attempts to integrate civil and military actions in the field of aid and restructuring create a situation where the humanitarian field is no longer present (Meharg, 2007, p. 116).

According to Petersen, Binnendijk and others;

“Civilian and military teammates cannot meet for the first time on the front lines of a crisis and cooperate effectively. NATO must plan and train better with its partners to protect its forces, alleviate civilian suffering, and bring missions to a successful conclusion as soon as possible” (Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 77).

This indicates that the Comprehensive Approach should be applied prior to an operation and during peacetime as well.

#### Difficulties in Application of Comprehensive Approach

Although the Comprehensive Approach might have the potential to establish a discussion forum and facilitate civil-military relations on the battlefield, it is not easy to implement as expected, as different actors have different cultures, structures, decision-making processes and motivations (Boiney and Schmorrow, 2010, p. 40). This makes it difficult to create cohesion between the actors and thus makes it difficult to apply the Comprehensive Approach. That is why it was discussed whether civilian components should be created within NATO.

According to Williams, the question of whether NATO should (or could) generate civilian capacity within the Alliance itself or whether the Comprehensive Approach

strategy was intended to leverage civil capacity from external organizations and agencies was never fully resolved (Williams, 2011, p. 103).

According to Jakobsen, after defining the understanding, doctrine and procedures, NATO should create required civilian components within itself (Jakobsen, 2008, p. 3). The difficulty here is that there is a very wide range of topics and issues to be covered to be able to conduct the missions successfully within a complex security environment. This will force NATO to limit the topics since the resources are inadequate resources. Instead of this, it is more acceptable to define and create a civil-military interface. In case this interface is established, lack of common terminology between the actors will emerge as another difficulty (Boiney and Schmorow, 2010, p. 40). So, the shared values, principles, goals and objectives will not be created easily (de Coning, 2008, p. 4). Contrary to this, Boiney and Schmorow state that all actors will declare that they aim to bring an end to conflict and create peace conditions (Boiney and Schmorow, 2010, p. 38-39). This statement indicates that all actors' end state might be the same and there is an opportunity to unite these issues. In this case, Hallett brings forward three major problems such as:

- Failure to embrace local actor priorities—it reflects the interests and objectives of the “International Community” more than those of local actors;
- Statement generation on common objectives without resource commitments;
- Failure to provide adequate direction for mission agreed objectives (Hallett, 2012, p. 15).

Another challenge is information sharing. According to Petersen, Binnendijk and others;

“NATO continues to improve its efforts to share information with partners on its own approach. This is a critical component of any successful civil–military strategy” (Petersen, Binnendijk and others, 2010, p. 85).

In order to successfully implement the Comprehensive Approach, it is necessary to provide information flow between the actors. On the other hand, actors who do not

know each other will be reluctant to share information. It is very difficult to define which information should be shared with which actor, at what level and via which means of communications.

In 2003 Allied Joint Publication-9 (AJP-9) was issued because of a need for a single document to be able to guide the dedicated CIMIC Units. In that publication, CIMIC was defined as;

“The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include cooperation with non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and authorities” (NATO, 2003a).

With the publication of AJP.9, it was accepted that CIMIC has three main functions such as; Liaison, Support the Force and Support the Civilians. The function Liaison indicates that CIMIC Units will define who is who in the operation area and learn their aim, capability, capacity, structure, mandate and needs. This will enable military units to create a civilian picture of the operation area. Support the Force function indicates that CIMIC will advise the commander of the military units in the operation area on how this civilian environment can support him/her in accomplishing his/her mission. Lastly, Support the civilians indicates how the military will and can support the civilian environment on the issues in a wide spectrum from information sharing about where the enemy is, which roads are safe to use, and which CIMIC projects should be conducted according to the needs of the population.

This definition, which remained valid until 2013, brings the civilian population forward and leaves the other civilian components at the backstage. This shows that NATO still responds within Cold War logic and that is why well-defined functions of CIMIC could not be applied properly. This also reflects the general understanding about CIMIC and its application since the 1990s. Today, some countries still assume that CIMIC must be kept in this concept and must be applied to establish good relations with the civilian population in the operation area. But this idea changed in 2013 with the publication of AJP 3.4.9.

With the experiences, lessons learned, increased effectiveness of the IOs and NGOs and the human factor of the military operations, NATO issued the latest version of the core CIMIC document 10 years later in 2013: AJP-3.4.9. In this document, CIMIC was defined as;

“The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies” (NATO, 2013a).

This definition seems quite pure and easy to understand but not perfect. On the one hand, it can immediately be noticed that the civilian part of the definition became more explicit and comprehensive. This strengthens the hands of the CIMIC appliers, so they gain the initiative to plan their activities in establishing liaison with the civilian environment. On the other hand, this definition irritates the members of the civilian environment, especially IOs and NGOs, because they feel they work for the commander of the military units in the operation area. This assumption is a big obstacle in front of the IOs and NGOs, who always indicate that they are neutral and impartial.

Meanwhile, the intent on limiting CIMIC with the “...in support of mission...” might be to avoid the application of this capability for other purposes. As it was witnessed, especially in the KFOR deployment, some countries applied CIMIC to disseminate their governments' humanitarian assistance to the population with whom they have close religious, ethnic and historical ties.

Here it should be stated that, in a broad sense, CIMIC is only the enabler for the military to enter the civilian environment by defining non-military actors. In this environment, military units or functions other-than-CIMIC need to engage with non-military actors for different purposes. For example, Transportation and Logistics Branches need to know the conditions of the roads, seaports, airports, thus need support from the Ministry of Transportation, related IOs and NGOs in the country. One other issue is the coordination of the movement and transportation. Main and alternative routes should be defined and using the routes must be coordinated with related actors. These actors are mainly military, humanitarian organizations, government and locals. This is called the

second core function of CIMIC, which is “Support to Force”. This helps the military to deconflict the actions, to avoid duplication of effort and to provide an economy of resources.

In a conflict or crisis area, there are a number of functions that should be covered by non-military actors, but sometimes these functions need to be covered by the military, especially when the lack of civilian authority. These areas are, but not limited to humanitarian assistance issues, gender issues, the status of children in an armed conflict, protection of cultural assets, protection of civilians, environmental protection, civil preparedness and etc. These areas could be covered by CIMIC by conducting CIMIC projects, providing awareness, reporting the developments and liaising with related stakeholders. With its limited resources, the military can contribute to civil situation when only really necessary. So, this is the third and last function of CIMIC, which is “Support to Civil Environment”.

During the crisis in the Balkans from the beginning of the 1990s, we see the first examples of CIMIC. These examples were the first applications of CIMIC as a NATO concept. Especially in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, the Support to Civil Environment function had the priority. That is why generally, this function of CIMIC was assumed as CIMIC itself. This early concept was developed after the Afghanistan case. In Afghanistan, military-experienced CIMIC within PRTs. CIMIC was again in the forefront in post-conflict situations but in a different way. In this case, civilian and military stakeholders worked together closely. But now we are experiencing another CIMIC concept, which is the main facilitator of the Comprehensive Approach.

CIMIC efforts during the Balkan crisis were applied in the post-conflict reconstruction process, which is directly related to the CIMIC projects and at the tactical level. Next, CIMIC efforts in Afghanistan were again related to reconstruction, but they were applied while the kinetic operation was ongoing and this provided some opportunities to the military. In Afghanistan, CIMIC was a concern of not only tactical but also an operational level. Currently, the military needs to know about the civil environment to be able to understand the root causes of a crisis or a conflict, to be able to conduct better

planning and to be able to contribute to the efforts of the international community. This requires the military to engage with the civilian environment prior to a mission in a comprehensive manner and here, the main facilitator is CIMIC.

### **6.5. Conclusion**

Unfortunately, the problems that emerged in the deployments of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR and the lessons learned or practices in the end could not be solved in Afghanistan. The tour of duty of CIMIC personnel has been a maximum of 6 months, the CIMIC is equated with humanitarian assistance activities, and the actors and factors that make up the civil environment have not been taken into account. In addition, the images of soldiers who drilled water wells, distributed food and clothing, repaired schools, and built bridges were not found realistic by both the soldiers and the civilians who were in charge of doing these (Paul, 2009, p. 5).

Negative assessments about the PRTs were also quite common and it can be said that the PRT model has failed. Research from German Institute for International and Security Affairs showed that after the deployment of the German Military, the security environment has deteriorated and violence against aid workers has increased (Shirzay, 2012). This situation was not about the Germans. This situation was due to the PRTs not operating according to their establishment purpose.

The PRTs conversely accelerated their “winning hearts and minds” operations by launching a huge number of quick-impact programs, aiming to gain community support. The establishment of PRTs rapidly led to the massive involvement of the military in delivering humanitarian and development assistance. This humanitarian nature of PRTs raised intense debates concerning CIMIC among the humanitarian actors.

One important issue was that the humanitarian affairs of the military did not adhere to the humanitarian organizations’ standards, as constantly claimed by IOs and NGOs (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005, p. 6). The other concern was that the humanitarian activities of the military has blurred the line between humanitarian actors and military actors on the ground and seriously affected the neutral and impartial image of international and

non-governmental organizations among the local Afghan communities (Parepa, 2014, p. 38; Gjørsv, 2014, p. 101). International and non-governmental organizations have increasingly suffered from the instrumentalization of humanitarian aid by the military (Maass, 2010, p. 221).

Unfortunately, there are many examples in this regard. Five members of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were killed in an incident. MSF blamed the soldiers who were conducting humanitarian assistance activities. According to MSF soldiers blurred the line between military and humanitarian activities by engaging in humanitarian assistance activities.

The PRT approach resulted in Afghans not providing themselves but relying on external assistance. Pugh states that the idea to release the people from conflict by the development of the societies attributes economic dysfunctionism (Pugh, 2005, p. 24). On the other hand, PRT's quick impact projects actually undermine sustainable development efforts (Williams, 2014, p. 23).

One other negative impact of the PRTs was that they had been applied as a tool for foreign policy (Shannon, 2009, p. 16). This was one of the mistakes, which was transferred from the Balkans.

These mismatches generally caused problems such as:

- Humanitarian principles that are very important and only shelter for international and non-governmental organizations were undermined.
- Against the aim of the military, projects were overlapped and this caused duplication of effort, time, money, manpower and other resources.
- Increased violence against humanitarian aid workers is another consequence of the current ineffective civil-military cooperation in post-Taliban Afghanistan (Shirzay, 2012).



As it should be, CIMIC was applied at the tactical level within PRT structures in Afghanistan. Here there are two important things. One is the lack of coordination and cooperation within the military both vertically and horizontally. The other is a lack of appropriate coordination and cooperation with the civilian environment.

If there is CIMIC, it means there is an operation, and if there is an operation, there should be an operation order. The CIMIC must be aware of all aspects of the operation order so that it can properly advise related military bodies on the civilian environment and evaluate how the civilian environment can support the military. As CIMIC personnel focus on tactical-level activities, it may deviate from the purpose of the operation. So when he/she deviates from the purpose, he/she should ask the question of “What is my mission?” and remember the order. Without this, the focus will be on humanitarian assistance, as it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan, and appropriate interaction with higher levels will not be achieved.

Political			
Strategic			
Operational			
Tactical			CIMIC applied in Afghanistan via PRTs during ISAF mission
	<b>Before the Armed Conflict (pre-2001)</b>	<b>During the Armed Conflict (2001)</b>	<b>After the Armed Conflict (post conflict - after 2003)</b>

Figure-6.2: CIMIC in Afghanistan

However, an important opportunity was seized within the framework of the Comprehensive Approach for the proper execution of CIMIC in Afghanistan. Accordingly, if effective top-down and bottom-up communication could be achieved, PRTs could have a higher chance of success, but this did not happen. Comprehensive Approach and CIMIC was discussed and applied without a strong link between them.




Figure-6.3: Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan

When we look at the aims of the operation, NATO and the wider international community, there is a gap between the aims and the activities. Targets or the end-state were defined jointly, but the activities were planned and conducted individually.

Consequently, in Afghanistan, the main task of CIMIC could be to facilitate commander in entering civilian environment at all levels and all dimensions thus enabling him/her to understand the civilian layer of the area of operation. According to Paul, this includes sub-tasks such as;

- a) The establishment and maintenance of contacts;

- b) The integration of important civil actors into strategic and operational planning; c) A continuous assessment of the civil environment including the identification of local needs;
- d) The supervision of appropriate activities, if necessary by calling in experts;
- e) The objective of a timely and smooth transfer of responsibility to the respective authorities;
- f) The close cooperation with other staff elements such as Intelligence, PsyOps, Info Ops; and
- g) Advising the commander accordingly (Paul, 2009, p. 11).



## **CHAPTER-VII**

### **CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION**

The current security environment is directly related to the annexation of Crimea and the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine. In the last part of “Current Debates on War” section in Chapter II of this study, the related theoretical background was provided. In this section, it would be good to look at Russia's activities in Ukraine to be able to get a better understanding. During the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in eastern Ukraine, Russia applied a number of tactics and used different tools from different dimensions such as economic, military, cultural and political from top to ground levels. Hunter and Pernik state that, during the annexation and crisis in eastern Ukraine, individuals, governmental and non-governmental structures were in close coordination with each other and this was the key for the Russian approach (Hunter and Pernik, 2015, p. 7). To be able to create this coordination, information was the most important element. As Rojansky and Kofman state, Russia applied information as an instrument of power and as a weapon to create space for its actions to be able to influence public and international opinion (Rojansky and Kofman, 2015, p. 6). Supporting this, Gen. Breedlove stated that;

“Russia, is waging the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare” (Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO Wales Summit, September 2014).

What Russia exploited was not only information and information warfare but also other tools, means, and tactics from political to tactical levels, including civilian and military dimensions. Thus, the Annexation of Crimea affected the security environment. Norwegian Minister of Defense stated that;

“We are faced with a different Russia. I want to warn against the fact that some people see this as something that is going to pass. The situation has changed, and it has changed profoundly” (Søreide, 2015).

### **7.1. Security Environment Before 2014**

As discussed in the Introduction Chapter and in the Conceptual Framework of this study, it is possible to periodize the time period from the beginning of the Cold War until now from security perspective. There are three milestones: 1-End of the Cold War, 2-9/11 Attacks and 3-Annexation of Crimea.

The content of the notion of security enlarged and discussions were made on what were the risks and threats and what were required to be protected during the post-Cold War period. It seems the end of the Cold War brought frustration and 9/11 added to this or we did not look through the right lenses.

According to John Baylis, idealism (and therefore cooperation) was a prevalent idea in the early League of Nations. Realism for a significant part of the Cold War process became dominant with its state-centric security assumption. New idealism after the end of the Cold War created a positive atmosphere, especially during the interventions to the crisis in the Balkans. After 9/11 realist perspective arose again (Baylis, 2008, p. 84).

Although this assessment might be valid in a general framework, Pınar Bilgin, who also agrees that there was a positive atmosphere before the September 11 (Bilgin, 2005, p. 63), states about the post-9/11 environment that September 11 proved the inadequacy of the traditional security approaches in detecting and remediating existing insecurities in the world. To her, while trying to understand world politics, it highlighted the importance of the need to deal directly with issues related to both war and peace, hard and soft power, states and non-state actors (Bilgin, 2010, p. 75).

Regarding the post-9/11 world, Mansbach and Taylor draw our attention to two important topics, such as territory and state capacity. They state that, while the importance of territory is declining, new technologies, international economic markets, and cultural identities become more important. As the second point, to them, state capacities were declining to protect and meet the needs of citizens (Mansbach and Taylor, 2018, p. 531). About this second point, Buzan asserts that, 9/11 attacks triggered another important shift in the military agenda. According to Buzan;

“It is certainly clear that this shift represents a radical departure from the previous agenda. In some respects, the traditional superiority of the military sector has been restored. Even the war has returned to the center of the scene” (Buzan, 2008, p. 118-119).

Developments in the security and change in risk and threat assessment can be examined with the help of Strategic Concepts of NATO. In fact, these concepts include beneficial observations and they provide us information to be able to compare and evaluate the developments. In Figure-7.1, there is brief information about the important points of the strategic concept.

	RISKS & THREATS			POSSIBLE AFFECTS	STRATEGIC AIM
	Conventional Risks & Threats	Risks & Threats to Peace and Stability	Other Areas of Concern		
DURING THE COLD WAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conventional Arms and Forces</li> <li>- Ballistic Missiles</li> <li>- Nuclear Arms</li> </ul>	-	-	Conventional and/or nuclear attack.	Defence and Deterrence
1991 SC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic,</li> <li>- Social,</li> <li>- Political difficulties,</li> <li>- Ethnic rivalries,</li> <li>- Territorial disputes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Proliferation of WMD.</li> <li>- Disruption of the flow of vital resources.</li> <li>- Actions of terrorism and sabotage.</li> </ul>	These risks and threats will cause instabilities which may cause armed conflicts and they can spill over.	Security and Stabilisation
1999 SC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and difficult to predict.</li> <li>- Religious rivalries.</li> <li>- Inadequate or failed efforts at reform.</li> <li>- The abuse of human rights</li> <li>- Dissolution of states.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organised crime.</li> <li>- Uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people.</li> </ul>	These risks and threats will cause human suffering, and armed conflicts which may affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over.	Security and Stabilisation
2010 SC	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fostering extremism.</li> <li>- Trans-national illegal activities (trafficking in arms, narcotics and people).</li> <li>- Cyber threats and attacks.</li> <li>- Energy Security.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key environmental and resource constraints.</li> <li>- Health risks.</li> <li>- Climate change.</li> <li>- Water scarcity.</li> <li>- Increasing energy needs.</li> </ul>	Inflicts on government administrations; businesses; economies; communication, transportation and supply networks; critical infrastructure.	Security and Stabilisation
2014 WALES SUMMIT	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Instability in maritime domain.</li> <li>- Proliferation of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>- Non-state actors.</li> <li>- A stable and reliable energy supply.</li> <li>- Diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources.</li> <li>- Interconnectivity of energy networks.</li> </ul>	Instabilities in eastern and southern borders are challenging Alliance security.	Security and Stabilisation

Figure-57.1: Security environment within NATO’s Strategic Concepts

As it is obvious in the post-Cold War period, different threats and risks came into view. Besides the conventional ones such as WMD and missile defense, according to

Mansbach and Taylor, drug trafficking, money laundering, the arms trade (the black market in weapons of mass destruction), the global movement of persons (refugees, undocumented aliens, immigration and demography, human trafficking), epidemics and pandemics (HIV/AIDS, SARS, Ebola) appeared as the issues within security (Mansbach and Taylor, 2018, p. 676-720).

NATO also included these and other issues in its strategic concepts and these topics were discussed during the summits. Among these, there are topics such as terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity, energy security, environmental issues, climate, and food and water security.

We need to mention some of these issues here. Among these, energy security is one of the important topics. Although this issue was discussed directly or indirectly since the 1999 Strategic Concept, the developments in 2005-2006 made this issue to be discussed comprehensively. The disagreement between Ukraine and Russia over natural gas between December 2005 and January 2006 made the energy a security issue for NATO (Çelikpala, 2013, p. 26). Energy security was discussed at the Bucharest Summit held in 2008 and a report titled "NATO's Role in Energy Security" was published. In line with the Strategic Concept published in 2010, the Energy Security Section was established at the NATO Headquarters and the Energy Security Center of Excellence was established in Lithuania in 2012.

The other important issue is cybersecurity. Crimes committed against or using information systems in the cyber field are defined as cybercrimes. Situations where these crimes threaten national or international security can be defined as cyber terrorism. Computer systems, which dominate almost all of daily life, have become the most important target of cyberterror in this sense. Salih Bıçakcı states that cyber threats should be organized in terms of national security. In terms of cyber threats and fight against them, military cyber organization and operations, intelligence and counterintelligence, critical infrastructure protection and national crisis management, cyber diplomacy and Internet governance constitute the foundations of national cyber security (Bıçakcı, 2019). Cyber defense entered the alliance's agenda with the 2002

Prague Summit. With the impact of cyber-attacks on Estonia's public and private institutions in 2007, the first Cyber Defense Principles were adopted in 2008. In 2008 The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established. Cyber Defense Principles developed in 2011 and were included in NATO Defense Planning in 2012.

Maritime security is another important issue. Maritime security is one of the topics, which is being studied intensively within the military, private sector and related academic environments currently. This is not surprising because of the obvious and agreed importance of the maritime domain. The maritime security was put on the agenda of the states such as the US, UK, France and India; and by organizations and initiatives such as NATO, EU, AU, G7 declaration, Our Ocean conference, Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO) (Bueger and Edmunds, 2017, p. 1293-1297). NATO has permanent efforts such as Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System (AWNIS) and NATO Shipping Center (NSC). The first two initiatives are not composed of only NATO nations but partner nations, non-NATO nations and other regional shipping organizations. NCAGS and AWNIS are contributing to a comprehensive approach in close cooperation with CIMIC.

In addition to the above-mentioned risks and threats, it is clear that issues such as the refugee crisis, epidemics and pandemics, environmental issues, climate change, water and food security will be discussed in terms of security. In these discussions within the security framework, it will be discussed how the societies are prepared against these risks and threats. The important thing is whether the relevant actors can come together in appropriate times and conditions in determining the answers to these issues and the measures to be taken.

Looking at the Annexation of Crimea and what happened in Eastern Ukraine from this perspective, it is seen that several arguments listed above were applied together and the society was not prepared for them for various reasons. That is why these developments deeply affected especially Europe. The developments in Crimea and Ukraine have



shown that many means/tools that are considered to be out of war have been used aggressively, remaining below the line of declaring war, and the unity and integrity of the society are targeted. The necessity for these developments to be related to security stems from this. This situation showed that elements such as energy, water and food, environment, global warming, cultural properties, social media, cyber space can be used as weapons.

The Ukrainian crisis might be regarded as the first conflict in Europe after the wars that took place during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. At that time, the risk was that the armed conflicts might spread and in this case, it was important to prevent the conflicts from spilling over. Instead of intervening in armed conflicts, the European countries provided significant humanitarian and developmental assistance after the conflicts. The case of Ukraine showed that the threat was big and it was not going to be enough to keep the conflicts away.

## **7.2. Annexation of Crimea and Conflicts in Eastern Ukraine (2014)**

The “BUMAGA (БУМАГА)” countries are very important for Russia. These countries are B-Belarus, U-Ukraine, M-Moldova, A-Azerbaijan, G-Georgia and A-Armenia. The first problem emerged in Georgia in terms of Russian interests. Georgia came close to NATO and the EU but faced with Russian aggression. After a short war with Georgia, Russia separated Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was the first Russian Army activity in the post-Cold War period (Mansbach and Taylor, 2018, p. 232). Constituting the next event, Ukraine also experienced the same. As one of the most important countries for post-Soviet Russia, Ukraine was affected by both Russia and the US (Mansbach and Taylor, 2018, p. 232). In this section, we are going to examine what actually happened in Ukraine and we are going to try to understand what the consequences were.

