Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences in Rent-Seeking Contests
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Date
2018
Authors
Keskin, Kerim
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Open Access Color
Green Open Access
No
OpenAIRE Downloads
OpenAIRE Views
Publicly Funded
No
BIP! Indicators
Impulse
Top 10%
Influence
Average
Popularity
Top 10%
Abstract
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels we present results on the existence of equilibrium and total rent dissipation. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Description
Keywords
N/A, Noncooperative games, cumulative prospect theory, rent-seeking contests, Utility theory, Individual preferences, preferences
Fields of Science
0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences
Citation
WoS Q
Q3
Scopus Q
Q2
OpenCitations Citation Count
10
Source
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume
96
Issue
Start Page
85
End Page
91
PlumX Metrics
Citations
CrossRef : 6
Scopus : 10
Captures
Mendeley Readers : 9
SCOPUS™ Citations
10
checked on Feb 10, 2026
Web of Science™ Citations
9
checked on Feb 10, 2026
Page Views
10
checked on Feb 10, 2026
Google Scholar™
