Ekonomi Bölümü Koleksiyonu

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/57

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Now showing 1 - 4 of 4

Citation - WoS: 8
Citation - Scopus: 9
Between Anchors and Aspirations: a New Family of Bargaining Solutions
(Springer, 2019) Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim; Özcan-Tok, Elif
We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line we enrich the analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: the first parameter can be interpreted as the effectiveness (or salience) of the reference point in determining the anchor whereas the second parameter can be interpreted as its effectiveness in shaping agents' aspirations. Utilizing these parameters we provide a unifying framework for the study of bargaining problems with a reference point. The two-parameter family of bargaining solutions we obtain encompasses some well-known solutions as special cases. We offer multiple characterizations for each individual member of this family as well as two characterizations for the whole solution family in bilateral bargaining problems.
Converse Tournaments
(Ege Univ Fac Economics & Admin Sciences, 2019) Keskin, Kerim
This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark and Riis (1998b)'s sequential model of nested multiple-prize contests. First we consider winning prizes endogenously determined by exerted contest efforts. Second we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in both models and compare the equilibrium strategies with those in the original model.
Citation - WoS: 3
Citation - Scopus: 4
A Mechanism Design Approach To Allocating Central Government Funds Among Regional Development Agencies
(Springer, 2014) Kıbrıs, Özgür; Tapkı, İpek Gürsel
To allocate central government funds among regional development agencies we look for mechanisms that satisfy three important criteria: efficiency (individual and coalitional) strategy proofness (a.k.a. dominant strategy incentive compatibility) and fairness. We show that only a uniform mechanism satisfies all three. We also show that all efficient and strategy proof mechanisms must function by assigning budget sets to the agencies and letting them freely choose their optimal bundle. In choosing these budget sets the agencies' private information has to be taken into account in a particular way. The only way to additionally satisfy a weak fairness requirement (regions with identical preferences should be treated equally) is to assign all agencies the same budget set as does the uniform mechanism. Finally and maybe more importantly we show that the central government should not impose constraints on how much to fund an activity (e.g. by reserving some funds only for a particular activity): otherwise there are no efficient strategy proof and fair mechanisms no matter how small these constraints are.
On (mis-)perception of Probabilities in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
(Economics Bulletin, 2019) Kantur, Zeynep; Keskin, Kerim
We study a two-stage probability weighting model [see Tversky and Fox 1995] in a first-price sealed-bid auction. We present the unique symmetric equilibrium and provide some experimental support for our model.

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