As it was presented earlier, Russia applied different tools within different dimensions during the annexation and aftermath. For example, from the perspective of international politics, Russian officials stated that Russia defends its legitimate rights such as Crimea was always part of Russia historically and politically (Cassidy, 2014); Crimean people has the right for self-determination like Kosovo (van den Driest, 2015, p. 330) and

Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine suffers from discrimination (Ball, 2019). While doing this, Russia's one of the main tools was diplomacy. Russian authorities spoke in one voice and used the same arguments in different platforms. The same authorities also stated that they support Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty (Freedman, 2014, p. 27-28; Merezhko, 2015, p. 170) and Russian intervention into Crimea brought stability to the region (Minina, 2014).

Vitaly Churkin's statement in UN Security Council on March 13, 2014, supports this approach (UNSC, 2014). While Ukrainian Prime Minister stated that Ukraine does not want war with Russia and they are open to talks in case Russia pulls back its troops, Russia's Ambassador to the United Nations responded, "*Russia does not want a war ... but Kyiv is "splitting its (own) country into two parts."*" (BBC, 2014).

In addition to that, during the voting of UN Security Council Resolution about denying annexation of Crimea, Vitali Churkin stated that;

"Crimean people had a right to determine their future, as well as an equal right to self-determination — principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The Russian Federation was not disputing the principle of territorial integrity, but when it became impossible to enjoy such rights within a single State, people could seek the right to self-determination, which was the case in Crimea now. Radicals had assumed power through an illegal coup d'état, thereby creating an illegal political vacuum. Generally agreed principles should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking political and historical specificities into account. The Crimean peninsula had previously been part of the Russian Federation, and had declared autonomy within Ukraine in 1991, he said, adding that the Russian Federation would respect the will of Crimea's people, to be expressed in Sunday's referendum" (UNSC, 2014).

Parallel to that statement, Lavrov also asserted that Russia was ready to protect the rights of the Russian minority in Ukraine by applying all measures, including political, diplomatic, and legal means (Sandford, 2014).

Another example of acting in the diplomacy dimension is Russia's threatening some countries not to vote in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution. It was reported that Russia threatened countries to get measures, including

“steps such as expelling migrant workers from Russia, halting natural gas supplies or banning certain imports to Russia. The countries that were threatened reportedly include Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, and a number of African states” (Charbonneau, 2014; Kirby, 2014).

After that, “Russia’s UN Mission denied the charges, stating that we never threaten anyone. We just explain the situation” (Trilling, 2014).

As complementary to these efforts, Russia applied economic tools as well. Sometimes threatened Ukraine asking to pay loans, and sometimes changed the gas prices and created an additional burden on Ukraine.

It was reported that for example, *“a spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Economy has stated that Russia is within its rights to use selective protective measures against Ukraine if it creates a free trade zone with a third government, or for example with the European Union”* (Reuters, 2014).

Another example is that Russia terminated the lease agreement with Ukraine over the use of the Sevastopol navy base. This created more reaction against Russia in the post-annexation situation (Hille, Buckley & Farchy, 2014).

Another tool in the toolkit of Russia was military and paramilitary or non-military during the annexation and aftermath. At the beginning of the annexation, the Russian-supported military was professionally covered and hidden, and Russian military infiltrated into Ukraine (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, 2015, p. 6) as in the previous example as Georgia. Men in unmarked uniforms or “little green men” stormed and invaded government buildings, airports, gas stations (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 175), organized pro-Russian minority<sup>19</sup>, helped young Russians in different parts of Ukraine to organize protests and fighting. In fact, the “little green men” concept is not new. This

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<sup>19</sup> “Public support for the annexation among the ethnic Russian population in Crimea was strong. Ethnic Russians, who make up 60 percent of the peninsula’s population, voted overwhelmingly for the incorporation of Crimea into Russia in the referendum held on March 18, 2014. This strong popular support gave the annexation a superficial veneer of international legitimacy” (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, 2015, p. 6).

concept has been applied since the intervention in Afghanistan (1979)<sup>20</sup>, then in Lithuania (1991), Transnistria (1990-1992), Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2009) and Georgia (2008) (US Army, 2015).

During this hybrid warfare, another example of to use of the military was the military exercises. According to related news,

“Russia's Defense Ministry announced that thousands of Russian troops in the regions of Rostov, Belgorod, Kursk and Tambov bordering Ukraine were involved in the exercises, which will continue until the end of the month” (Al Jazeera, 2014).

Later on, these exercises turned into military buildup. It was reported that the possibility of a Russian attack is highly likely than ever before. According to the news, the military build-ups were more than enough for an exercise and this was indicating the same scenario as in Chechnya and Georgia (Campbell, 2014).

One more example of the military dimension, as Treverton, Thvedt and others present, is that

“Russia used non-military and paramilitary elements to confuse the battlespace. Russian special forces were critical, but other elements were also deployed to give the impression of local support. Russian intelligence organized self-defense units comprised of local militia, Cossacks, and former special police. Russian troops also began to wear police uniforms to disguise themselves as part of the local security forces. Volunteers included army veterans, boxers, and members of the biker gang “Night Wolves” (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 20).

Another tool that was used was gatherings, protests and other kinds of movements to destabilize Ukrainian government authority in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 21). It was reported that Oleg Bakhtiyarov, the leader of the Eurasian Youth Union of Russia, which is a nationalist group in Russia, was arrested by

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<sup>20</sup> The Soviet attack on Afghanistan in 1979, the initial phase of which was conducted by 700 Soviet special forces dressed in Afghan uniforms (Popescu, 2015).

Ukrainian officials. It was stated that he was planning to infiltrate into the parliament and ministry buildings to hinder the elections in May (Dettmer, 2014).

Parallel to that, as Treverton, Thvedt and others inform, Russia started political warfare instead of using special forces and paramilitary units. Moscow applied the web of relations between political actors, businessmen, criminal groups and powerful oligarchs. Meanwhile, Ukraine assaulted these actors, arrested some of them and increased the tensions in favor of the Kremlin. As the protest movement turned into irregular warfare and Russia continued to launch conventional reinforcements with its troops to support separatists (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 21).

Another tool was media and the use of information campaign. As it is stated by Rojanski and Kofman,

“Russia’s use of broadcasting tools for propaganda and psychological operations, part of a broader information campaign to support the Crimean annexation, caught both Ukraine and the West by surprise” (Rojansky and Kofman 2015, p. 5).

The little green men mostly facilitated this. What they did first was to occupy “Krym” State Television Company and several facilities of Urktelecom. They seized the other television and radio stations, turned off the Ukrainian channels and replaced them with Rossiya 24 (Kates, 2014). These attempts were psychological in nature (Hunter and Pernik, 2015, p. 6).

Generally, Russian media is under the strict control of the state. “Ria Novosti” and “Voice of Russia” were replaced by Sputnik News Channel and Russia Today and they were owned by the state (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 18). All media and communications are under the direct control of Russia in Crimea and media workers are loyal to the Kremlin (Thiele, 2015, p. 6). This attempt of the state was observed in the social media dimension as well. VKontakte (Russian version of Facebook), Odnoklassniki and maluru.org (widespread in Eastern Europe) were exploited during the annexation (Thiele, 2015, p. 6; Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 28). Russia established troll farms to be able to infiltrate into news websites and social media web

sites in order to cut opposite voices. Controlling the information flow via conventional and cyber channels was central to Russian strategy (Hunter and Pernik, 2015, p. 6).

With the help of these trolls and social media, Kremlin launched an information campaign by targeting the Russian public, Crimean population and Ukrainian troops at the same time. After Yanukovich’s removal, Russia accelerated the campaign that government reshuffle was not legitimate and the Russian minority is in danger (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 18) and this messaging was supported at the international political level as we mentioned above. In addition to that, during the occupation of Crimea, Russia applied the information campaign “*simultaneously and synchronized with the military campaign*” (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 19). “*Russian troops began psychological pressure alongside an information operation to prompt defections of Ukrainian troops and officers*” by sending text messages that their troops were captured or killed in action<sup>21</sup> (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 18).

According to Pomerantsev and Weiss, Russia conducted the information campaign within this context:

Aim of Kremlin	Action of Kremlin
Shatter Communications	Buy up Western Media DDoS attacks Paralyze journalism with the threat of libel
Demoralize Enemy	Confuse the West with mixed messaging Seduce experts through high-level fora Disinformation campaigns
Take out Command Structure	Divide West though divide-and-conquer ruses Buy up political influence

Figure-7.2: Aim and Action of Kremlin During Hybrid Warfare (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2015, p. 14.)

<sup>21</sup> Ukrainian soldiers were subjected to a barrage of spam messages: “Your battalion commander has retreated. Take care of yourself”, “You will not regain Donbas back. Further bloodshed is pointless”, or “Ukrainian soldier, it’s better to retreat alive than stay here and die” (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 28 from Major Vasyl Tytarenko, Deputy Chief of the Cyber Security Division, Cyber Defense Center of Armed Forces of Ukraine, “Recent Cyber Events: Lessons Learned,” presentation, n.d.).

Russians also exploited humanitarian assistance and cultural issues. As a response to the Russian minority's proposal in eastern Ukraine, Russia sent humanitarian convoys. This created a dilemma that if these convoys were banned by the use of force, it would put the Ukrainian authorities in a difficult situation, otherwise, it would let Russia legitimize its actions (Freedman, 2014, p. 15-16).

To be able to wage hybrid warfare or apply hybrid threats in an effective way for success, the aggressor needs to know the culture of the target nation or population very well. According to Pomerantsev and Weiss,

“Russia cares very much about ideas—funding and engaging with intellectual influencers, think tanks, political parties, and religious and social movements across the world. However, its aim is less to further cultural understanding across borders, one of the pillars of liberal democracy, and more to use culture and ideas as tools to divide and rule, incite, corrupt and co-opt” (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2015, p. 18).

Consequently, by applying hybrid warfare, Russia gained more benefit in Ukraine. First of all, global norms and international rules against war, conquest and territorial violations have strengthened since the Second World War. It is difficult to justify unilateral seizures of territory held by other sovereign states. Russia bypassed the international rules about waging war against a sovereign state and also did not have to wait for a UN resolution. Secondly, more direct use of force might elicit resistance from a superior military coalition of adversaries. By waging a hybrid war, Russia also succeeded in keeping NATO and other possible coalitions away from the territory. Russia's activities expanded in a period, so no state realized the situation earlier. The third one is an overt military conflict could be unpopular. To be able to avoid this, Russia announced that the pro-Russian minority in Ukraine is under fierce conditions, and it is disseminating humanitarian aid to its cognates. The fourth one is hybrid warfare gives the belligerent plausible deniability because the state does not directly involve (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 180). The last one is that hybrid warfare is cheaper. When used in a coordinated and synchronized way, existing tools might be enough, which does not bring a new burden to the government.

As a result, Russia annexed Crimea and created instability, which is fully under control by the Kremlin, in the region. Russia did this by applying hybrid warfare and tools. At this point, we have to ask, “Why did Russia do this?” There are several discussions around the topic and Treisman summarizes such as;

-Crimean operation was a response to the threat of NATO’s further expansion along Russia’s western border.

-The annexation of Crimea was part of a Russian project to gradually recapture the former territories of the Soviet Union.

-The annexation was a hastily conceived response to the unforeseen fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich (Treisman, 2016, p. 47).

Here, the first option seems the most attractive one. Treverton, Thvedt and others, also stated that keeping NATO away was one of the main reasons (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 68). While answering his own question, Treisman also states;

“It is well known that Russia’s leaders are determined to prevent Ukraine from becoming a NATO member” (Treisman, 2016, p. 48).

Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon also support this option. To them, the current crisis in Ukraine was about whether Ukraine will remain within the Russian sphere of influence or will be moved into the Western sphere of influence (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, 2015, p. 3-4).

Yet, this does not seem valid. Ukraine is not a prosperous, fully democratic and powerful country that could pursue its own foreign policy. Additionally, with the current situation, it has very big problems. So, NATO would not accept Ukraine as a member not to own these critical problems.

Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon also supported the second option. It was stated that;

“a stable, independent, democratically oriented Ukraine on Russia’s western border with close ties to Europe and the West represents an attractive alternative model to Putin’s attempt to establish managed democracy in



Russia and the rest of the post-Soviet space” (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, 2015, p. viii).

This option also is not valid since Russia has different agreements with some of the former Soviet countries. Within this context, Russia does not need to recapture these regions by waging war, putting itself in a difficult position in the international arena and exploiting its own resources.

According to the third option, Russia annexed Crimea and occupied eastern Ukraine as a result of Yanukovich’s unpredictable fall. This option also seems invalid since the hybrid warfare needs to be planned for a long time and Russian actions, as they were mentioned so far, did not seem planned and applied in a hurry. The Russian military analysts’ studies also show that they were arguing this kind of warfare at least during a year.

But on the other hand, Treisman claims that Putin told him, at a reception in Sochi in October 2015, that “the operation to seize the peninsula was “spontaneous” and was “not at all” planned long in advance” (Treisman, 2016, p. 47). As the previous three options seem invalid, what Treisman reports also seems annoying.

When we look at the current situation, Russia probably wanted to create a frozen conflict as in Georgia and Moldova (Freedman, 2014, p. 13-14). Ukraine is a buffer zone between the west (NATO and EU) and Russia and Crimea is the key for Russia to be able to get involved in the Black Sea and the wider region. From this point of view, a Ukraine with problems, which can be controlled by Russia, thus, within the Russian sphere of influence, would be great for Russia.

### **7.3. Security Environment After Annexation of Crimea (after 2014)**

Russia’s activities shook up the Europeans. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that Russia’s invasion of Crimea was a

“wake-up call, for the Euro-Atlantic community, for NATO, and for all those committed to a Europe whole, free and at peace” (NATO, 2014d).

Russia's behavior in the Ukrainian crisis has been described by some as giving rise to

“the most dangerous situation in East-West relations since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968” (McDermott, Reisinger and Smith-Windsor, 2015, p. 41).

Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon state that Baltic countries and Moldova, who host a large number of the Russian minority, afraid that they might be the target of a new way of Russian aggression. Thus, Europe has decided to return front (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, 2015, p. iii-x).

As members of NATO, the Baltic States have a security guarantee under Article V of the Washington treaty. Thus, a direct Russian conventional attack against any one of the Baltic States is unlikely. However, there are myriad ways in which Russia could put pressure on the Baltic States short of a conventional attack (Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon, 2015, p. 33). Hybrid tactics can be applied over a period of time. They may seem easy to counter or negligible individually but they may be designed for certain vulnerable points. Treisman's statements give some clue how to think about what the west is facing. He states;

“A rational imperialist can be contained, but the appropriate response to a gambler who makes snap decisions based on short-term factors is less clear. In both Crimea and Syria, Putin has sought to exploit surprise, moving fast to change facts on the ground before the West could stop him. By reacting boldly to crises, he creates new ones for Russia and the world” (Treisman, 2016, p. 54).

When we read hybrid threats and resilience in that way, we may easily fall into the securitization trap. To be able to avoid this, defense and security issues must be evaluated and hybrid threats must be countered in a comprehensive and collaborative way.

Within this context, the most comprehensive response came during the Wales Summit on September 5, 2014. After the Ukraine Crisis, the alliance met for the first time in Wales and important decisions were made regarding NATO's future strategies and

structural changes. Alliance's defense policies, military force and command structure and crisis intervention process were evaluated.

According to the heads of states and governments of the member nations gathered in Wales, Russia's aggressive policies against Ukraine fundamentally changed the European understanding of freedom and peace. Besides, instability, supranational and multidimensional threats in the Middle East and North Africa threatened the security of the alliance. Within this context, the important decisions were as follows:

- The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was adopted to ensure that the Alliance could react quickly and decisively to new security threats.
- Efforts were initiated to increase the capacity of the Multinational Corps- North East (MNC NE),
- Implementation of an enhanced exercise program, focused on collective defense, including complex Civil-Military scenarios, was decided,
- It was emphasized that strategic communication, exercise scenarios with hybrid threats and coordination between the alliance and other organizations should be strengthened in order to combat hybrid threats,
- The importance of member states' fulfillment of their commitments in their defense budgets in the alliance's security and defense policies has been evaluated and all members have stated that they will fulfill their obligations,
- It was declared that the military intervention carried out by Russia in Ukraine was against international law and that it should end its presence in Crimea and Ukraine as soon as possible,
- While keeping political communication channels open with Russia, all civil and military cooperation were stopped,
- Regarding Syria, the violence of the Assad regime against the Syrian people and the chaos caused by it were condemned and the Syrian Government was called to act in accordance with international law,
- The tasks to be performed by the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) instead of ISAF, whose term of office expired in Afghanistan, were decided,

-It was assessed that the Alliance needed a modern, resilient and high level of preparedness in air, land and sea to combat the threats of today and the future more than ever, and the need for defense planning packages in this direction were emphasized,

-It was demonstrated that new initiatives were needed to increase the cyber defense capacities of member countries,

-It was emphasized that the ongoing defense cooperation with the European Union through the Smart Defense Program was important and it was decided to develop this cooperation (NATO, 2014b).

It was decided at the Wales Summit that the alliance would enter a transformation process. The reason for this was the observation that the Alliance was insufficient against conventional threats and the main indicator was the Readiness Action plan.

In response to hybrid threats, NATO developed a plan including three steps. This plan was applied after 2015. According to the plan, the steps are Prepare, Deter and Defend.

In “Prepare” NATO would constantly conduct information gathering, sharing and evaluation activities in order to detect any hybrid activity. Working under NATO Headquarters, the Joint Intelligence and Security Agency was tasked with increasing the alliance's knowledge level on hybrid threats and making accurate analyses. The alliance would also provide support to member countries when requested in civil preparedness, reaction to CBRN incidents, protection of critical infrastructures, strategic communication, protection of civilians, cyber defense, energy security, and combating terrorism.

In “Deter” the efforts of the Alliance was to keep its forces available, to improve the decision-making process and the command structure. This would give a strong message that the alliance was politically and militarily ready and capable of consolidating the appropriate forces at the right place and time.

If deterrence fails, the alliance was ready to defend any ally against any threat, reacting quickly and flexibly, wherever and whenever required.<sup>22</sup>

Within this context, we observe that NATO developed two kinds of main measures. These were not announced officially; however, we can call the first group “military-centric measures” and the other as “civilian-centric measures.” The military-centric measures included deploying troops on the border countries with Russia (within Enhanced Forward Presence (e-FP) regulations), establishing Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces (VJTF) at brigade level, enabling air policy missions over Eastern Europe, establishing NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) and NATO Strategic Direction-South (NSD-S) Hub. In fact, some of these newly established units such as NSD-S Hub and NFIUs also have civilian related tasks.

Civilian-centric measures included re-development of the concept of resilience, accepting five Cross-Cutting Topics (such as Protection of Civilians; Women, Peace and Security; Children and Armed Conflict; Cultural Property Protection and Building Integrity) and putting the intelligence, information collection and monitoring missions at the center. The second group of measures is directly related to the civilians from a broad spectrum, the concern of civil-military convergence and CIMIC might be the facilitator for them. Resilience and Cross-Cutting Topics are examined in the following parts. Here we will give some information about the last topic, which is related to intelligence.

What is important here is that NATO should diversify its tools against hybrid warfare and train, educate and exercise to be able to apply them whenever needed. To be able to realize that NATO needs to assume a comprehensive approach, improve interoperability with relevant external actors and establish required units. In this way, what NATO did so far, according to Rühle and Roberts, is the establishment of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), which included a special unit dealing with the hybrid threats in 2016. The JISD provided allies to connect the dots, closing the gaps and see the big

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<sup>22</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_156338.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm?selectedLocale=en)

picture (Rühle and Roberts, 2019, p. 64). In addition to that, “Counter-Hybrid Support Teams” (CHST) were introduced. As Rühle and Roberts inform,

“These teams were already existing and advising on resilience or critical infrastructure protection. CHST would consist of civilian experts, drawn from a pool of specialists nominated by allied nations, that could be deployed on short notice to an ally who requested NATO’s support, either in an acute hybrid crisis or in order to assist in building national counter-hybrid capacities. NATO also created Military Advisory Teams, which followed a similar logic to their civilian counterparts. These steps demonstrated that NATO was building response options below the threshold of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty” (Rühle and Roberts, 2019, p. 65).

NATO’s approach to these threats was also criticized. According to Pindják, NATO’s main strategy against hybrid threats was purely military. This reaction created three weaknesses;

“First, member states may find it difficult to agree on the source of a conflict, creating a significant barrier to prompt collective action. Second, to counter irregular threats, hard power alone is insufficient. Regardless of how rapid a response may be, deploying military force to an area swept by hybrid warfare will turn out as “too little too late”. Too often, the conflict evolves under the radar. Finally, a deterrent built upon military force alone will not be credible. To deal with irregular threats, NATO cannot simply revive the strategy of massive retaliation, or rely exclusively on one course of action” (Pindják, 2014).

In fact, responding to the hybrid threats and dealing with the hybrid warfare is the responsibility of the member nation but the main point here is that no any member nation can counter this alone. First of all, the vulnerabilities should be defined and secondly, ways for cooperation not only with the other nations but also with other relevant actors should be determined.

Considering the vulnerabilities, every member state must be aware of their own vulnerabilities to be able to make proper evaluations. Treverton, Thvedt and others state Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare is not the only job of a ministry but the job of all government thus whole-of-government or whole-of-society approach should be assumed (Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 79-80) at the national level and comprehensive approach at international level. All have one common point that civil-

military convergence. In addition to that, Mattsson also states these Russian threats must be responded to in two ways. One is the coordination of civil and military assets within national defense, and the other is civilian and military cooperation internationally (Mattsson, 2015, p. 68).

As it is shown in Figure-7.3, to be able to make a proper assessment on risks and threats, defining weaknesses of society, develop measures against defined risks and threats, promote national response (resilience mostly) and international response (in coordination and cooperation with other actors) comprehensive approach is required.




Figure-7.3: Comprehensive Approach vs. Hybrid Warfare (Hagelstam and Narinen, 2018).

At this point, what Rühle and Roberts propose is valuable. Regarding with the three-step plan of NATO in countering hybrid threats, Rühle and Roberts state that, NATO may take the role of a hub as an expert to discuss;

“civil preparedness and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incident response, critical infrastructure protection, strategic

communications, protection of civilians, cyber defense, energy security, and counter-terrorism. This would include exercising of decision-making processes and joint military and non-military responses in cooperation with other actors” (Rühle and Roberts, 2019, p. 63).

## **7.4. New Developments for CIMIC**

### **7.4.1. Resilience**

According to Walker and Cooper, “The concept of ‘resilience’ was first adopted within systems ecology in the 1970s” (Walker and Cooper, 2011, p. 143). After this, the concept of resilience spread over other areas of studies such as sociology, psychology, medicine, economics and ecology. It was also studied around different subjects such as “resilient regions, resilient security, flooding and resilience and resilient climate adaptation” (O’Hare, White and Connelly, 2016, p. 1175-1178).

Currently, it is widely being used within disaster reduction area. Also, within this area, there are different definitions of resilience. More or less all they focus on the same themes but from different perspectives such as readiness and preparedness, response and adaptation, and recovery or adjustment (Wiig and Fahlbruch, 2019, p. 1).

Related with disaster reduction, according to Wiig and Fahlbruch, resilience is;

“the ability of an entity, individuals, community, or system to return to normal condition or functioning after the occurrence of an event that disturbs its state” (Wiig and Fahlbruch, 2019, p. 1).

