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Endogenous reference points in bargaining
(Springer Heidelberg, 2018)
We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points taking into ...
Multi-player race
(Elsevier Science Bv, 2018)
We present a model of race with multiple players and study players' effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that in equilibrium once any two players win one battle each the remaining players do not exert ...
Investment on human capital in a dynamic contest model
(Walter De Gruyter Gmbh, 2019)
Although most contest games are modeled in such a way that the outcome depends only on the efforts exerted by the contestants what is arguably more important is the contestants' effective efforts which may be influenced ...
Time-varying fairness concerns delay and disagreement in bargaining
(Elsevier Science, 2018)
We study an alternating-offers bilateral bargaining game where players may derive disutility from accepting shares below what they deem as fair Moreover we assume that the values they attach to fairness (i.e. their sensitivity ...
Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions
(Springer, 2019)
We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: ...
Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
(Elsevier Science, 2018)
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels we present results on the existence of equilibrium and ...
A Dynamic Game Theory Model For Tourism Supply Chains
(Sage Publications, 2021)
This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple ...