Bargaining With Nonanonymous Disagreement: Decomposable Rules

dc.contributor.author Kıbrıs, Özgür
dc.contributor.author Gürsel Tapkı, İpek
dc.contributor.author Tapkı, İpek Gürsel
dc.contributor.other International Relations
dc.date.accessioned 2021-02-13T17:37:51Z
dc.date.available 2021-02-13T17:37:51Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.department Fakülteler, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümü en_US
dc.description.abstract We analyze bargaining situations where the agents' payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. In particular, decomposable rules (which are extensions of rules from the Nash domain) constitute a nowhere dense subset of all possible rules. For them, we analyze the process through which "good" properties of rules on the Nash domain extend to ours. We then enquire whether the counterparts of some well-known results on the Nash (1950) domain continue to hold for decomposable rules on our extended domain. We first show that an extension of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining rule uniquely satisfies the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) properties. This uniqueness result, however, turns out to be an exception. We characterize the uncountably large classes of decomposable rules that survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977), and Thomson (1981) properties. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Turkish Academy of Sciences TUBITAK en_US
dc.identifier.citationcount 2
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.07.002 en_US
dc.identifier.endpage 161 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896
dc.identifier.issue 3 en_US
dc.identifier.scopus 2-s2.0-80755143492 en_US
dc.identifier.scopusquality Q2
dc.identifier.startpage 151 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/3906
dc.identifier.uri https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.07.002
dc.identifier.volume 62 en_US
dc.identifier.wos WOS:000297831200003 en_US
dc.identifier.wosquality Q4
dc.institutionauthor Tapkı, İpek Gürsel en_US
dc.language.iso en en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier Science Bv en_US
dc.relation.journal Mathematical Social Sciences en_US
dc.relation.publicationcategory Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı en_US
dc.rights info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess en_US
dc.scopus.citedbyCount 3
dc.subject Point en_US
dc.subject Nash en_US
dc.subject Axioms en_US
dc.subject Model en_US
dc.title Bargaining With Nonanonymous Disagreement: Decomposable Rules en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.wos.citedbyCount 2
dspace.entity.type Publication
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