United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines the resilience as

“the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions” (UNSDIR, 2009, p. 24).

Although resilience is assumed as in the first line of defense (Roepke and Thankey, 2019), as it was stated in one of the articles on the NATO web page, resilience is not a



new concept for NATO, and it was asserted that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty refers to resilience (NATO, 2020). In Article-3 of the treaty, it was stated that;

“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (NATO, 1949).

In this statement, the closest reference to resilience might be hidden into “...continuous self-help, ... individual capacity to resist armed attack”. To resist an armed attack requires being ready not only within military means but also civilian capabilities that refer to civilian preparedness. During the Cold War, civilian preparedness, which was known as civil emergency planning at that time, was well organized and resourced. This was also very well established within the NATO command and force structure (Roepke and Thankey, 2019). Civil emergency planning was about being prepared against conventional attacks, natural and man-made disasters, and CBRN attacks during that time. So, can resilience and civil preparedness respond to current security needs?

As it was stated in the related section, hybrid threats and hybrid warfare include a wide range of threats and risks (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2015, p. 6; Lanoszka, 2016, p. 179; Treverton, Thvedt and others, 2018, p. 45-59) and NATO needed to prepare against all. Cavelty, Kaufmann and Kristense state that, the concept of resilience;

“proliferated into a wide range of security issues and policy domains, including military programs, critical infrastructures, migration policy, city planning or counterterrorism” (Cavelty, Kaufmann and Kristensen, 2015, p. 4).

When we consider this statement around hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, it seems resilience may provide an opportunity to define responses in a complex security environment. And civil preparedness is the answer to the question of how resilience will be achieved.

Kramer, Binnendijk and Hamilton also announced the requirement for resilience by stating that;

“NATO must add resilience as a core task to its existing tasks of collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. ... Accomplishing the new strategy will require sufficient military capabilities for both conventional collective defense and hybrid conflict; increased agility to enhance quicker and more effective responses; and structural changes encompassing cooperative actions and a strategy for resilience with civil government institutions and the private sector that tilt the security environment in NATO’s favor” (Kramer, Binnendijk and Hamilton, 2015, p. 1).

In the Warsaw Summit in 2016, resilience and civil preparedness were mentioned in the declaration. It was stated that;

“Today we have made a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience and to maintain and further develop our individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies' resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness. We will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means” (NATO, 2016a, para.73).

In this declaration, it was not mentioned about resilience is related to hybrid threats, but in the “Commitment to enhance resilience” document, which is one of the products of the Warsaw Summit, it was stated that as NATO;

“we are committing to continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks” (NATO, 2016b, para.1).

In this document, it was emphasized that member states need to maintain and protect their critical civilian capabilities working together with relevant stakeholders, including the private sector (NATO, 2016b, para.4). This indicates civil preparedness and it was mentioned in the same document that civil preparedness is a national responsibility and can be achieved via the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience. These are:

- 1-Assured continuity of government and critical government services;
- 2-Resilient energy supplies;
- 3-Ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people;
- 4-Resilient food and water resources;
- 5-Ability to deal with mass casualties;
- 6-Resilient civil communications systems;
- 7-Resilient civil transportation systems.

In the next summit, Brussels 2018, by emphasizing the hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, it was stated that;

“We are enhancing our resilience, improving our situational awareness, and strengthening our deterrence and defence posture. We are also expanding the tools at our disposal to address hostile hybrid activities. ... We will continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges” (NATO, 2018a, para.21).

Considering that the hybrid threats and hybrid warfare target at the cohesion of the society, at this stage, we can assert that resilience via civil preparedness were reapplied to protect the population. Currently, societies are interconnected to each other via different sectors and vital services. In delivering the services and goods, internet-based systems are fundamental (Roepke and Thankey, 2019). Besides these, governance, transportation and energy security are also vital. As it was stated in a related article on the NATO web page;

“soldiers depend on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfill their missions. Military efforts to defend Alliance territory and populations therefore need to be complemented by robust civil preparedness” (NATO, 2020).

From our study’s perspective, resilience can be described as

“the capacity to withstand and recover from shocks, absorb damage, resume function as normal as quickly and efficiently as possible following extreme disturbances” (NATO, 2017b, p. 2).

As it was stated by Cavelti, Kaufmann and Kristensen, a resilient system maintains “stability, survival and safety” (Cavelti, Kaufmann and Kristensen, 2015, p. 4). Parallel to that, Fjäder describes the resilient state as a;

“state that has the ability to ensure that its citizens are reasonably safe from physical harm, receive quality education, have an opportunity to prosper and can live their lives according to the standards set by their identity, culture and values” (Fjäder, 2014, p. 128).

Consequently, we understand that via the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, civil preparedness will be enhanced and thus unity and cohesion of society will be provided. At the same time, since the vital services will be continued and goods will be delivered, military responses will be sustained. As it is obvious, this requires coordination, cooperation and collaboration with relevant non-military stakeholders.

#### **7.4.2. Cross Cutting Topics**

Protection not only involves physical security from dangers such as violence and crime. It also includes the integrity of the family, freedom from economic insecurity, upholding value systems, cultural mores and generally maintaining the quality of life (Duffield, 2001:51).

The concept of Protection of Civilians (PoC) within NATO has three central elements: Mitigate Harm (MH), Contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment (C-SASE), and Facilitate Access to Basic Needs (FABN).

*“A fourth element, Understanding the Human Environment (UHE), is important to all three aspects. Additionally, there are five cross-cutting protection topics with existing NATO policy and guidance, including Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender Based Violence (CR-SGBV), Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), Building Integrity (BI), and Cultural Property Protection (CPP). NATO aims to ensure that existing guidance on these topics is mainstreamed into the overall protection of civilians planning and operations” (NATO, 2018d, p. 7-8).*

Cross-Cutting Topics (CCTs) seem not directly related to the military responsibility. That is why it might be difficult for soldiers to understand why they have to deal with them. In addition to this, it was stated that when NATO started to deal with CCTs it also entered into the Human Security<sup>23</sup> concept, which is “a 25-year-old concept created by the United Nations<sup>24</sup> as a response to profound changes in the global environment” (Godefroy, 2019). So, understanding the Human Security may help military decision-makers and practitioners to adapt the concept of protection effectively.




Figure-7.4: Protection of civilians cycle (NATO, 2018d, p. 7).

<sup>23</sup> “Human Security” (HS) has been conceptualized by the United Nations (UN) as a way to address “Freedom from Fear,” meaning violent threats to populations, “Freedom from Want,” meaning poverty and absence of basic needs, and finally “Freedom from Indignity,” including human rights abuses and limits on democratic participation (Godefroy, 2019).

<sup>24</sup> It was first used by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in their 1994 Human Development Report  
[http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr\\_1994\\_en\\_complete\\_nostats.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf)

#### **7.4.2.1. Protection of Civilians (PoC)**

NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians was endorsed during the 2016 Warsaw Summit. As the results of the operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the requirement of the current operational environment, the PoC concept was emerged. During the development of the PoC the experiences and expertise from UN, EU and ICRC were included (Hill and Manea, 2018, p. 148).

The PoC was defined as;

“including all efforts taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to undertake military or police action to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors” (NATO, 2016c, para.9).

It seems that this definition focuses on two kinds of harms. One is the harm as a result of NATO’s own operations and the other is other actors’ effects causing harm (Hill and Manea, 2018, p. 151).

The aim of the policy is;

“to instill a coherent, consistent and integrated approach to PoC in NATO and NATO-led operations, missions and other Council-mandated activities. This includes the planning and conducting of operations and missions, training, education and exercises, lessons learned, as well as defence and security-related capacity building activities” (NATO, 2016c, para.8).

There are four guiding principles of NATO PoC Policy such as:

- 1.NATO’s approach to the PoC is based on legal, moral and political imperatives.
- 2.NATO’s approach to PoC is consistent with applicable legal frameworks. All NATO and NATO-led operations, missions and other Council-mandated activities are conducted in accordance with applicable international law, which may include International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as applicable.
- 3.NATO’s fulfillment of its responsibilities under this policy is subject to the legal basis for the specific NATO operation, mission or activity, and to the specific Council-

approved mandate, without prejudice to force protection and collective defense obligations.

4. NATO recognizes that all feasible measures must be taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate harm to civilians. When planning and implementing such measures, NATO should give consideration to those groups most vulnerable to violence within the local context. NATO recognizes that, in general, children constitute a particularly vulnerable group during conflict and women are often disproportionately affected by violence (NATO, 2016c, para.4-7).

NATO's PoC approach examines the civil society as a whole over security gaps and threats, including strong and resilient sides. This provides guidance to define the weak groups and consider who needs special protection (Godefroy, 2019). As it was emphasized by Godefroy, NATO's approach assumes the civilian environment as a whole and this contributes to soldiers' understanding of the root causes of a given conflict, the indigenous population from many angles and possible effects of the operation on the civilian environment in a number of ways. While these issues facilitate military planners in considering the operational environment, applying this concept also supports the legitimacy of the operation, contributes to crisis management and supports discharging the military to its responsibilities emerging from the law of armed conflict.

It is obvious that the concept includes different aspects such as legal, political, humanitarian, developmental, national and international. When we consider this together with the different military disciplines, branches and command levels, it is obligatory that soldiers need to work (coordinate, cooperate and collaborate) closely with non-military stakeholders. Thus, it was stated in the policy,

“To be effective in integrating PoC, NATO efforts need to take into account the roles and activities of other international actors. Such a need was reflected through the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. Interaction with other actors and understanding how they perform their mission can ensure complementarity and boost objectives in NATO and NATO-led operations, missions and other Council-mandated activities. Some international organisations may also be interested in assistance from NATO in building their own institutional capacity” (NATO, 2016c, para.13).

The concept of human security enables to assess the early warning mechanisms, respond to violence and bring stabilization by thinking about the pre, during and post-conflict phases (Godefroy, 2019). This also can be achieved via NATO's Comprehensive Approach.

When it is considered with the current security environment, CCTs are not a new burden on the shoulders of soldiers to create confusion but facilitators to do their job effectively. However, to apply this concept might not be easy. First of all, although it was stated in the policy that IHRL and IHL would be considered, according to Hill and Manea, this is difficult since the practitioners must be educated and trained very well (Hill and Manea, 2018, p. 157).

There are other gaps such as, Development of protection assessment and planning capabilities; Institutionalization of best practices in civilian harm mitigation (protection from one's operations); Adoption of clear guidance and scenario-based training on how to protect civilians from other actors including strategic, operational and tactical options for taking action, alone or in partnership with other security forces or civilians; and Systematizing an approach to integrating civilian experts and expertise into NATO planning and implementation of protection of civilians (NATO, 2018d, p. 10).

#### **7.4.2.2. Women, Peace and Security (WPS)**

NATO assumes Women, Peace and Security within UN Security Council Resolutions. These resolutions are 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2422 and they;

“recognize the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls, and call for full and equal participation of women at all levels of conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, and protection of women and girls from sexual violence in conflict” (NATO, 2019).

The first resolution, UNSCR 1325, was issued on October 31, 2000, and defined women and girls as missing elements of peace and security processes, raising the question “Where are the women?”. Following resolutions widened the scope and depth. Wright thinks about the UNSCR 1325 that;



“It calls for gender mainstreaming across all peace and security areas and seeks to challenge the narrow definition of security as defense” (Wright, 2019, p. 91).

There was a growing concern within NATO about WPS, and the first policy and action plan were issued in 2007<sup>25</sup>. Around the WPS principles of Integration, Inclusiveness and Integrity of NATO, so far, six WPS Policy and Action Plan and 3 Bi-Strategic Command Directives were produced.

The WPS principles of NATO were described in the latest NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan, 2018 as follows.

