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dc.contributor.authorÖztürkkal, Belma
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-27T08:02:19Z
dc.date.available2019-06-27T08:02:19Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.issn2214-8450
dc.identifier.issn2214-8469
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/595
dc.identifier.urihttps://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2015.02.002
dc.description.abstractThis study analyzes the effect of interest and power structures and conflict of interest among managers and investors and tests the effect of different payout mechanisms on willingness to pay. In this study 74 student subjects are involved in a setting where the manager is determining his own compensation. A series of experiments that vary managers' ability to determine their own compensation and investors' ability to punish inappropriate behavior are reported. The experiments involve pairs of subjects consisting of an investor and a manager with asymmetric decision making powers. When managers compensate themselves inappropriately investors' recourse is to shun the company's shares-a model that arguably corresponds more closely to reality than the accepted efficient market traditional paradigm. The experiment shows that managers share profits even when investors cannot withhold investment and investors fairly compensate managers as well. This pattern explains both the ability of capital markets to function despite the presence of inherent moral hazard and occasional managerial misbehavior. Copyright (C) 2015 Borsa Istanbul Anonim Sirketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bv
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectBehavioral finance
dc.subjectPayout policy
dc.subjectExperiment
dc.titleProfit sharing between managers and investors: An experimental investigation
dc.typeArticle
dc.identifier.startpage106
dc.identifier.endpage114
dc.relation.journalBorsa Istanbul Review
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.volume15
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000434507700004
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.bir.2015.02.002
dc.contributor.khasauthorÖztürkkal, Belma


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