| dc.contributor.author | Keskin, Kerim | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-06-27T08:02:21Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-06-27T08:02:21Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1303-099X | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/604 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.21121/eab.2019148773 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://search.trdizin.gov.tr/yayin/detay/388096 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model. | en_US] |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences | en_US |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
| dc.subject | Converse tournaments | en_US |
| dc.subject | Nested multipleprize contests | en_US |
| dc.subject | Tullock contests | en_US |
| dc.subject | Endogenous prizes | en_US |
| dc.subject | Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.title | Converse Tournaments | en_US |
| dc.type | article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 33 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 43 | |
| dc.relation.journal | Ege Academic Review | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issue | 1 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 19 | en_US |
| dc.department | Fakülteler, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümü | en_US |
| dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000457787800003 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.21121/eab.2019148773 | en_US |
| dc.institutionauthor | Keskin, Kerim | en_US |
| dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
| dc.identifier.trdizinid | 388096 | en_US |
