Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences in Rent-Seeking Contests

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dc.contributor.authorKeskin, Kerim
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-27T08:03:14Z
dc.date.available2019-06-27T08:03:14Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi, İdari ve Sosyal Bilimler Fakültesi, Ekonomi Bölümüen_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the equilibrium behavior for agents with cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests. Characterizing the equilibrium effort levels we present results on the existence of equilibrium and total rent dissipation. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US]
dc.identifier.citation7
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.06.002en_US
dc.identifier.endpage91
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896en_US
dc.identifier.issn1879-3118en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.issn1879-3118
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85049632774en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2
dc.identifier.startpage85en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12469/759
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.06.002
dc.identifier.volume96en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000452585700008en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ4
dc.institutionauthorKeskin, Kerimen_US
dc.institutionauthorKeskin, Kerim
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Scienceen_US
dc.relation.journalMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.titleCumulative Prospect Theory Preferences in Rent-Seeking Contestsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication16e63a3f-dd9f-453d-92ed-0ca24467a63b
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery16e63a3f-dd9f-453d-92ed-0ca24467a63b

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