**Integration:** gender equality must be considered as an integral part of NATO policies, programs and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices. Achieving gender equality requires the recognition that each policy, program and project affects women and men differently.

**Inclusiveness:** representation of women across NATO and national forces is pivotal to enhancing operational effectiveness and success. NATO will seek to increase women's participation in all tasks throughout the International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS), including in meetings, training opportunities, and public engagement.

**Integrity:** systemic inequalities are addressed to ensure fair and equal treatment of women and men in the Alliance. Accountability on efforts to increase awareness and implementation of the WPS agenda shall be made a priority in accordance with international frameworks (NATO, 2018e, p. 18).

As we understand from these principles, they are designed for the organization itself, which means for internal application for collective defense and crisis management

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<sup>25</sup> But in fact NATO's history about gender perspective is long, for example; From 1961 First official NATO conference on the role of women in NATO forces in Copenhagen; 1976 Military Committee formally recognizes Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF); 2000 Adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and so far.

issues (NATO, 2018e, p. 19-25). The NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan is related to the internal application and related with political-strategic level. The WPS issue was transferred to operation and tactical levels via “Allied Command Operations (ACO) Gender Functional Planning Guide (FPG) (dated to July 24, 2015)” and “Bi-Strategic Command Directive 040-001 (dated to October 17, 2017)” documents. They define what the sub echelons will do and how they will implement related WPS issues to their work.

While the “Allied Command Operations (ACO) Gender Functional Planning Guide (FPG)” document provides instructions on Gender Perspective in Operations Planning, from the practitioners’ perspective, the “Bi-Strategic Command Directive 040-001” includes more detailed guidance about implementation. It is clearly defined in the Directive,

“It must be recognised that men, women, boys and girls are components of a gendered system and have influence on, and are influenced by, armed conflict. However, women and girls are disproportionately affected and thus, have a unique perspective to share and solutions to offer. Unless gender-based similarities and differences are addressed, conflict prevention, conflict-resolution, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding are negatively impacted. Consequently, it is necessary to assess notions equated with traditional masculinity and femininity that underpin organisations, societies and communities” (NATO, 2017c, p. 3).

What is defined in the directive is being implemented by relevant bodies and individuals such as Gender Advisor (GENAD), Gender Focal Points (GFP) and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Divisions/Branches. These bodies and individuals follow their tasks around and in line with Gender mainstreaming, Integration of gender perspective, Gender analysis, Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, Gender equality and Exploitation topics. The Bi-SC Directive 040-001 also defines the related training and tasks of other branches within the headquarters.

Why does NATO implement WPS?

NATO assumed the UNSCR 1325 as an added value from two perspectives. One is to support NATO’s agenda, which was established long ago to increase the representation

of women within NATO bodies and the second is that to increase operational effectiveness (Wright, 2016, p. 350-351). For this purpose, since NATO is not an expert on WPS, NATO should work with other relevant actors on WPS, especially in the area of operation.

#### **7.4.2.3. Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)**

Children are the most vulnerable actors in armed conflicts. It is very easy to affect them but very difficult to rehabilitate and reintegrate them after an armed conflict in case they suffer. In a related NATO document, it is stated;

“The glaring reality of protracted, complicated and proliferating conflicts today demonstrates that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is customarily flouted and violations and abuses against children take place with shocking frequency and brutality” (NATO, 2018f, p. 10).

The children are killed and maimed, recruited or used as soldiers, sexually exploited, abducted, their schools and hospitals are attacked, and their access to humanitarian services is denied.

As it is stated in the Brussels Summit Dialogue;

“NATO recognizes that protecting children from the effects of armed conflict is both a moral imperative and an essential element to break the cycle of violence” (NATO, 2018f).

The protection of children in armed conflict was discussed for the first time at the Chicago Summit in 2012. Later on, the first Military Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict was issued in 2013 in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 and related regulations. Following this, efforts for integration to UNSCR 1612 continued with “The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict-Way Forward” policy document in 2015.

The main priorities emphasized in this document are:

- Supporting UN efforts to monitor instances of grave violations committed against children affected by armed conflict.
- When participating in NATO-led operations or missions, military leadership and personnel are trained to recognize and respond to possible grave violations identified by the UN Secretary-General.
- When training local forces, NATO ensures that the protection of children affected by armed conflict is given the right attention; NATO also promotes adequate reporting and monitoring mechanisms focusing on the six grave violations.
- The development of standard operating procedures for reporting violations.

NATO continues to implement related measures in doctrine, training, education, exercise and operations and mission. Within this context, what NATO does is train and educate soldiers about Children and Armed Conflict, provide awareness in NATO command and force structures about the topic, monitor and report violence against children in the operation areas, and train the local forces in the mission areas. All these actions but especially monitoring and reporting, and training local forces, require strong coordination, cooperation and collaboration with relevant external actors at appropriate levels.

In fact, this topic is very sensitive and there are a number of international regulations but there is a very big gap between these documents and implementation. Although NATO has experiences from Afghanistan<sup>26</sup> from different perspectives such as protecting, monitoring and training, there is an increasing need to coordinate, cooperate and collaborate with external actors in defining required standards.

To be able to be more effective and efficient on that topic, it is recommended that;

- Integrate child protection at the core of planning and conducting of operations and missions, training, education, and exercises, lessons learned, as well as defense and security-related capacity building activities.

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<sup>26</sup> The policy framework was first applied in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan where the first Senior Child Protection Advisor in a NATO-led Mission was deployed. This coherent approach was essential in supporting the Afghan Ministry of Defence in establishing its first Child Protection Policy. The policy aims to shield children from the adverse effects of armed conflict and especially to prevent perpetrations of violence against children in combat operations (NATO, 2018f).

-Ensure protection of children receives the attention, expertise, and resources it deserves by increasing child protection capacity in HQ and all field operations.

-Work closely with the related actors on children and armed conflict to develop and systematize learning and good practice on children and armed conflict, particularly on harm mitigation, as well as on compliance to International Humanitarian Law and international human rights law (NATO, 2018g, p. 4).

#### **7.4.2.4. Cultural Property Protection (CPP)**

In fact, cultural property is a visible but mostly invisible part of the area of operation. The cultural property might be intangible or under the ground, so they are invisible. One more reason making them invisible is the lack of knowledge and unawareness. Although NATO has significant experience about this issue, not much could be achieved from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. NATO's experiences were mostly related to collateral damage. But now, the aggressor is directly targeting cultural properties.

Why is cultural property important?

First of all, it is a kind of a center of attraction that brings society together. Besides, it can be a common heritage of all humankind. It does not have to be constructions spread in wide areas, or it does not have to be produced from valuable materials. As it was stated, it can be intangible such as language, rituals and music (1954 Hague Convention, 1977 Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions). Secondly, cultural property is the source of peace and security itself. As it is stated by Irina Bokova, (former) Director-General of UNESCO;

“Violent extremists do not target only the general public; they also target teachers, journalists, schools, and historical monuments in an attempt to undermine and disrupt the societies they wish to subjugate. In response, we must do more to integrate culture in our strategies for security and peace, as a means to build long-term resilience, resistance and cohesion” (Bokova, 2017, p. 3).

Thirdly, looting and trade of cultural property can be a financial resource of an aggressor. As the last point, protecting cultural property may facilitate the activities of the military (NATO, 2018h, p. 9).

In fact, protecting cultural property is an international issue and not a new one. There are international agreements and regulations such as;

- The Law of Armed Conflict
  - 1954 Hague Convention and its First and Second Protocols
  - 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
  - Customary international law
- International Criminal Law
  - War crimes
  - Crimes against humanity
- International human rights law
- The World Heritage Convention
- 1970 UNESCO Convention
- United Nations Security Council resolutions
- UN Secretary-General's bulletin 1999/13
- Regional arrangements.

These documents define the cultural property and provide guidance on how to deal with cultural properties in case of war (O'Keefe, Péron and others, 2016).

What the military should do according to these regulations are:

- Military forces prohibit, prevent and stop damage, destruction, and looting to the cultural property by others, including by Organised Crime Groups (OCG).
- Make sure that there are mechanisms in place to ensure that if the cultural property is recognized during an attack, the attack is stopped.
- Abide by local cultural property laws when in occupation.

In addition to the above-mentioned issues, currently, cultural property is directly under attack (Brosché, Legnér and others, 2017, p. 248-249). The reasons for this can be; rise of identity politics, urbanization of conflict, the emergence of hybrid warfare, the

international market for illicit antiquities, identity and resilience. Consequently, it should be stated here that UN Security Council agreed that harming cultural protection is a war crime<sup>27</sup> (UNSC, 2017).

As it is obvious that the military is responsible for protecting cultural property both legally and morally. Besides, protecting the cultural property has benefits such as;

- Provides cultural understanding,
- Improves legitimacy of operation and organization,
- Contributes influencing efforts,
- Contributes counter adversary propaganda,
- Contributes force protection and information flow,
- Prevent threat financing,
- Facilitates post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The protection of the cultural property is an integral part of NATO's sustainable strategy to build peace and security. Within NATO, definitions, regulations and measures were defined in the Bi-SC Directive 086-005, "Implementing Cultural Property Protection (CPP) in NATO and NATO-led Operations and Missions" dated 2019.

#### **7.4.2.5. Building Integrity (BI)**

The last element of the CCTs is Building Integrity (BI). BI deals with the effects of corruption in the security sector both internally (within the organization and mainly about staff) and externally (during the execution of the operations and missions).

Corruption is widespread and not easy to define. It harms development, economic growth and one of the main reasons for financial shortages. Besides these, one of the less known results of corruption is related to security. Corruption may affect the

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<sup>27</sup> On 27 September 2016, Trial Chamber VIII of the International Criminal Court (ICC or 'the Court') unanimously sentenced Ahmad al-Faqi Al Mahdi to nine years' imprisonment after convicting him of the war crime of intentionally attacking cultural property in Timbuktu, Mali. Al Mahdi pled guilty as a co-perpetrator. His is the lowest sentence the ICC has thus far issued. On 17 August 2017, the Trial Chamber issued its reparations order in the same case. It found Al Mahdi liable for 2.7 million euros for individual and collective reparations (Drumbl, 2019, p. 78).

security directly and indirectly. It can cause mass demonstrations, give rise to extremists, cause to collapse of law enforcers. These can easily make a country failed or fragile that may turn into a source of instability (Rotberg, 2014, p. 8). While corruption may turn a country into a failed one, it can also block a failed state's recovery. Ryan Crocker, US Ambassador to Afghanistan in 2011-2012, states that *“The ultimate point of failure for our efforts...was not an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic corruption”* (SIGAR, 2016). Also, it is stated that the Iraqi Army could not resist against ISIL because of corruption on recruitment and promotions and theft and sale of weapons (MacLachlan, 2018).

In the operation areas, corruption is widespread. It is thought that, within a conflict environment, corruption is related to development and it is a secondary issue after security. Soldiers generally think that to provide security at first. But as in the above-mentioned example, it is directly related to security. Required measures should be defined and implemented before any crisis, not to deal with them during the crisis.

Corruption has been on NATO's agenda for at least ten years. Related NATO documents are;

- Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defense: A Compendium of Best Practices (2010)
- NATO Building Integrity Policy (2016).

According to the Fact Sheet published by CIMIC Center of Excellence;

“Corruption is understood by NATO as the “misuse of entrusted power for private benefit.” It complicates every security challenge faced by NATO, it limits operational effectiveness, undermines the defense and security capabilities and reduces public trust” (NATO, 2016d, p. 1).

NATO fights against corruption via three regulations: transparency, accountability and counter-corruption.



