Araştırma Çıktıları | WoS | Scopus | TR-Dizin | PubMed by Institution Author "Keskin, Kerim"
Now showing items 1-9 of 9
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Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions
Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Özcan-Tok, Elif (Springer, 2019)We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: ... -
Converse Tournaments
Keskin, Kerim (Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences, 2019)This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the ... -
Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
Keskin, Kerim (Elsevier Science, 2018)We investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels we present results on the existence of equilibrium and ... -
Endogenous reference points in bargaining
Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim (Springer Heidelberg, 2018)We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points taking into ... -
Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model
Keskin, Kerim; Sağlam, Çağrı (Walter De Gruyter Gmbh, 2019)Although most contest games are modeled in such a way that the outcome depends only on the efforts exerted by the contestants what is arguably more important is the contestants' effective efforts which may be influenced ... -
Multi-player race
Dogan, Serhat; Karagozoglu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, Cagri (Elsevier Science Bv, 2018)We present a model of race with multiple players and study players' effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that in equilibrium once any two players win one battle each the remaining players do not exert ... -
On (mis-)perception of probabilities in first-price sealed-bid auctions
Kantur, Zeynep; Keskin, Kerim (Economics Bulletin, 2019)We study a two-stage probability weighting model [see Tversky and Fox 1995] in a first-price sealed-bid auction. We present the unique symmetric equilibrium and provide some experimental support for our model. -
Sabotage in team contests
Dogan, Serhat; Keskin, Kerim; Saglam, Cagri (Springer, 2019)In the contest literature sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent's likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that anticipating a possible sabotage ... -
Time-varying fairness concerns delay and disagreement in bargaining
Karagozoglu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim (Elsevier Science, 2018)We study an alternating-offers bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair Moreover we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e. their sensitivity ...