Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü Koleksiyonu

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/48

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Browsing Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü Koleksiyonu by Journal "2019 16th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM)"

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    A Comparative Study of Energy Models for Turkish Electricity Market Using Leap
    (IEEE Computer Society, 2019) Massaga, Daniel Julius; Kirkil, Gökhan; Çelebi, Emre; Civil Engineering; 05. Faculty of Engineering and Natural Sciences; 01. Kadir Has University
    Fossil fuel thermal power plants constitute a large part of the Turkish electricity generation capacity. Turkish government has been developing several energy policy documents to evaluate how various renewable energy sources of the country can be utilized optimally in the generation of electricity within the next 30 years. This study considers three scenarios in the transition to renewable energy for Turkey; the business as usual (BAU), energy conservation (EC) and renewable energy (REN) scenarios. EC scenario considers the use of energy-efficient appliances and imposing a carbon tax, whereas REN scenario considers increasing the share of the renewable energy sources as much as possible in the power generation mix. These scenarios were evaluated in terms of cost and environmental impact. The LEAP (Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning Model) was used in the research. The REN scenario has been shown to be the optimal energy policy option for Turkey in terms of cost and environmental impact.
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    Citation - WoS: 3
    Citation - Scopus: 6
    Reformulations of a Bilevel Model for Detection of Tacit Collusion in Deregulated Electricity Markets
    (IEEE Computer Society, 2019) Çelebi, Emre; Şahin, Güvenç; Esmaeili Aliabadi, Danial; 01. Kadir Has University
    In this study, we consider a collusion model for competitive pool based electricity markets operated by an independent system operator (ISO), where it aims to prevent tacit collusion among generators. In order to determine the existence of tacit collusion in the market, we have employed the the game-Theoretic bilevel optimization model proposed by [1]. This model represents the market clearing mechanism, where generators determine their bids in order to maximize their profit while the system operator allocates power and determine locational electricity prices. The resulting optimization problem is a bilevel multi-criteria problem with non-linear terms, which is already complex and difficult to solve. We provide reformulations and linearization methods to obtain equivalent problems, e.g., a mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC), a mixed integer non-linear problem (MINLP) and a mixed integer problem (MIP). A simple 6-bus system is used to test the rate of detection for collusive states for the reformulations and the results are presented. We have found that MIP models and reformulations detect strong collusive states. This model can guide ISOs in identifying and preventing cases of generator collusion.