#### 7.4.2.6. Other issues that should be covered by CCTs

As it is seen, CCTs are directly and indirectly related to security. Generally, they have two dimensions such as internal and external. The internal one is related to organizational behavior and the external one is related to the area of operation or crisis where the organization is active. The CCTs should be learned, assumed and assessed by NATO staff at first. They have to apply them in their daily job. Then, when they start to plan for a mission, they always have to keep them in their minds. CCTs are not the issues to be applied for good messaging or showing the awareness of the organization to gain legitimacy and support. They are crucial and should be applied seriously.

Besides defined CCTs, there are other issues embedded into the area of operation such as environmental protection, climate change, economic security and infectious diseases. These topics are and will be challenging in front of weak states, which may turn into failed or fragile states.

#### 7.5. Conclusion

The 9/11 attacks and its aftermath enforced military to cooperate with non-military actors not only for humanitarian and developmental issues but also for security issues. After the acceptance of the Comprehensive Approach, the NATO Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated in the opening speech of the informal meeting with the foreign ministers of the countries that contributed to ISAF that;

“... this is a team effort. **NATO alone** all by itself **cannot** help Afghanistan build lasting peace. We can only succeed if we all, civilian and military alike, pull our weight and pull together (NATO, 2007).”

The Annexation of Crimea and armed conflicts in eastern Ukraine verified this reality and depend the situation. Now the issue is not only to provide security but in addition to defend the society. In the CIMIC Field Handbook issued in 2020, it was stated that;

“NATO recognizes that the military cannot resolve crisis or conflict by itself. Modern crises and conflicts are often not related to the military and therefore require assistance from outside the military. The operating environment involves complex and interlinked areas and crisis management requirements have expanded. Achieving acceptable and sustainable

solutions requires capabilities that the military alone cannot provide. A comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary to effectively manage today's complex crises. **At all levels, including the tactical one**, NATO commanders must be empowered to conduct effective cooperation and coordination to execute operations. This should include working with international and indigenous local authorities and other non-military actors. Sometimes local actors can have more power than the formal leaders. There is the importance for shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and common language. The Alliance also stresses the value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate. In this sense institutional familiarity and information sharing are the key" (CCOE, 2020, p. 1-2).

In the current situation besides military responses two important issues, Resilience and Cross-Cutting Topics were developed not only for NATO but also for nations as well. Resilience refers to being ready to recover in case of a shocking development. Cross-Cutting Topics (CCT) are important to conduct the operations in a successful way. At that point, it can be asserted that resilience is about defense and CCT are about operations. What is common to these measures is the civilian. Both of these measures require being aware of the civilian environment comprehensively to protect the civilians, to get their support and to provide support to them. While an understanding like the Comprehensive Approach would be very useful at the higher levels, CIMIC can be the tool of the military at the tactical level.

## CONCLUSION

Although applied, assumed, and taught like it, CIMIC was never and is not a helping hand of the military, not the smiling face of soldiers, not a humanitarian coordinator, not a military humanitarian NGO, or another tool peacekeepers. It was asserted in this study that CIMIC is a military function that establishes liaison with non-military actors to understand the non-military layer of the current or future (probable) area of operation, contributing military to understand the security environment, help define the measures and assist conducting operations.

NATO's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan were taken into consideration in this study and NATO terminology was applied. Periodization has been made in order to understand the security environment in connection with these operations. With this periodization, it has been tried to establish a connection between risk and threat assessments, the change/transformation in the concepts of war/armed conflict and CIMIC. The impact of these recent developments on CIMIC has been evaluated, including relevant NATO literature.

CIMIC was a natural consequence of the operational environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the tactical level. Conceptually there were three groups of actors in this environment: **the people** in need (refugee, IDP, local population), **the organizations** (international, governmental and non-governmental organizations such as UN, EU, WB, EBRD, OSCE, USAID, DFID, CIDA, OXFAM, MSF, ICRC and number of other NGOs) and **the soldiers**. The coexistence of these actors in the same area of operation was not enough to create an interface. There had to be needs, resources and capacities to create consultation, coordination and cooperation between these actors. All these issues created the civil-military interface. This caused the **convergence** of civilian and military entities and led to the emergence of CIMIC at the very tactical level. The emergence of CIMIC within the humanitarian context was not surprising in such an environment.

The Kosovo case was not different from Bosnia. In Kosovo, it would be expected that since there was trained personnel and experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

relevant members of the civil and military stakeholders (KFOR, UNMIK, UNHCR, NGOs) would come together before the deployment and define the duties and tasks to be coordinated and cooperated. It is obvious that CIMIC would be an important function that should be in or support the decision-making process. Despite the lessons and experiences, and although proper CIMIC courses were conducted, relevant literature was created and appropriate units were established after 2000; unfortunately, CIMIC was always regarded within the humanitarian context.

While the operations were continuing in Bosnia and Kosovo, the 9/11 attacks changed the security environment. War against terrorism in Afghanistan created another civil-military interface. It is generally claimed that Afghanistan is a laboratory in terms of civil-military convergence in the field of operation. The reason why Afghanistan is called a laboratory, but not Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, is the PRTs and Comprehensive Approach. Although the PRTs were established and the Comprehensive Approach was assumed, since things went well in the Balkans, CIMIC, which was at the heart of the PRTs and inspired decision-makers for the Comprehensive Approach, was applied again within the humanitarian context. The images of soldiers who drilled water wells, distributed food and clothing, repaired schools, and built bridges were not found realistic by both the soldiers and the civilians who were in charge of doing these. While NATO's efforts did not bring success, it brought harm in Afghanistan.

The ineffectiveness of the PRTs and the failure of institutionalizing the Comprehensive Approach caused the military value of NATO to be questioned. In the post-Cold War era, UN was incapable and in the post-9/11 period, NATO alone remained inadequate. Yet, with the Annexation of Crimea and the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine, NATO was again in the ascendant, but this time the points of contact between civilian and military have increased. Within these developments, two major issues came to the fore in CIMIC: Resilience and Cross-Cutting Topics (CCT). The rationale behind Resilience and CCTs are the protection of civilians and increasing the preparedness of the population against shocks. These issues were discussed during the Wales (2014), Warsaw (2016) and Brussels (2018) Summits.

In this study, it was examined how CIMIC emerged and evolved in the period from Bosnia in 1995 to the Annexation of Crimea in 2014. During this examination, we answered the questions that we asked to be able to provide the framework and define the hypothesis. One of the hypotheses of this study was “There is a relationship between security environment-armed conflict and CIMIC.” In case CIMIC is understood as a humanitarian element of the military, it is impossible to imagine the relationship between the security environment and CIMIC. Yet, the changes in risk and threat assessment and change in armed conflict directly affect CIMIC. We observed this during the emergence of CIMIC, CIMIC in Afghanistan and the developments about CIMIC after the Annexation of Crimea.

During the Cold War period and within the defensive posture, military planning ignored the civilian aspect of operations. Since military planners were busy with more strategic issues, mass movement of the population, an outbreak of widespread panic, or a complete breakdown of the civilian infrastructure was not considered as it was required. In that period CIMIC was regarded as a function related to resources and logistics to be able to sustain the military operations.

The end of the Cold War brought a different perspective. New issues were involved in NATO’s agenda. They were the risks and threats such as territorial disputes, ethnic and religious rivalries, failed/fragile states, abuse of human rights, transnational illegal activities (trafficking in arms, drugs and persons), organized crime, cyber-attacks, disruption of the flow of vital resources, energy security, uncontrolled movement of a large number of people, key environmental and resource constraints, health risks, climate change, water scarcity, instability in the maritime domain and non-state actors. All these were emphasized in NATO’s 1991, 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts. Between 2011 and 2014, there were direct or indirect incidents related to these concerns. In 2014, in the Wales Summit, which was conducted after the Annexation of Crimea and when the conflicts took place in eastern Ukraine, it was stated that NATO faces hybrid threats and in hybrid warfare which includes all or some of the above-mentioned risks and threats. In this situation, the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was announced that included military measures as Assurance Measures and Adaptation

Measures. These measures were developed to respond swiftly and firmly to the **new security challenges** and to strengthen NATO's collective defense and crisis management capability. These new security challenges, hybrid threats in other words, are related to the non-military environment and require understanding it.

In the 1991 Strategic Concept, it was emphasized that ethnic rivalries, territorial disputes and religious rivalries would be the sources of instability. The crises that took place in the Balkans approved this prediction. It can be asserted that two major developments occurred with the Bosnian War and the international civil and military intervention. One is that the emergence of new wars with the consequences of a humanitarian catastrophe and the other was that the international paradigm changed for the resolution of global conflicts. Both of these points are important for the scope of this study. The humanitarian perspective caused NGOs to increase and the involvement of the international community to establish peace together with the soldiers was the indicator of the paradigm change.

The Kosovo case also provided a different dimension or resurrected the discussions on humanitarian intervention. This was the continuation of the post-Cold War security assumption and CIMIC was consolidated in Kosovo. With the Kosovo case it was accepted that the security environment would be shaped by the above-mentioned risks and threats and in this security environment, NA5CRO or peace operations might be conducted. In this direction, CIMIC literature was created, relevant units and staff elements were established and courses and training increased. This did not happen only within NATO but within member nations' armies as well.

With 9/11 in 2001, terrorism became the dominant factor and failed states were discussed as sources of risks and threats. In this period, within a failed state context, security was related to the development and the main task of the military was nation-building in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was different from Bosnia and Kosovo in two aspects. One was that Afghanistan was totally different from the Balkans culturally. Secondly, in Afghanistan, there was an enemy in the area of operation and the fight against terrorism was going on. Besides humanitarian assistance, this time, NATO

aimed the development of Afghanistan, which was a failed state, to bring security. In this environment, after the coalition operations ended, after the Taliban was toppled and the terrorists left the cities, although conflicts continued partly, soldiers again focused on humanitarian and development issues. The coalition forces' attempt in this direction was to establish PRTs. The establishment of PRTs was one of the important developments. The other important development was the Comprehensive Approach.

It was announced by NATO in 2006 that challenges require a comprehensive approach involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. This statement was regarded as NATO's acceptance of the Comprehensive Approach. So far from that time, NATO never defined the Comprehensive Approach. NATO envisions the Comprehensive Approach as interactions between civilian and military actors that would occur both horizontally and vertically. Unfortunately, the Comprehensive Approach could not be applied as expected since the PRTs and CIMIC could not facilitate it.

The international efforts focused on the development of Afghanistan. It was aimed to create a self-sufficient nation that was capable of governing and defending. PRTs were the main pillars of this aim at the tactical level and the Comprehensive Approach can be assumed as the theory which was developed at the political level. Both PRTs and the Comprehensive approach were related to the civilian environment and expecting contributions from and trying to contribute to the civilian environment. It was assumed that building a nation with the efforts of civilian and military actors would bring security in Afghanistan and this model would be accepted and applied for other crises.

While NATO developed relations with non-military actors to be able to provide international security within the Afghanistan context, the Arab Spring and civil wars in Libya and Syria took place. The developments peaked with the Annexation of Crimea in 2014. It seems that what was defined as risk and threat in the NATO's strategic concepts were observed during the Annexation of Crimea and in the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine such as a wide variety of cyber-attacks, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, directly targeting civilians to force them to remove and targeting their cultural

properties, and economic and energy-related issues. This was named as hybrid threats and the events were called as hybrid warfare. Upon these developments, collective defense and crisis management were designed in civilian and military dimensions. It was discussed that hybrid threats are targeting the (cohesion of) society under the line of declaring war. In this environment, NATO turned back to the front and the protection of civilians and resilience became the most important topics. These issues were discussed during the Wales and Warsaw Summits. As a result of that the resilience and CCTs were examined in the AJP-3.19 published in 2018. It was stated in this document that;

“In collective defence it is important that Alliance member states focus on civil preparedness during peacetime in order to strengthen their overall resilience. ... Resilience is a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from these situations, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. Resilience is a broad concept focusing upon continuation of basic governmental functions. Resilience is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity (NATO, 2018b, p. 3.10, 4-19).

CCTs were also discussed in AJP-3.19 as;

“Cross-cutting topics (CCTs) are a range of different topics which could affect the mission in a number of ways, but which fall outside of the military’s primary responsibilities. Different military disciplines, branches and command levels may have to consider and deal with a variety of CCTs. CCTs have a significant impact on all missions” (NATO, 2018b, p. 1-9).

Resilience, as it was emphasized, might be related to collective defense more than other efforts, but CCTs are related to any operation, including defensive operations and stabilization operations and preparations for them. In fact, CCTs are mostly related to political and especially legal dimensions. Although they are less in number, they have the potential to strongly different areas of society since their cross-cutting nature. Military and civilian stakeholders must work together on CCTs. They should be considered during operation planning and execution.

At that point, as our cases show, we can assert that CIMIC is related to the security environment. When we consider the future security environment, that would be more complicated and sophisticated than understanding the civilian environment and defining



the procedures and areas to work with the non-military actors would remain important. This is important to minimize the effects of the operations, to protect the civilians and get the support of relevant non-military actors.

The other hypothesis this study asserted was that “In the current security environment, which includes a wide variety of actors and subjects, soldiers alone cannot provide security and cannot properly fulfill the tasks assigned to them”. It seems that discussing this issue is not the concern of CIMIC, but in case this is obvious and the external or non-military actors would close the gap when the military cannot provide security alone, then it is the concern of CIMIC.

Instead of discussing this issue in detail, it would be better to present statements from NATO after providing deductions from our cases. The important thing in the Balkans was to end the conflicts as soon as possible and to create an environment for permanent stability. In the Balkans, the UN's inadequacy was eliminated by the help of NATO. Both in Bosnia and Kosovo, in a very short time the fighting was stopped, the warring parties separated, weapons were collected and the conditions required for civilian stakeholders to work effectively was provided.

What was done in Afghanistan was to end the conflicts and create an environment of stability, as in the Balkans, and to contribute to the development and nation-building processes. The security issue was to prevent Afghanistan from turning into a source of instability that would adversely affect international security. In this situation, it was not possible for NATO to do this alone. Therefore, a different way followed than in the Balkans; PRTs were expanded and the Comprehensive Approach was adopted.

In Afghanistan, NATO increasingly needed to cooperate with external actors in the following period. Within the Comprehensive Approach understanding, NATO developed robust relations with the non-military actors focusing on four key areas: planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; cooperation with external actors; and strategic communications. These actors are the UN and its agencies, the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), World Bank (WB), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the African Union (AU), INTERPOL and the League of Arab States.

After 2014, this requirement peaked and this time the cooperation with external actors was required to defend the Euro Atlantic area. The new risks and threats directly targeted the population and preparation became more important instead of responding to them. At this point, it was important to understand the non-military environment, know the non-military actors both affecting and might be affected and define the measures and define the risks and threats in non-military posture. This was not something that NATO could do alone.

Related to the previous ones, the next hypothesis of this study is “Legacy of CIMIC application from the Balkans is not proper to apply in the current operations”. When we consider the CIMIC-security environment relation and the military’s inadequacy against modern risks and threats, it is obvious that experiences from the Balkans would not be helpful but what would be helpful is the convergence created during the Balkan deployments, although it was within a humanitarian context.

From its emergence until the 2010s, CIMIC was never assumed to be the facilitator or enabler of civil-military convergence or never seen as a link or tie between the civil and military actors and targets. Although CIMIC was regarded as one of the main components in peace operations or NA5CRO, it gained little attention. CIMIC was a helping hand, smiling face or humanitarian element of the military not only for soldiers but also for NGOs and local populations. This was taken from the Balkans and sustained in Afghanistan.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, IFOR had a CIMIC structure but its personnel consisted of US Civil Affairs staff. The applications and experiences of the Civil Affairs did not set a good example, and it caused CIMIC to emerge with a conservative understanding and sustained in that way. When other nations started to conduct CIMIC related tasks, since the lack of trained CIMIC personnel and doctrine CIMIC tasks were either secondary

tasks of units that were not needed in the field of operation such as anti-tank teams, or they turned into an activity implemented by every soldier in the area of operation. Later, the military engineers and quartermaster units were assigned for this. The easiest way to do CIMIC was to help the local population.

The Balkan example showed that the military should involve in the area of operation not only with the military means but also with the capabilities, which enable soldiers evaluating the political, economic, humanitarian, historical, cultural and social situation and thus contribute to forming the appropriate strategic framework. Unfortunately, this was not regarded as a lesson learned, but how to conduct humanitarian projects, how to prepare the budget for humanitarian projects and how to spark them were the main points within CIMIC.

Neither in Bosnia nor in Kosovo, the main official task of the military was not to conduct humanitarian or development projects. The main task of the military was to create a safe and secure environment, help to create appropriate conditions for non-military stakeholders and to assist them. The overall aim of these tasks was to keep and sustain the peace. Yet, in Bosnia and Kosovo, soldiers focused on humanitarian assistance and conducted small-scale quick impact projects. As time passed, the humanitarian context was replaced with development and capacity building, and the military focused on long-term reconstruction projects such as repairing infrastructure, building schools and bridges. CIMIC was the main facilitator and enabler of these projects. There were several reasons why soldiers conducted humanitarian activities.

Since things were accordingly going well in Bosnia and Kosovo, the same CIMIC applied in Afghanistan. As the Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan cases show that CIMIC was applied mainly within a humanitarian context. After NATO took the command of the ISAF, PRTs were assumed and expanded. Without consulting, coordinating and cooperating with the relevant stakeholders before deployment, without establishing close coordination through political and tactical levels and without understanding the local context focusing on humanitarian and development efforts did not bring success.

Neither the current nor the previous literature did not mention about providing humanitarian assistance as a task of CIMIC. Soldiers might conduct humanitarian assistance in case it has enough resources, in case there are no relevant stakeholders whose main duty is to provide humanitarian assistance and in case there is a need or demand for it from a civilian environment. So, why do we immediately imagine soldiers giving toys to children, providing humanitarian aid, repairing roads and bridges when we discuss CIMIC? The main reason is that CIMIC emerged with it and transferred to other staff like this. Another reason is that it is attractive and beneficial to provide humanitarian assistance in war-torn areas. First of all, there were no experienced, properly trained and equipped CIMIC staff and there was no guidance. That is why soldiers are directly involved in humanitarian activities instead of focusing on the tasks mentioned above. The other reason was that the “acceptance of force” and “force protection” by “winning the hearts and minds” of the local people was the primary rationale behind all these short or long term projects.

As time passed, the other benefits of providing humanitarian assistance were discovered. The common point of the Balkan and Afghanistan experiences was that CIMIC was providing a unique opportunity for troop-contributing nations to realize their national interests. With the help of their armies, countries established relations with the local population by transferring resources to their CIMIC and conducting humanitarian assistance. Thus, they were showing the flag and creating supportive groups and thus affecting the administrative authorities. Although especially the Western countries that support the operation state that they contributed to humanitarian purposes, this does not exactly reflect the truth. Humanitarian assistance was politicized. It was conducted according to the political aims of the contributing nation of the military units instead of according to the real needs in the area.

Military and humanitarian activities blurred, the civilian population confused and some humanitarian organizations lost their members because of this blurred line. This seriously affected the neutral and impartial image of international and non-governmental organizations among the local Afghan communities International and non-governmental organizations increasingly suffered from the instrumentalization of

humanitarian aid by the military. Humanitarian aid was politicized and militarized by the PRTs and the Comprehensive Approach understanding. The PRT approach resulted in Afghans not providing themselves but relying on external assistance. Pugh states that the idea to release the people from conflict by the development of the societies attributes economic dysfunctionality. On the other hand, PRT's quick impact projects actually undermined sustainable development efforts.

The PRTs conversely accelerated their "winning hearts and minds" operations by launching a huge number of quick-impact programs, aiming to gain community support. The establishment of PRTs rapidly led to the massive involvement of the military in delivering humanitarian and development assistance. One other negative impact of the PRTs was that they were applied as a tool for foreign policy. This humanitarian nature of PRTs raised intense debates concerning CIMIC among the humanitarian actors. Applying humanitarian assistance to win the hearts and minds was not only inconsistent with normative humanitarian principles but also ineffective.

NGOs did not assume and support the Comprehensive Approach of NATO. It was claimed by the NGOs that;

"humanitarians are now seen as obstructionist and antiquated by the political and military communities" (Cornish, 2007, p. 2).

It should be kept in mind that humanitarian assistance does not mean to distribute food or humanitarian materials provided by the contributing nation or a humanitarian organization and is not something very simple that military units can conduct. Conducting humanitarian assistance requires not only financial and material resources but also technical expertise. The best thing to do for the military was to coordinate with and assist the stakeholders whose job was to provide humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Humanitarian affairs of the military did not adhere to the humanitarian organizations' standards, as constantly claimed by international and non-governmental organizations. Especially in Afghanistan,

humanitarian principles that are very important and only shelter for international and non-governmental organizations were undermined and since lack of consultation, coordination and cooperation, the projects were overlapped. This caused duplication of effort, time, money, manpower and other resources.

The last hypothesis of this study is “CIMIC is one of the main facilitators of the Comprehensive Approach and it should be at the core of this approach”. Although it was a failure in Afghanistan, in case it can be applied and institutionalized in a proper way the Comprehensive Approach would be very beneficial. For this, the Comprehensive Approach should be degraded to the tactical level and CIMIC is the tool for it.

As it is presented in Figure-8.1, the relations between levels should be in two-way not only after an operation as it was previously but also before the operation in preparation for them. This will provide CIMIC to understand the full spectrum and thus, CIMIC will be able to define the relevant civilian actors and capacities to contribute to the planning, execution and post-conflict activities.

To be able to get the maximum benefit, CIMIC should be authorized to establish liaison with relevant stakeholders, conduct seminars and invite them to the exercises. Working together in peacetime will provide the opportunity to be familiar with each other and be aware of the procedures, decision-making processes as well. Defining the communication means is also important and it should be done before any operation since the civilian actors may not be deployed with military. This is the convergence that this study indicated.




Figure-8.1: Required civil-military convergence.

Convergence should not be understood simply as a rapprochement of two or more actors or areas for a certain reason and within a limited timeframe. In this context convergence takes place in a living, transforming and multidimensional environment and convergence itself also transforms and continues. According to Launius, space exploration is a preeminent example of many kinds of convergence.

From our study's perspective, security environment includes risks and threat assessments, means to provide security, operations and post-conflict situations, and it should be understood as a web of relations. In case we assume the security environment as in the matrix presented below as a sample, the requirement for a civil-military convergence became clearer and CIMIC would be the element of the military at the tactical level.



Figure-8.2: Security Ecosystem

CIMIC, as the window opening throughout the civilian environment and establishing bridges between military and civilian dimensions it would provide commanders and related staff a comprehensive civilian picture. This will facilitate understanding the security environment, contribute to risk and threat assessment, planning process and defining the measures for the execution of the operation and post-conflict activities. CIMIC will help to define the gaps, establish liaison and create the environment for civil and military actors to work together.

There are, of course, obstacles in front of this. For example, one of the problem areas that emerged in the Balkans was the organizational difference between soldiers and civilians. Soldiers wanted to conduct direct result-oriented activities and achieve the target in a short way. Thus, they expected maximum benefit by spending minimum resources. Another obstacle can be information sharing. Although it seems one of the most important ones, this and other issues can be eliminated via this convergence again by knowing each other and working together.



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